Case Digests Compilation

Manila Prince Hotel vs GSIS
Self Executing Statutes
Facts:
The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance

System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine
Government, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued
and outstanding shares of respondent Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). The
winning bidder, or the eventual strategic partner, will provide management
expertise or an international marketing/reservation system, and financial
support to strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel.
In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders
participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino
corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares
at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton
as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per
share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Prior to the declaration of
Renong Berhard as the winning bidder, petitioner Manila Prince Hotel
matched the bid price and sent a managers check as bid security, which
GSIS refused to accept.
Apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and
that the sale may be consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner filed a
petition before the Court.
Issues:
Whether or not Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is a
self-executing provision.
Whether or not the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony.
Whether or not the submission of matching bid is premature
Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
respondents in refusing the matching bid of the petitioner.
Rulings:
In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:
It is a self-executing provision.
Since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of

the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract. A provision
which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the
1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is
complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary
or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of
which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.
A constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the

right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself,
so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its
terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the
legislature for action. Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is
necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that
all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional
provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the
legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the
mandate of the fundamental law.
10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive
command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines
or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the
provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per
se judicially enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that in the grant
of rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just
that qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution
declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may
be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any
legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially
enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its
own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must
take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi
remedium.
The Court agrees.
In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage.
When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the
natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well
used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the
Filipinos.
It also refers to Filipinos intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. In the
present case, Manila Hotel has become a landmark, a living testimonial of
Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an American hotel when it first
opened in 1912, a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the
venue of various significant events which have shaped Philippine history.
Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony.
For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the
constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock, so
that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and
management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be
disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands.
It is not premature.
In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public
bidding concerning the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering
the national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino,
there is no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid
of the foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the
award should go to the Filipino. It must be so if the Court is to give life and
meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For,
while this may neither be expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding
rules, the constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To
ignore it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.
The Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy may
discourage foreign investors. But the Constitution and laws of the Philippines
are understood to be always open to public scrutiny. These are given factors
which investors must consider when venturing into business in a foreign
jurisdiction. Any person therefore desiring to do business in the Philippines or
with any of its agencies or instrumentalities is presumed to know his rights
and obligations under the Constitution and the laws of the forum.
There was grave abuse of discretion.
To insist on selling the Manila Hotel to foreigners when there is a Filipino

group willing to match the bid of the foreign group is to insist that
government be treated as any other ordinary market player, and bound by
its mistakes or gross errors of judgement, regardless of the consequences to
the Filipino people. The miscomprehension of the Constitution is regrettable.
Thus, the Court would rather remedy the indiscretion while there is still an
opportunity to do so than let the government develop the habit of forgetting
that the Constitution lays down the basic conditions and parameters for its
actions.
Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong
Berhad pursuant to the bidding rules, respondent GSIS is left with no
alternative but to award to petitioner the block of shares of MHC and to
execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale in
accordance not only with the bidding guidelines and procedures but with the
Constitution as well. The refusal of respondent GSIS to execute the
corresponding documents with petitioner as provided in the bidding rules
after the latter has matched the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly constitutes
grave abuse of discretion.
Hence, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA

HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE
GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST from
selling 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG
BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE
HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the
Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the
necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale, to issue the
necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be
necessary for the purpose.
Oposa vs. Factoran 224 SCRA 792

FACTS:
The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented and joined by their
parents. The first complaint was filed as a taxpayer's class suit at the Branch
66 (Makati, Metro Manila), of the Regional Trial Court, National capital Judicial
Region against defendant (respondent) Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Reasources (DENR). Plaintiffs alleged that they are
entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource
treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests. They further asseverate
that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn and
asserted that continued deforestation have caused a distortion and
disturbance of the ecological balance and have resulted in a host of
environmental tragedies.
Plaintiffs prayed that judgement be rendered ordering the respondent, his

agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to cancel all
existing Timber License Agreement (TLA) in the country and to cease and
desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new
TLAs.
Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
the complaint had no cause of action against him and that it raises a political
question.
The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further ruling that granting of
the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is
prohibited by the Constitution.
Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari
and asked the court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the
ground that the respondent RTC Judge gravely abused his discretion in
dismissing the action.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action.

(2) Whether or not the complaint raises a political issue.
(3) Whether or not the original prayer of the plaintiffs result in the
impairment of contracts.
RULING:
First Issue: Cause of Action.
Respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a

specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief
is provided by law. The Court did not agree with this. The complaint focuses
on one fundamental legal right -- the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology which is incorporated in Section 16 Article II of the Constitution. The
said right carries with it the duty to refrain from impairing the environment
and implies, among many other things, the judicious management and
conservation of the country's forests. Section 4 of E.O. 192 expressly
mandates the DENR to be the primary government agency responsible for
the governing and supervising the exploration, utilization, development and
conservation of the country's natural resources. The policy declaration of
E.O. 192 is also substantially re-stated in Title XIV Book IV of the
Administrative Code of 1987. Both E.O. 192 and Administrative Code of 1987
have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formation,
and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR. Thus, right of the
petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology
is as clear as DENR's duty to protect and advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or
obligation to respect or protect or respect the same gives rise to a cause of
action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLA, which they claim
was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balance and
healthful ecology. Hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further
TLAs should be renewed or granted.
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, the Court finds it to

be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their
rights.
Second Issue: Political Issue.
Second paragraph, Section 1 of Article VIII of the constitution provides for the
expanded jurisdiction vested upon the Supreme Court. It allows the Court to
rule upon even on the wisdom of the decision of the Executive and
Legislature and to declare their acts as invalid for lack or excess of
jurisdiction because it is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
Third Issue: Violation of the non-impairment clause.
The Court held that the Timber License Agreement is an instrument by which
the state regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the
end that public welfare is promoted. It is not a contract within the purview of
the due process clause thus, the non-impairment clause cannot be invoked.
It can be validly withdraw whenever dictated by public interest or public
welfare as in this case. The granting of license does not create irrevocable
rights, neither is it property or property rights.
Moreover, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of

contract is limit by the exercise by the police power of the State, in the
interest of public health, safety, moral and general welfare. In short, the non-
impairment clause must yield to the police power of the State.
The instant petition, being impressed with merit, is hereby GRANTED and the
RTC decision is SET ASIDE.
Kilosbayan vs Morato GR No. 118910
FACTS:
[T]his suit was filed seeking to declare the ELA invalid on the ground that it is
substantially the same as the Contract of Lease nullified in the first case
[decision in G.R. No. 113375 (Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Guingona, 232
SCRA 110 (1994)) invalidating the Contract of Lease between the Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the Philippine Gaming Management
Corp. (PGMC)]. Petitioners maintain (1) that the Equipment Lease Agreement
(ELA) is a different lease contract with none of the vestiges of a joint venture
which were found in the Contract of Lease nullified in the prior case; (2) that
the ELA did not have to be submitted to a public bidding because it fell
within the exception provided in E.O. No. 301, 1 (e); (3) that the power to
determine whether the ELA is advantageous to the government is vested in
the Board of Directors of the PCSO; (4) that for lack of funds the PCSO cannot
purchase its own on-line lottery equipment and has had to enter into a lease
contract; (5) that what petitioners are actually seeking in this suit is to
further their moral crusade and political agenda, using the Court as their
forum.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the ELA between the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office
and the Philippine Gaming Management Corp. is invalid.
HELD:
NO. Petition for prohibition, review and/or injunction was dismissed. Pertinent
to the issue, the SC held:
xxx
(3) that the ELA is valid as a lease contract under the Civil Code and is not
contrary to the charter of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office;
(4) that under 1(A) of its charter (R.A. 1169), the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office has authority to enter into a contract for the holding of
an on-line lottery, whether alone or in association, collaboration or joint
venture with another party, so long as it itselfholds or conducts such lottery;
and
(5) That the Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) in question did not have to
be submitted to public bidding as a condition for its validity.
RATIO:
E.O. No. 301, 1 applies only to contracts for the purchase of supplies,
materials and equipment. It does not refer to contracts of lease of equipment
like the ELA. The provisions on lease are found in 6 and 7 but they refer to
the lease of privately-owned buildings or spaces for government use or of
government-owned buildings or spaces for private use, and these provisions
do not require public bidding. It is thus difficult to see how E.O. No. 301 can
be applied to the ELA when the only feature of the ELA that may be thought
of as close to a contract of purchase and sale is the option to buy given to
the PCSO. An option to buy is not of course a contract of purchase and sale.
Indeed the question is not whether compared with the former joint venture
agreement the present lease contract is [more] advantageous to the
government. The question is whether under the circumstances, the ELA is
the most advantageous contract that could be obtained compared with
similar lease agreements which the PCSO could have made with other
parties. Petitioners have not shown that more favorable terms could have
been obtained by the PCSO or that at any rate the ELA, which the PCSO
concluded with the PGMC, is disadvantageous to the government.
Francisco, et al vs House Speaker Gr No. 160261
Rules in Interpretation
FACTS:
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution,
sponsored by Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the
Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on
the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)." On June 2, 2003,
former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this Court
for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and
other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T.
Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen, and was referred
to the House Committee. The House Committee on Justice ruled on October
13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form," but
voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in
substance. To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet been
sent to the House in plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of
Article XI of the Constitution. Four months and three weeks since the filing on
June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the
House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment
complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of
the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This
second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the
Members of the House of Representatives.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls
within the one year bar provided in the Constitution.
2. Whether the resolution thereof is a political question has resulted in a

political crisis.
HELD:
1. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the
impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the
initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI
becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the
foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a
one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution. In fine,
considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former
President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven
associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House
Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint
filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella
against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional
prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the
same impeachable officer within a one-year period.
2.From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional

Commission, it is clear that judicial power is not only a power; it is also a
duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this creature
called the political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to
clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with
"truly political questions." From this clarification it is gathered that there are
two species of political questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those
which "are not truly political questions." Truly political questions are thus
beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the doctrine of separation of
powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article
VIII of the Constitution, courts can review questions which are not truly
political in nature.
Santiago vs Guingona GR No. 134577

Political Question vs Justiciable Controversy
FACTS:
On July 27, 1998, the Senate of the Philippines convened for the first regular
session of the 11th Congress. On the agenda for the day was the election of
officers. Senator Francisco S. Tatad and Senator Marcelo B. Fernan were
nominated for the position of Senate President. By a vote of 20 to 2, Senator
Fernan was duly elected President of the Senate.
Thereafter, Senator Tatad manifested, with the agreement of Senator Miriam

Defensor Santiago, he was assuming the position of minority leader. He
explained that those who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the
majority while those who voted for him, belonged to the minority. During the
discussion, Senator Juan M. Flavier also manifested that the senators
belonging to the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP -- numbering 7, and, thus, also a
minority -- had chosen Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as minority leader. No
consensus was arrived at during the following days of session.
On July 30, 1998, the majority leader, informed the body that he received a
letter from the 7 members of the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP, stating that they had
elected Senator Guingona as minority leader. The Senated President then
recognized Senator Guingona as minority leader of the Senate.
The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before the Supreme
Court a petition for quo warranto alleging that Senator Guingona has been
usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minorit
leader, a position that, according to them, rightfully belongs to Senator
Tatad.
ISSUES:
1. Does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction over the petition?
2. Was there an actual violation of the Constitution?
3. Was Respondent Guingona usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising
the position of Senate minority leader?
4. Did Respondent Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in
recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority leader?
RULING:
First Issue: Court's Jurisdiction
In the instant controversy, the petitioners claim that Section 16 (1), Article VI
of the Constitution has not been observed in the selection of the Senate
minority leader. They also invoke the Courts judicial power to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of respondents.
The Court took jurisdiction over the petition stating that It is well within the
power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether indeed the Senate or
its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused their
discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives.
Second Issue: Violation of the Constitution
Petitioners claim that there was a violation of the Constitution when the
Senate President recognized Senator Guingona as minority leader.
The Court, however, did not find any violation since all that the Charter says
is that "[e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it may deem
necessary." The court held that, the method of choosing who will be such
other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative
conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such
method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court.
Notably, Rules I and II of the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the
positions of majority and minority leaders. Neither is there an open clause
providing specifically for such offices and prescribing the manner of creating
them or of choosing the holders thereof. However, such offices, by tradition
and long practice, are actually extant. But, in the absence of constitutional
or statutory guidelines or specific rules, this Court is devoid of any basis
upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate relative
thereto. On grounds of respect for the basic concept of separation of
powers, courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature.
Third Issue: Usurpation of Office
For a quo warranto prosper, the person suing must show that he or she has
a clear right to the contested office or to use or exercise the functions of the
office allegedly usurped or unlawfully held by the respondent. In this case,
petitioners present no sufficient proof of a clear and indubitable franchise to
the office of the Senate minority leader. The specific norms or standards that
may be used in determining who may lawfully occupy the disputed position
has not been laid down by the Constitution, the statutes, or the Senate itself
in which the power has been vested. Without any clear-cut guideline, in no
way can it be said that illegality or irregularity tainted Respondent
Guingonas assumption and exercise of the powers of the office of Senate
minority leader. Furthermore, no grave abuse of discretion has been shown
to characterize any of his specific acts as minority leader.
Fourth Issue: Fernan's Recognition of Guingona
Supreme Court held that Respondent Fernan did not gravely abuse his
discretion as Senate President in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the
minority leader. The latter belongs to one of the minority parties in the
Senate, the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP. By unanimous resolution of the members of
this party that he be the minority leader, he was recognized as such by the
Senate President. Such formal recognition by Respondent Fernan came only
after at least two Senate sessions and a caucus, wherein both sides were
liberally allowed to articulate their standpoints.
Under these circumstances, the Court believed that the Senate President
cannot be accused of capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment or of
an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. Where
no provision of the Constitution, the laws or even the rules of the Senate has
been clearly shown to have been violated, disregarded or overlooked, grave
abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts done within
their competence and authority.
The Petition is DISMISSED.

Javellana vs Exec Secretary GR No. 36142
Political Question vs Justiciable Controversy
FACTS:
On January 20, 1973, just two days before the Supreme Court decided the
sequel of plebiscite cases, Javellana filed this suit against the respondents to
restrain them from implementing any of the provisions of the proposed
Constitution not found in the present 1935 Constitution. This is a petition
filed by him as a Filipino citizen and a qualified and registered voter and as a
class suit, for himself and in behalf of all citizens and voters similarly
situated. Javellana also alleged that the President had announced the
immediate implementation of the new constitution, thru his Cabinet,
respondents including.
Respondents are acting without or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing

the said proposed constitution upon ground the that the President as
Commander-in-Chief of the AFP is without authority to create the Citizens
Assemblies; without power to approve proposed constitution; without power
to proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed
constitution; and the election held to ratify the proposed constitution was not
a free election, hence null and void.
Following that, petitioners prayed for the nullification of Proclamation No.

1102 and any order, decree, and proclamation which have the same import
and objective.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 is a
justiciable or political question, and therefore non-justiciable.
2. Whether or not the constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention has been ratified validly conforming to the applicable
constitutional and statutory provisions.
3. Whether or not the proposed Constitution has been acquiesced in (with
or without valid ratification) by the people.
4. Whether or not the petitioners are entitled for relief.
5. Whether or not the proposed Constitution by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention in force.
HELD:
First. To determine whether or not the new constitution is in force depends
upon whether or not the said new constitution has been ratified in
accordance with the requirements of the 1935 Constitution. It is well settled
that the matter of ratification of an amendment to the constitution should be
settled applying the provisions of the constitution in force at the time of the
alleged ratification of the old constitution.
The issue whether the new constitution proposed has been ratified in
accordance with the provisions of Article XV of the 1935 Constitution is
justiciable as jurisprudence here and in the US (from whom we patterned our
1935 Constitution) shall show.
Second. The Constitution does not allow Congress or anybody else to vest in
those lacking the qualifications and having the disqualifications mentioned in
the Constitution the right of suffrage.
The votes of persons less than 21 years of age render the proceedings in the
Citizens assemblies void. Proceedings held in such Citizens Assemblies were
fundamentally irregular, in that persons lacking the qualifications prescribed
in Article V Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution were allowed to vote in said
Assemblies. And, since there is no means by which the invalid votes of those
less than 21 years of age can be separated or segregated from those of the
qualified voters, the proceedings in the Citizens Assemblies must be
considered null and void.
Viva voce voting for the ratification of the constitution is void. Article XV of
the 1935 Constitution envisages with the term "votes cast" choices made
on ballots not orally or by raising hands by the persons taking part in
plebiscites. This is but natural and logical, for, since the early years of the
American regime, we had adopted the Australian Ballot System, with its
major characteristics, namely, uniform official ballots prepared and furnished
by the Government and secrecy in the voting, with the advantage of keeping
records that permit judicial inquiry, when necessary, into the accuracy of the
election returns.
The plebiscite on the constitution not having been conducted under the
supervision of COMELEC is void. The point is that, such of the Barrio
Assemblies as were held took place without the intervention of the COMELEC
and without complying with the provisions of the Election Code of 1971 or
even of those of Presidential Decree No. 73. The procedure therein mostly
followed is such that there is no reasonable means of checking the accuracy
of the returns filed by the officers who conducted said plebiscites. This is
another patent violation of Article X of the 1935 Constitution which form part
of the fundamental scheme set forth in the 1935 Constitution, as amended,
to insure the "free, orderly, and honest" expression of the people's will. For
this, the alleged plebiscite in the Citizens Assemblies is null and void, insofar
as the same are claimed to have ratified the revised Constitution.
Third. Proclamation No. 1102 is not an evidence of ratification. Article X of

the 1935 Constitution places COMELEC the "exclusive" charge to the "the
enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of
elections," independently of the Executive. But there is not even a
certification by the COMELEC in support of the alleged results of the citizens
assemblies relied upon in Proclamation No. 1102. Also, on January 17, 1973
neither the alleged president of the Federation of Provincial or City
Barangays nor the Department of Local Governments had certified to the
President the alleged result of the citizens' assemblies all over the
Philippines. The citizens assemblies did not adopt the proposed constitution.
It is to my mind a matter of judicial knowledge that there have been no such
citizens assemblies in many parts of Manila and suburbs, not to say, also, in
other parts of the Philippines.
Fourth. The Court is not prepared to concede that the acts the officers and
offices of the Executive Department, in line with Proclamation No. 1102,
connote recognition of or acquiescence to the proposed Constitution.
A department of the Government cannot recognize its own acts.

