La participacin segn aristoteles

Aristotle: Politics1
Aristotle In his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle (384-322 BCE) describes the happy life intended for man by
nature as one lived in accordance with virtue, and, in his Politics, he describes the role that politics and the
political community must play in bringing about the virtuous life in the citizenry.
The Politics also provides analysis of the kinds of political community that existed in his time and shows where
and how these cities fall short of the ideal community of virtuous citizens.
Although in some ways we have clearly moved beyond his thought (for example, his belief in the inferiority of
women and his approval of slavery in at least some circumstances), there remains much in Aristotles
philosophy that is valuable today.
In particular, his views on the connection between the well-being of the political community and that of the
citizens who make it up, his belief that citizens must actively participate in politics if they are to be happy and
virtuous, and his analysis of what causes and prevents revolution within political communities have been a
source of inspiration for many contemporary theorists, especially those unhappy with the liberal political
philosophy promoted by thinkers such as John Locke and John Stuart Mill.
Table of Contents
Biography and History
The Texts
Challenges of the Texts
Politics and Ethics
The Importance of Telos
The Text of the Politics
The Politics, Book I
The Purpose of the City
How the City Comes Into Being
Man, the Political Animal
Slavery
Women
The Politics, Book II
What Kind of Partnership Is a City?
Existing Cities: Sparta, Crete, Carthage
The Politics, Book III
Who Is the Citizen?
The Good Citizen and the Good Man
Who Should Rule?
The Politics, Book IV
Polity: The Best Practical Regime
The Importance of the Middle Class
The Politics, Book V
Conflict Between the Rich and the Poor
How to Preserve Regimes
The Politics, Book VI
Varieties of Democracy
The Best Kind of Democracy
The Role of Wealth in a Democracy
The Politics, Book VII
The Best Regime and the Best Men
Characteristics of the Best City
The Politics, Book VIII
The Education of the Young
1 http://www.iep.utm.edu/aris-pol/
References and Further Reading
1. Biography and History
Aristotles life was primarily that of a scholar. However, like the other ancient philosophers, it was not the
stereotypical ivory tower existence. His father was court physician to Amyntas III of Macedon, so Aristotle
grew up in a royal household. Aristotle also knew Philip of Macedon (son of Amyntas III) and there is a
tradition that says Aristotle tutored Philips son Alexander, who would later be called the Great after
expanding the Macedonian Empire all the way to what is now India. Clearly, Aristotle had significant firsthand
experience with politics, though scholars disagree about how much influence, if any, this experience had on
Aristotles thought. There is certainly no evidence that Alexanders subsequent career was much influenced by
Aristotles teaching, which is uniformly critical of war and conquest as goals for human beings and which
praises the intellectual, contemplative lifestyle. It is noteworthy that although Aristotle praises the politically
active life, he spent most of his own life in Athens, where he was not a citizen and would not have been allowed
to participate directly in politics (although of course anyone who wrote as extensively and well about politics as
Aristotle did was likely to be politically influential).
Aristotle studied under Plato at Platos Academy in Athens, and eventually opened a school of his own (the
Lyceum) there. As a scholar, Aristotle had a wide range of interests. He wrote about meteorology, biology,
physics, poetry, logic, rhetoric, and politics and ethics, among other subjects. His writings on many of these
interests remained definitive for almost two millennia. They remained, and remain, so valuable in part because
of the comprehensiveness of his efforts. For example, in order to understand political phenomena, he had his
students collect information on the political organization and history of 158 different cities. The Politics makes
frequent reference to political events and institutions from many of these cities, drawing on his students
research. Aristotles theories about the best ethical and political life are drawn from substantial amounts of
empirical research. These studies, and in particular the Constitution of Athens, will be discussed in more detail
below (Who Should Rule?). The question of how these writings should be unified into a consistent whole (if
that is even possible) is an open one and beyond the scope of this article. This article will not attempt to
organize all of Aristotles work into a coherent whole, but will draw on different texts as they are necessary to
complete one version of Aristotles view of politics.
2. The Texts
The most important text for understanding Aristotles political philosophy, not surprisingly, is the Politics.
However, it is also important to read Nicomachean Ethics in order to fully understand Aristotles political
project. This is because Aristotle believed that ethics and politics were closely linked, and that in fact the ethical
and virtuous life is only available to someone who participates in politics, while moral education is the main
purpose of the political community. As he says in Nicomachean Ethics at 1099b30, The end [or goal] of
politics is the best of ends; and the main concern of politics is to engender a certain character in the citizens and
to make them good and disposed to perform noble actions. Most people living today in Western societies like
the United States, Canada, Germany, or Australia would disagree with both parts of that statement. We are likely
to regard politics (and politicians) as aiming at ignoble, selfish ends, such as wealth and power, rather than the
best end, and many people regard the idea that politics is or should be primarily concerned with creating a
particular moral character in citizens as a dangerous intrusion on individual freedom, in large part because we
do not agree about what the best end is. In fact, what people in Western societies generally ask from politics
and the government is that they keep each of us safe from other people (through the provision of police and
military forces) so that each of us can choose and pursue our own ends, whatever they may be. This has been
the case in Western political philosophy at least since John Locke. Development of individual character is left
up to the individual, with help from family, religion, and other non-governmental institutions. More will be said
about this later, but the reader should keep in mind that this is an important way in which our political and
ethical beliefs are not Aristotles. The reader is also cautioned against immediately concluding from this that Ar
istotle was wrong and we are right. This may be so, but it is important to understand why, and the contrast
between Aristotles beliefs and ours can help to bring the strengths and weaknesses of our own beliefs into
greater clarity.
The reference above to Nicomachean Ethics at 1099b30 makes use of what is called Bekker pagination. This
refers to the location of beginning of the cited text in the edition of Aristotles works produced by Immanuel
Bekker in Berlin in 1831 (in this case, it begins on page 1099, column b, line 30). Scholars make use of this
system for all of Aristotles works except the Constitution of Athens (which was not rediscovered until after
1831) and fragmentary works in order to be able to refer to the same point in Aristotles work regardless of
which edition, translation, or language they happen to be working with. This entry will make use of the Bekker
pagination system, and will also follow tradition and refer to Nicomachean Ethics as simply Ethics. (There is
also a Eudemian Ethics which is almost certainly by Aristotle (and which shares three of the ten books of the
Nicomachean Ethics) and a work on ethics titled Magna Moralia which has been attributed to him but which
most scholars now believe is not his work. Regardless, most scholars believe that the Nicomachean Ethics is
Aristotles fullest and most mature expression of his ethical theory). The translation is that of Martin Ostwald;
see the bibliography for full information. In addition to the texts listed above, the student with an interest in
Aristotles political theory may also wish to read the Rhetoric, which includes observations on ethics and
politics in the context of teaching the reader how to be a more effective speaker, and the Constitution of Athens,
a work attributed to Aristotle, but which may be by one of his students, which describes the political history of
the city of Athens.
3. Challenges of the Texts
Any honest attempt to summarize and describe Aristotles political philosophy must include an
acknowledgment that there is no consensus on many of the most important aspects of that philosophy. Some of
the reasons for this should be mentioned from the outset.
One set of reasons has to do with the text itself and the transmission of the text from Aristotles time to ours.
The first thing that can lead to disagreement over Aristotles beliefs is the fact that the Politics andEthics are
believed by many scholars to be his lecture notes, for lectures which were intended to be heard only by his own
students. (Aristotle did write for general audiences on these subjects, probably in dialogue form, but only a few
fragments of those writings remain). This is also one reason why many students have difficulty reading his
work: no teachers lecture notes ever make complete sense to anyone else (their meaning can even elude their
author at times). Many topics in the texts are discussed less fully than we would like, and many things are
ambiguous which we wish were more straightforward. But if Aristotle was lecturing from these writings, he
could have taken care of these problems on the fly as he lectured, since presumably he knew what he meant, or
he could have responded to requests for clarification or elaboration from his students.
Secondly, most people who read Aristotle are not reading him in the original Attic Greek but are instead reading
translations. This leads to further disagreement, because different authors translate Aristotle differently, and the
way in which a particular word is translated can be very significant for the text as a whole. There is no way to
definitively settle the question of what Aristotle really meant to say in using a particular word or phrase.
Third, the Aristotelian texts we have are not the originals, but copies, and every time a text gets copied errors
creep in (words, sentences, or paragraphs can get left out, words can be changed into new words, and so forth).
For example, imagine someone writing the sentence Ronald Reagan was the lastcompetent president of the
United States. It is copied by hand, and the person making the copy accidentally writes (or assumes that the
author must have written) Ronald Reagan was the leastcompetent president of the United States. If the
original is then destroyed, so that only the copy remains, future generations will read a sentence that means
almost exactly the opposite of what the author intended. It may be clear from the context that a word has been
changed, but then again it may not, and there is always hesitation in changing the text as we have it. In addition,
although nowadays it is unacceptable to modify someone elses work without clearly denoting the changes, this
is a relatively recent development and there are portions of Aristotles texts which scholars believe were added
by later writers. This, too, complicates our understanding of Aristotle.
Finally, there are a number of controversies related to the text of the Politics in particular. These controversies
cannot be discussed here, but should be mentioned. For more detail consult the works listed in the Suggestions
for further reading below. First, there is disagreement about whether the books of the Politics are in the order
that Aristotle intended. Carnes Lord and others have argued based on a variety of textual evidence that books 7
and 8 were intended by Aristotle to follow book 3. Rearranging the text in this way would have the effect of
joining the early discussion of the origins of political life and the city, and the nature of political justice, with the
discussion of the ideal city and the education appropriate for it, while leaving together books 4-6 which are
primarily concerned with existing varieties of regimes and how they are preserved and destroyed and moving
them to the conclusion of the book. Second, some authors, notably Werner Jaeger, have argued that the different
focus and orientation of the different portions of the Politics is a result of Aristotle writing them at different
times, reflecting his changing interests and orientation towards Platos teachings. The argument is that at first
Aristotle stuck very closely to the attitudes and ideas of his teacher Plato, and only later developed his own
more empirical approach. Thus any difficulties that there may be in integrating the different parts of the
Politicsarise from the fact that they were not meant to be integrated and were written at different times and with
different purposes. Third, the Politics as we have it appears to be incomplete; Book 6 ends in the middle of a
sentence and Book 8 in the middle of a discussion. There are also several places in the Politicswhere Aristotle
promises to consider a topic further later but does not do so in the text as we have i t (for example, at the end of
Book II, Chapter 8). It is possible that Aristotle never finished writing it; more likely there is material missing as
a result of damage to the scrolls on which it was written. The extent and content of any missing material is a
matter of scholarly debate.
Fortunately, the beginning student of Aristotle will not need to concern themselves much with these problems. It
is, however, important to get a quality translation of the text, which provides an introduction, footnotes, a
glossary, and a bibliography, so that the reader is aware of places where, for example, there seems to be
something missing from the text, or a word can have more than one meaning, or there are other textual issues.
These will not always be the cheapest or most widely available translations, but it is important to get one of
them, from a library if need be. Several suggested editions are listed at the end of this article.
4. Politics and Ethics
In Book Six of the Ethics Aristotle says that all knowledge can be classified into three categories: theoretical
knowledge, practical knowledge, and productive knowledge. Put simply, these kinds of knowledge are
distinguished by their aims: theoretical knowledge aims at contemplation, productive knowledge aims at
creation, and practical knowledge aims at action. Theoretical knowledge involves the study of truth for its own
sake; it is knowledge about things that are unchanging and eternal, and includes things like the principles of
logic, physics, and mathematics (at the end of the Ethics Aristotle says that the most excellent human life is one
lived in pursuit of this type of knowledge, because this knowledge brings us closest to the divine). The
productive and practical sciences, in contrast, address our daily needs as human beings, and have to do with
things that can and do change. Productive knowledge means, roughly, know-how; the knowledge of how to
make a table or a house or a pair of shoes or how to write a tragedy would be examples of this kind of
knowledge. This entry is concerned with practical knowledge, which is the knowledge of how to live and act.
According to Aristotle, it is the possession and use of practical knowledge that makes it possible to live a good
life. Ethics and politics, which are the practical sciences, deal with human beings as moral agents. Ethics is
primarily about the actions of human beings as individuals, and politics is about the actions of human beings in
communities, although it is important to remember that for Aristotle the two are closely linked and each
influences the other.
The fact that ethics and politics are kinds of practical knowledge has several important consequences. First, it
means that Aristotle believes that mere abstract knowledge of ethics and politics is worthless. Practical
knowledge is only useful if we act on it; we must act appropriately if we are to be moral. He says at Ethics
1103b25: The purpose of the present study [of morality] is not, as it is in other inquiries, the attainment of
theoretical knowledge: we are not conducting this inquiry in order to know what virtue is, but in order to
become good, else there would be no advantage in studying it.
Second, according to Aristotle, only some people can beneficially study politics. Aristotle believes that women
and slaves (or at least those who are slaves by nature) can never benefit from the study of politics, and also
should not be allowed to participate in politics, about which more will be said later. But there is also a limitation
on political study based on age, as a result of the connection between politics and experience: A young man is
not equipped to be a student of politics; for he has no experience in the actions which life demands of him, and
these actions form the basis and subject matter of the discussion (Ethics 1095a2). Aristotle adds that young
men will usually act on the basis of their emotions, rather than according to reason, and since acting on practical
knowledge requires the use of reason, young men are unequipped to study politics for this reason too. So the
study of politics will only be useful to those who have the experience and the mental discipline to benefit from
it, and for Aristotle this would have been a relatively small percentage of the population of a city. Even in
Athens, the most democratic city in Greece, no more than 15 percent of the population was ever allowed the
benefits of citizenship, including political participation. Athenian citizenship was limited to adult males who
were not slaves and who had one parent who was an Athenian citizen (sometimes citizenship was further
restricted to require both parents to be Athenian citizens). Aristotle does not think this percentage should be
increased if anything, it should be decreased.
Third, Aristotle distinguishes between practical and theoretical knowledge in terms of the level of precision that
can be attained when studying them. Political and moral knowledge does not have the same degree of precision
or certainty as mathematics. Aristotle says at Ethics 1094b14: Problems of what is noble and just, which
politics examines, present so much variety and irregularity that some people believe that they exist only by
convention and not by nature.Therefore, in a discussion of such subjects, which has to start with a basis of
this kind, we must be satisfied to indicate the truth with a rough and general sketch: when the subject and the
basis of a discussion consist of matters that hold good only as a general rule, but not always, the conclusions
reached must be of the same order. Aristotle does not believe that the noble and the just exist only by
convention, any more than, say, the principles of geometry do. However, the principles of geometry are fixed
and unchanging. The definition of a point, or a line, or a plane, can be given precisely, and once this definition
is known, it is fixed and unchanging for everyone. However, the definition of something like justice can only be
known generally; there is no fixed and unchanging definition that will always be correct. This means that unlike
philosophers such as Hobbes and Kant, Aristotle does not and in fact cannot give us a fixed set of rules to be
followed when ethical and political decisions must be made. Instead he tries to make his students the kind of
men who, when confronted with any particular ethical or political decision, will know the correct thing to do,
will understand why it is the correct choice, and will choose to do it for that reason. Such a man will know the
general rules to be followed, but will also know when and why to deviate from those rules. (I will use man
and men when referring to citizens so that the reader keeps in mind that Aristotle, and the Greeks generally,
excluded women from political part icipation. In fact it is not until the mid-19th century that organized attempts
to gain the right to vote for women really get underway, and even today in the 21st century there are still many
countries which deny women the right to vote or participate in political life).
5. The Importance of Telos
I have already noted the connection between ethics and politics in Aristotles thought. The concept that most
clearly links the two is that which Aristotle called telos. A discussion of this concept and its importance will
help the reader make sense of what follows. Aristotle himself discusses it in Book II, Chapter 3 of the Physics
and Book I, Chapter 3 of the Metaphysics.
The word telos means something like purpose, or goal, or final end. According to Aristotle, everything has a
purpose or final end. If we want to understand what something is, it must be understood in terms of that end,
which we can discover through careful study. It is perhaps easiest to understand what a telos is by looking first
at objects created by human beings. Consider a knife. If you wanted to describe a knife, you would talk about its
size, and its shape, and what it is made out of, among other things. But Aristotle believes that you would also, as
part of your description, have to say that it is made to cut things. And when you did, you would be describing its
telos. The knifes purpose, or reason for existing, is to cut things. And Aristotle would say that unless you
included that telos in your description, you wouldnt really have described or understood the knife. This is
true not only of things made by humans, but of plants and animals as well. If you were to fully describe an
acorn, you would include in your description that it will become an oak tree in the natural course of things so
acorns too have a telos. Suppose you were to describe an animal, like a thoroughbred foal. You would talk about
its size, say it has four legs and hair, and a tail. Eventually you would say that it is meant to run fast. This is the
horses telos, or purpose. If nothing thwarts that purpose, the young horse will indeed become a fast runner.
Here we are not primarily concerned with the telos of a knife or an acorn or a foal. What concerns us is the telos
of a human being. Just like everything else that is alive, human beings have a telos. What is it that human beings
are meant by nature to become in the way that knives are meant to cut, acorns are meant to become oak trees,
and thoroughbred ponies are meant to become race horses? According to Aristotle, we are meant to become
happy. This is nice to hear, although it isnt all that useful. After all, people find happiness in many different
ways. However, Aristotle says that living happily requires living a life of virtue. Someone who is not living a
life that is virtuous, or morally good, is also not living a happy life, no matter what they might think. They are
like a knife that will not cut, an oak tree that is diseased and stunted, or a racehorse that cannot run. In fact they
are worse, since they have chosen the life they lead in a way that a knife or an acorn or a horse cannot.
Someone who does live according to virtue, who chooses to do the right thing because it is the right thing to do,
is living a life that flourishes; to borrow a phrase, they are being all that they can be by using all of their human
capacities to their fullest. The most important of these capacities is logos - a word that means speech and also
means reason (it gives us the English word logic). Human beings alone have the ability to speak, and
Aristotle says that we have been given that ability by nature so that we can speak and reason with each other to
discover what is right and wrong, what is good and bad, and what is just and unjust.
Note that human beings discover these things rather than creating them. We do not get to decide what is right
and wrong, but we do get to decide whether we will do what is right or what is wrong, and this is the most
important decision we make in life. So too is the happy life: we do not get to decide what really makes us
happy, although we do decide whether or not to pursue the happy life. And this is an ongoing decision. It is not
made once and for all, but must be made over and over again as we live our lives. Aristotle believes that it is not
easy to be virtuous, and he knows that becoming virtuous can only happen under the right conditions. Just as an
acorn can only fulfill its telos if there is sufficient light, the right kind of soil, and enough water (among other
things), and a horse can only fulfill its telos if there is sufficient food and room to run (again, among other
things), an individual can only fulfill their telos and be a moral and happy human being within a well
constructed political community. The community brings about virtue through education and through laws which
prescribe certain actions and prohibit others.
And here we see the link between ethics and politics in a different light: the role of politics is to provide an
environment in which people can live fully human, ethical, and happy lives, and this is the kind of life which
makes it possible for someone to participate in politics in the correct way. As Aristotle says at Ethics1103a30:
We become just by the practice of just actions, self-controlled by exercising self-control, and courageous by
performing acts of courage.Lawgivers make the citizens good by inculcating [good] habits in them, and this
is the aim of every lawgiver; if he does not succeed in doing that, his legislation is a failure. It is in this that a
good constitution differs from a bad one. This is not a view that would be found in political science textbooks
today, but for Aristotle it is the central concern of the study of politics: how can we discover and put into
practice the political institutions that will develop virtue in the citizens to the greatest possible extent?
6. The Text of the Politics
Having laid out the groundwork for Aristotles thought, we are now in a position to look more closely at the text
of the Politics. The translation we will use is that of Carnes Lord, which can be found in the list of suggested
readings. This discussion is by no means complete; there is much of interest and value in Aristotles political
writings that will not be considered here. Again, the reader is encouraged to investigate the list of suggested
readings. However, the main topics and problems of Aristotles work will be included. The discussion will, to
the extent possible, follow the organization of the Politics.
7. The Politics, Book I
a. The Purpose of the City
Aristotle begins the Politics by defining its subject, the city or political partnership. Doing so requires him to
explain the purpose of the city. (The Greek word for city is polis, which is the word that gives us English words
like politics and policy). Aristotle says that It is clear that all partnerships aim at some good, and that the
partnership that is most authoritative of all and embraces all the others does so particularly, and aims at the most
authoritative good of all. This is what is called the city or the political partnership (1252a3) (See also III.12). In
Greece in Aristotles time the important political entities were cities, which controlled surrounding territories
that were farmed. It is important to remember that the city was not subordinate to a state or nation, the way that
cities are today; it was sovereign over the territory that it controlled. To convey this, some translations use the
word city-state in place of the world polis. Although none of us today lives in a polis , we should not be too
quick to dismiss Aristotles observations on the way of life of the polis as irrelevant to our own political
partnerships.
Notice that Aristotle does not define the political community in the way that we generally would, by the laws
that it follows or by the group that holds power or as an entity controlling a particular territory. Instead he
defines it as a partnership. The citizens of a political community are partners, and as with any other partnership
they pursue a common good. In the case of the city it is the most authoritative or highest good. The most
authoritative and highest good of all, for Aristotle, is the virtue and happiness of the citizens, and the purpose of
the city is to make it possible for the citizens to achieve this virtue and happiness. When discussing the ideal
city, he says [A] city is excellent, at any rate, by its citizens those sharing in the regime being excellent;
and in our case all the citizens share in the regime (1332a34). In achieving the virtue that is individual
excellence, each of them will fulfill his telos. Indeed, it is the shared pursuit of virtue that makes a city a city.
As I have already noted at the beginning of this text, he says in the Ethics at 1099b30: The end of politics is the
best of ends; and the main concern of politics is to engender a certain character in the citizens and to make them
good and disposed to perform noble actions. As has been mentioned, most people today would not see this as
the main concern of politics, or even a legitimate concern. Certainly almost everyone wants to see law-abiding
citizens, but it is questionable that changing the citizens character or making them morally good is part of what
government should do. Doing so would require far more governmental control over citizens than most people in
Western societies are willing to allow.
Having seen Aristotles definition of the city and its purpose, we then get an example of Aristotles usual
method of discussing political topics. He begins by examining opinions which are generally accepted, which
means, as he says in the Topics at 100b21, are accepted by everyone or by the majority or by the philosophers
i.e. by all, or by the majority, or by the most notable and illustrious of them on the grounds that any such
opinions are likely to have at least some truth to them. These opinions (the Greek word isendoxa), however, are
not completely true. They must be systematically examined and modified by scholars of politics before the
truths that are part of these opinions are revealed. Because Aristotle uses this method of examining the opinions
of others to arrive at truth, the reader must be careful to pay attention to whether a particular argument or belief
is Aristotles or not. In many cases he is setting out an argument in order to challenge it. It can be difficult to tell
when Aristotle is arguing in his own voice and when he is considering the opinions of others, but the reader
must carefully make this distinction if they are to understand Aristotles teachings. (It has also been suggested
that Aristotles method should be seen as an example of how political discussion ought to be conducted: a
variety of viewpoints and arguments are presented, and the final decision is arrived at through a consideration of
the strengths and weaknesses of these viewpoints and arguments). For a further discussion of Aristotles
methodology, see his discussion of reasoning in general and dialectical reasoning in particular in the Topics.
Further examples of his approach can be found in Ethics I.4 and VII.1.
In this case, Aristotle takes up the popular opinion that political rule is really the same as other kinds of rule:
that of kings over their subjects, of fathers over their wives and children, and of masters over their slaves. This
opinion, he says, is mistaken. In fact, each of these kinds of rule is different. To see why, we must consider how
the city comes into being, and it is to this that Aristotle next turns in Book I, Chapter 2.
b. How the City Comes Into Being
Here Aristotle tells the story of how cities have historically come into being. The first partnerships among
human beings would have been between persons who cannot exist without one another (1252a27). There are
two pairs of people for whom this is the case. One pair is that of male and female, for the sake of reproduction.
This seems reasonable enough to the modern reader. The other pair, however, is that of the naturally ruling and
ruled, on account of preservation (1252a30). Here Aristotle is referring to slavery. By preservation he means
that the naturally ruling master and naturally ruled slave need each other if they are to preserve themselves;
slavery is a kind of partnership which benefits both master and slave. We will see how later. For now, he simply
says that these pairs of people come together and form a household, which exists for the purpose of meeting the
needs of daily life (such as food, shelter, clothing, and so forth). The family is only large enough to provide for
the bare necessities of life, sustaining its members lives and allowing for the reproduction of the species.
Over time, the family expands, and as it does it will come into contact with other families. Eventually a number
of such families combine and form a village. Villages are better than families because they are more self-
sufficient. Because villages are larger than families, people can specialize in a wider array of tasks and can
develop skills in things like cooking, medicine, building, soldiering, and so forth which they could not develop
in a smaller group. So the residents of a village will live more comfortable lives, with access to more goods and
services, than those who only live in families.
The significant change in human communities, however, comes when a number of villages combine to form a
city. A city is not just a big village, but is fundamentally different: The partnership arising from [the union of]
several villages that is complete is the city. It reaches a level of full self-sufficiency, so to speak; and while
coming into being for the sake of living, it exists for the sake of living well (1252b27). Although the founders
of cities create them for the sake of more comfortable lives, cities are unique in making it possible for people to
live well. Today we tend to think of living well as living a life of comfort, family satisfaction, and
professional success, surrounded by nice things. But this is not what Aristotle means by living well. As we
have seen, for Aristotle living well means leading a life of happiness and virtue, and by so doing fulfilling
ones telos. Life in the city, in Aristotles view, is therefore necessary for anyone who wishes to be completely
human. (His particular concern is with the free men who are citizens). He who is without a city through nature
rather than chance is either a mean sort or superior to man, Aristotle says (1253a3), and adds One who is
incapable of participating or who is in need of nothing through being self-sufficient is no part of a city, and so is
either a beast or a god (1253a27). Humans are not capable of becoming gods, but they are capable of becoming
beasts, and in fact the worst kind of beasts: For just as man is the best of the animals when completed, when
separated from law and adjudication he is the worst of all (1253a30). Outside of the context of life in a
properly constructed city, human happiness and well-being is impossible. Even here at the very beginning of the
Politics Aristotle is showing the link between ethics and politics and the importance of a well-constructed city in
making it possible for the citizens to live well.
There is therefore a sense in which the city is prior by nature to the household and to each of us (1253a19).
He compares the individuals relationship with the city to the relationship of a part of the body to the whole
body. The destruction of the whole body would also mean the destruction of each of its parts; if the whole
[body] is destroyed there will not be a foot or a hand (1253a20). And just as a hand is not able to survive
without being attached to a functioning body, so too an individual cannot survive without being attached to a
city. Presumably Aristotle also means to imply that the reverse is not true; a body can survive the loss of a foot
or a hand, although not without consequence. Thus the individual needs the city more than the city needs any of
its individual citizens; as Aristotle says in Book 8 before beginning his discussion of the desirable education for
the citys children, one ought not even consider that a citizen belongs to himself, but rather that all belong to
the city; for each individual is a part of the city (1337a26).
If the history that he has described is correct, Aristotle points out, then the city is natural, and not purely an
artificial human construction, since we have established that the first partnerships which make up the family are
driven by natural impulses: Every city, therefore, exists by nature, if such also are the first partnerships. For the
city is their end.[T]he city belongs among the things that exist by nature, andman is by nature a political
animal (1252b30-1253a3). From the very first partnerships of male and female and master and slave, nature
has been aiming at the creation of cities, because cities are necessary for human beings to express their
capacities and virtues at their best, thus fulfilling their potential and moving towards such perfection as is
possible for human beings. While most people today would not agree that nature has a plan for individual
human beings, a particular community, or humanity as a whole (although many people would ascribe such a
plan to a god or gods), Aristotle believes that nature does indeed have such a plan, and human beings have
unique attributes that when properly used make it possible for us to fulfill that plan. What are those attributes?
c. Man, the Political Animal
That man is much more a political animal than any kind of bee or any herd animal is clear. For, as we assert,
nature does nothing in vain, and man alone among the animals has speech.[S]peech serves to reveal the
advantageous and the harmful and hence also the just and unjust. For it is peculiar to man as compared to the
other animals that he alone has a perception of good and bad and just and unjust and other things of this sort;
and partnership in these things is what makes a household and a city (1253a8).
Like bees and herd animals, human beings live together in groups. Unlike bees or herd animals, humans have
the capacity for speech or, in the Greek, logos. As we have seen, logos means not only speech but also reason.
Here the linkage between speech and reason is clear: the purpose of speech, a purpose assigned to men by
nature, is to reveal what is advantageous and harmful, and by doing so to reveal what is good and bad, just and
unjust. This knowledge makes it possible for human beings to live together, and at the same time makes it
possible for us to pursue justice as part of the virtuous lives we are meant to live. Other animals living in
groups, such as bees, goats, and cows, do not have the ability to speak or to reason as Aristotle uses those terms.
Of course, they do not need this ability. They are able to live together without determining what is just and
unjust or creating laws to enforce justice among themselves. Human beings, for better or worse, cannot do this.
Although nature brings us together we are by nature political animals nature alone does not give us all of
what we need to live together: [T]here is in everyone by nature an impulse toward this sort of partnership. And
yet the one who first constituted [a city] is responsible for the greatest of goods [1253a29]. We must figure out
how to live together for ourselves through the use of reason and speech, discovering justice and creating laws
that make it possible for human community to survive and for the individuals in it to live virtuous lives. A group
of people that has done this is a city: [The virtue of] justice is a thing belonging to the city. For adjudication is
an arrangement of the political partnership, and adjudication is judgment as to what is just (1253a38). And in
discovering and living according to the right laws, acting with justice and exercising the virtues that allow
human society to function, we make possible not only the success of the political community but also the
flourishing of our own individual virtue and happiness. Without the city and its justice, human beings are the
worst of animals, just as we are the best when we are completed by the right kind of life in the city. And it is the
pursuit of virtue rather than the pursuit of wealth or security or safety or military strength that is the most
important element of a city: The political partnership must be regarded, therefore, as being for the sake of
noble actions, not for the sake of living together (1281a1).
d. Slavery
Having described the basic parts of the city, Aristotle returns in Chapter 3 of Book I to a discussion of the
household, beginning with the matter of slavery, including the question of whether slavery is just (and hence an
acceptable institution) or not. This, for most contemporary readers is one of the two most offensive portions of
Aristotles moral and political thought (the other is his treatment of women, about which more will be said
below). For most people today, of course, the answer to this is obvious: slavery is not just, and in fact is one of
the greatest injustices and moral crimes that it is possible to commit. (Although it is not widely known, there are
still large numbers of people held in slavery throughout the world at the beginning of the 21st century. It is easy
to believe that people in the modern world have put a great deal of moral distance between themselves and
the less enlightened people in the past, but it is also easy to overestimate that distance).
In Aristotles time most people at least the ones that were not themselves slaves would also have believed
that this question had an obvious answer, if they had asked the question at all: of course slavery is just. Virtually
every ancient Mediterranean culture had some form of the institution of slavery. Slaves were usually of two
kinds: either they had at one point been defeated in war, and the fact that they had been defeated meant that they
were inferior and meant to serve, or else they were the children of slaves, in which case their inferiority was
clear from their inferior parentage. Aristotle himself says that the sort of war that involves hunting those
human beings who are naturally suited to be ruled but [are] unwilling[is] by nature just (1256b25). What is
more, the economies of the Greek city-states rested on slavery, and without slaves (and women) to do the
productive labor, there could be no leisure for men to engage in more intellectual lifestyles. The greatness of
Athenian plays, architecture, sculpture, and philosophy could not have been achieved without the institution of
slavery. Therefore, as a practical matter, regardless of the arguments for or against it, slavery was not going to
be abolished in the Greek world. Aristotles willingness to consider the justice of slavery, however we might see
it, was in fact progressive for the time. It is perhaps also worth noting that Aristotles will specified that his
slaves should be freed upon his death. This is not to excuse Aristotle or those of his time who supported slavery,
but it should be kept in mind so as to give Aristotle a fair hearing.
Before considering Aristotles ultimate position on the justness of slavery for who, and under what
circumstances, slavery is appropriate it must be pointed out that there is a great deal of disagreement about
what that position is. That Aristotle believes slavery to be just and good for both master and slave in some
circumstances is undeniable. That he believes that some people who are currently enslaved are not being held in
slavery according to justice is also undeniable (this would apparently also mean that there are people who
should be enslaved but currently are not). How we might tell which people belong in which group, and what
Aristotle believes the consequences of his beliefs about slavery ought to be, are more difficult problems.
Remember that in his discussion of the household, Aristotle has said that slavery serves the interest of both the
master and the slave. Now he tells us why: those who are as different [from other men] as the soul from the
body or man from beast and they are in this state if their work is the use of the body, and if this is the best that
can come from them are slaves by nature.For he is a slave by nature who is capable of belonging to another
which is also why he belongs to another and who participates in reason only to the extent of perceiving it,
but does not have it (1254b16-23). Notice again the importance of logos reason and speech. Those who are
slaves by nature do not have the full ability to reason. (Obviously they are not completely helpless or unable to
reason; in the case of slaves captured in war, for example, the slaves were able to sustain their lives into
adulthood and organize themselves into military forces. Aristotle also promises a discussion of why it is better
