Professional Documents
Culture Documents
must be an act, and must be voluntary (both Common Law and MPC)
*we do not punish people for their thoughts or their statusthere must be an act (or
failure to act)
(1) A person is not guilty of an offense unless his liability is based on conduct that includes a
voluntary act or the
omission to perform an act of which he is physically capable.
(2) The following are NOT voluntary acts within the meaning of this Section:
(a) a reflex or convulsion;
(b) a bodily movement during unconsciousness or sleep;
(c) conduct during hypnosis or resulting from hypnotic suggestion;
(d) a bodily movement that otherwise is not a product of the effort or determination of the
actor, either
conscious or habitual (IE coerced action/duress)
** To qualify for criminal liability, conduct must be voluntary (conscious choice to act/will)
voluntary act definition: a movement of the human body that is, in some minimal sense,
willed or directed or
controlled by the mind of the actor
CAN ALSO BE THE RESULT OF HABIT/INADVERTENCE AS LONG AS THE ACTOR COULD HAVE
ACTED
DIFFERENTLY
to qualify as voluntary:
-actor must have conscious control over the act
-could the actor have acted differently?
-act must occur in the sequence of events that lead to the harm
purpose of voluntary act requirement: blame and punishment for free willif you choose to
put bad thoughts
into action, you deserve to be punishedwe do not punish people for their thoughts alone
criminal law is built on the presumption of free will, that people are generally responsible
for what they do
involuntary act definition: those over which individual has no conscious control
QUESTION: was there interference with the conscious minds direction of the body?
if yes: not voluntary act
if no: voluntary act
1
Martin v State 1944, p. 177 (being forced in public by police while drunk is not a voluntary
act, no culpability)
any person who, while intoxicated or drunk, appears in any public place where one or
more persons
are presentand manifests a drunken condition by boisterous or indecent conduct,
or loud and
profane discourse, shall on conviction be fined
VOLUNTARY NOT IN THE STATUTE, BUT COURT READING IN THE COMMON LAW PRINCIPLE
OF
VOLUNTARY ACT REQUIREMENT INTO IT
D FORCED INTO PUBLIC BY POLICE, ONLY VOLUNTARILY GOT DRUNK AT HOME, WHICH IS
NOT A CRIME
VALID DEFENSE THAT HE WAS FORCED BY POLICE, NOT A VOLUNTARY ACT
People v Decina 1956, p. 181 (driving with knowledge of epilepsy meets voluntary act
requirement)
*time framing issue: not guilty of offense unless actus reus is voluntary, accompanied by
mens rea,
AND actus reus is actual and proximate cause of the social harm
KNEW HE WAS SUBJECT TO SUDDEN, UNCONTROLLABLE SEIZURESACTUS REUS
WAS DRIVING
A VEHICLE SO AS TO CAUSE THE DEATH OF A HUMAN BEING (BC KNEW HIS
CONDITION)
MENS REA WAS NEGLIGENCE
*not necessary that all aspects of conduct be voluntary, only that conduct included
a voluntary act
(turning on ignition, driving car negligently)
Powell v Texas 1968, p. 172 (alcoholism is not a valid defense to public intoxication, THERE
WAS AN ACT here)
whoever shall get drunk or found in a state of intoxication in any public place, or at any
private house
except his own shall be fined not exceeding $100
NOT PROSECUTED FOR STATUS/CONDITION AS ALCOHOLIC, BUT FOR ACT OF
GETTING
INTOXICATED AND GOING TO A PUBLIC PLACE
FIRST DRINK OF THE DAY WAS VOLUNTARYSATISFIED VOLUNTARY ACT
REQUIREMENT
2
Does not follow Robinson v CA, there is no cruel and unusual punishment here:
-here, he is not convicted on being an alcoholic, but for being drunk in public=act
-here, not punishing a mere status, nor regulating behavior in ones private home
-far cry from being an addict, chronic alcoholic, mentally ill, etc
-here there is an actus reus, in Robinson there was not
OmissionFailure to Act
omission substitutes for a voluntary act when D has a legal duty to act
general rule: omission will not support liability UNLESS the law provides that the individual has a
special duty to act
purpose: criminal conduct requires guilty state of mind, and difficult to ascertain it in one who
fails to act
criminal law should not be used to force people to act to benefit otherslimited to
punishing moral
wrongdoings, not non-doings
(3) Liability for the commission of an offense may not be based on an omission unaccompanied
by action unless:
(a) the omission is expressly made sufficient by the law defining the offense; or
(b) a duty to perform the omitted act is otherwise imposed by law
**omission + duty can fulfill conduct requirement when language does not mention omission
(failure to act)
**status relationships, contracts, statues, give rise to duties
3
Minimum Requirements of CulpabilityModel Penal Cod 2.02 (1), p. 235
(1) Except as provided in Section 2.05, a person is not guilty of an offense unless he acted
purposely, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently, as the law may require, with respect to each
material element of the offense
Jones v United States 1962, p. 184 (if legal duty imposed + not performed, omission=failure
to act=voluntary act)
WAS D UNDER A LEGAL DUTY TO ACT TO CARE FOR THE CHILD? A QUESTION FOR THE
JURY TO DECIDE
if he was, failure to act (omission) = act
IF LEGAL DUTY OF CARE EXISTED, THEN OMISSION IS AN ACT
4
MENS REA
vicious will, evil mind, moral blameworthiness, culpable state of mind
rationale: retribution: if you commit actus reus in morally innocent manner, do not
deserve punishment
belief in freedom of will and ability to choose between good and evil
COMMON LAW
5
INTENTIONAL IF:
(1) it was Ds conscious object to bring about a certain result
OR
(2) if D knew that the harm was practically certain to occur as a result of
conduct
*intent pertains to the result itself, not to the act that causes the result
KNOWINGLY IF:
(1) aware of the fact
(2) correctly believes that the fact exists
OR
(3) suspects that it exists and purposely avoids learning whether he is correct
(willful blindness)
Negligently: if D should be aware that conduct creates a substantial and unjustifiable risk
of harm
6
engage in such that such attendant
conduct or cause circumstances exist
such result
Aware, or Practically certain Unjustifiable risk Unjustifiable risk
believes/hopes conduct will cause
attendant result
circumstances exist
(if they exist)
MPC Sect 2.02(5): the greater mental state includes the lesser mental state
if purposely, then also knowingly, recklessly, and negligently
if recklessly, then also negligently
**MPC also recognizes a person can simultaneously have more than one mental state, and that
the definition of a crime often entails use of multiple mental states
Morisette v United States 1952, p. 231 (no mens rea=no intent=no knowledge=no
culpability (conversion govt))
whoever embezzles, steals, purloins, or knowingly converts to his use or the use of
another, or without
authority sells, conveys, disposes of any record, voucher, money, or this of value of the US
shall be fined
BELIEVED PROPERTY TO BE ABANDONED, THEREFORE NO INTENT TO STEAL
SPECIFIC INTENT TO STEAL IS AN ELEMENT OF LARCENY
NOT A STRICT LIABILITY OFFENSE, CONGRESS MUST HAVE INTENDED MENS REA
7
statute interpreted to require the mens rea of common law larcenymust prove intent
to steal
Strict/Absolute Liability: crimes that do not require culpable mens rea, no evil-meaning
mind
IES
-malum prohibitum offenses like speeding
-statutory rape
MPC Sect. 2.05 (requirements of culpability do not extend to these SL offences) p. 227
(ie pubic welfare)
MPC strongly disfavors SL by only allowing it for offenses that do not carry
any prison
sentence whatsoever
Attributes of SL crimes
-penalties for the offense are minor (fine, infraction, NO PRISON)
-prohibited activity provides inherent notice of wrongdoing to the actor
-requiring proof of mens rea would be costly in terms of litigation and deterrence
-usually involve public welfare cases
*the extent to which conduct prohibited contains special risks to the public or inherent
notice of wrongdoing
often carries significant weight with courts when interpreting whether a crime is SL
or fault-based
8
MPC for Statutory Silence or Ambiguity regarding mens rea p. 236
Silence: MPC 2.02(3) if statute silent and not SL crime, prosecution must prove
recklessness at least
Ambiguity: MPC 2.02(4) if mens rea has been articulated at all in the statute, it applies to
all material elements of the crime in the statute
People v Taylor 2001, p. 239 (for possession of cane sword, D must have element of mens rea
to be culpable)
any person who does any of the following is punishable by imprisonment not exceeding
one year
-possess any . . . cane sword
*D did not know the cane contained a swordNEGATED MENS REA
NOT A STRICT LIABILITY OFFENSEknowledge mens rea
COURT APPLIES LA FAVES 7 FACTORS OF STRICT LIABILITY TO ANALYZE STATUTE
Supreme Court imputed knowledge mens rea to dirks and daggers, court here
reasoned
same mens rea for cane sword
Garnett v State 1993, supp (STATUTORY RAPE is SL offense, no defense of mistake of fact, no
mens rea element)
MD Rape Statute:
(a) any person is guilty of rape in 2nd degree if he engages in vaginal intercourse
with another
person:
(2) who is mentally defective, mentally incapacitated, or physically helpless,
and the person
performing the act knows or should reasonably know
(RECKLESS/NEGLIGENT) the
other person is mentally defective
(3) who is under 14 years of age and the person performing the act is at least
4 years older
than the victim (SL)
(b) any person violating the provisions of this section is guilty of a felony and upon
conviction is
subject to imprisonment for a period of not more than 20 years
PLAIN LANGUAGE OF STATUTE POINTS TO STRICT LIABILITY CRIME(a)(2) has mens rea,
but (a)(3)
does not, and D is charged with (a)(3)
LEGISLATURE INTENDED NO MENS REA IN (a)(3)
Mistake of age is not a valid defense
TRANSFERRING INTENT
9
potentially applies when the physical person hurt or killed is different from the one D meant to
hurt/kill
LEGAL FICTION TO RESOLVE BAD AIM CASES
ONLY APPLIES WHEN D ACCOMPLISHES THE SAME KIND OF HARM AS ORIGINALLY
CONTEMPLATED
*only the identity of the victim is different
USUALLY ONLY APPLIES TO INTENTIONAL WRONGS
*criticism of doctrine:
-it is unnecessary, bc identity of victim is not part of the definition of the offense, so no
need to transfer
victimsactus reus and mens rea requirements still met
*could be avoided if courts rejected TI doctrine and simply determined whether D had
mens rea to cause
the particular harm required in the charged offense
People v Scott supp (inadvertently killed bystander, meant to kill another, intent transfers,
guilty of murder)
THIS COURT SAYS TRANSFERRED INTENT CREATES ATTEMPT LIABILITY RE BYSTANDERS
ultimate question: was Ds conduct a sufficiently direct cause of the result to warrant
liability?
