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American Journal of Sociology
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Critical Theory: Is There Still Hope?'
The first critical theorists were unable to give their notion of "sub-
stantive reason," as opposed to merely instrumental rationality, any
real meaning. They ran aground on the old dilemma inherent in at-
tempting to combine the ideals of freedom and reason, what might
be called the "dilemma of democratic radicalism." A second genera-
tion, led by Habermas, claims to have resolved the dilemma with (1)
a "systems analysis" demonstrating the persistent "irrationality" of
capitalism, and (2) a "consensus theory of truth" capable of estab-
lishing "rational" norms. These attempts, it is argued here, do nothing
to resolve the dilemma: the first lacks any empirically verifiable im-
plications; the second is merely a restatement of the dilemma. Some
of the possible reasons that critical theory has nevertheless com-
manded increasing attention among North American sociologists are
suggested.
In recent years the critical theory of the Frankfurt school has received a
considerable amount of attention in the English-speaking world, as wit-
nessed by the rapidly growing literature explaining, introducing, criticizing,
or simply applauding the Frankfurt philosophy (see, e.g., Faught 1979;
Feuer 1972; Fuhrman 1979; Hearn 1974; Jay 1973, 1974; Leiss 1975;
O'Neill 1976; Slater 1977; Stewart 1978; Tar 1977; Therborn 1970,
1971). In addition, the story of the original members of the Frankfurt
school (particularly Adorno, Horkheimer, and Marcuse), of their initially
hopeful attempts to reunite Marxist theory and praxis and their eventual
failure, has been told and critically analyzed often enough (e.g., Jay
1973; Slater 1977; Tar 1977). Thus, it does not need to be repeated here
in great detail. However, what has not always been sufficiently clear in
these accounts (except, perhaps, Jay [1973]) is that their eventual failure
was to a large extent the result of a fundamental ambivalence which has
always been the distinctive feature of critical theory and which turned
out to be an irresolvable dilemma for the first generation of Frankfurt
philosophers.
From the outset, critical theory was the search for a "third road," re-
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American Journal of Sociology
2 The attitude of the early members of the Frankfurt Institute toward the Bolsheviks
is somewhat controversial. Kellner (1975) castigates Jay (1973) for failing to reveal
"the depth of [their] commitment to Marxism," for, he claims, "from the beginning,
the members of the Institute were pro-communist and supported the Revolution"
(Kellner 1975, p. 133). However, the point is a bit trivial since Kellner himself admits
that the later pessimism of Adorno and Horkheimer was, in some measure, the result
of elements that were part of critical theory from the start (p. 148).
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Critical Theory
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American Journal of Sociology
will not allow itself to be robbed of the distinction between essence and
appearance" [Adorno in Adorno et al. 1976, p. 11]). This posture of pos-
sessing a superior method while refusing to specify that method is par-
ticularly apparent in the famous "positivist dispute" (see Adorno et al.
1976), a misnomer which is the result of the Frankfurt school's dubious
habit of lumping all its non-Marxist opponents, from Comte to Popper,
together as positivists (e.g., Frankfurt Institute for Social Research 1972,
chap. 1; see also Faught 1979, p. 27, n. 6). Predictably, the empiricist
opponents have repeatedly accused critical theorists of elitism (Obernd6rfer
and Jager 1975, pp. 45-58; Tar 1977, pp. 154, 169 ff.), irrationalism (Al-
bert in Adorno et al. 1976, p. 187), and blind voluntarism (Oberndorfer and
Jager 1975, pp. 395-96).
This, then, is the fundamental ambiguity, and ultimately the dilemma,
of critical theory: on the one hand, the Frankfurt philosophers hold that
there is a higher truth over and beyond the verifiable "facts" of an em-
piricism which has reduced the quest for reason to the level of a mere
"value judgment," and that, furthermore, this higher truth is capable of
some sort of nonpositivist verification; on the other hand, they refuse to
unveil that higher truth, or the method of verification, fearing that it might
become petrified into another elitist, and possibly oppressive, dogma.
