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REPUBLIC vs. HON.

VERGARA

G.R. No. 95551.

March 20, 1997

DOCTRINE

Samuel Robert Dye, Jr. who is an American and, therefore, an alien is disqualified from adopting
the minors Maricel and Alvin Due because he does not fall under any of the three aforequoted
exceptions laid down by the law. He is not a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative
by consanguinity. Nor does he seek to adopt his wife's legitimate child. Although he seeks to
adopt with his wife her relatives by consanguinity, he is not married to a Filipino citizen, for
Rosalina was already a naturalized American at the time the petition was filed, thus excluding
him from the coverage of the exception. The law here does not provide for an alien who is
married to a former Filipino citizen seeking to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by
consanguinity, as an exception to the general rule that aliens may not adopt.

FACTS

On June 25, 1990, the spouses Samuel R. Dye, Jr. and Rosalina Due Dye filed a petition before
the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City to adopt Maricel R. Due and Alvin R. Due, ages 13 and
12 years old, respectively, younger siblings of Rosalina. Samuel R. Dye, Jr, a member of the
United States Air Force, is an American citizen who resided at the Clark Air Base in Pampanga.
His wife Rosalina is a former Filipino who became a naturalized American. They have two
children. Both Maricel and Alvin Due, as well as their natural parents, gave their consent to the
adoption.

After trial, the lower court rendered its decision on September 10, 1990 granting the petition and
declaring Alvin and Maricel to be the children of the spouses Dye by adoption. Respondent
Regional Trial Court disregarded the sixteen-year age gap requirement of the law, the spouses
being only fifteen years and three months and fifteen years and nine months older than Maricel
Due, on the ground that a literal implementation of the law would defeat the very philosophy
behind adoption statutes, namely, to promote the welfare of a child. The court also found that the
petitioning spouses are mentally and physically fit to adopt, possess good moral character,
sufficient financial capability and love and affection for the intended adoptees. The Republic
filed this petition for review on a pure question of law, contending that the spouses Dye are not
qualified under the law to adopt Maricel and Alvin Due.

ISSUE

Whether the spouses Dye are not qualified under the law to adopt Maricel and Alvin Due.

HELD

As a general rule, aliens cannot adopt Filipino citizens as this is proscribed under Article 184 of
the Family Code which states:

"Art. 184. The following persons may not adopt:

xxx xxx xxx

(3) An alien, except:

(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity;

(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or

(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her
spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter.

Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in accordance with
the rules on inter-country adoption as may be provided by law."

Samuel Robert Dye, Jr. who is an American and, therefore, an alien is disqualified from adopting
the minors Maricel and Alvin Due because he does not fall under any of the three aforequoted
exceptions laid down by the law. He is not a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative
by consanguinity. Nor does he seek to adopt his wife's legitimate child. Although he seeks to
adopt with his wife her relatives by consanguinity, he is not married to a Filipino citizen, for
Rosalina was already a naturalized American at the time the petition was filed, thus excluding
him from the coverage of the exception. The law here does not provide for an alien who is
married to a former Filipino citizen seeking to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by
consanguinity, as an exception to the general rule that aliens may not adopt.
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ vs JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL

G.R. No. 202242

April 16, 2013

DOCTRINE:

Yes. The practice is unconstitutional; the court held that the phrase a representative of congress
should be construed as to having only one representative that would come from either house, not
both. That the framers of the constitution only intended for one seat of the JBC to be allotted for
the legislative.

FACTS:

In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an eighth member was added to the JBC as two
representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC one from the House of Representatives
and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the JBC En Banc, in
separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the representatives from the Senate
and the House of Representatives one full vote each. Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and
Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of
the legislature. It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition. it should mean one
representative each from both Houses which comprise the entire Congress. Respondent contends
that the phrase a representative of congress refers that both houses of congress should have
one representative each, and that these two houses are permanent and mandatory components of
congress as part of the bicameral system of legislature. Both houses have their respective
powers in performance of their duties. Art VIII Sec 8 of the constitution provides for the
component of the JBC to be 7 members only with only one representative from congress.

