Conflict of Laws 3

Contents
1. In the Matter of the Claim for Attorneys Fees. CLARO
M. RECTO, claimant-Appellee, vs. ESPERANZA P. DE
HARDEN and FRED M. HARDEN, Defendants-
Appellants. ..................................................................... 2
2. ANGEL T. LIMJOCO, petitioner, vs. INTESTATE
ESTATE OF PEDRO O. FRAGRANTE,
deceased, respondent.................................................... 9
3. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GEORGE I.
FRANK, defendant-appellant. ...................................... 13
4. DJUMANTAN, petitioner, vs. HON. ANDREA D.
DOMINGO, COMMISSIONER OF THE BOARD OF
IMMIGRATION, HON. REGINO R. SANTIAGO and
HON. JORGE V. SARMIENTO, COMMISSIONERS
BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND
DEPORTATION, respondents...................................... 15
5. PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant, vs.
VICENTA F. ESCAO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.19
6. ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner, vs. HON.
MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of
Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the National Capital
Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON respondents.
..................................................................................... 23
7. IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner, vs. HON.
CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City
Fiscal of Manila; and ERICH EKKEHARD
GEILING, respondents. ................................................ 25
8. FE D. QUITA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
BLANDINA DANDAN, * respondents. .......................... 28
9. Digest ........................................................................... 30

Page 1 of 34

In the Matter of the Claim for Attorneys Fees. CLARO M.
RECTO, claimant-Appellee, vs. ESPERANZA P. DE HARDEN
and FRED M. HARDEN, Defendants-Appellants.
DECISION
CONCEPCION, J.:
This is an appeal taken by Esperanza P. de Harden and Fred M.
Harden from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
the pertinent part of which is of the following
tenor:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary.
The contingent fee to which the claimant is entitled under
paragraph 3 of the contract, Exhibit JJJ or 20, is 20% of
P1,920,554.85 or the sum of P384,110.97.
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves the recommendation
of the Commissioner with the above-stated modification, and finds
that Attorney Claro M. Recto is entitled to the sum of THREE
HUNDRED EIGHTY-FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED AND
TEN PESOS AND NINETY-SEVEN CENTAVOS (P384,110.97),
representing 20% of Esperanza P. de Hardens share in the
conjugal properties owned by her and her husband, Fred M.
Harden, as contingent fee stipulated in paragraph 3 of the
Contract of Professional Services, Exhibit JJJ or 20, and the said
Esperanza P. de Harden is hereby ordered to pay the said
amount above-stated. It appears that sometime in July,
1941, Appellant, Mrs. Harden, and Appellee, Claro M. Recto,
executed the following:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
CONTRACT OF PROFESSIONAL SERVICES
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE
PRESENTS:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
That I, ESPERANZA PEREZ DE HARDEN, of age, married to
Fred M. Harden, and temporarily residing in the Philippines, with
address at 534 Sales Street, Manila, have engaged the services
of Attorney Claro M. Recto to appear and act as my counsel in
the action which I will file against my husband, Fred M. Harden,
for the purpose of securing an increase in the amount of support
being received by me from the conjugal partnership of myself and
said Fred M. Harden, and for the purpose likewise of protecting
and preserving my rights in the properties of the said conjugal
partnership, in contemplation of the divorce suit which I intent to
file against him in the competent Court of California and of the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership between us, this contract of
services to be under the following
conditions:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1. That in lieu of retainer fee, which under the circumstances I
am not in a position to pay, I hereby agree to pay Attorney Claro
M. Recto, such payment to be made monthly, during the
pendency of the litigation and until the termination of the same,
twenty-five (25%) per cent of the total increase in allowance or
pension which may be awarded to me by the court over and
above the amount of P1,500.00 which I now receive monthly
from Defendant Fred M. Harden out of the funds of the conjugal
partnership; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryProvided, that should the
case be terminated or an amicable settlement thereof be arrived
Conflict of Laws 3
at by the parties before the expiration of two years from the date
of the filing of the complaint, I shall continue to pay the said
twenty-five (25%) per cent up to the end of said period.
2. That the aforesaid monthly payments shall be in addition to
whatever amount may be adjudged by the court against
the Defendant Fred M. Harden or against the conjugal partnership
by way of litis expense, that is, attorneys fees chargeable as
expenses of litigation.
3. That as full and complete satisfaction of the fees of Attorney
Claro M. Recto in connection with the case above referred to, and
said case being for the purposes aforestated, that is, to secure an
increase in the amount of support I now receive as well as to
protect and preserve my rights and interest in the properties of
the conjugal partnership, in contemplation of divorce and of the
liquidation of said partnership, I hereby agree to pay said Attorney
Claro M. Recto twenty (20%) per cent of the value of the share
and participation which I may receive in the funds and properties
of the said conjugal partnership of myself and Defendant Fred M.
Harden, as a result of the liquidation thereof either by death,
divorce, judicial separation, compromise or by any means or
method by virtue of which said partnership is or may be
liquidated.
4. All expenses in connection with the litigation are to be for my
account, but the same may be advanced by Attorney Claro M.
Recto, to be reimbursed to him either from the money which I
receive by way of support or from the funds of the conjugal
partnership.
5. It is hereby understood that this contract includes the services
of Attorney Claro M. Recto in connection with the securing of the
liquidation of the properties and assets of the conjugal partnership
of myself and Fred M. Harden, upon dissolution of said
partnership or for any other cause mentioned in Paragraph (3)
hereof.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have signed these presents in the
City _____ of Manila, Philippines this _______ day of July, 1941.
s/ Esperanza P. de Harden
t/ ESPERANZA P. DE HARDEN
ACCEPTED:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
s/ Claro M. Recto
t/ CLARO M. RECTO
In compliance therewith, on July 12, 1941, the Appellee, as
counsel for Mrs. Harden, commenced Civil Case No. 59634 of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled Esperanza P. de
Harden vs. Fred M. Harden and Jose Salumbides. In the
complaint therein filed, it was prayed, among other
things:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary (a) that Mrs. Harden be given
the exclusive administration of the business and all properties of
the conjugal partnership of Mr. and Mrs. Harden; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrary(b) that, in the event of denial of this prayer,
the Defendants be ordered to inform her of everything pertaining
to the administration of said business and properties, as well as
Page 2 of 34

to render accounts thereof and to permit her to examine the
books and records pertinent thereto; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrary(c) that Mr. Harden be ordered to account to
Mrs. Harden, and to return to this jurisdiction, the sum of
P449,015.44 allegedly withdrawn by him from the Philippines or
sent by him to Hongkong on April 1, 1941; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrary(d) that Defendant Salumbides be ordered to
account for all moneys, amounting to P285,000.00, belonging to
the business and assets of said conjugal partnership and
deposited by him in a safety box, either in his name, or in that of
Antonio Wilson, from January 23 to December 23, 1940; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrary(e) that the transfer, in the name of
Salumbides, of certain shares of stock, allegedly belonging to the
conjugal partnership, be rescinded and said Defendant ordered to
transfer said shares of stock in the name of Mrs. Harden or in that
of Mr. and Mrs. Harden, should Mr. Harden be allowed to
continue as administrator of said partnership; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrary( f ) that the transfer, made by Mr. Harden
and/or by Defendant Salumbides, as his attorney-in-fact, of
36,000 shares of stock of the Angelo Mining Company, to some
residents of Hongkong, be rescinded and said shares returned to
the assets of the conjugal partnership and placed in the name of
Mr. and Mrs. Harden; chan roblesvirtualawlibrary(g) that the
monthly allowance of Mrs. Harden be increased from P1,500 to
P15,000; chan roblesvirtualawlibrary(h) that, pending final
decision, Mr. Harden be ordered to increase the allowance or
pension of Mrs. Harden and their daughter Sarah Elizabeth to
P10,000 a month; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand (i) that a writ of
preliminary injunction be issued restraining the Defendants from
disposing of the assets of the conjugal partnership in fraud of Mrs.
Harden.
By an order dated July 12, 1941, the court authorized the
issuance of said writ, upon the filing of the corresponding bond. It
appears that, pursuant to an agreement submitted by both
parties, and with a view to avoiding unnecessary embarrassment,
restraint or inconvenience in the financial operations of the
business enterprises affected by said writ of preliminary
injunction, the same was amended by an order dated July 19,
1941, in the sense that.
cralaw without prejudicing in any way the rights of the parties in
this case, a separate bank account be established in the
Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China, of Manila, and all
transactions in connection with the aforesaid businesses passed
through that account by Mr. Harden or his duly authorized
representative, who at present is Mr. Salumbides, without the
necessity of securing a particular order from this Court on each
occasion; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat the present funds in the
Philippine National Bank in the name of Plaza Lunch and Fred M.
Harden be utilized for the purpose of starting said special bank
account in the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrarythat all income from the aforesaid
businesses be deposited in this special bank account and no
checks be drawn upon the same, except to pay the necessary
overhead and running expenses including purchases of tobacco,
merchandise, etc., required for the proper operation of said
businesses; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat a new set of books be
opened by Mr. Harden or his duly authorized representative
covering all business transactions passed through said special
Conflict of Laws 3
bank account and the same be opened for inspection by
the Plaintiffs duly authorized representative.
The order of injunction of July 12, 1941, is modified only to the
above extent, and in all other respects is maintained.
Subsequently, the Philippines was invaded by the Japanese and
placed under military occupation. Then came the liberation, in the
course of which the records of this case were destroyed. On
October 23, 1946, said records were reconstituted at the instance
of Appellee herein. Thereafter, the proceedings were resumed
and, in due course, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered,
on or about October 31, 1949, a decision the dispositive part of
which we quote:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In view of the foregoing considerations, this court finds and so
holds that
(a) Fred M. Harden abandoned his domicile of origin in New
Jersey and established a domicile of choice in Manila,
Philippines, since 1901;
(b) The matrimonial domicile of Fred M. Harden and Esperanza
P. de Harden was established in Manila, Philippines, from the
date of their marriage on December 14, 1917;
(c) Since they did not execute any antenuptial contract before
their marriage, all the properties, real or personal, acquired by
either or both of them on and after December 14, 1917, up to the
present, over and above the sum of P20,000.00 representing
Fred M. Hardens capital, are hereby declared conjugal
properties;
(d) The total amount of P1,944,794.37 representing deposits in
safety deposit boxes in the name of Jose Salumbides, the selling
price of the house in Los Angeles, California, and the pre-war and
post-war remittances abroad of Fred M. Harden, from which has
already been deducted the sum of P160,000.00 covering
payments for deficiency Federal income taxes and attorneys
fees, both in the tax case and the present one, is hereby declared
chargeable to the share of Defendant Harden and deductible from
whatever participation he may still have in the said conjugal
partnership upon the liquidation thereof, upon his failure to return
and deposit them in the name of the Plaza Lunch with the Manila
branch of the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China up to
the time this decision shall become final;
(e) A conjugal lien be annotated in the original and owners
duplicate of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 24393, 52436 and
54911 of the Register of Deeds of Manila and in Original
Certificate of Title No. 2292 of Quezon Province, and on all the
certificates of shares belonging to said conjugal partnership, as
well as in the corresponding books of the companies or
corporations issuing them, whereby it will be made to appear that
any subsequent alienation or encumbrance of said properties by
Fred M. Harden alone or his representative without the consent of
his wife will be deemed fraudulent and subject to revocation or
cancellation for being in fraud and prejudicial to the right of
Esperanza P. de Harden;
( f ) Within a period of fifteen (15) days after this decision shall
have become final, Fred M. Harden and Esperanza P. de Harden
Page 3 of 34

are hereby ordered to execute a document to be approved by this
court creating and express active trust upon the remaining cash
assets and income of the conjugal partnership in the Philippines,
whereby the Philippine Trust Company, with offices in Manila, will
act as trustee, subject to the right of Fred M. Harden to receive
therefrom the sum of P2,500,00 a month by way of allowance and
an equal amount for the Plaintiff as separate support and
maintenance;
(g) Within thirty (30) days after this decision shall have become
final, Fred M. Harden shall inform the Plaintiff of all the properties
and businesses of the conjugal partnership, be they in the
Philippines or abroad, and render a true and complete accounting
of the earnings and profits thereof;
(h) The Plaintiff is entitled to litis expensae in the amount of
P175,000.00 for services rendered by her counsel up to the
rendition of this judgment, which Fred M. Harden or the herein
receiver is ordered to pay within a period of fifteen (15) days after
this decision has become final; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand
(i) The writ of preliminary injunction of July 12, 1941, is hereby
declared permanent and the order of receivership of November
20, 1946, is hereby maintained, but said auxiliary remedies will be
automatically lifted upon the conclusion of the annotation of the
conjugal lien and the execution of the deed of trust above
mentioned. Without costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
The Defendants appealed from said decision to this Court, where
the case was docketed as case No. L-3687. While the appeal was
thus pending before us, herein Appellee filed a manifestation and
a motion, both dated February 20, 1952. In said
manifestation, Appellee stated that Mrs. Harden had instructed
him, by letter, to discontinue all proceedings relative to said
case, vacate all orders and judgments rendered therein, and
abandon and nullify all her claims to the conjugal partnership
existing between her and Mr. Harden, in accordance with several
instruments dated January 29, 1952, and executed without the
knowledge, advise and consent of said Appellee, as counsel for
Mrs. Harden, whereby:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary (1) Mr. and
Mrs. Harden had purportedly agreed to settle their differences in
consideration of the sum of $5,000 paid by Mr. Harden to Mrs.
Harden, and a monthly pension of P500 to be paid by him to
her; chan roblesvirtualawlibrary(2) Mr. Harden had created a trust
fund of $20,000 from which said monthly pension of $500 would
be taken; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand (3) Mr. and Mrs. Harden
had mutually released and forever discharged each other from all
actions, debts, duties, accounts, demands and claims to the
conjugal partnership, in consideration of the sum of $1. It was
further asserted, in Appellees manifestation, that the purpose of
the said instruments, executed by Mr. and Mrs. Harden, was to
defeat the claim of the former for attorneys fees, for which
reason, he prayed, in his aforementioned motion, that
a) Pending the resolution of this motion, the receiver appointed
herein be authorized to continue holding the properties above
mentioned in his custody in order not to defeat the undersigneds
inchoate lien on them;
Conflict of Laws 3
b) A day set aside to receive the evidence of the undersigned
and those of the Plaintiff and the Defendant Fred M. Harden, in
order to determine the amount of fees due to the undersigned, by
the appointment of a referee or commissioner for the reception of
such
c) After due hearing, the undersigned be declared entitled to the
sum of P400,000.00 as his fees for services rendered in behalf of
the Plaintiff in this case, under paragraph 3 of the contract, Annex
A, and to that end a charging lien therefore be established upon
the properties above-mentioned;
d) And the receiver be ordered to pay to the undersigned the full
amount of the fees to which the latter is found to be entitled.
Counsel for the Defendants-Appellants, in turn, moved for the
dismissal of the case, to which Appellee objected. Acting upon
the issues raised in such motion for dismissal and in Appellees
motion to establish and enforce his charging lien, as counsel for
Mrs. Harden, this Court issued on July 22, 1952, a resolution the
pertinent part of which reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
It will be seen from the above that the Defendants-
Appellants pray for the complete dismissal of the above entitled
case without prejudice to the annotation of the contingent claim of
Attorney Claro M. Recto on the property under receivership, other
than the 368,553 shares of the Balatoc Mining Company which
belong to Fred M. Harden. On the other hand, Attorney Claro M.
Recto agrees to the lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction, the
orders of contempt and commitment, and all other interlocutory
orders which were issued in the course of this case, with the
exception of the receivership, but objects to the dismissal of the
case on the ground that, since receivership is merely an auxiliary
remedy, the present case should be allowed to remain pending
for the purpose of maintaining the receivership to safeguard his
right to collect the fees that may be due him.
Attorney Claro M. Recto prays that a commissioner or referee be
immediately appointed by this Court to receive evidence in
support of his allegations as to his attorneys lien and its
enforcement. Counsel for the Defendants-Appellants does not
object to this proceeding provided that the restrictions set forth by
him be observed. However, this Court does not have the proper
facilities for receiving evidence in order to determine the amount
of the fees claimed by Attorney Claro M. Recto, and it is deemed
advisable that this matter be determined by the Court of First
Instance. This is specially so considering the opposition to the
claim of Attorney Claro M. Recto filed by Attorney J. W. Ferrier,
Sr. in behalf of Esperanza P. de Harden.
In view of the foregoing, the above entitled case is hereby
remanded to the court of origin in order to determine the amount
of fees claimed by Attorney Claro M. Recto in his motion dated
February 20, 1952.
It is understood that, after said fees had been finally determined
and paid, this case will be completely dismissed as prayed for by
the Defendants-Appellants, without prejudice to considering the
claim of the receiver for compensation as stated in his urgent
motion dated July 2, 1952. Pending the determination of the
amount of fees claimed by Attorney Claro M. Recto, the writ of
Page 4 of 34