Adorno has expresssed the dilemma very clearly in one of his critiques
of positivism. He first criticizes empirical (opinion) research for equating
the opinions of respondents with the truth proper, arguing that such a
volonte de tous merely adds up to a collection of ideologies, "the socially
average illusion"; however, he goes on: "But it should not be dogmatically
confronted with the mere assertion of a 'volonte generale' as a truth in-
itself, for instance, in the form of postulated 'values.' Such a procedure
would be loaded with the same arbitrariness as the installation of popular
opinion as objectively valid. Historically, since Robespierre, the establish-
ment of the 'volonte generale' has possibly caused even more harm than
the concept-free assumption of a 'volonte de tous'" (Adorno et al. 1976,
p. 85).
Eventually, critical theory would be doomed by this ambivalence: in-
sisting on an "entirely other," yet unwilling to name it. Its critique of
ideology, particularly of instrumental rationality as the ideology of modern
society, foundered on its reluctance to specify the substance of the practical
reason on which the critique was said to be based (see Jay 1973, pp. 56-63;
Leiss 1975; Stewart 1978; Tar 1977, pp. 84-95). But worse still, even
the faint indications, of which at least a few remained during the turbulent
1930s, that the future might some day provide the key to the as yet un-
definable notion of practical reason seemed to disappear completely during
the 1940s and 1950s. In the eyes of the weary critical theorists, instead
452
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453
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American Journal of Sociology
new era for the critical philosophy of the social sciences and for critical
theory" (Schroyer 1973, p. 37).4 Habermas is said to have shown the
way toward the resolution of both major problems that plagued the first
Frankfurt philosophers: first, by means of a "systems analysis" he and
his one-time pupil Claus Offe have presumably demonstrated that "late"
capitalism, far from being the epitome of impermeable domination, is still
as contradiction ridden and crisis prone (albeit in a noneconomic way, see
Keane [1975a]) as it ever was; second, Habermas is said to have finally
found a theoretical foundation for the notion of practical reason, at last
allowing for the crucial distinction between "false" and "true" conscious-
ness on intersubjectively transmissible (i.e., nonsubjectivistic) grounds (see
Schroyer 1973, pp. 132-68). In the next two sections I will briefly sum-
marize the two arguments, and in the sections thereafter I will try to
determine whether they really offer the prospect of solving the dilemma of
the Frankfurt school.
4 According to some authors, Habermas deviates too much from early critical theory
to be considered as truly belonging in the Frankfurt tradition (Kellner 1975; Slater
1977, pp. xv-xvi; Therborn 1971). However, as I hope to show below, Habermas's
concerns and approach are in all essentials identical with those of the earlier genera-
tion (see also Faught 1979).
5The arguments of Habermas and Offe are not entirely identical, but they seem to
agree on virtually all major points, as Habermas's frequent approving references to
Offe suggest (e.g., Habermas 1973b, p. 397; 1975, pp. 1, 37-38, 47-48, 60, 62-63, 66-67;
1976, pp. 219, 283-86, 316). As will be seen at the end of this section, Habermas's
argument complements that of Offe in some respects.
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455
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American Journal of Sociology
main rather vague on the matter. Offe comes close to defining the "logic
of development of capitalism" (his version of the organizational principle)
by its very "contradictoriness," which is, of course, logically inadmissible
(see Offe 1972, pp. 9-10), and elsewhere vaguely refers to the "exchange
principle" and "commodity relations" (Offe and Ronge 1975, pp. 140-41).
Habermas is equally elusive, referring to "the relationship of wage labor
and capital," a "self-regulative market," and "economic exchange" without
ever clarifying these notions (1975, pp. 20-21). But elsewhere, apparently
somewhat more aware of the problems involved in attempting to capture
the "identity" of social systems (see Habermas 1975, pp. 1-8; 1976, pp.
231 if.; Habermas and Luhmann 1971, pp. 146-70), he is a bit more
specific: "The boundaries of the system would be crossed to the extent that
the investment decisions of private economic actors would cease to be un-
ambiguously guided by the criterion of profit maximization" (Habermas
1973b, p. 45, n. 68, my translation). Although not even this is entirely
unambiguous, I think it can be safely concluded from the above and from
the rest of the argument (see Offe 1972, pp. 10-12) that Habermas and
Offe consider the organizational principle of capitalism to be the pursuit
of private profit by means of the exchange principle. It is this principle
which renders the system irrational and contradictory. Offe even considers
privateness to be practically synonymous with "irrationality" (1972, p.
16).
