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Richard Brown
(2012) Journal of Consciousness Studies 19(7-8)
In his engaging and important paper David Chalmers argues that perhaps the
best way to navigate the singularity is for us to integrate with the AI++ agents. One
computer is an organizational invariant). If this is the case then we can rest assured
that we will retain our consciousness inside such a simulation. In this commentary I
will explore these ideas and their relation to philosophical zombies. I will argue that
dualism could be true of the zombie world and that the conclusion of the standard
zombie argument needs to be modified to deal with simulation. In short I argue that
Interestingly Chalmers has pointed out that thinking about simulations gives
a person inside a perfect simulation but whose body is outside the simulation (like
in the movie the Matrix) then all of the things that dualists like Descartes thought
were true would have been true. From the point of view of the person inside the
simulation no amount of physics (i.e. the physics true in the simulation) would allow
them to deduce the existence of the body outside of the simulation. This would make
the
body
outside
the
simulation
nonphysical
from
the
point
of
view
of
those
in
the
simulation
(where
to
be
nonphysical
just
is
being
non-deducible
from
a
completed
physics).
Chalmers has elsewhere talked about zombies and the problems their
conceivability entails for physicalism (Chalmers 2009). Zombies are creatures that
have the exact same microphysical structure as I do but who lack consciousness all
together. Perhaps surprisingly we can use the above reasoning to show that
Cartesian dualism could be true for zombies as well! We can imagine our zombie
twins also being very motivated to create zombie AI and maybe even do so by
evolving these agents in virtual worlds. We can imagine the zombies creating
zombie AI++ and wondering (in their zombie way) what the best course of action
would be in such a case. We can even imagine our zombie twins wanting to be
environments would think that they were conscious, as per the above arguments.
They would have all the same beliefs etc as you would in the exact same simulated
environment. The crucial point is that zombies would live the very same lives
whether in the simulation or not. In either case they (allegedly) lack consciousness,
yet in one case Cartesian dualism is true and in the other case it is false. But if
dualism can be true at the zombie world then we seem to have missed what is
essential to Cartesian dualism. This makes is seem as though the debate between the
Cartesian dualist and the non-dualist is really a debate about whether we in fact live
Now what about us when we actually upload into a perfect simulation? Then
biological property of the brain. Let us call this kind of view biologism about
consciousness. There are many reasons to suppose that this is true. But of course,
there are some disagreements out there. Let us put these disagreements aside for
the moment and just stipulate, for purposes of discussion, that consciousness
depends on some biological property of the brain. According to this view non-
will think that consciousness just is something biological, as Ned Block tends to lean
towards. A dualist who accepts biologism will hold that only the biological
Now let us suppose that we have reached a period of time were we can
of the original brain. This could be done in either of the ways that Chalmers
canvasses in his paper. For instance it could be done by serially slicing the brain and
could be done using nanotechnology replacing neuron by neuron. Either way at the
end of this process we have a virtual duplicate of a human being. Now, according to
our previous stipulations this functional duplicate will not be conscious. This is
because it will not have the relevant biological property. But we can stipulate that
this functional duplicate, in its virtual world, will produce all the same behavior that
its
non-duplicated
biological
twin
would
produce.
We
can
even
take
this
a
step
further
and
imagine
hooking
up
this
functional
duplicate
of
a
brain
in
the
virtual
world to a robotic body in our world. We stipulate that this robotic body does not
have a brain and so also lacks the relevant biological properties postulated to be
depends on some biological property in the human brain. Given that stipulation,
identical to me but which lacks consciousness. To make it the case that we really
have a physical duplicate we can take this even further by imagining that this takes
place entirely inside a perfect simulation of our world. In that simulated world
the brain. But given this we come to an interesting conclusion. We seem to have
conceived of zombies in the way that the original zombie argument requires.
traditionally defined so lets take a moment to review. Chalmers (2009) has argued
that it is conceivable that we have (P & ~Q). Where P stands for the completed
microphysical theory of our world and Q is some phenomenal truth, like that I see
blue. Chalmers (2005) also argues elsewhere that this completed microphysical
theory could be computed. This means that we could devise a virtual world that was
an exact functional duplicate of our world. All of the laws of physics would be the
same
from
the
point
of
view
of
this
virtual
world.
Indeed
we
cannot
know
a
priori
that
the
actual
world
is
not
a
simulation
in
this
sense.
In
this
virtual
world
we
have
our functional duplicates of biological human beings. So, in this virtual world we
have P, the completed microphysics of our world, and, given that we are assuming
that biologism is true, not Q. We could, of course, stipulate that in this world there
are biological organisms outside the simulation, hooked into it in the appropriate
way, and then we would have consciousness in that world. But we are here
assuming that biologism is true about consciousness and therefore in this world,
which from its point of view is a microphysical duplicate of ours, we have traditional
zombies.
between physicalists and dualists. This follows from the fact that both the
physicalists and the dualist can endorse biologism about consciousness. If this is
right then the zombie argument may really be a test for whether one thinks we are
fact what is interesting about this line of argument is that it connects very closely to
things that Chalmers has said elsewhere in his work. For instance he has
2003; Chalmers 2005) and that perhaps information has a dual aspect. One aspect,
being the physical as we understand it the other aspect, being the properties of
conscious experience as we feel them. This line of thought fits very nicely with the
Now of course this entire discussion has been predicated on the idea that we
that this is most likely incorrect. And here, I am not talking about his zombie
invariant (Chalmers 1995). This is not the place to address this argument but the
prospects for a reply seem good. After all it is an empirical question whether we will
ever really be able to enact the kind of sci-fi scenarios that Chalmers appeals to in
whether they will proceed in the way he imagines, but this is an argument for
another day.
At the very least we can point out that if one accepts some form of biologism
about consciousness, as many do, then one can be a physicalist and grant the
any threat to physicalism. To those, like me, who find the prospects for biologism
about consciousness to be good and who want to endorse physicalism as well as the
conceivability of zombies and the link between conceivability and possibility this is
Work cited:
David
J.
Chalmers
(1995).
Absent
Qualia,
Fading
Qualia,
Dancing
Qualia.
In
Thomas
Metzinger
(ed.),
Conscious
Experience.
Ferdinand
Schoningh.
David
J.
Chalmers
(2003).
Consciousness
and
its
Place
in
Nature.
In
Stephen
P.
Stich
&
Ted
A.
Warfield
(eds.),
Blackwell
Guide
to
the
Philosophy
of
Mind.
Blackwell.
David
J.
Chalmers
(2005).
The
Matrix
as
Metaphysics.
In
Christopher
Grau
(ed.),
Philosophers
Explore
the
Matrix.
Oxford
University
Press.
David
J.
Chalmers
(2009).
The
Two-Dimensional
Argument
Against
Materialism.
In
Brian
P.
McLaughlin
&
Sven
Walter
(eds.),
Oxford
Handbook
to
the
Philosophy
of
Mind.
Oxford
University
Press.