preliminary injunction, the orders of contempt and commitment,
and all interlocutory orders which were issued in the course of this
case, are hereby lifted and vacated, and with regard to the
receivership, the same is hereby dissolved, only with respect to
the 368,553 shares of the Balatoc Mining Company. As to the rest
of the properties, the receivership shall be maintained.
In compliance with said resolution, the records of this case were
remanded to the lower court, which, on September 2, 1952,
designated a commissioner to receive evidence on the amount of
the fees collectible by herein Appellee and to report thereon. After
due hearing, said commissioner submitted, on February 6, 1953,
a report of about one hundred (100) pages of the printed record
on appeal, setting forth, in detail, the evidence introduced by both
parties, and his findings of fact, with the following conclusion and
recommendation:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Taking into consideration the value of the properties involved in
this litigation, the length of time in which claimant had handled the
same for Esperanza Harden, the volume and quality of the work
performed, the complicated legal questions involved, the
responsibility assumed by the claimant as counsel, his reputation
in the bar, the difficulties encountered by him while handling the
same in which he had to work hard every inch of the way because
of the stiff oppositions filed by adverse counsel, the diligence he
employed not only in the preservation of the records in his
possession during the days of enemy occupation but also in the
protection of the interests of Esperanza Harden, his successful
handling of said case and those cases growing out of it which
reached the Supreme Court, and the extra services he rendered
in her behalf in the tax and other court cases, the undersigned
Commissioner concludes that claimant is entitled to the full
amount of 20% of Esperanza Hardens share of the conjugal
properties, as provided in paragraph 3 of the Contract of
Professional Services, Exhibit JJJ.
WHEREFORE, the undersigned Commissioner respectfully
recommends that Atty. Claro M. Recto be paid the equivalent
amount of 20% of Esperanza P. de Hardens share of the
conjugal properties or the sum of P369,410.04 as his contingent
fee for services rendered in her behalf.
After appropriate proceedings, the lower court rendered a
decision dated April 30, 1953, adopting substantially said report of
the commissioner, but increasing the contingent fee
of Appellee herein from P369,410.04, the sum recommended in
the report, to P384,110.97. Hence, this appeal taken by Mr. and
Mrs. Harden.
The first question for determination therein is the validity of the
above-quoted contract of services, which the Appellants assail as
void, mainly, upon the ground:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary (1) that
Mrs. Harden cannot bind the conjugal partnership without her
husbands consent; chan roblesvirtualawlibrary(2) that Article
1491 of the Civil Code of the Philippines in effect prohibits
contingent fees; chan roblesvirtualawlibrary(3) that the contract in
question has for its purpose to secure a decree of divorce,
allegedly in violation of Articles 1305, 1352 and 1409 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand (4) that
the terms of said contract are harsh, inequitable and oppressive.
Conflict of Laws 3
The first objection has no foundation in fact, for the contract in
dispute does not seek to bind the conjugal partnership. By virtue
of said contract, Mrs. Harden merely bound herself or
assumed the personal obligation to pay, by way of contingent
fees, 20% of her share in said partnership. The contract neither
gives, nor purports to give, to the Appellee any right whatsoever,
personal or real, in and to her aforesaid share. The amount
thereof is simply a basis for the computation of said fees.
For the same reason, the second objection is, likewise,
untenable. Moreover, it has already been held that contingent
fees are not prohibited in the Philippines and are impliedly
sanctioned by our Cannons (No. 13) of Professional Ethics. (see,
also, Ulanday vs. Manila Railroad Co., 45 Phil., 540, 554.) Such
is, likewise, the rule in the United States (Legal Ethics by Henry
S. Drinker, p. 176).
cralaw in the United States, the great weight of authority
recognizes the validity of contracts for contingent fees, provided
such contracts are not in contravention of public policy, and it is
only when the attorney has taken an unfair or unreasonable
advantage of his client that such a claim is condemned. (See 5
Am. Jur. 359 et seq.; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryBallentine, Law
Dictionary, 2nd ed., p. 276.)
Needless to say, there is absolutely nothing in the records before
us to show that Appellee herein had, in any manner, taken an
unfair or unreasonable advantage of his client Mrs. Harden.
The third objection is not borne out, either by the language of the
contract between them, or by the intent of the parties thereto. Its
purpose was not to secure a divorce, or to facilitate or promote
the procurement of a divorce. It merely sought to protect the
interest of Mrs. Harden in the conjugal partnership, during the
pendency of a divorce suit she intended to file in the United
States. What is more, inasmuch as Mr. and Mrs. Harden are
admittedly citizens of the United States, their status and the
dissolution thereof are governed pursuant to Article 9 of the
Civil Code of Spain (which was in force in the Philippines at the
time of the execution of the contract in question) and Article 15 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines by the laws of the United
States, which sanction divorce. In short, the contract of services,
between Mrs. Harden and herein Appellee, is not contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order or public policy.
The last objection is based upon principles of equity, but,
pursuant thereto, one who seeks equity must come with clean
hands (Bastida, et al., vs. Dy Buncio & Co., 93 Phil., 195; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrary30 C.J. S. 475), and Appellants have not
done so, for the circumstances surrounding the case show, to our
satisfaction, that their aforementioned agreements, ostensibly for
the settlement of the differences between husband and wife, were
made for the purpose of circumventing or defeating the rights of
herein Appellee, under his above-quoted contract of services with
Mrs. Harden. Indeed, having secured a judgment in her favor,
acknowledging her rights to the assets of the conjugal
partnership, which turned out to be worth almost P4,000,000 in
addition to litis expensae in the sum of P175,000, it is
inconceivable that Mrs. Harden would have waived such rights,
as well as the benefits of all orders and judgments in her favor, in
consideration of the paltry sum of $5,000 allegedly paid to her by
Page 5 of 34

Mr. Harden and the additional sum of $20,000 to be paid by him
in installments, at the rate of $500 a month. In fact, no
explanation has been given for this most unusual avowed
settlement between Mr. and Mrs. Harden. One cannot even
consider the possibility of a reconciliation between the spouses,
the same being inconsistent with the monetary consideration for
said alleged settlement. What is more, the records show that the
relations between said spouses which were bad indeed, not
only in July, 1941, when Mrs. Harden engaged the services of
the Appellee, but, even, before, for Mr. and Mrs. Harden were
separated since 1938 had worsened considerably thereafter,
as evidence by an action for divorce filed by Mr. Harden in New
Jersey, in July 1948, upon the ground of repeated acts of infidelity
allegedly committed by Mrs. Harden in 1940 and 1941.
Again, it appears that Appellee had rendered, under the contract
in question, the following services, for the benefit of Mrs.
Harden:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1. He succeeded in defeating Defendants motion for the
dissolution of the writ of preliminary injunction, issued by the
Court on July 12, 1941, and amended on July 19, 1941.
2. On November 12, 1946, Appellee moved for the appointment
of a receiver, upon the ground that, despite said writ of
preliminary injunction, the Defendants had been disposing of the
properties of the conjugal partnership for the purpose of
defrauding Mrs. Harden. After due hearing, the court, by an order
dated November 20, 1946, directed the appointment of Abelardo
Perez as receiver of said properties, upon the filing of a P10,000
bond. Defendants asked, on February 13, 1947, that the
receivership be suspended, or else, that they be allowed to file a
bond for the discharge of the receivership. Appellee replied
objecting thereto, unless the Defendants posted a P4,000,000
bond. Subsequently or on March 5, 1947, the Defendants sought
a reconsideration of the order of November 20, 1946, and the
discharge of the receiver. By an order dated March 21, 1947, the
Court authorized said discharged upon the filing, by
the Defendants, of a bond in the sum of P500,000, provided that
Mr. Harden should bring back all the 368,553 shares of the
Balatoc Mining Co., in his name to the Philippines for deposit with
the Clerk of Court, or with the Chartered Bank of India, Australia
and China, at Manila cralaw
3. On motion of the Appellee dated March 4, 1947, the Court, by
an order dated April 5, 1947, directed Mr. Harden to remit to Mrs.
Harden the sum of $2,500, to be charged against her litis
expensae. Upon similar motion, filed by Appellee on or about
April 26, 1947, the Court ordered Mr. Harden, on May 13, 1947,
to furnish Mrs. Harden the sum of $5,000, under the same
conditions.
4. On June 21, 1947, the Defendants instituted Civil Case No. G.
R. No. L-1499 of this Court, entitled Fred M. Harden and Jose
Salumbides vs. Emilio Pea, Abelardo Perez and Esperanza P.
Harden for the purpose of annulling and setting aside, by writ of
certiorari, the aforementioned orders of the lower court dated July
12, 1941, November 20, 1946, and April 5 and May 13, 1947, and
to restrain, in the meantime, the enforcement thereof. After
appropriate proceedings, in the course of
which Appellee appeared as counsel for Mrs. Harden, and like
Conflict of Laws 3
counsel for the Petitioners therein, filed several lengthy, detailed
pleadings and memoranda, decision was rendered on November
21, 1950, denying the writ of certiorari prayed for.
5. On or about September 9, 1947, Appellee filed a motion
alleging that despite the writ of preliminary injunction above
mentioned, the Defendants had, fraudulently and without judicial
consent, remitted abroad several sums of money aggregating
P1,000,608.66, and praying that Mr. Harden be ordered to return
this sum to the Philippines, within a stated period, said sum to be
deposited with the account of the Plaza Lunch at the Manila
Branch of the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China. Mr.
Harden objected to said motion. Appellee filed a rejoinder, to
which Mr. Harden replied. Appellee filed a rejoinder to the
rejoinder. On October 7, 1947, the Court granted Appellees
motion. Mr. Harden sought a reconsideration, which was opposed
by the Appellee on October 27, 1947, and denied by an order
dated November 13, 1947. Mr. Harden moved, on November 18,
1947, for the suspension of this order, which was immediately
objected to by the Appellee and then denied by the Court.
6. Inasmuch as said order of November 13, 1947 had not been
complied with, Appellee filed on November 27, 1947, a motion
praying that Mr. Harden be declared in contempt of court and
punished accordingly. Meanwhile, or on November 24, 1947, Mr.
Harden had instituted case G. R. No. L-1816 of this Court against
Hon. Emilio Pea, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, and Mrs. Harden. In the petition therein filed, Mr. Harden
applied for a writ of certiorari annulling said orders of Judge Pea
of October 7 and November 13, 1947, and prayed that, pending
disposition of the case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued
restraining the Respondents therein from enforcing said orders,
particularly through contempt proceedings. Hence, the lower court
deferred action on the aforementioned motion of November 27,
1947. After due hearing, this Court, in a resolution dated February
12, 1948, refused to issue the writ of preliminary injunction prayed
for. Subsequently, or on November 21, 1950, decision was
rendered denying the petition for a writ of certiorari.
7. Soon after the issuance of our resolution in said case G. R.
No. 1816, dated February 12, 1948, or to be exact on March 27,
1948, the lower court issued an order directing Mr. Harden to
comply, within five (5) days from notice, with the order of October
7, 1947. On April 6, 1948, Appellee filed with the lower court the
corresponding formal charges against Mr. Harden for contempt of
court. After due hearing, Mr. Harden was, by an order of April 28,
1948, found guilty as charged and ordered confined until he
complies with the aforementioned orders of October 7, 1947 and
March 27, 1948. On motion of Mr. Harden, said order of April 28,
1948 was suspended until May 4, 1948, on which date he was
arrested and placed in confinement at the New Bilibid Prison, in
Muntinglupa, Rizal. On July 10, 1948, he filed with this Court a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus against the Director of
Prisons, (G. R. No. L-2349, entitled Fred M. Harden vs. The
Director of Prisons), which, in due course was denied in a
decision promulgated on October 22, 1948.
8. During the military occupation of the Philippines by the
Japanese, the Appellee made representations with the Japanese
Government to prevent the commandeering of a business
establishment belonging to Mr. and Mrs. Harden. Moreover, he
Page 6 of 34

succeeded in persuading the Japanese to refrain from interning
Mrs. Harden and her daughter and to allow her to withdraw, from
the formers deposit in a local bank, from P200 to P250 a month,
for their subsistence. He, likewise, lent her money to meet her
needs and spent the sum of P55,000 in the preservation of the
records and papers pertaining to the business and other
properties of the conjugal partnership of Mr. and Mrs. Harden.
9. Appellee assisted, also, the receiver, as his counsel and, in
such capacity, took all steps essential for the proper discharge of
the duties of the former. Among other things, Appellee sought and
obtained judicial authority for some important acts of
administration of, and disposition by, the receiver. He (Appellee)
secured judicial intervention for the protection and preservation of
the assets of the conjugal partnership, including orders for the
delivery of certificates of stock, the return thereof and/or its
deposit with the clerk of court. He, likewise, represented the
receiver in seeking war damage payments.
10. In civil case No. 6222 of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
entitled Francisco Dalupan vs. Fred M. Harden for the recovery
of P113,837.17, it was decided, through Appellees intervention,
that the conjugal assets would bear the payment of P22,767.43
only, the balance to be chargeable exclusively against Mr.
Hardens share of the conjugal partnership.
11. Appellee instituted civil case No. 6940 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, entitled Abelardo Perez vs. Chartered Bank
of India, Australia and China and Fred M. Harden, for the
recovery of P1,000,608.66 and the return of stock certificates of
the Balatoc Mining Co., which had been sent abroad.
12. He (Appellee) represented Mrs. Harden in connection with a
million-peso federal tax case against Mr. and Mrs. Harden.
13. Appellee successfully blocked Mr. Hardens attempts to
withdraw:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary (1) $53,000 and forward the
same to the Collector of Internal Revenue of Los Angeles,
California; chan roblesvirtualawlibrary(2) $50,000.00, allegedly to
defray expenses in resisting a new tax assessment against him in
the United States; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand (3) P65,000 for
his expenses.
Then too, the conjugal partnership had varried and extensive
business interests and its assets were worth almost P4,000,000.
The pleadings, motions, oppositions, rejoinders, and memoranda
filed, and the evidence introduced, in the aforementioned cases
in which Appellee was pitted against one of the most
experienced and able members of the Philippine Bar were
numerous, extensive and exhaustive. For instance, the record on
appeal in one of those cases, namely, G. R. No. L-3687,
consisted of 966 pages.
In short, considering the character of the services rendered by
the Appellee, the nature and importance of the issues in said
litigations, the amount of labor, time (1941 to 1952) and trouble
involved therein, the skill displayed in connection with said cases,
the value of the property affected by the controversy, the
professional character and standing of the Appellee, the risks
assumed and the results obtained, we are of the opinion, and so
Conflict of Laws 3
hold, that the contract of services in question is neither harsh nor
oppressive or inequitable.
Under their second assignment of error, Appellants maintain
that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The lower court erred in failing to find as a fact borne out by the
evidence that the legal services of Attorney Claro M. Recto to
Mrs. Esperanza P. de Harden, payment, for which is sought by
him in this case, have already been paid by his immediate
execution pending appeal of the decision in Civil Case No. CFI-R-
59634 (SC-G.R. No. L- 3687), wherein he collected the sum of
P176,000.00 for all such legal services.
Said decision, however, states clearly that the aforementioned
sum of P175,000 represents litis expensae, and the contract
between the Appellee and Mrs. Harden explicitly declares that
said litis expensae shall be in addition to Appellees share of
25% of the increase in the allowance of Mrs. Harden and his
attorneys fees of 20% of her share in the conjugal partnership.
The second assignment of error is, therefore, devoid of merit.
Appellants, further contend, that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
3. The lower court erred in holding that the inchoate share of the
wife, Esperanza P. de Harden, in the undissolved and
unliquidated conjugal partnership properties of the Harden
spouses, is capable of certain valuation before such dissolution
and liquidation, and summarily assessing the value of Mrs.
Hardens share in such conjugal properties without proper
evidence.
4. The lower court erred in awarding 20% of such inchoate
share to Attorney Claro M. Recto from Mrs. Hardens interests in
the Harden conjugal properties, summarily assessing such 20%
inchoate share as of a value of P384,110.97, and ordering the
payment of said sum to Attorney Recto in pursuance of the
provisions of paragraph 3 of the Contract of Professional
Services.
Appellants arguments in support thereof may be summarized as
follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary The contract of services in
question provides that Appellees contingent fees shall be 20% of
the share of Mrs. Harden in the conjugal partnership. Pursuant to
law, the share of Mrs. Harden shall be determined upon the
liquidation of said partnership, which has not taken place, as yet.
What is more, it cannot be effected until the dissolution of the
marriage relation between Mr. and Mrs. Harden. Inasmuch as this
relation subsists, it follows that the amount of attorneys fees due
to Appellee herein should not have been determined in the
decision appealed from.
This line of argument overlooks the fact that said contract of
services was made, principally, in contemplation of a suit for
divorce that, according to Mrs. Harden, she intended to file before
a competent court in California, and of the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership between her and Mr. Harden. Had she filed
said action for divorce and secured a decree of divorce, said
conjugal partnership would have been dissolved and then
liquidated, and the share of Mrs. Harden therein would have been
fixed. However, this cannot take place, either now, or in the
Page 7 of 34
 Conflict of Laws 3

foreseeable future, owing to the aforementioned agreements

between Mr. and Mrs. Harden, which were made for the evident
purpose of defeating Appellees claim for attorneys fees. In other
words, the occurrence, within the time contemplated by the
parties bearing in mind the nature of, and the circumstances
under which they entered into, said contract of services of the
event upon which the amount of said fees depended, was
rendered impossible by Mrs. Harden. Hence, whether such event
be regarded as a condition or as a period, she may not insist
upon its occurrence, prior to the enforcement of the rights of the
herein Appellee, for the condition shall be deemed fulfilled when
the obligor voluntarily prevents its fulfillment (Art. 1186, Civil
Code) and the debtor shall lose every right to make use of the
period when he violates any undertaking, in consideration of
which the creditor agreed to the period. (Art. 1198, Civil Code.)

