76.
essential if our Government is to be a government of
A.C. No. 8954 November 13, 2013
HON. MARIBETH RODRIGUEZ-MANAHAN,
Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court, San
Mateo, Rizal, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RODOLFO FLORES, Respondent.
FACTS: Atty. Flores was the counsel for the
defendant in a civil case before the sala of Judge
Manahan.
During the preliminary conference, Atty. Flores
entered his appearance and was given time to file a
Pre-Trial Brief.
Later, Atty. Flores filed his Pre-Trial Brief but without
proof of MCLE compliance hence it was expunged
from the records without prejudice to the filing of
another Pre-Trial Brief containing the required MCLE
compliance, however, Atty. Flores asked for ten (10)
days to submit proof.
The preliminary conference was set several times
and Atty. Flores was given several occasions to
submit the brief with the proper MCLE compliance.
On the final instance, instead of submitting the
promised proof of MCLE compliance, Atty. Flores filed
a letter stating that he was no longer representing
the defendant. Such was stated in what was deemed
as intemperate language.
In its stead, respondent Atty. Flores filed a Letter of
even date stating as follows:
If only to give your Honor another chance to prove
your pro plaintiff sentiment, I am hereby filing the
attached Motion which you may once more assign to
the waste basket of nonchalance.
With the small respect that still remains, I have asked
the defendant to look for another lawyer to represent
him for I am no longer interested in this case
because I feel I cannot do anything right in your sala.
The Investigating Judge found Atty. Flores to have
failed to give due respect to the court by failing to
obey court orders, by failing to submit proof of his
compliance with the Mandatory Continuing Legal
Education (MCLE) requirement, and for using
intemperate language in his pleadings. The
Investigating Judge recommended that Atty. Flores be
suspended from the practice of law for one year.
ISSUE: Whether Atty. Flores is guilty of disrespect to
court orders.
HELD:
here is no doubt that Atty. Flores failed to obey the
trial courts order to submit proof of his MCLE
compliance notwithstanding the several
opportunities given him. "Court orders are to be
respected not because the judges who issue them
should be respected, but because of the respect and
consideration that should be extended to the judicial
branch of the Government. This is absolutely
laws and not of men. Respect must be had not
because of the incumbents to the positions, but
because of the authority that vests in them.
Disrespect to judicial incumbents is disrespect to that
branc the Government to which they belong, as well
as to the State which has instituted the judicial
system."
Atty. Flores also employed intemperate language in
his pleadings. As an officer of the court, Atty. Flores is
expected to be circumspect in his language. Rule
11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility enjoins all attorneys to abstain from
scandalous, offensive or menacing language or
behavior before the Courts. Atty. Flores failed in this
respect.
At this juncture, it is well to remind respondent that:
A lawyer is entitled to voice his c1iticism within the
context of the constitutional guarantee of freedom of
speech which must be exercised responsibly. After
all, every right carries with it the corresponding
obligation. Freedom is not freedom from
responsibility, but freedom with responsibility. The
lawyer's fidelity to his client must not be pursued at
the expense of truth and orderly administration of
justice. It must be done within the confines of reason
and common sense.
77.
A.C. No. 8920 September 28, 2011
JUDGE RENE B. BACULI, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MELCHOR A. BATTUNG, Respondent.
FACTS:
Judge Baculi, Presiding Judge of Municipal Trial Court
in Cities, Branch 2, Tuguegarao City, filed a complaint
for disbarment against Atty. Battung. He claimed that
on July 24, 2008, during the hearing on the motion
for reconsideration of Civil Case No. 2502, the
respondent was shouting while arguing his motion.
Judge Baculi advised him to tone down his voice but
instead, the respondent shouted at the top of his
voice. When warned that he would be cited for direct
contempt, the respondent shouted, Then cite
me!Judge Baculi cited him for direct contempt and
imposed a fine of P100.00. The respondent then left.
While other cases were being heard, the respondent
re-entered the courtroom and shouted, Judge, I will
file gross ignorance against you! I am not afraid of
you! Judge Baculi ocited him for direct contempt of
court for the second time.
After his hearings, respondent again shouted in a
threatening tone, Judge, I will file gross ignorance
against you! I am not afraid of you! He kept on
shouting, I am not afraid of you! and challenged
the judge to a fight. Staff and lawyers escorted him
out of the building.
Judge Baculi later found out that after the respondent
left the courtroom, Atty. Battung continued shouting
and punched a table at the Office of the Clerk of
Court.
1
ISSUE:
Did Atty. Battung violate Cannons 11 and 12
of the Code of Professional Responsibility?
RULING:
We agree with the IBPs finding that the respondent
violated Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Atty. Battung disrespected
Judge Baculi by shouting at him inside the courtroom
during court proceedings in the presence of litigants
and their counsels, and court personnel. The
respondent even came back to harass Judge Baculi.
This behavior, in front of many witnesses, cannot be
allowed. We note that the respondent continued to
threaten Judge Baculi and acted in a manner that
clearly showed disrespect for his position even after
the latter had cited him for contempt. In fact, after
initially leaving the court, the respondent returned to
the courtroom and disrupted the ongoing
proceedings. These actions were not only against the
person, the position and the stature of Judge Baculi,
but against the court as well whose proceedings were
openly and flagrantly disrupted, and brought to
disrepute by the respondent.
Litigants and counsels, particularly the latter because
of their position and avowed duty to the courts,
cannot be allowed to publicly ridicule, demean and
disrespect a judge, and the court that he represents.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Canon 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the
respect due the courts and to judicial officers and
should insist on similar conduct by others.
Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous,
offensive or menacing language or behavior before
the Courts.
A lawyer who insults a judge inside a courtroom
completely disregards the latters role, stature and
position in our justice system. When the respondent
publicly berated and brazenly threatened Judge
Baculi that he would file a case for gross ignorance of
the law against the latter, the respondent effectively
acted in a manner tending to erode the public
confidence in Judge Baculis competence and in his
ability to decide cases. Incompetence is a matter
that, even if true, must be handled with sensitivity in
the manner provided under the Rules of Court; an
objecting or complaining lawyer cannot act in a
manner that puts the courts in a bad light and bring
the justice system into disrepute.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Atty. Melchor
A. Battung is found GUILTY of violating Rule 11.03,
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
for which he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for one (1) year effective upon the finality of this
Decision. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of
a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
78.
A.C. No. 5116 April 13, 2015
DAVAO IMPORT DISTRIBUTORS, INC.,
Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JOHNNY LANDERO, Respondent.
FACTS:
In August 1997, Davao Import Distributors hired Atty.
John Landero to represent them and file a complaint
against AngelitaLobrando and Juanito Du for the
recovery of one split type air-conditioner with
replevin and damages.
Lobrando purchased on installment from Davao
Import one-split type air-conditioner for her salon.
EventuallyLobrando failed to fulfill her obligations to
Davao Import. When Davao Import sought to retrieve
the unit, it was revealed that Lobrandos business
had already closed down. The air-conditioner was left
at the business salon however, Davao Import failed
to take hold of the unit because it was allegedly
retained by Juanito Du to whom AngelitaLibrando was
also indebted for unpaid rentals. Thus, Davao
Imported to file a civil action against Du.
The administrative controversy arose when Atty. John
Landero, failed to appear in the pre-trial. Davao
Import through its branch manager, Pandili, also
failed to attend because Atty. Landero did not inform
them of the schedule. As a result the case against Du
was dismissed and Du was allowed to present his
evidence ex-parte in support of his counterclaim. In
effect, the MTCC issued a decisionordering
complainant to pay Du the amounts of P70,000.00 as
moral damages, P15,000.00 as attorney's fees and
P5,000.00 as litigation expenses.
AttyLandero, in his defense, reasoned that he and
Pandili, the branch manager of Davao Import agreed
to abandon the case.
Atty. Landero failed to file a motion for
reconsideration with the RTC. Further, he also failed
to file a petition for review with the Court of Appeals
despite payment by Davao Import to file such
petition. Although Landeros motion for extension of
time to file the petition for review was granted by the
CA, Landero still failed to file such petition.
It has to be noted that the motion for extension of
time was granted because of Atty. Landeros pity to
his client, so he resorted to mislead the court by
alleging that he had just received the decision and
that the filing is within the reglementary period copy
furnished the counsel of Juanito Du, when in truth, he
received the decision at an earlier time.
Davao Import then filed a complaint for disbarment
against Atty. Landeroasserting that Landeros
actuations of (1) not appearing in the pre-trial of the
case, (2) not availing of the legal remedies against
the dismissal of the Complaint due to non-suit, and
(3) failing to file a petition for review, constitute
unprofessional behavior or misconduct and violations
of Canon 12 of the CPR, which merit disciplinary
action, if not, disbarment.
In March 2008, the Investigating Commissioner,
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) Commissioner Rebecca
Villanueva-Maala (Commissioner Villanueva-Maala)
recommended that respondent be suspended from
the practice of law for three months.
In July 2008, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the recommendation of Commissioner
Villanueva-Maala but modified the period of
suspension by increasing it from three months to six
months.
The complaint was thus submitted to the Court for
final action.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Landerodisplayed unprofessional
behavior and misconduct and violated Canons 12
and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
2
RULING:
The Court finds respondent's reason to be
unacceptable if not downright disrespectful to the
courts. The same only underscores his blatant
violation of Rule 12.03, Canon 12 of the CPR, which
states:
CANON 12 - A LA WYER SHALL EXERT EVERY EFFORT
AND CONSIDER IT HIS DUTY TO ASSIST IN THE
SPEEDY AND EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.
xxxx
Rule 12.03 -A lawyer shall not, after obtaining
extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or
briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the
same or offering an explanation for his failure to do
so.
Respondent needs lecturing that sympathy towards a
client does not justify his act of stating in his motion
for extension that he received the RTC Decision at a
later date to make it appear that the filing of the said
motion is well-within the period for filing an appeal.
Given his years of experience in the legal profession,
respondent should be well aware that "[a] lawyer is
first and foremost an officer of the court. Thus, while
he owes his entire devotion to the interest and
causes of his client, he must ensure that he acts
within the bounds of reason and common sense,
always aware that he is an instrument of truth and
justice. More importantly, as an officer of the court
and its indispensable partner in the sacred task of
administering justice, graver _responsibility is
imposed upon a lawyer than any other to uphold the
integrity of the courts and to show respect to its
processes. Thus, any act on his part which tends
visibly to obstruct, pervert or impede and degrade
the administration of justice constitutes professional
misconduct calling for the exercise of disciplinary
action against him."
All told, the Court finds respondent to have
committed acts violative of Canons 12and18 of the
CPR.
WHEREFORE, the Court ADOPTS the July 17, 2008
Resolution of the Board of Governors of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Atty. Johnny P.
Landero is ordered SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for six (6) months effective immediately. He is
directed to report the date of his receipt of this
Resolution to enable this Court to determine when
his suspension shall take effect Let a copy of this
Resolution be entered in the personal records of
respondent as a member of the Bar, and copies
furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of
the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in
the country.
79.
A.C. No. 8481 August 3, 2010
[Formerly B.M. No. 1524]
ATTY. JOSABETH V. ALONSO and SHALIMAR P.
LAZATIN, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. IBARO B. RELAMIDA, JR., Respondent.
FACTS:
In March 2001, Jennifer Ebanen filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal against Servier Philippines,
Incorporated in the NLRC. On July 5, 2002, the labor
Arbiter ruled in favor of Servier, stating that Ebanen
voluntarily resigned. Ebanen appealed at the NLRC
which only affirmed the appealed decision. Ebanen
filed for reconsideration but was denied. The case
eventually reached the Supreme Court. On February
17, 2005, the Courts Resolution dated August 4,
2004 has already become final and executory; thus,
a corresponding Entry of Judgment has been issued
dismissing the petition and holding that there was no
illegal dismissal since Ebanen voluntarily resigned.
However, despite the judgment, Ebanen through Atty.
Relamida, Jr. filed a second complaint on August 5,
2005 for illegal dismissal based on the same cause of
action of constructive dismissal against Servier. Thus,
on October 13, 2005, Servier, thru counsel, filed a
letter-complaint addressed to the then Chief Justice
Hilario Davide, Jr., praying that respondents be
disciplinary sanctioned for violation of the rules on
forum shopping and res judicata.
Respondents admitted the filing of the second
complaint against Servier. However, they opined that
the dismissal did not amount to res judicata, since
the decision was null and void for lack of due process
since the motion for the issuance of subpoena duces
tecum for the production of vital documents filed by
the complainant was ignored by the Labor Arbiter.
ISSUE:
Is the respondent guilty of forum shopping and res
judicata thus violating Canon 12 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility?
HELD:
During the IBP hearing, Atty. Relamida is ot a lawyer
but the daughter of Atty. Aurelio the senior partner of
A.M. Sison Jr. and Partners Law Offices where he is
employed as associate lawyer. Atty. Relamida
reasoned out that as a courtesy to Atty. Aurelio and
Ebanen, he had no choice but to represent the latter.
Moreover, he stressed that his client was denied of
her right to due process due to the denial of her
motion for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum.
He then argued that the decision of the Labor Arbiter
was null and void; thus, there was no res judicata. He
maintained that he did not violate the lawyers oath
by serving the interest of his client. The IBP-CBD
recommended that Atty. Relamida, Jr. be suspended
for 6 months for violating the rules on forum
shopping and res judicata.
The Supreme Court agrees to this finding. A lawyer
owes fidelity to the cause of his client, but not at the
expense of truth and the administration of justice.
The filing of multiple petitions constitutes abuse of
the courts processes and improper conduct that
tends to impede, obstruct and degrade the
administration of justice and will be punished as
contempt of court. Needless to state, the lawyer who
files such multiple or repetitious petitions (which
obviously delays the execution of a final and
executory judgment) subjects himself to disciplinary
action for incompetence (for not knowing any better)
or for willful violation of his duties as an attorney to
3
act with all good fidelity to the courts, and to
maintain only such actions as appear to him to be
just and are consistent with truth and honor.
The filing of another action concerning the same
subject matter, in violation of the doctrine of res
judicata, runs contrary to Canon 12 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which requires a lawyer
to exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist
in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.
By his actuations, respondent also violated Rule
12.02 and Rule 12.04 of the Code, as well as a
lawyers mandate "to delay no man for money or
malice."
80.
G.R. No. 159691 June 13, 2013
HEIRS OF MARCELO SOTTO, REPRESENTED BY:
LOLIBETH SOTTO NOBLE, DANILO C. SOTTO,
CRISTINA C. SOTTO, EMMANUEL C. SOTTO, and
FILEMON C. SOTTO; and SALVACION
BARCELONA, AS HEIR OF DECEASED MIGUEL
BARCELONA, Petitioners,
vs.
MATILDE S. PALICTE, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
We start this decision by expressing our alarm that
this case is the fifth suit to reach the Court dividing
the several heirs of the late Don Filemon Y. Sotto
(Filemon) respecting four real properties that had
belonged to Filemon' s estate (Estate of Sotto).
The first case (Matilde S. Palicte v. Hon. Jose O.
Ramolete, et al., No. L-55076, September 21, 1987,
154 SCRA 132) held that herein respondent Matilde
S. Palicte (Matilde), one of four declared heirs of
Filemon, had validly redeemed the four properties
pursuant to the assailed deed of redemption, and
was entitled to have the title over the four properties
transferred to her name, subject to the right of the
three other declared heirs to join her in the
redemption of the four properties within a period of
six months.
The second was the civil case filed by Pascuala
against Matilde (Civil Case No. CEB-19338) to annul
the formers waiver of rights, and to restore her as a
co-redemptioner of Matilde with respect to the four
properties (G.R. No. 131722, February 4, 1998).
The third was an incident in Civil Case No. R-10027
(that is, the suit brought by the heirs of Carmen
Rallos against the Estate of Sotto) wherein the heirs
of Miguel belatedly filed in November 1998 a motion
for reconsideration praying that the order issued on
October 5, 1989 be set aside, and that they be still
included as Matildes co-redemptioners. After the
trial court denied their motion for reconsideration for
its lack of merit, the heirs of Miguel elevated the
denial to the CA on certiorari and prohibition, but the
CA dismissed their petition and upheld the order
issued on October 5, 1989. Thence, the heirs of
Miguel came to the Court on certiorari (G.R. No.
154585), but the Court dismissed their petition for
being filed out of time and for lack of merit on
September 23, 2002.
The fourth was The Estate of Don Filemon Y. Sotto,
represented by its duly designated Administrator,
Sixto Sotto Pahang, Jr. v. Matilde S. Palicte, et al. (G.R.
No. 158642, September 22, 2008, 566 SCRA 142),
whereby the Court expressly affirmed the ruling
rendered by the probate court in Cebu City in Special
Proceedings No. 2706-R entitled Intestate Estate of
the Deceased Don Filemon Sotto denying the
administrators motion to require Matilde to turn over
the four real properties to the Estate of Sotto.
The fifth is this case. It seems that the disposition by
the Court of the previous cases did not yet satisfy
herein petitioners despite their being the successors-
in-interest of two of the declared heirs of Filemon
who had been parties in the previous cases either
directly or in privity. They now pray that the Court
undo the decision promulgated on November 29,
2002, whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) declared
their action for the partition of the four properties as
already barred by the judgments previously
rendered, and the resolution promulgated on August
5, 2003 denying their motion for reconsideration.
The principal concern here is whether this action for
partition should still prosper notwithstanding the
earlier rulings favoring Matildes exclusive right over
the four properties.
Antecedents
Filemon had four children, namely: Marcelo Sotto
(Marcelo), Pascuala Sotto-Pahang (Pascuala), Miguel
Barcelona (Miguel), and Matilde. Marcelo was the
administrator of the Estate of Sotto. Marcelo and
Miguel were the predecessors-in-interest of
petitioners.
In June 1967, Pilar Teves (Pilar) and other heirs of
Carmen Rallos (Carmen), the deceased wife of
Filemon, filed in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Cebu City a complaint against the Estate of Sotto
(Civil Case No. R-10027) seeking to recover certain
properties that Filemon had inherited from Carmen,
and damages. The CFI rendered judgment awarding
to Pilar and other heirs of Carmen damages of
P233,963.65, among other reliefs. To satisfy the
monetary part of the judgment, levy on execution
was effected against six parcels of land and two
residential houses belonging to the Estate of Sotto.
The levied assets were sold at a public auction. Later
on, Matilde redeemed four of the parcels of land in
her own name (i.e., Lots No. 1049, No. 1051, No.
1052 and No. 2179-C), while her sister Pascuala
redeemed one of the two houses because her family
was residing there. On July 9, 1980, the Deputy
Provincial Sheriff of Cebu executed a deed of
redemption in favor of Matilde, which the Clerk of
Court approved.
On July 24, 1980, Matilde filed in Civil Case No. R-
10027 a motion to transfer to her name the title to
the four properties. However, the CFI denied her
motion, and instead declared the deed of redemption
issued in her favor null and void, holding that
Matilde, although declared in Special Proceedings No.
2706-R as one of the heirs of Filemon, did not qualify
as a successor-in-interest with the right to redeem
4
the four properties. Matilde directly appealed the
adverse ruling to the Court via petition for review,
and on September 21, 1987, the Court, reversing the
CFIs ruling, granted Matildes petition for review but
allowed her co-heirs the opportunity to join Matilde
as co-redemptioners for a period of six months
before the probate court (i.e., RTC of Cebu City,
Branch 16) would grant her motion to transfer the
title to her name.1
The other heirs of Filemon failed to exercise their
option granted in the decision of September 21, 1987
to join Matilde as co-redemptioners within the six-
month period. Accordingly, on October 5, 1989, the
trial court issued an order in Civil Case No. R-10027
approving Matildes motion to transfer the title of the
four lots to her name, and directing the Register of
Deeds of Cebu to register the deed of redemption
and issue new certificates of title covering the four
properties in Matildes name.
It appears that Pascuala, who executed a document
on November 25, 1992 expressly waiving her rights
in the four properties covered by the deed of
redemption, changed her mind and decided to file on
September 23, 1996 in the RTC in Cebu City a
complaint to seek the nullification of her waiver of
rights, and to have herself be declared as a co-
redemptioner of the four properties (Civil Case No.
CEB-19338). However, the RTC dismissed Civil Case
No. CEB-19338 on the ground of its being barred by
laches. Pascuala then assailed the dismissal of Civil
Case No. CEB-19338 in the CA through a petition for
certiorari (C.A.-G.R. SP No. 44660), which the CA
dismissed on November 21, 1997. Undeterred,
Pascuala appealed the dismissal of her petition for
certiorari (G.R. No. 131722), but the Court denied
due course to her petition on February 4, 1998
because of her failure to pay the docket fees and
because of her certification against forum shopping
having been signed only by her counsel.
In November 1998, the heirs of Miguel filed a motion
for reconsideration in Civil Case No. R-10027 of the
RTC of Cebu City, Branch 16, praying that the order
issued on October 5, 1989 be set aside, and that
they be included as Matildes co-redemptioners. After
the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration for its
lack of merit on April 25, 2000, they assailed the
denial by petition for certiorari and prohibition (C.A.-
G.R. SP No. 60225). The CA dismissed the petition for
certiorari and prohibition on January 10, 2002.
Thereafter, they elevated the matter to the Court via
petition for certiorari (G.R. No. 154585), which the
Court dismissed on September 23, 2002 for being
filed out of time and for lack of merit.
On September 10, 1999, the heirs of Marcelo,
specifically: Lolibeth Sotto Noble, Danilo C. Sotto,
Cristina C. Sotto, Emmanuel C. Sotto, Filemon C.
Sotto, and Marcela C. Sotto; and the heirs of Miguel,
namely: Alberto, Arturo and Salvacion, all surnamed
Barcelona (herein petitioners), instituted the present
action for partition against Matilde in the RTC of Cebu
City, Branch 20 (Civil Case No. CEB-24293). 2 Alleging
in their complaint that despite the redemption of the
four properties having been made in the sole name
of Matilde, the four properties still rightfully belonged
to the Estate of Sotto for having furnished the funds
used to redeem the properties, they prayed that the
RTC declare the four properties as the assets of the
Estate of Sotto, and that the RTC direct their partition
among the heirs of Filemon.
It is notable at this juncture that the heirs of Pascuala
did not join the action for partition whether as
plaintiffs or defendants.3
Instead of filing her answer, Matilde moved to
dismiss the complaint,4 stating that: (a) petitioners
had no cause of action for partition because they
held no interest in the four properties; (b) the claim
was already barred by prior judgment, estoppel and
laches; (c) the court had no jurisdiction over the
action; and (d) a similar case entitled Pahang v.
Palicte (Civil Case No. 19338) had been dismissed
with finality by Branch 8 of the RTC in Cebu City.
On November 15, 1999, the RTC granted Matildes
motion to dismiss and dismissed the complaint, 5
holding that Civil Case No. CEB-24293 was already
barred by prior judgment considering that the
decision in G.R. No. 55076, the order dated October
5, 1989 of the RTC in Civil Case No. R-10027, and the
decision in G.R. No. 131722 had all become final, and
that the cases had involved the same parties, the
same subject matter, the same causes of action, and
the same factual and legal issues. The RTC observed
that it was bereft of jurisdiction to annul the rulings
of co-equal courts that had recognized Matildes
exclusive ownership of the four properties.
Following the denial by the RTC of their motion for
reconsideration,6 petitioners appealed the dismissal
of Civil Case No. CEB-24293 to the CA, which
promulgated its judgment on November 29, 2002
affirming the dismissal.7 After the CA denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration, 8 they brought
this present appeal to the Court.
In the meantime, the Estate of Sotto, through the
administrator, moved in the probate court (Special
Proceedings No. 2706-R) to require Matilde to
account for and turn over the four properties that
allegedly belonged to the estate, presenting
documentary evidence showing that Matilde had
effected the redemption of the four properties with
the funds of the estate in accordance with the
express authorization of Marcelo. 9 The probate court
granted the motion, but subsequently reversed itself
upon Matildes motion for reconsideration. Hence,
the Estate of Sotto appealed (G.R. No. 158642), but
the Court promulgated its decision on September 22,
2008 adversely against the Estate of Sotto. 10
Issue
Petitioners insist that this action for partition was not
barred by the prior judgment promulgated on
September 21, 1987 in No. L-55076, because they
were not hereby questioning Matildes right to
redeem the four properties but were instead raising
issues that had not been passed upon in No. L-
55076, or in any of the other cases mentioned by the
CA; that the issues being raised here were, namely:
(a) whether or not the redemption of the four
properties by Matilde was in accordance with the
agreement between her and Marcelo; and (b)
whether or not the funds used to redeem the four
properties belonged to the Estate of Sotto; 11 that
there could be no bar by res judicata because there
was no identity of parties and causes of action
5
between this action and the previous cases; that the
captions of the decided cases referred to by the CA
showed that the parties there were different from the
parties here; and that it had not been shown that this
action and the other cases were based on the same
causes of action.12
The sole decisive question is whether or not the
present action for partition was already barred by
prior judgment.
Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
Petitioners argue here that the four properties be
declared as part of the Estate of Sotto to be
partitioned among the heirs of Filemon because the
funds expended by Matilde for the redemption of the
properties came from the Estate of Sotto.
Their argument was similar to that made in The
Estate of Don Filemon Y. Sotto v. Palicte,13 the fourth
case to reach the Court, where the Court explicitly
ruled as follows:
All these judgments and order upholding Matildes
exclusive ownership of the subject properties
became final and executory except the action for
partition which is still pending in this Court. The
judgments were on the merits and rendered by
courts having jurisdiction over the subject matter and
the parties.
There is substantial identity of parties considering
that the present case and the previous cases involve
the heirs of Filemon. There is identity of parties not
only when the parties in the case are the same, but
also between those in privity with them, such as
between their successors-in-interest. Absolute
identity of parties is not required, and where a
shared identity of interest is shown by the identity of
relief sought by one person in a prior case and the
second person in a subsequent case, such was
deemed sufficient.
There is identity of causes of action since the issues
raised in all the cases essentially involve the claim of
ownership over the subject properties. Even if the
forms or natures of the actions are different, there is
still identity of causes of action when the same facts
or evidence support and establish the causes of
action in the case at bar and in the previous cases.
Hence, the probate court was correct in setting aside
the motion to require Matilde to turn over the subject
properties to the estate considering that Matildes
title and ownership over the subject properties have
already been upheld in previous final decisions and
order. This Court will not countenance the estates
ploy to countermand the previous decisions
sustaining Matildes right over the subject properties.
A party cannot evade the application of the principle
of res judicata by the mere expediency of varying the
form of action or the relief sought, or adopting a
different method of presenting the issue, or by
pleading justifiable circumstances.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the
Orders dated 20 December 2002 and 2 June 2003
issued by the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
Branch 16, in SP. PROC. No. 2706-R. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
For this the fifth case to reach us, we still rule that
res judicata was applicable to bar petitioners action
for partition of the four properties.
Res judicata exists when as between the action
sought to be dismissed and the other action these
elements are present, namely; (1) the former
judgment must be final; (2) the former judgment
must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties; (3)
the former judgment must be a judgment on the
merits; and (4) there must be between the first and
subsequent actions (i) identity of parties or at least
such as representing the same interest in both
actions; (ii) identity of subject matter, or of the rights
asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being
founded on the same facts; and, (iii) identity of
causes of action in both actions such that any
judgment that may be rendered in the other action
will, regardless of which party is successful, amount
to res judicata in the action under consideration.14
The first three elements were present. The decision
of the Court in G.R. No. 55076 (the first case), the
decision of the Court in G.R. No. 131722 (the second
case), the order dated October 5, 1989 of the RTC in
Civil Case No. R-10027 as upheld by the Court in G.R.
No. 154585 (the third case), and the decision in G.R.
No. 158642 (the fourth case) all of which dealt with
Matildes right to the four properties had upheld
Matildes right to the four properties and had all
become final. Such rulings were rendered in the
exercise of the respective courts jurisdiction over the
subject matter, and were adjudications on the merits
of the cases.
What remains to be determined is whether Civil Case
No. CEB-24293 and the previous cases involved the
same parties, the same subject matter, the same
causes of action, and the same factual and legal
issues.
We find that, indeed, Civil Case No. CEB-24293 was
no different from the previous cases as far as parties,
subject matter, causes of action and issues were
concerned. In other words, Civil Case No. CEB-24293
was an undisguised relitigation of the same settled
matter concerning Matildes ownership of the four
properties.
First of all, petitioners, as plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
CEB-24293, were suing in their capacities as the
successors-in-interest of Marcelo and Miguel. Even in
such capacities, petitioners identity with the parties
in the previous cases firmly remained. In G.R. No. L-
55076 (the first case), in which Matilde was the
petitioner while her brother Marcelo, the
administrator of the Estate of Sotto, was one of the
respondents, the Court affirmed Matildes redemption
of the four properties notwithstanding that it gave
the other heirs of Filemon the opportunity to join as
co-redemptioners within a period of six months.
When the other heirs did not ultimately join as
Matildes co-redemptioners within the period allowed
by the Court, the trial court in Civil Case No. R-10027
6
rightly directed the Register of Deeds to issue new
certificates of title covering the properties in
Matildes name. In Civil Case No. CEB-19338 (the
second case), the action Pascuala brought against
Matilde for the nullification of Pascualas waiver of
rights involving the four properties, the trial court
dismissed the complaint upon finding Pascuala
barred by laches from asserting her right as Matildes
coredemptioner. The CA and, later on, the Court itself
(G.R. No. 131722) affirmed the dismissal by the trial
court. In Civil Case No. R-10027, the trial court
denied the motion of the heirs of Miguel (who are
petitioners herein) to include them as co-
redemptioners of the properties on the ground of
laches and res judicata. Again, the CA and, later on,
the Court itself (G.R. No. 154585) affirmed the denial.
In G.R. No. 158642 (the fourth case), the Court
upheld the ruling of the probate court in Special
Proceedings No. 2706-R denying the administrators
motion to require Matilde to turn over the four real
properties to the Estate of Sotto.
In all the five cases (Civil Case No. CEB-24293
included), an identity of parties existed because the
parties were the same, or there was privity among
them, or some of the parties were successors-in-
interest litigating for the same thing and under the
same title and in the same capacity. 15 An absolute
identity of the parties was not necessary, because a
shared identity of interest sufficed for res judicata to
apply.16 Moreover, mere substantial identity of
parties, or even community of interests between
parties in the prior and subsequent cases, even if the
latter were not impleaded in the first case, would be
sufficient.17 As such, the fact that a previous case
was filed in the name of the Estate of Sotto only was
of no consequence.
Secondly, the subject matter of all the actions (Civil
Case No. CEB-24293 included), was the same, that is,
Matildes right to the four properties. On the one
hand, Matilde insisted that she had the exclusive
right to them, while, on the other hand, the other
declared heirs of Filemon, like petitioners
predecessors-in-interest, maintained that the
properties belonged to the Estate of Sotto.
And, lastly, a judgment rendered in the other cases,
regardless of which party was successful, would
amount to res judicata in relation to Civil Case No.
CEB-24293.
Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment
or decree on the merits rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction is conclusive about the rights
of the parties or their privies in all later suits and on
all points and matters determined in the previous
suit. The foundation principle upon which the
doctrine rests is that the parties ought not to be
permitted to litigate the same issue more than once;
that when a right or fact has been judicially tried and
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, so
long as it remains unreversed, it should be conclusive
upon the parties and those in privity with them in law
or estate.18
Section 47 (b) Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
institutionalizes the doctrine of res judicata in the
concept of bar by prior judgment, viz:
Section 47. Effect of judgments and final orders.
The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a
court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to
pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as
follows:
xxxx
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with
respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any
other matter that could have been raised in relation
thereto, conclusive between the parties and their
successors in interest by title subsequent to the
commencement of the action or special proceeding,
litigating for the same thing and under the same title
and in the same capacity; and
xxxx
The doctrine of res judicata is an old axiom of law,
dictated by wisdom and sanctified by age, and
founded on the broad principle that it is to the
interest of the public that there should be an end to
litigation by the same parties over a subject once
fully and fairly adjudicated. It has been appropriately
said that the doctrine is a rule pervading every well-
regulated system of jurisprudence, and is put upon
two grounds embodied in various maxims of the
common law: one, public policy and necessity, which
makes it to the interest of the State that there should
be an end to litigation interest reipublicae ut sit finis
litium; the other, the hardship on the individual that
he should be vexed twice for one and the same
cause nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem
causa. A contrary doctrine would subject the public
peace and quiet to the will and neglect of individuals
and prefer the gratification of the litigious disposition
on the part of suitors to the preservation of the
public tranquillity and happiness. 19 The doctrine is to
be applied with rigidity because:
x x x the maintenance of public order, the repose of
society, and the quiet of families require that what
has been definitely determined by competent
tribunals shall be accepted as irrefragable legal truth.
So deeply is this principle implanted in xxx
jurisprudence that commentators upon it have said,
the res judicata renders white that which is black and
straight that which is crooked. Facit excurvo rectum,
ex albo nigrum. No other evidence can afford
strength to the presumption of truth it creates, and
no argument can detract from its legal efficacy. 20
What we have seen here is a clear demonstration of
unmitigated forum shopping on the part of
petitioners and their counsel. It should not be enough
for us to just express our alarm at petitioners
disregard of the doctrine of res judicata. We do not
justly conclude this decision unless we perform one
last unpleasant task, which is to demand from
petitioners counsel, Atty. Makilito B. Mahinay, an
explanation of his role in this pernicious attempt to
relitigate the already settled issue regarding
Matildes exclusive right in the four properties. He
was not unaware of the other cases in which the
issue had been definitely settled considering that his
clients were the heirs themselves of Marcelo and
Miguel.1wphi1 Moreover, he had represented the
Estate of Sotto in G.R. No. 158642 (The Estate of Don
Filemon Y. Sotto v. Palicte).
7
Under the circumstances, Atty. Mahinay appears to
have engaged in the prejudicial practice of forum
shopping as much as any of his clients had been. If
he was guilty, the Court would not tolerate it, and
would sanction him. In this regard, forum shopping,
according to Ao-as v. Court of Appeals, 21 may be
committed as follows:
As the present jurisprudence now stands, forum
shopping can he committed in three ways: (1) filing
multiple cases based on the same cause of action
and with the same prayer, the previous case not
having been resolved yet (litis pendentia); (2) filing
multiple cases based on the same cause of action
and the same prayer, the previous case having been
finally resolved (res judicata); and (3) filing multiple
cases based on the same cause of action but with
different prayers (splitting of causes of action, where
the ground for dismissal is also either litis pendentia
or res judicata). If the forum shopping is not
considered willful and deliberate, the subsequent
cases shall he dismissed without prejudice on one of
the two grounds mentioned above. However, if the
forum shopping is willful and deliberate, both (or all,
if there are more than two) actions shall be dismissed
with prejudice.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for
review; AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on
November 29, 2002; and ORDERS petitioners to pay
the costs of suit.
The Court DIRECTS Atty. Makilito B. Mahinay to show
cause in writing within ten days from notice why he
should not be sanctioned as a member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for committing a
clear violation of the rule prohibiting forum-shopping
by aiding his clients in asserting the same claims at
least twice.
SO ORDERED.
81.
G.R. No. 172700 July 23, 2010
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner,
vs.
ROLSON RODRIGUEZ, Respondent.
FACTS:
On 26 August 2003, the Ombudsman inVisayas
received a complaint for abuse of authority,
dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, and
neglect of duty against Rolson Rodriguez, punong
barangay in Brgy. Sto. Rosario, Binalbagan, Negros
Occidental. On 1 September 2003, the
sangguniangbayan of Binalbagan, Negros Occidental,
through vice-mayor Jose G. Yulo, received a similar
complaint against Rodriguez for abuse of authority,
dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, and
neglect of duty.
Rodriguez filed a motion to dismiss the case filed in
the sangguniangbayan on the ground that the
allegations in the complaint were without factual
basis and did not constitute any violation of law, and
that complainants violated the rule against forum
shopping.
Meanwhile, the Ombudsman required Rodriguez to
file his answer to the similar complaint filed before it.
Rodriguez filed a motion to dismiss the case filed in
the Ombudsman on the grounds of litispendentia and
forum shopping. He alleged that the
sangguniangbayan had already acquired jurisdiction
over his person.
Upon complainants motion and
Rodriguezscommentpraying that the complaint be
dismissed on the ground of forum shopping, the
municipal vice-mayor dismissed the case filed in the
sangguniangbayan.
In his position paper submitted to the Ombudsman,
Rodriguez insisted that the sangguniangbayan still
continued to exercise jurisdiction over the complaint
filed against him. He claimed he had not received
any resolution or decision dismissing the complaint
filed in the sangguniangbayan. Rodriguez also
averred that the sangguniangbayan resolution
dismissing the case filed against him was not valid
because only the vice-mayor signed it.
Regardless, the Ombudsman rendered a decision
finding Rodriguez guilty of dishonesty and
oppression. It imposed on Rodriguez the penalty of
dismissal from the service with forfeiture of all
benefits, disqualification to hold public office, and
forfeiture of civil service eligibilities. Rodriguez filed a
motion for reconsideration, which was denied by
herein petitioner.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals set aside for lack of
jurisdiction the Decision of the Ombudsman and
directed the sangguniangbayan to proceed with the
hearing on the administrative case. The appellate
court reasoned that the sangguniangbayan had
acquired primary jurisdiction over the person of
Rodriguez to the exclusion of the Ombudsman. The
Court of Appeals relied on Section 4, Rule 46 of the
Rules of Court, to wit:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction over person of
respondent, how acquired. The court shall
acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
respondent by the service on him of its
order or resolution indicating its initial action
on the petition or by his voluntary
submission to such jurisdiction.
The appellate court noted that the
sangguniangbayan served on Rodriguez a notice,
requiring the latter to file an answer, on 8 September
2003 while the Ombudsman did so two days later or
on 10 September 2003.
Petitioner Ombudsman contends that upon the filing
of a complaint before a body vested with jurisdiction,
that body has taken cognizance of the complaint.
Petitioner cites Blacks Law Dictionary in defining
what to take cognizance means to wit, to
acknowledge or exercise jurisdiction. Petitioner
points out it had taken cognizance of the complaint
against Rodriguez before a similar complaint was
filed in the sangguniangbayan against the same
respondent.
Private respondent Rolson Rodriguez countered by
citing Article 124 of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of Republic Act No. 7160, which provides
that an elective official may be removed from office
by order of the proper court or the disciplining
authority whichever first acquires jurisdiction to the
exclusion of the other. Private respondent insists the
sangguniangbayan first acquired jurisdiction over the
complaint and his person. He argues jurisdiction over
the person of a respondent in an administrative
complaint is acquired by the service of summons or
other compulsory processes.Private respondent
stresses complainants violated the rule against forum
shopping when they filed identical complaints in two
disciplining authorities exercising concurrent
jurisdiction.
ISSUE:1. WON the prohibition on forum shopping
was violated.
8
 2. WONthe Ombudsman first acquired
jurisdiction.
HELD: 1. NO. The facts in the present case are
analogous to those in Laxina, Sr. v. Ombudsman,
which likewise involved identical administrative
complaints filed in both the Ombudsman and the
sangguniangpanlungsod against a punong barangay
for grave misconduct. The Court held therein that the
rule against forum shopping applied only to judicial
cases or proceedings, not to administrative cases.
Thus, even if complainants filed in the Ombudsman
and the sangguniangbayan identical complaints
against private respondent, they did not violate the
rule against forum shopping because their complaint
was in the nature of an administrative case.
2. YES. The Ombudsman, by constitutional grant and
under the Ombudsman Act of 1989 (RA 6770), has
the power to investigate and prosecute on its own or
on complaint by any person any public officer or
employee. The primary jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman to investigate cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan is limited by RA 8249, An Act Further
Defining the Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, to
public officials occupying positions corresponding to
salary grade 27 and higher. Since private respondent,
as punong barangay, is occupying a position
corresponding to salary grade 14 under RA 6758,
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989,
the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the case;
but since the punong barangay is a public officer, the
Ombudsman, nonetheless, still enjoys concurrent
jurisdiction with other investigative agenices by
virtue of the aforementioned constitutional and
legislative grant.
Under Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the
Local Government Code, the sangguniangpanlungsod
or sangguniangbayan has disciplinary authority over
any elective barangay official, to wit:
SEC. 61.Form and Filing of Administrative
Complaints. A verified complaint against any
erring elective official shall be prepared as
follows:
x xxx
(c) A complaint against any elective
barangay official shall be filed before the
sangguniangpanlungsod or
sangguniangbayan concerned whose
decision shall be final and executory.
Clearly, the Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction
with the sangguniangbayan over administrative
cases against elective barangay officials occupying
positions below salary grade 27, such as private
respondent in this case.
In Civil Service Commission vs Alfonso and Enrique
vs CA, the court ruled that in administrative cases
involving the concurrent jurisdiction of two or more
disciplining authorities, the body in which the
complaint is filed first, and which opts to take
cognizance of the case, acquires jurisdiction to the
exclusion of other tribunals exercising concurrent
jurisdiction. In this case, since the complaint was
filed first in the Ombudsman, and the Ombudsman
opted to assume jurisdiction over the complaint, the
Ombudsmans exercise of jurisdiction is to the
exclusion of the sangguniangbayan exercising
concurrent jurisdiction.
It is a hornbook rule that jurisdiction is a matter of
law. Jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost upon the
instance of the parties but continues until the case is
terminated. When herein complainants first filed the
complaint in the Ombudsman, jurisdiction was
already vested on the latter. Jurisdiction could no
longer be transferred to the sangguniangbayan by
virtue of a subsequent complaint filed by the same
complainants.
As a final note, under Section 60 of the Local
Government Code, the sangguniangbayan has no
power to remove an elective barangay official. Apart
from the Ombudsman, only a proper court may do
so. Unlike the sangguniangbayan, the powers of the
Ombudsman are not merely recommendatory. The
Ombudsman is clothed with authority to directly
remove an erring public official other than members
of Congress and the Judiciary who may be removed
only by impeachment.
82.
A.C. No. 6252 October 5, 2004
JONAR SANTIAGO, complainant,
vs.
Atty. EDISON V. RAFANAN, respondent.
FACTS:
This is a disbarment case filed by BJMP
employee Jonar Santiago against Atty. Edison
Rafanan.
Santiago, in his complaint, alleged among
others that Rafanan, in notarizing several
documents on different dates failed and/or
refused to:
o Make the proper notation regarding the
cedula or community tax certificate of
the affiants (*one making the affidavit);
o Enter the details of the notarized
documents in the notarial register;
o Make and execute the certification and
enter his PTR and IBP numbers in the
documents he notarized
Santiago also alleged that Rafanan executed
an Affidavit in favor of his client and offered it
as evidence (Rafanan stood as counsel and as
witness of his client) and Rafanan, as alleged
by Santiago, waited for him together with his
men and disarmed Santiago and uttered
insulting words at him.
ATTY. RAFANANS CONTENTIONS:
o Admitted having administered the oath
to the affiants whose Affidavits were
attached to the Complaint of Santiago.
But Rafanan believed that the non-
notation of their Residence Certificates in
the Affidavits and Counter-Affidavits
were allowed because:
Notation of residence certificates
applied only to documents
acknowledged by a notary
public, and
Was not mandatory for affidavits
related to cases pending before
courts and other government
offices (Side comment: If they
were not notarized and were
used for court proceedings,
edihindisilanaging public
documents? Paanosilamagiging
admissible sa court?
TengelangyatasiRafanan)
He also pointed out that older
practitioners in Nueva Ecija also
do what he did they do not
indicate affiants residence
certificates on documents they
notarized, or have entries in the
notarial register for these
documents.
9
 o As to his alleged failure to comply with
Sec.3 Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure: as counsel to the affiants, he
had the option not comply or not with
the certification.
o As to his alleged violation of Rule 12.08
of CPR: lawyers could testify on behalf of
their clients on substantial matters, in
cases where [their] testimony is
essential to the ends of justice.
Santiago charged Rafanans
clients with attempted murder.
Rafanan said that since his
clients were in his house during
the alleged crime, thats why he
said his testimony is very
essential.
o He also contends that the case filed by
Santiago was only to harass Rafanan
since he is the counsel of the parties who
filed cases against him before the
ombudsman (Brgy. Capt. Ernesto Ramos
and BJMP)
ISSUES:
Whether or not Rafanan is guilty in violating
the Notarial Law.
Whether or not a lawyer (in this case,
Rafanan) can stand as witness in favor of his
clients.
HELDS:
Yes, he violated the Notarial Law for not
making the proper notation and entering the
details of the notarized documents.
Yes, a lawyer can stand as witness of a client.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
On Issue No. 1
The Notarial Law is explicit on the
obligations and duties of notaries public.
And these formalities are mandatory and
cannot be simply neglected.
They are required to certify that the party to
every document acknowledged before them
has presented the proper residence certificate
(or exemption from the residence tax); and to
enter its number, place of issue and the date
as part of such certification.
They are also required to keep a notarial
register; to enter therein all instruments
notarized by them; etc.
As to Rafanans defense that its a common
practice in Nueva Ecija, SC says: It is appalling
and inexcusable that he did away with the
basics of notarial procedure allegedly because
others were doing so. Being swayed by the
bad example of others is not an acceptable
justification for breaking the law.
On Issue No. 2
A lawyer is not disqualified from being a
witness, except only in certain cases
pertaining to privileged communication arising
from an attorney-client relationship.
Reason: The difficulty posed upon lawyers by
the task of dissociating their relationship to
their clients as witnesses from that as an
advocate (Note: A witness must only say what
happened. Only the truth. As compared with
the task of a lawyer who will use all the
available remedies and actions in his arsenal
for his client to win the case.)
It is difficult to distinguish the fairness and
impartiality of a disinterested witness from the
zeal of an advocate.
The preference is for lawyers to REFRAIN from
testifying as witnesses, unless they absolutely
have to; and should they do so, to withdraw
from active management of the case.
In the case at bar:
o Atty. Rafanan cannot be
administratively liable because:
Its a duty of the lawyer to assert
every remedy and defense that is
authorized by law for the benefit
of the client. (Remember, there is
a criminal case of attempted
murder against his client which
will deprive his client of his life
and liberty, if they fail to display a
good defense.)
On the Side Issues:
There is no harassment of the part of Rafanan
against Santiago because there were no
pieces of evidence presented.
Mere allegation is never equivalent to proof,
and a bare charge cannot be equated with
liability.
RULING: Atty. Rafanan is GUILTY of violating the
Notarial Law and Canon 5 of the CPR. He is fined
P3,000.00 with a warning that similar infractions will
be dealt more severely.
83.
A.M. No. P-03-1690 April 4, 2003
(formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 00-956-P)
JUDGE ESTRELLITA M. PAAS, petitioner,
vs.
EDGAR E. ALMARVEZ, respondent.
In a separate case for inhibition of Judge Paas in a
criminal case, it was found that Judge Paas husband,
Atty. Paas, who is a private practitioner, was using his
wifes office address in his law practice, particularly
in a criminal case he was handling which was
docketed at an RTC also in Pasay. In support of this
charge, documents weres ubmitted such as 1) a
Notice of Appeal signed by Atty. Paas, and 2) notices
from Pasay City RTC, and from the Supreme Court.
This was admitted by Judge Paas, but she claims that
this was done only to ensure and facilitate the
delivery of those notices.
ISSUE
:
Wether or not Judge Paas and Atty. Paas should be
penalized for allowing the latter to use the office of
the former as his return address in his private
practice.
RULING
:
YES. Using the Judges address is a subtle was of
sending a message that Atty. Paas is the husband of
a judge in the same building and should be given
special treatment by other judges or court personnel.
In SC Administrative Circular No. 01-99, it was stated
that court officials and
employees must never use their offices...for any
other purpose that for court or judicial functions.
Code of Judicial Conduct provides that a judge should
avoid impropriety in all activities and shall not allow
the use of the judicial office to advance the private
interests of others. SC Circular No. 3-92 prohibits the
use of halls of justice for residential or commercial
purposes. It is unprofessional and dishonorable to
10
misuse a public office to enhance a lawyers prestige.
It violates canons3, 10, 13, and 15 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
On his part, Atty. Paas was guilty of using a
fraudulent, misleading, and deceptive address that
had no purpose other than to try to impress either
the court in which his cases are lodged, or his client,
that he has close ties to a member of the judiciary, in
violation of the following rules
of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Canon 3A lawyer in making known his legal services
shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and
objective information or statement of facts.
Rule 3.01. A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of
any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive,
undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or
claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.
Canon 10A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND
GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any
artifice.
Canon 13a LAWYER SHALL RELY UPON THE MERITS
OF HIS CAUSE AND REFRAIN FROM ANY IMPROPERITY
WHICH TENDS TO INFLUENCE, OR GIVES THE
APPEARANCE OF
INFLUENCING THE COURT.
Canon 15A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR,
FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND
TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENT
Rule 15.06.
A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to
influence any public official, tribunal or legislative
body.
The need for relying on the merits of a lawyers case,
instead of banking on his relationship with a member
of the bench which tends to influence or gives the
appearance of influencing the court, cannot be
overemphasized.
It is unprofessional and dishonorable, to say the
least, to misuse a public office to enhance a lawyers
prestige.
Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded
by such reprehensible and improper conduct.
84.
ADM. CASE No. 7006 October 9, 2007
RE : SUSPENSION OF ATTY. ROGELIO Z.
BAGABUYO, FORMER SENIOR STATE
PROSECUTOR.
This administrative case stemmed from the events of
the Criminal case proceeding originally raffled to the
sala of Judge Floripinas C. Buyser. Judge Buyser
denied the Demurrer to the Evidence of the accused,
declaring that the evidence thus presented by the
prosecution was sufficient to prove the crime of
homicide and not the charge of murder. The counsel
of the defense filed a Motion to fix the amount of Bail
Bond. Respondent Atty Bagabuyo, then Senior state
Prosecutor and the deputized prosecutor of the case,
objected thereto mainly on the ground that the
original charge of murder, punishable with reclusion
perpetua, was not subject of bail under the Rules of
Court.
Judge Buser inhibited himself from further trying the
case because of the harsh insinuation of Senior
Prosecutor Rogelio Bagabuyo that he lacks the cold
neutrality of an impartial magistrate, by allegedly
suggesting the filing of the motion to fix the amount
of bail bond by counsel for the accused.
Respondent appealed to the CA. Instead of availing
himself only of judicial remedies, respondent caused
the publication of an article regarding the Order
granting to the accused in the issue of the Mindanao
Gold Star Daily. The article, entitled Senior prosecutor
lambast Surigao judge for allowing murder suspect to
bail out.
The RTC of Surigao City directed respondent and the
writer of the article to appear in court to explain why
they should not be cited for indirect contempt of
court for the publication of the article which degrade
the court and its presiding judge with its lies and
misrepresentation.
Respondent admitted that he caused the holding of
the press conference, but refused to answer whether
he made the statement in the article until after he
shall have filed a motion to dismiss. For his refusal to
answer, the trial court declared him in contempt of
court pursuant to the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: WON Prosecutor Bagabuyo violated the
canons and his oath as a lawyer?
Held: YES
Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts who are
empowered to appear, prosecute and defend; and
upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and
liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence.
Membership in the bar imposes upon them certain
obligations. Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility mandates a lawyer to observe and
maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial
officers and [he] should insist on similar conduct by
others. Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 states that a lawyer
shall submit grievances against a judge to the proper
authorities only.
Respondent violated Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 when he
admittedly caused the holding of a press conference
where he made statements against the Order dated
November 12, 2002 allowing the accused in Crim.
Case No. 5144 to be released on bail.
Respondent also violated Canon 11 when he
indirectly stated that Judge Tan was displaying
judicial arrogance in the article entitled, Senior
prosecutor lambasts Surigao judge for allowing
murder suspect to bail out, which appeared in the
August 18, 2003 issue of the Mindanao Gold Star
Daily. Respondents statements in the article, which
were made while Crim. Case No. 5144 was still
pending in court, also violated Rule 13.02 of Canon
13, which states that a lawyer shall not make public
statements in the media regarding a pending case
tending to arouse public opinion for or against a
party.
In regard to the radio interview given to Tony
Consing, respondent violated Rule 11.05 of Canon 11
of the Code of Professional Responsibility for not
resorting to the proper authorities only for redress of
11
his grievances against Judge Tan. Respondent also
violated Canon 11 for his disrespect of the court and
its officer when he stated that Judge Tan was
ignorant of the law, that as a mahjong aficionado, he
was studying mahjong instead of studying the law,
and that he was a liar.
Respondent also violated the Lawyers Oath, as he
has sworn to conduct [himself] as a lawyer according
to the best of [his] knowledge and discretion with all
good fidelity as well to the courts as to [his] clients.
As a senior state prosecutor and officer of the court,
respondent should have set the example of
observing and maintaining the respect due to the
courts and to judicial officers. Montecillo v. Gica held:
It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the
courts a respectful attitude. As an officer of the court,
it is his duty to uphold the dignity and authority of
the court to which he owes fidelity, according to the
oath he has taken. Respect for the courts guarantees
the stability of our democratic institutions which,
without such respect, would be resting on a very
shaky foundation.
85.
A.C. No. 7199 July 22, 2009
[Formerly CBD 04-1386]
FOODSPHERE, INC., Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MELANIO L. MAURICIO, JR., Respondent.
FACTS:
[A] certain Alberto Cordero (Cordero) purportedly
bought from a grocery in Valenzuela City canned
goods including a can of CDO Liver spread. As
Cordero and his relatives were eating bread with the
CDO Liver spread, they found the spread to be sour
and soon discovered a colony of worms inside the
can. This was complained before the BFAD. After
conciliation meetings between Cordero and the
petitioner, the Corderos eventually forged
a KASUNDUAN seeking the withdrawal of their
complaint before the BFAD. The BFAD thus dismissed
the complaint. Respondent, Atty. Mauricio, Jr., who
affixed his signature to the KASUNDUAN as a witness,
later wrote in one of his articles/columns in a tabloid
that he prepared the document.
Complainant filed criminal complaints against
respondent and several others for Libel and
Threatening to Publish Libel under Articles 353 and
356 of the Revised Penal Code before the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Quezon City and Valenzuela
City. The complaints were pending at the time of the
filing of the present administrative complaint.
Despite the pendency of the civil case against him
and the issuance of a status quo order
restraining/enjoining further publishing, televising
and broadcasting of any matter relative to the
complaint of CDO, respondent continued with his
attacks against complainant and its products.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent violated the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
HELD: YES. Respondent suspended for three (3)
years from the practice of law.
The above actuations of respondent are also in
violation of Rule 13.03 of the Canon of Professional
Responsibility which reads: A lawyer shall not make
public statements in the media regarding a pending
case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a
party.
The language employed by respondent undoubtedly
casts aspersions on the integrity of the Office of the
City Prosecutor and all the Prosecutors connected
with said Office. Respondent clearly assailed the
impartiality and fairness of the said Office in handling
cases filed before it and did not even design to
submit any evidence to substantiate said wild
allegations. The use by respondent of the above-
quoted language in his pleadings is
manifestly violative of Canon 11 and the
fundamental Canon 1 also of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which mandates lawyers to uphold
the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and legal
processes. Respondent defied said
status quo order, despite his (respondents) oath as a
member of the legal profession to obey the laws as
well as the legal orders of the duly constituted
authorities.
Further, respondent violated Canon 8 and Rule 8.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
mandate, and by failing to live up to his oath and to
comply with the exacting standards of the legal
profession, respondent also violated Canon 7 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which directs a
lawyer to at all times uphold the integrity and the
dignity of the legal profession.
86.
G.R. No. L-27654 February 18, 1970
IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR
DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. VICENTE
RAUL ALMACEN In L-27654, ANTONIO H.
CALERO,
vs.
VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAY.
FACTS: Vicente Raul Almacens Petition to
Surrender Lawyers Certificate of Title, filed on Sept.
26, 1967, in protest against what he therein asserts
is a great injustice committed against his client by
Supreme Court. He indicts SC, in his own phrase, as
a tribual peopled by men who are calloused to our
pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their
own applicable decisions and commit culpable
violations of the Constitution with impunity. His
clients he continues, who was deeply aggrieved by
this Courts unjust judgment, has become one of
the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy.
He ridicules the members of the Court, saying that
justice as administered by the present members of
the Supreme Court is not only bline, but also deaf
and dumb. He then vows to argue the cause of his
client in the peoples forum, so that people may
12
know of the silent injustices committed by this court
and that whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices
that were committed must never be repeated. He
ends his petition with a prayer that:
a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court
to receive the certificate of the undersigned attorney
that at any time in the future and in the event we
regain our faith and confidence, we may retrieve our
title to assume the practice of the noblest
profession.
The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil
case entitled Yaptichay v. Calero, in which Atty.
Almacen was counsel for the defendant. The trial
court rencered judgment agains his client. On June
15, 1966 atty. Almacen receive acopy of the
decision. Twenty days later on he moved for its
reconsideration but did not notify the latter of the
time and plce of hearing on said motion. Meanwhile,
onJuly 18, 1966, the plaintiff moved for execution of
the judgment. For lack of proof of service, the trial
court denied both motions. To prove that he did
serve on the adverse party a copy of his first motion
for reconsideration, atty. Almacen filed on August 17,
1966 a second motion for reconsideration, however,
was ordered withdrawn by the trial court on August
30, 1966, upon verbal motion of Atty. Almacen
himself, who earlier, that is, on Aug. 22, 1966 had
already perfected the appeal. Motion for
reconsideration was denied by Court of Appeals.
HELD: Well-recognized is the right of a lawyer, both
as an officer of the court and as citizen, to criticize in
properly respectful terms and through legitimate
channels the acts of courts and judges.
As a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is
expected not only to exercise the right, but also to
consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law
may abridge this right. Nor is he professionally
answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of
the judges, which would not expose him to legal
animadversion as a citizen. Atty. Almacen is
suspended from the practice of law until further
orders.
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism
that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the
walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists
between fair criticism, on the One hand, and abuse
and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the
other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross
violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is Such a
misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary
action.
87.
January 26, 2016
A.C. No. 10868
[Formerly CBD Case No. 07-2041]
CHERYLE. VASCO-TAMARAY, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. DEBORAH Z. DAQUIS, Respondent.
FACTS
Cheryl E. Vasco-Tamaray (Vasco-Tamaray)
filed a Complaint-Affidavit before the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines on July 30, 2007, alleging that
respondent Atty. Deborah Z. Daquis (Atty. Daquis)
filed, on her behalf, a Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage without her consent and forged
her signature on the Petition.1 She also alleged that
Atty. Daquis signed the Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage as "counsel for petitioner,"
referring to Vasco-Tamaray.
Vasco-Tamaray narrated that in December
2006, Atty. Daquis informed her "that a Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage was filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City." 6 In February
2007, Atty. Daquis asked her to appear before the
City Prosecutor's Office of Muntinlupa City.
On March 5, 2007, Vasco-Tamaray appeared
before the City Prosecutor's Office and met Atty.
Daquis. She asked Atty. Daquis to give her a copy of
the Petition but Atty. Daquis refused.
Vasco-Tamaray stated that she obtained a
copy of the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage from Branch 207 of the Regional Trial Court
of Muntinlupa City. She was surprised to see that the
Petition was allegedly signed and filed by her.
Vasco-Tamaray alleged that she did not file
the Petition, that her signature was forged by Atty.
Daquis, and that her purported community tax
certificate appearing on the jurat was not hers
because she never resided in Muntinlupa City. 10 She
attached a Certification issued by the Sangguniang
Barangay of Putatan, Muntinlupa City stating that she
was "never ... a resident of #9 Daang Hari Street,
Umali Compound, Summitville Subdivision, Barangay
Putatan."11 She also attached a Certification issued
by Barangay Talipapa stating that she has been a
resident of "#484-J Saguittarius St., Solville Subd.,
Barangay Talipapa, Novaliches, Quezon City . . . from
2000 till present."
Vasco-Tamaray also alleged that the Petition
for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage was Atty.
Daquis' idea, consented to by Leomarte Tamaray.
She further alleged that she had never
received any court process. The Petition states that
her postal address is "09 Daang Hari St., Umali
Comp., Summitville Subd., Putatan, Muntinlupa
City[,]"14 which is the address of her husband's
family. The return slips of the notices sent by the trial
court were received by Encamacion T. Coletraba and
Almencis Cumigad, relatives of Leomarte Tamaray.
Atty. Daquis filed an Answer countering that
her client was Vasco-Tamaray, complainant herself,
and not complainant's husband. She alleged that
Vasco-Tamaray knew of the Petition as early as
October 2006, not December 2006.
With regard to the community tax
certificate, Atty. Daquis explained that when she
notarized the Petition, the community tax certificate
number was supplied by Vasco-Tamaray. Atty. Daquis'
allegation was supported by the Joint Affidavit of her
staff, Ma. Dolor E. Purawan (Purawan) and Ludy
Lorena (Lorena).
Purawan and Lorena detailed in their Joint
Affidavit that they knew Vasco-Tamaray to be a client
of Atty. Daquis and that they never saw Atty. Daquis
forge Vasco-Tamaray's signature. Purawan stated that
she typed the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage and that the community tax certificate was
provided by Vasco-Tamaray.
Atty. Daquis alleged that Vasco-Tamaray
wanted her to call and demand money from
Leomarte Tamaray but she refused to do so.
Atty. Daquis argued that Vasco-Tamaray had
a copy of the Petition. When Vasco-Tamaray
requested another copy on March 5, 2007, Atty.
Daquis was unable to grant her client's request
because she did not have a copy of the Petition with
her at that time.
Atty. Daquis further alleged that Vasco-
Tamaray conceived an illegitimate son with a certain
Reuel Pablo Aranda. The illegitimate son was named
Charles Dino Vasco. Reuel Pablo Aranda signed the
Affidavit of Acknowledgment/Admission of Paternity
portion of the birth certificate.
PROCEDURE
13

