Cocaine Abuse Bolivia

University of Miami
Dimensions of the South American Cocaine Industry

Author(s): Rensselaer Lee III
Source: Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 30, No. 2/3, Special Issue:
Assessing the Americas' War on Drugs (Summer - Autumn, 1988), pp. 87-103
Published by: Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Miami
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DIMENSIONS OF THE SOUTH
AMERICAN COCAINE INDUSTRY
RENSSELAER LEE III
DRUG ABUSE AND ATrEMPTS TO CONTROL the flow of

narcotics have come to pervade US relations with the Third
in recent years. The drug issue carries substantial potential f
flict and mutual recrimination between North and South. The main
drug-consuming countries are rich and industrialized; the main
drug-producing countries are poor and predominantly agricul-
tural. The drug trade generates a transfer of resources from North
to South and has gained a powerful economic foothold in some
Third World countries. Producing countries and consuming
countries blame each other for the accelerating drug traffic and
advocate, respectively, demand-side and supply-side solutions.
US programs to control drug cultivation and production overseas
often impinge on nationalist sensitivities. Moreover, political elites
in some Third World countries view anti-drug crusades as impos-
ing significant economic and social costs as well as creating new
and formidable political challenges.
The cocaine traffic in the Western Hemisphere constitutes a
particularly severe manifestation of the North-South conflict over
drugs. US concerns over cocaine are fairly clearcut. Although US
imports of heroin and marijuana remained roughly stable in the
past decade, imports of cocaine increased astronomically, rising
five to tenfold from 1977 to 1987, according to US government
sources. Traffickers are "literally just throwing it at our shores," in
the words of the US Commissioner of Customs (Brinkley, 1986).
Rensselaer Lee III is President of Global Advisory Services Inc. and

Associate Scholar of the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He is author
of numerous articles on the cocaine traffic and of a forthcoming book
entitled POLITICAL POWER AND COCAINE.
88 JOURNAL OF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS
Abuse
Abuse of
of cocaine
cocaineand
anditsits
derivative
derivative
"crack"
"crack"
- a -highly
a highly
toxictoxic
and and
addictive
addictive substance
substance- -hashasbecome
becomea fairly
a fairly
serious
serious
public
public
health
health
problem.
problem. Cocaine
Cocaineoverdoses
overdoses were
wereresponsible
responsiblefor for
about
about
26,000
26,000
hospital
hospital emergency
emergencycases
casesandand
1700
1700
deaths
deaths
in 1987;
in 1987;
in contrast,
in contrast,
in in
1980
1980 the
the corresponding
correspondingfigures
figures
were,
were,
respectively,
respectively,
4,800
4,800
and 250.
and 250.
Americans
Americansannually
annuallyspend
spend
$20-$25
$20-$25
billion
billion
on cocaine
on cocaine
- a sum
- a sum
roughly
roughly equivalent
equivalenttotothe
the
gross
gross
national
national
product
product
of Israel.
of Israel.
The
The United
UnitedStates
Statesexpends
expendsconsiderable
considerable
diplomatic
diplomatic
energy
energy
pressing
pressing Colombia,
Colombia,Bolivia,
Bolivia,and
and
Peru
Peru
- the
- the
major
major
countries
countries
producing
producingcocaine
cocaine- -totocurb
curb
illicit
illicit
drug
drug
cultivation
cultivation
and and
refining.
refining.
The
The cost
cost of
ofUSUSarrangements
arrangements for
for
funding,
funding,technical
technical
assistance,
assistance,
and and
narcotics
narcotics control
controlprogram
program personnel
personnelin the
in the
three
three
countries
countries
totalstotals
about
about $40-$50
$40-$50million
millionannually.
annually.
In In
Peru
Peru
andand
Bolivia,
Bolivia,
the the
United
United
States
States has
hasbuilt
builtthese
theseprograms
programs more
moreor or
lessless
fromfrom
scratch.
scratch.
In ad-
In ad-
dition,
dition, since
since1983,
1983,thetheUSUS
Congress
Congress hashas
increasingly
increasinglylinked
linked
foreign
foreign
aid
aid to
to performance
performanceininnarcotics
narcotics control.
control.
Countries
Countries
thatthat
do not
do take
not take
adequate
adequate steps
stepstotocontrol
controlillicit
illicit
drug
drug
production,
production,trafficking,
trafficking,
and and
money-laundering
money-launderingcan
canlose
lose
certain
certain
specified
specified
economic
economic
and and
military
military assistance
assistanceasaswell
wellas as
preferences
preferences
such
such
as sugar
as sugar
quotas
quotas
and and
Caribbean Initiative benefits.
Supply-side approaches, however, obviously have failed to
stem the flow of cocaine to US markets. Latin American govern-
ments lack the resources to counter the traffic; there is no cor-
respondence between the resources available to the traffickers
and those available to combat the traffic. Perhaps more important,
governments and important constituencies in the main producing
countries do not give the war against cocaine their full support.
The reasons for this position are detailed in the following text, but
several points must be mentioned from the outset.
First, the cocaine industry has gained a powerful economic
foothold in the Andean countries, especially in Peru and Bolivia.
Moving against the cocaine traffic entails substantial economic
costs for these countries. Second, the cocaine industry's economic
power has been translated into political power. The traffic in both
its upstream (agricultural) and downstream (processing and
smuggling) phases has spawned vast interlocking constituencies
which limit the scope and effectiveness of anti-drug efforts. Third,
in its higher value-added stages, the cocaine industry shares com-
mon interests with established economic and political elites. In
Colombia, cocaine traffickers have aligned themselves with the
LEE: DIMENSIONS OF THE SOUTH AMERICAN COCAINE INDUSTRY 89
more
moreconservative
conservativesocial
social
groups
groups
- rural
- rural
landowners,
landowners,
right winr
businessmen,
businessmen, and
and
factions
factions
of the
of military
the military
- in a common
- in a comm
stru
gle
gle against
againstguerrilla
guerrilla
organizations
organizations
and their
and civilian
their civilian
surrogates
The
The "para-establishment"
"para-establishment" political
political
cast of
cast
Colombia's
of Colombia's
cocaine eli
co
greatly
greatlycomplicates
complicatesthethe
war war
against
against
drugs drugs
in thatincountry.
that countr
Fourth
governments
governments andand
publics
publics
in Andean
in Andean
countries
countries
do not see
do narcotics
not see
control
controlasasa top
a topnational
nationalpriority-
priority-
a "survival"
a "survival"
issue. Indeed,
issue. na
In
cotics
coticscontrol
controloften
often
is seet
is seet
as conflicting
as conflicting
with more
withimportant
more imp na
tional
tionalgoals
goalssuch
such
as reducing
as reducing
unemployment,
unemployment,
maintaining
mai
economic
economicstability,
stability,
andand
fighting
fighting
subversion.
subversion.
ECONOMIC ISSUES
A LOOK AT THE ECONOMIC DIMENSION of the cocai

