Studies in Conflict & Terrorism

ISSN: 1057-610X (Print) 1521-0731 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/uter20

Countering Jihadi Terrorists and Radicals the

French Way

Dorle Hellmuth

To cite this article: Dorle Hellmuth (2015) Countering Jihadi Terrorists and Radicals the French
Way, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 38:12, 979-997, DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2015.1076277

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2015.1076277

Published online: 24 Aug 2015.

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Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 38:979997, 2015
Copyright Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
ISSN: 1057-610X print / 1521-0731 online
DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2015.1076277

Countering Jihadi Terrorists and Radicals

the French Way

DORLE HELLMUTH

Department of Politics
The Catholic University of America
Washington, DC, USA

The 2015 Charlie Hebdo attacks warrant a detailed profile of the French approach to
countering Jihadi terrorism. Much has been written about the tough French
counterterrorism regime, which originated in 1986 and remains unique among Western
democracies. There has been less analysis of Frances lengthy list of post-9/11
reforms, and even less discussion of the French approach to counterradicalization. In
fact, France was among only few European countries that did not engage in any
soft counterradicalization programs after the 2004 Madrid and the 2005 London
bombings. The mass exodus of foreign fighters to Syria led to a first national
counterradicalization plan in 2014. In response to the Paris attacks, much in line with
its security-oriented methods and outlook, the French government increased
counterterrorism spending and surveillance powers. Various other measures are
noteworthy, however, as they focus on prison radicalization and represent an effort to
strengthen the counterradicalization campaign.

The January 2015 Charlie Hebdo attacks warrant a closer look at the French approach to
countering Jihadi terrorism. Since 9/11, much has been written about the tough French
regime, which originated in 1986.1 Criticized by some and admired by others, French
counterterrorism institutions and policies were considered an important reason for why
France did not suffer a Jihadi attack at home after 1996, and until 2012. While an analysis
of the foundation and underlying principles of the counterterrorism arsenal is useful for
many reasons, it is equally important to note that French counterterrorism tools and insti-
tutions were further adjusted, reformed, and expanded after 9/11.
There has been less review and debate of these post-9/11 reforms and even less dis-
cussion of French counterradicalization measures. In fact, Frances approach to Jihadi
radicalization merits detailed analysis because France was among only few European
countries that did not engage in soft counterradicalization measures after the 2004
Madrid and Van Gogh attacks, and the 2005 London bombings. In other words, while
arresting and prosecuting terrorist suspects on a regular basis, the French government did
not attempt to prevent individuals from radicalizing or reintegrate those who have
become infected with the Jihadi virus. Only in the context of the recent mass exodus of

Received 5 June 2015; accepted 21 July 2015.

Address correspondence to Dorle Hellmuth, Assistant Professor of Politics, The Catholic Uni-
versity of America, 620 Michigan Avenue, NE, Washington, DC 20064, USA. E-mail:
hellmuth@cua.edu

979
980 D. Hellmuth

French foreign fighters to Syria did the government announce a policy review in 2014 and
a first national counterradicalization strategy.
The article proceeds as follows: The first part takes stock of French domestic counter-
terrorism reforms since 9/11. The second part discusses the French perspective on coun-
terradicalization, and the changes that have occurred since 2014. Against this backdrop,
the third part evaluates the steps that have been announced in response to the 2015
attacks. Illustrating a familiar pattern and much in line with its security-oriented
approach, the French government increased counterterrorism spending and personnel and
pledged to strengthen intelligence surveillance powers. Several other measures are of
note, however, as they focus on preventing prison radicalization.

Countering Jihadi Terrorism in France

Various scholars have written about the tough French counterterrorism approach after 9/
11, drawing particular attention to the seemingly almighty investigating judges and
their close relationship with one of the domestic intelligence services, the Directorate of
Territorial Surveillance, DST (Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire).2 The law of 9
September 1986 reform centralized counterterrorism powers in the position of seven
investigating magistrates (juge dinstruction), responsible for leading all preliminary
counterterrorism investigations across France.3 The specialized investigating magistrates
combine prosecutorial and judicial powers in one person. Their wide-ranging powers
include the rights to investigate, detain, and authorize wiretaps, search warrants, and sub-
poenas. In theory, they are tasked with leading impartial investigations to determine
whether official judicial proceedings should be launched and terrorist suspects be prose-
cuted. According to Shapiro, however, in practice, the terrorism magistrates are not
impartial investigators, they act like prosecutors but have the powers of a judge.4 Despite
this impressive array of powers, they still lacked the manpower and logistics to utilize
them to the fullest. The investigating magistrates thus struck up a symbiotic alliance with
the DST in the 1990s.5 This arrangement was deemed equally beneficial by the DST
agents who not only gained status but also executive powers, allowing them to boost their
preventive counterterrorism arsenal. The regime was further enhanced by the conspiracy
to commit a terrorist offense clause contained in the 1996 reform act that allows French
authorities to act preventively against terrorist suspects. Most important, the crimeterror-
ism linkage allowed for the preventive investigation and prosecution of criminal activities
as terrorist acts, provided they were at least remotely thought to be connected to terrorist
activity. In addition, criminal offenses that fall into the terrorism category automatically
trigger more severe penalties and judicial procedures (e.g., longer pre-charge detention),
as well as broader investigative powers.
Also of note, the French recognized a growing need to facilitate coordination, joint
intelligence analysis, and information sharing, at the operational level. The Anti-Terrorist
Coordination Unit, UCLAT (Unit
e de Coordination de la Lutte Anti-Terroriste), was cre-
ated in 1984 within the Interior Ministry and represents, in several ways, an early forerun-
ner of the British JTAC (Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre) and the American TTIC
(Terrorist Threat Integration Center, renamed National Counterterrorism Center in 2004),
created in 2002 and 2003, respectively. The UCLAT, generally overseen by a police rep-
resentative at the rank of commissaire divisionaire but led by the director general of the
National Police during times of crises,6 was designed to strengthen cooperation between
law enforcement and intelligence services. Serving as an all-source fusion center for ter-
rorist-related information, it was responsible for threat analysis and also served as a sort
 Countering Jihadi Terrorists and Radicals the French Way 981

of secretariat for the Interministerial Committee of the Fight Against Terrorism, CILAT
(Comit
e Interminist

eriel de Lutte Anti-Terroriste), an interagency platform at the high
policy level that convened twice every year.
Even though France already had a substantial counterterrorism arsenal at the time of
the 9/11 attacks, the French government continued to boost investigative and preventive
powers in the years afterward. Consistent with the previous approach, terrorism legisla-
tion passed after 2001 also assumed and targeted links between crime-related activities
and terrorism, including money laundering, drug trafficking, and weapons smuggling.
Ordinary crimes and delinquency have been purposefully targeted to detect and disrupt
potential terrorismcrime nexuses. Below, French post 9/11 reforms are grouped into the
four categories of (1) prevention and investigation, (2) disruption, (3) prosecution, as well
as (4) coordination and information-sharing.