1. Cheryl E. Vasco-Tamaray filed a complaint
affidavit before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines on July 30, 2007.
2. The Commission on Bar Bar Discipline
required the parties to submit their position
papers, but based on record, only Vasco-
Tamaray complied.
3. The Commission on Bar Discipline
recommended the dismissal of the
complaint because Vasco-Tamaray failed to
prove her allegations.
4. The Board of Governors of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines adopted and approved
the Report and Recommendation of the
Commission on Bar Discipline in the
Resolution dated September 27, 2014.
LAWS INVOLVED/APPLIED
1. CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the
constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and for legal
processes.
RULE 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
Application
In this case, respondent merely
denied complainant's allegation that
she was Leomarte Tamaray's counsel
but was unable to rebut the other
allegations against her.
The records of this case also
support complainant's allegation that
she never received any court process
because her purported address in the
Petition is the address of Leomarte
Tamaray.
When respondent filed the Petition
as counsel for complainant when the
truth was otherwise, she committed a
falsehood against the trial court and
complainant.
2. CANON 7 A lawyer shall at all times
uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession, and support the activities of the
integrated bar.
RULE 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in
conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether
in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the
legal profession.
...
Application
The Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage was signed by a
certain "CVasco." The records of this
case show that complainant has used
two signatures. In her identification
cards issued by the University of the
East, she used a signature that spelled
out "CVasco." In her Complaint-
Affidavit against respondent,
complainant used a signature that
spelled out "CTamaray."
A comparison of the signatures
appearing on the Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and
on complainant's identification cards
show a difference in the stroke of the
letters "c" and "o." Further,
complainant's signatures in the
documents50 attached to the records
consistently appear to be of the same
height. On the other hand, her alleged
signature on the Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage has a
big letter "c."51 Hence, it seems that
complainant's signature on the Petition
for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
was forged.
While there is no evidence to
prove that respondent forged
complainant's signature, the fact
remains that respondent allowed a
forged signature to be used on a
petition she prepared and notarized. In
doing so, respondent violated Canon 7,
Rule 7.03 and Canon 10, Rule 10.01.
3. CANON 10 A lawyer owes candor,
fairness and good faith to the court.
RULE 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
Court; nor shall he mislead or allow the
Court to be misled by any artifice.
Application
Respondents act of allowing the
use of a forged signature on a petition she
prepared and notarized demonstrates a lack
of moral fiber on her part.
Furthermore, allowing the use of a
forged signature on a petition filed before a
court is tantamount to consenting to the
commission of a falsehood before courts, in
violation of Canon 10.
4. CANON 15 A lawyer shall observe
candor, fairness and loyalty in all his
dealings and transactions with his client.
RULE 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent
conflicting interests except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts.
Application
This court notes that respondent
may have violated Canon 15, Rule 15.03
when she entered her appearance as
counsel for complainant68 even though she
was engaged as counsel by Leomarte
Tamaray.
Respondent was engaged by
Leomarte Tamaray to be his counsel.74 When
the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage was filed, respondent signed the
Petition as counsel for complainant. 75 If
respondent was indeed engaged as counsel
by complainant, then there is conflict of
interest, in violation of Canon 15, Rule
15.03.
However, there is nothing on
record to show that respondent was
engaged as counsel by complainant. Hence,
this court finds that respondent did not
commit conflict of interest.
5. CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the
cause of his client and he shall be mindful of
the trust and confidence reposed in him
Application
Respondent failed to protect the
interests of her client when she represented
complainant, who is the opposing party of
her client Leomarte Tamaray, in the same
case.
DECISION
Respondent Atty. Deborah Z. Daquis is found
GUILTY of violating
1. Canon 1, Rule 1.01
2. Canon 7, Rule 7.03
3. Canon 10, Rule 10.01, and
4. Canon 17 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
The charge for violation of Canon 15, Rule 15.03
against respondent Atty. Deborah Z. Daquis is
DISMISSED.
The penalty of DISBARMENT is imposed upon
respondent Atty. Deborah Z. Daquis. The Office of the
14
Bar Confidant is directed to remove the name of
Deborah Z. Daquis from the Roll of Attorneys.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the
Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to
respondent's personal record as attorney, to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and to the Office of
the Court Administrator for dissemination to all
courts throughout the country for their information
and guidance.
88.
A.C. No. 5768 March 26, 2010
ATTY. BONIFACIO T. BARANDON, JR.,
Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. EDWIN Z. FERRER, SR., Respondent.
On January 11, 2001 complainant Atty. Bonifacio T.
Barandon, Jr. filed a complaint-affidavit with the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar
Discipline (IBP-CBD) seeking the disbarment,
suspension from the practice of law, or imposition of
appropriate disciplinary action against respondent
Atty. Edwin Z. Ferrer, Sr. for filing a reply with
opposition to motion to dismiss that contained
abusive, offensive and improper language which
insinuated that Atty. Barandon presented a falsified
document in court. The said document purported to
be a notarized document executed at a date when
Atty. Barandon was not yet a lawyer.
Moreover, on December 19, 2000, Atty. Ferrer,
evidently drunk, threatened Atty. Barandon saying,
Laban kung laban, patayan kung patayan, kasama
ang lahat ng pamilya. Wala na palang magaling na
abogado sa Camarines Norte, angabogadonarito ay
mga taga-Camarines Sur, umuwina kayo sa
Camarines Sur, hindi kayo taga-rito at the Municipal
Trial Court in Daet before the start of a hearing.
The Court had warned Atty. Ferrer in his first
disbarment case against repeating his unethical act;
yet he faces a disbarment charge for sexual
harassment of an office secretary of the IBP Chapter
in Camarines Norte; a related criminal case for acts
of lasciviousness; and criminal cases for libel and
grave threats that Atty. Barandon filed against him.
On October 10, 2001 Investigating Commissioner
Milagros V. San Juan of the IBP-CBD submitted to this
Court a Report, recommending the suspension for
two years of Atty. Ferrer. The Investigating
Commissioner found enough evidence on record to
prove Atty. Ferrers violation of Canons 8.01 and 7.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He
attributed to Atty. Barandon, as counsel in Civil Case
7040, the falsification of the plaintiffs affidavit
despite the absence of evidence that the document
had in fact been falsified and that Atty. Barandon was
a party to it. The Investigating Commissioner also
found that Atty. Ferrer uttered the threatening
remarks imputed to him in the presence of other
counsels, court personnel, and litigants before the
start of hearing. On June 29, 2002 the IBP Board of
Governors passed Resolution adopting and approving
the Investigating Commissioners recommendation
but reduced the penalty of suspension to only one
year.
WHETHER OR NOT THE IBP BOARD OF
GOVERNORS AND THE IBP INVESTIGATING
COMMISSIONER ERRED IN FINDING
RESPONDENT GUILTY OF THE CHARGES
AGAINST HIM AND IF THE PENALTY IMPOSED
WAS JUSTIFIED.
The Supreme Court examined the records of this
case and finds no reason to disagree with the
findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of
Governors and the Investigating Commissioner.
The practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers
who meet the high standards of legal proficiency and
morality. Any violation of these standards exposes
the lawyer to administrative liability.
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
commands all lawyers to conduct themselves with
courtesy, fairness and candor towards their fellow
lawyers and avoid harassing tactics against opposing
counsel.
Atty. Ferrers actions do not measure up to this
Canon. The evidence shows that he imputed to Atty.
Barandon the falsification of an affidavit without
evidence that the document had indeed been
falsified. Moreover, Atty. Ferrer could have aired his
charge of falsification in a proper forum and without
using offensive and abusive language against a
fellow lawyer. The Court has constantly reminded
lawyers to use dignified language in their pleadings
despite the adversarial nature of our legal system.
Atty. Ferrer had likewise violated Canon 7 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility which enjoins lawyers
to uphold the dignity and integrity of the legal
profession at all times. Several disinterested persons
confirmed Atty. Ferrers drunken invectives at Atty.
Barandon shortly before the start of a court hearing
and Atty. Ferrer failed to show convincing evidence
denying the said charge against him.
All lawyers should take heed that they are licensed
officers of the courts who are mandated to maintain
the dignity of the legal profession, hence they must
conduct themselves honorably and fairly. Atty.
Ferrers display of improper attitude, arrogance,
misbehavior, and misconduct in the performance of
his duties both as a lawyer and officer of the court,
before the public and the court, was a patent
transgression of the very ethics that lawyers are
sworn to uphold. Consequently, the penalty of
suspension of one from the practice of law is deemed
just and proper.
89.
Adm. Case No. 4749 January 20, 2000
SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., complainant,
vs.
ATTY. FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS, respondent.
FACTS: This is a complaint for misrepresentation and
non-payment of bar membership dues filed against
respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas who for a
number of years has not indicated the proper PTR
and IBP O.R. Nos. and data (date & palce of issuance)
in his pleadings. If at all, he only indicated IBP Rizal
259060 but he has been using this for at least 3
15
years already, as shown by the following attached
sample pleadings in various courts in 1995, 1996 &
1997. Respondents last payment of his IBP dues was
in 1991. Since then he has not paid or remitted any
amount to cover his membership fees up to the
present. He likewise admit that as appearing in the
pleadings submitted by complainant to this Court, he
indicated "IBP-Rizal 259060" in the pleadings he filed
in court, at least for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997,
thus misrepresenting that such was his IBP chapter
membership and receipt number for the years in
which those pleadings were filed. He claims,
however, that he is only engaged in a "limited"
practice and that he believes in good faith that he is
exempt from the payment of taxes, such as income
tax, under R.A. No. 7432, as a senior citizen since
1992.
ISSUES: Whether or not the respondent has misled
the court about his standing in the IBP by using the
same IBP O.R. number in his pleadings of at least 6
years and therefore liable for his actions.
Whether or not the respondent is exempt from
paying his membership dues owing to limited
practice of law and for being a senior citizen.
HELD: Yes. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his
pleadings and thereby misrepresenting to the public
and the courts that he had paid his IBP dues to the
Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of violating the
Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. His act is
also a violation of Rule 10.01 which provides that: A
lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in court; nor mislead or allow the court
to be misled by any artifice.
No. Rule 139-A requires that every member of the
Integrated Bar shall pay annual dues and default
thereof for six months shall warrant suspension of
membership and if nonpayment covers a period of 1-
year, default shall be a ground for removal of the
delinquents name from the Roll of Attorneys. It does
not matter whether or not respondent is only
engaged in limited practice of law. Moreover, While
it is true that R.A. No. 7432, grants senior citizens
"exemption from the payment of individual income
taxes: provided, that their annual taxable income
does not exceed the poverty level as determined by
the National Economic and Development Authority
(NEDA) for that year," the exemption however does
not include payment of membership or association
dues.
Respondent's failure to pay his IBP dues and his
misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in court
indeed merit the most severe penalty. However, in
view of respondent's advanced age, his express
willingness to pay his dues and plea for a more
temperate application of the law, we believe the
penalty of one year suspension from the practice of
law or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is
later, is appropriate. Respondent Atty. Francisco R.
Llamas is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
ONE (1) YEAR, or until he has paid his IBP dues,
whichever is later.
90.
A.C. No. 6422 August 28, 2007
WILFREDO T. GARCIA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. BENIAMINO A. LOPEZ, Respondent.
In a complaint dated September 24, 2002,
complainant Atty. Wilfredo T. Garcia charged
respondent Atty. Beniamino A. Lopez with violation of
his oath as a member of the bar and officer of the
court, and misrepresentation, amounting to perjury
and prayed that respondent be suspended or
disbarred.
Complainant was the counsel of the late Angelina
Sarmiento, applicant in LRC Case No. 05-M-96 which
was pending in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 15.1 Sarmiento sought the
registration and confirmation of her title over a
376,397 sq. m. tract of land. This was granted by the
court.2 The case went all the way to the Supreme
Court and ultimately, the RTC decision was upheld.
The decision became final and executory and the
RTC, in an order dated February 21, 2002, directed
the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to issue the
decree of registration and certificate of title. 3 The LRA
failed to comply, prompting the complainant to file
an urgent motion to cite the LRA administrator or his
representative in contempt of court. Hearings were
scheduled.
On September 19, 2002, respondent, claiming to be
the counsel of the heirs of Sarmiento, filed his entry
of appearance and motion for postponement.4
Complainant alleged that he was surprised by this,
considering that he had not withdrawn from the case.
He contended that respondent should be sanctioned
for misrepresenting to the court that he was the
counsel of all the heirs of Sarmiento and omitting to
mention that complainant was the counsel of record.
According to him, his attorney's fee was arranged on
a contingent basis and therefore, the attempt of
respondent to enter his appearance at the final stage
of the proceedings was tantamount to "unfair
harvesting" of the fruit of complainant's labors since
1996.5
It appears that Sarmiento was succeeded by the
following compulsory heirs: Gina Jarvia (Angelina's
daughter by her common-law husband Victor
Jarvia), Alfredo, Zenaida, Wilson, Jeanette and
Geneva, all surnamed Ku (Angelina's children by her
husband prior to her relationship with Victor).
Complainant presented an affidavit executed by Gina
Jarvia and Alfredo Ku wherein they stated that they
did not engage the services of respondent and that
they recognized complainant as their only counsel of
record.
In his defense, respondent claimed that he was
merely representing Zenaida and Wilson Ku6 who
sought his help on September 19, 2002 and told him
that they wanted to retain his services. They
allegedly did not have a lawyer to represent them in
a hearing scheduled the next day. Because of the
scheduled hearing, he had to immediately file an
entry of appearance with motion for postponement.
He asserted that it was an honest mistake not to
have listed the names of his clients. He claimed it
was not deliberate and did not prejudice anyone. He
insisted that he had no intention of misrepresenting
himself to the court.
The complaint was referred to the Commission on
Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP). The investigating commissioner, Wilfredo E.J.E.
Reyes, in his report and recommendation dated
January 8, 2004, found respondent guilty of
misrepresentation and violation of Rule 8.02 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) when he
16
failed to specify in his entry of appearance the
individuals he was representing. He recommended
that respondent be strongly reprimanded for his act
with a reminder that a repetition of the same or
similar offense would be dealt with more severely.
This was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of
Governors in its resolution passed on February 27,
2004.
We affirm the factual findings of the IBP but modify
the penalty recommended.
Lawyers are officers of the court who are empowered
to appear, prosecute and defend the causes of their
clients. The law imposes on them peculiar duties,
responsibilities and liabilities. Membership in the bar
imposes on them certain obligations. 7 They are duty
bound to uphold the dignity of the legal profession.
They must act honorably, fairly and candidly towards
each other and otherwise conduct themselves
beyond reproach at all times.8
Complainant was the counsel of Sarmiento, the
original applicant. Upon her death, the attorney-
client relationship was terminated. However,
complainant was retained as counsel by Gina Jarvia
and Alfredo Ku. In filing an entry of appearance with
motion of postponement in behalf of the "compulsory
heirs of the late Angelita Sarmiento" when in truth he
was merely representing some of the heirs but not all
of them, respondent was guilty of misrepresentation
which could have deceived the court. He had no
authorization to represent all the heirs. He clearly
violated his lawyer's oath that he will "do no
falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court."
Likewise, the CPR states:
CANON 10 A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS
AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood,
nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any
artifice.
Moreover, Canon 8 of the CPR demands that lawyers
conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness and
candor toward their fellow lawyers:
CANON 8 A lawyer shall conduct himself with
courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional
colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against
opposing counsel.
xxx xxx xxx
Rule 8.02 A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly,
encroach upon the professional employment of
another lawyer; however, it is the right of any lawyer,
without fear or favor, to give proper advice and
assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful
or neglectful counsel.
Respondent failed to observe the foregoing rules. He
made it appear that he was entering his appearance
as counsel for all the heirs of Sarmiento which was
highly unfair to complainant who had worked on the
case from the very beginning (i.e. since 1996) and
who had not been discharged as such. It is true that
without the formal withdrawal of complainant as
counsel of record, respondent would merely be
considered as collaborating counsel. Nevertheless,
by being less than candid about whom he was
representing, respondent undeniably encroached
upon the legal functions of complainant as the
counsel of record.1avvphi1
We cannot casually brush aside what respondent did.
Even assuming that it was not a calculated
deception, he was still remiss in his duty to his fellow
lawyer and the court. He should have been more
careful about his actuation since the court was
relying on him in its task of ascertaining the truth.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Beniamino A. Lopez
is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
one (1) month for violating Canons 8 and 10, Rules
8.02 and 10.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He is warned that the commission of
the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with
more severely.
Let this resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant for
appropriate annotation in the record of respondent.
SO ORDERED.
91.
A.C. No. 4545 February 5, 2014
CARLITO ANG, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JAMES JOSEPH GUPANA, Respondent.
FACTS:
The case stemmed from an affidavit-complaint filed
by complainant Carlito Ang against respondent. Ang
alleged that he and the other heirs of the late
Candelaria Magpayo, namely Purificacion Diamante
and William Magpayo, executed an Extra-judicial
Declaration of Heirs and Partition involving a land
which was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
(T-22409)-6433. He was given his share of 2,003
square meters designated as Lot No. 2066-B-2-B-4,
together with all the improvements thereon.
However, when he tried to secure a TCT in his name,
he found out that said TCT number had already been
cancelled and in lieu thereof, new TCTs had been
issued in the names of William Magpayo, Antonio
Diamante, Patricia Diamante, Lolita D. Canque,
Gregorio Diamante, Jr. and Fe D. Montero.
Ang alleged that there is reasonable ground to
believe that respondent had a direct participation in
the commission of forgeries and falsifications
because he was the one who prepared and notarized
the Affidavit of Loss and Deed of Absolute Sale that
led to the transfer and issuance of the new TCTs. Ang
pointed out that the Deed of Absolute Sale which was
allegedly executed by Candelaria Magpayo on April
17, 1989, was antedated and Candelaria Magpayos
signature was forged as clearly shown by the
Certification issued by the Office of the Clerk of Court
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu since the
Notarial Report indubitably showed that the
document executed was an affidavit, not a Deed of
Absolute Sale.
17
As to the Affidavit of Loss, which was allegedly
executed by the late Candelaria Magpayo on April 29,
1994, it could not have been executed by her as she
Died three years prior to the execution of the said
affidavit of loss.
Ang further alleged that respondent made himself
the attorney-in-fact and executed a Deed of Sale
selling the lot to Lim Kim So Mecantile Co even
though a civil case was pending before the RTC of
Mandaue City, Cebu.
Respondent denied any wrongdoing. According to the
respondent, in the pending civil case Ang anchored
his claim on the Extra-judicial Declaration of Heirs
and Partition and sought to annul the deed of sale
and prayed for reconveyance of the subject parcel of
land. However, because of Angs admission that he is
not an heir of late Candelaria Magpayo, the notice of
lis pendens annotated in the title of land were
ordered cancelled and the land became available for
disposition. Respondent surmised that these
developments in Civil Case No. Man-2202 meant that
Ang would lose his case so Ang resorted to the filing
of the present administrative complaint. Thus,
respondent prayed for the dismissal of the case for
being devoid of any factual or legal basis, or in the
alternative, holding resolution of the instant case in
abeyance pending resolution of civil case.
Investigating Commissioner Navarro of the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline found that respondent
is administratively liable. She recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for
three months. She held that respondent committed
an unethical act when he allowed himself to be an
instrument in the disposal of the subject property
through a deed of sale executed between him as
attorney-in-fact of his client and Lim Kim So
Mercantile Co. despite his knowledge that said
property is the subject of a pending litigation before
the RTC of Mandaue City, Cebu.
The Investigating Commissioner additionally found
that respondent "delegated the notarial functions to
the clerical staff of their office before being brought
to him for his signature." This, according to the
commissioner, "must have been the reason for the
forged signatures of the parties in the questioned
documentas well as the erroneous entry in his
notarial register. Respondent should not delegate to
any unqualified person the performance of any task
which by law may only be performed by a member of
the bar in accordance with Rule 9.0117 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.

