Supreme Court Rules Death Extinguishes Criminal and Civil Liability

Case
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Prosec. Dige

Victoria C. Garcia] sts
Article 89 113
PEOPLE vs. BAYOT

G.R. No. 200030
April 18, 2012
FACTS:
Appellant Nelson Bayot was charged with rape. The Information filed against
him states that on September 17, 1997, by means of force, violence and
intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of and/or sexual intercourse with [AAA], 44 years old, against her will.
RTC: In its July 31, 2000 Decision, convicted appellant of the crime of rape and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay AAA the
amount of P40,000.00 as indemnity with costs.
CA: In its Decision dated May 9, 2006, affirmed appellants conviction with the
modification increasing the award of indemnity from P40,000.00 to P50,000.00. It
likewise awarded moral damages in favor of AAA in the amount of P50,000.00.
However, in a letter dated May 29, 2006, the Penal Superintendent of the
New Bilibid Prison, informed the Court of Appeals that appellant died at the New
Bilibid Prison Hospital on December 4, 2004.
Nonetheless, the Public Attorneys Office still appealed, on behalf of

appellant, the aforesaid
Court of Appeals Decision to this Court (Supreme Court) dated May 31, 2006,
which was given due course by the Court of Appeals per Resolution dated January
19, 2007. The Court of Appeals also directed the Chief of the Judicial Records
Division to forward the entire records of the case to this Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not appellants death on December 4, 2004, during the pendency

of his appeal before the Court of Appeals, extinguished his criminal liability for the
crime of rape and his civil liability solely arising from or based on said crime (YES)
HELD:
YES, the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction

extinguishes his criminal liability, as well as the civil liability ex delicto.
Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code provides for the effect of death of the
accused on his criminal, as well as civil, liability. It reads:
SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Bongalon. Bose. Candelaria. De Leon. Dizon. 1
Feliciano. Hermogenes.
Maranan. Navarez. Oliva. Ongoco. Sison. Symaco. Tolentino. Valentin. Villafuerte.
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ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal

liability is totally extinguished:
(1) By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as
to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only
when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment;
xxx
Applying the foregoing provision, People vs. Bayotas had laid down the
following guidelines:
1) Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his

criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As
opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, the death of the accused prior to
final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly
arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex
delicto in senso strictiore."
2) Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death
of the accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of
obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these
other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of
the same act or omission: law, contracts, quasi contracts, and quasi delict.
3) Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an

action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a
separate civil action subject to the
Rules on Criminal Procedure. This separate civil action may be enforced either
against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on
the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.
4) Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file
this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution
of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party
instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of
limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the
pendency of the criminal case, conformably with the provisions of Article
1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible
privation of right by prescription.
From the foregoing, it is clear that the death of the accused pending
appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability, as well as the
civil liability ex delicto. The rationale, therefore, is that the criminal action is
extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused,
the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto
extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal case.
Evidently, it is already unnecessary to rule on appellants appeal. Appellants

appeal was still pending and no final judgment had been rendered against him at
the time of his death. Thus, whether or not appellant was guilty of the crime
charged had become irrelevant because even assuming that appellant did incur
criminal liability and civil liability ex delicto, these were totally extinguished by
his death.
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PEOPLE vs. AMISTOSO

G.R. No. 201447
August 28, 2013
FACTS:
Accused-appellant Anastacio Amistoso y Broca (Amistoso) was charged

before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Masbate City, with the rape of his daughter,
AAA, alleged to be 12 years old at the time of the incident.
Crime charged: statutory rape under Article 266-A, paragraph (1)(d) of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended
RTC: guilty, not of statutory rape, but of qualified rape under Article 266-A
CA: affirmed Amistosos conviction for qualified rape but modified the penalties
imposed in accordance with Republic Act No. 9346 and the latest jurisprudence on
awards of damages
Insisting upon his innocence, Amistoso appealed to the Supreme Court. In

its Decision dated January 9, 2013, the Court affirmed with modification the
judgment of conviction against Amistoso, expressly making him liable for
interest on the amounts of damages awarded.
However, in a letter dated February 7, 2013, Ramoncito D. Roque, OIC,

Inmate Documents and Processing Division of the Bureau of Corrections, informed
the Court that Amistoso had died on December 11, 2012 at the New Bilibid
Prison. Roque attached to his letter a photocopy of the Death Report stating that
Amistoso, 62 years old, died at about 5:00 p.m. on December 11, 2012 of cardio
respiratory arrest. Roques letter was received by the Court on February 12, 2013.
Penal Institution Supervisor (PIS) Fajardo R. Lansangan, Sr. (Lansangan), OIC,

Maximum Security Compound, NBP, wrote another letter, likewise informing the
Court of Amistosos death. PIS Lansangan appended to his letter a photocopy of
Amistosos Death Certificate. The Court received PIS Lansangans letter on
February 18, 2013.
Yet, on February 22, 2013, the Public Attorneys Office (PAO), which
represented Amistoso and which was apparently also unaware of its clients demise,
still filed a MR of the Courts Decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not accused-appellants death on December 11, 2012, during the

pendency of his appeal before the Supreme Court, extinguished his criminal liability
for the crime of qualified rape and his civil liability solely arising from or based on
said crime notwithstanding the Courts
Decision affirming his conviction dated January 9, 2013 (YES)
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HELD:
YES, accused-appellants death on December 11, 2012, during the

pendency of his appeal before the Supreme Court, extinguished his
criminal liability, as well as his civil liability ex delicto.
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal

xxx
Applying the foregoing provision, in People vs. Bayotas, the Court laid down
the rules in case the accused dies prior to final judgment:
1) Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his

criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As
opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, the death of the accused prior to
final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly
arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex
delicto in senso strictiore."
2) Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death
of the accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of
obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these
other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of
the same act or omission: law, contracts, quasi contracts, and quasi delict.
3) Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an

action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a
separate civil action subject to the
Rules on Criminal Procedure. This separate civil action may be enforced either
against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on
the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.
4) Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file
this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution
of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party
instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of
limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the
pendency of the criminal case, conformably with the provisions of Article
1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible
privation of right by prescription.
Given the foregoing, it is clear that the death of the accused pending
appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability, as well as the
civil liability ex delicto. Since the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as
there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused, the civil action instituted
therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded
as it is on the criminal case.