The reason is that this organizational principle leads the system to ignore
persistently all those legitimate needs which are not readily turned into
private gain. This constantly provokes antagonism, conflict, and increasing
demands on the state by politically vocal groups whose needs are not met
in the marketplace. Hence, state intervention and the rise of "organized"
capitalism are explained as the result of continuous adaptations necessary
to protect the system against its own inherently self-destructive tendencies,
that is, its contradictoriness (Habermas 1975, pp. 33-41; Offe 1972, pp.
11, 15-17, 20-25). However, without fundamental change of the system's
organizational principle its self-destructive tendencies are merely displaced,
not resolved. Not only does the state seem to have exhausted the number
of policy tools available that do not violate the system's fundamental logic
(hence the term "late" capitalism, which does not necessarily imply im-
minent collapse, however; see Offe [1972, pp. 19, 24-25]), the state's
efforts to maintain the viability of the system also create a "growing func-
tional incompatibility of composite structures" (Offe 1972, p. 12). For in
dealing with the dysfunctions of the system, the state is forced to extend
continually the social sector regulated by a use-value orientation which
is at odds with the system's fundamental logic and is bound to undermine
eventually the legitimacy of the exchange-value orientation which upholds
it (Habermas 1975, pp. 66 if.; Offe 1972, pp. 27-63).
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457
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American Journal of Sociology
"engineering of passive mass consent." The mass media, the mass political
parties, and the legislatures have replaced public debate with advertising
and "public relations" in order to generate mass acclamation to sanction
back-room compromises between powerful interest groups. The state, whole-
heartedly supported by the representatives of science (who depend on the
state for funding), masquerades as a politically neutral, problem-solving
"technocracy." The "positivistic" insistence that all values are "irrational"
helps justify a situation in which only the means are subjected to public
debate, not the ends to which they are put. Thus the capitalist state is
able to rest its claim to legitimacy on purely negative accomplishments:
its ability to remove dysfunctions and avoid crises brought on by the very
logic of the system it seeks to preserve (Habermas 1962, pp. 184-250;
1968c, pp. 48-104, 76-79; 1971, pp. 321-28, chap. 9; 1973a, chaps. 1-2;
Offe 1972, pp. 107-22).
However, this only seems to raise again the two basic questions that
lie at the heart of the Frankfurt school dilemma. First, given the past
success of the apparatus of mass manipulation in creating a "false" con-
sensus, what is there to suggest that it will be less effective in the future?
Second, how can one be sure that it is a false consensus in the first place?
Here the answers of Habermas and Offe diverge.
Offe seems to waver between two positions. On the one hand, he seems
to be content with the abstract, somewhat mechanical systems analysis:
the "functional incompatibility" of exchange-value and use-value orienta-
tion is bound to lead to a crisis sooner or later (see also Keane 1978, pp.
70 ff.). But on the other hand, he argues at length that the class character
of the capitalist state consists in part of its very capability to conceal that
class character (Offe 1972, pp. 74-105). Thus he states: "Simplifying
somwhat, one can say that political domination in industrial capitalist
societies is that method of class domination that does not allow itself to be
known as such" (1972, p. 91, emphasis in original, my translation). Hence
his somewhat paradoxical but consistent conclusion: the class character of
the capitalist state will be demonstrated empirically only when it finally
breaks down (1972, p. 92, n. 32). Proof of the validity of his systems
analysis of late capitalism, then, is not possible for the moment. It is "con-
tingent upon political action" (Offe and Ronge 1975, p. 146). It will be
validated only by successful future praxis, that is to say, by class struggle
that will eventually force the state to "show its real face" (Offe 1972, p.
90).
Habermas, however, is not so optimistic. He is not convinced that Offe's
"functional incompatibility" will automatically cause the machinery for
engineering passive mass consent to break down. After reviewing a number
of theories proclaiming "the end of the individual" (Habermas 1975, pp.
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American Journal of Sociology
460
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Critical Theory
cluded" (Habermas 1973b, p. 168; see also Habermas 1968b, pp. 88-115;
Habermas and Luhmann 1971, pp. 123 ff.; McCarthy 1973, p. 142). But
if, Habermas continues, scientific truth finally rests on the preempirical
belief in the validity of an unconstrained discourse among competent par-
ticipants, that is, a debate in which only "the force of reason" is allowed
to prevail, there is no reason to believe that norms and values could not
in principle be established as valid and binding in precisely the same way.