to hold out freedom as a reward for all slaves (1330a30) which is not in the Politics as we have it, but if slaves
were not capable of reasoning well enough to stay alive it would not be a good thing to free them). They are
incapable of fully governing their own lives, and require other people to tell them what to do. Such people
should be set to labor by the people who have the ability to reason fully and order their own lives. Labor is their
proper use; Aristotle refers to slaves as living tools at I.4. Slaves get the guidance and instructions that they
must have to live, and in return they provide the master with the benefits of their physical labor, not least of
which is the free time that makes it possible for the master to engage in politics and philosophy.
One of the themes running through Aristotles thought that most people would reject today is the idea that a life
of labor is demeaning and degrading, so that those who must work for a living are not able to be as virtuous as
those who do not have to do such work. Indeed, Aristotle says that when the master can do so he avoids labor
even to the extent of avoiding the oversight of those who must engage in it: [F]or those to whom it is open not
to be bothered with such things [i.e. managing slaves], an overseer assumes this prerogative, while they
themselves engage in politics or philosophy (1255b35).
This would seem to legitimate slavery, and yet there are two significant problems.
First, Aristotle points out that although nature would like us to be able to differentiate between who is meant to
be a slave and who is meant to be a master by making the difference in reasoning capacity visible in their
outward appearances, it frequently does not do so. We cannot look at peoples souls and distinguish those who
are meant to rule from those who are meant to be ruled and this will also cause problems when Aristotle turns
to the question of who has a just claim to rule in the city.
Second, in Chapter Six, Aristotle points out that not everyone currently held in slavery is in fact a slave by
nature. The argument that those who are captured in war are inferior in virtue cannot, as far as Aristotle is
concerned, be sustained, and the idea that the children of slaves are meant to be slaves is also wrong: [T]hey
claim that from the good should come someone good, just as from a human being comes from a human being
and a beast from beasts. But while nature wishes to do this, it is often unable to (1255b3). We are left with the
position that while some people are indeed slaves by nature, and that slavery is good for them, it is extremely
difficult to find out who these people are, and that therefore it is not the case that slavery is automatically just
either for people taken in war or for children of slaves, though sometimes it is (1256b23). In saying this,
Aristotle was undermining the legitimacy of the two most significant sources of slaves. If Aristotles personal
life is relevant, while he himself owned slaves, he was said to have freed them upon his death. Whether this
makes Aristotles position on slavery more acceptable or less so is left to the reader to decide.
In Chapter 8 of Book I Aristotle says that since we have been talking about household possessions such as
slaves we might as well continue this discussion. The discussion turns to expertise in household management.
The Greek word for household is oikos, and it is the source of our word economics. In Aristotles day
almost all productive labor took place within the household, unlike today, in modern capitalist societies, when it
mostly takes place in factories, offices, and other places specifically developed for such activity.
Aristotle uses the discussion of household management to make a distinction between expertise in managing a
household and expertise in business. The former, Aristotle says, is important both for the household and the city;
we must have supplies available of the things that are necessary for life, such as food, clothing, and so forth, and
because the household is natural so too is the science of household management, the job of which is to maintain
the household. The latter, however, is potentially dangerous. This, obviously, is another major difference
between Aristotle and contemporary Western societies, which respect and admire business expertise, and
encourage many of our citizens to acquire and develop such expertise. For Aristotle, however, expertise in
business is not natural, but arises rather through a certain experience and art (1257a5). It is on account of
expertise in business that there is held to be no limit to wealth and possessions (1257a1). This is a problem
because some people are led to pursue wealth without limit, and the choice of such a life, while superficially
very attractive, does not lead to virtue and real happiness. It leads some people to proceed on the supposition
that they should either preserve or increase without limit their property in money. The cause of this state is that
they are serious about living, but not about living well; and since that desire of theirs is without limit, they also
desire what is productive of unlimited things (1257b38).
Aristotle does not entirely condemn wealth it is necessary for maintaining the household and for providing the
opportunity to develop ones virtue. For example, generosity is one of the virtues listed in the Ethics, but it is
impossible to be generous unless one has possessions to give away. But Aristotle strongly believes that we must
not lose sight of the fact that wealth is to be pursued for the sake of living a virtuous life, which is what it means
to live well, rather than for its own sake. (So at 1258b1 he agrees with those who object to the lending of money
for interest, upon which virtually the entire modern global economy is based). Someone who places primary
importance on money and the bodily satisfactions that it can buy is not engaged in developing their virtue and
has chosen a life which, however it may seem from the outside or to the person living it, is not a life of true
happiness.
This is still another difference between Aristotle and contemporary Western societies. For many if not most
people in such societies, the pursuit of wealth without limit is seen as not only acceptable but even admirable.
At the same time, many people reject the emphasis Aristotle places on the importance of political participation.
Many liberal democracies fail to get even half of their potential voters to cast a ballot at election time, and jury
duty, especially in the United States, is often looked on as a burden and waste of time, rather than a necessary
public service that citizens should willingly perform. In Chapter 11, Aristotle notes that there is a lot more to be
said about enterprise in business, but to spend much time on such things is crude (1258b35). Aristotle
believes that we ought to be more concerned with other matters; moneymaking is beneath the attention of the
virtuous man. (In this Aristotle is in agreement with the common opinion of Athenian aristocrats). He concludes
this discussion with a story about Thales the philosopher using his knowledge of astronomy to make a great deal
of money, thus showing how easy it is for philosophers to become wealthy if they so wish, but it is not this
they are serious about (1259a16). Their intellectual powers, which could be turned to wealth, are being used in
other, better ways to develop their humanity.
In the course of discussing the various ways of life open to human beings, Aristotle notes that If, then, nature
makes nothing that is incomplete or purposeless, nature must necessarily have made all of these [i.e. all plants
and animals] for the sake of human beings (1256b21). Though not a directly political statement, it does
emphasize Aristotles belief that there are many hierarchies in nature, as well as his belief that those who are
lower in the natural hierarchy should be under the command of those who are higher.
e. Women
In Chapter 12, after the discussion of business expertise has been completed, Aristotle returns to the subject of
household rule, and takes up the question of the proper forms of rule over women and children. As with the
masters rule over the slave, and humanitys rule over plants and other animals, Aristotle defines these kinds of
rule in terms of natural hierarchies: [T]he male, unless constituted in some respect contrary to nature, is by
nature more expert at leading than the female, and the elder and complete than the younger and incomplete
(1259a41). This means that it is natural for the male to rule: [T]he relation of male to female is by nature a
relation of superior to inferior and ruler to ruled (1245b12). And just as with the rule of the master over the
slave, the difference here is one of reason: The slave is wholly lacking the deliberative element; the female has
it but it lacks authority; the child has it but it is incomplete (1260a11).
There is a great deal of scholarly debate about what the phrase lacks authority means in this context. Aristotle
does not elaborate on it. Some have suggested that it means not that womens reason is inferior to that of men
but that women lack the ability to make men do what they want, either because of some innate psychological
characteristic (they are not aggressive and/or assertive enough) or because of the prevailing culture in Greece at
the time. Others suggest that it means that womens emotions are ultimately more influential in determining
their behavior than reason is so that reason lacks authority over what a woman does. This question cannot be
settled here. I will simply point out the vicious circle in which women were trapped in ancient Greece (and still
are in many cultures). The Greeks believed that women are inferior to men (or at least those Greeks who wrote
philosophy, plays, speeches, and so forth did. These people, of course, were all men. What Greek women
thought of this belief is impossible to say). This belief means that women are denied access to certain areas of
life (such as politics). Denying them access to these spheres means that they fail to develop the knowledge and
skills to become proficient in them. This lack of knowledge and skills then becomes evidence to reinforce the
original belief that they are inferior.
What else does Aristotle have to say about the rule of men over women? He says that the rule of the male over
the female and that of the father over children are different in form from the rule of masters over slaves.
Aristotle places the rule of male over female in the household in the context of the husband over the wife
(female children who had not yet been married would have been ruled by their father. Marriage for girls in
Athens typically took place at the age of thirteen or fourteen). Aristotle says at 1259a40 that the wife is to be
ruled in political fashion. We have not yet seen what political rule looks like, but here Aristotle notes several of
its important features, one of which is that it usually involves alternation in ruling and being ruled (1259b2),
and another is that it involves rule among those who tend by their nature to be on an equal footing and to differ
in nothing (1259b5). In this case, however, the husband does not alternate rule with the wife but instead always
rules. Apparently the husband is to treat his wife as an equal to the degree that it is possible to do so, but must
retain ultimate control over household decisions.
Women have their own role in the household, preserving what the man acquires. However, women do not
participate in politics, since their reason lacks the authority that would allow them to do so, and in order to
properly fulfill this role the wife must pursue her own telos. This is not the same as that of a man, but as with a
man nature intends her to achieve virtues of the kind that are available to her: It is thus evident thatthe
moderation of a woman and a man is not the same, nor their courage or justicebut that there is a ruling and a
serving courage, and similarly with the other virtues (1260a19). Unfortunately Aristotle has very little to say
about what womens virtues look like, how they are to be achieved, or how women should be educated. But it is
clear that Aristotle believes that as with the masters superiority to the slave, the mans superiority to a woman
is dictated by nature and cannot be overcome by human laws, customs, or beliefs.
Aristotle concludes the discussion of household rule, and the first book of the Politics, by stating that the
discussion here is not complete and must necessarily be addressed in the [discourses] connected with the
regimes (1260a11). This is the case because both women and children must necessarily be educated looking
to the regime, at least if it makes any difference with a view to the citys being excellent that both its children
and its women are excellent. But it necessarily makes a difference (1260a14). Regime is one of the ways
to translate the Greek word politeia, which is also often translated as constitution or political system.
Although there is some controversy about how best to translate this word, I will use the word regime
throughout this article. The reader should keep in mind that if the word constitution is used this does not mean
a written constitution of the sort that most contemporary nation-states employ. Instead, Aristotle uses politeia
(however it is translated) to mean the way the state is organized, what offices there are, who is eligible to hold
them, how they are selected, and so forth. All of these things depend on the group that holds political power in
the city. For example, sometimes power is held by one man who rules in the interest of the city as a whole; this
is the kind of regime called monarchy. If power is held by the wealthy who rule for their own benefit, then the
regime is an oligarchy.
We will have much more to say later on the topic of regimes. Here Aristotle is introducing another important
idea which he will develop later: the idea that the people living under a regime, including the women and
children, must be taught to believe in the principles that underlie that regime. (In Book II, Chapter 9, Aristotle
severely criticizes the Spartan regime for its failure to properly educate the Spartan women and shows the
negative consequences this has had for the Spartan regime). For a monarchy to last, for example, the people
must believe in the rightness of monarchical rule and the principles which justify it. Therefore it is important for
the monarch to teach the people these principles and beliefs. In Books IV-VI Aristotle develops in much more
detail what the principles of the different regimes are, and the Politics concludes with a discussion of the kind of
education that the best regime ought to provide its citizens.
8. The Politics, Book II
Citiesthat are held to be in a fine condition In Book II, Aristotle changes his focus from the household to
the consideration of regimes that are in use in some of the cities that are said to be well managed and any
others spoken about by certain persons that are held to be in a fine condition (1260a30). This examination of
existing cities must be done both in order to find out what those cities do properly, so that their successes can be
imitated, and to find out what they do improperly so that we can learn from their mistakes. This study and the
use of the knowledge it brings remains one of the important tasks of political science. Merely imitating an
existing regime, no matter how excellent its reputation, is not sufficient. This is the case because those regimes
now available are in fact not in a fine condition (1260a34). In order to create a better regime we must study the
imperfect ones found in the real world. He will do this again on a more theoretical level in Books IV-VI. We
should also examine the ideal regimes proposed by other thinkers. As it turns out, however fine these regimes
are in theory, they cannot be put into practice, and this is obviously reason enough not to adopt them.
Nevertheless, the ideas of other thinkers can assist us in our search for knowledge. Keep in mind that the
practical sciences are not about knowledge for its own sake: unless we put this knowledge to use in order to
improve the citizens and the city, the study engaged in by political science is pointless. We will not consider all
the details of the different regimes Aristotle describes, but some of them are important enough to examine here.
a. What Kind of Partnership Is a City?
Aristotle begins his exploration of these regimes with the question of the degree to which the citizens in a
regime should be partners. Recall that he opened the Politics with the statement that the city is a partnership,
and in fact the most authoritative partnership. The citizens of a particular city clearly share something, because
it is sharing that makes a partnership. Consider some examples of partnerships: business partners share a desire
for wealth; philosophers share a desire for knowledge; drinking companions share a desire for entertainment;
the members of a hockey team share a desire to win their game.
So what is it that citizens share? This is an important question for Aristotle, and he chooses to answer this
question in the context of Socrates imagined community in Platos dialogue The Republic. Aristotle has already
said that the regime is a partnership in adjudication and justice. But is it enough that the people of a city have a
shared understanding of what justice means and what the laws require, or is the political community a
partnership in more than these things? Today the answer would probably be that these things are sufficient a
group of people sharing territory and laws is not far from how most people would define the modern state. In
the Republic, Socrates argues that the city should be unified to the greatest degree possible. The citizens, or at
least those in the ruling class, ought to share everything, including property, women, and children. There should
be no private families and no private property. But this, according to Aristotle, is too much sharing. While the
city is clearly a kind of unity, it is a unity that must derive from a multitude. Human beings are unavoidably
different, and this difference, as we saw earlier, is the reason cities were formed in the first place, because
difference within the city allows for specialization and greater self-sufficiency. Cities are preserved not by
complete unity and similarity but by reciprocal equality, and this principle is especially important in cities
where persons are free and equal. In such cities all cannot rule at the same time, but each rules for a year or
according to some other arrangement or period of time. In this way, then, it results that all rule (1261a30).
This topic, the alternation of rule in cities where the citizens are free and equal, is an important part of
Aristotles thought, and we will return to it later.
There would be another drawback to creating a city in which everything is held in common. Aristotle notes that
people value and care for what is their own: What belongs in common to the most people is accorded the least
care: they take thought for their own things above all, and less about things common, or only so much as falls to
each individually (1261b32). (Contemporary social scientists call this a problem of collective goods).
Therefore to hold women and property in common, as Socrates proposes, would be a mistake. It would weaken
attachments to other people and to the common property of the city, and this would lead to each individual
assuming that someone else would care for the children and property, with the end result being that no one
would. For a modern example, many people who would not throw trash on their own front yard or damage their
own furniture will litter in a public park and destroy the furniture in a rented apartment or dorm room. Some in
Aristotles time (and since) have suggested that holding property in common will lead to an end to conflict in
the city. This may at first seem wise, since the unequal distribution of property in a political community is,
Aristotle believes, one of the causes of injustice in the city and ultimately of civil war. But in fact it is not the
lack of common property that leads to conflict; instead, Aristotle blames human depravity (1263b20). And in
order to deal with human depravity, what is needed is to moderate human desires, which can be done among
those adequately educated by the laws (1266b31). Inequality of property leads to problems because the
common people desire wealth without limit (1267b3); if this desire can be moderated, so too can the problems
that arise from it. Aristotle also includes here the clam that the citizens making up the elite engage in conflict
because of inequality of honors (1266b38). In other words, they engage in conflict with the other citizens
because of their desire for an unequal share of honor, which leads them to treat the many with condescension
and arrogance. Holding property in common, Aristotle notes, will not remove the desire for honor as a source of
conflict.
b. Existing Cities: Sparta, Crete, Carthage
In Chapters 9-11 of Book II, Aristotle considers existing cities that are held to be excellent: Sparta in Chapter 9,
Crete in Chapter 10, and Carthage (which, notably, was not a Greek city) in Chapter 11. It is noteworthy that
when Athens is considered following this discussion (in Chapter 12), Aristotle takes a critical view and seems to
suggest that the city has declined since the time of Solon. Aristotle does not anywhere in his writings suggest
that Athens is the ideal city or even the best existing city. It is easy to assume the opposite, and many have done
so, but there is no basis for this assumption. We will not examine the particulars of Aristotles view of each of
these cities. However, two important points should be noted here. One general point that Aristotle makes when
considering existing regimes is that when considering whether a particular piece of legislation is good or not, it
must be compared not only to the best possible set of arrangements but also the set of arrangements that actually
prevails in the city. If a law does not fit well with the principles of the regime, although it may be an excellent
law in the abstract, the people will not believe in it or support it and as a result it will be ineffective or actually
harmful (1269a31). The other is that Aristotle is critical of the Spartans because of their belief that the most
important virtue to develop and the one that the city must teach its citizens is the kind of virtue that allows them
to make war successfully. But war is not itself an end or a good thing; war is for the sake of peace, and the
inability of the Spartans to live virtuously in times of peace has led to their downfall. (See also Book VII,
Chapter 2, where Aristotle notes the hypocrisy of a city whose citizens seek justice among themselves but care
nothing about justice towards others (1324b35) and Book VII, Chapter 15).
9. The Politics, Book III
a. Who Is the Citizen?
In Book III, Aristotle takes a different approach to understanding the city. Again he takes up the question of
what the city actually is, but here his method is to understand the parts that make up the city: the citizens. Thus
who ought to be called a citizen and what the citizen is must be investigated (1274b41). For Americans today
this is a legal question: anyone born in the United States or born to American citizens abroad is automatically a
citizen. Other people can become citizens by following the correct legal procedures for doing so. However, this
rule is not acceptable for Aristotle, since slaves are born in the same cities as free men but that does not make
them citizens. For Aristotle, there is more to citizenship than living in a particular place or sharing in economic
activity or being ruled under the same laws. Instead, citizenship for Aristotle is a kind of activity: The citizen
in an unqualified sense is defined by no other thing so much as by sharing in decision and office (1275a22).
Later he says that Whoever is entitled to participate in an office involving deliberation or decision is, we can
now say, a citizen in this city; and the city is the multitude of such persons that is adequate with a view to a self-
sufficient life, to speak simply (1275b17). And this citizen is a citizen above all in a democracy; he may, but
will not necessarily, be a citizen in the others (1275b4). We have yet to talk about what a democracy is, but
when we do, this point will be important to defining it properly. When Aristotle talks about participation, he
means that each citizen should participate directly in the assembly not by voting for representatives and
should willingly serve on juries to help uphold the laws. Note again the contrast with modern Western nation-
states where there are very few opportunities to participate directly in politics and most people struggle to avoid
serving on juries.
Participation in deliberation and decision making means that the citizen is part of a group that discusses the
advantageous and the harmful, the good and bad, and the just and unjust, and then passes laws and reaches
judicial decisions based on this deliberative process. This process requires that each citizen consider the various
possible courses of action on their merits and discuss these options with his fellow citizens. By doing so the
citizen is engaging in reason and speech and is therefore fulfilling his telos, engaged in the process that enables
him to achieve the virtuous and happy life. In regimes where the citizens are similar and equal by nature
which in practice is all of them all citizens should be allowed to participate in politics, though not all at once.
They must take turns, ruling and being ruled in turn. Note that this means that citizenship is not just a set of
privileges, it is also a set of duties. The citizen has certain freedoms that non-citizens do not have, but he also
has obligations (political participation and military service) that they do not have. We will see shortly why
Aristotle believed that the cities existing at the time did not in fact follow this principle of ruling and being ruled
in turn.
b. The Good Citizen and the Good Man
Before looking more closely at democracy and the other kinds of regimes, there are still several important
questions to be discussed in Book III. One of the most important of these from Aristotles point of view is in
Chapter 4. Here he asks the question of whether the virtue of the good man and the excellent citizen is to be
regarded as the same or as not the same (1276b15). This is a question that seems strange, or at least irrelevant,
to most people today. The good citizen today is asked to follow the laws, pay taxes, and possibly serve on juries;
these are all good things the good man (or woman) would do, so that the good citizen is seen as being more or
less subsumed into the category of the good person. For Aristotle, however, this is not the case. We have already
seen Aristotles definition of the good man: the one who pursues his telos, living a life in accordance with virtue
and finding happiness by doing so. What is Aristotles definition of the good citizen?
Aristotle has already told us that if the regime is going to endure it must educate all the citizens in such a way
that they support the kind of regime that it is and the principles that legitimate it. Because there are several
different types of regime (six, to be specific, which will be considered in more detail shortly), there are several
different types of good citizen. Good citizens must have the type of virtue that preserves the partnership and the
regime: [A]lthough citizens are dissimilar, preservation of the partnership is their task, and the regime is [this]
partnership; hence the virtue of the citizen must necessarily be with a view to the regime. If, then, there are
indeed several forms of regime, it is clear that it is not possible for the virtue of the excellent citizen to be
single, or complete virtue (1276b27).
There is only one situation in which the virtue of the good citizen and excellent man are the same, and this is
when the citizens are living in a city that is under the ideal regime: In the case of the best regime, [the citizen]
is one who is capable of and intentionally chooses being ruled and ruling with a view to the life in accordance
with virtue (1284a1). Aristotle does not fully describe this regime until Book VII. For those of us not living in
the ideal regime, the ideal citizen is one who follows the laws and supports the principles of the regime,
whatever that regime is. That this may well require us to act differently than the good man would act and to
believe things that the good man knows to be false is one of the unfortunate tragedies of political life.
There is another element to determining who the good citizen is, and it is one that we today would not support.
For Aristotle, remember, politics is about developing the virtue of the citizens and making it possible for them
to live a life of virtue. We have already seen that women and slaves are not capable of living this kind of life,
although each of these groups has its own kind of virtue to pursue. But there is another group that is incapable
of citizenship leading to virtue, and Aristotle calls this group the vulgar. These are the people who must work
for a living. Such people lack the leisure time necessary for political participation and the study of philosophy:
it is impossible to pursue the things of virtue when one lives the life of a vulgar person or a laborer (1278a20).
They are necessary for the city to exist someone must build the houses, make the shoes, and so forth but in
the ideal city they would play no part in political life because their necessary tasks prevent them from
developing their minds and taking an active part in ruling the city. Their existence, like those of the slaves and
the women, is for the benefit of the free male citizens. Aristotle makes this point several times in the Politics:
see, for example, VII.9 and VIII.2 for discussions of the importance of avoiding the lifestyle of the vulgar if one
wants to achieve virtue, and I.13 and III.4, where those who work with their hands are labeled as kinds of
slaves.
The citizens, therefore, are those men who are similar in stock and free, (1277b8) and rule over such men by
those who are their equals is political rule, which is different from the rule of masters over slaves, men over
women, and parents over children. This is one of Aristotles most important points: [W]hen [the regime] is
established in accordance with equality and similarity among the citizens, [the citizens] claim to merit ruling in
turn (1279a8). Throughout the remainder of the Politics he returns to this point to remind us of the distinction
between a good regime and a bad regime. The correct regime of polity, highlighted in Book IV, is under political
rule, while deviant regimes are those which are ruled as though a master was ruling over slaves. But this is
wrong: For in the case of persons similar by nature, justice and merit must necessarily be the same according
to nature; and so if it is harmful for their bodies if unequal persons have equal sustenance and clothing, it is so
also [for their souls if they are equal] in what pertains to honors, and similarly therefore if equal persons have
what is unequal (1287a12).
c. Who Should Rule?
This brings us to perhaps the most contentious of political questions: how should the regime be organized?
Another way of putting this is: who should rule? In Books IV-VI Aristotle explores this question by looking at
the kinds of regimes that actually existed in the Greek world and answering the question of who actually does
rule. By closely examining regimes that actually exist, we can draw conclusions about the merits and drawbacks
of each. Like political scientists today, he studied the particular political phenomena of his time in order to draw
larger conclusions about how regimes and political institutions work and how they should work. As has been
mentioned above, in order to do this, he sent his students throughout Greece to collect information on the
regimes and histories of the Greek cities, and he uses this information throughout the Politics to provide
examples that support his arguments. (According to Diogenes Laertius, histories and descriptions of the regimes
of 158 cities were written, but only one of these has come down to the present: the Constitution of Athens
mentioned above).
Another way he used this data was to create a typology of regimes that was so successful that it ended up being
used until the time of Machiavelli nearly 2000 years later. He used two criteria to sort the regimes into six
categories.
The first criterion that is used to distinguish among different kinds of regimes is the number of those ruling: one
man, a few men, or the many. The second is perhaps a little more unexpected: do those in power, however many
they are, rule only in their own interest or do they rule in the interest of all the citizens? [T]hose regimes which
look to the common advantage are correct regimes according to what is unqualifiedly just, while those which
look only to the advantage of the rulers are errant, and are all deviations from the correct regimes; for they
involve mastery, but the city is a partnership of free persons (1279a16).
Having established these as the relevant criteria, in Book III Chapter 7 Aristotle sets out the six kinds of
regimes. The correct regimes are monarchy (rule by one man for the common good), aristocracy (rule by a few
for the common good), and polity (rule by the many for the common good); the flawed or deviant regimes are
tyranny (rule by one man in his own interest), oligarchy (rule by the few in their own interest), and democracy
(rule by the many in their own interest). Aristotle later ranks them in order of goodness, with monarchy the best,
aristocracy the next best, then polity, democracy, oligarchy, and tyranny (1289a38). People in Western societies
are used to thinking of democracy as a good form of government maybe the only good form of government
but Aristotle considers it one of the flawed regimes (although it is the least bad of the three) and you should
keep that in mind in his discussion of it. You should also keep in mind that by the common good Aristotle
means the common good of the citizens, and not necessarily all the residents of the city. The women, slaves, and
manual laborers are in the city for the good of the citizens.
Almost immediately after this typology is created, Aristotle clarifies it: the real distinction between oligarchy
and democracy is in fact the distinction between whether the wealthy or the poor rule (1279b39), not whether
the many or the few rule. Since it is always the case that the poor are many while the wealthy are few, it looks
like it is the number of the rulers rather than their wealth which distinguishes the two kinds of regimes (he
elaborates on this in IV.4). All cities have these two groups, the many poor and the few wealthy, and Aristotle
was well aware that it was the conflict between these two groups that caused political instability in the cities,
even leading to civil wars (Thucydides describes this in his History of the Peloponnesian War, and the
Constitution of Athens also discusses the consequences of this conflict). Aristotle therefore spends a great deal
of time discussing these two regimes and the problem of political instability, and we will focus on this problem
as well.
First, however, let us briefly consider with Aristotle one other valid claim to rule. Those who are most virtuous
have, Aristotle says, the strongest claim of all to rule. If the city exists for the sake of developing virtue in the
citizens, then those who have the most virtue are the most fit to rule; they will rule best, and on behalf of all the
citizens, establishing laws that lead others to virtue. However, if one man or a few men of exceptional virtue
exist in the regime, we will be outside of politics: If there is one person so outstanding by his excess of virtue
or a number of persons, though not enough to provide a full complement for the city that the virtue of all the
others and their political capacity is not commensurablesuch persons can no longer be regarded as part of the
city (1284a4). It would be wrong for the other people in the city to claim the right to rule over them or share
rule with them, just as it would be wrong for people to claim the right to share power with Zeus. The proper
thing would be to obey them (1284b28). But this situation is extremely unlikely (1287b40). Instead, cities will
be made up of people who are similar and equal, which leads to problems of its own.
The most pervasive of these is that oligarchs and democrats each advance a claim to political power based on
justice. For Aristotle, justice dictates that equal people should get equal things, and unequal people should get
unequal things. If, for example, two students turn in essays of identical quality, they should each get the same
grade. Their work is equal, and so the reward should be too. If they turn in essays of different quality, they
should get different grades which reflect the differences in their work. But the standards used for grading papers
are reasonably straightforward, and the consequences of this judgment are not that important, relatively
speaking they certainly are not worth fighting and dying for. But the stakes are raised when we ask how we
should judge the question of who should rule, for the standards here are not straightforward and disagreement
over the answer to this question frequently does lead men (and women) to fight and die.
What does justice require when political power is being distributed? Aristotle says that both groups the
oligarchs and democrats offer judgments about this, but neither of them gets it right, because the judgment
concerns themselves, and most people are bad judges concerning their own things (1280a14). (This was the
political problem that was of most concern to the authors of the United States Constitution: given that people
are self-interested and ambitious, who can be trusted with power? Their answer differs from Aristotles, but it is
worth pointing out the persistence of the problem and the difficulty of solving it). The oligarchs assert that their
greater wealth entitles them to greater power, which means that they alone should rule, while the democrats say
that the fact that all are equally free entitles each citizen to an equal share of political power (which, because
most people are poor, means that in effect the poor rule). If the oligarchs claim seems ridiculous, you should
keep in mind that the American colonies had property qualifications for voting; those who could not prove a
certain level of wealth were not allowed to vote. And poll taxes, which required people to pay a tax in order to
vote and therefore kept many poor citizens (including almost all African-Americans) from voting, were not
eliminated in the United States until the mid-20th century. At any rate, each of these claims to rule, Aristotle
says, is partially correct but partially wrong. We will consider the nature of democracy and oligarchy shortly.
Aristotle also in Book III argues for a principle that has become one of the bedrock principles of liberal
democracy: we ought, to the extent possible, allow the law to rule. One who asks the law to rule, therefore, is
held to be asking god and intellect alone to rule, while one who asks man adds the beast. Desire is a thing of this
sort; and spiritedness perverts rulers and the best men. Hence law is intellect without appetite (1287a28). This
is not to say that the law is unbiased. It will reflect the bias of the regime, as it must, because the law reinforces
the principles of the regime and helps educate the citizens in those principles so that they will support the
regime. But in any particular case, the law, having been established in advance, is impartial, whereas a human
judge will find it hard to resist judging in his own interest, according to his own desires and appetites, which can
easily lead to injustice. Also, if this kind of power is left in the hands of men rather than with the laws, there will
be a desperate struggle to control these offices and their benefits, and this will be another cause of civil war. So
whatever regime is in power should, to the extent possible, allow the laws to rule. Ruling in accordance with
ones wishes at any particular time is one of the hallmarks of tyranny (it is the same way masters rule over
slaves), and it is also, Aristotle says, typical of a certain kind of democracy, which rules by decree rather than
according to settled laws. In these cases we are no longer dealing with politics at all, For where the laws do not
rule there is no regime (1292b30). There are masters and slaves, but there are no citizens.
10. The Politics, Book IV
a. Polity: The Best Practical Regime
In Book IV Aristotle continues to think about existing regimes and their limitations, focusing on the question:
what is the best possible regime? This is another aspect of political science that is still practiced today, as
Aristotle combines a theory about how regimes ought to be with his analysis of how regimes really are in
practice in order to prescribe changes to those regimes that will bring them more closely in line with the ideal. It
is in Book VII that Aristotle describes the regime that would be absolutely the best, if we could have everything
the way we wanted it; here he is considering the best regime that we can create given the kinds of human beings
and circumstances that cities today find themselves forced to deal with, For one should study not only the best
regime but also the regime that is [the best] possible, and similarly also the regime that is easier and more
attainable for all (1288b37).
Aristotle also provides advice for those that want to preserve any of the existing kinds of regime, even the
defective ones, showing a kind of hard-headed realism that is often overlooked in his writings. In order to do
this, he provides a higher level of detail about the varieties of the different regimes than he has previously given
us. There are a number of different varieties of democracy and oligarchy because cities are made up of a number
of different groups of people, and the regime will be different depending on which of these groups happens to
be most authoritative. For example, a democracy that is based on the farming element will be different than a
democracy that is based on the element that is engaged in commerce, and similarly there are different kinds of
oligarchies. We do not need to consider these in detail except to note that Aristotle holds to his position that in
either a democracy or an oligarchy it is best if the law rules rather than the people possessing power. In the case
of democracy it is best if the farmers rule, because farmers will not have the time to attend the assembly, so they
will stay away and will let the laws rule (VI.4).
It is, however, important to consider polity in some detail, and this is the kind of regime to which Aristotle next
turns his attention. Simply speaking, polity is a mixture of oligarchy and democracy (1293a32). Remember
that polity is one of the correct regimes, and it occurs when the many rule in the interest of the political
community as a whole. The problem with democracy as the rule of the many is that in a democracy the many
rule in their own interest; they exploit the wealthy and deny them political power. But a democracy in which the
interests of the wealthy were taken into account and protected by the laws would be ruling in the interest of the
community as a whole, and it is this that Aristotle believes is the best practical regime. The ideal regime to be
described in Book VII is the regime that we would pray for if the gods would grant us our wishes and we could
create a city from scratch, having everything exactly the way we would want it. But when we are dealing with
cities that already exist, their circumstances limit what kind of regime we can reasonably expect to create.
Creating a polity is a difficult thing to do, and although he provides many examples of democracies and
oligarchies Aristotle does not give any examples of existing polities or of polities that have existed in the past.
One of the important elements of creating a polity is to combine the institutions of a democracy with those of an
oligarchy. For example, in a democracy, citizens are paid to serve on juries, while in an oligarchy, rich people
are fined if they do not. In a polity, both of these approaches are used, with the poor being paid to serve and the
rich fined for not serving. In this way, both groups will serve on juries and power will be shared. There are
several ways to mix oligarchy and democracy, but The defining principle of a good mixture of democracy and
oligarchy is that it should be possible for the same polity to be spoken of as either a democracy or an oligarchy
(1294b14). The regime must be said to be both and neither a democracy and an oligarchy, and it will be
preserved because none of the parts of the city generally would wish to have another regime (1294b38).