Prevention and Investigation

Data Collection. Starting in 2001,7 counterterrorism authorities could monitor bank

accounts, and tax records became subject to disclosure requests. Moreover, telecommuni-
cations providers were required to store phone, e-mail, and Internet transactional data for
one year and make it available to law enforcement services. After January 2006,8 all wire-
less Internet access providers, including hotels, cybercaf
es, and so forth, fell into the same
category. Beginning in 2003,9 the Judicial Police could gain remote access to conduct
online searches of private and public databases of financial institutions, telecommunica-
tions providers, and government services, if the data was considered useful to establish
the truth. Also, telecommunication providers could be ordered to retain usage informa-
tion, this time involving contents, for up to one year. Pursuant to a 2006 law, selected
police, gendarmerie, and customs agents could access travel databases with visa, passen-
ger, and passports lists. In addition, airlines, transportation authorities, and travel agents
were required to collect records of passengers going to and from nonEuropean Union
(EU) countries, especially those with terrorist training camps. The government extended
ID checks on trains from the border regions to all of France. New shared databases
enabled National Police and Gendarmerie to jointly access personal files beginning in
2002.10 Starting in 2006, the National Police, Gendarmerie, and the Central Directorate
of General Intelligence, DCRG (Direction Centrale des Renseignements G
en
eraux) could
also cross-reference database information held at the Interior Ministry, including pass-
port, driver license, ID card, and immigration records. The Judicial Police and the two
domestic intelligence services, the DST and DCRG, could access phone and Internet traf-
fic data more easily through a new technical platform beginning in 2007. In July 2013, Le
Monde further reported that Frances foreign intelligence agency, the Directorate-General
of External Security, DGSE (Direction G
en
erale de la S

ecurit

e Ext

erieure), had been col-
lecting and storing Internet, e-mail, and phone communications data of French residents;
the data collection was supposedly subject to administrative CNCIS (Commission Natio-
nale du Contr^ ole des Interceptions de S
e) oversight.11 Airline passenger name
ecurit

records (PNRs) will be collected starting in fall 2015 by means of the systeme API-PNR
France, for the purposes of counterterrorism and other national security threats.12

Camera Surveillance. Video camera surveillance, with images stored for one month,
was expanded across France in 2006. Prefects became authorized to compel any private
or public entities (including banks, airports, department stores, nuclear plants, or
982 D. Hellmuth

industrial plants) to install video cameras; the images were subject to law enforcement
and gendarmerie review. In addition, pictures of cars, their occupants, and license plates
could be stored for at least eight days, and be accessed by gendarmerie, police, and cus-
toms services. The number of surveillance cameras in France was further expanded in
2011.13

Searches. Starting in 2001, stationary, parked, and moving vehicles could be stopped
and searched without probable cause or warrant, only requiring judicial requisition orders.
House searches, subject to warrants, could be conducted on a preliminary basis, and with-
out the residents consent. Items that were found but not specified on the warrant could be
kept and further investigated. Roving wiretaps were introduced in 2003, based on which
computer search warrants extended to networks rather than individual computers. Subject
to judicial approval, police could conduct secret computer searches remotely and in real
time by means of spyware installations since 2011.

Pre-Charge Detention. The period was extended from four to six days in 2006, to be
authorized in two intervals after the first four days and by a so-called freedom and release
judge (rather than an investigating magistrate) in the event of imminent terrorist activity
or international emergencies.

Disruption

Travel. Starting in 2014,14 counterterrorism authorities could confiscate passports and

identity cards, for a period of six months and renewable for up to two years, if there was
serious reason to believe that French nationals were leaving France to engage in terror-
ist activity or terrorist group operations.

Internet. Since 2014, security services have been authorized to block Internet sites that
incite or glorify terrorism, and without requiring judicial approval. Alternatively, Internet
service providers and website hosts could remove the content within 24 hours.

Finances. Pursuant to a 2006 law, financial assets of individuals involved in terrorist

acts could be frozen for six months by means of Economy Ministry decree, subject to
renewal. Individuals engaged in inciting to terrorism could be subjected to asset-freezing
since 2012.

Citizenship. To facilitate the deportation of hate preachers, radical nationals could be

stripped of their citizenship starting in 2006.

Prosecution

Finances. Financial support of terrorist acts and groups became a punishable crime in
2001.

Lone Wolves. Pursuant to a 2014 law, individual terrorist intent suffices as a criminal
offense, as opposed to terrorist activities in association with others.
 Countering Jihadi Terrorists and Radicals the French Way 983

Incitement of Terrorism. While the incitement and glorification of terrorism (both writ-
ten, spoken, and pictorial) have been criminalized since 1881, punishment for online
activities condoning terrorism was stepped up as part of a 2012 law as the offense was
moved from the press law to the criminal code. Starting in 2014, publishing illegal con-
tent became a criminal offense with up to seven years in prison. Targeting lone wolves as
well as online recruitment, the 2014 law also criminalized searching, attaining, or creating
material that could be used in an individuals terrorist activity.

Terrorist Training Camps. The act of visiting either military or ideological training
camps, or committing terrorist acts abroad, became a criminal offense in 2012 so that
individuals could be arrested and prosecuted upon their return, even if terrorist activities
did not occur on French soil.15

Coordination and Information-Sharing

Regional Representation. Starting in 2002, new regional intervention units, GIRs

(Groupements dIntervention R
egionaux), combined National Police (mostly active in
urban areas) and Gendarmerie (focusing on small towns and rural areas) units, in addition
to customs and tax officers. While targeting organized crime networks, the units had rele-
vance for terrorism because of the aforementioned crimeterrorism nexus. Regional pre-
fects who represent the central government outside of Paris gained requisition order
powers for car, database, computer network, and online data searches in 2003. In 2004,
permanent taskforces for combating radical Islam were set up in all of Frances twenty-
two regions, in an effort to better monitor mosques, hate preachers, and prayer rooms.16
Led by the prefects and coordinated by the DCRG, the DST, Customs, local police, and
others participated in the centers as well.

Interagency and Intra-Executive Coordination. After 9/11, various presidential and

prime ministerial advisor positions were created and designed to facilitate interagency
coordination across the national government. A new Elysee czar became the head of the
Domestic Security Council, CSI (Conseil de S
ecurit
erieur), in 2002,17 and was sup-
e Int

posed to coordinate all ministries involved in fighting crime and terrorism (Interior, Jus-
tice, Defense, Budget, Foreign Affairs, Economy, and Finance). A presidential creation,
the new format replaced another council previously under the chairmanship of the prime
minister and therefore also expanded the presidents reach in the domestic security
domain.
Furthermore of note, in 2004 agents from the DST, DCRG, and DGSE were detailed
to a permanent center at the DGSE headquarters.18 This location was chosen so that the
services could take advantage of the foreign intelligence agencys extensive technical
capacities. As opposed to UCLATs more administrative information sharing and threat
analysis functions, so government officials argued, the focus of the new center would
involve operational planning among the services. However, the new joint venture was
also considered a response to UCLATs perceived shortcomings, as UCLAT members
had been criticizing the lack of information sharing among the participating agencies for
years.
Also in 2004, a new Domestic Intelligence Council, CRI (Conseil du Renseignement
erieur), was formed.19 Led by the prime minister, it convened monthly and brought
Int

together members of the domestic intelligence and law enforcement community,
984 D. Hellmuth

including, inter alia, the DST and DCRG, the Judicial Police, and the Gendarmerie. Crit-
ics again called attention to its resemblance with UCLAT, while the government refuted
these comparisons, arguing that the CRI was tasked with crafting strategic guidelines for
information sharing and cooperation for UCLAT, which by contrast, was a permanent
forum responsible for information sharing and threat assessment at the operational level.
Be that as it may, both CSI and CRI were replaced in 2007:20 The CSI was merged with
its defense counterpart, and formed the new Defense and National Security Council,
CDSN (Conseil de D
efense et de S
ecurit
e Nationale). In doing so, President Sarkozy
sought to break the traditional borderline between domestic security and external
security he considered largely obsolete.21 He suggested creating a National Security
Council, very much based on the U.S. model (which, ironically, at the time was separate
from the domestic-oriented Homeland Security Council), which would coordinate and
decide all issues of national security. Representing a truly transnational approach, it was
supposed to be responsible for all homeland security, public safety, and international and
defense issues. Not surprisingly, the council was to be chaired by the president himself.
Officials on both sides of the political divide supported the planhowever, the Ministry
of Defense was concerned about becoming marginalized and insisted on expanding the
national security focus to emphasize defense as part of the councils title and portfolio.22
Serving as a specialized formation of the CDSN, the CRI was renamed National
Intelligence Council, CNR (Conseil National du Renseignement), to be chaired by a presi-
dential intelligence advisor, and therefore under presidential leadership as well. The new
intelligence council and coordinator were tasked with coordinating intelligence services,
in particular with regard to developing intelligence strategies and collection and analysis
priorities, implementation, and sharing; allocating resources; and overseeing the legal
framework for intelligence operation. Once again, this move illustrated the presidential
claims and power expansion in the domestic security arena and continuing marginaliza-
tion of the prime minister in counterterrorism matters. Critics warned against the
concentration of power in the hands of the head of state . . . [which] multiplies the viola-
tions of the principle of political accountability, as the arrangement lacked parliamentary
scrutiny and went against the principles and traditions of the republic.23 Others ques-
tioned the nature of the relationship between the existing UCLAT, responsible to the Inte-
rior Ministry and, therefore, the prime minister, and the new presidential council.24 Yet
others voiced concerns about how political cohabitation could have detrimental effects on
this arrangement in the futureas UCLAT and CNR would be overseen by a prime min-
ister and a president belonging to different parties.25 However, it must be noted that the
latter scenario seems unlikely ever since the constitutional reform of 2000 aligned presi-
dential and parliamentary terms and elections.
Finally, as part of a considerable institutional reform in 2008, the DST and DCRG
were folded into a new Central Directorate of Domestic Intelligence, DCRI (Direction
Centrale du Renseignement Int
erieur), renamed Directorate-General of Domestic Secu-
rity, DGSI (Direction G
en