Recognition normally connotes the acknowledgment by a party of the acts of
another. Individual acts of recognition by members of Congress do not
constitute congressional recognition, unless the members have performed
said acts in session duly assembled. This is a well-established principle
of Administrative Law and of the Law of Public Officers. The compliance by
the people with the orders of martial law government does not constitute
acquiescence to the proposed Constitution. Neither does the Court prepared
to declare that the people's inaction as regards Proclamation No. 1102, and
their compliance with a number of Presidential orders, decrees and/or
instructions, some or many of which have admittedly had salutary
effects, issuedsubsequently thereto, amounts to a ratification, adoption or
approval of said Proclamation No. 1102. The intimidation is there, and
inaction or obedience of the people, under these conditions, is not
necessarily an act of conformity or acquiescence.
As regards the applicability to these cases of the "enrolled bill" rule, it is well
to remember that the same refers to a document certified to the President
for his action under the Constitution by the Senate President and the Speaker
of the House of Reps, and attested to by the respective Secretaries of both
Houses, concerning legislative measures approved by said Houses. Whereas,
Proclamation No. 1102 is an act of the President declaring the results of a
plebiscite on the proposed Constitution, an act which Article X of the 1935
Constitution denies the executive department of the Government.
In all other respects and with regard to the other respondent in said case,
petitions therein should be given due course, there being more than prima
facie showing that the proposed Constitution has not been ratified in
accordance with Article XV of the 1935 Constitution, either strictly,
substantially, or has been acquiesced in by the people or majority thereof;
that said proposed Constitution is not in force and effect; and that the 1935
Constitution is still the Fundamental Law of the Land, without prejudice to
the submission of said proposed Constitution to the people at a plebiscite for
its ratification or rejection in accordance with Articles V, X and XV of the
1935 Constitution and the provisions of the Revised Election Code in force at
the time of such plebiscite.
Fifth. Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar,
Antonio and Esguerra hold that it is in force by virtue of the people's
acceptance thereof; 4 members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal,
Castro, Fernando and Teehankee cast no vote thereon on the premise stated
in their votes on the third question that they could not state with judicial
certainty whether the people have accepted or not accepted the
Constitution; and 2 members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and
myself voted that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention is not in force; with the result, there are not enough votes to
declare that the new Constitution is not in force.
Bondoc vs. Pineda 201 SCRA 792

Supremacy of the Constitution
FACTS:
In the elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano Pineda of the LDP and
Emigdio Bondoc of the NP were candidates for the position of Representative
for the Fourth District of Pampanga. Pineda was proclaimed winner. Bondoc
filed a protest in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET),
which is composed of 9 members, 3 of whom are Justices of the SC and the
remaining 6 are members of the House of Representatives (5 members
belong to the LDP and 1 member is from the NP). Thereafter, a decision had
been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda. Congressman Camasura of
the LDP voted with the SC Justices and Congressman Cerilles of the NP to
proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest.
On the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, Congressman

Camasura received a letter informing him that he was already expelled from
the LDP for allegedly helping to organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo
Cojuangco and for allegedly inviting LDP members in Davao Del Sur to join
said political party. On the day of the promulgation of the decision, the
Chairman of HRET received a letter informing the Tribunal that on the basis
of the letter from the LDP, the House of Representatives decided to withdraw
the nomination and rescind the election of Congressman Camasura to the
HRET.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the House of Representatives, at the request of the

dominant political party therein, may change that partys representation in
the HRET to thwart the promulgation of a decision freely reached by the
tribunal in an election contest pending therein.
RULING:
The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral

Commission was to provide an independent and impartial tribunal for the
determination of contests to legislative office, devoid of partisan
consideration.
As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must

discharge their functions with complete detachment, impartiality and
independence even independence from the political party to which they
belong. Hence, disloyalty to party and breach of party discipline are not valid
grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In expelling
Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a conscience vote
in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the examination and
appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the
House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice
and a violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against
Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void.
Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of
Representatives is that it violates Congressman Camasuras right to security
of tenure. Members of the HRET, as sole judge of congressional election
contests, are entitled to security of tenure just as members of the Judiciary
enjoy security of tenure under the Constitution. Therefore, membership in
the HRET may not be terminated except for a just cause, such as, the
expiration of the members congressional term of office, his death,
permanent disability, resignation from the political party he represents in the
tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party or removal for other
valid cause. A member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives
for party disloyalty, short of proof that he has formally affiliated with another.
Angara vs. Electoral Commission 63 Phil 139

Supremacy of the Constitution
FACTS:
In the elections of Sept. 17, 1935, petitioner Jose A. Angara and the
respondents Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo, and Dionisio Mayor
were candidates for the position of members of the National Assembly for
the first district of Tayabas.
On Oct. 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as
member-elect of the National Assembly and on Nov. 15, 1935, he took his
oath of office.
On Dec. 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8, which in

effect, fixed the last date to file election protests.
On Dec. 8, 1935, Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of
Protest" against Angara and praying, among other things, that Ynsua be
named/declared elected Member of the National Assembly or that the
election of said position be nullified.
On Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution (No. 6)

stating that last day for filing of protests is on Dec. 9. Angara contended
that the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon
the Electoral Commission solely as regards the merits of contested elections
to the National Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore has no
jurisdiction to hear the case.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over

the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the controversy upon the
foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative,
RULING:
In the case at bar, here is then presented an actual controversy involving as

it does a conflict of a grave constitutional nature between the National
Assembly on one hand, and the Electoral Commission on the other. Although
the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with, when and while acting
within the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the reach
of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not
subject to constitutional restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not a
separate department of the government, and even if it were, conflicting
claims of authority under the fundamental law between departmental powers
and agencies of the government are necessarily determined by the judiciary
in justiciable and appropriate cases.
The court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject
matter of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the
character, scope, and extent of the constitutional grant to
the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly."
The Electoral Commission was created to transfer in its totality all the powers
previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested
elections of its members, to an independent and impartial tribunal. The
express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied
denial in the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. And thus, it is
as effective a restriction upon the legislative power as an express prohibition
in the Constitution.
Therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the
proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of members of the National Assembly,
must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in
the Electoral Commission.
It appears that on Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission met for the first
time and approved a resolution fixing said date as the last day for the filing
of election protests. When, therefore, the National Assembly passed its
resolution of Dec. 3, 1935, confirming the election of the petitioner to the
National Assembly, the Electoral Commission had not yet met; neither does it
appear that said body had actually been organized.
While there might have been good reason for the legislative practice of
confirmation of the election of members of the legislature at the time the
power to decide election contests was still lodged in the legislature,
confirmation alone by the legislature cannot be construed as depriving
the Electoral Commission of the authority incidental to its constitutional
power to be "the sole judge of all contests...", to fix the time for the filing of
said election protests.
The Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its
constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed
by the respondent, Pedro Ynsua against the election of the herein petitioner,
Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of the National Assembly on Dec. 3,
1935, cannot in any manner toll the time for filing protest against the
election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly, nor prevent the filing of protests within such time as the rules of
the Electoral Commission might prescribe.
The petition for a writ of prohibition against the electoral commission is

hereby denied, with cost against the petitioner.
Magallona, et al vs Ermita GR No. 187167
Archipelagic Doctrine
Facts:
RA 3046 was passed in 1961 which provides among others the demarcation
lines of the baselines of the Philippines as an archipelago. This is in
consonance with UNCLOS I.
RA 5446 amended RA 3046 in terms of typographical errors and included

Section 2 in which the government reserved the drawing of baselines in
Sabah in North Borneo.
RA 9522 took effect on March 2009 amending RA 5446. The amendments,

which are in compliance with UNCLOS III in which the Philippines is one of the
signatory, shortening one baseline while optimizing the other and classifying
Kalayaan Group of Island and Scarborough Shoal as Regimes of Island.
Petitioners in their capacity as taxpayer, citizen and legislator assailed the

constitutionality of RA 9522:- it reduces the territory of the Philippines in
violation to the Constitution and it opens the country to maritime passage of
vessels and aircrafts of other states to the detriment of the economy,
sovereignty, national security and of the Constitution as well. They added
that the classification of Regime of Islands would be prejudicial to the lives of
the fishermen.
Issues:
1. WON the petitioners have locus standi to bring the suit; and
2. WON RA 9522 is unconstitutional
Ruling:
Petition is dismissed.
1st Issue:
The SC ruled the suit is not a taxpayer or legislator, but as a citizen suit,
since it is the citizens who will be directly injured and benefitted in affording
relief over the remedy sought.
2nd Issue:
The SC upheld the constitutionality of RA 9522.
First, RA 9522 did not delineate the territory the Philippines but is merely a
statutory tool to demarcate the countrys maritime zone and continental
shelf under UNCLOS III. SC emphasized that UNCLOS III is not a mode of
acquiring or losing a territory as provided under the laws of nations. UNCLOS
III is a multi-lateral treaty that is a result of a long-time negotiation to
establish a uniform sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e., the territorial
waters [12 nautical miles from the baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical
miles from the baselines], exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from
the baselines]), and continental shelves. In order to measure said distances,
it is a must for the state parties to have their archipelagic doctrines
measured in accordance to the treatythe role played by RA 9522. The
contention of the petitioner that RA 9522 resulted to the loss of 15,000
square nautical miles is devoid of merit. The truth is, RA 9522, by optimizing
the location of base points, increased the Philippines total maritime space of
145,216 square nautical miles.
Second, the classification of KGI and Scarborough Shoal as Regime of Islands

