REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. SANDIGANBAYAN QUEZON CITY FIFTH DIVISIO! PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff, SB-16-CRM-0830 — CALIXTO R. CATAQUIZ, et al., Present: Accused. LAGOS, J., Acting Chairperson: MENDOZA-ARCEGA and CRUZ, Jd. Promulgated: Februacy 24,2017 pel RESOLUTION MENDOZA-ARCEGA, J.: This resolves the Omnibus Motion (For judicial Determination [or Re- Determination] of Probable Cause and/or to Quash Information, filed by accused, Calixto R. Cataquiz, Erlinda Namora Sietereales and Katrina Namora Sietereales, through counsel, on January 19, 2017. In the said motion, the accused aver that they can still question the legality of the information because accused Cataquiz refused to enter a plea after the Information was read to him. According to him, such refusal indicates that he has not relinquished his right to question the Information and the inordinate delay of the Office of the Ombudsman, thus, he is not precluded to submit the instant motion. Secondly, the right of the accused to speedy disposition of case was violated for it took the Office of the Ombudsman Four (4) years to issue the assailed resolution “As per Administrative Order No, 17 ted January 30,2017 "As per Administrative Order No, 025-2017 dated Febry 1, 2017Resolution People v. Cataquiz, et al. $8-16-CRM-0830 since its inception. The significant period of time is tantamount to a vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delay, which violates the constitutional right of the accused. Finally, the lack of probable cause for the crime charged justifies the dismissal of the instant case, The second requirement of the first element is lacking, because no conspiracy can be found between the accused. The second element is also wanting considering that accused’s (Cataquiz) interest in the mortgagee bank is of no moment because the purchase of the subject property was neither decided nor approved by his office. His only role in the purchase, as the local chief executive, is ministerial in character when the LGU exercises its power of eminent domain. As to the third element, the accused avows that no person was injured in the transaction between the local government and his co-accused Sietereales because the purchase price is lower compared to the average price and zonal value of the property. Furthermore, the fourth element of the crime charged is also lacking because the re- classification of the subject property was beyond the control of the accused as it is lodged in the Sangguniang Bayan. In addition, he alleges that itis erroneous to allege that the bank benefitted as it was saved from the rigorous procedure of foreclosure It would have been more profitable for the bank to foreclose based on the meager loan of Six Million Pesos. Lastly, the fifth element is non-existent as no manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence is attributable to the accused. In response, the prosecution filed an Opposition stating that the grounds relied upon by the accused, inordinate delay and lack of probable cause, are not grounds for the quashal of the Information. Moreover, there is no inordinate delay to speak of because accused Cataquiz himself failed to file his counter-affidavit 10 days from receipt of the Order for him to file a Counter-Affidavit. Furthermore, there is no showing of actual prejudice on the part of the accused. In fact, as admitted by the accused (Cataquiz), the petition for certiorari he filed before the Supreme Court invoking grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Office of the Ombudsman was denied on July 4, 2016. Finally, accused belatedly filed and had their motion heard on the same day of filing, which was the schedule of the arraignment, hence the motion is a mere scrap of paper apparently aimed at deferring the arraignment last January 19, 2017. Hence, the instant motion was submitted for resol yn on January 31, 2017. The motion is a mere scrap of paper for failure of the accused to observe the provisions of Sec 15 of the Rules of Court. Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court provide that: Sec. 4, Hearing of motion. ~ Except for motions which the court may act upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every written motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant. 2|Page Vae feResolution People v. Cataquiz, et al. SB-16-CRM-0830 Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the date of hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice. Sec. 5. Notice of hearing. - The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties concemed, and shall specify the time and date of the hearing which must not be later than ten (10) days after the filing of the motion. The general rule is that the three-day notice requirement in motions under Sections 4 and 5 of the Rules of Court is mandatory. It is an integral component of procedural due process.” "The purpose of the three-day notice requirement, which was established not for the benefit of the movant but rather for the adverse party, is to avoid surprises upon the latter and to grant it sufficient time to study the motion and to enable it to meet the arguments interposed therein."* “A motion that does not comply with the requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court is a worthless piece of paper which the clerk of court has no right to receive and which the court has no authority to act upon."* Nevertheless, the three-day notice requirement is not a hard and fast rule. When the adverse party had been afforded the opportunity to be heard, and has been indeed heard through the pleadings filed in opposition to the motion, the purpose behind the three-day notice requirement is deemed realized. In such case, the requirements of procedural due process are substantially complied with. Thus, in Preysler, Jr. v. Manila Southcoast Development Corporation,’ the Court ruled that: The three-day notice rule is not absolute. A liberal construction of the procedural rules is proper where the lapse in the literal observance of a rule of procedure has not prejudiced the adverse party and has not deprived the court of its authority. Indeed, Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the Rules should be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. Rules of procedure are tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, and courts must avoid their strict and rigid application which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice. Lack of probable cause for the crime charged Cabrera v. Felix Ng, G.R. No. 201601, March 12, 2014, citing Jehan Shipping Corporation v. National Food Authority, 514 Phil. 166, 173 (2005). 