Of course, Habermas is well aware that no such "generalizable" norms
have been established yet, and that any imputations of such "correct"
norms can easily lead to an elitist dogmatism which would, of course,
defeat the whole purpose of emancipation (Habermas 1968a, p. 16; 1971,
pp. 33-42; 1973a, pp. 378-88). However, he insists that none of this pre-
cludes a priori the possibility that free and rational men could arrive at
a rational consensus concerning their collective interests, acceptable to all
and thus binding on all (Habermas 1975, p. 108; 1976, pp. 334-35).
In this way Habermas argues that norms can in principle claim empirical
validity, just as facts can, if it can be shown that they are truly "gen-
eralizable" (verallgemeinerungsfahig), that is, if they are capable of justi-
fication through a debate among truly free and equal men. Such a rational
discourse or "ideal speech situation" would be characterized by the rigorous
exclusion of all external and internal constraints except the logically com-
pelling force of reason, while all those who are affected by the outcome
of the debate should have free and equal access to it. Hence each individual
could plead for his own particular interest only in terms of the general
interest; and, thus, all ulterior motives except the collective search for
truth would be excluded. Finally, no one could be forced to obey any
norms to which he or she does not freely subscribe as rational and just
(Habermas 1971, pp. 42-45; 1975, pp. 107-8; 1976, pp. 334-35).
The notion of an ideal speech situation, Habermas believes, at last pro-
vides the criterion by which to distinguish between "true" and "false"
interests, and between a "true" and a "false" (because manipulated) con-
sensus on theoretically justifiable grounds. Of course, in a society which
will not permit a truly unconstrained discourse to take place, and in which,
in fact, all "practical" communication is systematically distorted and re-
pressed, it is not easy to make these distinctions. However, Habermas
seems to consider the living and working conditions of (social) scientists
and intellectuals, and the general character of scientific discourse, sufficient-
ly undistorted (see Faught 1979, p. 16) to permit them, in a free discourse
of their own, to infer such "generalizable interests" hypothetically by ask-
ing themselves the following question: "How would the members of a social
system, at a given stage in the development of productive forces, collec-
tively and bindingly have interpreted their needs (and which norms would
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they have accepted as justified) if they could and would have decided on
organization of social intercourse through discursive will-formation, with
adequate knowledge of the limiting conditions and functional imperatives
of their society?" (Habermas 1975, p. 113). The provisional answers to
this question, Habermas argues, will serve as objective and theoretically
justifiable standards by which the irrationality and contradictoriness of the
capitalist system can be criticized. He seems quite confident that such a
procedure could provide the "scientifically explicated understanding of the
world" needed to "guide action" (Habermas 1968c, p. 113; 1971, p. 366).
But, of course, final verification must still come from actual society-wide
discourse, since any other way to proceed (such as imposing "generalizable"
norms before they have actually been unanimously accepted) would go
against the very logic of generalizability, which implies that nobody can
be compelled to obey any norms he has not freely accepted on the strength
of reason alone (Habermas 1975, pp. 111-17).
However, we still seem to be left with an ultimate value judgment: in
what sense is the above more than a personal and subjective commitment
to a particular form of "discursive" equality? To remove this last "de-
cisionistic" residue from his argument, Habermas sets out to formulate
a "theory of communicative competence" (analogous to Chomsky's lin-
guistic competence) which is based on a theory of "universal pragmatics"
and is eventually to provide the "universal rules of a communicative ethic"
by means of which the possibility and theoretical validity of the ideal
speech situation can be demonstrated (Habermas and Luhmann 1971, pp.
101-4). However, after some elaborate classifications and distinctions be-
tween different types of "pragmatics," "speech acts," "discourses," and
other forms of "communicative action" (the importance of which is not
entirely clear in terms of the rest of the argument [see also Faught 1979,
pp. 15-16]), he concludes that the possibility and the desirability of the
ideal speech situation is inescapably, albeit implicitly, presupposed by
the very act of communication. Any kind of communication (even refusal
to communicate is a communicative act in spite of itself [see Habermas
1975, pp. 110-11, n. 16]) unavoidably anticipates the possibility of an
unconstrained consensus and thus the ideal speech situation, no matter
how counterfactually. Even the simplest act of communication, and the
very idea of truth for that matter, would be completely senseless without
this implicit presupposition. In Habermas's own words: "What raises us
out of nature is the only thing whose nature we can know: language.