is consistent with the Philippines sovereignty. Had RA 9522 enclosed the
islands as part of the archipelago, the country will be violating UNCLOS III
since it categorically stated that the length of the baseline shall not exceed
125 nautical miles. So what the legislators did is to carefully analyze the
situation: the country, for decades, had been claiming sovereignty over KGI
and Scarborough Shoal on one hand and on the other hand they had to
consider that these are located at non-appreciable distance from the nearest
shoreline of the Philippine archipelago. So, the classification is in accordance
with the Philippines sovereignty and States responsible observance of its
pacta sunt servanda obligation under UNCLOS III.
Third, the new base line introduced by RA 9522 is without prejudice with
delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of
Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines
has acquired dominion and sovereignty.
And lastly, the UNCLOS III and RA 9522 are not incompatible with the
Constitutions delineation of internal waters. Petitioners contend that RA
9522 transformed the internal waters of the Philippines to archipelagic
waters hence subjecting these waters to the right of innocent and sea lanes
passages, exposing the Philippine internal waters to nuclear and maritime
pollution hazards. The Court emphasized that the Philippines exercises
sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of the baselines, including
the air space over it and the submarine areas underneath, regardless
whether internal or archipelagic waters. However, sovereignty will not bar
the Philippines to comply with its obligation in maintaining freedom of
navigation and the generally accepted principles of international law. It can
be either passed by legislator as a municipal law or in the absence thereof, it
is deemed incorporated in the Philippines law since the right of innocent
passage is a customary international law, thus automatically incorporated
thereto.
This does not mean that the states are placed in a lesser footing; it just
signifies concession of archipelagic states in exchange for their right to claim
all waters inside the baseline. In fact, the demarcation of the baselines
enables the Philippines to delimit its exclusive economic zone, reserving
solely to the Philippines the exploitation of all living and non-living resources
within such zone. Such a maritime delineation binds the international
community since the delineation is in strict observance of UNCLOS III. If the
maritime delineation is contrary to UNCLOS III, the international community
will of course reject it and will refuse to be bound by it.
The Court expressed that it is within the Congress who has the prerogative to
determine the passing of a law and not the Court. Moreover, such enactment
was necessary in order to comply with the UNCLOS III; otherwise, it shall
backfire on the Philippines for its territory shall be open to seafaring powers
to freely enter and exploit the resources in the waters and submarine areas
around our archipelago and it will weaken the countrys case in any
international dispute over Philippine maritime space.
The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine
archipelago and adjacent areas, as embodied in RA 9522, allows an
internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines
maritime zones and continental shelf. RA 9522 is therefore a most vital step
on the part of the Philippines in safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent
with the Constitution and our national interest.
Tecson vs. Comelec GR No. 161434
Modes of Acquisition: Citizenship
Facts:
On 31 December 2003, Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe,
Jr. (FPJ), filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the
Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino
(KNP) Party, in the 2004 national elections. In his certificate of candidacy,
FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines,
stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth
to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila. Victorino X. Fornier,
(GR 161824) initiated, on 9 January 2004, a petition (SPA 04-003) before the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course
or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a
material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a
natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents
were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his
father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a
Spanish subject. Granting, Fornier asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a
Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ,
the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Fornier based the
allegation of the illegitimate birth of FPJ on two assertions: (1) Allan F. Poe
contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to
Bessie Kelley and, (2) even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe,
married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of FPJ. On 23 January 2004,
the COMELEC dismissed SPA 04-003 for lack of merit. 3 days later, or on 26
January 2004, Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration. The motion was
denied on 6 February 2004 by the COMELEC en banc. On 10 February 2004,
Fornier assailed the decision of the COMELEC before the Supreme Court
conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure. The petition likewise prayed for a temporary restraining order, a
writ of preliminary injunction or any other resolution that would stay the
finality and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions. The other petitions,
later consolidated with GR 161824, would include GR 161434 and GR
161634, both challenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting that,
under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the
Supreme Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic
issue on the case.
Issue: Whether FPJ was a natural born citizen, so as to be allowed to run for
the offcie of the President of the Philippines.
Held: Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses that "No
person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of
age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least
ten years immediately preceding such election." The term "natural-born
citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens of the Philippines from
birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine
citizenship." Herein, the date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be
20 August 1939 during the regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through its
history, four modes of acquiring citizenship - naturalization, jus soli, res
judicata and jus sanguinis had been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus
sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of Customs (1912), did not last
long. With the adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the reversal of Roa in
Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor (1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationship
would now become the primary basis of citizenship by birth. Considering the
reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some of the entries on
the birth certificate of FPJ and the marriage certificate of his parents, the only
conclusions that could be drawn with some degree of certainty from the
documents would be that (1) The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie
Kelley; (2) FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939; (3) Allan F. Poe and
Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16 September, 1940; (4) The
father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and (5) At the time of his death on 11
September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old. The marriage certificate of
Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ, and the death
certificate of Lorenzo Pou are documents of public record in the custody of a
public officer. The documents have been submitted in evidence by both
contending parties during the proceedings before the COMELEC. But while
the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that FPJ is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would
preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of
having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in
violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election
Code. Fornier has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the Court,
notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to present their
position and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been material
misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC,
must not only be material, but also deliberate and willful. The petitions were
dismissed.
Mo ya Lim Yao vs. Commission on Immigration 41 SCRA 29
Modes of acquisition: Citizenship
FACTS:
Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a non-
immigrant on 8 February 1961. In the interrogation made in connection with
her application for a temporary visitor's visa to enter the Philippines, she
stated that she was a Chinese residing at Kowloon, Hongkong, and that she
desired to take a pleasure trip to the Philippines to visit her great grand
uncle, Lau Ching Ping. She was permitted to come into the Philippines on 13
March 1961 for a period of one month.
On the date of her arrival, Asher Y. Cheng filed a bond in the amount of
P1,000.00 to undertake, among others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung would
actually depart from the Philippines on or before the expiration of her
authorized period of stay in this country or within the period as in his
discretion the Commissioner of Immigration or his authorized representative
might properly allow.
After repeated extensions, Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the
Philippines up to 13 February 1962. On 25 January 1962, she contracted
marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged
Filipino citizen. Because of the contemplated action of the Commissioner
of Immigration to confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate
deportation, after the expiration of her authorized stay, she brought an
action for injunction. At the hearing which took place one and a half years
after her arrival, it was admitted that Lau Yuen Yeung could not write and
speak either English or Tagalog, except for a few words. She could not name
any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name except one, Rosa. She did not
know the names of her brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-law. As a result, the
Court of First Instance of Manila denied the prayer for preliminary injunction.
Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her
marriage to a Filipino citizen.
HELD:
Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a
Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided
she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the
same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently
naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the
moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not
suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4. Whether the
alien woman requires to undergo the naturalization proceedings, Section 15
is a parallel provision to Section 16. Thus, if the widow of an applicant for
naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not required to
go through a naturalization proceedings, in order to be considered as a
Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot
be denied the same privilege.
This is plain common sense and there is absolutely no evidence that the
Legislature intended to treat them differently. As the laws of our country,
both substantive and procedural, stand today, there is no such procedure (a
substitute for naturalization proceeding to enable the alien wife of a
Philippine citizen to have the matter of her own citizenship settled and
established so that she may not have to be called upon to prove it everytime
she has to perform an act or enter into a transaction or business or exercise
a right reserved only to Filipinos), but such is no proof that the citizenship is
not vested as of the date of marriage or the husband's acquisition of
citizenship, as the case may be, for the truth is that the situation obtains
even as to native-born Filipinos. Everytime the citizenship of a person is
material or indispensible in a judicial or administrative case. Whatever the
corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such
citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be
threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. Lau Yuen Yeung,
was declared to have become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her
marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen of
25 January 1962.
Valles vs Comelec 337 SCRA 543
FACTS:
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Australia to a Filipino
father and an Australian mother. In 1949, at the age of fifteen, she left
Australia and came to settle in the Philippines, where she later married a
Filipino and has since then participated in the electoral process not only as a
voter but as a candidate, as well. In the May 1998 elections, she ran for
governor but Valles filed a petition for her disqualification as candidate on
the ground that she is an Australian.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Rosalind is an Australian or a Filipino
HELD:
The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis.

Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents
regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli
which determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of birth.
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born a year before the 1935 Constitution took
into effect and at that time, what served as the Constitution of the
Philippines were the principal organic acts by which the United States
governed the country. These were the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the
Philippine Autonomy Act of Aug. 29, 1916, also known as the Jones Law.
Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish
subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided therein including their children are
deemed to be Philippine citizens. Private respondents father, Telesforo
Ybasco, was born on Jan. 5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines Norte.... Thus, under
the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was deemed
to be a Philippine citizen. By virtue of the same laws, which were the laws in
force at the time of her birth, Telesforos daughter, herein private respondent
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the Philippines.
The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution has established the
principle of jus sanguinis as basis for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship,
xxx
So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of

blood relationship, was subsequently retained under the 1973 and 1987
Constitutions. Thus, the herein private respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is
a Filipino citizen, having been born to a Filipino father. The fact of her being
born in Australia is not tantamount to her losing her Philippine citizenship. If
Australia follows the principle of jus soli, then at most, private respondent
can also claim Australian citizenship resulting to her possession of dual
citizenship.
Bengson III vs HRET GR No. 142840
Mode of acquisition: Citizenship
FACTS: The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of

the constitutional requirement that no person shall be a Member of the
House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen.
Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in Tarlac in

1960 of Filipino parents. In 1985, however, Cruz enlisted in the US Marine
Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an
oath of allegiance to the USA. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino
citizenship for under CA No. 63 [(An Act Providing for the Ways in Which
Philippine Citizenship May Be Lost or Reacquired (1936)] section 1(4), a
Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, rendering service
to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country.
Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship
was erased by his naturalization as a U.S. citizen in 1990, in connection with
his service in the U.S. Marine Corps.
In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under

