1.

Kiani

Habeas corpus is not in the nature of a writ of error; nor intended as substitute for the trial courts
function. It cannot take the place of appeal, certiorari or writ of error. The writ cannot be used to
investigate and consider questions of error that might be raised relating to procedure or on the
merits. The inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding is addressed to the question of whether the
proceedings and the assailed order are, for any reason, null and void. The writ is not ordinarily
granted where the law

provides for other remedies in the regular course, and in the absence of exceptional
circumstances. Moreover, habeas corpus should not be granted in advance of trial. The orderly
course of trial must be pursued and the usual remedies exhausted before resorting to the writ
where exceptional circumstances are extant. In another case, it was held that habeas corpus
cannot be issued as a writ of error or as a means of reviewing errors of law and irregularities not
involving the questions of jurisdiction occurring during the course of the trial, subject to the
caveat that constitutional safeguards of human life and liberty must be preserved, and not
destroyed. It has also been held that where restraint is under legal process, mere errors and
irregularities, which do not render the proceedings void, are not grounds for relief by habeas
corpus because in such cases, the restraint is not illegal.33

In this case, when petitioner filed her Petition for Habeas Corpus with the RTC in behalf of her
husband, a Charge Sheet had already been filed against him for violation of Section 37(a)(7) and
Section 45 of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended. The filing of the Charge
Sheet before the BSI cured whatever irregularities or infirmities were attendant to his arrest. The
remedy of petitioner was to file a motion for the dismissal of the Charge Sheet and the Mission
Order of the Immigration Commissioner, not a petition for a writ of habeas corpus before the
RTC. The RTC had no authority to nullify the Mission Order issued by the Immigration
Commissioner, much less set aside the arrest of Javed Kiani. As held by this Court in
Commissioner Rodriguez v. Judge Bonifacio:34

2. Salienes

Under Rule 41, Section 11[8] of the Rules of Court, an interlocutory order is
not appealable but the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special action under
Rule 65. The aggrieved party must show that the court gravely abused its discretion
in issuing the interlocutory order. In the present case, it is incumbent upon

1
petitioners to show that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the
order.

Habeas corpus may be resorted to in cases where rightful custody is

withheld from a person entitled thereto.2[9] Under Article 2113[10] of the Family
Code, respondent Loran and petitioner Marie Antonette have joint parental
authority over their son and consequently joint custody. Further, although the
couple is separated de facto, the issue of custody has yet to be adjudicated by the
court. In the absence of a judicial grant of custody to one parent, both parents are
still entitled to the custody of their child. In the present case, private respondents
cause of action is the deprivation of his right to see his child as alleged in his
petition.4[11] Hence, the remedy of habeas corpus is available to him.

Again, it bears stressing that the order did not grant custody of the minor to any of
the parties but merely directed petitioners to produce the minor in court and
explain why private respondent is prevented from seeing his child. This is in line
with the directive in Section 95[14] of A.M. 03-04-04-SC6[15] that within fifteen
days after the filing of the answer or the expiration of the period to file answer, the
court shall issue an order requiring the respondent (herein petitioners) to present
the minor before the court. This was exactly what the court did.

3. As to residency requirement, it does not apply kasi substantial change

6
 It can not be gainsaid that the petition, insofar as it sought to change the
citizenship of Carlitos mother as it appeared in his birth certificate and delete the
married status of Carlitos parents in his and his siblings respective birth
certificates, as well as change the date of marriage of Carlito and Marivel involves
the correction of not just clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature. 7[10]
Rather, the changes entail substantial and controversial amendments.

For the change involving the nationality of Carlitos mother as reflected in

his birth certificate is a grave and important matter that has a bearing and effect on
the citizenship and nationality not only of the parents, but also of the offspring. 8
[11]

Further, the deletion of the entry that Carlitos and his siblings parents were
married alters their filiation from legitimate to illegitimate, with significant
implications on their successional and other rights.

RUEL 108

Parenthetically, it seems highly improbable that Marivel was unaware of the

proceedings to correct the entries in her childrens birth certificates, especially since

8
the notices, orders and decision of the trial court were all sent to the residence 9[23]
she shared with Carlito and the children.

It is also well to remember that the role of the court in hearing a petition to
correct certain entries in the civil registry is to ascertain the truth about the facts
recorded therein.10[24]

With respect to the date of marriage of Carlito and Marivel, their certificate
of marriage11[25] shows that indeed they were married on January 21, 2000, not on
April 27, 1989. Explaining the error, Carlito declared that the date April 27, 1989
was supplied by his helper, adding that he was not married to Marivel at the time
his sons were born because his previous marriage was annulled only in 1999. 12[26]
Given the evidence presented by respondents, the CA observed that the minors
were illegitimate at birth, hence, the correction would bring about no change at all
in the nature of their filiation.

10

11

12
 With respect to Carlitos mother, it bears noting that she declared at the
witness stand that she was not married to Juan Kho who died in 1959. 13[27] Again,
that testimony was not challenged by the city prosecutor.