It should be noted, also, that the compensation agreed upon

for Appellees services, consists of three (3) parts,
namely:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary (a) 25% of the increase in the
allowance of Mrs. Harden; chan roblesvirtualawlibrary(b) litis
expensae; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand (c) 20% of her share in
the conjugal partnership. The first part was dealt with in the first
paragraph of their contract of services. The second and third
parts were the object of the second and third paragraphs,
respectively. The first paragraph limited the rights
of Appellee thereunder to two (2) years, in the event of
termination of the case or amicable settlement thereof within two
(2) years from the filing of the complaint. No such limitation
appears in the second and third paragraphs of said contract.
Hence, the same were intended by the parties to be fully
operative under any and all conditions.

It may not be amiss to add that the value of the properties

involved has been assessed, not summarily, but after due notice
and full dress hearing, in the course of which both parties
introduced testimonial and documentary
evidence. Appellants presented Exhibits 1 to 58, whereas those
of the Appellee were so numerous that, having begun with Exhibit
A, his last piece of documentary evidence was marked Exhibit 26
Ys. The transcript of the hearing, which lasted ten (10) days,
covers over 220 pages.

The other assignments of error made by Appellants herein are

mere corollaries of those already disposed of, and, hence, no
further discussion thereof is necessary.

In conclusion, it appears that the assets of the conjugal

partnership between Mr. and Mrs. Harden are reasonably valued
at P3,841,109.70. One-half (1/2) thereof, representing the share
of Mrs. Harden, is therefore, worth P1,920,554.85. Twenty
percentum (20%) of this sum is P384,110.97, which is the
contingent fee due to the Appellee, apart from the litis expensae
already paid to him. Inasmuch as the Appellee has collected,
also, the sum of P80,000.00, on account of said contingent fees,
there results in his favor a balance of P304,110.97.

Subject to this qualification, the decision appealed from is hereby

affirmed, therefore, with costs against the Appellants. SO
ORDERED.

Page 8 of 34

ANGEL T. LIMJOCO, petitioner,
vs.
INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO O. FRAGRANTE,
deceased, respondent.
Angel Limjoco, Jr. and Delfin L. Gonzales for petitioner.
Bienvenido A. Tan for respondent.
HILADO, J.:
Under date of May 21, 1946, the Public Service Commission,
through Deputy Commissioner Fidel Ibaez, rendered its decision
in case No. 4572 of Pedro O. Fragante, as applicant for a
certificate of public convenience to install, maintain and operate
an ice plant in San Juan, Rizal, whereby said commission held
that the evidence therein showed that the public interest and
convenience will be promoted in a proper and suitable manner
"by authorizing the operation and maintenance of another ice
plant of two and one-half (2-) tons in the municipality of San
Juan; that the original applicant Pedro O. Fragante was a Filipino
Citizen at the time of his death; and that his intestate estate is
financially capable of maintaining the proposed service". The
commission, therefore, overruled the opposition filed in the case
and ordered "that under the provisions of section 15 of
Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended a certificate of public
convenience be issued to the Intestate Estate of the deceased
Pedro Fragante, authorizing said Intestate Estate through its
Special or Judicial Administrator, appointed by the proper court of
competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate an ice plant with a
daily productive capacity of two and one-half (2-1/2) tons in the
Municipality of San Juan and to sell the ice produced from said
plant in the said Municipality of San Juan and in the Municipality
of Mandaluyong, Rizal, and in Quezon City", subject to the
conditions therein set forth in detail (petitioner's brief, pp. 33-34).
Petitioner makes four assignments of error in his brief as follows:
1. The decision of the Public Service Commission is not in
accordance with law.
2. The decision of the Public Service Commission is not
reasonably supported by evidence.
3. The Public Service Commission erred in not giving petitioner
and the Ice and Cold Storage Industries of the Philippines, Inc.,
as existing operators, a reasonable opportunity to meet the
increased demand.
4. The decision of the Public Service Commission is an
unwarranted departure from its announced policy with respect to
the establishment and operation of ice plant. (Pp. 1-2, petitioner's
brief.)
In his argument petitioner contends that it was error on the part of
the commission to allow the substitution of the legal
representative of the estate of Pedro O. Fragante for the latter as
party applicant in the case then pending before the commission,
and in subsequently granting to said estate the certificate applied
for, which is said to be in contravention of law.
If Pedro O. Fragante had not died, there can be no question that
he would have had the right to prosecute his application before
the commission to its final conclusion. No one would have denied
Conflict of Laws 3
him that right. As declared by the commission in its decision, he
had invested in the ice plant in question P 35,000, and from what
the commission said regarding his other properties and business,
he would certainly have been financially able to maintain and
operate said plant had he not died. His transportation business
alone was netting him about P1,440 a month. He was a Filipino
citizen and continued to be such till his demise. The commission
declared in its decision, in view of the evidence before it, that his
estate was financially able to maintain and operate the ice plant.
The aforesaid right of Pedro O. Fragante to prosecute said
application to its conclusion was one which by its nature did not
lapse through his death. Hence, it constitutes a part of the assets
of his estate, for which a right was property despite the possibility
that in the end the commission might have denied application,
although under the facts of the case, the commission granted the
application in view of the financial ability of the estate to maintain
and operate the ice plant. Petitioner, in his memorandum of
March 19, 1947, admits (page 3) that the certificate of public
convenience once granted "as a rule, should descend to his
estate as an asset". Such certificate would certainly be property,
and the right to acquire such a certificate, by complying with the
requisites of the law, belonged to the decedent in his lifetime, and
survived to his estate and judicial administrator after his death.
If Pedro O. Fragrante had in his lifetime secured an option to buy
a piece of land and during the life of the option he died, if the
option had been given him in the ordinary course of business and
not out of special consideration for his person, there would be no
doubt that said option and the right to exercise it would have
survived to his estate and legal representatives. In such a case
there would also be the possibility of failure to acquire the
property should he or his estate or legal representative fail to
comply with the conditions of the option. In the case at bar Pedro
O. Fragrante's undoubted right to apply for and acquire the
desired certificate of public convenience the evidence
established that the public needed the ice plant was under the
law conditioned only upon the requisite citizenship and economic
ability to maintain and operate the service. Of course, such right
to acquire or obtain such certificate of public convenience was
subject to failure to secure its objective through nonfulfillment of
the legal conditions, but the situation here is no different from the
legal standpoint from that of the option in the illustration just
given.
Rule 88, section 2, provides that the executor or administrator
may bring or defend actions, among other cases, for the
protection of the property or rights of the deceased which survive,
and it says that such actions may be brought or defended "in the
right of the deceased".
Rule 82, section 1, paragraph (a), mentions among the duties of
the executor or administrator, the making of an inventory of all
goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased which
shall come to his possession or knowledge, or to the possession
of any other person for him.
In his commentaries on the Rules of Court (Volume II, 2nd ed.,
pages 366, 367) the present chief Justice of this Court draws the
following conclusion from the decisions cited by him:
Page 9 of 34

Therefore, unless otherwise expressly provided by law, any action
affecting the property or rights (emphasis supplied) of a deceased
person which may be brought by or against him if he were alive,
may likewise be instituted and prosecuted by or against the
administrator, unless the action is for recovery of money, debt or
interest thereon, or unless, by its very nature, it cannot survive,
because death extinguishes the right . . . .
It is true that a proceeding upon the application for a certificate of
public convenience before the Public Service Commission is not
an "action". But the foregoing provisions and citations go to prove
that the decedent's rights which by their nature are not
extinguished by death go to make up a part and parcel of the
assets of his estate which, being placed under the control and
management of the executor or administrator, can not be
exercised but by him in representation of the estate for the benefit
of the creditors, devisees or legatees, if any, and the heirs of the
decedent. And if the right involved happens to consist in the
prosecution of an unfinished proceeding upon an application for a
certificate of public convenience of the deceased before the
Public Service Commission, it is but logical that the legal
representative be empowered and entitled in behalf of the estate
to make the right effective in that proceeding.
Manresa (Vol. III, 6th ed., p. 11) says that No. 10 of article 334
and article 336 of the Civil Code, respectively, consider
as immovable and movable things rights which are not material.
The same eminent commentator says in the cited volume (p. 45)
that article 336 of the Civil Code has been deficiently drafted in
that it is not sufficiently expressive of all incorporeal rights which
are also property for juridical purposes.
Corpus Juris (Vol. 50, p. 737) states that in the broad sense of the
term, property includes, among other things, "an option", and "the
certificate of the railroad commission permitting the operation of a
bus line", and on page 748 of the same volume we read:
However, these terms (real property, as estate or interest) have
also been declared to include every species of title, inchoate or
complete, and embrace rights which lie in contract, whether
executory or executed. (Emphasis supplied.)
Another important question raised by petitioner is whether the
estate of Pedro O. Fragrante is a "person" within the meaning of
the Public Service Act.
Words and Phrases, First Series, (Vol. 6, p, 5325), states the
following doctrine in the jurisdiction of the State of Indiana:
As the estate of the decedent is in law regarded as a person, a
forgery committed after the death of the man whose name
purports to be signed to the instrument may be prosecuted as
with the intent to defraud the estate. Billings vs. State, 107 Ind.,
54, 55, 6 N. E. 914, 7 N. E. 763, 57 Am. Rep. 77.
The Supreme Court of Indiana in the decision cited above had
before it a case of forgery committed after the death of one
Morgan for the purpose of defrauding his estate. The objection
was urged that the information did not aver that the forgery was
committed with the intent to defraud any person. The Court, per
Elliott, J., disposed of this objection as follows:
Conflict of Laws 3
. . . The reason advanced in support of this proposition is that the
law does not regard the estate of a decedent as a person. This
intention (contention) cannot prevail. The estate of the decedent
is a person in legal contemplation. "The word "person" says Mr.
Abbot, "in its legal signification, is a generic term, and includes
artificial as well as natural persons," 2 Abb. Dict. 271; Douglas vs.
Pacific, etc. Co., 4 Cal. 304; Planters', etc., Bank vs. Andrews, 8
Port. (Ala.) 404. It said in another work that 'persons are of two
kinds: natural and artificial. A natural person is a human being.
Artificial persons include (1) a collection or succession of natural
persons forming a corporation; (2) a collection of property to
which the law attributes the capacity of having rights and duties.
The latter class of artificial persons is recognized only to a limited
extent in our law. "Examples are the estate of a bankrupt or
deceased person." 2 Rapalje & L. Law Dict. 954. Our own cases
inferentially recognize the correctness of the definition given by
the authors from whom we have quoted, for they declare that it is
sufficient, in pleading a claim against a decedent's estate, to
designate the defendant as the estate of the deceased person,
naming him. Ginn vs. Collins, 43 Ind. 271. Unless we accept this
definition as correct, there would be a failure of justice in cases
where, as here, the forgery is committed after the death of a
person whose name is forged; and this is a result to be avoided if
it can be done consistent with principle. We perceive no difficulty
in avoiding such a result; for, to our minds, it seems reasonable
that the estate of a decedent should be regarded as an artificial
person. It is the creation of law for the purpose of enabling a
disposition of the assets to be properly made, and, although
natural persons as heirs, devises, or creditors, have an interest in
the property, the artificial creature is a distinct legal entity. The
interest which natural persons have in it is not complete until
there has been a due administration; and one who forges the
name of the decedent to an instrument purporting to be a
promissory note must be regarded as having intended to defraud
the estate of the decedent, and not the natural persons having
diverse interests in it, since ha cannot be presumed to have
known who those persons were, or what was the nature of their
respective interest. The fraudulent intent is against the artificial
person, the estate and not the natural persons who have
direct or contingent interest in it. (107 Ind. 54, 55, 6 N.E. 914-
915.)
In the instant case there would also be a failure of justice unless
the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante is considered a "person", for
quashing of the proceedings for no other reason than his death
would entail prejudicial results to his investment amounting to
P35,000.00 as found by the commission, not counting the
expenses and disbursements which the proceeding can be
presumed to have occasioned him during his lifetime, let alone
those defrayed by the estate thereafter. In this jurisdiction there
are ample precedents to show that the estate of a deceased
person is also considered as having legal personality independent
of their heirs. Among the most recent cases may be mentioned
that of "Estate of Mota vs. Concepcion, 56 Phil., 712, 717,
wherein the principal plaintiff was the estate of the deceased
Lazaro Mota, and this Court gave judgment in favor of said estate
along with the other plaintiffs in these words:
Page 10 of 34

. . . the judgment appealed from must be affirmed so far as it
holds that defendants Concepcion and Whitaker are indebted to
he plaintiffs in the amount of P245,804.69 . . . .
Under the regime of the Civil Code and before the enactment of
the Code of Civil Procedure, the heirs of a deceased person were
considered in contemplation of law as the continuation of his
personality by virtue of the provision of article 661 of the first
Code that the heirs succeed to all the rights and obligations of the
decedent by the mere fact of his death. It was so held by this
Court in Barrios vs. Dolor, 2 Phil., 44, 46. However, after the
enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure, article 661 of the Civil
Code was abrogated, as held in Suiliong & Co. vs. Chio-Taysan,
12 Phil., 13, 22. In that case, as well as in many others decided
by this Court after the innovations introduced by the Code of Civil
Procedure in the matter of estates of deceased persons, it has
been the constant doctrine that it is the estate or the mass of
property, rights and assets left by the decedent, instead of the
heirs directly, that becomes vested and charged with his rights
and obligations which survive after his demise.
The heirs were formerly considered as the continuation of the
decedent's personality simply by legal fiction, for they might not
have been flesh and blood the reason was one in the nature of
a legal exigency derived from the principle that the heirs
succeeded to the rights and obligations of the decedent. Under
the present legal system, such rights and obligations as survive
after death have to be exercised and fulfilled only by the estate of
the deceased. And if the same legal fiction were not indulged,
there would be no juridical basis for the estate, represented by
the executor or administrator, to exercise those rights and to fulfill
those obligations of the deceased. The reason and purpose for
indulging the fiction is identical and the same in both cases. This
is why according to the Supreme Court of Indiana in Billings vs.
State, supra, citing 2 Rapalje & L. Dictionary, 954, among the
artificial persons recognized by law figures "a collection of
property to which the law attributes the capacity of having rights
and duties", as for instance, the estate of a bankrupt or deceased
person.
Petitioner raises the decisive question of whether or not the
estate of Pedro O. Fragrante can be considered a "citizen of the
Philippines" within the meaning of section 16 of the Public Service
Act, as amended, particularly the proviso thereof expressly and
categorically limiting the power of the commission to issue
certificates of public convenience or certificates of public
convenience and necessity "only to citizens of the Philippines or
of the United States or to corporations, copartnerships,
associations, or joint-stock companies constituted and organized
under the laws of the Philippines", and the further proviso that
sixty per centum of the stock or paid-up capital of such entities
must belong entirely to citizens of the Philippines or of the United
States.
Within the Philosophy of the present legal system, the underlying
reason for the legal fiction by which, for certain purposes, the
estate of the deceased person is considered a "person" is the
avoidance of injustice or prejudice resulting from the impossibility
of exercising such legal rights and fulfilling such legal obligations
of the decedent as survived after his death unless the fiction is
indulged. Substantially the same reason is assigned to support
Conflict of Laws 3
the same rule in the jurisdiction of the State of Indiana, as
announced in Billings vs. State, supra, when the Supreme Court
of said State said:
. . . It seems reasonable that the estate of a decedent should be
regarded as an artificial person. it is the creation of law for the
purpose of enabling a disposition of the assets to be properly
made . . . .
Within the framework and principles of the constitution itself, to
cite just one example, under the bill of rights it seems clear that
while the civil rights guaranteed therein in the majority of cases
relate to natural persons, the term "person" used in section 1 (1)
and (2) must be deemed to include artificial or juridical persons,
for otherwise these latter would be without the constitutional
guarantee against being deprived of property without due process
of law, or the immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures.
We take it that it was the intendment of the framers to include
artificial or juridical, no less than natural, persons in these
constitutional immunities and in others of similar nature. Among
these artificial or juridical persons figure estates of deceased
persons. Hence, we hold that within the framework of the
Constitution, the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante should be
considered an artificial or juridical person for the purposes of the
settlement and distribution of his estate which, of course, include
the exercise during the judicial administration thereof of those
rights and the fulfillment of those obligations of his which survived
after his death. One of those rights was the one involved in his
pending application before the Public Service Commission in the
instant case, consisting in the prosecution of said application to its
final conclusion. As stated above, an injustice would ensue from
the opposite course.
How about the point of citizenship? If by legal fiction his
personality is considered extended so that any debts or
obligations left by, and surviving, him may be paid, and any
surviving rights may be exercised for the benefit of his creditors
and heirs, respectively, we find no sound and cogent reason for
denying the application of the same fiction to his citizenship, and
for not considering it as likewise extended for the purposes of the
aforesaid unfinished proceeding before the Public Service
Commission. The outcome of said proceeding, if successful,
would in the end inure to the benefit of the same creditors and the
heirs. Even in that event petitioner could not allege any prejudice
in the legal sense, any more than he could have done if Fragrante
had lived longer and obtained the desired certificate. The fiction of
such extension of his citizenship is grounded upon the same
principle, and motivated by the same reason, as the fiction of the
extension of personality. The fiction is made necessary to avoid
the injustice of subjecting his estate, creditors and heirs, solely by
reason of his death to the loss of the investment amounting to
P35,000, which he has already made in the ice plant, not counting
the other expenses occasioned by the instant proceeding, from
the Public Service Commission of this Court.
We can perceive no valid reason for holding that within the intent
of the constitution (Article IV), its provisions on Philippine
citizenship exclude the legal principle of extension above
adverted to. If for reasons already stated our law indulges the
fiction of extension of personality, if for such reasons the estate of
Pedro O. Fragrante should be considered an artificial or juridical
Page 11 of 34
 Conflict of Laws 3

person herein, we can find no justification for refusing to declare a

like fiction as to the extension of his citizenship for the purposes
of this proceeding.

