Professional Documents
Culture Documents
In OCA vs. Judge Melchor, AM No. P-06-2227, August 19, 2014, the
withheld salaries and benefits of Judge Mario Melchor were released to him
after dismissing him from service. The point of inquiry: Were there
payments of the mandatory withholding taxes to the BIR and the
compulsory payments of the premiums to the GSIS, PHILHEALTH and
PAG-IBIG during the withholding of Judge Mario Melchor's salaries and
benefits while his administrative case is pending until their release to him?
Consequently, if there are no payments of the withholding taxes and
compulsory premiums of now Ex Judge Mario Melchor made by the Office
of the Court Administrator, the same will give rise to administrative, civil
and criminal liabilities provided under RA No. 7875, RA No. 8291, RA No.
9679 and RA No. 8424.
An example of the above is the case of Pros. Romana Reyes vs. Judge
Julia Reyes A.M. No. MTJ-06-1623 , September 18, 2009: The Supreme
Court preventively suspended Judge Julia Reyes effective immediately
and until further orders, by Resolution of December 14, 2004 in A.M. No.
04-12-335-MeTC, Re: Problem Besetting MeTC, Branch 69, Pasig City.
Consequently, Judge Julia Reyes salaries and benefits were withheld until
the termination of her administrative cases. From December 14, 2004 until
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September 17, 2009, Judge Julia Reyes was an incumbent Judge whose
salaries and benefits were withheld. On September 18, 2009, Judge Julia
Reyes was dismissed from service. Preventive suspension should not
exceed 90 days beyond that is illegal under our Constitution, CSC Rules
and SC jurisprudences. Corollary, the withholding of Judge Julia Reyes
salaries and benefits should not exceed ninety (90) days, beyond that is
illegal that entitled her the full net salaries and benefits whatever be the
outcome of the administrative case.
The pendency of the administrative cases cannot be a ground for the non-
remittance of the compulsory premiums to GSIS, PHILHEALTH and PAG-
IBIG because preventive suspension is not a penalty but only a
precautionary measure. To suspend the payments of compulsory premiums
of SC employee can be considered as a penalty that is contrary to the
nature of a preventive suspension. XXX
If the preventive suspension is illegal from the start, for among many
reasons, on the lack of due process, there is no legal basis and factual
basis to withhold the salaries and allowances of the Judge or court
employee by the Office of the Court Administrator, more so, not for it to
remit the compulsory premiums when a judge or court employee is still an
employee of the Supreme Court because an illegal act is void, it produces
no legal effect as supported by jurisprudences like Rubio Jr. vs. Paras,
GR No. 156047, April 12, 2005; Lubaton vs. Judge Lazaro, AM No.
RTJ-12-2320, September 2, 2013; Garcia v. Molina et al., G.R. No.
157383, August 10, 2010; Garcia v. Executive Secretary, GR No. L-
19748, September 13, 1962; Layno Sr. vs. Sandiganbayan 136 SCRA
536.
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during the period of the withholding of the salaries and allowances of the
respondent court employee as provided by special laws since payments of
Compulsory premiums of respondent court employee are determined solely
by the existence of employer-employee relationship and the withheld
salaries and allowances of respondent court employee are not tax-free?
The Office of the Chief Justice has received complaints from judges, as well
as court officials and employees, of what they consider unjust and unfair
withholding of their salaries and other monetary benefits allegedly for failure
to comply with some administrative orders, circulars, or directives of the
Supreme Court or the Office of the Court Administrator, or for pendency of
administrative cases.
Of late, too, there have been complaints of the withholding of salary checks
allegedly to set off or refund some monetary benefits, such as 13th month
bonus, alleged to have been erroneously released to the Judge, court
officials or employees concerned.
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The aforementioned withholding or set-off or deduction, as the case may
be, may be well-founded; and complaints may likewise have some merit.
Thus, specific guidelines on the matter must be provided to avoid
misunderstanding.
Accordingly, henceforth,
Chief Justice
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3. When employer may not be criminally liable for violation of GSIS
law.
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non-remittance of GSIS, Pag-IBIG premiums, ABS-CBNnews.com, posted
at 06/19/2015 4:10 PM).
Word employer is repeatedly mentioned not only in PAG-IBIG law but also
in GSIS law, to quote:
(b) The employer shall include in its annual appropriation the necessary
amounts for its share of the contributions indicated above, plus any
additional premiums that may be required on account of the hazards or
risks of its employees' occupation.