RA 2630 [(An Act Providing for Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by
Persons Who Lost Such Citizenship by Rendering Service To, or Accepting
Commission In, the Armed Forces of the United States (1960)]. He ran for
and was elected as the Representative of the 2nd District of Pangasinan in
the 1998 elections. He won over petitioner Bengson who was then running
for reelection.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with

respondent HRET claiming that Cruz was not qualified to become a member
of the HOR since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI,
section 6 of the Constitution.
HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto and
declaring Cruz the duly elected Representative in the said election.
ISSUE: WON Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen,

can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship.
HELD: petition dismissed
YES
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the
same in the manner provided by law. C.A. No. 63 enumerates the 3 modes by
which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen:
1. by naturalization,
2. by repatriation, and
3. by direct act of Congress.
Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost their
citizenship due to:
1. desertion of the armed forces;

2. services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II;
3. service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time,
4. marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and
5. political economic necessity
Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality This means that
a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior
status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally
a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be
restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
R.A. No. 2630 provides:
Sec 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service
to, or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or
after separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United
States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the same with
Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in the
Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any
other citizenship.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having
registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in
accordance with the aforecited provision, Cruz is deemed to have recovered
his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at
birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of
repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he
lost his Philippine citizenship.
Co vs HRET 199 SCRA 692
Facts:
On May 11, 1987, the congressional election of Northern Samar was

held.Among the candidate is herein respondent Jose Ong, Jr. Respondent Ong
was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of
Northern Samar. Petitioners questioned the citizenship of respondent Ong
since Ongs father was only a naturalized Filipino citizen and questioned
Ongs residence qualificationsince Ong does not own any property in Samar.
ISSUE/s:
1.) Whether the decision of HRET is appealable;
2.) Whether respondent is a citizen of the Philippines; and
3.) WhetherOng is a resident of Samar.
RULING:
1.) Yes. The Constitution explicitly provides that the House of

Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the Senate Electoral Tribunal
(SET) shall be the sole judges of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of their respective members. In the case at bar, the Court
finds no improvident use of power, no denial of due process on the part of
the HRET which will necessitate the exercise of the power of judicial review
by the Supreme Court.
2.) Yes. On April 28, 1955, Jose OngChuan, respondents father, an

immigrant from China was declared a Filipino citizen by the CFI of Samar. At
the time Jose OngChuan took his oath, the private respondent then is a minor
of nine years, was finishing his elementary education in the province of
Samar. Hence, there is no ground to deny the Filipino citizenship of
respondent Ong. Respondent Ong was also born of a natural-born Filipino
mother, thus the issue of citizenship is immaterial.
3.) Yes. The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier definition
given to the word residence which regarded it as having the same meaning
as domicile. The domicile of origin of the private respondent, which was the
domicile of his parents, is fixed at Laoang, Samar. Contrary to the
petitioners' imputation, Jose Ong, Jr. never abandoned said domicile; it
remained fixed therein even up to the present. Hence, the residency of
respondent Ong has sufficiently proved.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED.

Balgamelo Cabiling, et al vs Commissioner GR No. 183133
Modes of acquisition: Citizenhip
FACTS:
The petitioners herein were born of a naturalized Filipino father and a

natural-born Filipino mother. They were all raised, have resided and lived
their whole lives in this country. During their age of minority, they secured
from the Bureau of Immigration their Alien Certificates of Registration
(ACRs).Immediately upon reaching the age of twenty-one, they claimed
Philippine citizenship. Having taken their oath of allegiance as Philippine
citizens, petitioners, however, failed to have the necessary documents
registered in the civil registry as required under Section 1 of Commonwealth
Act No. 625.
ISSUE:
Whether late registration of the acquired Filipino citizenship in the Civil

Registry encumbers persons to become naturalized citizens of the
Philippines.
RULING:
No. Petitioners complied with the first and second requirements upon
reaching the age of majority. It was only the registration of the documents of
election with the civil registry that was belatedly done. The SC ruled that
under the facts peculiar to the petitioners, the right to elect Philippine
citizenship has not been lost and they should be allowed to complete the
statutory requirements for such election.The actual exercise of Philippine
citizenship, for over half a century by the herein petitioners, is actual notice
to the Philippine public which is equivalent to formal registration of the
election of Philippine citizenship.
WHEREFORE, the Decision Court of Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE.
Republic vs Dela Rosa GR No. 104654
Naturalization
FACTS:
September 20, 1991 - Frivaldo filed a petition for naturalization under the
Commonwealth Act No. 63 before the RTC Manila.
October 7, 1991 - Judge dela Rosa set the petition for hearing on March 16,
1992, and directed the publication of the said order and petition in the
Official Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation, for 3 consecutive
weeks, the last publication of which should be at least 6 months before the
date of the said hearing.
January 14, 1992 - Frivaldo asked the Judge to cancel the March 16 hearing
and move it to January 24, 1992, citing his intention to run for public office in
the May 1992 elections. Judge granted the motion and the hearing was
moved to February 21. No publication or copy was issued about the order.
February 21, 1992 - the hearing proceeded.
February 27, 1992 - Judge rendered the assailed Decision and held that
Frivaldo is readmitted as a citizen of the Republic of the Philippines by
naturalization.
Republic of the Philippines filed a petition for Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court in relation to R.A. No. 5440 and Section 25 of the
Interim Rules, to annul the decision made on February 27, 1992 and to nullify
the oath of allegiance taken by Frivaldo on same date.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Frivaldo was duly re-admitted to his citizenship as a Filipino.
RULING:
No. The supreme court ruled that Private respondent is declared NOT a
citizen of the Philippines and therefore disqualified from continuing to serve
as governor of the Province of Sorsogon. He is ordered to vacate his office
and to surrender the same to the Vice-Governor of the Province of Sorsogon
once this decision becomes final and executory. The proceedings of the trial
court was marred by the following irregularities:
(1) the hearing of the petition was set ahead of the scheduled date of
hearing, without a publication of the order advancing the date of hearing,
and the petition itself;
(2) the petition was heard within six months from the last publication of the
petition;
(3) petitioner was allowed to take his oath of allegiance before the finality of
the judgment; and
(4) petitioner took his oath of allegiance without observing the two-year
waiting period.
Frivaldo vs Comelec 257 SCRA 731
Naturalization
FACTS:
Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor of the province of Sorsogon and
assumed office in due time. The League of Municipalities filed with the
COMELEC a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo on the ground that he was
not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States.
Frivaldo admitted the allegations but pleaded the special and affirmative
defenses that he was naturalized as American citizen only to protect himself
against President Marcos during the Martial Law era.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Frivaldo is a Filipino citizen.
RULING:
No. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter
must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being
an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the
Constitution.
He claims that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of valid

repatriation. He claims that by actively participating in the local elections, he
automatically forfeited American citizenship under the laws of the United
States of America. The Court stated that that the alleged forfeiture was
between him and the US. If he really wanted to drop his American
citizenship, he could do so in accordance with CA No. 63 as amended by CA
No. 473 and PD 725. Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of
Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.
Tabasa vs Court of Appeals G.R. No. 125 793

Naturalization: Reacquisition
FACTS:
When he was 7 years old, Joevanie A. Tabasa acquired American citizenship
when his father became a naturalized citizen of the US. In 1995, he arrived in
the Philippines and was admitted as "balikbayan"; thereafter, he was
arrested and detained by the agent of BIR. The Consul General of the US
embassy of Manila filed a request with the BID that his passport has been
revoked and that Tabasa had a standing warrant for several federal charges
against him.
Petitioner alleged that he acquired Filipino citizenship by repatriation in
accordance with the RA No. 8171, and that because he is now a Filipino
citizen, he cannot be deported or detained by the BID.
ISSUE:
Whether or not he has validly reacquired Philippine citizenship under RA
8171 and therefore, is not an undocumented alien subject to deportation.
RULING:
No. Petitioner is not qualified to avail himself of repatriation under RA 8171.
The only person entitled to repatriation under RA 8171 is either a Filipino
woman who lost her Philippine citizenship by marriage to an alien, or a
natural-born Filipino, including his minor children who lost Philippine
citizenship on account of political or economic necessity.
Petitioner was already 35 years old when he filed for repatriation. The act
cannot be applied in his case because he is no longer a minor at the time of
his repatriation in 1996. The privilege under RA 8171 only belongs to children
who are of minor age at the time of filing of the petition for repatriation.
Mercado vs Manzano G.R. No. 135083
Dual Citizenship; Dual Allegiance
FACTS:
Petition for disqualification was filed against Edu Manzano to hold elective
office on the ground that he is both an American citizen and a Filipino citizen,
having been born in the United States of Filipino parents. COMELEC granted
the petition and disqualified Manzano for being a dual citizen pursuant to the
Local Government Code RA 7160, that those with dual citizenship are
disqualified from running any public position.
ISSUE:
Whether or not dual citizenship is a ground for disqualification to hold or run
office in the local position.
RULING:
No. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. What is inimical is not
dual citizenship per se, but with naturalized citizens who maintain their
allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence,
the phrase dual citizenship in RA 7160 must be understood as referring to
dual allegiance. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not
fall under this disqualification.
Jacot vs Dal and Comelec GR No. 179848
FACTS:
Petitioner Nestor Jacot assails the Resolution of COMELEC disqualifying him
from running for the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin, in the 14
May 2007 National and Local Elections, on the ground that he failed to make
a personal renouncement of US citizenship. He was a natural born citizen of
the Philippines, who became a naturalized citizen of the US on 13 December
1989. He sought to reacquire his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No.
9225.
ISSUE: Did Nestor Jacot effectively renounce his US citizenship so as to

