Contemporary Arab Affairs,

Vol. 1, No. 3, July 2008, 445–463

Democracy and the re-consolidation of authoritarian rule in Egypt

Louay Abdulbaki

Asia Institute, University of Melbourne, Australia

Despite the introduction of important liberalization measures, Egypt still suffers

from serious democratic deficits. Mubarak’s inconsistent political reforms,
especially since the 2005 legislative elections, have raised many questions and
revived the discussion on whether Egypt is heading in a democratic direction. This
article contributes to this discussion by investigating the political process under
Mubarak’s regime and critically analysing the 2005 legislative elections and the
2007 constitutional amendments. It argues that the behaviour of the Egyptian
regime since the 2005 elections, particularly with the introduction of the 2007
constitutional amendments, demonstrates its determination to re-consolidate its
authoritarian practices.
Keywords: Egypt; democracy; authoritarianism; Arab politics; liberalization

Introduction
One of the most salient features of Egyptian politics under President Hosni
Mubarak’s regime is the ‘creative’, albeit paradoxical, mixture of democratic and
authoritarian elements. Since his ascendance to the presidency in 1981, Mubarak has
been eager to present an image of a reform-minded and democratic ruler. However,
the persistence of the state of emergency, which allows the regime to control and
contain political opposition, has been the main insurmountable obstacle to any
meaningful democratic reforms. The state of emergency does not only empower the
regime to prohibit demonstrations, censor newspapers and curb ‘the rights to
freedom of expression, association and assembly’, but it also provides for the trial of
civilians by military courts and allows suspects to be detained without trial (Amnesty
International 2007). Yet, despite this authoritarian structure, Egypt has been able to
develop a relatively independent judiciary, which has been regarded by some political
researchers as a sign of a maturing or ongoing democratization safeguarded by the
rule of law (Korany 1998, pp. 64–65; Kienle 2001, p.45). Can we have democracy
under the current state of emergency in Egypt?
The 2005 Egyptian legislative elections were conducted under comprehensive
judicial supervision. Therefore, the elections were initially expected to be among the
most free and fair in Egypt’s history. However, the reaction of the regime to the rise
of the influence of the opposition, particularly with regard to the Muslim
Brotherhood (MB), during and after the 2005 elections has raised many questions
about the prospects for democracy in Egypt. Given the rising popularity of the MB,
and especially its remarkable performance in the 2005 elections where it emerged as
by far the largest and most powerful opposition block in parliament, can
democratization progress in Egypt without the full and formal inclusion of this
movement in the political process? Will the Egyptian regime tolerate the possibility

Corresponding Address: Email: l_a_baki@hotmail.com

ISSN 1755-0912 print/ISSN 1755-0920 online

# 2008 The Centre for Arab Unity Studies
DOI: 10.1080/17550910802164796
http://www.informaworld.com
446 L. Abdulbaki

of the MB becoming an effective catalyst for political reform? In order to answer

these questions and provide an objective assessment of Egypt’s democratization
prospects, this article closely examines the regime’s response to the MB’s unexpected
success in the 2005 legislative elections and discusses the 2007 constitutional
amendments. However, in order to link the subject matter to the wider context of the
Arab world and facilitate a deeper understanding of Egyptian politics, the article
first explores and discusses some theoretical explanations for the challenges to
democracy and the persistence of authoritarianism in the Arab world. It also sheds
light on some of the basic rules of the political game in Egypt, as determined by the
political structure and underlined by the Egyptian constitution and other political
laws regulating the electoral process and political activities.

Democracy deficit in the Arab world

Despite some political openings in a number of Arab countries, such as Egypt,
Jordan, Morocco and Kuwait, political participation, according to the United
Nations’ Arab Human Development Report (AHDR), has remained limited and the
‘transfer of power through the ballot box is not a common phenomenon’ (AHDR
2003, ch. 7). What the Arab states ‘have in common’, according to another report, ‘is
that power is concentrated at the tip of the executive pyramid and that the margin of
freedom permitted (which can swiftly be reduced) has no effect on the state’s firm
and absolute grip on power’ (AHDR 2005, p. 16). The peculiar conditions that have
enabled Arab rulers to build resilient authoritarian regimes that successfully defy any
consistent tendency towards democratization remain a highly problematic issue.
The absence of democracy in the Arab world has been linked by some social
scientists to deep-seated cultural and religious values. While some studies mainly
focus on cultural and religious factors that supposedly contradict democracy or
hinder democratic development (Kedourie 1994; Lewis 1994), other studies even seek
to discover certain essential qualities or intrinsic anti-democratic characteristics of
Arabs to explain the persistent democracy deficit in Arab states (Anderson 1995).
Some analysts, for example, argue that Arab society is culturally intolerant and that
Arab–Islamic culture is not compatible with democracy. They claim that ‘the
political traditions of the Arab world, which are the political traditions of Islam’, do
not help in utilizing ‘the organising ideas of constitutional and representative
government’ (Kedourie 1992, p. 5; cf. Kramer 2003). Nevertheless, empirical
investigations and survey works on various Arab countries have found no significant
connections between the lack of, or support for, democracy and cultural/religious
values. Consequently, these studies conclude with the assertion that cultural
explanations are indeed misleading and of little use in understanding Arab politics
(Tessler 2002a; Tessler 2002b).
In a very powerful critique of the political culture approach, L. Anderson (1995)
indicates that the literature on Arab political culture offers an essentialist
explanation of the authoritarian tendencies in the Arab world, treating the resistance
to democratization as if it were due to congenital defectiveness. She draws attention
to recent works that echo the racist scholarship presented ‘during the heyday of
imperialism’, such as the works of J. Entelis on Lebanon and North Africa, in which
he portrays the ‘Arab personality’ as ‘essentially negative and deficient’ (Anderson
1995, p. 80). Consequently, as Anderson argues, in this racist literature ‘[n]ot only are
 Contemporary Arab Affairs 447

