You are on page 1of 6

LIMJOCO v Estate if Fragante

FACTS:

Pedro Fragante, a Filipino citizen at the time of his death, applied


for a certificate of public convenience to install and maintain an ice
plant in San Juan Rizal. His intestate estate is financially capable of
maintaining the proposed service. The Public Service Commission
issued a certificate of public convenience to Intestate Estate of the
deceased, authorizing said Intestate Estate through its special or
Judicial Administrator, appointed by the proper court of competent
jurisdiction, to maintain and operate the said plant. Petitioner
claims that the granting of certificate applied to the estate is a
contravention of law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the estate of Fragante may be extended an


artificial judicial personality.

HELD:

The estate of Fragante could be extended an artificial judicial


personality because under the Civil Code, estate of a dead person
could be considered as artificial juridical person for the purpose of
the settlement and distribution of his properties. It should be
noted that the exercise of juridical administration includes those
rights and fulfillment of obligation of Fragante which survived after
his death. One of those surviving rights involved the pending
application for public convenience before the Public Service
Commission.

Vda. De Celis vs. Vda. Dela Santa

G.R. No. L-5294. September 30, 1953

FACTS

Asuncion Vda. de la Santa is one of the instituted heirs in the will of her
deceased brother, Teofilo Roque, together with her other brothers and
sisters, Marcela, Catalina, Sofronio, Joaquin, Manuela and Francisco, all
surnamed Roque, and was given a one-seventh (1/7) undivided share in a
house and lot located in the City of Manila. The said will was allowed to
probate in the CFI of Manila. Sofronio Roque, one of the heirs, is the
executor (note: he was also referred to as the administrator in the case) of
the estate.
The instituted heirs, with the exception of Asuncion Roque who was very ill in
the provinces, had prayed for the sale of the house and lot in question for
the price of P350,000; the administrator asked that the said authority be
not given until after 2 weeks; in view of the fact that Asuncion Roque had
not appeared before the court; and, that the difficulty of her non-
appearance might be avoided in view of the fact that Asuncion Roque had
already executed a special power of attorney in favor of her son, Ricardo.
The judge ordered that notice should be given to Ricardo de la Santa, as
attorney-in-fact of Asuncion. However, Ricardo failed to appear in court to
manifest his acceptance of the proposal to sell the property in issue, hence,
the hearing were postponed several times. The judge issued another order,
which authorized the administrator to sell the property for a price of not
less than P350,000 within one month from the date thereof, which authority
shall automatically be cancelled if the sale is not realized within said period
of time.
Asuncion filed a petition to the effect that the allegedly undervalued personal
properties of the deceased valued at P2053.83 be sold to cover the debt of
the deceased to her amounting to P1600, since the sale was not realized
within the period provided in the order.
The other heirs, on the other hand, asked the court for another order to
authorize them to sell the property P245,000 to P300,000. The court gave
them the authority to sell the property for not less than P245,000. The said
Judge issued another order approving the deed of sale of the property in
controversy, executed by the administrator in favor of Luisa Avecilla Vda.
de Celis, for the price of P320,000, which order also authorized the
administrator to receive the purchase price from appellant and to deposit
one-half thereof in the PNB.
No copies of the orders were received by Asuncion or Ricardo, in
spite of the fact that the orders contained directives that notice of
the same be served upon the Asuncion or Ricardo. Asuncion filed an
action to ANNUL THE SALE. CFI granted in so far as the 1/7 share of
Assuncion is concerned, CA affirmed.

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

W/N the order issued by the judge can be attacked collaterally.


W/N the sale should be annulled due to the lack of notice to an heir

HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI


NO. The validity of a judgment or order of a court entered in a special
proceeding cannot be assailed collaterally unless the ground for the attack is
lack of jurisdiction of the court entering such judgment or order or fraud by
the party sought to be charged with it in its procurement. If the nullity of the
judgment or order assailed is for failure to adhere to or comply with the
statutory requirements which must be followed before such judgment or
order may be entered, the remedy for the agreed party is to appeal from
such order or judgment, or if final, to apply for relief under Rule 38 which is
also applicable to special proceedings.