b. The Importance of the Middle Class
In addition to combining elements from the institutions of democracy and oligarchy, the person wishing to
create a lasting polity must pay attention to the economic situation in the city. In Book II of the EthicsAristotle
famously establishes the principle that virtue is a mean between two extremes. For example, a soldier who flees
before a battle is guilty of the vice of cowardice, while one who charges the enemy singlehandedly, breaking
ranks and getting himself killed for no reason, is guilty of the vice of foolhardiness. The soldier who practices
the virtue of courage is the one who faces the enemy, moves forward with the rest of the troops in good order,
and fights bravely. Courage, then, is a mean between the extremes of cowardice and foolhardiness. The person
who has it neither flees from the enemy nor engages in a suicidal and pointless attack but faces the enemy
bravely and attacks in the right way.
Aristotle draws a parallel between virtue in individuals and virtue in cities. The city, he says, has three parts: the
rich, the poor, and the middle class. Today we would probably believe that it is the rich people who are the most
fortunate of those three groups, but this is not Aristotles position. He says: [I]t is evident that in the case of the
goods of fortune as well a middling possession is the best of all. For [a man of moderate wealth] is readiest to
obey reason, while for one who is [very wealthy or very poor] it is difficult to follow reason. The former sort
tend to become arrogant and base on a grand scale, the latter malicious and base in petty ways; and acts of
injustice are committed either through arrogance or through malice (1295b4). A political community that has
extremes of wealth and poverty is a city not of free persons but of slaves and masters, the ones consumed by
envy, the others by contempt. Nothing is further removed from affection and from a political partnership
(1295b22). People in the middle class are free from the arrogance that characterizes the rich and the envy that
characterizes the poor. And, since members of this class are similar and equal in wealth, they are likely to regard
one another as similar and equal generally, and to be willing to rule and be ruled in turn, neither demanding to
rule at all times as the wealthy do or trying to avoid ruling as the poor do from their lack of resources. Thus it
is the greatest good fortune for those who are engaged in politics to have a middling and sufficient property,
because where some possess very many things and others nothing, either [rule of] the people in its extreme form
must come into being, or unmixed oligarchy, or as a result of both of these excesses tyranny. For tyranny
arises from the most headstrong sort of democracy and from oligarchy, but much less often from the middling
sorts [of regime] and those close to them (1295b39).
There can be an enduring polity only when the middle class is able either to rule on its own or in conjunction
with either of the other two groups, for in this way it can moderate their excesses: Where the multitude of
middling persons predominates either over both of the extremities together or over one alone, there a lasting
polity is capable of existing (1296b38). Unfortunately, Aristotle says, this state of affairs almost never exists.
Instead, whichever group, rich or poor, is able to achieve power conducts affairs to suit itself rather than
considering the interests of the other group: whichever of the two succeeds in dominating its opponents does
not establish a regime that is common or equal, but they grasp for preeminence in the regime as the prize of
victory (1296a29). And as a result, neither group seeks equality but instead each tries to dominate the other,
believing that it is the only way to avoid being dominated in turn. This is a recipe for instability, conflict, and
ultimately civil war, rather than a lasting regime. For the polity (or any other regime) to last, the part of the city
that wants the regime to continue must be superior to the part not wanting this in quality and quantity
(1296b16). He repeats this in Book V, calling it the great principle: keep watch to ensure that that the
multitude wanting the regime is superior to that not wanting it (1309b16), and in Book VI he discusses how
this can be arranged procedurally (VI.3).
The remainder of Book IV focuses on the kinds of authority and offices in the city and how these can be
distributed in democratic or oligarchic fashion. We do not need to concern ourselves with these details, but it
does show that Aristotle is concerned with particular kinds of flawed regimes and how they can best operate and
function in addition to his interest in the best practical government and the best government generally.
11. The Politics, Book V
a. Conflict between the Rich and the Poor
In Book V Aristotle turns his attention to how regimes can be preserved and how they are destroyed. Since we
have seen what kind of regime a polity is, and how it can be made to endure, we are already in a position to see
what is wrong with regimes which do not adopt the principles of a polity. We have already seen the claims of
the few rich and the many poor to rule. The former believe that because they are greater in material wealth they
should also be greater in political power, while the latter claim that because all citizens are equally free political
power should also be equally distributed, which allows the many poor to rule because of their superior numbers.
Both groups are partially correct, but neither is entirely correct, And it is for this reason that, when either
[group] does not share in the regime on the basis of the conception it happens to have, they engage in factional
conflict which can lead to civil war (1301a37). While the virtuous also have a claim to rule, the very fact that
they are virtuous leads them to avoid factional conflict. They are also too small a group to be politically
consequential: [T]hose who are outstanding in virtue do not engage in factional conflict to speak of; for they
are few against many (1304b4). Therefore, the conflict that matters is the one between the rich and poor, and as
we have seen, whichever group gets the upper hand will arrange things for its own benefit and in order to harm
the other group. The fact that each of these groups ignores the common good and seeks only its own interest is
why both oligarchy and democracy are flawed regimes. It is also ultimately self-destructive to try to put either
kind of regime into practice: Yet to have everywhere an arrangement that is based simply on one or the other of
these sorts of equality is a poor thing. This is evident from the result: none of these sorts of regimes is lasting
(1302a3). On the other hand, [O]ne should not consider as characteristic of popular rule or of oligarchy
something tha t will make the city democratically or oligarchically run to the greatest extent possible, but
something that will do so for the longest period of time (1320a1). Democracy tends to be more stable than
oligarchy, because democracies only have a conflict between rich and poor, while oligarchies also have conflicts
within the ruling group of oligarchs to hold power. In addition, democracy is closer to polity than oligarchy is,
and this contributes to its greater stability. And this is an important goal; the more moderate a regime is, the
longer it is likely to remain in place.
Why does factional conflict arise? Aristotle turns to this question in Chapter 2. He says: The lesser engage in
factional conflict in order to be equal; those who are equal, in order to be greater (1302a29). What are the
things in which the lesser seek to be equal and the equal to be greater? As for the things over which they
engage in factional conflict, these are profit and honor and their opposites.They are stirred up further by
arrogance, by fear, by preeminence, by contempt, by disproportionate growth, by electioneering, by
underestimation, by [neglect of] small things, and by dissimilarity (1302a33). Aristotle describes each of these
in more detail. We will not examine them closely, but it is worth observing that Aristotle regards campaigning
for office as a potentially dangerous source of conflict. If the city is arranged in such a way that either of the
major factions feels that it is being wronged by the other, there are many things that can trigger conflict and
even civil war; the regime is inherently unstable. We see again the importance of maintaining a regime which all
of the groups in the city wish to see continue.
Aristotle says of democracies that [D]emocracies undergo revolution particularly on account of the wanton
behavior of the popular leaders (1304b20). Such leaders will harass the property owners, causing them to unify
against the democracy, and they will also stir up the poor against the rich in order to maintain themselves in
power. This leads to conflict between the two groups and civil war. Aristotle cites a number of historical
examples of this. Oligarchies undergo revolution primarily when they treat the multitude unjustly. Any leader
is then adequate [to effect revolution] (1305a29). Revolution in oligarchical regimes can also come about from
competition within the oligarchy, when not all of the oligarchs have a share in the offices. In this case those
without power will engage in revolution not to change the regime but to change those who are ruling.
b. How to Preserve Regimes
However, despite all the dangers to the regimes, and the unavoidable risk that any particular regime will be
overthrown, Aristotle does have advice regarding the preservation of regimes. In part, of course, we learn how
to preserve the regimes by learning what causes revolutions and then avoiding those causes, so Aristotle has
already given us useful advice for the preservation of regimes. But he has more advice to offer: In well-
blended regimes, then, one should watch out to ensure there are no transgressions of the laws, and above all be
on guard against small ones (1307b29). Note, again, the importance of letting the laws rule.
It is also important in every regime to have the laws and management of the rest arranged in such a way that it
is impossible to profit from the offices.The many do not chafe as much at being kept away from ruling they
are even glad if someone leaves them the leisure for their private affairs as they do when they suppose that
their rulers are stealing common [funds]; then it pains them both not to share in the prerogatives and not to share
in the profits (1308b32).
And, again, it is beneficial if the group that does not have political power is allowed to share in it to the greatest
extent possible, though it should not be allowed to hold the authoritative offices (such as general, treasurer, and
so forth). Such men must be chosen extremely carefully: Those who are going to rule in the authoritative
offices ought to have three things: first, affection for the established regime; next, a very great capacity for the
work involved in rule; third, virtue and justice in each regime the sort that is relative to the regime
(1309a33). It is difficult to find all three of these in many men, but it is important for the regime to make use of
the men with these qualities to the greatest degree possible, or else the regime will be harmed, either by
sedition, incompetence, or corruption. Aristotle also reminds us of the importance of the middling element for
maintaining the regime and making it long-lasting; instead of hostility between the oligarchs and democrats,
whichever group has power should be certain always to behave benevolently and justly to the other group
(1309b18).
But the greatest of all the things that have been mentioned with a view to making regimes lasting though it is
now slighted by all is education relative to the regimes. For there is no benefit in the most beneficial laws,
even when these have been approved by all those engaging in politics, if they are not going to be habituated and
educated in the regime if the laws are popular, in a popular spirit, if oligarchic, in an oligarchic spirit
(1310a13). This does not mean that the people living in a democracy should be educated to believe that
oligarchs are enemies of the regime, to be oppressed as much as possible and treated unjustly, nor does it mean
that the wealthy under an oligarchy should be educated to believe that the poor are to be treated with arrogance
and contempt. Instead it means being educated in the principles of moderate democracy and moderate oligarchy,
so that the regime will be long-lasting and avoid revolution.
In the remainder of Book V Aristotle discusses monarchy and tyranny and what preserves and destroys these
types of regimes. Here Aristotle is not discussing the kind of monarchies with which most people today are
familiar, involving hereditary descent of royal power, usually from father to son. A monarch in Aristotles sense
is one who rules because he is superior to all other citizens in virtue. Monarchy therefore involves individual
rule on the basis of merit for the good of the whole city, and the monarch because of his virtue is uniquely well
qualified to determine what that means. The tyrant, on the other hand, rules solely for his own benefit and
pleasure. Monarchy, therefore, involving the rule of the best man over all, is the best kind of regime, while
tyranny, which is essentially the rule of a master over a regime in which all are slaves, is the worst kind of
regime, and in fact is really no kind of regime at all. Aristotle lists the particular ways in which both monarchy
and tyranny are changed and preserved. We do not need to spend much time on these, for Aristotle says that in
his time there are many persons who are similar, with none of them so outstanding as to match the extent and
the claim to merit of the office that would be required for the rule of one man on the basis of exceptional virtue
that characterizes monarchy (1313a5), and tyranny is inherently extremely short lived and clearly without value.
However, those wishing to preserve either of these kinds of regimes are advised, as oligarchs and democrats
have been, to pursue moderation, diminishing the degree of their power in order to extend its duration.
12. The Politics, Book VI
a. Varieties of Democracy
Most of Book VI is concerned with the varieties of democracy, although Aristotle also revisits the varieties of
oligarchy. Some of this discussion has to do with the various ways in which the offices, laws, and duties can be
arranged. This part of the discussion we will pass over. However, Aristotle also includes a discussion of the
animating principle of democracy, which is freedom: It is customarily said that only in this sort of regime do
[men] share in freedom, for, so it is asserted, every democracy aims at this (1317a40). In modern liberal
democracies, of course, the ability of all to share in freedom and for each citizen to live as one wants is
considered one of the regimes strengths. However, keep in mind that Aristotle believes that human life has a
telos and that the political community should provide education and laws that will lead to people pursuing and
achieving this telos. Given that this is the case, a regime that allows people to do whatever they want is in fact
flawed, for it is not guiding them in the direction of the good life.
b. The Best Kind of Democracy
He also explains which of the varieties of democracy is the best. In Chapter 4, we discover that the best sort of
democracy is the one made up of farmers: The best people is the farming sort, so that it is possible also to
create [the best] democracy wherever the multitude lives from farming or herding. For on account of not having
much property it is lacking in leisure, and so is unable to hold frequent assemblies. Because they do not have
the necessary things, they spend their time at work and do not desire the things of others; indeed, working is
more pleasant to them than engaging in politics and ruling, where there are not great spoils to be gotten from
office (1318b9). This is a reason why the authoritative offices can be in the hands of the wealthy, as long as the
people retain control of auditing and adjudication: Those who govern themselves in this way must necessarily
be finely governed. The offices will always be in the hands of the best persons, the people being willing and not
envious of the respectable, while the arrangement is satisfactory for the respectable and notable. These will not
be ruled by others who are their inferiors, and they will rule justly by the fact that others have authority over the
audits (1318b33). By adjudication Aristotle means that the many should be certain that juries should be
made up of men from their ranks, so that the laws will be enforced with a democratic spirit and the rich will not
be able to use their wealth to put themselves above the law. By authority over the audits Aristotle refers to an
institution which provided that those who held office had to provide an accounting of their activities at regular
intervals: where the citys funds came from, where they went, what actions they took, and so forth. They were
liable to prosecution if they were found to have engaged in wrongdoing or mismanagement, and the fear of this
prosecution, Aristotle says, will keep them honest and ensure that they act according to the wishes of the
democracy.
So we see again that the institutions and laws of a city are important, but equally important is the moral
character of the citizens. It is only the character of the farming population that makes the arrangements Aristotle
describes possible: The other sorts of multitude out of which the remaining sorts of democracy are constituted
are almost all much meaner than these: their way of life is a mean one, with no task involving virtue among the
things that occupy the multitude of human beings who are vulgar persons and merchants or the multitude of
laborers (1319a24). And while Aristotle does not say it here, of course a regime organized in this way, giving a
share of power to the wealthy and to the poor, under the rule of law, in the interest of everyone, would in fact be
a polity more than it would be a democracy.
c. The Role of Wealth in a Democracy
In Chapter 5 of Book VI he offers further advice that would move the city in the direction of polity when he
discusses how wealth should be handled in a democracy. Many democracies offer pay for serving in the
assembly or on juries so that the poor will be able to attend. Aristotle advises minimizing the number of trials
and length of service on juries so that the cost will not be too much of a burden on the wealthy where there are
not sources of revenue from outside the city (Athens, for example, received revenue from nearby silver mines,
worked by slaves). Where such revenues exist, he criticizes the existing practice of distributing surpluses to the
poor in the form of cash payments, which the poor citizens will take while demanding more. However, poverty
is a genuine problem in a democracy: [O]ne who is genuinely of the popular sort (i.e. a supporter of
democracy) should see to it that the multitude is not overly poor, for this is the reason for democracy being
depraved (1320a33). Instead the surplus should be allowed to accumulate until enough is available to give the
poor enough money to acquire land or start a trade. And even if there is no external surplus, [N]otables who are
refined and sensible will divide the poor among themselves and provide them with a start in pursuing some
work (1320b8). It seems somewhat unusual for Aristotle to be advocating a form of welfare, but that is what he
is doing, on the grounds that poverty is harmful to the character of the poor and this harms the community as a
whole by undermining its stability.
13. The Politics, Book VII
a. The Best Regime and the Best Men
It is in Book VII that Aristotle describes the regime that is best without qualification. This differs from the
discussion of the best regime in Book IV because in Book IV Aristotles concern was the best practical regime,
meaning one that it would be possible to bring about from the material provided by existing regimes. Here,
however, his interest is in the best regime given the opportunity to create everything just as we would want it. It
is the city that is to be constituted on the basis of what one would pray for (1325b35). As would be expected,
he explicitly ties it to the question of the best way of life: Concerning the best regime, one who is going to
undertake the investigation appropriate to it must necessarily discuss first what the most choiceworthy way of
life is. As long as this is unclear, the best regime must necessarily be unclear as well (1323a14). We have
already discussed the best way of life, as well as the fact that most people do not pursue it: For [men] consider
any amount of virtue to be adequate, but wealth, goods, power, reputation, and all such things they seek to
excess without limit (1323a35). This is, as we have said more than once, a mistake: Living happilyis
available to those who have to excess the adornments of character and mind but behave moderately in respect to
the external acquisition of good things (1323b1). And what is true for the individual is also true for the city.
Therefore the best city is happy and acts nobly. It is impossible to act nobly without acting [to achieve] noble
things; but there is no noble deed either of a man or of a city that is separate from virtue and prudence. The
courage, justice, and prudence of a city have the same power and form as those human beings share in
individually who are called just, prudent, and sound. (1324b30). The best city, like any other city, must educate
its citizens to support its principles. The difference between this city and other cities is that the principles that it
teaches its citizens are the correct principles for living the good life. It is here, and nowhere else, that the
excellent man and the good citizen are the same.
b. Characteristics of the Best City
What would be the characteristics of the best city we could imagine? First of all, we want the city to be the right
size. Many people, Aristotle says, are confused about what this means. They assume that the bigger the city is,
the better it will be. But this is wrong. It is certainly true that the city must be large enough to defend itself and
to be self-sufficient, but This too, at any rate, is evident from the facts: that it is difficult perhaps impossible
for a city that is too populous to be well managed (1326a26). So the right size for the city is a moderate one;
it is the one that enables it to perform its function of creating virtuous citizens properly. [T]he [city] that is
made up of too few persons is not self-sufficient, though the city is a self-sufficient thing, while the one that is
made up of too many persons is with respect to the necessary things self-sufficient like a nation, but is not a
city; for it is not easy for a regime to be present (1326b3). There is an additional problem in a regime that is
too large: With a view to judgment concerning the just things and with a view to distributing offices on the
basis of merit, the citizens must necessarily be familiar with one anothers qualities; where this does not happen
to be the case, what is connected with the offices and with judging must necessarily be carried on poorly
(1326b13).
The size of the territory is also an important element of the ideal regime, and it too must be tailored to the
purpose of the regime. Aristotle says [the territory should be] large enough so that the inhabitants are able to
live at leisure in liberal fashion and at the same time with moderation (1326b29). Again Aristotles main
concern is with life at peace, not life at war. On the other hand, the city and its territory should be such as to
afford its inhabitants advantages in times of war; it ought to be difficult for enemies to enter, but readily exited
by [the citizens] themselves, and not so big that it cannot be readily surveyable because only such a territory
is readily defended (1326b41). It should be laid out in such a way as to be readily defensible (Book VII,
Chapters 11-12). It should also be defensible by sea, since proper sea access is part of a good city. Ideally the
city will (like Athens) have a port that is several miles away from the city itself, so that contact with foreigners
can be regulated. It should also be in the right geographical location.
Aristotle believed that geography was an important factor in determining the characteristics of the people living
in a certain area. He thought that the Greeks had the good traits of both the Europeans (spiritedness) and Asians
(souls endowed with art and thought) because of the Greek climate (1327b23). While the harsh climate to the
north made Europeans hardy and resilient, as well as resistant to being ruled (although Aristotle did not know
about the Vikings, they are perhaps the best example of what he is talking about), and the climate of what he
called Asia and we now call the Middle East produced a surplus of food that allowed the men the leisure to
engage in intellectual and artistic endeavors while robbing them of spiritedness, the Greeks had the best of both
worlds: [I]t is both spirited and endowed with thought, and hence both remains free and governs itself in the
best manner and at the same time is capable of ruling all (1327b29).
However, despite the necessary attention to military issues, when we consider the ideal city, the principles
which we have already elaborated about the nature of the citizens remain central. Even in the ideal city,
constructed to meet the conditions for which we would pray, the need for certain tasks, such as farming and
laboring, will remain. Therefore there will also be the need for people to do these tasks. But such people should
not be citizens, for (as we have discussed) they will lack the leisure and the intellect to participate in governing
the city. They are not really even part of the city: Hence while cities need possessions, possessions are no part
of the city. Many animate things (i.e. slaves and laborers) are part of possessions. But the city is a partnership of
similar persons, for the sake of a life that is the best possible (1328a33). The citizens cannot be merchants,
laborers, or farmers, for there is a need for leisure both with a view to the creation of virtue and with a view to
political activities (1329a1). So all the people living in the city who are not citizens are there for the benefit of
the citizens. Any goals, wishes, or desires that they might have are irrelevant; in Kants terms, they are treated
as means rather than ends.
Those that live the lives of leisure that are open to citizens because of the labor performed by the non-citizens
(again, including the women) are all similar to one another, and therefore the appropriate political arrangement
for them is in similar fashion to participate in ruling and being ruled in turn. For equality is the same thing [as
justice] for persons who are similar, and it is difficult for a regime to last if its constitution is contrary to justice
(1332b25). These citizens will only be able to rule and be ruled in turn if they have had the proper upbringing,
and this is the last major topic that Aristotle takes up in the Politics. Most cities make the mistake of neglecting
education altogether, leaving it up to fathers to decide whether they will educate their sons at all, and if so what
subject matter will be covered and how it will be taught. Some cities have in fact paid attention to the
importance of the proper education of the young, training them in the virtues of the regime. Unfortunately, these
regimes have taught them the wrong things. Aristotle is particularly concerned with Sparta here; the Spartans
devoted great effort to bringing up their sons to believe that the virtues related to war were the only ones that
mattered in life. They were successful; but because war is not the ultimate good, their education was not good.
(Recall that the Spartan education was also flawed because it neglected the women entirely).
It is important for the person devising the ideal city to learn from this mistake. Such cities do not last unless
they constantly remain at war (which is not an end in itself; no one pursues war for its own sake). Aristotle says
Most cities of this sort preserve themselves when at war, but once having acquired [imperial] rule they come to
ruin; they lose their edge, like iron, when they remain at peace. The reason is that the legislator has not educated
them to be capable of being at leisure (1334a6). The proper education must be instilled from the earliest stages
of life, and even before; Aristotle tells us the ages that are appropriate for marriage (37 for men, 18 for women)
in order to bring about children of the finest quality, and insists on the importance of a healthful regimen for
pregnant women, specifying that they take sufficient food and remain physically active. He also says that
abortion is the appropriate solution when the population threatens to grow too large (1335b24).
14. The Politics, Book VIII
a. The Education of the Young
Book VIII is primarily concerned with the kind of education that the children of the citizens should receive.
That this is a crucial topic for Aristotle is clear from its first sentence: That the legislator must, therefore, make
the education of the young his object above all would be disputed by no one (1337a10). It is so important that
it cannot be left to individual families, as was the custom in Greece. Instead, Since there is a single end for the
city as a whole, it is evident that education must necessarily be one and the same for all, and that the
superintendence of it should be common and not on a private basis.For common things the training too
should be made common (1337a21). The importance of a common education shaping each citizen so as to
enable him to serve the common good of the city recalls the discussion of how the city is prior to the individual
in Book I Chapter 2; as has been quoted already in the discussion above, one ought not even consider that a
citizen belongs to himself, but rather that all belong to the city; for each individual is a part of the city
(1337a26).
He elaborates on the content of this education, noting that it should involve the body as well as the mind.
Aristotle includes physical education, reading and writing, drawing, and music as subjects which the young
potential citizens must learn. The aim of this education is not productive or theoretical knowledge. Instead it is
meant to teach the young potential citizens practical knowledge the kind of knowledge that each of them will
need to fulfill his telos and perform his duties as a citizen. Learning the subjects that fall under the heading of
productive knowledge, such as how to make shoes, would be degrading to the citizen. Learning the subjects that
would fall under the heading of theoretical knowledge would be beyond the ability of most of the citizens, and
is not necessary to them as citizens.
15. References and Further Reading
The list below is not intended to be comprehensive. It is limited to works published from 1962 to 2002. Most of
these have their own bibliographies and suggested reading lists, and the reader is encouraged to take advantage
of these.
Translations of Aristotle
Barnes, Jonathan, ed. The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1984. Two volumes.
The standard edition of Aristotles complete works.
Irwin, Terence, and Gail Fine, eds. Aristotle: Introductory Readings. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing
Company, Inc., 1996
As the title suggests, this book includes excerpts from Aristotles writings. Understanding any of Aristotles
texts means reading it in its entirety, but if you want a book by your side to check cross-references from
whichever of his texts you are reading (for example, if the editor of the edition of the Politics you are reading
refers to the Ethics), this one should do the trick.
Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. Translated and edited by Roger Crisp. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2000.
This translation lacks the scholarly and critical apparatus of the Rowe translation but is still a fine choice.
Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. Translated and edited by Terry Irwin. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1999.
Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. Translated and with an introduction by Martin Ostwald. New York: Macmillan
Publishing Company, 1962.
The translation used in preparing this entry. A good basic translation.
Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. Translated and with an introduction by David Ross. Revised by J.L. Ackrill and
J.O. Urmson. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980.
Updated and revised version of a classic translation from 1925. See also Ross book on Aristotle below.
Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. Translation and historical introduction by Christopher Rowe; philosophical
introduction and commentary by Sarah Broadie. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
A very thorough introduction and commentary are included with this translation of theEthics. A good choice for
the beginning student but remember that the introduction and commentary are not meant to substitute for
actually reading the text!
Aristotle. The Politics. Translated and with an introduction by Carnes Lord. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1984.
The translation used in preparing this entry. A useful introduction and very thorough notes, identifying names,
places, and terms with which the reader may not be familiar.
Aristotle. The Politics. Translated by C.D.C. Reeve. Indianapolis : Hackett Publishing, 1998.
Aristotle. The Politics of Aristotle. Translated by Peter Simpson. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 1997.
Aristotle. The Politics and The Constitution of Athens. Edited by Stephen Everson. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996.
If youre looking for The Constitution of Athens this is a good place to go and with thePolitics in the same
book its easy to compare the two books to each other. However, the texts are lacking in footnotes, which is a
particular problem with the Constitution since it records Athenian history. So, for example, on page 237 we
learn that during the rule of the Thirty Tyrants in Athens the rulers chose ten colleagues to govern the
Peiraeus, without any indication that the Peiraeus was the Athenian harbor and its surrounding community, five
miles from the city (it is also the setting of Platos Republic). It would help to have names, places, and concepts
defined and explained through footnotes for the beginning student. The more advanced student may wish to
consult the four volumes on the Politics in the Oxford University Presss Clarendon Aristotle Series. Volume I,
covering Books I and II of the Politics, is by Trevor Saunders; Volume II, on Books III and IV, is by Richard
Robinson; Volume III, on Books V and VI, is by David Keyt, and Volume IV, on Books VII and VIII, is by
Richard Kraut.
Aristotle. The Rhetoric. In George A. Kennedy, Aristotle On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse.Translated
and with an introduction by George A. Kennedy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991.
The Rhetoric includes observations on politics and ethics in the context of teaching the reader how to become a
rhetorician. Whether or not this requires the student to behave ethically is a matter of some debate. Speaking
well in public settings was crucial to attaining political success in the Athenian democracy (and is still valuable
today) and much of Aristotles practical advice remains useful.
Secondary literature general works on Aristotle
Ackrill, J. L. Aristotle the Philosopher. New York: Oxford University Press, 1981.
Adler, Mortimer. Aristotle for Everybody: Difficult Thought Made Easy. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co.,
Inc., 1978.
This is probably the easiest-to-read exposition of Aristotle available; Adler says that it is aimed at everybody
of any age, from twelve or fourteen years upward. Obviously the author has had to make some sacrifices in the
areas of detail and complexity to accomplish this, and anyone who has spent any time at all with Aristotle will
probably wish to start elsewhere. Nevertheless, the author succeeds to a very great degree in delivering on the
promise of the subtitle, expressing the basics of Aristotles thought in simple language using common examples
and straightforward descriptions.
Barnes, Jonathan. Aristotle: A Very Short Introduction. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.
Barnes, Jonathan, ed. The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
The Companion is intended for philosophical readers who are new to Aristotle, Barnes writes in the
Introduction, and the book delivers. Chapter Seven, by D.S. Hutchinson, covers Aristotles ethical theory;
Chapter Eight, by C.C.W. Taylor, his political theory. Barnes himself writes the first chapter on Aristotles life
and work, as well as an excellent introduction which includes an explanation of why no book (or, I would add,
encyclopedia article) can substitute for reading the original Aristotelian texts. It also includes the following:
Plato had an influence second only to Aristotle. But Platos philosophical views are mostly false, and for the
most part they are evidently false; his arguments are mostly bad, and for the most part they are evidently bad.
If those remarks provoke any kind of emotional or intellectual response in you, you may as well give up: you
are on the way to being a student of philosophy.
Guthrie, W.K.C. Aristotle: An Encounter. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.
Volume 6 of his six volume Cambridge History of Ancient Greek Philosophy written between 1962 and 1981.
Robinson, Timothy A. Aristotle in Outline. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1995.
Another short (125 pages) introduction to Aristotles thought, with three sections: Wisdom and Science,
Aristotles Ethics, and Politics. It would be an excellent choice for the beginning student or anyone who just
wants to be introduced to Aristotles philosophy. Robinson is sympathetic to Aristotle but also to his readers,
keeping things easy to read while at the same time offering enough detail about Aristotles doctrines to
illuminate his entire system and making the interconnections among the various elements of Aristotles system
clear.
Ross, Sir David. Aristotle. With an introduction by John L. Ackrill. Sixth edition. London: Routledge, 1995.
This is a classic in the field, now in its sixth edition, having first been published in 1923. Not many books can
stay useful for eighty years. It is not an elementary introduction for the absolute beginner, the introduction
says, and that seems right to me, but neither does it require the reader to be an expert. It covers all of Aristotles
work, with chapters on Logic, Philosophy of Nature, Biology, Psychology, Metaphysics, Ethics, Politics, and
Rhetoric and Poetics.
Thompson, Garrett and Marshall Missner. On Aristotle. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2000.
Another short (100 page) overview of Aristotles thought that is too short to be adequate for any one topic
(Chapter Nine, Aristotles view of politics, is less than six pages long) but might be useful for the new student of
Aristotle interested in a brief look at the breadth of Aristotles interests. The book by Barnes included above is
to be preferred.
Secondary literature books on Aristotles Politics
Keyt, David, and Fred Miller, eds. A Companion to Aristotles Politics. London: Blackwell, 1991.
Kraut, Richard. Aristotle: Political Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
An exceptional work of scholarship. Detailed, insightful, and as close to being comprehensive as anyone is
likely to get in one book. The text is clearly broken down by topic and sub-topic, and the bibliography will help
steer the Aristotle student in the right direction for future research. Kraut also notes other authors who disagree
with his interpretation and why he believes they are wrong; this too is helpful for further research. Highly
recommended.
Miller, Fred. Nature, Justice and Rights in Aristotles Politics. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.
Mulgan, R.G. Aristotles Political Theory: An Introduction for Students of Political Theory. Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1977.
Mulgans book is intended for students of political theory who are meeting the Politics for the first time and in
an English translation. It is divided into subjects rather than following the topics in the order discussed in the
Politics as this article has done, with footnotes to the relevant passages in Aristotles texts. It is nicely detailed
and offers excellent discussions (and criticisms) of Aristotles thought.
Simpson, Peter. A Philosophical Commentary on the Politics of Aristotle. Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1998.
Author Information:
Edward Clayton
Email: clayt1ew@cmich.edu
Central Michigan University
U. S. A.
Some Main Points of Aristotle's Thought2
A. The Criticism of Plato's Theory of Forms:
In general, Aristotle thought that Plato's theory of forms with its two separate realms failed to
explain what it was meant to explain. That is, it failed to explain how there could be permanence
and order in this world and how we could have objective knowledge of this world. By separating
the realm of forms so radically from the material realm, Plato made it impossible to explain how
the realm of forms made objectivity and permanence possible in the material realm. The objectivity
and permanence of the realm of forms does not help to explain the material world because the
connection between the two worlds is so hard to understand. The theory of forms, therefore, is an
unnecessary proposal. There is no need to split the world up into two separate realms in order to
explain objectivity and permanence in our experience.
Aristotle elaborated this general criticism into two more particular objections:
1. The obscurity of the notion of participation or imitation:
According to Plato, material objects participate in or imitate the forms. It is in virtue of this relation
to the realm of forms that material objects are knowable and have order. Yet, Aristotle argues, it is
almost impossible to explain what exactly this participation or imitation is. The properties that the
forms have (eternal, unchanging, transcendent, etc. ) are all incompatible with material objects.
How, for example, can a white object be said to participate in or copy the form of whiteness? Is the
form of whiteness white itself? How can there be whiteness without any thing which is white?
What can a white object and the form of whiteness be said to have in common? It seems that the
metaphor of imitation or participation seems to break down in these cases because of the special
properties that Plato ascribes to the forms. The only link between the realm of forms and the
material world, then, breaks down. The forms cannot explain anything in the material world.
2. The third man argument:
This argument, like the first one, was first given by Plato himself in his later dialogues. It is related
to the first objection, but is a more technical way of getting at the main problem with the theory of
forms. The resemblance between any two material objects is explained by Plato in terms of their
joint participation in a common form. A red book and a red flower, for example, resemble each
other in virtue of being copies of the form of redness. Because they are copies of this form, they
also resemble the form. But this resemblance between the red object and the form of redness must
also be explained in terms of another form. What form does a red object and the form of redness
both copy to account for their similarity? One can see that this will lead to an infinite regress.
Whenever someone proposes another form that two similar things copy, you can always ask them
to explain the similarity between the form and the objects. This will always require another form.
The notion of imitation or copying used in the theory of forms, then, runs into logical difficulties.
The theory of forms really explains nothing about the similarity of objects; another form is always
needed beyond the one proposed. Thus to explain the similarity between a man and the form of
man, one needs a third form of man, and this always requires another form. The explanation of the
original similarity is never given; it is only put off to the next level.
B. Aristotle's theory of form and matter:
Aristotle, then, thought that in order to explain coherence and objective knowledge in this world,
form must be located in particular individual objects. Yet, he still had to explain how things could
change, how they could have permanence, and how we could have knowledge. He still had to
address the problem of reconciling the objective and subjective views of the world. Instead of