ISSUE:
WON the respondent is administratively liable for
violating the notarial law and the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

RULING:
The Court finds respondent administratively liable for
violation of his notarial duties when he failed to
require the personal presence of Candelaria
Magpayo. it is clear that the party acknowledging
must appear before the notary public or any other
person authorized to take acknowledgments of
instruments or documents.23 In the case at bar, the
jurat of the TAXATION II CLASS (A.Y. 2014-2015)

18
Affidavit of Loss stated that Candelaria subscribed to
the affidavit before respondent on April 29, 1994, at
Mandaue City. Candelaria, however, was already
dead since March 26, 1991. Hence, it is clear that the
jurat was made in violation of the notarial law.
As a lawyer commissioned as notary public,
respondent is mandated to subscribe to the sacred
duties appertaining to his office, such duties being
dictated by public policy impressed with public
interest. Faithful observance and utmost respect of
the legal solemnity of the oath in an
acknowledgment or jurat is sacrosanct. The Code of
Professional Responsibility also commands him not to
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct and to uphold at all times the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession.
Respondent likewise violated Rule 9.01, Canon 9, of
the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides that "[a] lawyer shall not delegate to any
unqualified person the performance of any task
which by law may only be performed by a member of
the Bar in good standing."
in notarizing an affidavit executed by a dead person,
respondent is liable for misconduct. Under the facts
and circumstances of the case, the revocation of his
notarial commission, disqualification from being
commissioned as a notary public for a period of two
years and suspension from the practice of law for
one year are in order.
92.
A.M. No. RTJ-04-1823 August 28, 2006
ARCELY Y. SANTOS, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE UBALDINO A. LACUROM, Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court, Cabanatuan City,
Branch 29 and Pairing Judge, Branch 30,
Respondent.
This is an administrative complaint filed by Arcely Y.
Santos ("complainant") against Judge Ubaldino A.
Lacurom ("respondent judge"), Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cabanatuan City, Branch
29 and Pairing Judge, Branch 30. Complainant
charged respondent judge with gross misconduct,
grave abuse of judicial authority, gross bias and
partiality, and gross violation of the Code of Judicial
Ethics.
The Facts
The complaint stemmed from respondent judges
alleged bias and partiality in favor of one Rogelio R.
Santos, Sr. ("Santos"), who had three pending
cases1 before respondent judges sala, as shown by
the following:
1. Respondent judge allowed Santos, a non-lawyer, to
appear in court and litigate personally the three
cases. Complainant pointed out that Santos was
already represented by counsels2 who have not
withdrawn their appearances. Complainant alleged
that respondent judge is guilty of gross misconduct
and grave abuse of judicial discretion for having
allowed a non-lawyer to engage in the practice law.
In Special Proceedings Case No. 516-AF, respondent
judge, in an Order3 dated 28 February 2003, even
"appointed" Santos as lead counsel for the
petitioners. As early as 26 September 2002,
complainant had been questioning the appearance of
Santos as "counsel" during the proceedings in
court.4 On 11 November 2002, complainant filed a
motion to expunge a pleading signed by Santos,
claiming that Santos, a non-lawyer, is not allowed to
sign pleadings.5 In a Joint Resolution dated 7
February 2003, respondent judge denied
complainants motion and stated that Santos is
qualified to conduct his litigation personally. 6 Then on
20 February 2003, complainant filed a motion to
reconsider the Joint Resolution and suggested that,
since Santos is now representing himself and, at the
same time, is being represented by counsel,
respondent judge should appoint a member of the
Bar as lead counsel.7
On the other hand, complainant alleged that she and
the other oppositors were not allowed to address the
court directly and respondent judge even compelled
them, under the pain of contempt, to secure the
services of a lawyer to represent them.
2. Respondent judge always granted, with dispatch,
all the pleadings of Santos.
3. Respondent judge had unduly delayed the
execution of the 28 April 2000 Court of Appeals
decision against Santos in Cadastral Case No. 384-AF.
4. Respondent judge denied complainants letter-
request8 dated 16 March 2001 for respondent judge
to inhibit himself from the cases to avoid suspicion of
bias, prejudice, conflict of interest and partiality.
Complainant alleged that respondent judge used his
office to advance and protect the interests of Santos,
respondent judges "close friend," to the prejudice of
complainant and in violation of Canon 2 9 of the Code
of Judicial Conduct (Code).
Complainant pointed out that in an earlier
case10 respondent judge inhibited himself because
Santos is respondent judges "close friend."11
Complainant also added that respondent judge
refused to inhibit himself because he was protecting
his interest in Villa Benita Subdivision ("subdivision").
Complainant explained that all three cases involved
properties in the subdivision12 and that respondent
judge is an incorporator,13 a director, an officer and a
legal adviser14 of Villa Benita Homeowners
Association ("VBHA"). VBHA allegedly filed several
cases before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board (HLURB) against Faberns Inc. and
complainant. Complainant asserted that respondent
judge had personal knowledge of the facts of the
HLURB cases. Complainant added that in refusing to
inhibit himself, respondent judge violated Rule 3.12
(a)15 and Canon 516 of the Code.
In its 1st Indorsement dated 15 May 2003, the Office
of the Court Administrator (OCA) required respondent
judge to comment on complainants allegations and
to show cause why he should not be sanctioned as a
member of the Bar for violation of Canon 9, Rule
9.0117 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In an Answer dated 27 June 2003, respondent judge
offered the following explanations:
1. Respondent judge, citing Section 34, Rule 138 18 of
the Rules of Court (Rules), admitted that he allowed
Santos to litigate personally his cases before the
court.
19
On Special Proceedings Case No. 516-AF, respondent
judge explained that he merely "recognized" Santos
as lead counsel because his counsel was often
absent from the proceedings.19 Respondent judge
added that complainants counsel did not object to
the appointment of Santos as lead counsel, but
merely suggested that lead counsel should be a
member of the Bar. Respondent judge also added
that, if complainant did not agree with respondent
judges decision on the matter, complainant should
have filed a petition for certiorari.
Respondent judge also explained that complainant
was allowed to address the court directly, though not
at length because complainant was represented by
counsel.
2. Respondent judge denied that he always granted
the pleadings of Santos.
3. Respondent judge denied that the Court of
Appeals decision in Cadastral Case No. 384-AF has
remained unenforced because of his bias in favor of
Santos. Respondent judge stated that he had ordered
the implementation of the decision as early as 25
September 200020 and issued a writ of execution on
25 October 2002.21
4. Respondent judged stated that he denied
complainants request to inhibit himself because he
can fairly hear and decide the cases.
On respondent judges inhibition in Civil Case No.
3074-AF, respondent judge explained that he
inhibited himself from the case because Santos was
his "close friend," while respondents were not
respondent judges friends. In these cases,
respondent judge pointed out that he was friends
with both Santos and the other parties 22 to the cases,
in effect, "neutralizing" respondent judges close
friendship with Santos.
Respondent judge explained that Santos became a
"close friend" when Santos lent his portable bunker
to Dr. Ferdinand Lacurom ("Dr. Lacurom"),
respondent judges son, during the construction of
Dr. Lacuroms house in the subdivision. Respondent
judge also admitted that the officers of Faberns Inc.
extended a favor to Dr. Lacurom when they
facilitated the cementing of the road in front of Dr.
Lacuroms house.23 However, respondent judge
denied that he received any favor from Santos.
On the matter of VBHA, respondent judge denied
that he had any interest to protect in the subdivision,
as respondent judge is not a landowner, or
homeowner, or lessee in the subdivision. Respondent
judge clarified that Dr. Lacurom is the one who owns
property in the subdivision and that respondent
judge stayed there only on some occasions.
Respondent judge admitted that he is a "nominal"
incorporator and adviser of VBHA. 24 Atty. Napoleon
Reyes, president of VBHA, requested respondent
judge to agree to be an incorporator of VBHA "to lend
a bit of prestige to the association." However,
respondent judge stated that his only participation in
VBHA was to sign the registration documents of
VBHA. Respondent judge clarified that he never
attended any of the meetings of VBHA, nor has he
any knowledge of any case filed by VBHA before the
HLURB.
Respondent judge also stated that if complainant
filed the proper motion for inhibition, he would have
granted the same.
The OCAs Report and Recommendation
In its Report dated 21 November 2003, the OCA
recommended that the complaint be re-docketed as
an administrative matter and that respondent judge
be fined P5,000. The OCA found respondent judge
administratively liable for recognizing Santos as lead
counsel despite the fact that Santos had two
counsels of record. The OCA did not find respondent
judge liable for the delay in the execution of the
decision of the Court of Appeals in Cadastral Case
No. 384-AF, as the delay was brought about by the
parties themselves. On respondent judge being an
incorporator and adviser of VBHA and his refusal to
inhibit himself from the cases, the OCA opined that
the subject cases are not covered by the rule on
mandatory disqualification of judges, hence,
respondent judges inhibition rested upon his own
discretion.
In a Resolution dated 21 January 2004, the Court
resolved to docket the case as a regular
administrative matter and required the parties to
manifest within ten days from notice if they were
willing to submit the case for resolution based on the
pleadings on record. Respondent judge manifested
affirmatively. Complainant filed a memorandum
dated 9 August 2004 reiterating her allegations. In
turn, respondent judge also submitted a
memorandum on 21 August 2004.
Complainant filed the present administrative
complaint on 5 May 2003 when respondent judge
was still presiding judge of Branch 29 and pairing
judge of Branch 30. Respondent judge compulsorily
retired on 16 May 2003. However, his retirement
does not render this administrative case moot.25
The Courts Ruling
In administrative proceedings, the complainant has
the burden of proving by substantial evidence the
allegations in the complaint.26 In this case,
complainant failed to prove that respondent judge
granted with dispatch all the pleadings of Santos and
that respondent judge was responsible for the delay
in the execution of the Court of Appeals decision in
Cadastral Case No. 384-AF. Hence, the Court
dismisses this particular charge.
On a Partys Right to Self Representation
The Rules recognize the right of an individual to
represent himself in any case in which he is a party.
The Rules state that a party may conduct his
litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and that
his appearance must be either personal or by a duly
authorized member of the Bar.27 The individual
litigant may personally do everything in the progress
of the action from commencement to the termination
of the litigation.28 A partys representation on his own
behalf is not considered to be a practice of law as
"one does not practice law by acting for himself, any
more than he practices medicine by rendering first
aid to himself."29
20
Therefore, Santos can conduct the litigation of the
cases personally. Santos is not engaged in the
practice of law if he represents himself in cases in
which he is a party. By conducting the litigation of his
own cases, Santos acts not as a counsel or lawyer
but as a party exercising his right to represent
himself. Certainly, Santos does not become a counsel
or lawyer by exercising such right.
The Court, however, notes the use of the disjunctive
word "or" under the Rules, signifying disassociation
and independence of one thing from each of the
other things enumerated,30 to mean that a party
must choose between self-representation or being
represented by a member of the bar. During the
course of the proceedings, a party should not be
allowed to shift from one form of representation to
another. Otherwise, this would lead to confusion, not
only for the other party, but for the court as well. If a
party, originally represented by counsel, would later
decide to represent himself, the prudent course of
action is to dispense with the services of counsel and
prosecute or defend the case personally.31
For the orderly administration of justice, respondent
judge should not have allowed Santos to litigate
personally because Santos was already represented
by counsel. Respondent judge should have required
Santos to choose between self-representation or
being represented by counsel.
Moreover, respondent judge should not have
recognized Santos as lead counsel. The "lead
counsel" is the lawyer on either side of a litigated
action who is charged with the principal
management and direction of the partys case, as
distinguished from his collaborating counsels or
subordinates.32 In recognizing Santos as "lead
counsel", respondent judge made it appear that
Santos was a counsel or lawyer when he is not. To
repeat, when a party represents himself in his own
case, he does so not as a counsel or lawyer but as a
party exercising his right of self-representation.
On Respondent Judges Inhibition
The Court agrees with the OCAs finding that
respondent judges inhibition from the cases was
discretionary. The three cases do not fall under the
instances covered by the rule on the mandatory
disqualification of judges33 and the issue of voluntary
inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and
sound discretion on the part of the judge.34
Besides, complainant did not follow the proper
procedure for the disqualification of judges.
In Constante v. Pimentel,35 the Court ruled that the
procedure for disqualification of judges in Section 2,
Rule 13736 must be substantially followed.
On Respondent Judges Violation of the Code of
Judicial Conduct
On respondent judges admission that Dr. Lacurom
received a favor from the officers of Faberns Inc.,
respondent judge violated Rule 5.04 37 of the Code.
Faberns Inc. is the petitioner in Cadastral Case No.
384-AF, which was then pending before respondent
judges sala. Respondent judge should have advised
Dr. Lacurom not to accept any favor from Faberns
Inc. or from any of its officers 38 or principal
stockholders. Judges, as occupants of exalted
positions in the administration of justice, must pay a
high price for the honor bestowed on them. 39 Their
private, as well as their official conduct, must always
be free from the appearance of impropriety. 40
On respondent judges close friendship with Santos,
such fact did not render respondent judge guilty of
violating any canon of judicial ethics as long as his
friendly relations with Santos did not influence his
official conduct as a judge in the cases where Santos
was a party.41 Complainant failed to present any
convincing proof that respondent judge gave any
undue privileges in his court to Santos, or that Santos
benefited from his personal relations with respondent
judge, or that respondent judge used his influence, if
any, to favor Santos.
However, it would have been more prudent if
respondent judge avoided hearing the cases where
Santos was a party because their close friendship
could reasonably tend to raise suspicion that
respondent judges social relationship with Santos
would be an element in his determination of the
cases of Santos.42 This may erode the trust of the
litigants in respondent judges impartiality and
eventually, undermine the peoples faith in the
administration of justice.43 Judges must not only
render a just, correct and impartial decision but
should do so in such a manner as to be free from any
suspicion as to his fairness, impartiality and
integrity.44
On the Appropriate Penalty Against
Respondent Judge
Respondent judges actuations constitute simple
misconduct, a less serious charge punishable with (a)
suspension from office without salary and other
benefits for a period of not less than one month but
not more than three months; or (b) fine of more
than P10,000 but not exceeding P20,000.45 However,
considering that respondent judge had retired
compulsorily on 16 May 2003 after twenty-eight
years of service in the government and that this is
respondent judges first offense, the P10,000
withheld from his retirement benefits 46 should be
forfeited as sufficient penalty for his administrative
offense.47
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge
Ubaldino A. Lacurom GUILTY of simple misconduct
and ORDERS the FORFEITURE of the P10,000
withheld from his retirement benefits.
SO ORDERED.
93.
FERDINAND A. CRUZ, 332 Edang St., Pasay City,
Petitioner,
21

