Habitat International 34 (2010) 5358

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Habitat International
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/habitatint

Strategies to implement the build then sell housing delivery system in Malaysia
NorAini Yusof*, Mohd Wira Mohd Shaei, Sofri Yahya, Marwani Ridzuan
School of Housing, Building and Planning, Universiti Sains Malaysia, 11800 Penang, Malaysia

a b s t r a c t

Keywords: The Build Then Sell (BTS) system is a new housing delivery system introduced by the Malaysian
Build then sell government in which housing developers must complete a housing project before selling individual
Housing delivery system houses to buyers. This new system differs from the current Sell Then Build (STB) system, which allows
Housing developers
developers to sell houses and collect progress payments while housing is being built and thus is not yet
t for habitation. Even though the so-called BTS system is the norm in other developed countries, it is
still very much a foreign idea in Malaysia. In April 2007, the government announced that the BTS system
would run in parallel to the conventional STB system for trial period of two years, with a package of
incentives offered for developers who adopt BTS. Clearly, more work needs to be done before the BTS
system can become a reality. This paper explores strategies for facilitating the full implementation of BTS
in Malaysia. To accomplish this goal, a series of focus group interviews was conducted with all the main
stakeholders in the BTS system. A number of strategies to make the BTS implementation a success are
outlined and discussed.
2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Introduction
The housing industrys decades-old practice of Sell Then Build
(STB) allows developers to sell houses and collect payments after
obtaining advertising permits from the Ministry of Housing and
Local Government (MHLG). The Real Estate and Housing Devel-
opers Association (REHDA), the umbrella body for property devel-
opers in Malaysia, asserts that this system has successfully met the
backlog of housing needs for over 40 years and produced in excess
of 3.5 million affordable housing units for all income groups in the
country (New Straits Times, 10th October 2005). REHDA also claims
that the time-tested STB system has successfully and efciently
achieved the nations multi-pronged objectives of generating
economic growth, creating employment, and meeting the social
need to provide shelter to lower income people.
STB may have met its housing targets, but the system is not
without aws. A review of housing provision performance in ve
years of Malaysian Plans revealed that, by and large, since the
countrys independence, both the public and private sectors have
over-performed in supplying sufcient housing using the STB
system. This was not the case, however, for the 4th and 5th
Malaysian Plans (a period between 1981 and 1990), in which both
sectors performed badly, failing to meet set targets because of the
economic downturn. Nevertheless, because the developers were
* Corresponding author. Tel.: 604 6532500; fax: 604 6576523.
E-mail address: ynoraini@usm.my (Y. Nor Aini).
able to sell houses before they were built to obtain money to fund
construction or secure bridge nancing through joint venture
arrangements with banks, some developers managed to get away
from completing their projects with few nancial consequences,
but at the expense of unsuspecting home-buyers.
The negative experience of abandoned projects during the
economic recession in the 1980s and early 1990s provides proof that
the STB system is susceptible to abuse by developers who choose to
take advantage of the system. During this period, there were many
complaints made by home-buyers about shoddy workmanship, late
delivery of houses, and abandoned projects. The rst case of an
abandoned housing project was reported in 1983, during the
economic slump, a slump that precipitated a housing bubble in
other parts of the country. The situation was made worse by the fact
that home-buyers made installment payments for these unnished
houses while simultaneously paying rent on their existing accom-
modations. Because of these problems, many stakeholders in the
property industry have argued against continuing the STB system to
protect the rights of home-buyers.
When the idea of implementing BTS was rst discussed by the
government, many industry observers noted that few property
developers are ready and able to switch to BTS system, wherein
developers are required to complete housing projects before selling
them. Under this model, risk is shared between developers and
their lending banks. In order to help spread the risks taken on by
developers under the BTS system, the National House Buyers
Association (HBA) proposed a system called the 10:90 model.
According to HBA (2005), the 10:90 model compromises between

0197-3975/$ see front matter 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.habitatint.2009.06.001
54 Y. NorAini et al. / Habitat International 34 (2010) 5358
the present progressive payment system of STB and the full BTS
system. In the 10:90 model, house buyers must pay a deposit of 10
percent upon signing their Sale and Purchase Agreement (S&P),
with the remaining 90% payable upon completion of the house and
the issuance of a Certicate of Fitness for Occupation (Akbal, 2006).
This system could help create a better image for the industry, as
only qualied developers would be allowed to participate in it.