erale de la S
ecurit

e Int

erieure), in 2012. Security officials had
been stressing the need to increase cooperation among or even merge the two domestic
intelligence services, DST and DCRG, since the 1990s, when a plan drawn up by Prefect
Jacques Fournet was withdrawn at the last minute due to political snags.26 Merger opti-
mists were quick to point out that the pooling of resources and expertise would help
reduce redundant missions and functions and represent a winwin situation for both serv-
ices. The DCRGs impressive regional representation included more than twenty out-
posts; the DST could point to its established relationship with the investigating
magistrates that set it apart from all other services.27 While the complementary features
 Countering Jihadi Terrorists and Radicals the French Way 985

of the two services were generally recognized or at least assumed, reorganization pessi-
mists warned against brutally forc[ing] these two services together . . . [as] the sharing of
resources would be a major step, further emphasizing that one must understand the ben-
efits of retaining different competences and cultures.28 Whereas the DST had a more
international focus and representation, having traditionally engaged in counterintelligence
and targeted foreign intelligence and terrorist activities on French soil, the DCRG and its
extensive network of regional outposts traditionally focused on homegrown terrorism and
surveillance of French citizen suspects. The 2012 rebranding entailed a few more changes
designed to increase technical resources and the small cadre of radical Islam experts.
Most important, it was supposed to strengthen information sharing between the former
DCRG and DST services, as the DCRG appeared to have become increasingly marginal-
ized after the merger.29
Summing up, the overall scope of French reforms after 9/11 is of note, especially
when considering Frances extensive prior counterterrorism experience, which culmi-
nated in various major counterterrorism reforms in 1986 and 96. In fact, French
investigating magistrates and other security services, the DST in particular, had even
specialized in countering Jihadi terrorism. Regardless, French presidents and prime
ministers consistently sought to adjust and expand the existing counterterrorism arse-
nal after 9/11. All in all, French governments passed more than seven domestic secu-
rity laws after 2001, three of which were specifically formulated to counter terrorism.
New counterterrorism measures broadened data collection and disclosure powers of
security services, in particular those of the regular police forces. Preventive policing
powers and criminal law provisions were strengthened, while judicial checks on law
enforcement powers continued to fade. Many of the new counterterrorism provisions
were consistent with Frances unique approach to purposefully target ordinary crimi-
nals, delinquents, or immigrants, and any of their activities, in an effort to identify or
disrupt potential terrorismcrime linkages. Similarly, the overall trend was consistent
with French counterterrorism tradition where the barrier between prevention and
punishment is not airtight.30
In terms of institutional reforms, the 9/11 attacks presented an opportunity for vari-
ous presidents to assume the leadership role in the domestic security realm, traditionally
considered prime ministerial turf. The creation of numerous new coordinative mecha-
nisms, including the 2001 Elys
ee security czar, the 2002 Domestic Security Council
(replaced by the Defense and National Security Council and the National Intelligence
Council in 2009), and the 2004 Domestic Intelligence Council (which became obsolete
due to the DCRI merger), reflects this struggle over domestic counterterrorism power, as
well as presidential expansionism under presidents Jacque Chirac and Nicolas Sarkozy.
Largely created by and for the president, the mechanisms were intended to strengthen the
presidential hand and domestic reach. President Sarkozy also oversaw and determined the
details of the DCRG/DST merger into the new DCRI, followed by President Francois
Hollandes more recent DGSI modifications.
While French counterterrorism forces were able to disrupt and prevent various
attacks between 2001 and 2014,31 also with the help of their counterterrorism arsenal, in
2012 France suffered its first domestic terrorist attack in sixteen years: Islamist gunman
Mohamed Merah killed seven people in a series of attacks across the country. French
authorities were not unfamiliar with him: he was deemed a security threat by the DCRG
due to his travel interests in the Middle East and South Asia,32 had been questioned by
the DCRI after he was picked up by Afghan security forces in 2010, and was subject to
DCRI surveillance after returning to France in 2011.33 French authorities also were not
986 D. Hellmuth

clueless with regard to the 2015 attackers. A variety of counterterrorism surveillance

measures involved the Kouachi brothers and Amedy Coulibaly before the attacks: their
phones were tapped, their interactions with radical imams known, as were their visits to
terrorist camps in Yemen.34

The French Approach to Jihadi Radicalization

While equipped with an extensive, if not impenetrable, counterterrorism arsenal that cen-
ters on repression and prosecution, until 2014 France did not view Jihadi radicalization
as an issue that ought to be tackled separately and by means of also soft counterradical-
ization measures. According to Marret, a good argument can be made, inter alia, that this
noticeable absence can be attributed to Frances overall counterterrorism success35pre-
ventive measures that have allowed France to quickly arrest and prosecute terrorism-
related crimes and put Jihadi terrorist suspects behind bars. However, there is a growing
concern that the large number of Jihadi prisoners will proselytize and radicalize others.
What the 2012 and 2015 attackers, Merah, the Kouachi brothers, and Coulibaly, had in
common, apart from launching attacks on French soil, was the fact that their radicaliza-
tion trajectory appeared to have been significantly influenced by their prison experience.
One of the two brothers responsible for the Charlie Hebdo attack, Ch
erif Kouachi, spent
twenty months in the Fleury-Merogis prison, where he met Amedy Coulibaly, responsible
for the killings in the Jewish supermarket. While Coulibaly and Merah, who went on a
shooting spree in Toulouse and Montauban in 2012, first became radicalized in prison,
Ch
erif Kouachi was thought to have hardened his Jihadi convictions while behind bars.36
What exactly is meant by radicalization? Like terrorism,37 radicalization is difficult
to define as it is in the eye of the beholder and very much dependent on subjective inter-
pretation, norms, and judgments. Different political, cultural and historical contexts, in
other words, produce different notions of radicalism.38 In 2011, Coolsaet referred to
radicalization as ill-defined, complex and controversial.39 Just as it is impossible to pro-
file terrorists, as there is no one pathway to terrorism, there is no single pathway to radi-
calization, and by implication, no single method or technique that can prevent people
from turning to radicalism.
According to McCauley and Moskalenko, radicalization is the development of
beliefs, feelings, and actions in support of any group or cause in conflict,40 and terrorism
must be seen as an extreme form of radicalization. Looking for the smallest common
denominator, Neumann summarized that radicalization can be defined as the process
whereby people become extremists.41 The focus on process illustrates a widespread con-
sensus among scholars who conceptualize radicalization as a progression which plays
out over a period of time and involves different factors and dynamics.42 Conversely,
Sageman has argued that, The notion that there is any serious process called
radicalization, or indoctrination, is really a mistake. What you have is some young peo-
ple acquiring some extreme ideasbut its a similar process to acquiring any type of
ideas. It often begins with discussions with a friend.43
What is considered radical or extreme may involve either political ideas and/or
actions that run counter to a societys values and norms. Neumann identifies two schools
of thought regarding the end-points of radicalization: the cognitive school focuses on
extremist beliefs and ideas on the one hand and the behavioral school on violent extremist
actions and behavior on the other end of the spectrum.44 The two may be connected at
times. However, Horgan and Borum remind us that one does not automatically lead to the
other. In other words, not all violent extremists hold strong, extreme beliefs, and not all
 Countering Jihadi Terrorists and Radicals the French Way 987

