1 Paranormal Conjunction Fallacy PDF

APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY
Appl. Cognit. Psychol. 23: 524542 (2009)

Published online 8 June 2008 in Wiley InterScience
(www.interscience.wiley.com) DOI: 10.1002/acp.1472
Paranormal Belief and Susceptibility

to the Conjunction Fallacy
PAUL ROGERS*, TIFFANY DAVIS and JOHN FISK

School of Psychology, University of Central Lancashire, UK
SUMMARY
Numerous studies have shown paranormal believers misperceive randomness and are poor at judging
probability. Despite the obvious relevance to many types of alleged paranormal phenomena, no one
has examined whether believers are more susceptible to the conjunction fallacy; that is to
misperceiving co-occurring (conjunct) events as being more likely than singular (constituent) events
alone. The present study examines believer vs. non-believer differences in conjunction errors for both
paranormal and non-paranormal events presented as either a probability or a frequency estimation
task. As expected, believers made more conjunction errors than non-believers. This was true for both
event types, with both groups making fewer errors for paranormal than for non-paranormal events.
Surprisingly, the response format (probability vs. frequency) had little impact. Results are discussed
in relation to paranormal believers susceptibility to the conjunction fallacy and more generally, to
their propensity for probabilistic reasoning biases. Copyright # 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Despite limited scientific evidence for the validity of paranormal claims (Alcock, 1981,
2003; Hines, 2003; Irwin & Watt, 2007), belief in the existence of paranormal phenomena
remains prevalent the world over (e.g. Haraldsson, 1985; Rhine-Feather & Schmicker,
2005). Psychologists have become increasingly interested in understanding why such
beliefs are maintained with various ideas, including the notion that paranormal believers
have certain cognitive deficits, being proposed (for reviews see French, 1992; French &
Wilson, 2007; Irwin, 1993, 2008; Irwin & Watt, 2007; Wiseman & Watt, 2006). Because
many seemingly extraordinary coincidences are actually quite common (Gilovich, 1991;
Martin, 1998; Watt, 1990/1991), one suggestion is that paranormal believers are especially
prone to misunderstanding probability and thus that a misunderstanding of probability
(chance) underlies the formation and maintenance of belief in the paranormal.
Paranormal belief and probabilistic reasoning biases

It is widely recognised that most people are poor at judging probability and that under
conditions of uncertainty, will rely on heuristicscognitive rules of thumbto simplify
the reasoning process so as to make quick, easy and proximate, but ultimately flawed,
judgments (e.g. Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002; Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky,
1982; Shaifi, 2004; Sutherland, 1992). Further research suggests a persons pre-existing or
*Correspondence to: Dr Paul Rogers, School of Psychology, University of Central Lancashire, Preston,
Lancashire PR1 2HE, UK. E-mail: progers@uclan.ac.uk
Copyright # 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Paranormal belief and the conjunction fallacy 525
a priori beliefs can have a significant influence on these heuristical judgements (e.g. Watt,
1990/1991).
Blackmore and Troscianko (1985) were first to test whether paranormal believers were
especially prone to probabilistic reasoning biases. They had paranormal believers and
non-believers answer questions relating to the generation of random strings (i.e. list
20 numbers as if drawn from a hat), randomness judging (i.e. indicate whether various boy/
girl mixes were biased or unbiased), coin tossing outcomes (i.e. indicate whether the
number of heads scored from 20 throws was biased or unbiased) and sampling decisions
(e.g. indicate which is more likely to be drawn from a given number of red and blue
sweets). Whilst no group differences were found for the random string generation or
randomness judging tasks, Blackmore and Troscianko found that those who believed in the
possibility of extrasensory perception1 made more coin tossing and sampling errors than
non-believers. These data suggest paranormal believers underestimate the likelihood of a
chance outcome and look beyond coincidence in search of causalusually super-
naturalexplanations. According to Blackmore and Troscianko (1985), this under-
estimating of chance expectationstermed the chance baseline shiftmay strengthen
ones belief in psi even when there is no evidence that psi actually exists.
Subsequent work examining believers tendency to misunderstand chance offers mixed
results. Henry (1993) found most people believe intuition (71%) and psi (64%) are the best
explanations for everyday coincidence experiences (see also Henry, 2005) whilst Bressan
(2002; Study 1) found paranormal believers reported having more frequent meaningful
coincidences than non-believers. Likewise, Tobacyk and Wilkinson (1991) found those
with a more pronounced belief in the paranormal (specifically, in superstition, psi and
precognition) had a higher preference for games of chance and were more prone to
developing illusory correlations between statistically unrelated events (see also Vyse,
1997). Marks (2002) goes further by suggesting believers misperceive chance events as
somehow being related because their a priori beliefs in the paranormal demand such a
relationship and thus, that they are especially prone to making subjective validations.
But other findings fail to support the chance baseline shift hypothesis (cf. Blackmore &
Troscianko, 1985). Blackmore (1997) found paranormal believers and sceptics were
equally likely to underestimate the odds that statements such as I have a scar on my left
knee and I once broke my arm would apply to most people. Similarly, Roberts and
Seager (1999) found belief in the paranormal correlated with conditionalbut not
probabilisticreasoning ability. More recently, Bressan (2002) gave believers and
non-believers the same four probability tasks first used by Blackmore and Troscianko
(1985), plus Kahneman and Tverskys (1972) classic maternity ward problem (i.e. indicate
whether a larger or smaller hospital is more likely to have a higher proportion of male births
over the next year; Study 1) and a modified version of Bar-Hillels (1982) pollster problem
(i.e. indicate whether you have more confidence in a larger or smaller sample of voters;
Study 2). Overall, Bressan found believers and sceptics were equally prone to errors on the
sampling, maternity ward and pollster problems, implying that the two groups were equally
insensitive to sample size differentials. Interestingly, Musch and Ehrenberg (2002) found
that believers initial biases in probabilistic reasoning disappeared once general cognitive
1
Extrasensory perception (ESP) is defined as the alleged ability to obtain information via non-sensory means and
comprises three sub-components, namely the non-sensory awareness of distant individuals (telepathy), of distant
objects or events (clairvoyance) and of future events (precognition). Due to a philosophical overlap between these
three concepts, the term psi is often used to denote the unknown paranormal element underlying all ostensibly
psychic experiences (Beloff & Henry, 2005; Irwin & Watt, 2007).
Copyright # 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Appl. Cognit. Psychol. 23: 524542 (2009)
DOI: 10.1002/acp
526 P. Rogers et al.
ability (measured by final exam grades) was controlled for. Finally Blagrove, French, and
Jones (2006) asked participants to solve sampling problems relating to dice throwing (i.e.
indicate the best way to throw 10 sixes) and lottery play (i.e. indicate how someone else
picking your lottery ticket would influence your chances of winning). Blagrove and
colleagues found that those with a more pronounced belief in paranormal phenomena
(specifically precognition) made more probabilistic reasoning errors for the lottery task
although not the dice throwing taskthan did those with a lower level of belief. Additional
evidence that both types of error correlated positively with the reported number of
(allegedly) precognitive dreams suggests these results are more indicative of believers
greater susceptibility to probabilistic reasoning biases than to a stronger illusion of control
(c.f. Langer, 1975).
Evidence that paranormal believers are especially prone to misperceiving randomness is
also mixed. Contrary to earlier claims (Blackmore & Troscianko, 1985), Brugger, Landis,
and Regard (1990) found paranormal believers were less normative and predicted fewer
number repetitions from a sequence of dice throws than paranormal sceptics. Brugger,
Regard, Landis, Krebs and Niederberger (1991; Study 1) later found that within in
customised die throwing task, believers predicted fewer repetitions for both conceptually
identical outcomes (e.g. carrot-carrot) and conceptually related outcomes (e.g. carrot-
rabbit) than would be expected by chance. The same authors also found that belief in ESP
was positively associated with misperceiving semantic relatedness in both pairs of
drawings (Study 2) and in random dot patterns (Study 3). Bressan (2002) reports similar
trends regardless of whether previously generated strings were visible or hidden from
participants. According to Bressan, paranormal believers are not especially prone to
underestimating the likelihood of chance events per se but instead, are more susceptible to
misperceiving patterns in randomness (i.e. the absence of meaning). This suggests
believers and non-believers have different internal representations of what constitutes
randomness, with believers requiring less subjective evidence of relatedness before they
misattribute a cause-and-effect relationship to objectively (i.e., statistically) unrelated
events. This lowered threshold of subjective chance may explain why believers often see
coincidences as more meaningful (Brugger & Taylor, 2003). Finally, Dagnall, Parker, and
Munley (2007) found that only perceptions of randomness predicted scores on a global
paranormal measure which, according to the authors, implies believers general weakness
in probabilistic reasoning stems from a specific deficit relating to the misrepresentation of
randomness (chance).
Paranormal belief, representativeness and the conjunction fallacy

