Human Embodiment: The Theme and the Encounter in Vedantic Phenomenology

Author(s): Debabrata Sinha

Source: Philosophy East and West, Vol. 35, No. 3 (Jul., 1985), pp. 239-247
Published by: University of Hawai'i Press
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Debabrata Sinha Human embodiment:The theme and the encounterin
Vedantic phenomenology

Speakingon theproverbialproblemofbody-soulrelationin theWesternphilo-

sophictradition, Hannah Arendtobserves:"The inside-outside relation,truefor
our own bodies, is not trueforour souls, even thoughwe speak of our own
psychiclifeand itslocation'inside'ourselvesinmetaphorsobviouslydrawnfrom
bodily data and experiences." The basicallydualisticmodel inherentin the
Platonicconceptioncomesup witha cleardistinction of thesoul (psyche)from
thebody(soma).2ThePlatonicidea of independenceof thesoul fromthebody,
and theurgeto getridofit,werepushedfurther intoa hostilitytowardthebody.
The bodyis comparedbothto a prisonand a tomb,fromwhichthesoul longsto
be released.As Aristotlesubsequently urged,thePlatonicaffirmation oftheone-
sidedsuperiority ofthepsycheoverthebodyonlyexhibiteda failureto graspthe
relationof theformerto thelatter.That thetwo can be logicallydistinguished
neednotprecludethetruththatthebodyservesas theinstrument throughwhich
a soul expressesitself.On thecontrary, theAristotelianemphasison body-soul
organicity, as W. K. C. Guthrierightly suggests,indicates"a hintthata satis-
factorystudyof lifemustbe based on a studyof thelivingbody."3
It is thisquestionofthelivedbodyunderthefocusofhumansubjectivity-the
bodyofwhichI am consciousas myown-that is posed in thepresentdiscourse,
in termsof the Vedanticperspectiveof Self (Atman)qua pure consciousness
(caitanya).To turnbriefly once moreto Westernthought,in Descartes'dualistic
model we stillcome across,in an unexpectedmanner,an accenton thetruism
that the body is 'intimatelyunioned' with the mind. As Richard Zaner, a
contemporary in thisarea of problems,putsit,the'body' poses "a
investigator
wonderfulenigmawithintheverysystemof thedualism:shifting, equivocal,at
once both'mentaland 'material',yetneithertheone northeothersimpliciter." 4
Thus in place of a disjunction,of an exclusivity
of resextensaand rescogitans,
thereapears a conjunctionof the two, whichyet is not logicallya case of
conjunction.So, evenin termsof theCartesianmodel,thehumanbodytendsto
standout as unique,breakingthroughthe'either... or' as wellas the'neither...
nor' of mindand matter.Comingalong thisline of reflection, in recenttimes
Hans Jonas,forexample,developshis 'philosophicalbiology' of the organic
body,or moreappropriately, of'my own livingbody'.
Coming to the Indian philosophictradition-particularlythe Upanisads
and AdvaitaVedanta of Sarhkara-the issueconcerningthestatusof thebody
(dehalsarfra) showsup. Theremightprevaila generaldoubtwhethertheroleof
thebodyis not considerablyundermined withinthetranscendental perspective
of Atman,withits exclusiveaccenton pure consciousness(cit). And again, if
therewerea place forthebody-as is to be expectedin any genuineinterpre-

DebabrataSinha is ProfessorofPhilosophyat BrockUniversity,

OntarioCanada.
AUTHOR'SNOTE: Thispaper wasfirstpresented
at theSocietyforAsian and ComparativePhilosophy
panelon "Consciousness:East and West"heldinconjunction
withtheWestern
DivisionoftheAmerican
April1984.
PhilosophicalAssociation,Cincinnati,
PhilosophyEast and West34, no.3 (July1985). by theUniversity
of Hawaii Press.All rightsreserved.