Pedro O. Fragrante was a Filipino citizen, and as such, if he had

lived, in view of the evidence of record, he would have obtained
from the commission the certificate for which he was applying.
The situation has suffered but one change, and that is, his death.
His estate was that of a Filipino citizen. And its economic ability to
appropriately and adequately operate and maintain the service of
an ice plant was the same that it received from the decedent
himself. In the absence of a contrary showing, which does not
exist here, his heirs may be assumed to be also Filipino citizens;
and if they are not, there is the simple expedient of revoking the
certificate or enjoining them from inheriting it.

Upon the whole, we are of the opinion that for the purposes of the
prosecution of said case No. 4572 of the Public Service
Commission to its final conclusion, both the personality and
citizenship of Pedro O. Fragrante must be deemed extended,
within the meaning and intent of the Public Service Act, as
amended, in harmony with the constitution: it is so adjudged and
decreed.

Decision affirmed, without costs. So ordered.

Page 12 of 34

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs.
GEORGE I. FRANK, defendant-appellant.
Bishop and O'Brien for appellant.
Attorney-General Wilfley for appellee.
JOHNSON, J.:
Judgment was rendered in the lower court on the 5th day of
September, 1905. The defendant appealed. On the 12th day of
October, 1905, the appellant filed his printed bill of exceptions
with the clerk of the Supreme Court. On the 5th day of December,
1905, the appellant filed his brief with the clerk of the Supreme
Court. On the 19th day of January, 1906, the Attorney-General
filed his brief in said cause. Nothing further was done in said
cause until on or about the 30th day of January, 1909, when the
respective parties were requested by this court to prosecute the
appeal under the penalty of having the same dismissed for failure
so to do; whereupon the appellant, by petition, had the caused
placed upon the calendar and the same was heard on the 2d day
of February, 1909.
The facts from the record appear to be as follows:
First. That on or about the 17th day of April, 1903, in the city of
Chicago, in the state of Illinois, in the United States, the
defendant, through a respective of the Insular Government of the
Philippine Islands, entered into a contract for a period of two
years with the plaintiff, by which the defendant was to receive a
salary of 1,200 dollars per year as a stenographer in the service
of the said plaintiff, and in addition thereto was to be paid in
advance the expenses incurred in traveling from the said city of
Chicago to Manila, and one-half salary during said period of
travel.
Second. Said contract contained a provision that in case of a
violation of its terms on the part of the defendant, he should
become liable to the plaintiff for the amount expended by the
Government by way of expenses incurred in traveling from
Chicago to Manila and one-half salary paid during such period.
Third. The defendant entered upon the performance of his
contract upon the 30th day of April, 1903, and was paid half-
salary from that date until June 4, 1903, the date of his arrival in
the Philippine Islands.
Fourth. That on the 11th day of February, 1904, the defendant left
the service of the plaintiff and refused to make further compliance
with the terms of the contract.
Fifth. On the 3d day of December, 1904, the plaintiff commenced
an action in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila to
recover from the defendant the sum of 269.23 dollars, which
amount the plaintiff claimed had been paid to the defendant as
expenses incurred in traveling from Chicago to Manila, and as
half salary for the period consumed in travel.
Sixth. It was expressly agreed between the parties to said
contract that Laws No. 80 and No. 224 should constitute a part of
said contract.
Conflict of Laws 3
To the complaint of the plaintiff the defendant filed a general
denial and a special defense, alleging in his special defense that
the Government of the Philippine Islands had amended Laws No.
80 and No. 224 and had thereby materially altered the said
contract, and also that he was a minor at the time the contract
was entered into and was therefore not responsible under the
law.
To the special defense of the defendant the plaintiff filed a
demurrer, which demurrer the court sustained.
Upon the issue thus presented, and after hearing the evidence
adduced during the trial of the cause, the lower court rendered a
judgment against the defendant and in favor of the plaintiff for the
sum of 265.90 dollars. The lower court found that at the time the
defendant quit the service of the plaintiff there was due him from
the said plaintiff the sum of 3.33 dollars, leaving a balance due
the plaintiff in the sum of 265.90 dollars. From this judgment the
defendant appealed and made the following assignments of error:
1. The court erred in sustaining plaintiff's demurrer to defendant's
special defenses.
2. The court erred in rendering judgment against the defendant on
the facts.
With reference to the above assignments of error, it may be said
that the mere fact that the legislative department of the
Government of the Philippine Islands had amended said Acts No.
80 and No. 224 by the Acts No. 643 and No. 1040 did not have
the effect of changing the terms of the contract made between the
plaintiff and the defendant. The legislative department of the
Government is expressly prohibited by section 5 of the Act of
Congress of 1902 from altering or changing the terms of the
contract. The right which the defendant had acquired by virtue of
Acts No. 80 and No. 224 had not been changed in any respect by
the fact that said laws had been amended. These acts,
constituting the terms of the contract, still constituted a part of
said contract and were enforceable in favor of the defendant.
The defendant alleged in his special defense that he was a minor
and therefore the contract could not be enforced against him. The
record discloses that, at the time the contract was entered into in
the State of Illinois, he was an adult under the laws of that State
and had full authority to contract. The plaintiff [the defendant]
claims that, by reason of the fact that, under the laws of the
Philippine Islands at the time the contract was made, male
persons in said Islands did not reach their majority until they had
attained the age of 23 years, he was not liable under said
contract, contending that the laws of the Philippine Islands
governed. It is not disputed upon the contrary the fact is
admitted that at the time and place of the making of the
contract in question the defendant had full capacity to make the
same. No rule is better settled in law than that matters bearing
upon the execution, interpretation and validity of a contract are
determined by the law of the place where the contract is made.
(Scudder vs. Union National Bank, 91 U. S., 406.) Matters
connected with its performance are regulated by the law
prevailing at the place of performance. Matters respecting a
remedy, such as the bringing of suit, admissibility of evidence,
Page 13 of 34
 Conflict of Laws 3

and statutes of limitations, depend upon the law of the place

where the suit is brought. (Idem.)

The defendant's claim that he was an adult when he left Chicago

but was a minor when he arrived at Manila; that he was an adult
at the time he made the contract but was a minor at the time the
plaintiff attempted to enforce the contract, more than a year later,
is not tenable.

Our conclusions with reference to the first above assignment of

error are, therefore:

First. That the amendments to Acts No. 80 and No. 224 in no way
affected the terms of the contract in question; and

Second. The plaintiff [defendant] being fully qualified to enter into

the contract at the place and time the contract was made, he can
not plead infancy as a defense at the place where the contract is
being enforced.

We believe that the above conclusions also dispose of the second

assignment of error.

For the reasons above stated, the judgment of the lower court is
affirmed, with costs.

Page 14 of 34

DJUMANTAN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANDREA D. DOMINGO, COMMISSIONER OF THE
BOARD OF IMMIGRATION, HON. REGINO R. SANTIAGO and
HON. JORGE V. SARMIENTO, COMMISSIONERS BUREAU OF
IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION, respondents.
QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules
of Court with preliminary injunction, to reverse and set aside the
Decision dated September 27, 1990 of the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation (CID), ordering the deportation of
petitioner and its Resolution dated January 29, 1991, denying the
motion for reconsideration.
I detained at the CID detention cell. She later released pending the
Bernard Banez, the husband of Marina Cabael, went to Indonesia
as a contract worker.
On April 3, 1974, he embraced and was converted to Islam. On
May 17, 1974, he married petitioner in accordance with Islamic
rites. He returned to the Philippines in January 1979.
On January 13, 1979, petitioner and her two children with Banez,
(two-year old Marina and nine-month old Nikulas) arrived in
Manila as the "guests" of Banez. The latter made it appear that he
was just a friend of the family of petitioner and was merely
repaying the hospitability extended to him during his stay in
Indonesia.
When petitioner and her two children arrived at the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport on January 13, 1979, Banez, together with
Marina Cabael, met them.
Banez executed an "Affidavit of Guaranty and Support," for his
"guests," stating inter alia, that:
That I am the guarantor for the entry into the Philippines of Mrs.
Djumantan, 42 years old, and her two minor children, MARINA, 2
years old, and NIKULAS, 9 months old, all Indonesian citizens,
who are coming as temporary visitors.
That I am willing to guaranty them out of gratitude to their family
for the hospitality they have accorded me during the few years
that I have stayed in Indonesia in connection with my employment
thereat.
That I guaranty they are law abiding citizens and I guaranty their
behavior while they are in the Philippines; I also guaranty their
support and that they will not become a public charge.
That I guaranty their voluntary departure upon the termination of
the authorized stay granted them by the Government (Rollo, p.
41).
As "guests," petitioner and her two children lived in the house of
Banez.
Conflict of Laws 3
Petitioner and her children were admitted to the Philippines as
temporary visitors under Section 9(a) of the Immigration Act of
1940.
In 1981, Marina Cabael discovered the true relationship of her
husband and petitioner. She filed a complaint for "concubinage"
with the Municipal Trial Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan against
the two. This case was, however, dismissed for lack of merit.
On March 25, 1982, the immigration status of petitioner was
changed from temporary visitor to that of permanent resident
under Section 13(a) of the same law. On April 14, 1982, petitioner
was issued an alien certificate of registration.
Not accepting the set-back, Banez' eldest son, Leonardo, filed a
letter complaint with the Ombudsman, who subsequently referred
the letter to the CID. On the basis of the said letter, petitioner was
deportation proceedings (DEP Case No. 90-400) after posting a
cash bond (Rollo, pp. 15-16). Thereafter, she manifested to the
CID that she be allowed to depart voluntarily from the Philippines
and asked for time to purchase her airline ticket (Rollo, p. 10).
However, she a change of heart and moved for the dismissal of
the deportation case on the ground that she was validly married
to a Filipino citizen (Rollo, pp. 11-12).
In the Decision dated September 27, 1990, the CID, through
public respondents, disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Board of
Commissioners finds the second marriage of Bernardo Banes to
respondent Djumantan irregular and not in accordance with the
laws of the Philippines. We revoke the Section 13(a) visa
previously granted to her (Rollo, p. 23).
Public respondents denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration
in their Resolution dated January 29, 1991 (Rollo, pp. 31-33).
Hence, this petition.
We issued a temporary restraining order, directing public
respondents to cease and desist from executing or implementing
the Decision dated September 27, 1990 and the Resolution dated
January 29, 1991 (Rollo, pp. 34-36).
On September 20, 1994, Leonardo C. Banez manifested that his
father died on August 14, 1994 and that he and his mother were
withdrawing their objection to the granting of a permanent
resident visa to petitioner (Rollo, pp. 173-175).
II
Petitioner claims that her marriage to Banez was valid under
Article 27 of P.D. No. 1085, the Muslim Code, which recognizes
the practice of polyandry by Muslim males. From that premise,
she argues that under Articles 109 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, Article 68 of the Family Code and Article 34 of the
Muslim Code, the husband and wife are obliged to live together
and under Article 110 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the
husband is given the right to fix the conjugal residence. She
claims that public respondents have no right to order the couple
to live separately (Rollo, pp. 5-7).
Page 15 of 34

When asked to comment on the petition, the Solicitor General
took the position that the CID could not order petitioner's
deportation because its power to do so had prescribed under
Section 37 (b) of the Immigration Act of 1940 (Rollo, pp. 57-74).
III
We need not resolve the validity of petitioner's marriage to Banez,
if under the law the CID can validly deport petitioner as an
"undesirable alien" regardless of her marriage to a Filipino citizen.
Therefore, to be first resolved is the question on petitioner's
immigration status, particularly the legality of her admission into
the country and the change of her status from temporary visitor to
permanent resident. Upon a finding that she was not lawfully
admitted into the country and she did not lawfully acquire
permanent residency, the next question is whether the power to
deport her has prescribed.
There was a blatant abuse of our immigration laws in effecting
petitioner's entry into the country and the change of her
immigration status from temporary visitor to permanent resident.
All such privileges were obtained through misinterpretation.
Never was the marriage of petitioner to Banez disclosed to the
immigration authorities in her applications for temporary visitor's
visa and for permanent residency.
The civil status of an alien applicant for admission as a temporary
visitor is a matter that could influence the exercise of discretion on
the part of the immigration authorities. The immigration authorities
would be less inclined to allow the entry of a woman who claims
to have entered into a marriage with a Filipino citizen, who is
married to another woman (Cf. Shiu Shin Man v. Galang, 3 SCRA
871 [1961]).
Generally, the right of the President to expel or deport aliens
whose presence is deemed inimical to the public interest is as
absolute and unqualified as the right to prohibit and prevent their
entry into the country (Annotations, 8 ALR 1286). this right is
based on the fact that since the aliens are not part of the nation,
their admission into the territory is a matter of pure permission
and simple tolerance which creates no obligation on the part of
the government to permit them to stay (3 Am. Jur. 2d. 72).
The interest, which an alien has in being admitted into or allowed
to continue to reside in the country, is protected only so far as
Congress may choose to protect it (United States ex rel. Kaloudis
v. Shauhnessy 180 F. 2d. 489).
There is no law guaranteeing aliens married to Filipino citizens
the right to be admitted, much less to be given permanent
residency, in the Philippines.
The fact of marriage by an alien to a citizen does not withdraw her
from the operation of the immigration laws governing the
admission and exclusion of aliens (United States ex rel. Knauff v.
Shauhnessy, 338 US 537 94 L. Ed. 317, 70 S. Ct. 309 [1950];
Low Wah Suey v. Backus, 225 US 460 56 L. Ed. 1165, 32 S. Ct.
734 [1912]; Annotations, 71 ALR 1213). Marriage of an alien
woman to a Filipino husband does not ipso facto make her a
Filipino citizen and does not excuse her from her failure to depart
Conflict of Laws 3
from the country upon the expiration of her extended stay here as
an alien (Joaquin v. Galang, 33 SCRA 362 [1970]).
Under Section 9 of the Immigration Act of 1940, it is not
mandatory for the CID to admit any alien who applies for a
visitor's visa. Once admitted into the country, the alien has no
right to an indefinite stay. Under Section 13 of the law, an alien
allowed to stay temporarily may apply for a change of status and
"may be admitted" as a permanent resident. Among those
considered qualified to apply for permanent residency if the wife
or husband of a Philippine citizen (Immigration Act of 1940, Sec.
13[a]). The entry of aliens into the country and their admission as
immigrants is not a matter of right, even if they are legally married
to Filipino citizens.
IV
We now address the issue raised by the Solicitor General that the
right of public respondents to deport petitioner has prescribed,
citing Section 37(b) of the Immigration Act of 1940.
Said Section 37(b) provides:
Deportation may be effected under clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 of
paragraph (a) of this section at any time after entry, but shall not
be effected under any clause unless the arrest in the deportation
proceedings is made within five years after the cause for
deportation arises. Deportation under clauses 3 and 4 shall not be
effected if the court, or judge thereof, when sentencing the alien,
shall recommend to the Commissioner of Immigration that the
alien be not deported (As amended by Rep. Act No. 503).
Section 37(a) of the said law mentioned in Section 37(b) thereof
provides:
The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the
Commissioner of Immigration or of any other officer designated
by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the
Commissioner of Immigration after a determination by the Board
of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation
as charged against the alien:
1) Any alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of
this Act by means of false and misleading statements or without
inspection and admission by the immigration authorities at a
designating port of entry or at any place other than at a
designated port of entry.
2) Any alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of
this Act, who was not lawfully admissible at the time of entry;
3) Any alien who, after the effective date of this Act, is convicted
in the Philippines and sentenced for a term of one year or more
for a crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years
after his entry, is so convicted and sentenced more than once;
4) Any alien who is convicted and sentenced for a violation of the
law governing prohibited drugs;
5) Any alien who practices prostitution or is an inmate of a house
of prostitution or is connected with the management of a house of
prostitution, or is a procurer;
Page 16 of 34

