Compendium Technical PaperI

First Nation
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FirstNationalDamSafetyConference
24&25March2015 Chennai
Select papers submitted for the First National Dam Safety Conference organized by Central Water
Commission (CWC) in collaboration with Tamil Nadu Water Resources Department (TNWRD) and
IndianInstituteofTechnology,Madras(IITM)during24&25March2015inChennaiarepublishedin
thisCompendiumafterincorporatingeditorialcorrectionsasnecessary.
Disclaimer
Theviewsandopinionsexpressedorassumptionsmadeinthesepapersarethoseoftheauthorsand
do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of CWC, TNWRD or IITM. Appropriate
discretion may be exercised while utilizing the information, examples, analysis or case histories
presented within these papers in realworld situations; concerned authors of the papers may be
contactedasnecessary.
Foranyinformation,pleasecontact
TheProjectDirector,
CentralProjectManagementUnit,DRIP
CentralWaterCommission,
3rdFloor,NewLibraryBuilding(NearSewaBhawan),
R.K.Puram,NewDelhi110066.
Email:cpmucwc@nic.in
Website:www.damsafety.in
FOREWORD
First National Dam Safety Conference was jointly organized by

Central Water Commission. Tamil Nadu Water Resources
Department (TNWRD) and Indian Institute of Technology, Madras
(llTM) in Chennai during 24 & 25 March 2015. The conference
spread over six technical sessions focused upon (i) Design Flood
Estimation, (ii) Risk Assessment, (iii) Institutional Arrangements for
Sustainable Dam Safety, (iv) New Materials and Methods for Dam
Rehabilitation, (v) Innovations and Methods for Dam Health Monitoring and (vi)
lssues & Strategies for Compliance with Design Standards. The conference received
immense response with over 280 delegates registering for participation and receipt of
50 technical papers, of which 30 papers were selected for oral presentation.
National Dam Safety Conferences are henceforth planned to be organized every year
in different parts of the country to deliberate on varied dam safety aspects; e.g.
hydrological studies, design, construction, operation, maintenance, rehabilitation,
environmental impact, state of the art technology, emergency action plans, financing,
contract management, quality management systems, etc. Technical papers
deliberated in these conferences are expected to go a long way in sensitizing dam
safety concerns and evolving standardized dam safety practices.
To provide permanent record and for wider dissemination, select papers received for
the First National Dam Safety Conference are published in this compendium. I hope
that this compendium will provide an important reference material for decision-
makers, researchers, engineers and all those associated with dam safety in line with
the spirit of the Conference. Lot of efforts have gone in organizing the Conference
and in bringing out this Compendium; and I take this opportunity to compliment the
Organizing and Technical Committees of the First National Dam Safety Conference
for their valuable contribution. Meticulous planning and untiring efforts of several
individuals from the collaborating organizations have played an important role in this
achievement, and I appreciate the hard work of each such individual.
,V
(A.B Pandya)
New Delhi Chairman
25 August 201 5 Central Water Commission
i
PREFACE
India has over 4900 large dams: three-fourths of these dams are more than 25
years old and require rehabilitation to restore their operational performance and safety.
Central Water Commission (CWC) with financial assistance from the World Bank,
embarked upon the six year Dam Rehabilitation and lmprovement Project (DRIP) at an
estimated cost of Rs. 2100 crore, The objectives of DRIP includes rehabilitation of about
250 dams and also promoting new technologies and improving institutional capacities
for dam safety evaluation and project implementation at the Central and State levels
and in some identified premier academic and research institutes of the country,
As part of institutional strengthening for dam safety, First National Dam Safety
Conference was organized in Chennai during 24 - 25 March 2015 by CWC jointly with
Tamil Nadu Water Resources Department (TNWRD) and Indian Institute of Technology,
Madras (llTM). The Conference provided a forum for sharing knowledge and experience
of experts in the field, belonging to distinguished organizations, dam owners, academic
and research institutes and the industry. The focus of the Conference was on effective
application of knowledge and technologies to real-life problems faced by the dam safety
professionals and help them in determining the strategies for effectively managing the
uncertainties associated with dam ooeration and maintenance.
The topics for technical sessions in the First National Dam Safety Conference
were chosen to reflect key concerns highlighted during the first three years of DRIP
implementation. There was good response for the conference both in terms of technical
papers received for presentation and the registered delegates Fifty technical papers
were contributed by experts from government agencies, utilities, academia, consulting
firms and private industry within and outside the country; due to paucity of time all the
papers could not be presented during the Technical Sessions.
To create a repository of the knowledge and experience reflected in the technical

papers and making them available for permanent reference, select papers received for
the Conference are published in the form of a Compendium under the aegis of the
Technical Committee of the Conference. This Compendium is an un-priced publication
for distribution to DRIP lmplementing Agencies and others concerned. I am sure this
Compendium will act as an important reference material for dam professionals for
implementing their dam safety initiatives.
I take this opportunity to thank all the esteemed members of the Technical
Committee for their untiring support in conduct of the Conference and in compiling this
valuable Compendium.
C.K. Agrawal, Member (D&R)

New Delhi Central Water Commission
12 August 2015 Chairman, Technical Committee
ii
CONFERENCE INTRODUCTION
The notion of scarcity of water on planet earth is day-by-day gaining strength. But this
view is somewhat erroneous because earth is the only known planet with abundant water; or
may be the only planet where fresh water is available in renewable liquid form. However the
renewable fresh water on earth is not distributed uniformly in space and time. This single natural
factor, along with the dilemma of ever increasing human population, forms the premises of our
great water problem. The remedy for the geographic non-uniformity in availability of water lies in
construction of diversion dams; while time related non-uniformity in availability of water is
essentially addressed by construction of storage dams. Dams as solution for water problem
were apparently known to very early civilizations; and even today, dams provide the only
meaningful solution for meeting water demands of the current and future world population.
With a geographic land proportion of only 2.2%, India musters a share of about 4.6% in
renewable water. Yet it faces water stress because of over 16.6% share in world population.
Moreover, India suffers due to erratic rainfall pattern both over space and time. About 65% of
Indias land area accounts for less than 30% renewable water resource. More than 80% of
annual rainfall occurs during four monsoon months. Even during monsoon, distribution of rainfall
remains uneven with 50% of rainfall happening in less than 15 days, and in less than 100
hours. It has been realized very early that vulnerable dependence of Indian agriculture on the
vagaries of the monsoons must be reduced through storage dams. Accordingly, over the last
fifty years, India has invested substantially in infrastructure necessary to store surface runoff
water in reservoirs formed by large as well as small dams. India now ranks third in the world
after USA and China in terms of number of large dams. The country has over 4900 large dams
and another 350 dams are under various stages of construction.
The health and safety of these dams are of paramount importance for three primary
reasons: (i) for the sustainable utilization of the valuable water resources; (ii) for the protection
of heavy investment made in primary dam assets; the secondary assets such as canal network,
powerhouse etc; and the tertiary assets like agro industries, transmission lines etc; and (iii) for
the protection of life and property of people downstream of dams. A safe dam is one, which
performs its intended functions without imposing unacceptable risks to the public and society in
normal as well extreme conditions that may occur. The safe design of a dam calls for hydraulic
safety, seismic safety, foundation safety, structural safety, and hydro-mechanical safety
throughout the life of dam. The safety of a dam can be threatened by natural phenomena such
as floods, earthquakes, landslides and deterioration of construction materials with ageing
process. Safety of a dam can also be threatened by manmade causes arising from faulty
planning, inadequate design, poor quality of construction, insufficient maintenance, or improper
operation; or a combination of these factors.
Dam safety is thus considered an inherent function in the planning, design, construction,
maintenance and operation of dams. Over the time, these aspects have improved significantly
with the development of new investigation techniques, design tools, construction technologies
and materials. Many of the existing dams, which were built using the then available knowhow
and technologies, are not meeting the stringent provisions of the current times. Moreover, with
the current approach of greater risk aversion, some of these ageing dams may not be meeting
the safety standards and criteria of today. It has been generally recognized that a successful
dam safety assurance programme with a dedicated institutional structure is essential for
ensuring safety of all dams. In recognition of this need for a nation-wide initiative, Dam Safety
Organization was established in the Central Water Commission in 1979. Subsequently, CWC
has helped in setting up independent Dam Safety Organisations in most of the States. The
iii
National Committee on Dam Safety was also set up in 1987 to guide and oversee the activities
of the State Dam Safety Organizations.
With CWC initiative and World Bank funding, the Dam Safety Assurance & Rehabilitation
Project was implemented during 1991-1999, wherein in about 33 distressed dams of the country
were restored to good health. This project was the first of its kind in the whole World. As a
follow-up of this dam safety project, another project namely Dam Rehabilitation and
Improvement Project has now been taken up, again with World Bank assistance. This Six
year project has commenced from April, 2012, and is presently under implementation in Kerala,
Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Tamil Nadu, and Karnataka, and few more States are likely to join
shortly. Project targets rehabilitation of about 250 dams in DRIP States, besides strengthening
of the dam safety institutional capacities of State dam owning organizations and Central Water
Commission. DRIP will also improve upon the dam safety expertise of some of the identified
premier academic and research Institutions, including IIT Madras.
As part of institutional strengthening for dam safety, this First National Dam Safety
Conference is being organized by CWC jointly with Tamil Nadu Water Resources Department
and IIT- Madras. It is our intention to make the National Dam Safety Conference an annual
feature with subsequent events planned jointly with other DRIP States and Academic
Institutions. Focus of the Conference will be on effective application of knowledge and
technology to real-life problems faced by the dam safety professionals. The Conference is also
intended to bridge the knowledge gap between expert organizations, dam owners, research
institutes, and the industry. Topics for technical sessions of the Conference have been chosen
to reflect key concerns flagged during first three years of DRIP implementation. For the six
identified themes, very good responses have been received in terms of about 50 technical
papers contributed by professionals cutting across Expert organizations; Dam owning agencies;
Academia, Consulting firms and Industry. The industry response is also demonstrated by the
active involvement of about 15 firms in the Conference Exposition. The participation for the
Conference has also exceeded the originally set target with the registration of about 280
delegates from within India as well as from abroad.
I am confident that the deliberations during the Conference will not only be enlightening
to the professionals attending the Conference but also result in valuable recommendations for
strengthening the dam safety initiatives in the country. Success of this Conference will also help
in setting the bench-mark for future National Dam Safety Conferences.
Chennai Dr. B.R.K. Pillai

24 March 2015 Project Director (DRIP)
Central Water Commission
iv
First National Dam Safety Conference
24 - 25 March, 2015 IC&SR Auditorium, IITM, CHENNAI
Recommendations based on the deliberations during the Conference
TS-I: Design Flood Estimation and Dam safety Measures for Flood Mitigations
For dams with small catchment areas, storms having less than 24 hours duration
may be critical and should be adopted while assessing their design flood. It would be
worthwhile to adopt multiple storm durations to produce multiple inflow design flood
hydrographs to arrive at the most severe inflow design flood hydrograph.
Frequency of extreme events has been seen to be increasing in the South Indian
peninsula. More extensive data needs to be analyzed for establishing the reasons for
significant increasing trends in rainfall in this region. The impact of the likely increase
in extreme hydro-meteorological events on river valley projects should be addressed.
The Probable Maximum Precipitation (PMP) atlases form a comprehensive
knowledge bank which provide not only readily useable SPS/PMP estimates at sub
basin level/ grid points but also detailed data of around 700 storms for carrying out
project/ catchment specific SPS/PMP studies. Use of revised PMS atlas for design
flood reviews are recommended.
In case of blockage of rivers due to a major landslide, the information pertaining to
possible additional rise in river water level and warning time in the event of possible
dam breach is very important input for disaster management planning. The river
cross sections and other data along with breach modelling framework may be kept
ready so as to provide requisite information to concerned authorities at the shortest
possible time.
While carrying breach analysis of blockage of river due to land slide or any other
reason, the assessment of sediment volume likely to be generated during the event
should also be taken care of.
As hydrology is a dynamic process, the hydrological parameters such as design
flood, should be reviewed periodically, particularly when a significant hydro-
meteorological event occurs in the catchment of the project.
Impact on design flood due to cloud burst and GLOF needs to be analyzed and
incorporated in the practice.
TS-II: Risk assessment and emergency preparedness
The conference recommends that the efforts to ensure fail safe dam structures shall
be made with a timely release of the funds required for the purpose.
Institutional capacities of dam owning organizations as well as premier academic
institutes shall be improved to develop emergency action plans for every large dam in
the country and keep them updated.
The soundness and stability of dam abutments needs to be thoroughly investigated
and suitably featured in the dam design for mitigation of risks associated with
abutment failures.
TS-III: Institutional arrangements and good management practices for sustainable

dam safety
Dam safety organizations in every state and other dam owning authorities shall be
strengthened with adequate and qualified manpower.
Development of information system for monitoring the status of dam health and long
term data backup shall be taken up as priority.
Quality control set up for monitoring the quality of works during construction of new
dams or during dam rehabilitation shall be strengthened in each state.
v
Recommendations based on the deliberations during the Conference
DRIP can provide the necessary initiative for a three-way collaboration involving
experts in technical organizations, dam owners and academic and research
institutions for effective implementation of new technologies in dam safety.
A suitable workflow process for dam rehabilitation works, similar to DRIP mechanism,
needs to be replicated by non DRIP states.
TS-IV: Latest Innovations and Methods for Monitoring Dam Health
State-of-art tools have become available at affordable costs for real time, automated
monitoring of dam behaviour. The dam owners are advised to make maximum use of
these technologies for ensuring the health and safety of their dams.
Pollution of dam reservoirs can have significant impact on the health of dams and
hence preventive measures are needed to check the entering of pollutants in dam
reservoirs.
Dam instrumentation is also vital for establishing the prevalent design philosophies
so as to improve upon them. All new dam constructions shall be encouraged to
incorporate such instrumentation preferably in collaboration with premier academic
and research institutes.
TS-V: New Materials and Methods for Dam Rehabilitation
Existing techniques of dam rehabilitation based on grouts, guniting, etc. may not be
effective in all cases. New techniques based on geomembranes, micro-fine cements,
fibre reinforced concrete and other chemical based grouts shall be adopted based on
sound engineering judgement.
Wherever appropriate, new materials and technologies shall be encouraged in a
select few dams so as to derive confidence on their performance, and also to scale
up their usage for financial viability of such new techniques.
TS-VI: Compliance with the Provisions of Design Standards Issues & Strategies for
Existing Dams
Periodic maintenance and adherence to codal requirements in dam construction is

important.
The relaxation of codal stipulations for rehabilitation of dams needs to be examined
case-to-case based on the site conditions, hazard potential and techno-economics.
The effect of alkali-silica slow reaction (ASSR) for dam rehabilitation works needs to
be validated through more field data. The phenomenon of Delayed Entringite
Formation (DEF) and its impact on dam concrete swelling needs to be investigated
on ageing concrete dams.
vi

Technical Session Plan
Technical Session 1: Design Flood Estimation and Dam Safety Measures for Flood Mitigation
Date & Time: 24 March 2015; 1130 1300 h
Chairman: Prof. K. Srinivasan, IITM
Co-Chairman: Shri. Rajan Nair, Former Chairman, Brahmaputra Board, Guwahati
Rapporteur: Shri. Bhopal Singh, Director, CWC
Technical Session 2: Risk Assessment and Emergency Preparedness

Date & Time: 24 March 2015; 1400 1530 h
Chairman: Shri. M.K. Gopalakrishnan, Former Member, CWC
Co-Chairman: Shri A.K. Ganju, Former Member, CWC
Rapporteur: Dr. Balaji Narasimhan, IITM
Technical Session 3: Institutional Arrangements and Good Management Practices for

Sustainable Dam Safety
Date & Time: 24 March 2015; 1600 1730 h
Chairman: Shri. A.K. Bajaj, Former Chairman, CWC
Co-Chairman: Shri S.R.Toley, Former Chief Engineer, CWC & Member DSRP. MP
Rapporteur: Shri Atul Jain, Chief Engineer, (HRM), CWC
Technical Session 4: Latest Innovations and Methods for Monitoring Dam Health
Date & Time: 25 March 2015; 0900 1030 h
Chairman: Shri. Ashwin B. Pandya, Chairman, CWC
Co-Chairman: Shri Suresh Chandra, Former Chairman, CWC
Rapporteur: Dr. Arun Menon, IITM; Email: arunmenon@iitm.ac.in
Technical Session 5: New Materials and Methods for Dam Rehabilitation

Date & Time: 25 March 2015; 1100 1230 h
Chairman: Mr. Jun Matsumoto, Task Team Leader, DRIP, World Bank
Co-Chairman: Shri Murari Ratnam, Director, CSMRS
Rapporteur: Dr. Manu Santhanam, IITM; Email: manus@iitm.ac.in
Technical Session 6: Compliance with the Provisions of Design Standards Issues &
Strategies for Existing Dams
Date & Time: 25 March 2015; 1330 1500 h
Chairman: Shri. R. Subramanian, Chairman, TN Cauvery Technical Cell
Co-Chairman: Shri R. Jeyaseelan, Former Chairman, CWC
Rapporteur: Shri Saibal Ghosh, Director, CWC
vii
2425March,2015IC&SRAuditorium,IITM,Chennai
CompendiumofTechnicalPapers

INDEX

S.N. Titleofpaper Page#

Foreword i
Preface ii
ConferenceIntroduction iii
ConferenceRecommendations v
TechnicalSessionPlan vii
1. FrequencyAnalysisforNonstationaryFloodSeries 1
NarendraKumarGoel,SunilPoudel,andRBJigajinni
2. PlanningofFloodStorageCapacitiesofUpstreamReservoirsforFloodMitigationatAkola 8
City
CABirajdar,RWNikum,ArunRNaikandSunandaNJagtap
3. FloodEstimateforPossibleDamBreakScenarioofSunKosiLandslideDam 16
N.N.RaiandO.P.Gupta
4. RoleofPMPAtlasinDesignFloodEstimation 23
M.RaghuramandRaviRanjan
5. TrendofAnnualOneDayMaximumRainfallSeriesoverSouthIndia 31
AshokeBasistha,PriyaNarayanan,RaviRanjanandAntonioPorcheddu
6. FailureofAnkamnhalMinorIrrigationDam Investigation 42
Y.K.Handa
7. DamBreakAnalysisABasicApproach 49
AntonioPorcheddu
8. AKnowledgeBasedSystemTechnologyforDamSafetyAnalysis 57
S.Mohan
9. DegreeofRiskofDamFailure 63
RameshNikum
10. RiskInformedDecisionMakingforDamMaintenanceandRehabilitationinIndia 71
BDasgupta,GScottandGWittmeyer
11. EmergencyActionPlanImplementationforDRIPDams 77
AntonioPorcheddu,PhilippeCleyetMerletandEdwardE.Flint
12. Atwodimensionaldambreakflowsimulationmodelforpreparingemergencyactionplans 82
SoumendraNathKuiry
13. DamSafetyStatusofDRIPDams TrendsandImprovementInitiatives 93
VinodKVerma,YokiVijayandGaranceBlaut
14. TemghardamAcasestudyofHandling of Seepages in Gravity Dams 102
IshwarChaudhari
15. ManagingOurWaterConservationAssetsRoleofDamSafety 110
A.B.Pandya,B.R.K.PillaiandManojKumar
16. OrganisationalSetupandMonitoringSystemsforSustainable DamSafetyinMaharashtra 126
State
K.S.VemulkondaandRameshNikum
17. IntegratedGeophysicalApproachforDamHealthChecks&DamConditionMonitoring 133
SanjayRana
18. DamSafetyChallengeanInstitutionalDiagnosis 139
AkshayaKumarDasandGopalPrasadRoy
19. DamSafetyandDripActivitiesinTamilNadu 149
V.D.Suresh,P.GunasekaranandV.Veeralakshmi
20. QualityManagementSystemsinCentralDamSafetyOrganisation 156
M.BhaskaraReddyandYokiVijay
21. LeveragingWebBasedApplicationsforMonitoringRehabilitationofDams 162
AmitKDasgupta,AjjayAroraandAnkitKumar
2425March,2015IC&SRAuditorium,IITM,Chennai
CompendiumofTechnicalPapers
S.N. Titleofpaper Page#
22. DamSafetyInstrumentationwithCaseStudy 172

RajbalSingh
23. Assessment,InstrumentationandManagementofDams 178
MatthewA.Pavelchak,GabrielA.Jimenez,AndyYoung,andAbhijitShah
24. RealTimeInfrastructureMonitoringforDams(RTIM):UsingArtificialIntelligence(AI) 184
fordataanalysis
A.ToppleandG.Kilbride
25. MonitoringandAssessingReservoirsthrougheDAMs:AWirelessFieldMonitoring 191
ServerandRemoteRealitySensors(RRS)network
HiromichiFUKUI,B.BabuMadhavanandS.Nishadh
26. CaseStudyonWaterQualityandLimeLeachinginDams 196
N.Pandian,A.KalimuthuandE.Raju
27. ReservoirSedimentationasaChunkofDamHealth:AGlimpseofRealWorldPractices 203
andtheStateoftheArtApproaches
SanjayGiri
28. SediconDredgingasEffectiveMethodofSedimentRemovalfromReservoirs 211
TomJacobsenandSudhirGupta
29. UseofPozzollanicMaterialsforMinimisingtheRiskofAlkaliAggregateReactionin 218
Concrete
MurariRatnam,N.V.MahureandPankajSharma
30. PreventiveMeasuresofAlkaliAggregateReactioninHardenedConcrete 227
RajeevKumar,RajeevGuptaandN.K.Khoth
31. BasaltFiberandRebar:AConstructionMaterialofFuture 234
SudhirGuptaandN.Nalini
32. MicrofineCementgroutsanditsapplications 239
A.V.Shroff
33. RepairofDamagesinDistressedMasonryDamsACaseStudy 251
A.V.Patil,S.J.Pillai,R.Vigneswaran,K.Balachandran,S.D.PingaleandRizwanAli
34. StateoftheArtontheApplicationsofGeosyntheticsforDamRepairandRehabilitation 257
K.RajagopalandD.N.Arnepalli
35. AnOverviewofKonarDamonNeedofRehabilitation 269
DipankarChaudhuri,A.K.Dubey,andS.B.Pandey
36. GeosyntheticswaterbarriersinKadamparaidam:observedbehaviourofits 277
exposedgeomembraneafter10yearsofinstallation
V.Subramanian
37. ABriefStudyofArchDamsBehaviour 283
B.R.K.Pillai,ZikaSmiljkovicandA.K.Dhawan
38. FailureofspillwayradialgateofNarayanapurDaminKarnataka acasestudy 292
N.Srinivas
39. FailureofBarrageGates:CaseStudyofFarrakaBarrageProject 298
GulshanRajandAmitRanjan
40. BasicApproachforAnalysisofEarthquakeResponseofDams 305
ZikaSmiljkovicandA.K.Dhawan
41. ManagingGeotechnicalInstabilitiesofAbutmentsforDamSafety 312
R.K.Gupta
42. BasicDesignProvisionsforExistingDams 318
C.S.Mathur,ManojKumarandAnkitKumar
First National Dam Safety Conference, Chennai - March,2015
Frequency Analysis for Non-stationary Flood Series