reveals that, first, the cocaine industry is a relatively im
source of foreign exchange for the Andean countries. In
1980s, South American cocaine traffickers probably e
tween $5 and $6 billion dollars annually from internat
in the US market. Perhaps $1.5 to $2 billion flowed b
cocaine-producing countries. Viewed in terms of repat
lars, cocaine exports are equivalent to an estimated 10 to
Colombia's 1987 legal exports, 25 to 30% of Peru's, and 50
of Bolivia's (corresponding dollar figures are, respecti
million-$1 billion, $600-$700 million, and $250-$450
Cocaine is almost certainly the most important export in
Bolivia, although in Colombia it probably earns less th
and petroleum.
Second, the cocaine industry provides jobs. As man
million South Americans work in the many phases of th
- cultivation, processing and refining, transportation, an
gling. In Bolivia, where one-fifth of the population is off
employed, cocaine employs an estimated 350,000 t
people (5 to 6% of the population); however, this is j
employment. There also are incalculable numbers
Americans in licit occupations - lawyers, accountants,
construction workers, automobile salesmen, and the l
benefit from the multiplier effect of the cocaine indust
prosper by selling goods and services to the industry.
Third, cocaine traffickers invest some of their earnin
businesses. In Colombia, for example, a Cali drug king
Gilberto Rodriguez Orejuela built an extensive commercial em-

pire which at one time consisted of a Chrysler dealership, a con-
struction firm, an automobile race track, a network of toy stores,
various real estate companies, 28 radio stations in various cities in
Colombia, two business schools, and one of Colombia's largest
banks, the Banco de Trabajadores (Castillo, 1983: 124-150). The
Medellin mafia's investments in office buildings and high-rise
condominiums have stimulated a tremendous building boom in
that city. Furthermore, Colombia's cocaine barons have used their
profits to buy huge extensions of rural property (an estimated $2.5
billion dollars worth in the past five years), such as cattle ranches,
horse farms, cacao and banana plantations, and so on. In Bolivia,
where most of the cocaine elite have arisen from the landed gentry
(instead of buying into it as in Colombia), traffickers have invested
some of their profits in crossbreeding cattle and improving cotton
or sugarcane yields. Agriculture, commerce, real estate, and con-
struction clearly have benefited from inflows of narco-dollars
while other economic sectors appear to have been shortchanged.
Fourth, particularly in Peru and Bolivia, the cocaine industry is
an economic safety valve; it provides jobs, income, and foreign
exchange when the formal economy fails to deliver. In Bolivia, for
instance, the gross national product declined by 2 to 3% per year
from 1980 to 1986 and the official unemployment rate jumped
from 6 to 20%0/ while the area of coca cultivation and the number
of Bolivian families engaged in it, tripled during that time. With
the collapse of the Bolivian tin industry, thousands of miners have
gone to the coca fields for work. Similarly, the hard currency
earned by cocaine compensates for declining inflows of legal
foreign exchange. Peru's and Bolivia's legal exports declined,
respectively, by 15% and 30% from 1984 to 1987. Also, interation-
al commercial lending to the two countries has almost dried up in
recent years.
In Colombia the rise of the cocaine industry paralleled and to
some extent compensated for the deterioration of Medellin's in-
dustrial base (especially of its leading sector, textiles) in the 1970s.
The industrial depression in Medellin lingered into the 1980s; from
1980 to 1985 the city had the highest unemployment rate of any
major city in Colombia (in 1986 only Barranquilla had a higher
rate). In these circumstances, the cocaine traffic absorbed many
new elements, including "small and medium level industrialists
who
whowerewere
bankrupt
bankrupt
or almost
or almost
bankrupt,
bankrupt,
unemployed
unemployed
profes- pro
sionals,
sionals,housewives
housewives
without
without
income,
income,
and skilled
andand
skilled
unskilled
and unsk
workers"
workers" (Arango-Jaramillo,
(Arango-Jaramillo,
1988: 96).
1988:
In 1987,
96). according
In 1987, toaccordi
Colombian economist Mario Arango, cocaine traffickers
repatriated about $300 million to Medellin; in so doing, says Aran-
go, they generated 28,000 new jobs in commerce, industry, per-
sonal services, and in the informal economy (Arango-Jaramillo,
1988: 140-141).
Finally and crucially important for understanding the political
economy of cocaine, the cocaine industry has generated radical-
ly new expectations and aspirations within Andean societies. Coca
farmers receive less than one percent of the final street value of
their crop - i.e., the value of the refined cocaine sold to con-
sumers in industrialized countries; nonetheless, they typically
earn several times the net income they would receive from grow-
ing alternative crops such as cacao, oranges, and coffee. All along
the cocaine production-logistics chain, people receive substantial-
ly higher wages than they would in the licit economy. For rural
dwellers, the industry offers an instant introduction to modern life-
styles - the chance to enjoy video cassette recorders, high-tech
sound systems, and the latest Toyota Landcruiser or Datsun car.
For some, it offers the chance to become fabulously wealthy. As
Pablo Escobar remarked in an interview circa 1982:
Fortunes, large or small, always have a beginning. Most of
the great millionaires of Colombia and of the world have
begun with nothing. But it is precisely this which converts
them into legends, myths, and an example for the people. To
make money in a capitalist society is not a crime but rather a
virtue (Arango-Jaramillo and Child-Velez, 1985: 128-129).
Escobar expresses the assimilationist view of most of
Colombia's cocaine elite. For him and his colleagues, the cocaine
industry represents the purest form of rags-to-riches capitalism. It
is a route to power and quasi-respectability in societies where
legitimate economic opportunities tend to be monopolized by a
few established families, dominated by foreign capital, or cir-
cumscribed by government. It is important to understand the
mind-set of Colombia's cocaine elite. In general, they are not
revolutionaries; rather, they constitute an emerging social class, a
"new illegitimate bourgeoisie" (Comacho-Guizado, 1981: 98).
(Bruce Bagley draws a fascinating comparison between the
cocaine
cocaineelite and
elite
the parvenu
andColombian
the parvenu
coffee growersColomb
of the
late
late19th19th
and 20thand
centuries.
20th[Bagley,
centuries.
1986: 97-98]). The[Bagley,
one ex-
ception
ceptionto this to
rule is
this
Carlos rule
Lehder who
is openly
CarloscalledLehder
for the over-who
throw
throw of Colombia's
of Colombia's
"monarchical oligarchy,"
"monarchical
and considered ol
cocaine
cocaineand marijuana
and to marijuana
be "revolutionaryto weapons"
be "revolu
against
North
North American
American
imperialism (Arango-Jaramillo
imperialism and Child-Velez,
(Arango
1985:
1985:142). Lehder,
142).however,
Lehder, was more
however,
or less disowned
was
by themor
other
othertraffickers,
traffickers,
and now is in theand
Unitednow
States in
isjailin
for the
life plus
Uni
135
135years.
years.
Cocaine
Cocaine has not has
been, and
not is not
been,
likely toand
be, a catalyst
is not for the
likely
economic
economic "take-off'"take-off'
of the Andean countries.
of the Most Andean
of the profitscoun
of
ofSouth
South
American American
traffickers are retained
traffickers
abroad, stashedare in taxreta
havens
havens such assuch
Panama or
asthe
Panama
Cayman Islands,
ororthe
reinvested
Cayman
in
foreign
foreignreal estate,
real securities,
estate, and businesses
securities,
(the Medellin
andsyndi-
busin
cates
catesalone alone
are reputedare
to hold
reputed
at least $10 billion
to hold dollars worth
at leas
of
offixed
fixed
and liquid
andassetsliquid
in North America,
assets Europe,
in North
and Asia). A
Much
Much of theof
money
thethatmoney
is repatriatedthat
does notis
help
repatriated
the economy;
it
itis recycled
is recycled
in the production
in the of cocaine,
production
spent on protection
of - coc
bribes,
bribes,privateprivate
armies, and elaborate
armies, security
and
systems
elaborate
- or frit-
tered
teredaway away
on imported
on luxuly
imported
goods. The portion
luxuly
that is invested
goods. T
seldom
seldomis channeled
is channeled
into "core" industries
into - mining,
"core"manufac-
indu
turing,
turing,and commercial
and commercial
transport. Recently, transport.
Colombian economist
Rece
Mario
Mario Arango
Arango
questioned 20questioned
medium- and top-level
20 Medellin
medium
capos
caposabout about
their investment
their preferences
investment
and the responses
preferenc
were
as
asfollows:
follows:
(Arango-Jaramillo,
(Arango-Jaramillo,
1988: 126). 1988: 1
Legal Investment Preferences No. Percent