Through its structure, autonomy and responsibility [Miindigkeit] are
posited for us. Our first sentence expresses unequivocally the intention of
universal and unconstrained consensus" (Habermas [1968c, p. 163]; see
also Habermas [1973b, p. 185]; Jay [1974, p. 33]; this translation can be
found in Keane [1975b, p. 95] and McCarthy [1973, p. 153]).
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Critical Theory
This, then, is how Habermas and Offe propose to reestablish the lost
Marxian unity of theory and praxis: first, by a structural-functional sys-
tems analysis of late capitalism presumably showing that the system is
still inherently contradictory, and, second, by a theoretical grounding of
the notion of reason as a guide to morally correct praxis without falling
back on a form of neo-idealist metaphysics. Many aspects of their argu-
ments are very much in the tradition of the early Frankfurt school: the
absence of the proletariat as the Marxist historical subject, the character-
istic reversal of the Marxist relation between base and superstructure, and
the resulting overriding emphasis on superstructural phenomena (the state,
mass culture, epistemology, ideology, etc.). There is also an interesting
analogy between the earlier Hegelian notion of a "totality" permeated
by a single "essence" that manifests itself in various "appearances" and
Habermas and Offe's "system" characterized by a profound "contradictori-
ness" that manifests itself in historically varying forms of "antagonism."
But most important, there is that typically "Frankfurterian" ambiguity
between empiricism and reason. However, whereas this was an irresolvable
dilemma for the early critical theorists, Habermas and Offe claim to have
found a way out. This claim is, it seems to me, hardly justified.
Although it may be true, as Habermas and Offe maintain (Habermas
1975, pp. 59-60; Offe 1972, pp. 32-35, 66-74), that their systems analysis
avoids the problems of other modern Marxist theories which view the
capitalist state as the willing instrument of the bourgeoisie (e.g., Miliband
1969; Parkin 1971), thereby assuming an unrealistically high degree of
secretiveness, foresight, and coherence on the part of the capitalist class
in order to keep the state from implementing any "fundamental" change,
their own explanation does not seem to be any more plausible. It is not
at all clear what compels the state to remain within the confines of "the
system" rather than simply implement some fundamental changes and
get it all over with. Offe argues that, for the purpose of collecting its taxes,
"the state depends on a process of accumulation which is beyond its power
to organize" (Offe and Ronge 1975, p. 140, emphasis in original) and
that it must therefore limit itself to smoothing the process of private ac-
cumulation. But this only begs the question. In what sense is the vast
body of interventions, regulations, and public agencies and companies
present in all modern capitalist societies (many of which are quite ob-
viously part of the "process of accumulation") something other than
"organization of the process of accumulation"? The answer is, presumably,
that all this does not affect the system "fundamentally."
But this only raises further questions. What would be fundamental
change? If modern, "organized" capitalism, with its expanding "decom-
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American Journal of Sociology
modified" sectors under the auspices of the state (to use Offe's terminol-
ogy), is nevertheless fundamentally the same system as 19th-century
laissez-faire capitalism, what exactly is the fundamental organizational
principle they have in common? As noted above, Habermas and Offe are
never quite clear on what is the defining characteristic of the capitalist
system (exchange? private accumulation? commodity relations? class dom-
ination? contradictoriness? all of these are rather ambiguous), and which
are its consequences, let alone what distinguishes change within from
change of the system. Thus, all these crucial questions are tacitly bypassed
and the system's identity is simply taken for granted. It is portrayed as
one huge machine with the state functioning as some kind of homeostatic
device blindly obeying the "logic of systemic requirements." How this kind
of reification explains anything at all escapes me, but then, these are only
my minor objections.