2 http://www.anselm.edu/homepage/dbanach/arist.htm
splitting the world into two separate realms, Aristotle divides objects into two parts or aspects: form
and matter. All objects are composed of a certain material arranged in a certain way. The material
they are composed of is their matter. The way it is arranged is their form. Take as an example a
child playing with building blocks. The child could use the same blocks to first build a wall, and
then tear it down and build a house. The material or matter in each case would be the same, the
blocks. Yet, the house and the wall have the matter arranged in different ways. They have different
forms. The house is still just one material object; yet it has two different aspects, its form and its
matter.
All objects then have matter, or the material of which they are composed, and form, the way the
matter is arranged. It is the form of a thing, however, that makes a thing what it is. When the child
knocked down the block wall, the blocks or matter remained. The wall no longer existed, however,
because the blocks no longer had the arrangement or form characteristic of a wall. It is the form of
an object that makes it the particular object that it is.
It is also the form of a thing that we know when we have knowledge of it. To know a wall or a
person is to know the peculiar arrangement of matter or their form. This is what makes them what
they are.
Aristotle also uses this distinction to explain how there can be both permanence and change in the
world:
Explanation of Change: Change can occur because the same matter can be arranged in different
ways. When the block wall was destroyed the matter, the blocks, remained. In change, therefore, it
is the form that changes while the matter remains the same. Change occurs when the arrangement
of the matter changes, when it moves from one form to another.
Explanation of permanence: Yet, even though the form of an object can change, it is form, not
matter, that provides the order and permanence in the world. The matter of all things is ultimately
the same; it could not account for the order and intelligibility that the changes of things have. There
must be some part of the form of a thing, its essential form, that remains the same as the thing
changes. The essential form of a thing determines what an object is and guides the changes and
development of that thing. That is why we find changes intelligible or orderly. While some aspects
of the form of a thing are always changing, as long as a thing remains in existence, its essential
form must remain the same. For example, as a tree develops from a seed into a giant oak tree its
form is constantly changing. Yet its changes are not random; it does not change into a rock or a pig.
It changes in just the ways necessary to make it an oak tree. This is because some part of the tree
stays the same from the time it is a seed until it is a mature oak. The essential form of a thing makes
it what it is and guides the thing through its changes to its final goal. This is how there can be
permanent objects in a world that is always changing.
C. The four causes:
In order to understand how a thing comes about there are four things that it is necessary to know:
(1) What type of material it is made of. (2) What type of thing it is. (3) What caused it to come into
being; and (4) What purpose or function the thing is meant to fulfill. Take, for example, a table. To
understand the table fully you need to know: (1) its material, that it is made of wood; (2) the
arrangement of that material, the type of table it is or its shape (this is the form of the table); (3)
how it was built, the various thing that had to be done to manufacture the table; and (4) the function
of the table, that it is meant to be a dinner table or a desk. The first of these is the material cause.
The second is the formal cause. The third is the efficient cause. The fourth is the final cause.
It was the fourth of these causes that was Aristotle's most original contribution and which played
the greatest role in both his theory of nature and his theory of form.
D. The theory of nature:
Aristotle applied his doctrine of the four causes to the study of the natural world. Although all
natural objects were composed of a certain matter and certain immediate causes for all their
changes, it was the formal and final causes that drew most of Aristotle's attention. All objects, both
alive and inanimate, have an essential form that makes them what they are and a goal or final state
that they are progressing towards. These two causes were very closely related in Aristotle's natural
science. Consider, for example, an acorn. It has a particular form, particular way that its matter is
arranged. This is what makes it the type of thing it is, in this case the seed of an oak tree. This form
defines for the acorn a goal or final state which defines it and guides all the various changes the
acorn will go through. In this case the goal or final state is to be an oak tree. The goal or final cause
guides the object through the various changes of form that the object goes through on the way to
the accomplishment of its goal. It provides coherence, order, and intelligibility to the change that an
object undergoes. The essential form of the thing, however, determines what goal it pursues. The
final state of a thing depends upon what type of thing it is. This close connection of the final and
formal causes led Aristotle to combine the two in his later account of what form is.
Il cammino della filosofia3
Hans-Georg Gadamer
Aristotele