6) Any alien who becomes a public charge within five years after
entry from causes not affirmatively shown to have arisen
subsequent to entry;
7) Any alien who remains in the Philippines in violation of any
limitation or condition under which he was admitted a non-
immigrant;
8) Any alien who believes in, advises, advocates or teaches the
overthrow by force and violence of the Government of the
Philippines, or of constituted law and authority, or who disbelieves
in or is opposed to organized government, or who advises,
advocates, or teaches the assault or assassination of public
officials because of their office, or who advises, advocates, or
teaches the unlawful destruction of property, or who is a member
of or affiliated with any organization entertaining, advocating or
teaching such doctrines, or who on any manner whatsoever lends
assistance, financial or otherwise, to the dissemination of such
doctrines;
9) Any alien who commits any of the acts described in Sections
forty-five and forty-six of this Act, independent of criminal action
which may be brought against him: Provided, That in the case of
an alien who, for any reason, is convicted and sentenced to suffer
both imprisonment and deportation, said alien shall first serve the
entire period of his imprisonment before he is actually
deported: Provided, however, That the imprisonment may be
waived by the Commissioner of Immigration with the consent of
the Department Head, and upon payment by the alien concerned
of such amount as the Commissioner may fix and approved by
the Department Head, and upon payment by the alien concerned
of such amount as the Commissioner may fix and approved by
the Department Head (as amended by R.A. No. 144);
10) Any alien who, at any time within five years after entry, shall
have been convicted of violating the provisions of the Philippine
Commonwealth Act Numbered Six hundred and fifty-three,
otherwise known as the Philippine Alien Registration Act of 1941
(now Republic Act No. 562), or who, at any time after entry, shall
have been convicted more than once of violating the provisions of
the same Act;
11) Any alien who engages in profiteering, hoarding, or black-
marketing, independent of any criminal action which may be
brought against him;
12) Any alien who is convicted of any offense penalized under
Commonwealth Act Numbered Four hundred and seventy-three,
otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Laws of the
Philippines, or any law relating to acquisition of Philippine
citizenship;
13) Any alien who defrauds his creditor by absconding or
alienating properties, to prevent them from being attached or
executed.
Under clause 1 of Section 37(a), an "alien who enters the
Philippines after the effective date of this Act by means of false
and misleading statements or without inspection and admission
by the immigration authorities at a designated port of entry or at
Conflict of Laws 3
any place other than at a designated port of entry" is subject to
deportation.
The deportation of an alien under said clause of Section 37(a)
has a prescriptive period and "shall not be effected ... unless the
arrest in the deportation proceedings is made within five years
after the cause for deportation arises" (Immigration Act of 1940,
Sec. 37[b]).
Congress may impose a limitation of time for the deportation of
alien from the country (Costanzo v. Tillinghast, 287 US 341 77 L.
Ed. 350, 53 S. Ct. 152 [1932]; Guiney v. Bonham [CA 9] 261 F.
582, 8 ALR 1282).
In Board of Commissioners (CID) v. Dela Rosa, 197 SCRA 853
(1991), we held that under Section 37(b) of the Immigration Act of
1940, the deportation of an alien may be barred after the lapse of
five years after the cause of deportation arises. Justice Feliciano,
in his dissenting opinion, qualified the broad statement of the law
as follows:
Examination of the above quoted Section 37 (b) shows that the
five (5) year limitation is applicable only where deportation is
sought to be effected under clauses of Section 37 (a) other than
clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12; that where deportation or exclusion is
sought to be effected under clauses of Section 37(a), no period of
limitation is applicable; and that to the contrary, deportation or
exclusion may be effected "at any time after entry."
Justice Davide, in his dissenting opinion, clarified:
Note that the five-year period applies only to clauses other than 2,
7, 8, 11 and 12 of paragraph (a) of the Section. In respect to
clauses 2, 7, 8, 11, and 12, the limitation does not apply.
In Lam Shee v. Bengzon, 93 Phil. 1065 (1953), the alien admitted
that she had gained entrance into the Philippines fraudulently by
making use of the name of a Chinese resident-merchant other
than that of her lawful husband. The Court, however, held that
she could no longer be deported "for the simple reason that more
than 5 years had elapsed from the date of her admission."
The right of public respondents to deport petitioner has
prescribed.
Petitioner was admitted and allowed entry into the Philippines on
January 13, 1979 on the basis of false and misleading statements
in her application and in the other supporting documents
submitted to the immigration authorities. Leonardo C. Banez first
complained with the CID on November 19, 1980 about the
manner petitioner was admitted into the country and asked for her
deportation (Rollo, pp. 77-78). After the EDSA Revolution, he sent
a follow-up letter to the CID requesting action on his 1980 letter-
complaint (Rollo, p. 78).
Tolling the prescriptive period from November 19, 1980, when
Leonardo C. Banez informed the CID of the illegal entry of
petitioner into the country, more than five years had elapsed
before the issuance of the order of her deportation on September
27, 1990.
Page 17 of 34
 Conflict of Laws 3

In their Comment, public respondents urged that what is barred

under Section 37(b) is the deportation of an alien and claimed
that what they ordered was not the deportation of petitioner but
merely the revocation of Section 13(a) which refers to the visa
previously granted her (Rollo, p. 102).

The "arrest" contemplated by Section 37(b) refers to the arrest for

the purpose of carrying out an order for deportation and not the
arrest prior to proceedings to determine the right of the alien to
stay in the country. When public respondents revoked the
permanent residence visa issued to petitioner, they, in effect,
ordered her arrest and deportation as an overstaying alien.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the temporary

restraining order issued on June 4, 1991 is MADE PERMANENT.

The Decision of the Board of Commissioners dated September

27, 1990 revoking the issuance of the permanent resident visa to
petitioner and the Resolution dated January 29, 1991 are
REVERSED.

SO ORDERED.

Page 18 of 34

PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
VICENTA F. ESCAO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
I. V. Binamira & F. B. Barria for plaintiff-appellant.
Jalandoni & Jarnir for defendants-appellees.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Direct appeal, on factual and legal questions, from the judgment
of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, in its Civil Case No. R-
4177, denying the claim of the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor B.
Tenchavez, for legal separation and one million pesos in
damages against his wife and parents-in-law, the defendants-
1
appellees, Vicente, Mamerto and Mena, all surnamed "Escao,"
2
respectively.
The facts, supported by the evidence of record, are the following:
Missing her late afternoon classes on 24 February 1948 in the
University of San Carlos, Cebu City, where she was then enrolled
as a second year student of commerce, Vicenta Escao, 27 years
of age (scion of a well-to-do and socially prominent Filipino family
of Spanish ancestry and a "sheltered colegiala"), exchanged
marriage vows with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years of age, an
engineer, ex-army officer and of undistinguished stock, without
the knowledge of her parents, before a Catholic chaplain, Lt.
Moises Lavares, in the house of one Juan Alburo in the said city.
The marriage was the culmination of a previous love affair and
was duly registered with the local civil register.
Vicenta's letters to Pastor, and his to her, before the marriage,
indicate that the couple were deeply in love. Together with a
friend, Pacita Noel, their matchmaker and go-between, they had
planned out their marital future whereby Pacita would be the
governess of their first-born; they started saving money in a piggy
bank. A few weeks before their secret marriage, their
engagement was broken; Vicenta returned the engagement ring
and accepted another suitor, Joseling Lao. Her love for Pastor
beckoned; she pleaded for his return, and they reconciled. This
time they planned to get married and then elope. To facilitate the
elopement, Vicenta had brought some of her clothes to the room
of Pacita Noel in St. Mary's Hall, which was their usual trysting
place.
Although planned for the midnight following their marriage, the
elopement did not, however, materialize because when Vicente
went back to her classes after the marriage, her mother, who got
wind of the intended nuptials, was already waiting for her at the
college. Vicenta was taken home where she admitted that she
had already married Pastor. Mamerto and Mena Escao were
surprised, because Pastor never asked for the hand of Vicente,
and were disgusted because of the great scandal that the
clandestine marriage would provoke (t.s.n., vol. III, pp. 1105-06).
The following morning, the Escao spouses sought priestly
advice. Father Reynes suggested a recelebration to validate what
he believed to be an invalid marriage, from the standpoint of the
Church, due to the lack of authority from the Archbishop or the
parish priest for the officiating chaplain to celebrate the marriage.
The recelebration did not take place, because on 26 February
1948 Mamerto Escao was handed by a maid, whose name he
claims he does not remember, a letter purportedly coming from
Conflict of Laws 3
San Carlos college students and disclosing an amorous
relationship between Pastor Tenchavez and Pacita Noel; Vicenta
translated the letter to her father, and thereafter would not agree
to a new marriage. Vicenta and Pastor met that day in the house
of Mrs. Pilar Mendezona. Thereafter, Vicenta continued living with
her parents while Pastor returned to his job in Manila. Her letter of
22 March 1948 (Exh. "M"), while still solicitous of her husband's
welfare, was not as endearing as her previous letters when their
love was aflame.
Vicenta was bred in Catholic ways but is of a changeable
disposition, and Pastor knew it. She fondly accepted her being
called a "jellyfish." She was not prevented by her parents from
communicating with Pastor (Exh. "1-Escao"), but her letters
became less frequent as the days passed. As of June, 1948 the
newlyweds were already estranged (Exh. "2-Escao"). Vicenta
had gone to Jimenez, Misamis Occidental, to escape from the
scandal that her marriage stirred in Cebu society. There, a lawyer
filed for her a petition, drafted by then Senator Emmanuel Pelaez,
to annul her marriage. She did not sign the petition (Exh. "B-5").
The case was dismissed without prejudice because of her non-
appearance at the hearing (Exh. "B-4").
On 24 June 1950, without informing her husband, she applied for
a passport, indicating in her application that she was single, that
her purpose was to study, and she was domiciled in Cebu City,
and that she intended to return after two years. The application
was approved, and she left for the United States. On 22 August
1950, she filed a verified complaint for divorce against the herein
plaintiff in the Second Judicial District Court of the State of
Nevada in and for the County of Washoe, on the ground of
"extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." On 21 October
1950, a decree of divorce, "final and absolute", was issued in
open court by the said tribunal.
In 1951 Mamerto and Mena Escao filed a petition with the
Archbishop of Cebu to annul their daughter's marriage to Pastor
(Exh. "D"). On 10 September 1954, Vicenta sought papal
dispensation of her marriage (Exh. "D"-2).
On 13 September 1954, Vicenta married an American, Russell
Leo Moran, in Nevada. She now lives with him in California, and,
by him, has begotten children. She acquired American citizenship
on 8 August 1958.
But on 30 July 1955, Tenchavez had initiated the proceedings at
bar by a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, and
amended on 31 May 1956, against Vicenta F. Escao, her
parents, Mamerto and Mena Escao, whom he charged with
having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining her
husband, and alienating her affections, and against the Roman
Catholic Church, for having, through its Diocesan Tribunal,
decreed the annulment of the marriage, and asked for legal
separation and one million pesos in damages. Vicenta claimed a
valid divorce from plaintiff and an equally valid marriage to her
present husband, Russell Leo Moran; while her parents denied
that they had in any way influenced their daughter's acts, and
counterclaimed for moral damages.
The appealed judgment did not decree a legal separation, but
freed the plaintiff from supporting his wife and to acquire property
Page 19 of 34

to the exclusion of his wife. It allowed the counterclaim of
Mamerto Escao and Mena Escao for moral and exemplary
damages and attorney's fees against the plaintiff-appellant, to the
extent of P45,000.00, and plaintiff resorted directly to this Court.
The appellant ascribes, as errors of the trial court, the following:
1. In not declaring legal separation; in not holding defendant
Vicenta F. Escao liable for damages and in dismissing the
complaint;.
2. In not holding the defendant parents Mamerto Escano and the
heirs of Doa Mena Escao liable for damages;.
3 In holding the plaintiff liable for and requiring him to pay the
damages to the defendant parents on their counterclaims; and.
4. In dismissing the complaint and in denying the relief sought by
the plaintiff.
That on 24 February 1948 the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor
Tenchavez, and the defendant-appellee, Vicenta Escao, were
validly married to each other, from the standpoint of our civil law,
is clearly established by the record before us. Both parties were
then above the age of majority, and otherwise qualified; and both
consented to the marriage, which was performed by a Catholic
priest (army chaplain Lavares) in the presence of competent
witnesses. It is nowhere shown that said priest was not duly
authorized under civil law to solemnize marriages.
The chaplain's alleged lack of ecclesiastical authorization from
the parish priest and the Ordinary, as required by Canon law, is
irrelevant in our civil law, not only because of the separation of
Church and State but also because Act 3613 of the Philippine
Legislature (which was the marriage law in force at the time)
expressly provided that
SEC. 1. Essential requisites. Essential requisites for marriage are
the legal capacity of the contracting parties and consent.
(Emphasis supplied)
The actual authority of the solemnizing officer was thus only a
formal requirement, and, therefore, not essential to give the
3
marriage civil effects, and this is emphasized by section 27 of
said marriage act, which provided the following:
SEC. 27. Failure to comply with formal requirements. No marriage
shall be declared invalid because of the absence of one or
several of the formal requirements of this Act if, when it was
performed, the spouses or one of them believed in good faith that
the person who solemnized the marriage was actually
empowered to do so, and that the marriage was perfectly legal.
The good faith of all the parties to the marriage (and hence the
validity of their marriage) will be presumed until the contrary is
positively proved (Lao vs. Dee Tim, 45 Phil. 739, 745; Francisco
vs. Jason, 60 Phil. 442, 448). It is well to note here that in the
case at bar, doubts as to the authority of the solemnizing priest
arose only after the marriage, when Vicenta's parents consulted
Father Reynes and the archbishop of Cebu. Moreover, the very
act of Vicenta in abandoning her original action for annulment and
Conflict of Laws 3
subsequently suing for divorce implies an admission that her
marriage to plaintiff was valid and binding.
Defendant Vicenta Escao argues that when she contracted the
marriage she was under the undue influence of Pacita Noel,
whom she charges to have been in conspiracy with appellant
Tenchavez. Even granting, for argument's sake, the truth of that
contention, and assuming that Vicenta's consent was vitiated by
fraud and undue influence, such vices did not render her
marriage ab initio void, but merely voidable, and the marriage
remained valid until annulled by a competent civil court. This was
never done, and admittedly, Vicenta's suit for annulment in the
Court of First Instance of Misamis was dismissed for non-
prosecution.
It is equally clear from the record that the valid marriage between
Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escao remained subsisting and
undissolved under Philippine law, notwithstanding the decree of
absolute divorce that the wife sought and obtained on 21 October
1950 from the Second Judicial District Court of Washoe County,
State of Nevada, on grounds of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental
in character." At the time the divorce decree was issued, Vicenta
4
Escao, like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen. She was
then subject to Philippine law, and Article 15 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines (Rep. Act No. 386), already in force at the time,
expressly provided:
Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition
and legal capacity of persons are binding upon the citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad.
The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in force, does not admit
absolute divorce, quo ad vinculo matrimonii; and in fact does not
even use that term, to further emphasize its restrictive policy on
the matter, in contrast to the preceding legislation that admitted
absolute divorce on grounds of adultery of the wife or
concubinage of the husband (Act 2710). Instead of divorce, the
present Civil Code only provides for legal separation (Title IV,
Book 1, Arts. 97 to 108), and, even in that case, it expressly
prescribes that "the marriage bonds shall not be severed" (Art.
106, subpar. 1).
For the Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition or
effect to a foreign decree of absolute divorce betiveen Filipino
citizens could be a patent violation of the declared public policy of
the state, specially in view of the third paragraph of Article 17 of
the Civil Code that prescribes the following:
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and
those which have for their object public order, policy and good
customs, shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in
a foreign country.
Even more, the grant of effectivity in this jurisdiction to such
foreign divorce decrees would, in effect, give rise to an irritating
and scandalous discrimination in favor of wealthy citizens, to the
detriment of those members of our polity whose means do not
permit them to sojourn abroad and obtain absolute divorces
outside the Philippines.
Page 20 of 34

