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Wyatt Fisher

Dr. Robin Datta

Pol S 321

March 20th, 2014

American Strategies for Power Application in a Multipolar World

Coral Bells 2007 report entitled The End of the Vasco de Gama Era: The Next

Landscape of World Politics states, The three pillars of the unipolar world of US paramountcy

were its unequalled economic strength, its worldwide diplomatic clout and its unprecedented

military superiority. Increasingly, these pillars are being chipped away at by the diffusion of

economic, diplomatic, and military power across what Bell describes as a rising concert of

powers. The growing economies of the European Union, China, and India, in addition to smaller

developing economies, are beginning to rival the strength of the American economy and will in

the coming years eclipse the power the United States economy once wielded. American

diplomatic leverage is increasingly small, as evidenced by recent events in Ukraine and Israel,

though these may be due to missteps in foreign policy, but are likely also symptoms of a wider

trend in international relations away from American dominance. While American military

spending is highest in the world and the United States remains one of few states with the means

to project its power globally, other states (particularly China) are beginning to pose greater

threats in regions of strategic importance. Additionally, in the modern world American military

prowess is less effective against terrorist insurgents in states such as Afghanistan. Each of these

challenges to the status of the United States and the application of its power cannot be avoided,

but can be responded to with increased multilateralism and cooperation in pursuit of common

goals.
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According to the Central Intelligence Agency, the United States has a GDP of over $16.7

trillion. While this makes the United States the largest economy in the world, it is only barely so.

The European Unions GDP has now reached over $15.8 trillion, and Chinas estimated GDP is

over $13.3 trillion. India, Japan, Russia, and Brazil also wield significant GDPs at between $2.4-

4.9 trillion each (CIA). This diffusion of economic power poses a severe threat to the ability of

the United States to apply its economic power in international relations because where the United

States seeks to project its power through economic support (or the withholding thereof), other

states can stand in opposition. In the past, if the United States wanted a government to succeed, it

provided that government financial aid, and if the United States wanted that government to fail,

it took back the financial aid. Yet, in August 2013, when the United States and Europe sought to

punish the Egyptian regime by cutting cash aid, Saudi Arabia stood in as a replacement

benefactor (Nordland). In the Syria conflict of the last several years, the United States has sought

to end the bloodshed through use of sanctions as a means to debilitate the Assad regime, yet little

has been accomplished (Sanger). These failures to effectively achieve American strategic goals

through the use of economic pressures are symptomatic of waning American power.

Rather than seek to regain American economic hegemony (if it every truly existed), the

President of the United States and his (or potentially her in the future) administration should rely

more heavily on regional intergovernmental organizations to resolve issues of American concern.

Where the United States seeks to influence these organizations, it should draw on and strengthen

economic partnerships with leading members of the organizations. For example, if the United

States wishes to influence events in Egypt it should seek to strengthen economic ties with Saudi

Arabia, which has the largest economy in the Arab League at over $740 billion GDP

(International Monetary Fund). With increased economic ties to regional intergovernmental

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organization leaders, the United States is more likely to have its interests protected because those

states economic success will be tied to the health of their partnerships with the United States.

Essentially, this policy would serve to maximize the ability of the United States to apply power

while minimizing necessary direct intervention, in a way similar to the way the United States

aided Western Europe and Japan after WWII to use them as pawns as part of the containment

strategy against the Soviet Union. The United States should also seek to strengthen its economic

ties to other large economies through free trade agreements, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership

and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, which would together encompass 70%

of global trade (The Economist), to allow the United States greater leverage over other great

economic powers.