Narendra Kumar Goel Sunil Poudel
Indian Institute of Technology Roorkee Indian Institute of Technology Roorkee
goelhy@gmail.com
R.B. Jigajinni
Indian Institute of Technology Roorkee
ABSTRACT
There are many physical processes or factors that could lead to non-stationarity in a flood series. Changes in the
land use within the catchment area, such as urbanization, could be expected to increase the mean of the flood
series. A standard assumption in flood frequency analysis is that the available data represent a stationary series
i.e. past data series are representative of future data series. This requirement of stationarity is not always satisfied
in practical applications. The objective of this paper is to investigate the presence of non stationarity in annual
maximum daily rainfall and annual flood series and quantify its impact on the frequency estimates. The focus in
the present work is on Zone 3, which is one of the seven hydro meteorologically homogeneous zones of the
country. This zone covers the river basins of central India. This zone has been further divided into the 9 sub-
zones. Sub-zones 3 (g) and 3 (i) have not been considered in the present study because of the lack of
hydrometric data for these sub-zones. Furthermore, some of the hydrometric gauging locations have been
excluded from analysis either because of very short data records or because screening of the extreme flow data
revealed data that were suspect. The summary of test results for short-term and long-term dependence indicates
that 9.21% annual flood series show short-term dependence and 17.10% show long-term dependence. 9.76%
annual daily maximum rainfall series show short-term dependence and 11.22% show long-term dependence. The
conditional probabilities of existence of long-term dependence when the series has passed short-term
dependence tests are 18.84% and 12.64% for annual flood series and annual daily maximum rainfall series
respectively. The probabilities are fairly high and there is no reason to disregard them. Hence, if a series shows
short-term independence, one should still investigate for long-term dependence. From the frequency analysis, it is
quite evident that on the independence assumption, when the series is in fact non-stationary leads to
underestimation of quantiles. This underestimation increases with the increase in return period. This has also
been found to be directly related with the Hurst coefficient. The under estimation due to independence
assumption were obtained as per the procedure explained in the previous section. The results indicate that the
assumption of independence, when the series is in fact non-stationary leads to under estimation of flood
quantiles. This underestimation has been found to be increasing with increase in return period and Hurst
coefficient (K). Long-term dependence, if present in a data series, increases degree of uncertainty
associated with extreme flow quantiles.
1. INTRODUCTION
There are many physical processes or factors that could lead to non-stationarity in a flood series.
Changes in the land use within the catchment area, such as urbanization, could be expected to lead to
changes (increases) in the mean of the flood series. Changes to the climatic conditions (e.g., as a
results of global warming) could result in changes to both the mean of the flood series and also to the
variability of the flood series (Burn, 1998). In addition, the physical characteristics of the catchment
area could contribute to non- stationarity in the flood series. An example of this is a river that is
downstream of a large lake that exerts a natural storage effect resulting in persistence (short-term or
long-term) in the flow series.
Standard approaches to flood frequency analysis invariably include, as an initial step, an examination
of the flood series for trends and other indications of non-stationarity (see, for example, Pilon and
Harvey, 1994). If a series does not pass the prescribed tests for stationarity, little guidance is given as
to how to proceed. However, often an estimate for a design flood quantile is still required for a river
that demonstrates non-stationarity. This paper attempts to address the issue of non-stationarity in
peak flood and rainfall data. A particular focus of this work is on zone 3 of central India.
Previous work includes that of Wall and Englot (1985) who investigated the dependence between
annual peak flows from Pennsylvania streams to determine if basin carryover effects were related to
the degree of dependence. They concluded that the assumption of independence of annual peak
flows is valid in flood frequency analysis for Pennsylvania streams. Knox (1984) estimated flood
1
Compendium of Technical Papers
quantiles for the Mississippi River at St. Paul, Minnesota for four climatic periods and observed large
differences in extreme flood quantiles. Webb and Betancourt (1992) observed an increase in flood
magnitudes on the Santa Cruz River, in Arizona, in recent decades due in large part to an increase in
floods from dissipating tropical storms during El Nino years.
Booy and Morgan (1985) analyzed the annual flood record of the Red River at Winnipeg, Manitoba
and found that the record demonstrates clustering of high flood events. This clustering increases the
uncertainty in the parameters of the probability distribution of peak flows estimated from the record.
Booy and Morgan used a fractional Gaussian noise model to generate a time series having an
appropriate degree of clustering and Bayes theorem to update the distribution parameters. Their
results show the flood risk to the City of Winnipeg and the Red River Valley to be substantially higher
than was estimated by a conventional approach.
Booy and Lye (1989) analyzed 49 annual peak flow series for Canadian rivers and found that many
exhibit long-term persistence. Lye and Lin (1994) analyzed the serial correlation structure of 90
Canadian rivers for both short-term and long-term dependence. It was found that significant long-term
dependence, as measured by the Hurst coefficient, is present in a large number of rivers and that
when a peak flow series shows short-term independence, there is still a fairly high probability of long-
term dependence.
Villarini et al. (2009) prepared new model to dynamically capture the evolution of probability density
function over time. He studied Charlotte of North Carolina which witnessed extensive urban and sub
urban development over past 40 years. GAMLSS package is used to model annual peak discharge.
GAMLSS package is used to model the nonstationary series and to determine the flood frequency
using two parameters distribution over future decades.
The next sections of this paper provide the details of the study area and data used. This is followed by
the results of the tests used for investigating the non-stationarity. The assessment of impact of non-
stationarity on frequency estimates is presented next.
2. DESCRIPTION OF STUDY AREA
The focus in the present work is on Zone 3, which is one of the seven hydro meteorologically
homogeneous zones of the country. This zone covers the river basins of central India. This zone has
been further divided into the 9 sub-zones. Sub-zones 3 (g) and 3 (i) have not been considered in the
present study because of the lack of hydrometric data for these sub-zones. Furthermore, some of the
hydrometric gauging locations have been excluded from analysis either because of very short data
records or because screening of the extreme flow data revealed data that were suspect. The
summary information presented in Table 1 is for the 76 gauge and discharge sites that are analyzed in
this work. These data sets have been compiled from various reports of Central Water Commission.
The criterion for selection is that each series should have 20 or more observations.
Table 1: Summary of annual flood data used
Sub- Number of Catchment Record Length

Zone River Basin Sites Area (km2) (years)
3 (a) Mahi and Sabarmati 4 30.1- 1094 20 25
3 (b) Lower Narmada and Tapi 9 17.2- 284.9 21-28
3 (c) Upper Narmada and Tapi 12 41.8- 2110.8 20 30

3 (d) Mahanadi 17 30-1150 20 31
3 (e) Upper Godavari 8 31.3 2227.4 21 32
3 (f) Lower Godavari 15 35 824 21-29
3 (g) Indravati 0
3 (h) Krishna and Penner 11 31.72 1690 22 32
3 (i) Kaveri 0
2
The annual daily maximum rainfall series from 205 raingauge stations are selected for the analysis.
The raingauge stations are located in and around zone 3 and are spread over Kerala, Tamilnadu ,
Karnataka , Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra , Gujarat , Orissa , Bihar and West Bengal. These states
cover an area of approximately 1.6 million Km2. These data sets have been obtained from India
Meteorological Department (IMD). The summary of raingauge stations is provided in Table 2.
Table 2: Summary of rainfall data used in the study
State Number of rain gauge stations Record length (years)
Andhra Pradesh 24 20-96

Bihar 6 55-96
Gujarat 25 22-95
Karnataka 27 22-96
Kerala 10 20-97
Maharashtra 46 21-97
Orissa 15 23-96
Tamilnadu 31 23-95
West Bengal 21 27-96
3. INVESTIGATION OF NON-STATIONARITY
In this work, non-stationarity due to short term dependence and long term dependence (Hurst
phenomenon) only has been examined. The short-term dependence was examined using: (i) the
median crossing test (Fisz, 1963); (ii) the turning point test (Kendall and Stuart, 1976); (iii) the rank
difference test (Meacham, 1968); (iv) Kendalls rank correlation test (Kendall, 1970); (v) the run test
(Guttman et al.,1971); (vi) the linear regression test ( Kottegoda, 1980); (vii) the Wald-Wolfowitz test
(Wald and Wolfowitz, 1943); (viii) the runs above and below the median test (Shiau and Condie, 1980);
(ix) the rank Von Neumann ratio test (Madansky, 1988); (x) the Von Neumann ratio test (Madansky,
1988); and (xi) the auto correlation test (Yevjevich, 1971). A wide range of tests was selected as
different statistical tests for dependence have been designed under different assumptions and
conditions, and these do not have equal power in discriminating between time series, which are not
truly random. The power of tests depends upon the nature of the dependence present and on the
length of the record. Hence, sometimes, various tests employed give different conclusions for the
same series. This means that a flood series can fail one test of independence but pass the other tests.
This can clearly be seen in the results. Due to this, it is difficult to say whether a flood series is
independent or not based only on the result of one test. Therefore several tests have been applied
before arriving at any conclusion. It has been assumed in this analysis that, for short-term
dependence, at least four out of eleven short-term dependence tests applied to each data sequence
should indicate dependence. Lye and Lin (1994) and Jigajinni (2001) provide the description of each
of the tests used herein for short-term dependence.
Long-term dependence was measured by the Hurst coefficient, K (Hurst, 1951). The nonparametric
bootstrap approach (Efron, 1979; Lye and Lin, 1994 and Jigajinni, 2001) was used to test whether or
not the computed Hurst coefficient was greater, at the 5% significance level, than the values from
other generated samples, as follows:
(i) Suppose that the annual flow series X1, X2,........,Xn are independent observations. Each Xi
has the same probability of occurrence, which equals 1/n.
(ii) Generate a uniform random data i between one and n, then choose Xi as one point in the boot
strap sample. Repeat this step n-time to generate a boot strap sample of the same size n as
the original sample.
(iii) Calculate Hursts K for the boot strap sample.
(iv) Repeat steps (ii) and (iii) a large number of times (10,000 times in this study).
3
(v) Count the number of times the observed K value of the sample is exceeded by the
10,000 boot strapped K values.
(vi) Calculate P value given by No. of K K obs.
P value
10,000
Hence, if the P value is less than the specified significance level, it is concluded that the sample being
tested is long-term dependent at the specified level; otherwise it has no long-term dependence.
4. ANALYSIS OF ANNUAL FLOOD SERIES AND ANNUAL DAILY MAXIMUM RAINFALL SERIES
Information of annual flood and rainfall series analyzed including length of record, mean, standard
deviation, coefficient of skewness, coefficient of kurtosis, lag-one serial correlation. Annual flood series
data are in cumecs and annual daily maximum rainfall series are in mm. For annual flood series the
record length ranges from 20 to 32 years. Lag-one serial correlation varies from 0.476 to 0.715. Many
rivers have fairly high Hursts K. Hursts K varies from 0.4507 to 0.9381 with an average of 0.6993. For
annual daily maximum rainfall series, r1 varies from 0.4350 to 0.650 with an average of 0.0119 and
Hursts coefficient K from 0.4655 to 0.9521 with an average of 0.6427.
In annual flood series, 90.79% series show short-term independence and 82.90% series show long-
term independence. In annual daily maximum rainfall series, 90.24% series indicate short-term
independence and 88.78% series exhibit long-term independence. For short-term tests, maximum
number of annual flood series i.e. 15.79% fail in Wald-Wolfowitz test and next, 13.16% in Von
Neumann ratio test. None fails in run above and below the median test. In annual daily maximum
rainfall series, maximum number of data series i.e. 14.63% fail in Kendalls rank correlation test and
next, 13.66% of data series fail in linear regression test.
The summary of test results for short-term and long-term dependence indicates that 9.21% annual
flood series show short-term dependence and 17.10% show long-term dependence. 9.76% annual
daily maximum rainfall series show short-term dependence and 11.22% show long-term dependence.
The conditional probabilities of existence of long-term dependence when the series has passed short-
term dependence tests are 18.84% and 12.64% for annual flood series and annual daily maximum
rainfall series respectively. The probabilities are fairly high and there is no reason to disregard them.
Hence, if a series shows short-term independence, one should still investigate for long-term
dependence.
5. IMPACT OF NON-STATIONARITY ON FREQUENCY ESTIMATES
In order to examine the impact of any dependencies in the data on the extreme flow and rainfall
estimates, synthetic sequences that preserve the important characteristics of the available data set
including any non-stationarity present in the data set, are generated. The intent with the data
generation process is to examine other possible sequences that are plausible given the information
available for the site. Information from the generated sequences can then be used to estimate impact
of non- stationarity on various flood and rainfall quantiles. Data sequences were generated using a
mixed noise model (Booy and Lye, 1989). This model is given by
X t w a a X (a)
t1 t
(a)
w b b X (b)
t1 t
(b)
w c c X (c)
t1 t
(c)

w d d X (d)
t1 t
(d)

where, wa , wb , wc and wd are weights , and a ,b , c and d are serial correlation coefficients, t(a) ,
t , t , t are independent processes , having zero mean and variances (1-a ) , (1-b ) , (1-c ) ,
(b) (c) (d) 2 2 2
2
(1-d ) respectively.
Sequences are generated by a FORTRAN-program for mixed-noise model. First, for given lag-one
serial correlation and Hurst K of original series, parameters of mixed-noise model i.e. wa, wb, wc , wd ,
a, b, c and d are computed as per procedure given by (Booy and Lye, 1989). Normal distributed
random numbers are first generated. These are then transformed into Gamma distributed random
4
numbers, in order to account for coefficient of skewness. In this study, two types of data sets are
generated.
(i) 1000 samples of 100 years length having r1 and K of original series.
(ii) 1000 samples of 100 years length having r1 =0.0 and K=0.5 i.e. independent case.
The intent with the mixed noise model is to preserve in the generated data sequences both the short-
term and long-term dependence observed in the available data record. In particular, this modelling
approach is designed to reproduce, on average, the lag one serial correlation coefficient and the Hurst
coefficient, K.
In order to quantify the impact of non-stationarity, quantiles for 50 years, 100 years, 200 years return
period were computed using General Extreme Value distribution and probability weighted moments
(PWM) method for each of the generated samples. For 1000 long-term generated samples (with r1 and
Hurst K of original series) and for 1000 independent samples (with r1 = 0.0, Hursts K = 0.5) the
expected values of flood quantiles for return periods for 50, 100, 200 years i.e. E (Q50), E (Q100), E
(Q200) were computed.
In annual flood series, 13 series have long-term dependence and remaining series show no long-term
dependence. Average Hursts K for series, having long-term dependence is 0.8324 and for those not
having long-term dependence are 0.6754 i.e. Hursts K is significant at 0.8324. Expected values of
flood quantiles for 50 years, 100 years and 200 years return periods for the two cases are computed.
For annual flood series with long-term dependence, maximum underestimation for 50 years return
period is 44.28% and it increases to 54.20% for 100 years return period and 64.26% for 200 years
return period.
Similarly, for annual daily maximum rainfall series only 23 series have long-term dependence with
average Hursts K as 0.7630.The maximum underestimation for 50 years return period is 30.88% and
it goes up to 42.28% for 100 years return period and 54.83% for 200 years return period.
From the analysis, it is quite evident that on the independence assumption, when the series is in fact
non-stationary leads to underestimation of quantiles. This underestimation increases with the increase
in return period. This has also been found to be directly related with the Hurst coefficient. For obtaining
this variation 1000 samples of 100 years length were generated for each of the series for the two
cases viz. (i) samples having r1 and K of original series, and (ii) samples having r1 =0.0 and K=0.5 i.e.
independent case. The under estimation due to independence assumption were obtained as per the
procedure explained in the previous section. For a return period of 100 years the underestimation has
been found to be linearly varying with Hurst coefficient (K) as follows:
Y= 53.495 X- 27.89; r=0.69, Where, Y is % underestimation in 100 years return period quantile, X is
Hursts coefficient (K) and r is coefficient of correlation.
6. CONCLUSIONS
For estimating the flood quantile, the assumption that the data series is random, stationary and
representative of population, sometimes may not hold good. Based on the analysis of 76 annual flood
series and 205 annual daily maximum rainfall series, pertaining to Zone 3 of India, the following
conclusions may be drawn.
(i) Before estimation of flood quantiles, the data series should be investigated not only for short
term dependence, but also for long-term dependence. Both short-term dependence and long-
term dependence have far reaching effects on estimation of flood quantiles for different return
periods.
(ii) In this study, conditional probability of existence of long-term dependence when the series have
passed short-term dependence tests are high i.e., 18.84% for annual flood series, and 12.64%
for annual daily maximum series. These probabilities are fairly high and therefore, if a series
shows short-term independence, one must further investigate for long-term dependence. The
long-term dependence should not be disregarded unlike in traditional flood frequency analysis, it
should be taken into account as it may significantly increase the risk associated with future peak
flows.
5
(iii) Data sequences can be generated using mixed noise model (Booy and Lye, 1989). The intent
with mixed noise model is to preserve in the generated data sequences both short-term and
long-term dependence observed in the original series i.e. this model can produce, on average,
the lag one serial correlation coefficient and Hursts coefficient K of original series.
(iv) Long-term dependence, if present in a data series, increases degree of uncertainty associated
with extreme flow quantiles.
The results obtained by this study are based on annual flood and annual daily maximum rainfall series
of zone-3. Similar study should be taken up for other series also such as, annual maximum
temperature series, annual maximum wind velocity series, and annual daily maximum evaporation
series, etc. in order to evaluate any long term non-stationarity in these parameters.
AKCNOWLEDGEMENT
The authors are thankful to Prof. D.H. Burn for providing guidance to carry out this study and improving several
sections of this study.
REFERENCES
Booy, C. and Lye, L.M. (1989). A new look at flood risk determination, Water Resources Bulletin, 25(5), 933-943.
Booy, C. and Morgan, D.R. (1985). The effect of clustering of flood peaks on a flood risk analysis for the Red
River, Canadian Journal of Civil Engineering, 12, 150-165.
Bradley, A.A. (1998). Regional frequency analysis methods for evaluating changes in hydrologic extremes, Water
Resources Research, 34(4), 741-750.
Burn, D.H. (1998). Climatic change impacts on hydrologic extremes and the implications for reservoirs,
Proceeding of The Second International Conference on Climate and Water, Espoo, Finland, Volume 1, 273-281.
Efron, B. (1979). Bootstrap methods: another look at the jackknife, Annals of Statistics, 7, 1-26.
Fisz, M. (1963). Probability Theory and Mathematical Statistics, Wiley, New York.
Guttman, I., Wilks, S.S. and Hunter, J.S. (1971). Introductory Engineering Statistics, Wiley, New York.
Hurst, H.E. (1951). Long term storage capacity of reservoirs, Transactions American Society of Civil Engineering,
116, 770-808.
Jigajinni, R.B. ( 2001). Estimation of flood quantiles from non-stationary flood series. Unpublished M.E. Thesis,
Department of Hydrology, University of Roorkee, 78p.
Kendall, M. and Stuart, A. (1976). The Advanced Theory of Statistics, Vol. 3, Charles Griffin, London.
rd
Kendall, M. (1970). Rank Correlation Methods, 3 Edition, Charles Griffin, London.
Knox, J.C. (1984). Fluvial response to small scale climate changes, in Developments and Applications of
Geomorphology, edited by J.E. Costa andP.J. Fisher, Springer-Verlag, New York, 318-342.
Kottegoda, N.T. (1980). Stochastic Water Resources Technology, John Wiley and Sons, New York.
Kubik, H.E. (1992). Annual extreme lake elevations by tot al probability theorem, Journal of Great Lakes
Research, 18(1), 202-206.
Lye, L.M. and Lin, Y. (1994). Long-term dependence in annual peak flows ofCanadian rivers, Journal of
Hydrology, 160, 89-103.
Madansky, A. (1988). Prescriptions for Working Statisticians,Springer, New York.
Meacham, I. (1968). Correlation in sequential data three sampleindicators, Civil Engineering Transactions of
the Institute of Engineers ofAustralia, CE10(2), 225-228.
Pilon, P.J. and Harvey, K.D. (1994). Consolidated Frequency Analysis(CFA), Version 3.1 Reference Manual,
Environment Canada, Ottawa.
Potter, K.W. (1992). Estimating the probability distribution of annual maximum levels on the Great Lakes, Journal
of Great Lakes Research,18(1), 229-235.
Shiau, S.Y. and Condie, R. (1980). Statistical test for independence,trend, homogeneity and randomness,
Hydrologic Applications Division, WaterResources Branch, Inland Waters Directorate, Environment Canada,
Ottawa.
6
Strelchuk, D.L. (1976). Multivariable flood level frequency distributions,Journal of Hydraulic Division, ASCE,
102(12), 1737-1744.
Villarini, G., Smith, J. A., Serinaldi, F., Bales, J., Bates, P. D., & Krajewski, W. F. (2009). Flood frequency analysis
for nonstationary annual peak records in an urban drainage basin. Advances in Water Resources, 32(8), 1255-
1266.
Wald, A. and Wolfowitz, J. (1943). An exact test for randomness in the non-parametric case based on serial
correlation, Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 14, 378-388.
Wall, D.J. and Englot, M. (1985). Correlation of annual peak flows for Pennsylvania streams, Water Resources
Bulletin, 21(3), 459-464.
Webb, R.H. and Betancourt, J.L. (1992). Climatic variability and flood frequency of the Santa Cruz River, Pima
County, Arizona, U.S. GeologicalSurvey Water Supply Paper 2379.
Yevjevich, V. (1971). Stochastic Processes in Hydrology, WaterResources Publications, Fort Collins, CO.
7
Planning of Flood Storage Capacities of Upstream Reservoirs for