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240 Sinha

tation of human reality-what would be the Vedantic responseto the said

'enigma'withinthebody-souldualism?Or,woulditat all be appropriate,in that
context,to speak in termsof a metaphysicalstereotype of body-souldualism?
The frameof reference forour questionis, of course,morephenomenological
thanstrictly metaphysical: it is concernedwiththebodilyphenomenonviewed
underthefocusofthehumansubject'sexperience.In otherwords,itis meantto
be a critiqueof body-consciousness, in thelightof humansubjectivity.
The centralimageoftheembodiedhumansubject(jTva)is projected,underthe
focusoftheultimateperspective ofAtman,intheKathopanisad, offeringthebasic
paradigmforanysubsequentconceptionof humanexistencein classicalIndian
thought."Know thou theself(atman)as ridingin a chariot-the body as the
chariot,intellect (buddhi)as thechariot-driver and mind(manas)as thereins;the
senses(indriya)are thehorses,and theobjectsofsensewhattheyrangeover.The
self,joinedwithsensesand mindis calledtheexperiencing subject(bhoktr)bythe
wise."5 This holisticmodel presentstheentirepsychophysical complexof the
humanreality, as muchinitsgraduatedcompositionas initsinherent integrality,
presidedoverby thefoundationalprincipleof self.The hierarchicorderof the
constitutive componentsis projected,in itsorganicity, in a morecosmicperspec-
tive,intermsoftheso-called'sheaths'(kosa) ofBrahman-startingwiththelevel
of thematerial-bodily (annamaya),ascendingon to thevital(prdn.amaya), the
mental(manomaya),and so on. Again,themicrocosmic statusofthebodyin the
macrocosmicunderstanding of theuniverseat largeis typicallyexpressedin a
Bengalifolksaying,whichrunsthus:"Whateverthereis in thebowlofthisbody
(dehabhdn.da) is also to be foundin theuniverse(brahmadn.da) itself."That only
suggests theessential recognition of the body in an interpretation of reality.
Now, comingdirectlyto AdvaitaVedanta,its recognitionof theprimacyof
bodilyrealityin the reflection on human subjectivity is indicatedin the very
definition ofjva offeredby Samkara: "The word 'jfva'indicatestheconscious
principleexercising supervisionoverthebodyand sustainingthevitalairs."6 In
the
fact, verynamingof Vedantaas "Sadrraka-mimdmsd"- thatis, theinquiry
pertaining to theessentialnatureof theindividualselfas residingin thebody-
expressesthe truismthattheindividualhas primarily to be consideredas em-
bodied,notwithstanding theultimateidentity ofhisnaturewithselfas equivalent
of pureconsciousness(ciddtmdn). The physicalframeof thehumanis described
as the 'conglomerationof effectsand causes' (kdryakdranasamtghdta); it is a
networkof interactionsin termsof the threefoldcategoriesof description,
namely,cause (kdrana),effect (karya),and instrument (karana)-the elementsof
naturebeingthe causes, the bodies the effects, and sense-organs(indriya)the
instruments. Whilethebody servesas thebasis or ground(adhisthdna)forthe
sensesto be and to function, senses'move' thebodyin itsmultifarious activities.
Bodyand sensesthusforman integrated wholeintheshapeofthephysicalframe
of the human (or any) organism.Otherwiseexpressed,the human subject