From this point of view, it is irrelevant that appellant Pastor
Tenchavez should have appeared in the Nevada divorce court.
Primarily because the policy of our law cannot be nullified by acts
of private parties (Civil Code,Art. 17, jam quot.); and additionally,
because the mere appearance of a non-resident consort cannot
confer jurisdiction where the court originally had none (Area vs.
Javier, 95 Phil. 579).
From the preceding facts and considerations, there flows as a
necessary consequence that in this jurisdiction Vicenta Escao's
divorce and second marriage are not entitled to recognition as
valid; for her previous union to plaintiff Tenchavez must be
declared to be existent and undissolved. It follows, likewise, that
her refusal to perform her wifely duties, and her denial
of consortium and her desertion of her husband constitute in law
a wrong caused through her fault, for which the husband is
entitled to the corresponding indemnity (Civil Code, Art. 2176).
Neither an unsubstantiated charge of deceit nor an anonymous
letter charging immorality against the husband constitute, contrary
to her claim, adequate excuse. Wherefore, her marriage and
cohabitation with Russell Leo Moran is technically "intercourse
with a person not her husband" from the standpoint of Philippine
Law, and entitles plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez to a decree of
"legal separation under our law, on the basis of adultery"
(Revised Penal Code, Art. 333).
The foregoing conclusions as to the untoward effect of a marriage
after an invalid divorce are in accord with the previous doctrines
and rulings of this court on the subject, particularly those that
were rendered under our laws prior to the approval of the
absolute divorce act (Act 2710 of the Philippine Legislature). As a
matter of legal history, our statutes did not recognize divorces a
vinculo before 1917, when Act 2710 became effective; and the
present Civil Code of the Philippines, in disregarding absolute
divorces, in effect merely reverted to the policies on the subject
prevailing before Act 2710. The rulings, therefore, under the Civil
Code of 1889, prior to the Act above-mentioned, are now, fully
applicable. Of these, the decision in Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil.
855, is of particular interest. Said this Court in that case:
As the divorce granted by the French Court must be ignored, it
results that the marriage of Dr. Mory and Leona Castro,
celebrated in London in 1905, could not legalize their relations;
and the circumstance that they afterwards passed for husband
and wife in Switzerland until her death is wholly without legal
significance. The claims of the very children to participate in the
estate of Samuel Bishop must therefore be rejected. The right to
inherit is limited to legitimate, legitimated and acknowledged
natural children. The children of adulterous relations are wholly
excluded. The word "descendants" as used in Article 941 of the
Civil Code cannot be interpreted to include illegitimates born
of adulterous relations. (Emphasis supplied)
Except for the fact that the successional rights of the children,
begotten from Vicenta's marriage to Leo Moran after the invalid
divorce, are not involved in the case at bar, the Gmur case is
authority for the proposition that such union is adulterous in this
jurisdiction, and, therefore, justifies an action for legal separation
on the part of the innocent consort of the first marriage, that
stands undissolved in Philippine law. In not so declaring, the trial
court committed error.
Conflict of Laws 3
True it is that our ruling gives rise to anomalous situations where
the status of a person (whether divorced or not) would depend on
the territory where the question arises. Anomalies of this kind are
not new in the Philippines, and the answer to them was given
in Barretto vs. Gonzales, 58 Phil. 667:
The hardship of the existing divorce laws in the Philippine Islands
are well known to the members of the Legislature. It is the duty of
the Courts to enforce the laws of divorce as written by Legislature
if they are constitutional. Courts have no right to say that such
laws are too strict or too liberal. (p. 72)
The appellant's first assignment of error is, therefore, sustained.
However, the plaintiff-appellant's charge that his wife's parents,
Dr. Mamerto Escao and his wife, the late Doa Mena Escao,
alienated the affections of their daughter and influenced her
conduct toward her husband are not supported by credible
evidence. The testimony of Pastor Tenchavez about the Escao's
animosity toward him strikes us to be merely conjecture and
exaggeration, and are belied by Pastor's own letters written
before this suit was begun (Exh. "2-Escao" and "Vicenta," Rec.
on App., pp. 270-274). In these letters he expressly apologized to
the defendants for "misjudging them" and for the "great
unhappiness" caused by his "impulsive blunders" and "sinful
pride," "effrontery and audacity" [sic]. Plaintiff was admitted to the
Escao house to visit and court Vicenta, and the record shows
nothing to prove that he would not have been accepted to marry
Vicente had he openly asked for her hand, as good manners and
breeding demanded. Even after learning of the clandestine
marriage, and despite their shock at such unexpected event, the
parents of Vicenta proposed and arranged that the marriage be
recelebrated in strict conformity with the canons of their religion
upon advice that the previous one was canonically defective. If no
recelebration of the marriage ceremony was had it was not due to
defendants Mamerto Escao and his wife, but to the refusal of
Vicenta to proceed with it. That the spouses Escao did not seek
to compel or induce their daughter to assent to the recelebration
but respected her decision, or that they abided by her resolve,
does not constitute in law an alienation of affections. Neither does
the fact that Vicenta's parents sent her money while she was in
the United States; for it was natural that they should not wish their
daughter to live in penury even if they did not concur in her
decision to divorce Tenchavez (27 Am. Jur. 130-132).
There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out of improper
motives, aided and abetted her original suit for annulment, or her
subsequent divorce; she appears to have acted independently,
and being of age, she was entitled to judge what was best for her
and ask that her decisions be respected. Her parents, in so doing,
certainly cannot be charged with alienation of affections in the
absence of malice or unworthy motives, which have not been
shown, good faith being always presumed until the contrary is
proved.
SEC. 529. Liability of Parents, Guardians or Kin. The law
distinguishes between the right of a parent to interest himself in
the marital affairs of his child and the absence of rights in a
stranger to intermeddle in such affairs. However, such distinction
between the liability of parents and that of strangers is only in
regard to what will justify interference. A parent isliable for
Page 21 of 34
 Conflict of Laws 3

alienation of affections resulting from his own malicious conduct, (1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and
as where he wrongfully entices his son or daughter to leave his or decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act
her spouse, but he is not liable unless he acts maliciously, without 386), is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction; and
justification and from unworthy motives. He is not liable where he neither is the marriage contracted with another party by the
acts and advises his child in good faith with respect to his child's divorced consort, subsequently to the foreign decree of divorce,
marital relations in the interest of his child as he sees it, the entitled to validity in the country;
marriage of his child not terminating his right and liberty to interest
himself in, and be extremely solicitous for, his child's welfare and (2) That the remarriage of divorced wife and her co-habitation
happiness, even where his conduct and advice suggest or result with a person other than the lawful husband entitle the latter to a
in the separation of the spouses or the obtaining of a divorce or decree of legal separation conformably to Philippine law;
annulment, or where he acts under mistake or misinformation, or
where his advice or interference are indiscreet or unfortunate, (3) That the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree
although it has been held that the parent is liable for by one consort entitles the other to recover damages;
consequences resulting from recklessness. He may in good faith
(4) That an action for alienation of affections against the parents
take his child into his home and afford him or her protection and
of one consort does not lie in the absence of proof of malice or
support, so long as he has not maliciously enticed his child away,
unworthy motives on their part.
or does not maliciously entice or cause him or her to stay away,
from his or her spouse. This rule has more frequently been WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as
applied in the case of advice given to a married daughter, but it is follows;
equally applicable in the case of advice given to a son.
(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a
Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta's aged parents decree of legal separation from defendant Vicenta F. Escao;
with racial or social discrimination and with having exerted efforts
and pressured her to seek annulment and divorce, (2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escao to pay
unquestionably caused them unrest and anxiety, entitling them to plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the amount of P25,000 for damages
recover damages. While this suit may not have been impelled by and attorneys' fees;
actual malice, the charges were certainly reckless in the face of
the proven facts and circumstances. Court actions are not (3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee,
established for parties to give vent to their prejudices or spleen. Mamerto Escao and the estate of his wife, the deceased Mena
Escao, P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys' fees.
In the assessment of the moral damages recoverable by
appellant Pastor Tenchavez from defendant Vicente Escao, it is Neither party to recover costs.
proper to take into account, against his patently unreasonable
claim for a million pesos in damages, that (a) the marriage was
celebrated in secret, and its failure was not characterized by
publicity or undue humiliation on appellant's part; (b) that the
parties never lived together; and (c) that there is evidence that
appellant had originally agreed to the annulment of the marriage,
although such a promise was legally invalid, being against public
policy (cf. Art. 88, Civ. Code). While appellant is unable to
remarry under our law, this fact is a consequence of the
indissoluble character of the union that appellant entered into
voluntarily and with open eyes rather than of her divorce and her
second marriage. All told, we are of the opinion that appellant
should recover P25,000 only by way of moral damages and
attorney's fees.

With regard to the P45,000 damages awarded to the defendants,

Dr. Mamerto Escao and Mena Escao, by the court below, we
opine that the same are excessive. While the filing of this
unfounded suit must have wounded said defendants' feelings and
caused them anxiety, the same could in no way have seriously
injured their reputation, or otherwise prejudiced them, lawsuits
having become a common occurrence in present society. What is
important, and has been correctly established in the decision of
the court below, is that said defendants were not guilty of any
improper conduct in the whole deplorable affair. This Court,
therefore, reduces the damages awarded to P5,000 only.

Summing up, the Court rules:

Page 22 of 34

ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of
Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the National Capital
Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:\
In this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner Alice Reyes
Van Dorn seeks to set aside the Orders, dated September 15,
1983 and August 3, 1984, in Civil Case No. 1075-P, issued by
respondent Judge, which denied her Motion to Dismiss said case,
and her Motion for Reconsideration of the Dismissal Order,
respectively.
The basic background facts are that petitioner is a citizen of the
Philippines while private respondent is a citizen of the United
States; that they were married in Hongkong in 1972; that, after
the marriage, they established their residence in the Philippines;
that they begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and December
18, 1975, respectively; that the parties were divorced in Nevada,
United States, in 1982; and that petitioner has re-married also in
Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against
petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that petitioner's business in
Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal property
of the parties, and asking that petitioner be ordered to render an
accounting of that business, and that private respondent be
declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner
moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action
is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before
the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he
and petitioner had "no community property" as of June 11, 1982.
The Court below denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned
case on the ground that the property involved is located in the
Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the
case. The denial is now the subject of this certiorari proceeding.
Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a civil case is
interlocutory and is not subject to appeal. certiorari and
Prohibition are neither the remedies to question the propriety of
an interlocutory order of the trial Court. However, when a grave
abuse of discretion was patently committed, or the lower Court
acted capriciously and whimsically, then it devolves upon this
Court in a certiorari proceeding to exercise its supervisory
authority and to correct the error committed which, in such a
1
case, is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Prohibition would then
lie since it would be useless and a waste of time to go ahead with
2
the proceedings. Weconsider the petition filed in this case within
the exception, and we have given it due course.
For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties
and their alleged conjugal property in the Philippines.
Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim
on the alleged conjugal property because of the representation he
made in the divorce proceedings before the American Court that
they had no community of property; that the Galleon Shop was
Conflict of Laws 3
not established through conjugal funds, and that respondent's
claim is barred by prior judgment.
For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by
the Nevada Court cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the
Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts and
declaration of a foreign Court cannot, especially if the same is
contrary to public policy, divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to
entertain matters within its jurisdiction.
For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine
whether the property relations between petitioner and private
respondent, after their marriage, were upon absolute or relative
community property, upon complete separation of property, or
upon any other regime. The pivotal fact in this case is the
Nevada divorce of the parties.
The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had
obtained jurisdiction over petitioner who appeared in person
before the Court during the trial of the case. It also obtained
jurisdiction over private respondent who, giving his address as
No. 381 Bush Street, San Francisco, California, authorized his
attorneys in the divorce case, Karp & Gradt Ltd., to agree to the
divorce on the ground of incompatibility in the understanding that
there were neither community property nor community
3
obligations. As explicitly stated in the Power of Attorney he
executed in favor of the law firm of KARP & GRAD LTD., 336 W.
Liberty, Reno, Nevada, to represent him in the divorce
proceedings:
xxx xxx xxx
You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to file
an Answer, appear on my behalf and do an things necessary and
proper to represent me, without further contesting, subject to the
following:
1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of
incompatibility.
2. That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the
Court.
3. 'I'hat there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by
the court.
xxx xxx xxx
4
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce
in any of the States of the United States. The decree is binding on
private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private
respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of
the Union. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is
not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary
to local law and public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article
5
15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by
the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered
contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However,
aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in
the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national
Page 23 of 34
 Conflict of Laws 3

6
law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private
respondent from the marriage from the standards of American
law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by
the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs.
Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:

The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of

matrimony by a court of competent jurisdiction are to change the
existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to
free them both from the bond. The marriage tie when thus
severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without
a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When
the law provides, in the nature of a penalty. that the guilty party
shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still
absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage.

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer

the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in
the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control
over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own
country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and
whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his right over the
alleged conjugal property.

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws,

petitioner has to be considered still married to private respondent
and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq.
of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged
to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render
support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to
be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She
should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends
of justice are to be served.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is

hereby ordered to dismiss the Complaint filed in Civil Case No.
1075-P of his Court.

Without costs.

SO ORDERED.

Page 24 of 34

IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner,
vs.
HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXVI;
HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City Fiscal of
Manila; and ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
An ill-starred marriage of a Filipina and a foreigner which ended in
a foreign absolute divorce, only to be followed by a criminal
infidelity suit of the latter against the former, provides Us the
opportunity to lay down a decisional rule on what hitherto appears
to be an unresolved jurisdictional question.
On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a
Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a
German national, were married before the Registrar of Births,
Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic
of Germany. The marriage started auspiciously enough, and the
couple lived together for some time in Malate, Manila where their
1
only child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on April 20, 1980.
Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations
between the spouses, followed by a separation de facto between
them.
After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial
disharmony eventuated in private respondent initiating a divorce
proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg
Local Court in January, 1983. He claimed that there was failure of
their marriage and that they had been living apart since April,
2 same order also directed the arraignment of both accused
1982.
Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation,
support and separation of property before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, on January 23, 1983 where the
same is still pending as Civil Case No. 83-15866.
3 former was ordered detained until she submitted herself for
On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court,
Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce
on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody
of the child was granted to petitioner. The records show that
under German law said court was locally and internationally
competent for the divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of
said marriage was legally founded on and authorized by the
applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction.
4 decide the charge of adultery, which is a private offense that
On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of
the divorce decree, private respondent filed two complaints for
adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still
married to said respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain
William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man named
Jesus Chua sometime in 1983". Assistant Fiscal Jacinto A. de los
Reyes, Jr., after the corresponding investigation, recommended
the dismissal of the cases on the ground of insufficiency of
5
evidence. However, upon review, the respondent city fiscal
approved a resolution, dated January 8, 1986, directing the filing
6
of two complaints for adultery against the petitioner. The
complaints were accordingly filed and were eventually raffled to
Conflict of Laws 3
two branches of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The case
entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and William
Chia", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52435, was assigned to
Branch XXVI presided by the respondent judge; while the other
case, "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and James
Chua", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52434 went to the sala
7
of Judge Leonardo Cruz, Branch XXV, of the same court.
On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary of
Justice asking that the aforesaid resolution of respondent fiscal
8
be set aside and the cases against her be dismissed. A similar
petition was filed by James Chua, her co-accused in Criminal
Case No. 87-52434. The Secretary of Justice, through the Chief
State Prosecutor, gave due course to both petitions and directed
the respondent city fiscal to inform the Department of Justice "if
the accused have already been arraigned and if not yet arraigned,
to move to defer further proceedings" and to elevate the entire
records of both cases to his office for review.
9
Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer
her arraignment and to suspend further proceedings
10
thereon. As a consequence, Judge Leonardo Cruz suspended
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. On the other hand,
respondent judge merely reset the date of the arraignment in
Criminal Case No. 87-52435 to April 6, 1987. Before such
scheduled date, petitioner moved for the cancellation of the
arraignment and for the suspension of proceedings in said
Criminal Case No. 87-52435 until after the resolution of the
petition for review then pending before the Secretary of
11
Justice. A motion to quash was also filed in the same case on
12
the ground of lack of jurisdiction, which motion was denied by
the respondent judge in an order dated September 8, 1987. The
therein, that is, petitioner and William Chia. The latter entered a
plea of not guilty while the petitioner refused to be arraigned.
Such refusal of the petitioner being considered by respondent
judge as direct contempt, she and her counsel were fined and the
13
arraignment. Later, private respondent entered a plea of not
14
guilty.
On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action
for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a temporary
restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower
court denying her motion to quash. The petition is anchored on
the main ground that the court is without jurisdiction "to try and
cannot be prosecuted de officio (sic), since the purported
complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as an offended spouse
having obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior
15
to his filing the criminal complaint."
On October 21, 1987, this Court issued a temporary restraining
order enjoining the respondents from implementing the aforesaid
order of September 8, 1987 and from further proceeding with
Criminal Case No. 87-52435. Subsequently, on March 23, 1988
Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoez acted on the aforesaid
petitions for review and, upholding petitioner's ratiocinations,
issued a resolution directing the respondent city fiscal to move for
16
the dismissal of the complaints against the petitioner.
Page 25 of 34