qualify him to run as a vice-mayor?
HELD: No. It bears to emphasize that the oath of allegiance is a general

requirement for all those who wish to run as candidates in Philippine
elections; while the renunciation of foreign citizenship is an additional
requisite only for those who have retained or reacquired Philippine
citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 and who seek elective public posts,
considering their special circumstance of having more than one citizenship.
AAJS Member Calilang vs Dumatong GR No. 160869
FACTS:
Petitioner prays for a writ of prohibition be issued to stop respondent from
implementing RA 9225, or Act Making the Citizenship of the Philippine
Citizens Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent, Amending for the
Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, as Amended, and for Other Purposes.
Petitioner avers that said Act is unconstitutional as it violates Section 5,
Article IV of the 1987 Constitution: "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to
the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."
ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 9225 is unconstitutional by recognizing and allowing dual
allegiance.
RULING:
No. Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of policy and is
not self-executing provision.
What RA 9225 does is to allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino

citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship, by reason of naturalization
as citizens of a foreign country. In its face, it does not recognize dual
allegiance.
Co Kim Cham vs Tan Keh 75 Phils 113
Kinds of Government: De Facto and De Jure
FACTS:
The respondent judge refused to take cognizance of the case and to continue
the proceedings in petitioners case on the ground that the proclamation
issued on October 23, 1944 by General Douglas MacArthur had invalidated
and nullified all judicial proceedings and judgments of court during the
Japanese occupation. Respondent contends that the lower courts have no
jurisdiction to continue pending judicial proceedings and that the
government established during the Japanese occupation was no de facto
government.
ISSUE:
1. Do the judicial acts and proceedings of the court during the Japanese
occupation remain good and valid?
2. Did the proclamation of MacArthur invalidated all judgments and judicial

acts and proceedings of said court?
3. May the present courts continue those proceedings pending in said

courts?
HELD:
It is evident that the Philippine Executive Commission was a civil government
established by military forces and thus a de facto government of the second
kind. Legislative, as well as judicial, acts of de facto governments, which are
not of political complexion, remain valid after reoccupation. It is presumed
that the proclamation of General MacArthur did not specifically refer to
judicial processes thus it has not invalidated all the judgments and
proceedings of the courts during the Japanese regime. The existence of the
courts depend upon the laws which create and confer upon them their
jurisdiction. Such laws, not political in nature, are not abrogated by a change
of sovereignty and continue in force until repealed by legislative acts. It is
thus obvious that the present courts have jurisdiction to continue
proceedings in cases not of political complexion.
Lawyers League for Better Phils vs Aquino GR No. 73748, 73972
Kinds of Government: De Facto and De Jure
Facts:
On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1

announcing that she and Vice President Laurel were taking power.
On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the
Aquino government assumption of power by stating that the new
government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the
Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines.
Petitioners alleged that the Aquino government is illegal because it was

not established pursuant to the 1973 Constitution.
Issues:
Whether or not the petitioners have a personality to sue.
Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.
Discussions:
In order that the citizens actions may be allowed a party must show that he
personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the
allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to
the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favourable
action.
The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the provisional It
was the people that made the judgement and accepted the new
government. Thus, the Supreme Court held its legitimacy.
Rulings:
1.Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions state no cause of

action. The holding that petitioners did not have standing followed from the
finding that they did not have a cause of action.
2. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but

belongs to the realm of politics where only the people are the judge. And the
people have made the judgment; they have accepted the government of
President Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of the entire country
so that it is not merely a de facto government but is in fact and law a de jure
government. Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the
legitimacy of the present government.
GP vs Monte De Piedad GR No. 9959
Doctrine of Parens Patriae
Facts:
A devastating earthquake took place in the Philippines sometimes in 1863.

Contributions amounting to $400,000 were collected during the Spanish
regime for the relief of the victims of an earthquake. Out of the aid,
$80,000.00 was left untouched. The Monte de Piedad, a charitable
institution, in need for more working capital, petitioned the Governor-General
for the transfer of $80,000 as a loan.
In June 1893, the Department of Finance called upon the Monte de Piedad to
return the $80,000. The respondent bank declined to comply with this order
upon the ground that only the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands and
not the Department of Finance had the right to order the reimbursement.
On account of various petitions of the persons, the Philippine Islands,

through the Attorney-General, bring suit against the Monte de Piedad for a
recover of the $80,000, together with interest, for the benefit of those
persons or their heirs. After due trial, judgment was entered in favor of the
plaintiff for the sum of $80,000 gold or its equivalent in Philippine currency,
together with legal interest from February 28, 1912, and the costs of the
cause.
The defendant appealed. One of the assignment of errors made by the
defendant was to question the competence of the plaintiff (government) to
bring the action, contending that the suit could be instituted only by the
intended beneficiaries themselves or by their heirs.
Issues:
Whether or not the Philippine government is competent to file a complaint

against the respondent bank for the reimbursement of the money of the
intended beneficiaries?
Discussions:
In accordance with the doctrine of Parens Patriae. The government being the
protector of the rights of the people has the inherent supreme power to
enforce such laws that will promote the public interest. No other party has
been entrusted with such right hence as parents of the people the
government has the right to take back the money intended for the people.
Soriano vs Laguardia GR No. 164785, 587 SCRA 79
Doctrine of Parens Patriae
Facts:
On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the program
Ang Dating Daan, aired on UNTV 37, made obscene remarks against INC. Two
days after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost identical affidavit-
complaints were lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and seven other private
respondents, all members of the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC), against petitioner in
connection with the above broadcast. Respondent Michael M. Sandoval, who
felt directly alluded to in petitioners remark, was then a minister of INC and
a regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang Daan.
Issue:
Whether or not Sorianos statements during the televised Ang Dating Daan
part of the religious discourse and within the protection of Section 5, Art.III.
Held:
No. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, therefore, and

considering the adverse effect of petitioners utterances on the viewers
fundamental rights as well as petitioners clear violation of his duty as a
public trustee, the MTRCB properly suspended him from appearing in Ang
Dating Daan for three months. Furthermore, it cannot be properly asserted
that petitioners suspension was an undue curtailment of his right to free
speech either as a prior restraint or as a subsequent punishment. Aside from
the reasons given above (re the paramount of viewers rights, the public
trusteeship character of a broadcasters role and the power of the State to
regulate broadcast media), a requirement that indecent language be avoided
has its primary effect on the form, rather than the content, of serious
communication. There are few, if any, thoughts that cannot be expressed by
the use of less offensive language.
Tanada vs Angara GR No. 118295
Theory of Auto-limitation
Facts:
This is a petition seeking to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World
Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement. Petitioners question the concurrence
of herein respondents acting in their capacities as Senators via signing the
said agreement.
The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading
partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly
agricultural and industrial products. Thus, provides new opportunities for the
service sector cost and uncertainty associated with exporting and more
investment in the country. These are the predicted benefits as reflected in
the agreement and as viewed by the signatory Senators, a free market
espoused by WTO.
Petitioners on the other hand viewed the WTO agreement as one that limits,
restricts and impair Philippine economic sovereignty and legislative power.
That the Filipino First policy of the Constitution was taken for granted as it
gives foreign trading intervention.
Issue : Whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Senate in giving
its concurrence of the said WTO agreement.
Held:
In its Declaration of Principles and state policies, the Constitution adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the
land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom,
cooperation and amity , with all nations. By the doctrine of incorporation, the
country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which
are considered automatically part of our own laws. Pacta sunt servanda
international agreements must be performed in good faith. A treaty is not a
mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties.
Through WTO the sovereignty of the state cannot in fact and reality be
considered as absolute because it is a regulation of commercial relations
among nations. Such as when Philippines joined the United Nations (UN) it
consented to restrict its sovereignty right under the concept of sovereignty
as autolimitation. What Senate did was a valid exercise of authority. As to
determine whether such exercise is wise, beneficial or viable is outside the
realm of judicial inquiry and review. The act of signing the said agreement is
not a legislative restriction as WTO allows withdrawal of membership should
this be the political desire of a member. Also, it should not be viewed as a
limitation of economic sovereignty. WTO remains as the only viable structure
for multilateral trading and the veritable forum for the development of
international trade law. Its alternative is isolation, stagnation if not economic
self-destruction. Thus, the people be allowed, through their duly elected
officers, make their free choice.
Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
The Province of North Cotabato vs GRP Peace Panel GR No. 183591
Question: Is Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) a State within a