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241

(purusa)is thevisiblebodylocatedin thelivingindividual,who is thecomplexof

causes and effects.
The organism,however,is a materialaggregateendowedwithlife(prana),
whichis not theactivityof any organin particular,but is recognizedto be the
totalfunctionof thebody.As theetymology of thetermimpliesmotionas well
as action,thevitalcurrentmovesthebodyas wellas pervadesall theactivitiesof
thebody.However,as ChdndogyaUpanisad,and Sarhkara'scommentary on it,
affirm,7the vital airs in theirfivefoldphases-namely, prdna,apdna,samana,
uddna,and vydna-are all necessarily seatedin thebodyand neveroverreachit,
and consequentlyare to be characterized,like the body itself,as 'mundane'
(pdrthiva).Our different organs, sensoryand motor,owe theircapacity to
perform their respective tasks to the fundamentalvital function;withprdna
intact,we know the outer world and behave in an appropriatemanner.It is
the
through unceasingactivity of the vitalbreaththatthecontinuity in thebody
is maintainedbetweenwakingand sleep,thoughin thelatterstate,senseorgans
and themindare said not to function.Butprdna,in any case, differs fromthe
senseorgans(indriya)in not beingan instrument, and consequentlyis not in a
positionto interactwithphysicalphenomenaas itsobjects(visaya).
From theabove preliminary sketchit mayappear thattheunderstanding of
the human body as the networkof subtlyinteractingfactorsand forces-
corporeal,vital,sensory,and even mental,that is, pertainingto the internal
organ (antahkarana)-cuts across the dualism of the physicalbody vis-a-vis
nonphysicalmindas in traditionalWesternmetaphysics. On theotherhand,it
almost seems to anticipatea currentstrandin phenomenologically-oriented
philosophicalanthropologyto veiw the 'body-proper'as a phenomenon-in
otherwords, as Richard Zaner seeks to formulateit, "the phenomenonof
embodiment(etre-incarne)." 8 That thebodyis notjust a physicallump,a mere
complexofnaturalproducts,in spiteof itsvisiblemundaneity, butis rather'the
matrixof concretehuman existence',to use an existential-phenomenological
phrase, would be furtherborn out by the distinction,more operativethan
entitative,between'grossbody' (sthuilaardra) and 'subtlebody' (stuksm.asarfra)
in theIndian tradition.Whereastheformeris describedas a conglomeration of
natural elements (in their fivefoldprocess of mutual transformation-
painckarana),the latteris said to be constitutedof the fivefoldvital airs, the
twofoldformsofbuddhiand manasin termsofwhichantahkaran.a operates,and
thetenorgans-five cognitive-sensory and fiveconative-motor. However,most
significantly,Samkara adds thatthegrossbody (thatis, thevisiblebody) is the
locus of all experiences, withall theirrespectivehedonictonesof pleasureand
pain-bhogdyatana; the subtlebody,on theotherhand,is definedas themeans
of suchexperience-bhogasddhana.9 Here,again,theveryword'body',used in
commonto encompassthewholespectrumofphysico-mental phenomena,with
physicalbody as thebottom lineand the intellectual at
faculty theotherend,only

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242 Sinha

illustrates theintegraltotality ofthehumancondition.All thismightlegitimately

suggesta kindofparallelismto thephenomenological concernwiththe'consti-
tution'ofthebody.As Husserlobserves,thebody,viewedas 'purephenomenon'
underthefocusof phenomenological reflection, takingall possiblenaturalistic
correlatesapart,'constitutes' itselfindoubleways:on theone side,itis a physical
thing,matter;on theotherside,I findthingson it,and I sense'on it'and 'init' the
varioussensiblequalities,likethewarmthon thepalm of thehand.10Merleau-
Pontybringsout thepointsharply:whatpreventsmybodyeverbeingan object,
everbeing'completely constituted' (in thesensein whichphysicalobjectsare) is
thatit is thatbywhichthereare objects.11
However,our originalquestionstillremains.Even iftheconnotationof the
body is widenedthroughthe'gross-subtle'distinction, so as to bridgetherigid
hiatusof thebody-minddualism,does notthebodilyphenomenonstillpose an
enigma,so faras itfunctions, in a peculiarmanner,as subject?Thus,althoughin
AdvaitaVedantaselfis positedas in itspureessencenothingbutconsciousness
(cit)perse,therewouldstillbe thelegitimacy, fromthepointofviewofa critique
of experience,of referring to some kind of bodilyconsciousness,althoughin
strictlylogicalterms,bodyand consciousnessare categorically notmerelyapart
butincompatible. Thisis exactlythelogicalaporiathatSamkarabreaksthrough
by his affirmation of the phenomenologicaltruismof alogical identification
(adhydsa)betweenpureconsciousness,theessenceof self-subject-ciddtman
and its contrary,the aconsciousobject (acit). The preliminary epistemological
tone of Sarhkara'sexpositionof falseidentification (adhyasa) as theessenceof
an errorsituation(bhrama),shouldnoteclipsethefocusofhisbasicinterest inthe
interpretation of human subjectivity.On thecontrary, itis the bodilylevelwhich
providesthe unmistakableexemplification of the basic modus operandi of
'mutualidentification' (itaretarddhydsa) of thetwo termsof thisrelation,with
theirrespective qualities concerned. The most intimateunionofthetwoalone-
it is
which, interesting note,to Samkara expressesevenin thelanguageofsexual
union (mithunlkrtya)-enables such a judgmentaluse as 'I am this,thebody'
(aham idam). It bespeaks a completeidentification, thougha functionalone,
betweenme and thebody,wherebythesupposedtranscendental essenceof my
subjectivity getscompletely submerged. Such evidence is, fact,paradigmaticof
in
theprereflective 'naturalattitude'(as Husserlwould call it),and Samkaracalls
thewholephenomenonofadhydsa'natural'(naisargika);on thatgroundall our
empiricmundaneusages(lokavyavahdra) are also natural.A subtlevariationof
thisdatumofnaturalconsciousnesswouldcomeup in theformof'This (body)is
mine'(mamaidam),indicatinga degreeof reflection withinthenaturalattitude
itself.Thus,whenI speakof 'mybody',itentailsan awarenessofsomedistinction
betweenme,theessentialme,and thebodywhichI own.
In emphasizingthe natural attitudestatus of the body-selfidentification
(dehdtmddhydsa), Sarmkara, withsomejustification, extendsthatevento animal
behavior-or behaviorthatis commonto humansand animalsalike.It mightbe