We find this petition meritorious. The writs prayed for shall
accordingly issue.
17
Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of
adultery, as well as four other crimes against chastity, cannot be
prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by
the offended spouse. It has long since been established, with
unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule is a
18
jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, requirement. While in
point of strict law the jurisdiction of the court over the offense is
vested in it by the Judiciary Law, the requirement for a sworn
written complaint is just as jurisdictional a mandate since it is that
19
complaint which starts the prosecutory proceeding and without
which the court cannot exercise its jurisdiction to try the case.
Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery
and concubinage the person who can legally file the complaint
should be the offended spouse, and nobody else. Unlike the
offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness,
no provision is made for the prosecution of the crimes of adultery
and concubinage by the parents, grandparents or guardian of the
offended party. The so-called exclusive and successive rule in the
prosecution of the first four offenses above mentioned do not
apply to adultery and concubinage. It is significant that while the
State, as parens patriae, was added and vested by the 1985
Rules of Criminal Procedure with the power to initiate the criminal
action for a deceased or incapacitated victim in the aforesaid
offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness,
in default of her parents, grandparents or guardian, such
amendment did not include the crimes of adultery and
concubinage. In other words, only the offended spouse, and no
other, is authorized by law to initiate the action therefor.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse
to institute the action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must
have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the
time of the filing of the criminal action. This is a familiar and
express rule in civil actions; in fact, lack of legal capacity to sue,
as a ground for a motion to dismiss in civil cases, is determined
as of the filing of the complaint or petition.
The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the prosecution of
criminal cases does not mean that the same requirement and
rationale would not apply. Understandably, it may not have been
found necessary since criminal actions are generally and
fundamentally commenced by the State, through the People of
the Philippines, the offended party being merely the complaining
witness therein. However, in the so-called "private crimes" or
those which cannot be prosecuted de oficio, and the present
prosecution for adultery is of such genre, the offended spouse
assumes a more predominant role since the right to commence
the action, or to refrain therefrom, is a matter exclusively within
his power and option.
This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved
party who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than
20
go through the scandal of a public trial. Hence, as cogently
argued by petitioner, Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code thus
presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the
time of the institution of the criminal action for, adultery. This is a
logical consequence since the raison d'etre of said provision of
Conflict of Laws 3
law would be absent where the supposed offended party had
ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the
21
filing of the criminal case.
In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and
capacity of the complainant to commence the action be definitely
established and, as already demonstrated, such status or
capacity must indubitably exist as of the time he initiates the
action. It would be absurd if his capacity to bring the action would
be determined by his status before or subsequent to the
commencement thereof, where such capacity or status existed
prior to but ceased before, or was acquired subsequent to but did
not exist at the time of, the institution of the case. We would
thereby have the anomalous spectacle of a party bringing suit at
the very time when he is without the legal capacity to do so.
To repeat, there does not appear to be any local precedential
jurisprudence on the specific issue as to when precisely the
status of a complainant as an offended spouse must exist where
a criminal prosecution can be commenced only by one who in law
can be categorized as possessed of such status. Stated
differently and with reference to the present case, the inquiry
;would be whether it is necessary in the commencement of a
criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds between the
complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at the
time of the institution of the action by the former against the latter.
American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that
jurisdiction which are in pari materia with ours, yields the rule
that after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse no
longer has the right to institute proceedings against the
offenders where the statute provides that the innocent spouse
shall have the exclusive right to institute a prosecution for
adultery. Where, however, proceedings have been properly
commenced, a divorce subsequently granted can have no legal
effect on the prosecution of the criminal proceedings to a
22
conclusion.
In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that
'No prosecution for adultery can be commenced except on the
complaint of the husband or wife.' Section 4932, Code. Though
Loftus was husband of defendant when the offense is said to
have been committed, he had ceased to be such when the
prosecution was begun; and appellant insists that his status was
not such as to entitle him to make the complaint. We have
repeatedly said that the offense is against the unoffending
spouse, as well as the state, in explaining the reason for this
provision in the statute; and we are of the opinion that the
unoffending spouse must be such when the prosecution is
commenced. (Emphasis supplied.)
We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should not apply in
this case and in our jurisdiction, considering our statutory law and
jural policy on the matter. We are convinced that in cases of such
nature, the status of the complainant vis-a-vis the accused must
be determined as of the time the complaint was filed. Thus, the
person who initiates the adultery case must be an offended
spouse, and by this is meant that he is still married to the accused
spouse, at the time of the filing of the complaint.
Page 26 of 34
 Conflict of Laws 3

In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a
valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is
admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in
23
the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned in
view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of
status of persons.
Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et
24
al., after a divorce was granted by a United States court
between Alice Van Dornja Filipina, and her American husband,
the latter filed a civil case in a trial court here alleging that her
business concern was conjugal property and praying that she be
ordered to render an accounting and that the plaintiff be granted
the right to manage the business. Rejecting his pretensions, this
Court perspicuously demonstrated the error of such stance, thus:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce
in any of the States of the United States. The decree is binding on
private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private
respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of
the Union. ...
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article
15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the
policy against absolute divorces the same being considered
contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However,
aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in
the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national
law. ...
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer
the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in
the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control
25
over conjugal assets. ...
infidelity of a married woman to her marital vows, even though it
should be made to appear that she is entitled to have her
marriage contract declared null and void, until and unless she
actually secures a formal judicial declaration to that effect".
Definitely, it cannot be logically inferred therefrom that the
complaint can still be filed after the declaration of nullity because
such declaration that the marriage is void ab initio is equivalent to
stating that it never existed. There being no marriage from the
beginning, any complaint for adultery filed after said declaration of
nullity would no longer have a leg to stand on. Moreover, what
was consequently contemplated and within the purview of the
decision in said case is the situation where the criminal action for
adultery was filed before the termination of the marriage by a
judicial declaration of its nullity ab initio. The same rule and
requisite would necessarily apply where the termination of the
marriage was effected, as in this case, by a valid foreign divorce.
Private respondent's invocation of Donio-Teves, et al. vs.
27
Vamenta, hereinbefore cited, must suffer the same fate of
inapplicability. A cursory reading of said case reveals that the
offended spouse therein had duly and seasonably filed a
complaint for adultery, although an issue was raised as to its
sufficiency but which was resolved in favor of the complainant.
Said case did not involve a factual situation akin to the one at bar
or any issue determinative of the controversy herein.
WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner's motion
to quash is SET ASIDE and another one
entered DISMISSING the complaint in Criminal Case No. 87-
52435 for lack of jurisdiction. The temporary restraining order
issued in this case on October 21, 1987 is hereby made
permanent.
SO ORDERED.

Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent,

being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing
to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was
the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

The allegation of private respondent that he could not have

brought this case before the decree of divorce for lack of
knowledge, even if true, is of no legal significance or
consequence in this case. When said respondent initiated the
divorce proceeding, he obviously knew that there would no longer
be a family nor marriage vows to protect once a dissolution of the
marriage is decreed. Neither would there be a danger of
introducing spurious heirs into the family, which is said to be one
of the reasons for the particular formulation of our law on
26
adultery, since there would thenceforth be no spousal
relationship to speak of. The severance of the marital bond had
the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other,
hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on
the other.

The aforecited case of United States vs. Mata cannot be

successfully relied upon by private respondent. In applying Article
433 of the old Penal Code, substantially the same as Article 333
of the Revised Penal Code, which punished adultery "although
the marriage be afterwards declared void", the Court merely
stated that "the lawmakers intended to declare adulterous the

Page 27 of 34

FE D. QUITA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and BLANDINA
DANDAN, * respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
FE D. QUITA and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married
in the Philippines on 18 May 1941. They were not however
blessed with children. Somewhere along the way their
relationship soured. Eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce in San
Francisco, California, U.S.A. She submitted in the divorce
proceedings a private writing dated 19 July 1950 evidencing their
agreement to live separately from each other and a settlement of
their conjugal properties. On 23 July 1954 she obtained a final
judgment of divorce. Three (3) weeks thereafter she married a
certain Felix Tupaz in the same locality but their relationship also
ended in a divorce. Still in the U.S.A., she married for the third
time, to a certain Wernimont.
On 16 April 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. On 31 August 1972
Lino Javier Inciong filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City for issuance of letters of administration concerning
the estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust Company.
Respondent Blandina Dandan (also referred to as Blandina
Padlan), claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan,
and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, all
surnamed Padlan, named in the children of Arturo Padlan
opposed the petition and prayed for the appointment instead of
Atty. Leonardo Casaba, which was resolved in favor of the latter.
Upon motion of the oppositors themselves, Atty. Cabasal was
later replaced by Higino Castillon. On 30 April 1973 the
oppositors (Blandina and Padlan children) submitted certified
photocopies of the 19 July 1950 private writing and the final
judgment of divorce between petitioner and Arturo. Later Ruperto
T. Padlan, claiming to be the sole surviving brother of the
deceased Arturo, intervened.
On 7 October 1987 petitioner moved for the immediate
declaration of heirs of the decedent and the distribution of his
estate. At the scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987, private
respondent as well as the six (6) Padlan children and Ruperto
failed to appear despite due notice. On the same day, the trial
court required the submission of the records of birth of the Padlan
children within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, after which, with
or without the documents, the issue on the declaration of heirs
would be considered submitted for resolution. The prescribed
period lapsed without the required documents being submitted.
1
The trial court invoking Tenchavez v. Escao which held that "a
foreign divorce between Filipino citizens sought and decreed after
the effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386) was not
2 right of the six (6) Padlan children to inherit from the decedent
entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction," disregarded
the divorce between petitioner and Arturo. Consecuently, it
expressed the view that their marriage subsisted until the death of
Arturo in 1972. Neither did it consider valid their extrajudicial
settlement of conjugal properties due to lack of judicial
3 of Arturo. The trial court, after the parties other than petitioner
approval. On the other hand, it opined that there was no
showing that marriage existed between private respondent and
Arturo, much less was it shown that the alleged Padlan children
Conflict of Laws 3
had been acknowledged by the deceased as his children with her.
As regards Ruperto, it found that he was a brother of Arturo. On
4
27 November 1987 only petitioner and Ruperto were declared
the intestate heirs of Arturo. Accordingly, equal adjudication of the
net hereditary estate was ordered in favor of the two intestate
5
heirs.
On motion for reconsideration, Blandina and the Padlan children
were allowed to present proofs that the recognition of the children
by the deceased as his legitimate children, except Alexis who was
recognized as his illegitimate child, had been made in their
6
respective records of birth. Thus on 15 February 1988 partial
reconsideration was granted declaring the Padlan children, with
the exception of Alexis, entitled to one-half of the estate to the
exclusion of Ruperto Padlan, and petitioner to the other
7
half. Private respondent was not declared an heir. Although it
was stated in the aforementioned records of birth that she and
Arturo were married on 22 April 1947, their marriage was clearly
void since it was celebrated during the existence of his previous
marriage to petitioner.
In their appeal to the Court of Appeals, Blandina and her children
assigned as one of the errors allegedly committed by the trial
court the circumstance that the case was decided without a
hearing, in violation of Sec. 1, Rule 90, of the Rules of Court,
which provides that if there is a controversy before the court as to
who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the
distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law,
the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
Respondent appellate court found this ground alone sufficient to
sustain the appeal; hence, on 11 September 1995 it declared null
and void the 27 November 1987 decision and 15 February 1988
order of the trial court, and directed the remand of the case to the
8
trial court for further proceedings. On 18 April 1996 it denied
9
reconsideration.
Should this case be remanded to the lower court for further
proceedings? Petitioner insists that there is no need because,
first, no legal or factual issue obtains for resolution either as to the
heirship of the Padlan children or as to the decedent; and,
second, the issue as to who between petitioner and private
respondent is the proper hier of the decedent is one of law which
can be resolved in the present petition based on establish facts
and admissions of the parties.
We cannot sustain petitioner. The provision relied upon by
respondent court is clear: If there is a controversy before the court
as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the
distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law,
the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
We agree with petitioner that no dispute exists either as to the
because there are proofs that they have been duly acknowledged
by him and petitioner herself even recognizes them as heirs of
10
Arturo Padlan; nor as to their respective hereditary shares. But
controversy remains as to who is the legitimate surviving spouse
failed to appear during the scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987
of the motion for immediate declaration of heirs and distribution of
Page 28 of 34

estate, simply issued an order requiring the submission of the
records of birth of the Padlan children within ten (10) days from
receipt thereof, after which, with or without the documents, the
issue on declaration of heirs would be deemed submitted for
resolution.
We note that in her comment to petitioner's motion private
respondent raised, among others, the issue as to whether
petitioner was still entitled to inherit from the decedent
considering that she had secured a divorce in the U.S.A. and in
fact had twice remarried. She also invoked the above quoted
11
procedural rule. To this, petitioner replied that Arturo was a
Filipino and as such remained legally married to her in spite of the
12
divorce they obtained. Reading between the lines, the
implication is that petitioner was no longer a Filipino citizen at the
time of her divorce from Arturo. This should have prompted the
trial court to conduct a hearing to establish her citizenship. The
purpose of a hearing is to ascertain the truth of the matters in
issue with the aid of documentary and testimonial evidence as
well as the arguments of the parties either supporting or opposing
the evidence. Instead, the lower court perfunctorily settled her
claim in her favor by merely applying the ruling in Tenchavez v.
Escao.
Then in private respondent's motion to set aside and/or
reconsider the lower court's decision she stressed that the
citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the light of the ruling
13
in Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. that aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided
they are valid according to their national law. She prayed
14
therefore that the case be set for hearing. Petitioner opposed
the motion but failed to squarely address the issue on her
15
citizenship. The trial court did not grant private respondent's
prayer for a hearing but proceeded to resolve her motion with the
finding that both petitioner and Arturo were "Filipino citizens and
16
were married in the Philippines." It maintained that their divorce
obtained in 1954 in San Francisco, California, U.S.A., was not
valid in Philippine jurisdiction. We deduce that the finding on their
citizenship pertained solely to the time of their marriage as the
trial court was not supplied with a basis to determine petitioner's
citizenship at the time of their divorce. The doubt persisted as to
whether she was still a Filipino citizen when their divorce was
decreed. The trial court must have overlooked the materiality of
this aspect. Once proved that she was no longer a Filipino citizen
at the time of their divorce, Van Dorn would become applicable
and petitioner could very well lose her right to inherit from Arturo.
Respondent again raised in her appeal the issue on petitioner's
17
citizenship; it did not merit enlightenment however from
18
petitioner. In the present proceeding, petitioner's citizenship is
brought anew to the fore by private respondent. She even
furnishes the Court with the transcript of stenographic notes taken
on 5 May 1995 during the hearing for the reconstitution of the
original of a certain transfer certificate title as well as the issuance
of new owner's duplicate copy thereof before another trial court.
When asked whether she was an American citizen petitioner
19
answered that she was since 1954. Significantly, the decree of
divorce of petitioner and Arturo was obtained in the same year.
Petitioner however did not bother to file a reply memorandum to
erase the uncertainty about her citizenship at the time of their
divorce, a factual issue requiring hearings to be conducted by the
Conflict of Laws 3
trial court. Consequently, respondent appellate court did not err in
ordering the case returned to the trial court for further
proceedings.
We emphasize however that the question to be determined by the
trial court should be limited only to the right of petitioner to inherit
from Arturo as his surviving spouse. Private respondent's claim to
heirship was already resolved by the trial court. She and Arturo
were married on 22 April 1947 while the prior marriage of
petitioner and Arturo was subsisting thereby resulting in a
bigamous marriage considered void from the beginning under
Arts. 80 and 83 of the Civil Code. Consequently, she is not a
surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this status
20
presupposes a legitimate relationship.
As regards the motion of private respondent for petitioner and a
her counsel to be declared in contempt of court and that the
21
present petition be dismissed for forum shopping, the same
lacks merit. For forum shopping to exist the actions must involve
the same transactions and same essential facts and
circumstances. There must also be identical causes of action,
22
subject matter and issue. The present petition deals with
declaration of heirship while the subsequent petitions filed before
the three (3) trial courts concern the issuance of new owner's
duplicate copies of titles of certain properties belonging to the
estate of Arturo. Obviously, there is no reason to declare the
existence of forum shopping.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of
respondent Court of Appeals ordering the remand of the case to
the court of origin for further proceedings and declaring null and
void its decision holding petitioner Fe D. Quita and Ruperto T.
Padlan as intestate heirs is AFFIRMED. The order of the
appellate court modifying its previous decision by granting one-
half (1/2) of the net hereditary estate to the Padlan children,
namely, Claro, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, with
the exception of Alexis, all surnamed Padlan, instead of Arturo's
brother Ruperto Padlan, is likewise AFFIRMED. The Court
however emphasizes that the reception of evidence by the trial
court should he limited to the hereditary rights of petitioner as the
surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan.
The motion to declare petitioner and her counsel in contempt of
court and to dismiss the present petition for forum shopping is
DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Page 29 of 34