Arabs thought to be dismal prospects for democratic politics, but they appear to be
fairly dismal people all around: illogical, untrustworthy, passive before domineering
rulers’ (Anderson 1995, p. 88). Although her investigation of the literature on
political culture in the Arab world finds ‘very little concern with testing and
verification…, a marked willingness to make categorical statements without regard
to evidence’ as well as many ‘logical and epistemological flaws’, she does not dismiss
the importance of the role of cultural values and attitudes in politics. Rather, she
emphasizes that the impact of culture, its limits and context, should be very carefully
assessed, suggesting that political culture is highly seductive and susceptible to
distortion and bias (Anderson 1995, pp. 89–90).
On the other hand, the concept of civil society has been used by many political
scientists as an analytical tool for the explanation of the lack of democracy in the
Arab world. Many analysts, for example, attribute the durability of authoritarianism
in the Arab world to the absence of a strong or ‘genuine’ civil society, the emergence
of which has been regarded as an ‘early step towards full democratisation of Arab
political systems’ (al-Sayyid 1995, p. 142). It has been strongly argued that the
modernization projects carried out by Arab regimes have been selectively
unfavourable to democratization, because they did not facilitate the emergence of
‘modern’ civil societies that effectively engage ‘in real democratic games’ (Kamali
2001, pp. 478–479). Since democracy involves a synergetic or interactive ‘relationship
between state and civil society’, where an effective and productive civil society can
flourish, the Arab authoritarian nature of ‘civil associations [is] in little position to
inculcate values of democratic participation’ (Brynen et al. 1998, p. 275).
M.K. al-Sayyid has identified three groups of Arab countries that impose
different limitations and conditions with respect to freedom of association and
civil society groups. In the first group, which have initiated some liberalization
processes (e.g. Egypt, Morocco, Jordan and Yemen), moderate degrees of freedom
of association are guaranteed. In the second group, which he identifies as ‘the
radical regimes of the Arab world’, various civil society groups exist but remain
heavily controlled by the regimes’ ruling parties. This group includes Syria, Iraq
(under Saddam) Libya and Sudan. In the third group, which includes the Gulf
countries with the exception of Kuwait (and Bahrain after the constitutional
amendments of 2002), no freedom of association is allowed (al-Sayyid 1995,
p. 141). Although countries of the first group, which has embarked on political
liberalization, have been relatively tolerant of ‘an emergent civil society’, given the
fact that these liberalization processes are the result of top-down measures and
totally controlled by the ruling regimes rather than the result of the growth of or
pressure from civil society, no civil society that might effectively foster pluralism,
counterbalance the power of the state, or even evoke ‘an image of a political order
respecting the civil and political rights of citizens’ exists in the Arab world (al-
Sayyid 1995, p. 141; Entelis 1996, p. 47). This is how, as most scholars of Arab
politics would agree, the weakness of civil society is closely linked to the
authoritarian nature of political systems in the Arab world (Kassem 2004, p. 87;
Hawthorne 2004, p. 10).
On the other hand, the impacts of external factors on Arab internal politics have
generally been acknowledged, though not rigorously examined, in the literature on
Arab democratic development and liberalization. Many scholars and observers of
Arab politics believe that international support for authoritarianism, particularly
448 L. Abdulbaki

Western support, has been a major obstacle to democratization in the Arab world
(Bellin 2005, pp. 32–33; Brownlee 2005, pp. 58–59). E. Bellin argues that, contrary to
authoritarian states in other regions, Middle Eastern and North African
authoritarian regimes ‘did not see their sources of international patronage evaporate
with the end of the Cold War nor with the Unite States’ subsequent reanimation with
democracy’ (Bellin 2005, p. 32). Bellin insists that the two strategic concerns of
‘assuring a reliable oil supply’ and ‘containing the Islamist threat’ prompted Western
powers ‘to persist in providing patronage to many authoritarian states in the region’
(pp. 32–33). Similarly, J. Brownlee emphasizes that US foreign policy, while
promoting democracy where it served its interests, was not favourable to pluralism
in Middle Eastern Muslim states, ‘especially when Israel, oil resources, and a
perceived Islamic threat were involved’ (Brownlee 2005, pp. 58–59).
In his assessment of the impacts of external factors on the process of
democratization in the Arab world, P.W. Moore advances five categories of
external explanatory variables: (1) cultural diffusion and demonstration effects; (2)
foreign governmental policies and aid; (3) non-governmental activities; (4) the
regional security environment and regional actors; and (5) the international fiscal
environment and policy (Moore 1994, pp. 43–66). Firstly, Moore contends that, with
the lack of societal interactions and cultural exchanges between Eastern Europe and
the Arab world prior to 1989, as well as the failure of the Algerian experiment with
democracy, the demonstration effects exerted little influence on the potential
occurrence of democratic contagion in the Arab region. Secondly, Moore recognizes
the absence of Western coherent and direct political commitment towards
democratization in the Arab world. However, he maintains that, while pressure
from Western governments may facilitate a favourable environment for democratic
transitions in the future and soften the general perception that Western foreign
policy towards the Arab world is hypocritical, they are incapable of imposing
political liberalization. Thirdly, Moore also draws attention to the significant role
that external NGOs, such as human rights organizations, play in assisting Arab
human rights activists by publicizing their plight and pressing Arab regimes to
minimize the repression and persecution of dissident groups. Fourthly, regional
insecurity and external threats, particularly in relation to Israel’s conflict with Arab
states, have had huge negative impacts on the process of democratization in the Arab
world, as Moore maintains. Not only has this sense of persistent insecurity hindered
economic development, as excessive spending is devoted to security and defence,
argues Moore, but it has also obstructed all efforts towards political representation
while fostering the militarization of state–society relations. Finally, in relation to the
international fiscal environment and policy, Moore argues that the impacts of
external rents, on the one hand, and the policies of the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and the World Bank, on the other, have been overemphasized in the
literature, where they are regarded as the most powerful external factors influencing
democratization in the Arab world. In general, although external economic forces
have facilitated economic and political liberalization in some Arab countries, they
cannot fully guarantee continuous advancement towards democratic transitions, as
the process remains under the total control of the rulers, who can reverse it at any
stage.
Many scholars and observers of Arab politics emphasize the importance of
distinguishing between political liberalization and the process of democratization.
 Contemporary Arab Affairs 449