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Undeniably, Amistosos death on December 11, 2012 preceded the

promulgation by the Court of its Decision on January 9, 2013. When Amistoso
died, his appeal before the Court was still pending and unresolved. The
Court ruled upon Amistosos appeal only because it was not immediately informed
of his death.
Amistosos death on December 11, 2012 renders the Courts

Decision dated January 9, 2013, even though affirming Amistosos
conviction, irrelevant and ineffectual. Moreover, said Decision has not yet
become final, and the Court still has the jurisdiction to set it aside.
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PEOPLE vs. CONSORTE

G.R. No. 194068
November 26, 2014
FACTS:
Benjie Consorte y Franco (appellant) was a former conductor of Elizabeth

Palmars jeepney. Sometime in June 2000, Elizabeths residence was robbed and
several personal belongings, including cash, were taken. Appellant was the only one
who had access to the house, aside from Elizabeths family. So Elizabeths brother
tailed appellant and found out that the latter pawned her TV set to Frederic
Francisco. She then sued appellant for robbery. A hearing was scheduled on
January 23, 2001, but on the night of January 22, 2001, Elizabeth was murdered.
On January 22, 2001, Jose Palmar, Elizabeths husband, instructed Rolando

Visbe to haul feeds from Morong, Rizal and deliver them to their piggery in
Binangonan, Rizal. As he was driving the jeepney, Rolando saw Elizabeth together
with her 14-year old daughter Myrna and her 3-year old nephew Big Boy. They
went with him to deliver the feeds. On their way back to Morong, Rolando noticed
appellant, who was wearing a hat. When they got near him, Rolando slowed down
and asked appellant where he was going. Appellant did not reply. Rolando veered to
the right to avoid hitting appellant. In the process, the jeepney ran over a stone, lost
its balance, and rolled into a ditch. While struggling to release the vehicle, Rolando
heard a gunshot. He looked around and saw appellant standing near the jeepneys
left rear, holding a handgun. Appellant immediately fled. He (Rolando) then heard
Myrna shouting Ninong, may dugo si Nanay! They rushed Elizabeth to Angono
District Hospital. But due to her fatal gunshot wound on the forehead, she died.
Aneline Mendoza, a resident of Greenpark, Cainta, Rizal, testified that on

January 22, 2001, around 8:45 pm while on her way home, a stranger greeted her
magandang gabi po. He was carrying something wrapped in a black cloth which
looked like a gun. She was somewhat frightened so she let him walk ahead of her.
She saw him turn to a corner. Immediately after she entered her house, she heard a
gunshot. She opened her window and saw the stranger, standing by the side of the
jeepney. The stranger immediately ran toward the direction of Elizabeths house.
She also heard the driver saying Putang ina, sinong bumaril?
Crime charged: murder
RTC: found appellant guilty of murder, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and directed him to indemnify the heirs of Elizabeth Palmar the
amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P29,500.00 as actual damages
CA: affirmed the judgment of the trial court with modification as to damages;
in addition to actual damages, appellant was further directed to pay moral and
exemplary damages in the amounts of P50,000.00 and P25,000.00, respectively
SC (July 9, 2014): affirmed the Decision of the CA with the following

modifications:
1) the amount of civil indemnity is increased from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00;
and
2) the amount of exemplary damages is increased from P25,000.00 to
P30,000.00.

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Accused- Benjie Consorte y Franco thereafter a

appellant filed Motion
for Reconsideration above-mentioned Decision July 9, 2014. raises
of the dated He the
incredibility of his identification as the perpetrator of the
crime.
Meanwhile, in a Letter dated September 21, 2014, the Officer-in-Charge of the

New Bilibid Prison (NBP) informed the Court that accused-appellant died on July
14, 2014.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the criminal and civil liability ex delicto of accused-appellant

are extinguished by his death prior to final judgment (YES)
HELD:
YES, the criminal and civil liability ex delicto of accused-appellant

Benjie Consorte y Franco are extinguished by his death prior to final
judgment. The judgment or conviction against him is therefore set aside.
Article 89 (1) of the Revised Penal Code is illuminating:
ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. - Criminal


xxxx
Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his

criminal liability as well as the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on
the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore.
In the case at bar, accused-appellant died before final judgment, as in

fact, his motion for reconsideration is still pending resolution by the Court. As such,
it therefore becomes necessary for the Court to declare his criminal
liability as well as his civil liability ex delicto to have been extinguished by
his death prior to final judgment.
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PEOPLE vs. BAUTISTA

G.R. No. 168641
April 27, 2007
FACTS:
On June 12, 1999, a dispute arose between respondent and his co-accused
Leonida Bautista, on one hand, and private complainant Felipe Goyena, Jr., on the
other.
Private complainant filed a Complaint with the Office of the Barangay of

Malate, Manila, but no settlement was reached. The barangay chairman then issued
a Certification to file action dated August 11, 1999.
On August 16, 1999, private complainant filed with the Office of the City
Prosecutor (OCP) a Complaint for slight physical injuries against herein
respondent and his co-accused. After conducting the preliminary investigation,
Prosecutor Jessica Junsay-Ong issued a Joint Resolution dated November 8, 1999
recommending the filing of an Information against herein respondent. Such
recommendation was approved by the City Prosecutor, represented by First
Assistant City Prosecutor Eufrocino A. Sulla, but the date of such approval cannot be
found in the records.
The Information was, however, filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) of Manila, Branch 28 only on June 20, 2000.
Respondent sought the dismissal of the case against him on the ground that
by the time the Information was filed, the 60-day period of prescription from the
date of the commission of the crime, that is, on June 12, 1999 had already elapsed.
MeTC: ruled that the offense had not yet prescribed
Respondent elevated the issue to the RTC via a Petition for Certiorari.
RTC: denied said petition and concurred with the opinion of the MeTC
Respondent then filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA.
CA: On June 22, 2005, the CA rendered its Decision wherein it held that, the 60-day
prescriptive period was interrupted when the offended party filed a Complaint with
the OCP of Manila on August 16, 1999. Nevertheless, the CA concluded that the
offense had prescribed by the time the Information was filed with the
MeTC, reasoning that even if the 10-day period for the CP or ACP Sulla, to act on
the resolution is extended up to the utmost limit, it ought not have been taken as
late as the last day of the year 1999. Yet, the information was filed with the MeTC
only on June 20, 2000, or already nearly six (6) months into the next year. To use
once again the language of Article 91 of the RPC, the proceedings at the CPO was
unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him (the accused) for a time
very much more than the prescriptive period of only two
(2) months. The offense charged had, therefore, already prescribed when
filed with the court on June 20, 2000.
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Petitioner now comes before the Supreme Court seeking the reversal of the
foregoing CA Decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the prescriptive period began to run anew after the
investigating prosecutors recommendation to file the proper criminal information
against respondent was approved by the City Prosecutor (NO)
HELD:
The answer is in the negative.
It is not disputed that the filing of the Complaint with the OCP effectively
interrupted the running of the 60-day prescriptive period for instituting the criminal
action for slight physical injuries.
Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides thus:
ART. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. - The period of

prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime
is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents,
and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or
information, and shall commence to run again when such
proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or
acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to
him.
The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is

absent from the Philipppine Archipelago.
The CA and respondent are of the view that upon approval of the
investigating prosecutor's recommendation for the filing of an Information against
respondent, the period of prescription began to run again. The Court does not
agree. It is a well-settled rule that the filing of the complaint with the fiscals
office suspends the running of the prescriptive period.
The proceedings against respondent were not terminated upon the City
Prosecutor's approval of the investigating prosecutor's recommendation that an
Information be filed with the court. The prescriptive period remains tolled from
the time the complaint was filed with the
Office of the Prosecutor until such time that respondent is either
convicted or acquitted by the proper court.
The Office of the Prosecutor miserably incurred some delay in filing the
Information but such mistake or negligence should not unduly prejudice the
interests of the State and the offended party.
The constitutional right of the accused to a speedy trial cannot be invoked by
the petitioner in the present petition considering that the delay occurred not in the
conduct of preliminary
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investigation or trial in court but in the filing of the Information after the City
Prosecutor had approved the recommendation of the investigating prosecutor to file
the Information.
The Office of the Solicitor General does not offer any explanation as to the
delay in the filing of the Information. The Court will not be made as an
unwitting tool in the deprivation of the right of the offended party to
vindicate a wrong purportedly inflicted on him by the mere expediency of a
prosecutor not filing the proper information in due time.
The Court will not tolerate the prosecutors apparent lack of a sense of
urgency in fulfilling their mandate. Under the circumstances, the more appropriate
course of action should be the filing of an administrative disciplinary action
against the erring public officials.
The Petition is hereby granted and the Decision of the RTC is hereby
reinstated.
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ABELLANA vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 174654
August 17, 2011
FACTS:
In 1985, petitioner extended a loan to private respondents spouses Diaga and

Saapia Alonto (spouses Alonto), secured by a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over Lot
Nos. 6471 and 6472 located at Pardo, Cebu City. Subsequently, or in July 9, 1987,
petitioner prepared a Deed of Absolute Sale conveying said lots to him for a
consideration of P130,000.00. The Deed of Absolute Sale was signed by spouses
Alonto in Manila. However, it was notarized in Cebu City allegedly without the
spouses Alonto appearing before the notary public. Thereafter, petitioner caused
the transfer of the titles to his name and sold the lots to third persons. On August
12, 1999, an Information was filed charging petitioner with estafa through
falsification of public document.
Crime charged: estafa through falsification of public document
RTC: guilty of Falsification of a Public Document by a private individual
Petitioner did not intend to defraud the spouses Alonto; that after the latter
failed to pay their obligation, petitioner prepared a Deed of Absolute Sale which
spouses Alonto actually signed; but that the Deed of Absolute Sale was notarized
without the spouses Alonto personally appearing before the notary public. From
these, the trial court concluded that petitioner can only be held guilty of
falsification of a Public Document by a private individual under Art. 172(1)
in relation to Art. 171(2) of the RPC and not estafa through falsification of
public document as charged in the Information. Petitioner is also directed to
institute reconveyance proceedings to restore ownership and possession of the real
properties in question in favor of private complainants or to pay them
P1,103,000.00 representing the value of the properties in case of failure to restore
the properties.
CA: acquitted the petitioner but nonetheless affirmed the RTCs finding with
respect to petitioners civil liability (No criminal liability, only civil liability)
CA acquitted him of Falsification of Public Document by a Private Individual

because the
Information charged him with a different offense which is estafa through
falsification of a public document.
Petitioner who was charged with and arraigned for estafa through
falsification of public document under Art. 171(1) of the RPC could not be
convicted of falsification of public document by a private individual under
Art. 172(1) in relation to Art. 171(2). The falsification committed in Art. 171(1)
requires the counterfeiting of any handwriting, signature or rubric while the
falsification in Art. 171(2) occurs when the offender caused it to appear in a
document that a person participated in an act or proceeding when in fact such
person did not so participate. Thus, the conviction of the petitioner for an
offense not alleged in the Information or one not necessarily included in
the offense charged violated his constitutional right to be informed