IF 2+ CAUSES (multiple act causes): when each act would have produced the
result, use modified
TEST: result would not have occurred when it did/as it did but for Ds act
[or if 2nd cause was a substantial factor in bringing about result, each act is
sufficient]
ie if one independent act accelerated the death caused by the other
act
IF ACTING IN CONCERT WITH EACH OTHERCONSPIRACY LIABILITY
10
(2) PROXIMATE CAUSE (find out who is responsible):
are Ds actions so remote or attenuated that it would be unfair to hold D
responsible?
[the result must be the natural and foreseeable consequence of Ds act]
an act or event, that comes after Ds act but before social harm (ie death),
AND contributes
causally to the social harm
**ies of intervening causes: acts of nature, acts of the victim, grossly erroneous
medical
maltreatment
(medical negligence is not enough), or acts of 3 rd parties
IF 2+ ACTORS: other actors break causal chain only if mental state and
blameworthiness play major
roles in additional actors acts
**first actor will be found NOT to have been proximate cause of result
De Minimus Contribution
if Ds contribution to social harm is minimal/minor, relieves him of criminal liability
11
if you intended the consequences, you are liable EVEN IF THERE IS AN INTERVENING
CAUSE
if result happens and you intended it, even if it happened in an unforeseeable
manner, liable
(IE: D wants to poison V, leaves poison on table and X gives V poison instead not
knowing what it
was D liable for poisoning bc he intended to poison V)
Omissions
will rarely, if ever, supersede an earlier voluntary wrongful act
12
State v Jenkins 1981, p. 482 (stabbed victim, victim died from reaction to treatment, Ds act
was proximate cause)
ILLUSTRATES EGGSHELL VICTIM RULE
D stabbed victim (proximate cause)
V rushed to hospital, had common procedure and died from rare allergy (but for
cause)
DEPENDENT INTERVENING CAUSE, NOT BIZARRE/UNUSUAL, THEREFORE STABBING WAS
PROXIMATE CAUSE OF DEATH, D LIABLE
People v Flenon 1972, p. 483 (victim died from blood transfusion, med negligence
foreseeable, proximate cause)
**medical maltreatment must be grossly erroneous to be an intervening causenot mere
negligence
GENERAL MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE IS FORESEEABLE, GROSS NEGLIGENCE IS NOT
DEPENDENT INTERVENING CAUSE, NOT BIZARRE/UNUSUAL BC INHERENT RISK IN BLOOD
TRANSFUSIONS, THEREFORE FORESEEABLE
Ds act was proximate cause of death
State v Echols 1995, p. 485 (V fell calling for help, D caused her injury, proximate cause
eggshell victim rule)
DEPENDENT INTERVENING CAUSE, NOT BIZARRE/UNUSUAL
falling is a natural reaction to the act of being robbed
Ds robbery was proximate cause of harm
People v Kibbe 1974, p. 486 (death should have been foreseen even though not intended by
D, proximate cause)
DEATH IS A FORESEEABLE RESULT OF DS ACTIONS
VICTIM COULD NOT EXTRICATE HIMSELF OF ATTENDANT CIRCUMSTANCES
THEREFORE D LIABLE FOR 2ND DEG. MURDER
13
Commonwealth v Root 1961, p. 489 (victim drove recklessly, D not direct cause of death, no
proximate cause)
D and decedent were in drag race, decedent recklessly tried to pass D, died in head on
collision with truck
DECEDENTS RECKLESS DRIVING BROKE CHAIN OF CAUSATION
D NOT CULPABLE FOR DEATHNOT PROXIMATE CAUSE
decedents reckless driving was of his own accord
court interprets proximate cause STRICTLY, death must be a direct proximate cause of Ds
driving
while D was driving recklessly, decedent brought about his own death by driving on wrong
side of road
[SOCIAL HARM]
Destruction of, or injury to, or endangerment of, a socially valuable interest
Result Crimes: social harm is the specific result (ie homicide = death of another human
being)
Conduct Crimes: punishes the conduct, not the harm that results (ie drunk driving)
ATTENDANT CIRCUMSTANCES
Facts that exist at the time of the actors conduct or at the time of a particular result
required to be
proven in the definition of the offense
IEs:
homicide: victim is a human being
drunk driving: that the driver was under the influence of alcohol
rape: the victim did not consent, [victim was not actors wife]
larceny: the property did not belong to the actor
14
HOMICIDE (the killing of another human being)
Doctrinal Structure
Actus Reus: the taking of another persons life
Mens Rea: depends on the type of homicide
**if you have premeditation and deliberation, bumped up to 1st degree murder
DEFENSES
Provocation: reduces 1st and 2nd degree intentional to voluntary manslaughter (partial
defense)
Self Defense: not guilty of murder/manslaughter of any kind (affirmative full defense)
15
Intoxication: partial defense
Causation Issues
[MOF/MOL]
16
CA Murder Statute PC 189 (p. 325)
All murder which is perpetrated by means [enum means] of a destructive device or
explosive, a weapon of mass destruction, knowing use of ammunition
designed primarily to penetrate
metal or armor, poison, lying in wait, torture [end of enum means], or by
any other willful,
deliberate and premeditated killing, or which is committed in the perpetration
of, or attempt to perpetrate, [enum felonies] arson, rape, carjacking,
robbery, burglary, mayhem, kidnapping, train wrecking, or any act punishable
under[sodomy with a minor/against anothers will, in prison, any lewd act on
a child, oral copulation with a minor.against anothers will/in prison, any
anal/genital penetration with a foreign object for a sexual purpose against a
minor against his will], or any murder which is perpetrated by means of
discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle [end of enum felonies]
intentionally at another person outside of the vehicle with the intent to inflict
death, is murder OF THE FIRST DEGREE. All other kinds of murder are of the
second degree.
To prove the killing was deliberate and premeditated, it shall not be necessary to
prove the
defendant maturely and meaningfully reflected upon the gravity of his or her
act.
*no degrees: ALL murders are 1st degree felonies under MPC
*does not include term malice: that is a common law term
*does not define murder as including intent to cause grave bodily harm
MPC Manslaughter
Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter when
(a) it is committed recklessly, OR
(b) a homicide which would otherwise be murder is committed under the
influence of
extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is no
reasonable
explanation or excuse. The reasonableness of such explanation or
excuse shall be
determined from the viewpoint of a person in the actors situation
under the
circumstances as he believes them to be (SUBJECTIVE)
18
INTENTIONAL KILLINGEXPRESS MALICE
intent to kill = express malice aforethought
1st Degree: Ds act was willful (intent to kill), deliberate (evaluated choice) and premeditated
(took time to think
beforehand)premeditation and deliberation (not all states have this requirement in their
statute)
preconceived plan
19
(2) Broad Approach/Jury Discretion Approach - CALIFORNIA (Carroll, Young,
Carmichael)
premeditation and deliberation the same, little difference between
them and intent
2nd Degree: NO premeditation or deliberation, AND NO enumerated means or felonies, BUT YES
intent to kill
State v Bingham
DELIBERATION = VALUE ADDED TO PREMEDITATION, DISTINCT
CANNOT INFER PREMEDITATION AND DELIBERATION FROM INTENT
3-5 mins of strangulation (manner) does not allow us to infer premed/delib
it was an intentional killing, but no direct or circumstantial evidence of planning or motive
CANNOT INFER P + D FROM ONLY MANNER AND INTENT WITHOUT PLANNING OR MOTIVE
2ND DEGREE MURDER
Commonwealth v Carroll
NO DISTINCTION BETWEEN PREMEDITATION AND DELIBERATION
= INTENTIONAL KILLING
1ST DEGREE MURDER (P + D inferred)
planning: thought about gun on headboard, took steps (but could also be heat of
passion)
motive: he confessed, was resentful of wife
manner: lethal weapon, shot head twice (vital organ)
NO AMOUNT OF TIME TOO SHORT TO FORM PREMEDITATED INTENT TO KILL
Young v State
NO DISTINCTION BETWEEN PREMEDITATION AND DELIBERATION
= INTENDS TO COMMIT THE ACT AND INTENDS DEATH TO RESULT
Carmichael v State
PREMEDITATION DISTINCT FROM DELIBERATION
PREMEDITATION = INTENT TO CAUSE DEATH, formed before the act
DELIBERATION = WEIGHING OF CONSEQUENCES OF ACT,
People v Anderson
planning: weak evidence
motive: no motive
20
manner: brutal killing
Provocation/Heat of Passion
D acted in a moment of such strong emotion in response to a provoking incident
that if affected his
ability to think clearly about his actions and their consequences
intentional killing where actor take a life in a sudden heat of passion as a result of
adequate
provocation
21
provoking incident can only be:
-extreme assault or battery against D
-injury or serious abuse of a close relative of D
-an illegal arrest of D
-mutual combat
-sudden discovery of spouses adultery
*in some jurisdictions: D must have killed the person who provoked him, not
a 3rd party
(misdirected retaliation) DEFENSE CANNOT BE ASSERTED IF D KILLS
3RD PARTY
MORE SUBJECTIVE THAN COMMON LAW TEST, LESS STRINGENT (see below)
22
[*under MPC, manslaughter is a 2nd degree felony]
Reasonable Man
-of ordinary disposition
-not exceptionally belligerent
-sober at the time of provocation
-of normal mental capacity
In Ds Shoes
-not clear how far subjectivity of reasonable person standard the MPC
goes
-relevant to
-measuring gravity of provocation to a reasonable person
-assessing the level of self-control to be expected of a
reasonable person
People v Barry (cumulative rage could be adequate provocation, right to give provocation
instruction to jury)
D still could have been in heat of passion after 20 hours of waiting for victimquestion for
the jury re
adequate cooling off period
CUMULATIVE RAGE + RECIPROCAL ESCALATION
Wifes taunts, teases, provoked an uncontrollable rage
REASONABLE PROVOCATION
-20 hrs cooling off not enough in light of cumulative rage
-immasculation, 2 weeks of taunting, inflagrante delicto
A RESONABLE PERSON COULD BE SORELY TEMPTED TO KILL, QUESTION FOR THE JURY
Commonwealth v Carr (D killed one, wounded one when he saw 2 lesbians lovemakingNOT
adequate provoc.)