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243

relevantin thiscontextto compare,bywayofnegativeconfirmation, thetypeof

cases in abnormalpsychologypertainingto a personwho neverbecomesquite
'incarnate',and who mayspeak ofhimself/herself as 'moreor lessunembodied'.
As R. D. Laing, a contemporary psychologist,observes,theschizoidcleavage
disrupts the normal sense of selfbydisembodying thesenseof 'I', consequently
givingriseto "a confusionat theinterfacebetweenhereand there,insideand
outside,"because body is not firmly feltas 'me' in contrastto the 'not-me'.12
Such psychopathological evidenceonlygoes to confirmcontrarywise thebasic
Vedanticinsightregardingbodilyconsciousness,eventhoughexpressed(in the
latter)rathersimplistically.
The facticity ofthebodilycontextofself-subject, acknowledgedon thelevelof
naturalconsciousness,ratherthanprecludingit,bringsinto thefocusof ontic
reflection the'innerness'of theauthenticself-pratyagdtman or antardtman,as
it is called. It mightbe pointedout thatthe conceptionof 'innerness'hereis
drawnobviouslyfrombodilydata and experience, and as such,theoutside-inside
model is a metaphoricalone. One way of respondingto thispointwould be as
Hannah Arendt,forinstance,observes:our soul-experiences are 'body-bound'
to suchan extentthatto speakofan 'innerlife' of the soul is "as unmetaphorical
as to speak of an innersense."13
In theVedanticcontext,however,thedistinction betweentheinnersenseand
the selfproperis drawn explicitly-antahkaranabeing an associationalcon-
dition(upddhi)of theself,and as such stillto be regardedas 'object',however
subtle,whenviewedin theperspectiveof the self-essence, cit,whichis ideally
unobjective(avisaya). Accordingly,the 'innerness'of antahkaranaand of cit
woulddiffer, in respectofthebody-and conversely, the'outerness'ofthebody
would respectively differ. It is onlytheformerwhichcould be regardedas the
(inner)counterpart of thebody,and not thelatter.The verywordantahkarana
literallymeans'innerorgan',and as suchsuggests,bywayofcontrast,thebodily
groundedexternalsenses(bahirindriya). Citis inneronlyina veryuniquesense-
thesenseofinnerdimension,whichis self-evidencing (svaprakasa)and provides
thefoundationforimmediacy.
It may be interesting to note in thisconnectionthatMerleau-Ponty,in his
attempted 'philosophy of theflesh',as he prefersto call it,also definesmindas
"theothersideofthebody,"breakingthroughthetraditionaldualisticmodel.14
Yet he seemstomissthedistinction betweensoul and mind,whenhe attributes to
thesaid mindsuchfunctionalrelationto body as would be appropriateforthe
groundingprincipleor self-subject(or perhaps soul, in the common termi-
nology).For he does recognizethatthis'otherside of thebody' "overflowsinto
the body,encroachesupon it, is hiddenin it-and at the same timeneeds it,
terminates in it,is anchoredin it." 15 It seemsSamkara harpsbasicallyon the
samenote,thoughundertheperspective ofadhyasa,whenhe describesthebody
as the locus (adhisthdna),whichmakes the use of senses possible. But to be
engagedinthebody,again,theself-sense has inevitably to be thereinthebody;as