Flood Mitigation at Akola City
C. A. Birajdar R. W. Nikum
Director General Chief Engineer
Maharashtra Engineering Research Institute, Nashik Maharashtra Engineering Training Academy
patodgmeri@gmail.com Nashik
Arun R. Naik Sunanda N. Jagtap

Superintending Engineer Executive Engineer
Command Area Development Authority Designs Division (Power House 1)
Aurangabad Central Designs Organization
Nashik
ABSTRACT
The function of a flood-mitigation / storage reservoir is to retain a portion of the flood inflow so as to minimize the
flood peak at the point to be protected. In an ideal case, the reservoir is situated immediately upstream from the
protected area and is operated to cut off the flood peak. This is accomplished by discharging all reservoir inflow
until the outflow reaches the safe capacity of the channel downstream. All flow above this rate is stored until inflow
drops below the safe channel capacity, and the stored water is released to recover storage capacity for the next
flood. Since the reservoir is situated immediately upstream from the point to be protected, the hydrograph at that
point is the same as that released at the dam, and the peak has been reduced.
While doing various trials , to facilitate planning of Upstream reservoirs namely the following guiding principles
are generally considered to restrict the flood peak at, to be protected area.
(i) In order to restrict the flood peak at, to be protected area, flood storage capacity would be exclusively
necessary and not flood absorption capacity. It means the flood storage capacity would be provided below
FRL.
(ii) The spillway capacity of all these reservoirs will have to be designed as per criteria laid down by BIS 11223-
1985.
(iii) In case irrigation, domestic water supply, Industrial water supply etc. is planned from these dams, the flood
storage capacity would be over and above the live storage capacity required for the above purposes.
(iv) All flood volume which is required to be retained in any reservoir should be in the capacity available above
crest of spillway.
Keywords: Flood Storage, Flood Mitigation, Inflow Hydrograph, Restricted Inflow
1. CASE STUDY: FLOOD MITIGATION AT AKOLA CITY, MAHARASHTRA
Akola city is situated on the banks of the Morna river. Heavy floods were experienced during the year
August 83 & August 1994 because of which lot of damages occurred in the city.
Protection work of Akola city included a scheme as under :
(1) Part I : To widen and remove the obstructions in the river channel.
(2) Part II: To construct protection Bunds on both the banks of Morna river.
Government further directed to work out, what should be the flood magnitude to protect the Akola City
from flood hazards. Also to take into account the flood moderation which is likely to take place in all the
upstream reservoirs, existing projects, under construction and future projects.
The study had been undertaken in Water Planning Division of Central Designs Organization, (Earth
Dam), Nasik.
2. APPROACH TO STUDY
In the light of above, two approaches have been studied in Central Designs Organization,
(i) To estimate the flood for design of Flood Protection Works at Akola.
8
estrict the flo

(ii) To re ood at Akola a within the safe
s channel carrying cap
pacity of Morna river by providing
upstream reservo oirs for flood
d moderation.
2.1 Triall Studies to Restrict the

e Flood at Akola
A City
Compute er program in
i EXCEL iss used for ca
arrying out various
v trials
s. In doing th
hese trial stu
udies the
following
g concept has been used.
2.2 Conc
cept
While m moderating thet flood hyydrographs through 4 reservoirs, restricted re eleases are planned
througho out the flood event, and the flood oveer and above these releases are sim multaneouslyy retained
in the flo
ood storage capacities
c off the reservo
oirs. Graphica ation of conccept used is shown in
al representa
Fig. 1
Figure 1: In
nflow Outflow Hydrograph
SCRIPTION OF
3. DES O THE CAT
TCHMENT
The tota al catchment of upto Ako ola city is 652 2.92 sq km. Akola city is s situated onn the banks of Morna
river. Moorna river is a tributary off Purna riverr. Purna riverr is left bank
k of tributary of Tapi riverr. Vidrupa
river, a right
r hand tributary of Mo orna river me eets upstream of Akola city.
c The catcchment area a of Akola
city is sh
hown in Platee 1.
The interrcepted catchment area upto Akola city

c are as be
elow :
Table 1: Catchment
C Arrea Details
Sr. N
No. Catchmentt Are
ea sq km
a) Upper Morn
na 80.94
b) Middle
e Morna Uninttercepted 103.50
c) Lowerr Morna Unintercepted 129.00
d) Dhapedwad da 82.60
e) Unintercepte
ed 256.88
TOTAL 652.92
9
4. DESIGN FLOOD CONSIDERED
For flood of 100 years frequency for works pertaining to protection of town, important industrial and
other vital installations. Accordingly 1 in 100 year return flood is considered in the study.
( IS:12094 )
5. ESTIMATION OF 1 IN 100 YEAR FLOOD AT AKOLA CITY
Normally 1 in 100 year flood can be estimated by carrying out frequency analysis, by fitting a
frequency distribution in a particular set of data. The annual peak data of minimum 20 years length of
record is essential to carryout flood frequency analysis. Normally flood frequency analysis gives peak
figure only. Whereas for integrated planning of reservoirs, full flood hydrograph would be essential,
since we are interested in retaining part of flood hydrograph in upstream dams and releasing part of
it.(IS:5477-1971 Part-4)
Clarks method is used for developing unit hydrograph. (Kolher)
Using storm depths & time distribution respectively, the inflow flood hydrographs corresponding to 1 in
100 year frequency flood hydrograph at Upper Morna, Middle Morna, Lower Morna, Dagadparva and
Akola (unintercepted catchment) site are worked out.
5.1 Time of Travel
In order to combine these flood hydrographs, to get combined flood hydrograph at Akola City, suitable
time lag, i.e. time of travel is assumed based on the experience.
Time of travel assumed is shown below.
Table 2: Travel Time
Sr.No. Time of Travel Time of Travel

In terms of Time in
From Upto
Tcal hours
1 Upper Morna Dam site Middle Morna dam site 1.0 Tcal 6
2 Middle Morna dam site Lower Morna dam site 1.0 Tcal 4
3 Lower Morna dam site Confluence of Morna and Vidrupa rivers 0.6 Tcal 5
4 Dagadparva dam site Confluence of Morna and Vidrupa rivers 0.6 Tcal 4
5 Confluence Akola City 0.6 Tcal 2
The flood at various nodes are channel routed so as to take into effect valley storage and time of travel
for finding out the effect of all these sub catchments floods at Akola City.
5.2 Base Flow
The base flow observed during 31st August 1994 at Middle Morna dam site is of the order of 39.5
cumecs to 72.9 cumecs from the catchment area of 184.43 sq.km. From this, rate of base flow is
worked out as 0.3 cumecs /sq.km. With this rate the base flow for other sub catchments is worked out
as follows :
Table 3: Catchment wise Base flow
Sr.N C.A. Base flow

Sub catchment name Type of catchment
o in sq.km. in cumecs.
1 Upper Morna Total 80.94 24.28
2 Middle Morna Unintercepted 103.50 30.92
3 Lower Morna Unintercepted 129.00 38.85
4 Dagadparva Total 82.60 24.78
Akola below Dagadparva and
5 Unintercepted 256.88 77.07
Lower Morna Dam site.
All these sub catchments inflow flood hydrographs are lagged by suitable time lag and combined to
get 1 in 100 year frequency flood hydrograph at Akola City. This is shown in Plate 2. This 1 in 100
10
year frequency flood hydrograph at Akola City has a peak of 1822.36 cumecs and is considered for
further analysis.
Peaks of individual flood hydrographs from various sub-basins are shown below:
Table 4: Catchment wise Flood Peak
Sr.No. Sub Catchment Peak Corresponding To 1 In 100 Year

Flood in Cumecs
1 Upper Morna 897.57
2 Middle Morna 764.99
3 Lower Morna 1199.42
4 Dagadparva 841.05
5 Unintercepted catchment below Lower Morna and 457.89
Dagadparva
6 Entire Virgin Catchment 2335
These sub catchments inflow flood hydrographs are to be used for planning of respective upstream
reservoirs.
6. FLOOD STORAGE CAPACITIES PLANNED
Flood storage capacities are computed on the basis of basic data furnished by the field officers as
follows :
a) Upper Morna Project
(i) Gross Storage Capacity @ 104 M = 13.59 MCM
(ii) Dead Storage = 0.75 MCM
(iii) Irrigation requirement = 5.68 MCM
Flood storage capacity available = 7.16 MCM
b) Middle Morna Project This is a completed ungated dam, hence no storage capacity
available.
c) Lower Morna Project

(i) Gross Storage @ FRL 321.3 M = 17.34 MCM
(ii) Dead Storage = 2.38 MCM
Flood storage capacity available = 14.96 MCM
d) Dagadparva Project
(i) Gross Storage @ FRL 319.45 M = 23.48 MCM
(ii) Drinking Water Supply = 10.19 MCM
(iii) Dead Storage = 1.88 MCM
Flood Storage Capacity available = 11.41 MCM
7. RESULTS OF STUDIES
While moderating the respective flood hydrographs corresponding to the 1 in 100 years flood
hydrograph through various upstream reservoirs namely Upper Morna, Middle Morna, Lower Morna
and Dagadparva. Part of respective flood hydrograph is retained within the flood storage capacities
assumed and a restricted outflow is released through respective upstream flood control reservoirs.
Then the net effect at Akola City, of all the outflow releases from various upstream reservoirs, together
with the unintercepted catchment flow downstream of Lower Morna and Dagadparva dams are worked
out allowing suitable time lag. These studies carried out will be useful to formulate tentative guide
lines. These tentative guide lines will facilitate planning of these three reservoirs namely Upper Morna,
Lower Morna, and Dagadparva reservoirs with an objective to restrict the flood at Akola City.
Inglis flood at Akola city works out to 3194 cumecs for virgin condition. 1 in 100 year return period
flood at Akola city works out to 1822.36.cumecs without moderation of flood in upstream. If upstream
11
reservoirrs are operatted well, utilizing their flood storage capacity, th

he flood at Akola city worrks out to
umecs.. The inflow, outflo
931.4 cu ow, flood hyddrographs is shown in Plaate 3.
Thereforre it can be seen that thhrough a pro oper planninng and opera ation of upstream reservvoirs, the
flood dowwnstream ca an be moderrated to a larrge extent. Itt is more judicious to mo
oderate the fllood than
to provid
de flood prote
ection work as
a it rules out the drainag
ge problem / dewatering of o interceptin
ng nallas.
REFRENCES:
1. IIS : 5477 - 197

71 Method forr Fixing Capaccities of Reserrvoir (Part1 to Part 4)
2. IIS: 11223 - 19
985 Guideliness for Fixing Sp
pillway Capaciity
3. IIS: 12094- 19887 - Guideline
es for Planning
g and Design ofo River Emba ankments (Lev
vees)
4. CChapter 19 PW WD Handbookk for Hydrolog gy
5. EEngineering Hydrology:
H Linssley Kohler
Figure 1. Plate
e1
12
Figure 2. Graph
h1
Figure 3. Graph
h2
Figure 4. Graph
h3
13
Figure 5. Graph
h4
Figure 6. Graph
h5
Figure 7. Graph
h6
14
Figure 8. Graph
h7
Figure 9. Graph
h8
15
Flood Estimate for possible Dam Break Scenario

of Sun Kosi Landslide Dam
N.N.Rai
Director, Central Water Commission, New Delhi, India
Email: nnraicwc@gmail.com
O.P.Gupta
Director, Central Water Commission, New Delhi, India
ABSTRACT
Blockage of rivers due to landslides in Himalayas and consequent formation of lakes behind landslide dams
poses a major threat of flash flood to downstream areas due to possible breaching of such dams. Because
landslide dams are natural phenomena, they are vulnerable to failure by overtopping and breaching. In past a
number of flash flood events due to breaching of landslide dams on river Parechu, Kurichhu etc occurred. For an
effective disaster management planning, it is essential to have an estimate of lake volume behind landslide dam,
dam break flood due to possible breaching of such dam, attenuation and translation pattern of dam break flood. In
majority of cases getting the input data for having the above estimate is not possible. In the present paper an
attempt has been made to discuss the methodology for estimating the flood scenario due to possible breaching of
landslide dams, using the input data, which can be easily obtained from open sources. The methodology has
been presented through a case study of Sun Kosi landslide dam, which was formed due to a major landslide that
took place on 02.08.2014 in the upper reaches of Sun Kosi river in Sindhupalchowk district of Nepal. For effective
disaster management planning in the downstream reaches of Nepal and Bihar (India), it was essential to estimate
the possible rise in river water level in the event of landslide dam breach and travel time of flood peak. At the time
of landslide dam formation, the available input data was latitude, longitudes of landslide dam site and fetch of the
lake thus formed. To have a realistic estimate of possible rise in river water level and travel time of flood peak at
different downstream locations, in event of possible dam breach, better estimate of lake volume, catchment
details at landslide dam site and river cross sections from landslide dam location upto Kosi barrage were
essential. Based on the latitude and longitude information, the lake volume and river cross sections were obtained
using open source ASTER DEM and HEC-RAS mathematical model. The dam break flood and propagation of
flood wave in downstream was simulated using MIKE11 mathematical model to estimate the possible rise in river
water level and its time of arrival at salient locations. The study results were shared with relevant authorities
responsible for disaster management planning.
Keywords: Landslide dam, Dam break flood, Flood attenuation, Warning time, Disaster management
1.0 INTRODUCTION
Landslide dams are natural phenomena that pose hazards for the downstream territory due to failure
by overtopping and breaching. A few of these blockages attain heights and volumes that exceed the
man-made large dams. Some of the worlds largest and most catastrophic floods have occurred
because of failure of these natural dams. In past a number of flash flood events due to breaching of
landslide dams on river Parechu, Kurichhu etc occurred. The recent landslide dam formation on Sun
Kosi river in Nepal was a major concern for Nepal and India due to possible flash flood in downstream
in the event of sudden breaching of the dam. This landslide took place on 02.08.2014 in the upper
reaches of Sun Kosi river in Sindhupalchowk district of Nepal at a location having latitude: 2704540 N,
0
longitude: 85 52 08 E, which blocked the Sun Kosi river about 1.2 km u/s of existing Sun Kosi Hydro
Power Dam. The consequent impounding of water behind landslide dam submerged the area upto 4 to
5 km u/s of the landslide dam location. A site photograph of landslide dam is shown in Figure 1. In the
event of dam break, the flash flood was likely to enter in Kosi river, which might have caused heavy
devastation for Kosi barrage and thickly populated areas of Bihar near the Kosi river. Accordingly, for
effective disaster management planning by concerned agencies, necessary study was carried out by
Central Water Commission to estimate the possible flood peak, differential rise in river water level and
travel time of flood peak at different locations downstream of the landslide dam, in event of a dam
break. Kosi barrage is about 280 km downstream of the landslide dam. There were some information
from the different sources that the rise in river water level behind the dam was about 80 m. Based on
the limited information available from different sources and using open source data, necessary study
was carried out in Central Water Commission and outcome of the study was shared with relevant
authorities responsible for disaster management planning.
16
Figure 1. Photograph
h of landslide dam
d on Sun Kosi
K river
2.0 D
DATA CONS
STRAINTS
At the time of landsslide dam fo ormation on Sun Kosi river, the da ata available
e were, Latittude and
Longitudde of landslide dam, its photograph h and approoximate height, prevailing discharge of 3540
cumec ata Kosi barragge located about 280 km m downstreamm of landslide e dam locatio
on. In order tto have a
proper e estimate of flood peak, its travel timme and diffferential rise in river waater level at different
downstre eam location
ns in event off a possible dam break, the
t proper estimate of sttorage volum me behind
landslide
e dam, crosss sections off river from dam location n up to Kosi barrage, ca atchment are ea of the
river at landslide da
am location & at Kosi ba arrage and ppossible rainnfall scenario
o in drainagee area of
e dam were essential.
landslide e
3.0 M
METHODOL
LOGY ADOP
PTED TO TA
ACKLE THE PROBLEM
Locationn of landslide
e dam was marked on Go oogle Earth. ASTER
A DEMM of 30m x 30 m resolutio on having
grid size
e 1 degree x 1 degree wa as download ded and a mo osaic to get the coverage of entire catchment
of Kosi rriver up to Kosi
K barrage prepared. Catchment
C arrea and hypssometry of th he river catcchment at
landslide
e dam and att Kosi barrag ge were estimmated by GIS S processingg of the DEM M. Catchmentt areas of
major sttreams betw ween landslid de dam and d Kosi barra age were also
a estimateed for distribution of
prevailing initial conddition flow in
n Kosi river. Cross sections of river upstream off landslide dam d were
extractedd from ASTE ER DEM ussing open so ource HEC-G GeoRAS exttension of ARC-GIS.
A Froom these
cross seections the sttorage volum me behind da am was estim mated using open source e software HEC-RAS.
Cross seections of riv
ver from landslide dam up pto Kosi barrrage were exxtracted for hydrodynam
h ic routing
of dam b break flood to
t get flood peak,
p its travvel time and possible add ditional rise in river wateer level at
different downstream m locations.
3.1 C
Catchment area of riverr at landslid
de dam locattion
The catcchment area a of the Sun Kosi river ata landslide dam location was abou ut 2494 sq.km m, out of
which abbout 1004 sqq.km was abo ove the elevaation band 5000
5 m. A ca
atchment are ea map of the e location
is shownn in Figure 2.
2 The inform mation abouut next 24 hour rainfall estimate
e was obtained from
f IMD
sources and this estiimate was ab bout 60 mm.. For the rive
er catchmentt at the landsslide dam loccation the
possible runoff volum
me in 24 hou urs for aboutt 60 mm rainnfall was esttimated as 54
5 million cub bic meter
which waas equivalennt to a discha
arge of aboutt 620 cumec..
17
Figure 2. Catchment area of Sun Ko

osi river at land
dslide dam
3.2 V
Volume estiimate of lake behind lan
ndslide dam
m
There w were a lot off uncertaintie es about the e lake volum me behind the landslide e dam. However, the
estimatee about fetch of lake form med behind dam was appropriate. This fetch was about a 5 km. Hence to
get this a
amount of feetch behind la andslide dam m a number of o water proffile simulations were run on HEC-
RAS usiing the riverr cross sectio ons extracte ed from AST TER DEM. ThisT fetch wa
as obtained for 80 m
depth ne ear landslide
e dam. Base ed on the wa ater profile simulation
s th
he volume off lake formeed behind
landslidee dam was estimated abo out 31 million
n cubic mete er. The volumme estimate is presented d in Table
1. The bbed profile off the river upstream of the landslide damd along with
w water surface profile is shown
in Figure
e 3.
Table 1.
1 Estimated volume
v behind
d landslide dam
m for 80m dep
pth of water ne
ear LSD
River Chainaage River bed

b Wateer Flow Area
A Top
p flow Volume
Reach (m) u/ss of elevation Surfacce W
Width
landslide Elevv
damm
(m)) (m) (m22) (m)
( (1000 m3)
LSDUS 6000
0 836.3
36 840 75.4
49 43
3.27 31195.52
2
LSDUS 5000
0 825.3
37 840 1600..46 157.22 30357.55
5
LSDUS 4000
0 813.7
73 840 3294..37 195.52 27910.13
3
LSDUS 3000
0 785.4
49 840 163800.13 474.23 18072.88
8
LSDUS 2000
0 760.4
48 840 197655.64 354.11
18
Volum
me Plan: Plan
n 01
R iver LSD
DUS
Leg
gend
900
WS PF 1
880 Gro
ound
860
840
Elevation (m)
820
800
780
760
740
720
-1000 0 1000
0 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000
Main Cha
annel Dis tance (m)
(
Figure 3. Possible fetch of

o lake behind
d landslide dam
m for 80 m depth of water near dam site
3.3 D
Dam break simulation
s a results
and
For the estimated volume

v of 31
1 million cubbic meter, thhe possible critical dam break scen nario was
generateed to estimaate the flood peak, its tra
avel time annd possible rise
r in river water level. For dam
break sccenario the initial
i condition flood in the river at Kosi barragge was adop pted as 3540 0 cumec,
which waas distributed
d along the e
entire 280 kmm study reach of the riverr from landslide dam loca ation upto
Kosi barrrage in catcchment area proportion. The catchm ment area of the Kosi rivver at Kosi barrage
b is
about 577971 sq.km.. Taking the e river crosss section fro
om ASTER DEM, D the daam break sttudy was
carried out
o using 1 dimensional mathematica
m l model MIKE11. The mo odel set up iss shown in Figure 4.
Figure 4. Mike11 model set up for dam break

b study off landslide dam
m
For the breach width of 80m, breach

b depth
h of 40 m and breach development
d t time of 2 hours
h the
maximum m discharge through the
e breach wass estimated as 5884 cum mec. The saame was found to get
attenuate
ed to 940 cu
umec at upsstream of Ko
osi barrage. The travel time of flood peak from Landslide
L
19
dam location and upp to the Kossi barrage lo