TEST: reasonable person test
REASONABLE PERSON WOULD NOT BE SORELY TEMPTED TO KILL BY SIGHT OF
LESBIANS
Ds reaction out of tune with provoking incident
COMMON LAW, NOT MPC TEST
under MPC, would need expert witness to testify as to extreme emotional
disturbance
from Ds situation (subjective test), possibly adequate provocation bc
reasonable to actor
(would be a question for the jury)
23
State v Dumlao (Hawaii case, MPC extreme emotional disturbance test, court should give
provocation instruct)
MD Manslaughter Statute
(b) spousal adultery not a mitigating factorthe discovery of ones spouse engaged
in sexual
intercourse with another DOES NOT constitute legally adequate provocation
for the
purpose of mitigating a killing from the crime of murder to voluntary
manslaughter even
though the killing was provoked by that discovery
D HAD PARANOID PERSONALITY DISORDER
A JURY COULD FIND THIS A PSYCHIATRIC DISORDER AND FIND HIS EXCUSE WAS
REASONABLE
FROM DS PERSPECTIVE, MATTER OF FACT FOR THE JURY
PROVOCATION INSTRUCTION GIVEN TO JURY
Imperfect and Perfect Self Defense are separate and distinct doctrinessimilarity ends
with malice
-ISD not rooted in mental capacity or awareness of need to act lawfully
-can be free on diminished capacity but still (though unreasonably) believe in the need for
self-defense in a
given situation
**if you believe you need to act in self-defense, you think you are acting lawfully
(and therefore aware of obligation to act lawfully)
ELEMENTS
(1) actual belief
(2) unreasonable belief (yet honest belief) OBJECTIVE STANDARD
(3) necessary to defend oneself
(4) from imminent peril to life or great bodily injury
IMPERFECT SELF DEFENSE NEGATES MALICE, REDUCES 1ST AND 2ND DEGREE
MURDER TO
VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHER
24
25
UNINTENTIONAL KILLINGIMPLIED MALICE
depraved heart, malignant and abandoned heart, depravity of mind = implied malice
aforethought
Implied Malice: Extreme recklessness that reveals an indifference to the value of human
life
2 Basic Components
(1) Extreme Recklessness: wanton and willful disregard of likelihood of death/great
bodily harm
ELEMENTS:
(1) Implied Malice
TEST: did D or his accomplices act with awareness of a substantial risk
that his
conduct was extreme enough to likely produce a violent
response by their victims?
(2) the killing is attributable to act of D or his accomplice
(3) the killing was committed during commission of one of the enumerated
felonies
THEN 1ST DEGREE UNINTENTIONAL MURDER (Taylor v Superior
Court)
CA v Watson (standard for implied malice in CA, question for the jury re extreme
recklessness/indifference)
STANDARD FOR IMPLIED MALICE IN CA
(1) natural consequences are dangerous to human life
(2) the act was deliberately performed
27
(3) by a person who knows that his conduct endangers the life of another
(4) the person acts with conscious disregard for life
COURT: NATURAL CONSEQUENCES OF DRIVING TO A BAR AND DRINKING, KNOWING YOU
WOULD
NEED TO DRIVE HOME LATER, AND AT THE TIME OF DRIVING DRUNK D IS PRESUMED
TO KNOW THE HAZARDS OF DRUNK DRIVING (if not, standard is negligence, not
recklessness)
FACTS
-excessive drinking, drove to bar before beginning to drink
-high speed reckless driving while drunk
-300 ft of skidmarks to try to avoid accidentknew of danger
-veered into oncoming traffic
QUESTION FOR JURY: WAS THRE AWARENESS OF RISK OF DEATH ON PART OF D? re
element (3)
if yes, then drunk and reckless driving death = murder NOT manslaughter
People v Knoller (failing to properly control dog with violent history = extreme recklessness =
depraved heart)
IMPLIED MALICE because Ds knew dog was dangerous and consciously disregarded the
risk
implied malice test: if D is aware that his act is likely to cause death or serious injury to
another and
commits act anyhow
2nd Degree implied malice murder
high probability of death in keeping dangerous dog
Taylor v Superior Court (PROVOCATIVE ACT DOCTRINE re 1st degree unintentional murder)
FACTS
-D was getaway driver, not inside liquor store during armed robbery, victim killed
co-felon
NO FM BECAUSE CA HAS AGENCY LIMITATIONvictim killed co-felon, not in furtherance of
crime
CAN BE PROSECUTED UNDER 1ST DEGREE UNINTENTIONAL MURDER
PROVOCATIVE ACT DOCTRINE
if you act in a way so as to make another need to use lethal force in self
defense, you are
imputed with IMPLIED MALICE
Ds acts: execution threats, chattering insanely, coercive conduct
WOULD LEAD AN ORDINARY PERSON TO LETHALLY/JUSTIFIABLY RESIST
INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER
unintentional killing where there is no implied malice
Doctrinal Structure:
actus reus: the killing of another human being
mens rea (depends on jurisdiction)
recklessnesssubjective awareness required (NOT WITH NEGLIGENCE
BELOW)
28
gross negligence (criminal negligence)risky conduct, notice of risk, less
justification
ordinary negligence (simple negligence)like civil negligence
People v Hall (MPC definition of recklessness used, SKIING TOO FAST for conditions)
COURT INFERRING D MUST HAVE KNOWN OF RISK BY SAYING THAT A REASONABLE
PERSON IN
DS SHOES WITH HIS EXPERTISE, ETC, WOULD HAVE KNOWN
Courts can infer whether actor consciously disregarded such a risk from actors
knowledge,
experience, and what a reasonable person would have understood the risk to
be
RISK OF DEATH DOES NOT HAVE TO BE MORE LIKELY THAN NOT IN COLORADO
TO SEND
TO TRIAL FOR RECKLESS MANSLAUGHTER
-assess likelihood that harm will occur AND magnitude of such harm if
it occurs
-assess the nature and purpose of Ds conduct RELATIVE to how
substantial risk is
-risk must be of such a nature that disregarding it constitutes a gross
deviation from
standard of care a reasonable would exercise
ELEMENTS of Reckless Manslaughter:
Prosecution must prove Ds actions caused death, AND
(1)consciously disregarded
(2)a substantial and
(3)unjustifiable risk that he would
(4)cause the death of another
HERE: excessive speed and lack of control = extreme deviation from standard of
care
State v Williams (parents did not take child to doctor until too late to savenegligent
involuntary
manslaughter)
UNEDUCATED, NOT AWARE OF SEVERITY OF ILLNESS AND RISK TO CHILD
REASONABLE PERSON WOULD HAVE KNOWN CHILD WAS SERIOUSLY ILL
ordinary NEGLIGENCE, not extreme recklesness
*if parents consciously disregarded a known risk, it would have been depraved heart
murder)
29
30
FELONY MURDER
guilty of murder when a killing is committed in perpetration, or attempt to perpetrate a
felony (anchor,
predicate, or underlying felony)death can be accidental, still guilty of murder
Strict liability re mens rea in the death, still need voluntary actus reus AND
causation
counter: increase the punishment for the predicate felonies themselves if you want
to deter
felonies, not indirectly with FM rule
anchor felony MUST come from statutorily enumerated felonies, or DOES NOT
qualify for
1st degree FM (CA enumerated in murder statute)
31
2 Approaches (dep on jurisdiction)
IEs
-discharging weapon into inhabited dwelling
-manufacturing meth (bc of hazardous chemicals)
-willful discharge of weapon in grossly negligent manner
*more difficult to argue than as committedkeeps out many
felonies
yes independent
no independent felonious purpose
felonious purpose
32
(4) Agency/In Furtherance Of (Weick v State, State v Oimen)
2 approaches
(a) the Agency ApproachMAJORITYCALIFORNIA
killing must be done by felon or co-felon to qualify for FM
TEST: was killing done by felon or co-felon? if felon, CAN
PROSECUTE FM
if done by intended victim, CANNOT prosecute felons for it
STEPS OF ANALYSIS
(1) prove all elements of underlying felony
(2) decide degree of felony murder (if enumerated, 1st degree, otherwise 2nd)
(3) if 2nd degree, is underlying felony inherently dangerous? (2 approaches, dep on
jurisdiction)
(4) is death a direct causal result of the felony?