Brynen, Korany and Noble argue that political liberalization may involve ‘the
expansion of public space’ and the initiation of some limited political openings that
enable the citizenry ‘to engage in [relatively] free political discourse and to freely
organise in pursuit of common interests’ (Brynen et al. 1995, p. 3). Such processes,
they insist, should not be confused with democratization, mainly because the former
can exist without the latter. Although political liberalization entails the relaxation of
political repression, democratization not only facilitates effective and inclusive
political participation, but also ‘provide[s] citizens with a degree of real and
meaningful collective control over public policy’ (pp. 3–4). In addition, while almost
totally state-controlled, the process of political liberalization can be used for mere
containment or cosmetic purposes and, thus, remains subject to revocation at the
whims of the rulers.

A multi-party system within an authoritarian framework in Egypt

The status of political parties and the electoral laws provide a clear picture of
political reality and can be utilized as an empirical test of the genuineness of political
reforms and democratization. Although parties are not the only political actors in
democratic systems, they remain essentially important for democratic governance.
The functions that parties provide in democratic systems cannot be overstated,
especially with regard to responsive policy formulation, government accountability
and the expansion of political mobilization, participation and education. During
electoral campaigns in competitive multi-party systems, political parties develop
responsive policies and introduce alternative programmes and prospective govern-
ment agendas. This enables citizens to participate, directly or indirectly, in political
discussions and policy making and compels elected officials, who aspire to re-
election, to be more responsive to public demands, rendering ‘publicly visible the
process by which a plethora of group demands are aggregated into more or less
coherent and manageable policy programmes’ (Webb 2002, p. 448). Consequently, if
the freedom of political parties to organize, nominate parliamentary candidates and
campaign for elections is not evenly unhampered, political elections and outcomes
cannot be considered as democratic or free and fair. The means through which the
Egyptian regime ensures that opposition political parties remain effectively margin-
alized in order to maintain the unchallenged dominance of the ruling National
Democratic Party (NDP) in the People’s Assembly attests to the kind of political
reform espoused under Mubarak’s regime.
Mubarak’s regime has preserved and built upon the non-competitive multi-party
system which emerged as a result of the disintegration of the Arab Socialist Union
(ASU) during the 1970s and was formally legalized with the enactment of the
political parties’ law in 1977 (ESIS 2007a). Mubarak’s regime has re-entrenched the
authoritarian structure of this system by imposing new restrictions on political life
whenever it was deemed necessary for the preservation of the status quo. While legal
recognition remains the main obstacle preventing important social forces, most
notably the MB, from entering formal party politics, government interference in the
internal administrative affairs of the legal opposition parties ensures that they
remain fragmented, co-opted and/or alienated from the people. In cases of overt
political dissent, opposition parties can also face dissolution or have their political
activities frozen, as will be demonstrated.
450 L. Abdulbaki

The Egyptian regime legally controls political activities through the political
parties’ law (Law 40 of 1977 and Law 177 of 2005), which vaguely governs the
criteria according to which political parties are formed and allowed to conduct their
political activities.1 According to this law (Article 8), in order to receive legal
recognition, political parties are required to obtain the approval of a political parties
committee. The law (Article 4) stipulates that the objectives, policies and
programmes of a political party must not diverge from the virtues of preserving
national unity, social peace, the socialist and democratic system and the gains of
Socialism. It also specifies that the party should not be formed on the basis of
ethnicity, race, sex or religion. Accordingly, the Political Parties Affairs Committee
(PPAC) consistently utilizes the vagueness of this law to restrict channels of political
participation by rejecting party applications and halting the operation of legal
opposition parties (Kienle 2001, p. 29). Until the year 2000, when the establishment
of the National Accord Party was approved, the PPAC had rejected approximately
50 political party applications (Kassem 2004, p. 57).
Although the number of political parties under Mubarak’s regime has increased
from five to 24 legal parties, all of which remain virtually ineffective, only five party
licenses have been approved by the PPAC (ESIS 2007b). The rest of the parties had
to struggle to obtain recognition through the courts, while tens of other proposed
parties have been denied legal recognition. In January 2007, twelve of the political
parties that have been fighting for legal recognition in the Egyptian courts, most
notably the New Wasat and pan-Arab Karama, had their appeal against the PPAC’s
rejection of their applications refused by the Supreme Administrative Court. Abul-
Ela Madi and Hamdin Sabahi, heads of the New Wasat and Karama parties,
respectively, criticized the court’s decision as politically motivated and called for the
removal of the PPAC, which, as Sabahi insists, is totally ‘owned’ by the ruling NDP
(Al-Mas: rı̄ al-Yawm 2007). In other words, the PPAC has been used as a means by
which the government selects its own opposition. Accordingly, it appears that, with
the exception of the al-Ghad Party of Ayman Nour, whose extensive connections
were an important factor in gaining the PPAC’s approval, only marginal parties that
lack popular support and are less likely to pose any challenge to the ruling NDP
receive the approval of the PPAC.2
Moreover, legal parties also face huge pressure from the government, and in
cases of overt dissent risk being suspended or having their political activities frozen.
The PPAC has suspended seven legal parties, four of which are still currently frozen.
In many cases, such as the case of the Labour Party, the government ignored many
court rulings requiring the lifting of the ban on frozen parties and allowing them to
resume their political activities ( Abd al-Hādı̄ 2006).