ocated abou ut 280 km do ownstream was
w estimate ed as 20
hours. T
The drainagee area map of Kosi rive er at Kosi baarrage site is
i shown in Figure 5, where
w the
numberss shown in different polyg
gons represe
ent the draina k 2 at the ou
age area in km utlet of the re
espective
polygon.
LSD Location
L
Figure 5. Drain
nage area of Kosi
K river at Ko
osi Barrage
The estimated flood peak due to o landslide dam

d breach and possible
e additional rise in wate
er level at
ocations is given
salient lo g in Tabble 2. The atttenuation and translatio
on pattern off flood hydro
ograph is
shown in n Figure 6, where
w lake 3000
3 denotess flood hydro
ograph near landslide daam and Kosi 279000
denotes flood hydrog graph near Kosi
K barrage.
Table 2. Estimated floo od peak due tto landslide da

am breach and possible additional rise in
n water level at
a different
locations of the Kosi rivver
Note: Kossi 10500.00 deenotes the loccation 10500 m downstream

m of landslide dam location. Same way alll the other
locations may please be read. Furrther the date es and time given in the table are the e same as aadopted in
mathema atical model sim
mulation. The same should not be treated
d in absolute terms.
t
Locatiomm (m) Initial flood Initial floo

od + ood peak
Flo Possible Floodd peak
downstreeam of in river landslide damd d to
due additional rise
a e in occurrrence
landslide
e dam (cumec) breach flo ood landslide dam water level du
ue time (date-
(
(cumecc) (ccumec) t landslide da
to am hr:m
min
breach (m)
Landslid
de dam 0 5885 5885 8.50 3/8/201
14 2:15
KOSI 10 0500.00 152 5827 5675 6.09 3/8/201
14 2:40
KOSI 25 5500.00 182 5698 5516 7.19 3/8/201
14 3:00
KOSI 40 0500.00 182 5231 5049 9.18 3/8/201
14 3:40
KOSI 55 5500.00 182 4673 4491 8.62 3/8/201
14 4:20
KOSI 61500.00 182 4547 4365 5.54 3/8/201
14 4:35
KOSI 112500.00 620 3564 2944 5.31 3/8/201
14 6:54
20
Locatiom (m) Initial flood Initial flood + Flood peak Possible Flood peak
downstream of in river landslide dam due to additional rise in occurrence
landslide dam (cumec) breach flood landslide dam water level due time (date-
(cumec) (cumec) to landslide dam hr:min
breach (m)
KOSI 121500.00 620 3531 2911 4.52 3/8/2014 7:15
KOSI 151500.00 620 3097 2477 3.42 3/8/2014 8:49
KOSI 181500.00 997 3136 2139 3.78 3/8/2014 10:30
KOSI 220500.00 997 2991 1994 5.87 3/8/2014 11:55
KOSI 237714.28 997 2618 1621 1.88 3/8/2014 13:34
KOSI 254000.00 3540 4604 1064 0.68 3/8/2014 16:54
KOSI 279000.00 3540 4482 942 0.44 3/8/2014 22:20
(Near Kosi barrage)
[m^3/s] Discharge
Time Series Discharge
6000.0 KOSI 61500.00
KOSI 121500.00
5500.0 KOSI 181500.00
KOSI 220500.00
5000.0 KOSI 279000.00
LAKE 3000.00
4500.0
4000.0
3500.0
3000.0
2500.0
2000.0
1500.0
1000.0
500.0
0.0
00:00:00 04:00:00 08:00:00 12:00:00 16:00:00 20:00:00 00:00:00 04:00:00
3-8-2014 4-8-2014
Figure 6: Attenuation and translation pattern of landslide dam break flood hydrograph
(Note: The horizontal line before rising limb of each hydrograph shows the initial discharge in river at that location
before arrival of dam break flood)
3.4 Limitations
The above estimate was obtained using the river cross sections from ASTER DEM, which may differ in
comparison to surveyed river cross sections. A very high rainfall in the drainage area of the rivers
might have influenced the attenuation pattern of the flood peak, resulting some higher discharge in
comparison to estimated one. It is not possible to exactly predict the dam breach parameters, hence a
major variation in dam breach parameter might have resulted in variation of estimated flood peak
4.0 CONCLUSIONS
In case of blockage of rivers due to a major landslide dam, the information pertaining to possible
additional rise in river water level and warning time in the event of possible dam breach is very
important input for disaster management planning, which should be made available to concerned
authorities at the shortest possible time. In majority of the cases it may not be possible to get the data
21
of lake volume and river cross sections, which are essential for hydrodynamic simulation. However,
from the available open source DEM and modeling tools some of the important data can be extracted
and used for hydrodynamic simulation to provide the desired input for disaster management planning.
While providing the inputs regarding additional rise in river water level and warning time etc limitations
of the data should be clearly mentioned in order to take some reasonable additional factor of safety in
the estimate and consequent disaster management planning.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in the paper are purely personal and not necessarily the views of the
organisation.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This technical paper could be possible due to availability of SRTM and ASTER DEM of NASA and HEC-RAS
software of HEC. Further we acknowledge the inputs received from the officers of Govt. of Nepal and Central
Water Commission to carry out this study.
REFERENCES
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, HEC ( 2011): HEC-GeoRAS Users Manual
Rai, N. N. (2009): Glacial Lake Outburst Flood Study Journal of Hydrological Research and Development, Vol
24, 2009 published by Indian National Committee on Hydrology (INCOH), p.159-184
Froehlich, David C. (1987): Embankment-Dam Breach Parameters, Hydraulic Engineering, Proceedings of the
1987 ASCE National Conference on Hydraulic Engineering, Williamsburg, Virginia, August 3-7, 1987, p. 570-575.
Froehlich, David C. (1995a): Peak Outflow from Breached Embankment Dam, Journal of Water Resources
Planning and Management, vol. 121, no. 1, p. 90-97.
Froehlich, David C. (1995b): Embankment Dam Breach Parameters Revisited, Water Resources Engineering,
Proceedings of the 1995 ASCE Conference on Water Resources Engineering, San Antonio, Texas, August 14-18,
1995, p. 887-891.
22
Role of PMP Atlas in Design Flood Estimation

Er M.Raghuram Er Ravi Ranjan,
Director, Central Water Commission Deputy Director, Central Water Commission
raghuram32@rediffmail.com
ABSTRACT
In India, important hydraulic structures are designed based on the size of the structure and the risk involved in an
event of failure. Accordingly, BIS prescribes the Standard Project Flood (SPF) and Probable Maximum Flood
(PMF) as design flood for intermediate and large dams respectively. The Standard Project Storm (SPS) and
Probable Maximum Precipitation (PMP) are the main inputs in computations of SPF/ PMF. Estimation of PMP is a
time consuming process and requires large amount of data such as daily rainfall data, critical storms information,
synoptic situation of such critical storms, persistent dew point temperature, near by SRRG data, topography,
transposabilty of the storms etc as well as indepth knowledge and experience in the field of hydro-meteorology.
Recognizing the importance of PMP studies in the design of hydraulic structures, in recent years CWC, IMD, and
IITM brought out PMP atlases for different river basins of India. CWC in association with IMD has recently taken
up a project which includes the updating of existing PMP atlases prepared in nineties and development of new
PMP atlases for Ganga and Brahmaputra basins. The present PMP atlases provide SPS/ PMP estiamtion at sub
basin level and at uniformly placed grid points in the basins as well. In addition, the PMP atalses include isohyetal
patterns in GIS form, synoptic situation, DAD curves, persisting dew point temperature data, moisture
maximization factors and other relevant details of about 700 key storms across different river basins of India. The
maximum one/ two/ three day annual rainfall series have also been analysed for all rain-gauge stations of river
basins for assessing various return period rainfall as well as point PMP estimates by statistical method. The PMP
atlases are comprehensive knowledge bank which provide not only readily useable SPS/ PMP estimates at sub
basin level/ grid points but also detailed data of around 700 storms for carrying out project/ catchmnet specific
SPS/PMP studies. It is usually advocated to limit the usage of grid wise PMP/SPS given in atlases for small and
medium cathments and detailed storm analysis using the storm data incorporated in the atlases must be
employed for large catchments. Few case studies are presented to demonstrate usage of PMP atlases in
different ways and the results are also compared. Through case studies efforts have been made to formulate
guidelines for usage of PMP atlases in computing the project specific SPS/ PMP estimates.
1 INTRODUCTION
In India, hydraulic structures are designed depending on the size of the structure and the risk involved
in an event of failure. Accordingly, BIS: 11223, 1985 prescribes the Standard Project Flood (SPF) and
Probable Maximum Flood (PMF) as design flood for intermediate and large dams respectively. In the
design of small structures, some calculated risk is taken and for that reason, estimates of maximum
point or areal rainfalls of different return periods are used. The basic step in computation of SPF/ PMF
is the estimation of Standard Project storm (SPS) /Probable Maximum Precipitation (PMP). Though
the hydrologists and practicing engineers are well equipped with algorithms to convert SPS/ PMP into
SPF/ PMF, evaluation of SPS/ PMP itself poses a challenge. WMO (2009) defined PMP as the depth
of precipitation for a given duration that is meteorologically possible for a design watershed or a given
size storm area at a particular location at a certain time of year. Estimation of PMP is a time
consuming process and requires large amount of data such as daily rainfall data, critical storms
information, synoptic situation of such critical storms, persistent dew point temperature, near by SRRG
data, topography, transposabilty of the storms etc as well as indepth knowledge and experience in the
field of hydro-meteorology. Recognizing the importance of PMP studies in design of hydraulic
structures, there have been major efforts in recent years by CWC, IMD and IITM in analysis of critical
storms and preparation of the PMP atlases for different river basins of India. Recently, CWC and IMD
have taken up a project to update existing PMP atlases prepared by CWC under DSARP-1 in
nineties and develope new atlases for Ganga and Brahmaputra basins.
The study area in the present project includes river basins of Ganga, Brahmaputra , Cauvery and
other east flowing rivers, Godavari, Mahanadi, Brahmani, Baitarani and other east flowing rivers
between Mahanadi and Godavari, Narmada, Tapi, Sabarmati, Banas and Luni and rivers of
Saurashtra and Kutch regions including Mahi and West flowing rivers of the Western Ghats
The present study covers all the river basins in the country except the Indus and Krishna basins. The
PMP atlases for Indus and Krishna basins were prepared in year 2007. Thus PMP atlases have been
prepared for all river basins in the country.
23
2 S
SALIENT FE
EATURES OF
O PMP ATL
LAS
The follo ults are iincluded in the PMP Atlase

owing vital data and resu es which can n be used ass a quick
reference for SPS/ PMP
P compuutaions at grrid points as well as for carrying out project / catchment
specific d
detailed SPS
S/ PMP comp putations alsso:
i. CClimatology of the basins - mean monthly, seasonal and annual rain nfall maps fo or all the
bbasins.
ii. DDetails of 7000 identified storms
s and synoptic
s situa
ation of key storms
s
iii. IIsohyetal pa atterns, DAD (Depth- Are ea- Duration) analysis of 1- day, 2-d day & 3-dayy duration
sstorms
iv. TThe Moisture e Maximization Factor (M MMF) computtations
v. MMatrix showiing sub basin n/ grid point wise
w affectin
ng storms of 1- day, 2-dayy & 3-day du uration
vi. SSub Basin wise
w SPS and d PMP estima ates in tabulaar and graphhical form
vii. PPMP estimates at 10 X 10 grid poin nts for each of the basinss and presenting in the maps for
ddifferent areaas
viii. SSub basin wise
w Time Disstribution (TDD-Analysis) factors
f for 12
2- hour, 24-hhour, 48-hour and 72-
hhour duration n storms
ix. SSub basin wise Area Red duction Facto ors (ARF)
x. PPoint PMP estimation
e for the duratioons of 1-day, 2-day and 3-day
3 stormss based on maximum
m
aannual rainfa all series off stations in and around d the basin by using He ershfield method and
rresults in maaps and table es
xi. 2 2 50; 100; 500; 1,000; 5,000 and 10,000 year return
2.33; 5; 10; 25; r period
d rainfall estim
mates for
aall stations
xii. MMaps showin ng the snow fed areas an nd rain fed arreas.
xiii. AAll the maps prepared on n GIS plotforrm
xiv. WWorked out examples
e for highlighting
g use of atlasses
Methodo
ology followed in preparin
ng the above
e products is described in
n brief in the following
f pra
agraphs.
3 S
STORM ANA
ALYSIS
The daily rainfall datta for the peeriod 1901-22006 were su urveyed to determine
d th
he rainstormss over all
river bassins /rivers sy
ystems unde er study. Thee criteria of rain
r spells ha
aving recordeed rainfall off 200 mm
or more in 1-day, 250 mm or more in 2-day and a 300 mm or more in 3-day 3 duratio
on at the cenntre of the
storm wa as applied too select the ra
ainstorms. A list of all raiinstorms seleected using the
t above crriteria has
been pre epared. In this study, aboout 700 stormms have bee en selected across
a river basins/
b river systems.
Isohyetaal maps of alll the stormss were prepa ared by using g geospatial techniques.. Rainfall datta for the
duration of storms within
w the bassin and adjoining areas was w considerred in the pre eparation of isohyetal
maps. The DAD ana alysis was caarried out using the deve eloped isohye etal pattern for
f all the sto orms and
included in the reporrt in graphica al and tabula
ar form. Figu ure 1 showss a typical isohyetal patte ern for 1-
day rainsstorm, while Figure 2 sho al DAD curve for 1-day, 2-day and 3-d
ows a typica day durationss.
24
Figure 1: Isohyetal Pattern

P for 18 July, 2000 rainstorm
pth Area Durattion curves of 17-19 July, 2000

Figure 2: Dep 2 rainstorm
m
4 P
PMP ESTIMATION AT SUB
S BASIN LEVEL
Considering the topo ography of thhe catchmen nts, PMP esttimation hass been carrie ed out by DA AD or DD
(Depth Duration)
D meethod. Out of
o storms listted, a sub basin
b wise matrix
m has be een prepare ed for the
identifica
ation of affec
cting rainstorms for 1-daay, 2-day an nd 3-day durrations at ea ach sub bassin. DAD
envelope e curve for each
e sub bassin was prepa ared for 1-da
ay, 2-day andd 3-day dura ations. Whilee deciding
the stormms that can contribute to o the DAD envelope
e curve of each sub basin, limits
l of tran
nsposition
were followed. Sub basin
b wise co
ontributing storms to the DAD envelo oping curvess for 1-day, 2-day
2 and
3-day du urations havee been tabulated for quicck reference.. Figure 3 shhows typical DAD envelo ope curve
for sub bbasin 311 of Godavari ba asin. The inssitu Standardd Project Sto
orm (SPS) for different arreas were
read fromm corresponding DAD en nvelope curvves of the suub basin for 1-day, 2-dayy and 3-day durations
and tabu ulated. Thesee insitu SPS values were e multiplied with
w the MMF F to obtain inssitu PMP vallues.
Figure 3:
3 Envelope DA
AD Curve (1-d
day) for Sub Basin-311
B
5 P
PMP ESTIMATION AT GRID
G POINT
T LEVEL
Grid points were constructed in the basins at the interssection pointts of 10 latitu ude X10 long gitude for
computa ations of PMPP at these grrid points. De
epending on the topography, the grid d points were e taken at
finer inte O of the storms listed, a grid point wise matrix was prepare
ervals also. Out ed for identiffication of
affectingg rainstorms for 1-day, 2--day and 3-d day durationss at each loccation. The storms
s that fell
f within
the limitss of transpos
sition were marked
m as afffecting storm
ms at each lo
ocation. DA AD envelope curve for
25
each grid point was s prepared fo or 1-day, 2-day and 3-d day durations separatelyy. While decciding the
storms that can conttribute to thee DAD envellope curve ofo each grid point, limits of transposittion were
followed. From the DAD
D enveloppe curves off each grid point
p and duuration (1-daay, 2-day and 3-day),
Grid Rain Depth valu ues were rea ad at standard areas. Grrid point Rainn Depth valuues for differe
ent areas
were mu ultiplied by the correspo onding valuees of Transsposition Adjjustment Fa actor (TAF) to t obtain
1-day, 2--day and 3-dday areal SPPS values at various
v grid points corresponding to specified are eas. The
SPS vallues were fu plied by the MMF to ob
urther multip btain the PM MP values at each grid point for
standard
d areas and durations. Grid
G wise PM MP map of Godavari
G rive
er basin for the 1-day duration for
500 sq. kkm. areas is given in Figure 4.
Figure 4: Grid
d PMP Estima
ate for 500 sq. km area for Godavari
G basin
n
6 P
PMP BY STA
ATISTICAL APPROACH
H
Statistica
al approach of PMP estimmation is gennerally used to estimate the PMP values at rainfa all station
locationss. Globally accepted Herrshfield meth
hod has been n used in thiis study to estimate
e the statistical
point PMMP values. The
T station w
wise point PMP estimate es have bee en computed for 1Day, 2Day
2 and
3Day durations and have
h been given in tabula
ar and map format.
f
7 U
USAGE OF PMP ATLAS
S
The PM MP atlases arre comprehensive data banks which will w be useful not only forr quick assesssment of
design storm
s ( PMP, SPS or retu urn period sto
orm) for a smmall or mediu
um catchmen nt but also in
n detailed
project specific
s studiies. The diffe
erent ways which
w can be e employed in
i SPS/ PMP P computatio ons using
the PMPP atlas are exxplained in brief in the following lines::
7.1 G
Grid Point PMP
P Values
The read dymade Grid Point PMP P values preesented in the

t atlas are
e ideally suited for projects with
medium size drainag ge areas and d matching with
w one of the standard d areas adop pted in the atlas
a with
estriction tha
further re at the projecct basin shou
uld have one e of the grid points closee to its centrre. In this
case, we e need to picck up a suitaable areal PM
MP value from one of the e relevant tables presentted in the
atlas. Hoowever, such an ideal ccondition can n rarely exisst. In such cases the intterpolated arreal PMP
values corresponding g to the drain
nage area off the project for
f surroundiing grid points are compu uted. The
average value of succh computed PMP valuess of surround ding grid poinnts can be ussed as PMP value for
ect.
the proje
omputation of
In the co o Grid Point PMP valuess, influencing g points, transposabiltyy of such
g storms at grid
storms, barrier elevaation and maaximum persisting dew point
p tempera atures vary from
f one gridd point to
the other resulting in
n discrete PM
MP values at different Griid Points. Avveraging out such valuess for large
26
catchment areas may yield erroneous results. In view of these limitations, the grid point PMP values
cannot be used for large catchments say catchments with more than 500 sq km drainage area.
7.2 Sub Basin wise Envelope DAD Curve
Based on the location of the project and its catchment area, the relevant sub basin can be identified
from the Atlas. The SPS value corresponding to drainage area of the project can be read from relevant
sub basin envelope DAD curve. Further, the Moisture Adjustment Factor (MAF) pertaining to the storm
for the project location can be computed using the dew point temperature data incorporated in the
Atlas. Using the computed SPS and MAF values, the project PMP value can be estimated. Usage of
envelope DAD curve usually yields higher SPS values because of which this method can be employed
for small and medium drainage areas only.
7.3 Identifying the Critical Storms and Using DAD Curve
The atlas provides the list of storms affecting the basin as well as different sub basins also. Using such
data and taking the transposabilty limitations into account, the critical storms for the specific catchment
area can be identified. Using relevant DAD curve, the SPS value for the appropriate area can be
computed. Further MAF for the identified storm at the project location can be computed and
subsequently the PMP can be evaluated. Usually usage of DAD curves result in higher areal rainfall
values compared to areal rainfall depths computed by superimposing isohyetal pattern over the
catchment. Because of this restriction, the method results in slightly higher values but can be
considered as better method when compared with earlier described methods.
7.4 Catchment Specific Storm Studies
This is the most preferred method which can be employed for any catchment area as the method
takes care of all aspects of study. The method involves following steps:
a. Identification of the critical storms for the catchment from the matrix of the influencing storms
given in atlas for the sub basin or nearby grid points
b. Computation of transposed areal rainfall depth on the catchment from all the critical storms
using readily available isohyetal patterns
c. Computation of SPS value from the transposed areal rainfall depths from all the critical storms
d. Computation of MAF for the relevant critical storms using the persisting dew point temperature
data, topography of the storm centre and location of the project
e. Calculation of PMP from the estimated SPS and relevant MAF
In conducting the detailed storm studies, all the necessary data such as the list of influencing storms,
storm centers and isohyetal patterns of such storms, synoptic situation, barrier elevation of storms and
persisting dew point temperature of the storms, maximum persisting temperature maps are readily
available in the atlas. So, the atlas will be very handy for carrying out such detailed storm studies
otherwise procuring such data itself will be a herculean task. Further the availability of data in GIS
compatible form makes the analysis much easier and less time consuming also.
7.5 Statistical Point PMP Values
The physical method is preferred over the statistical method in computation of project specific PMP
values. However, as cross check, the statistical point PMP maps/ values along with Aral Reduction
Factors (ARF) can be employed to compute areal PMP value for the project. As the statistical point
PMP values are estimated using the specific rain-gauge data, these values are not preferred in project
PMP computations.
8 EXAMPLE AND CASE STUDIES
A worked out example is presented in the following section to appreciate the role of PMP atlas in
estimation of SPS/ PMP values.
27
8.1 E
Example Problem
Estimatioon of one da ay areal PMP

P for a Uppe
er Wardha project
p (havin
ng an area of
o 4,205 sq. km) on a
tributary of river Wardha. The Fig 5 shows the catchme ent area map p of the projject and rele
evant grid
point dettails also. Th
he PMP value
es are computed using different meth
hods as explaained above.
Fig
gure 5: Location map of pro
oblem catchme
ent
8.1.1 Grid Point PMP