According to Bressan (2002) paranormal believers generally require less objective
evidence of causal relatedness before they perceive a cause-and-effect relationship
between events. That is, they are more prone to misperceiving meaning (relatedness) in
random noise (see also Marks, 2002). The implication here is that believers employ a
more relaxed internal representation of what constitutes a random event and that their
perceptions of chance are unduly influenced by factors such as the salience or
observability of possible causes (Bressan, 2002). This, in turn, suggests paranormal
believers base their probability judgements on the representativeness heuristic.
The representativeness heuristic is a cognitive rule of thumb in which the subjective
probability of an event is judged by the extent to which that event resemblesis
DOI: 10.1002/acp
representative ofeither the salient features of its parent population or alternatively, the
process by which that particular event is generated (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972; Tversky
& Kahneman, 1982). In the first instance, representativeness implies people believe a given
category exemplar ought to resemble the category prototype. In the second, it implies
people (mis)perceive a given outcome as being associated with, or caused by, a particular
process.
Representativeness biases are robust and can be applied to people, objects, situations and
even abstract concepts such as chance and randomness (Tversky & Kahneman, 1982,
1983). In lottery play for example, random looking number combinations (e.g. 08, 15, 21,
30, 39, 46) are deemed more likely to win than numbers which appear sequentially related
(e.g. 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21), with regular lottery players more prone to these misperceptions
than non-players (Rogers, 1999; Rogers & Webley, 2001). Gilovich & Savitsky (1996)
describe how similar biases underlie pseudoscientific beliefs in astrology, graphology
and dream interpretation. For instance, the personality characteristics associated with
each astrological sun sign appear to be anthropomorphised representations of the sign
itself. Thus, people born under the sign of Libra (the scales) are often stereotypically
described as being well-balanced and fair-minded (see also Eysenck & Nias, 1982;
Groome, 2001). Ironically, Irwin (2008) criticises Blackmore and Trosciankos (1985)
studyand by implication many subsequent studiesfor not being representative of
real-life situations.
Representativeness biases are prevalent when people are asked to judge co-occurring or
conjunct events. Tversky and Kahneman (1982) famously gave participants a fictitious
personality sketch in which the central character (Linda) is described as 31 years old,
single, outspoken and very bright who majored in philosophy and who, as a student, had
been deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice and who had
participated in antinuclear demonstrations (p. 92). Thus, Lindas character was
constructed so as to be representative (typical) of an active feminist and unrepresentative
(atypical) of a bank teller. Participants had to rank order eight possible conclusions
including a representative outcome (Linda is an active feminist), an unrepresentative
outcome (Linda is a bank teller) and a conjunction of the two (Linda is a bank teller and
an active feminist).2 Tversky and Kahneman found that regardless of their level of
statistical sophistication, between 85 and 90% of participants ranked the co-occurring
(conjunctive) outcome as being more likely than the singular (constituent), representative
outcome of Linda being a bank teller. According to the laws of normative probability this is
not possible. Since being a feminist bank teller was more representative of Lindas
description than simply being a bank teller, it seems the vast majority of participants
ignored normative statistics and erroneously judged the former possibility (feminist bank
teller) more likely than the latter (bank teller) thereby succumbing to the conjunction
fallacy (Tversky & Kahneman, 1982).
Fisk (2004) argues that representativeness accounts of the conjunction fallacy are
invalid. Following his review of several alternative models Fisk (2004) concludes that
despite some limitations, the best explanation of the conjunction fallacy is one that
highlights the potential surprise value of constituent events. According to surprise theory
(cf. Shackle, 1969) potential surprise determines subjective likelihood estimations with
2
Italic were not in the original text but are added here to emphasis the conjunction. For the record, the remaining
five outcomes in Tversky and Kahnemans (1982) original study were that Linda was an elementary school
teacher, a bookstore worker who took yoga classes, a psychiatric social worker, a member of the League of Women
voters or an insurance salesperson (Tversky & Kahneman, 1982; within subjects version).
DOI: 10.1002/acp
more surprising events seen as less probable and less surprising events deemed more
probable (Fisk, 2004). In terms of conjunctive events it is the surprise value of the more
surprising and less likely constituent which alone is key in determining the probability
assigned to the conjunction (Fisk, 2004; Fisk & Pidgeon, 1996).
Conjunction biases have been demonstrated in a wide variety of hypothetical contexts
where, in most cases, the proportion of individuals violating the conjunction rule ranges
from between 50 and 90% (Fisk, 2004; Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). Given previous
claims that paranormal believers susceptibly to reasoning biases may be context or domain
specific (e.g. Gray & Mills, 1990; Merla-Ramos, 2000; Wierzbicki, 1985; although see
Lawrence & Peters, 2004; Roe, 1999), it seems reasonable to expect believers will be more
prone to the conjunction fallacy, particularly when conjunctive events appear to reflect
paranormal phenomena. Take the common example of when one is thinking about an old
friend just at the moment he/she unexpectedly calls (e.g. Rhine-Feather & Schmicker,
2005). Here, the two constituent eventsnamely (a) thinking about the friend and (b) that
friend unexpectedly callingmay not be unusual in their own right. One may have thought
about the same friend many times before or alternatively, many other friends may have
unexpectedly called in the past; neither would be particularly surprising (cf. Fisk, 2004). It
is only when these two constituent events co-occur in close temporal proximity that this
conjunction is deemed too unlikely to be a simple coincidence. In such cases, many
experients will dismiss chance and look for a causal, often paranormal, explanation (cf.
Blackmore & Troscianko, 1985; Bressan, 2002; Marks, 2002). Similar logic can be applied
to other aspects of the paranormal including the apparent accuracy of psychic predictions
where the co-occurrence of two constituent eventsnamely (a) the prediction and (b) the
predicted outcomeseems too unlikely to be just a coincidence.
Given previous claims that paranormal believers often misunderstand chance and
randomness (e.g. Bressan, 2002), it seems reasonable to suggest believers may be
especially prone to the conjunction fallacy. Evidence that believers tend to adopt an
intuitive (heuristical) as opposed to an analytic thinking style (Aarnio & Lindeman, 2005;
Irwin & Young, 2002; Lester, Thinschimdt, & Trautman, 1987), which in turn is associated
with more conjunction errors (Fisk, 2004; Toyosawa & Karasawa, 2004), adds further
support to this assertion. Moreover, given that personal experience of alleged paranormal
phenomena is the single biggest predictor of paranormal belief (Blackmore, 1984),
a tendency to misjudge conjunctive events as having some underlying causal rela-
tionship may help explain the maintenance, and perhaps even the development, of
such beliefs.
To date, the only study to examine the relationship between paranormal belief and
susceptibility to the conjunction fallacy is that by Dagnall et al. (2007). They had university
students complete a series of probabilistic reasoning tasks including one asking whether in
a local football match it was more likely for (a) Team A to score first, (b) Team A to score
first and win, (c) Team A to score first and lose or (d) Team A to score first and the game is
drawn. Contrary to expectations, Dagnell and colleagues found susceptibility to the
conjunction fallacy was unrelated to paranormal belief ratings and that believers and
non-believers performed equally well in solving the conjunction task. One problem with
this study, as the authors note, is that the sample comprised psychology students who
presumably had some basic understanding of probability theory. In addition, the study
employed a global measure of paranormal beliefTobacyks (1988) Revised Paranormal
Belief Scale (RPBS)which has been criticised on both content and psychometric
grounds (see Holden & French, 2000; Irwin, 2008). Finally, Dagnall et al. presented just
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one conjunction problem relating to a football match and it may be that non-significant
results were an artefact of this particular event type. As such, the present study controls for
previous training in maths, statistics and psychology, employs a narrower and arguably
more appropriate measure of paranormal belief, and presents a series of 16 conjunctive
events incorporating both paranormal and non-paranormal contexts. In addition, the
current study also investigates whether believers are unduly influenced by the formatting of
conjunction problems.
Fisk (2004) argues that the formatting of questions is an important factor underlying
conjunction biases. Whereas the original Linda Problem (Tversky & Kahneman, 1982)
asked participants to rank order the likelihood of each outcome, some researchers (e.g. Fisk
& Pidgeon, 1996) have asked participants to estimate the probability (i.e. chances between
0 and 100) of each constituent and conjunct outcome occurring. Others (e.g. Fielder, 1988)
have presented conjunction problems as absolute frequency estimates (i.e. if 100 people fit
Lindas description, how many would be feminists, how many would be bank tellers and
how many would be both?). According to Fisk (2004), more people succumb to the
conjunction fallacy when asked either to rank order the statements or to produce
probability estimates for them. In contrast, few people commit the fallacy when asked
to produce frequency estimates. With this formatting bias in mind, one might also expect
paranormal believers to make more conjunction errors for probabilistic over frequency
estimations (cf. Blackmore & Troscianko, 1985). The present study explores this
possibility.
Study overview and hypotheses