(c) It shall be mandatory and compulsory for all employers to include the
payment of contributions in their annual appropriations. Penal sanctions
shall be imposed upon employers who fail to include the payment of
contributions in their annual appropriations or otherwise fail to remit the
accurate/exact amount of contributions on time, or delay the remittance of
premium contributions to the GSIS. The heads of offices and agencies shall
be administratively liable for non-remittance or delayed remittance of
premium contributions to the GSIS.
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SECTION 6. Collection and Remittance of Contributions. (a) The
employer shall report to the GSIS the names of all its employees, their
corresponding employment status, positions, salaries and such other
pertinent information, including subsequent changes therein, if any, as may
be required by the GSIS; the employer shall deduct each month from the
monthly salary or compensation of each employee the contribution payable
by him in accordance with the schedule prescribed in the rules and
regulations implementing this Act.
(b) Each employer shall remit directly to the GSIS the employees' and
employers' contributions within the first ten (10) days of the calendar month
following the month to which the contributions apply. The remittance by the
employer of the contributions to the GSIS shall take priority over and above
the payment of any and all obligations, except salaries and wages of its
employees.
SECTION 52. Penalty. (a) Any person found to have participated directly
or indirectly in the commission of fraud, collusion, falsification, or
misrepresentation in any transaction with the GSIS whether for him or for
some other persons, shall suffer the penalties provided for in Article 172 of
the Revised Penal Code. XXX
(g) The heads of the offices of the national government, its political
subdivisions, branches, agencies and instrumentalities, including
government-owned or controlled corporations and government financial
institutions, and the personnel of such offices who are involved in the
collection of premium contributions, loan amortization and other accounts
due the GSIS who shall fail, refuse or delay the payment, turnover,
remittance or delivery of such accounts to the GSIS within thirty (30) days
from the time that the same shall have been due and demandable shall,
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upon conviction by final judgment, suffer the penalties of imprisonment of
not less than one (1) year nor more than five (5) years and a fine of not less
than Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) nor more than Twenty thousand
pesos (P20,000.00), and in addition shall suffer absolute perpetual
disqualification from holding public office and from practicing any profession
or calling licensed by the government.
Please note that this criminal principle may not apply to the Chief Justice
and Supreme Court Justices due to the inherent principle of auto-
correction, among others. The illegal jurisprudences are deemed legal
unless abandoned by the Honorable Supreme Court En Banc.
For one, the Supreme Court as employer is among the national offices
exempted for violation of RA No. 8291 because of Art. VIII, Section 5 and
Section 6, 1987 Philippine Constitution and P.D. No. 828, Section 6 that it
granted the Office of the Court Administrator, a national office within the
definition of GSIS law, the sole duty and responsibility to remit the
compulsory GSIS premiums. By parity of reasoning is the case of People
vs. Castillo et al., Criminal Cases Nos. 27824-28, February 9, 2012,
Sandiganbayan held with finality that E.O. No. 190 series of 1999 directed
the DBM to remit directly GSIS contributions of the LGUs to GSIS. The
accused should not be liable for failure of municipality to remit the subject
GSIS premiums contributions because the duty to remit said premiums
during said period is lodged with DBM. In Garcia vs. SSS, G.R. No.
170735, December 17, 2007, The sympathy of the law on social security is
toward its beneficiaries. This Court will not turn a blind eye on the
perpetration of injustice. This Court cannot and will not allow itself to be
made an instrument nor be privy to any attempt at the perpetration of
injustice." The same principle applies to the non-payments of premiums to
PAG-IBIG and PHILHEALTH as well as to the non-payments of
withholding taxes to BIR involving Judges and court personnel whose
salaries and allowances have been withheld legally or illegally by OCA that
has the sole duty and responsibility to remit them to the concerned
government agencies.
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A few re-reading of Section 52 (g) of Republic Act No. 8291, the head of the
office of the national government does not refers to the Chief Justice or to
the Acting Chief Justice under the ejusdem generis statutory construction.