Urban and Rural Real Estate 9 45%
Cattle Ranching 4 200/o
Commerce 3 15%
Construction Activity
(building condomini
and offices) 2 10%
Services and Recreation 2 100/o
The case can be made that the co

economic growth (though distortion
term). Furthermore, some drug traffic
a loss because they are money-launder
poorly planned. Such a white elephant
Alemana
Alemana hotel
hotel complex
complex outside
outside of
ofArmenia,
Armenia,the
thecapital
capitalof
ofQ
dio department;
department; it it lost
lost over
over $1
$1 million
millionin
inthe
thethree
threeyears
yearsof
ofiti
istence (Eliezer-Orozco, 1987: 101).
The cocaine industry does provide benefits for the ailing
economies of the Andean region. In the words of Bolivia's presi-
dent, Victor Paz Estenssoro: "Cocaine has gained an importance
in our economy in direct response to the shrinking of the formal
economy" (Graham, 1986). Moreover, perhaps the most impor-
tant point is that by raising expectations and transforming life-
styles, the cocaine industry has created new patterns of interest
articulation and generated new demands on Andean political sys-
tems.
POLITICAL ISSUES
SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL CLOUT has been amassed in the A

dean countries by the cocaine industry because of its large pop
base in the upstream phases and its enormous financial and log
tical capabilities in the downstream phases. Cocaine's most vi
constituency consists of the hundreds of thousands of Sou
American farmers (including working family members, the to
is at least 600,000) who cultivate coca leaves. Coca farmers
highly organized, sometimes well-armed, and capable of exer
tremendous pressure on governments. The "coca lobby" in Boliv
and Peru is a formidable political force. Bolivia's 70,000 coca-fa
ing families are organized into 10 regional federations (four in
Yungas, six in the Chapare - the two main coca-growing reg
located, respectively, in the La Paz and Cochabamba dep
ments). These federations receive direct political support from
1.3 million-member Bolivian Workers' Union and its main affil
the confederation of Bolivian peasant workers. Bolivia h
population of only 6.4 million people; the coca lobby, writ la
encompasses about 20%/ of the national population. In addit
coca farmers are backed by left and far-left political parties; in
Bolivian Chamber of Deputies, they have a combined re
sentation of 40 deputies - one-third of the total (120) in that b
Such backing reflects ideological considerations more than
pro-coca sentiment per se (the left is both anti-government
anti-US);yet, it adds to the farmers' overall political clout.
In Peru, coca growers are not the national political force
they
theyare
areinin
Bolivia;
Bolivia;
however,
however,
they they
are well-entrenched
are well-entrenched
locally. Inlocally. In
Peru's
Peru'sUpper
UpperHuallaga
Huallaga
Valley
Valley
where
where
over 90%
over
of90%
farmof
income
farmisincome is
from
fromcoca
cocacultivation,
cultivation,
growers
growers
articulate
articulate
their interests
their interests
through through
provincial
provincialand
anddistrict
district
self-defense
self-defense
fronts.
fronts.
These Federaciones
These Federaciones
de de
Defensa
Defensadede loslos
Intereses
Intereses
del Pueblo
del Pueblo
(FEDIP)(FEDIP)
currently
currently
seem to beseem to be
dominated
dominatedbyby moderate
moderateleftist
leftist
leaders
leaders
(representatives
(representatives
of the Iz-of the Iz-
quierda
quierdaUnida),
Unida), butbut
they
they
probably
probably
also are
also
infiltrated
are infiltrated
by Senderoby Sendero
Luminoso
Luminosoguerrillas.
guerrillas.
Sendero
Sendero
has gained
has gained
a political
a political
footholdfoothold
- -
partly
partlyby byexploiting
exploitingresentment
resentment
againstagainst
US-Peruvian
US-Peruvian
eradication
eradication
policies
policies- -and
andnownowhashas
considerable
considerable
influence
influence
among peasants
among peasants
in
in the
theValley.
Valley.Sendero's
Sendero's
propagandists
propagandists
have had
have
a field-day
had a field-day
denouncing
denouncing controversial
controversialplansplans
to spray
to spray
herbicides
herbicides
on coca. To
on coca. To
quote
quotea aSendero
Senderoleaflet
leaflet
distributed
distributed
at a roadblock
at a roadblock
in the Upper
in the Upper
Huallaga
HuallagaValley
Valley
lastlast
August:
August:
We
We repudiate
repudiateand
and
denounce
denounce
the plan
the to
plan
eradicate
to eradicate
coca plan-
coca plan-
tations
tationsby byusing
usinginsecticides
insecticides
of high
of high
destructive
destructive
power, such
power, such
as
as 'Spike,'
'Spike,'which
which notnotonlyonly
destroy
destroy
coca, flora,
coca, and
flora,
fauna,
andbut
fauna, but
also
also threaten
threaten thethe
lives
lives
of animals
of animals
and humans
and humans
throughout
throughout
the the
Huallaga
Huallagaregion
region(Bases
(Bases
Huallaga,
Huallaga,
1988: 1988:
1). Sendero
1). Sendero
also also
helps
helpscoca
cocafarmers
farmers
in another
in another
important
important
respect;respect;
it protects
it protects
them
themagainst
against
thethe
bullying
bullying
violence
violence
of drug
ofdealers
drug dealers
and en- and en-
courages