The present study is the first to explore paranormal believers susceptibility to the
conjunction fallacy for both paranormal and non-paranormal events. Using 16 newly
created vignettes, participants were asked to rank order the likelihood of two constituent
and one conjunct event occurring.3 Of these, eight vignettes described an ostensibly
paranormal event such as dreaming of a future house fire which later happened, whilst eight
described an everyday, non-paranormal event such as having a mild case of food poisoning.
In line with Fisk (2004), half of these were formatted as a probability, and half as a
frequency, estimation task. Finally, the present study also controls for participants level of
qualification in mathematics, statistics and/or psychology.
Several hypotheses are proposed. First, given their potential proneness to representa-
tiveness biases, paranormal believers should make more conjunction errors than
non-believers. Second, if such biases are domain-specific, believers should make more
conjunction errors for paranormal than for non-paranormal events. Third, both groups
should make more conjunction errors when problems require probabilityrather than
frequencyestimates. Further, this formatting bias should be more pronounced amongst
believers and/or for paranormal events. Finally, individuals who report having a greater
number of paranormal experiences should make more conjunction errors than those who
report having fewer paranormal experiences.
3
The number of response outcomes was limited to three (i.e. two constituent events plus one conjunctive event)
due to space and participants time considerations. A full copy of the Scenario judgements questionnaire (SJQ) is
available from the first author (PR).
DOI: 10.1002/acp
METHOD
Participants
An opportunity sample of 200 participants (82 males, 118 females) was recruited from the
main campus of a large university in the North West of England. Participant age ranged
from 18 to 56 years (mean 22.2 years; SD 5.3 years) with the majority of either
Caucasian (67.5%) or Asian (24.0%) ethnicity. Most respondents were either full or
part-time university students (90.0%) and educated to at least A Level or equivalent
(85.0%). A sizeable proportion (19.5%) had obtained at least A Level qualifications or
equivalent in maths, statistics and/or psychology.
Design
A 2 paranormal belief group (believer vs. non-believer) 2 event type (paranormal vs.
non-paranormal) 2 conjunction response format (probability vs. frequency) mixed
factorial design was employed.
Materials
Paranormal belief
Paranormal belief was assessed via the Australian SheepGoat Scale (ASGS: Thalbourne
& Delin, 1993), a psychometrically sound measure of paranormal belief comprising
18 statements assessing peoples acceptance of extrasensory perception, psychokinesis and
life after death as genuine phenomena. The ASGS has a narrower focus and was deemed
more suitable for assessing probabilistic reasoning biases than other, broader measures of
paranormal belief (e.g. see Irwin, 2008; Tobacyk, 1988). Traditionally, the ASGS utilises
either a visual analogue or a trichotomous (true/do not know/false) scale (Holden &
French, 2000). But following methodological debate over the former (Roe, 1998, 2002;
Thalbourne, 1998, 2003), and in order to obtain a broader range of paranormal belief scores
afforded by the latter, all ASGS items in the present study were rated on a 7-point Likert
scale from 1 strongly disagree to 7 strongly agree.
Paranormal experiences questionnaire (PEQ)