(5) rule out bars and restrictions to felony murderFROM CHART
State v Sims (D shot victim in the course of an attempted burglary, defense was muscle spasm,
but FM is SL Crime)
VA Felony Murder Statute:
People v Stamp (death from a robbery, enumerated in CA, 1st degree FM, forseeability not a
requirement)
D DID NOT KNOW VICTIM HAD A HEART CONDITION, BUT FORESEEABILITY NOT AN
ELEMENT OF FM
as long as death is a direct causal result of the voluntary act of a felony, liable for FM
voluntary act = robbery (prove all elements)
ARMED ROBBERY ENUMERATED IN CA
THEREFORE 1ST DEGREE FELONY MURDER
People v Sanchez (police evasion is NOT INHERENTLY DANGEROUS in the abstractCA case)
EVASION IS NOT INHERENTLY DANGEROUS IN THE ABSTRACT
not enumerated in CA
CANNOT CHARGE FELONY MURDER BC EVASION NOT INHERENTLY DANGEROUS
court used OJ Simpson chase as example of a way to evade police without being
dangerous
standard of inherently dangerous = SIGNIFICANT RISK OF DEATH
Barnett v State (MERGER DOCTRINE BARS prosecution for FM when underlying felony is assault
in 1st degree)
ASSAULT IN 1ST DEGREE MERGES WITH FMCANNOT PROSECUTE FOR FM
must prosecute 1st degree assault separately, and another murder theory NOT FM
34
Assault DOES NOT have an independent felonious purpose other than to kill or inflict great
bodily harm
Weick v State (AGENCY LIMITATION BARS prosecution of felon for FM when victim kills co-felon)
AGENCY LIMITATION BARS FELON PROSECUTION FOR FM WHEN VICTIM KILLS A CO-FELON
CONDUCT WAS NOT IN FURTHERANCE OF THE CRIME, IT WAS IN OPPOSITION TO IT
predicate felony was robbery
but VICTIM, not a co-felon, killed the other co-felon
THIS JURISDICTION HAS AGENCY LIMITATION MAJORITY IN FURTHERANCE OF
takeaway: if conduct causing the death is not in furtherance of the crime, cannot
prosecute for FM
in this jurisdiction
State v Oimen (AGENCY LIMITATION DOES NOT BAR prosecution for FM bc MINORITY proximate
cause juris)
Wisconsin FM Statute:
Whoever causes the death of another human being while committing or
attempting to commit [first or second degree sexual assault with use or
threat of force or violence, arson, armed burglary, armed robbery]
State v Adams (RES GESTAE DOES NOT BAR 1st degree FMarmed burglary, while fleeing,
killed night marshal)
WAS IN ONE CONTINUOUS TRANSACTION
FLEEING BC INTERRUPTED DURING ARMED BURGLARY
fleeing is within res gestae of armed burglary
closely connected in point of time, place, causal relation
-no break in causal chainno place of temporary safety, no break in chain of events
HOMICIDE WITHIN RES GESTAE OF BURGLARYone continuous transaction
ENUMERATED IN MISSOURI
1ST DEGREE FM
TAKEAWAY: renunciation valid only if voluntary and complete
35
MISDEMEANOR MANSLAUGHTER
a person who commits a killing in the perpetration of a misdemeanor can be convicted IF
ANCHOR
MISDEMEANOR IS INHERENTLY DANGEROUS
STEPS IN ANALYSIS
(1) prove all elements of underlying misdemeanor
(2) is death a direct causal result of the misdemeanor?
(3) is underlying misdemeanor inherently dangerous? (2 approaches, dep on
jurisdiction)
(4) rule out bars and restrictions to felony murderdepends on jurisdiction
Taylor v Superior Court (provocative act doctrine re unintentional 1st degree unintentional
murder)
FACTS
-D was getaway driver, not inside liquor store during armed robbery, victim killed
co-felon
NO FM BECAUSE CA HAS AGENCY LIMITATIONvictim killed co-felon, not in furtherance of
crime
CAN BE PROSECUTED UNDER 1ST DEGREE UNINTENTIONAL MURDER
PROVOCATIVE ACT DOCTRINE
if you act in a way so as to make another need to use lethal force in self
defense, you are
imputed with IMPLIED MALICE
Ds acts: execution threats, chattering insanely, coercive conduct
WOULD LEAD AN ORDINARY PERSON TO LETHALLY/JUSTIFIABLY RESIST
D WAS AWARE HIS ACTS WOULD LEAD A PERSON TO NEED TO DEFEND
THEMSELF
36
37
INCHOATE OFFENSESATTEMPT, CONSPIRACY, SOLICITATION
(incomplete/unsuccessful)
because we do not punish for thoughts alone, at what point does an incomplete/unsuccessful
effort to commit a
crime become a crime itself?
*ALL DEFENSES APPLY, INCLUDING THOSE BELOW THAT ARE SPECIFIC TO INCHOATE CRIMES
ATTEMPT (specific intent crime, even if the target crime is general ie rape)
*when a person, with the intent to commit a criminal offense, engages in conduct that
constitutes the beginning of
perpetration of the target offense
*usually punished as harshly as completed offense (ie rape 20 yrs, attempted rape 10 yrs)
rationale: attempt causes less social harm than completed offense = lesser debt to pay to
society = punish
less
Doctrinal Structure:
ACTUS REUS: how far did the conduct go in completing the target crime?
*think about all steps necessary to fulfill actus reus of target crimedid D get
close enough
to meet the elements of the actus reus of the target crime?
*were acts closer to planning activity or closer to perpetration of the crime?
2 tests
(1) Dangerous Proximity Test (Common Law, People v Rizzo)Oliver
Wendell Holmes
(a) was Ds conduct dangerously close to success?
(b) was there reasonable likelihood of success but for intervention?
*this test is closer to perpetration than planning
* the more serious the offense, the less close D must come to
completion
38
(2) Substantial Step Test (MPC)
(a) did Ds act constitute a substantial step in the course of conduct
planned to culminate in the commission of the target crime?
(b) was Ds act strongly corroborative of Ds criminal purpose?
*this test is closer to planning activity than perpetration
MENS REA: dual mens rea (1) for target crime (intent to commit acts which constitute
actus reus of target
offense) and (2) for attempted crime (specific intent to commit target offense
engage in conduct or achive result required for target offense)
2 tests
(1)Common Law Test
(a) was there general intent to commit the acts which constitute the
actus reus of the target crime?
(b) was there specific intent to commit the target crime? ie engage in
conduct or
achieve result required by target crime?
*go through steps of analysis of the target crime (if murder, must
determine degree)
(IE if pulling gun was meant to scare rather than kill, lacked specific
intent of murder, CANNOT be convicted of attempted murder)
majority approach: the mens rea IS THE SAME for attendant circ as it is for the
completed crime
ie if mens rea is negligence, then negligence for attendant circumstance too
minority approach: mens rea for attendant circumstances is purpose (must intend
and know)
regardless of what mens rea is for completed crime
STRICTER than majority approach
39
trend is to allow so long as it is complete and voluntary)
LEGAL impossibility:
Kansas v Gobin
Kansas Attempt Statute
any overt act toward the perpetration of a crime done by a person who
intends to commit
such crime but fails in the perpetration thereof or is prevented or
intercepted in executing such crime
3 elements
(1)intent to commit the crime
(2)an overt act toward the perpetration of the crime
(3) a failure to consummate the crime
41
People v Rizzo (Victim never showed up, common law ACTUS REUS test, not dangerously close
to success)
D and 3 others drove around looking for intended victim, victim did not show up
LACKED ABILITY TO COMMIT CRIME BC VICTIM DID NOT SHOW UPTHEREFORE NOT
DANGEROUSLY
CLOSE TO SUCCESSCANNOT BE LIABLE FOR ATTEMPT
Actus Reus TEST: Dangerous Proximity Test
TAKEAWAY: conduct must come dangerously close to success to satisfy actus reus element
of attempt
South Dakota v Lyerla (cannot attempt to commit an unintentional crime, MENS REA 2 of
attempt not satisfied)
CANNOT HAVE SPECIFIC INTENT TO KILL BC HE DID NOT INTEND TO KILL
DID NOT MEET MENS REA ELEMENT (2)
Dissent represents the minority view:
-you can still be prosecuted for unintentional crimes of recklessness (extreme or
ordinary)
People v Staples (NO defense of ABANDONMENT once acts sufficient to be considered attempt
at common law)
DS ACTS WENT BEYOND PLANNING AND PREPARATION
HE BEGAN TO DRILL THRU THE FLOOR
COMMON LAW RULE: NO EXCULPATORY ABANDONMENT ONCE ACTS CONSIDERED
ATTEMPT
People v Dlugash (D shot V AFTER another had already shot Vlegal impossibility to kill V if V
already dead)
LEGAL IMPOSSIBILITY TO KILL A DEAD PERSON BC LAW OF HOMICIDE PREVENTS KILLING
OF A HUMAN
BEING, AND V WAS NO LONGER A HUMAN BEING BC X HAD ALREADY KILLED V
(coroner said V could have already been dead before D shot himNO PROOF
BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT RE V WAS DEAD/ALIVE WHEN D SHOT HIM)
NO CAUSATION so cannot prosecute for murder
*CAN PROSECUTE FOR ATTEMPTED MURDER, EVEN THOUGH VICTIM ALREADY DEAD
if attendant circumstances are as D believed them to be, can prosecute for
attempt
AC = D thought V was dead?