The order in question in so far as Asuncion Roque Vda. de la Santa is


concerned is not final and executory because, as found by the Court of
Appeals, she has not been notified not only of the petition, filed not by the
executor but by five of the heirs and devisees named in the will of the late
Teofilo Roque duly probated, praying for authority to the executor named in
the will and duly appointed to sell the lot and buildings erected thereon but
also of the orders granting such authority and approving the sale made by
the executor pursuant to such authority. Hence this action is improperly
brought because the plaintiff has still the remedy of appeal to assail directly
the validity of the order.
NO.Pursuant thereto, the notice caused by the court to be made may be
given to the person interested personally or by mail or by publication or
otherwise, as it shall deem proper. If the interested party to whom the notice
was mailed at his residence, as it appeared on the record of the special
proceedings, had absented himself therefrom and failed to receive it, that
fact would not deprive the court of the power to proceed with the hearing of
the petition of the executor or administrator seeking authority to sell
property of the estate of the deceased and to grant or deny it.

The question then that arises is: Granting that she objected to the sale of the
lot and buildings erected thereon and her objection considered, as it must
be presumed for it was in the record of the special proceedings when the
hearing of the application for authority to sell was heard, but was
disregarded, by the probate court, could her objection be sufficient to
prevent the probate court from granting the executor authority to sell the
property? The Rules of Court do not deprive the probate court of the power
to grant license to the administrator or executor to sell personal or real
property of the deceased even if there be an objection to it by an heir,
devisee or legatee, provided that such license to sell will redound to the
benefit of the interested persons and hasten the winding up or the final
settlement of the estate. The intent of the framers of the rules to grant
more power to probate courts in dealing with the settlement and
administration of the estate of deceased persons.
Consequently, neither the objection of Asuncion Vda. de la Santa to the
application for authority to sell the lot and buildings erected thereon
belonging to the estate of the deceased Teofilo Roque nor the failure to
receive the notice of such application caused to be served upon her
personally or upon her son Ricardo de la Santa as her attorney-in-fact, it
appearing that she had actual knowledge thereof, is sufficient legal cause
to annul the sale, because the probate court had authority under the
provisions of sections 4 and 7, Rule 90, (Now Rule 89) to grant authority to
the executor or administrator to sell the property of the deceased.

LIM V CA

G.R. No. 124715, January 24, 2000

Petitioners, heirs of Cresencia, alleged that since the demise of


the spousesTan Quico and Josefa Oraa, the subject properties had
been administered by respondent Lorenzo. They claimed that before her
death, Cresencia had demanded their partition from Lorenzo. After
Cresencias death, they likewise clamored for their partition. Their efforts
proved fruitless.

Respondent Lorenzo and Hermogenes adamant stance against partition is


based on various contentions. Principally, they urge: (1) that the properties
had already been partitioned, albeit, orally; and (2) during her lifetime, the
late Cresencia had sold and conveyed all her interests in said properties to
respondent Lorenzo. They cited as evidence the Deed of Confirmation of
Extra Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Tan Quico and Josefa Oraa and a
receipt of payment.

ISSUE: Whether or not the late Crescencia sold her inheritance share in favor
of the respondent Lorenzo.

The Supreme Court reinstated the decision of the trial court which voided the
Deed of Confirmation of Extra Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Tan Quico
and Josefa Oraa and Sale on the ground that it was not understood by the
late Cresencia when she signed it. As to the receipt, it speaks of the late
Cresencias pro-indiviso share of the subject properties or her share before
division. The SC noted that the subject lots are still covered by tax
declarations in the name of their parents. If these lots had already been
partitioned to the different heirs and then occupied by them,
it appearsstrange that their tax declarations have not been adjusted to
reflect their ownership considering the long time that has elapsed since
1930. Respondent Lorenzo testified that he took possession of the lot
supposed to belong to the late Crescencia in 1966, yet, he himself did not
cause any change in its tax declaration.. To say the least,
the omission buttresses the conclusion that the properties have not been
partitioned.