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of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Nonetheless, the CA
affirmed the trial courts finding with respect to petitioners civil liability.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Petitioner Felixberto A. Abellana could still be held civilly

liable notwithstanding his acquittal (NO)
HELD:
It is an established rule in criminal procedure that a judgment of acquittal

shall state whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the
guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In
either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil
liability might arise did not exist. When the exoneration is merely due to the failure
to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the court should award
the civil liability in favor of the offended party in the same criminal action.
In other words, the extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the
extinction of civil liability unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a
final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.
Civil liability arises when one, by reason of his own act or omission, done
intentionally or negligently, causes damage to another. Hence, for petitioner to be
civilly liable to spouses Alonto, it must be proven that the acts he committed had
caused damage to the spouses. However, based on the records of the case, the
Court finds that the acts allegedly committed by the petitioner did not cause
any damage to spouses Alonto.
First, the Information charged petitioner with fraudulently making it appear

that the spouses Alonto affixed their signatures in the Deed of Absolute Sale
thereby facilitating the transfer of the subject properties in his favor. However, after
the presentation of the parties respective evidence, the RTC found that the charge
was without basis as the spouses Alonto indeed signed the document and
that their signatures were genuine and not forged.
Second, even assuming that the spouses Alonto did not personally appear
before the notary public for the notarization of the Deed of Absolute Sale, the same
does not necessarily nullify or render void ab initio the parties transaction. Such
non-appearance is not sufficient to overcome the presumption of the truthfulness of
the statements contained in the deed. The defective notarization does not ipso
facto invalidate the Deed of Absolute Sale, the transfer of said properties
from spouses Alonto to petitioner remains valid. Hence, when on the basis of
said
Deed of Absolute Sale, petitioner caused the cancellation of spouses Alontos title
and the issuance of new ones under his name, and thereafter sold the same to third
persons, no damage resulted to the spouses Alonto.
Moreover, the Court cannot sustain the alternative sentence imposed

upon the petitioner, to wit: to institute an action for the recovery of the
properties of spouses Alonto or to pay them actual and other kinds of damages.
First, it has absolutely no basis in view of the trial courts finding that the
signatures of the spouses Alonto in the Deed of Absolute Sale are genuine and not

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forged. Second, sentences should not be in the alternative. There is

nothing in the law which permits courts to impose sentences in the alternative.
While a judge has the discretion of imposing one or another penalty, he cannot
impose both in the alternative. He must fix positively and with certainty the
particular penalty.
There is absolutely no basis for the RTC and the CA to hold petitioner
civilly liable to restore ownership and possession of the subject properties to the
spouses Alonto or to pay them P1,103,000.00 representing the value of the
properties and damages. (SC affirmed the judgment of acquittal, however, it
deleted the civil liabilities for lack of factual and legal basis)
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PEOPLE vs. PANGILINAN

G.R. No. 152662
June 13, 2012
FACTS:
On September 16, 1997, private complainant Virginia Malolos filed with

the Office of the City Prosecutor an affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation
of B.P. Blg. 22 against respondent Ma. Theresa Pangilinan alleging that respondent
issued 9 checks in favor of private complainant which were dishonored upon
presentment for payment.
Respondent filed a civil case for accounting, recovery of commercial

documents, enforceability and effectivity of contract and specific performance
against private complainant with the RTC, followed by "Petition to Suspend
Proceedings on the Ground of Prejudicial Question" before the Office of the City
Prosecutor. The City Prosecutor approved the petition for suspension.
Private complainant raised the matter before the Secretary of Justice who
reversed the resolution of the City Prosecutor and ordered the filing of
Informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 against respondent in connection with
her issuance of 2 checks. The 7 other checks included in the affidavit-complaint
filed on September 16, 1997 were, however, dismissed.
Consequently, two counts for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, were filed against
respondent Pangilinan on February 3, 2000 before the Office of the Clerk of
Court, MeTC.
Respondent filed an "Omnibus Motion to Quash the Information and to Defer

the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest" alleging that her criminal liability has been
extinguished by reason of prescription.
MeTC: granted the motion in an order
Private complainant filed a notice of appeal.
RTC: reversed the order of MeTC ruling that inasmuch as the Informations were
filed on February 3, 2000 although received by the Court itself only on June 7, 2000,
they are covered by the Rule as it was worded before the latest amendment. The
criminal action on two counts for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, had, therefore, not yet
prescribed when the same was filed with the court a quo considering the
appropriate complaint that started the proceedings having been filed with the
Office of the Prosecutor on September 16, 1997 yet. RTC in reversing the said
decision, directed to proceed with the hearing of the criminal cases.
CA: reversed the decision of RTC, thereby dismissing the criminal cases for the
reason that the cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 had already prescribed. It
held that it reckons the commencement of the period of prescription for violations
of B.P. Blg. 22 imputed to respondent sometime in the latter part of 1995, as it was
within this period that the she was notified by the private complainant of the fact of
dishonor of the subject checks and, the 5-day grace period granted by law had
elapsed. The private respondent then had, pursuant to Section 1 of Act

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3326, four years therefrom or until the latter part of 1999 to file her complaint or
information against the petitioner before the proper court. The Informations against
the petitioner having been filed on February 3, 2000, the said cases had therefore,
clearly prescribed.
Pursuant to Section 2 of Act 3326, as amended, prescription shall be

interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person.
It was held in the case of Zaldivia vs. Reyes that the proceedings referred to
in Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, are judicial proceedings, which
means the filing of the complaint or information with the proper court. Otherwise
stated, the running of the prescriptive period shall be stayed on the date
the case is actually filed in court and not on any date before that, which is
in consonance with Section 2 of Act 3326, as amended. While the aforesaid case
involved a violation of a municipal ordinance, the SC, considering that Section 2 of
Act 3326, as amended, governs the computation of the prescriptive period of both
ordinances and special laws, finds that the ruling likewise applies to special laws,
such as Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
The OSG sought relief to the Supreme Court in the instant petition for review
contending that, while it admits that Act No. 3326, as amended by Act No. 3585
and further amended by Act No. 3763, governs the period of prescription for
violations of special laws, it is the institution of criminal actions, whether filed with
the court or with the Office of the City Prosecutor, that interrupts the period of
prescription of the offense charged. It submits that the filing of the complaint-
affidavit by private complainant on September 16, 1997 interrupted the running of
the prescriptive period of the subject B.P. Blg. 22 cases.
Petitioner submits that the CA erred in its decision when it relied on the
doctrine laid down by this Court in the case of Zaldivia vs. Reyes, Jr. that the filing
of the complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor is not the "judicial
proceeding" that could have interrupted the period of prescription, contending that
in a catena of cases, the SC ruled that the filing of a complaint with the Fiscals
Office for preliminary investigation suspends the running of the prescriptive period.
It therefore concluded that the filing of the Informations with the MeTC of Quezon
City on February 3, 2000 was still within the allowable period of four years within
which to file the criminal cases for violation of
B.P. Blg. 22 in accordance with Act No. 3326, as amended.
Respondent reiterates the ruling of the CA that the filing of the complaint
before the City
Prosecutors Office did not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period
considering that the offense charged is a violation of a special law, thus, claiming
that the cases relied upon by petitioner involved felonies punishable under the RPC
and are therefore covered by Article 91 of the RPC and
Section 1, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. Respondent pointed
out that the crime imputed against her is for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, which is
indisputably a special law and as such, is governed by Act No. 3326, as amended.
She submits that a distinction should thus be made between offenses covered by
municipal ordinances or special laws , as in this case, and offenses covered by the
RPC.
Viray.
Case
ISSUE:
Whether or not the filing of the affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of
B.P. Blg. 22 against respondent with the Office of the City Prosecutor on September
16, 1997 interrupted the period of prescription of such offense (YES)
HELD:
The Court finds that the CA reversively erred in ruling that the offense
committed by respondent had already prescribed. Indeed, Act No. 3326
entitled "An Act to Establish Prescription for Violations of Special Acts and Municipal
Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin," as amended, is the law
applicable to B.P. Blg. 22 cases. The law reads:
SECTION 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless

otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the
following rules: (a) xxx; (b) after four years for those punished by
imprisonment for more than one month, but less than two years; (c)
xxx.
SECTION 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the

commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known
at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are

instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if
the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
Since B.P. Blg. 22 is a special law that imposes a penalty of imprisonment

of not less than 30 days but not more than one year or by a fine for its
violation, it therefore prescribes in four (4) years in accordance with Act No.
3326. The running of the prescriptive period, however, should be tolled
upon the institution of proceedings against the guilty person.
It has been held in a previous case that the filing of the complaint in the
Municipal Court even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or
investigation, should, and thus, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal
responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed cannot
try the case on the merits. Moreover, another case broadened such rule that the
filing of the complaint with the Fiscals Office also suspends the running of the
prescriptive period of a criminal offense.
There is no more distinction between cases under the RPC and those
covered by special laws with respect to the interruption of the period of
prescription.
The ruling in Zaldivia vs. Reyes, Jr. is not controlling in special laws. It has
been held in a number of cases involving special laws that the institution of
proceedings for preliminary investigation against the accused interrupts the period
of prescription. The Court has even ruled that investigations conducted by the
Securities and Exchange Commission for violations of the
Revised Securities Act and the Securities Regulations Code effectively interrupts the
prescription period because it is equivalent to the preliminary investigation
conducted by the DOJ in criminal
Viray.
Case
cases. In a case which is in all fours with the present case, the Court ruled that
commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused
before the Office of the City Prosecutor effectively interrupted the
prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged under
B.P. Blg. 22. In the same case it was held that aggrieved parties, especially those
who do not sleep on their rights and actively pursue their causes, should not be
allowed to suffer unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances beyond
their control, like the accuseds delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the
investigating agencies.
The Court follows the factual finding of the CA that "sometime in the latter
part of 1995" is the reckoning date of the commencement of presumption for
violations of B.P. Blg. 22, such being the period within which herein respondent was
notified by private complainant of the fact of dishonor of the checks and the five-
day grace period granted by law elapsed.
The affidavit-complaints for the violations were filed against respondent on

September 16, 1997. The cases reached the MeTC of Quezon City only on
February 13, 2000 because in the meanwhile, respondent filed a civil case for
accounting followed by a petition before the City Prosecutor for suspension of
proceedings on the ground of "prejudicial question". The matter was raised before
the Secretary of Justice after the City Prosecutor approved the petition to suspend
proceedings. It was only after the Secretary of Justice so ordered that the
Informations for the violation of B.P. Blg. 22 were filed with the MeTC of Quezon
City.
Clearly, it was respondents own motion for the suspension of the

criminal proceedings that caused the filing in court of the 1997 initiated
proceedings only in 2000.
As laid down in jurisprudence, it is unjust to deprive the injured party of

the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his
control. The only thing the offended party must do to initiate the prosecution of the
offender is to file the requisite complaint. Therefore, DOJ is ordered to re-file the
Informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 against the respondent.
Viray.
Case
LUMANTAS vs. CALAPIZ

G.R. No. 163753
January 15, 2014
FACTS:
On January 16, 1995, Spouses Hilario Calapiz, Jr. and Herlita Calapiz brought
their 8-year-old son, Hanz Calapiz (Hanz), to the Misamis Occidental Provincial
Hospital, Oroquieta City, for an emergency appendectomy. Hanz was attended to by
the petitioner, who suggested to the parents that Hanz also undergo circumcision at
no added cost to spare him the pain. With the parents consent, the petitioner
performed the coronal type of circumcision on Hanz after his appendectomy. On the
following day, Hanz complained of pain in his penis, which exhibited blisters. His
testicles were swollen. The parents noticed that the child urinated abnormally after
the petitioner forcibly removed the catheter, but the petitioner dismissed the
abnormality as normal.
On January 30, 1995, Hanz was discharged from the hospital over his parents
protestations, and was directed to continue taking antibiotics.
On February 8, 1995, Hanz was confined in a hospital because of the abscess

formation between the base and the shaft of his penis. Presuming that the
ulceration was brought about by Hanzs appendicitis, the petitioner referred him to
Dr. Henry Go, an urologist, who diagnosed the boy to have a damaged urethra.
Thus, Hanz underwent cystostomy, and thereafter was operated on three times to
repair his damaged urethra. When his damaged urethra could not be fully repaired
and reconstructed, Hanzs parents brought a criminal charge against the
petitioner for reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries.
Crime charged: serious physical injuries originally in the MTC but was
transferred to the RTC pursuant to Supreme Court Circular No. 11-99
Prosecution
They presented Dr. Rufino Agudera as an expert witness and as the physician
who had operated on Hanz twice to repair the damaged urethra. Dr. Agudera
testified that Hanz had been diagnosed to have urethral stricture and cavernosal
injury left secondary to trauma that had necessitated the conduct of two operations
to strengthen and to lengthen the urethra. Although satisfactorily explaining that
the injury to the urethra had been caused by trauma, Dr. Agudera could not
determine the kind of trauma that had caused the injury.
Defense
Petitioner denied the charge. He contended that at the time of his

examination of Hanz on January 16, 1995, he had found an accumulation of pus at
the vicinity of the appendix two to three inches from the penis that had required
immediate surgical operation; that after performing the appendectomy, he had
circumcised Hanz with his parents consent by using a congo instrument, thereby
debunking the parents claim that their child had been cauterized; that he had then
cleared Hanz on January 27, 1995 once his fever had subsided; that he had found
no complications when