State?
FACTS:
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and
the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign a
Memorandum of Agreement of the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP -
MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, the petitioners
seek to compel respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and
official copies of the MA-AD and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD
and the holding of public consultation thereon. They also pray that the MOA-
AD be declared unconstitutional. The Court issued a TRO enjoining the GRP
from signing the same.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for
adjudication;
2. Whether or not there is a violation of the people's right to information on
matters of public concern (Art 3 Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure
of all its transactions involving public interest (Art 2, Sec 28) including public
consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991)
3. Whether or not the signing of the MOA, the Government of the Republic of
the Philippines would be binding itself
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a
separate state, or a juridical, territorial or political subdivision not recognized
by law;
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the
MOA;
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front
for ancestral domain in violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)
RULINGS:
1. Yes, the petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of the respondents
to consult the local government units or communities affected constitutes a
departure by respondents from their mandate under EO No. 3. Moreover, the
respondents exceeded their authority by the mere act of guaranteeing
amendments to the Constitution. Any alleged violation of the Constitution by
any branch of government is a proper matter for judicial review.
As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public
interest or of transcendental importance, the Court grants the petitioners,
petitioners-in-intervention and intervening respondents the requisite locus
standi in keeping with the liberal stance adopted in David v. Macapagal-
Arroyo.
In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, this Court held:
x x x [B]y the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval
of the challenged action, the dispute is said to have ripened into a
judicial controversy even without any other overt act . Indeed, even a
singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken
judicial duty.x x x x
By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our constitutional
scheme is a coequal of Congress, is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution and the laws x x x settling the dispute becomes the duty and
the responsibility of the courts.
That the law or act in question is not yet effective does not negate ripeness.
2. Yes. The Court finds that there is a grave violation of the Constitution
involved in the matters of public concern (Sec 7 Art III) under a state policy
of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (Art 2, Sec 28)
including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of
1991).
(Sec 7 ArtIII) The right to information guarantees the right of the people to
demand information, while Sec 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give
information even if nobody demands. The complete and effective exercise of
the right to information necessitates that its complementary provision on
public disclosure derive the same self-executory nature, subject only to
reasonable safeguards or limitations as may be provided by law.
The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern
involving public interest in the highest order. In declaring that the right to
information contemplates steps and negotiations leading to the
consummation of the contract, jurisprudence finds no distinction as to the
executory nature or commercial character of the agreement.
E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on
both national and local levels and for a principal forum for consensus-
building. In fact, it is the duty of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace
Process to conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant information,
comments, advice, and recommendations from peace partners and
concerned sectors of society.
3.
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a
separate state, or a juridical, territorial or political subdivision not recognized
by law;
Yes. The provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the
Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the status of an associated state or,
at any rate, a status closely approximating it.
The concept of association is not recognized under the present
Constitution.
No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under

our laws as having an associative relationship with the national
government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go beyond anything
ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It also
implies the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The
Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction
other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory
status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence.
The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous region
recognized in the Constitution. It is not merely an expanded version of
the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national government being
fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in
all but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the
Montevideo Convention, namely, a permanent population, a defined
territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations with
other states.
Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any
portion of Philippine territory, the spirit animating it which has betrayed
itself by its use of the concept of association runs counter to the national
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic.
The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national

government and the BJE being itself contrary to the present Constitution, it is
not surprising that many of the specific provisions of the MOA-AD on the
formation and powers of the BJE are in conflict with the Constitution and the
laws. The BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even
assuming that it is covered by the term autonomous region in the
constitutional provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict with
it.
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the

MOA:
The MOA-AD provides that any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring

amendments to the existing legal framework shall come into force upon the
signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary
changes to the legal framework, implying an amendment of the
Constitution to accommodate the MOA-AD. This stipulation, in effect,
guaranteed to the MILF the amendment of the Constitution .
It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath of
office, only to preserve and defend the Constitution. Such presidential power
does not, however, extend to allowing her to change the Constitution, but
simply to recommend proposed amendments or revision. As long as she
limits herself to recommending these changes and submits to the proper
procedure for constitutional amendments and revision, her mere
recommendation need not be construed as an unconstitutional act.
The suspensive clause in the MOA-AD viewed in light of the above-

discussed standards.
Given the limited nature of the Presidents authority to propose

constitutional amendments, she cannot guarantee to any third party
that the required amendments will eventually be put in place, nor
even be submitted to a plebiscite. The most she could do is submit
these proposals as recommendations either to Congress or the people, in
whom constituent powers are vested.
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front

for ancestral domain in violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)
This strand begins with the statement that it is the birthright of all Moros
and all Indigenous peoples of Mindanao to identify themselves and be
accepted as Bangsamoros. It defines Bangsamoro people as the natives
or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan
and the Sulu archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization, and their
descendants whether mixed or of full blood, including their spouses.
Thus, the concept of Bangsamoro, as defined in this strand of the MOA-AD,

includes not only Moros as traditionally understood even by Muslims, but
all indigenous peoples of Mindanao and its adjacent islands. The MOA-AD
adds that the freedom of choice of indigenous peoples shall be respected.
What this freedom of choice consists in has not been specifically defined. The
MOA-AD proceeds to refer to the Bangsamoro homeland, the ownership of
which is vested exclusively in the Bangsamoro people by virtue of their prior
rights of occupation. Both parties to the MOA-AD acknowledge that ancestral
domain does not form part of the public domain.
Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides
for clear-cut procedure for the recognition and delineation of ancestral
domain, which entails, among other things, the observance of the free and
prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous
Peoples. Notably, the statute does not grant the Executive Department or
any government agency the power to delineate and recognize an ancestral
domain claim by mere agreement or compromise.
Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires
all national offices to conduct consultations beforeany project or program
critical to the environment and human ecology including those that may call
for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in such locality, is
implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that
unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the
Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically result to the
diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total
environment.
CONCLUSION:
In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave
abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out the pertinent consultation
process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160, and Republic Act
No. 8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and
crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to
a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof.
It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform
the duty enjoined.
The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws.
Not only its specific provisions but the very concept underlying them,
namely, the associative relationship envisioned between the GRP and the
BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated
entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence.
Peralta vs Director of Prisons 75 PHIL 285

Belligerent Occupation and its effects
FACTS:
William Peralta was prosecuted for the crime of robbery and was sentenced
to life imprisonment as defined and penalized by Act No. 65 of the National
Assembly of the Republic of the Philippines. The petition for habeas corpus is
based on the contention that the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal
Jurisdiction created by Ordinance No. 7 was a political instrumentality of the
military forces of Japan and which is repugnant to the aims of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines for it does not afford fair trial and impairs
the constitutional rights of the accused.
ISSUE:
1. Is the creation of court by Ordinance No. 7 valid?
2. Is the sentence of life imprisonment valid?
3. By principle of postliminy, did the punitive sentence cease to be valid

from the time of the restoration of the Commonwealth?
HELD:
There is no room for doubt to the validity of Ordinance No. 7 since the
criminal jurisdiction established by the invader is drawn entirely from the law
martial as defined in the usages of nations. It is merely a governmental
agency. The sentence rendered, likewise, is good and valid since it was within
the power and competence of the belligerent occupant to promulgate Act No.
65. All judgments of political complexion of the courts during Japanese
regime ceased to be valid upon reoccupation of the Islands, as such, the
sentence which convicted the petitioner of a crime of a political complexion
must be considered as having ceased to be valid.
Laurel vs Misa 77 Phil 856
Belligerent Occupation and its effects
FACTS:
Anastacio Laurel filed a petition for habeas corpus contending that he cannot
be prosecuted for the crime of treason defined and penalized by the Article
114 of the Revised Penal Code on the grounds that the sovereignty of the
legitimate government and the allegiance of Filipino citizens was then
suspended, and that there was a change of sovereignty over the Philippines
upon the proclamation of the Philippine Republic.
ISSUE:
1. Is the absolute allegiance of the citizens suspended during Japanese
occupation?
2. Is the petitioner subject to Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code?
HELD:
The absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory
occupied by the enemy of their legitimate government on sovereign is not
abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation because the sovereignty of
the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred to the occupier. There
is no such thing as suspended allegiance.
The petitioner is subject to the Revised Penal Code for the change of form of
government does not affect the prosecution of those charged with the crime
of treason because it is an offense to the same government and same
sovereign people.
Republic vs Villasor 54 SCRA 83
Non-suability of the State
Facts:
The case was filed by the Republic of the Philippines requesting to nullify the
ruling of The Court of First Instance in Cebu in garnishing the public funds
allocated for the Arm Forces of the Philippines.
A decision was rendered in Special Proceedings in favor of respondents P. J.
Kiener Co., Ltd., Gavino Unchuan, and International Construction
Corporation, and against the petitioner herein, confirming the arbitration
award in the amount of P1,712,396.40, subject of Special Proceedings. The
respondent Honorable Guillermo P. Villasor, issued an Order declaring the
said decision final and executory, directing the Sheriffs of Rizal Province,
Quezon City and Manila to execute the said decision. The corresponding Alia
Writ of Execution was issued. On the strength of the aforementioned Alias
Writ of Execution, the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal served Notices of
Garnishment with several Banks. The funds of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines on deposit with Philippine Veterans Bank and PNB are public
funds duly appropriated and allocated for the payment of pensions of
retirees, pay and allowances of military and civilian personnel and for
maintenance and operations of the AFP.
Petitioner, filed prohibition proceedings against respondent Judge Villasor for

acting in excess of jurisdiction with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction in granting the issuance of a Writ of Execution against the
properties of the AFP, hence the notices and garnishment are null and void.
Issues:
Whether or not the state can be sued without its consent.
Whether or not the notice of garnishment issued by Judge Villasor is valid.
Discussions:
The provision of Sec 3 Article XVI declares that the State may not be sued
without its consent. This provision is merely a recognition of the sovereign
character of the State and express an affirmation of the unwritten rule
insulating it from the jurisdiction of the courts of justice. Another justification
is the practical consideration that the demands and inconveniences of
litigation will divert time and resources of the State from the more pressing
matters demanding its attention, to the prejudice of the public welfare.
As a general rule, whether the money is deposited by way of general or

special deposit, they remain government funds and are not subject to
garnishment. An exception of the rule is a law or ordinance that has been
enacted appropriating a specific amount to pay a valid government
obligation.
Tan vs Director of Forestry 125 SCRA 302
Non-suability of the State
FACTS:
Sometime in April 1961, the Bureau of Forestry issued notice advertising for
public bidding a certain tract of public forest land situated in Olongapo,
Zambales consisting of 6,420 hectares, within the former U.S. Naval
Reservation comprising 7,252 hectares of timberland, which was turned over
by the US Government to the Philippine Government. Wenceslao Tan with
nine others submitted their application in due form.
The area was granted to the petitioner. On May 30, 1963, Secretary Gozon of
Agriculture and Natural Resources issued a general memorandum order
authorizing Dir. Of Forestry to grant new Ordinary Timber Licenses (OTL)
subject to some conditions stated therein (not exceeding 3000 hectares for
new OTL and not exceeding 5000 hectares for extension)
Thereafter, Acting Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Feliciano