The documentary evidence supporting the deletion from Carlitos and his
siblings birth certificates of the entry Married opposite the date of marriage of their
parents, moreover, consisted of a certification issued on November 24, 1973 by St.
Joseph (Butuan City) Parish priest Eugene van Vught stating that Juan Kho and
Epifania had been living together as common law couple since 1935 but have
never contracted marriage legally.14[28]

A certification from the office of the city registrar, which was appended to
respondents Amended Petition, likewise stated that it has no record of marriage
between Juan Kho and Epifania.15[29] Under the circumstances, the deletion of the
word Married opposite the date of marriage of parents is warranted.

With respect to the correction in Carlitos birth certificate of his name from
Carlito John to Carlito, the same was properly granted under Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court.

13

14

15
 4. In Re, Petition for Change of Name of Julian Lin Carulasan
Wang vs. Cebu LCR, GR NO. 159966

PRIVILEGE
The Court has had occasion to express the view that the State has an interest in the
names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification, and that a
change of name is a privilege and not a right, so that before a person can be
authorized to change his name given him either in his certificate of birth or civil
registry, he must show proper or reasonable cause, or any compelling reason which
may justify such change. Otherwise, the request should be denied.
CHARACTERISTICS
A name is said to have the following characteristics: (1) It is absolute, intended to
protect the individual from being confused with others. (2) It is obligatory in certain
respects, for nobody can be without a name. (3) It is fixed, unchangeable, or
immutable, at least at the start, and may be changed only for good cause and by
judicial proceedings. (4) It is outside the commerce of man, and, therefore,
inalienable and intransmissible by act inter vivos or mortis causa. (5) It is
imprescriptible.
APPLY

Applying these laws, an illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by the father bears
only a given name and his mothers surname, and does not have a middle name. The name of the
unrecognized illegitimate child therefore identifies him as such. It is only when the illegitimate
child is legitimated by the subsequent marriage of his parents or acknowledged by the father in a
public document or private handwritten instrument that he bears both his mothers surname as his
middle name and his fathers surname as his surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated child
or an acknowledged illegitimate child.

Accordingly, the registration in the civil registry of the birth of such individuals requires that the
middle name be indicated in the certificate. The registered name of a legitimate, legitimated and
recognized illegitimate child thus contains a given or proper name, a middle name, and a
surname.

DENIED

In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping his middle name is
convenience. However, how such change of name would make his integration into Singaporean
society easier and convenient is not clearly established. That the continued use of his middle
name would cause confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to
drop it from his registered complete name.
In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous foundation on which his petition
for change of name is based, it is best that the matter of change of his name be left to his
judgment and discretion when he reaches the age of majority.[26] As he is of tender age, he may
not yet understand and appreciate the value of the change of his name and granting of the same at
this point may just prejudice him in his rights under our laws.

3. Grande

From the foregoing provisions, it is clear that the general rule is that an illegitimate child shall
use the surname of his or her mother. The exception provided by RA 9255 is, in case his or her
filiation is expressly recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil
register or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by
the father. In such a situation, the illegitimate child may use the surname of the father.

In the case at bar, respondent filed a petition for judicial approval of recognition of the filiation
of the two children with the prayer for the correction or change of the surname of the minors
from Grande to Antonio when a public document acknowledged before a notary public under
Sec. 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court15 is enough to establish the paternity of his children. But
he wanted more: a judicial conferment of parental authority, parental custody, and an official
declaration of his childrens surname as Antonio.

USE OF SURNAME

Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the surname of their
father or not. It is not the father (herein respondent) or the mother (herein petitioner) who is
granted by law the right to dictate the surname of their illegitimate children.

Nothing is more settled than that when the law is clear and free from ambiguity, it must be taken
to mean what it says and it must be given its literal meaning free from any interpretation.16
Respondents position that the court can order the minors to use his surname, therefore, has no
legal basis.

On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free from ambiguity. And where there is no ambiguity, one
must abide by its words. The use of the word "may" in the provision readily shows that an
acknowledged illegitimate child is under no compulsion to use the surname of his illegitimate
father. The word "may" is permissive and operates to confer discretion17 upon the illegitimate
children.

It is best to emphasize once again that the yardstick by which policies affecting children are to be
measured is their best interest. On the matter of childrens surnames, this Court has, time and
again, rebuffed the idea that the use of the fathers surname serves the best interest of the minor
child. In Alfon v. Republic,18 for instance, this Court allowed even a legitimate child to continue
using the surname of her mother rather than that of her legitimate father as it serves her best
interest and there is no legal obstacle to prevent her from using the surname of her mother to
which she is entitled. In fact, in Calderon v. Republic,19 this Court, upholding the best interest of
the child concerned, even allowed the use of a surname different from the surnames of the childs
father or mother. Indeed, the rule regarding the use of a childs surname is second on