P Values
None of the standarrd grid pointts lie near th

he centre of the project basin. The drainage are ea of the
project b
basin is 4,205
5 sq. km, wh
hich also doees not matchh the standarrd area proje
ected in the atlas.
a The
PMP vallues at the 4 surrounding g grid points WRD-4, WR RD-5, WNG--3 and NT10 04M-4 corresponding
to 4,000 sq. km., 5,000 sq. km. and
a the interp polated value
es for 4,205 sq.
s km. are as
a given belo ow:
Neigh
hboring Grids
s WRD--4 (mm) W
WRD-5 (mm) WNG-3 (m
mm) NT104
4M-4
PMP ffor 4,000 sq.kkm 469 489 439 454
PMP ffor 5,000 sq.kkm 456 476 428 444
Interp
polated PMP fo
or 4,205 sq.km
m 466 486 437 452
Average of the areal one day PM

MP for 4,205 sq.
s km. = (466+486+
+437+452)/4 = 460 mm
8.1.2 S
Sub Basin Envelope
E DAD
D Curve
From th
he one day envelope DAD
D curve of
o Wardha SubS basin, the
t SPS value correspo onding to
4205 sq km area is s read as 37
72 mm. Thee MAF for th nding storm of 12th Julyy 1994 is
he correspon
computeed as 1.18. The
T estimatedd PMP value
e works out to
o 438.8 mm.
8.1.3 C
Catchment Specific
S Storm
m Study
From thee list of the storms

s influencing the Wardha sub ba asin, three most
m severe storms that lay
l within
the transsposable limmits of the prroject were id d the same are transpossed to the catchment
dentified and
area. Thhe areal rain nfall depth over
o a the three storms are computed u
the catcchment for all using the
isohyetal patterns givven in the report and the same are taabulated beloow:
Transpo osed areal

Storm
m Storm Centrre Storm
m Peak (mm))
rainfall depth
d (mm)
27 June, 19914 Parbhani 401 2
274
12 July, 1994 Chandur Railwayy 468 3
322
18 July, 2000 Paoni 407 3
338
28
From the table it can be seen that the SPS value for the project is 338 mm and relevant MAF works
out to be 1.24. Computed SPS and MAF yields estimated PMP value as 419 mm.
8.1.4 Statistical point PMP values
The point static PMP value at the project location is read from the map as 470 mm and the Area
Reduction Factor for the project catchment works out to be 0.85. The areal PMP value for the project
works out to 400 mm.
8.2 Case Studies
The data and outputs of the PMP atlas have been used to estimate the PMP values for various
projects with different catchment areas and at different locations. The results of few projects are
tabulated below:
S.N Project Name and State River Catchment One day PMP by One day PMP by
Basin Area (sqkm) Grid Point values detailed storm
(mm) analysis (mm)
1 Sukta Project, Madhya Narmada 450 554 480
Pradesh
2 Willingdon Dam Project, Cauvery 130 712 658

Tamilnadu
3 Mohanpura Project, Madhya Chambal 3825 413 425

Pradesh
4 Raghava Rosara Basania Narmada 3164/ 4255/ Cannot be Different scenarios

Project, MP 4796 estimated as were generated to find
project consists of out critical situation for
cascading dams each project
From the case studies and limitations involved in estimation of Grid Point and Sub Basin SPS/ PMP
values as explained in the above sections, following few guidelines can be drawn for better usage of
PMP Atlas:
Grid Point SPS/ PMP is preferred for the catchment areas up to 200 sq km
If elongation ratio is less than 1.5 and one of the grid points close to the centre of the
catchment, Grid Point SPS/ PMP values can be used for the catchments up to 500 sqkm
Envelope DAD values can be used for the catchments up to 500 sqkm
For catchments of more than 500 sq.km., detailed storm study is recommended
When an existing dam intercepts the project catchment, detailed storm study is preferred.
9 CONCLUSIONS
The PMP atlas utilizes long term data mostly available till the recent period. Each atlas has been
prepared focusing on basin specific geography, topography and meteorological aspects. The study
has been conducted by extensive use of GIS, Relational Database and Statistical techniques. As a
result, each atlas provides a comprehensive knowledge bank including various aspects of climatology
including maps and tables, extreme rainfall statistics and synoptic situations. About 700 medium and
severe storms have been analyzed for their isohyetal patterns, DADs, dew point temperatures,
moisture maximization factors and moisture adjustment factors. A comprehensive data and information
have been generated through this study which will be useful not only for quick assessment of design
storm ( PMP, SPS or return period storm) for a small or medium catchment but also in detailed project
specific studies. The atlases provide detailing for every important aspect such as worked out
examples, area reduction factors and time distribution coefficients. The atlases shall be very useful in
the assessment of design storm as required in the assessment of design flood for any water resources
development project.
29
10 REFERENCE
1. PMP Atlases for different river basins brought out by CWC, IMD and RMSI
2. Dr. Kishor Dhore, RMSI, Bhopal Singh, Director, Hydrology(S), CWC, Vinay Kumar, Chief Engineer,
HSO, CWC, Deshraj Singh, RMSI 2015: Preparation of Probable Maximum Precipitation Atlases for
Major River Basins of India
3. Manual on Estimation of PMP (2009): WMO-1045, World Meteorological Organisation
30
Trend of Annual One-Day Maximum Rainfall Series over South India

Ashoke Basistha Priya Narayanan,
EGIS India Consulting Engineers Pvt. Ltd., National Centre for Sustainable Coastal Management
ashoke.b@egis-india.com (MoEF), Chennai
Ravi Ranjan Antonio Porcheddu

Deputy Director Hydrology (South), CWC, Delhi EGIS France, CPMU, DRIP, Delhi
ABSTRACT
There are many important dams spread over the southern states of Tamil Nadu, Kerala and Karnataka, supplying
water for habitations, irrigation or hydropower. Design flood estimation for many of the dams under the DRIP
project, some of which are more than a century old, have been carried out using empirical approach / considering
lower design storm rainfall depths compared to those considered reasonable as per the recent practice. The
possibility of increase in storm rainfall depth receivable in a day potentially increases the danger of having greater
flood magnitudes. This poses direct threat to the safety of the dams and the life and property of the inhabitants
downstream, as most of the areas are thickly populated.
The paper explores the long-term trend of annual maximum rainfall series over South India from the gridded (one
degree by one degree) Indian rainfall data set over the period of 1951 2008. Pre-whitened Mann-Kendall test
has been chosen for the purpose. This trend detection test performs best with presence of auto correlation in
data, which is often the case with natural data series. The most popular test for trend detection, viz., the Mann-
Kendall test, is known to detect trend even in its absence for series which are auto correlated. This study also
investigates the spatial pattern of trends of 1-day annual maximum rainfall over the region, with particular
reference to the south Indian states of Karnataka, Kerala and Tamil Nadu, currently covered under the DRIP
project.
The results of the study reaffirm the findings of earlier researchers that extreme rainfall is increasing over south
India. Over the long period of 1951 to 2008, the gridded annual maximum 1-day maximum rainfall series over the
south Indian land region has shown statistically significant increasing trend (at 10% level of significance) at 20
points out of a total of 69 (which is about 29%). The results of this study is supposed to be an improvement over
that of the earlier researchers as PMK test, best suitable for detecting trend in auto correlated series has been
used, and 17 series (25% of total) have been found to be auto correlated.
At 5% level of significance, increasing trend has been detected at 14 points (about 20% of the total). However,
only one grid point at Karnataka and one other at Tamil Nadu shows statistically significant rising trend which are
significant at 5% level.
Increasing trend has been shown at only 4 points (about 6% of the total), at a significance level of 1%. However,
within the boundary of the three southern DRIP states of Karnataka, Kerala and Tamil Nadu, none of the grid
points depict any rising or falling trend, which are significant at 1% level. Over the maximum at the corresponding
location, at 23 grid points (33% of total grid points considered) the increases over the data period of 58 years
exceed 10%, the chosen limit for practical implications. Over the whole region, the maximum increase in one-day
rainfall is 19.55%. However, only at two grid points (about 7%, out of a total of 29) within the boundary of the
southern DRIP states of Karnataka, Kerala and Tamil Nadu, the maximum increase exceeds the chosen limit of
10%, being 16.94% at 10 north and 78 east and 12.90% at 10 north and 79 east. Considering all the 69 data
points, the average change over 58 years is 6.69%, increasing. Over the 29 grid points covering the DRIP states,
the average change is 3.04%, also increasing. Perhaps, this may be considered as an indication that the increase
of extreme rainfall over the DRIP states is less alarming. Further studies based on more extensive data,
preferably using modelling techniques are required for attribution.
Keywords: Extreme rainfall; trend, Pre-whitened Mann Kendall Test, spatial pattern, South India
1. INTRODUCTION
Climate change has been attracting global attention at an ever-increasing rate over the last two and
half decades, starting with the appearance of First Assessment Report of Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) in 1990. The large volume of literature related to climate change is an
indicator of the increased awareness in the subject.
South India had been the cradle of civilization since times historical. Along with agriculture, the art and
science of dam construction was also not unknown to the people of the past. For example, Kallanai
31
Dam, (Grand Anicut) of Tamilnadu is the fourth oldest dam in the world. This dam on the River Kaveri,
constructed by King Karikala Chola of the Chola Dynasty in the 2nd century AD and is still serving the
people.
The assessment of design flood, a prerequisite for the estimation of design spillway discharge for
ensuring structural safety of dams, has been evolving throughout the time. The current practice of
estimation using deterministic and stochastic approaches, based on collection of observed rainfall data
helps to impart better confidence in the results. However, with the threat of a changing climate with
increase in extreme rainfall looming large, this poses a question to the degree of reliance. In order to
assess the seriousness of threat of increase in design flood due to increase in extreme rainfall over
south India, the present study attempts to explore the presence of trend in annual maximum one-day
rainfall, based on daily rainfall over the region as a one degree by one degree grid data. This also tries
to look into the practical implications of the rate of change, if any.
2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Based on their analysis of 104 years of gridded daily rainfall data, Rajeevan et al. (2008) reveal
statistically significant long term trendin frequency of extreme rainfall events over central India. A vast
majority of the studies indicate increase in extreme precipitation over parts of the Indian subcontinent,
e.g., the Himalayas (Caesar et al. 2010); as also over the central India (Pattanaik and Rajeevan 2009),
particularly over urban regions (Kishtawal et al. 2009), the north-western Himalaya and the foothills of
the Himalaya extending south into the Indo-Gangetic basin (Sen Roy and Balling 2009), parts of West
Bengal near Bangladesh border (Ghosh et al. 2009). Based on their analysis of daily rainfall data from
2599 selected rain gauge stations over India for the period 1901-2005, Guhathakurta et al. (2010)
report significant increasing trend in one-day extreme rainfall over the south peninsular region.
Analysis of Guhathakurta et al. (2011) bring out that the frequency of heavy rainfall events are
decreasing in major parts of central and north India while they are increasing in peninsular, east and
north east India. Ghosh et al. (2011) indicate increasing spatial variability of rainfall extremes over
India. It has been projected by that the end of this century, extreme precipitation events over wet
tropical regions will very likely be more intense and more frequent (IPCC, 2013).
3. METHODOLOGY
In climatic and hydrologic literature, only one nonparametric method, i.e. Mann-Kendall, has been
used in trend studies (Kahya and Kalayci 2004). Being based on ranks of observations, this does not
require any assumption regarding the normality of data, which, often, the hydrological records do not
follow. Yue and Pilon (2003) have shown that the rank-based tests exhibit higher power than their
slope-based counterparts for non-normally distributed data. However, in presence of positive
autocorrelations, this may indicate presence of trend where actually it is absent (Hamed and Rao
1998; Yue et al. 2002; Cunderlik and Burn 2004; Bayazit and Onoz 2007). Autocorrelation in
hydrological or climatic records are common (Haan 1995). Therefore, the present study attempts to
detect trend in rainfall time series using Prewhitened Mann Kendall test (Bayazit and Onoz 2007;
Cunderlik and Burn 2004).
Mann Kendall (MK) test
It is based on the test statistic S defined as:
n 1 n
S sgn( x j xi ) (1)
i 1 j i 1
where, x j are the sequential data values, n is the length of the data set and
1if ( y 0)

sgn( y ) 0if ( y 0) (2)
1if ( y 0)

32
Mann and Kendall have documented that when n 8, the statistic S is approximately normally
distributed with the mean E(S) = 0 (3)
m
n(n 1)(2n 5) t i (ti 1)(2t i 5)
and variance as V (S ) i 1
(4)
18
where, m is the number of tied groups and ti is the size of the ith tied group. The standardised test
statistic Z is computed by
S 1
whenS 0
Var ( S )

Z MK 0 whenS 0 (5)
S 1
whenS 0
Var ( S )
The standardised MK statistic Z follows the standard normal distribution with mean of zero and
variance one.
Pre-Whitened Mann Kendall (PMK) Test
In PMK, removal of the serial correlation is accomplished by
xt xt 1 1 xt (6)
where, 1 is the lag-1 autocorrelation coefficient. Serial independence is tested using
n2
t 1 (7)
1 12
where, the test statistic t has a Students t -distribution with n-2 degrees of freedom. If t t 2 , the
null hypothesis about serial independence is rejected at significance level . MK test is applied on
the series generated after removing the serial correlation.
A change that is statistically significant may not have practical significance and vice-versa (Yue and
Hashino 2003). To explore the practical significance of a change, percentage changes over the data
period were calculated. It has been obtained by computing the Theil and Sens median slope from the
series (described later), multiplying with 58, and calculating percentage over respective highest annual
one-day rainfall for the grid point under consideration.
Theil and Sens median slope
The procedure is not greatly affected by gross data errors or outliers (Helsel and Hirsch 2002). In this
approach, the slope estimates of N pairs of data are first computed by
Qi ( x j x k ) /( j k ) for i 1, N (8)
33
where, x j and x k are data values at times j and k , ( j k ) respectively. The median of these N
values of Qi is Sens estimator of slope. If there is only one data in each time period, then
N n ( n 1) / 2 (9)
where n is the number of time periods. The median of the N estimated slopes is obtained in the
usual way, i.e., the N values of Qi are ranked by Q1 Q2 Q N 1 Q N and
Q ( N 1 ) / 2 if N is odd

Sens estimator 1
Q N / 2 Q ( N 2 ) / 2 if N is even
2
It has been assumed that a change of 10% will have practical implications. This study considers a
significance level of 10%, to match with practical significance.
4. DATA
The study was carried out on gridded Indian daily rainfall data set over 1051-2008 prepared by the
Indian Institute of Tropical Meteorology, Pune. Annual one-day maximum rainfall series for the South
Indian land region (considered from the southernmost tip to 19 north) was derived from the data. The
grid points considered for the study has been shown in Figure 1. It also shows the south Indian states
under the Dam Rehabilitation and Improvement (DRIP) project.
Analysis for shorter sub periods was not attempted, following Chen and Grasby (2009). They caution
that the critical length of data period for undertaking trend analysis using Mann-Kendall or Theil and
Sens approach is 60 years, as otherwise the results may not represent climate change truly, owing to
the long-term periodicity associated with natural phenomena. The data period considered for present
study is 58 years, which approximately satisfy their criteria.
5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
5.1 Results of Statistical Trend Analysis
The results of PMK test show that at 10% level of significance, out of 69 grid points over the south
Indian land region, there are statistically significant rising trends at 20 grid points, the remaining
depicting random behaviour. At none of the grid point statistically significant falling trend was noticed.
The number of grid points with significant rising trend is about 29% of the total number of grid points
considered for the study. The results of statistical analysis for trend in annual 1-day maximum rainfall
series has been presented in Table 1. To assess the effect of chosen level of significance on the
results, the results at 5% and 1 % level of significance were also explored, and have been shown in
Table 1. The spatial distribution of the results of trend analysis with PMK at 10% level of significance
has been shown in Figure 2. It brings out that the many of the grid points showing statistically
significant rising trend lay within the newly formed state of Telangana, and the state of Andhra
Pradesh. Statistically significant increasing trend has also been portrayed at a few other grid points in
Tamil Nadu and Karnataka. This also shows that out of the 29 grid points under the DRIP states of
south India, only 5 points have statistically significant rising trend (at 10% level of significance) over
the period, which is about 17% of the total.
Increasing trend has been detected at 14 points (about 20% of the total), at 5% level of significance.
The spatial distribution of the results of trend analysis with PMK at 5% level of significance has been
shown in Figure 3. This brings out that out of the 29 grid points within the boundary of the DRIP states,
only one grid point at Karnataka and one other at Tamil Nadu has statistically significant rising trend
which are significant at 5% level.
34
At 1% le evel of signifficance only 4 points (about 6% of the total) sh how increasing trend. Th he spatial
distribution of the re
esults of tren
nd analysis with
w PMK at 5% level off significance e has been shown in
Figure 4. There are no grid points within the e boundary of o the three DRIP
D states of south Ind
dia, which
shows a rising trend in annual ma aximum 1-da ay rainfall at 1% level of significance.
s
Fig
gure 1: Grid Points Conside
ered for the Stu
udy
These rresults reaffirm the findings of earllier research hers that the e south Ind dian land region has
experien nced increasiing trend in extreme
e rain
nfall. Howeve er, it was found that 17 raainfall series (out of a
total of 6
69) are auto correlated
c att 10% level of
o significancce. So, the reesults of this study are co onsidered
to be be etter than sim
milar study byy earlier reseearchers using Mann-Ke endall test known to be e affected
by auto correlation. For example e, using origginal Mann K Kendall test at 10% leve el of significa
ance, the
number of grid pointss which show ws statisticallly significant increasing trend is 29.
5.2 R
Results of Practical
P Sig
gnificance Analysis
A
For asse essment of the

t practicall implicationss of the tren nd, it has be een considerred that a change
c of
rainfall of
o 10% or more over the e maximum one-day rain nfall at the correspondin
c ng grid point over the
data perriod is practiccally significant. There are
a 23 (or 33 3% of the total of 69) grid points in the t study
area whe ere the increease over 58 8 year period d has excee eded 10%, as s shown in Figure
F 3. Wh hile at 33
points thhere has bee en an increa ase of the magnitude
m lesss than 10% %, there hass been a deccrease of
magnitud de less than n -10% at 12 2 grid pointss as well. At A a single grid
g point (9 north 77 east) the
decrease e was estimmated as -10.24%, which h is marginally less than n -10%. The maximum e estimated
increase e was 19.55% %, for the gridd point locateed at 18 norrth and 80 east.
e At 14 grid points (20 0% of the
total num mber of grid d points considered forr the study)), rising tren nd is significcant statisticcally and
practically, as portrayyed in Figure e 5. It also brings
b out thaat barring a single
s point in
i Tamil Nad du, all the
other grid points whe ere the risingg trend is sta
atistically sig
gnificant at 10% level, as s well as the increase
over the e data period d is greater than 10% are a concentrated over Telangana
T a
and Andhra Pradesh.
Interestinngly, the sing
gle grid poinnt with a pracctically signifficant (less th
han -10%) decreasing tre end does
not show w up in Fig gure 6, as there are no n decreasin ng trends which
w are sttatistically siignificant.
Considering all the 69 data pointss, the averag ge change is 6.69%, incre easing.
he boundaryy of the three DRIP stattes of Karna

Within th ataka, Keralaa and Tamil Nadu, the m maximum
estimateed increase at
a a grid poinnt was found d to be 16.94 4%, at 10 noorth and 78 east, in Tam mil Nadu.
The risin
ng trend at th
his location iss also statisttically significcant at 10% level of sign
nificance. Ovver the 29
grid poin
nts covering the
t DRIP sta ates, the average change e is 3.04%, in
ncrease. The e results of an
nalysis of
practical significance
e of trend havve also been n presented in Table 1.
35
6. CON
NCLUSIONS
S
The resu ults of the study reaffirm the findingss of earlier re

esearchers extreme
e rainffall is increassing over
south India. Over th he long perio od of 1951 to 2008, the e gridded an nnual maxim mum 1-day m maximum
rainfall sseries over thhe south Indian land region has show wn statisticaally significan
nt increasing trend (at
10% level of signific cance) at 20 points out ofo a total of 69 (which iss about 29% %). The resullts of this
study are e supposed to be an imp provement ov ver that of th
he earlier ressearchers ass the PMK te est is best
suitable for detecting g trend in au
uto correlated
d series and d 17 series (2 25% of total) are auto co orrelated.
Mann-Ke endall test, th
he most popular test for trend
t detection is well knnown to detecct trend even n where it
is actually absent, if the
t series is auto correlaated.
At 5% le evel of significance, increeasing trend has been de

etected at 14
4 points (abo
out 20% of the
t total).
Howeverr, only one gridg point att Karnataka and one othher at Tamil Nadu has statistically
s s
significant
rising tre
end which are e significant at 5% level.
Increasinng trend has been shown n at only 4 points (about 6% of the to otal), at a significance levvel of 1%.
Howeverr, the grid po oints within the
t boundaryy of the three southern DRIP D states of Karnatakka, Kerala
and Tam mil Nadu, do o not depict any trend, rising or fallin ng. Over thee maximum at the corresponding
location, at 23 grid po
oints (33% of
o total grid points conside creases over the data perriod of 58
ered) the inc
years exxceed 10%, the chosen limit for practical implica ations. Overr the whole region,
r the maximum
m
increasee in one-day rainfall is 19.55%. However, only at two t grid poin
nts (about 7% %, out of a to
otal of 29)
within the boundary of the southern DRIP sta ates of Karnnataka, Keralla and Tamil Nadu, the m maximum
increasee exceeds the e chosen limmit of 10%, be eing 16.94%% at 10 northh and 78 ea ast and 12.90 0% at 10
north and 79 east. Considering
C all the 69 da
ata points, th
he average change is 6.6 69%, increasing. Over
the 29 ggrid points coovering the DRIP
D states, the averagee change is 3.04%, also increasing. Perhaps,
this mayy be considered as an in ndication thatt the increasse of extreme rainfall ove er the DRIP states is
less alarrming. Furtheer studies baased on more extensive e data, preferably using modelling te echniques
are required for attrib
bution.
Figure 2: Results of PM
MK test of Ann
nual Maximum
m 1-Day Rainfa
all Series at 10
0% level of Sig
gnificance
36
Fiigure 3: Results of PMK test of Annual Ma

aximum 1-Dayy Rainfall Seriies at 5% leve
el of Significan
nce
Fiigure 4: Results of PMK test of Annual Ma

aximum 1-Dayy Rainfall Seriies at 1% leve
el of Significan
nce
37
Figure
e 5: Results off Analysis of Annual
A Maximu
um 1-Day Rainfall Series for Practical Sig
gnificance of Change
C
Figure 6: Locations where Trend of Annual