couragesthem
them to to
demand
demand
fromfrom
dealers,
dealers,
higher higher
prices for
prices for
their coca leaves.
In defending the right of farmers to cultivate and sell coca

leaves, the coca lobby relies heavily on mass mobilization tactics
such as sit-ins, demonstrations, and roadblocks. For example,
Peruvian coca farmers, backed by narcotics traffickers and
Sendero Luminoso guerrillas, shut down the main jungle highway
(Carretera Marginal) in the Huallaga Valley for several days in
August 1987 and again in August 1988. Acts of sabotage on these
occasions included blowing up bridges, digging trenches, and
erecting barriers of boulders, logs, and burning rubber tires.
Bolivian coca farmers and their worker-peasant allies have block-
aded and sealed off Cochabamba - the nation's third largest city
- four times since 1983 to protest US-Bolivian anti-drug policies.
Other anti-government demonstrations also have occurred. In
May 1987, hundreds of coca farmers laid seige to a Drug Enforce-
ment Administration (DEA) encampment in the Chapare, forcing
DEA agents to temporarily withdraw from the region. In June
1988, a contingent of Chapare peasants briefly occupied Bolivian
government
governmentoffices
officesin in
Cochabamba
Cochabambaand and
tooktook
12 hostages,
12 hostages,
includ-in
ing
ing two
twoAmerican
American advisors.
advisors.
Also
Also
in June,
in June,
an estimated
an estimated
4,000 4,0
to
5,000
5,000 coca
cocagrowers
growers broke
brokeinto
into
thethe
offices
offices
of DIRECO
of DIRECO
(Direcco6n
(Dire
de Reduccfon de Cultivos de Coca, Bolivia's coca eradication
agency) in the Chapare town of Villa Tunari. These farmers were
searching for evidence to support a rumor that DIRECO and DEA
were testing herbicides against coca in the Chapare. UMOPAR
(Unidad Movile de Patrullaje Rural, the anti-drug police) units
stationed in the town staged a counterattack that cost the lives of
10 to 15 peasants and one policeman.
Pressures from the coca lobby have severely impeded crop
reduction efforts, the cornerstone of US anti-cocaine policy in An-
dean source countries. In Bolivia, the goverment cannot eradi-
cate a single hectare of coca without the consent of peasants'
federations. Bolivia's new anti-coca legislation, enacted inJuly of
1988 - thanks largely to the coca lobby's efforts - included a
prohibition against chemical herbicides. In Peru, because of
growers' opposition and general security problems, eradication in
the Upper Huallaga Valley almost came to a halt in 1987; only 355
hectares were destroyed - a drop from 2575 in 1986, and 4830 in
1985. Pressure from the coca lobby and from environmental
groups in mid-1988, caused the Peruvian government to suspend
a program for the aerial testing of herbicides. To stop cocaine "at
the source" thus appears to be an unrealistic hope.
Less visible but even more powerful than South American coca
lobbies, are the criminal syndicates that refine, smuggle, and dis-
tribute cocaine. Here the discussion will focus mainly on Colom-
bia, where the cocaine mafia has emerged as a significant actor
on the national political scene. There is general agreement that
two networks of trafficking organizations, one based in Medellin
and the other in Cali, dominate the production of refined cocaine
in Colombia. Five major syndicates appear to handle the majority
(70 to 80%) of Colombia's cocaine exports. These are headed,
respectively, by Medellin traffickers Pablo Escobar Gaviria, Jorge
Luis Ochoa Visquez, andJose Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha, and by
Call traffickers Gilberto Rodriguez Orejuela and Jose Santa Cruz
Londofio. The major exporters do not comprise a successful car-
tel in the economic sense - they cannot maintain cocaine prices
any better than OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries) maintains oil prices (average wholesale prices for
cocaine
cocaine per
per kilo
kiloin
inthe
theUnited
UnitedStates
States
dropped
dropped from
from$55,000
$55,000
- -
$60,000
$60,000 inin 1980
1980and
andtoto$10,000-
$10,000-$15,000
$15,000in in
mid-1988).
mid-1988).Also,
Also,
therethere
is lethal
lethal competition
competitionbetween
betweenthethe
Medellin
Medellin andand
CaliCali
syndicates
syndicates
- -
as of
of August
August1988,
1988,the
thedeath
deathtoll
toll
inin
the
the
"war"
"war"
hadhad
reached
reached
78 just
78 just
in Medellin
Medellin (Semana,
(Semana,1988a:
1988a:26-28).
26-28).
Apparently,
Apparently,
thethe
dispute
dispute
derives from Medellin's efforts to move into the lucrative New
York City market, traditionally a Call preserve. There is, however,
considerable business collaboration on an intra-city basis; traffick-
ers collaborate on insuring cocaine shipments, engage in joint
ventures, exchange loads, and jointly plan assassinations. (In the
past, Medellin and Cali families collaborated in setting up a
cocaine distribution network in Western Europe). Moreover,
cocaine barons share a common political agenda which includes
blocking the extradition of drug traffickers, immobilizing the
criminal justice system, and selectively persecuting the Colombian
left.
Cocaine syndicates in Colombia and elsewhere maintain an ex-