Viray.
Case
Hanz returned for his follow up check-up on February 2, 1995; and that the abscess
formation between the base and the shaft of the penis had been brought about by
Hanzs burst appendicitis.
RTC: acquitted the petitioner of the crime charged for insufficiency of the
evidence. Nonetheless, the RTC ruled that the petitioner was liable for moral
damages and and was ordered to pay P50,000 because there was a preponderance
of evidence showing that Hanz had received the injurious trauma from his
circumcision by the petitioner.
CA: affirmed the RTC
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming petitioners civil liability despite his
acquittal of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries
(NO)
HELD:
NO, CA is correct in affirming petitioners civil liability despite his

acquittal of the crime of charged.
It is axiomatic that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable. Nevertheless, the acquittal of an accused of the crime charged does
not necessarily extinguish his civil liability.
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil
liability of the accused.
First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the
act or omission complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability,
for a person who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or
omission cannot and can never be held liable for such act or omission.
There being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the civil
action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds other than the
delict complained of.
The second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt

of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been
satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil liability which may
be proved by preponderance of evidence only.
The Rules of Court requires that in case of an acquittal, the judgment shall
state "whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt
of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either
case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil
liability might arise did not exist."
Conformably with the foregoing, therefore, the acquittal of an accused
does not prevent a judgment from still being rendered against him on the
civil aspect of the criminal case

Viray.
Case
unless the court finds and declares that the fact from which the civil liability might
arise did not exist.
Although it found the Prosecutions evidence insufficient to sustain a

judgment of conviction against the petitioner for the crime charged, the RTC did not
err in determining and adjudging his civil liability for the same act complained of
based on mere preponderance of evidence. In this connection, the Court reminds
that the acquittal for insufficiency of the evidence did not require that the
complainants recovery of civil liability should be through the institution of a
separate civil action for that purpose.
The petitioners contention that he could not be held civilly liable because
there was no proof of his negligence deserves scant consideration. The failure of
the Prosecution to prove his criminal negligence with moral certainty did
not forbid a finding against him that there was preponderant evidence of
his negligence to hold him civilly liable. With the RTC and the CA both finding
that Hanz had sustained the injurious trauma from the hands of the petitioner on
the occasion of or incidental to the circumcision, and that the trauma could have
been avoided, the Court must concur with their uniform findings.
Every person is entitled to the physical integrity of his body. Although the
Court has long advocated the view that any physical injury, like the loss or
diminution of the use of any part of ones body, is not equatable to a pecuniary loss,
and is not susceptible of exact monetary estimation, civil damages should be
assessed once that integrity has been violated. The assessment is but an imperfect
estimation of the true value of ones body. The usual practice is to award moral
damages for the physical injuries sustained. In Hanzs case, the undesirable
outcome of the circumcision performed by the petitioner forced the young child to
endure several other procedures on his penis in order to repair his damaged
urethra. Surely, his physical and moral sufferings properly warranted the amount of
P50,000.00 awarded as moral damages.
Many years have gone by since Hanz suffered the injury. Interest of 6% per
annum should then be imposed on the award as a sincere means of adjusting the
value of the award to a level that is not only reasonable but just and commensurate.
Viray.
Case
DALURAYA vs. OLIVA

G.R. No. 210148
December 08, 2014
FACTS:
One afternoon, Marina Oliva was crossing the street when a Nissan Vanette,
bearing plate number UPN-172 and traversing EDSA near the Quezon Avenue
flyover in Quezon City, ran her over. While Marina Oliva was rushed to the hospital
to receive medical attention, she eventually died, prompting her daughter, herein
respondent Marla Oliva (Marla), to file a criminal case for reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide against Daluraya, the purported driver of the vehicle.
The prosecution presented as witness Shem Serrano (Serrano), an eye-

witness to the incident, who testified that on said date, he saw a woman crossing
EDSA heading towards the island near the flyover and that the latter was bumped
by a Nissan Vanette bearing plate number UPN-172. The prosecution also offered
the testimonies of (a) Marla, who testified as to the civil damages sustained by her
family as a result of her mothers death; (b) Dr. Paul Ortiz (Dr. Ortiz), who presented
his findings on the autopsy conducted upon the body of Marina Oliva; and (c) Police
Senior Inspector Lauro Gomez (PSI Gomez), who conducted the investigation
following the incident and claimed that Marina Oliva was hit by the vehicle being
driven by Daluraya, albeit he did not witness the incident.
However, Daluraya filed an Urgent Motion to Dismiss (demurrer) asserting

that he was not positively identified by any of the prosecution witnesses as the
driver of the vehicle that hit the victim, and that there was no clear and competent
evidence of how the incident transpired.
Crime charged: reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
MeTC: granted Dalurayas demurrer and dismissed the case for

insufficiency of evidence. It found that the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses were wanting in material details and that they failed to sufficiently
establish that Daluraya committed the crime imputed upon him.
As to the civil aspect of the case, the MeTC likewise denied the same,
holding that no civil liability can be awarded absent any evidence proving that
Daluraya was the person responsible for
Marina Olivas demise.
RTC: dismissed the appeal and affirmed the MeTCs ruling, declaring that the
act from which the criminal responsibility may spring did not at all exist
CA: reversed the RTC Decision, ordering Daluraya to pay Marla the amounts of
P152,547.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and P50,000.00 as
moral damages. It also held that the MeTCs Order showed that Dalurayas acquittal
was based on the fact that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. As such, Daluraya was not exonerated from civil liability.
Hence, this petition.
Viray.
Case
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA was correct in finding Daluraya civilly liable for Marina
Olivas death despite his acquittal in the criminal case for reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide on the ground of insufficiency of evidence (NO)
HELD:
The petition is meritorious.
Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. The acquittal
of an accused of the crime charged, however, does not necessarily
extinguish his civil liability.
In Manantan vs. CA, the Court expounded on the two kinds of acquittal
recognized by our law and their concomitant effects on the civil liability of the
accused, as follows:
First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the
act or omission complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability,
for a person who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or
omission cannot and can never be held liable for such act or omission.
There being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the civil
action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds other than the
delict complained of. This is the situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court.
The second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt

of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been
satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil liability which may
be proved by preponderance of evidence only.
The acquittal of the accused does not automatically preclude a judgment

against him on the civil aspect of the case. The extinction of the penal action
does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability where:
1) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of
evidence is required;
2) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and
3) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based
upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted.
However, the civil action based on delict may be deemed extinguished if

there is a finding on the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or
omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist or where the
accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him.
Thus, if demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the
accused has the right to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case unless the
court also declares that the act or omission from which the civil liability
may arise did not exist. This is because when the accused files a demurrer to
evidence, he has not yet adduced evidence both on the criminal and civil aspects of
the case. The only evidence on record is the evidence for the prosecution.

Viray.
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In case of an acquittal, the Rules of Court requires that the judgment state
whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the
accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case,
the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability
might arise did not exist.
Dalurayas acquittal was based on the conclusion that the act or

omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist, given that the
prosecution was not able to establish that he was the author of the crime imputed
against him. Such conclusion is clear and categorical when the MeTC declared that
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are wanting in material details and
they did not sufficiently establish that the accused precisely committed the crime
charged against him. Furthermore, when Marla sought reconsideration of the
MeTCs Order acquitting Daluraya, said court reiterated and firmly clarified that the
prosecution was not able to establish that the accused was the driver of the Nissan
Vanette which bumped Marina Oliva and that there is no competent evidence on
hand which proves that the accused was the person responsible for the death of
Marina Oliva.
Hence, the CA erred in construing the findings of the MeTC, as affirmed by

the RTC, that Dalurayas acquittal was anchored on reasonable doubt, which would
necessarily call for a remand of the case to the court a quo for the reception of
Dalurayas evidence on the civil aspect. Records disclose that Dalurayas acquittal
was based on the fact that the act or omission from which the civil liability may
arise did not exist in view of the failure of the prosecution to sufficiently establish
that he was the author of the crime ascribed against him. Consequently, his civil
liability should be deemed as non-existent by the nature of such acquittal.
Viray.
Case
SOLIDUM vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 192123
March 10, 2014
FACTS:
Gerald Albert Gercayo (Gerald) was born on June 2, 1992 with an

imperforate anus. Two days after his birth, Gerald underwent colostomy, a
surgical procedure to bring one end of the large intestine out through the
abdominal wall, enabling him to excrete through a colostomy bag attached to the
side of his body.
On May 17, 1995, Gerald, then three years old, was admitted at the Ospital
ng Maynila for a pull-through operation. Dr. Leandro Resurreccion headed the
surgical team, and was assisted by Dr. Joselito Luceo, Dr. Donatella Valea and Dr.
Joseph Tibio. The anesthesiologists included Dr. Marichu Abella, Dr. Arnel Razon and
petitioner Dr. Fernando Solidum (Dr. Solidum). During the operation, Gerald
experienced bradycardia, and went into a coma. His coma lasted for two weeks,
but he regained consciousness only after a month. He could no longer see, hear or
move.
Agitated by her sons helpless and unexpected condition, Ma. Luz Gercayo
(Luz) lodged a complaint for reckless imprudence resulting in serious
physical injuries with the City
Prosecutors Office of Manila against the attending physicians.
Crime charged: reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries
RTC: guilty as charged; also held the Ospital ng Maynila civilly liable jointly and
severally with the petitioner
CA: affirmed
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was applicable herein (NO);
2) Whether or not Dr. Solidum was liable for criminal negligence (NO)
3) Whether or not Ospital ng Maynila could be held civilly liable jointly and severally
with Dr. Solidum (NO)
HELD:
RES IPSA LOQUITOR NOT APPLICABLE
In order to allow resort to the doctrine, therefore, the following essential

requisites must first be satisfied, to wit:
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1) the accident was of a kind that does not ordinarily occur unless
someone is negligent;
2) the instrumentality or agency that caused the injury was under the
exclusive control of the person charged; and
3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action
or contribution of the person injured.
The Court considers the application here of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
inappropriate. Although it should be conceded without difficulty that the second
and third elements were present, considering that the anesthetic agent and the
instruments were exclusively within the control of Dr. Solidum, and that the patient,
being then unconscious during the operation, could not have been guilty of
contributory negligence, the first element was undeniably wanting.
Luz delivered Gerald to the care, custody and control of his physicians for a
pull-through operation. Except for the imperforate anus, Gerald was then of sound
body and mind at the time of his submission to the physicians. Yet, he experienced
bradycardia during the operation, causing loss of his senses and rendering him
immobile. Hypoxia, or the insufficiency of oxygen supply to the brain that caused
the slowing of the heart rate, scientifically termed as bradycardia, would not
ordinarily occur in the process of a pull-through operation, or during the
administration of anesthesia to the patient, but such fact alone did not prove
that the negligence of any of his attending physicians, including the
anesthesiologists, had caused the injury. In fact, the anesthesiologists
attending to him had sensed in the course of the operation that the lack of oxygen
could have been triggered by the vago-vagal reflex, prompting them to administer
atropine to the patient.
NO CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE
Dr. Solidum was criminally charged for "failing to monitor and regulate
properly the levels of anesthesia administered to said Gerald Albert Gercayo and
using 100% halothane and other anesthetic medications." However, the foregoing
circumstances, taken together, did not prove beyond reasonable doubt that Dr.
Solidum had been recklessly imprudent in administering the anesthetic agent to
Gerald. Indeed, Dr. Vertidos findings did not preclude the probability that other
factors related to Geralds major operation, which could or could not
necessarily be attributed to the administration of the anesthesia, had
caused the hypoxia and had then led Gerald to experience bradycardia. Dr.
Vertido revealingly concluded in his report, instead, that
"although the anesthesiologist followed the normal routine and precautionary
procedures, still hypoxia and its corresponding side effects did occur."
The existence of the probability about other factors causing the hypoxia
has engendered in the mind of the Court a reasonable doubt as to Dr. Solidums
guilt, and moves us to acquit him of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to
serious physical injuries.
The Court has to clarify that the acquittal of Dr. Solidum would not
immediately exempt him from civil liability. But it cannot now find and declare
him civilly liable because the circumstances that have been established here do
not present the factual and legal bases for validly doing so. His acquittal did
not derive only from reasonable doubt. There was really no firm and competent
showing how the injury to Gerard had been caused. That meant that the
manner of administration of the anesthesia by Dr. Solidum was not necessarily the
cause of the hypoxia that caused the bradycardia experienced by Gerard.
Consequently, to adjudge Dr. Solidum