A Maxim
mum 1-Day Ra ainfall Series iss Significant both Statistically (at 10%
evel) and Pracctically (>10% of the maximu
le um obtained at a the grid poin nt)
Tablle 1: Results of
o Trend Analy
ysis of Annual Maximum 1-D
Day Rainfall Series
S
Resultts of PMK Results of PMK
P Resu
ults of PMK
Latitud
de Longitu
ude Rainfaall
test at 10% test at 5%
% tes
st at 1%
Degreees Degre
ees % Chan nge
Significance Significanc ce Significance
9 77 Raandom Random R
Random -10.244
Random 6.53
Random 4.03
10 78 R
Rise Rise R
Random 16.944
Random 12.900
Random -0.96
Random -1.08
11 78 R
Rise Random R
Random 7.73
Random 2.73
Random -2.53
Random -4.73
38
Results of PMK Results of PMK Results of PMK

Latitude Longitude Rainfall
test at 10% test at 5% test at 1%
Degrees Degrees % Change
Significance Significance Significance
12 78 Random Random Random 1.91
13 76 Random Random Random -2.11
13 78 Rise Random Random 6.34
14 75 Rise Rise Random 5.36
16 79 Rise Rise Rise 11.79
39
Results of PMK Results of PMK Results of PMK

Latitude Longitude Rainfall
test at 10% test at 5% test at 1%
Degrees Degrees % Change
Significance Significance Significance
Rise 20 14 4 23
Random 49 55 65 45
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Journal,, 52 (4), 611-624.
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Htay, M.M., Karmacharya, J., Jayasinghearachchi, D.A., Sakkamart, J., Soares, E., Hung, L.T., Thuong, L.T.,
Hue, C.T., Dung, N.T.T., Hung, P.V., Cuong, H.D., Cuongo, N.M., Sirabaha, S., 2010, Changes in temperature
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Selected Climatic Variables, ASCE J Hyd Eng, 9(4), 246-256.
Ghosh, S., Das, D., Kao, S-C and Ganguly, A.R., 2011, Lack of Uniform Trends but Increasing Spatial Variability
in Observed Indian Rainfall Extremes, Letters to Nature Climate Change, DOI: 10.1038/NCLIMATE132.
Ghosh, S., Luniya, V., Gupta, A., 2009, Trend analysis of Indian summer monsoon rainfall at different spatial
scales, Atm Sc Lett, 10, 285290.
Guhathakurta, P., Menon, P., Mazumdar, A.B., and. Sreejith, O. P, 2010. Changes in Extreme Rainfall Events and
Flood Risk in India During the Last Century, National Climate Centre Research Report No: 3/2010.
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and Flood Risk in India, J. Earth Syst. Sci.120, No. 3, pp. 359373.
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Hamed, K.H. and Rao, A.R., 1998, A Modified Mann-Kendall Trend Test for Auto correlated Data, J Hyd, 204,
182-196.
Helsel, D.R. and Hirsch, R.M., 2002, Statistical Methods in Water Resources Hydrologic Analysis and
Interpretation: Techniques of Water Resources Investigations of the U.S. Geological Survey, Chapter A3, Book 4,
510pp.
IPCC, 2013: Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth
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Tignor, M., Allen, S.K., Boschung, J., Nauels, A., Xia, Y., Bex V., and Midgley P.M. (eds.)], Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA.
Kahya, E. and Kalayci, S., 2004, Trend Analysis of Stream Flow in Turkey, Journal of Hydrology, 289, 128-144.
Kishtawal, C.M., Niyogi, D., Tewari, M., Pielke R.A.Sr. and Shepherd, J.M., 2009, Urbanization signature in the
observed heavy rainfall climatology over India, Int J Clim, DOI: 10.1002/joc.2044.
Pattanaik, D.R. and Rajeevan, M, 2009, Variability of extreme rainfall events over India during southwest
monsoon season, Met Appl, 17(1), 88-104.
Rajeevan, M., Bhate, J.and Jaswal A.K., 2008, Analysis of Variability and Trends of Extreme Rainfall Events over
India using 104 years of Gridded Daily Rainfall Data, Geophys. Res. Lett., 35, L18707, DOI:
10.1029/2008GL035143.
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29, 345-355.
40
Yue, S. and Hashino, M., 2003, Long Term Trends of Annual and Monthly Precipitation in Japan, Journal of the
American Water Resources Association, 587-596.
Yue, S., Pilon, P., Phinney, B. and Cavadias, G., 2002, The influence of Autocorrelation on the Ability to Detect
Trend in Hydrological Series, Hyd Proc, 16, 1807-1829.
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(4), 1077 Doi: 10.1029/2001WR001210.
41
Failure of Ankamnhal Minor Irrigation Dam- Investigation

Y.K. Handa
Chief Engineer,
Designs (N&W), Central Water Commission
cedesnws@nic.in
ABSTRACT
The Ankamanhal Minor Irrigation Dam, 16.83 m high and 278 m long embankment dam was designed and
constructed by the State Government in Krishna Basin across a nala near Ankamanhal village in 1988
downstream of a old bund which had breached earlier also. No records were found available of the old earthen
th st
dam breached earlier and the present dam, which breached on the night of 20 and 21 August, 2010. Both the
dams breached in the deep nala portion. The spillway width of the old dam was very less compared to the
th st
present dam. The dam had breached for a length of 71 m during the night of 20 and 21 August, 2010 after the
catchment experienced an unprecedented rainfall of 102 mm for about 9 hours. The breach of the dam was
investigated by the several panels/authorities and committees. The state Dam Safety review panel, headed by
Dr. Y.K. Murthy, Ex Chairman Central Water Commission, was of the opinion that a lineament of a major joint
which existed all along the mother valley in the foundation of the earth dam as a major cause of concern.
Member DSRP observed that discharge over the spillway was much above the designed capacity which might
have caused overtopping the dam. He also anticipated foundation failure along the same shear lineament or
because of differential settlement in the right bank. The team of CWC and GSI inspected the breached dam
along with Geologist from GSI. Since no one saw the dam when it was breaching and no records were available,
all the aspects were studied on the basis of site observations and accordingly analysis was carried out on the
basis of data generated through observations and using codal provisions to arrive at the probable failure cause.
1.0 BACKGROUND
The Ankamanhal Minor Irrigation Dam in Krishna Basin was constructed across a nala near
Ankamanhal village in 1988 downstream of the old bund which had breached earlier. No records were
available for the construction as well as breaching of the dam before 1988. The 16.83 m high & 278 m
long embankment dam was designed and constructed by the State Government. The 53.35 m long
ogee crested spillway (waste weir) was ungated and designed to pass a design discharge of 102
cumec with 0.9 m head. The dam was having two sluices Right and Left bank for irrigation. Due to
mining activities in the upstream the dam reservoir had been silted up to the extent of 0.5 m above sill
elevation of irrigation sluices and the irrigation sluices were not functioning. The farmers were pumping
ground water from the downstream of the dam. No water level records of the reservoir and spillage
from the waste weir were being maintained by the department.
The state Dam Safety review panel, headed by Dr. Y.K. Murthy, Ex Chairman Central Water
Commission, had inspected the dam on 08-12-2009 and following were the main observations.
a. Left Bank consists of schistose formation on which spillway waste weir is constructed. Team had
observed extensive damage to the bed pitching constructed of dry slabs provided in between four
drop walls along the tail channel.
b. In the foundation of the earth dam, there is lineament of a major joint which exists all along the
mother valley, which was considered by the team during the inspection as a major cause of
concern. During the inspection it was reported that no treatment was given to the foundation in this
reach of the main dam.
c. The waste weir structure was designed with an Ogee crest. Team had recommended that the
spillway design discharge should be 1 in 100 years flood as per IS Codes and the adequacy of the
existing spillway capacity should be checked for SPF. The free board shall also be provided as per
IS codal provisions.
d. The top width of the dam i.e. 2.44 m was considerably reduced at many places. The original dam
section shall be restored by providing additional earth work duly compacted. Also the stability of
the dam shall be checked for all conditions including seismic condition since the dam is in Zone II.
If needed strengthening measures should be carried out.
42
e. No seepage was observed on the downstream slope and no trace of seepage collected in the toe
drain below rock toe. Team observed leakage of 5 liters/s in the nala immediately downstream of
the dam. But one of the drawings shows a 5.07 m deep cut off trench. This needs to be
investigated.
f. Few piezometers shall be provided in the downstream zone of embankment dam to observe water
levels with reference to reservoir levels.
g. Outlet gates, seals and other maintenance works shall be undertaken if irrigation is to be revived.
2.0 SITE INSPECTION BY MEMBER DSRP
The dam was inspected by a Member 0f Dam Safety Review Panel (DSRP0 on 30-09-2010 after the
breach. The following were his main findings.
1. The depth of water that passed over the spillway was about 1.5 m as ascertained from the
flood mark.
2. The discharge over the spillway with 1.5 m head of water, appears to have reached a peak of
219 cumec and outflow of 180 cumec against a designed capacity of 102 cumec.
3. The flood was arrested between the old bund and new bund and might have caused a
heading up of 0.6 to 0.7 m of water and consequently overtopped the earth dam resulting in
the breach of the new bund.
4. The breached portion needs to be rectified and all the components of the dam be rehabilitated
to make it serviceable.
3.0 OBSERVATIONS OF DR Y .K. MURTHY, CHAIRMAN, DSRP
The report of Member DSRP of State along with flood hydrograph and photographs, after the breach,
were sent to Dr. Y.K. Murthy for his observations. His main observations were.
1. The difference between the top of waste weir and top of dam is 2.14 m. With 2.14 m head,
discharge will be 366.79 cumec and 334.91 cumec for Cd value of 2.19 & 2.0 respectively.
Therefore, the dam cannot overtop with a flood of 219 or 180 cumec.
2. It is anticipated that a shear lineament extends from the upstream in the reservoir to the
downstream all along the mother valley. It is also anticipated that no foundation treatment was
given at the time of construction. The seepage of 5 liters/sec in the nala portion at the time of
inspection in Dec. 2009 justifies the above. Therefore the failure could have caused due to
foundation failure along this shear lineament. The failure could also be due to cracks as a result of
differential settlement in the right bank,
3. The Photographs do not suggest any overtopping, at anticipated location i.e. from CH 180 to 193.
4. The Chairman DSRP desired that there was a need to investigate each issue and the project
organization should take up detailed inspection with the help of an earth dam design engineer and
an expert engineering geologist to know the actual cause of failure before rehabilitation is taken
up.
4.0 VISIT OF CWC AND GSI FROM 24-02-2011 TO 25-02-2011
The following data was supplied during the visit:
1. Copy of the DPR stage drawings and estimate of the dam constructed in 1988.
2. Cross section of the dam at 30 m interval taken after the breach of 21st August 2010, showing
the profile of the embankment dam.
3. Longitudinal section of the embankment dam after the breach.
4. Submergence plan of the dam up to 1 m above the top of dam.
43
4.1 Observations of the site visit
Hard Schishtose formation with interbanded quartzite and thin quartz veins were exposed both in
the upstream and downstream of the ogee waste weir. The waste weir (spillway) drop walls were
heavily damaged. This was mainly due to two reasons firstly the discharge on the 20th August night
was nearly double the designed discharge (102 cumec) and secondly the design of the weir was not
as per state of the art.
No records were found available of the old earthen dam breached earlier and the present dam, which
breached on 21st August was inspected. Both the dams breached in the deep nala portion. The
spillway width of the old dam was very less compared to the present dam.
The entire reach of the dam from upstream and downstream was inspected. There was no sign of
distress at any place on the slope except the three failures stretches i.e. CH 180 to 193, CH 199 to
270 and the failure around the right bank sluice. The top width of the dam in the entire reach as
provided at the time of construction was found to be less than 2.44 m (8 feet). No signs of overtopping
of the earthen dam were also apparent in the visible reach.
The embankment material exposed in the steep right breach face between CH 199 to 270 does not
show any visible signs of distress such as cracking and loosening. The cross section of the dam at
CH.240, which is the deepest valley portion shows the existing breached embankment level to be 2 to
3 m above the stripped foundation level. The soil material of side slopes of the breached reach from
CH 199 to 270 showed only little difference in colour of the shell and core material. The core soil, when
dry was very hard and was easily rolled into balls in wet condition indicating that the soil was having
high clay content. The horizontal and inclined filter material was visible only at few locations on the
side slopes. At other locations probably it would have been mixed up with the surrounding soil due to
side slope slips.
The failure at CH 180 to 193 looked to be slip failure and no sign of overtopping could be seen. The
slip appeared to be a surface failure. In the right bank sluice portion around CH 307 the failure was
nearly up to the ground level at that point. The sluice is close to nala portion and downstream of the
breached portion of the old dam. (see Googles map enclosed).
44
OLD SPILLWAY
OLD DA
AM
Figure 1 : Satellitte View of the Dam & Reserrvoir
There waas a thick co over of 3 to 5 m impervioous clayey sediment exte ending for ab
bout 300 m upstream
of the da
am. Due to drying, the clayey mate erial in the rreservoir bed
d was highlyy cracked an
nd gulley
formation
n was observed along g the right flank hill. This
T sedimeent should have acted d as an
impervio
ous blanket and safegu uard againsst seepage through th he foundation
n of the dam.
d The
permeab bility of the se
ediment in th
he reservoir may
m be determined by la aboratory testts.
The brea ach in the oldd dam was also

a inspecte
ed as it was dry on the day of inspecction. Highly contorted
c
schistosee rocks were a along the entire length
e exposed all h of the brea ach. No majo
or discontinu
uity in the
form of sshear of fractture zone could be obserrved during this field insp
pection.
ht flank hill forming the right

The righ r rim of the reservoir presents stable
s s. No major landslide
slopes
scars weere observed d. Therefore the possibility of a large
e landslide into the reservoir therebyy causing
over topp
ping of the dam appears to be remote e.
epth of 2 to 3 mts along the toe of th

A few triial pits were dug to a de he dam. Stifff clayey matterial was
encounte ered in them below top.
ssible Cause of Failure

4.2 Pos
After insspection and d discussion and going through the data suppliied by proje ect authoritie
es, it was
conclude ed that failurre could havve taken placce by any off the followin
ng four causses or combiination of
more tha an one.
a. O
Overtopping due to high flood.
45
b. Failure of foundation due to shear lineament.

c. Overtopping due to wave action.
d. Slip failure of earth dam slope leading to breaching of the dam.
Each of the above cause has been analyzed as discussed below:-
4.2.1 Overtopping due to high flood.
Since the 1.5 m water level mark was at the spillway crest, the water level in the reservoir would have
been more than 1.5 m may be nearly equal to 1.7 m This was conformed with the help of water profile
table given in Central water Commission Manual on Hydraulic design of Spillways for Ogee shapes.
Considering He = Hd =1.7 m (i.e. actual head equal to design head) the factors X/He and Y/He from
Chart 7 of the Manual are:-
X/He Y/He
0.2 0.821
1.0 0.933
Putting a value of He =1.7
For X = 0.34 m (1.7 X 0.2), Y will be 1.51 (1.7 X 0.821) and
For X =1.70 m (1.7 X 1.0), Y will be 1.72 (1.7 X 0.933)
Therefore the water level in the reservoir would have been close to 1.7 m at the time of breach. Since
the upstream floor of waste weir was nearly at the same level as crest of spillway the coefficient of
discharge Cd will be 1.84 and discharge over the waste weir will be :-
Q = Cd L He3/2 = 1.84 x 53.35 x 1.7 3/2 = 218 cumec.

Where 53.35 m is length of waste weir
4.2.2 Failure of foundation due to shear lineament.
The cross section of the dam at CH 240 shows the existing breached embankment level to be 2 to 3
m above the stripped foundation level. If seepage through foundations were to be a primary cause for
failure, one would normally expect the failure to be initiated at the base of the dam and extend
upwards progressively, which does not seem to be the present case.
In the ground water prospects map of part of Bellary and Chitra Durga districts of Karnataka, on
1:50,000 scale, a lineament is shown along the course of the nala in the mother valley. During
discussions with geologist it was confirmed that this was the same lineament referred to in the DSRP
team report. The trend of this lineament is in NW-SE direction which is also the regional foliation
direction of Dharwar Schistose rocks. This lineament when extended to the present breached dam
alignment would intercept it near its waste weir location and would therefore be far away from the deep
valley section. The trend of the line joining the deep valley points of the breached dams in N 70o E-70o
W or E-W which is quite different from the trend of the inferred lineament.
There is a nala which joins the mother valley nala some distance upstream of the dam and the trend
of its course is nearer to the direction of the line joining the mid points of the two breaches. However,
no lineament is shown along this nala course in the Ground water prospects map referred to earlier.
A doubt had been expressed about the actual execution of a cut of trench as per the design drawings.
This fact could not be verified during field inspection as the breach at CH.240.00m (the deepest valley
portion) was quite above the base of the dam. However, the drawings and estimate of the DPR stage
provided during the visit shows cut of trench
The right sluice is located at CH.307 m. The breach has exposed the foundations of the sluice and its
abutting surface with the right flank hill. It was observed that the sluice was founded on loose talus
material and the failure can be attributed to its foundations.
4.2.3 Overtopping due to wave action
46
As per the cross sections (taken after the breach) at every 30 m and the longitudinal sections supplied
during the visit it was observed that the dam top had a settlement of nearly 30 cm at CH 90, 120, 150
& 165 and from 30 to 45 cm from CH 180 onwards. The higher settlement from CH 180 could be due
to the slip failure from CH 180 to 193 and breach at or around CH 199 to 307. Therefore it can be
considered that there was an overall settlement of nearly 30 cm. in the entire length of the dam which
could be slightly higher in the nala portion due to height of dam.
The old earth dam upstream of the present earth dam could be seen just upstream in the reservoir and
top nearly at same level as that of the waste weir crest. A wave originating from the farthest left end of
reservoir will break due to the obstruction from the old earth dam. Therefore the straight reach along
the nala on the right side of the reservoir was the only path along which the wave could have
generated and hit the dam. The free board was calculated considering this as the main path.
Considering the MWL condition the free board calculations were carried out with water level 1.7 m
above waste weir crest level using IS 10635 code i.e. free board Requirement for Embankment dams -
Guidelines. Calculations were also carried out for normal condition i.e. water at FRL (waste weir level).
The free board required for MWL condition was 0.64 m and the significant wave height 0.41m.
Significant wave height is the average height of one third of the highest waves. Though the permissible
free board required is 1.5 m in MWL condition but in this case even the significant wave could over top
the dam since there was a free board of only 0.14 m available with water level as 55.95 m. (crest level
54.25 +1.70) and top of dam reduced from 56.39 m to 56.09 m due to settlement of dam top.
4.2.4 Slip failure of earth dam slope leading to breaching of the dam.
The soil properties of the dam were not available and the dam section for slope failure could not be
checked with actual properties. Due to heavy rains on that night the dam was in fully saturated
condition. When the dam was almost full of water up to top and in saturated condition a slope of
1.5(H):1(V) & 2(H):1(V) in the downstream and 2(H):1(V) & 2.5 (H):1(V) in the upstream was probably
not enough.
5.0 CONCLUSION
No records/data were collected after the breach and after the breach there was a soil cover of 2 to 3 m
left above nala bed from CH 199 to 270. There was no signs of washing off the foundation material at
the site. The geologist also did not support the existence of shear lineament. Therefore, the theory of
shear lineament failure was ruled out.
The possibility of a failure only due to flood with a water level at EL 55.95 m against top of dam EL
56.09 m at the time of breach was also not likely possibility. Though the permissible free board
required is 1.5 m in MWL condition but, in this case there was a free board of only 0.14 m available
with water level at 55.95 m. (crest level 54.25 +1.70) and top of dam reduced from 56.39 m to 56.09 m
due to settlement of dam top, where even the significant wave could over top the dam. Hence, the
most likely reason for failure of the dam was overtopping due to wave action. This explanation is also
supported by the fact that the dam had breached at two places CH 199 to 270 and around CH 307
both of them are in line with the nala and the upstream old bund breach portion and where wave
height calculations for free board were carried out. As already explained above since the water level
was high and the soil material was fully saturated some slip failure might have also.
Since the failure occurred during the night and no one saw the failure, with the data available and the
analyses carried out as explained above, the most possible cause of failure was due to overtopping by
wave action and slip failure.
6.0 BASIC CODAL PROVISIONS AND STATE OF THE ART NOT FALLOWED RESULTED IN
LESS UTILITY AND FAILURE OF DAM.
1. The spillway design discharge should have been checked for SPF.
2. The free board not provided as per IS codal provisions & no parapet wall provided.
3. Waste weir design - No water cushion was provide at each drop of waste weir.
47
4. The stability of the dam not checked for all conditions including seismic condition since the dam is
in Zone II.
5. Heavy siltation due to mining waste in the reservoir resulting in non operational of outlets.
6. No record of discharge from the spillway was maintained and also no instruments were installed.
7. Lack of maintenance
I. The top width of the dam (2.44 m) considerably reduced at many places.
II. The original dam section needed to be restored by providing additional earth work
duly compacted where ever it was required.
III. Outlet gates, seals etc.
48
Dam Break Analysis A basic approach