One major objection should be raised against the ambiguous, indeed
self-contradictory, manner in which Habermas and Offe employ the con-
cept of a "social system." In fact, they seem to alternate between two
quite different concepts as it suits their argument, concealing this basic
inconsistency by the exceedingly abstract jargon of structural functional-
ism. At first, they appear to present capitalism as a Parsonian social sys-
tem: as a relatively coherent entity consisting of mutually reinforcing
components. What makes the system a capitalist one, and thus funda-
mentally the same as 19th-century liberal capitalism, is that it has the
same organizational principle, its components are permeated by an all-
encompassing exchange-value orientation. But such a Parsonian view of a
relatively well-integrated system does not of course automatically yield
irresolvable contradictions. If it contains any important "system-foreign"
elements at all, these may cause internal "strains," but their resolvability
would depend on the initial degree of integration and on the adaptability
of the system. However, rather than exploring these possibilities, Habermas
and Offe simply switch to quite another concept of the system, namely,
one that is inherently contradictory, one whose very logic compels it (or
compels one of its central components, the state, which apparently has
followed a different orientation all along) to infuse itself with use-value
oriented elements. But then Habermas and Offe return to the Parsonian
concept to argue that the survival of the system depends on its degree of
integration, which means that it can have one guiding principle only, and
since exchange- and use-value orientations are "functionally incompatible"
one of them will have to give way for the system to survive. Rather than
an explanation this is merely a silly play with words. There is not a single
substantive argument suggesting that the two orientations are, in fact,
incompatible, and that they could not continue to exist side by side within
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Critical Theory
the same society, as they have done until now (for a similar criticism,
see Oberndorfer and Jager [1975, pp. 243-74]).
In fact, the abstract formulation helps to conceal the substantive, but
extremely implausible, presupposition on which the entire argument is
based. For the basic assumption crucial to the entire theory is that a wide-
spread commitment to exchange-value orientation (belief in the equity of
free-market exchange) is absolutely indispensable for the survival of the
capitalist system. Habermas even comes close to choosing exchange-value
orientation as the defining characteristic of a capitalist system (Habermas
1975, pp. 1-30). Yet, significantly, only once does he briefly consider
whether this orientation really is widespread, and then only with respect
to 19th-century capitalism. He concedes that the "socially integrative
effect of the value form" may have been restricted, "by and large, to the
bourgeoisie class" (Habermas 1975, p. 22). But then he argues that at
the time the bourgeoisie was the dominant class, and that, therefore, this
new ideology was very effective nonetheless. After that, he apparently
considers the matter settled and goes on to discuss late capitalism without
ever mentioning it again.
However, even though it might have been the value consensus of the
elite that mattered in the 19th century, in modern mass democracies it is
quite a different story. This is obviously implied by Habermas and Offe
themselves, since their discussion of crisis tendencies is clearly based on
the expected adoption of a use-value orientation by the masses, not by
the bourgeois elite. Thus, the Parsonian assumption that the stability
and very survival of the social system depends entirely on a value con-
sensus is essential to the theory. But Habermas and Offe make this as-
sumption only implicitly, so they never bother to examine its plausibility.
Had they done so, their argument would have become very unconvincing
indeed, for the value consensus theory has been under attack for years
and it has been effectively demolished time and again (see, e.g., Hamilton
1972; Mann 1970; Wright 1976). It seems, in fact, that different value
orientations can and do exist within the same system without any dis-
astrous effects on its stability.7 But this means that Offe's theory of "de-
commodification" and Habermas's theory of motivation and legitimacy
"deficits" do not lead to any predictions of impending crises at all. Simi-
larly, they cannot possibly demonstrate that capitalism is inherently con-
tradictory since this they themselves have made dependent on whether per-
sistent crisis tendencies could be "hypothetically" deduced from its organi-
7 And within the same person for that matter. Parkin (1971, p. 76) is probably quite
right that "perhaps only intellectuals are prone to find this troublesome" (see also
Hamilton 1972, pp. 413-14).
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sociologizing." Habermas even admits: "At the moment I can see no possi-
bility of cogently deciding the question about the chances for a self-
transformation of capitalism" (1975, p. 40). In other words, at the mo-
ment there is no way to tell whether the capitalist system might not be
able to continue to solve all its problems, without fundamental change,
indefinitely.
What, then, is the basis of the proposition that modern capitalism is
still inherently contradictory? The answer is: nothing at all. Habermas
and Offe strip the notion of contradiction of all the empirical referents it
may ever have had, and consequently of any possible meaning, while
retaining it apparently for its rhetorical appeal. Of course, it seems per-
fectly sensible to define capitalism in terms of the predominance of "pro-
duction for private gain." But it is quite another matter to maintain that
this makes it inherently contradictory irrespective of the actual conse-
quences. Since there are no actual, observable consequences flowing from
capitalism's contradictoriness, the term "contradiction" loses all its mean-
ing in Habermas and Offe's usage. It is not just reduced to a synonym
for "conflict," it is reduced to nothing but a word. What does it mean to
speak of a contradiction when its actual, real-life consequences can take
any shape or form, may or may not manifest themselves at any time (of
course, they do "in the long run," but that can take forever), may or may
not be observable, and may or may not be resolvable?