- versus -
JUDGE PRISCILLA MIJARES, Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 108, Pasay City, Metro Manila,
Public Respondent.
. with the Court of Appeals.
This Courts jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus and injunction is not
exclusive; it has concurrent jurisdiction with the RTCs
and the Court of Appeals. This concurrence of
jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as an
absolute, unrestrained freedom to choose the court
where the application therefor will be directed. A
becoming regard of the judicial hierarchy most
certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of
extraordinary writs against the RTCs should be filed

The hierarchy of courts is determinative of the

Petitioner Cruz sought permission to enter his
appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary
appearance for and on his behalf, before the RTC in a
writs; and only in exceptional cases and for
civil case for Abatement of Nuisance. Petitioner, a
compelling reasons, or if warranted by the nature of
fourth year law student, anchors his claim on Section
the issues reviewed, may this Court take cognizance
34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court that a nonlawyer
of petitions filed directly before it. Considering,
may appear before any court and conduct his
however, that this case involves the interpretation of
litigation personally.
Section 34, Rule 138 and Rule 138A of the Rules of
Court, the Court takes cognizance of herein petition.
During the pretrial, Judge Priscilla Mijares required
the petitioner to secure a written permission from the
2) NO (But it erred in denying petitioners
Court Administrator before he could be allowed to
appearance).
appear as counsel for himself, a partylitigant. Atty.
Sec. 34 or Rule 138 recognizes the right of an
Stanley Cabrera, counsel for Benjamin Mina, Jr., filed
individual to represent himself in any case to which
a Motion to Dismiss instead of a pretrial brief to
he is a party.
which petitioner Cruz vehemently objected alleging
that a Motion to Dismiss is not allowed after the
The Rules state that a party may conduct his
Answer had been filed. Judge Mijares then remarked,
litigation personally or with the aid of an attorney,
Hay naku, masama yung marunong pa sa Huwes.
and that his appearance must either be personal or
Ok? and proceeded to hear the pending Motion to
by a duly authorized member of the Bar. The
Dismiss and calendared the next hearing.
individual litigant may personally do everything in
the course of proceedings from commencement to
Petitioner Cruz filed a Manifestation and Motion to
the termination of the litigation.
Inhibit, praying for the voluntary inhibition of Judge
Mijares. The Motion alleged that expected partiality
Considering that a party personally conducting his
on the part of the respondent judge in the conduct of
litigation is restricted to the same rules of evidence
the trial could be inferred from the contumacious
and procedure as those qualified to practice law,
remarks of Judge Mijares during the pretrial. It
petitioner, not being a lawyer himself, runs the risk of
asserts that the judge, in uttering an uncalled for
falling into the snares and hazards of his own
remark, reflects a negative frame of mind, which
ignorance. Therefore, Cruz as plaintiff, at his own
engenders the belief that justice will not be served.
instance, can personally conduct the litigation. He
would then be acting not as a counsel or lawyer, but
In an Order, Judge Mijares denied the motion for
as a party exercising his right to represent himself.
inhibition stating that throwing tenuous allegations of
partiality based on the said remark is not enough to
The trial court must have been misled by the fact
warrant her voluntary inhibition, considering that it
that the
was said even prior to the start of pretrial. Petitioner
petitioner is a law student and must, therefore, be
filed a MR of the said order.
subject to the conditions of the Law Student Practice
Rule. It erred in applying Rule 138A, when the basis
Judge Mijares denied the motion with finality. In the
of the petitioners claim is Section 34 of Rule 138.
same Order, the trial court held that for the failure of
The former rule provides for conditions when a law
petitioner Cruz to submit the promised document
student may appear in courts, while the latter rule
and jurisprudence, and for his failure to satisfy the
allows the appearance of a nonlawyer as a party
requirements or conditions under Rule 138A of the
representing himself.
Rules of Court, his appearance was denied.
No GAD on the part of Judge
In MR, petitioner reiterated that the basis of his
94.
appearance was not Rule 138A, but Section 34 of
Rule 138. He contended that the two Rules were
distinct and are applicable to different circumstances, A.C. No. 6705 March 31, 2006
but the respondent judge denied the same, still
invoking Rule 138A. Petitioner filed this case with SC.
RUTHIE LIM-SANTIAGO, Complainant,
ISSUES vs.
1) W/N the extraordinary writs of certiorari, ATTY. CARLOS B. SAGUCIO, Respondent.
prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of
the 1997 Rules of Court may issue
FACTS: Respondent Atty. Sagucio, was the former
2) W/N respondent court acted with grave Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or Industries, Inc., until his appointment as Assistant
excess of jurisdiction when it denied the Provincial Prosecutor of Tuguegarao, Cagayan in
appearance of the petitioner as party 1992. When employees of Taggat ("Taggat
litigant and when the judge refused to
employees") filed a criminal complaint entitled "Jesus
inhibit herself from trying the case
Tagorda, Jr. et al. v. Ruthie Lim-Santiago, Atty.
Sagucio was assigned to conduct the preliminary
HELD investigation. He resolved the criminal complaint by
recommending the filing of 651 Informations 10 for
1) YES (It should be filed with CA, but SC took violation of Article 288 11 in relation to Article 11612
cognizance because it involves of the Labor Code of the Philippines. Complainant
interpretation of procedural rules).
now charges respondent with the violation of
engaging in the private practice of law while working

22
as a government prosecutort respondent received
retainers fee from Taggat employees.
ISSUE: Whether or not Respondents act of receiving
fees from Taggat for legal services while serving as a
government prosecutor is an unlawful conduct, which
constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01.
RULING: Yes.Under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, "[a]
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct." Unlawful conduct
includes violation of the statutory prohibition on a
government employee to "engage in the private
practice of [his] profession unless authorized by the
Constitution or law, provided, that such practice will
not conflict or tend to conflict with [his] official
functions." Respondents admission that he received
from Taggat fees for legal services while serving as a
government prosecutor is an unlawful conduct, which
constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01. .
95.
G.R. No. 109870 December 1, 1995
EDILBERTO M. CUENCA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
After his petition for review of the Court of Appeals'
judgment 1 affirming his conviction for violation of the
"Trust Receipts Law" (Presidential Decree No. 115)
was denied by this Court in a Resolution dated
February 9, 1994, 2 petitioner filed on July 6, 1994 a
pleading entitled "SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL WITH
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE MOTION FOR NEW
TRIAL" 3 setting forth, in relation to the motion for
new trial:
6. The Motion for New Trial shall be grounded on
newly discovered evidence and excusible (sic)
negligence, and shall be supported by affidavits
of:
(i) an officer of private complainant
corporation who will exculpate petitioner;
(ii) an admission against interest by a
former officer of the owner of Ultra
Corporation (the Corporation that employed
petitioner), which actually exercised control
over the affairs of Ultra; and
(iii) the petitioner wherein he will assert
innocence for the first time and explain why
he was unable to do so earlier.
The Court in its July 27, 1994
Resolution, 4 among other things, granted
the substitution but denied the motion for
leave to file motion for new trial, "the
petition having been already denied on
February 9, 1994."
Notwithstanding, petitioner on August 8, 1994 filed a
"MOTION TO ADMIT ATTACHED MOTION FOR NEW
TRIAL", 5 and a "MANIFESTATION AND SECOND
MOTION TO ADMIT" on August 17, 1994. 6 The Court
thereafter required the Solicitor General to comment
on said motion and manifestation within ten (10)
days from notice, in a Resolution dated September 7,
1994. 7
In the Comment filed after three (3) extensions of
time were given by the Court, 8 the Solicitor General
himself recommends that petitioner be entitled to a
new trial, proceeding from the same impression that
a certain Rodolfo Cuenca's (petitioner's brother)
sworn statement is an admission against interest
which may ultimately exonerate petitioner from
criminal liability. The full text of Mr. Rodolfo Cuenca's
"Affidavit" 9 reads:
RODOLFO M. CUENCA, Filipino, of
legal age, with the residence at
Urdaneta Village, Makati, Metro
Manila, after being duly sworn and
(sic) state that:
1. During the years 1967 until
February 1983, I was the President
and Chief Executive Officer of
Construction Development
Corporation of the Philippines
(CDCP).
2. During that period, I controlled
an effective majority of the voting
shares of stock of CDCP.
3. Sometime in 1974, upon my
initiative, CDCP together with its
affiliated companies, organized a
number of wholly-owned service
corporations. One of these was
Ultra International Trading
Corporation, whose purpose was to
serve and supply the needs of
CDCP and its other subsidiaries
with lower value goods and using
Ultra's financial resources.
4. The directors in Ultra
Corporation were nominees of
CDCP, and received the
instructions directly from me and or
Mr. Pedro Valdez, Chairman of
CDCP.
5. From Ultra's inception, my
brother, Mr. Edilberto M. Cuenca
was appointed President and Chief
Executive Officer. On March, 1979, I
instructed Ultra through my
brother, Mr. Edilberto Cuenca to
purchase for CDCP various steel
materials. These materials were
received by CDCP and are covered
by the trust receipts which are the
subject of this case.
6. In 1980, CDCP suffered cashflow
problems, and consciously omitted
payment to Ultra for the delivery of
the said steel materials. As a
nominee of CDCP, Mr. Edilberto M.
Cuenca merely acted as agent for
CDCP. As such, CDCP provided him
with the guarantees needed to
persuade China Bank to issue the
23
 said trust receipts. On the basis of The People is inclined to allow
such guarantees, along with petitioner to establish the
informal assurances issued by genuineness and due execution of
CDCP to China Bank that the his brother's affidavit in the interest
transactions of Ultra were of justice and fair play.
undertaken for and on behalf of
CDCP and CDCP Mining Under Rule 6.01 of Canon 6 of the
Corporation, Ultra was able to Code of Professional Responsibility,
obtain credit facilities, among prosecutors who represent the
which included the trust receipts People of the Philippines in a
subject of this case. criminal case are not duty bound to
seek conviction of the accused but
7. However, Mr. Edilberto M. to see that justice is done. Said
Cuenca had no power to cause the Rule 6.01 of Canon 6 states:
payment of said trust receipts
because the common Treasurer and Canon 6 These
controller of both CDCP and Ultra, canons shall
Ms. Nora Vinluan, acted under my apply to lawyers
control and I did not allow her to in government
make the appropriate payments. service in the
discharge of their
8. To my knowledge, CDCP has not official tasks.
paid Ultra the amounts
corresponding to the materials Rule 6.01 The
covered by the trust receipts primary duty of a
subject of this case. lawyer engaged
in public
9. By the time final demand to pay prosecution is
on the trust receipts were (sic) not to convict but
served in 1984, Mr. Edilberto to see that
Cuenca was no longer president of justice is done.
Ultra Corporation and could not The suppression
have possibly cause (sic) Ultra of facts or the
Corporation to pay. concealment of
witnesses
10. I have executed this affidavit in capable of
order to accept personal establishing the
responsibility for the trust receipts innocence of the
subject of this case and to accused is highly
exculpate Mr. Edilberto Cuenca of reprehensible
the criminal charges which he has and is cause for
asked this Honorable Court to disciplinary
review. action. (Emphasis
supplied.)

11. Accordingly, I also undertake to

pay the civil obligations arising
from the subject trust receipts.
(Sgd.)
RODOLFO M. CUENCA
Affiant
And the Solicitor General had this to say:
Ordinarily, it is too late at this
stage to ask for a new trial.
However, the sworn statement of
Rodolfo Cuenca is a declaration
against his own interests under
Section 38, Rule 130, Revised Rules
of Court and it casts doubt on the
culpability of his brother Edilberto
Cuenca, the petitioner. Hence, the
alleged confession of guilt should
be given a hard look by the Court.
The above duty is well founded on
the instruction of the U.S. Supreme
Court in Berger v. United States,
295 U.S. 78 (1935) that
prosecutors represent a sovereign
"whose obligation to govern
impartially is compelling as its
obligation to govern at all;
and whose interest, therefore in a
criminal prosecution is not that it
shall win a case, but that justice
shall be done (Time to Rein in the
Prosecution, by Atty. Bruce Fein,
published on p. 11, The Lawyers
Review, July 31, 1994). (Emphasis
supplied.) 10
Although in "Goduco v. CA" (14 SCRA 282 [1965])
decided some twenty (20) years ago, this Court ruled
that it is not authorized to entertain a motion for
reconsideration and/or new trial predicated on
allegedly newly discovered evidence the rationale of
which being:
The judgment of the Court of
Appeals is conclusive as to the