*can also be characterized as factual impossibility: did not know V already dead, so failed
to complete
offense even though he intended to kill VBUT FACTUAL IMPOSS IS NOT A DEFENSE
42
COMPLICITY/ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY/AIDING AND ABETTING
(NOT a crime in and of itselfa way of sharing the liability with the principalvicarious liability)
rationale: you are using principal as your agent, effectively saying your acts are my
acts -- thus punished
ALSO, group criminality poses special added dangers to society, so those who
promote or
encourage crime are liable for the crimes themselves
*the accomplices conduct MUST ACTUALLY ASSIST the principaleven if it just made
it easiercan be
trivial
(psychological encouragement, opening a window so perp can enter, etc)
COMMON LAW
43
*ACT CAN BE SUFFICIENT IF IT MIGHT HAVE PROMOTED/ENCOURAGES
PRINCIPALS ACT
-speech sufficient if intended to encourage/help principal commit crime
-mere presence insufficient unless it is offered as a form of
encouragement
-accomplices help need not contribute to the criminal result
-principal need not be aware of accomplices acts
-accomplices acts must be capable of assisting the principal
(if you omit duty to act, ie police officer stands by and does nothing, sufficient
actus reus)
` (1) accomplice must intend to assist principal in commission of the target crime
purposely
promote
majority rule: accomplice must have the mens rea of purpose regarding
the principals
crime
minority rule: accomplice must know principal will commit the target
offense
(2) purpose is to assist principal in completing crime: sharing in the mens rea
for target crime
(if police officer fails to prevent, and wants crime to occur, liable as
accomplice)
(principal need not be aware of accomplices assistance)
CAUSATION: only required for the principal, not for the accomplice bc not an
independent crime, only
derivative liability for accomplice
*BUT MUST ESTABLISH THAT THE PRINCIPAL COMMITTED THE CRIME
DEFENSES: Abandonment/Withdrawal
44
majority: requires complete and voluntary abandonment
minority: requires complete and voluntary abandonment AND that D
communicate the
withdrawal to perpetrators AND law enforcement BAR VERY HIGH
MPC
(3) a person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of an offense if
(a) with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the
offense he
(i) solicits the other person to commit it
(ii) aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in planning or
committing it
OR
(iii) having a legal duty to prevent commission and fails to make proper
effort
45
ACTUS REUS: aids or agrees to aid or attempts to aid principal in planning or
commission
*omission satisfies IF D has legal duty to prevent
State v VT (MERE PRESENCE NOT ENOUGH to meet actus reus of complicity in Utah)
Not enough evidence to show D encouraged theftno slight conduct or verbage, was
merely present
was not a lookout, did not encourage the crime
PASSIVE BEHAVIOR/PRESENCE NOT ENOUGH FOR ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY
DOES NOT MEET ACTUS REUS
State v Walden (OMISSION OF AFFIRMATIVE DUTY + PRESENCE IS ENOUGH to meet actus reus
of complicity)
MOTHER D WAS PRESENT WHILE BOYFRIEND BEAT HER 1 YEAR OLD FOR 1 HRS, DID
NOTHING
affirmative duty to protect your childcannot stand by when reasonably within power to
protect child
while mere presence does not establish complicity, combined with affirmative
duty imposed, an act
of omission can establish criminal conduct
D WAS AIDER AND ABETTOR, THUS GUILTY AS A PRINCIPAL
OMISSION CONSTITUTED ENCOURAGEMENT OF THE COMMISSION OF THE ASSAULT
People v Beeman (aided and abetted, liability extends to NATURAL AND REASONABLE
CONSEQUENCES)
D INTENDED TO AID AND ABET PERPETRATORS IN ROBBERY
TEST:
(1) D acted with knowledge of principals criminal purpose
(2) with intent of encouraging commission of the crime
LIABILITY extends to natural and reasonable consequences of acts that D
knowingly and
intentionally aids
46
PROOF OF INTENT TO ASSIST IN THE CRIME REQUIRED FOR AIDING AND
ABETTING
D LIABLE FOR ROBBERY, BURGLARY, DESTRUCTION OF PHONE EQUIPMENT even
though he
wasnt there for the robbery (sketched layout of home, told principals where
jewelry was)
State v Hoselton (MERE PRESENCE NOT ENOUGH for accomplice liability, no MENS REA bc did
not know of plan)
NO PRIOR AGREEMENT, NOT FORESEEABLE TO D THAT FRIENDS WOULD STEAL
WHEN D FOUND OUT ACTS OF FRIENDS, HE REMOVED HIMSELF FROM THE SITUTATION
the only evidence was a confession, when asked if he was a lookout, he replied you could
say that
*does not establish he was an aider and abettor
DID NOT INTEND HIS FRIENDS TO COMMIT LARCENYlacked mens rea to help commit
crime
*also cannot get him on natural and probable consequences doctrine, because (4) NOT
FORESEEABLE
*no FM prosecution bc armed robbery not enumerated in Maine, AND bc D asserted mens
rea defense
and FM is an SL crime
*no need for intent to kill if killing was result of natural and probable
consequences
State v Medina (NATURAL AND PROBABLE CONSEQ of gang fight is death, STANDARD
NEGLIGENCE in jurisdic)
D AIDED AND ABETTED ASSAULT
COURT EMPLOYS NEGLIGENCE STANDARDseems to go against name of doctrine
*does not need to be PROBABLE that someone would die in gang fight, only that it is
POSSIBLE
OBJECTIVE STANDARD: would a reasonable person know/should have known someone
might
47
be killed in a gang fight?
People v Flayhart (INTENTIONAL OMISSION OF DUTY to provide care satisfies ACTUS REUS of
complicityNY)
Husband and Wife had affirmative duties to care for husbands brother
mens rea: negligence
CAN BE AN ACCOMPLICE TO NEGLIGENCE CRIMES
CAN INTENTIONALLY AID ANOTHER IN FAILING TO PERCEIVE A SUBSTANTIAL AND
UNJUSTIFIABLE
RISKnegligent unintentional homicide
each intentionally aided the other in conduct AND each also acted with
negligence because
they each failed to perceive risk of death, and intentionally aided
each other in failing to provide food and medical care, which caused
brothers death
*if police unable to intervene, prosecution can convict on BOTH conspiracy AND the target
offense
DOES NOT MERGE (unlike attempt and solicitation)
rationale: conspiracy presents extra dangers, and the extra danger justifies double
punishment
*co-conspirators can also be held vicariously liable for acts of other co-conspirators (like
complicity)holds
people responsible for the acts of others
COMMON LAW ONLY
MPC: must get them on complicity, automatic co-conspirator liability rejected
48
Common Law Doctrinal Structure
ACTUS REUS:
over act = any form of observable conduct undertaken as part of the conspiracy
(any act OK)
Unilateral Conspiracy
=actual agreement not necessary so long as D believes the other is
agreeing
49
BUT CAN INFER INTENT FROM KNOWLEDGE Pinkerton v US
Whartons Rule
you CANNOT prosecute a 2-person conspiracy if the crime by definition
requires 2 people to
commit
statute MUST provide that both participants are culpable for the conductif
the two
conspirators are not the parties necessary to commit the offense, can
charge consp.
