Cusipag 1
Statutory Construction Doctrines
Statutory Construction Doctrines
(Based on the Agpalo Book)
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Construction, defined
Construction is the art or process of discovering
and expounding the meaning and intention of
the authors of the law, where that intention is
rendered doubtful by reason of the ambiguity in
its language or of the fact that the given case is
not explicitly provided for in the law. (Caltex v.
Palomar)
Plain Meaning Rule/Verba Legis
Where the statute is clear, plain and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning
and applied without interpretation. This plain
meaning rule or verbal egis derived from the
maxim index animi sermo est (speech is the
index of intention) rests on the valid presumption
that the words employed by the legislature in a
statute correctly express its intention or will and
preclude the court from construing it differently.
Legislative intent/Ratio Legis
A statute must be read according to its spirit and
intent, and where legislative intent apparently
conflicts with the letter of the law, the former
prevails over the latter. (Tanada v. Cuenco)
The principle that what is within the spirit of a
statute is within the statute itself although it is
not within its letter applies only when there is
ambiguity in the language employed in the law.
Where the law is clear and free from ambiguity,
the letter of the law is not to be disregarded on
the pretext of pursuing its spirit. (Tanada v.
Cuenco)
Dura Lex Sed Lex
The principle requires that the statute should be
applied regardless of whether it is unwise, hard
or harsh. If the law is clear and free from doubt,
it is the sworn duty of the court to apply it without
fear or favor, to follow its mandate, and not to
tamper with it. (Go v. Anti-Chinese League of
the Phils.)
Ut Res Magis Valeat Quam Pereat
The rule is that a construction that would render
a provision inoperative should be avoided;
instead, apparently inconsistent provisions
should be reconciled whenever possible as parts
of a coordinated and harmonious whole. (JMM
Promotions & Management, Inc. v. NLRC)
Review of law in its entirety and its
intendment must be given effect
The legislative meaning is to be extracted from
the statute as a whole. Its clauses are not to be
segregated, but every part of a statute is to be
construed with reference to every other part and
every word and phrase in connection with its
context. (Tamayo v. Gsell)
Wisdom/Practicality of Law
Courts do not pass upon questions of wisdom,
justice, or expediency of legislation, for it is not
within their province to supervise legislation and
keep it within the bounds of propriety and
common sense. That is primarily and exclusively
a legislative concern. Hence, as long as laws do
not violate the Constitution, the courts merely
interpret and apply them regardless of whether
or not they are wise or salutary. (Quintos v.
Lacson)
Executive/Administrative Interpretation
The principle that the contemporaneous
construction of a statute by the executive
officers of the government, whose duty it is to
execute it, is entitled to great respect, and
should ordinarily control the construction of the
statute by the courts, is so firmly embedded in
our jurisdiction that no authorities need be cited
to support it. (In re Allen)
Valid in part, void in part
The general rule is that where part of a statute is
void as repugnant to the Constitution, while
another part is valid, the valid portion, if
separable from the invalid, may stand and be
enforced. (Barrameda v. Moir)
The exception to the general rule is that when
the parts of a statute are so mutually dependent
and connected, as conditions, considerations,
inducements, or compensations for each other,
as to warrant a belief that the legislature