Major industry players such as developers and REHDA, however,
reacted negatively to this plan. They believed that BTS and the
10:90 model were unnecessary for protecting home-buyers rights
against errant developers, claiming that the number of such
developers is small. They claimed that responsible developers
should not be punished with a BTS or 10:90 system because of
others faults.
Despite lengthy debates about the merits and possibilities of the
BTS and 10:90 models, little research exists on how the new system
or its variant might be implemented effectively. The few extant
studies tend to focus on the advantages, disadvantages and possible
variants of the BTS system and the issue of the main players
readiness to implement BTS (e.g., Nazihan, 2005; NorAini et al.,
2007; NorAini et al., 2008). As such, a systematic study is necessary
to explore stakeholder views about what needs to be done before
the new system can be put into place. In particular, relatively little
research has focused specically on the formulation of strategies
that can increase the chances of successful implementation of the
BTS or 10:90 models.
Thus, the main aim of this paper is to explore the stakeholders
opinions about the implementation of BTS in Malaysia, with the
hope that these opinions would be subsequently taken into
consideration in formulating strategies to implement the BTS
system fully. For the purposes of clarity, this paper considers both
the BTS and the 10:90 system to be the same system.
The various important stakeholders will be described thor-
oughly later in this paper. There is no doubt that there is strong
support for BTS amongst a subset of Malaysian developers. They
may be motivated by self-interest or as part of a business strategy to
penetrate a highly competitive market. Housing advocates and
NGOs have also shown strong support, though their motives may
be quite different. The governments support is not well expressed
apart from the incentives that it has offered. In the midst of all the
debate, nancial institutions have steadfastly kept their silence.
This might indicate that they have adopted a wait and see attitude
before deciding whether to support BTS. Developers, housing
advocates, NGOs, the government and nancial institutions are the
stakeholders whose motivations may be most apparent in terms of
supporting or ghting the movement toward a BTS system. After
discussing the stakeholders involved in BTS, the methodology
employed will be discussed, followed by discussions on important
excerpts collected from focus group interviews held with the main
stakeholders.
Dening stakeholders
In broad terms, stakeholders are groups or individuals who are
involved or affected, directly or indirectly, by a system or program
(Atkinson et al., 1997). This includes groups or individuals whose
interests or quality of life is affected, positively or negatively, by the
decision to implement BTS. Housing developers and home-buyers
are both considered stakeholders in the BTS system. Financial
institutions are also stakeholders, as they are involved in providing
loans to the developers and buyers. Other stakeholders include
the government, professional bodies, and social activists. Taken
together, these stakeholders constitute the studys primary focus, as
they represent the various interests and views with respect to BTS
implementation. By studying their perspectives, the stakeholders
interests and needs can be captured and then utilized to develop
constructive alternative methods for implementing a BTS system
that can best meet the various parties interests and needs.
Issues of STB and BTS systems in Malaysia
The government adopted the BTS system in response to the
large number of abandoned housing projects that resulted from the
economic downturn combined with developers nancial short-
comings. The benets of BTS are clear home-buyers get the
chance to see built housing units, spot weaknesses, and gauge
a units quality rather than simply betting on such issues based on
a colored brochure, as is common under STB (New Straits Times, 1
September 2004).
The proposal to implement the BTS system is not new; the
system has been debated and studied over the past two decades.
The Federation of Malaysian Consumer Associations (FOMCA)
proposed the implementation of a BTS system as early as 1981
(Zulkii & Abdul Ghani, 2004). A decade later (in 1991), the then-
Minister of Housing and Local Government, Dr Ting Chew Peh,
called for BTS implementation. The government responded by
organizing seminars exploring the possibility of implementing BTS
in Malaysia (Norakmarwati, 2003). In 1996, the government
endorsed BTS, reected in the Seventh Malaysia Plan tabled in
Dewan Rakyat by then-Prime Minister Dr Mahathir Mohamad
(New Straits Times, 25 January 1999). In April 2007, the govern-
ment announced that either the BTS or the 10:90 system would run
concurrently with the STB system for a two-year trial period. To
encourage developers to implement a BTS or 10:90 system, the
government offered incentives to developers, including fast-track
approval (within four months) for BTS projects, a waiver of the
RM200,000 deposit for a housing developers license, and an
exemption from the low-cost house construction quota. Never-
theless, a developer can choose whether to follow the new BTS
concept or the current STB concept (The Star, 23 June 2007), and
unfortunately, few developers have taken the governments offered
incentives. One possible reason for developers reluctance may be
the choice between the BTS, or 10:90, system and the old STB
system. The STB system is preferable to developers, as it has been
practiced for over 50 years; developers did not want to take on the
new systems risks. In fact, many developers are still unclear about
how the new system will work, how it will be implemented, and
how to apply for the incentives. In addition, when the imple-
mentation of Malaysias BTS system was announced by then-
Deputy Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak, organizations such as
REHDA and HBA expressed concern that many niggling issues must
be solved before the BTS system could be implemented.