In the final analysis, these contradictions and crises boil down to nothing
but inflated triviality. What Habermas and Offe are saying in effect is
that in a predominantly private enterprise economy problems and conflicts
may, and probably will, arise from the fact that it is a predominantly
private enterprise economy. The great dialectical profundity of this in-
sight will be fully appreciated when one realizes that, by the same im-
peccable logic, in a centrally planned economy problems are not very likely
to be the result of private enterprise, but they will probably have some-
thing to do with the central planning of the economy. A somewhat less
than revolutionary discovery. Thus, according to Habermas and Offe, the
capitalist system will in the future have its problems and conflicts, as it
has in the past. I do not know of any sensible person who would deny
such a thing. But to deduce from this that capitalism is therefore inherently
contradictory is to argue that anything less than a model of cozy harmony
is, therefore, the very opposite: irresolvably contradiction ridden. Thius,
all the conflicts and problems of the world, no matter how resolvable and
inconsequential they turn out to be, are irrefutable evidence for the
existence of profound contradictions. To insist on retaining the term "con-
tradiction," so obviously devoid of any meaning, is simply making words,
not sense.
Rather ironically, the critical theorists' complete emasculation of the
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8 This is clearly illustrated by Hyman and Brough (1975, pp. 246-51), who propose a
systems analysis virtually identical with that of Habermas and Offe but refer only to
Lockwood (1964) and Althusser (1969), apparently unaware of Habermas and Offe's
work. As a matter of fact, as Koch (1979) has shown, the structural-functional para-
digm as a way to circumvent the rather unpleasant empirical evidence is gaining wide
acceptance among modern Marxists, which suggests, it seems to me, a general malaise
underneath the triumphant proclamations of a revival of Marxist sociology (e.g.,
Flacks and Turkel 1978).
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never held that values are "irrational" or that they are irrelevant to science
or vice versa, nor has Popper, for that matter. In fact, Weber's central
point in all his major statements on value judgments was precisely that
social science can and ought to contribute in a variety of ways to matters
of ultimate values and the debates about them (for a good summary see
Brecht [1959, pp. 221-31]). Nor did he ever claim that formal rationality
is somehow superior to substantive reason (i.e., the choice of ultimate
ends). On the contrary, he repeatedly stressed the importance of ultimate
values in all human activity and the humble place which the formal ra-
tionality of empirical science must therefore take (e.g., Weber 1948, pp.
77-156). From this perspective it is practically self-evident that every
"technocratic" justification really conceals a form of domination, and it
hardly requires the agonizing treatises that some have devoted to it (e.g.,
Habermas 1968c; Ellul 1964; Touraine 1969).
Second, Habermas's grounds for arguing that the ideal speech situa-
tion, the attainment of a rational consensus, and thus the emancipatory
interest are presupposed in the very act of communication are far from
clear. At times the argument seems to rest merely on a play with the
ambiguous meanings of his concepts. Thus, in one instance it sounds vague-
ly plausible only because he deceptively uses "practical discourse" in two
senses: simply as a neutral act of communication and in his own special
sense of unconstrained discourse (Habermas 1975, p. 110). Thus, simple
communication is discourse, discourse is by definition unconstrained, hence
communication implies the ideal speech situation: Q.E.D. Similarly, the
passage cited above (p. 462) sounds awfully obscure in the English transla-
tion, but in German it has a certain convincing ring to it because of the
ambiguous meaning of the German word Miindigkeit, which literally means
"having a mouth" (i.e., the capacity to use language), but it also happens
to be the conventional German term for "being of age" or being "com-
petent to judge for oneself."