a party to a conspiracy is liable for any criminal act committed by a co-conspirator if it is within
the scope
of the conspiracy OR it is a foreseeable consequence of the unlawful agreement
problem with doctrine: VERY BROAD LIABILITYbc conspiracies are usually open ended,
they can last a
long time and involve many parties and many crimesthis doctrine holds every
member of the
conspiracy liable for every crime committed by every other member to the
conspiracy as long as
the crime is among the objects of the conspiracy or is a reasonably foreseeable
outgrowth of the
conspiracy
Merger Doctrine DOES NOT apply: if attempted or completed, prosecuted for conspiracy AND
attempt or target
rationale: conspiracy presents extra dangers, and the extra danger justifies double
punishment
MPC
ACTUS REUS:
(1) agreeing to engage in conduct that constitutes a crime or attempted crime
OR
(2) agreeing to aid in planning or commission of crime or attempted crime
AND
(3) overt act in pursuance of conspiracy, EXCEPT in 1st and 2nd degree felonies, no
overt act
needed
MENS REA
(1) must act with purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the
conduct that
constitutes the offense
51
*no 2-person minimum re mens rea like in common law: onlu 1 person
must truly agree-
so undercover cops, insane, incapable count--UNILATERAL
JURISDICTION
DEFENSE: requires:
(1) COMPLETE renunciation
(2) VOLUNTARY renunciation AND
(3) THWARTING the success of the conspiracy
*no overt act requirement at the time, but Wyoming NOW requires it
Washington v Pacheco (CANNOT AGREE WITH FEIGNING PARTY, does not meet ACTUS REUS
for conspiracy)
Bilateral jurisdictionneed 2 people minimum to have mens rea, cannot include
police officers
YOU CANNOT AGREE WITH A FEIGNING PARTYpolice officer was predending to agree
D DID NOT CONSPIRE WITH ANYONE
although D had requisite criminal intent, he lacked the criminal act of
agreementno genuine
agreement
LAW in WA: requires D to reach a genuine agreement with at least one other genuine co-
conspirator
52
People v Lauria (mens rea for conspiracy, INFERRING INTENT FROM KNOWLEDGE)
for FELONIES, intent to commit the conspiracy can be inferred from knowledge that the
buyer will use the
goods or services for criminal purposes IF
(1) there is direct evidence that he intends to participate OR
(2) through an inference that he intends to participate based on
(a) a special interest in the activity
(b) the aggravated nature of the crime itself
special interest in the activity can be inferred
(1) when purveyor of legal goods for illegal purposes has acquired a stake in the
venture, OR
(2) when no legitimate (lawful) use for the goods or services exist, OR
(3) when the volume of business with the buyer is grossly disproportionate to any
legitimate
demand, OR when sales for illegal use amount to a high proportion of sellers
total business
for MISDEMEANORS, intent CANNOT be inferred from mere knowledge that buyer is using
products for
criminal purposes
HOWEVER, intent CAN still be inferred from knowledge IF supplier has special
interest in
operation of the criminal enterprise
special interest can be inferred
(1) when purveyor of legal goods for illegal purposes has acquired a stake in the
venture, OR
(2) when no legitimate (lawful) use for the goods or services exist, OR
(3) when the volume of business with the buyer is grossly disproportionate to any
legitimate
demand, OR when sales for illegal use amount to a high proportion of sellers
total business
US. v Feola (ATTENDANT CIRCUMST. for conspiracysame as mens rea for target crime
ASSAULT ON COP)
conspiracy to assault a police officer
Ds defense: lacked mens rea because didnt know he was a cop
Court: it is an SL crime, no requirement that actor must know he is assaulting a police
officer
TAKEAWAY: YOU CAN BE PROSECUTED UNDER A CONSPIRACY THEORY FOR SL TARGET
CRIME
EVEN THOUGH CONSPIRACY IS A SPECIFIC INTENT CRIMENO SCIENTER REQUIRED
FOR
ACTOR, ONLY ACTUS REUS
IF YOU HAVE AN ATTENDANT CIRCUMSTANCE FOR A CRIME, IT IS THE SAME AS THE MENS
REA FOR
THE UNDERLYING CRIME
53
D agreed to conspiracy and did not withdraw, even though he didnt know his brother was
carrying out
the conspiracy, liable for his brothers acts bc did not withdraw
RULE: AGREEMENT IS THE FORMATION OF CRIMINAL INTENT
+
OVERT ACT OF ANY CO-CONSPIRATOR IN FURTHERANCE OF THE CONSPIRACY
THAT IS A
FORESEEABLE CONSEQUENCE OF THE UNLAWFUL AGREEMENT,
CONSPIRATORS
LIABLE
a party to a conspiracy is liable for any criminal act committed by a co-conspirator if it is
within the scope
of the conspiracy OR it is a foreseeable consequence of the unlawful agreement
(vicarious liability if in furtherance of conspiracy)
US v Jiminez Recio (duration of conspiracyDOES NOT TERMINATE when police defeat object
of conspiracy)
D claims not guilty because he joined the conspiracy AFTER POLICE seized the drugs
Court: CONSPIRACY DOES NOT TERMINATE WHEN POLICE DEFEAT THE OBJECT OF THE
CONSPIRACYYOU ARE STILL DANGEROUS BECAUSE YOU AGREED TO COMMIT
UNLAWFUL
ACTS
conspiracy does not end when object of conspiracy becomes impossible to
complete
the agreement is still a threat to the public due to the likelihood that other
crimes will be
committed
MUST WITHDRAW/ABANDON (or Whartons Rule if applicable)
54
SOLICITATION (specific intent crime AND theory of vicarious liability)a crime in every
state
55
*no soliciation occurs if solicitor intends to commit substantive offense himself but requests
assistance of another
*CRIME OF SOLICITATION COMPLETE THE INSTANT THE ACTOR SOLICITS ANOTHERNO NEED
FOR FURTHER
ACT BY SOLICITEE
*VICARIOUS LIABILITY makes solicitor liable for ANY crime the solicitee commitsvicarious
liability
usually treated as lesser offense than crime solicited (like attempt)
rationale: get the actor early in the process due to the increased danger of using agents
to commit crime
Doctrinal Structure:
ACTUS REUS: must promote/encourage/hire/request/command another to commit a crime
BROAD
*act complete at time of solicitation, no need for further act by
solicitee
words alone are enough
*will MERGE (see below) if solicitee takes action towards or completes crime
MENS REA: solicitor must intend the solicitee to commit the target crime AND intend the
outcome
DEFENSES: Renunciation
(1) must renounce completely AND voluntarily
AND
(2) must persuade solicitee not to commit offense OR prevent the solicitee
from commiting
*cannot be out of fear of getting caught, to wait for more opportune time,
to transfer
target of the crime, etc. MUST BE VOLUNTARY AND COMPLETE
COMMON LAW
ACTUS REUS
(1) invites, requests, commands, or encourages
*ACT IS COMPLETE THE INSTANT THE ACTOR SOLICITS ANOTHERNO
NEED
FOR FURTHER ACT BY SOLICITEE
56
MENS REA (dual)
(1) intentionally invites, requests, commands, or encourages another
person to engage in
conduct constituting a crime
AND
(2) must intend that the person solicited commit the target offense
MPC
ACTUS REUS
(1) with such purpose he commands encourages, or requests another
person to
engage in conduct that would constitute the crime, an attempt to
commit it, or
would establish the other persons complicity in its commission or
attempted commission
MENS REA
(1) Ds purpose is to promote or facilitate the commission of a substantive
offense
majority rule: solicitor NOT liable if he uses an innocent agentdoes not meet mens rea
*GET THEM FOR ATTEMPT IF BARRED BY INNOCENT AGENT RULE
minority rule: solicitor LIABLE even if uses an innocent agent (State v Bush)
State v Bush (MINORITY jurisdiction re INNOCENT AGENTS, can prosecute solicitor for using
innocent agent)
Montana Minority Jurisdiction
IT IS THE INTENT OF THE SOLICITOR, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER ACTOR IS INNOCENT
AGENT
SOLICITATION OF ANOTHER TO POSSESS DANGEROUS DRUGS
PROPERTY CRIMES
3 traditional forms of theft: Larceny/Larceny by trick, Embezzlement, False Pretenses
possession: sufficient control over the property to use it in a relatively unrestricted manner
possessor has actual or constructive control of the property with the intent to possess
it and has the
right to exclude others from possessing it at that time
custody: physical control over the property, usually for a very short period of time and usually for
limited purpose
(custodians right to use property is restricted)
title: ownership
(distinct from embezzlement which occurs when the thief obtains lawful possession then
converts it to his
own use)
2 degrees
-grand theftvalue of stolen property greater than $950
-petty theftvalue of stolen property less than $950
Doctrinal Structure
Actus Reus : the trespassory taking and carrying away of the property of another
Mens Rea: intent to deprive owner permanently of property
Attendant Circumstances: personal property belongs to another
Defenses: Claim of Right
59
purpose: so that if D did not intend to permanently deprive owner of property when
taken, but
later decides to steal it, you can prosecute for larceny bc concurrence
requirement of
intent to steal and taking of property satisfied
IE: if D non-consensually takes As car and intended to return it the next day, but
then decides to
keep car permanently, not guilty of larceny at time of taking (bc no mens rea
to
permanently deprive) BUT under continuing trespass, since the moment he
decided to keep car permanently, each moment thereafter D is committing
the actus reus of larceny anew
*if thefts were part of a continuous act, a single larceny has occurred
61
Robbery (specific intent crime)
62
the felonious taking of personal property in the possession of another, from his person or
immediate
presence, and against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear
*essentially an aggravated form of theft: use of force or fear to disposess the victim
of property
fear=sufficient fear to cause victim to comply with the unlawful demand for his property
can be inferred from circumstances, no need for direct proof of fear
intimidation of victim equates with fear
Doctrinal Structure
Actus Reus
Mens Rea: specific intent to deprive the victim of the property permanently
CA Robbery Statute
(1) Felonious taking
(2) of personal property
(3) in the possession of another