24
 facts, and cannot be reviewed by
the Supreme Court. Accordingly, in
an appeal by certiorari to the
Supreme Court, the latter has no
jurisdiction to entertain a motion
for new trial on the ground of
newly discovered evidence, for
only questions of fact are involved
therein.
the rule now appears to have been relaxed,
if not abandoned, in subsequent cases like
"Helmuth, Jr. v. People" 11 and "People v.
Amparado". 12
In both cases, the Court, opting to brush aside
technicalities and despite the opposition of the
Solicitor General, granted new trial to the convicted
accused concerned on the basis of proposed
testimonies or affidavits of persons which the Court
considered as newly discovered and probably
sufficient evidence to reverse the judgment of
conviction. Being similarly circumstanced, there is no
nagging reason why herein petitioner should be
denied the same benefit. It becomes all the more
plausible under the circumstances considering that
the "People" does not raise any objection to a new
trial, for which reason the Solicitor General ought to
be specially commended for displaying once again
such statesmanlike gesture of impartiality. The
Solicitor General's finest hour, indeed.
WHEREFORE, petitioner's Motion For New Trial is
hereby GRANTED. Let the case be RE-OPENED and
REMANDED to the court of origin for reception of
petitioner's evidence.
SO ORDERED.
96.
G.R. Nos. 151809-12. April 12, 2005
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD
GOVERNMENT (PCGG), Petitioners,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division), LUCIO C. TAN,
CARMEN KHAO TAN, FLORENCIO T. SANTOS,
NATIVIDAD P. SANTOS, DOMINGO CHUA, TAN
HUI NEE, MARIANO TAN ENG LIAN, ESTATE OF
BENITO TAN KEE HIONG (represented by
TARCIANA C. TAN), FLORENCIO N. SANTOS, JR.,
HARRY C. TAN, TAN ENG CHAN, CHUNG POE
KEE, MARIANO KHOO, MANUEL KHOO, MIGUEL
KHOO, JAIME KHOO, ELIZABETH KHOO, CELSO
RANOLA, WILLIAM T. WONG, ERNESTO B. LIM,
BENJAMIN T. ALBACITA, WILLY CO, ALLIED
BANKING CORP., ALLIED LEASING AND FINANCE
CORPORATION, ASIA BREWERY, INC., BASIC
HOLDINGS CORP., FOREMOST FARMS, INC.,
FORTUNE TOBACCO CORP., GRANDSPAN
DEVELOPMENT CORP., HIMMEL INDUSTRIES,
IRIS HOLDINGS AND DEVELOPMENT CORP.,
JEWEL HOLDINGS, INC., MANUFACTURING
SERVICES AND TRADE CORP., MARANAW
HOTELS AND RESORT CORP., NORTHERN
TOBACCO REDRYING PLANT, PROGRESSIVE
FARMS, INC., SHAREHOLDINGS, INC., SIPALAY
TRADING CORP., VIRGO HOLDINGS &
DEVELOPMENT CORP., and ATTY. ESTELITO P.
MENDOZA, Respondents.
FACTS
In 1976 the General Bank and Trust Company
(GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties.
GENBANK had extended considerable financial
support to Filcapital Development Corporation
causing it to incur daily overdrawings on its current
account with Central Bank. Despite the mega loans
GENBANK failed to recover from its financial woes.
The Central Bank issued a resolution declaring
GENBANK insolvent and unable to resume business
with safety to its depositors, creditors and the
general public, and ordering its liquidation. A public
bidding of GENBANKs assets was held where Lucio
Tan group submitted the winning bid. Solicitor
General Estelito Mendoza filed a petition with the CFI
praying for the assistance and supervision of the
court in GENBANKs liquidation as mandated by RA
265.
After EDSA Revolution I Pres Aquino established the
PCGG to recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of
former Pres Marcos, his family and cronies. Pursuant
to this mandate, the PCGG filed with the
Sandiganbayan a complaint for reversion,
reconveyance, restitution against respondents Lucio
Tan, at.al.
PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on
properties allegedly acquired by them by
taking advantage of their close relationship and
influence with former Pres. Marcos. The
abovementioned respondents Tan, et. al are
represented as their counsel, former Solicitor General
Mendoza.
PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza
as counsel for respondents Tan et. al. with
Sandiganbayan. It was alleged that Mendoza as then
Sol Gen and counsel to Central Bank actively
intervened in the liquidation of GENBANK which was
subsequently acquired by respondents Tan et. al.,
which subsequently became Allied Banking
Corporation. The motions to disqualify invoked Rule
6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
prohibits former government lawyers from accepting
engagement or employment in connection with
any matter in which he had intervened while in the
said service.
The Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denyting
PCGGs motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza. It
failed to prove the existence of an inconsistency
between respondent Mendozas former function as
SolGen and his present employment as counsel of
the Lucio Tan group. PCGGs recourse to this court
assailing the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE
Whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility applies to respondent Mendoza. The
prohibition states: A lawyer shall not, after leaving
government service, accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which
he had intervened while in the said service.
25
HELD
The case at bar does not involve the adverse
interest aspect of Rule 6.03. Respondent Mendoza,
it is conceded, has no adverse interest problem when
he acted as SOlGen and later as counsel of
respondents et.al. before the Sandiganbayan.
However there is still the issue of whether there
exists a congruent-interest conflict sufficient to
disqualify respondent Mendoza from representing
respondents et. al.
The key is unlocking the meaning of matter and
the metes and bounds of intervention that he made
on the matter. Beyond doubt that the matter or
the act of respondent Mendoza as SolGen involved in
the case at bar is advising the Central Bank, on how
to proceed with the said banks liquidation and even
filing the petition for its liquidation in CFI of Manila.
The Court held that the advice given by respondent
Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate GENBANK is
not the matter contemplated by Rule 6.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. ABA Formal
Opinion No. 342 is clear in stressing that drafting,
enforcing or interpreting government
or agency procedures, regulations and laws, or
briefing abstract principles of law are acts which do
not fall within the scope of the term matter and
cannot disqualify. Respondent Mendoza had nothing
to do with the decision of the Central Bank to
liquidate GENBANK. He also did not participate in the
sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. The legality of the
liquidation of GENBANK is not an issue in the
sequestration cases. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the
PCGG does not include the dissolution and liquidation
of banks.
Thus, the Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility cannot apply to respondent Mendoza
because his alleged intervention while SolGen is an
intervention on a matter different from the matter
involved in the Civil case of sequestration.
In the metes and bounds of the intervention. The
applicable meaning as the term is used in
the Code of Professional Ethics is that it is an act of a
person who has the power to influence the subject
proceedings. The evil sought to be remedied by
the Code do not exist where the government lawyer
does not act which can be considered as innocuous
such as drafting, enforcing, or interpreting
government or agency procedures, regulations or
laws or briefing abstract principles of law. The court
rules that the intervention of Mendoza is not
significant and substantial. He merely petitions that
the court gives assistance in the liquidation of
GENBANK. The role of court is not strictly as a court
of justice but as an agent to assist the Central Bank
in determining the claims of creditors. In such a
proceeding the role of the SolGen is not that of the
usual court litigator protecting the interest of
government.
Petition assailing the Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan is denied.
Relevant Dissenting Opinion of Justice Callejo:
Rule 6.03 is a restatement of Canon 36 of the Canons
of Professional Ethics: A lawyer, having once held
public office or having been in the public employ,
should not after his retirement accept employment in
connection with any matter which he has
investigated or passed upon while in such office or
employ.
Indeed, the restriction against a public official from
using his public position as a vehicle to promote or
advance his private interests extends beyond his
tenure on certain matters in which he intervened as
a public official. Rule 6.03 makes this restriction
specifically applicable to lawyers who once held
public office. A plain reading shows that the
interdiction 1. applies to a lawyer who once served in
the government and 2. relates to his accepting
engagement or employment in connection with
any matter in which he had intervened while in the
service.
97.
G.R. No. 129416 November 25, 2004
ZENAIDA B. TIGNO, IMELDA B. TIGNO and ARMI
B. TIGNO, petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES ESTAFINO AQUINO and FLORENTINA
AQUINO and the HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
FACTS:
The controversy in the present petition hinges on the
admissibility of a single document, a deed of sale
involving interest over real property, notarized by a
person of questionable capacity.
The facts alleged are as follows: Spouses Aquino
wanted the enforcement of a deed of sale executed
by Mr. Bustria for a fishpond located in Pangasinan.
Following this, a compromise agreement approved by
the CFI of Pangasinan was made. However, on 1986
Mr. Bustria died and was then represented by his
daughter Zenaida Tigno. Zenaida wanted that the
right of repurchase be exercised by her through
consignation but the same was denied by the RTC.
Meanwhile Spouese Aquino alleged that the right to
repurchase was already sold to them by Mr. Bustria in
1985. They presented two witnesses Mr. De Francia ,
who was the witness in the execution of the deed of
sale, and former Judge Carino who notarized the
same. Zenaida Tigno objected to the admission of
the deed of sale saying that it was not acknowledged
by Bustria, her father, and that it was previously
unknown and was not even presented during the
Spouses Aquinos opposition to her consignation.
RTC ruled for Zenaida saying that Bustria did not
acknowledge it nor was it done through the
assistance of a counsel. RTC also said that there
were inconsistencies in the statements of the
witnesses presented by Spouses Aquino.
The CA issued a different ruling with the RTC. The CA
stated that there were no substantial inconsistencies
with the statements of the witnesses De Francia and
Judge Carino. Also, that the absence of
acknowledgment and substitution instead of a jurat
did not make the instrument doubtful. Even the
absence of counsels representation did not render
26
the same as void. It was noted that a notarized
document carried in its favor the presumption of
regularity with respect to its due execution, and that
there must be clear, convincing and more than
merely preponderant evidence to contradict the
same.
ISSUE: Whether or not former Judge Carino has the
capacity to notarize the alleged document in this
present case
HELD:
The notarial certification of the Deed of Sale reads as
follows:
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES)
PROVINCE OF PANGASINAN ) S.S.
MUNICIPALITY OF ALAMINOS )
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this
17th day of October 1985 at Alaminos,
Pangasinan both parties known to me to be
the same parties who executed the
foregoing instrument.
FRANKLIN CARIO
Ex-Officio Notary Public
Judge, M.T.C.
Alaminos, Pangasinan
There are palpable errors in this certification. Most
glaringly, the document is certified by way of a jurat
instead of an acknowledgment. A jurat is a distinct
creature from an acknowledgment. An
acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed
a deed in going before some competent officer or
court and declaring it to be his act or deed; while a
jurat is that part of an affidavit where the officer
certifies that the same was sworn before him.
[A notary ex officio] should not compete
with private law practitioners or regular
notaries in transacting legal conveyancing
business.
In the instant case, it was not proper that a city judge
should notarize documents involving private
transactions and sign the document in this wise:
"GUMERSINDO ARCILLA, Notary Public Ex-Officio, City
Judge" In doing so, he obliterated the distinction
between a regular notary and a notary ex officio.
This Decision should again serve as an affirmation of
the rule prohibiting municipal judges from notarizing
documents not connected with the exercise of their
official duties, subject to the exceptions laid down in
Circular No. 1-90.
The Deed of Sale was offered in evidence as
authentic by the Aquinos, who likewise insist that its
enforceability militates against Tigno's claim.
Correspondingly, the burden falls upon the Aquinos
to prove its authenticity and due execution. The
Court of Appeals clearly erred in not appreciating the
Deed of Sale as a private document and in applying
the presumption of regularity that attaches only to
duly notarized documents, as distinguished from
private documents.
However, if we were to instead believe De Francia,
then the integrity of the notary public, Judge Cario,
would be obviously compromised. Assuming that
Judge Cario had indeed authored the Deed of Sale,
it would indeed be odd that he would not remember
having written the document himself yet sufficiently
recall notarizing the same. If his testimony as to
authorship of the document is deemed as dubious,
then there is all the reason to make a similar
assumption as to his testimony on the notarization of
the Deed of Sale.
These inconsistencies are not of consequence
because there is need to indubitably establish the
author of the Deed of Sale. They are important
because they cast doubt on the credibility of those
witnesses of the Aquinos, presented as they were to
attest to the due execution and authenticity of the
Deed of Sale. The Court of Appeals was clearly in
error in peremptorily disregarding this observation of
the RTC.
Since the validity of the Deed of Sale has been
successfully assailed, Tigno's right to repurchase was
not extinguished at the time of the filing of the
Petition for revival of judgment, as correctly
concluded by the RTC. The Court of Appeals being in
error when it concluded otherwise, the reinstatement
of the RTC Decision is warranted.
Most crucially for this case, we should deem the
Deed of Sale as not having been notarized at all. The
validity of a notarial certification necessarily derives
from the authority of the notarial officer. If the notary
public does not have the capacity to notarize a
document, but does so anyway, then the document
should be treated as unnotarized. The rule may
strike as rather harsh, and perhaps may prove to be
prejudicial to parties in good faith relying on the
proferred authority of the notary public or the person
pretending to be one. Still, to admit otherwise would
render merely officious the elaborate process
devised by this Court in order that a lawyer may
receive a notarial commission. Without such a rule,
the notarization of a document by a duly appointed
notary public will have the same legal effect as one
accomplished by a non-lawyer engaged in pretense.
The notarization of a document carries considerable
legal effect. Notarization of a private document
converts such document into a public one, and
renders it admissible in court without further proof of
its authenticity.40Thus, notarization is not an empty
routine; to the contrary, it engages public interest in
a substantial degree and the protection of that
interest requires preventing those who are not
qualified or authorized to act as notaries public from
imposing upon the public and the courts and
administrative offices generally.41
98.
A.C. No. 4545 February 5, 2014
27
CARLITO ANG, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JAMES JOSEPH GUPANA, Respondent.
99.
A.C. No. 7036 June 29, 2009
JUDGE LILY LYDIA A.
LAQUINDANUM, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. NESTOR Q. QUINTANA, Respondent.
Facts:
Judge Laquindanum sent a letter to the Supreme
Court requesting that proper disciplinary action be
imposed to Atty. Nestor Quintana for the following
acts:
1. Notarizing documents outside of the area of
his commission as notary public;
2. Allowing his wife to notarize documents in
his absence;
3. Notarizing a document where one of the
signatories therein was already dead at that
time.
Issues:
1. Whether or not a lawyer of good standing
has the right to practice his profession
including notarial acts in the entire
Philippines, as so claimed by the respondent
2. Whether or not Atty. Quintana can transfer
the blame to his wife for the latters
unauthorized practice of notarial acts
3. Whether or not a notary public can notarize
documents where one of the signatories
therein was already dead at that time
Held:
1. No. While it is true that lawyers in good
standing are allowed to engage in the
practice of law in the Philippines, however,
not every lawyer even in good standing
can perform notarial functions without
having been commissioned as notary
public. He must have submitted himself to
the commissioning court by filing his
petition for issuance of his Notarial
Practice.
2. No. A notary public takes full responsibility
for all the entries in his notarial register.
Respondent cannot take refuge claiming
that it was his wifes act and that he did
not authorize his wife to notarize
documents. He is personally accountable
for the activities in his office as well as the
acts of his personnel including his wife,
who acts as his secretary.
3. No. Sec. 2, (b), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules
on Notarial Practice provides A person
shall not perform a notarial act if the
person involved as signatory to the
instrument or document (1) is not in the
notarys presence personally at the time of
the notarization; and (2) is not personally
known to the notary public through
competent evidence of identity as defined
by these Rules.
100.
A.C. No. 10695 March 18, 2015
CRESCENCIANO M. PITOGO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JOSELITO TROY SUELLO, Respondent.
Legal and Judicial Ethics; Notarization;
Notarization is not an empty, meaningless,
routinary act. It is invested with such
substantial public interest that only those who
are qualified or authorized may act as notaries
public. Notarization converts a private
document into a public document, making that
document admissible in evidence without
further proof of its authenticity. For this
reason, notaries must observe with utmost
care the basic requirements in the
performance of their duties. Otherwise, the
confidence of the public in the integrity of this
form of conveyance would be undermined.
LEONEN, J.:
FACTS: Atty. Joselito Troy Suello (Suello) notarized
the documents for the registration of the motorcycle
of Crescenciano M. Pitogo (Pitogo) which the latter
purchased from Emcor, Inc. Pitogo obtained a copy of
the documents from the Land Transportation Office
and proceeded to Suellos office to have the
documents certified since these were important in
his pending civil case against Emcor, Inc. However,
Suello ignored Pitogos request and instead ordered
his secretary to give Pitogo a copy of his notarial
register.
Upon noticing that there were discrepancies
between the notarized documents and the entries in
the notarial register, Pitogo filed an Affidavit-
Complaint against Suello. In the Affidavit-Complaint,
Suello claimed that he certified the documents as
true copies. Later, in his Position Paper, he passed
the blame to his secretary, claiming that it was his
secretary who certified Pitogos documents.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT SUELLO IS LIABLE FOR
NEGLIGENCE IN KEEPING AND MAINTAINING HIS
NOTARIAL REGISTER
HELD: AFFIRMATIVE. Notarization is not an empty,
meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with such
substantial public interest that only those who are
qualified or authorized may act as notaries public.
Notarization converts a private document into a
28
public document, making that document admissible
in evidence without further proof of its authenticity.
For this reason, notaries must observe with utmost
care the basic requirements in the performance of
their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public
in the integrity of this form of conveyance would be
undermined. Failure to properly record entries in the
notarial register is a ground for revocation of notarial
commission.
When Atty. Suelo negligently failed to enter
the details of the documents on his notarial register,
he cast doubt on the authenticity of the said
documents and on the credibility of the notarial
register and the notarial process. He violated the law
which requires lawyers to promote respect for law
and legal processes. Suello also appeared to have
committed a falsehood in the pleadings he
submitted. Initially, Suello claimed that he certified
the documents as true copies. Later, he passed the
blame to his secretary. This violates the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which prohibits lawyers
from engaging in dishonest and unlawful conduct.
The secretary cannot be held responsible for
the erroneous entries in the notarial register. The
notarial commission is a license held personally by
the notary public. It cannot be further delegated. It
is the notary public alone who is personally
responsible for the correctness of the entries in his or
her notarial register. Suellos apparent regret may
alleviate the injury done privately, but it does not
change the nature of the violation.
100.
A.C. No. 6767, October 05, 2016
ELIZABETH RECIO, Complainant, vs.
ATTY. JOSELITO I. FANDIO, Respondent.
DECISION
JARDELEZA, J.:
Elizabeth Recio, the bonds manager of Oriental
Assurance Corporation (ORASCO), seeks the
disbarment of Atty. Joselito I. Fandio due to grave
misconduct, gross dishonesty, and conduct
unbecoming of a lawyer.
The Facts
On June 28, 2005, the Court received an undated
Complaint Affidavit1 of Elizabeth Recio (complainant)
against Atty. Joselito I. Fandio (respondent). She
alleged that sometime in early 2003, ORASCO
started to receive several orders from the Court
stating that ORASCO bail bonds have been issued
and have been in fact confiscated by the various
branches of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga,
Legazpi and other RTCs and Municipal Trial Courts
(MTCs) of the 5th Judicial Region. ORASCO then wrote
to the clerks of court of the various branches of the
RTCs and MTCs of Naga and Legazpi to request for
copies of the bail bonds. Upon verification of the bail
bonds received by ORASCO, the latter discovered
that the bail bonds were fake, simulated or spurious
for the following reasons:
1. The bail bond form used was not the
genuine bail bond form being issued by
ORASCO;
2. The signatures appearing in the falsified
bail bonds were forgeries, being obviously
different. from the genuine signature of
ORASCO's authorized signing officer,
Conrado B. Sicat; and
3. That immediately noticeable is a notice
stamped in the spurious bail bond stating
"SEND ALL NOTICES AT RM 303 PNB BLDG.
NAGA CITY" despite the fact that ORASCO
does not have any extension office or
agency in Naga City much less at the
aforestated address.2
Complainant alleged that respondent was the Notary
Public of the spurious bonds and that the address
mentioned in the Notice was the law office of
respondent. The latter also signed for and
misrepresented himself to be the counsel of the
bondsman ORASCO in several pleadings when in fact
he was not appointed as ORASCO's counsel nor did
anyone in ORASCO even know him. Sheriff Rolando
Borja, a sheriff of Naga City also executed a sworn
affidavit to the effect that respondent represented
himself to be the manager and counsel of ORASCO
and further stated that he will just settle the amount
subject of a writ of execution by that court. All
circumstances of forgery or falsification pointed to
respondent as the culprit. Complainant also alleged
that there was a strong indication that he solicited
and illegally received payments of the premiums of
these spurious bail bonds as he has admitted to have
been the unauthorized representative or agent of
ORASCO. Thus, she prayed that respondent be
disbarred due to grave misconduct, gross dishonesty,
and conduct unbecoming of a lawyer. 3chanrobleslaw
In his Comment4 dated September 27, 2005,
respondent alleged that he maintained in his office
an insurance business including the issuance of bail
bonds, and that he delegated its operation and
management to one Jeanette Cruz (Cruz) with whom
he shared his office. However, he claimed that Cruz
also conducted her own insurance business, separate
and apart from that of his insurance business. Cruz
also maintained offices at Legazpi City and Daet,
Camarines Norte.5chanrobleslaw
Respondent then alleged that in one occasion, he
was asked by one Willy Vargas (Vargas) to refer to
the latter clients in Naga City. In gratitude to Vargas
who had referred him to insurance agencies, he
introduced Vargas to Cruz so Cruz could give
business to Vargas. Respondent maintained that he
had no actual participation in transactions Vargas
made with Cruz involving the issuance of ORASCO
bonds.6chanrobleslaw
Respondent also alleged that he was not the one who
notarized the bonds and that he had no knowledge
when the bonds were made, accomplished and
issued. His signature appearing in the bonds was
believed to be actually affixed by Cruz. He also
argued that the stamping of the words in the bond to
the effect that all notices shall be sent at "RM 303
BLDG., NAGA CITY" was merely made for
convenience in an arrangement made by Cruz with
Vargas.7chanrobleslaw
However, respondent admitted that he appeared as
counsel in connection with the bonds but merely
because Vargas solicited his services. Further, the
allegations in the pleadings filed before the court
were prepared by Cruz. He previously made different
kinds of motions that were usually filed in court
regarding bond liability and problems, and these
were in tum used as patterns. Respondent alleged
that he only signed them upon their preparation and
argued what was stated in the pleadings when he
appeared in court.8chanrobleslaw
29
As to the sheriffs affidavit, respondent denied that he
misrepresented to the sheriff that he was the
manager of ORASCO. Moreover, the fact that the
sheriff has himself stated that ORASCO does not hold
office at "RM 303 PNB BLDG., NAGA CITY" even
supported respondent's contention that he never had
any participation in the issuance of the subject
bonds.9chanrobleslaw
The Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.10chanrobleslaw
Findings of the IBP
Commissioner Pedro A. Magpayo, Jr. (Commissioner)
ruled in his Report and Recommendation11dated
March 18, 2009 that it was difficult to state with a
high degree of certainty that the signatures of
respondent on the bonds were genuine or not
because the alleged fake bail bonds which were
submitted as evidence were mere photocopies. Thus,
they cannot be used as basis for comparison with an
acknowledged standard signature of respondent
without running the risk of committing serious
error.12chanrobleslaw
However, the Commissioner noted that respondent
was quick in acknowledging that the bonds were
issued by Vargas through Cruz. The latter was the
person to whom the actual operation and
management of respondent's insurance business
were delegated and entrusted. She held office at the
law office of respondent during the period material to
the issuance of the bail bonds. As such co-occupant,
she had free access to his notarial records and
paraphernalia incident to
notarization.13chanrobleslaw
The Commissioner ruled that the freedom and facility
enjoyed by Cruz opened the door to the commission
of forgery by Cruz and Vargas. Without such liberty
gained by Cruz through her association with
respondent, the forging of the latter's signature could
not have been possible. Also, had he observed
prudence and circumspection in his personal dealings
with the two, Cruz and Vargas, they could not have
easily succeeded in issuing bail bonds, which
ORASCO steadfastly claims to be spurious and the
premiums of which were not even remitted to the
company.14chanrobleslaw
The Commissioner also ruled that the counterfeit
ORASCO bonds were made possible on fake bail bond
forms which were furnished by Vargas and
complemented by the bogus notarization supplied by
Cruz. Had Cruz not been equipped with the needed
familiarity and given access to respondent's notarial
tools, no fake ORASCO bail bond could have been
circulated. The negligence and oversight of
respondent produced a grave wrong to
ORASCO.15chanrobleslaw
The respondent also admitted that: (1) he signed
pleadings and/or motions which were manually
prepared by Cruz and which were regularly presented
in court regarding bond liability and problems; and
(2) the averments or allegations were composed by
respondent, the draft of which served as pattern for
Cruz in the physical preparation of the pleadings
submitted in court.16 The Commissioner ruled that
affixing one's signature in the manner mentioned by
the respondent to a motion or pleading filed in court,
where ORASCO is the bondsman on record, is
equivalent to, and not different from, actually
representing ORASCO in that case. Such act is
indicative of the lack of prudence on the part of
respondent.17chanrobleslaw
Thus, the Commissioner recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for
a period of six (6) months for negligence for not
securing his notarial paraphernalia and for appearing
in court without being actually authorized by
ORASCO.18 The Report and Recommendation was
adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors
through Resolution No. XIX-2011-18219 dated May 14,
2011.
The respondent filed a Motion for
Reconsideration20 dated August 10, 2011 but this was
denied by the IBP Board of Governors in Resolution
No. XXI-2014-9021 dated March 21, 2014.
Ruling
We affirm the findings of the IBP with modification on
the imposed penalty.
Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides
the grounds for discipline, to wit:
Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by
Supreme Court on what grounds.- A member of the
bar may be removed or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for
any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before the admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court,
or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney
for a party to a case without authority so to do. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice.
In Santuyo v. Hidalgo,22 Spouses Santuyo accused
Atty. Hidalgo of serious misconduct and dishonesty
for breach of his lawyer's oath and the notarial law.
Denying the authenticity of his signature in a deed of
sale, Atty. Hidalgo claimed that at the time the deed
of sale was supposedly notarized, he was on
vacation. He surmised that complainants must have
gone to the law office and enticed one of the
secretaries, with the concurrence of the senior
lawyers, to notarize the document. He claimed that
he was a victim of a criminal scheme motivated by
greed.
We found Atty. Hidalgo guilty of negligence in the
performance of his duties as notary public and
suspended him from his commission as a notary
public for a period of two (2) years. We cited the
report of the IBP as basis for a finding of negligence,
to wit:
Considering that the responsibility attached to
a notary public is sensitive respondent should
have been more discreet and cautious in the
execution of his duties as such and should not
have wholly entrusted everything to the
secretaries; otherwise he should not have been
commissioned as notary public.
For having wholly entrusted the preparation and
other mechanics of the document for notarization to
the secretary there can be a possibility that even the
respondent's signature which is the only one left for
him to do can be done by the secretary or anybody
for that matter as had been the case herein.
As it is respondent had been negligent not only in the
supposed notarization but foremost in having allowed
the office secretaries to make the necessary entries
in his notarial registry which was supposed to be
done and kept by him alone; and should not have
relied on somebody else.23 (Emphasis supplied.)
Here, respondent violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice24 particularly Section 2(a) and (c), Rule VII, to
wit:
Sec. 2. Official Seal.-
30
(a) Every person commissioned as notary public shall
have a seal of office, to be procured at his own
expense, which shall not be possessed or owned by
any other person. x x x
xxx
(c) When not in use, the official seal shall be kept
safe and secure and shall be accessible only to the
notary public or the person duly authorized by him.
Complainant successfully showed in her Position
Paper25cralawred that Cruz is the secretary of
respondent. This was evidenced by the Affidavit of
Service26 signed by Cruz of a Motion to Withdraw as
Bondsman27 dated June 23, 1999 filed before RTC
Branch 22 Naga City. Even so, respondent should not
have entrusted everything to his secretary and
allowed the latter to have full access to his notarial
paraphernalia considering the sensitivity of his
responsibility as a notary public. His negligence in
giving Cruz absolute freedom and access to his office
paved the way for Vargas and Cruz to secure the
notarization of the spurious ORASCO bonds. Such act
of respondent also constitutes malpractice of law
which is a ground for suspension or disbannent under
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
Respondent again manifested his negligence when
he purported to represent ORASCO, by signing the
pleadings and appearing in court on its behalf,
without verifying the authority of Vargas to ask him
to act on behalf of ORASCO. As a lawyer, respondent
is expected to have exercised due diligence in
ensuring that ORASCO indeed sought his
representation. In Manila Memorial Park Cemetery,
28
Inc. v. Linsangan, we held:
It is a settled rule that persons dealing with an agent
are bound at their peril, if they would hold the
principal liable, to ascertain not only the fact of
agency but also the nature and extent of authority,
and in case either,is controverted, the burden of
proof is upon them to establish it. The basis for
agency is representation and a person dealing
with an agent is put upon inquiry and must
discover upon his peril the authority of the
agent. If he does not make such an inquiry, he
is chargeable with knowledge of the agent's
authority and his ignorance of 'that authority
will not be any excuse.
As noted by one author, the ignorance of a person
dealing with an agent as to the scope' of the latter's
authority is no excuse to such person and the fault
cannot be thrown upon the principal. A person
dealing with an agent assumes the risk of lack of
authority in the agent. He cannot charge the
principal by relying, upon the agent's assumption of
authority that proves to be unfounded. The principal,
on the other hand, may act on the presumption that
third persons dealing with his agent will not be
negligent in failing to ascertain the extent of his
authority as well as the existence of his
agency.29 (Citations omitted; Emphasis supplied.)
In the Urgent Motion for Extension of Time 30 filed by
respondent before RTC Branch 22 Naga City to file his
comment or opposition to ORASCO's motion to
declare the bond null and void, respondent merely
explained that his appearance in the case was only
due to the request of Vargas who represented himself
as an agent of the bondsman. As alleged by
complainant in her Position Paper, he was not
appointed as counsel of ORASCO and none of
ORASCO's officers and employees knew
him.31chanrobleslaw
Respondent's negligence in not securing his notarial
paraphernalia and in appearing for parties or
insurance companies who did not seek
representation caused prejudice not only to ORASCO
but to the several accused whose bail bonds were
confiscated due to the spurious character of the
documents.
We, however, modify the IBP recommended penalty
on respondent, of suspension from the practice of
law for six months. This is the penalty for respondent
not securing his notarial paraphernalia:and for
appearing in court without authority by ORASCO.
Under existing jurisprudence, gross misconduct for
violation of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice is also
meted the penalty of disqualification, revocation of
notarial commission and disqualification from
appointment as notary public. In Gonzales v.
Ramos,32 Atty. Ramos violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility and the 2004 Ruleon
Notarial Practice by notarizing a Deed of Absolute
Sale despite the non-appearance of one of the
signatories. Thus, aside from his suspension from the
practice of law tor one (1) year and revocation of his
notarial commission, Atty. Ramos was disqualified
from reappointment as notary public for two (2)
years.33 Here, considering that respondent also
violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, the
penalty to be imposed on him should include not only
his suspension from the practice of law for six
months, but also the revocation of his commission
and disqualification from appointment as notary
public.
WHEREEORE, the recommendation of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines
is ADOPTED with MODIFICATION. Respondent Atty.
Joselito I. Fandio is GUILTY of negligence in
performing his duties as a notary public and of
breach of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.
Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for six (6) months; his incumbent commission if
any is REVOKED; and he is PROHIBITED from being
commissioned as a notary public for two (2) years,
effective immediately. He is WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar acts in the future
shall be dealt with more severely.
Let all the courts, through the Office of the Court
Administrator, as well as the IBP and the Office of the
Bar Confidant, be notified of this Decision and be it
entered into respondent's personal record.
The respondent is DIRECTED to report the date of
his receipt of this Decision to enable us to determine
when his suspension shall take effect.
SO ORDERED.c
102.
A.C. No. 6270 January 22, 2007
HEIRS OF THE LATE SPOUSES LUCAS and
FRANCISCA VILLANUEVA, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. SALUD P. BERADIO, Respondent.
This is a disbarment case against Atty. Salud
P. Beradio (respondent), filed by the heirs of the late
spouses Lucas and Francisca Villanueva (spouses
Villanueva).
Facts:
During their lifetime, the spouses Villanueva
acquired several parcels of land in Pangasinan, one
of which was covered by Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. 2522. Francisca died in 1968, and Lucas in
1974. Their five children, namely, Simeona, Susana,
Maria, Alfonso, and Florencia, survived them.
On May 22, 1984, Alfonso executed an
Affidavit of Adjudication stating that as "the only
31
surviving son and sole heirs" of the spouses
Villanueva, he was adjudicating to himself the parcel
of land under OCT No. 2522. Alfonso then executed a
Deed of Absolute Sale on July 5, 1984, conveying the
property to Adriano Villanueva. Respondent appeared
as notary public on both the affidavit of adjudication
and the deed of sale.
Contrary to the misrepresentations of
Alfonso, his sister Florencia was still alive at the time
he executed the affidavit of adjudication and the
deed of sale, as were descendants of the other
children of the spouses Villanueva. Complainants
claimed that respondent was aware of this fact, as
respondent had been their neighbor in Balungao,
Pangasinan, from the time of their birth, and
respondent constantly mingled with their family.
Complainants accused respondent of knowing the
"true facts and surrounding circumstances" regarding
the properties of the spouses Villanueva, yet
conspiring with Alfonso to deprive his co-heirs of
their rightful shares in the property.
In a resolution, this Court required
respondent to comment on the complaint. In her
Comment, respondent admitted that she notarized
the affidavit of adjudication and the deed of sale
executed by Alfonso in 1984. However, respondent
denied that she conspired with Alfonso to dispose of
fraudulently the property.
Issue:
Whether or not, the respondent violated
Canon 1 and 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility when she failed to discharge properly
her duties as a notary public and as a member of the
bar.
103.
A.C. No. 8103 December 03, 2014
ATTY. AURELIO C. ANGELES, JR., PROVINCIAL
LEGAL OFFICER, BATAAN CAPITOL, BALANGA
CITY, BATAAN, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RENATO C. BAGAY, Respondent.
Legal Ethics; Canon 7; Canon 9
FACTS:
This case stemmed from the letter, dated June 11,
2008, submitted by Atty. Aurelio C. Angeles, Jr. (Atty.
Angeles, Jr.), the Provincial Legal Officer of Bataan, to
Hon. Remigio M. Escalada, Jr. (Executive Judge),
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Bataan
against Atty. Renato C. Bagay (respondent), for his
alleged notarization of 18 documents at the time he
was out of the country from March 13, 2008 to April
8, 2008.
These documents were endorsed to the Provincial
Legal Office by the Provincial Treasurer who had
information that they were notarized while
respondent was outside the country attending the
Prayer and Life Workshop in Mexico. The letter
contained the affidavits of the persons who caused
the documents to be notarized which showed a
common statement that they did not see respondent
sign the documents himself and it was either the
secretary who signed them or the documents came
out of the office already signed. Upon verification
with the Bureau of Immigration, it was found out that
a certain Renato C. Bagay departed from the country
on March 13, 2008 and returned on April 8, 2008. The
copy of the Certification issued by the Bureau of
Immigration was also attached to the letter.

Ruling:

The Court held that respondent's conduct

amounted to a breach of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which requires lawyers to
obey the laws of the land and promote respect for
the law and legal processes. Respondent also
violated Rule 1.01 of the Code which proscribes
lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral, or deceitful conduct. It was established that
Alfonso's affidavit does not appear to contain any
"illegal or immoral" declaration. However,
respondent herself admitted that she knew of the
falsity of Alfonso's statement that he was the "sole
heir" of the spouses Villanueva. Respondent
therefore notarized a document while fully aware
that it contained a material falsehood, i.e., Alfonso's
assertion of status as sole heir. The affidavit of
adjudication is premised on this very assertion. By
this instrument, Alfonso claimed a portion of his
parents' estate all to himself, to the exclusion of his
co-heirs. Shortly afterwards, respondent notarized
the deed of sale, knowing that the deed took basis
from the unlawful affidavit of adjudication. Thus,
where admittedly the notary public has personal
knowledge of a false statement or information
contained in the instrument to be notarized, yet
proceeds to affix his or her notarial seal on it, the
Court must not hesitate to discipline the notary
public accordingly as the circumstances of the case
may dictate. Otherwise, the integrity and sanctity of
the notarization process may be undermined and
public confidence on notarial documents diminished.

Adjudication:

WHEREFORE, for violation of Canon 1 and

Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
we REVOKE the commission of respondent Atty. Salud
P. Beradio as Notary Public, if still existing, and
DISQUALIFY her from being commissioned a notary
public for one (1) year. We further SUSPEND
respondent from the practice of law for six (6)
months effective upon finality of this decision.

32
The Report and Recommendation of Atty. Felimon C.
Abelita III (Atty. Abelita III) as Investigating
Commissioner found that the letter of Atty. Angeles,
Jr., dated June 11, 2008, was not verified, that most
of the attachments were not authenticated
photocopies and that the comment of respondent
was likewise not verified. Atty. Abelita III, however,
observed that respondents signature on his
comment appeared to be strikingly similar to the
signatures in most of the attached documents which
he admitted were notarized in his absence by his
office secretary. He admitted the fact that there were
documents that were notarized while he was abroad
and his signature was affixed by his office secretary
who was not aware of the import of the act. Thus, by
his own admission, it was established that by his
negligence in employing an office secretary who had
access to his office, his notarial seal and records
especially pertaining to his notarial documents
without the proper training, respondent failed to live
up to the standard required by the Rules on Notarial
Practice.