The PEQ comprised six items assessing participants personal experiences of events which
could be termed paranormal. Specifically, items asked if they had ever dreamt of something
they later witnessed (precognitive dream), had an intuitive feeling about something which
was later confirmed as accurate (precognitive intuition), had a fortune teller either
accurately predict their future (fortune teller prediction) or accurately describe their
personality (fortune teller profile), inexplicably imagined an event just before it happens
(waking precognition) or finally, if they had ever experienced an effective spiritual healing
(healing). All six PEQ items were rated along a 7-point Likert scale from 1 strongly
disagree to 7 strongly agree.
Scenario judgements questionnaire (SJQ)

The SJQ comprised 16 conjunction vignettes of approximately 40 words in length
(mean 43.8; SD 9.3) which describes either an ostensibly paranormal or a
non-paranormal event (eight of each). The former included descriptions of an apparent
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spiritual healing, various forms of alleged precognition, an apparitional experience, a

seemingly accurate horoscope prediction and a near-death experience (cf. Irwin & Watt,
2007). In each case, only one of the two constituent events referred to these paranormal
concepts. By comparison non-paranormal scenarios incorporated more mundane events
such as getting food poisoning, queuing for airport coffee and a womens rights protest. In
line with previous work (De Neys, 2006; Fisk, 2004; see footnote 3) participants were
asked to indicate which of three different response optionsthe conjunction or either of
the two constituent eventsthey felt was most likely for each of the 16 scenarios. For
example one paranormal SJQ item states:
Billy has a long lost friend who he has not seen in years. They were good friends in
school but drifted apart when they went away to different colleges. Billy comes home
from work one evening and sits down to eat his dinner.
Here, participants were asked to indicate the likelihood of the following three
statements: (a) Billy thinks about his long lost friend, (b) Billys long lost friend
unexpectedly phones him or (c) Billy thinks about his long lost friend and suddenly his long
lost friend unexpectedly phones him. Following Fisk (2004), participants gave their
responses in one of two formats; either as a probability (i.e. chances in 100) or as a
frequency estimate (i.e. the number out of 100 occurrences). In each case, a conjunction
error was made whenever the third (conjunct) option was rated more likely than one or both
of the singular (constituent) options. To counterbalance potential order effects a second
version of the SJQ with item order reversed was also created. Finally, a practice scenario
was included at the start of the SJQ to ensure participants understood task instructions.
Demographics
Participants were also asked to indicate their gender, age, ethnicity, highest qualification
generally and highest qualification in mathematics, statistics and/or psychology to date.
Ethnicity was coded as one of 16 standard response options covering Caucasian, Asian,
Afro-Caribbean, Chinese and mixed race backgrounds. Both general qualifications and
qualifications in maths, statistics and/or psychology were rated on a 6-point ordinal scale
from 1 no qualifications through to 5 professional/postgraduate degree, plus 6 other
level of qualification.4
Procedure
Volunteer participants were recruited via the main campus library at the University of
Central Lancashire; a large university in the North West of England. Those who agreed to
take part in this study of beliefs and judgements were given a questionnaire pack
containing a brief sheet, the ASGS, the SJQ and the demographics questionnaires. To
control for potential order effects still further, the order of the ASGS and SJQ
questionnaires was reversed in half of the packs before these were randomly distributed to
volunteers. Participants were instructed to complete all questionnaires as quickly as
possible without conferring. No time limit was given. Completed questionnaires were
returned to the second author (TD) in person who then handed each participant a full
debrief sheet. No form of payment was made to any participant.
4
No respondents reported having other qualifications either generally or specifically in maths, statistics and/or
psychology. As such, this sixth response level was dropped from both qualification items.
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RESULTS
Belief in the paranormal