(4) from his person or immediate presence
(5) against his will
(6) by means of force or fear
63
64
False Pretenses (specific intent crime)
every person who shall knowingly and designedly, by any false or fraudulent
misrepresentation or
pretense, defraud any other person of money, labor, or real or personal property
D knowingly misrepresents present or past fact which induces the victim to give D title to
the property
requires intent to defraud
conversion: an act that seriously interferes with the owners ability to use that property
-using something up
-selling it/ giving it away
-using it as collateral for a loan
- delivering it to someone not entitled to it
-inflicting serious damage to it
66
Burglary (specific intent crime)
Doctrinal Structure:
Actus Reus: entering a dwelling
Mens Rea: intent to commit a felony therein
Attendant Circumstances: dwelling of another
*burglary complete even if felony not committed once insideNO NEED TO TAKE
ANYTHING
(possessory interest of physical dwelling is breached once penetrated, no need to
dispossess)
People v Davis (passing a check into a slot DOES NOT COUNT AS ENTRY for purposes of
burglary)
D PASSED A CHECK INTO SLOT TO CASH A FALSE CHECK
Court: cannot define enter so broadly
MUST BE PHYSICAL PENETRATION OF DWELLING THAT THREATENS OWNERSHIP (body,
tools, etc)
67
Arson
(1) the burning
(2) of the real property
(3) of another
(4) without consent or with unlawful intent
68
RAPEgeneral intent crime
Traditional CL Def: unlawful sexual intercourse with a woman without her consent with
force, fear or
fraud
Doctrinal Structure
ACTUS REUS: specified sexual acts, done by force, fear, fraud
DEFENSES: Mistake of Fact (re D did not know he didnt have consent)
*not all jurisdictions
[Insanity]
69
Modern Definition:
(1) specified sexual act or acts
(2) victim non-consent AND
(3) proof of Ds culpable disregard for victims non-consent
Modern Doctrine
(1) Lack of Consent
(2) Elimination/relaxation of resistance requirement
(3) Elimination/relaxation of physical force requirement
(4) Emphasis on Ds culpable disregard for victims non-consent
-sufficient notice of non-consent = FORCE REQUIREMENT
-Ds negligence in regards to non-consent = NO FORCE REQUIREMENT
70
force to accomplish act
NOT ENOUGH D COMMITED ACT WITHOUT VICTIMS CONSENT
few jurisdictions: have eliminated the word force from their statutes
it is enough that D used the force necessary to accomplish the sexual act
CA Force:
prosecution need only show D used physical force of a degree sufficient to
support a finding
that the act of sexual intercourse was against the will of the victim People
v Griffin
Fraud in Rape
CA Rape Statute
(a) Rape is an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a person not the spouse
of the
perpetrator, under any of the following circumstances:
71
(1) Where a person is incapable, because of a mental disorder or
developmental or physical
disability, of giving legal consent, and this is known or reasonably
should be known to the person committing the act
(4) Where a person is at the time unconscious of the nature of the act, and
this is known to
the accused. As used in this paragraph, unconscious of the nature of
the act means
incapable of resisting because the victim meets one of the following
conditions:
(5) Where a person submits under the belief that the person committing the
act is the
victims spouse, and this belief is induced by an artifice, pretence, or
concealment practice by the accused, with intent to induce the belief
(6) Where the act is accomplished against the victims will by threatening to
retaliate in the
future against the victim or any other person, and there is a reasonable
possibility that the perpetrator will execute the threat. As used in this
paragraph, threaten to retaliate means a threat to kidnap or falsely
imprison, or to inflict extreme pain, serious bodily injury or death
72
A CURRENT or PREVIOUS dating or marital relationship SHALL NOT BE
SUFFICIENT to
constitute consent where consent is at issue
force = the prosecution need only show the defendant used physical force of a
degree sufficient to
support a finding that the act of sexual intercourse was against the will of the
victim
Brown v State (victim must USE EVERY PHYSICAL POWER TO RESIST rape)
D convicted of rape, asserts only that V tried to escape, did not try to resist physically
victim DID NOT PUT UP THE UTMOST RESISTANCE
absence of consent is not enough
NO EVIDENCE OF PHYSICAL RESISTANCEno marks on D of signs of struggle
-she said let her go, she screamed
-no other verbal protests
-tried to escape, but retreat is not the same as resistance
very harsh, later decisions rejected this decision, in 1905
People v Barnes (rape must be committed AGAINST VS WILL BY MEANS OF FORCE OR FEAR OF
INJURY)
D convicted of rape, no proof V resisted or that D used force to overcome her resistance
REJECTION OF PROOF OF RESISTANCE requirement in 1966
now only need the crime to be committed against victims will and by means of
force or fear of
immediate and unlawful bodily injury
(some can be paralyzed with fear, others its too dangerous to resist)
LACK OF RESISTANCE DOES NOT CONSTITUTE CONSENT
Resistance now used as evidence to evaluate whether D reasonably/honestly believed he
had consent
73
DEFENSES
Justification: was D justified in doing what he did?
indicates Ds conduct was morally good/socially desirable/or not wrongful
outcome (harm) of Ds conduct is proper
IE:
-whether gun was loaded
-mistake about who owned the laptop taken by D in theft case
**mistake DOES NOT HAVE TO BE REASONABLE if the mens rea of the offense is
purposely or knowingly
STEPS OF ANALYSIS:
(1) Does the MOF relate to an element of the offense as to which mens rea is
required?
AND, if so,
(2) Does the MOF negate the mens rea? IF YES, CAN ASSERT MOF DEFENSE
(unless SL offense)
74
Common Law MOF
General Intent Crimes:
-MOF must negate general intent mens rea element of the offense
IE unauthorized use of anothers car: MOF that she had consent of owner negates
mens rea
75
MISTAKE OF LAW (generally not a valid defense, but there are exceptions)
4 valid MOL defenses: MPC 2.04, p. 265 (MUST NEGATE MENS REA
REQUIREMENT OF CRIME)
(1) mistakes about mens rea (mistake of specialized legal knowledge that negates mens
rea) Regina v Smith
(2) if knowledge that prohibited conduct is unlawful is an element of the crime rare
(3) reasonable reliance on official statement of law later changed/deemed invalid rare
(4) inadequate publication of the law rare
*unlike MOF, MOL DOES NOT HAVE TO BE REASONABLE TO BE VALIDONLY NEEDS TO NEGATE
MENS REA
STEPS OF ANALYSIS
(1) Identify attendant circumstances
(2) Does D require specific knowledge regarding the attendant
circumstances?
(3) Identify Mens Rea required in the statute
(4) Does D lack the mens rea? IF YES, CAN ASSERT MOL DEFENSE
People v Rypinski 1990, p. 248 (acquitted of shooting friend bc mistake of fact re bullets
loaded in his rifle)
A person is not relieved of criminal liability for conduct because he engages in such
conduct under a
mistaken belief of fact UNLESS
(a) such factual mistake negatives the culpable mental state required for the
commission of an
offense NY PENAL LAW
MOF AND INTOXICATION NEGATED MENS REA HERE
D DID NOT KNOW THE RUFLE WAS LOADED (shot his friend in the knee)
ACQUITTED OF RECKLESS ASSAULT 2ND DEG. BC LACK OF KNOWLEDGE NEGATED MENS
REA
A person is guilty of assault in the second degree when:
(4) He recklessly causes serious physical injury to another person by
means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument NY PENAL LAW
United States v Baker 1986, p. 255 (D claimed to not know its crime to sell fake Rolexes-NO
MOF defense)
anyone who intentionally traffics or attempts to traffic in goods or services and
knowingly uses a
counterfeit mark on or in connection with such goods and services
77
(bold = mental elements, underline = non-mental elements)
*D: MOL BECAUSE HE DIDNT KNOW IT WAS ILLEGAL TO SELL FAKE WATCHES
*COURT: KNOWLEDGE IS NOT AN ELEMENT OF THE CRIME OF SELLING WATCHES, NO MOL
DEFENSE
Regina v Smith 1973, p. 267 (YES MOL defense to Criminal Damage Act 1971)
a person who without lawful excuse destroys or damages any property belonging to
another intending to
destroy or damage any such property or being reckless as to whether any such
property would be
destroyed, shall be guilty of an offense
(bold = mental elements, underlined = non-mental elements)
People v Sally Mistook p. 297 (burglary specific intent, trespass general intent, abandon
fridge strict liability)
Burglary: every person who enters any building or part of a building at night with intent to
commit grand
or petit larceny or any felony is guilty of burglary
Trespass: every person who willfully commits a trespass by any of the following is guilty
of a
misdemeanor:
(a) entering and occupying real property or structures of any kind without the
consent of the
owner, the owners guest, or the person in lawful possession
Abandoned Refrigerators: every person who discards or leaves in any place accessible to
children any
refrigerator, having a capacity of one and one-half cubic feet or more, which is no
longer in use, and
which has not had the door removed or the hinges and such portion of the latch
mechanism
removed to prevent latching or locking of the door is guilty of an infraction (MINOR
OFFENSE)
NECESSITYJustification
*Choice between 2 evils
78
*triggered when actor engages in what would otherwise be a crime to order to avoid a
greater harm
*MUST SHOW THE EVIL CHOSEN WAS GREATER THAN THE OTHER EVIL
*traditionally used in situations where necessity is borne out of FORCES OF NATURE, and Ds
action is in interest
of the general welfare (as opposed to duress = human forces)
rationale for necessity defense: public policythe law ought to promote the achievement
of higher
values at the expense of lesser values, and sometimes the greater good for society
will be
accomplished by violating the literal language of the criminal law
ELEMENTS of Necessity
(1) D must be faced with clear and imminent danger
(2) D must reasonably expect that his action will be effective in abating the danger
he seeks to avoid
(3) there must be no effective legal way to avert the harm