Legislative elections: autocratic façade legitimacy

Political elections are considered as a cornerstone of democracy, because they
facilitate the most effective method of conflict-resolution by enabling all citizens of a
polity to exercise their right to choose their representatives and largely influence the
outcome of the political process. In addition to facilitating political participation and
the change of governments, elections provide legitimacy to the rulers who become
representatives of the popular will (Schumpeter 1947, p.269; Dahl 1989).
Consequently, in order to justify their claim to legitimacy, most autocratic rulers
 Contemporary Arab Affairs 451

recognize the importance of elections and feel the need regularly to hold flawed
ballots that are designed and implemented in such a particular way as to guarantee
their desired outcome. The Egyptian regime under Mubarak has maintained this
tradition, which was instigated by President Anwar al-Sadat during the 1970s. The
electoral rules and processes in Egypt have been cleverly shaped to guarantee the
absolute domination of the ruling NDP in parliament. An opposition presence in
parliament is only tolerated to an extent that never allows it ‘to embarrass the
government or significantly affect policy’ (Hamzawy and Brown 2005, p. 1).
Six legislative elections have been held in Egypt under Mubarak’s regime. They
include the 1984, 1987, 1990, 1995, 2000 and 2005 elections, the last of which will be
discussed in greater detail in the following section. In addition to a number of legal
opposition parties, the MB has been actively contesting legislative elections either by
forming alliances with political parties or by fielding independent candidates. During
the 1980s, the MB formed electoral alliances with the New Wafd Party (in 1984) and
the Socialist Labour and Liberal parties (in 1987). In the former, the alliance won a
total of 58 seats, eight of which went to the MB. In 1987, the tripartite alliance
gained a combined total of 62 seats with 36 seats going to the MB. The ruling NDP
secured an absolute majority in both elections, winning 87% (394 seats) and 78%
(339 seats), respectively, of the 444 contested seats (Al-Ahrām Weekly 1995). In
addition to extensive government fraud and intimidation, the restrictive electoral law
prevented most opposition parties and genuine independents from making their way
into the People’s Assembly in the 1984 and 1987 elections (Kassem 2004, p. 61). As
opposition forces became sceptical about the whole process, they reconsidered their
view on participating in elections, demanding ‘minimum guarantee of fairness’
(Ghadbian 1997, p. 92), and all opposition parties with the exception of the
Tagammu Party decided to boycott the 1990 parliamentary elections.
The 1990s were marked by political de-liberalization and repression. As a
reaction to the insurgence of radical Islamic groups, the regime tightened its security
measures, indiscriminately cracking down on moderate Islamists and particularly
targeting the MB, which proved its strength by controlling many professional
syndicates and social associations (Al-Ahrām Weekly 1995; Fahmy 1998). Despite
this, the MB decided to participate fully in the 1995 elections, which was one of the
most criticized elections that has been conducted under Mubarak’s regime. In order
to deprive the MB of any electoral chances, the security forces launched waves of
arrests against its leaders and prominent members (Estimate 2000). The results of the
elections were hardly unpredictable. The ruling NDP secured its usual absolute
majority in the People’s Assembly, winning 417 of the 444 contested seats, while only
thirteen seats went to the legal opposition parties and a lone seat to the MB (El-Din
1995).
In contrast, the 2000 elections were the most free and fair elections conducted
under Mubarak’s presidency. For the first time, regime-loyal civil servants were
prevented from manipulating the voting process. This was due to the Supreme
Constitutional Court’s ruling that the constitution demands full judicial supervision
of the voting system. According to the court ruling, Article 88 of the Egyptian
Constitution stipulates that, in order to guarantee impartiality and fairness,
‘veritable rather than formal’ judicial supervision of the voting process in
parliamentary elections is necessary (El-Din 2000a). However, this did not prevent
government interference and disruptions. The new measures merely led the regime to
452 L. Abdulbaki

switch its manipulation techniques from direct interference in ballot counting and
processing inside polling stations to blatant obstruction outside the stations. As the
election campaign approached, the regime stepped up its security and coercive
measures, particularly intensifying its crackdown against the MB. According to
some estimates the number of those arrested during the election campaign reached
approximately 1,600, in addition to the 2,400 detainees who were already
incarcerated under the emergency law (Howeidy 2000a). The Egyptian
Organization for Human Rights (EOHR) reported that about 500 activists and
supporters of opposition and independent candidates, including candidates’ proxies,
were arrested during the elections (EOHR 2003). Moreover, independent observers
reported numerous incidents where police forces surrounded polling stations,
forcefully blocking voters and attacking journalist photographers and poll watchers,
while ‘only buses packed with NDP supporters were permitted to reach the polling
stations’ (Howeidy 2000b). In almost every constituency, the police remained in
control of who should or should not be permitted to gain access to the polling
stations (EOHR 2003). The most important lesson learned from the 2000
parliamentary elections was that full judicial supervision does not necessarily
produce fully free and fair elections, at least as long as the emergency law remains
applicable.
Although the official NDP candidates initially won only 170 seats (about 38%),
after adding 218 of the 256 winning ‘independents’ who were affiliated to or joined
the NDP after the elections, NDP’s share rises to 388 seats (85.5%). The NDP
therefore maintained its absolute majority in the People’s Assembly, though with 29
seats fewer than the 417 seats won in the previous elections. On the other hand,
seventeen of the independents candidates elected were affiliated to the MB, but the
legal opposition parties performed very poorly, with only four of the eleven
contesting parties managing to get places in the People’s Assembly, winning a
combined total of 17 seats (El-Din 2000b; Estimate 2000).