Antonio Porcheddu Ashoke Basistha
Dam Break Analysis, Egis, New Delhi Hydrologist
antonio.porcheddu-int@egis.fr Egis-India, New Delhi
ABSTRACT
One of the scopes of Dam Rehabilitation and Improvement Project (DRIP) is to prepare the Emergency Action
Plan (EAP) for the dams included in the project. The results of the Dam Break (DB) study, jointly with the results
of the routing of the discharge from the outlets, are the major information to be included in the EAPs. In this paper
it is illustrated the approach used to develop this study, the basic mathematical equations that describe the
phenomena and the possible approximations, the numerical schemes that could be used to solve the equations.
Also some information and hints regarding the software used to implement the mathematical model are given.
Considering the important number of dams within the DRIP project we have adopted a basic approach that may
be used for the majority of analysis. The study is generally based on the open channel flow theory, but for some
particular circumstances, a mixed approach, given by open channel equations and mathematical solver tools,
normally used in aeronautics, is suggested. These latter numerical models have the benefit to be more stable and
therefore to represent the discontinuities that frequently can happen in rapidly varied flow in a more satisfactory
way.
1 INTRODUCTION
The safety of dam has always been a matter of concern for designers who make a lot of efforts in
order to guarantee an absence of risk in terms of failure and deterioration. However, a certain risk is
always present even if the structure is safe and the actual tendency is to assess it trough an economic
analysis.
Risk assessment is the first step toward a correct landscape management and it is of fundamental
importance considering that threat to human life is involved. In different countries there are laws which
mandate a dam-break wave study for dams to be built and for existing dams. This study is usually
performed by means of mathematical models which, actually, in case of a flood propagation involving
an area of hundreds square kilometers, are less expensive and give more reliable results than
physical model.
In this paper a simple mathematical approach is illustrated and a short description of the software that
is recommended for DRIP Project is articulated.
2 DESCRIPTION OF THE PHENOMENA
When a dam breaks the dynamic situation is characterized by a perturbation which acts on the system
lake-dam-river; the perturbation propagates as a steep negative wave upstream and a steep positive
wave downstream. Waves characteristics depend upon the velocity with which the dam collapses, the
reservoir morphology, the channel shape and roughness. To summarize the dam-break event
following the breach formation can be characterized through three basic steps:
formation of a steep negative wave that trigs an acceleration in the body of water that can
significantly influence the outflow;
outflow through the breach;
formation and propagation of a positive wave downstream.
Generally speaking the three steps are strictly dependent because the outflow is influenced by the
negative wave and the positive wave can influence the outflow as well. The situation is complex and
the use of a model that simulate the movement evolution without separating it into different steps
might seem better. However there are some situations, in which the outflow is free, i.e. uninfluenced
by the positive wave, and the problem can be split into two parts: outflow hydrograph (OH)
determination and flood routing downstream. In these cases can be easier to implement the study.
49
3 OUTFLOW HYDROGRAPH (OH)
3.1 Breach formation mechanism
The way a breach forms is peculiar to the type of dam considered, it means that different techniques
should be used to determine the OH. A short classification on the possible type of breach and the time
for it to develop is given below:
Concrete Dam: the structure is built with blocks statically independent from each other, the
most likely situation is a partial breach caused by blocks failure. The time for the breach to
develop can be considered short.
Arch Dam : the structure is monolithic therefore a almost complete and instantaneous
structure failure should be assumed.
Earth Dam : partial breach which forms relatively slowly (half an hour, two hours); formation
mechanisms are: flood overtopping and landslide of a zone due to infiltration in the
embankment body.
3.2 Dam breach type,
The outflow hydrograph is the result of the "reservoir's behavior" both with respect to the breach
formation and to the downstream river or valley features.
The variables that control the outflow are many, among them the most important are:
Breach size, Time for the breach to develop, Breach shape,
Head H=H(t), Storage S =S(H(t)), Reservoir's morphology and roughness;
Morphology and roughness of the channel downstream.
Therefore in order to compute the OH, in accordance with Yevjevich, we can identify three situations
based on the effect of the breach and of the channel on the outflow hydrograph.
Small Breach: the effect of the negative wave generated by the sudden water release can be
neglected. The maximum outflow occurs at the initial time because an instantaneous acceleration of
the water body is assumed. The reservoir empties in conditions of quasi steady flow (i.e. reservoir
surface remain nearly horizontal), the critical depth occurs in the breach section.
Hunt gives an "a priori" criterion to verify if we can consider a quasi steady flow in case of partially
breached dam:
b/B < 0.37 (b=breach width, B=dam width)

which is a situation likely to be met in many practical condition.
Yevjevich instead gives an "a posteriori" criterion:

Q = Qm-Q0 < Qm
Qm =max discharge without considering the negative wave, Q0 = max discharge considering
the negative wave, ( =0.05-0.10).
If these criterion are met, the outflow hydrograph can be determined using the continuity equation
(conservation of mass):

(1)

in order to perform the integration, S=S(H(t)), Q=Q(H(t)) and I=I(t) must be known. In the literature
there are several examples and in case of special forms of S=S(t) and Q=Q(t) analytical solutions are
given, otherwise it is necessary to integrate it numerically.
Medium Breach: the effect of the negative wave cannot be neglected nor the reservoir shape and
roughness. The maximum discharge occurs when the negative wave is fully developed and the critical
depth still occurs in the breach section. There are several procedures to determine the outflow
hydrograph, the procedure proposed by Yevjevich take into account the negative wave effects through
50
a fictitious hydrograph, to be introduced into the continuity equation (1), and evaluated from the
negative wave travelling upstream.
Large Breach: the effects of negative wave, of reservoirs roughness and shape and of tailwater
cannot be neglected. Critical depth does not occur in the breach section and thus the outflow is not
free. The tailwater effect decreases the outflow at the beginning and increases it at the end, increasing
also the time for the reservoir to empty. The best technique seems to analyze the outflow and the
routing downstream together and with the complete equations, the outflow through the breach should
be considered as an internal boundary condition [Schamber & Katopodes]
4 FLOOD ROUTING
4.1 Flow conditions
The condition of the fluid flowing downstream through the breach can be schemed as follows (Also in
accordance with Schamber & Katopodes):
Free outflow / supercritical flow (Fr > 1)

Free outflow / subcritical flow (Fr< 1)
Outflow influenced by tailwater (submerged) and hence subcritical.
In the first two situations the Outflow Hydrograph can be used as an input function to perform the flood
routing downstream, in the third case it is advisable, as already stated, not to split the computation.
4.2 Theory
The treatment of gradually varied unsteady flow can be performed with the St. Venant equations which
are a system of hyperbolic partial differential equations. Their derivation is based on mass and
momentum conservation principles: they are reported here for one dimensional case with u(x,t) and
h(x,t) as unknowns (for basic hypothesis see Cunge) :
A u A
u A = 0 (2)
x x x
u u h
u g g ( So S f ) ( 3)
t x x
where:
A: cross section area,
u(x,t) : flow velocity
h(x,t) : flow height
S0 : river slope
Sf : energy grade line slope,
g: gravitational acceleration,
x,t : space and time variables.
This system of equation has to be coupled with suitable initial and boundary conditions (the unknowns
being u(x,t) and h(x,t)) :
initial conditions : u=u(x,0),h=h(x,0);

boundaries conditions: upstream u=u(0,t) = (1/A(h)) ( Q(0,t)) ;
one more boundary condition has to be specified depending on the flow conditions: if the flow is
supercritical the boundary must be specified upstream ( ex. h=h(0,t)), if subcritical, it must be specified
downstream.
It can be proved that, if equations and initial and boundary conditions meet the hypothesis, a solution
exists and it is unique. Yet there are some situations when these hypothesis (continuity,
51
differentiability, etc) are violated and thus the equations are not longer applicable; it is the case, for
example, of an undular moving jump. Nevertheless, the discontinuity can be considered infinitesimal
and the moving hydraulic jump relation can be used as an internal boundary condition to link the flow
immediately upstream and downstream [Cunge]. In conclusion the St.Venant equations are a powerful
tool to perform flood routing, they can simulate perturbations which either propagate upstream and
downstream. The existing discontinuities, that do not comply with the basic hypothesis of the
equations, may be treated as internal boundary, overcoming in this way an important limitation.
4.3 Simplified equations
There are same particular situations, to be evaluated carefully, where it is possible to use a simplified
form of the full equations. A brief discussion on it follows.
Terms in the momentum equation (3) can be considered as slopes [Yevjevich]: the first term
represents the slope of the energy line (total head) with respect to the acceleration, the second term is
the slope which corresponds to the variation of kinetic energy in space and in condition of steady flow,
the third represents the water surface slope, Sf is the slope due to friction forces which oppose the
flow and S0 is the channel slope. From the channel characteristics and the possible type of flow we
can roughly estimate the order of magnitude of each term and predict its role in the fluid flow : for
example, if one is interested in the global evolution of a flood, which is a typical engineering interest,
the local acceleration terms may be dropped (diffusive approximation), and also dh/dt may be dropped
if small compared with S (kinematic approximation). In case of steady flow, the time dependent terms,
either from (2) and (3) could be dropped.
Diffusive equation:
The acceleration terms are small compared with the others and so they can be dropped from (3) which
reduces to
h
So S f ( 4)
t
(4) coupled with the (2) becomes [Cunge] :
Q Q dK Q K 2 2Q
0 (5)
t b1 K1 dh x 2b Q x 2
(6) is a parabolic partial differential convective-diffusive equation in the dependent variable Q(x,t). This
equation is adequate to simulate also backwater effects and requires two boundary conditions.
Kinematic equation :
If no backwater effects propagate upstream the diffusive term can be dropped and (3) reduces to :
0 So S f (6)
coupling (6) with (2) it becomes [Cunge] :
Q dQ Q
0 (7)
t dA x x
which is a first order differential equation in the unknown Q(x,t) and it is widely used in hydrologic
studies. Wooliser and Ligget proposed a criterion to verify the applicability of (7) to describe flood
propagation, based on the Kinematic Number,
S 0L
K (8)
Y (Fr ) 2
52
The two authors found out that if K>20 the approximation is good and if K>10 the approximation is
acceptable.
US Agencies, like FEMA, suggest to select the type of model depending on the hazard of the dam, i.e.
depending on the damages that can occur downstream. Therefore the suggestion is for the use of a
simplified model (essentially with hydrologic routing) for low and intermediate hazard potential and
unsteady (1D or 2D with unsteady flow) model in case of high hazard potential.
4.4 Numerical Solution
The equation proposed are too complex to be solved analytically so it is necessary to use a numerical
technique to get approximate solutions which satisfy the original differential equations as well as
possible.
Methods of solution found in the literature are : FEM (Finite Element Method), FDM (Finite Difference
Method) and Method of Characteristics. FEM is not commonly used; the Characteristics Method is
used in special problems where accuracy is mainly important; FDM is the most widespread technique
in mathematical modeling of flood propagation. The basic idea of the FDM method is to replace
continuous functions by functions defined on a discrete number of points within field of existence. A
FDM can employ an explicit scheme or an implicit scheme or both: in the explicit scheme the solution
is computed, for a given time line, from one point to the next; in the implicit scheme the solution is
computed simultaneously for all the points that lie on the same time line. The first scheme is
computationally easiest to use but unstable if Courant Friedrichs and Lewis condition (CFL) is not
satisfied, the second is mathematically more complicated but always stable and more accurate. Also a
semi implicit scheme can be used, this scheme has the advantage to be mathematically complicated
only when necessary, i.e. only the terms that cause instability are treated implicitly, while the other
terms are treated explicitly; this technique is usually powerful and computationally convenient.
Over the last few years more powerful numerical schemes were implemented thanks to improved
computers, these schemes are usually in use in fluid dynamic and have high grade of stability also
when they simulate discontinuities like hydraulic jumps. It is worth to mention about the TVD model
(Total Variation Diminishing), the Godunov scheme, the approximate Riemann solver, the Flux vector
and the Petrov-Galerkin scheme.
5 SOFTWARE
Different software has been implemented in the last 30 years by Institutions, Universities and
Research Centers to take advantage of the increased computational power of the new computers.
Among the commercial software the most used are Mike and FLO-2D, among the free software we
should remind the ones developed by the National Weather Service as Breach, Dambreak, SMPBBK
and HEC-1 and HEC-RAS developed by the US Army Corps of Engineers. Dambreak and Breach
have been used for many years as an efficient tool, though nowadays HEC-RAS, that is more recent,
efficient and user friendly is more used.
HEC-RAS (Hydrologic Engineering Center - River Analysis System), developed by the US Army Corps
of Engineers, is multi purposes hydrologic and hydraulic software to perform one dimensional river
analysis in condition of steady and unsteady flow. It is mainly used in the United States for dam break
analysis but is also used in Europe and other Countries with satisfactory results. Recent comparison
between Mike and HEC-RAS by Fleenor and Jensen (2013), in modeling of unsteady flow, have led to
the conclusion that both get to a reliable representation of the benchmark test and both were able to
model transient effect in California Aqueduct. It is now a quite stable (numerically speaking) code and
can deal with different situations, as quite complicated shape of channel or channels and different
structures that interfere with the flow. In addition it is user friendly because of its graphic infer face and
the detailed manuals. All these assets easy to use by engineers who have got vast specific
experience.
Within the DRIP project we have started to work on HEC-RAS that we recognize to be one of the most
flexible software and probably the most suitable to our necessities. In the figure n 1 an inundation
map in scale 1:2000 was prepared as final result of dam break study.
53
Figure n 1 Example
e of inundation
n map prepare
ed as final outp
put of Dam Brreak Study
6 CONCLUSION
The dam m break analysis is a com mplex pheno omenon but, in particularr situations, can
c be treate ed with a
basic appproach. Ab bove all, in case of free e outflow fro
om the brea ach it is convenient to split the
computa ation in two steps,
s i.e. ca
alculation of the
t outflow hydrograph
h f
from the breaach and floood routing
of the ou
utflow downsstream, and focus
f on themm separatelyy. A first evaluation of the
e outflow cann be done
using the continuity equation. The T routing of
o the hydroograph down nstream of th he breach should be
carried o
out with the complete dyynamic equa ation, unless particular coonditions aree met. As a matter of
fact the kinematic flo
ood routing iss acceptable e of large sccale study, in areas with adequate
e only in case a
slopes and
a at a certa ain distance from the bre each. But in some situation it may be e useful to ca
arry out a
preliminaary study witth the Kinematic model in n order speedd up the who ole study proocess.
One of tthe softwaree used to ca arry out the Dam Break Analysis and the flood routing is HEC-RAS,
which usses the complete motion h got a user friendly in
n equation, has nterface and has got its own GIS
software
e application.. Within DRIPP project moost of the stud e under development, and
dies that are d that will
lead to tthe preparatiion of inunda
ation maps, are carried out
o with HEC C-RAS or with software of similar
characteeristics.
54
LIST OF SYMBOLS AND VARIABLES

x Space coordinate (along the river), propagation direction
t Time
A = A (H(t)) Reservoir area
A(x,t): Average cross sectional area;
CFL Courant Friedrichs and Lewis (Criterion)
Fr Froude number
g : Acceleration due to gravity
H = H (x,t) Height of water ( in channels or reservoir)
Q = Q (x,t) Discharge
q Unit discharge
S 0L
K Kinematic number
Y (Fr ) 2
S = S(H(t)) Storage of reservoir
So : Channels slope;
Sf : Rate of energy loss (energy grade line slope);
y (x,t) : Height of flow respect a datum (z+h)
v = v (x,t) Fluid velocity (water)
V = V (H(t)) Volume of water in the reservoir
REFERENCES
BALLOFET, SCHEFFLER : Teton dam failure flood. JHE 04/82.

BELLOS, SAKKAS : Dam-break flood propagation on dry bed. JHE vol.113, 12/87
BRAKENSIEK, COMER : A re-examination of a flood routing method comparison. JHE 03/65.
CHOW, MAIDMENT, MAYS: Applied Hydrology . Mc Graw Hill 1988 (N.Y.)
CUNGE, HOLLY, VERWEY: Practical aspects of computational river hydraulics . Pitman 1980 (London).
DRESSLER : Comparison of theories and experiment for the hydraulics dam-break wave. National Bureau of
Standards, Washington, U.S.A.
FENNEMA, CHAUDRY : Simulation of one dimensional dam-break flows. JHE vol.25, 01/87.
FRENCH : Open Channel Hydraulics. Mc Graw Hill 1986 (N.Y.).
GABOS, ZIFFERERO : Calcolo generalizzato di profili idrici. Idrotecnica 05/90.
HROMADKA, DE VRIES: Kinematic wave routing and computational error.JHE02/88.
HENDERSON : Open channel flow . The McMillan Company 1964 (N.Y.).
IAHR : XX IAHR Congress Proceedings . Moscow 1983
ICOLD : 17 International congress on large dam. Idrotecnica Special Issue March-April 1991
U.S. Army Corps of Engineer : HEC-RAS Users Manual January 2010
HUNT : Dam break solution . JHE 06/84.
HUNT : Perturbation solution for dam break flood . JHE 08/84.
LINSLEY, FRANZINI: Water resources engineering . Mc Graw Hill 1987 (N.Y.)
KATOPODES, SCHAMBER: Applicability of dam break flood wave models. JHE 05/83.
KATOPODES, STRELKOFF :Computing two dimensional dam-break flood wave. JHD 09/84.
MACDONALD et Al : Breaching characteristics of dam failures. JHE 8/84.
MAHMOOD, YEVJEVICH: Unsteady flow in open channels. Vol I, II 1975 WRP (Fort Collins, Colorado).
PORCHEDDU A.: Studio della formazione e della propagazione dell'onda di piena conseguente alla rottura di uno
sbarramento. Msc. Thesis, College of Engineering, University of Cagliari (Italy) 07/1989
PORCHEDDU A. : Considerations on Dam-Break problem. University of Sassari (Italy) Studi Sassaresi 1991
SCHAMBER, KATOPODES : One dimensional model for partially breached dams. JHE 09/84.
STEPHENSON : Kinematic Hydrology and modeling . Development in WS.
STOKER: Water waves. Interscience Publishers (N.Y.).
55
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 1: HEC-1 Users Manual 1986,

WURBS : Dam breach flood wave models. JHE 01/87
XANTHOPOULOS, KOUTITAS : Numerical solution of two dimensional flood wave propagation due to dam
failure. JHE 04/82.
56
A Knowledge Based System Technology for Dam Safety Analysis

Dr. S. Mohan
Professor
Environmental and Water Resources Engineering
Department of Civil Engineering
Indian Institute of Technology Madras
smohan@iitm.ac.in
ABSTRACT
Dam Engineering emerged as a structured branch of engineering in the earlier parts of this century. Because
many dams are now over 50 years old, special attention has been devoted to the issue of their effective
management. The art of managing dams is very complex and requires the efforts of multi-disciplinary teams
involving highly specialized knowledge. In case of dams, such knowledge is accumulated through a process of
learning and understanding how each structure responds to the current and exceptional actions. As old
structures tend to deteriorate and warrant special attention from managers and as more dams need to be
monitored for safety, managers are faced with large amounts of information which need to be evaluated in order
to highlight any anomalous situation which may endanger the structure serviceability or its safety and trigger
possible remedial actions. Also, the safety and serviceability requirements of existing dams must endorse all
relevant aspects of its history, namely design, construction, operation, and maintenance. Such task is also very
comprehensive, demanding and often very much puzzling. To ensure that a dam remains in good health,
surveillance must be continuous and performed at a professional level. To ensure timely perceptive analysis,
those who process surveillance data must be selective and be able to sort out what may be important.
Otherwise, there may be a tendency to bog down with the voluminous detail that can be generated by a
comprehensive system of observations. Artificial Intelligence and data mining concepts and techniques, referred
as knowledge based systems are tools with a recognizable potential to assist the engineering activities related
to monitoring, interpretation and diagnosis, in terms of simple rules of decision making. Also, engineers
responsible for a new dam have opportunities to know its foundation and materials, and to determine and
execute their treatment, processing and placement. They know where the site and the structure are strong and
where they are weak. For the sake of later analysis, their knowledge and its limits must be thoroughly
preserved. Otherwise, as those engineers responsible for the dam age with the structure, crucial knowledge
about the dam will be lost. Indeed, an old dam that has outlived its creators may be a puzzle to those who see it
for the first time.. This paper deals with how knowledge based system technology could help managers in the
everyday management of dams, especially the dam safety control activity. Including the knowledge acquisition
process. Secondly, it not only analyzed knowledge representation about dam safety monitoring expert system,
that is, factual knowledge, rule knowledge and procedure knowledge, but also established a simple knowledge
base based on relational database for dam safety monitoring expert system including fact base, rule base and
knowledge inference strategies. Finally, knowledge base has been embedded in an DKBASE system developed
indigenously at IIT Madras and applied to dam safety monitoring expert system for providing the dam safety
monitoring works.
INTRODUCTION
The subject of Safety of Dams has generated a lot of interest in recent years. This is mainly on
account of the potential for extensive loss of life and property in case a failure occurs. Though other
factors like natural calamities, wars, etc have resulted in greater deaths, dam failure on account of
being a failure of a man made structure, attract a lot of concern. A dam may fail due to several causes.
Some of the likely causes are foundation inadequacy, inadequate spillway capacity, defective material,
poor workmanship in construction, unexpected settlement, high pore pressure, embankment slips,
incorrect operations of spillway gates, earthquakes, etc.
According to statistics, out of nearly 15000 dams built, only 150 dams have failed. Two thirds of them
are of low height upto 30m. The large number of these (80 %) are earth embankments mostly built
without applications of modern technology in soil mechanics and control of quality. However, with
recent advances in quality control and monitoring methodologies, the percentage of Dams failed to
those constructed have reduced considerably. To solve a particular problem, engineers make use of
scientific knowledge which uses general models that have a great degree of abstraction and can be
used in too wide an application. On the other hand, engineers often make use of their experience and
common sense by using rules of thumb or heuristics. For the engineer, experience and judgement
must take over when scientific knowledge lacks or fails.
57
Up to now dam safety assessment has relied heavily on the skills and experience of dam engineers.
The expertise accumulated by those engineers throughout the years is not always easily transferred to
new staff or might even not be transferable through written reports. Expert system technology has an
important and growing role here as one of the tools available to dam engineers for the management of
safety control (Comerford et al 1992).
Knowledge based systems technology differs from other, more traditional, computer programs
because their reasoning is not straightforward. Their tasks have no practical algorithmic solutions and
they must often make conclusions based on incomplete, judgmental, speculative, uncertain, or fuzzy
information. To reason like a human being expert systems rely not only on factual knowledge, as
conventional programs do, but also on uncertain knowledge and observations based on experience
and intuition (collectively called heuristics). The facts and heuristics are extracted from experts in a
specialised subject area. They are then coupled with methods of analysing, manipulating and applying
the encoded knowledge so that the program can make inferences and explain its actions. The purpose
of this paper is to develop an Expert System for the analysis of the safety of embankment dams. This
is done by asking for distress symptoms and other background data. These data are put through a set
of rules and the causes of the distress are identified along with suggestions for remedial measures.
EMBANKMENT DAMS
Embankment dams are the most common dams built since time immemorial. These are still the
common type of dams constructed for irrigational purposes. The failures of embankment dams in the
past have given invaluable lessons and enhanced our understanding of such immense structures.
With the development of heavy machinery for transportation and compaction of different types of soils
and rocks it has now been possible to build embankment dams of heights exceeding 300m.
The failure of embankment dams could be broadly classified into the following three categories.
Hydraulic failures
Seepage failures
Structural failure
They are briefly explained below
Hydraulic failures
Hydraulic failures involve the erosion of surfaces of the embankment and account for nearly third of all
disasters. No soil is erosion resistant and even a small but steady flow of water can wash out large
quantities of materials. Obviously a larger flow will wash out more material and do it faster. The
common forms of hydraulic failures are described below
Overtopping: (flow over embankment):This can be caused by inadequate spillway capacity,