3 United Pulp and Paper Co. Ine. v. Acropolis Central Guaranty Corporation, G.R. No. 171750, January 25, 2012, 664 SCRA 65, 78. 4Pallada v. RTC of Kalibo, Aklan, Br. 1, 364 Phil. 81, 89 (1999). 5G.R. No. 171872, June 28, 2010, 621 SCRA 636. 3[ Page ye feResolution People v. Cataquiz, etal. ‘SB-16-CRM-0830 In People v. Castillo and Mejia,® the Supreme Court has stated: There are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and judicial. The executive determination of probable cause is one made during preliminary investigation. It is a function that properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to charge those whom he believes to have committed the crime as defined by law and thus should be held for trial. Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-judicial authority to determine whether or not a criminal case must be filed in court. Whether or not that function has been correctly discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e., whether or not he has made a correct ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon. ‘The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. The judge must satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is necessity for placing the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant.” The difference is clear: The executive determination of probable cause concerns itself with whether there is enough evidence to support an Information being filed. The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest should be issued. In People v. Inting:* x x x Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or released. Even if the two inquiries are conducted in the course of one and the same proceeding, there should be no confusion about the objectives. The determination of probable cause for the warrant of arrest is made by the Judge. The preliminary investigation proper—whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and, therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial—is the function of the Prosecutor.” While it is within the trial court’s discretion to make an independent assessment of the evidence on hand, it is only for the purpose of determining whether © 607 Phil. 754 (2009) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division]. 71d. at 764-765, citing Paderanga v. Drilon, 273 Phil. 290, 296 (1991) [Per J. Regalado, En Banc]; Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 324 Phil. 568, 620-621 (1996) [Per J. Davide, Jr., En Banc]; Ho v. People, 345 Phil. 597, ou C997 fled. Panganiban a Bane) a he No. 88919, July 25, 1990, 187 SCRA 788 [Per J. Gutierrez, Jr., En Banc]. 4 ae / ?Resolution People v. Cataquiz, et al ‘SB-16-CRM-0830 a warrant of arrest should be issued. The judge does not act as an appellate court of the prosecutor and has no capacity to review the prosecutor's determination of probable cause; rather, the judge makes a determination of probable cause independent of the prosecutor's finding.'° The factual and legal issues raised by the accused in the present case should be passed upon after a full blown trial. As mentioned above, the determination of probable cause exercised by this Court is only for the purpose of whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. If the Information is valid on its face and there is no showing of manifest error, grave abuse of discretion or prejudice on the part of the public prosecutor, courts should not dismiss it for ‘want of evidence,” because evidentiary matters should be presented and heard during the trial." Noteworthy is the fact that on November 9, 2016, the Court in its Minutes stated that there exists probable cause in the instant case to wit: “After perusing the Information and carefully assessing the resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman, the evidence in support thereof and the records of the preliminary investigation attached thereto, the Court finds that sufficient grounds Exist for the finding of probable cause for the purpose of issuing warrant of arrest in this case.” Inordinate delay by the Office of the Ombudsman The right to "a speedy disposition of cases" is guaranteed by the Constitution. Section 16 of Article III thereof provides: "All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative bodies." This right, however, like the right to a speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceedings is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays." The concept of speedy disposition is relative or flexible. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient. Particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case." Hence, the doctrinal rule is that in the determination of whether that right has been violated, the factors that may be considered and balanced are as follows: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay." "e Mendoza. People, GR. No. 197299, April 21,2014. ul + Cojuangco v. Sandiganbayan, 300 SCRA 367, 393 [1998]; Blanco v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 136757- 58, 27 November 2000. 's Binay v. Sandiganbayan, 316 SCRA 65, 93 [1999]; Castillo v. Sandiganbayan, 328 SCRA 69, 76 [2000]. 4 Alvizo v. Sandiganbayan, 220 SCRA §5, 63 [1993]; Dansal v. Fernandez, 327 SCRA 145, 153 [2000]; Blanco v. Sandiganbayan 5] ae / vResolution People v. Cataquiz, et al. SB-16-CRM-0830 In the instant case, the Office of the Ombudsman received the complaint on November 14, 2011, the last pleading was filed by accused Cataquiz on May 7, 2012. The OMB-Luzon came up with a resolution with the attached Information on December 8, 2015 or after three (3) years, 11 months which was endorsed to the Ombudsman for signature. The resolution thereafter was forwarded to the Office of the Special Prosecutor for review and on October 24, 2016, the Information was filed before this Court. In total, it took the Office of the Ombudsman four (4) years and eleven (11) months, from the filing of the complaint in their office up to the time of the filing of the Information before this Court. In the case of Lopez, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman,!