Logica e filosofia
Fisica e metafisica
L'ordine del mondo
L'essenza del movimento
Energia e dinamica
L'essenza del tempo
Platone , Aristotele e il dialogo
La dottrina delle categorie
Lo spirito del filosofo
Teoria e prassi
Tra i membri dellAccademia fondata da Platone cerano molti personaggi di rilievo, soprattutto giovani, che,
grazie al dialogo educativo condotto da Platone con i suoi allievi per tutta la vita, maturarono straordinarie
conoscenze e capacit. Uno di questi giovani fu Aristotele. Era figlio di un medico macedone e studi
nellAccademia. Di lui si racconta che un giorno, essendo malato, non prese parte a una piccola discussione di
gruppo; e allora Platone avrebbe detto: Oggi mancato lo spirito. In effetti, i due ebbero fin dallinizio
un legame profondo. In seguito Aristotele diverr celebre come critico della dottrina delle idee, anche se la
principale obiezione mossa a Platone sar introdotta da unaffermazione diventata a sua volta famosa: Sono
amico di Platone, ma pi ancora sono amico della verit.
Chi fu dunque Aristotele? Dotato fin da giovane di eccellenti qualit intellettuali, inizi presto a insegnare
nellAccademia, occupandosi soprattutto di retorica. Egli prosegu in tal modo lopera di rivalutazione e
riabilitazione della retorica avviata da Platone nel Fedro; senza dubbio, questo suo interesse particolare,
testimoniato anche dalle lezioni sulla retorica e da altri scritti, diede vita a una vera e propria antropologia, a una
sorta di dottrina filosofica delluomo, e non a un semplice manuale tecnico di eloquenza. Egli realizz il
vecchio programma del Fedro, secondo il quale chi vuole tenere un buon discorso deve aver di mira innanzitutto
gli individui ai quali si rivolge e sui quali vuole far presa.

LOGICA E FILOSOFIA
Aristotele fu ben presto incaricato di occuparsi anche delle lezioni di logica. Questo il secondo aspetto che di
lui tutti conoscono, che cio fu il fondatore della logica formale, e pi precisamente di una certa parte di quel
complesso edificio che la logica formale, vale a dire la dottrina della corretta deduzione, la cosiddetta
sillogistica aristotelica. Spieghiamo che cosa significa: si trattava, per cos dire, dellanalisi logica dei
procedimenti in uso nella matematica del tempo.
La logica formale la dottrina della conoscenza, in forma un po ampliata; la dimostrazione di cui si faceva
uso in matematica. Come noto, la filosofia come tale non riducibile a questa logica formale. Anche
Aristotele, ovviamente, ne era consapevole: infatti, subito dopo i suoi scritti di logica, c un capitolo nel quale
descrive come avvenga, propriamente, latto del filosofare umano. In questa sede egli illustra anzitutto come
certe impressioni fugaci si fissino nella memoria, e come, da queste, si formi in seguito un ricordo unitario di
ci che sappiamo e infine come questo sapere venga comunicato agli altri. Egli spiega, insomma, in che
modo si produca il sapere delle archi (questa lespressione greca che noi traduciamo con princpi, inizi).
Qual il punto cruciale? La dimostrazione sempre dimostrazione che muove da premesse, cosicch la
conclusione, cui si perviene, risulta valida. Non vi dubbio, perci, che debbano gi esservi dei presupposti,
quelli che in logica vengono chiamati premessa maggiore e premessa minore. Ma quando si tratta dei
princpi, non si pu presupporre qualcosa che sta ancor prima del principio. Quindi la filosofia non pu
coincidere con la logica della dimostrazione. Essa deve consistere piuttosto in una induzione che risale
allorigine, ai presupposti primi. Il termine greco epagogh, induzione. E Aristotele un maestro nelle
immagini forti ne offre appunto un drastico paragone. Come nasce in realt questa universalit della nozione
3 http://www.emsf.rai.it/gadamer/interviste/05_aristotele/aristotele.htm
di principio? Ecco egli dice come quando un esercito fugge davanti al nemico; e finalmente uno si gira a
guardare se il nemico incalza, fermandosi. Gli altri intanto continuano a correre; poi un altro si guarda intorno e
vede quel soldato che ha smesso di scappare perch il nemico gi lontano, e cos uno dopo laltro si
voltano tutti quanti, fino a che le milizie obbediscono di nuovo al comando di uno solo. Per comando, la
parola greca ancora arch: ci che primo, e che domina. Questa dunque lanalisi logica di che cos
filosofia, secondo la descrizione di Aristotele. E in un certo senso questa induzione, che conduce alluniversale,
proprio la stessa via percorsa dai dialoghi platonici, che muovono dal non-sapere alla visione di ci da cui
tutto dipende.
Non ho intenzione di raccontare qui la vita di Aristotele. Non molto importante, in effetti. Quello che conta,
invece, che Aristotele fond una propria scuola anzi la prima vera scuola che si poi sviluppata e ha fatto
storia nel corso dei secoli, grazie anche ai commenti delle opere aristoteliche. Ed eccoci allopera fondamentale!

FISICA E METAFISICA
Si dice in genere che Aristotele sia il fondatore della metafisica. vero, ma innanzitutto dobbiamo prestare
ascolto a questo termine. Che cosa fond? La meta-fisica? Allora il fondatore di una scienza che fonda la
fisica? Che razza di scienza mai questa, come possibile che essa si dia? E come pu essere nata
dallispirazione platonica? In effetti, si soliti affermare: metafisica tutto ci che ha avuto inizio con
Parmenide, e poi con Eraclito e con Platone Ma tutte queste sono interpretazioni successive! Se si dovesse
definire Platone, si dovrebbe dire, in realt, che fu innanzitutto un metamatematico: il mistero dei numeri,
questo fu, da buon pitagorico, il suo punto di partenza. Fu il rigore scientifico della geometria euclidea a
stimolarlo, come ho potuto mostrare analizzando il Teeteto, in cui Platone convince a poco a poco un giovane e
geniale matematico del fatto che, al di l della matematica, vi anche una conoscenza argomentativa, dialogica.
Qui riecheggia, in parte, un innegabile spirito agonistico: bisogna ammettere che la filosofia dialettica; cio
nei lgoi, nello scambio di domanda e risposta, nellalternarsi di critiche e riformulazioni insomma
attraverso questo processo che le discussioni tra gli uomini pervengono infine a risultati, magari non tangibili,
ma pur sempre significativi e fecondi. Una discussione valida anche quando si capisce di essere approdati a
qualcosa, bench gli interlocutori non sappiano esattamente a che cosa, e si tratta in realt di una prospettiva
comune, che venuta formandosi.
Una cosa, comunque, chiara. Metafisica significa questo: che Aristotele cominci con la fisica. Egli ha attuato
il programma espresso da Socrate nel Fedro: posso cogliere un ordine della natura, solo se capisco che tutto
conforme a una certa finalit. In tal senso si parla di teleologia, cio mirare a uno scopo: questo un principio
unitario che spiega tutto ci che incontriamo.