Their offices have no personnel involved in remitting the GSIS compulsory
premiums. In City of Manila et al. v. Emtite, G.R. No. L24776, June 28,
1974, it is this kind of phraseology in a statute or any written document
which precisely calls for the application of the doctrine of "ejusdem generis"
in construing the import of the general phrase used. For under the maxim of
"ejusdem generis" which means "of the same kind, class or nature", when
general words follow an enumeration of particular cases, such words apply
only to cases of the same kind as those expressly mentioned. Thus, when
broad expressions are used, such as, "and all others" or "any others" these
are usually to be restricted to persons or things of the same kind or class
with those specifically named in the preceding words. In our jurisdiction, this
Court in Ollada vs. Court of Tax Appeals, et al. 99 Phil. 604, 610 applied
the rule of "ejusdem generis" to construe the purview of a general phrase
"other matters" appearing after an enumeration of specific cases decided by
the Collector of Internal Revenue and appealable to the Court of Tax
Appeals found in section 7, paragraph 1, of Republic Act No. 1125, and it
held that in order that a matter may come under said general clause, it is
necessary that it belongs to the same kind or class of cases therein
specifically enumerated. In Mutuc vs. Commission on Elections, L-32717,
November 26, 1970, 36 SCRA 228, 232, the rule of "ejusdem generis" was
once more applied to construe a provision of the Constitutional Convention
Act of 1970 (R.A. 6132) which made it unlawful for candidates "to purchase,
produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda
gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashlights,
athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches,
cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or foreign origin," and the Court
held that under the doctrine of "ejusdem generis" the phrase "and the like"
applies to things or gadgets of the kind specifically enumerated, and that
consequently the use of a taped jingle for campaign purposes is not within
the general clause. All the above imply shows that contrary to the
assertions of the intervenors, in the case now before Us, the Appellate
Court correctly applied the rule of "ejusdem generis" in construing the
easement in question thereby holding that the clause "any and all other
persons whomsoever" embraces only "those who are privy to the owners of
the dominant estate, lots 1 and 2 Plan Pcs-2672" and excludes "the
indiscriminate public from the enjoyment of the right-of-way easement."
Section 52 (d) of Republic Act No. 8291 has similar groupings, namely , the
treasurer, finance officer, cashier, disbursing officer, budget officer or other
official or employee who fails to include in the annual budget the amount
corresponding to the employer and employee contributions XXX, the Chief
Justice or the Acting Chief Justice is not among their group, Section 5(c) of
the same Act that It shall be mandatory and compulsory for all employers
to include the payment of contributions in their annual appropriations. Penal
sanctions shall be imposed upon employers who fail to include the payment
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of contributions in their annual appropriations or otherwise fail to remit the
accurate/exact amount of contributions on time, or delay the remittance of
premium contributions to the GSIS. The heads of offices and agencies shall
be administratively liable for non-remittance or delayed remittance of
premium contributions to the GSIS refer to them enumerated in Section 52
(d) of Republic Act No. 8291 not to the Chief Justice or Acting Chief Justice.
It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute
must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to
the general intent of the whole enactment. Because the law must not be
read in truncated parts, its provisions must be read in relation to the whole
law. The statute's clauses and phrases must not, consequently, be taken as
detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof
must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts in order to
produce a harmonious whole. Consistent with the fundamentals of statutory
construction, all the words in the statute must be taken into consideration in
order to ascertain its meaning (Land Bank of the Philippines v. AMS
Farming Corporation, G.R. No. 174971. October 15, 2008, 569 SCRA
154, 183; Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. Urgello, G.R.
No. 162288. April 4, 2007, 520 SCRA 515, 535; Smart Communications,
Inc. vs. The City of Davao, G.R. No. 155491, September 16, 2008, 565
SCRA 237, 247-248).
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The method of withholding tax at source is a procedure of collecting income
tax sanctioned by the National Internal Revenue Code. Section 53 (c) of
which, provides: Return and Payment - Every person required to deduct and
withhold any tax under this section shall make return thereof, for the
payment of the tax, shall pay the amount withheld to the officer of the
Government of the Philippines authorized to receive it. Every such person is
made personally liable for such tax, and is indemnified against the claims
and demands of any person for the amount of any payments made in
accordance with the provision of this section. In the afore-cited provision of
law, the withholding agent is explicitly made personally liable for the income
tax withheld under Section 54. In Phil. Guaranty Co., Inc. vs.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the Court, has ratiocinated: The law
sets no condition for the personal liability of the withholding agent to attach.