ASGS ratings were (re)coded such that high scores reflected a greater paranormal belief
(potential range 17; actual range 1.006.61; median 3.58). No outliers were
revealed. Median split analysis5 reclassified participants as either paranormal believers
(mean 4.50; SD 0.68; n 98) or sceptics (mean 2.48; SD 0.69; n 102). Whilst
no group differences were found in participant age, gender, ethnicity or general educational
attainment, believers were less well qualified in maths, statistics and/or psychology
compared to non-believers (U 4374.5; z 2.04; p .041). Future analyses will control
for this difference.
Conjunction fallacies
As noted above, a conjunction error was made whenever participants rated the conjunctive
event to be more likely that either of the two constituent events. Inspection of individual
SJQ items confirmed that some proportion of the sample made conjunction errors for each
of the 16 scenarios (range 11.562.5%). Thus, all SJQ items were deemed suitable for
inclusion. The total number of conjunction errors made by each participant was then
computed separately for paranormal vs. non-paranormal event types (range 08). Over half
(53.5%) the sample made at least one conjunction error for paranormal events
(range 17; median 1) with a much larger proportion (91.5%) making at least one
conjunction error for non-paranormal events (range 18; median 4).
A 2 paranormal belief group (believer vs. sceptic) 2 event type (paranormal vs.
non-paranormal) 2 conjunction response format (probability vs. frequency) mixed
Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA)controlling for participants level of qualification in
maths, statistics and/or psychologywas performed on the number of conjunction errors
made. Mean and standard deviation scores (adjusted following ANCOVA) are given in
Table 1.
ANCOVA revealed qualifications in maths, statistics and/or psychology to be a
significant covariate (F1,195 27.02; p < .001; h2 .12) with more qualified participants
making fewer conjunction errors. This trend was reinforced by a significant
qualification event type interaction (F1,195 14.69; p < .001; h2 .07) such that those
with higher qualifications made fewer conjunction errors for paranormal events than they
did for non-paranormal events (r 0 .18 and r 0 .40, respectively; z 2.19; p .014;
n 200).
Having controlled for these qualification levels, ANCOVA also revealed highly
significant main effects for both paranormal belief group (F1,195 53.89; p < .001;
h2 .22)with believers making more conjunction errors than non-believersand event
type (F1,195 55.44; p < .001; h2 .22), with participants generally making fewer
conjunction errors for paranormal events than they did for non-paranormal events. In
5
Median split analysis of paranormal belief measures is a valid way of differentiating between believers vs.
sceptics (e.g. Dagnall et al., 2007; Wiseman & Morris, 1995). Whilst technically, it would have been more
appropriate to refer to low vs. moderate paranormal believers here, the original terms believers and
non-believers/sceptics are retained for the sake of convenience. For further discussion of methodological
issues surrounding the measurement of paranormal belief, see Irwin (2008). Interestingly, many parapsychologists
argue that there is sufficient empirical evidence to suggest certain phenomena such as ESP and PK do exist and as
such, challenge the entire notion of a belief (aka. faith) in the paranormal (Delanoy, Personal Communication).
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Table 1. Mean no. of conjunction errors across paranormal belief group, event type & conjunction
format (controlling for participants maths/statistics/psychology qualifications)
Non-
Believers believers All
Event type Format type M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) Sig. effects

Paranormal Probability 2.69 (1.92) 0.61 (1.13) 1.67 (1.89) B
Frequency 1.94 (1.85) 0.29 (0.68) 1.13 (1.62) E
All 2.31 (1.91) 0.45 (0.94) 1.40 (1.78) B E
B Fa
Non-paranormal Probability 4.43 (2.17) 2.73 (2.24) 3.60 (2.36) E F
Frequency 4.51 (1.99) 3.51 (2.24) 4.02 (2.16)
All 4.47 (2.08) 3.12 (2.26) 3.81 (2.27)
Ally Probability 7.12 (3.44) 3.35 (2.74) 5.27 (3.63)
Frequency 6.45 (3.24) 3.80 (2.49) 5.15 (3.18)
All 6.78 (3.34) 3.57 (2.61) 3.57 (2.61)
Note: Range 08 errors except yrange 016 errors: Adjusted means following ANCOVA. Significant paranormal
belief group (B), event type (E), conjunction format (F) and subsequent interaction effects found at the: p < .05,