LORDINE DEL MONDO

[Per esempio] Aristotele interpreta la caduta dei sassi, e, in generale, di ci che cade, dicendo: il sasso vuole
tornare dai suoi sassi; e lo stesso vale per il fuoco che avvampa verso lalto, per raggiungere gli altri fuochi, nel
cielo. Evidentemente si tratta di modelli di spiegazione basati interamente sullesperienza umana della finalit,
dellazione conforme a uno scopo. Si pu certo sorridere di ci, tanto pi se si figli, come noi, della scienza
moderna. Nondimeno, uno dei pi importanti teorici della storia della scienza, Thomas Kuhn, ha riconosciuto di
essere giunto alla sua teoria delle rivoluzioni scientifiche, perch aveva tanto ammirato il fatto che la fisica
aristotelica rappresentasse unimmagine complessiva del mondo, unitaria e coerente, come la scienza moderna.
Io non sono daccordo con Kuhn, perch penso che qui le differenze siano sostanziali; ma in ogni caso il suo
giudizio risulta illuminante per il nostro contesto: che cosa c di nuovo, dunque, nel modo aristotelico di fare
filosofia partendo dalla fisica? Fisica significa: comprendere lessere del movimento; lessenza
dellaritmetica, infatti, sta nel cogliere la a-ritmicit dei rapporti immutabili tra numeri e figure da
essa elaborati, che non partecipano del movimento. Il giovane Platone concepiva ancora il movimento come un
non-essere, perch differente da quellessere, la cui immutabilit, come diceva Parmenide, sempre e ovunque
presente. Aristotele, invece, fa proprio il programma che possiamo gi intravvedere nel tardo Platone, il quale
aveva criticato a sua volta la dottrina dei due mondi contrapposti, elaborata in realt solo da Plotino (nella tarda
antichit), come vera e propria concezione filosofica. Platone stesso, dunque, aveva assunto, di fronte a
questa dottrina, un atteggiamento critico, cercando di mostrare come il mondo delle strutture immutabili come i
numeri e le figure si rispecchi negli eventi di questo mondo, e abbiamo visto come ci trovi espressione nel
concetto di misura e armonia, di ordine e bellezza.

LESSENZA DEL MOVIMENTO

Aristotele cerca soprattutto di comprendere che cosa sia il movimento. Ma gi nel pronunciare questo termine,
il nostro pensiero corre subito al movimento da un luogo a un altro; per, come ovvio, si finisce per
concepirlo, immediatamente, con i concetti della meccanica galileiana: pensiamo alla caduta dei gravi,
pensiamo allaccelerazione, al rapporto fra tempo e spazio percorso insomma alle ben note leggi della
meccanica galileiana. Si cadrebbe ovviamente in errore, se per la fisica aristotelica si ricorresse a un sistema di
elementi astratti: un tempo vuoto, un corpo qualsiasi, indefinito, che percorre un certo spazio in un determinato
tempo a una velocit data. Questo sarebbe gi il nuovo edificio della meccanica, assurta al rango di scienza
fondamentale fra le discipline scientifiche moderne. Quando Aristotele parla del movimento, intende lessenza
di ci che mosso: da grande biologo, qual era come spesso accade ai figli di medici si sempre molto
interessato, per esempio, ai diversi movimenti degli animali, quelli che strisciano, che volano, che corrono,
eccetera, descrivendone tutte le infinite variet. In altri termini, rispetto ai presupposti fondamentali della
scienza moderna, ha operato scelte differenti: non la compagine astratta di spazio, tempo e velocit, nella quale i
punti-massa sono concepiti del tutto astrattamente, bens proprio la diversit degli enti, che partecipano del
movimento questo lelemento essenziale. Tutti ricordano dai tempi della scuola lesperimento in cui si
mostra che, nel vuoto, un pezzo di piombo e una piuma cadono pi o meno alla stessa velocit. Galilei lo sapeva
gi, prima ancora di aver potuto creare il vuoto, e poi lesperimento lo ha confermato: effettivamente, il peso
non influisce sulla caduta. Con Aristotele siamo ancora in un mondo tutto pieno, nel quale ci sono enti di
diverso tipo, ciascuno con un movimento differente.
Ma che cos, in generale, il movimento? Non , semplicemente, un non-essere-qui. Ma non nemmeno,
soltanto, un essere-qui. Infatti, se di movimento si tratta, insieme qualcosa che qui e non pi qui. Queste
sono le aporie a partire dalle quali Agostino ha successivamente affrontato il mistero del tempo: di nessun
istante si pu dire: adesso; non appena lo si nomina, infatti, listante gi passato. Lo stesso vale,
ovviamente, anche per il movimento, ad esempio il percorrere una via. (Il tedesco Bewegung movimento
ancora strettamente connesso a Weg, la via che esso percorre).

ENERGIA E DINAMICA
Aristotele si posto il seguente problema: questa presenza dellessere che gi Parmenide conosceva e che
Platone ha descritto come limmutabile presenzialit dellidea come si concilia con la motilit degli eventi del
mondo e della natura che vi prendono parte? Quando Platone dice: ogni ente prende parte dellidea che tipo
di partecipazione questa?, chiede Aristotele: che cosa significa?
Partecipazione traduce il greco mtexis. Precisiamo, allora, questo concetto di partecipare: possiamo anche
dire prendere parte; e sappiamo bene che prendere parte non significa prendere soltanto una parte.
Ugualmente, quando diciamo partecipare, non intendiamo dire che abbiamo soltanto una parte di ci di cui
partecipiamo: si partecipa di tutto! Questo prender parte, questa partecipazione! Che cosa ne consegue?
Che Platone ne ha parlato solo per immagini: ecco perch ha detto ogni ente prende parte dellidea.
Aristotele si chiede: che cosa significa attribuire lessere allo spazio e al tempo (il primo come luogo in cui si
trova un ente, laltro come il tempo in cui esso si muove)? Che tipo di essere mai questo? In generale,
spazio e tempo sono pur qualcosa qualcosa di effettivamente reale. Lespressione greca che Aristotele ha
coniato per dire questo enrgheia. Vi risuona per noi la parola energia: ovvero qualcosa che non
semplicemente presente, ma che in grado di provocare certi effetti, e perci davvero effettiva, reale.
Ebbene, Aristotele ha individuato qualcosa come un essere allopera, un essere in opera, o, come
potremmo anche dire, il compiersi di qualcosa. Che cos il compiersi del movimento? Il movimento si
compie non quando lho gi compiuto: se sono gi arrivato, il movimento terminato, non c pi moto, ma
quiete. Che cos invece il movimento in quanto movimento? Il movimento come tale! questo dobbiamo
descrivere, esso due cose: adesso allopera, e al tempo stesso gi non pi, listante dopo. In altre parole:
il movimento devessere descritto come intreccio di dynamis ed enrgheia.
Dynamis noi conosciamo il termine dinamica, vale a dire forza efficiente. unespressione frequente
nella lingua greca: anche Platone la usa, in passi importanti, per mostrare che, quando parla dellessere,
intende appunto la realt effettiva, e non solo un insieme di rapporti numerici e di relazioni tra figure. Nel
Sofista Platone parla della dynamis, di questa capacit di produrre effetti. Aristotele, con lincredibile acume
che lo contraddistingue, ha poi osservato che, pensando insieme le due cose, il non-ancora, che produrr effetti,
e lessere di ci che effettivo in altri termini il non-ancora e lessere gi si arriver a cogliere appieno
la natura di ci che in movimento.

ESSENZA DEL TEMPO

Lo stesso vale anche per il flusso del tempo; facciamo un esempio: lattimo listante del tempo in verit,
gi passato? E listante successivo non ancora? Ecco, proprio questo trapassare dal non-ancora al non-pi:
questo listante.
Aristotele ha analizzato anche il concetto di tempo, creando un apparato concettuale davvero epocale, che ha
esercitato su tutto il nostro pensiero europeo uninfluenza decisiva. Qui il tempo gi trattato come una
sequenza numerica che scorre parallela al movimento. Proprio cos, infatti, Aristotele ha definito il tempo: come
il numero del movimento dellistante. unastrazione immensa, se si considera che cos la vita e che cos il
tempo: per esempio il futuro o il passato non sono mica semplici somme di istanti! Pensiamo a esperienze
come la speranza o lattesa, oppure a quando ci capita, per un attimo, di sprofondare in un pensiero, o nella
contemplazione di qualcosa di bello! ben altra cosa il tempo che occupiamo, rispetto a questo tempo astratto!
Con questi esempi desidero solo far capire limmane spirito fondativo che agisce allinterno del pensiero
aristotelico. (E non solo in quello aristotelico, naturalmente). Nel Timeo di Platone affiorano gi dei cenni in
questo senso offerti in maniera poetica, con descrizioni vivaci ma incentrati proprio sullessenza del tempo.
Per in entrambi emerge un aspetto davvero imprescindibile: cominciamo a capire come in questa fisica greca,
allapparenza tanto ingenua che ci parla di un fuoco nostalgico, desideroso di tornare alle stelle, oppure di
pietre che aspirano a ricongiungersi con lamata Madre-Terra al di l di queste espressioni ingenue,
antropologiche si esprima gi la capacit di astrazione propria dellOccidente.
Ritengo assai importante mostrare anzitutto come Aristotele si sia richiamato alla tesi platonica, che afferma
espressamente: lidea non un mondo a s stante, bens (come pu dirsi del bello) in ogni cosa. Platone
aveva di mira questa immanenza dellidea quando parlava di un prendere parte, ma questo non significa
affatto che egli abbia detto le stesse cose che, in seguito, fu invece Aristotele a elaborare, facendo del concetto
di essere luniversale che presente nelle singole cose concrete, e dichiarandolo esplicitamente. Daltro canto,
per, si vede quanto vicine risultino essere queste due posizioni, allorch si impari a leggere i testi della
filosofia cercando di comprenderli ermeneuticamente, vorrei dire.

PLATONE, ARISTOTELE E IL DIALOGO

Quando leggo i dialoghi di Platone, so che si tratta di poesia pensante, grazie alla quale ci viene offerto, come
per incantesimo, un dialogo con tutti gli aspetti imponderabili della comunicazione, della comprensione, del
fraintendimento, dellincontro reciproco nel consenso; di fronte, invece, al Corpus Aristotelicum, alla gran
massa degli scritti di Aristotele (2000 pagine nella editio maior del Becker), la nostra cultura ermeneutica
dovrebbe indurci a domandare: che cosa abbiamo davanti a noi? Libri da acquistare in libreria, come facciamo
noi, oggi, andando a comprare le opere di Aristotele? No di certo: erano appunti, sulla base dei quali Aristotele
faceva lezione; era una retorica vivente, di cui dobbiamo sempre percepire la presenza quando leggiamo le
argomentazioni e le analisi aristoteliche. Questo non significa che debbano essere argomentazioni coerenti, nel
senso attuale del termine. Tutto invece incentrato sulla ripetizione, che nella retorica rappresenta un principio
fondamentale dellarte di persuadere. Intendo dire che dobbiamo renderci conto di quanto siano diverse le
modalit della conversazione e del colloquio adottate nello stile dialogico, poeticamente raffinato di Platone,
rispetto alle bozze di lavoro che ci ha lasciato Aristotele.
A dire il vero, Aristotele ha scritto anche dialoghi, che per non conosciamo; ma sappiamo, da Cicerone, che
furono celebri nellantichit per il flumen aureum orationis, per quellaureo fluire delleloquenza che vi si
trovava.
(Dallimitazione ciceroniana dei dialoghi aristotelici, ancora famosi allepoca, sappiamo che erano dibattiti
scritti, nei quali due personaggi di regola due soltanto discutevano tra di loro, e poi interveniva un terzo
personaggio che assisteva al colloquio, con il compito di proporre una qualche soluzione mediatrice: nello
stesso modo strutturata la Politica di Cicerone, al pari di altri suoi scritti. Da questi testi possiamo immaginare
approssimativamente come fossero i dialoghi artistotelici. Ma non questo che ci interessa, ora.)
L importante, adesso, imparare a far proprie le intenzioni sottese ai diversi stili, traducendole nel rispettivo
pensiero; solo cos emergono i punti di reciproco contatto, anche fra Platone ed Aristotele, come accade in ogni
dialogo fecondo.
Chi, nel corso di una disputa, concentra la sua attenzione nel chiedersi che cosa posso obiettare?, non presta
ascolto come dovrebbe. Se invece si pensa: che cosa intende dire laltro? Perch non mi convince?, Che
cosa mi sfugge? (e linterlocutore, adottando a sua volta lo stesso atteggiamento, chiede: che cosa vuole
propriamente dire?) si ottiene che i due partner in gioco siano gi molto vicini a una possibile comprensione
reciproca. Bisogna essere consapevoli di questa essenza del dialogo, della vera discussione, e del contenuto di
verit che pu celarsi nel pensiero filosofico. Una volta Platone comment: Il pensiero il dialogo interiore
dellanima con se stessa; e aveva pienamente ragione: anche in questo modo possiamo approssimarci alla
verit: immaginando delle obiezioni, cos da mirare, grazie al loro esame, a un nuovo possibile punto di
accordo. Questa la via del pensiero.

LA DOTTRINA DELLE CATEGORIE

Tornando alla Metafisica: non posso certo tralasciare di dire che essa non consiste della sola dottrina
dellenrgheia e della dnamis. Ci si aspetta, ovviamente, che io parli della dottrina delle categorie: quella parte
della Metafisica sulla quale Kant ha espresso il celebre verdetto: Aristotele stato solo rapsodico ma non
sistematico nellelaborare la tavola delle categorie. Certo: solo rapsodico! cio solo retorico! Egli le raccolse
dallesempio vivo delle lezioni e delle spiegazioni che teneva nella sua scuola. In realt, che cosa ha fatto
Aristotele? Innanzitutto ha elaborato ci che, nella nostra proposta interpretativa, avevamo intravisto gi nel
tardo Platone, ricavandone concetti. Che cos lessere? Lessere non mai soltanto luniversale; lessere
sempre anche questo essere qui. Entrambi sono essere: luniversale, e il determinato.
Questo un altro modo di descrivere quella che ci appare come lintenzione della dottrina platonica: lidea del
bene si mostra nella forma del bello. Il bello, infatti, sempre un tde ti, sempre un questo qui. Il bello deve
apparire. Non serve a niente pensare una bellezza che non compare affatto: non avrebbe sostanza.
Con questo concetto cominciamo a esplorare il significato della dottrina delle categorie; questultima esercita,
in effetti, una ben precisa funzione di raccolta, visto che lessere dellente si diversifica in altre forme,
inseparabili da esso, che si trovano gi prefigurate in Platone: il poin, (il come fatto), il posn, (il
quanto, il quanto grande), e soprattutto il prs ti, ovvero ci che pensiamo in relazione con, in
riferimento a qualcosa. Queste sono dunque le categorie fondamentali che Aristotele ha sviluppato, e che sono
rimaste un saldo punto di riferimento nella storia della Sto e nella tradizione della metafisica successiva.
Queste quattro categorie comportano naturalmente anche dei problemi: Che ne , in loro, dellessere?
Prendiamo la relazione: chi diventato padre, con ci in relazione con il figlio che nato. Ricordo qui un
passo geniale di Eraclito, che ho ricostruito io stesso: il padre non ha generato soltanto il figlio, ma anche se
stesso, in quanto padre. Queste sono le misteriose strutture della relazione! E altrettanto pu dirsi per la
qualit e la quantit (per usare i nomi latinizzati delle categorie). E infine abbiamo lenigmatica struttura
della sostanza, unitaria e determinata.

LO SPIRITO DEL FILOSOFO

Ebbene, la Metafisica ha cercato di mostrare, su questa base, che c una sorta di ordine nella totalit
dellessere, la cui espressione pi alta ancora una volta una realt eterna nella quale non si ha pi alcun
movimento: il primo motore, il concetto filosofico di Dio, nel quale sembra trovare coronamento la metafisica
aristotelica. Certamente oggi, dopo tutte le ricerche e gli studi che si sono occupati della Metafisica aristotelica,
si sono fatti dei progressi interpretativi e perci diremmo che questa una delle possibilit che Aristotele ha
maturato: la enrgheia suprema, un essere che sempre in s e presso di s, oggetto di amore cui tutto aspira, e
quindi causa del movimento di tutte le cose. Questa soltanto una delle possibilit. Ma oggi la mia convinzione
questa: sono state le metafisiche del tardo Medioevo e soprattutto della Controriforma penso a Surez a
fare di tutto ci un sistema. Metafisica non significa sistema: in Aristotele essa connota tutto ci che non si
poteva includere nella fisica. Vi si affrontano, perci, ambiti diversissimi, come il principio di non
contraddizione (la bebaiotte arch, il principio pi sicuro, secondo Aristotele, per garantire correttezza al
pensiero) o appunto i concetti di sostanza, o di potenza, e molte altre cose che vi possiamo incontrare e che
procedono in direzioni assai differenti, nelle quali forse, al di l della fisica, possono maturare princpi
fondamentali.
La retorica resta la forma viva nella quale il pensiero greco ha riflettuto e, nel leggere i testi antichi, non
dovremmo mai dimenticare che nessun Greco stato capace di leggere senza scandire ad alta voce. Agostino
ammirava Ambrogio, vescovo di Milano, per il fatto che sapeva addirittura leggere in silenzio. In realt, fu solo
nel dodicesimo secolo che nacque la lettura silenziosa, non accompagnata dalla voce. Leggere significava
ascoltare: lettura e ascolto vigile erano inscindibili. Vorrei raccontare un altro aneddoto su Aristotele (ma gli
argomenti incalzano: su di lui c molto da dire). una storia davvero bella.
Tra i suoi amici, Aristotele era soprannominato il grande lettore: leggeva continuamente e di sera, quando
era disteso sulla klne, cio sul letto, aveva da un lato una bacinella di ottone, e mentre leggeva teneva in mano
una sfera di metallo; ogni volta che si addormentava, la sfera cadeva con gran rumore nella bacinella, cos egli
si risvegliava e poteva continuare a leggere. Questa unimmagine inventata, con grande sagacia, per accostare
il filosofo, il suo spirito vigile, allo spirito divino, caratterizzato appunto dalla presenza costante. Infatti, il
concetto di Dio della metafisica aristotelica quello di uno spirito che non interrotto, come quello umano,
dalla veglia e dal sonno, o da analoghe situazioni.
Questo bellepisodio che troviamo in Diogene Laerzio (una vera e propria miniera di informazioni), si presta
assai bene per mostrare che non c niente di tanto interessante quanto gli aneddoti inventati.

TEORIA E PRASSI
Ma ora devo trattare anche dellaltro versante del pensiero di Aristotele, e cio di quellaspetto per cui, a
partire da Socrate, il discorso su Dio non deve allontanarci dal mondo. Si tratta del problema della vita etica,
dello Stato e della societ: su tutto ci Aristotele ha svolto, in effetti, una riflessione consapevole, collocandosi,
certo, anche nel solco dei dialoghi platonici della vecchiaia, come il Filebo e il Politico. Si tratta cio della
filosofia pratica, un pensiero che intende cogliere la vita effettiva delluomo, la sua prassi. Il termine prassi ci
ben noto, anche e soprattutto nei suoi significati secondari, derivati, che richiamiamo sempre alla memoria
quando, per esempio, parliamo di prassi amministrativa o della prassi abituale di un ufficio. Che cos, nel
nostro caso, la prassi? Certo, non un agire, no, no! E che cosa dovrebbe essere, allora? Un certo modo di
stare?! Cos gi va meglio, a patto che si intenda uno stare l dove si agisce! Dunque: prassi non affatto
lapplicazione della teoria; essa piuttosto un modo particolare di sapere e di essere, un modo di stare nelle
situazioni. I Greci concludevano le lettere con la formula: u prtein, che si pu rendere con ti auguro di
star bene. Noi stessi non diciamo: agisci bene, bens auspichiamo: stammi bene! Prtein si usa anche per
significare che le cose vanno bene, oppure vanno male. Insomma: la filosofia pratica non semplicemente una
dottrina dellazione; essa tratta di come luomo si muove e si situa nella vita, in quanto essere che agisce e
patisce. E cos Aristotele, distinguendo opportunamente i concetti e seguendo il proprio metodo didattico, ha
scoperto innanzitutto che la vita umana caratterizzabile attraverso lthos e la frnesis, cio quellimpronta
data dallabitudine e dalleducazione che si riflette nella scelta responsabile e consapevole del meglio e del
giusto, che orienta il comportamento nelle diverse situazioni.
In altre parole, letica. Questo nome diventato familiare solo con Aristotele, sebbene esistesse gi come
sostantivo, usato per nel senso di stile di vita, riferito agli animali, o anche agli uomini.
Ma qui sopravvive la lezione di Socrate. Se il socratismo comincia con Platone, Aristotele il secondo grande
socratico, e ha tentato di mostrare che qui tutto dipende da questo intreccio di thos, di educazione e di
abitudine che diventa come una seconda natura, un secondo essere. quello che intendiamo pi o meno
quando diciamo che uno ha carattere, oppure che ha un suo essere, e con questo vogliamo appunto
sostenere che qualcosa entrato a far parte della sua natura grazie alleducazione, allistruzione ricevuta, alle
influenze sociali, ma anche (come oggi ben sappiamo) in larga misura, a causa della natura stessa, del
patrimonio genetico. Tutto ci rappresenta un presupposto affinch si possieda un certo sapere, che non per
lo stesso della scienza. Per la scienza non deve avere importanza il fatto che uno abbia certe inclinazioni e un
altro ne abbia certe altre, che uno sia stato educato in un modo e un altro diversamente, che ci sia chi abbia un
certo temperamento e chi ne mostri uno differente; tutto ci invece decisivo per la vita pratica e per lazione
consapevole, per sapere come comportarci di fronte a ci che consideriamo giusto.
Voglio dire, in definitiva, che Aristotele, nel tener fede alleredit socratica, e cio ammettendo che non c solo
imitazione, ma anche libera scelta e responsabilit consapevole, ha proposto, in realt, quello che gi era stato
descritto, seppur con immagini mitiche, nella Repubblica di Platone: uno Stato nel quale non si pu agire
scorrettamente, e un sapere che governi questo Stato. La vita umana queste due cose insieme: filosofia
teoretica e filosofia pratica. E il divino sta in entrambe.