tensive system of protection and intelligence. They have suc-
ceeded in penetrating and corrupting nearly every important
national institution - police forces, military establishments, legis-
latures, key government ministries (such as the Colombian Mini-
stries of Justice and Foreign Affairs), and the news media. Also,
cocaine dealers play the role of power broker; they are a major
source of funding for political parties and electoral campaigns.
Finally, a few leading mafia figures have earned tremendous
popular support by sponsoring public works such as clinics,
schools, sewer repair projects, housing developments, and sports
stadiums - projects which benefit the urban and rural poor. Pablo
Escobar, for example, built 450 two-bedroom housing units for
the slum-dwelling families of Medellin. This project is now called
the "Barrio Pablo Escobar" and it compares very favorably with
typical graduate student housing in the United States.
This pattern of corruption also has an international dimension.
In their search for transit routes and money-laundering facilities,
Colombian trafficking organizations have cultivated ties with top
political and military leaders throughout Central America and the
Caribbean - for example,in Panama, Honduras, Nicaragua, Haiti,
the Bahamas, and the Turks and Caicos Islands. (In Nicaragua, the
Colombians reportedly hedge their bets by also funneling millions
of dollars to various contra factions). Colombian traffickers
probably
probablyhave
have
paid
paid
bribes
bribes
to Mexican
to Mexican
authorities
authorities
to allowto
cocaine
allow
to
to be
betransshipped
transshippedthrough
through
Mexico
Mexico
en route
en route
to the to
United
the States.1
United St
The
The Colombian
Colombianmafids
mafidstentacles
tentacles
also have
also extended
have extended
southward.
south
In
In the
theearly
early1980s,
1980s,
Medellin
Medellin
traffickers
traffickers
made an
made
unsuccessful
an unsuccessfu
ef-
fort
fortto topurchase
purchaseBolivian
Bolivian
communications'
communications'
media, media,
including
includ
El
Diario,
Diario,a aleading
leading
La La
PazPaz
daily,
daily,
and TV
andstations
TV stations
in Cochabamba
in Cochabam
and
Santa
SantaCruz.
Cruz.Bolivia's
Bolivia's
"King
"King
of Cocaine,"
of Cocaine,"
Roberto
Roberto
Suarez, Suarez,
apparent-
appar
ly
ly was
wasthethefront
frontman man
for for
this this
scheme
scheme
(Interview,
(Interview,
BolivianBolivian
Ministry Min
of Interior).
In sum, the cocaine constituency in Colombia and other Latin
American countries extends beyond the people who make and
move cocaine, right to the heart of the political systems of these
countries; but this is not all of the story.
South American cocaine elites basically are a conservative
political force. Their values reflect, in an exaggerated form, those
of the "establishment" they emulate. While coca-growing peasants
in South America often align with (or are courted by) leftist move-
ments and parties, cocaine traffickers - especially the major
dealers - gravitate toward the political right. For example,
Colombia has a serious subversion problem - there are said to
be 10,000 to 15,000 armed guerrillas operating in the country-
and the large cocaine syndicates have emerged as determined foes
of the Marxist revolutionary movements. Colombian traffickers
are on the cutting edge of the "dirty war" being waged between
the property-owning classes and the revolutionary leftist groups
- a struggle which may have significant implications for the fu-
ture evolution of Colombia's political system.
Consider, for example, what is happening in the countryside.
As mentioned above, Colombia's traffickers have invested much
of their repatriated profits in landed estates in the countryside.
Traffickers' farms and ranches may be purely legitimate opera-
tions, or they may also house cocaine laboratories. Whatever the
case, traffickers - like other rural property owners - are vul-
nerable to extortion by local guerrilla forces. That is, they share
some class interests and concerns with the traditional rural elite.
In a number of Colombian departments - such as Antioquia,
Cordoba, Meta, and Santander- cocaine traffickers seem to have
played the role of white knights. For years, guerrillas routinely ex-
torted protection money from local landowners; those who did
not pay saw their farms burned down and their family members
kidnapped.
kidnapped. When
When the
the big
big capos
caposarrived
arrivedand
andbecame
becamethe
theneigh-
neigh-
bors of
of the
the traditional
traditional landed
landedgentry,
gentry,however,
however,the
theneighborhood
neighborhood
actually
actually improved
improved -- at
at least
leasttemporarily.
temporarily.The
Thetraffickers
traffickersspear-
spear-
headed
headed the
the creation
creation of
of local
localself-defense
self-defenseassociations.
associations.They
They
brought
