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FACTS:
HELD:
FACTS
Asuncion Vda. de la Santa is one of the instituted heirs in the will of her
deceased brother, Teofilo Roque, together with her other brothers and
sisters, Marcela, Catalina, Sofronio, Joaquin, Manuela and Francisco, all
surnamed Roque, and was given a one-seventh (1/7) undivided share in a
house and lot located in the City of Manila. The said will was allowed to
probate in the CFI of Manila. Sofronio Roque, one of the heirs, is the
executor (note: he was also referred to as the administrator in the case) of
the estate.
The instituted heirs, with the exception of Asuncion Roque who was very ill in
the provinces, had prayed for the sale of the house and lot in question for
the price of P350,000; the administrator asked that the said authority be
not given until after 2 weeks; in view of the fact that Asuncion Roque had
not appeared before the court; and, that the difficulty of her non-
appearance might be avoided in view of the fact that Asuncion Roque had
already executed a special power of attorney in favor of her son, Ricardo.
The judge ordered that notice should be given to Ricardo de la Santa, as
attorney-in-fact of Asuncion. However, Ricardo failed to appear in court to
manifest his acceptance of the proposal to sell the property in issue, hence,
the hearing were postponed several times. The judge issued another order,
which authorized the administrator to sell the property for a price of not
less than P350,000 within one month from the date thereof, which authority
shall automatically be cancelled if the sale is not realized within said period
of time.
Asuncion filed a petition to the effect that the allegedly undervalued personal
properties of the deceased valued at P2053.83 be sold to cover the debt of
the deceased to her amounting to P1600, since the sale was not realized
within the period provided in the order.
The other heirs, on the other hand, asked the court for another order to
authorize them to sell the property P245,000 to P300,000. The court gave
them the authority to sell the property for not less than P245,000. The said
Judge issued another order approving the deed of sale of the property in
controversy, executed by the administrator in favor of Luisa Avecilla Vda.
de Celis, for the price of P320,000, which order also authorized the
administrator to receive the purchase price from appellant and to deposit
one-half thereof in the PNB.
No copies of the orders were received by Asuncion or Ricardo, in
spite of the fact that the orders contained directives that notice of
the same be served upon the Asuncion or Ricardo. Asuncion filed an
action to ANNUL THE SALE. CFI granted in so far as the 1/7 share of
Assuncion is concerned, CA affirmed.
The question then that arises is: Granting that she objected to the sale of the
lot and buildings erected thereon and her objection considered, as it must
be presumed for it was in the record of the special proceedings when the
hearing of the application for authority to sell was heard, but was
disregarded, by the probate court, could her objection be sufficient to
prevent the probate court from granting the executor authority to sell the
property? The Rules of Court do not deprive the probate court of the power
to grant license to the administrator or executor to sell personal or real
property of the deceased even if there be an objection to it by an heir,
devisee or legatee, provided that such license to sell will redound to the
benefit of the interested persons and hasten the winding up or the final
settlement of the estate. The intent of the framers of the rules to grant
more power to probate courts in dealing with the settlement and
administration of the estate of deceased persons.
Consequently, neither the objection of Asuncion Vda. de la Santa to the
application for authority to sell the lot and buildings erected thereon
belonging to the estate of the deceased Teofilo Roque nor the failure to
receive the notice of such application caused to be served upon her
personally or upon her son Ricardo de la Santa as her attorney-in-fact, it
appearing that she had actual knowledge thereof, is sufficient legal cause
to annul the sale, because the probate court had authority under the
provisions of sections 4 and 7, Rule 90, (Now Rule 89) to grant authority to
the executor or administrator to sell the property of the deceased.
LIM V CA
ISSUE: Whether or not the late Crescencia sold her inheritance share in favor
of the respondent Lorenzo.
The Supreme Court reinstated the decision of the trial court which voided the
Deed of Confirmation of Extra Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Tan Quico
and Josefa Oraa and Sale on the ground that it was not understood by the
late Cresencia when she signed it. As to the receipt, it speaks of the late
Cresencias pro-indiviso share of the subject properties or her share before
division. The SC noted that the subject lots are still covered by tax
declarations in the name of their parents. If these lots had already been
partitioned to the different heirs and then occupied by them,
it appearsstrange that their tax declarations have not been adjusted to
reflect their ownership considering the long time that has elapsed since
1930. Respondent Lorenzo testified that he took possession of the lot
supposed to belong to the late Crescencia in 1966, yet, he himself did not
cause any change in its tax declaration.. To say the least,
the omission buttresses the conclusion that the properties have not been
partitioned.