extreme ideas lead to violent behavior. There will always be far more radicals than
terrorists, and the question of how people are radicalizing is just as important as the why
they are radicalizing.45
Prominent places and means of recruitment involve mosques and community centers,
the Internet, and prisons. The latter have long been considered places where individuals
are especially vulnerable to Jihadi radicalization.46 When arriving in prison, inmates
experience stress, alienation, and isolationmaking them vulnerable to extremist
approaches. A prison sentence marks a drastic break with existing routines, familiar sur-
roundings and personal safety, and frequently goes hand in hand with personal crisis and
a desire to take revenge or at least defy authorities. Under these circumstances, religion
provides a stable framework and security. Many prisoners face existential questions, and
religion helps answer these questions.47 Religious communities offer a way out of isola-
tion and into new social networks, and may afford important physical protection against
other prisoners. Members of radical Islamic prison gangs who adhere to strict Islamist
behavior and language manage to intimidate others, even the prison staff. Joining these
gangs induces a sense of strength and superiority compared to other gangs.48
Several European countries, first and foremost the Netherlands and Britain, began
addressing counterradicalization after suffering homegrown attacks in 2004 and 2005.49
While their approach also includes tough security-oriented measures (surveillance,
repression, prosecution, and administrative measures), these often go hand in hand with
softer measures and programs designed to prevent individuals from becoming fully radi-
calized and participating in violent actions, or rehabilitate and reintegrate them.50 Softer
measures may involve interventions, phone hotlines, dialogues and workshops with Mus-
lim communities, vocational training, or counseling and exit programs.51 While local pro-
grams started springing up after 9/11, some countries were slower than others to tackle the
issue at the national level, with, for example, Germany being comparatively late to
address the issue.52
France, however, did not fall into either category. As a matter of fact, France until
2014 solely countered radicalization by prosecuting those guilty of committing terrorism
offenses and rejected any soft counterradicalization measures, such as assisting those
who have strayed from the non-radical path.53 Instead, terrorism was viewed as a viola-
tion of law that is punishable by law, facilitated by the preventive investigating judges,
and not the culmination of the radicalization process.54 The foreign fighter dilemma
that emerged in 2014 was thus treated as a terrorism-related crime and answered by
means of repressive and judicial measures.55 Aspiring foreign fighters, their recruiters,
and those returning from foreign battlefields were subjected to the conspiracy clause
whenever possible, and, therefore, surveillance, arrests, interrogations, deportations, and
prison sentences. According to Marret, this perspective comes with benefits: it categorizes
terrorism as a crime and distinguishes between the fight against terrorism and the social-
political conditions under which terrorism or political violence can take place.56At the
same time, Marret draws attention to the Catch-22 situation: France is paradoxically a
victim of the successes of its national Counter-Terrorism system.57 While prison senten-
ces are comparatively short, on average seven years,58 57 percent of prisoners are re-con-
victed within five years of their release.59 The large number of Islamist prisoners is
thought to facilitate proselytization and radicalization behind bars. Isolating them used to
be an option only in exceptional cases, due to human rights concerns.
In this context it is important to note that counterradicalization models utilized in
many other European countries run counter to one of the key pillars of the French repub-
lic: Frances particular version of secularism does not allow for religion or religious
988 D. Hellmuth

institutions in the public domain. For French counterterrorism officials, so Ragazzi

explains, setting up formal partnerships with imams and community religious institutions
is out of the question, just as it is difficult to imagine local police-mosque or police-Mus-
lim association collaborations.60 French authorities also do not distinguish between dif-
ferent ethnic or religious communities, as there is only the French community.61
The French government merely began shifting gears in 2013. In October 2013, then
Prime Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault stated his intention to launch a discussion about the
prevention of radicalization phenomena,62 as the 2013 White Paper on Defense and
National Security for the first time mentioned the need to develop government initiatives
to combat radicalization.63 By spring 2014, the government appeared to be responding to
growing concerns and criticism about French foreign fighter streams to Syria and Iraq.
Specifically, the Interior Ministry announced a plan to fight against radicalization,
designed to destroy recruitment networks and prevent French citizens from joining the
conflict in Syria.64 Others note, however, that the policy review had been in the works
since 2012, and was triggered by the Merah attack.65 For the first time, a national plan
was to include soft measures that targeted the passage to violence and the process of
radicalization. The plan was designed to address radicalization at the earliest stages and
also included an experimental program for reintegration (based on the British Channel
project). Similar to other countries in Europe, the Interior Ministry was to create a
national center for assistance and prevention, phone hotline, and Internet website for
endangered individuals, their parents and other relatives, allowing them to ask for
advice, help, or alert authorities to potential cases. The national contact forum would help
filter information and initiate local assistance, if needed, which could be tailored to indi-
vidual cases. Local assistance could involve prosecutors, mayors, police, schools, youth
and employment services, religious leaders, family foundations, and would be geared
toward reintegrating and re-socializing the affected teenagers.
This seemed to indicate an overall paradigm shiftapart from the national phone
hotline, however, the various programs were not to be implemented until 2015. The eight
members of the national phone hotline are retired security personnel. They are trained by
UCLAT Islam experts and operating out of the Interior Ministry.66 When questioned
about the security-centric approach, the UCLAT director emphasized that the hotline staff
was not selected because of their security background, but because of their ability to lis-
ten and their emotional sensitivity,67 and because they come with more than twenty-five
years of work and fifty-five years of life experience. They are assisted by a psychologist
and two inservice police officers, the latter are responsible for filtering the information
and conduct analyses.
Displaying a more familiar pattern, the 2014 counterterrorism act (passed in the after-
math of the Nemmouche attack) focused on strengthening security and repressive meas-
ures, seeking to prevent, counter, and punish foreign fighter travel, lone wolfs, and
Internet recruitment.

Responses to the 2015 Attacks

In response to the January 2015 attacks, Prime Minister Manuel Valls also announced
new security measures:68 Counterterrorism funds would be boosted (with an additional
246 million euro in 2015 and an estimated total of 736 million euro by 2017) and 2,680
new jobs created. 1,400 of these positions would become available in the Ministry of Inte-
rior, including 1,100 in the area of domestic intelligence (the DGSI and the intelligence
service of the Paris prefecture police), in an effort to monitor an estimated 2,500 radicals.
 Countering Jihadi Terrorists and Radicals the French Way 989