The reason is to compel the withholding agent to withhold the tax under all
circumstances. In effect, the responsibility for the collection of the tax as well
as the payment thereof is concentrated upon the person over whom the
Government has jurisdiction. Thus, the withholding agent is constituted the
agent both the government and the taxpayer. With respect to the collection
and/or withholding of the tax, he is the Governments agent. In regard to the
filing of the necessary income tax return and the payment of the tax to the
Government, he is the agent of the taxpayer. The withholding agent,
therefore, is no ordinary government agent especially because under
Section 53 (c) he is held personally liable for the tax he is duty bound to
withhold; whereas, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and his deputies
are not made liable to law. On the other hand, under the accrual basis
method of accounting, income is reportable when all the events have
occurred that fix the taxpayers right to receive the income, and the amount
can be determined with reasonable accuracy. Thus, it is the right to receive
income, and not the actual receipt, that determines when to include the
amount in gross income. Gleanable from this notion are the following
requisites of accrual method of accounting, to wit: (1) that the right to receive
the amount must be valid, unconditional and enforceable, i.e., not
contingent upon future time; (2) the amount must be reasonably susceptible
of accurate estimate; and (3) there must be a reasonable expectation that
the amount will be paid in due course (Filipinas Synthetic Fiber
Corporation v. CA et al., G.R. Nos. 118498 & 124377, October 12,
1999). In contrast, gross revenue covers money or its equivalent actually or
constructively received, including the value of services rendered or articles
sold, exchanged or leased, the payment of which is yet to be received. This
is in consonance with the International Financial Reporting Standards,
which defines revenue as the gross inflow of economic benefits (cash,
receivables, and other assets) arising from the ordinary operating activities
of an enterprise (such as sales of goods, sales of services, interest,
royalties, and dividends), which is measured at the fair value of the
consideration received or receivable. As aptly stated by the RTC:
[R]evenue from services rendered is recognized when services have been
performed and are billable. It is recorded at the amount received or
expected to be received. Under Section E [17] of the Statements of
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Financial Accounting Standards No. 1 (Ericsson Telecommunications,
Inc. v. City of Pasig, G.R. NO. 176667, November 22, 2007).
The Office of the Chief of the Justice initiated the investigation on these
matters, and the Supreme Court En Banc acted accordingly by requiring
the concerned officials of the Office of the Court Administrator to submit
their answers and memoranda since last year.
The Supreme Court Justices who adopt a false, slanted and misleading
recommendation by the Office of the Court Administrator and the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines are not administratively, civilly and criminally liable.
Indeed, as a matter of public policy, not every error or mistake committed by
judges in the performance of their official duties renders them
administratively liable. Only errors that are tainted with fraud, corruption or
malice may be the subject of disciplinary actions. For administrative liability
to attach, respondent must be shown to have been moved by bad faith,
dishonesty, hatred or some other similar motive (Atty. Lacurom v. Judge
Tienzo, 561 Phil. 376, 382-383 (2007), citing Dr. Cruz v. Judge Iturralde,
450 Phil. 77, 85 (2003); Planas v. Reyes, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1905,
February 23, 2005, 452 SCRA 146, 155). To constitute gross ignorance of
the law, it is not enough that the subject decision, order or actuation of the
judge in the performance of his official duties is contrary to existing law and
jurisprudence but, most importantly, he must be moved by bad faith, fraud,
dishonesty, or corruption. Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt
motives or improper considerations, are sufficient defenses in which a
judge charged with ignorance of the law can find refuge. However, good
faith in situations of fallible discretion inhered only within the parameters of
tolerable judgment and does not apply where the issues are so simple and
the applicable legal principles evident and basic as to be beyond possible
margins of error (Officers and Members of the IBP, Baguio-Benguet
Chapter v. Pamintuan, A.M. No. RTJ-02-1691, November 19, 2004, 443
SCRA 87, 110; Ong v. Rosete, A.M. No. MTJ-04-1538, October 22, 2004,
441 SCRA 150, 159; Pesayco v. Layague, A.M. No.RTJ-04-1889,
December 22, 2004, 447 SCRA 450, 460; Dadizon v. Asis, A.M. No.
RTJ-03-1760, January 5, 2004, 419 SCRA 456, 463-464; Zuo v. Cabebe,
A.M. OCA No. 03-1800-RTJ, November 26, 2004, 444 SCRA 382, 391;
Balsamo v. Suan, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1656, September 17, 2003, 411
SCRA 189, 200; Dantes v. Caguioa, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1919, June 27,
2005, 461 SCRA 236, 246).
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