The 2005 legislative elections

The 2005 legislative elections were remarkable in terms of competitiveness and
outcome. For the first time since the 1952 revolution, the government’s absolute
domination of the People’s Assembly appeared to be at risk, as the ruling party’s
two-thirds majority was threatened by the significant gains of the MB in the first
stage of the elections. According to the Egyptian Constitution, constitutional
amendments can only pass with a minimum two-thirds majority vote in the People’s
Assembly. While the NDP’s majority in parliament was an unchallengeable
certainty, the opposition aimed to challenge NDP’s two-thirds majority in order
to be able to prevent any government-proposed constitutional amendments that
would reverse political reforms or further curtail political rights and freedoms.
However, with the MB’s unexpected gains in the first stage, the government reverted
to its usual intimidation and repressive strategies in the second and third stages of
the elections. In the final results, 145 (33.5%) of the 432 officially-listed NDP
candidates won seats. However, with 166 independents joining the NDP, the ruling
party managed to raise its share to 311 seats (71.9%), down from 388 seats in the
previous parliament. Despite all the violations, rigging and intimidation, as will be
shown, the MB won 88 seats (approximately 20%). Non-affiliated independents and
 Contemporary Arab Affairs 453

opposition parties collectively won 36 seats, only nine of which went to the
opposition parties, with six to the Wafd, two to the Tagammu and one to al-Ghad
(Al-Ahrām Weekly 2005a).
In order to facilitate comprehensive judicial supervision, the elections were
scheduled to run in three stages from 9 November 2005, to 7 December 2005. There
were over 32 million registered voters and over 7,000 candidates competed for the
444 elected seats. The first stage covered eight governorates with 10.7 million
registered voters, while the second and third stages each covered nine governorates,
with 10.5 and 10.6 million registered voters, respectively (Al-Mas: rı̄ al-Yawm 2005a;
Al-Ahrām Weekly 2005b).
In its efforts to avoid government persecution and provoking the ruling party,
the MB tried not to present itself as an alternative to the regime. Therefore, the
movement contested only one-third of the parliamentary seats, fielding a total of 150
candidates. According to Mohamed Habib, deputy of MB’s supreme guide, the
movement’s expectation was that, after the rigging of the votes by the regime, 50 MB
candidates would be elected to the People’s Assembly (Howeidy 2005). However, in
order to ensure that its gains came at the expense of the NDP rather than other
opposition forces, the MB cooperated with opposition parties, especially the United
National Front for Change, which was formed by the Wafd, Tagammu , Nasserist
and eight other smaller political parties one month before the elections. They hoped
that together they would be able to attain their target of winning one-third of the
parliamentary seats. Accordingly, the movement refrained from running in certain
constituencies, giving way to other opposition candidates. It also adopted an
electoral platform promoting a reform agenda, which emphasized points of
agreement with the opposition, particularly with regard to democratic free and fair
elections, the rule of law, good governance, citizenship, and constitutional
legitimacy. Although the movement maintained the expression of its Islamic identity
through its distinctive slogan ‘Islam is the Solution’, it emphasized the concept of
partnership rather than dominance by adding a new slogan ‘Together for Reform’
(Howeidy 2005).
Despite numerous violations and irregularities, most observers agree that the
first stage of the elections was one of the most, if not the most, free since the 1952
revolution. Intervention by the security forces, for example, was kept to a minimum
and political arrests did not occur. The opposition and independent press enjoyed
unprecedented freedom to criticize government policies. Independent observers and
human rights groups, however, reported many infringements, such as overlooking
erroneous electoral registers, mass-transportation (especially of government employ-
ees) for collective NDP voting, vote-buying, bribery, balt: aga (thuggery), rigging
ballot boxes and obstructing scrutineers from attending canvassing for votes
(Bidaywı̄ 2005). According to the EOHR, in many constituencies, public buses were
used to transport government employees, women and elderly people en masse, and
they were illegally issued with election identity papers to vote for NDP candidates in
constituencies other than their own (EOHR 2005). In the first stage, 68 of the 164
NDP candidates and 34 of the MB’s 50 candidates won seats. The combined number
of seats won by the legal opposition forces amounted to only eight, one of which
went to the al-Ghad Party and six to the United National Front for Change. The
remaining 54 seats were won by independent candidates, some of whom later joined
the NDP (Al-Mis: rı̄yyūn 2005; Shehab 2005).
454 L. Abdulbaki