Copyright Rai Educational

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LA NOZIONE DI PARTECIPAZIONE IN TOMMASO DAQUINO4
A cura di Cosimo Lamanna

Est autem partecipare quasi partem capere senza dubbio una delle affermazioni pi secche con le quali
Tommaso dAquino affronta e definisce il tema della partecipazione, vale a dire uno degli aspetti filosofici e
religiosi pi importanti del suo pensiero.
I dottori scolastici del secolo XIII per spiegare il significato del termine partecipare si riferiscono
immediatamente alla etimologia: <<Partecipare=partem-capere>>, ma non curandosi troppo di tale etimologia,
passano senzaltro alle applicazioni dottrinali, come fa San Tommaso nel testo principale sullargomento (Il De
hebdomadibus).
Il verbo partecipare ha un largo uso nel linguaggio ordinario: fra i pi evidenti e correnti, quello in cui il
partecipare, nellambito di una concezione quantitativa, un vero <<partem capere>> di qualche cosa, e
suppone sempre che un tutto qualsiasi, nel campo degli interessi concreti, si sia scisso in parti, che vengono poi
distribuite ai partecipanti. In questo caso il <<partecipare>> ha tutto il suo significato forte di prendere una
parte fra le altre parti, sia come ricevere reale, sia come prendere una parte con esclusione formale delle altre
parti.
Possiamo definire questo tipo di partecipazione, una partecipazione quantitativa, che nella sua intellegibilit
una nozione del tutto chiusa, che non pone alcun problema: problemi sorgono invece quando, applicato alla
qualit e agli altri predicamenti quel significato si oscura e sembra andare incontro alla contraddizione[1].
Il linguaggio ordinario[2] presenta tanti altri usi del termine <<partecipare>>, e non sempre in essi implicata
la divisione di un tutto preesistente, anzi a volte questo tutto manca: <<partecipare>> alla gioia o al dolore ad
esempio.
In base a ci, si pu dire che il <<partecipare>> nellordine quantitativo affetta direttamente loggetto della
divisione mentre nel <<partecipare>> morale la partecipazione riguarda il modo. Loggetto pu essere presente
tutto intero ai singoli partecipanti, ma esso tocca qualcuno di essi a preferenza secondo un modo intenso e
proprio, e alle volte incomunicabile, in relazione al quale, secondo che pi o meno si avvicinano, anche gli altri
modi sono detti <<partecipazioni>>.
La ragione formale della partecipazione <<morale>>, o meglio il suo fondamento, non dato dalloggetto
stesso, quanto dai legami particolari che i partecipanti possono stringere con colui il quale per primo compete
loggetto della partecipazione: legami di amicizia, di parentela. Mentre nei rapporti quantitativi la
<<comunanza>> era un effetto della partecipazione, in quelli dordine morale affettivo, la comunanza invece
la radice del partecipare[3].
Siamo quindi di fronte a due significati quasi antitetici e in s inconciliabili, poich guardano alla realt sotto
punti di vista del tutto disparati: nellordine metafisico che tutte queste esigenze del <<partecipare>> sono
ridotte in ben legittime proporzioni.
Pi facile delletimologia latina, sembra quella offerta dalla lingua greca, che la madre legittima del termine,
ove, se il significato resta pi vago, insieme meno esclusivo del latino <<partem capere>>. A partecipare
corrispondono in greco due verbi meteceim e coinwnein: il greco non sembra suggerire immediatamente
<<partem capere>>, <<partem habere>>, ma piuttosto <<habere simul>>, <<habere cum alio>>,
<<communicare cum aliquo in aliqua re>>[4].
2. LE FONTI DELLA NOZIONE TOMISTA
Gli studi pi recenti hanno messo in luce il fatto che nessun dottore medievale pu reggere il confronto con
Tommaso dAquino, per lampiezza e la sicurezza dellinformazione positiva. In lui troviamo mirabilmente fuse
in una sola persona la solerzia dello storico e la tendenza irrefrenabile del teorico a portare le idee al vertice
della speculazione pura.
Tommaso arriv certamente a una concezione dinamica della vita intellettuale, che lo portava a considerare i
singoli risultati in una continuit armonica, che dai primi contatti incerti e parziali, giunge alla conquista
definitiva e quieta della verit. E con questo modo di pensare che lAngelico si rivolge alle fonti, non allo
scopo di fare semplicemente la storia temporale delle idee, ma per la verit intemporale che esse racchiudono.
4 http://www.filosofico.net/tommadcquinopartecipazionetsdf7.htm
E molto importante riconoscere che San Tommaso non fu un puro storico, ma neppure un pensatore puro nel
senso moderno del termine, cio un contemplatore solipsista, deduttivo e universale, che saffida a nozioni e
principi, pochi di numero ed esclusivi nel contenuto. Il suo metodo ha un duplice carattere: da un lato si
presenta come interpretazione storica delle Fonti, dallaltro essenzialmente sintetico, nel senso che tende a
accogliere tutti gli aspetti di verit, qua e l dispersi o mal compresi nei sistemi precedenti, e cerca poi di
assimilarli e incorporarli in una unit vivente.
Nonostante il Santo Dottore sia stato piuttosto avaro nel rivelarci lintimo lavorio del suo spirito, per quanto
riguarda la nozione di partecipazione, esse sono state indicate in modo esplicito in due articoli delle Quaestiones
disputatae. LAngelico, infatti, nella Quaestio disputatae De veritate (q. XXI, art.5) chiedendosi se la bont della
creazione sia buona a causa della sua essenza, non esita a rispondere in modo negativo, sostenendo che, in base
a quanto affermano Agostino, Boezio e lautore del De Causis, le creature non sono buone per essenza, ma per
partecipazione.
Nella Quaestio disputata De potentia (q. III, art. 5) pone il problema della creazione universale: <<Utrum possit
esse aliquid quod non sit a Deo>>; la risposta provata attraverso tre ragioni, delle quali la prima riferita a
Platone, la seconda ad Aristotele, la terza ad Avicenna: tutte e tre hanno per fondo comune la nozione di
partecipazione. Se ora a questi sei autori aggiungiamo lo Pseudo Dionigi Aeropagita, che forse in questo affare
il pi interessato di tutti gli altri, abbiamo ormai tutte le fonti principali, alle quali si ispirata e pu essere
riferita, nel suo contenuto, la nozione tomista di partecipazione[5].
Il termine partecipare, partecipazione, ha senza dubbio unorigine platonica, e va letto alla luce della teoria
platonica delle Idee, nellambito della quale esprime il rapporto che la realt sensibile dei singoli (concreti), ha
con quella intellegibile universale (astratta). Platone diede vita a questo dualismo per cercare di soddisfare
lesigenza di una sapere come conoscenza necessaria nei rapporti, e oggettiva nel contenuto. Oggetto di un
tale tipo di conoscenza, non poteva essere, agli occhi di Platone, la realt sensibile, soggetta alla corruzione e al
mutamento, ma la realt ultrasensibile, eterna e immutabile.
Alla luce di questa ripartizione vanno letti i rapporti che hanno i sensibili, sempre cangianti, con le idee
immutabili, e questa relazione espressa, appunto, con il termine di partecipazione.
La instancabile ricerca delluniversale portava Platone ad asserire che luomo di cui c scienza, deve essere
sempre, necessariamente, e quindi, in modo esclusivo tale. Si tratta quindi delluomo ideale, incorruttibile,
contrapposto alluomo sensibile, particolare. Vista in questi termini, la realt sensibile, considerata come un
pallido riflesso, unimitazione ispirata allidea modello, che bench si comunichi alla cosa concreta, resta nella
sua interezza e incorruttibilit, mentre la cosa concreta altro non che un suo pallido riflesso, una sua caduca
imitazione.
Il pensiero aristotelico, di contro, si oppone a questo modo di pensare e di leggere la realt: Aristotele condanna
lidea di partecipazione[6], e cerca di rivalutare il mondo sensibile, da lui considerato come il punto di partenza
della conoscenza: le forme universali vengono raggiunte per il tramite del particolare. Da questo punto di vista
Tommaso si schiera con Aristotele, nella convinzione che le idee universali, hanno ragion dessere solo nella
mente, ma non esistono nella realt.
Non ci sono quindi due realt contrapposte, ma vi una sola realt, quella sensibile, punto di partenza
obbligatorio per la conoscenza, che poi tramite lastrazione[7] formula concetti universali. Ma se Aristotele era
stato drastico nella sua critica alla nozione di partecipazione, almeno nella fase matura del suo pensiero, e aveva
criticato nel I Libro della Metafisica[8], sia Platone che i Pitagorici, San Tommaso dAquino assume un diverso
atteggiamento nei confronti della nozione di partecipazione, rivalutandola e superando la contrapposizione tra i
due massimi pensatori greci, in una sintesi grandiosa e originale. Lopera di sintesi e conciliazione tra i due
massimi pensatori greci compiuta dal Dottore Angelico pu essere considerata epocale in quanto il divario tra i
due pensatori, quali potevano essere conosciuti dalle opere di cui disponevano i medievali, appariva cos
rilevante, anzi sostanziale, che sembrava impossibile qualsiasi tentativo di realizzare un reale avvicinamento.
Tale infatti fu lo stato danimo della maggior parte dei Padri della Chiesa e di buona parte dei maestri medievali,
anche contemporanei del Santo Dottore, per i quali lAristotelismo rappresentava il tentativo supremo, per far
deviare il cammino della ragione, che Platone aveva indirizzato verso il Cristo e la sua dottrina: atteggiamento,
che a volte assunse delle forme esterne anche violente, di avversione alla penetrazione dellAristotelismo, come
si pu rilevare dalle condanne ecclesiastiche dellinizio e della fine del secolo XIII.
La nozione tomista di partecipazione, che oserei dire, alla fine resta nello spirito essenzialmente aristotelica, ha
potuto affermarsi e reggere agli urti polemici, grazie anche allinflusso di correnti intermediarie, delle quali la
principale rappresentata dal Neoplatonismo.
IL NEOPLATONISMO, INFATTI, CERCA DI REALIZZARE, GI PRIMA DI TOMMASO, UNA
CONCILIAZIONE DEL PENSIERO ARISTOTELICO CON QUELLO PLATONICO, OPERA QUESTA
QUANTO MAI URGENTE PER UNA CIVILT PAGANA, CHE DOVEVA MOSTRARE LA PROPRIA
SUFFICIENZA DI FRONTE ALLIDEA CRISTIANA CHE SI PROCLAMAVA UNIVERSALE, E CHE
MINACCIAVA DI SOSTITUIRSI A TUTTO IL PASSATO. SI CERC DI MOSTRARE CHE LE
DIFFERENZE TRA I DUE FILOSOFI GRECI ERANO SOLO APPARENTI, ED ERANO DOVUTE
ESCLUSIVAMENTE A DIVERSIT DI METODO, CHE A REALI DIVERGENZE DI DOTTRINA:
ARISTOTELE VOLEVA PARLARE DELLE COSE SENSIBILI, PLATONE DEL MONDO
INTELLEGIBILE.
Lo scontro tra Paganesimo e Cristianesimo, si concluse con la vittoria di questultimo, che fin per incorporare
leredit dottrinale del primo, dando cos vita al Neoplatonismo cristiano[9].
Si pass da un atteggiamento di aperto contrasto, o almeno di riluttanza, nei confronti della speculazione greca,
a quello di una calda simpatia nei tempi seguenti. I Padri della Chiesa[10] furono senza dubbio gli artefici di
questo cambiamento di mentalit, animati dalla convinzione che a contatto della verit divina anche il frutto
dellumana speculazione potesse diventare buon vino.
Nella ricerca delle fonti della nozione di partecipazione, si possono distinguere per comodit di esposizione, due
linee di ricerca: una greco-cristiana con Agostino, lo Pseudo Dionigi e Boezio, e una greco-araba con Avicenna
e il De Causis; gli influssi di altre fonti, rispetto a queste indicate, non hanno che una valore relativo e
secondario.
Per quanto riguarda SantAgostino[11], si pu rintracciare allinterno della sua opera una linea filosofica di
ispirazione Neoplatonica. Tommaso individu subito questo carattere inconfondibile della speculazione
Agostiniana, e lo fa notare soprattutto allorquando quella terminologia, cos diversa dalla sua -aristotelica-,
poteva creare qualche imbarazzo nellesposizione del suo pensiero, e si fa premura di distinguere bene tra
lautorit che il Santo Vescovo aveva come dottore della Fede, da quella che poteva avere come filosofo.
Per quello che ci riguarda, Agostino si serve spesso del termine partecipare, per indicare le relazioni di
dipendenza delle creature dal Creatore: tutto il creato, ogni bont, verit, bellezza, vita finita, non sono che
partecipazioni della bont, verit, bellezza, vita divina infinita.
Lesuberante fioritura delle sue opere piena di simili asserzioni, pervase da questo spirito trascendentale nella
considerazione del creato, ma in nessuna parte delle sue opere, forse, come nella quaestio 46 delle 83
quaestiones, dedicata a celebrare le <<Idee>>, SantAgostino[12] ha espresso le sue convinzioni platoniche con
maggiore eleganza e profondit. Questa questione ha avuto unimportanza capitale nella formazione della
teologia Scolastica[13] e in particolare di quella tomista.
Un posto di primo piano, in questa ricerca delle fonti della nozione tomista di partecipazione, spetta senza
dubbio allo Pseudo Dionigi Aeropagita. Grazie al nome di cui si copr, questo profondo pensatore esercit tale
influsso sul pensiero medievale, da poter reggere il confronto con quello di Agostino[14]. Per quanto riguarda
San Tommaso, il Durantel, nel suo vivace Saint Thomas et le Pseudo-Denis (1919), rilev dalle opere
dellAquinate pi di 1702 citazioni espresse, tolte dal complesso degli <<Areopagitica>>, che inquadrano i
punti pi vitali del Tomismo.
Non si potrebbe meglio caratterizzare linflusso di Dionigi su S. Tommaso, che dichiarandolo complementare di
quello di S.Agostino: mentre la speculazione agostiniana pu essere detta la <<metafisica del Vero e del
Verbo>>, quella dellAreopagita la <<metafisica dellAmore e del Bene>>, che detto il nome proprio di
Dio[15].
Nel De Divinis Nominibus, ove esposta questa metafisica, il Bene o, pi esattamente il <<Superbonum>>,
presentato nel suo aspetto formale, cio secondo il suo diffondersi nelle varie partecipazioni alle creature: pur
restando sempre in s diviso e impartecipato nellincomunicabilit della sua sostanza, si afferma che tutto
quanto nel mondo emana da Lui, e tutto resta attaccato a Lui, come il raggio di luce al Sole... ( Div. Nom.
c.V).
Il <<superbonum>> quindi causa di tutto, e la sua causalit arriva fino al <<non ens>> cio la Materia; il
male, come tale, non esiste, perch non che la privazione di un bene (debito), onde i mali particolari non
possono derivare da qualcosa che male per essenza, poich non sono tali per una qualche partecipazione, ma
per una <<privazione>> di partecipazione[16].
La dialettica sempre identica: ogni perfezione finita non che un effetto della perfezione per essenza; cos
ogni esistente, ogni vivente, ogni sapiente, deriva da ci che , che vive, che sapiente per essenza, e tutte le
creature hanno in Dio le proprie <<ragioni>>, che Dionigi, per restare fedele alle Sacre Scritture, chiama
<<praedefinitiones>>. Le creature vengono cos a mostrare in s una somiglianza di Dio, e diventano per il
nostro intelletto le vie, risalendo le quali possiamo arrivare a quella conoscenza che di Lui possibile. La nostra
conoscenza di Dio, quindi, resta sempre indiretta e mediata, e possiamo indicare tre tappe: la prima, affermando
che Dio la causa di tutte le cose (via causale); la seconda, che non pu avere alcuna delle imperfezioni e
limitazioni proprie dei causati (via negationis); la terza, che le stesse perfezioni dei causati sono in lui in un
modo eccedente (via eminentiae).
La teologia dei <<Nomi Divini>> passa cos attraverso due fasi: una affermativa, quando ci solleviamo dalle
creature a Dio, e unaltra negativa, quando, ritornando alle creature, siamo obbligati a negare di Dio, i modi di
essere trovati in quelle, e a concepirlo al di sopra di tutti i predicati positivi e negativi.
Non di secondaria importanza stato linflusso di Boezio, cui Tommaso si rif espressamente nei due commenti
al De Trinitate e al De hebdomadibus.
Il programma della speculazione filosofica di Boezio quello stesso del Neoplatonismo, quale lo poteva
assumere un cristiano: realizzare una sintesi del Platonismo e dellAristotelismo, quale preparazione alla
speculazione teologica, nella quale sar congiunta alla Fede e la Fede alla ragione. E difficile precisare fin dove
egli sia riuscito nel suo intento: sembra che spesso, anche sotto il formulario pi platonico, non sia espresso se
non il pensiero aristotelico, come nellopuscolo De hebdomdibus, che interessa in modo tutto particolare la
nozione tomista di partecipazione[17].
Circa il contenuto dellopuscolo, stato gi detto nel capitolo precedente, e quello che mi preme precisare in
questo capitolo, linfluenza che esso ha avuto su Tommaso dAquino.
La maggior parte dei critici sono concordi nel ritenere che il significato dato da Boezio alle proposizioni ipsum
esse e id quod est, non lo stesso che ha inteso Tommaso. LAquinate, infatti, ritiene che l ipsum esse sia l
actus essendi, mentre l id quod est rappresenti la sostanza concreta che funge da soggetto nellatto
esistenziale.
Ricerche critiche recenti, condotte sia dai difensori, come dagli avversari della distinzione reale, hanno portato
al risultato concorde per il quale linterpretazione pi corretta dei testi boeziani non suggerisce, almeno
direttamente, una distinzione reale fra essenza ed esistenza, poich essa ne completamente assente. Lidentit
che Boezio pone in Dio, lidentit della sostanza e della forma divina, la distinzione che stabilisce nella
creatura una distinzione fra la sostanza prima e la sostanza seconda, non si tratta quindi di una distinzione tra
essenza e atto di essere come la intende Tommaso. Ens per participationem quindi, significa per Boezio lente
finito e composto, nellordine della sostanza, di materia e forma, o a somiglianza di materia e forma, e non la
composizione in linea essendi di essenza e atto di essere.
Boezio pu essere considerato il vero intermediario tra Platone e Aristotele, come lui stesso mostra chiaramente
non riuscendo a scegliere da che parte schierarsi. Lindecisione confessata dallo stesso Boezio indurr Goffredo
di San Vittore, nellXI secolo, a vederlo seduto tra Platone e Aristotele, intento ad ascoltare ora luno ora
laltro[18].
Assieme a Boezio, per quanto riguarda lorigine della nozione di partecipazione predicamentale, va ricordato il
neoplatonico Porfirio, di cui Boezio tradusse e comment due volte lIsogage i Categorias Aristotelis, operetta
che fu tenuta in gran conto dai medievali.
NellIsogage Porfirio, cercando di coordinare i predicabili fra di loro, si serve sistematicamente del termine
<<partecipazione>>: egli ritiene che per la partecipazione i molti predicabili vengono a formare come ununit;
ma la partecipazione non avviene sempre allo stesso modo, quella al genere e alla specie avviene sempre in
modo uguale, non cos per quanto riguarda gli accidenti, soprattutto per quelli separabili.
Quello che va notato che mentre il termine <<partecipazione>> conserva in Porfirio un significato
essenzialmente logico, e cos pure nei Commenti di Boezio, nei testi tomisti, esso suppone un profondo
significato metafisico[19].
Fra le influenze che hanno preparato la nozione tomista di partecipazione, ha unimportanza di primo piano
quella che part dal Neoplatonismo arabo: in particolare ai fini di questo lavoro, interessa la forma che la
riflessione arabo-islamica assunse nellopuscolo intitolato De Causis e nella filosofia del persiano Avicenna.
Per quanto riguarda il De Causis si tratta di unopera di alta metafisica, composta tra il sec. IX e X, a lungo
attribuita ad Aristotele, e conosciuta attraverso una traduzione della Scuola di Toledo, dal titolo De bonitate
pura. In seguito Tommaso dAquino, servendosi della traduzione della Elementatio di Proclo fatta da Guglielmo
di Moerbeke, not la straordinaria somiglianza tra questa e il De Causis, e ne dedusse che questultima non
poteva appartenere ad Aristotele[20].
Per quanto riguarda la dottrina propria del De Causis, si pu osservare che essa poggia tutta su di un realismo
esagerato, che tiene limmediata corrispondenza, come Platone, fra i gradi di astrazione intellettuale e quelli di
essere nella realt.
Al sommo degli esseri sta lUno e il Bene, causa prima, collocata ante aeternitatem, da essa derivano le
Intelligenze pure, collocate cum aeternitate (derivano le une dalle altre per un complicato processo di
emanazione intellettuale, per cui la perfezione e purezza della prima, si viene degradando nella seconda).
Dallintelligenza deriva l Anima mundi, che detta post aeternitatem, e dallAnima deriva la Natura, cio il
mondo dei corpi, che solo effetto e non causa.
In questa sede, giova notare specialmente la nozione di esse, che detto la prima formalit creata: <<prima
rerum creatarum est esse>>. L esse indica il contenuto pi profondo delle cose, su cui tutto posa, e San
Tommaso, collegando questa nozione a quella di Dionigi, e a quella che ha letto in Boezio, pu arrivare in modo
definitivo alla nozione di esse, che gli propria, dellesse cio come atto ultimo, come <<actus omnium>>,
<<forma formarum>>, nozione che sta a fondamento della nozione tomista di partecipazione[21].

Quanto allinfluenza di Avicenna sul pensiero di Tommaso dAquino, si deve dire che questultimo,
specialmente nei primi anni di carriera, sub in grande proporzione linflusso di questo pensiero, com evidente
nel De ente et essentia, anche se tale influsso non fu mai esclusivo, poich non manca di criticare alcune
posizioni del filosofo persiano: lemanatismo causale, la conoscenza divina indiretta dei singolari, e nozione di
esse come accidens predicamentale, lintelletto agente separato.
Nonostante ci, bisogna ammettere che alcuni aspetti del pensiero tomista risentono del contributo di
Avicenna[22]:
a) La soluzione tomista del problema tirata sulla falsa riga di Avicenna, e sono ad esso riferiti anche i rapporti
fra Genere e Materia, Differenza e Forma, cio fra gli elementi della definizione e quelli della realt concreta,
rapporti con i quali si stabilir la nozione tomista di partecipazione nellordine predicamentale.
b) La distinzione reale fra essenza ed essere nelle creature, riceve la prima elaborazione nel Tomismo in
dipendenza quasi esclusiva, e spesso perfino verbale, da Avicenna.
Altrettanto si pu dire delle nozioni avicenniane di <<necesse esse>> e di <<possibile esse>>: solo Dio <<per
se necesse esse>>, la creatura in quanto riceve tutto lesse da Dio, e lesse rimane del tutto al di fuori dalla sua
essenza (come accidens).
c) La distinzione tra cause del divenire e cause dellessere: solo Dio causa dellessere, le creature influiscono
soltanto sul divenire[23].