Research methodology
A purposive sampling method was employed to locate infor-
mation-rich key stakeholders for the purpose of this study:
respondents were selected according to a set of pre-determined
criteria, as suggested by Zikmund (2003). The criteria for selecting
the stakeholders included experience in handling cases related to
the STB and BTS systems and knowledge of the Malaysian property
sectors. One of the advantages of purposive sampling is that it
narrows respondents down to specic types of people who can
provide the desired information (Sekaran, 2003). In total, three
BTS-adopting developers organizations, two social activists, two
consumer organizations, three local authorities, one ministry at the
federal level, a developers association, a building contractor rm,
consultants of construction organizations and two professional
bodies participated in a series of focus groups held between May
and August of 2008. Preliminary telephone conservations were
 Y. NorAini et al. / Habitat International 34 (2010) 5358
made to the aforementioned organizations to secure their partici-
pation and identify suitable members or ofcers who are knowl-
edgeable, have experience and are in the best position to provide
information regarding BTS and STB systems. Phone calls were then
made to the identied individuals, followed by ofcial conrmation
letters. Several attempts were also made to obtain feedback from
the National Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia) and the
Association of Banks of Malaysia (ABM), but these institutions were
either unable or unwilling to participate.
Focus groups were conducted to obtain in-depth responses from
the stakeholders regarding the issues surrounding BTS imple-
mentation. The meetings were held face-to-face at the participants
ofce or at a place determined by the participants. A discussion
guide, similar to the interview guide suggested by Patton (1990),
was developed to minimize variation and offer exibility in the
discussion. The key themes of the discussion were the organiza-
tions roles in supporting BTS, their strategies or plans of action for
BTS implementation, and prospects for enhancing the image of the
housing industry. Each focus group interview was tape-recorded
and subsequently transcribed in full by student assistants into word
documents as quickly as possible. The transcriptions were then
cross-checked by the interviewers to include written notes taken
during the meetings (if any) and to ensure accuracy. The results of
earlier focus groups served as a guide for topics to emphasize or
include in later focus groups.
The data were analyzed manually using content analysis,
following Miles and Huberman (1994). The transcribed data were
categorized using several codes. After eliminating or combining
code categories, the nal codes were organized according to
common themes to identify patterns and highlight important ideas.
Whenever necessary, diagrams were used to illustrate groupings of
or relationships between the main themes. The analysis took
another two months to complete and involved at least four full time
students and research assistants.
Findings and discussion
The housing industry involves many players, including consul-
tants, local authorities, professionals, nancial institutions, and
others. BTS would be an ideal system for the property development
industry if all industry players agreed to cooperate with one
another. Based on several discussions with other players in the
industry, several issues critical to the successful implementation of
BTS were identied. The following ndings come from the focus
group interviews conducted with industry stakeholders.
Implement mechanisms and policies to expedite
the implementation of the BTS system
This point is agreed upon by many stakeholders in the industry.
To date, the government has not properly formulated a National
Housing Policy. This lack of proper policy can be seen as one of the
primary weaknesses of the local housing industry. Many devel-
opers, especially those from developers organizations, think that
the government itself is still fuzzy on the idea of BTS and that the
lines between the system and the government have not been
properly dened. The government has been said to have simply
thrown the idea around without preparing proper mechanisms for
implementation. For instance, the MHLG prepared guidelines for
only the 10:90 model, not for other models. As an ofcer with the
federal government observed:
Why do we not have BTS 20:80 or 30:70? At this point, the
government must state their position. At the moment, it is BTS
55
10:90, meaning that we only regulate 10:90. But 0:100 is better,
and this is not subject to the Act.
Participants have argued that proper procedures and guidelines
should be developed for all BTS variants. Policy makers, especially
the central government, state governments and local authorities,
should work together to facilitate and promote BTS implementa-
tion. Administrative and procedural issues should be addressed, as
they play an important role in the implementation and smooth
functioning of new systems.