(4) the harm that D will cause by violating law must be less serious that the harm
he seeks to avoid
(5) the legislature must not have precluded the particular choice of evils defense
that D is seeking
(some enumerate crimes that are not eligible for necessity defense, ie
homicide)
(6) D must have clean hands (not have wrongfully placed himself in the situation)
Limitations
-some states limit necessity to emergencies created by natural forces (exclude
human forces)
-some states limit to protections of persons or property only
-DOES NOT APPLY TO HOMICIDE CASES (use self defense/imperfect self defense
instead)
People v Lovercamp (2 INMATES ESCAPE because threatened with rape by other inmates)
met all 6 elements of DURESS
ADDED ELEMENT for prison escapees:
Must turn themselves into authorities immediately upon escape
(here, they were immediately apprehended, so immaterial in this case)
79
80
SELF-DEFENSEJustification
person is justified in using deadly force against another if (a) he is not the aggressor and
(b) he reasonably
believes that such force is necessary to repel the imminent use of unlawful deadly
force by the other
person
(deadly force = force likely to cause or intended to cause death or serious bodily harm)
*aggressor may not use deadly force in self defense UNLESS regained the right of SD, see
below
*if person acted with reasonable belief that emergency existed and there were no
alternatives available,
sufficient EVEN IF BELIEFS ARE MISTAKENobjective reasonable man test
APPLIES TO:
(1) an innocent party facing a deadly threat (if you are at fault, does not
apply)
(2) outside the home and (cannot be inside your home)
(3) when innocent party wishes to use deadly force in response to threat
81
MAJORITY DO NOT REQUIRE RETREAT RULES
Initial Aggressor Rule (some jurisdictionsother jurisdictions have last wrongdoer rule)
Once D starts a violent conflict, he remains an aggressor (AND CANNOT ASSERT
SELF DEFENSE)
UNLESS D takes some significant and usually dramatic action to restore Self
Defense rights
= renunciation of aggression with BOTH words and deeds
= withdraws from the conflict
*if no withdrawal of D from conflict, cannot assert self defense EVEN IF other
party
wrongfully escalated the conflict from non-deadly to deadly force
**very harsh rule when there are 2 wrongdoerssome states instead have
last wrongdoer
rule to avoid this harshness
Defense of Others
majority rule: intervenor may use deadly/non deadly force to the extent that such
force
reasonably appears to the intervenor to be justified in defense of the 3rd
party
minority rule: intervenor may only use force to defend a 3rd party if the 3rd party
would in fact haven been justified in using force in self defense, and
force that is proportional to the
threat
82
MPC
A person is generally justified in using force upon another person if he believes that
such force is
immediately necessary to protect himself against the exercise of unlawful
force by the other
individual on the present occasion
DURESS/COERCIONExcuse
where extrinsic circumstances compel a person to perform unlawful acts he does not wish
to commit
but was forced to in response to threat of death or great bodily harm
*traditionally used in situations where duress is borne out of HUMAN ACTION, and Ds action does
not promote
general welfare (as opposed to necessity defense = natural forces)
83
ELEMENTS of Duress
(1) when another person has threatened to kill or seriously injure D or a 3rd party
(2) D reasonably believed the threat was genuine
(3) the treat was imminent at the time of Ds criminal act
(4) there was no reasonable escape from threat except through compliance with
coercers demands
(5) D was not at fault for finding himself in the coercive situation
(6) DOES NOT APPLY TO HOMICIDE
People v Lovercamp (SEE NECESSITY ABOVE, BUT IT WAS REALLY MORE A CASE OF DURESS)
US v Contento-Pachon (D SMUGGLED DRUGS INTO US to avoid his and his familys death)
Court allowed DURESS instruction, NOT necessity instruction
necessity is for general welfare interests and forces of nature, not applicable here
CAN ASSERT DURESS WHEN UNDER FUTURE THREAT OF HARM IF CANNOT ESCAPE
SITUATION
issue for court regarding Duress: was the threat immediate, and was D lacking in an
opportunity to escape?
*avenue of escape must be reasonable: was not reasonable to flee with family:
would need to pack
up belongings, quit job, travel beyond reaches of drug traffickers
*immediate here = force of threats continued to restrain him until off the flight
and refusal to
comply = immediate death of him and his family
84
INSANITYExcuse--focuses on Ds condition at the time of the offense
rationale: those who lack mental capacity to conform to strictures of the law should not
be held criminally
responsible for their conduct
85
(2) D lacks substantial capacity to appreciate wrongfulness/criminality of his
conduct
OR
(2) lacks capacity to conform his conduct to requirements of the law
CA TEST (from 2009 prop 8before this test was MNaughten from 1982-2008, now again
like
MNaughten)
(1) D is incapable of knowing or understanding the nature or quality of his act
OR
(2) D is incapable of distinguishing right from wrong
(3) at the time of the commission of the offense
87
INTOXICATIONExcuse
EVALUATED AT TIME OFFENSE COMMITTED
common law treats it as an affirmative defense
*2 distinct defenses
(1) voluntary intoxication
CANNOT BE ASSERTED FOR GENERAL INTENT CRIME (People v Register)
ONLY ASSERTABLE FOR SPECIFIC INTENT CRIMES TO NEGATE SPECIFIC INTENT
MENS REA
*D must show he did not have specific intent required for commission of crime due
to intoxication
D MUST ARGUE WHY INTOXICATION SHOULD ELIMINATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY
MPC: may be used to negate mens rea of PURPOSE OR KNOWLEDGE BUT NOT
RECKLESSNESS OR
NEGLIGENCE
People v Register (NO VOLUNTARY INTOXICATION defense when GENERAL INTENT CRIME)
*CANNOT USE INTOXICATION DEFENSE WHEN CRIME IS 2ND DEGREE
UNINTENTIONAL MURDER
BECAUSE IT IS A GENERAL INTENT CRIME
*CANNOT USE VOLUNTARY INTOXICATION DEFENSE WHEN MENS REA ELEMENT
OF CRIME IS
RECKLESSNESS
because it is in itself reckless to get so intoxicated, so it cannot negate the mens rea of
recklessness
THEREFORE D GUILTY OF 2ND DEGREE UNINTENTIONAL HOMICIDE (depraved heart
murder, mens rea
is reckless)
DIMINISHED CAPACITYExcuse
88
*lack of capacity to entertain required mental state for the crime
*not a true affirmative defenseaffects evaluation of whether prosecution has proved the
requisite mens rea
EVALUATED AT TIME OFFENSE COMMITTED
INCOMPETENCE
*lack of ability to understand the legal proceedings and assist in his own defense
*can arise at many points during criminal case
EVALUATED DURING CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
lack of competence bars prosecution while D incompetent
court can delay or suspend criminal proceedings
resume proceedings if D regains competence
89
ETC
MORAL CONDEMNATION OF THE COMMUNITY
PUNISHMENT IS JUSTIFIED BY COMMUNITY CONDEMNATION
Burden of Proof
(1) BURDEN OF PRODUCTION
-burden of producing evidence
-P: burden of producing evidence re the elements of the crime charged
-D: burden of producing evidence re the affirmative defenses
*must show that a jury could reasonably find X
*effect is that the issue has been properly raised to try upon
Police control first portal: whether and how to investigate (incl. minimal or extensive
investigation)
-influences: police policy, legal boundaries, info available about case, social/cultural
perceptions, gravity of
harm, criminal history of the accused, policy resources
-If police decide case warrants prosecution, they contact prosecutors office Prosecutors
control second
portal: the charging of a crime (rules, standards, and statues govern this discretion)
-influences: limited time and resources, changes in political/social dynamics, new research,
education or
90
info
-turn to statutes to determine if the law is applicable to particular cases (federal, state,
and local)
-if conduct involved violated criminal law + merits prosecution, jurisdictions
charging procedures
Plea Negotiations: 90%+ state and 95% federal convictions are pleas of guiltydont go to trial
get early guilty
plea for lighter sentences than might be assigned if D pushes case through system
Discovery: P and sometimes D provide info about case to opposing sidedisclose exculpatory
info (favorable to D)
91
-crime and punishment are both evils because they both result in pain to
indiv and society
-PAIN OF PUNISHMENT UNDESIRABLE UNLESS LIKELY TO PREVENT
MORE PAIN
IN THE FUTURE THAN IT INFLICTS BY PUNISHMENT
-purpose is to prevent future crime, not to punish prior wrongdoing
-forms:
-general and specific deterrence
-rehabilitation
(2) Retribution
-foundation: wrongdoing creates moral disequilibrium in society
wrongdoer receives benefits of others obeying the law but he
does not do so
proportional punishment restores equilibrium: pays his debt
-humans possess free will, and it is a choice to commit wrongs, so
punishment justified
-PAIN OF PUNISHMENT UNDESIRABLE UNLESS PERSON HAS FREELY
CHOSEN
TO COMMIT AN OFFENSE (PUNISH WRONG IF PERSON LACKS FREE
CHOICE)
-purpose: to punish the wrongdoing itself, regardless of future prevention
-forms: retribution
Dudley v Stephens 1884, p. 532 (marooned, cannibalism, defense of necessity not valid when
you kill people)
NECESSITY DEFENSE CANNOT BE INVOKED IN HOMICIDE
Court: more important to preserve the integrity of life than to preserve your own
Killing of Parker not justified, Ds may have survived 4 more days until rescue without
eating Parker
Sentence commuted, was death penalty, speaks to denunciation
92
United States v Bergman, 1976, p. 34 (Rabbi defrauded govt, court decided appropriate
types of punishment)
RETRIBUTION, DENUNCIATION, GENERAL DETERRENCE
Court gave Rabbi 4 months in prisonthis was a premeditated crime, court does not want
to make
exceptions for privileged offenders
D argued for behavioral sanction ie community service, volunteer work
court: that would not be a punishment as Rabbi would be doing what he does for a
living as punish.
Rabbi has free will, chose to commit the crime
93