At any rate, the argument is simply mistaken. Judging from history,
communication seems to lend itself just as well, or perhaps even better,
to (un-)intentional distortion as it lends itself to rational discourse. In
fact, a pretty strong case can be made for the theory that man's capacity
for symbolic manipulation is one of the prime causes of social inequality
(see Collins 1975, pp. 170-73). Besides, the one strong point in most
radical critiques, including Habermas's own, is that even in mass democ-
racies inequality may be maintained through the use of communicative
resources (media, etc.) to manipulate values and beliefs.12 It is hard to
understand, then, why the mere act of communication presupposes the
possibility and desirability of an unconstrained consensus. In the final
12 Bachrach and Baratz's (1962) formulation of this important (but hard to test em-
pirically) argument still seems the most plausible.
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472
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But what does "binding" mean under such conditions? In fact, it means
nothing at all. For in what sense can a person be bound by a norm with
which he himself fully agrees, and which he can put on the public agenda
and thus presumably suspend for the time being, whenever he likes? All
it means then, is that all people should do what they want to do. But
obviously, there is nothing to stop them from doing something if they
all want to do it, irrespective of whether the critical philosopher would
consider it rational. In such an idyllic state there is no need for any "factual
validity" or "binding force" of norms, and in fact these terms would not
make any sense. In other situations they can only mean authoritarianism.
Thus, Habermas's consensus theory of truth offers no way out of the
authoritarianism/value relativism dilemma. It is merely an elaborate re-
statement of the dilemma. Instead of embracing either alternative, he
wavers between the two. If unsympathetically interpreted, he could be
accused of latent totalitarianism (e.g., Oberndorfer and Jaiger 1975, pp.
45-58), for all his insistence that, as yet, only the critical theorist some-
how enjoys a privileged insight into the substance of reason. On the other
hand, if somewhat more benevolently interpreted, Habermas does not
appear to be saying that there is such a thing as a priori reason, only
that people ought to decide for themselves. He then turns out to be nothing
but a good-hearted liberal with a propensity to express his unshakable
faith in humanity rather frequently and in rather obscure prose. He is a
typical Frankfurt philosopher in that he cannot choose between these two
alternatives; he is somewhat exasperating in that he refuses to acknowledge
his indecision.
CONCLUSION
I hope I have shown that the second generation of critical theorists has
been just as unsuccessful as the first generation in trying to solve the
"dilemma of democratic radicalism." Habermas and Offe's systems analy-
sis, far from reestablishing critical theory's claim of being based on a
better future, the anticipation of which can already be discerned from
present trends, turns out to be merely a way of rendering Marxism in-
determinate and hence unfalsifiable, a way of retaining the rhetoric despite
the facts. Habermas's attempt to ground practical reason convincingly
appears to be nothing but a restatement of the old dilemma based on a
faith in the goodness of man without any further justification. Apparently
Schumpeter was right: there cannot be a priori reason if man is to be free
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Thus, the kind of free discourse that Habermas calls for has already been
going on among intellectuals and scientists for a very long time. Only it
turns out to be hard enough to collect "adequate knowledge of the limiting
conditions and functional imperatives of our society" (Habermas 1975, p.
113), let alone find norms that are both substantive and likely to meet with
unanimous consent if they were subjected to a truly inclusive discourse.'4
Yet for all their moral commitments, the critical theorists have con-
tributed absolutely nothing to any of these debates. Instead, they have
chosen the comfortable heights of philosophical abstraction and obscurity,
far away from the daily concerns of the rabble. To expect any public sup-
port for a philosophy whose only distinction is its sheer obscurity, for a
notion of reason lacking all substance, for a utopia without any indication
of its features or feasibility has absolutely nothing to do with emancipation
of any kind.'5 It is really an act of supreme arrogance toward those very
'masses" whose advocates the critical theorists claim to be.
One last word about the facts-and-values issue. If there is anything
that has helped to reduce bloody repression in recent centuries it is pre-
cisely, it seems to me, that positivistic separation of facts and values. Facts
conceived as something "out there," that is, as independent of our opinion
about them, can be considered verifiable without any disastrous conse-
quences for anybody concerned. The nice thing about them, thus con-
ceived, is that we can shrug our shoulders at nonbelievers: sooner or later
they are bound to find out the hard way, since the facts are there and
cannot be wished away. Norms and values are a different matter for they
can be wished away simply by refusing to honor them. As a result, every
time in history when norms and values were considered to be absolutely
valid, capable of some kind of irrefutable verification or other, a massacre
has resulted. I am perfectly willing to believe that Habermas has only
good intentions, but then again, so did Marx.
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