Revise the incentives plan
The current incentives offered by the government for BTS
adopters are only applicable to developers who use the 10:90
model and thus will not help motivate developers to implement
other BTS models. The latest information from the MHLG showed
a negative response to the incentives, as only one application had
been received to date. The low response rate means that the
incentives currently being offered are not attractive enough to
inuence developers to implement BTS. All BTS adopters in this
study stated that they did not apply for the governments incen-
tives. According to one BTS adopter:
It (the incentive) doesnt matter because our Ministry says one
thing, but the authority is saying another thing, so there is no link.
Another BTS adopter replied in similar vein:
We never apply.why? First, the procedure.we are not very clear
(on it). Second, we cannot afford to wait. It will denitely take time
before the authority approves our application. But how long do we
have to wait? We dont really know. I believe that the authority is
not able to tell us either.
The remarks suggest that the current incentives offered by the
government have not been well received by developers. Even
developers who have adopted BTS seem to be willing to forego
government incentives. Unclear procedures and uncertainty about
the application process made participants feel that the incentives
were not worth the time and effort required.
Consumer Organization A has urged the government to provide
more incentives, and the New Straits Times (2006) suggested that
developers need greater motivation in order to fully embrace the
10:90 BTS system. In our focus group meeting with Consumer
Organization A, the secretary general suggested three additional
incentives that the government could offer to attract developers:
discount land premiums (i.e., give more than a 20% discount for the
conversion of agricultural land), special tax structures and lower
levy for foreign labor.
Focus group participants agreed that these additional incentives
could increase the attractiveness of BTS. They were condent that
the additional incentives would attract small developers as well as
large ones.
Improve the monitoring system through rules and regulations
The existing rules and regulations of the Housing Developers Act
have been amended several times over the years. These amend-
ments have been intended to ensure that laws protect the rights of
home-buyers. Projects continue to be abandoned, however, and
many home-buyers continue to suffer because developers run away
without completing the projects. Therefore, one of the main goals
of BTS implementation is to tackle the issue of abandoned projects.
One question that arises with the new system is whether the
country can solve the problem of abandoned projects and improve
housing quality in the process.
56 Y. NorAini et al. / Habitat International 34 (2010) 5358
It has been reported that the problem of abandoned projects is
not merely a result of the conventional STB system. In fact, countries
like Australia, which also implements both BTS and STB, do not face
similar abandoned project problems. This is because existing laws
complement the rights of the industrys major players. Australia
also has an effective monitoring system that regulates who can
become a developer or builder. The Australian government requires
that developers and builders sit for an exam before obtaining their
license. The case of Australia indicates that regardless of whether
BTS or STB is used, a proper monitoring system is necessary to
ensure the housing delivery systems success.
Unfortunately, such a proper monitoring system does not exist
in Malaysia. Flaws in the monitoring system and lack of enforce-
ment by authorities have led to many unscrupulous developers
taking advantage of loopholes and giving the industry a bad image.
A study of critical factors in the redevelopment of abandoned
projects revealed that one reason for abandoned projects is the lack
of enforcement and control on the part of proper authorities
(Ibrahim, 2006).
A representative from Consumer Organization A pointed out:
we have seen that many buyers have suffered from the problem of
abandoned projects. It is rare to see irresponsible developers
brought to court or punished for their default because of lack of
enforcement by the government.
A participant from Professional Body A also expressed concern:
The issue is not whether current law is sufcient to protect the
house buyers. It goes back to the issue of enforcement.
The participant noted that there are many loopholes in the
current law and added:
The regulations are already stated in the Act, but we do not know
why they are not used, and why many of the checks and balances
that you can actually enforce have not been enforced.
One example is an advertisement by a developer claiming free
legal fees, which means that the same lawyer is acting on behalf of
both the developer and purchaser. The participant from Profes-
sional Body A expressed the view that the Ministry should not
allow that sort of advertisement because whenever there is
a conict of interest, the lawyer will act for the benet of whoever is
paying him or her, putting the home-buyers on the losing end of
the deal.
Though the above argument may be just one persons view, this
matter should be taken into consideration for the benet of the
industry. In a newspaper report, the REHDA itself asked the MHLG
to strengthen its monitoring system for developers (Berita Harian, 7
April 2008). However, simply increasing the quantity of monitoring
will not ensure effective enforcement of housing regulations.
