FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 184197. February 11, 2010.]

RAPID CITY REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION ,

petitioner, vs. ORLANDO VILLA and LOURDES PAEZ-VILLA , 1
respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J : p

Sometime in 2004, Rapid City Realty and Development Corporation (petitioner)

led a complaint for declaration of nullity of subdivision plans . . . mandamus and
damages against several defendants including Spouses Orlando and Lourdes Villa
(respondents). The complaint, which was docketed at the Regional Trial Court of
Antipolo City as Civil Case No. 04-7350, was lodged at Branch 71 thereof.

After one failed attempt at personal service of summons, Gregorio Zapanta

(Zapanta), court process server, resorted to substituted service by serving summons
upon respondents' househelp who did not acknowledge receipt thereof and refused
to divulge their names. Thus Zapanta stated in the Return of Summons:

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that on September 24, 2004, the undersigned caused

the service of summons together with a copy of the complaint with its
annexes to defendant Spouses Lourdes Estudillo Paez-Cline and Orlando
Villa at their given address at 905 Padre Faura Street, Ermita Manila, as per
information given by two lady househelps who are also residing at the said
address, the defendant spouses are not around at that time. On the
27th of September, 2004, I returned to the same place to serve the
summons. I served the summons and the copy of the complaint with its
annexes to the two ladies (The same lady househelp I met on Sept.
24, 2004) but they refused to sign to acknowledge receipt and
they refused to tell their name as per instruction of the
defendants. With me who can attest to the said incident is Mr. Jun Llanes,
who was with me at that time. 2 . . . (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Despite substituted service, respondents failed to le their Answer, prompting

petitioner to le a "Motion to Declare Defendants[-herein respondents] in Default"
which the trial court granted by Order of May 3, 2005. cDIaAS

More than eight months thereafter or on January 30, 2006, respondents led a
Motion to Lift Order of Default, 3 claiming that on January 27, 2006 they "officially
received all pertinent papers such as Complaint and Annexes. Motion to Dismiss of
the Solicitor General and the ORDER dated May 3, 2005 granting the Motion to
Declare [them] in Default." And they denied the existence of two women helpers
who allegedly refused to sign and acknowledge receipt of the summons. In any
event, they contended that assuming that the allegation were true, the helpers had
no authority to receive the documents. 4

By Order of July 17, 2006, the trial court set aside the Order of Default and gave
herein respondents ve days to le their Answer. Respondents just the same did not
le an Answer, drawing petitioner to again le a Motion to declare them in default,
which the trial court again granted by Order of February 21, 2007.

On April 18, 2007, respondents led an Omnibus Motion for reconsideration of the
second order declaring them in default and to vacate proceedings, this time claiming
that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons due to invalid
service of summons.

The trial court denied respondents' Omnibus Motion by Order of May 22, 2007 and
proceeded to receive ex parte evidence for petitioner.

Respondents, via certiorari, challenged the trial court's February 21, 2007 and April
18, 2007 Orders before the Court of Appeals.

In the meantime, the trial court, by Decision of September 4, 2007,

rendered judgment in favor of petitioner.

By Decision of April 29, 2008, 5 the appellate court annulled the trial court's Orders
declaring respondents in default for the second time in this wise:

In assailing the orders of the trial court through their Motion to Lift. . . and
later their Omnibus Motion. . . the petitioners [herein-respondents] never
raised any other defense in avoidance of the respondents' [herein
petitioners] claim, and instead focused all their energies on questioning the
said court's jurisdiction. The latter motion clearly stated prefatorily their
counsel's reservation or "special appearance to question jurisdiction" over
the persons of the petitioners. "A party who makes a special appearance in
court challenging the jurisdiction of said court based on the ground of invalid
service of summons is not deemed to have submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court." 6 (citation omitted; italics, emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court by
Resolution of August 12, 2008, it comes to the Court via petition for review on
certiorari, arguing in the main that respondents, in ling the rst Motion to Lift the
Order of Default, voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court.
SHTaID

The petition is impressed with merit.

It is settled that if there is no valid service of summons, the court can still acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by virtue of the latter's voluntary
appearance. Thus Section 20 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 20. Voluntary appearance. The defendant's voluntary appearance

 in the action shall be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a
motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the
person shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance.

And Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Spouses Wilson Dy Hong Pi and

Lolita Dy, et al. enlightens:
Preliminarily, jurisdiction over the defendant in a civil case is acquired either
by the coercive power of legal processes exerted over his person, or his
voluntary appearance in court. As a general proposition, one who seeks an
armative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court.
It is by reason of this rule that we have had occasion to declare that the
ling of motions to admit answer, for additional time to le answer, for
reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion
for reconsideration, is considered voluntary submission to the court's
jurisdiction. This, however, is tempered by the concept of conditional
appearance, such that a party who makes a special appearance to
challenge, among others, the court's jurisdiction over his person cannot be
considered to have submitted to its authority.

Prescinding from the foregoing, it is thus clear that:

(1) Special appearance operates as an exception to the general rule

on voluntary appearance;

(2) Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the court over the

person of the defendant must be explicitly made, i.e., set forth in an
unequivocal manner; and

(3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the jurisdiction

of the court, especially in instances where a pleading or motion seeking
armative relief is led and submitted to the court for resolution. 7 (italics
and underscoring supplied)

In their rst Motion to Lift the Order of Default 8 dated January 30, 2006,
respondents alleged:

xxx xxx xxx

4. In the case of respondents, there is no reason why they should not

receive the Orders of this Honorable Court since the subject of the
case is their multi-million real estate property and naturally they would
not want to be declared in default or lose the same outright without
the benefit of a trial on the merits;

5. It would be the height of injustice if the respondents is [sic] denied the

equal protection of the laws[;] HTAIcD

6. Respondents must be aorded "Due process of Law" as enshrined in

the New Constitution, which is a basic right of every Filipino, since they
were not furnished copies of pleadings by the plainti and the Order
 dated May 3, 2005;

xxx xxx xxx 9

and accordingly prayed as follows:

WHEREFORE, . . . it is most respectfully prayed . . . that the Order dated

May 5, 2005 declaring [them] in default be LIFTED. 10

Respondents did not, in said motion, allege that their ling thereof was a special
appearance for the purpose only to question the jurisdiction over their persons.
Clearly, they had acquiesced to the jurisdiction of the court.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Court of Appeals Decision of

April 29, 2008 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Let the original records of Civil Case No. 04-7350 be remanded to the court of
origin, Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 71.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, C.J., Nachura, * Bersamin and Villarama, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1. The Court of Appeals was originally impleaded as respondent. Pursuant however

to Rule 45, Sec. 4 of the Rules of Court, the courts or judges rendering the
assailed judgment shall not be impleaded as respondents in a petition for review on
certiorari.

2. Records, p. 219.

3. Id. at 367-372.

4. Rollo, pp. 70-71.

5. Penned by Associate Justice Apolinario O. Bruselas, Jr. with the concurrence of

Associate Justices Rebecca de Guia-Salvador and Vicente S.E. Veloso.

6. Supra note 4.

7. G.R. No. 171137, June 5, 2009.

8. Records, pp. 367-371.

9. Id. at 368-369.

10. Id. at 370.

* Additional member per Special Order No. 821.