Digest
1. RECTO V. HARDEN (1959)
Short summary: Recto was hired by American wife to represent
her in RP case for protection of her interest in the conjugal
property, vs. American husband, in conjunction with the divorce
proceeding she's going to file in US. They won in TC, but on
appeal, American H & W agreed to settle. Recto now wants to
collect fees for services, but as defense, Harden spouses argues
that the contract's object was unlawful (Divorce not allowed in
RP) so it is invalid, thus, Recto cannot enforce it against them.
Court ruled for Recto
Facts:
Mrs. Harden, US Citizen, engaged services of Claro M. Recto, for
suit
to secure an increase in the amount of support she was
receinging
to preserve her rights in the properties of the conjugal
partnership
in contemplation of a divorce suit she's going to file in the US.
Compensation for RECTO: 20% of value of her share of conjugal
partnership after liquidation
TC: for Mrs. Harden
CA: Harden Sps. Mutually released and forever discharged each
other from all actions, debts, duties, and claims to the conjugal
partnership
-Recto filed motion contesting agreement
-defense: contract of services invalid: to secure a divorce decree
in violation of our laws
WON RECTO COULD ENFORCE THE AGREEMENT? YES
*CONTRACT OF SERVICES IS NOT CONTRARY TO LAW,
MORALS, GOOD CUSTOMS, PUBLIC ORDER, OR PUBLIC
POLICY
1. The contract has a lawful object: it is to protect the
interests of Mrs. Harden in the conjugal partnership
during the pendency of a divorce suit
-NOT
to secure divorce
to facilitate or promote procurement of divorce
2. Divorce can be granted to the Sps Harden, they being
nationals of country whose laws allow divorce (following
the nationality principle in determining the status and
dissolution of the marriage)
Conflict of Laws 3
1. LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION V. JUDICIAL
JURISDICTION
*status, once established by the personal law of the party, is
given universal recognition. (UNIVERSALITY OF STATUS)
-once status is set by Country A, Country B is bound to attribute
to a person of Country A the status that is established in Country
A
-Courts of Country B also cannot introduce exceptions or
qualifications that are not set in Country A
If ALIENS sue and are sued in RP Courts
*RP would apply RP Procedural rules relevant to status and
capacity (JUDICIAL JURISDICTION)
BUT would apply personal law of the alien to determine status
and capacity (LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION)
2. Limjoco vs. Estate of Fragrante
FACTS:
On May 21, 1946, the Public Service Commission issued a
certificate of public convenience to the Intestate Estate of the
deceased Pedro Fragante, authorizing the said intestate estate
through its Special or Judicial Administrator, appointed by the
proper court of competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate an
ice plant with a daily productive capacity of two and one-half (2-
1/2) tons in the Municipality of San Juan and to sell the ice
produced from the said plant in the Municipalities of San Juan,
Mandaluyong, Rizal, and Quezon City; that Fragantes intestate
estate is financially capable of maintaining the proposed service.
Petioner argues that allowing the substitution of the legal
representative of the estate of Fragante for the latter as party
applicant and afterwards granting the certificate applied for is a
contravention of the law.
ISSUE:
Whether the estate of Fragante be extended an artificial judicial
personality.
HELD:
The estate of Fragrante must be extended an artificial judicial
personality. If Fragrante had lived, in view of the evidence of
record, would have obtained from the commission the certificate
for which he was applying. The situation has not changed except
for his death, and the economic ability of his estate to
appropriately and adequately operate and maintain the service of
an ice plant was the same that it received from the decedent
himself.
It has been the constant doctrine that the estate or the mass of
property, rights and assets left by the decedent, directly becomes
vested and charged with his rights and obligations which survive
Page 30 of 34

after his demise. The reason for this legal fiction, that the estate
of the deceased person is considered a "person", as deemed to
include artificial or juridical persons, is the avoidance of injustice
or prejudice resulting from the impossibility of exercising such
legal rights and fulfilling such legal obligations of the decedent as
survived after his death unless the fiction is indulged.
The estate of Fragrante should be considered an artificial or
juridical person for the purposes of the settlement and distribution
of his estate which, include the exercise during the judicial
administration of those rights and the fulfillment of those
obligations of his estate which survived after his death.
The decedent's rights which by their nature are not extinguished
by death go to make up a part and parcel of the assets of his
estate for the benefit of the creditors, devisees or legatees, if any,
and the heirs of the decedent. It includes those rights and
fulfillment of obligation of Fragante which survived after his death
like his pending application at the commission.
3. Insular Govt vs Frank
FACTS: In 1903, in the city of Chicago, Illinois, Frank entered into
a contract for a period of 2 years with the Plaintiff, by which Frank
was to receive a salary as a stenographer in the service of the
said Plaintiff, and in addition thereto was to be paid in advance
the expenses incurred in traveling from the said city of Chicago to
Manila, and one-half salary during said period of travel.
Said contract contained a provision that in case of a violation of
its terms on the part of Frank, he should become liable to the
Plaintiff for the amount expended by the Government by way of
expenses incurred in traveling from Chicago to Manila and the
one-half salary paid during such period.
Frank entered upon the performance of his contract and was paid
half-salary from the date until the date of his arrival in the
Philippine Islands.
Thereafter, Frank left the service of the Plaintiff and refused to
make a further compliance with the terms of the contract.
The Plaintiff commenced an action in the CFI-Manila to recover
from Frank the sum of money, which amount the Plaintiff claimed
had been paid to Frank as expenses incurred in traveling from
Chicago to Manila, and as half-salary for the period consumed in
travel.
It was expressly agreed between the parties to said contract that
Laws No. 80 and No. 224 should constitute a part of said
contract.
The Defendant filed a general denial and a special defense,
alleging in his special defense that
(1) the Government of the Philippine Islands had amended Laws
Conflict of Laws 3
No. 80 and No. 224 and had thereby materially altered the said
contract, and also that
(2) he was a minor at the time the contract was entered into and
was therefore not responsible under the law.
the lower court rendered a judgment against Frank and in favor of
the Plaintiff for the sum of 265. 90 dollars
ISSUE:
1. Did the amendment of the laws altered the tenor of the contract
entered into between Plaintiff and Defendant?
2. Can the defendant allege minority/infancy?
HELD: the judgment of the lower court is affirmed
1. NO; It may be said that the mere fact that the legislative
department of the Government of the Philippine Islands had
amended said Acts No. 80 and No. 224 by Acts No. 643 and No.
1040 did not have the effect of changing the terms of the contract
made between the Plaintiff and the Defendant. The legislative
department of the Government is expressly prohibited by section
5 of the Act of Congress of 1902 from altering or changing the
terms of a contract. The right which the Defendant had acquired
by virtue of Acts No. 80 and No. 224 had not been changed in
any respect by the fact that said laws had been amended. These
acts, constituting the terms of the contract, still constituted a part
of said contract and were enforceable in favor of the Defendant.
2. NO; The Defendant alleged in his special defense that he was
a minor and therefore the contract could not be enforced against
him. The record discloses that, at the time the contract was
entered into in the State of Illinois, he was an adult under the laws
of that State and had full authority to contract. Frank claims that,
by reason of the fact that, under that laws of the Philippine Islands
at the time the contract was made, made persons in said Islands
did not reach their majority until they had attained the age of 23
years, he was not liable under said contract, contending that the
laws of the Philippine Islands governed.
It is not disputed upon the contrary the fact is admitted that
at the time and place of the making of the contract in question the
Defendant had full capacity to make the same. No rule is better
settled in law than that matters bearing upon the execution,
interpretation and validity of a contract are determined b the law
of the place where the contract is made. Matters connected with
its performance are regulated by the law prevailing at the place of
performance. Matters respecting a remedy, such as the bringing
of suit, admissibility of evidence, and statutes of limitations,
depend upon the law of the place where the suit is brought.
4. Sottomayor vs Barros
FACTS:Ignacia Sottomayor and Gonzalo De Barros were married
in England in 1866. Subsequently, Sottomayor filed a petition for
divorce.
1. She alleged that:
a. She and De Barros were both natives of Portugal
and domiced in the same at the time of their
marriage
Page 31 of 34

b. They were natural and lawful first cousins
c. The laws of Portugal provides that first cousins are
incapable of contracting marriage on the ground of
consanguinity
2. It appears that in 1858, petitioner Sottomayor, her
parents, and her uncle De Barros and his family
(respondent De Barros is the eldest sons petitioners
uncle) occupied a house in London. Petitioners father
stayed in London due to his health and De Barros stayed
there for the education of his sons and their wine
business. Sottomayor family and De Barros family
occupied the same house.
3. On June 21, 1866, Sottomayor, then 14 years old, and
De Barros, then 16, married in London (Reason: To save
the business of their family). No religious ceremony
followed. And although they lived in the same house until
1872, Sottomayor and De Barros never consummated
the marriage.
4. De Barros entered his appearance but did not file a
reply.
5. The Queens Proctor (solicitor) then obtained leave to
intervene and file pleas.
6. The court ordered (based on the consent of both parties)
that the questions of law referred to the Queens Proctor
be heard first before the questions of fact, without
prejudice to either party
7. Sir Robert Phillimore refused to set aside the case on
the ground of incapacity of age, or collusion or fraud,
and held that marriage having been contracted in
England and valid by English law, cannot be declared
null on the ground that the parties were incapacitated
from contracting marriage under the law of Portugal.
8. Petitioner appealed and the case was remitted to
Divorce Division on the questions of fact
ISSUE: WON a marriage solemnized in London between two
parties not domiciled in the same is valid
HELD:No. It is a well-settled principle in law that the question of
personal incapacity to enter into any contract is decided by the
law of domicile. In short, where personal capacity depends on the
law of domicile.
The marriage is invalid. The law of a country where marriage is
solemnized must decide all questions relating to the validity of the
ceremony by which the marriage is alleged to have been
constituted; but as regards questions on personal capacity, it
must depend on the law of the domicile, and if the laws of any
Conflict of Laws 3
country prohibit its subjects within certain degrees of
consanguinity from contracting marriage and treats such as
incestuous, this imposes on the subjects a personal incapacity
which continues to affect them so long as they are domiciled in
said country and renders such marriage invalid wherever it may
have been solemnized.
Since both parties, being minor at the time the marriage was
contracted, their domicile follows that of their parents, i.e.
Portugal. Since the law of Portugal prohibits marriage between
parties who are related by consanguinity, it follows then that the
marriage between Sottomayor and De Barros is void.
5. In Re: Mays Estate
6. Djumantan vs Domingo
Facts
Bernard Banez, husband of Marina Cabael, went to Indonesia as
a contract worker.He then embraced and was converted to Islam.
He then, married petitioner in accordance with Islamic rites.
Banez then returned to the Philippines. Petitioner and her two
children with Banez arrived in Manila as the guests of Banez.
The latter made it appear that he was just a friend of the family of
petitioner and was merely repaying the hospitability extended to
him during his stay in Indonesia. Banez executed an Affidavit of
Guaranty and Support, for his guests. As guests, petitioner
and her two children lived in the house of Banez. Petitioner and
her children were admitted to the Philippines as temporary
visitors. Marina Cabael discovered the true relationship of her
husband and petitioner. She filed a complaint for concubinage,
however, subsequently dismissed for lack of merit. Immigration
status of petitioner was changed from temporary visitor to that of
permanent resident. Petitioner was issued an alien certificate of
registration. Banez eldest son, Leonardo, filed a letter complaint
subsequently referred to CID. Petitioner was detained at the CID
detention cell. Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the
deportation case on the ground that she was validly married to a
Filipino citizen. CID disposed that the second marriage of
Bernardo Banes to respondent Djumantan irregular and not in
accordance with the laws of the Philippines. They revoked the
visa previously granted to her.
Issue
Whether or not the Djumantans admission and change of
immigration status from temporary to permanent resident legal.
Ruling
There was a blatant abuse of our immigration laws in effecting
petitioners entry into the country and the change of her
immigration status from temporary visitor to permanent resident.
All such privileges were obtained
through misinterpretation.Never was the marriage of petitioner to
Page 32 of 34

Banez disclosed to the immigration authorities in her applications
for temporary visitors visa and for permanent residency.
Generally, the right of the President to expel or deport aliens
whose presence is deemed inimical to the public interest is as
absolute and unqualified as the right to prohibit and prevent their
entry into the country. This right is based on the fact that since the
aliens are not part of the nation, their admission into the territory
is a matter of pure permission and simple tolerance which creates
no obligation on the part of the government to permit them to
stay.
There is no law guaranteeing aliens married to Filipino citizens
the right to be admitted, much less to be given permanent
residency, in the Philippines.The fact of marriage by an alien to a
citizen does not withdraw her from the operation of the
immigration laws governing the admission and exclusion of
aliens. Marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino husband does not
ipso facto make her a Filipino citizen and does not excuse her
from her failure to depart from the country upon the expiration of
her extended stay here as an alien. It is not mandatory for the
CID to admit any alien who applies for a visitors visa. Once
admitted into the country, the alien has no right to an indefinite
stay. an alien allowed to stay temporarily may apply for a change
of status and may be admitted as a permanent resident. Among
those considered qualified to apply for permanent residency if the
wife or husband of a Philippine citizen. The entry of aliens into the
country and their admission as immigrants is not a matter of right,
even if they are legally married to Filipino citizens.
7. Tenchavez vs Escano
FACTS:
27 years old Vicenta Escano who belong to a prominent Filipino
Family of Spanish ancestry got married on Feburary 24, 1948
with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years old engineer, and ex-army
officer before Catholic chaplain Lt. Moises Lavares. The marriage
was a culmination of the love affair of the couple and was duly
registered in the local civil registry. A certain Pacita Noel came to
be their match-maker and go-between who had an amorous
relationship with Tenchavez as written by a San Carlos college
student where she and Vicenta are studying. Vicenta and Pastor
are supposed to renew their vows/ marriage in a church as
suggested by Vicentas parents. However after translating the
said letter to Vicentas dad , he disagreed for a new marriage.
Vicenta continued leaving with her parents in Cebu while Pastor
went back to work in Manila.
Vicenta applied for a passport indicating that she was single and
when it was approved she left for the United States and filed a
complaint for divorce against Pastor which was later on approved
and issued by the Second Judicial Court of the State of Nevada.
She then sought for the annulment of her marriage to the
Archbishop of Cebu. Vicenta married Russell Leo Moran, an
American, in Nevada and has begotten children. She acquired
citizenship on August 8, 1958. Petitioner filed a complaint against
Vicenta and her parents whom he alleged to have dissuaded
Vicenta from joining her husband.
ISSUE: Whether the divorce sought by Vicenta Escano is valid
and binding upon courts of the Philippines.
Conflict of Laws 3
HELD:
Civil Code of the Philippines does not admit divorce. Philippine
courts cannot give recognition on foreign decrees of absolute
divorce between Filipino citizens because it would be a violation
of the Civil Code. Such grant would arise to discrimination in
favor of rich citizens who can afford divorce in foreign countries.
The adulterous relationship of Escano with her American husband
is enough grounds for the legal separation prayed by Tenchavez.
In the eyes of Philippine laws, Tenchavez and Escano are still
married. A foreign divorce between Filipinos sought and decreed
is not entitled to recognition neither is the marriage of the
divorcee entitled to validity in the Philippines. Thus, the desertion
and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one spouse entitled
the other for damages.
WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as
follows;
(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a
decree of legal separation from defendant Vicenta F. Escao;
(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escao to pay
plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the amount of P25,000 for damages
and attorneys' fees;
(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee,
Mamerto Escao and the estate of his wife, the deceased Mena
Escao, P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys' fees.
8. Van Dorn vs Romillo
FACTS:
Alice Reyes Van Dorn, a Filipino Citizen and private respondent,
Richard Upton, a US citizen, was married in Hong Kong in 1979.
They established their residence in the Philippines and had 2
children. They were divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982 and
petitioner remarried, this time with Theodore Van Dorn. A suit
against petitioner was filed on June 8, 1983, stating that
petitioners business in Ermita Manila, the Galleon Shop, is a
conjugal property with Upton and prayed therein that Alice be
ordered to render an accounting of the business and he be
declared as the administrator of the said property.
ISSUE: Whether or not the foreign divorce between the petitioner
and private respondent in Nevada is binding in the Philippines
where petitioner is a Filipino citizen.
HELD:
Private respondent is no longer the husband of the petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue petitioner to exercise control over
conjugal assets. He is estopped by his own representation before
the court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal
property. Furthermore, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which
may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law. Petitioner is not bound to her
marital obligations to respondent by virtue of her nationality laws.
She should not be discriminated against her own country if the
end of justice is to be served.
9. Pilapi vs Ibay-Somera
FACTS:
Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married with private
respondent, Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national before
the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler,
Page 33 of 34
 Conflict of Laws 3

Federal Republic of Germany. They have a child who was born
on April 20, 1980 and named Isabella Pilapil Geiling. Conjugal
disharmony eventuated in private respondent and he initiated a
divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the
Schoneberg Local Court in January 1983. The petitioner then filed
an action for legal separation, support and separation of property
before the RTC Manila on January 23, 1983.
The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on
the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of
the child was granted to the petitioner.
On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed 2 complaints for
adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that while still
married to Imelda, latter had an affair with William Chia as early
as 1982 and another man named Jesus Chua sometime in
1983.
ISSUE: Whether private respondent can prosecute petitioner on
the ground of adultery even though they are no longer husband
and wife as decree of divorce was already issued.
2. Who between the petitioner and private respondent is the
proper heir of the decedent?
Held:
If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful
heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to
which each person is entitled under the law, the
controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
No dispute exists as to the right of the six Padlan children to
inherit from the decedent because there are proofs that they have
been duly acknowledged by him and petitioner herself even
recognizes them as heirs of Arturo Padlan, nor as to their
respective hereditary shares.
Private respondent is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from
him as this status presupposes a legitimate relationship. Her
marriage to Arturo being a bigamous marriage considered void ab
inito under Articles 80 and 83 of the Civil Code renders her not a
surviving spouse.

The decision of the Court of Appeals ordering the remand of the

case is affirmed.
HELD:

The law specifically provided that in prosecution for adultery and

concubinage, the person who can legally file the complaint should
be the offended spouse and nobody else. Though in this case, it
appeared that private respondent is the offended spouse, the
latter obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic
of Germany, and said divorce and its legal effects may be
recognized in the Philippines in so far as he is concerned. Thus,
under the same consideration and rationale, private respondent is
no longer the husband of petitioner and has no legal standing to
commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the
offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

10. Quita vs CA

Facts:

Fe D. Quita and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in

the Philippines on May 18, 1941. No children were born out of
their marriage. On July 23, 1954, petitioner obtained a final
judgment of divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. On April
16, 1972, Arturo died leaving no will. On August 31, 1972, Lino
Javier Inciong filed a petition with the RTC for issuance of letters
of administration concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the
Philippine Trust Company. Respondent Blandina Dandan,
claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo Dandan and the
surviving children, all surnamed Padlan, opposed the petition.
The RTC expressed that the marriage between Antonio and
petitioner subsisted until the death of Arturo in 1972, that the
marriage existed between private respondent and Arturo was
clearly void since it was celebrated during the existence of his
previous marriage to petitioner. The Court of
Appeals remandedthe case to the trial court for
further proceedings.

Issues:

1. Should the case be remanded to the lower court?

Page 34 of 34