p < .01 and p < .001 levels; a, approaches sig. (two-tailed).
contrast, format type had no impact on the number of conjunction errors made
(F1,195 .22; p .643; ns; h2 .00).
ANCOVA also revealed three significant or near-significant interaction effects. First, a
significant paranormal belief group event type interaction (F1,195 4.76; p .030;
h2 .02) was found. Subsequent inspection of CI graphs suggested the need for four
post-hoc comparisons. Simple effects analyses via mixed ANCOVAcontrolling for
maths, statistics and/or psychology qualification and with a adjusted to .0125confirmed
that believers made more conjunction errors than non-believers for both paranormal
(F1,197 71.28; p < .001; h2 .27) and non-paranormal events (F1,197 16.01; p < .001;
h2 .08). In addition, believers made fewer errors for paranormal than for non-paranormal
events (F1,100 22.19; p < .001; h2 .18). Similar trends were also found for
non-believers who made relatively few conjunction errors for paranormal compared to
non-paranormal events (F1,96 32.73; p < .001; h2 .25). In sum, most conjunction errors
were made by paranormal believers for non-paranormal events, with fewest made by
non-believers for paranormal events. These data are illustrated in Figure 1.
Second, analyses also revealed a significant event type format type interaction
(F1,195 9.43; p .002; h2 .05). Inspection of CI graphs again suggested the need for
four post-hoc comparisons. Simple effectsalso controlling for maths, statistics and/or
psychology qualification and with a adjusted to .0125confirmed that participants made
fewer conjunction errors when paranormal events were formatted as a probability
(F1,98 18.03; p < .001; h2 .16) or a frequency (F1,98 34.24; p < .001; h2 .26)
estimation task than they did for corresponding non-paranormal events. No other
differences were found.
Finally, the hypothesised paranormal belief group format type interaction was just
short of significance (F1,195 3.57; p .060; h2 .02). Since the effect approached
significance, it was deemed worthwhile to perform post-hoc simple effects comparisons to
explore the basis of the interaction. Analysis revealed that paranormal believers made more
conjunction errors than non-believers for both the probability (F1,97 43.77; p < .001;
h2 .31) and frequency (F1,97 16.10; p < .001; h2 .14) formatted questions. In
DOI: 10.1002/acp
5
Paranormal
Errors
4
Non-Paranormal
3
0
Non-believers Believers
Figure 1. Number of conjunction errors across paranormal belief group event type (with
5% confidence intervals)
contrast, neither believers nor non-believers differed in the number of errors they made
across the two format types. These data are summarised in Figure 2. No other significant
differences were found.
Personal experiences of ostensibly paranormal events

Table 2 presents the mean number of reported paranormal experiences. Overall,
participants claimed to have experienced a moderate number of accurate dream, intuitive
and waking precognitions but fewer accurate fortune teller predictions, fortune teller
profile or spiritual healing successes. Correlations (rho) between the six personal
experiences items and the number of conjunction fallacies made are also given in Table 2.
In general, participants who reported having more ostensibly paranormal experiences also
5
Probability
Errors
4
Frequency
3
0
Non-believers Believers
Figure 2. Number of conjunction errors across paranormal belief group format type (with
5% confidence intervals)
DOI: 10.1002/acp
Table 2. Frequency of reported paranormal experiences and correlations (rho) with number of
conjunction errors
Frequency
Correlation (rho) with no.
Reported paranormal experience M (SD) of conjunction errors
Accurate dream precognitions 4.64 (1.68) .39
Accurate intuitions 5.19 (1.60) .35
Accurate waking precognitions 4.64 (1.68) .32
Accurate fortune teller predictions 2.42 (1.64) .33
Accurate fortune teller profiles 2.31 (1.56) .31
Successful spiritual healing 1.89 (1.40) .13