Enforcement should encourage developers (or their agents) to
improve housing quality. This suggests the importance of the
governments role in promoting the positive image of the industry
by having a proper monitoring system and strictly enforcing the Act
and its regulations. Such actions will help restore public condence
in the monitoring system.
Political will as the main driver of BTS implementation
Any new government policy needs strong political will from the
top of the administration to ensure its successful implementation.
As far as BTS is concerned, developers have been given the choice of
implementing the system because the system has only been
approved in principle; the government still needs to discuss
implementation with state governments and local authorities (New
Straits Times, 15 July 2006). Under the current scenario, few
developers are willing to implement the BTS system. According to
consumer organizations and local activists, if the political will
shown by the government were stronger, then BTS could become
the new housing delivery system in Malaysia. A representative of
one consumer organization observed:
It is impossible for the Ministry of Housing to force developers to
adopt BTS, unless there is political will that urges all developers to
adopt it. For instance, the Prime Ministers willpower will inuence
the developers willingness to implement such a system.
This sentiment was echoed by one of the social activists who
participated in a focus group:
If the government really wants the BTS system to be implemented,
they can do that by issuing a new circular like they did for other
issues. Take, for example, the issue of teaching Science and Math in
English. The government was able to implement this by using their
political power, despite receiving many protests from the public -
especially the Nationalists.
However, political will alone will not be able to ensure the
success of BTS implementation. The entire industry infrastructure
must be in place to ensure the successful implementation of BTS.
The role of nancial institutions in supporting BTS implementation
Most participants in the focus groups stressed the crucial role of
nancial institutions in supporting BTS implementation. In the
existing STB system, developers nd it difcult to get funding from
nancial institutions. Thus, it is not surprising that most developers
believe that the BTS system makes the situation worse because
banks are not willing to bear the nancial risks involved in devel-
opment projects. Feedback from BTS adopters also revealed that
they did not rely on banks to nance their BTS projects. In fact, they
complained that banks were not supportive. One developer
commented:
We have a lot of trouble dealing with banks. They dont under-
stand the concept. I feel the reason they are not supportive is that
they dont gain.
The other stakeholders agree that nancial institutions should
show more commitment to encouraging developers to adopt the
BTS or 10:90 systems. Consumer Organization A, for instance,
asserted that dealing with developers in the BTS or 10:90 systems
would be a safer bet for banks, as every developer is required to
submit a feasibility study to the bank when applying for a loan.
Ideally, banks would be dealing with developers with good nan-
cial positions and track records. In these cases, banks should be
more proactive in assessing the viability of a project. As reported in
the New Straits Times on July 15, 2006, the vice president of HBA
said, With 10:90, the nancier will be able to operate in a more
secure environment, as it will have absolute control over loan
disbursement and full control of the collateral (p. 6).
The role of professionals in supporting BTS implementation
Professionals, such as architects, engineers, quantity surveyors,
and lawyers, play a vital role in the Malaysian housing industry.
These professionals are responsible for ensuring that housing
development projects are carried out appropriately based on
specic processes and procedures. They are subject to professional
ethics and codes of conduct and thus should play a role in
encouraging developers to adopt BTS. In reality, developers appoint
most of the professionals, creating potential conicts of interest.
 Y. NorAini et al. / Habitat International 34 (2010) 5358
Professionals have to act as independent parties and must disclose
all information to those who rely on their opinions (i.e., home-
buyers). Under the current system, some professional misconduct
was believed to contribute to the housing industrys problems.
Dishonest architects, for example, may approve project progress
even when developers do not meet specications (according to one
of the participants; a federal government ofcer). In addition, most
lawyers prepare their documents during the pre-construction stage
and will simply walk away if the project has been abandoned
(Consumer Organization B). A few participants highlighted this
issue during focus group interviews. For instance, in supporting the
above argument, a member of Professional Body B admitted that
conicts of interest exist between themselves and developers,
stating that:
.there are developers who have always forced us to certify earlier
than necessary. They would like to make money earlier, and at
times architects bent to this pressure. So some architects had
problems in these situations and got reprimanded.