brought in
in paramilitary
paramilitary squads
squadsthat
thatformed
formedthe
thenucleus
nucleusofofprivate
private
armies.
armies. In
In certain
certain regions
regions ofofColombia
Colombia- -the
theMiddle
MiddleMagdalena
Magdalena
Valley,
Valley, for
for example
example -- three-way
three-wayalliances
alliancesdeveloped
developedamong
amongcat-
cat-
tle ranchers,
ranchers, the
the drug
drug mafia,
mafia,and
andlocal
localmilitary
militarycommanders.
commanders.The
The
military
military chased
chased guerrillas,
guerrillas,the
themafids
mafidshit
hitsquads
squadskilled
killedguerrilla
guerrill
sympathizers,
sympathizers, and
and the
the traditional
traditionalelite
elitesupplied
supplied"an
"anair
airofof
legitimacy"
legitimacy" (Collett,
(Collett, 1988:
1988: 132).
132).
The result
result in
in many
many cases
cases has
hasbeen
beento
todrive
driveaway
awaythe
theguerrillas.
guerrillas.
Yet the
the limpieza
limpieza functions
functionsof
ofthese
thesewhite
whiteknights
knightshave
havehad
ha
catastrophic
catastrophic consequences
consequences for
forhuman
humanrights
rightsininColombia.
Colombia.For
Forex-
ex
ample,
ample, they
they have
have massacred
massacredpeasants
peasantswho
whocollaborate
collaboratewith
withguer-
guer
rillas or
or who
who belong
belong to
to guerrilla
guerrillafront
frontorganizations.
organizations.InInMarch
March1988,
1988,
30 armed
armed men
men shouting
shouting "long
"longlive
livepeace,
peace,down
downwith
withthethePatriotic
Patriotic
Union (the civilian arm of the FARC [Fuerzas Armadas
Revolucionarias de Colombia]) and the Popular Front (the civilian
arm of the EPL [Ejercito Popular de Legalizaci6n]), invaded a
banana plantation in the Uraba region of Antioquia. They woke
up a group of sleeping banana workers, lined 17 of them against
the wall, and shot them. Later, the murderers went to another plan-
tation and killed three more peasants. Preliminary reports suggest
a rather vast conspiracy: that Pablo Escobar and Gonzalo
Rodriguez Gacha recruited the assassins and paid their salaries;
that the killers were trained on ranches belonging to an alleged
cocaine trafficker named Fidel Castano; and that local military
commanders in Uraba provided lists of peasant "subversives" and
led the killers to their targets (Espectador, 1988).
In April 1988, there was another such incident. A group of 10
men, armed "to the teeth," machine-gunned 36 peasants to death
during an Easter festival near the C6rdoba town of La Mejor
Esquina. About 15% of the village died in the attack. Evidently, the
festival itself had been a cruel trap: an alleged narcotraficante
named Cesar Cura had "paid 120,000 pesos for the orchestra and
helped with other organizational aspects of the fiesta" (Semana,
1988b). Apparently, some of the victims were members of the EPL.
The infamous Fidel Castano, one of those allegedly responsible
for the Uraba massacre, also is accused of having organized and
trained
trainedthe
thekillers
killers
of the
of the
La Mejor
La Mejor
Esquina
Esquina
peasants.
peasants.
The
Thedirty
dirtywar
warhashas
extended
extended
to Colombia's
to Colombia's
towns and
towns
cities.
and citi
Various
Variousright
right
wing
wing
vigilante
vigilante
squads,
squads,
many financed
many financed
with drugwith d
money,
money,havehave
been
been
carrying
carrying
out an
outextermination
an extermination
campaigncampa
against
againstvisible
visible
members
members
of the
of extreme
the extreme
left: professors,
left: professors,
labor or- labor o
ganizers,
ganizers,amnestied
amnestied
guerrillas,
guerrillas,
and leftist
and leftist
politicalpolitical
leaders. Aleaders.
prime A pri
example
exampleofof
mafia
mafia
vigilantism
vigilantism
was the
was
October
the October
1987 assassination
1987 assassinat
ofJaime
ofJaimePardo
Pardo
Leal,
Leal,
Colombia's
Colombia's
foremost
foremost
MarxistMarxist
leader. Aleader.
major A m
figure
figureininthe
the
Medellin
Medellin
Cartel,
Cartel,
Gonzalo
Gonzalo
Rodriguez
Rodriguez
Gacha, isGacha,
said to is said t
have
havepaid
paidhenchmen
henchmen
30 million
30 million
pesos pesos
(about (about
$120,000)
$120,000)
to arrangeto arra
the
the hit.
hit.(Afterwards,
(Afterwards,
at one
at of
onehisof
estates
his estates
in Pachoin[near
Pacho
Bogota],
[near Bogota
Rodriguez
Rodriguez reportedly
reportedly
hosted
hosted
a lavish
a lavish
reception
reception
for the assassins
for the assas
[Ttempo,
[Ttempo,1987]).
1987]).
TheThe
motive
motive
for the
forkilling
the killing
is not clear;
is nothowever,
clear; however
one
one Colombian
Colombianjournalist
journalist
suggests
suggests
that Rodriguez'
that Rodriguez'
vendetta vendetta
with w
the
the FARC
FARC dated
datedback
back
to late
to 1983
late 1983
when when
the guerrillas
the guerrillas
invaded one
invaded on
of
of his
hisranches
ranches andand
made
made
off with
off with
180 kilos
180ofkilos
coca, of
a number