The second and third stages: a shift in tactics

With the MB emerging as the real winner in the first stage, many political analysts
and observers wondered at the government’s unusual tolerance towards the
movement. Some political analysts speculated that an under-the-table deal between
the NDP and the MB had been arranged. Others, however, insisted that the
government was sending a message to the West, particularly the US, that
democratization in Egypt would only bring the MB to power, which Western policy
makers would not appreciate (Shehab 2005). The message was not in vain as it led to
Western criticisms of the electoral violations during the second and third stages
being kept to a minimum. In fact, the shift in the government’s tactics towards the
MB was blatant and full scale. Security forces arrested hundreds of MB members,
cordoned off and closed hundreds of polling stations, especially in areas known to be
MB strongholds, and gave armed thugs a free hand to bully non-NDP voters. Most
ironically, superintendent judges, who were legally entrusted with the responsibility
of supervising and facilitating the fairness of the elections, were not immune from
police harassment and abuse. Independent observers and media correspondents also
received their share and, in many cases, were violently attacked by security forces
and thugs hired by NDP candidates (Milı̄jı̄ et al. 2005; El-Menshawy 2005; EOHR
2005).
In the early morning of the first day of the second stage, 400 MB members, many
of whom were agents of MB candidates, were arrested by security forces. This was
enough to convince political observers that the government had decided to abolish
the margin of freedom and tolerance demonstrated in the first stage. According to
independent sources, NDP candidates hired gangs and thugs who cooperated with
the security forces in order to terrorize MB members and opposition activists. In
Alexandria and al-Qalyubiyya governorates, for example, NDP thugs working under
police guidance attacked MB members and supporters using knives and sticks (Milı̄jı̄
et al. 2005). However, despite all the restrictions, vote-rigging and violations, the MB
was still able to top up its parliamentary gains by 42 seats, increasing its share in the
second stage to a total of 76 seats (17%) (Musallam 2005). Oppression and violence
by security forces therefore rose to an unprecedented level during the third stage. In
order to hinder the MB’s progress, the security forces arrested and detained 898 MB
activists in the early morning of the third stage. About 344 of the detainees were
representatives of MB candidates and influential campaigners (Milı̄jı̄ 2005; El-
Menshawy 2005). By 4 December, the security forces had detained 1,286 MB
activists (Sharı̄f 2005a).
The second and third stages of the elections witnessed the most blatant violations
against voters. The aggression of the security forces and the NDP’s thugs targeted
any voters not known to be NDP loyalists. In order to deter non-NDP voters from
casting their votes, hundreds of polling stations were cordoned off and shut down
and voters were violently attacked by police and NDP thugs. In many constituencies,
only NDP voters were allowed to vote and, during the second and third stages, 496
and more than 470 polling stations respectively were closed off by security forces
(EOHR 2005; 2006). Other sources reported that 434 ballot stations in areas that
supported MB candidates were closed in the final run-off (Sharı̄f 2005b). Frustrated
voters determined to cast their votes were violently confronted by security forces. As
a result, the 2005 elections changed from being one of the most free and peaceful
elections to being one of the bloodiest and most violent in Egypt’s history. Some
 Contemporary Arab Affairs 455

observers described the areas surrounding the polling stations as battlefields. The
violent clashes between voters and police caused the death of eleven civilians, nine of
whom were opposition supporters killed by police gunfire during the run-off votes.
Other casualties amounted to over 1,000 wounded, many of whom were severely
injured and left with permanent disabilities (Sid-Ahmed 2005). On the first day of the
third stage, Baltim Public Hospital, for example, received 182 people wounded in the
face and chest by rubber bullets; two died and two others were completely blinded
(Bakr 2005). According to human rights organizations and independent observers,
voters were beaten with sticks and fired on by security forces. Tear gas was also used
by police to disperse the crowds of people trying to enter the cordoned off stations.
Reporters indicated that some of the hired thugs were released from prison by police
on the eve of the elections specifically to terrorize voters, as happened in Damanhur
where one of the thugs captured by voters confessed (El-Menshawy 2005; EOHR
2006).
Violence and aggression by police and the NDP’s thugs also targeted
independent watchdogs, media fieldworkers and superintendent judges. Media field
workers and human rights activists, in particular, were repeatedly harassed and, in
some instances, beaten and kidnapped. Harassment of media representatives and
journalists increased after al-Jazeera, the BBC and other news agencies repeatedly
displayed images of voters covered with blood and security forces using sticks, tear
gas and gunfire against voters. Images of thugs threatening voters with swords and
machetes were also broadcasted by many television stations. The Al-Jazeera team
were detained and had their tape covering the election process damaged by security
forces. Other media workers, such as reporters for the BBC, Dubai TV and the Al-
Masry al-Youm and Al-Karāma newspapers, were banned from filming or shooting
and had their equipment damaged by police (EOHR 2005). In addition, 76 incidents
of police aggression against judges were reported by the EOHR alone. Ahmed
Mekki, Cassation Court Deputy Chief, emphasized that as ‘judges intervened to help
voters get to the polls, police ordered thugs to wreck havoc on the voting process’
(El-Menshawy 2005). Many superintendent judges were beaten by police officers. In
al-Daqahliyya Governorate, six judges walked out of polling stations in protest
against electoral violations and police interference (EOHR 2005).
According to the Al-Mis: rı̄yyūn newspaper, the government issued ‘secret’ orders
instructing the rigging of the ballot boxes in the third stage. Consequently, in many
instances, the defeat of MB candidates was announced without regard to the ballot
results ( Adl 2005; Shalabı̄ and Bidaywı̄ 2005). Superintendent Nuha al-Zaynı̄
declared that after witnessing the counting of the votes where Dr Jamal Hishmat, an
MB candidate, was ahead of his rival Dr Mustafa al-Feqi, a prominent NDP
candidate, by at least 18,000 votes, the election results were rigged in favour of the
latter (al-Mas: rı̄ al-Yawm 2005b; El-Nahhas 2005). According to Judge Mahmoud al-
Khudeiry, head of the Alexandria Judges’ Club, the fact-finding report about the
rigging incident confirmed al-Zaynı̄’s testimony: 137 judicial superintendents
supported her claim with sufficient evidence (Amı̄n 2005). In the Bandar al-
Mansur constituency, after the judicial committee declared MB candidates Dr Yusri
Hani and Saber Zaher as the winners, security forces blockaded the station and the
head of the station announced Muhammad Ibrahim al-Disuqy, an NDP affiliated
independent, as the winner, despite the fact that he only received 500 votes against
11,000 and 11,100 votes for the MB candidates (Ikhwan Online 2005a).
456 L. Abdulbaki

In general, the 2005 elections did little to enhance the Egyptian regime’s
democratic credentials. Despite some gains by the MB, the regime’s staunch
determination to manipulate and control the elections’ outcome indicates that the
prospects for democracy in Egypt remain bleak. Judicial supervision of the voting
system did not guarantee free and fair elections as the regime merely redirected its
manipulative techniques from direct interference in ballot counting and processing to
blatant obstruction outside polling stations. However, with the increase of the
opposition’s presence in the 2005 People’s Assembly, comprehensive judicial
supervision proved to be an important step as it did limit electoral fraud and
rigging to some extent. In order to effectively ensure fully free and fair elections, this
should be accompanied by other liberalizing measures, particularly with regard to
lifting the state of emergency and easing restrictive laws on participation. The MB’s
substantial electoral gains, in spite of the regime’s intimidation and oppression,
reflects the success of its gradual approach to winning the hearts and minds of the
people. However, as the MB remains the only viable opposition force, unless it is
fully included in the political process, democracy is less likely to progress and take
root in Egypt. Will the Egyptian regime tolerate the possibility of the MB becoming
an effective vehicle for political reform? The reaction of the regime to the MB’s rising
popularity during and after the 2005 elections gives negative indications in this
regard. The 2007 constitutional amendments provide a telling picture of the regime’s
limits of tolerance towards serious opposition and clearly indicate its lack of
commitment to political reform.