intended them as a whole, the nullity of one part
will vitiate the rest. (Lindasan v. Commission on
Elections)
Law does not distinguish, Courts should not
distinguish
The principle that where the law does not
distinguish, neither should the courts do so,
assumes that the legislature made no
qualification in the use of a general word or
expression. The courts may distinguish when
there are facts or circumstances showing that
the legislature intended a distinction or
qualification, for in such case, the courts merely
give effect to the legislative intent. (Social
Security System v. City of Bacolod)
Mandatory/Directory/Prohibiture
Whether a statutory requirement is mandatory or
directory depends on its effect. If no substantial
rights depend on it and no injury can result from
ignoring it; and the purpose of the legislature
can be accomplished in a manner other than
that prescribed and substantially the same
results obtained, then the statute will generally
be regarded as directory; but if not, it will be
mandatory. (Miller v. Lakewood Housing Co.)
Expressio unius est exclusion alterius
One variation of the rule is the principle that
what is expressed puts an end to that which is
implied. (Espiritu v. Cipriano)
Another variation of the rules is the canon that a
general expression followed by exceptions
therefrom implies that those which do not fall
under the exceptions come within the scope of
the general expression. (Villanueva v. City of
Iloilo)
Still another variation of the rule is the axiom
that the expression of one or more things of a
class implies the exclusion of all not expressed,
even though all would have been implied had
none been expressed. (Empire Insurance Co. v.
Rufino)
Ejusdem generis
The general rule is that where a general word or
phrase follows an enumeration of particular and
specific words of the same class or where the
latter follow the former, the general word or
Cusipag 2
Statutory Construction Doctrines
phrase is to be construed to include, or to be
restricted to, persons, things or cases akin to,
resembling, or of the same king or class as
those specifically mentioned. (Go Tiaco y
Hermanos v. Union Insurance Society of
Canton)
Exceptions: Enumeration has no distinguishable
common characteristics and enumeration of the
particular and specific words is exhaustive.
Where a statute uses a general word, followed
by an enumeration of specific words embraced
within the general word merely as examples, the
enumeration does not thereby restrict the
meaning of the general word, but should include
all others of the same class although not
enumerated therein. (Asturias Sugar Central,
Inc. v. Commissioner of Customs)
Statement of Individual Legislator
Thus, where there is doubt as to what a
provision of a statute means, that meaning
which was put to the provision during the
legislative deliberation or discussion on the bill
may be adopted. (Arenas v. City of San Carlos)
Where the statute is clear and free from
ambiguity, courts will not inquire into the motives
which influence the legislature, or individual
members, in voting for its passage; nor indeed
as to the intention of the draftsman, or the
legislators, so far as it has not been expressed
in the act. To read into the law the supposed
intention of the legislators, where there is no
ambiguity in it, would be to supply something
that does not appear in the act. (Manila Jockey
Club, Inc. v. Games and Amusements Board)
Noscitur a sociis
A word or phrase should be interpreted in
relation to, or given the same meaning of, words
with which it is associated. (Magtajas v. Pryce
Properties Corp., Inc.)
And/or
The word or is a disjunctive term signifying
disassociation and independence of one thing
from each of the other things enumerated.
(People v. Martin)
The term or has sometimes been held to mean
and, when the spirit or context of the law so
 Cusipag 3
Statutory Construction Doctrines

warrants. (Gonzales v. Commission on The exclude-the-first and include-the-last day

Elections)
The word or may also be used as the
equivalent of that is to say, giving that which
precedes it the same significance as that which
follows it. (San Miguel Corp. v. Municipal City of
Mandaue)
The word or may also mean successively. (US
v. De la Sabta)
On the other hand, the word and is a
conjunction pertinently defined as meaning
together with, joined with, along or together
with, added to or linked to, used to conjoin
word with word, phrase with phrase, clause with
clause. (Phil. Constitutional Assn., Inc. v.
Mathay)
rule governs the computation of a period.
(Cervantes v. Auditor General)
If by applying the rule that the first day shall be
excluded and the last day included in the
computation of a period within which an act shall
be done, the last day falls on a Sunday or a
holiday, the act can still be done the following
day. (Sec. 31, Revised Administrative Code)
This principle does not apply to the computation
of the period of prescription of a crime, in which
the rule is that if the last day in the period of
prescription of a felony falls on a Sunday or legal
holiday, the information concerning said felony
cannot be filed on the next working day, as the
offense has by then already prescribed.
(Yapdiangco v. Buencamino)

The term and/or means that effect shall be

given to both the conjunctive and and the
disjunctive or or that one word or the other may
be taken accordingly as one or the other will
best effectuate the purpose intended by the
legislature as gathered from the whole statute
(AE Davidson v. FW Wollworth Co.)

Retroactivity

The general rule is that laws have no retroactive

effect. However, there are exceptions to the
general rule such as procedural laws and
curative laws which are given retroactive
operation. (Zulueta v. Asia Brewery, Inc.)

Casus omissus pro omisso habendus est

The rule of casus omissus pro omisso habendus

est states that a person, object or thing omitted
from an enumeration must be held to have been
omitted intentionally. The rule does not apply
where it is shown that the legislature did not
intend to exclude the person, thing or object
from enumeration (People v. Manantan)

Computation of Time

See Article 13 of the Civil Code and CIR v.

Primetown Property Group, Inc..

Where a statute requires the doing of an act

within a specified number of days, such as ten
days, from notice, it means ten calendar days
and not ten working days. (Vir-jen Shipping &
Marine Services, Inc. v. NLRC)