Nevertheless, focus group interviews with professional bodies A
and B revealed that they believed that the BTS or 10:90 systems
could help boost the housing industry. They also foresaw that the
systems would minimize the industrys problems. In fact, Profes-
sional Body A addressed the Ministry of Housing in order to promote
the BTS and 10:90 systems as the primary housing delivery systems
in the country. In terms of quality housing, Professional Body B
believed that the entire housing delivery system ought to be
revamped. To quote the President of Professional Body B:
.I think another aspect is BTS, which will raise quality because
buyers can see what they are getting and pay only then.because
at that time the onus is back on the developer. If the developer
produces something that is lousy, he is not going to be able to sell it.
He cant recover his cost. Our current system is that he sells the
building before he even builds it. So, what else is there left for him to
hang on to? He will say Thank you very much. I got my money
already.
This indicates that some industry players agree that the BTS or
10:90 system would be more benecial for the housing industry
than the STB system.
Market and society awareness of the BTS and 10:90 systems
Our previous ndings indicate that the developers readiness to
adopt BTS is dependent on the market (NorAini et al., 2008).
Affordability for buyers and the markets absorbency are both
important factors here. Our interviews with Consumer Organiza-
tions A and B revealed that most buyers are ready to pay slightly
higher costs as long as they are assured a high-quality house. This
suggests that buyers can accept either the BTS or 10:90 system, as
both reduce their risk when buying a house. Most people will be
content if they are given the chance to examine the completed
product (the house) before deciding to buy it. To quote one repre-
sentative from Consumer Organization B:
.Buyers will very happy and satised with the completed house,
and it doesnt matter to them if they have to pay more to get
a higher quality house rather than take on higher risk by buying an
incomplete one.
This statement coincides with the conclusions of Zan Yangs
(2001) study, which suggested that Beijing buyers are willing to pay
more to protect themselves from low-quality construction.
Another point highlighted in the focus groups is the issue of
buyers (and, more generally, societys) awareness of the BTS or
57
10:90 systems. Consumer Organization A, which claimed to
represent the voice of Malaysian home-buyers, asserted that the
environment has shaped the buyers mindset that STB is the only
system available in the country. A representative of the same
organization further noted:
.not only are buyers not aware of the new system, but bankers
also have an incorrect mindset when it comes to BTS, as they are
bound to a system in which progressive payment is the only system
they know.
The secretary general of the same organization added that:
.only those people who have been burned, or experienced an
abandoned project, understand and realize that they should buy
a secondary house on the market or go for BTS or 10:90.
A participant from Professional Body A agreed with this opinion,
saying that the most powerful people inuencing BTS imple-
mentation are the home-buyers themselves. Societys low level of
awareness is evidence that the public is not exercising their rights.
The Malaysian public seems reluctant to realize the consequences
of what is going on in the housing industry and thus seems to
repeat the same mistakes by accepting whatever developers offer.
Therefore, there is a need to educate people. As another member of
Professional Body A observed:
The government and other authorities can only do so much.in the
end the people must decide. If people dont want to listen and dont
want to hear, the BTS system and the laws will only exist on paper.
This implies that it is time for society to become more educated in
order to revitalize the current housing delivery system. In addition,
the government should empower house buyers to protect them-
selves through education and knowledge. It is possible to establish
an institution that would act as an independent body to provide
reliable and credible data about housing developers, banks, insurers,
and other aspects of the housing delivery system. This would agree
with Sommervilles (1998) work, which dened housing-related
empowerment as a process by which people gain increased control
over their housing situations. Specic means of empowerment
include provision of information, passing of legislation, commitment
of resources, and transfer of management functions (ibid).
Conclusion
The main purpose of the housing delivery system is to provide
decent and affordable housing. While many believe that BTS is
a better system than the conventional STB system, its imple-
mentation should incorporate the factors raised in this study to
ensure acceptance by various stakeholders. The results of this
studys analysis suggest that 6 major steps are needed in order for
BTS to be fully implemented. The rst 4 suggestions concern the
role of the government in guaranteeing successful implementation
of the BTS system. Specically, the government should establish
proper mechanisms for BTS, revise the incentive plan, improve the
monitoring system, and garner political will. We also suggest that
other stakeholders, such as nancial institutions and professionals,
should help ensure successful implementation of BTS. Finally,
awareness in society and the market is necessary for either the BTS
or the 10:90 system to be a success.
Acknowledgements
The authors acknowledge the research grant provided by the
National Property Research Coordinator (NAPREC) of Malaysia,
which was instrumental in supporting this paper.
58 Y. NorAini et al. / Habitat International 34 (2010) 5358

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