These figures are expected to grow due to the rising numbers of returning foreign fighters
in France. France leads Western countries in terms of overall numbers of foreign fighters,
with more than 1,200 estimated to have left for Syria and Iraq by February 2015.69
Moreover, external border controls of the Schengen area would be stepped up. The
government further announced a new database for convicted terrorists and plans for a
new intelligence law to be passed before the summer. The intelligence bill, approved by
the Cabinet in March 201570 and adopted by the National Assembly in the first reading in
early May,71 introduced a legal framework for intelligence collection, specifically wire-
taps and connection data. Internet and phone service providers would have to provide
access to their data, intelligence services be authorized to tape and record in private resi-
dences and capture computer data by means of keylogging devices, and mobile and digi-
tal communications of terrorist suspects could be monitored more easily. These powers
already existed, but pursuant to the new bill intelligence services would be subject to
administrative oversight only, in form of a (newly created) Commission and prime minis-
terial approval. While this focus on expanding surveillance powers had been expected,
the bill did not include any provisions geared toward criminalizing racist and anti-Semitic
behavior, hate speech, and language on the Internet. The latter illustrates an effort to go
after the online recruitment of foreign fighters and cognitive radicalization, at the risk of
infringing on the freedom of speech, and became a core element of a three-year national
plan Prime Minister Valls announced in April.72 In addition, the Interior Ministry
launched a public campaign calling on U.S. Internet service operators to block content
thought to be responsible for inciting hatred.73 Finally, the intelligence bill also contained
a provision that intelligence collection in prisons, for example the monitoring of prison
communications, would become the responsibility of intelligence services and no longer
be handled by the prison administration.
In terms of prison reforms, two other government initiatives are of note, announced
days after the attacks. First, in an effort to better control and counter radicalization among
the prison population, inmates who are deemed radicalized will be isolated from com-
mon criminals.74 Isolating radical prisoners from others has already been possible in
France under the DPS (D
etenu Particuli erement Signal
e) procedure, but it was not
applied consistently or across the board but on an individual basis.75 Since November
2014, twenty-three prisoners have been subject to a pilot project at the prison of Fresnes
(Val-de-Marne), and their isolation will be extended to four other prisons. All of their
activities are performed in isolation, their cells do not have outside windows, and they are
highly monitored.76 But to be effective, according to Prime Minister Valls, this iso-
lation must go hand in hand with a strategy of structured intelligence shared with the Min-
istry of the Interior, a review of the conditions under which imams are recruited and
trained, and further professional training for staff dealing with these inmates.77 Repre-
senting a softer counterradicalization approach, the number of prison imams is to
increase by sixty and their recruitment and training to improvea challenging undertak-
ing since prison imams need to be both qualified, modern enough to understand social
media, and also moderate, willing, and capable of engaging in political debates.78
The focus on prisons is not coincidental or new. The main perpetrator of the 1995
Paris subway attacks, Khaled Kelkal, was a thief-turned terrorist who radicalized in
prison. Two of the 2015 Paris attackers met in prison, as mentioned above. One of the
two brothers, Ch
erif Kouachi, met Amedy Coulibaly inside the Fleury-Merogis prison,
where he was incarcerated from January 2005 to October 2006. While Coulibaly, who
served a sentence for drug trafficking and robbery, became radicalized in prison, Ch
erif,
convicted for attempting to travel to an Iraqi terrorist camp, reportedly intensified his
990 D. Hellmuth

Jihadi convictions behind bars. Djamel Beghal, who at the time served a ten-year prison
term for plotting to attack the U.S. embassy in 2001, is considered instrumental in their
radicalization. Mohamed Merah, who shot dead seven people in 2012, also became radi-
calized while behind bars. Finally, Mehdi Nemmouche, deemed responsible for the May
2014 murder of four people in Brussels, was radicalized when he spent five years in
prison for robbery. In fact, the role of the prison imams was already scrutinized and
debated in the aftermath of both the 2012 and 2014 attacks.79
At least 50 percent of the 68,29580 prison inmates in France are Muslim, and the lack
of Muslim chaplains is thought to have created a vacuum that leaves room for self-
appointed and self-taught imams and their radical ideas.81 France did increase the number
of prison imams in 2009 and 2010, and introduced new vetting and training programs to
ensure that imam teachings are compatible with French values, but the overall numbers
are considered marginal. While counterradicalization was not tackled per se, prison staff
was trained to detect radicalization and for intelligence collection, and imams made in
France were considered the best way of spreading moderate Islam.82 In July 2009, Mar-
ret counted 147 official prison imams in France, compared to only eighty in 2006.83
Another fifteen were added in 2012 and 2013 each.84 By 2014, the number had thus
increased to 182 imams who were responsible for more than 35,000 Muslims, compared
to 681 Catholic and 70 Jewish chaplains.85 The figures also pale compared to the 200
Muslim chaplains who tend to approximately 11,000 Muslim inmates in English and
Welsh prisons.86
While the estimated number of Jihadi prison inmates lay between 150 and 160 in
February 2015, identifying radical inmates is also difficult because prisons are generally
overcrowded and understaffed. French prisons had an official capacity of 57,920 in April
2015, but held more than 66,700 inmates.87 Prison guards oversee some 100 inmates
respectively, but are not trained for counterradicalization.88 Detecting radical prisoners
also represents challenges because their profile has changed over the past ten years, mak-
ing it ever more difficult for prison authorities and others to identify them.89 Taqiya, the
practice of concealing ones faith to avoid detection by the authorities, remains a chal-
lenge for everybody involved.90 The brother of Toulouse killer Abdelkader Merah, kept
in his iPod a small manual that reminded brothers to have a suitable image vis-a-vis the
population, or to not wear their wrist watches on their right arms.91 All of this is sup-
posed to prevent them from being noticed and distinguish them from the die-heart Salafi-
Jihadists who seek to imitate the appearance and doings of the Prophet Mohammed in
every detail of life. While Nemmouche did have a run-in with prison authorities because
he called for a collective prayer in violation of prison rules, neither Mohamed Merah,
Ch
erif Kouachi, nor Amedy Coulibaly displayed any obvious symptoms indicating their
radicalization.
Prison intelligence resources have been boosted after the 2015 attacks, and another
fifty-five intelligence officers are being added to prison bureaus. Established in 2003, the
intelligence offices of the prison administration (Bureau du Renseignement Penitentiaire)
were created to detect those radical inmates who were withdrawing from mainstream
prison population, and also supervise them. Prison intelligence did not cooperate or share
information with other intelligence services until after the 2012 Merah attacks, when an
official information-sharing protocol was signed by the prison administration and the
Directorate-General of Domestic Security. In addition, the protocol specified that the
DGSI would train some of the personnel on new issues of radical Islam.92 A staff of
thirteen work out of the prison intelligence office in Paris and communicate with the
Directorate-General on a daily basis, but each of the ten regional prisons also rely on one
 Countering Jihadi Terrorists and Radicals the French Way 991

intelligence delegate, and Paris, Lyon, Lille, and Marseille on two full-time intelligence
staff.93 Since 5 January 2015, the prison administration has been detailed to the UCLAT
and participates in its weekly meetings.94
Based on French Justice Department statistics, only a small minority of Jihadi
inmates become radicalized while in prison. According to the Department of Justice,
among the total prison population of 66,530 in November 2014, 850 prisoners were being
monitored due to the seriousness of the crimes committed. Of the 850, 283 were con-
victed on the basis of terrorism charges (including non-Jihadi). However, only 152 of the
283 were categorized as Jihadi terrorists.95 Since the majority of Jihadi prisoners, a total
of 84 percent, are serving their first prison sentence, they must have radicalized outside
prison.96 While the focus on prison radicalization may indeed be exaggerated, and prison
counterradicalization programs certainly do not represent a panacea to the Jihadi threat,
one might argue that the degree of Jihadi commitment varies among radicals, especially
when considering that the criminal association in relation with terrorism charge that
allows security services to act preventively before crimes have been committed is often
based on only circumstantial evidence. In other words, while Jihadi prisoners have been
convicted based on Jihadi terrorism charges they may not (yet) represent hardened Jihad-
ist terrorists when entering prison.
The twofold reforms, increasing the number of better vetted and trained imams and
isolating radical Islamists from petty criminals, are supposed to address the two related
dilemmas of leaving vulnerable prisoners at the mercy of radical inmates, or self-
appointed imams. A greater number of imams should help fill a vacuum and reduce room
for radical propaganda.97 However, it will remain challenging to improve their overall
caliber. In June 2014, Hassan el-Anoui Talibi, chief prison imam in France, issued a state-
ment, calling for an official and professional status for prison chaplains, similar to that
which already exists for hospital and military chaplains. Currently, prison imams do not
receive a pension, social security, or any other public assistance, and are merely reim-
bursed for their travel expenses.98 While the budget for Muslim chaplains will be dou-
bled, it will not be sufficient to pay salaries, pensions, or health benefits.99 While this
kind of support does not exist in the case of, for example, Catholic prison chaplains either,
the latter receive substantial financial aid through the Catholic Church, which is also
responsible for their training. Finding qualified and moderate imams is not only a financial
challenge; it remains complicated to certify imam qualifications as Islam does not require
a standardized education or diplomas for its spiritual leaders. The imams who tend to pris-
ons are volunteers, but do not undergo any required training. However, some kind of man-
datory training would provide status by professionalizing the function, as already exists
in the army.100
While increasing the number of qualified Muslim chaplains is deemed an urgent
necessity, so is the integration of additional services as part of a wider inter-disciplinary
approach. According to Ouisa Kies, prison administration director of the detection and
supervision of radical inmates program, new forms of radicalization cannot be dealt
with unless a close cooperation is established between the various professionals involved
in the prison administration (prison counselors and probation officers, intelligence offi-
cers, schools, doctors, psychologists, etc.).101 A system-wide approach becomes impera-
tive also due to the large number of serious mental disorders, which affect about thirty
percent of all prisoners who become easy prey for jihadists.102 Further illustrating the
unique French perspective, Kies explains that chaplains are essential partners in the
administration, but we cannot imagine a secular republic meeting a social problem only
by means of religion.103
992 D. Hellmuth