ISSUE:

Whether the JBCs practice of having members from the Senate and the House of
Representatives making 8 instead of 7 sitting members to be unconstitutional as provided in Art
VIII Sec 8 of the constitution.
HELD:

Yes. The practice is unconstitutional; the court held that the phrase a representative of congress
should be construed as to having only one representative that would come from either house, not
both. That the framers of the constitution only intended for one seat of the JBC to be allotted for
the legislative.

It is evident that the definition of Congress as a bicameral body refers to its primary function
in government to legislate. In the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction
of the role of each house in the process. The same holds true in Congress non-legislative
powers. An inter-play between the two houses is necessary in the realization of these powers
causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount. This, however, cannot be said
in the case of JBC representation because no liaison between the two houses exists in the
workings of the JBC. Hence, the term Congress must be taken to mean the entire legislative
department. The Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only.
SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE VS MANALO

G.R. No. 180906

7 October 2008

DOCTRINE:

In upholding the CA decision, the Supreme Court ruled that there is a continuing violation of the
Manalos right to security. xxx The Writ of Amparo is the most potent remedy available to any
person whose right to life, liberty, and security has been violated or is threatened with violation
by an unlawful act or omission by public officials or employees and by private individuals or
entities. xxx Understandably, since their escape, the Manalos have been under concealment and
protection by private citizens because of the threat to their life, liberty, and security. The
circumstances of respondents abduction, detention, torture and escape reasonably support a
conclusion that there is an apparent threat that they will again be abducted, tortured, and this
time, even executed. These constitute threats to their liberty, security, and life, actionable through
a petition for a writ of amparo, the Court explained.

FACTS:

Brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were abducted by military men belonging to the
CAFGU on the suspicion that they were members and supporters of the NPA. After 18 months of
detention and torture, the brothers escaped on August 13, 2007. Ten days after their escape, they
filed a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order to stop the military
officers and agents from depriving them of their right to liberty and other basic rights. While the
said case was pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect on October 24, 2007. The
Manalos subsequently filed a manifestation and omnibus motion to treat their existing petition as
amparo petition.

On December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals granted the privilege of the writ of amparo. The
CA ordered the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP to furnish the
Manalos and the court with all official and unofficial investigation reports as to the Manalos
custody, confirm the present places of official assignment of two military officials involved, and
produce all medical reports and records of the Manalo brothers while under military custody. The
Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP appealed to the SC seeking to
reverse and set aside the decision promulgated by the CA.
ISSUE:

WON the privilege of the writ of amparo was properly given

HELD:

In upholding the CA decision, the Supreme Court ruled that there is a continuing violation of the
Manalos right to security. xxx The Writ of Amparo is the most potent remedy available to any
person whose right to life, liberty, and security has been violated or is threatened with violation
by an unlawful act or omission by public officials or employees and by private individuals or
entities. xxx Understandably, since their escape, the Manalos have been under concealment and
protection by private citizens because of the threat to their life, liberty, and security. The
circumstances of respondents abduction, detention, torture and escape reasonably support a
conclusion that there is an apparent threat that they will again be abducted, tortured, and this
time, even executed. These constitute threats to their liberty, security, and life, actionable through
a petition for a writ of amparo, the Court explained.

Three ways of exercising right to security

1. First, the right to security of person is freedom from fear. In its whereas clauses, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) enunciates that a world in which human
beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been
proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people. Some scholars postulate that
freedom from fear is not only an aspirational principle, but essentially an individual
international human right.

2. Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and psychological


integrity or security. Article III, Section II of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that, as a
general rule, ones body cannot be searched or invaded without a search warrant. Physical
injuries inflicted in the context of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances
constitute more than a search or invasion of the body. It may constitute dismemberment,
physical disabilities, and painful physical intrusion. As the degree of physical injury
increases, the danger to life itself escalates. Notably, in criminal law, physical injuries
constitute a crime against persons because they are an affront to the bodily integrity or
security of a person.

3. Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of ones rights by the
government. In the context of the writ of amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of
the right to life and liberty under Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and the
right to security of person (as freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and
psychological integrity) under Article III, Section 2. The right to security of person in this
third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State guarantees full respect for human
rights under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. As the government is the
chief guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life,
liberty and security of person is rendered ineffective if government does not afford
protection to these rights especially when they are under threat. Protection includes
conducting effective investigations, organization of the government apparatus to extend
protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or threats thereof)
and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice.
SPO2 GERONIMO MANALO VS HON. PNP CHIEF CALDERON

G.R. No. 178920

October 15, 2007

DOCTRINE:

A petition for habeas corpus will be given due course only if it shows that petitioner is being
detained or restrained of his liberty unlawfully. A restrictive custody and monitoring of
movements or whereabouts of police officers under investigation by their superiors is not a form
of illegal detention or restraint of liberty.

FACTS

On May 15, 2007, at around 3:00 a.m., five armed men forcibly entered Polling Precinct 76-A,
and poured gasoline over a ballot box. Then they fired several rounds of ammunitions at the
premises, setting it ablaze. Several eye-witnesses identified some of petitioners as the
perpetrators of the school burning. The investigation also yielded that all six petitioners, who are
all members of the PNP Regional Special Operations Group (PNP-RSOG), failed to timely
respond to the incident at the Pinagbayanan Elementary School.

Petitioners contend that the May 22, 2007 Memorandum defines and circumscribes the scope of
petitioners restrictive custody status; that although technically speaking, petitioners
as PNP officer are not detained or imprisoned, their physical movements are, however, limited
only within Camp Vicente Lim, Calamba City, Laguna; they cannot go home to their respective
families and if they would leave Camp Vicente Lim they need to be escorted; that petitioners
restrictive custody status is illegal and not sanctioned by any existing provision of our
constitution and law; that it is degrading, summarily and arbitrarily imposed on the basis of mere
suspicion and it actually makes PNP members enjoy lesser rights than what are actually enjoyed
by ordinary citizens. Petitioners further posit that what is only sanctioned is preventive
suspension under which they can enjoy liberty and go home to their families pending
administrative investigation. Hence, they urge, this practice by the PNP organization should be
put to a stop.
ISSUES

Whether or not they are unlawfully detained or restrained of their liberty under their restrictive
custody status.

HELD

The main thrust of the special proceeding of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of one's
detention. More specifically, its vital purpose is to obtain immediate relief from illegal
confinement, to liberate those who may be imprisoned without sufficient cause and to deliver
them from unlawful custody.

Only if the Court is satisfied that a person is unlawfully restrained of his liberty will a petition
for habeas corpus be granted and the person detained released from confinement. If respondents
are not detaining nor restraining the applicants or the person in whose behalf the petition
for habeas corpus is filed, the petition should perforce be dismissed.

It is crystal-clear that petitioners are free to go in and out of Camp Vicente Lim as they please.
The only limitation imposed upon them is that their movements within the premises of the camp
shall be monitored; that they have to be escorted whenever the circumstances warrant that they
leave the camp; and that their estimated time of departure and arrival shall be entered in a
logbook. Even petitioners themselves admit they are not actually detained or imprisoned.

Clearly, placing police officers facing a grave administrative case under restrictive custody is a
disciplinary measure authorized under the PNP law.

In sum, petitioners are unable to discharge their burden of showing that they are entitled to the
issuance of the writ prayed for. The petition fails to show on its face that they are unlawfully
deprived of their liberties guaranteed and enshrined in the Constitution. No unlawful restraint is
foisted on them by the PNP authorities under the questioned memoranda.
The ultimate purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to relieve a person from unlawful restraint.
The writ cannot and will not issue absent a showing that petitioners are deprived of their liberty.
Neither can it relieve petitioners, who are police officers, from the valid exercise of prescribed
discipline over them by the PNP leadership.