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244 Sinha

Samkara puts the point straight,no subject can operate (cognitivelyand

behaviorally)exceptwiththe selfhoodfalselyascribedon thebody.16Failing
such reciprocalidentification betweenthe body and the innerself(pratyagdt-
man), and the respective setsof attributes (dharma)pertainingto both,theself
wouldbe left'dissociated'(asangim)and incapableoftakingthecharacterofthe
cognizingsubject(pramdtr).
As regardsthesenses(indriya),theyare theinstruments at thedisposalof the
mind,butmediatingat thesame timebetweenthepsychicorgan(antahkarana)
and theworldoutside.Nevertheless, itis onlyas abidinginthebody,likethevital
force(prdna),thattheorganscome to functionas channelsofperception-and
not whiletheyreston thevitalforceitself.As Brhaddran.yaka Upanisadputsit
directly, itis onlywhentheorgansoccupytheirrespective seatsin thebodythat
theindividualselfis noticedas perceivingthings.For thesensesare, afterall,
regardedas the'doors of perception'(upalabdhidvarani).17
Butevenwhenspeakingof thesenseorgansas thedoorwayforthesubjectto
reachout to theperceptible externalworld,itis notjust meantto be an objectiv-
isticaccount.For theobjectivity of theperceivedobjectsis constituted by their
position relativeto the percipient's as
body; such, the lattercannot be takento be
constitutedin the like manneras the perceivedobject. As Merleau-Ponty,
echoingHusserl,observes:"My body... is theNullpunkt ofall thedimensionsof
theworld."18In apprehending theworldofspatio-temporal objects,theprimacy
of the body assertsitselfin a certainbasic sense,the objectsin the world of
experiencebeingthemselvesintuitedas extensionsof the body. On the other
hand, the constitution(in thephenomenological sense) of our body-as-object
provides,as Merleau-Ponty, again,pointsout,"a crucialmomentin thegenesis
of theobjectiveworld."19
The mode of reflection and analysison bodilyexperience,thoughmarkedly
presentin boththephilosophies,stilldiffers in intentand direction.
significantly
Fromthebodilyphenomenon, viewedin contradistinction to thematerialthing,
as thebeareroflocalizedsensations,Husserltakesoffdirectly to thelevelof'pure
I' as freelyand spontaneously acting. For Samkara, on theother hand,thebody-
senseessentially exemplifies thenaturalleveloffunctional identification,and as
suchthepointof departurefortranscendental reflectionto moveon to theideal
overnaturaldimensionof pureconsciousness.As earlierpointedout,Vedanta
wouldperhapsfinda closerallyinMerleau-Ponty, inrespectofthisaccenton the
unionor identification betweenbodyand subjectivity. Bothwouldagreethatthe
so-calledbody-soulrelationdoes not simplyindicatethejuxtapositionof two
mutuallyexternalterms,that is, the objective-material process in itselfand
cogitatio, but thatit is rathera case of 'the livingsubject myown body'.
of
At thispoint it would be appropriateto turnto the Neo-Vedantist,K. C.
Bhattacharyya, who offershis 'transcendental psychology',conceivedas the
legitimate substitutefortheso-calledmetaphysics ofsoul.Whatpresentsitselfin
our reflection on thebodyas livedand experienced is the"feltbody,"according