Conclusion
The 2015 reforms are consistent with Frances past approaches to Jihadi terrorism. Illus-
trating a familiar pattern and much in line with its security-oriented counterterrorism
approach, the French government boosted counterterrorism spending and personnel and
expanded surveillance powers. Similarly, radicalism is tackled and countered by means
of surveillance, intelligence, prosecution, and the concentration and isolation of prison
radicals.
In addition, however, Prime Minister Valls introduced a few softer preventive meas-
ures and pledged that the number of prison imams would increase and their training be
improved, to assist Muslim prison populations and in an effort to prevent the spread of
the Jihadi virus in the first place. The focus on prison imams is noteworthy as it represents
an effort to bolster the counterradicalization campaign, thus far centered on the national
phone hotline center in combination with local initiatives that are triggered through the
hotline. According to Interior Ministry estimates, a total of seventy to eighty people
(approximately 12 percent of all calls recorded by the hotline) were thus prevented from
leaving France within the first six months of the hotlines existence in the latter part of
2014.104 The number of calls into the hotline doubled in the weeks following the January
attacks, from previously seven to sixteen per day.105 The hotline was also deemed instru-
mental in preventing several French nationals from leaving for Syria in February 2015, as
they became the first to have their passports confiscated.106 In a similar vein, to give fami-
lies and relatives of those in danger of radicalizing additional tools and arguments to chal-
lenge the Jihadi ideology, the French government introduced a new Stop-jihadism
Internet platform. The documents and videos posted on the site offer a counternarrative to
the Jihadi perspective in an effort to prevent online recruitment of foreign fighters.107
Apart from increasing the numbers of prison imams, however, their status has not
been elevated or professionalized, a fact that will continue to hamper their overall poten-
tial. The commitment to French republican, secular values makes the consideration of
other counterradicalization options more challenging. A much discussed December 2014
report that was prepared by a former defense department official emphasized the need to
include Muslim elites, and especially religious ones, when it comes to counterradicaliza-
tionotherwise, Muslim communities would feel stigmatized. According to the report,
moderate Muslim voices are needed to counter radical Salafi narratives that capture all
of the media space.108 As long as the government office of organized religions (bureau
centrale des cultes) remains part of the security-minded Interior Ministry, so the report
argued, it would not be possible to build these relations as Muslim representatives would
be considered deputy-sheriffs by their community. In the absence of a political
response to growing islamist fundamentalism, so the report summarized, various
administrations have opted for a security-focused response to its terrorist
manifestation.109
The decision to isolate radical prisoners fits with this still prevailing security-focused
approach. Several European countries, including Spain and the United Kingdom, have in
the past opted to concentrate and separate terrorist prisoners from ordinary prisoners. The
approach is designed to prevent further radicalization and provide for additional security.
However, it comes with the risk of facilitating so-called prison universities110group
polarization that occurs when like-minded people deliberate in a confined space and the
discussions push individuals to become more extreme.111 While behind bars, prisoners
have all the time in the world to compare notes on ideas, ideologies, tactics, strategies,
mistakes made, and lessons learned. In sum, isolating radical jihadists from so-called
 Countering Jihadi Terrorists and Radicals the French Way 993

petty criminals, according to Khosrokhavar, will keep them from influencing others, but
it strengthens the bonds they have with each other.112 At the same time, isolating them
may lead others to view them as victimized and thereby increase their importance. Others
have pointed to a loophole that only those detained on terrorism charges will be subjected
to isolation, whereas petty criminals may also be radical and be able to still proselytize.113
The practical feasibility of isolating the radicals may be questioned as well.114 In this con-
text it is worth noting that Djamel Beghal, considered instrumental in the radicalization of
the 2015 attackers, was held in solitary confinement between March 2003 and 2006, when
he first met Ch
erif Kouachi and Coulibaly.115 Finally, critics argue that only the most rad-
ical prisoners should be isolated, especially when considering the growing numbers of
returning foreign fighters.116 There are different levels of radicalization, and while all
were considered radical when leaving for Syria or Iraq, not all of them return as hardened
jihadists but some may have become disillusioned with waging Jihad or even deeply trau-
matized, especially the teenagers.117 Upon their return, however, all French foreign fight-
ers are treated alike and are either directly taken into custody and prosecuted, or else put
under surveillance. While in June 2014 prison authorities counted only ninety radical
Jihadi inmates, their numbers had grown to 152 in January 2015.118 If nothing else, these
figures suggest that French prisons will continue to face formidable challenges in the
years ahead as more and more foreign fighters return home.

Notes
1. See, for example, Jeremy Shapiro and B
en
edicte Suzan, The French Experience of
Counter-Terrorism, Survival 41(1) (2003), pp. 6798; Jeremy Shapiro, France and the GIA, in
Democracy and Counterterrorism, ed. Robert Art and Louise Richardson (Washington, DC: USIP,
2007), pp. 133166; Gary Schmitt, France: In a League of Its Own, in Safety, Liberty, and Islamic
Terrorism, ed. Gary Schmitt (Washington, DC: AEI, 2010), pp. 3147.
2. Pursuant to a 2008 reform, the DST was merged into the DCRI (Central Directorate of
Domestic Intelligence). The DCRI was renamed Central Directorate of Domestic Security (DGSI)
in 2012. The DSTs relationship with the investigating judges was not affected by the
reorganization.
3. For a detailed discussion of the investigating judges, see, French Experience, pp. 7778.
4. Jeremy Shapiro, Detention of Terrorism Suspects in Britain and France, Brookings Insti-
tution, 15 July 2008.
5. Shapiro and Suzan, French Experience, pp. 8283.
6. This point has been clarified by Frank Foley in Countering Terrorism in Britain and
France (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 99.
7. All 2001 references in this section refer to provisions of the 2001 LSQ Law. Loi no.
20011062 du 15 novembre 2001 relative a la s
ecurit
e quotidienne, Journal Officiel 266 (16
November 2001), pp. 1821518229.
8. 2006 references in this part refer to the 2006 Combating Terrorism Law. Loi no. 200664
du 23 janvier 2006 relative a la lutte contre le terrorisme et portant dispositions diverses relatives a
la s
ecurit
e et aux contr^oles frontaliers, Journal Officiel 20 (24 January 2006), pp. 11291137.
9. 2003 references in this segment refer to the 2003 LSI Law, Loi 2003239 du 18 Mars 2003
pour la s
ecurit
e int
erieure, Journal Officiel 66 (19 March 2003), pp. 47614789.
10. 2002 references in this section refer to the 2002 LOPSI Law, Loi no. 20021094 du 29
ao^ut 2002 dorientation et de programmation pour la s
ecurit
e int
erieure, Journal Officiel 202 (30
August 2002), pp. 1439814410.
11. Laurent Borredon and Jacques Follorou, En France, la DGSE au cur dun programme
de surveillance dInternet, Le Monde, 11 June 2013.
12. As per D
ecret n 20141095 du 26 septembre 2014 portant cr
eation dun traitement de
donn
ees a caractere personnel d
enomm
e systeme API-PNR France pris pour lapplication de
larticle L. 2327 du code de la s
ecurit
e int
erieure.
994 D. Hellmuth