The United States has in the past wielded tremendous diplomatic clout, playing a leading

role in international affairs; in conflicts that seemed tough, the United States could broker deals,

build coalitions, and dictate plans of action. This historical diplomatic power was displayed by

American leaderships role in the Camp David Accords that led to an Israeli-Egyptian peace

treaty in the late 1970s brokered by President Carter (Encyclopaedia Britannica), in assembling

the large and diverse international coalition for the Gulf War by the first Bush administration

(Walt), and in withdrawing support for the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda

during the Rwandan Genocide of 1994, which led to the almost total withdrawal of international

assistance during the genocide (Power). This position for the United States as the worlds chief

diplomat lent a certain power to the United States to control world affairs. In recent years,

however, the United States ability to resolve conflicts through diplomacy has waned, facing

resistance from old adversaries and allies alike. Peace talks between the Israelis and Palestinians

brokered by the United States have stalled despite great efforts American diplomats have taken to
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pressure both sides to compromise (Landler). Considering Israel is a United States ally, this

might be surprising, but because the United States has other pressing interests such as Iran or

Ukraine, its diplomatic ability has worn too thin to pressure Israel to compromise. Even with the

United States chief former adversary, Russia, American diplomatic pressure has limited ability.

In the current Crimea crisis, the United States and Europe have tried to pressure Russia through

travel bans and threats to allow Ukraine to retain sovereignty over Crimea, but these efforts seem

to be failing, with Russia announcing plans to annex Crimea after a March 16th, 2014 vote in

Crimea to secede from Ukraine (Baker). The United States no longer has diplomatic control over

its allies, nor does it have the diplomatic clout needed to oppose its adversaries.

The United States must respond to the reduction in its diplomatic power by reshaping its

foreign policy away from reliance on getting a lot while giving a little and toward increasing

partnerships and bolstering forums for great power leaders to cooperate. The G20 is a forum of a

group of great economic powers that allows these states to cooperate on some economic matters

(Bell). As we enter a new era of many powers, the best response by the United States to waning

diplomatic power is to seek to replicate the G20 model for other areas of international relations

most or all great powers must cope with, such as terror groups, climate change, and nuclear

proliferations. Additionally, the United States must recognize the limits of strategic interest, and

at times allow regional powers to resolve regional conflicts. While this strategy may not always

result in favorable outcomes for the United States, in a more multipolar world unfavorable

outcomes will have to be something the United States can accept. Further, by refining its list of

strategic interests and goals, the United States will better be able to respond to those conflicts

that truly matter, being less limited by other interests.

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The United States, at $682 billion, spends more on its military than the next ten countries

combined, four of which are members of NATO (Koba). Yet, while the United States military is

far superior to any other military in the world, its military might does not lend the United States

unquestioned dominance over the world. For the past decade, the United States has fought wars

in Iraq and Afghanistan, two largely underdeveloped states that should have been no problem for

the United States to win wars in, yet in neither was there a speedy, clear-cut victory like in the

Gulf War, and to this day it still does not seem the United States won (Moran). This is largely

due to the guerilla tactics of radical Islamist groupsnon-state actors, which the United States is

not equipped to respond to. Where in typical warfare, the United States combines its diplomatic,

economic, and military power, war with non-state actors typically only allows for military power

to be applied, and in the war against terror, American military power alone is not sufficient.

Additionally, Chinese military power is rising at alarming rates. The Chinese navy has recently

been increasingly modernizing, developing destroyers, corvettes, troop carriers, hospital ships

and spy ships (Mizokami), likely to rival the United States Pacific Fleet. China has recently

inflamed relations with several United States allies in Asia, including Japan with claims over the

Senkaku/Diaoyo Islands (Fisher) and the Philippines with aggression against the Spratly Islands

(Himmelman), and by extension challenging the United States. However, it is likely that China is

gambling that the United States values its trade relationship with China more than it values its

security agreements with East and Southeast Asian states, a gamble that may be wrong.

To counter Chinas increasing aggression, the United States should continue to support its

partners in Tokyo, Seoul, and Manila through joint military exercises and support in each state

bolstering their independent militaries to show China that the United States still maintains a

military presence in Asia. Additionally, the United States should seek to foster new military
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partnerships with rising powers in Asia such as India and Indonesia and strengthen lesser

partnerships with Thailand (Lohman) and Australia. As the United States draws back from

Afghanistan, it should work to partner with the Afghan government to train Afghan forces,

provide military equipment, and build government services to win over support of the Afghan

people. In the future, the United States should seek to avoid direct war with non-state actors and

instead support local governments in their anti-terror efforts. In sum, the United States should

adopt a more balance of power approach to China and a more hands off approach to non-state

actors.