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245

to him.20The feelingof thebody fromwithinis to be distinguished fromone's

own body as perceivedfromoutside,so faras it is an 'interior'thatis never
perceivedand cannot even be imaginedto be perceivedfromoutside. Like
Husserland Merleau-Ponty, Bhattacharyya recognizes"the unique singularity
ofone's ownbody,"evenas a perceivedobject.Butessentially reinterpretingthe
Vedanticinsighton 'dehatmadhydsa', he prefers to call it"bodilysubjectivity." 21
Although these ideas are in
developed complete mutual independence, we are
struckby a remarkableconcurrenceon this issue betweenBhattacharyya's
sketchof "bodilysubjectivity" and Merleau-Ponty'sphenomenological"redis-
coveryofourownbody." As thelatterobserves,inthestepsofhisanalysisofthe
perceptionof one's own body: "We have relearnedto feelour body," so faras
perceiving withour body,thelatterprovesto be "a naturalself,and, as it were,
the subjectof perception."22 As he pointsout, the statusof myown body,as
projectedin classicalpsychology, has turnedintoa 'representation ofthebody',
'a factofthepsyche',ratherthana 'phenomenon'.23 And itis on thelatterrather
thantheformerthatanyphenomenologically orientedreflection wouldfocusits
attention-be thatmodernWesternor Indian,Vedantic,and Neo-Vedantic.
In thisreflection,however,on thesaid 'bodilysubjectivity', as providingthe
of
point departure for what might be called a 'transcendental psychology'ofpure
consciousness, the crucial movement towards a deeper core of humansubjectiv-
ity remains.In recognizingmy body as a 'natural subject', Merleau-Ponty
alreadydiscoversin it "a provisionalsketchof mytotalbeing,"as he typically
putsit.24In a verysimilarveinbutwitha subtletwistofaccent,theVedanta-style
reflectionwould directitsfocuson theinnercore of subjectivity ratherthanon
thetotality,although theformer transcendentally groundsthelatter.The levelof
bodilyexperience, involvingthesensoryand thevital,alreadysetsthegroundfor
the self-transcending movementtowardsthe foundationalessence of human
that
subjectivity, is, consciousness-self (ciddtman).Translatingthe situationin
termsofNeo-Vedanticphenomenology, thesubject,eveniftakenas nothingbut
one's own perceivedbody,involvesa dimensionof whichwe are aware not as
somethingto be understoodin thenatural-objective attitude.In thatsensethe
feltbodycarriesalmosta mysticfringeoftheinnerdimension, whichdemandsto
standinitsspiritualautonomyindissociationfromtheobjective-bodily complex
in whichit findsitselfinvolvedqua phenomenon.As Bhattacharyya, again,
observes:"What is intendedby thewordI cannotbe characterizedevenin the
loweststageof subjectivity as simplythisobject."25
To conclude,intheunderstanding ofthebodyintermsoftheVedanticcritique
ofexperience, as withanyin-depthphenomenology ofthebody,thebodyproves
to play an ambiguous role. As Merleau-Pontyexpressesit froma different
perspective,theexperienceofourownbodyrevealsto us "an ambiguousmodeof
existing."26This ambiguitymakes its appearance in the focus of reflection
throughthedialecticalinterplayof mundaneityand extramundaneconscious-
ness,ofthenaturaland theovernatural, ofexperienceand transcendence. Yet an

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246 Sinha

authenticunderstanding of thelivedexperienceofmyown bodycould possibly

provide theclue towardsa full-fledged
phenomenology ofconsciousness.On the
otherhand,theintegralrole of consciousness-self in groundingand unitingall
thecomponentsof a humanbeing(jiva), fromthebodilylevelonwards,could
also hardlybe overlooked-as has mostoftenbeenthecase in theexpositionof
SamkaraVedanta.In essentialconfirmation ofour approachwe mayrelevantly
mentionPaul Hacker's strongargumentin this respect,that in Samhkara's
conceptiontheselfis "theprincipleofexistential unityin humanbeing."27 But
an understanding of the bodilyphenomenonas lived and experiencedcould
alone legitimizesuch an integralconceptionof man underthefocusof Self-a
viewwhichHackerconspicuously Yet, all beingsaid to thecontrary,
exemplifies.
theadmittedelementofambiguity, ofparadox,withregardto thephenomenon
of embodiedness,could alone promotean in-depthunderstanding of theworld
and theinnerdimensionthatis self.A shortcutmetaphysical resolutionof that
'inexplicable'dilemmacould onlyprevent,ratherthanhelp,an authenticunder-
standingof thetotalexperienceof thehumancondition.