13. 2011 references in this part refer to the 2011 LOPPSI II Law, Loi no. 2011267 du 14
mars 2011dorientation et de programmation pour la performance de la s
ecurit
e int
erieure, Journal
Officiel 62 (15 March 2011), p. 4582.
14. 2014 references in this segment refer to the 2014 Reinforcing Counterterrorism Law, Loi
n 20141353 du 13 novembre 2014 renforc ant les dispositions relatives a la lutte contre le terror-
isme, Journal Officiel 263 (14 November 2014), p. 19162.
15. 2012 references in this section refer to the 2012 Security Law, Loi no. 20121432 du 21
d
ecembre 2012 relative a la s
ecurit
e et a la lutte contre le terrorisme, Journal Officiel 298 (22
December2012).
16. Jean Chichizola, Islamisme radical: la police dIle-de-France multiplie les d
ecouvertes,
Le Figaro, 18 May 2005; Jean Chichizola, Parti de Manchester, le franc ais
etait un professionnel
du djihad, Le Figaro, 29 June 2005.
17. Pascal Ceaux and Herv
e Gattegno, LElys
ee veut faire de Philippe Massoni son Monsieur
S
ecurit
e, Le Monde, 2 November 2001; Un super-pr
efet a lElys
ee, Le Monde, 2 November
2001.
18. Piotr Smolar, Une cellule permanente contre le terrorisme a
et
e cr
e
ee autour de la
DGSE, Le Monde, 18 September 2004.
19. Christophe Cornevin, Les six grands chantiers de Villepin, Le Figaro, 25 June 2004.
20. Pr
esidence de la R
epublique, no. 20091657 du 24 d
ecembre 2009 relatif au conseil de
d
efense et de s
ecurit
e nationale et au secr
etariat g
en
eral de la d
efense et de la s
ecurit
e nationale,
Journal Officiel 301 (29 December 2009), p. 22561.
21. Open Source EUP20070308029001, Paris, D
efense (in French), 1 January 200428 Febru-
ary 2007. Interview with Nicolas Sarkozy, Frances Sarkozy Sets Out Defense Policy Guidelines.
22. Open Source EUP20070222338004 Paris, Intelligence Online in English language, 23
February 2007, French Interior Minister Intent on Merging Domestic Spy Agencies.
23. Floran Vadillo, Le Conseil National du Renseignement: Une pr
esidentialisation sans
justification, La Fondation Progressiste Terra Nova Note (7 December 2009), p. 1. On this issue,
see also Floran Vadillo, Vers une nouvelle coordination du renseignement, Le Monde, 7 March
2011; Nathalie Cettina, Antiterrorisme: Une Fragile Coordination, Centre Franc ais de Recherche
sur le Renseignement, Note de R
eflexion No. 9 (10 April 2011), pp. 811.
24. Cettina, Antiterrorisme, pp. 1012.
25. Foley, Countering Terrorism, p. 123; Cettina, Antiterrorisme, pp. 1213.
26. Jacques Fournet On se heurte a des objections de carriere et a des inconv
enients polit-
iques, Le Monde, 26 December 2003.
27. Jean-Marc Leclerc, Les Renseignements g
en
eraux et la Direction de la s
ecurit
e du terri-
toire r
efl
echissent a leur r
eorganisation, voire a leur fusion, Le Figaro, 19 August 2002.
28. Jacky Durand, Les mondes paralleles du renseignement, Lib
eration, 26 April 2006.
29. Ministere de lInt
erieur, Interventions du Ministre, R
eforme du renseignement, 17 June
2013.
30. Dominique de Villepin, Prevailing Against Terrorism: White Paper on Domestic Security
Against Terrorism (Paris: Documentation Franc aise, 2006), p. 53.
31. De Villepin, Prevailing Against Terrorism, pp. 34, 129130. See also Petter Nesser,
Chronology of Jihadism in Western Europe 19942007: Planned, Prepared, and Executed Terrorist
Attacks, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 31(10) (October 2008); Petter Nesser, Toward an
Increasingly Heterogeneous Threat: A Chronology of Jihadist Terrorism in Europe 20082013,
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 37(5) (April 2014).
32. C
ecile Deffontaines and Olivier Toscer, Comment le contre-espionnage a
egar
e la fiche
de Merah, Le Nouvel Observateur, 18 April 2012.
33. Laurent Borredon and Jacques Fallorou, Bernard Squarcini: Nous ne pouvions pas aller
plus vite, Le Monde, 23 March 2012.
34. Paris Killings Show the Challenges for Security Services, Financial Times, 15 January
2015.
35. Jean-Luc Marret, Prison De-Radicalization and Disengagement: The French Case, ICSR
Project on De-radicalization in Jail (20 October 2009), p. 21. For a similar argument, see also
Soren Seelow, Quelle politique de lutte contre la radicalisation? Le Monde, 19 January 2015.
36. Damien Leloup, Paris, Bruxelles, Toulouse . . . la radicalisation des terroristes na pas eu
lieu sur le Web, Le Monde, 13 January 2015.
 Countering Jihadi Terrorists and Radicals the French Way 995

37. For a summary of the debate and evolution of terrorism definitions, see Bruce Hoffman,
Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), pp. 141; Louise Richardson,
What Terrorists Want (New York: Random House, 2007), pp. 320.
38. Peter Neumann, The Trouble with Radicalization, International Affairs 89(4) (2013), p.
876.
39. Rik Coolsaet, Europe: Reinforcing Existing Trends, in Mohammed Ayoob and Etga
Ugur, eds., Assessing the War on Terror (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2013), p. 148.
40. Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, Friction: How Radicalization Happens to Them
and Us (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 4.
41. Neumann, Radicalization, p. 874.
42. Ibid. Neumann refers to the models of Fathali Moghadam, Clark McCauley and Sophia
Moskalenko, and Zeyno Baran. Magnus Ranstorp emphasizes process and context in Understanding
Violent Radicalization (London: Routledge, 2010).
43. Mehdi Hasan, Woolwich Attack: Overreacting To Extremism Could Bring Back Al
Qaeda Ex CIA Officer Warns, Huffington Post, 28 May 2013.
44. Ibid.
45. John Horgan is quoted in Neumann, Radicalization, p. 879. See also Randy Borum,
Radicalization into Violent Extremism I: A Review of Social Science Theories, Journal of Strate-
gic Security 4(4) (2011), p. 8.
46. Neumann distinguishes between places of vulnerability and places of congregation, in
Joining Al Qaeda: Jihadist Recruitment in Europe, Adelphi Books (December 2008), p. 21. In the
United States, Jihadi prison radicalization drew attention starting in 2006; see Out of the Shadows:
Getting Ahead of Prisoner Radicalization, The George Washington University Homeland Security
Policy Institute and The University of Virginia Critical Incident Analysis Group (2006); Mark
Hamm, Prisoner Radicalization: Assessing the Threat in U.S. Correctional Institutions, National
Institute of Justice Journal 261 (October 2008).
47. Neumann, Joining Al Qaeda, p. 25.
48. Ibid., p. 26.
49. Coolsaet, Existing Trends, p. 11; Angel Rabasa, Stacie Pettyjohn, Jeremy Ghez, and
Christopher Boucek, Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists, RAND Corporation Monograph (Santa
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010), 121155.
50. See also Piotr Bakowski and Laura Puccio, Foreign Fighters, European Parliamentary
Research Service (February 2015); Radicalization Awareness Network (RAN), The RAN Declara-
tion of Good Practices for Engagement with Foreign Fighters for Prevention, Outreach, Rehabilita-
tion and Reintegration. Available at http://www.icct.nl/download/file/RAN-Declaration-Good-
Practices-for-Engagement-with-Foreign-Fighters.pdf (accessed 28 May 2015).
51. James Brandon, The UKs Experience in Counterradicalization, Combating Terrorism
Center Sentinel 1(5) (April 2008); Lorenzo Vidino, A Preliminary Assessment of Counterradicali-
zation in the Netherlands, Combating Terrorism Center Sentinel 1(9) (August 2008).
52. Dorle Hellmuth, Countering Islamist Radicalization in Germany, Combating Terrorism
Center Sentinel 6(1) (January 2013).
53. Seelow, Quelle politique; see also Foreign Fighters: An Overview of Responses in
Eleven Countries, CSS Study (Zurich: Center for Security Studies, 2014), p. 10.
54. Marret, Prison, p. 15.
55. Foreign Fighters, CSS Study, p. 10.
56. Marret, Prison, p. 16.
57. Ibid., p. 21.
58. Ibid., p. 18.
59. Prison Overcrowding: Rare Glimpse Inside French Prison, BBC News Europe, 20 Octo-
ber 2013.
60. Francesco Ragazzi, Towards Policed Multiculturalism? Counter-radicalization in
France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom Les Etudes du CERI, n 206 bis (September
December 2014), p. 10.
61. Ragazzi, Policed Multiculturalism, p. 35.
62. Terrorisme: Ayrault demande une r
eflexion sur les ph
enomenes de radicalization, Les
Echo, 4 October 2013.
63. Livre blanc, D
efense et la S

ecurit

e Nationale (Paris: Direction de linformation l
egale et
administrative, 2013), p. 104.
996 D. Hellmuth