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Case
civilly liable would be to speculate on the cause of the hypoxia. The Court is
not allowed to do so, for civil liability must not rest on speculation but on
competent evidence.
LIABILITY OF OSPITAL NG MAYNILA
Although the result now reached has resolved the issue of civil liability, we
have to address the unusual decree of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, of expressly
holding Ospital ng Maynila civilly liable jointly and severally with Dr. Solidum. The
decree was flawed in logic and in law.
In criminal prosecutions, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability that
is deemed instituted with the criminal action refers only to that arising from the
offense charged. It is puzzling, therefore, how the RTC and the CA could have
adjudged Ospital ng Maynila jointly and severally liable with Dr. Solidum for the
damages despite the obvious fact that Ospital ng Maynila, being an artificial
entity, had not been charged along with Dr. Solidum. The lower courts
thereby acted capriciously and whimsically, which rendered their judgment
against Ospital ng Maynila void as the product of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Moreover, Ospital ng Maynila could be held civilly liable only when subsidiary
liability would be properly enforceable pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal
Code. But the subsidiary liability seems far-fetched here. The conditions for
subsidiary liability to attach to Ospital ng Maynila should first be complied with.
Firstly, pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, Ospital ng Maynila
must be shown to be a corporation "engaged in any kind of industry."
The term industry means any department or branch of art, occupation or business,
especially one that employs labor and capital, and is engaged in industry. However,
Ospital ng Maynila, being a public hospital, was not engaged in industry
conducted for profit but purely in charitable and humanitarian work. Secondly,
assuming that Ospital ng Maynila was engaged in industry for profit, Dr. Solidum
must be shown to be an employee of Ospital ng Maynila acting in the
discharge of his duties during the operation on Gerald. Yet, he definitely was not
such employee but a consultant of the hospital. And, thirdly, assuming that civil
liability was adjudged against Dr. Solidum as an employee (which did not happen
here), the execution against him must have been unsatisfied due to his
being insolvent.
Petition granted.
Viray.

Supreme Court Rules Death Extinguishes Criminal and Civil Liability

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Supreme Court Rules Death Extinguishes Criminal and Civil Liability

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Case

CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Prosec. Dige

PEOPLE vs. BAYOT

Nonetheless, the Public Attorneys Office still appealed, on behalf of

Whether or not appellants death on December 4, 2004, during the pendency

YES, the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction

ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal

1) Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his

3) Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an

Evidently, it is already unnecessary to rule on appellants appeal. Appellants

PEOPLE vs. AMISTOSO

Accused-appellant Anastacio Amistoso y Broca (Amistoso) was charged

Insisting upon his innocence, Amistoso appealed to the Supreme Court. In

However, in a letter dated February 7, 2013, Ramoncito D. Roque, OIC,

Penal Institution Supervisor (PIS) Fajardo R. Lansangan, Sr. (Lansangan), OIC,

Whether or not accused-appellants death on December 11, 2012, during the

YES, accused-appellants death on December 11, 2012, during the

Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal

1) Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his

3) Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an

SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Bongalon. Bose. Candelaria. De Leon. Dizon. 4

Undeniably, Amistosos death on December 11, 2012 preceded the

Amistosos death on December 11, 2012 renders the Courts

PEOPLE vs. CONSORTE

Benjie Consorte y Franco (appellant) was a former conductor of Elizabeth

On January 22, 2001, Jose Palmar, Elizabeths husband, instructed Rolando

Aneline Mendoza, a resident of Greenpark, Cainta, Rizal, testified that on

Crime charged: murder

SC (July 9, 2014): affirmed the Decision of the CA with the following

SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Bongalon. Bose. Candelaria. De Leon. Dizon. 6

Accused- Benjie Consorte y Franco thereafter a

Meanwhile, in a Letter dated September 21, 2014, the Officer-in-Charge of the

Whether or not the criminal and civil liability ex delicto of accused-appellant

YES, the criminal and civil liability ex delicto of accused-appellant

Article 89 (1) of the Revised Penal Code is illuminating:

ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. - Criminal

(1) By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as

Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his

In the case at bar, accused-appellant died before final judgment, as in

PEOPLE vs. BAUTISTA

Private complainant filed a Complaint with the Office of the Barangay of

MeTC: ruled that the offense had not yet prescribed

Respondent then filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA.

The answer is in the negative.

Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides thus:

ART. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. - The period of

The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is

ABELLANA vs. PEOPLE

In 1985, petitioner extended a loan to private respondents spouses Diaga and

Crime charged: estafa through falsification of public document

RTC: guilty of Falsification of a Public Document by a private individual

CA acquitted him of Falsification of Public Document by a Private Individual

SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Bongalon. Bose. Candelaria. De Leon. Dizon. 11

Whether or not Petitioner Felixberto A. Abellana could still be held civilly

It is an established rule in criminal procedure that a judgment of acquittal

First, the Information charged petitioner with fraudulently making it appear

Moreover, the Court cannot sustain the alternative sentence imposed

SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Bongalon. Bose. Candelaria. De Leon. Dizon. 12

forged. Second, sentences should not be in the alternative. There is

PEOPLE vs. PANGILINAN

On September 16, 1997, private complainant Virginia Malolos filed with

Respondent filed a civil case for accounting, recovery of commercial