NOTES

1. Hannah Arendt,TheLifeoftheMind(New York: Harvest/HBJ, 1981),part1,chap. 1,no. 4;

hereafter citedas Arendt,LifeoftheMind.
2. Cf. Plato in Alcibiades(I): "Hence manis different fromhisown body?- It seemsso. - What,
then,is man?- I cannotsay.- But you can say thathe is thatwhichuses thebody.- Yes. - Now is
thereanything elsethatusesthebodybutthesoul (psyche)?- Nothingelse.- The soul,then,rulesit?-
Yes."
3. W. K. C. Guthrie,The GreekPhilosophers: FromThalesto Aristotle(New York: Harper&
Row, 1975),p. 143.
4. RichardZaner, The Contextof Self: A Phenomenological InquiryUsingMedicineas a Clue
(Athens,Ohio: Ohio University Press,1981),p. 10.
5. Katha Upanisad,I.iii.3-4.
6. Brahmasiitra-Bhasya, I.i.6: "Jivohi ndmasarfrddhyaksah prdndndm dhdrayitd."
7. ChdndogyaUpanisad,I.xii.3.
8. RichardZaner, The ProblemofEmbodiment. Some Contributions to a Phenomenology of the
Body,Phaenomenologica17 (The Hague: MartinusNijhoff,1964),"Epilogue."
9. Cf. anikaracarya, Atmabodha,12-13.
10. EdmundHusserl,Ideenzu einerreinenPhdnomenologie undphdnomenologischen Philosophie,
zweitesBuch: Phanomenologische Untersuchungen zurKonstitution,vol. 4 of Husserliana... (Haag:
MartinusNijhoff,1952), 36.
11. M. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology ofPerception,trans.Colin Smith(London: Routledge&
Kegan Paul, 1962),part 1,chap. 2; hereafter citedas Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology ofPerception.
12. R. D. Laing,TheDividedSelf:An ExistentialStudyinSanityandMadness(London: Penguin,
1965),p. 174f.
13. Arendt,LifeoftheMind,p. 32.
14. Merleau-Ponty,The Visibleand theInvisibleFollowedby WorkingNotes,trans.A. Lingis
(Evanston,Illinois:Northwestern UniversityPress,1968),p. 259; hereaftercitedas Merleau-Ponty,
Visibleand theInvisible.
15. Ibid.
16. Brahmasutra-Bhdsya, Adhydsabhdsya:"Na ca anadhyastdtmabhdvena dehena kascit
vydpriyate."

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247

17. Brhaddranyaka Upanisad,II.ii.l.

18. Merleau-Ponty,Visibleand theInvisible,pp. 248-249.
19. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology ofPerception,p. 721.
20. Cf. K. C. Bhattacharyya, Searchfor theAbsolutein Neo-Vedanta,ed. and withintrod.by
GeorgeBosworthBurch(Honolulu,Hawaii: The University PressofHawaii, 1976),"The Subjectas
Freedon,"chap. 3 ("Bodily Subjectivity"); hereaftercitedas Bhattacharyya,Search.
21. Ibid.
22. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology ofPerception,p. 206.
23. Ibid., p. 94.
24. Ibid., p. 198.
25. Bhattacharyya, Search,chap. 3.
26. Merleau-Ponty.
27. Paul Hacker, "A Note on Saiakara's Conceptionof Man," in GermanScholarson India.
Contributions to IndianStudies,vol. 1, (Varanasi, 1973).

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