33

Finding respondent guilty of negligence in the
performance of his notarial duty which gave his office
secretary the opportunity to abuse his prerogative
authority as notary public, the Investigating
Commissioner recommended the immediate
revocation of respondents commission as notary
public and his disqualification to be commissioned as
such for a period of two (2) years.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved
the said recommendation in its Resolution, dated
September 28, 2013.
ISSUE:
Whether the notarization of documents by the
secretary of respondent while he was out of the
country constituted negligence.
RULING:
The Court answers in the affirmative.
Respondent admitted in his comment and motion for
reconsideration that the 18 documents were
notarized under his notarial seal by his office
secretary while he was out of the country. This clearly
constitutes negligence considering that respondent is
responsible for the acts of his secretary. Section 9 of
the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides that a
Notary Public refers to any person commissioned to
perform official acts under these Rules. A notary
publics secretary is obviously not commissioned to
perform the official acts of a notary public.
Respondent must fully bear the consequence of his
negligence. A person who is commissioned as a
notary public takes full responsibility for all the
entries in his notarial register. He cannot relieve
himself of this responsibility by passing the buck to
his secretary.
Respondent violated Canon 9 of the CPR which
requires lawyers not to directly or indirectly assist in
the unauthorized practice of law. Due to his
negligence that allowed his secretary to sign on his
behalf as notary public, he allowed an unauthorized
person to practice law. By leaving his office open
despite his absence in the country and with his
secretary in charge, he virtually allowed his secretary
to notarize documents without any restraint.
Respondent also violated his obligation under Canon
7 of the CPR, which directs every lawyer to uphold at
all times the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession. The people, who came into his office
while he was away, were clueless as to the illegality
of the activity being conducted therein. They
expected that their documents would be converted
into public documents. Instead, they later found out
that the notarization of their documents was a mere
sham and without any force and effect. By
prejudicing the persons whose documents were
notarized by an unauthorized person, their faith in
the integrity and dignity of the legal profession was
eroded.
104. EN BANC
A.M. No. 09-6-1-SC, January 21, 2015
RE: VIOLATION OF RULES ON NOTARIAL
PRACTICE
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This case stemmed from three (3) letter-complaints
for Violation of Rules on Notarial Practice endorsed to
the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for appropriate
action. The first letter-complaint,1dated March 2,
2009, was filed by the commissioned notaries public
within and for the jurisdiction of Lingayen,
Pangasinan, namely, Atty. Butch Cardinal Torio, Atty.
Nepthalie Pasiliao, Atty. Dominique Evangelista, and
Atty. Elizabeth C. Tugade (complainants) before the
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Lingayen,
Pangasinan (RTC-Lingayen) against Atty. Juan C.
Siapno, Jr. (Atty. Siapno) for notarizing documents
without a commission.
In their letter, complainants alleged that Atty. Siapno
was maintaining a notarial office along Alvear Street
East, Lingayen, Pangasinan, and was performing
notarial acts and practices in Lingayen, Natividad
and Dagupan City without the requisite notarial
commission. They asserted that Atty. Siapno was
never commissioned as Notary Public for and within
the jurisdiction of Lingayen, Natividad and Dagupan
City. Instead, he applied and was commissioned to
perform notarial functions by Executive Judge
Anthony Sison of the RTC, San Carlos City,
Pangasinan from March 22, 2007 to December 31,
2008. His notarial commission, however, was never
renewed upon expiration. Complainants presented
evidence supporting their allegations such as the
pictures of Atty. Siapnos law office in Lingayen,
Pangasinan; and documents to prove that Atty.
Siapno performed acts of notarization in Lingayen,
Natividad and Dagupan City, to wit: (1) Addendum to
Loan and Mortgage Agreement2 showing that the
Promissory Note was notarized before Atty. Siapno in
Lingayen, Pangasinan in 2007; (2) Deed of Absolute
Sale,3 dated January 24, 2008, notarized in Natividad,
Pangasinan; (3) Joint Affidavit of Two Disinterested
Persons Re: Given Name and Date of Birth,4 dated
January 6, 2009, notarized in Dagupan City; and (4)
Acknowledgement of Debt,5 dated January 24, 2008,
notarized in Dagupan City.
Complainants also averred that Atty. Siapno had
delegated his notarial authority to his secretaries,
Mina Bautista (Bautista) and Mary Ann Arenas
(Arenas), who wrote legal instruments and signed the
documents on his behalf.
On March 17, 2009, the RTC-Lingayen forwarded the
said letter-complaint to the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA)6 which, in turn, indorsed the
same to the OBC.
The second letter-complaint7 was filed by Audy B.
Espelita (Espelita) against Atty. Pedro L. Santos (Atty.
Santos). It alleged that in 2008, Espelita lost his
drivers license and he executed an affidavit of loss
which was notarized by Atty. Santos. The said
affidavit, however, was denied for authentication
when presented before the Notarial Section in Manila
because Atty. Santos was not commissioned to
perform notarial commission within the City of
Manila.
The third letter-complaint8 came from a concerned
citizen reporting that a certain Atty. Evelyn who was
holding office at Room 402 Leyba Bldg., 381
Dasmarias Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, had been
notarizing and signing documents for and on behalf
of several lawyers.
In its Resolution,9 dated June 9, 2009, the Court
directed the Executive Judge of the RTC-Lingayen to
conduct a formal investigation on the complaint
against Atty. Siapno and Executive Judge Reynaldo G.
Ros (Judge Ros) of the RTC-Manila to conduct a
formal investigation on the alleged violation of the
Notarial Law by Atty. Santos, and the illegal activities
of a certain Atty. Evelyn, and thereafter, to submit a
report and recommendation thereon.
Re: Complaint against Atty. Siapno
34
With regard to the complaint against Atty. Siapno, the
Executive Judge conducted a hearing wherein the
complainants affirmed the allegations in their letter-
complaint. For his part, Atty. Siapno denied the
accusations and averred that the law office in
Lingayen, Pangasinan, was not his and that Bautista
and Arenas were not his secretaries.10
In her Report and Recommendation,11 the Executive
Judge found that Atty. Siapno was issued a notarial
commission within the jurisdiction of Lingayen,
Pangasinan, from January 20, 2003 to December 31,
2004 and February 8, 2005 to December 3, 2006. His
commission, however, was cancelled on June 8, 2006
and he was not issued another commission
thereafter. The Executive Judge found Atty. Siapno to
have violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Commission
when he performed notarial functions without
commission and recommended that he be fined in
the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00).
The Court agrees with the findings of the Executive
Judge but not to the recommended penalty.
A review of the records and evidence presented by
complainants shows that Atty. Siapno indeed
maintained a law office in Lingayen, Pangasinan, just
beside the law office of one of the complainants, Atty.
Elizabeth Tugade. It was also proven that Atty. Siapno
notarized several instruments with an expired
notarial commission outside the territorial jurisdiction
of the commissioning court. Section 11, Rule III of the
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides
that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Jurisdiction and Term A person commissioned as
notary public may perform notarial acts in any place
within the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning
court for a period of two (2) years commencing the
first day of January of the year in which the
commissioning is made, unless earlier revoked or the
notary public has resigned under these Rules and the
Rules of Court.
Under the rule, only persons who are commissioned
as notary public may perform notarial acts within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court which granted the
commission. Clearly, Atty. Siapno could not perform
notarial functions in Lingayen, Natividad and
Dagupan City of the Province of Pangasinan since he
was not commissioned in the said places to perform
such act.
Time and again, this Court has stressed that
notarization is not an empty, meaningless and
routine act. It is invested with substantive public
interest that only those who are qualified or
authorized may act as notaries public.12 It must be
emphasized that the act of notarization by a notary
public converts a private document into a public
document making that document admissible in
evidence without further proof of authenticity. A
notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and
credit upon its face, and for this reason, notaries
public must observe with utmost care the basic
requirements in the performance of their duties.
By performing notarial acts without the necessary
commission from the court, Atty. Siapno violated not
only his oath to obey the laws particularly the Rules
on Notarial Practice but also Canons 1 and 7 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which proscribes
all lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct and directs them to
uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession, at all times.13
In a plethora of cases, the Court has subjected
lawyers to disciplinary action for notarizing
documents outside their territorial jurisdiction or with
an expired commission. In the case of Nunga v.
Viray,14 a lawyer was suspended by the Court for
three (3) years for notarizing an instrument without a
commission. In Zoreta v. Simpliciano,15 the
respondent was likewise suspended from the practice
of law for a period of two (2) years and was
permanently barred from being commissioned as a
notary public for notarizing several documents after
the expiration of his commission. In the more recent
case of Laquindanum v. Quintana,16 the Court
suspended a lawyer for six (6) months and was
disqualified from being commissioned as notary
public for a period of two (2) years because he
notarized documents outside the area of his
commission, and with an expired commission.
Considering that Atty. Siapno has been proven to
have performed notarial work in Ligayen, Natividad
and Dagupan City in the province of Pangasinan
without the requisite commission, the Court finds the
recommended penalty insufficient. Instead, Atty.
Siapno must be barred from being commissioned as
notary public permanently and suspended from the
practice of law for a period of two (2) years.
Re: Complaints against Atty. Santos and Atty. Evelyn
In a letter,17 dated July 29, 2013, Judge Ros informed
the Court that he could not have complied with the
June 9, 2009 and August 4, 2009 orders of the Court
because he was no longer the Executive Judge of the
RTC-Manila at that time. To date, no formal
investigation has been conducted on the alleged
violation of Atty. Santos and the reported illegal
activities of a certain Atty. Evelyn.
With respect to the complaints against Atty. Santos
and a certain Atty. Evelyn, the Clerk of Court is
ordered to RE-DOCKET the same as separate
administrative cases.
The incumbent Executive Judge of the RTC-Manila,
whether permanent or in acting capacity, is ordered
to conduct a formal investigation on the matter and
to submit his Report and Recommendation within
sixty (60) days from receipt of copy of this decision.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Juan C. Siapno, Jr. is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two
(2) years and BARRED PERMANENTLY from being
commissioned as Notary Public, effective upon his
receipt of a copy of this decision.
Let copies of this decision be furnished all the courts
of the land through the Office of the Court
Administrator, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
the Office of the Bar Confidant, and be recorded in
the personal files of the respondent.
With respect to the complaints against Atty. Pedro L.
Santos and a certain Atty. Evelyn, the Clerk of Court
is ordered to RE-DOCKET them as separate
administrative cases. The Executive Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Manila, is ordered to conduct a
formal investigation on the matter and to submit his
Report and Recommendation within sixty (60) days
from receipt of a copy of this decision.
SO ORDERED.
105.
G.R. No. 174240 March 20, 2013
SPOUSES LEHNER and LUDY
MARTIRES, Petitioners,
vs.
MENELIA CHUA, Respondent.
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to
reverse and set aside the Amended Decision, 1 as well
as the Resolutions2 of the Court of Appeals (CA),
dated September 30, 2005, July 5, 2006 and August
28, 2006, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 76388. The
assailed Decision of the CA reversed and set aside its
35
earlier Decision, dated April 30, 2004, in favor of
petitioners. The July 5, 2006 Resolution denied
petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration, while the
August 28, 2006 Resolution denied petitioners'
Second Motion for Reconsideration.
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case
are as follows:
Subject of the instant controversy are twenty-four
memorial lots located at the Holy Cross Memorial
Park in Barangay Bagbag, Novaliches, Quezon City.
The property, more particularly described as "Lot: 24
lots, Block 213, Section: Plaza of Heritage-Reg.," is
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
342914. Respondent, together with her mother,
Florencia R. Calagos, own the disputed property.
Their co-ownership is evidenced by a Deed of Sale
and Certificate of Perpetual Care, denominated as
Contract No. 31760, which was executed on June 4,
1992.3
On December 18, 1995, respondent borrowed from
petitioner spouses the amount of P150,000.00. The
loan was secured by a real estate mortgage over the
abovementioned property. Respondent committed to
pay a monthly interest of 8% and an additional 10%
monthly interest in case of default.4
Respondent failed to fully settle her obligation.
Subsequently, without foreclosure of the mortgage,
ownership of the subject lots were transferred in the
name of petitioners via a Deed of Transfer.5
On June 23, 1997, respondent filed with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City a Complaint against
petitioners, Manila Memorial Park Inc., the company
which owns the Holy Cross Memorial Park, and the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City, praying for the
annulment of the contract of mortgage between her
and petitioners on the ground that the interest rates
imposed are unjust and exorbitant. Respondent also
sought accounting to determine her liability under
the law. She likewise prayed that the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City and Manila Memorial Park, Inc.
be directed to reconvey the disputed property to
her.6
On November 20, 1998, respondent moved for the
amendment of her complaint to include the
allegation that she later discovered that ownership of
the subject lots was transferred in the name of
petitioners by virtue of a forged Deed of Transfer and
Affidavit of Warranty. Respondent prayed that the
Deed of Transfer and Affidavit of Warranty be
annulled.7 In their Manifestation dated January 25,
1999, petitioners did not oppose respondent's
motion.8 Trial ensued.
After trial, the RTC of Quezon City rendered a
Decision in favor of petitioners, the dispositive
portion of which reads, thus:
Wherefore, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered against Menelia R. Chua and in favor of the
Sps. Lehner Martires and Ludy Martires; and Manila
Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. as follows:
1. The Complaint is denied and dismissed
for lack of merit;
2. The counterclaims are granted as follows:
a. Menelia R. Chua is ordered to
pay the Sps. Martires the amount
of P100,000.00 as moral damages;
the amount of P50,000.00 as
exemplary damages; and the
amount of P30,000.00 as
reasonable attorneys fees plus
costs of suit.
b. Menelia R. Chua is ordered to
pay Manila Memorial Park
Cemetery, Inc. the amount
of P30,000.00 as reasonable
attorney's fees plus costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.9
On appeal, the CA affirmed, with modification, the
judgment of the RTC, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
appeal is hereby DENIED for lack of merit, and the
decision of the trial court dated 03 August 2002 is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to the
amount of moral and exemplary damages, and
attorney's fees. Plaintiff-appellant Menelia R. Chua is
hereby ordered to pay the defendant-appellees
Spouses Martires the amount of P30,000.00 as moral
damages; P20,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
attorney's fees of P10,000.00 plus costs of suit.
Insofar as defendant-appellee Manila Memorial Park
Cemetery, Inc. is concerned, the attorney's fees
awarded is reduced to P10,000.00 plus costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.10
The CA ruled that respondent voluntarily entered into
a contract of loan and that the execution of the Deed
of Transfer is sufficient evidence of petitioners'
acquisition of ownership of the subject property.
Respondent filed a Motion for
Reconsideration.11 Petitioners opposed it.12
On September 30, 2005, the CA promulgated its
assailed Amended Decision with the following
dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, the Court grants the movant's Motion
for Reconsideration.
Accordingly, the decision of this Court dated April 30,
2004 in CA-G.R. CV No. 76388, which had affirmed
the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 221, in Civil Case No. Q-97-31408, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and it is hereby declared
that:
(1) The assailed decision dated August 3, 2002 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City Branch 221 in
Civil Case No. Q-97-31408 is hereby Reversed with
the following MODIFICATIONS, to wit:
36
 (1) The Deed of Transfer dated July 3, 1996,
as well as the Affidavit of Warranty, are
hereby declared void ab initio;
(2) The loan of P150,000.00 is hereby
subject to an interest of 12% per annum.
(3) The Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc.
and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City
[are] hereby directed to cancel the
registration or annotation of ownership of
the spouses Martires on Lot: 24 lots, Block
213, Section: Plaza Heritage Regular, Holy
Cross Memorial Park, being a portion of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 342914
issued by the Register of Deeds of Quezon
City, and revert registration of ownership
over the same in the name of appellant
Menelia R. Chua, and Florencia R. Calagos.
(4) The movant, Menelia R. Chua, is hereby
ordered to pay the spouses Martires the
amount of P150,000.00 plus interest of 12%
per annum computed from December 18,
1995 up to the time of full payment thereof
and, after deducting payments made in the
total amount of P80,000.00, the same shall
be paid within ninety (90) days from the
finality of this decision. In case of failure to
pay the aforesaid amount and the accrued
interests from the period hereinstated, the
property shall be sold at public auction to
satisfy the mortgage debt and costs, and if
there is an excess, the same is to be given
to the owner.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.13
The CA reconsidered its findings and concluded that
the Deed of Transfer which, on its face, transfers
ownership of the subject property to petitioners, is, in
fact, an equitable mortgage. The CA held that the
true intention of respondent was merely to provide
security for her loan and not to transfer ownership of
the property to petitioners. The CA so ruled on the
basis of its findings that: (1) the consideration,
amounting to P150,000.00, for the alleged Deed of
Transfer is unusually inadequate, considering that the
subject property consists of 24 memorial lots; (2) the
Deed of Transfer was executed by reason of the same
loan extended by petitioners to respondent; (3) the
Deed of Transfer is incomplete and defective; and (4)
the lots subject of the Deed of Transfer are one and
the same property used to secure
respondent's P150,000.00 loan from petitioners.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 14 but
the CA denied it in its Resolution dated July 5, 2006.
On July 26, 2006, petitioners filed a Second Motion
for Reconsideration,15 but again, the CA denied it via
its Resolution dated August 28, 2006.
Hence, the present petition based on the following
grounds:
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN NOT
UPHOLDING THE DEED OF TRANSFER EXECUTED BY
THE RESPONDENT IN FAVOR OF THE PETITIONERS BY
RULING THAT:
1. The Deed of Transfer executed by
respondent in favor of petitioners over the
subject property was not entered in the
Notarial Book of Atty. Francisco Talampas
and reported in the Notarial Section of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
2. The Deed of Transfer was not duly
notarized by Atty. Francisco Talampas
inasmuch as there was no convincing proof
that respondent appeared before Notary
Public Atty. Talampas.
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN
RULING THAT THE DEED OF TRANSFER EXECUTED
BETWEEN THE RESPONDENT AND THE PETITIONERS
CONSTITUTED AN EQUITABLE MORTGAGE
CONSIDERING THAT:
1. Said issue was not raised in any pleading
in the appellate and trial courts.1wphi1
2. Respondent herself admitted that a
separate mortgage was executed to secure
the loan.16
The petition lacks merit.
At the outset, the instant petition should be denied
for being filed out of time. Petitioners admit in the
instant petition that: (1) on July 18, 2006, they
received a copy of the July 5, 2006 Resolution of the
CA which denied their Motion for Reconsideration of
the assailed Amended Decision; (2) on July 26, 2006,
they filed a Motion to Admit Second Motion for
Reconsideration attaching thereto the said Second
Motion for Reconsideration; (3) on September 5,
2006, they received a copy of the August 28, 2006
Resolution of the CA which denied their Motion to
Admit as well as their Second Motion for
Reconsideration; and (4) they filed the instant
petition on October 20, 2006.
Section 2, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides that
a petition for review on certiorari under the said Rule
"shall be filed within fifteen (15) days from notice of
the judgment or final order or resolution appealed
from or of the denial of the petitioner's motion for
new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after
notice of the judgment." Relative thereto, Section 2,
Rule 52 of the same Rules provides that "no second
motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final
resolution by the same party shall be entertained."
Based on the abovementioned dates, the start f the
15-day period for the filing of this petition should
have been reckoned from July 18, 2006, the time of
petitioners' receipt of the CA Resolution denying their
Motion for Reconsideration, and not on September 5,
2006, the date when they received the CA Resolution
denying their Second Motion for Reconsideration.
Thus, petitioners should have filed the instant
petition not later than August 2, 2006. It is wrong for
petitioners to reckon the 15-day period for the filing
of the instant petition from the date when they
received the copy of the CA Resolution denying their
Second Motion for Reconsideration. Since a second
motion for reconsideration is not allowed, then
unavoidably, its filing did not toll the running of the
37
period to file an appeal by certiorari. 17 Petitioners
made a critical mistake in waiting for the CA to
resolve their second motion for reconsideration
before pursuing an appeal.
Perfection of an appeal within the reglementary
period is not only mandatory but also
jurisdictional.18 For this reason, petitioners' failure to
file this petition within the 15-day period rendered
the assailed Amended CA Decision and Resolutions
final and executory, thus, depriving this Court of
jurisdiction to entertain an appeal therefrom.19On this
ground alone, the instant petition should be
dismissed.
In any case, even granting, arguendo, that the
present petition is timely filed, the Court finds no
cogent reason to depart from the findings and
conclusions of the CA in its disputed Amended
Decision.
Anent the first assigned error, petitioners are correct
in pointing out that notarized documents carry
evidentiary weight conferred upon them with respect
to their due execution and enjoy the presumption of
regularity which may only be rebutted by evidence
so clear, strong and convincing as to exclude all
controversy as to falsity.20However, the presumptions
that attach to notarized documents can be affirmed
only so long as it is beyond dispute that the
notarization was regular.21 A defective notarization
will strip the document of its public character and
reduce it to a private instrument.22 Consequently,
when there is a defect in the notarization of a
document, the clear and convincing evidentiary
standard normally attached to a duly-notarized
document is dispensed with, and the measure to test
the validity of such document is preponderance of
evidence.23
In the present case, the CA has clearly pointed out
the dubious circumstances and irregularities
attendant in the alleged notarization of the subject
Deed of Transfer, to wit: (1) the Certification 24 issued
by the Clerk of Court of the Notarial Section of the
RTC of Makati City which supposedly attested that a
copy of the subject Deed of Transfer is on file with
the said court, was contradicted by the
Certification25 issued by the Administrative Officer of
the Notarial Section of the same office as well as by
the testimony of the court employee who prepared
the Certification issued by the Clerk of Court, to the
effect that the subject Deed of Transfer cannot, in
fact, be found in their files; (2) respondent's
categorical denial that she executed the subject
Deed of Transfer; and (3) the subject document did
not state the date of execution and lacks the marital
consent of respondent's husband.
Indeed, petitioners' heavy reliance on the
Certification issued by the notary public who
supposedly notarized the said deed, as well as the
Certification issued by the Clerk of Court of the
Notarial Section of the RTC of Makati City, is
misplaced for the following reasons: first, the persons
who issued these Certifications were not presented
as witnesses and, as such, they could not be cross-
examined with respect to the truthfulness of the
contents of their Certifications; second, as mentioned
above, these Certifications were contradicted by the
Certification issued by the Administrative Officer of
the Notarial Section of the RTC of Makati City as well
as by the admission, on cross-examination, of the
clerk who prepared the Certification of the Clerk of
Court, that their office cannot, in fact, find a copy of
the subject Deed of Transfer in their files; 26 and third,
the further admission of the said clerk that the
Certification, which was issued by the clerk of court
and relied upon by petitioners, was not based on
documents existing in their files, but was simply
based on the Certification issued by the notary public
who allegedly notarized the said Deed of Transfer. 27
Assuming further that the notarization of the
disputed Deed of Transfer was regular, the Court,
nonetheless, is not persuaded by petitioners'
argument that such Deed is a sufficient evidence of
the validity of the agreement between petitioners
and respondent.
While indeed a notarized document enjoys the
presumption of regularity, the fact that a deed is
notarized is not a guarantee of the validity of its
contents.28 The presumption is not absolute and may
be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the
contrary.29 In the present case, the presumption
cannot be made to apply, because aside from the
regularity of its notarization, the validity of the
contents and execution of the subject Deed of
Transfer was challenged in the proceedings below
where its prima facie validity was subsequently
overthrown by the questionable circumstances
attendant in its supposed execution. These
circumstances include: (1) the alleged agreement
between the parties that the ownership of the
subject property be simply assigned to petitioners
instead of foreclosure of the contract of mortgage
which was earlier entered into by them; (2) the Deed
of Transfer was executed by reason of the loan
extended by petitioners to respondent, the amount
of the latter's outstanding obligation being the same
as the amount of the consideration for the
assignment of ownership over the subject property;
(3) the inadequacy of the consideration; and (4) the
claim of respondent that she had no intention of
transferring ownership of the subject property to
petitioners.
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds no cogent
reason to depart from the findings of the CA that the
agreement between petitioners and respondent is, in
fact, an equitable mortgage.
An equitable mortgage has been defined as one
which, although lacking in some formality, or form or
words, or other requisites demanded by a statute,
nevertheless reveals the intention of the parties to
charge real property as security for a debt, there
being no impossibility nor anything contrary to law in
this intent.30
One of the circumstances provided for under Article
1602 of the Civil Code, where a contract shall be
presumed to be an equitable mortgage, is "where it
may be fairly inferred that the real intention of the
parties is that the transaction shall secure the
payment of a debt or the performance of any other
obligation." In the instant case, it has been
established that the intent of both petitioners and
respondent is that the subject property shall serve as
security for the latter's obligation to the former. As
correctly pointed out by the CA, the circumstances
surrounding the execution of the disputed Deed of
Transfer would show that the said document was
38
executed to circumvent the terms of the original
agreement and deprive respondent of her mortgaged
property without the requisite foreclosure.
With respect to the foregoing discussions, it bears to
point out that in Misena v. Rongavilla,31 a case which
involves a factual background similar to the present
case, this Court arrived at the same ruling. In the
said case, the respondent mortgaged a parcel of land
to the petitioner as security for the loan which the
former obtained from the latter. Subsequently,
ownership of the property was conveyed to the
petitioner via a Deed of Absolute Sale. Applying
Article 1602 of the Civil Code, this Court ruled in
favor of the respondent holding that the supposed
sale of the property was, in fact, an equitable
mortgage as the real intention of the respondent was
to provide security for the loan and not to transfer
ownership over the property.
Since the original transaction between the parties
was a mortgage, the subsequent assignment of
ownership of the subject lots to petitioners without
the benefit of foreclosure proceedings, partakes of
the nature of a pactum commissorium, as provided
for under Article 2088 of the Civil Code.
Pactum commissorium is a stipulation empowering
the creditor to appropriate the thing given as
guaranty for the fulfillment of the obligation in the
event the obligor fails to live up to his undertakings,
without further formality, such as foreclosure
proceedings, and a public sale.32
In the instant case, evidence points to the fact that
the sale of the subject property, as proven by the
disputed Deed of Transfer, was simulated to cover up
the automatic transfer of ownership in petitioners'
favor. While there was no stipulation in the mortgage
contract which provides for petitioners' automatic
appropriation of the subject mortgaged property in
the event that respondent fails to pay her obligation,
the subsequent acts of the parties and the
circumstances surrounding such acts point to no
other conclusion than that petitioners were
empowered to acquire ownership of the disputed
property without need of any foreclosure.
Indeed, the Court agrees with the CA in not giving
credence to petitioners' contention in their Answer
filed with the RTC that respondent offered to transfer
ownership of the subject property in their name as
payment for her outstanding obligation. As this Court
has held, all persons in need of money are liable to
enter into contractual relationships whatever the
condition if only to alleviate their financial burden
albeit temporarily.33
Hence, courts are duty-bound to exercise caution in
the interpretation and resolution of contracts lest the
lenders devour the borrowers like vultures do with
their prey.34 Aside from this aforementioned reason,
the Court cannot fathom why respondent would
agree to transfer ownership of the subject property,
whose value is much higher than her outstanding
obligation to petitioners. Considering that the
disputed property was mortgaged to secure the
payment of her obligation, the most logical and
practical thing that she could have done, if she is
unable to pay her debt, is to wait for it to be
foreclosed. She stands to lose less of the value of the
subject property if the same is foreclosed, rather
than if the title thereto is directly transferred to
petitioners. This is so because in foreclosure, unlike
in the present case where ownership of the property
was assigned to petitioners, respondent can still
claim the balance from the proceeds of the
foreclosure sale, if there be any. In such a case, she
could still recover a portion of the value of the
subject property rather than losing it completely by
assigning its ownership to petitioners.
As to the second assigned error, the Court is not
persuaded by petitioners' contention that the issue of
whether or not the subject Deed of Transfer is, in
fact, an equitable mortgage was not raised by the
latter either in the RTC or the CA.
It is true that, as a rule, no issue may be raised on
appeal unless it has been brought before the lower
tribunal for its consideration.35 Higher courts are
precluded from entertaining matters neither alleged
in the pleadings nor raised during the proceedings
below, but ventilated for the first time only in a
motion for reconsideration or on appeal.36 However,
as with most procedural rules, this maxim is subject
to exceptions.37 In this regard, the Court's ruling in
Mendoza v. Bautista38 is instructive, to wit:
x x x Indeed, our rules recognize the broad
discretionary power of an appellate court to waive
the lack of proper assignment of errors and to
consider errors not assigned. Section 8 of Rule 51 of
the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 8 Questions that may be decided. - No error
which does not affect the jurisdiction over the subject
matter or the validity of the judgment appealed from
or the proceedings therein will be considered, unless
stated in the assignment of errors, or closely related
to or dependent on an assigned error and properly
argued in the brief, save as the court may pass upon
plain errors and clerical errors.
Thus, an appellate court is clothed with ample
authority to review rulings even if they are not
assigned as errors in the appeal in these instances:
(a) grounds not assigned as errors but affecting
jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) matters not
assigned as errors on appeal but are evidently plain
or clerical errors within contemplation of law; (c)
matters not assigned as errors on appeal but
consideration of which is necessary in arriving at a
just decision and complete resolution of the case or
to serve the interests of justice or to avoid dispensing
piecemeal justice; (d) matters not specifically
assigned as errors on appeal but raised in the trial
court and are matters of record having some bearing
on the issue submitted which the parties failed to
raise or which the lower court ignored; (e) matters
not assigned as errors on appeal but closely related
to an error assigned; and (f) matters not assigned as
errors on appeal but upon which the determination of
a question properly assigned, is dependent.39
In the present case, petitioners must be reminded
that one of the main issues raised by respondent in
her appeal with the CA is the validity and due
execution of the Deed of Transfer which she
supposedly executed in petitioners' favor. The Court
agrees with respondent that, under the factual
circumstances obtaining in the instant case, the
39
determination of the validity of the subject Deed of
Transfer would necessarily entail or involve an
examination of the true nature of the said
agreement. In other words, the matter of validity of
the disputed Deed of Transfer and the question of
whether the agreement evidenced by such Deed
was, in fact, an equitable mortgage are issues which
are closely related, which can, thus, be resolved
jointly by the CA.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The

assailed Amended Decision and Resolutions of the
Court of Appeals, dated September 30, 2005, July 5,
2006 and August 28, 2006, respectively, in CA-G.R.
CV No. 76388, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

RULE 138

Attorneys and Admission to Bar

Section 1. Who may practice law. Any person

heretofore duly admitted as a member of the bar, or
hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the
provisions of this rule, and who is in good and regular
standing, is entitled to practice law.