(replacing Gozon) promulgated on December 19, 1963 a memorandum
revoking the authority delegated to the Director of Forestry to grant ordinary
timber licenses. On the same date, OTL in the name of Tan, was signed by
then Acting Director of Forestry, without the approval of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources. On January 6, 1964, the license
was released by the Director of Forestry .
Ravago Commercial Company wrote a letter to the Secretary of ANR praying

that the OTL of Tan be revoked. On March 9, 1964, The Secretary of ANR
declared Tans OTL null and void (but the same was not granted to Ravago).
Petitioner-appellant moved for a reconsideration of the order, but the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources denied the motion.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not petitioners timber license is valid (No)
II. Whether or not petitioner had exhausted administrative remedies

available (No)
RULING:
Petitioners timber license was signed and released without authority and is
therefore void ab initio. In the first place, in the general memorandum dated
May 30, 1963, the Director of Forestry was authorized to grant a new
ordinary timber license only where the area covered thereby was not more
than 3,000 hectares; the tract of public forest awarded to the petitioner
contained 6,420 hectares In the second place, at the time it was released to
the petitioner, the Acting Director of Forestry had no more authority to grant
any license. (The license was released to the petitioner on January 6,
1964 while on the other hand, the authority of the Director of Forestry to
issue license was revoked on December 19, 1963). In view thereof, the
Director of Forestry had no longer any authority to release the license on
January 6, 1964, and said license is therefore void ab initio. What is of
greatest importance is the date of the release or issuance. Before its release,
no right is acquired by the licensee.
Granting arguendo, that petitioner-appellant's timber license is valid, still

respondents-appellees can validly revoke his timber license. "A license is
merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is
not a contract between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it
and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property
right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation
The welfare of the people is the supreme law. Thus, no franchise or right can
be availed of to defeat the proper exercise of police power.
II
Petitioner did not exhaust administrative remedy in this case. He did not
appeal the order of the respondent Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources to the President of the Philippines. Considering that the President
has the power to review on appeal the orders or acts of the respondents, the
failure of the petitioner-appellant to take that appeal is failure on his part to
exhaust his administrative remedies.
Republic vs Feliciano 148 SCRA 424
State cannot be sued without its consent
Facts:
The appeal was filed by 86 settlers of Barrio of Salvacion, representing the

Republic of the Philippines to dismiss the complaint filed by Feliciano, on the
ground that the Republic of the Philippines cannot be sued without its
consent.
Prior to this appeal, respondent Pablo Feliciano filed a complaint with the
Court of First Instance against the Republic of the Philippines, represented by
the Land Authority, for the recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel
of land consisting of four lots. The trial court rendered a decision declaring
Lot No. 1 to be the private property of Feliciano and the rest of the property,
Lots 2, 3 and 4, reverted to the public domain.
The trial court reopened the case due to the filing of a motion to intervene
and to set aside the decision of the trial court by 86 settlers, alleging that
they had been in possession of the land for more than 20 years under claim
of ownership. The trial court ordered the settlers to present their evidence
but they did not appear at the day of presentation of evidence. Feliciano, on
the other hand, presented additional evidence. Thereafter, the case was
submitted for decision and the trial court ruled in favor of Feliciano.
The settlers immediately filed a motion for reconsideration. The case was
reopened to allow them to present their evidence. But before this motion was
acted upon, Feliciano filed a motion for execution with the Appellate Court
but it was denied.
The settlers filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the Republic of the
Philippines cannot be sued without its consent and hence the action cannot
prosper. The motion was opposed by Feliciano.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the state can be sued for recovery and possession of a parcel
of land.
Discussions:
A suit against the State, under settled jurisprudence is not permitted, except
upon a showing that the State has consented to be sued, either expressly or
by implication through the use of statutory language too plain to be
misinterpreted. It may be invoked by the courts sua sponte at any stage of
the proceedings.
Waiver of immunity, being a derogation of sovereignty, will not be inferred
lightly. but must be construed in strictissimi juris (of strictest right).
Moreover, the Proclamation is not a legislative act. The consent of the State
to be sued must emanate from statutory authority. Waiver of State immunity
can only be made by an act of the legislative body.
Ruling/s:
No. The doctrine of non-suability of the State has proper application in this
case. The plaintiff has impleaded the Republic of the Philippines as defendant
in an action for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land,
bringing the State to court just like any private person who is claimed to be
usurping a piece of property. A suit for the recovery of property is not an
action in rem, but an action in personam. It is an action directed against a
specific party or parties, and any judgment therein binds only such party or
parties. The complaint filed by plaintiff, the private respondent herein, is
directed against the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land
Authority, a governmental agency created by Republic Act No. 3844.
The complaint is clearly a suit against the State, which under settled
jurisprudence is not permitted, except upon a showing that the State has
consented to be sued, either expressly or by implication through the use of
statutory language too plain to be misinterpreted. There is no such showing
in the instant case. Worse, the complaint itself fails to allege the existence of
such consent.
PNB vs Pabala 83 SCRA 595
State cannot be sued without its consent
Facts:
The case was filed by petitioner requesting for certiorari against the writ of
execution authorized by the Hon Judge Pabalan regarding the transfer of
funds amounting to P12,724.66 belonging to Philippine Virginia Tobacco
Administration (PVTA).
Philippine National Bank (PNB) of La Union filed an administrative complaint

against Judge Pabalan for grave abuse of discretion, alleging that the latter
failed to recognize that the questioned funds are of public character and
therefore may not be garnished, attached or levied upon. The PNB La Union
Branch invoked the doctrine of non-suability, putting a bar on the notice of
garnishment.
Issues:
Whether or not Philippine National Bank can be sued.
Whether or not the notice of garnishment of funds of Philippine Virginia

Tobacco deposited with the petitioner bank is valid.
Discussions:
The consent of the state to be sued may be given expressly or impliedly. In

this case, Consent to be sued was given impliedly when the State enters into
a commercial contract. When the State enters into a contract, the State is
deemed to have divested itself of the mantle of sovereign immunity and
descended to the level of the ordinary individual. Hence, Funds of public
corporations could properly be made the object of a notice of garnishment.

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Manila Prince Hotel vs GSIS

Self Executing Statutes

The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance

Whether or not the submission of matching bid is premature

Since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of

A constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the

The Court agrees.

There was grave abuse of discretion.

To insist on selling the Manila Hotel to foreigners when there is a Filipino

Hence, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA

Oposa vs. Factoran 224 SCRA 792

Plaintiffs prayed that judgement be rendered ordering the respondent, his

(1) Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action.

First Issue: Cause of Action.

Respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a

After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, the Court finds it to

Second Issue: Political Issue.

Third Issue: Violation of the non-impairment clause.

Moreover, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of

Kilosbayan vs Morato GR No. 118910

Self Executing Statutes

2. Whether the resolution thereof is a political question has resulted in a

2.From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional

Santiago vs Guingona GR No. 134577

Thereafter, Senator Tatad manifested, with the agreement of Senator Miriam

First Issue: Court's Jurisdiction

Second Issue: Violation of the Constitution

Third Issue: Usurpation of Office

Fourth Issue: Fernan's Recognition of Guingona

The Petition is DISMISSED.

Respondents are acting without or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing

Following that, petitioners prayed for the nullification of Proclamation No.

Third. Proclamation No. 1102 is not an evidence of ratification. Article X of

A department of the Government cannot recognize its own acts.

Bondoc vs. Pineda 201 SCRA 792

On the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, Congressman

Whether or not the House of Representatives, at the request of the

The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral

As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must

Angara vs. Electoral Commission 63 Phil 139

On Dec. 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8, which in

On Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution (No. 6)

Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over

In the case at bar, here is then presented an actual controversy involving as

The petition for a writ of prohibition against the electoral commission is

Magallona, et al vs Ermita GR No. 187167

RA 5446 amended RA 3046 in terms of typographical errors and included

RA 9522 took effect on March 2009 amending RA 5446. The amendments,

Petitioners in their capacity as taxpayer, citizen and legislator assailed the

2. WON RA 9522 is unconstitutional

The SC upheld the constitutionality of RA 9522.

Second, the classification of KGI and Scarborough Shoal as Regime of Islands

Tecson vs. Comelec GR No. 161434

Modes of Acquisition: Citizenship

Mo ya Lim Yao vs. Commission on Immigration 41 SCRA 29

Modes of acquisition: Citizenship

Valles vs Comelec 337 SCRA 543

Modes of acquisition: Citizenship

Whether or not Rosalind is an Australian or a Filipino

The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis.

So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of

Bengson III vs HRET GR No. 142840

Mode of acquisition: Citizenship

FACTS: The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of