64. Le Ministre de linterieur, Prevention de la radicalisation et accompagnement des

familles, 29 April 2014. Available at http://circulaire.legifrance.gouv.fr/pdf/2014/05/cir_38287.
pdf (accessed 17 July 2015).
65. Ragazzi, Policed Multiculturalism, p. 10.
66. Marion Garreau, Un num
ero vert contre la radicalisation djihadiste, Le Monde, 12 Feb-
ruary 2015.
67. Ibid.
68. David Revault dAllonnes; Bastien Bonnefous, Valls annonce la cr
eation de 2 680 postes
pour lutter contre le terrorisme, Le Monde, 23 January 2015.
69. Jihadisme: six Franc ais pr^ets a partir en Syrie priv
es de leurs passeports, Le Parisien, 23
February 2015.
70. Compte-rendu du Conseil des ministres du 19 mars 2015, Projets de Loi:
Renseignement, 19 March 2015. Available at http://www.elysee.fr/conseils-des-ministres/article/
compte-rendu-du-conseil-des-ministres-du-19-mars-2/ (accessed 17 July 2015).
71. Mathilde Siraud, Le projet de loi sur le renseignement adopt
e a une large majorit
e, Le
Figaro, 5 May 2015.
72. Alissa Rubin and Aurelien Breeden, France Announces Stronger Fight Against Racism
and Anti-Semitism, New York Times, 17 April 2015.
73. #Stopdjihadisme: le gouvernement sattaque a la radicalisation djihadiste, Le Monde, 28
January 2015.
74. Fight against TerrorismHandling of the Terrorist Attacks of 79 January 2015
Communiqu
e Issued Following the Council of Ministers Meeting (Excerpts), 13 January 2015.
Available at http://basedoc.diplomatie.gouv.fr/vues/Kiosque/FranceDiplomatie/kiosque.php?
fichierDbaen2015-01-15.html (accessed 17 July 2015).
75. Marret, Prison, pp. 1011.
76. Villechenon, Pour le personnel p
enitentiaire.
77. Fight against TerrorismHandling of the Terrorist Attacks of 79 January 2015.
78. Harriet Alexander, Whats Going Wrong in Frances Prisons? The Telegraph, 17 Janu-
ary 2015.
79. See, for example, Pierre Botton, Il manque 186 imams en prison, France Info Radio, 2
June 2014.
80. France, International Centre for Prison Studies. Available at http://www.prisonstudies.
org/country/france (accessed 10 February 2015).
81. Anne Villechenon, Aum^oniers musulmans et surveillants d
emunis face a la radicalisation
en prison, Le Monde, 23 January 2015.
82. Marret, Prison, p. 21.
83. Ibid., p. 23. Marret cites Farhad Khosrokhavar, LIslam dans les prisons (Paris: Balland,
2004).
84. Ministere de la Justice, Lutte contre la radicalisation en prison: Les actions mises en
place, 12 January 2015. Available at http://www.justice.gouv.fr/la-garde-des-sceaux-10016/lutte-
contre-la-radicalisation-en-prison-27787.html (accessed 17 July 2015).
85. Villechenon, Aum^oniers musulmans.
86. British Muslims in Numbers, The Muslim Council of Britain (January 2015); Alexander,
What is Going Wrong?
87. France, International Centre for Prison Studies. Available at http://www.prisonstudies.
org/country/france (accessed 3 June 2015). The total prison capacity is currently being expanded
and is to reach 63,500 by 2019, see Justice, Lutte contre la radicalisation en prison.
88. Michael Birnbaum, French Prisons, Long Hotbeds of Radical Islam, Get New Scrutiny
after Paris Attacks, Washington Post, 28 January 2015.
89. Ouisa Kies, Privil
egions le travail social! Le Monde, 26 January 2015.
90. Jacques Follorou, Matthieu Suc, and Simon Piel, Lislam radical, un d
efi pour le
renseignement p
enitentiaire, Le Monde, 29 January 2015; Emeline Cazi; Ariane Chemin, Prison:
les pr
edicateurs de lombre, Le Monde, 4 February 2015.
91. Cazi and Chemin, Prison: les pr
edicateurs de lombre.
92. Jacques Follorou, Matthieu Suc, and Simon Piel, Lislam radical, un d
efi pour le
renseignement p
enitentiaire, Le Monde, 29 January 2015.
93. Ibid.
94. Justice, Lutte contre la radicalisation en prison.
 Countering Jihadi Terrorists and Radicals the French Way 997

95. Follorou et al., Lislam radical.

96. Justice, Lutte contre la radicalisation en prison. See also Franck Johannes,
Changement de doctrine sur lislamisme en prison, Le Monde, 13 January 2015.
97. Botton, Les aum^oniers musulmans sont plus utiles que lisolement.
98. Les aum^oniers musulmans r
eclament un statut, Zaman France, June 19, 2014. Avail-
able at http://www.zamanfrance.fr/article/aumoniers-musulmans-reclament-statut-10382.html
(accessed 17 July 2015); see also Cazi and Chemin, Prison: les pr
edicateurs de lombre.
99. Contre le terrorisme, des mesures d
eja annonc
ees pour la plupart, Le Monde, 21 Janu-
ary 2015.
100. Kies, Privil
egions le travail social!
101. Ibid.
102. Chambraud, En regroupant les radicaux.
103. Kies, Privil
egions le travail social!
104. Marion Garreau, Un num
ero.
105. Ibid.
106. Jihadisme: six Franc ais pr^ets a partir en Syrie.
107. #Stopdjihadisme: le gouvernement sattaque a la radicalisation djihadiste.
108. Seelow, Quelle politique.
109. Ibid.
110. On prison universities, see Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, Friction: How Rad-
icalization Happens to Them and Us (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 106108. See
also comments by Sarah Dindo in Anna Villechenon, Pour le personnel p
enitentiaire, regrouper les
d
etenus radicalis
es nest pas la solution, Le Monde, 24 January 2015; Emeline Cazi and Ariane
Chemin, Il faut au minimum unaum^onier musulman parprison pour prot
eger les d
etenus des plus
radicaux, Le Monde, 4 February 2015.
111. McCauley and Moskalenko, Friction, pp. 95; 103.
112. C
ecile Chambraud, En regroupant les radicaux, on renforce leurs liens, Le Monde, 13
January 2015.
113. Henri Astier, Paris Attacks: Prisons Provide Fertile Ground for Islamists, BBC News, 4
February 2015.
114. Pierre Botton, Les aum^oniers musulmans sont plus utiles que lisolement, Le Monde,
25 January 2015.
115. Jacques Follorou, Simon Piel, and Matthew Suc, Le pros
elytisme carc
eral, terreau de la
radicalization, Le Monde, 29 January 2015.
116. Cazi and Chemin, Il faut au minimum.
117. Chambraud, En regroupant les radicaux. On this point, see also Daniel Byman and
Jeremy Shapiro, Be Afraid. Be a Little Afraid, Brookings Policy Paper (November 2014), pp.
2627.
118. Cazi and Chemin, Prison: les pr
edicateurs de lombre.