40
Section 2. Requirements for all applicants for
admission to the bar. Every applicant for
admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen
of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age,
of good moral character, and resident of the
Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme
Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character,
and that no charges against him, involving moral
turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court
in the Philippines.
Section 3. Requirements for lawyers who are
citizens of the United States of America. Citizens
of the United States of America who, before July 4,
1946, were duly licensed members of the Philippine
Bar, in active practice in the courts of the Philippines
and in good and regular standing as such may, upon
satisfactory proof of those facts before the Supreme
Court, be allowed to continue such practice after
taking the following oath of office:
I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., having
been permitted to continue in the practice
of law in the Philippines, do solemnly swear
that I recognize the supreme authority of
the Republic of the Philippines; I will support
its Constitution and obey the laws as well as
the legal orders of the duly constituted
authorities therein; I will do no falsehood,
nor consent to the doing of any in court; I
will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue
any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor
give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay
no man for money or malice, and will
conduct myself as a lawyer according to the
best of may knowledge and discretion with
all good fidelity as well as to the courts as to
my clients; and I impose upon myself this
voluntary obligation without any mental
reservation or purpose of evasion. So help
me God.
Section 4. Requirements for applicants from other
jurisdictions. Applicants for admission who, being
Filipino citizens, are enrolled attorneys in good
standing in the Supreme Court of the United States
or in any circuit court of appeals or district court
therein, or in the highest court of any State or
Territory of the United States, and who can show by
satisfactory certificates that they have practiced at
least five years in any of said courts, that such
practice began before July 4, 1946, and that they
have never been suspended or disbarred, may, in the
discretion of the Court, be admitted without
examination.
Section 5. Additional requirements for other
applicants. All applicants for admission other than
those referred to in the two preceding section shall,
before being admitted to the examination,
satisfactorily show that they have regularly studied
law for four years, and successfully completed all
prescribed courses, in a law school or university,
officially approved and recognized by the Secretary
of Education. The affidavit of the candidate,
accompanied by a certificate from the university or
school of law, shall be filed as evidence of such facts,
and further evidence may be required by the court.
No applicant shall be admitted to the bar
examinations unless he has satisfactorily completed
the following courses in a law school or university
duly recognized by the government: civil law,
commercial law, remedial law, criminal law, public
and private international law, political law, labor and
social legislation, medical jurisprudence, taxation
and legal ethics.
Section 6. Pre-Law. No applicant for admission to
the bar examination shall be admitted unless he
presents a certificate that he has satisfied the
Secretary of Education that, before he began the
study of law, he had pursued and satisfactorily
completed in an authorized and recognized
university or college, requiring for admission thereto
the completion of a four-year high school course, the
course of study prescribed therein for a bachelor's
degree in arts or sciences with any of the following
subjects as major or field of concentration: political
science, logic, english, spanish, history and
economics.
Section 7. Time for filing proof of qualifications.
All applicants for admission shall file with the clerk of
the Supreme Court the evidence required by section
2 of this rule at least fifteen (15) days before the
beginning of the examination. If not embraced within
section 3 and 4 of this rule they shall also file within
the same period the affidavit and certificate required
by section 5, and if embraced within sections 3 and 4
they shall exhibit a license evidencing the fact of
their admission to practice, satisfactory evidence
that the same has not been revoked, and certificates
as to their professional standing. Applicants shall also
file at the same time their own affidavits as to their
age, residence, and citizenship.
Section 8. Notice of Applications. Notice of
applications for admission shall be published by the
clerk of the Supreme Court in newspapers published
in Pilipino, English and Spanish, for at least ten (10)
days before the beginning of the examination.
Section 9. Examination; subjects. Applicants, not
otherwise provided for in sections 3 and 4 of this
rule, shall be subjected to examinations in the
following subjects: Civil Law; Labor and Social
Legislation; Mercantile Law; Criminal Law; Political
Law (Constitutional Law, Public Corporations, and
Public Officers); International Law (Private and
Public); Taxation; Remedial Law (Civil Procedure,
Criminal Procedure, and Evidence); Legal Ethics and
Practical Exercises (in Pleadings and Conveyancing).
Section 10. Bar examination, by questions and
answers, and in writing. Persons taking the
examination shall not bring papers, books or notes
into the examination rooms. The questions shall be
the same for all examinees and a copy thereof, in
English or Spanish, shall be given to each examinee.
Examinees shall answer the questions personally
without help from anyone.
Upon verified application made by an examinee
stating that his penmanship is so poor that it will be
difficult to read his answers without much loss of
time., the Supreme Court may allow such examinee
to use a typewriter in answering the questions. Only
noiseless typewriters shall be allowed to be used.
The committee of bar examiner shall take such
precautions as are necessary to prevent the
substitution of papers or commission of other frauds.
Examinees shall not place their names on the
examination papers. No oral examination shall be
given.
Section 11. Annual examination. Examinations
for admission to the bar of the Philippines shall take
place annually in the City of Manila. They shall be
held in four days to be disignated by the chairman of
the committee on bar examiners. The subjects shall
be distributed as follows: First day: Political and
International Law (morning) and Labor and Social
Legislation (afternoon); Second day: Civil Law
(morning) and Taxation (afternoon); Third day:
Mercantile Law (morning) and Criminal Law
(afternoon); Fourth day: Remedial Law (morning) and
legal Ethics and Practical Exercises (afternoon).
41
Section 12. Committee of examiners.
Examinations shall be conducted by a committee of
bar examiners to be appointed by the Supreme
Court. This committee shall be composed of a Justice
of the Supreme Court, who shall act as chairman, and
who shall be designated by the court to serve for one
year, and eight members of the bar of the
Philippines, who shall hold office for a period of one
year. The names of the members of this committee
shall be published in each volume of the official
reports.
Section 13. Disciplinary measures. No candidate
shall endeavor to influence any member of the
committee, and during examination the candidates
shall not communicate with each other nor shall they
give or receive any assistance. The candidate who
violates this provisions, or any other provision of this
rule, shall be barred from the examination, and the
same to count as a failure against him, and further
disciplinary action, including permanent
disqualification, may be taken in the discretion of the
court.
Section 14. Passing average. In order that a
candidate may be deemed to have passed his
examinations successfully, he must have obtained a
general average of 75 per cent in all subjects,
without falling below 50 per cent in any subjects. In
determining the average, the subjects in the
examination shall be given the following relative
weights: Civil Law, 15 per cent; Labor and Social
Legislation, 10 per cent; Mercantile Law, 15 per cent;
Criminal Law; 10 per cent: Political and International
Law, 15 per cent; Taxation, 10 per cent; Remedial
Law, 20 per cent; Legal Ethics and Practical
Exercises, 5 per cent.
Section 15. Report of the committee; filing of
examination papers. Not later than February 15th
after the examination, or as soon thereafter as may
be practicable, the committee shall file its report on
the result of such examination. The examination
papers and notes of the committee shall be filed with
the clerk and may there be examined by the parties
in interest, after the court has approved the report.
Section 16. Failing candidates to take review
course. Candidates who have failed the bar
examinations for three times shall be disqualified
from taking another examination unless they show
the satisfaction of the court that they have enrolled
in and passed regular fourth year review classes as
well as attended a pre-bar review course in a
recognized law school.
The professors of the individual review subjects
attended by the candidates under this rule shall
certify under oath that the candidates have regularly
attended classes and passed the subjects under the
same conditions as ordinary students and the ratings
obtained by them in the particular subject.
Section 17. Admission and oath of successful
applicants. An applicant who has passed the
required examination, or has been otherwise found to
be entitled to admission to the bar, shall take and
subscribe before the Supreme Court the
corresponding oath of office.
Section 18. Certificate. The supreme Court shall
thereupon admit the applicant as a member of the
bar for all the courts of the Philippines, and shall
direct an order to be entered to that effect upon its
records, and that a certificate of such record be given
to him by the clerk of court, which certificate shall be
his authority to practice.
Section 19. Attorney's roll. The clerk of the
Supreme Court shall kept a roll of all attorneys
admitted to practice, which roll shall be signed by the
person admitted when he receives his certificate.
Section 20. Duties of attorneys. It is the duty of
an attorney:
(a) To maintain allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines and to support the
Constitution and obey the laws of the
Philippines.
(b) To observe and maintain the respect due
to the courts of justice and judicial officers;
(c) To counsel or maintain such actions or
proceedings only as appear to him to be
just, and such defenses only as he believes
to be honestly debatable under the law.
(d) To employ, for the purpose of
maintaining the causes confided to him,
such means only as are consistent with
truth and honor, and never seek to mislead
the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice
or false statement of fact or law;
(e) To maintain inviolate the confidence, and
at every peril to himself, to preserve the
secrets of his client, and to accept no
compensation in connection with his client's
business except from him or with his
knowledge and approval;
(f) To abstain from all offensive personality
and to advance no fact prejudicial to the
honor or reputation of a party or witness,
unless required by the justice of the cause
with which he is charged;
(g) Not to encourage either the
commencement or the continuance of an
action or proceeding, or delay any man's
cause, from any corrupt motive or interest;
(h) Never to reject, for any consideration
personal to himself, the cause of the
defenseless or oppressed;
(i) In the defense of a person accused of
crime, by all fair and honorable means,
regardless of his personal opinion as to the
guilt of the accused, to present every
defense that the law permits, to the end
that no person may be deprived of life or
liberty, but by due process of law.
Section 21. Authority of attorney to appear. an
attorney is presumed to be properly authorized to
represent any cause in which he appears, and no
written power of attorney is required to authorize him
to appear in court for his client, but the presiding
judge may, on motion of either party and on
reasonable grounds therefor being shown, require
any attorney who assumes the right to appear in a
case to produce or prove the authority under which
he appears, and to disclose, whenever pertinent to
any issue, the name of the person who employed
him, and may thereupon make such order as justice
requires. An attorneys wilfully appear in court for a
person without being employed, unless by leave of
the court, may be punished for contempt as an
officer of the court who has misbehaved in his official
transactions.
Section 22. Attorney who appears in lower court
presumed to represent client on appeal. An
attorney who appears de parte in a case before a
lower court shall be presumed to continue
42
representing his client on appeal, unless he files a
formal petition withdrawing his appearance in the
appellate court.
Section 23. Authority of attorneys to bind clients.
Attorneys have authority to bind their clients in any
case by any agreement in relation thereto made in
writing, and in taking appeals, and in all matters of
ordinary judicial procedure. But they cannot, without
special authority, compromise their client's litigation,
or receive anything in discharge of a client's claim
but the full amount in cash.
Section 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement
as to fees. An attorney shall be entitled to have
and recover from his client no more than a
reasonable compensation for his services, with a
view to the importance of the subject matter of the
controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and
the professional standing of the attorney. No court
shall be bound by the opinion of attorneys as expert
witnesses as to the proper compensation, but may
disregard such testimony and base its conclusion on
its own professional knowledge. A written contract
for services shall control the amount to be paid
therefor unless found by the court to be
unconscionable or unreasonable.
Section 25. Unlawful retention of client's funds;
contempt. When an attorney unjustly retains in his
hands money of his client after it has been
demanded, he may be punished for contempt as an
officer of the Court who has misbehaved in his official
transactions; but proceedings under this section shall
not be a bar to a criminal prosecution.
Section 26. Change of attorneys. An attorney
may retire at any time from any action or special
proceeding, by the written consent of his client filed
in court. He may also retire at any time from an
action or special proceeding, without the consent of
his client, should the court, on notice to the client
and attorney, and on hearing, determine that he
ought to be allowed to retire. In case of substitution,
the name of the attorney newly employed shall be
entered on the docket of the court in place of the
former one, and written notice of the change shall be
given to the advance party.
A client may at any time dismiss his attorney or
substitute another in his place, but if the contract
between client and attorney has been reduced to
writing and the dismissal of the attorney was without
justifiable cause, he shall be entitled to recover from
the client the full compensation stipulated in the
contract. However, the attorney may, in the
discretion of the court, intervene in the case to
protect his rights. For the payment of his
compensation the attorney shall have a lien upon all
judgments for the payment of money, and executions
issued in pursuance of such judgment, rendered in
the case wherein his services had been retained by
the client.
Section 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by
Supreme Court on what grounds. A member of the
bar may be removed or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for
any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before the admission to practice, or for a wilfull
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court,
or for corruptly or willful appearing as an attorney for
a party to a case without authority so to do. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice.
Section 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of
Appeals or a Court of First Instance. The Court of
Appeals or a Court of First Instance may suspend an
attorney from practice for any of the causes named
in the last preceding section, and after such
suspension such attorney shall not practice his
profession until further action of the Supreme Court
in the premises.
Section 29. Upon suspension by the Court of
Appeals or Court of First Instance, further
proceedings in Supreme Court. Upon such
suspension, the Court of Appeals or the Court of First
Instance shall forthwith transmit to the Supreme
Court a certified copy of the order of suspension and
a full statement of the facts upon which the same
was based. Upon the receipt of such certified copy
and statement, the Supreme Court shall make a full
investigation of the facts involved and make such
order revoking or extending the suspension, or
removing the attorney from his office as such, as the
facts warrant.
Section 30. Attorney to be heard before removal or
suspension. No attorney shall be removed or
suspended from the practice of his profession, until
he has had full opportunity upon reasonable notice to
answer the charges against him, to produce
witnesses in his own behalf, and to be heard by
himself or counsel. But if upon reasonable notice he
fails to appear and answer the accusation, the court
may proceed to determine the matter ex parte.
Section 31. Attorneys for destitute litigants. A
court may assign an attorney to render professional
aid free of charge to any party in a case, if upon
investigation it appears that the party is destitute
and unable to employ an attorney, and that the
services of counsel are necessary to secure the ends
of justice and to protect the rights of the party. It
shall be the duty of the attorney so assigned to
render the required service, unless he is excused
therefrom by the court for sufficient cause shown.
Section 32. Compensation for attorneys de oficio.
Subject to availability of funds as may be provided by
the law the court may, in its discretion, order an
attorney employed as counsel de oficio to be
compensates in such sum as the court may fix in
accordance with section 24 of this rule. Whenever
such compensation is allowed, it shall be not less
than thirty pesos (P30) in any case, nor more than
the following amounts: (1) Fifty pesos (P50) in light
felonies; (2) One hundred pesos (P100) in less grave
felonies; (3) Two hundred pesos (P200) in grave
felonies other than capital offenses; (4) Five Hundred
pesos (P500) in capital offenses.
Section 33. Standing in court of person authorized
to appear for Government. Any official or other
person appointed or designated in accordance with
law to appear for the Government of the Philippines
shall have all the rights of a duly authorized member
of the bar to appear in any case in which said
government has an interest direct or indirect.
Section 34. By whom litigation conducted. In the
court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct
his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or
friend appointed by him for the purpose, or with the
aid an attorney. In any other court, a party may
conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an
attorney, and his appearance must be either
personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
Section 35. Certain attorneys not to practice. No
judge or other official or employee of the superior
courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General, shall
engage in private practice as a member of the bar or
give professional advice to clients.
43
 Section 36. Amicus Curiae. Experienced and
impartial attorneys may be invited by the Court to
appear as amici curiae to help in the disposition of
issues submitted to it.
Section 37. Attorneys' liens. An attorney shall
have a lien upon the funds, documents and papers of
his client which have lawfully come into his
possession and may retain the same until his lawful
fees and disbursements have been paid, and may
apply such funds to the satisfaction thereof. He shall
also have a lien to the same extent upon all
judgments for the payment of money, and executions
issued in pursuance of such judgments, which he has
secured in a litigation of his client, from and after the
time when he shall have the caused a statement of
his claim of such lien to be entered upon the records
of the court rendering such judgment, or issuing such
execution, and shall have the caused written notice
thereof to be delivered to his client and to the
adverse paty; and he shall have the same right and
power over such judgments and executions as his
client would have to enforce his lien and secure the
payment of his just fees and disbursements.
RULE 116
Arraignment and Plea
Section 7. Appointment of counsel de oficio. The
court, considering the gravity of the offense and the
difficulty of the questions that may arise, shall
appoint as counsel de oficio only such members of
the bar in good standing who, by reason of their
experience and ability, can competently defend the
accused. But in localities where such members of the
bar are not available, the court may appoint any
person, resident of the province and of good repute
for probity and ability, to defend the accused. (7a)
LABOR CODE
Art. 222
Appearances and Fees.
1. Non-lawyers may appear before the
Commission or any Labor Arbiter only:
2. If they represent their organization or
members thereof.
3. No attorneys fees, negotiation fees or
similar charges of any kind arising from any
collective bargaining agreement shall be
imposed on any individual member of the
contracting union: Provided, However, that
attorneys fees may be charged against union
funds in an amount to be agreed upon by the
parties. Any contract, agreement or
arrangement of any sort to the contrary shall be
null and void. (As amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1691, May 1, 1980
Republic Act No. 6713 February 20,
1989
AN ACT ESTABLISHING A CODE OF CONDUCT
AND ETHICAL STANDARDS FOR PUBLIC
OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES, TO UPHOLD THE
TIME-HONORED PRINCIPLE OF PUBLIC OFFICE
BEING A PUBLIC TRUST, GRANTING INCENTIVES
AND REWARDS FOR EXEMPLARY SERVICE,
ENUMERATING PROHIBITED ACTS AND
TRANSACTIONS AND PROVIDING PENALTIES
FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. - In
addition to acts and omissions of public officials and
employees now prescribed in the Constitution and
existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited
acts and transactions of any public official and
employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
(a) Financial and material interest. - Public
officials and employees shall not, directly or
indirectly, have any financial or material
interest in any transaction requiring the
approval of their office.
(b) Outside employment and other activities
related thereto. - Public officials and
employees during their incumbency shall
not:
(1) Own, control, manage or accept
employment as officer, employee,
consultant, counsel, broker, agent,
trustee or nominee in any private
enterprise regulated, supervised or
licensed by their office unless
expressly allowed by law;
(2) Engage in the private practice
of their profession unless
authorized by the Constitution or
law, provided, that such practice
will not conflict or tend to conflict
with their official functions; or
(3) Recommend any person to any
position in a private enterprise
which has a regular or pending
official transaction with their office.
ARTICLE VII
ART. VII
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the
Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or
assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution, hold any other office or employment
during their tenure. They shall not, during said
tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other
profession, participate in any business, or be
financially interested in any contract with, or in any
franchise, or special privilege granted by the
Government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned
or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They
shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct
of their office.
The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity
within the fourth civil degree of the President shall
not, during his tenure, be appointed as Members of
the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the
Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries,
chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including
government-owned or controlled corporations and
their subsidiaries.
ARTICLE IX
Constitutional Commissions
44
 A. Common Provisions
SECTION 1. The Constitutional Commissions, which
shall be independent, are the Civil Service
Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the
Commission on Audit.
SECTION 2. No Member of a Constitutional
Commission shall, during his tenure, hold any other
office or employment. Neither shall he engage in the
practice of any profession or in the active
management or control of any business which in any
way be affected by the functions of his office, nor
shall he be financially interested, directly or
indirectly, in any contract with, or in any franchise or
privilege granted by the Government, any of its
subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries.
ARTICLE XI
Accountability of Public Officers
SECTION 8. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall
be natural-born citizens of the Philippines, and at the
time of their appointment, at least forty years old, of
recognized probity and independence, and members
of the Philippine Bar, and must not have been
candidates for any elective office in the immediately
preceding election. The Ombudsman must have for
ten years or more been a judge or engaged in the
practice of law in the Philippines.
During their tenure, they shall be subject to the same
disqualifications and prohibitions as provided for in
Section 2 of Article IX-A of this Constitution.
Republic Act No. 7160 October 10, 1991
Setion 41(b) Amended by RA 8553
Setion 43 Amended by RA 8553
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A LOCAL GOVERNMENT
CODE OF 1991
Section 90. Practice of Profession. -
(a) All governors, city and municipal mayors
are prohibited from practicing their
profession or engaging in any occupation
other than the exercise of their functions as
local chief executives.
(b) Sanggunian members may practice their
professions, engage in any occupation, or
teach in schools except during session
hours: Provided, That sanggunian members
who are also members of the Bar shall not:
(1) Appear as counsel before any
court in any civil case wherein a
local government unit or any office,
agency, or instrumentality of the
government is the adverse party;
(2) Appear as counsel in any
criminal case wherein an officer or
employee of the national or local
government is accused of an
offense committed in relation to his
office.
(3) Collect any fee for their
appearance in administrative
proceedings involving the local
government unit of which he is an
official; and
(4) Use property and personnel of
the government except when the
sanggunian member concerned is
defending the interest of the
government.
(c) Doctors of medicine may practice their
profession even during official hours of work
only on occasions of emergency: Provided,
That the officials concerned do not derive
monetary compensation therefrom.
ARTICLE VI
The Legislative Department
SECTION 14. No Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives may personally appear as counsel
before any court of justice or before the Electoral
Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative
bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be
interested financially in any contract with, or in any
franchise or special privilege granted by the
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including any government-
owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary,
during his term of office. He shall not intervene in
any matter before any office of the Government for
his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called
upon to act on account of his office.
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 910
AN ACT TO PROVIDE FOR THE RETIREMENT OF
JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT AND OF THE
COURT OF APPEALS, FOR THE ENFORCEMENT
OF THE PROVISIONS HEREOF BY THE
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM,
AND TO REPEAL COMMONWEALTH ACT
NUMBERED FIVE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-SIX
Section 1. When a Justice of the Supreme Court or
of the Court of Appeals who has rendered at least
twenty years' service either in the judiciary or in any
other branch of the Government, or in both, (a)
retires for having attained the age of seventy years,
or (b) resigns by reason of his incapacity to discharge
the duties of his office, he shall receive during the
residue of his natural life, in the manner hereinafter
provided, the salary which he was receiving at the
45
time of his retirement or resignation. And when a
Justice of the Supreme Court or of the Court of
Appeals has attained the age of fifty-seven years and
has rendered at least twenty-years' service in the
Government, ten or more of which have been
continuously rendered as such Justice or as judge of
a court of record, he shall be likewise entitled to
retire and receive during the residue of his natural
life, in the manner also hereinafter prescribed, the
salary which he was then receiving. It is a condition
of the pension provided for herein that no retiring
Justice during the time that he is receiving said
pension shall appear as counsel before any court in
any civil case wherein the Government or any
subdivision or instrumentality thereof is the adverse
party, or in any criminal case wherein and officer or
employee of the Government is accused of an
offense committed in relation to his office, or collect
any fee for his appearance in any administrative
proceedings to maintain an interest adverse to the
Government, insular, provincial or municipal, or to
any of its legally constituted officers.
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice
RESOLUTION
Acting on the compliance dated 05 July 2004 and on
the proposed Rules on Notarial Practice of 2004
submitted by the Sub-Committee for the Study,
Drafting and Formulation of the Rules Governing the
Appointment of Notaries Public and the Performance
and Exercise of Their Official Functions, of the
Committees on Revision of the Rules of Court and on
Legal Education and Bar Matters, the Court Resolved
to APPROVE the proposed Rules on Notarial Practice
of 2004, with modifications, thus:
2004 RULES ON NOTARIAL PRACTICE
RULE I
IMPLEMENTATION
SECTION 1. Title. - These Rules shall be known as the
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.
SEC. 2. Purposes. - These Rules shall be applied and
construed to advance the following purposes:
(a) to promote, serve, and protect public interest;
(b) to simplify, clarify, and modernize the rules
governing notaries public; and
(c) to foster ethical conduct among notaries public.
SEC. 3. Interpretation. - Unless the context of these
Rules otherwise indicates, words in the singular
include the plural, and words in the plural include the
singular.
RULE II
DEFINITIONS
SECTION 1. Acknowledgment. - Acknowledgment
refers to an act in which an individual on a single
occasion:
(a) appears in person before the notary public
and presents an integrally complete
instrument or document;
(b) is attested to be personally known to the notary
public or identified by the notary public through
competent evidence of identity as defined by these
Rules; and -
(c) represents to the notary public that the signature
on the instrument or document was voluntarily
affixed by him for the purposes stated in the
46
instrument or document, declares that he has
executed the instrument or document as his free and
voluntary act and deed, and, if he acts in a particular
representative capacity, that he has the authority to
sign in that capacity.
SEC. 2. Affirmation or Oath. - The term Affirmation
or Oath refers to an act in which an individual on a
single occasion:
(a) appears in person before the notary public;
(b) is personally known to the notary public or
identified by the notary public through
competent evidence of identity as defined
by these Rules; and
(c) avows under penalty of law to the whole
truth of the contents of the instrument or
document.
SEC. 3. Commission. - Commission refers to the
grant of authority to perform notarial acts and to the
written evidence of the authority.
SEC. 4. Copy Certification. - Copy Certification
refers to a notarial act in which a notary public:
(a) is presented with an instrument or
document that is neither a vital record, a
public record, nor publicly recordable;
(b) copies or supervises the copying of the
instrument or document;
(c) compares the instrument or document with
the copy; and
(d) determines that the copy is accurate and
complete.
SEC. 5. Notarial Register. - Notarial Register refers
to a permanently bound book with numbered pages
containing a chronological record of notarial acts
performed by a notary public.
SEC. 6. Jurat. - Jurat refers to an act in which an
individual on a single occasion:
(a) appears in person before the notary public and
presents an instrument or document;
(b) is personally known to the notary public or
identified by the notary public through competent
evidence of identity as defined by these Rules; chan
robles virtual law library
(c) signs the instrument or document in the
presence of the notary; and
(d) takes an oath or affirmation before the notary
public as to such instrument or document.
SEC. 7. Notarial Act and Notarization. - Notarial Act
and Notarization refer to any act that a notary
public is empowered to perform under these Rules.
SEC. 8. Notarial Certificate. - Notarial Certificate
refers to the part of, or attachment to, a notarized
instrument or document that is completed by the
notary public, bears the notary's signature and seal,
and states the facts attested to by the notary public
in a particular notarization as provided for by these
Rules.
SEC. 9. Notary Public and Notary. - Notary Public
and Notary refer to any person commissioned to
perform official acts under these Rules.
SEC. 10. Principal. - Principal refers to a person
appearing before the notary public whose act is the
subject of notarization.
SEC. 11. Regular Place of Work or Business. - The
term regular place of work or business refers to a
stationary office in the city or province wherein the
notary public renders legal and notarial services.
SEC. 12. Competent Evidence of Identity. - The
phrase competent evidence of identity refers to the
identification of an individual based on:
(a) at least one current identification document
issued by an official agency bearing the
photograph and signature of the individual;
47
 SEC. 19. Vendor. - Vendor under these Rules refers
(b) the oath or affirmation of one credible to a seller of a notarial seal and shall include a
witness not privy to the instrument, document or wholesaler or retailer.
transaction who is personally known to the
notary public and who personally knows the
individual, or of two credible witnesses neither of
whom is privy to the instrument, document or
SEC. 20. Manufacturer. - Manufacturer under these
transaction who each personally knows the
Rules refers to one who produces a notarial seal and
individual and shows to the notary public
shall include an engraver and seal maker.
documentary identification.

RULE III
SEC. 13. Official Seal or Seal. - Official seal or
COMMISSIONING OF NOTARY PUBLIC
Seal refers to a device for affixing a mark, image or
impression on all papers officially signed by the
notary public conforming the requisites prescribed by
these Rules.
SECTION 1. Qualifications. - A notarial commission
may be issued by an Executive Judge to any qualified
person who submits a petition in accordance with
these Rules.
SEC. 14. Signature Witnessing. - The term signature
witnessing refers to a notarial act in which an
individual on a single occasion:

To be eligible for commissioning as notary public, the

petitioner:
(a) appears in person before the notary public and
presents an instrument or document;

(1) must be a citizen of the Philippines;

(b) is personally known to the notary public or

identified by the notary public through competent (2) must be over twenty-one (21) years of age;
evidence of identity as defined by these Rules;
and chan robles virtual law library
(3) must be a resident in the Philippines for at
least one (1) year and maintains a regular place
of work or business in the city or province where
(c) signs the instrument or document in the presence the commission is to be issued;
of the notary public.

(4) must be a member of the Philippine Bar in

SEC. 15. Court. - Court refers to the Supreme Court good standing with clearances from the Office of
of the Philippines. the Bar Confidant of the Supreme Court and the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and

SEC. 16. Petitioner. - Petitioner refers to a person (5) must not have been convicted in the first
who applies for a notarial commission. instance of any crime involving moral turpitude.

SEC. 17. Office of the Court Administrator. - Office of SEC. 2. Form of the Petition and Supporting
the Court Administrator refers to the Office of the Documents. - Every petition for a notarial
Court Administrator of the Supreme Court. commission shall be in writing, verified, and shall
include the following:c

SEC. 18. Executive Judge. - Executive Judge refers

to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of a (a) a statement containing the petitioner's
city or province who issues a notarial commission. personal qualifications, including the
petitioner's date of birth, residence,
telephone number, professional tax receipt,
roll of attorney's number and IBP
membership number;

48
 (b) certification of good moral character of the
petitioner by at least two (2) executive officers
of the local chapter of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines where he is applying for commission;
(c) proof of payment for the filing of the petition
as required by these Rules; and
(d) three (3) passport-size color photographs
with light background taken within thirty (30)
days of the application. The photograph should
not be retouched. The petitioner shall sign his
name at the bottom part of the photographs.
SEC. 3. Application Fee. - Every petitioner for a
notarial commission shall pay the application fee as
prescribed in the Rules of Court. chan robles virtual
law library
SEC. 4. Summary Hearing on the Petition. - The
Executive Judge shall conduct a summary hearing on
the petition and shall grant the same if:
(a) the petition is sufficient in form and substance;
(b) the petitioner proves the allegations contained in
the petition; and
(c) the petitioner establishes to the satisfaction of
the Executive Judge that he has read and fully
understood these Rules.
The Executive Judge shall forthwith issue a
commission and a Certificate of Authorization to
Purchase a Notarial Seal in favor of the petitioner.
SEC. 5. Notice of Summary Hearing.
(a) The notice of summary hearing shall be
published in a newspaper of general
circulation in the city or province where the
hearing shall be conducted and posted in a
conspicuous place in the offices of the
Executive Judge and of the Clerk of Court.
The cost of the publication shall be borne by
the petitioner. The notice may include more
than one petitioner.
(b) The notice shall be substantially in the
following form:
NOTICE OF HEARING
Notice is hereby given that a summary hearing
on the petition for notarial commission of
(name of petitioner) shall be held on (date) at
(place) at (time). Any person who has any
cause or reason to object to the grant of the
petition may file a verified written opposition
thereto, received by the undersigned before
the date of the summary hearing.
Executive Judge
SEC. 6. Opposition to Petition. - Any person who has
any cause or reason to object to the grant of the
petition may file a verified written opposition thereto.
The opposition must be received by the Executive
Judge before the date of the summary hearing. chan
robles virtual law library
SEC. 7. Form of Notarial Commission. - The
commissioning of a notary public shall be in a formal
order signed by the Executive Judge substantially in
the following form:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ______________
This is to certify that (name of notary public) of
(regular place of work or business) in (city or
province) was on this (date) day of (month)
two thousand and (year) commissioned by the
undersigned as a notary public, within and for
the said jurisdiction, for a term ending the
thirty-first day of December (year)
________________________
Executive Judge
SEC. 8. Period Of Validity of Certificate of
Authorization to Purchase a Notarial Seal. - The
Certificate of Authorization to Purchase a Notarial
Seal shall be valid for a period of three (3) months
from date of issue, unless extended by the Executive
Judge.
A mark, image or impression of the seal that may be
purchased by the notary public pursuant to the
Certificate shall be presented to the Executive Judge
for approval prior to use.
SEC. 9. Form of Certificate of Authorization to
Purchase a Notarial Seal. - The Certificate of
Authorization to Purchase a Notarial Seal shall
49
substantially be in the following form:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF_____________
CERTIFICATE OF AUTHORIZATION
TO PURCHASE A NOTARIAL SEAL
This is to authorize (name of notary public) of
(city or province) who was commissioned by
the undersigned as a notary public, within and
for the said jurisdiction, for a term ending, the
thirty-first of December (year) to purchase a
notarial seal.
Issued this (day) of (month) (year).
________________________
Executive Judge
SEC. 10. Official Seal of Notary Public. - Every person
commissioned as notary public shall have only one
official seal of office in accordance with these Rules.
SEC. 11. Jurisdiction and Term. - A person
commissioned as notary public may perform notarial
acts in any place within the territorial jurisdiction of
the commissioning court for a period of two (2) years
commencing the first day of January of the year in
which the commissioning is made, unless earlier
revoked or the notary public has resigned under
these Rules and the Rules of Court. chan robles
virtual law library
SEC. 12. Register of Notaries Public. - The Executive
Judge shall keep and maintain a Register of Notaries
Public in his jurisdiction which shall contain, among
others, the dates of issuance or revocation or
suspension of notarial commissions, and the
resignation or death of notaries public.
The Executive Judge shall furnish the Office of the
Court Administrator information and data recorded in
the register of notaries public. The Office of the Court
Administrator shall keep a permanent, complete and
updated database of such records. chan robles
virtual law library
SEC. 13. Renewal of Commission. - A notary public
may file a written application with the Executive
Judge for the renewal of his commission within forty-
five (45) days before the expiration thereof. A mark,
image or impression of the seal of the notary public
shall be attached to the application.
Failure to file said application will result in the
deletion of the name of the notary public in the
register of notaries public.
The notary public thus removed from the Register of
Notaries Public may only be reinstated therein after
he is issued a new commission in accordance with
these Rules.
SEC. 14. Action on Application for Renewal of
Commission. - The Executive Judge shall, upon
payment of the application fee mentioned in Section
3 above of this Rule, act on an application for the
renewal of a commission within thirty (30) days from
receipt thereof. If the application is denied, the
Executive Judge shall state the reasons therefor.
RULE IV
POWERS AND LIMITATIONS OF NOTARIES
PUBLIC
SECTION 1. Powers. - (a) A notary public is
empowered to perform the following notarial acts:
(1) acknowledgments;
(2) oaths and affirmations;
(3) jurats; chan robles virtual law library
(4) signature witnessings;
(5) copy certifications; and
(6) any other act authorized by these Rules.
(b) A notary public is authorized to certify the affixing
of a signature by thumb or other mark on an
instrument or document presented for notarization if:
(1) the thumb or other mark is affixed in the
presence of the notary public and of two (2)
disinterested and unaffected witnesses to
the instrument or document;
(2) both witnesses sign their own names in
addition to the thumb or other mark;
(3) the notary public writes below the thumb or
other mark: "Thumb or Other Mark affixed
by (name of signatory by mark) in the
presence of (names and addresses of
witnesses) and undersigned notary public";
and chan robles virtual law library
(4) the notary public notarizes the signature by
thumb or other mark through an
acknowledgment, jurat, or signature
witnessing.
50