Range: From 1 strongly disagree to 7 strongly agree; sig. at p < .001 level (two-tailed) (n 200).
made more conjunction errors. This was true of all experience types except spiritual
healing successes.
DISCUSSION
Contrary to previous claims that the conjunction fallacy is largely unaffected by peoples
level of statistical awareness (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983), current findings suggest
participants who were less qualified in maths, statistics and/or psychology made more
conjunction errors than those who were more qualified in these subjects. With these
qualifications controlled for, participants still made a sizeable number of conjunction errors
(mean 3.57), further highlighting the general the robustness of the conjunction fallacy
(Fisk, 2004; Kahneman & Tversky, 1972, Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). All subsequent
discussion relates to data in which levels of maths, statistics and/or psychology
qualification have already been controlled for.
The aim of the present study was to test the notion that paranormal believers are more
susceptible to the conjunction fallacy, in particular, for paranormal events and/or those
requiring probability estimates. Partial support for these hypotheses was found.
First, as predicted, believers made more conjunction errors than non-believers. This
suggests believers are more susceptible to the conjunction fallacy and thus, that they are
especially prone to erroneously judging the conjunctive event to be more likely than one or
both of the constituents events alone (cf. Kahneman & Tversky, 1972; Tversky &
Kahneman, 1982, 1983). Thus, current findings contradict those of Dagnall et al. (2007).
As noted earlier, this misperception contravenes the laws of normative probability
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1982). One possibility is that paranormal believers base these
judgements on what they see as being representative of a typical coincidence (i.e. on their
own internal representation of chance and/or randomness) which differs from that of
paranormal sceptics (Blackmore & Troscianko, 1985; Bressan, 2002; Gilovich & Savitsky,
1996; Marks, 2002; Tversky & Kahneman, 1982). Another is that believers are somehow
more sensitive to the potential surprise value of the less surprising constituent event (cf.
Fisk, 2004). Either way, believers greater susceptibility to the conjunction fallacy is
consistent with previous claims that they are especially prone to misperceiving randomness
(Bressan, 2002; Brugger et al., 1990; Brugger & Taylor, 2003; Regard et al., 1990), to poor
probabilistic reasoning (cf. Blackmore & Troscianko, 1985; Blagrove et al., 2006; Dagnall
et al., 2007; Marks, 2002; Tobacyk & Wilkinson, 1991) and ultimately, to deficits in
DOI: 10.1002/acp
cognitive processing (French, 1992; French & Wilson, 2007; Irwin, 1993, 2008; Irwin &
Watt, 2007). It also supports the view that believers are more likely to adopt an intuitive or
heuristical, rather than analytic, style of thinking (Aarnio & Lindeman, 2005; Irwin &
Young, 2002; Lester et al., 1987). As yet, it is still unclear whether believers heightened
susceptibility to the conjunction fallacy leads to, or conversely is caused by, their
endorsement of the paranormal. Given that the single biggest predictor of belief
in the paranormal is the reported experience of paranormal phenomena (Blackmore, 1984),
the latter seems more plausible. Either way, the generality of believers conjunction errors
(see below) renders it likely that conjunction biases will help maintain and reinforce their
paranormal beliefs.
Second, participants generally made fewer conjunction errors for paranormal than for
non-paranormal events. This illustrates that at least some contextual factors will influence
the strength of conjunction biases. Moreover, while believers produced some conjunction
errors for paranormal events this tendency was much less evident among non-believers. At
first glance, current findings seem to suggest believers are even more prone to violating the
conjunction rule for ostensibly paranormal phenomena and thus, as with other cognitive
biases (Alcock & Otis, 1980; Gray & Mill, 1990; Merla-Ramos, 2000; Wierzbicki, 1985),
that their susceptibility to the conjunction fallacy is domain specific. This apparent context
specificity supports the view that paranormal believers maintain a different internal
representation of paranormality and thus that they require less subjective evidence of
(temporal) relatedness before they misattribute causal relationships to objectively
(statistically) unrelated, constituent events (cf. Bressan, 2002; Brugger & Taylor, 2003;
Wiseman & Watt, 2006). But compared to sceptics, paranormal believers also made
more errors for non-paranormal conjunctions too, thereby weakening this argument
(cf. Lawrence & Peters, 2004; Roe, 1999). In sum, it seems that paranormal believers are
especially susceptible to the conjunction fallacy. Further, whilst non-believers commit few
errors when conjunctions relate to ostensibly paranormal experiences, believers continue to
commit the conjunction fallacy given either context.
Third, contrary to expectations, paranormal believers made fewer conjunction errors
for paranormal events than they did for non-paranormal events. Interestingly, identical
trends were also found for non-believers. A possible explanation for this unexpected
finding is that the two constituent events within paranormal conjunctions differed markedly
in terms of their surprise values. Generally, the conjunction fallacy is highly prevalent in
contexts where a very surprising constituent event is combined with a non-surprising one;
that is, where the surprise differential is large (Fisk, 2004; Shackle, 1969). Thus, the
finding that participants susceptibility to the conjunction fallacy differed across the two
scenario types may reflect the fact that the paranormal scenarios had large surprise
differentials whereas non-paranormal scenarios contained two constituent events that were
similar in terms of their surprise value. But subsequent analysis of individual SJQ items
offers only limited support for this notion.6 Thus, it seems participants heightened
6
Specifically, a series of 16 separate 2 constituent events 2 paranormal beliefs 2 format type mixed ANCOVA
(controlling for maths, statistics and/or psychology qualification) revealed significant differences in mean
judgement ratings across first vs. second constituent events in four of the eight paranormal items (significant
F1,195 values ranged from 8.36 to 18.98; all p < .005; all h2 .04). However, similar significant, albeit smaller,
main effects were also found also for three of the eight non-paranormal items (significant F1,195 values ranged
from 3.95 to 10.55; all p < .05; all h2 .02). In sum, overall trends offer little indication that paranormal
constituents had a greater potential surprise value (cf. Fisk, 2004) than corresponding non-paranormal constitu-
ents. Further details of these data are available from the first author (PR).
DOI: 10.1002/acp
tendency to violate normative rules for non-paranormal over paranormal conjunctions does
not reflect differential surprise values across these two types of event.
Taken together these unexpected findings suggest violation of the conjunction rule is less
prominent for events with an obvious paranormal connotation and thus that all participants,
regardless of their a priori beliefs, had their own internal representations of what
constitutes a paranormal as opposed to chance experience (cf. Bressan, 2002; Marks, 2002;
Watt, 1990/1991; Wiseman & Watt, 2006). The additional finding that compared to
sceptics, believers also made more conjunction errors for non-paranormal events has two
consequences. First, it further illustrates the generality and robustness of believers
susceptibility to the conjunction fallacy (cf. Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). Second, by
implication, it reinforces the claim that believers have particularly strong views on what
represents paranormality which may, in turn, reflect their own personal experiences of
alleged paranormal phenomena (cf. Blackmore, 1984).
Fourth, and contrary to expectations, the format with which conjunction events were
presented had little impact on participants conjunction biases. Overall, paranormal
believers made more conjunction errors given both probability and frequency formatted
items than did non-believers. This was the case regardless of the type of event described
and suggests that conjunction format may not be as important as previous suggested
(Fielder, 1988; Fisk, 2004; Fisk & Pidgeon, 1996).
Finally, current trends suggest individuals who reported a greater number of paranormal
experiences (i.e. seemingly accurate dream, waking, intuitive and/or fortune telling
predictions) also made more conjunction errors. These data reinforce previous claims that
alleged paranormal, and in particular precognitive, experiences are more prevalent in
individuals with a poorer understanding of probability (e.g. Blagrove et al., 2006). It seems
this may be especially true for probabilistic reasoning biases relating to conjunction events.
Such biases are likely to have a major impact on subjective perceptions of chance and
randomness, and thus on peoples meaningful coincidence experiences (cf. Bressan,
2002; Henry, 1993, 2005).
Methodological issues and general discussion