The 2007 constitutional amendments

While hailed by the government as an important step towards democratization, the
2007 constitutional amendments, which affected 34 articles of the constitution, have
been fiercely criticized by opposition forces and human rights organizations alike.
Egyptian human rights activists in particular have insisted that the amendments will
infringe human rights protections, curtail individual freedoms and restrict political
activity. Opposition forces described the amendments as ‘a constitutional coup and a
deathblow to the margin of democracy in Egypt’ (Ikhwan Online 2005b; El-Din
2007). Independent political analysts and international human rights organizations
have also criticized the amendments considering them, at best, to be politically
motivated. In a special report released on 11 April 2007, Amnesty International
warned that the amendments and the proposed anti-terrorism law ‘will be used to
further stifle peaceful political dissent’, and ‘cement patterns of serious abuses by
security forces’ (Amnesty International 2007).
The current Egyptian constitution was introduced in 1971 and has been subjected
to important amendments, especially in 1980, 2005 and 2007.3 The extensive
constitutional rights given to the presidency render the balance of power between the
executive, legislature and judiciary extremely uneven. These all-encompassing
constitutional rights enable the presidency to remain ‘the most dominant force in
contemporary Egypt’ (Kassem 2004, p. 11). According to Articles 141 and 143, it is
the president who appoints and dismisses the prime minister and his deputies, the
ministers and their deputies, civil and military officials, and diplomatic representa-
tives. The president is not only the head of state (Article 73) and assumes and
exercises executive power (Article 137), but he is also the Supreme Commander of
 Contemporary Arab Affairs 457

the Armed Forces (Article 150) and as the Head of the Supreme Council, which
‘supervise[s] the affairs of the judiciary organisations’ (Article 173). Moreover, the
president presides over the National Defence Council (Article 182) and is considered
to be the Supreme Chief of the Police Authority (Article 184). Article 136, under
which the president can only dissolve the People’s Assembly after a public
referendum, was one of the 34 articles amended in the controversial 2007
amendments. In fact, the 2007 amendments have given the president the right to
dissolve the parliament unilaterally. Furthermore, the president has the right to
dissolve the Shura Assembly (Article 204) and to appoint one third of its members
(Article 196), and the right to promulgate laws, object to them (Article 112) and
grant amnesty or commute a sentence (Article 149).
The Egyptian constitution clearly asserts the principles of freedom of the press,
printing, publication and mass media (Articles 48, 206 and 208). It also guarantees
the independence of the judiciary (Articles 165 and 166), ensuring the non-
interference of the executive in trials and the irrevocability of the status of judges
(Article 168). However, by giving the president the right to proclaim a state of
emergency (Article 148), it allows him to bypass the judicial authority and normal
courts, which undermines the effectiveness and autonomy of the judiciary. In
addition, the regime has utilized the State Security Courts, also maintained by the
constitution (Article 171), in developing an alternative or parallel system of
jurisdiction. The president continues to maintain his dominance over political and
state institutions, using his sweeping constitutional powers and abundant
emergency and other laws regulating the state of emergency, and other special
courts that are only vaguely defined by the constitution. Although the constitution
clearly states that ‘the proclamation of the state of emergency shall be for a limited
period’ (Article 148), the current state of emergency has been in force continuously
since 1981, with the emergency provisions renewed regularly. As Amnesty
International asserts, this alternative system of emergency justice allows the
violation of citizens’ essential rights, which are guaranteed by the constitution.
Some of these violations include ‘arbitrary detention, torture or other ill-treatment
and unfair trials’, curbing freedom of expression and assembly and allowing the
trial of civilians before military and emergency courts (Amnesty International
2007).
Despite all these constitutional defects, the judicial authority has been able to
demonstrate a promising degree of independence. This is especially evident with
regard to the Supreme Constitutional Court, which issued several rulings censuring
some human rights violations and rejecting a number of unconstitutional
legislative procedures and electoral laws. On the other hand, many court rulings
have been ignored by the executive authorities and security forces. For example,
not only did the PPAC suspend or freeze several legal parties, but the government
has also ignored many court rulings that allow frozen parties to resume their
political activities (Albrecht 2005, p. 383). On 24 April 2007, the government
ignored for the third time a Cairo Criminal Court order acquitting Khairat
al-Shater, deputy leader of the MB, as well as ten other political detainees.
Attorney A. Abdul-Maqsoud insisted that, although the government continues to
show its lack of respect for the judiciary, the civilian court ruling attests the
independence and fairness of the Egyptian justice system (Muh: ammad 2007;
Al-Sha b 2007).
458 L. Abdulbaki