The world is transitioning from a unipolar world dominated by the United States to a

multipolar world with economic, diplomatic, and military power diffused across many great

powers. Key challenges to the application of American power abroad include the growing

economic power of several rising powers, the United States decreasing diplomatic leverage, and

Chinas emergence as a military power in Asia. The United States must foster broad partnerships

with the growing regional and international powers in order to protect American interests. As

American power decreases, the integration of the worlds economies, the open communication

and cooperation among world powers, and military partnerships intended to balance against

China will be vital to accomplishing American strategic goals. The President of the United States

would do good to make maintaining peace among the world powers a top American strategic

goal.
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Works Cited

Bell, Coral. "The End of the Vasco de Gama Era: The Next Landscape of World Politics." Lowry

Institute for International Policy, 2007. Web. 17 March 2014.

"GDP (current US$)." Data. The World Bank, n.d. Web. 17 Mar. 2014.

"Country Comparison :: GDP (purchasing Power Parity)." Central Intelligence Agency. Central

Intelligence Agency, n.d. Web. 17 Mar. 2014.

Nordland, Rod. "Saudi Arabia Promises to Aid Egypts Regime." The New York Times. The New

York Times, 19 Aug. 2013. Web. 17 Mar. 2014.

Sanger, David E. "Obamas Policy Is Put to the Test as Crises Challenge Caution." The New York

Times. The New York Times, 16 Mar. 2014. Web. 17 Mar. 2014.

"Report for Selected Countries and Subjects." Data and Statistics. International Monetary Fund,

n.d. Web. 17 Mar. 2014.

"Time to Pay the Piper." The Economist. The Economist Newspaper, 23 Nov. 2013. Web. 17 Mar.

2014.

Camp David Accords. Encyclopaedia Britannica. Encyclopaedia Britannica Online.

Encyclopaedia Brittanica Inc., 2014. Web. 17 Mar. 2014.

Walt, Stephen M. "When Did the American Empire Start to Decline?" Foreign Policy, 2 Aug.

2011. Web. 17 Mar. 2014.

Power, Samantha. "Bystanders to Genocide." The Atlantic. Atlantic Media Company, 01 Sept.

2001. Web. 17 Mar. 2014.

Landler, Mark. "Jewish State Declaration an Unyielding Block to Deal." The New York Times.

The New York Times, 17 Mar. 2014. Web. 17 Mar. 2014.

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Baker, Peter. "U.S. and Europe Step Up Sanctions on Russian Officials." The New York Times.

The New York Times, 17 Mar. 2014. Web. 17 Mar. 2014.

Koba, Mark. "U.S. Military Spending Dwarfs Rest of World." NBC News. N.p., 24 Feb. 2014.

Web. 17 Mar. 2014.

Moran, Michael. "Who Actually Won the Iraq War?" Slate Magazine. N.p., 8 Nov. 2011. Web. 18

Mar. 2014.

Mizokami, Kyle. "These 5 Ships Are the Real Future of the Chinese Military." Foreign Policy.

N.p., 16 Dec. 2013. Web. 18 Mar. 2014.

Fisher, Max. "Why Did China Impose an air Defense Zone That Was so Likely to Fail?" The

Washington Post, 29 Nov. 2013. Web. 17 Mar. 2014.

Himmelman, Jeff. "A Game of Shark and Minnow." The New York Times, 27 Oct. 2013. Web.

17 Mar. 2014.

Lohman, Walter. "Reinvigorating the U.S.-Thailand Alliance." The Heritage Foundation. N.p.,

28 Sept. 2011. Web. 18 Mar. 2014.