Several methodological issues in the present study are worthy of note. First, the vast
majority (90.0%) of participants were university students and of those that did
have qualifications in maths, statistics and/or psychology, only a tiny minority (2.0%)
were qualified beyond A Level standard. This has two implications. First, the
predominance of students within the sample, means the generalisability of current
findings are diminished (although see Farha & Steward, 2006). Second, it remains possible
that those with a university level education in maths, statistics and/or psychology might
have performed better than the current sample. It would be interesting to see whether
current findings extend to members of the general public and/or to those who have
completed an undergraduate or higher degree in these subjects.
A second methodological issue relates to the content of SJQ scenarios. As noted above,
there was little difference in the total number of surprising constituents across paranormal
(n 4) vs. non-paranormal (n 3) events. However, noticeable differences in magnitude
were found, with surprise differentials generally larger for paranormal constituents (see
footnote 6). This may have important consequences for conjunction estimates (Fisk, 2004).
Based on participant response codes, the one very surprising non-paranormal constituent
related to student vs. builder usage of a cafe at lunchtime, with the latter judged less likely
DOI: 10.1002/acp
(i.e., more surprising) than the former ( p .001). This may be a reflection of participants
own student status. By comparison, the four very surprising paranormal constituents
related to feeling anxious when witnessing a ghostly image ( p .003), to a horoscope
correctly predicting a job promotion ( p .004), to dreaming about a house fire which later
happens ( p .004) and to accurately intuiting a small lottery win ( p < .001). In each case,
the second constituent was judged less likely (more surprising) than the first.
It is noticeable that five of the eight paranormal events incorporated sequential rather
than technically co-occurring constituents. In the dream precognition item for instance, the
first constituent described Leanne dreaming of a house fire whereas the second described a
fire breaking out at her sisters home. Whilst the third conjunction statements described
these events as co-occurring, participants may have inferred a temporal sequence, with the
first event presumed to have occurred before the second. By comparison, only two of the
eight non-paranormal events incorporated this temporal element. It is possible this
presumed sequential relationship between each pair of paranormal constituents influenced
ratings above and beyond their stated paranormality. Of course, this temporal relationship
may instead reflect the very essence of their paranormality. Nevertheless, future work
should ensure such factors are consistent across all event types. One way to achieve this is
to compare the precognitive (paranormal) vs. inferential (non-paranormal) prediction of
the same future event (e.g. a job promotion).
A similar criticism is that some paranormal events such as the near-death experience
(SJQ item 14) may be highly surprising simply because participants are unfamiliar with
such terms and/or concepts. Future work could test for this possibility via piloting scenario
content beforehand.
Finally, some paranormal events may be judged unsurprising because participants have a
considerable personal experience of them. Whilst a PEQ was included in the current study,
it failed to cover all paranormal events outlined in conjunction scenarios. Future versions of
the PEQ should attempt to do this.
So far, results from the present study have been framed within normative probability
theory and as such, implies optimally correct probability judgements are at least possible
(Baron, 1994; Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Some have debated whether probabilities can be
applied to single events such as those included in the present study. Researchers adopting
the frequentist perspectivewho define probability as the proportion of actual
occurrences relative to all possible occurrences of a given event (Manktelow, 1999)
claim that probabilities cannot be meaningfully assigned in the absence of a reference
class. As such, frequentists believe judgements about the conjunction of single events are
not governed by the rules of normative probability theory (Gigerenzer, 1991). Whilst this
suggestion has been strongly criticised (Kahneman & Tversky, 1996), others suggest that
the conjunction rule is not necessarily the appropriate rule to apply for problems of the kind
reported here. One alternative is to take a Bayesian perspective (e.g., Wolford, Taylor &
Beck, 1990). According to this view, individuals faced with the aforementioned Linda
problem (Tversky and Kahneman, 1982) do not estimate the probability that Linda is a
feminist and a bank teller given her character description but instead, estimate the
probability of Lindas description given the possibility she actually is a feminist and a bank
teller. If individuals were indeed adopting this Bayseian approach then their judgements
would not necessarily be fallacious (Wolford et al., 1990). Overall, evidence for this
proposition is absent (e.g. Fisk, 1996). Nonetheless, whilst current findings reveal some
interesting group differences between paranormal believers vs. paranormal sceptics, it is
possible that the kind of judgements they make about conjunctive events do not in fact
DOI: 10.1002/acp
violate the rules of probability theory. Future studies need to examine this possibility more
closely.
Summary and conclusion

Findings suggest paranormal believers are more susceptible to the conjunction fallacy and
thus that they are especially prone to misperceiving the co-occurrence of two independent
events as being more likely than either constituent event alone. Surprisingly, believers
susceptibility to this fallacy is less pronounced when one constituent is portrayed as an
ostensibly paranormal event implying such biases are, at least in part, context specific. In
general, participants susceptibility was unaffected by the format of conjunction items.
Taken together, current findings add further weight to the claim that paranormal believers
have a particularly poor understanding of probability and that they are prone to
various deficits in cognitive processing. Future research to overcome methodological
limitations and extend this line of work is recommended.
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DOI: 10.1002/acp

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APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY

Appl. Cognit. Psychol. 23: 524542 (2009)

Paranormal Belief and Susceptibility

PAUL ROGERS*, TIFFANY DAVIS and JOHN FISK

Paranormal belief and probabilistic reasoning biases

Copyright # 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Paranormal belief, representativeness and the conjunction fallacy

Study overview and hypotheses

Paranormal experiences questionnaire (PEQ)

Scenario judgements questionnaire (SJQ)

spiritual healing, various forms of alleged precognition, an apparitional experience, a

Belief in the paranormal

Event type Format type M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) Sig. effects

Personal experiences of ostensibly paranormal events

Methodological issues and general discussion

Summary and conclusion

Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1972). Subjective probability: A judgment of representativeness.

Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1982). Judgements of and by representativeness. In D. Kahneman,

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