coca, aof
number
weapons,
weapons,and
and
$500,000
$500,000
in cash
in cash
(Castillo,
(Castillo,
1983: 235).
1983: 235).
It
It is
isimportant
important to note
to note
thatthat
drug drug
trafficking
trafficking
vigilantism
vigilantism
is not is n
something
something occurring
occurringin isolation.
in isolation.
It has It
thehas
tacit
theif tacit
not the
ifactive
not the acti
support
supportofof other
other
groups
groups
within
within
society:
society:
rural landowners
rural landowners
(of (
course),
course),right
right
wing
wing
businessmen,
businessmen,
and elements
and elements
of the police
of the andpolice
military.
military.
There
Thereis,
is,ofof
course.
course.
the the
question
question
of theof
nexus
the between
nexus between
the drug the dr
trade
tradeand
andinsurgent
insurgent
groups.
groups.
FARCFARC
guerrillas
guerrillas
tax and,tax
in certain
and, in cert
cases,
cases,directly
directlymanage
manage
coca coca
cultivation
cultivation
as well as
as well
cocaine
asprocess-
cocaine proc
ing
ing facilities.
facilities.YetYet
thethe
Medellin-Cali
Medellin-Cali
syndicates,
syndicates,
which get
which
most get
of most o
their crude cocaine from Bolivia and Peru (and which account for
most of Colombia's refined cocaine production), probably have
few ties with the FARC. Most cocaine hydrochloride laboratories
in Colombia are not "protected" (i.e., taxed) by the guerrillas.
Many are located deep in the Amazon jungles along the Peru-
Colombia-Brazil border where there is virtually no guerrilla
presence; others are located in regions such as the Middle Mag-
dalena Valley where traffickers, or the "triple-alliances" described
above, have a preponderance of power (Collette, 1988: 132). To
put the point somewhat differently, if Colombia stopped cultivat-
ing coca tomorrow, the financial base of the FARC would shrink
considerably and some independent cocaine operators would go
out of business; however, the operators of the Medellin-Cali or-
ganizations would not be greatly affected.
This
This pattern
patternofofnarco-guerrilla
narco-guerrillaconflict
conflict
is also
is also
apparent
apparent
in Peru,
in Peru,
but
but Peruvian
Peruviantrafficking
traffickinggroups
groupsareare
relatively
relativelyweak,
weak,
disorganized,
disorganized,
and
and dependent
dependentononColombian
Colombian groups
groupsforfor
leadership,
leadership,
technical
technical
ad- ad
vice,
vice, and
andarmed
armedsupport.
support.There
Thereis no
is no
self-conscious
self-conscious
bourgeois
bourgeois
narco-class
narco-classcomparable
comparabletoto
that
that
in in
Colombia
Colombiaor Bolivia.
or Bolivia.
Cocaine
Cocaine
traffickers
traffickershave
havenot
notyet
yetdeveloped
developeda common
a common anti-leftist
anti-leftist
agenda
agend
nor
nor have
havethey
theyestablished
establisheda close
a close
alliance
alliance
with
with
the the
propertied
propertied
clas- clas-
ses
ses and
and the
themilitary.
military.Nonetheless,
Nonetheless,forforseveral
several
years
years
drugdrug
dealers
dealers
in in
the
the Upper
UpperHuallaga
HuallagaValley
Valleyhave
have
battled
battled
thethe
Sendero
Sendero
Luminoso
Luminoso
guerrillas
guerrillasfor
forterritory,
territory,resources,
resources,
andand
control
control
of the
of coca-growing
the coca-growing
peasantry.
peasantry.ToTocite
citeanan
example,
example,
there
there
waswas
a bloody
a bloody
trafficker-guer-
trafficker-guer-
rilla
rilla shootout
shootoutlast
lastOctober
Octoberin in
thethe
valley
valley
town
town
of Paraiso;
of Paraiso;
34 people
34 people
died.
died. The
Thehead
headofofthe
thecocaine-trafficking
cocaine-trafficking
gang
gang
(who,
(who,
incidental-
incidental
ly,
ly, was
was wounded
woundedininthe
the
battle
battle
andand
later
later
waswas
taken
taken
into into
police
police
cus- cus-
tody)
tody) was
waswell
wellknown
knowntoto
the
the
police
police
forfor
his his
effort
effort
in organizing
in organizin
local
local communities
communitiesagainst
against
Sendero.
Sendero.
There also is evidence of collaboration. An informed US source
in Lima reports that on one shipment of cocaine base flown out
of the Uchiza district in mid-1988, traffickers paid bribes totaling
$12,000: $5,000 went to the local military command, $5,000 to the
Uchiza branch of the Guardia Civil(national police), and $2,000
to Sendero front organizations. One Peruvian trafficker named
"Vampiro" (because he lacks all his front teeth except the two
upper incisors) reportedly allowed Sendero Luminoso guerrillas
to use his house as a command post when Sendero briefly oc-
cupied the Upper Huallaga Valley town of Tocache in April 1988.
Still, the narco-guerrilla relationship is mainly competitive, with
each side trying to stake out territories (red and white zones, to
use Sendero's terminology) where it can exercise predominant
control.
ATtITUDES
THE VISIBLE AND INVISIBLE cocaine constituencies sk