* the Supreme Court dismissed the complaints against the petitioner due to the failure of the Office of the Ombudsman to resolve the same that have been pending for almost four (4) years, ruling that such delay clearly violates petitioner’s constitutional right to speedy disposition of his cases. In the present case, the Office of the Ombudsman did not give a justification as to the cause of delay. The issues raised by the private complainants are simple and did not involve complex interpretation of existing laws neither did it comprise voluminous records that could justify the delay in the resolution of the case. The significant amount of time consumed by the Office of the Ombudsman in coming up with a resolution and filing the Information before this Court is synonymous to a vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delay, which violated the constitutional right of the accused. The Ombudsman’s inaction shows a disregard of the constitutional right of the accused to speedy disposition of cases, which is a contravention of its solemn mandate. Here, the Ombudsman, the very protector of the people, became the perpetrator of the dictum that "justice delayed is justice denied.” Indeed, the said dictum is not a meaningless concept that can be taken for granted by those who are tasked with the dispensation of justice." The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable delay in the disposition of cases was intended to stem the tide of disenchantment among the people in the administration of justice by our judicial and quasi-judicial tribunals.'” The adjudication of cases must not only be done in an orderly manner that is in accord with the established rules of procedure, but must also be promptly decided to better serve the ends of justice. Excessive delay in the disposition of cases renders the rights of the people guaranteed by the Constitution and by various legislations inutile."* The people’s respect and confidence in the Office of the Ombudsman are measured not only by its impartiality, fairness, and correctness of its acts, but also by its eapacity to resolve cases speedily. "GR. No. 140529, September 6, 2001. °8 Licaros v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 145851, November 22, 2001, 370 SCRA 394. ¥ Cruz, Constitutional Law, 2007 Edition, p. 295. 8 Matias v. Plan, A.M. No. MTJ-98-1159, August 3, 1998, 293 SCRA 532. 0 ftResolution People v. Cataquiz et al ‘SB-16-CRM-0830 Furthermore, as to the allegation of the Ombudsman that the accused did not show any actual prejudice caused by the length of time it took their office to file the Information, the Supreme Court in Coscolluela v. Sandiganbayan'” said Fourth, the Court finally recognizes the prejudice caused to the petitioners by the lengthy delay in the proceedings against them. Lest it be misunderstood, the right to speedy disposition of cases is not merely hinged towards the objective of spurring dispatch in the inistration of justice but also to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding a criminal prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite time. Akin to the right to speedy trial, its "salutary objective" is to assure that an innocent person may be free from the anxiety and expense of litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and consideration of whatsoever legitimate defense he may interpose.”” This looming unrest as well as the tactical disadvantages carried by the passage of time should be weighed against the State and in favor of the individual. While the foregoing should result in the acquittal of the accused, it does not necessarily follow that accused are entirely exculpated from any civil liability, assuming that the same is proven in a subsequent case which the municipality may opt to pursue. Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court provides that an acquittal in a criminal case does not bar the private offended party from pursuing a subsequent civil case based on the delict, unless the judgment of acquittal explicitly declares that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist! As explained in the case of Abejuela v. People,” citing Banal v. Tadeo, J The Rules provide: "The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. In other cases, the person entitled to the civil action may institute it in the jurisdiction and in the manner provided by law against the person who may be liable for restitution of the thing and reparation or indemnity for the damage suffered." © G.R.No. 191411, July 15, 2013. 29 Mari v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 187728, September 12, 2011, 657 SCRA 414, 423. ® Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court partly provides: ‘SEC. 2. When separate civil action is suspended. The extinction ofthe penal action does not carry with it extinetion of the civil action. However, the civil action based on delict may be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment inthe criminal action thatthe act or omission from which the civil lability may arise did not exist. * G.R. No. 80130, August 19, 1991, 200 SCRA 806, 814-815, 29240 Phil. 326, 331 (1987). ve feResolution People v. Cataquiz, et al. SB-16-CRM-0830 The Court finds, in view of the inordinate delay, which is a clear violation of the constitutional right of the accused to speedy disposition of case, there is no need to discuss the other issues raised. WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court resolves to GRANT the Omnibus Motion of accused Calixto R. Cataquiz, Erlinda Namora Sietereales and Katrina Namora Sietereales, and hereby accordingly DISMISSES the Information against them for violation of their constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases. Accordingly, the hold-departure order issued by the Court against the accused is hereby LIFTED and SET ASIDE, and the bonds they posted for their provisional liberty are ordered RELEASED, subject to the usual accounting and auditing procedures. SO ORDERED. WE CONCUR: es FAEL R. LAGOS (ALI CRUZ Acting Chairperson Associate Justice 8|Page