In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Ismael Reyes, G.R. No.


139587, November 22, 2000 (345 SCRA 541)

The jurisdiction of the probate court merely relates to matters having to do


with the settlement of the estate and the probate of wills of deceased
persons, and the appointment and removal of administrators, executors,
guardians and trustees.18 The question of ownership is as a rule, an
extraneous matter which the Probate Court cannot resolve with
finality.19 Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property
should or should not be included in the inventory of estate proceeding, the
probate court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is
provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate
action to resolve title.20
Settled is the rule that the Regional Trial Court acting as a probate court
exercises but limited jurisdiction, thus it has no power to take cognizance of
and determine the issue of title to property claimed by a third person
adversely to the decedent, unless the claimant and all other parties having
legal interest in the property consent, expressly or impliedly, to the
submission of the question to the Probate Court for adjudgment, or the
interests of third persons are not thereby prejudiced.

Crucillo vs. IAC (317 SCRA 351)


FACTS:
Balbino A. Crucillo was married to Juana Aure. They had eight (8)
children, namely, Elena, Maximino, Perpetua, Santiago, Adelaida, Miguel,
Rafael, and Vicente, all surnamed Crucillo. Balbino A. Crucillo died intestate
in 1909. Juana Aure died on November 19, 1949. Balbino A. Crucillo left,
among other things, two(2) parcels of unregistered land situated at General
Luna Street, Mendez-Nunez,Cavite. He was survived by his heirs, who
became co-owners of the aforesaid lots and thereafter, entered into the
possession thereof with each one of them possessing their respective shares
and exercising acts of ownership. Rafael had sold two other lots belonging to
the estate. Nicasio Sarmiento (son of Perpetua Crucillo) has caused a
residential lot situated at Gen. Trias St., Mendez, Cavite to be registered in
his name alone, Miguel Crucillo is in exclusive possession ofa residential lot
located at General Trias St., Mendez, Cavite. An agriculturalland located at
Sitio Niko, Mendez, Cavite, covered by Tax Declaration No. 1179 is owned in
common by Vicente Crucillo, Buenaventurada Sarmiento (daughter of the
deceased Perpetua Crucillo), Adelaida Crucillo, and Atty. Conrado Crucillo
(son of the deceased Santiago Crucillo). Another agricultural land situated at
Pulong Munti, is owned in common by the Heirs of Elena Crucillo, Adelaida
Crucillo,and Nicasio Sarmiento. Still another property covered by Tax
Declaration No. 653 is owned in common by Buenaventurada Sarmiento and
Vicente Crucillo, whose share was acquired by Miguel Crucillo. Additionally,
Primitiva Mendoza is in possession of an agricultural land in Pulong Munti and
also in Niko, Mendez, Cavite, while Carlomagno Crucillo possesses an
agricultural land at Sitio Maykiling, Mendez, Cavite, Miguel Crucillo is
exclusively occupying an agricultural land at Pulong Munti and Ulo ng Bukal,
and the remaining portion another agricultural land after the other portion
thereof had been sold by Rafael Crucillo.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a partition of the disputed property.


RULING:
Yes. From the foregoing facts, it can be gleaned unerringly that the
heirs of Balbino A. Crucillo agreed to orally partition subject estate
among themselves, as evinced by their possession of the inherited
premises, their construction of improvements thereon, and their having
declared in their names for taxation purposes their respective shares. These
are indications that the heirs of Balbino A. Crucillo agreed to divide subject
estate among themselves, for why should they construct improvements
thereon, pay the taxes therefor, and exercise other acts of ownership, if they
did not firmly believe that the property was theirs. It is certainly foolhardy for
petitioners to claim that no oral partition was made when their acts showed
otherwise.
Moreover, it is unbelievable that the possession of the heirs was by
mere tolerance, judging from the introduction of improvements thereon and
the length of time that such improvements have been in existence. Then
too, after exercising acts of ownership over their respective portions of the
contested estate, petitioners are estopped from denying or contesting the
existence of an oral partition. The oral agreement for the partition of the
property owned in common is valid, binding and enforceable on theparties