above benefit from the lack of a truly awakened anti-drug c
sus in the Andean source countries. While concern over cocaine
and other drugs is growing, governments and publics still do not
consider drug trafficking to be a "survival issue." For example
various opinion surveys in Colombia suggest that Colombians ar
overwhelmingly opposed to the traffic, but that they see it as a les
important national
national problem
problem than
than unemployment,
unemployment, inflation,
inflation, street
street
crime, and subversion.
subversion. Also,
Also, certain
certain drug
drug enforcement
enforcement measures
measures
- such as the US-Colombian
US-Colombian extradition
extradition treaty
treaty and
and the
the use
use of
of the
the
US Army to raid
raid cocaine
cocaine laboratories
laboratories in
in Bolivia
Bolivia -- have
have aroused
aroused
intense nationalistic
nationalistic reactions.
reactions. Recent
Recent opinion
opinion polls
polls show
show that
that aa
substantial majority
majority of
of Colombians
Colombians oppose
oppose the
the extradition
extradition of
of drug
drug
traffickers to the
the United
United States.
States.
There are signs that
that Colombians
Colombians are
are growing
growing weary
weary of
of the
the drug
drug
war. A number of
of prominent
prominent leaders,
leaders, including
including aa head
head of
of the
the
Council of State and
and an
an attorney
attorney general,
general, have
have publicly
publicly supported
supported
negotiating with
with cocaine
cocaine traffickers
traffickers as
as aa prelude
prelude to
to legalizing
legalizing and
and
taxing the cocaine
cocaine trade.
trade. An
An opinion
opinion poll
poll commissioned
commissioned by by the
the
Medellin daily, ElMundo,
ElMundo, inin August
August 1988,
1988, shows
shows that
that 55%
55% of
of the
the
residents of that
that city
city favor
favor aa dialogue
dialogue with
with narcotics
narcotics traffickers
traffickers
(Mundo, 1988). The
The cocaine
cocaine mafids
mafids habit
habit of
of killing
killing off
off judges
judges and
and
public officials who
who favor
favor strong
strong stands
stands against
against drugs
drugs has
has doubt-
doubt-
less contributed to these defeatist attitudes.
More important, there is a widely-held presumption - from
top government officials on down - that the drug trade con-
tributes to economic growth and financial stability, even if it is
harmful in other respects. The crises of debt, economic stagna-
tion, and rampant unemployment which haunt most countries in
the region, reinforce this perception. Indeed, if the South
American cocaine industry disappeared today, the result would
be catastrophic: evaporation of hard currency reserves, massive
unemployment, increase in crime and subversion in rural areas, a
flood of new migrants to the cities, and so on. Such a situation
could only play into the hands of extremist groups on both the left
and the right. One wonders, for example, how long democracy
would last in Bolivia if 200,000 dispossessed coca farmers sudden-
ly decided to march on La Paz. The failure to date of Andean
governments to use herbicides against coca - perhaps the only
effective way to control cocaine trafficking at the supply end
mirrors these socio-economic concerns more than it reflects con-
cern over damage to the environment.
The subversion question also complicates the drug enforce-
ment picture in cocaine-producing countries. Despite occasional
bursts of anti-drug rhetoric, political leaders see Marxist revolu-
tionary movements as a bigger (or at least more immediate) threat
to the political and social order than the cocaine industry. Further-
more, Colombia's
Colombia's cocaine
cocaine barons
baronsseem
seemto
tobe
beenthusiastically
enthusiasticallypar-
par-
ticipating
ticipating in
in the
the struggle
struggle against
againstinsurgency.
insurgency.InInColombia
Colombia- -
shaken by
by more
more than
than 30
30 years
yearsof
ofguerrilla
guerrillaterrorism
terrorism- -sabotage,
sabotage,
kidnapping
kidnapping and
and the
the panorama
panoramaof ofcocaine
cocainedealers
dealersmassacring
massacring
communists
communists no
no doubt
doubt are
are greeted
greetedwith
withsatisfaction
satisfactionininsome
some
quarters.
quarters.
In sum,
sum, the
the cocaine
cocaine industry
industry has
hascreated
createdvast
vastnetworks
networksofofal-
al-
liances both inside and outside the Andean source countries.
These constituencies present an almost insuperable barrier to dr
law enforcement in the region. There are, of course, differ
dimensions to the war against drugs. US and Latin American an
drug programs can limit the traffickers' inroads to the political
tem; they make it harder for traffickers to run for public offic
form "nationalist" political parties, to carve out fiefdoms within
national territory, and (as occurred under the Garcia Meza regi
in Bolivia in 1980-81) to control the top eschelons of governme
Yet curbing the more outrageous political manifestations of
drug trade is not the same as stopping the flow of drugs. Boliv
got rid of Garcia Meza and his cronies but the cocaine traff
Bolivia has expanded enormously since the early 1980s.
Ultimately, the solution to the US cocaine epidemic lies
wiping out the demand for the drug. This means, especially, ale
ing US citizens to the lethally addictive properties of coca
There are some heartening signs that US teenagers and yo
adults are increasingly aware of the dangers of cocaine use,
that they are reducing their consumption accordingly. Yet brea
ing the hold of cocaine on the US population will be a long
difficult process -it could take a generation or more. In the me
time, US policymakers need to reduce the now excessively h
profile that cocaine has in US relations with the Andean countr
that is, the cocaine issue should not be allowed to obscure
traditional diplomatic interests in these countries.
NOTES
1. On the international activities of the Colombian mafia, see Bagle

(1988): 83.
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(1986) "The Colombian Connection: The Impact of Drug Traffic
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University of Miami

Dimensions of the South American Cocaine Industry

RENSSELAER LEE III

DRUG ABUSE AND ATrEMPTS TO CONTROL the flow of

Rensselaer Lee III is President of Global Advisory Services Inc. and

A LOOK AT THE ECONOMIC DIMENSION of the cocai

Gilberto Rodriguez Orejuela built an extensive commercial em-

Legal Investment Preferences No. Percent

The case can be made that the co

SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL CLOUT has been amassed in the A

In defending the right of farmers to cultivate and sell coca

Cocaine syndicates in Colombia and elsewhere maintain an ex-

THE VISIBLE AND INVISIBLE cocaine constituencies sk

1. On the international activities of the Colombian mafia, see Bagle

ARANGO-JARAMILLO, M. (1988) Impacto del Narcotrafico en A

BAGLEY, B. (1988) "Colombia and the War on Drugs," Foreign Affairs

GRAHAM, B. (1986) "Bolivia Runs Risk in Drug Drive." The Washington

Interview. (1988) Bolivian Ministry of Interior (10 October).

(El) Mundo (1988) "Piden el Dialogo entre Gobiero y la Guerrilla." (17

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