The 2007 amendments were initially proposed by President Mubarak and

approved by parliament in a single vote on 20 March, and by popular referendum
one week later. Opposition forces, particularly the MB, boycotted the referendum,
for which there was a very low turnout not exceeding 10%, according to some
independent sources (Amnesty International 2007). Although the official authorities
declared that the turnout was as high as 27%, non-governmental sources put it at less
than 5%. According to the EOHR, the average turnout across the nation was
between 2% and 3% of registered voters. The EOHR reported many violations, such
as bribes, lack of phosphoric ink and ‘forging of the voting results’, insisting that ‘the
absence of the judicial supervision over the whole voting process paved the way for
the manipulation of the people’s will, and raised suspicions around the fairness of the
voting process’ (EOHR 2007).
The amendments provide for a new anti-terrorism law which gives the security
forces sweeping powers of arrest and surveillance, effectively entrenching the state
of emergency. They also reduce the role of the judges in supervising elections and
referendums and allow the Egyptian president to dissolve the parliament
unilaterally and bypass ordinary courts. Amendments to Articles 179, 88, 5 and
136 have been regarded as the most controversial aspects of the constitutional
changes (Brown et al. 2007). Criticized by the opposition for paving the way to
making Egypt a police state, Article 179 provides for the trial of civilians in
military courts and the evasion of the procedures stipulated in Articles 41, 44 and
45, which guarantee protections against (1) arbitrary arrest; (2) restrictions over
individual freedom; (3) search without judicial warrant; and (4) violation of the
private life of citizens.
Moreover, amendments to Article 88 remove provisions for judicial super-
vision of elections and referendums, as was formerly stipulated. This reverses
the Supreme Constitutional Court’s ruling in 2000 that, according to the
constitution, the electoral process should facilitate judicial oversight of all
polling stations. In the 2000 and 2005 parliamentary elections, as demonstrated
above, judicial supervision made some contribution to minimizing electoral fraud
and violations. Uncer the new amendments, judicial supervision will be replaced
by an electoral commission. By giving the president the power to unilaterally
dissolve the parliament in the case of unspecified ‘necessity’, amendments to
Article 136, in effect, further entrench the constitutional imbalance of state
powers.
The political motivation of the amendments is blatantly inscribed in Article 5,
which obviously targets the MB by banning the establishment of Islamic-oriented
political parties. According to Article 5, not only are Islamic political parties denied
any legal recognition and excluded from political participation, but also the pursuit
of any political activities on the basis of a religious marji iyya (frame of reference) is
not permitted. Thus, the amendments clearly give the government ‘the constitutional
right to accuse any civil religious institution or civil organization of involvement in
religiously inspired political activity’ (Hamzawy 2007). It is obvious that the real
intention of the regime is to justify political persecution rather than to reduce the role
of religion in politics, as the ruling NDP does not refrain from using religious
symbols. Consequently, as many analysts agree, within the context of the
government’s continuous ‘campaign of arrests and financial investigations’ against
MB’s leaders and activists, the 2007 amendments ‘constitute the regime’s response to
 Contemporary Arab Affairs 459

the Brotherhood’s impressive showing in the 2005 parliamentary elections’ (Brown

et al. 2007).

Conclusion
As the investigation in this article has demonstrated, Mubarak’s regime does not
seem to be serious about political reform and democratization. The regime’s blatant
reaction to the MB’s rising popularity, especially since the 2005 elections, and the
introduction of the 2007 de-liberalizing constitutional amendments, which further
entrench the state of emergency, provide a clear picture of the real intentions of
Mubarak’s regime. The overwhelming evidence clearly shows that, rather than
democratizing, Egypt today appears to be reverting to more authoritarianism, wit
political de-liberalization becoming the norm.
Mubarak’s limited political openness, which has always been marked by
ostensible commitment to multi-party politics and inconsistent tolerance of political
dissent, presents a façade of democratization characterized by a non-competitive
multi-party system and elections with a pre-determined outcome. With its relative
independence and its ability to challenge the government, though to a limited extent,
the judiciary appeared to be a catalyst for, or protector of, due political
democratization based on the rule of law. However, the regime’s unswerving
determination to maintain the state of emergency and an abundance of laws
restricting participation, as well as its consistent reliance on the security apparatus
and military courts to control and contain political opposition, have demolished all
earlier hopes and optimistic expectations. In fact, the regime has not been showing
many positive signs that it may yield its absolute control over the political process,
especially with regard to the absolute domination of parliament by the ruling NDP.
The continuous exclusion of the MB from formal politics, rather than doing
away with its popularity, has only helped strengthen its social base and popular
support. The MB’s peaceful and gradual approach has proved to be effective and has
enabled the movement to maintain a steadily growing support base and eventually to
emerge as the strongest and only viable opposition force in Egypt. This has become
particularly evident with its impressive success in the 2005 elections, where, wining 88
seats in the People’s Assembly, it emerged as by far the largest opposition block in
parliament. To what extent will the Egyptian regime tolerate the possibility of the
MB becoming a catalyst for political reform? The regime’s response to the MB’s
rising popularity give a gloomy picture of Egypt’s political future and democratiza-
tion prospects. The ongoing waves of political arrests against the MB and the
introduction of the 2007 constitutional amendments, which removed provisions for
judicial supervision of elections and entrenched the authoritarian elements of the
regime, discourage any optimistic expectations.
The general conclusion which can be drawn is that the future of democracy in
Egypt is highly unpredictable. What can be deduced with a high degree of certainty is
that, as long as the Egyptian regime remains determined to cling on to the state of
emergency and the use the security apparatus as a means of manipulating the
political process, the future of democracy in Egypt will continue to be unpromising.
To sum up, without the full removal of the state of emergency and the formal
inclusion of the MB in the political process, the prospects for democracy in Egypt
will remain bleak.
460 L. Abdulbaki

Notes
1. Law 177/2005 on political parties (issued in July 2005) amended some provisions of Law 40/
1977. For the complete (Arabic) text of Law 40/1977 and Law 177/2005, see Egyptian
People’s Assembly 2005.
2. The total membership of some of the parties approved by the PPAC does not exceed tens or
a few hundreds (ESIS 2007b).
3. For an English translation of the Egyptian Constitution see the official website of the Office
of the Prime Minister (OPM 2008).

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