In questa breve, ma essenziale ricostruzione, sono state ricordate soltanto quelle fonti che, dal testo stesso di S.
Tommaso, appaiono aver avuto un influsso dordine sistematico in relazione allargomento in questione: esse
quindi non sono le uniche. Cos dei Padri della Chiesa ho indicato soltanto Agostino e lo Ps.-Dionigi, ma per la
sua profonda conoscenza della letteratura patristica lAquinate ha subto certamente degli altri influssi: S.Ilario
a proposito della distinzione reale e San Gregorio a proposito della conservazione di tutte le cose da Dio.
Riepilogando sembra che San Tommaso abbia distinto nelle sue fonti almeno tre aspetti diversi, secondo i quali
era stata presentata la nozione di partecipazione:
1) Per Platone la ragione della partecipazione fondata sul fatto che i <<molti>> sono trovati convenire in una
formalit comune, che deve essere trascendentale ai molti: si tratta dellunit, che deve precedere la moltitudine
(Dialettica dellUno e dei Molti).
2) Per Aristotele la ragione di partecipazione trovata nel fatto che una formalit si trova, in natura, realizzata
in modi e in gradi diversi, secondo <<prius et posterius>>, <<magis et minus>> di perfezione: ci non
possibile se non in quanto esiste di fatto qualcosa che abbia quella formalit in tutta la sua pienezza formale,
alla quale pi o meno gli altri partecipano, secondo che a essa sono pi o meno vicini (Dialettica del Perfetto e
dellImperfetto).
3) Per Avicenna infine la ragione della partecipazione fondata nella distinzione reale che c in ogni creatura
fra essenza ed essere, poich a capo degli esseri vi deve stare un Essere che atto puro e semplicissimo, che
atto ed essere secondo tutta la sua essenza; anzi non ha essenza, ma solo essere (Dialettica del Semplice e del
Composto).
Queste tre <<rationes>> per San Tommaso presentano un contenuto equivalente, ed egli usa nelle sue opere,
indifferentemente ora delluna e ora dellaltra. Il suo indomito ingegno ha saputo tutto ripensare, e riprendendo i
problemi dallinterno del loro contenuto dottrinale, riuscito ad affinare, rettificare e collocare al debito posto
ogni nozione[24].

3. LA NOZIONE DI PARTECIPAZIONE NEL DE HEBDOMADIBUS

Il commento al De hebdomadibus di Boezio costituisce, secondo il giudizio dello stesso C.Fabro, il punto di
partenza obbligatorio per una indagine sulla nozione tomista di partecipazione, poich in questopera Tommaso
espone di getto tutta la sua nozione di partecipazione.
Come ho gi avuto modo di dire, in questopera sono scarsi, o quasi del tutto assenti i riferimenti alla tradizione
e, insieme allesposizione letterale del testo boeziano, troviamo esposto il genuino pensiero del Dottore
Angelico su un problema filosofico di capitale importanza.
Nel testo boeziano posta una differenza tra lessere e il ci che [25], ed proprio partendo dalla spiegazione
di tale differenza che Tommaso introduce la nozione di partecipazione. La prima differenza consiste nel fatto
che noi intendiamo lastratto sempre come atto, e il concreto come soggetto di questo atto, che partecipa a suo
modo al medesimo. L ipsum esse qui considerato come lastratto di ens, cos come il currere lastratto
di currens: il currere qui inteso come ci, o per partecipazione del quale, il currens corre, mentre l esse
considerato come quella formalit o attualit suprema per partecipazione alla quale compreso esser di fatto
tutto ci che esiste in concreto.
A proposito della seconda differenza, Tommaso dAquino parla di partecipazione in questi termini: <<Est autem
partecipare quasi partem capere>>. E questo il primo significato di partecipazione proposto nel commento, ed
questa quella che C.Fabro definisce partecipazione predicamentale[26], vale a dire quella nella quale i termini
della relazione, partecipato e partecipante, restano nel campo dellente e della sostanza finita (predicamenti).
Nel De hebdomadibus ne sono presentati due modi: uno formale-nozionale, allorch si dice che la specie
partecipa al genere e lindividuo alla specie, e uno reale nel senso che la Materia partecipa alla Forma, ed il
soggetto allaccidente. Pur utilizzando un linguaggio aristotelico, nelle suddette affermazioni contenuto il
personale punto di vista di Tommaso, in quanto Aristotele non aveva mai parlato di attribuzione per
partecipazione e identit sostanziale per il caso della specie e del genere.
Tommaso qui afferma, invece, che la specie partecipa al genere, che il genere attribuito alla specie per
partecipazione. Questa una posizione importante e innovativa, nel contesto dellAristotelismo tomista, e indica
anche quanto doveva essere importante per Tommaso dAquino, recuperare la nozione di partecipazione.
Nel De hebdomadibus Tommaso definisce la partecipazione come ricevere una parte, e aggiunge: Inoltre
ogni volta che un essere riceve in maniera particolare, ci che a unaltra cosa appartiene universalmente, si dice
che partecipa[27]. A partire da queste osservazioni Tommaso distingue tre generi di partecipazione: quella del
soggetto allaccidente, quella della materia alla forma, quella delleffetto alla causa.
A tal proposito si pu dire, secondo il Geiger[28], che la specie, pur essendo sostanzialmente identica al
genere, non ne possiede la ragione in tutta la sua generalit. La partecipazione che, per Boezio, era prima di
tutto, e forse esclusivamente, la composizione tra due elementi estranei luno allaltro, ma uniti in una sola
realt, diventa in San Tommaso un rapporto di similitudine, tra due stati pi o meno perfetti di una stessa forma.
Questa posizione appare nel De hebdomadibus allorch si afferma: <<homo dicitur partecipare animal quia non
habet rationem animalis sucundum totam communitatem>>[29]; tuttavia se in questo passo la communitas pu
essere intesa sia in ordine intensivo (di perfezione), sia in ordine estensivo (di predicazione), nella Contra
Gentiles, la partecipazione spiegata senza dubbio nellordine intensivo[30]; qui infatti appare chiaramente la
differenza di perfezione tra il partecipante e il Partecipato, poich il primo, possiede in maniera limitata e
parziale, secondo il suo modo proprio, mentre Dio non possiede per partecipazione, ma assolutamente. Questa
distinzione permette poi allAquinate di risolvere il difficile problema del testo, vale a dire <<in che modo le
cose sono buone in ci che sono, pur non essendo beni sostanziali>>[31].
In definitiva Tommaso d una nozione sistematica del partecipare, come <<partem capere>>, che viene
applicata ovunque si diano astratti e concreti, nellordine predicamentale delle nature particolari ai rispettivi
universali, nei principi dellessere concreto, e nellordine dei rapporti causali.
I tre significati che si susseguono: partecipazione del particolare alluniversale, del soggetto alla forma e
delleffetto alla causa, sono congiunti con un similiter che testimonia lampiezza della sintesi alla quale
lAngelico arrivato, e in relazione alla quale espone le indicazioni di Boezio.
Si pu anche notare che il primo e terzo significato esulano dal testo e dal problema posto da Boezio, e sono
invece una esigenza del problema che si posto Tommaso, quella del rapporto tra l ipsum esse e tutto ci che
. Nel commento al testo di Boezio, Tommaso mette da parte il terzo modo di intendere la partecipazione, non
perch sia meno importante degli altri due, ma perch non direttamente implicato nella risoluzione del tema in
discussione. LAquinate mostra che l ipsum esse, non pu partecipare a qualcosa, n nel primo n nel secondo
modo, poich non c al di sopra dellessere una formalit superiore alla luce della quale lessere pu essere
detto partecipare; ci che partecipa invece l ens inteso come il concreto che partecipa allastratto,
rappresentato dall esse.
Tommaso inoltre allarga la nozione di partecipazione anche agli stessi astratti (esempio: albedo e color,
homo e animal),cosa che non solo estranea al testo di Boezio, ma ripugnante allo spirito del medesimo,
secondo il quale lastratto ha la propriet di essere partecipato, ma non pu partecipare.
Tenendo conto della etimologia tomista di partecipare: << Est autem partecipare quasi partem capere>>
importante non soffermarsi al significato puramente materiale di questa affermazione; infatti se da un lato
nellordine della quantit, la partecipazione avviene per una comunicazione di una parte, per il fatto che in
quellordine si possono avere realmente delle parti di un tutto distinte realmente le une dalle altre, nellordine
metafisico, cio della qualit e dellatto in genere, il partecipare non pu avere questo significato troppo
materiale. Latto e la qualit, come tali sono semplici, e pertanto o si hanno o non si hanno; se ad essi si applica
il <<partecipare>> ci potr significare non lavere una parte, poich non vi sono parti, ma lavere in modo
particolare, limitato, imperfetto, un atto e una formalit che altrove si trovano in modo totale, illimitato e
perfetto[32].
Si potr avere in definitiva una stessa forma o qualit, realizzata in maniera differente secondo le condizioni del
soggetto, e spiegabile alla luce del <<magis et minus>>, posizione di chiara origine aristotelica. Il significato
pregnante della nozione tomista di partecipazione pertanto, va ricercato, a mio parere, nella relazione di
somiglianza e dissomiglianza che si stabilisce tra il partecipato e il partecipante.
San Tommaso, infatti, ritiene che il <<partecipare>> sia un <<partialiter esse>>, un <<partialiter habere>>, che
si oppone ad <<esse, habere, accipere... totaliter>>. La specie che nella realt identica al genere, rappresenta
un tipo pi particolare, meno universale, della forma generica. Allo stesso modo la bont delle cose create
simile alla Bont universale, ma nello stesso tempo differisce da questa, per il fatto che una bont per
partecipazione, e come tale limitata e parziale.
Da questo punto di vista chi ricevesse tutto quanto ha il donatore, non partecipa del suo atto, ma
consustanziale con il donatore, come avviene nelle processioni <<ab intra>> della SS.Trinit[33]. E Tommaso
continua nel suo commento, distinguendo lessere per essenza, che un essere semplice, e lessere per
partecipazione, che accidentale, secondo qualcosa[34].

4. MODI DI PARTECIPAZIONE
San Tommaso afferma due modi fondamentali di partecipazione: uno predicamentale-univoco, laltro
trascendentale-analogo. Nel primo caso tutti i partecipanti hanno in s la stessa formalit secondo tutto il suo
contenuto essenziale, ed il partecipato non esiste in s, ma solo nei partecipanti (esempio: lumanit non esiste
in se, ma esiste luomo concreto, espressione particolare dellumanit).
Nel secondo caso invece, i partecipanti non hanno in s che una <<similitudine degradata>> del partecipato che
sussiste in s, al di fuori di essi (esempio: lessere delluomo deriva dallEsse subsistens che Dio). Qui
troviamo il significato pi forte di partecipazione, presente gi nellultimo Platone, e che San Tommaso trovava
avvalorata dalla speculazione Neoplatonica e di SantAgostino in particolare. Questo tipo di partecipazione
definita analoga, ed quella della creatura al Creatore che, essendo lessere per lessenza, in s riassume tutte le
altre perfezioni[35].
Infatti nel De hebdomadibus, a proposito della Bont divina e di quella creata, si sottolinea che mentre il Primo
bene buono assolutamente, in qualsiasi modo si dia, il bene creato lo per partecipazione, e in quanto tale
risulta essere sempre unespressione parziale e limitata del Primo. Solo Dio buono per essenza, le cose creata
lo sono per partecipazione, in lui inoltre essere e agire coincidono, motivo per cui Egli buono e giusto nello
stesso tempo, mentre nelluomo (essere composto), esser buono ed esser giusto non coincidono, con la
conseguenza che luomo non sempre giusto nel suo agire[36].
In base a ci si pu concludere che il partecipare il rapporto metafisico supremo, e sfugge ad una
determinazione logica. Partecipare <<si predica di un soggetto che ha una qualche formalit o atto, ma non in
modo esclusivo e in modo totale>>, o come afferma lo Scheller: <<Partecipare significa nel partecipante il
ricevere in modo essenziale o graduale, qualcosa del partecipato come proprio atto secondo una forma di
analogia o di somiglianza. La partecipazione cos una recezione parziale nel partecipante in quanto potenza
del partecipato, che atto, secondo che il partecipato causa esemplare per leffetto somigliante>>[37].
Il partecipato e il partecipante, differiscono per il modo di avere: si dice, infatti che la creatura partecipa l
esse, non solo nel senso che l esse della creatura non esaurisce la pienezza estensiva dellesse, come la mia
umanit non esaurisce la pienezza estensiva di questa forma, poich essa pu essere in altri e altrove: ma
soprattutto nel senso che lessere creato formalmente finito sotto laspetto intensivo; esse soltanto e non
necessariamente vita, sapienza...,come lo invece l Esse per se subsistens; e se la creatura esercita queste
ulteriori formalit non immediatamente per il suo esse, ma per mezzo di potenze e accidenti aggiunti, radicate
nella essenza.
5. PARTECIPAZIONE E CAUSALIT NEL TOMISMO
La nozione tomista di partecipazione, assume particolare importanza nellambito della storica opposizione tra
platonismo e aristotelismo. Da questo punto di vista essa riassume, forse, loriginalit storico-speculativa del
tomismo, in quanto Tommaso riuscito a privare il Platonismo e lAristotelismo dellaspetto caduco che li
opponeva, facendoli convivere secondo una mutua complementarit.
La filosofia cristiana del medioevo, sulla scorta di Platone, Agostino, Avicebron, Avicenna e altri[38], aveva
badato a salvaguardare i diritti di Dio, con una specie di geloso timore, quasi che concedendo qualcosa alla
creature, si sottraesse qualcosa alla perfezione divina.
Tommaso dAquino intu ben presto, grazie anche alla conoscenza del pensiero aristotelico, che questo modo di
leggere la realt creata, e i rapporti di questa con Dio, era sbagliato. Tuttavia la sua risposta non fu quella di
negare drasticamente la nozione platonica di partecipazione a favore di quella aristotelica di causalit, ma di
sviluppare luna e laltra in senso convergente, quasi che il concetto e il modo pi puro di causare fosse un puro
partecipare.
Tommaso ha tenuto insieme i due concetti, privandoli dellopposizione che avevano, e si potrebbe dire che la
partecipazione tomista , e insieme non , la partecipazione platonica, cos come la causalit tomista , e
insieme non , la causalit aristotelica[39]. Non si pu dire dunque, che Tommaso abbia soppresso la nozione di
partecipazione a favore di quella di causalit, piuttosto si deve dire che il Santo Dottore riusc a raggiungere un
punto di vista privilegiato, che permise di conciliare entrambe le nozioni, in maniera tale da farle risultare
armonicamente equilibrate.
E lo stesso San Tommaso daltronde ad affermare questo suo modo di vedere le cose, dicendo <<Similiter
effectus dicitur participare suam causa, et praecipue quando non adaequat virtutem suae causae>>: si tratta del
terzo modo di partecipazione espresso nel De hebdomadibus[40], che per la verit non molto sviluppato in
questo opuscolo, poich non direttamente coinvolto nella risoluzione del problema in questione. Nel Commento
alla Lettera ai Colossesi[41], quel terzo modo di partecipare, lasciato nellombra nel De hebdomadibus, viene
ampiamente sviluppato.
Il termine partecipare, in Tommaso dAquino, ha la propriet di esprimere nello stesso tempo la dipendenza
causale del partecipante dal partecipato, ed insieme leccedenza metafisica assoluta del partecipato rispetto al
partecipante. Il partecipare viene cos a esprimere, in un modo nel quale nessun altro termine filosofico pu
pretendere di fare, il rapporto che lente finito ha con lessere infinito, la creatura con il Creatore.
Per questo, tutte le opere che Dio mette al di fuori di S non sono che partecipazioni, e questo significa sia che
la creatura ha ricevuto da Dio tutto quanto ha nellessere e nelloperare, sia che ogni creatura nelle sue
attuazioni non riceve che un aspetto di quella pienezza fontale, presente nella Divinit. Tommaso riesce a
esprimere in questo modo lesatto rapporto tra la creatura e il Creatore.
Loriginalit della posizione tomista, dunque, non consiste in una negazione della partecipazione a favore della
causalit, ma deve essere cercata nella novit dei principi, grazie ai quali riuscito a salvare luna, proprio
dando allaltra tutta lespansione che le conveniva.

[1] Cfr. C. FABRO, cit., pp. 39-41.

[2] Cfr. RIGUTINI-FANFANI, Dizionario della lingua italiana, U.T.E.T., Torino, v. III, sottp <<Partecipare>>,
p. 705, col. 3 e p. 706 coll. 1-2.
[3] Cfr. C. FABRO, cit., pg. 42.
[4] Cfr. C. FABRO, cit., pp. 42-43.
[5] Cfr. C. FABRO, cit., pp. 39-122.
[6] Cfr. L.B.GEIGER, La participation dans la philosophie de S. Thomas dAquin, Librairie Philosophique J.
Vrin, Paris 1953, introd. p. 9.
[7] Cfr. P. A. CASTRONOVO, La cogitativa in S. Tommaso, Officium Libri Catholici, Romae 1966.
[8] Cfr. ARISTOTELE, Metafisica. A,5, 987 b, a cura di G. REALE, Rusconi, Milano 1993.
[9] Cfr. C. FABRO, cit., pp. 75-77.
[10] Cfr. UEBERWEG-GEYGER, Die patristiche und scholastiche Philosphie, Berlin 1928, p. 99.
[11] Cfr. E. GILSON, Introduction ltude de Saint Augustin, Paris 1929; p. 115 n.
[12] Cfr. D. AUGUSTINI HIPP., 83 Quaestiones, q. 46 De Ideis, P. L., t. 40, col. 29 n. 1. Per una esposizione
dinsieme, un po troppo letterale, della celebre <<quaestio>>, cfr. H. MEYERHOFF, On the Platonism of St.
Augustines Quaestio de ideis, in <<The New Scholasticism>>, XVI (1942), pp. 16-45.
[13] Cfr. S. TOMMASO, Summa theologiae, I, q. 15, a.1 Sed contra; ib., a.2 Sed contra; a.3 Sed contra; q.84, a.
5, ed. Leonina, 1888-1906, con il commento del Gaetano. Tutto lart. non che una presa di posizione di fronte
alla dottrina della q.46.
[14] Per la storia degli <<Areopagitica>> in Occidente, cfr. C. THRY, Lentre du Pseudo-Denys en Occident,
<<Mlanges Mandonnet>>, II (Paris, Vrin, 1930), p. 23 ss.
[15] Cfr. C. FABRO, cit., pp. 86-88.
[16] Cfr. C. FABRO, cit., pg. 88.
[17] Cfr. C. FABRO, cit., pp. 98-100.
[18] Cfr. C. PANDOLFI, cit., introd. pp. 22-23.
[19] Cfr. C. FABRO, cit., pp. 105-107.
[20] Cfr. OTTO BARDENHEWER, Die pseudo-aristotelische Schrift: Ueber das reine Gute bekannt unter den
Namen <<Liber de Causis>>, Freiburg i. Br. 1882; cfr. M. STEINSCHNEIDER, Die europaische
Uebersetzungen aus den Arabischen, Wien 1904, p. 40;cfr. M. GRABMANN, Die Proklusubersetzungen des
Wilhem von Moerbeke unde ihre verwertung in der lateinische Literatur des Mittelalters, Byzantinische
Zeitschrift 30 (1929-1930) riprodotto in <<Mittelalters Geistesleben>>, Munchen, II, p. 415. Questo studio
stato ripreso e integrato nella monografia: Guglielmo di Moerbeke O. P., il traduttore delle opere di Aristotele,
in <<Miscellanea Historiae Pontificiae>>, vol. IX, Roma 1946, p. 147 ss.
[21] Cfr. C. FABRO, cit., pp. 107-113.
[22] Cfr. DE VAUX, R., Notes et Textes sur lAvicennisme latin, Paris 1934, p. 29.
[23] Cfr. C. FABRO, cit., pp.113-117.
[24] Cfr. C. FABRO, cit., pp. 120-122.
[25] Cfr. C. PANDOLFI, cit., p. 97.
[26] Cfr. C. FABRO, cit., pp.144-186.
[27] Cfr. P. PORRO, cit., pp. 386-387: Et ideo quando aliquid particulariter recepit id quod ad alterum pertinet
universaliter, dicitur participare illud.....
[28] Cfr. GEIGER, cit., pp.47-83.
[29] Cfr. P. PORRO, cit., pp. 386-387: <<si dice che uomo partecipa di animale perch non possiede la
ragione di animale secondo la sua intera estensione>>.
[30] Cfr. TOMMASO DAQUINO, Summa contra Gentiles, ed. Marietti, cura et studio C. PERA-P.MARC-
P.CARAMELLO, 1961-67 (3 volumi; testo della Leonina), Lib. I : <<Omne quod de pluribus praedicatur
univoce secundum partecipationem, cuilibet eorum convenit de quo praedicatur, nam species partecipare dicitur
genus et individuum speciem. De Deo autem nihil dicitur per partecipationem, nam omne quod participatur
determinatur ad modum participantis, et sic partialiter habetur, et non secundum omnem perfectionis modum>>.
[31] Cfr. P.PORRO, cit., pp. 398-399.
[32] Cfr. C. FABRO, cit., pg. 316.
[33] Cfr. C. FABRO, cit., pg. 317.
[34] Cfr. C. FABRO, cit., pp. 315-327.
[35] Cfr. C. FABRO, cit., pg. 318.
[36] Cfr. P. PORRO, cit., pp. 418-19.
[37] E. SCHELLER, Das Priestertum Christi, Paderbon 1931, p. 67.
[38] Cfr. C. FABRO, cit., pg. 356.
[39] Cfr. C. FABRO, Partecipazione e causalit secondo S. Tommaso dAquino, Societ Editrice Internazionale,
Milano 1958.
[40] Cfr. P. PORRO, cit., pp. 382-383.
[41] Cfr. TOMMASO DAQUINO, Expositio et Lectura super Epistolas Pauli Apostoli, ed. Marietti, 2 t.
Indietro

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