(c) A notary public is authorized to sign on behalf of a
person who is physically unable to sign or make a
mark on an instrument or document if:
(1) the notary public is directed by the person
unable to sign or make a mark to sign on his behalf;
(2) the signature of the notary public is affixed in the
presence of two disinterested and unaffected
witnesses to the instrument or document;
(3) both witnesses sign their own names ;
(4) the notary public writes below his signature:
Signature affixed by notary in presence of (names
and addresses of person and two [2] witnesses);
and
(5) the notary public notarizes his signature by
acknowledgment or jurat.
SEC. 2. Prohibitions. - (a) A notary public shall not
perform a notarial act outside his regular place of
work or business; provided, however, that on certain
exceptional occasions or situations, a notarial act
may be performed at the request of the parties in the
following sites located within his territorial
jurisdiction:
(1) public offices, convention halls, and similar
places where oaths of office may be administered;
(2) public function areas in hotels and similar places
for the signing of instruments or documents requiring
notarization;
(3) hospitals and other medical institutions where a
party to an instrument or document is confined for
treatment; and
(4) any place where a party to an instrument or
document requiring notarization is under detention.
(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the
person involved as signatory to the instrument or
document -
(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the
time of the notarization; and
(2) is not personally known to the notary public or
otherwise identified by the notary public through
competent evidence of identity as defined by these
Rules.chan robles virtual law library
SEC. 3. Disqualifications. - A notary public is
disqualified from performing a notarial act if
he:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) is a party to the instrument or document that is
to be notarized; chan robles virtual law library
(b) will receive, as a direct or indirect result, any
commission, fee, advantage, right, title, interest,
cash, property, or other consideration, except as
provided by these Rules and by law; or
(c) is a spouse, common-law partner, ancestor,
descendant, or relative by affinity or consanguinity of
the principal within the fourth civil degree. chan
robles virtual law library
SEC. 4. Refusal to Notarize. - A notary public shall not
perform any notarial act described in these Rules for
any person requesting such an act even if he tenders
the appropriate fee specified by these Rules
if:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) the notary knows or has good reason to believe
that the notarial act or transaction is unlawful or
immoral;
(b) the signatory shows a demeanor which
engenders in the mind of the notary public
reasonable doubt as to the former's knowledge of the
consequences of the transaction requiring a notarial
act; and
(c) in the notary's judgment, the signatory is not
acting of his or her own free will.
SEC. 5. False or Incomplete Certificate. - A notary
public shall not: chan robles virtual law library
(a) execute a certificate containing information
known or believed by the notary to be false.
(b) affix an official signature or seal on a notarial
certificate that is incomplete.chan robles virtual law
library
SEC. 6. Improper Instruments or Documents. - A
notary public shall not
notarize:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) a blank or incomplete instrument or document;
or chan robles virtual law library
(b) an instrument or document without appropriate
notarial certification.
RULE V
FEES OF NOTARY PUBLIC
SECTION 1. Imposition and Waiver of Fees. - For
performing a notarial act, a notary public may charge
the maximum fee as prescribed by the Supreme
Court unless he waives the fee in whole or in part.
chan robles virtual law library
SEC. 2. Travel Fees and Expenses. - A notary public
may charge travel fees and expenses separate and
apart from the notarial fees prescribed in the
preceding section when traveling to perform a
notarial act if the notary public and the person
requesting the notarial act agree prior to the
travel.cralaw
SEC. 3. Prohibited Fees. No fee or compensation of
any kind, except those expressly prescribed and
allowed herein, shall be collected or received for any
notarial service.cralaw
SEC. 4. Payment or Refund of Fees. - A notary public
shall not require payment of any fees specified
herein prior to the performance of a notarial act
51
unless otherwise agreed upon. chan robles virtual
law library
Any travel fees and expenses paid to a notary public
prior to the performance of a notarial act are not
subject to refund if the notary public had already
traveled but failed to complete in whole or in part the
notarial act for reasons beyond his control and
without negligence on his part.cralaw
SEC. 5. Notice of Fees. - A notary public who charges
a fee for notarial services shall issue a receipt
registered with the Bureau of Internal Revenue and
keep a journal of notarial fees. He shall enter in the
journal all fees charged for services rendered. chan
robles virtual law library
A notary public shall post in a conspicuous place in
his office a complete schedule of chargeable notarial
fees.cralaw
RULE VI
NOTARIAL REGISTER
SECTION 1. Form of Notarial Register. - (a) A notary
public shall keep, maintain, protect and provide for
lawful inspection as provided in these Rules, a
chronological official notarial register of notarial acts
consisting of a permanently bound book with
numbered pages. chan robles virtual law library
The register shall be kept in books to be furnished by
the Solicitor General to any notary public upon
request and upon payment of the cost thereof. The
register shall be duly paged, and on the first page,
the Solicitor General shall certify the number of
pages of which the book consists.cralaw
For purposes of this provision, a Memorandum of
Agreement or Understanding may be entered into by
the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of
the Court Administrator. chan robles virtual law
library
(b) A notary public shall keep only one active notarial
register at any given time.cralaw
SEC. 2. Entries in the Notarial Register. - (a) For every
notarial act, the notary shall record in the notarial
register at the time of notarization the
following: chan robles virtual law library
(1) the entry number and page number; chan robles
virtual law library
(2) the date and time of day of the notarial act;
(3) the type of notarial act; chan robles virtual law
library
(4) the title or description of the instrument,
document or proceeding;
(5) the name and address of each principal; chan
robles virtual law library
(6) the competent evidence of identity as defined by
these Rules if the signatory is not
personally known to the notary; chan robles virtual
law library
(7) the name and address of each credible witness
swearing to or affirming the person's identity;
(8) the fee charged for the notarial act;
(9) the address where the notarization was
performed if not in the notary's regular place of work
or business; and
(10) any other circumstance the notary public may
deem of significance or relevance.
(b) A notary public shall record in the notarial register
the reasons and circumstances for not completing a
notarial act.
(c) A notary public shall record in the notarial register
the circumstances of any request to inspect or copy
an entry in the notarial register, including the
requester's name, address, signature, thumbmark or
other recognized identifier, and evidence of identity.
The reasons for refusal to allow inspection or copying
of a journal entry shall also be recorded.cralaw
(d) When the instrument or document is a contract,
the notary public shall keep an original copy thereof
as part of his records and enter in said records a brief
description of the substance thereof and shall give to
each entry a consecutive number, beginning with
number one in each calendar year. He shall also
retain a duplicate original copy for the Clerk of
Court.cralaw
(e) The notary public shall give to each instrument or
document executed, sworn to, or acknowledged
before him a number corresponding to the one in his
register, and shall also state on the instrument or
document the page/s of his register on which the
same is recorded. No blank line shall be left between
entries.cralaw
(f) In case of a protest of any draft, bill of exchange
or promissory note, the notary public shall make a
full and true record of all proceedings in relation
thereto and shall note therein whether the demand
for the sum of money was made, by whom, when,
and where; whether he presented such draft, bill or
note; whether notices were given, to whom and in
what manner; where the same was made, when and
to whom and where directed; and of every other fact
touching the same.cralaw
(g) At the end of each week, the notary public shall
certify in his notarial register the number of
instruments or documents executed, sworn to,
acknowledged, or protested before him; or if none,
this certificate shall show this fact.cralaw
(h) A certified copy of each month's entries and a
duplicate original copy of any instrument
acknowledged before the notary public shall, within
the first ten (10) days of the month following, be
forwarded to the Clerk of Court and shall be under
the responsibility of such officer. If there is no entry
to certify for the month, the notary shall forward a
statement to this effect in lieu of certified copies
herein required.cralaw
SEC. 3. Signatures and Thumbmarks. - At the time of
notarization, the notary's notarial register shall be
signed or a thumb or other mark affixed by
each:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) principal;
(b) credible witness swearing or affirming to the
identity of a principal; and
(c) witness to a signature by thumb or other mark, or
to a signing by the notary public on behalf of a
person physically unable to sign.
52
SEC. 4. Inspection, Copying and Disposal. - (a) In the
notary's presence, any person may inspect an entry
in the notarial register, during regular business
hours, provided;
(1) the person's identity is personally known to the
notary public or proven through competent evidence
of identity as defined in these Rules;
(2) the person affixes a signature and thumb or other
mark or other recognized identifier, in the notarial
register in a separate, dated entry;
(3) the person specifies the month, year, type of
instrument or document, and name of the principal in
the notarial act or acts sought; and
(4) the person is shown only the entry or entries
specified by him.
(b) The notarial register may be examined by a law
enforcement officer in the course of an official
investigation or by virtue of a court order.
(c) If the notary public has a reasonable ground to
believe that a person has a criminal intent or
wrongful motive in requesting information from the
notarial register, the notary shall deny access to any
entry or entries therein.cralaw
SEC. 5. Loss, Destruction or Damage of Notarial
Register. - (a) In case the notarial register is stolen,
lost, destroyed, damaged, or otherwise rendered
unusable or illegible as a record of notarial acts, the
notary public shall, within ten (10) days after
informing the appropriate law enforcement agency in
the case of theft or vandalism, notify the Executive
Judge by any means providing a proper receipt or
acknowledgment, including registered mail and also
provide a copy or number of any pertinent police
report.cralaw
(b) Upon revocation or expiration of a notarial
commission, or death of the notary public, the
notarial register and notarial records shall
immediately be delivered to the office of the
Executive Judge.cralaw
SEC. 6. Issuance of Certified True Copies. - The notary
public shall supply a certified true copy of the
notarial record, or any part thereof, to any person
applying for such copy upon payment of the legal
fees.cralaw
RULE VII
SIGNATURE AND SEAL OF NOTARY PUBLIC
SECTION 1. Official Signature. In notarizing a paper
instrument or document, a notary public
shall:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) sign by hand on the notarial certificate only the
name indicated and as appearing on the notary's
commission; chan robles virtual law library
(b) not sign using a facsimile stamp or printing
device; and
(c) affix his official signature only at the time the
notarial act is performed.
SEC. 2. Official Seal. - (a) Every person commissioned
as notary public shall have a seal of office, to be
procured at his own expense, which shall not be
possessed or owned by any other person. It shall be
of metal, circular in shape, two inches in diameter,
and shall have the name of the city or province and
the word Philippines and his own name on the
margin and the roll of attorney's number on the face
thereof, with the words "notary public" across the
center. A mark, image or impression of such seal
shall be made directly on the paper or parchment on
which the writing appears.
(b) The official seal shall be affixed only at the time
the notarial act is performed and shall be clearly
impressed by the notary public on every page of the
instrument or document notarized. chan robles
virtual law library
(c) When not in use, the official seal shall be kept
safe and secure and shall be accessible only to the
notary public or the person duly authorized by
him. chan robles virtual law library
(d) Within five (5) days after the official seal of a
notary public is stolen, lost, damaged or other
otherwise rendered unserviceable in affixing a legible
image, the notary public, after informing the
appropriate law enforcement agency, shall notify the
Executive Judge in writing, providing proper receipt
or acknowledgment, including registered mail, and in
the event of a crime committed, provide a copy or
entry number of the appropriate police record. Upon
receipt of such notice, if found in order by the
Executive Judge, the latter shall order the notary
public to cause notice of such loss or damage to be
published, once a week for three (3) consecutive
weeks, in a newspaper of general circulation in the
city or province where the notary public is
commissioned. Thereafter, the Executive Judge shall
issue to the notary public a new Certificate of
Authorization to Purchase a Notarial Seal.cralaw
(e) Within five (5) days after the death or resignation
of the notary public, or the revocation or expiration
of a notarial commission, the official seal shall be
surrendered to the Executive Judge and shall be
destroyed or defaced in public during office hours. In
the event that the missing, lost or damaged seal is
later found or surrendered, it shall be delivered by
the notary public to the Executive Judge to be
disposed of in accordance with this section. Failure to
effect such surrender shall constitute contempt of
court. In the event of death of the notary public, the
person in possession of the official seal shall have
the duty to surrender it to the Executive Judge.cralaw
SEC. 3. Seal Image. - The notary public shall affix a
single, clear, legible, permanent, and
photographically reproducible mark, image or
impression of the official seal beside his signature on
the notarial certificate of a paper instrument or
document.cralaw
SEC. 4. Obtaining and Providing Seal. - (a) A vendor
or manufacturer of notarial seals may not sell said
product without a written authorization from the
Executive Judge.cralaw
(b) Upon written application and after payment of the
application fee, the Executive Judge may issue an
authorization to sell to a vendor or manufacturer of
notarial seals after verification and investigation of
the latter's qualifications. The Executive Judge shall
charge an authorization fee in the amount of PhP
53
4,000 for the vendor and PhP 8,000 for the
manufacturer. If a manufacturer is also a vendor, he
shall only pay the manufacturer's authorization
fee.cralaw
(c) The authorization shall be in effect for a period of
four (4) years from the date of its issuance and may
be renewed by the Executive Judge for a similar
period upon payment of the authorization fee
mentioned in the preceding paragraph.cralaw
(d) A vendor or manufacturer shall not sell a seal to a
buyer except upon submission of a certified copy of
the commission and the Certificate of Authorization
to Purchase a Notarial Seal issued by the Executive
Judge. A notary public obtaining a new seal as a
result of change of name shall present to the vendor
or manufacturer a certified copy of the Confirmation
of the Change of Name issued by the Executive
Judge.cralaw
(e) Only one seal may be sold by a vendor or
manufacturer for each Certificate of Authorization to
Purchase a Notarial Seal.cralaw
(f) After the sale, the vendor or manufacturer shall
affix a mark, image or impression of the seal to the
Certificate of Authorization to Purchase a Notarial
Seal and submit the completed Certificate to the
Executive Judge. Copies of the Certificate of
Authorization to Purchase a Notarial Seal and the
buyer's commission shall be kept in the files of the
vendor or manufacturer for four (4) years after the
sale.cralaw
(g) A notary public obtaining a new seal as a result of
change of name shall present to the vendor a
certified copy of the order confirming the change of
name issued by the Executive Judge.cralaw
RULE VIII
NOTARIAL CERTIFICATES
SECTION 1. Form of Notarial Certificate. - The notarial
form used for any notarial instrument or document
shall conform to all the requisites prescribed herein,
the Rules of Court and all other provisions of
issuances by the Supreme Court and in applicable
laws. chan robles virtual law library
SEC. 2. Contents of the Concluding Part of the
Notarial Certificate. The notarial certificate shall
include the following:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) the name of the notary public as exactly indicated
in the commission;
(b) the serial number of the commission of the notary
public;
(c) the words "Notary Public" and the province or city
where the notary public is commissioned, the
expiration date of the commission, the office address
of the notary public; and
(d) the roll of attorney's number, the professional tax
receipt number and the place and date of issuance
thereof, and the IBP membership number.
RULE IX
CERTIFICATE OF AUTHORITY OF NOTARIES
PUBLIC
SECTION 1. Certificate of Authority for a Notarial Act.
- A certificate of authority evidencing the authenticity
of the official seal and signature of a notary public
shall be issued by the Executive Judge upon request
in substantially the following form: chan robles virtual
law library
CERTIFICATE OF AUTHORITY FOR A NOTARIAL
ACT
I, (name, title, jurisdiction of the Executive
Judge), certify that (name of notary public), the
person named in the seal and signature on the
attached document, is a Notary Public in and
for the (City/Municipality/Province) of the
Republic of the Philippines and authorized to
act as such at the time of the document's
notarization.chanrobles virtual law librarychan
robles virtual law library
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have affixed below my
signature and seal of this office this (date) day
of (month) (year).chanrobles virtual law
library chan robles virtual law library
_________________
(official signature)
(seal of Executive Judge)
RULE X
CHANGES OF STATUS OF NOTARY PUBLIC
SECTION 1. Change of Name and Address. -
Within ten (10) days after the change of name of the
notary public by court order or by marriage, or after
ceasing to maintain the regular place of work or
business, the notary public shall submit a signed and
dated notice of such fact to the Executive Judge.
The notary public shall not notarize
until:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) he receives from the Executive Judge a
confirmation of the new name of the notary public
and/or change of regular place of work or business;
and
(b) a new seal bearing the new name has been
obtained.
The foregoing notwithstanding, until the
aforementioned steps have been completed, the
notary public may continue to use the former name
or regular place of work or business in performing
notarial acts for three (3) months from the date of
the change, which may be extended once for valid
and just cause by the Executive Judge for another
period not exceeding three (3) months.
SEC. 2. Resignation. - A notary public may resign his
commission by personally submitting a written, dated
and signed formal notice to the Executive Judge
together with his notarial seal, notarial register and
records. Effective from the date indicated in the
notice, he shall immediately cease to perform
notarial acts. In the event of his incapacity to
personally appear, the submission of the notice may
be performed by his duly authorized
representative.cralaw
54
SEC. 3. Publication of Resignation. - The Executive
Judge shall immediately order the Clerk of Court to
post in a conspicuous place in the offices of the
Executive Judge and of the Clerk of Court the names
of notaries public who have resigned their notarial
commissions and the effective dates of their
resignation.cralaw
RULE XI
REVOCATION OF COMMISSION AND
DISCIPLINARY SANCTIONS
SECTION 1. Revocation and Administrative Sanctions.
- (a) The Executive Judge shall revoke a notarial
commission for any ground on which an application
for a commission may be denied. chan robles virtual
law library
(b) In addition, the Executive Judge may revoke the
commission of, or impose appropriate administrative
sanctions upon, any notary public
who:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(1) fails to keep a notarial register;
(2) fails to make the proper entry or entries in his
notarial register concerning his notarial acts;
(3) fails to send the copy of the entries to the
Executive Judge within the first ten (10) days of the
month following;
(4) fails to affix to acknowledgments the date of
expiration of his commission;
(5) fails to submit his notarial register, when filled, to
the Executive Judge;
(6) fails to make his report, within a reasonable time,
to the Executive Judge concerning the performance
of his duties, as may be required by the judge;
(7) fails to require the presence of a principal at the
time of the notarial act;
(8) fails to identify a principal on the basis of
personal knowledge or competent evidence;
(9) executes a false or incomplete certificate under
Section 5, Rule IV;
(10) knowingly performs or fails to perform any
other act prohibited or mandated by these Rules;
and
(11) commits any other dereliction or act which in
the judgment of the Executive Judge constitutes good
cause for revocation of commission or imposition of
administrative sanction.
(c) Upon verified complaint by an interested, affected
or aggrieved person, the notary public shall be
required to file a verified answer to the complaint. If
the answer of the notary public is not satisfactory,
the Executive Judge shall conduct a summary
hearing. If the allegations of the complaint are not
proven, the complaint shall be dismissed. If the
charges are duly established, the Executive Judge
shall impose the appropriate administrative
sanctions. In either case, the aggrieved party may
appeal the decision to the Supreme Court for review.
Pending the appeal, an order imposing disciplinary
sanctions shall be immediately executory, unless
otherwise ordered by the Supreme Court.
(d) The Executive Judge may motu proprio initiate
administrative proceedings against a notary public,
subject to the procedures prescribed in paragraph (c)
above and impose the appropriate administrative
sanctions on the grounds mentioned in the preceding
paragraphs (a) and (b).cralaw
SEC. 2. Supervision and Monitoring of Notaries Public.
- The Executive Judge shall at all times exercise
supervision over notaries public and shall closely
monitor their activities. chan robles virtual law library
SEC. 3. Publication of Revocations and Administrative
Sanctions. - The Executive Judge shall immediately
order the Clerk of Court to post in a conspicuous
place in the offices of the Executive Judge and of the
Clerk of Court the names of notaries public who have
been administratively sanctioned or whose notarial
commissions have been revoked.cralaw
SEC. 4. Death of Notary Public. - If a notary public
dies before fulfilling the obligations in Section 4(e),
Rule VI and Section 2(e), Rule VII, the Executive
Judge, upon being notified of such death, shall
forthwith cause compliance with the provisions of
these sections. chan robles virtual law library
RULE XII
SPECIAL PROVISIONS
SECTION 1. Punishable Acts. - The Executive Judge
shall cause the prosecution of any person
who:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) knowingly acts or otherwise impersonates a
notary public; chan robles virtual law library
(b) knowingly obtains, conceals, defaces, or destroys
the seal, notarial register, or official records of a
notary public; and
(c) knowingly solicits, coerces, or in any way
influences a notary public to commit official
misconduct.
SEC 2. Reports to the Supreme Court. - The Executive
Judge concerned shall submit semestral reports to
the Supreme Court on discipline and prosecution of
notaries public.
RULE XIII
REPEALING AND EFFECTIVITY PROVISIONS
SECTION 1. Repeal. - All rules and parts of rules,
including issuances of the Supreme Court
inconsistent herewith, are hereby repealed or
accordingly modified. chan robles virtual law library
SEC. 2. Effective Date. - These Rules shall take effect
on the first day of August 2004, and shall be
published in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines which provides sufficiently wide
circulation.
Promulgated this 6th day of July, 2004. chan robles
virtual law library
55

RULE 139-B
Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys
Section 1. How Instituted. Proceedings for the
disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys
may be taken by the Supreme Court motu propio, or
by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon
the verified complaint of any person. The complaint
shall state clearly and concisely the facts complained
of and shall be supported by affidavits of persons
having personal knowledge of the facts therein
alleged and/or by such documents as may
substantiate said facts.
The IBP Board of Governors may, motu propio or
upon referral by the Supreme Court or by a Chapter
Board of Officers, or at the instance of any person,
initiate and prosecute proper charges against erring
attorneys including those in the government service.
Six (6) copies of the verified complaint shall be filed
with the Secretary of the IBP or the Secretary of any
of its chapter who shall forthwith transmit the same
to the IBP Board of Governors for assignment to an
investigator.
A. PROCEEDINGS IN THE INTEGRATED BAR OF
THE PHILIPPINES
Section 2. National Grievance Investigators. The
Board of Governors shall appoint from among IBP
members an Investigator or, when special
circumstances so warrant, a panel of three (3)
investigators to investigate the complaint. All
Investigators shall take an oath of office in the form
prescribed by the Board of Governors. A copy of the
Investigator's appointment and oath shall be
transmitted to the Supreme Court.
An Investigator may be disqualified by reason of
relationship within the fourth degree of consanguinity
of affinity to any of the parties of their counsel,
pecuniary interest, personal bias, or his having acted
as counsel to his acting as such Investigator. Where
the Investigator does not disqualify himself, a party
may appeal to the IBP Board of Governors, which by
majority vote of the members present, there being a
quorum, may order his disqualification.
Any Investigator may also be removed for cause,
after due hearing, by the vote of at least six (6)
members of the IBP Board of Governors. The decision
of the Board of Governors in all cases of
disqualification or removal shall be final.
Section 3. Duties of the National Grievance
Investigator. The National Grievance Investigators
shall investigate all complaints against members of
the Integrated Bar referred to them by the IBP Board
of Governors.
Section 4. Chapter assistance to complainant.
The proper IBP Chapter may assist the
complainant(s) in the preparation and filing of his
complaint(s).
Section 5. Service or dismissal. If the complaint
appears to be meritorious, the Investigator shall
direct that a copy thereof be served upon the
respondent, requiring him to answer the same within
fifteen (15) days from the date of service. If the
complaint does not merit action, or if the answer
shows to the satisfaction of the Investigator that the
complaint is not meritorious, the same may be
dismissed by the Board of Governors upon his
recommendation. A copy of the resolution of
dismissal shall be furnished the complainant and the
Supreme Court which may review the case motu
propio or upon timely appeal of the complainant filed
within 15 days from notice of the dismissal of the
complainant.
No investigation shall be interrupted or terminated
by reason of the desistance, settlement,
compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges,
or failure of the complainant to prosecute the
same, unless the Supreme Court motu propio or
upon recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors,
determines that there is no compelling reason to
continue with the disbarment or suspension
proceedings against the respondent. (Amendment
pursuant to Supreme Court Resolution dated May 27,
1993 re Bar Matter 356).
Section 6. Verification and service of answer. The
answer shall be verified. The original and five (5)
legible copies of the answer shall be filed with the
Investigator, with proof of service of a copy thereof
on the complainant or his counsel.
Section 7. Administrative counsel. The IBP Board
of Governors shall appoint a suitable member of the
Integrated Bar as counsel to assist the complainant
of the respondent during the investigation in case of
need for such assistance.
Section 8. Investigation. Upon joinder of issues or
upon failure of the respondent to answer, the
Investigator shall, with deliberate speed, proceed
with the investigation of the case. He shall have the
power to issue subpoenas and administer oaths. The
respondent shall be given full opportunity to defend
himself, to present witnesses on his behalf, and be
heard by himself and counsel. However, if upon
reasonable notice, the respondent fails to appear, the
investigation shall proceed ex parte.
The Investigator shall terminate the investigation
within three (3) months from the date of its
commencement, unless extended for good cause by
the Board of Governors upon prior application.
Willful failure or refusal to obey a subpoena or any
other lawful order issued by the Investigator shall be
dealt with as for indirect contempt of court. The
corresponding charge shall be filed by the
Investigator before the IBP Board of Governors which
shall require the alleged contemnor to show cause
within ten (10) days from notice. The IBP Board of
Governors may thereafter conduct hearings, if
necessary, in accordance with the procedure set
forth in this Rule for hearings before the Investigator.
56
Such hearing shall as far as practicable be
terminated within fifteen (15) days from its
commencement. Thereafter, the IBP Board of
Governors shall within a like period of fifteen (15)
days issue a resolution setting forth its findings and
recommendations, which shall forthwith be
transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action and
if warranted, the imposition of penalty.
Section 9. Depositions. Depositions may be taken
in accordance with the Rules of Court with leave of
the investigator(s).
Within the Philippines, depositions may be taken
before any member of the Board of Governors, the
President of any Chapter, or any officer authorized by
law to administer oaths.
Depositions may be taken outside the Philippines
before diplomatic or consular representative of the
Philippine Government or before any person agreed
upon by the parties or designated by the Board of
Governors.
Any suitable member of the Integrated Bar in the
place where a deposition shall be taken may be
designated by the Investigator to assist the
complainant or the respondent in taking a deposition.
Section 10. Report of Investigator. Not later than
thirty (30) days from the termination of the
investigation, the Investigator shall submit a report
containing his findings of fact and recommendations
to the IBP Board of Governors, together with the
stenographic notes and the transcript thereof, and all
the evidence presented during the investigation. The
submission of the report need not await the
transcription of the stenographic notes, it being
sufficient that the report reproduce substantially from
the Investigator's personal notes any relevant and
pertinent testimonies.
Section 11. Defects. No defect in a complaint,
notice, answer, or in the proceeding or the
Investigator's Report shall be considered as
substantial unless the Board of Governors, upon
considering the whole record, finds that such defect
has resulted or may result in a miscarriage of justice,
in which event the Board shall take such remedial
action as the circumstances may warrant, including
invalidation of the entire proceedings.
Section 12. Review and decision by the Board of
Governors.
a) Every case heard by an investigator shall
be reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors
upon the record and evidence transmitted
to it by the Investigator with his report. The
decision of the Board upon such review shall
be in writing and shall clearly and distinctly
state the facts and the reasons on which it
is based. It shall be promulgated within a
period not exceeding thirty (30) days from
the next meeting of the Board following the
submittal of the Investigator's Report.
b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of
its total membership, determines that the
respondent should be suspended from the
practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a
resolution setting forth its findings and
recommendations which, together with the
whole record of the case, shall forthwith be
transmitted to the Supreme Court for final
action.
c) If the respondent is exonerated by the
Board or the disciplinary sanction imposed
by it is less than suspension or disbarment
(such as admonition, reprimand, or fine) it
shall issue a decision exonerating
respondent or imposing such sanction. The
case shall be deemed terminated unless
upon petition of the complainant or other
interested party filed with the Supreme
Court within fifteen (15) days from notice of
the Board's resolution, the Supreme Court
orders otherwise.
d) Notice of the resolution or decision of the
Board shall be given to all parties through
their counsel. A copy of the same shall be
transmitted to the Supreme Court.
B. PROCEEDINGS IN THE SUPREME COURT
Section 13. Supreme Court Investigation. In
proceedings initiated motu propio by the Supreme
Court or in other proceedings when the interest of
justice so requires, the Supreme Court may refer the
case for investigation to the Solicitor-General or to
any officer of the Supreme Court or judge of a lower
court, in which case the investigation shall proceed in
the same manner provided in sections 6 to 11 hereof,
save that the review of the report of investigation
shall be conducted directly by the Supreme Court.
Section 14. Report of the Solicitor General of other
Court-designated Investigator. Based upon the
evidence adduced at the investigation, the Solicitor
General or other Investigator designated by the
Supreme Court shall submit to the Supreme Court a
report containing his findings of fact and
recommendations for the final action of the Supreme
Court.
C. COMMON PROVISIONS
Section 15. Suspension of attorney by Supreme
Court. After receipt of respondent's answer or
lapse of the period therefor, the Supreme
Court, motu propio, or at the instance of the IBP
Board of Governors upon the recommendation of the
Investigator, may suspend an attorney from the
practice of his profession for any of the causes
specified in Rule 138, Section 27, during the
pendency of the investigation until such suspension
is lifted by the Supreme Court.
Section 16. Suspension of attorney by the Court of
Appeals or a Regional Trial Court. 1 The Court of
Appeals or Regional Trial Court may suspend an
attorney from practice for any of the causes named
in Rule 138, Section 27 2, until further action of the
Supreme Court in the case.
Section 17. Upon suspension by Court of Appeals or
Regional Trial Court, further proceedings in Supreme
Court. Upon such suspension, the Court of Appeals
or a Regional Trial Court shall forthwith transmit to
the Supreme Court a certified copy of the order of
57
suspension and a full statement of the facts upon
which the same was based. Upon receipt of such
certified copy and statement, the Supreme Court
shall make a full investigation of the case and may
revoke, shorten or extend the suspension, or disbar
the attorney as the facts may warrant.

RULE 140
Section 18. Confidentiality. Proceedings against
attorneys shall be private and confidential. However,
the final order of the Supreme Court shall be Charges Against Section 1. Complaint - All
published like its decisions in other cases. Charges against judges of first instance shall be in
writing and shall set out distinctly, clearly, and
concisely the facts complained of as constituting the
Section 19. Expenses. All reasonable and
alleged serious misconduct or inefficiency of the
necessary expenses incurred in relation to
respondent, and shall be sworn to and supported by
disciplinary and disbarment proceedings are lawfull
affidavits of persons who have personal knowledge of
charges for which the parties may be taxed as costs.
the facts therein alleged, and shall be accompanied
with copies of documents which may substantiate
Section 20. Effectivity and Transitory Provision. said facts.
This Rule shall take effect June 1, 1988 and shall
supersede the present Rule 139 entitled
Section 2. Service or dismissal. - If the charges
"DISBARMENT OR SUSPENSION OF ATTORNEYS". All
appear to merit action, a copy thereof shall be
cases pending investigation by the Office of the
served upon the respondent, requiring him to answer
Solicitor General shall be transferred to the
within ten (10) days from the date service. If the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors
charges do not merit action, or if the answer shows
for investigation and disposition as provided in this
to the satisfaction of the court that the charges are
Rule except those cases where the investigation has
not meritorious, the same shall be dismissed.
been substantially completed.

Section 3. Answer; hearing. - Upon the filing of

Footnotes
1 This section and the following Section 17
sepersede Section 9 of Rule 139.
2 The text of Rule 138, Section 27 reads:
"SEC. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended
by the Supreme Court on what grounds. A
member of the bar may be removed or
suspended form his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice
or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before
admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court, or for corruptly or willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a
case without authority so to do. The practice
of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
respondents answer or upon the expiration of the
time for its filing, the court shall assign one of its
members, a Justice of the Court of Appeals or a judge
of first instance to conduct the hearing of the
charges. The Justice or judge so assigned shall set a
day for the hearing, and notice thereof shall be
served on both parties. At such hearing the parties
may present oral or written evidence.
Section 4. Report - After the hearing, the Justice or
judge shall file with the Supreme Court a report of his
findings of fact and conclusions of law, accompanied
by the evidence presented by the parties and the
other papers in he case.
Section 5. Action - After the filing of the report, the
court will take such action as the facts and the law
may warrant.
Section 6. Confidential. - Proceedings against
judges of first instance shall be private and
confidential.
Judges of First Instance

58