clogging of spillways, obstruction in the spillway channel, malfunctioning of gates, provision of
insufficient freeboard or settlement of embankment after construction.
Wave Erosion(upstream)::The attack of waves on the upstream face and the action of currents in
the vicinity of the spillways and outlets can notch the dam and weaken it structurally. This is
caused by the absence or improper rip rap design or inadequate protection measures near the
structures
Toe Erosion (downstream): Erosion of toe of the dam due to outlet or spillway discharges is
caused by locating the spillway or outlet toe close to the dam, inadequate divide / training wall,
improper design or absence of rock toe and pitching upto the required elevation.
Gullying(downstream slope ): Erosion of downstream slope due to rainfall is caused by lack of

proper turfing or pitching and poor surface drainage arrangements.
Seepage Failure
Seepage of water through the embankment or foundation is responsible for a large number of failures
of embankment dams. Some seepage is inevitable in such dams and when it is controlled it does not
58
cause any damage. Uncontrolled seepage can lead to excessive loss of water from the reservoir or to
seepage erosion and piping through the dam. Excess seepage loss frequently comes from pervious
strata, seams or cavities in the foundation.
Excessive leakage through the embankment is caused by highly pervious soil, debris, and poor
compaction. Usually this leads to internal erosion and piping. Leaks could develop in conduits through
the embankment due to deterioration or settlement. Occasionally excessive seepage loss has been
caused by cracks in the dam produced by settlement . Drying of clay dams exposed by prolonged low
water level in the reservoir also produce cracks and excessive seepage.
Fine sands, silts and poorly compacted soils are particularly sensitive to seepage erosion. the same
leakage that causes excess water loss often leads to erosion, even though the amount of seepage
may be too small to notice.
Piping : piping begins at a point of concentrated seepage where velocity gradient is high. If point of
erosion is on the face of dam, where soils can be washed away, a small cavity is formed. This brings
in elongation of the cavity on the upstream side .The further the cavity ,the greater the seepage and
higher are the velocity gradients. The pipe which initially might have been few inches develops
suddenly into a tunnel which can cause a structural collapse of the dam.
A pervious dam foundation or a leaky reservoir bottom is a frequent cause of excessive loss and
occasionally of piping. The most common cause is the strata and the lenses of sand or gravel so
frequently encountered in the alluvial deposits on which earth dams are built.
Structural Failure
Structural failure or sliding of embankment and the foundation due to slope instability or liquefaction
are responsible for about one third of all failures. They take place when the stress in the soil produced
by the weight of the dam or the load of water on it exceeds the strength of the soil. Any combination of
circumstances that causes an increase in the loads or a decrease in the soil strength can lead to
failure . Sometimes surface erosion and uncontrolled seepage , though may not produce a failure on
their own account , can cause weakening of the soil and a structural failure.
The seams of sands and silt in the foundation which are connected to the reservoir, can build up water
pressure and create a plane of weakness in the foundation. Horizontal sliding may take place on this
surface which Slides can take place in either the upstream or the downstream face of the dam above
or including the foundation. Upstream slides usually occur during or immediately after a sudden
drawdown of the reservoir level.
Downstream slides usually occur during the first filling of the reservoir or following unusually heavy
rains or abnormally high reservoir. Though most slides are caused by sudden draining in the upstream
face and saturation of the downstream face, they can occur in either face during construction if the soil
is weak, the design is skimpy, or the soil is not properly and adequately compacted.
In flow slides the soil within the failure zone suffers a structural collapse. It suddenly flows like a
viscous liquid , completely destroying its original form and coming to rest far from its original position.
Sudden saturation and shock and vibration have been known to induce flow slides.
DAM DETAILS TO BE INSPECTED
The external surface provides a clue to the behaviour of the interior of the structure. hence a thorough
check of all exposed surfaces should be made. The earthen dam should be carefully examined for any
evidence of displacement, cracks, sinkholes, springs, wet spots, surface erosion, animal burrows,
vegetation, etc. Surface displacement on the earth dam can often be detected by visual examination.
The alignment, any depressions, upstream and downstream slopes should be checked. Any bulges in
previously smooth surfaces also indicate problems, including checking up for any cracks on the
surface
59
The downstream face and the toe of the dam should be inspected for wet spots, boils, depressions,
sinkholes or springs. The upstream side should be carefully examined during period of low reservoir
stage when conditions permit.
NEED FOR AN KNOWLEDGE BASED TECHNOLOGY
With age dams may pose problems due to deterioration of materials used, sedimentation of the
reservoir, etc. With a sound design and quality construction, the problems of dam safety cannot be
said to be resolved to entirety. It is necessary to keep the Dam under observation continuously, even
during the maintenance phase. This pre-supposes that adequate instrumentation in the Dam is
provided so that it would give timely information about the happenings on the Dam and alert the
maintenance engineers for possible action to be taken to keep the Dam under safe conditions.
The engineer-in-charge of maintenance should have adequate knowledge of the various forces that
can cause failures, causes of failure and /or deterioration which generally occur or can occur so that
he can detect distress in time and take possible remedial measures and where they require specialist
advice obtain it without any loss of time. In the present system of administration when persons often
change charge it is necessary to devise a system by which every maintenance engineer is initiated to
the dam safety problems.
The above indicate an urgent need for an expert system that can perform the function of an expert
and also provide the means for transmitting knowledge in a methodical manner.
Knowledge Based Systems
The term Expert Systems does not describe a product but rather a whole set of concepts, procedures,
and techniques that enable people to use computers in a variety of valuable new ways. In essence,
Expert Systems techniques enable computers to assist people in analysing and solving complex
problems that can often be stated only in verbal terms. By encoding the knowledge and reasoning
skills of human experts within expert systems programs, we can create programs to diagnose
problems and make recommendations that would previously have required a human experts attention.
A broad definition of an Expert Systems is that Expert Systems is a program that manifests some
combination of concepts, procedure, and techniques derived from recent AI research, to allow people
to design and develop computer systems that use knowledge and inference techniques to analyse and
solve problems.
The six components of an expert system are briefly explained below:
Knowledge Base:
The knowledge base is where the domain specific knowledge acquired from the expert is stored. The
behaviour and action of the expert system entirely depend on the nature of the knowledge put in the
knowledge base. It is essential that the knowledge representation scheme adopted should be capable
of handling complexities, inexactness, and uncertainties of engineering knowledge.
Inference Engine:
Inference Engine which is nothing but the implementation of one or more inference mechanisms,
carries out the search through the knowledge base either to prove hypothesis or to arrive at a
conclusion. This is very important as Expert Systems do inferential computing and not algorithmic
computing.
Working Memory:
Working memory ,also called context , is a workspace for the problem, generated by the inference
engine, from the information provided by the user. Many hypotheses and facts are established during
the reasoning process. These are stored in the working memory. The information available in the
working memory are used for continuing with the inference process using the knowledge contained in
60
the knowledge base. The explanation facility also uses the information in the working memory, to
answer the queries of the user.
Knowledge Acquisition Facility:
This is an optional component of an expert system depending on the expert system development tool
used to implement the system. Any text editor can be viewed as a knowledge acquisition facility, since
it provides an environment for the knowledge expert or the expert to input the coded knowledge into
the system. A good knowledge acquisition facility should have the capability to incrementally acquire
the knowledge at various levels of knowledge abstraction and update the knowledge base.
Explanation Facility:
This is one of the most important components of an expert system providing the user of the expert
system to get more information on the inference process. The possible pieces of information required
by the user during and after the inference process are
* Description of the variable whose value the user is asked to input

* Reason for the requirement of the variable
* How the system arrived at a particular conclusion after reference
User Interface:
This component is an interface module for a user to interact with the expert system.
DEVELOPMENT OF DEKBASE: KNOWLEDGE BASED SYSTEM
DEKBASE is an acronym for DEVELOPMENT ENVIRONMENT FOR KNOWLEDGE BASED

SYSTEMS FOR ENGINEERING DESIGN. It was developed by a team of IIT Madras professors lead
by Dr. C. S. Krishnamoorthy in collaboration with Prof. S. J. Fenves of Carnegie Mellon University,
USA. It is a general purpose environment for developing Knowledge -Based Expert Systems (KBES).
DEKBASE is much more than a traditional knowledge based shell. It provides features required for
developing prototypes in Engineering domains.
DEKBASE provides an elegant language for expressing the experts knowledge. The language is
English like and is highly readable. The main form of knowledge representation is production rules. It
is possible to use multiple knowledge bases (as has been done in this assignment) for building a
prototype. Such a division of knowledge is usually dependant on the problem domain and on how
knowledge pertaining to the domain can be further sub classified. Using multiple knowledge bases
promotes efficiency and encourages structured development of prototypes.
The formal structure of a knowledge base in DEKBASE is shown below:
* Title Block
* # Directives
* Declarations
* # Variable flags
* # Initializations
* Goal statement
* Rules
* # Info Definitions
The portions of the knowledge base that are optional are indicated with a hash ( #) . A rule base must
always end with the keyword END. The rule bases are ascii files with an .rl extension and any text
editor can be used to build them. The rule bases are compiled by the Rule Base Compiler to object
form. The object file has the same name as the source file but has an .rbs extension. The rule base
compiler is invoked as :
c:\> rbc <filename>
61
The filename is given without the .rl extension. Only on file name can be specified at each invocation
of RBC. The various object files need to be linked together using the rule base linker. The output file of
RLINK is named runfile. The linker is invoked as :
c:\> rlink < file1> <file2>
No extensions should be specified in the file names. The order of naming the object files is important.
The first file or knowledge base is the one loaded by the inference engine when it is invoked. The
order of naming the remaining files is not significant. The linker checks for dependencies amongst the
various knowledge bases. It reports an error if a knowledge base referred to by another is not linked. It
is however possible to link knowledge bases that are not dependent on each other. In such cases,
some of the knowledge bases are never loaded by the inference engine in the normal course of
inferencing, but it is possible to switch to any of the knowledge bases through the environment.
The main file that is to be loaded first is the damsaf.rl The other files are damseep.rl dampipe.rl
damhyd.rl damstru.rl
damsaf.rl is a general introduction file setting the linkages into action
damseep.rl considers the problem of seepage in earth embankment dams
dampipe.rl considers the problem of piping in the embankment dams
damhyd.rl considers the problem of hydraulic failure and erosion in earth

embankment dams
damstru.rl considers the problem of structural failure in the embankment dams
When the DEKBASE shell is opened . Press F10 to obtain the menu . Click at GO to execute the
program and one can follow the instructions given regarding the nature of input data required and get
the rules of operation and maintenance. The developed expert system was validated for the the
analysis of Dam Safety and Improvement of this expert system using Data Mining is under progress.
REFERENCES
1. C.Srinivas Rao, S. Suresh, H. Shiva Kumar, C. S. Krishnamoorthy, S. Rajeev Development Environment for
Knowledge-Based Systems in Engineering (DEKBASE) Research Report R-94-1 (July 1994) Indo-US
Project on Knowledge-Based Expert Systems for Civil Engineering Design-
2. Workshop Dam Safety 5-6 July 1994 Madras Proceedings - Organised by Central Board of Irrigation and
Power , New Delhi
3. Seepage and Leakage from Dams and Impoundments- Proceedings of a symposium sponsored by the
Geotechnical Engineering Division in conjunction with the ASCE National Convention, Denver, Colorado May
5 1985
4. Ronald C. Hirschfeld ,Steve J. Poulos (2002) Embankment-Dam Engineering Casagrande Volume - editors
, John Wiley & Sons
5. Engineering for Dams, William P. Creager, Joel D. Justin, Julian Hinds (2011) Vols 2 and 3, Wiley Eastern
private limited
6. Proceedings Symposium on Earth and Rockfill Dams December 18-19, 1999, Department of Civil
Engineering, University of Roorkee,Roorkee
7. Dr C. S. Krishnamoorthy, Dr S. Rajeev Computer aided design Software and Analytical Tools( Revised
Edition), 1998.
62
Degree of Risk of Dam Failure

Ramesh Nikum
Chief Engineer
Design, Training, Research & Safety, Maharashtra
metanashik@gmail.com
ABSTRACT
Reservoirs are formed by dams while reservoirs are designed and operated to reduce the risk such as water
shortage, downstream flooding. They inevitably create a new risk of dam failure. This risk is characteristically of
low probability, but can be of high consequence, with a potential for life loss in addition to economic and
environmental damages and societal disruption. Many dams that were constructed decades ago do not meet the
current state-of-the-art in dam design practice. The growth of civilization is inextricably woven around the
availability of water the world over. Dams are human device for exploitation of water for irrigation, flood control
and hydro-power development etc, and thus occupy a pivotal role in the development activities of the human
race. Dams, however, are not unmixed blessings they do pose a major hazard in the unlikely event of a failure.
There have been about 200 notable reservoir failures in 20th century in the world so far. It is estimated that more
than 8000 people lost their lives in these failures have not only occurred in dams were built without
application of engineering principles; but also in dams built to accepted state of art of dam engineering.
In situations of this kind it is at the outset impossible to divorce the technical aspects of the event from the
human tragedies involved. Yet every fair-minded Engineer will remember that failures of this kind are,
unfortunately, essential and inevitable links in the chain of progress in the realm of engineering, because there
are no other means for detecting the limit to the validity of our concepts and procedures. The failure was not a
consequence of an error in design but in the past has not received the attention which it requires. Several dam
incidents with severe consequences during recent years had given rise to general concern about the safety of
dams, and indicate the necessity for the introduction of a formal safety approach to predicting the failure in
feature with its magnitude in easiest way i.e. degree of risk. Degree of risk can be calculated on the arithmetical
basis by considering Numerical value of vulnerability & Potential consequences of dam failure .This Vulnerability
calculated on basis of Physical parameters like Dam height, type of dam , impounding capacity of dam & type of
foundation Also Variable parameter like Dam age , Spillway waste weir age , Seismicity , reliability of discharge
facility & Dam condition. Thus Degree of risk may help to forecast dam failure consequences for managing prior
repairs, maintenance & operation of dam.
INTRODUCTION
Reservoirs are formed by dams while reservoirs are designed and operated to reduce the risk such as
water shortage, downstream flooding and insufficient draft for navigation; they inevitably create a new
risk of dam failure. This risk is characteristically of low probability, but can be of high consequence,
with a potential for life loss in addition to economic and environmental damages and social disruption.
Thus reservoirs present societal tradeoffs of the everyday benefits of more reliable project outputs,
against the remote potential for dam failure. However, the distributions of project benefits and dam
failure consequences are seldom congruent. This can result in conflicts between the beneficiaries of a
reservoir / project and those whose lives and livelihoods are placed at risk, albeit a low probability risk,
by the existence of the project.
Today, many dams that were constructed decades ago do not meet the current state-of-the-art in dam
design practice. In many cases downstream development has increased the hazard associated with
dam failure. Our understanding of the seismic threat to dams has grown in recent decades. Also
todays engineering practice yields more severe safety evaluation floods and earthquake than most
existing dams were designed to withstand engineering assessments of dam safety are characterized
by various uncertainties like dam classifications, physical parameters type of foundation, age of dam,
seismic zone, condition of dam, discharge reliability, design floods etc. Based on the above
parameters, we can work out the vulnerability of dam.
1.0 DAM CLASSIFICATION
Classification of Dams based on degree of risk, it poses to persons and property, say it as P.
P=VxC where P - Degree of Risk.
63
V - Numerical value of Vulnerability

C - Numerical value of potential consequences of dam failure.
According to equation, Dams can be classified into 4 classes of degree of risk. i.e. A to D
Table No. 1 : Dam Classification

Sr. No. P value Dam Classification on degree of risk.
1 P >= 120 A
2 70 =< P < 120 B
3 25 <= P < 70 C
4 P < 25 D
2.0 DAM VULNERABILITY (V)
The vulnerability (V) of the dam is measured by multiplying the arithmetic mean value of the constant
physical parameters ' ' by the arithmetic mean value of the variable parameters ' '
DAM VULNERABILITY V = ' X '
- ' means average value of constant physical parameters i.e - 1,2,3,4

- ' means average value of variable parameters i.e - 1 ,2,3,4,5
2.1 Constant Physical Parameters -
Constant physical parameters to be considered from Dam Height,Dam Type, Impounding capacity
of Dam, Foundation types of Dam.
2.1.1 Dam Height - 1
Constant physical parameters 1 to be considered from Height of Dam
Table No. 2: Dam Height Classification

Dam Height (m) Points
<= 5 1
10 2
20 3.5
30 4.5
40 5.0
50 5.8
75 8.0
100 10.0
The points for intermediate heights shall be determined by linear variation, except a dam 5 m or lower,
which is always assigned 1 point.
2.1.2 Dam types - 2
Constant physical parameters 2 to be considered from Type of Dam
Table No. 3: Dam Type Classification

Dam Type Points
Concrete arch 1
Concrete gravity 2
Concrete buttresses 3
Masonry Gravity 5
Earth 10
Rock fill dam with
- Concrete facing -
- Upstream earth filled core 3
64
2.1.3 Impounding capacity 3
Constant physical parameters 3 to be considered from impounding capacity of Dam,
Table No. 4: Dam impounding capacity classification

Capacity in ( m3) Points
<=1 1
50 3
1000 5
2000 6.5
2500 8
3000 10
The point for intermediate capacities shall be determined by considering linear variation.
2.1.4 Foundation types 4
Constant physical parameters 4 to be considered from types of foundation of Dam.
Table No. 5: Dam Foundation Classification

Foundation types Points
Treated Basalt rock 1
Basalt Rock 2
Treated rock other than basalt 3
Rock other than basalt 4
Treated clay 6
Clay 7
Treated alluvial deposits 8
Alluvial or unknown deposits 10
Note: The treatment includes all the geotechnical methods meant to reduce the permeability of the
foundation and increase its resistance to internal erosion or to increase the bearing capacity of the
foundation or the stability of the dam.
If there is more than one foundation type in a section of dam, the points to be assigned to the
foundation type parameter for that section of dams must be the highest of the points assigned to the
different foundation types in that section.
2.2 Variable Parameter -
The variable Parameters to be considered from Age of Dam , Age of spillway / Waste weir ,
Seismicity zone, Reliability of discharge facilities ,& Condition of Dam.
2.2.1 Dam Age - 1
The dam age, which is number of years since its construction or as the case may be, as determined by
the engineer in charge of the safety and review on the basis of the useful life of the dam.
Table No. 6: Dam Age Classification

Concrete dam Embankment Dam
Age (years) Points Age (years) Points
<1 1 <1 25
5 3 5 20
10 5 10 15
20 8 15 10
40 15 20 8
50 18 25 6
>=55 20 30 5
40 4
50 3
65
>=60 2
The points for intermediate dam ages shall be determined by considering linear variation.
2.2.2 Spillway / Waste Weir : - 2
Table No. 7: Dam Spillway Age Classification

Sr. No. Spillway / Waste Weir Age in Year Points
1 <=5 5
2 10 6
3 15 7
4 20 8
5 25 9
6 > = 30 10
2.2.3 Seismicity : - 3
The seismic zone in which dam is located according to the seismic zone map.
Table No. 8: Seismicity zone Classification

Sr. No. Seismicity Zones Points
1 I 1
2 II 1
3 III 2
4 IV 6
5 V 8
2.2.4 Reliability of discharge facilities: - 4
The reliability of the discharge facilities of the dam, which must be capable of passing the inflow design
flood. The reliability is assessed on the basis of the design of the discharge facilities and the
procedures established by the owner to ensure that they operate effectively during floods. At the
completion of the assessment, the reliability of the discharge facilities is rated satisfactory,
acceptable or unsatisfactory or unknown.
Table No. 9: Reliability of discharge Classification

Sr. No. Reliability Points
1 Satisfactory 1
2 Acceptable 5
3 Unsatisfactory Or unknown 10
2.2.5 Dam condition : - 5
The dam condition, which is assessed by considering the physical state and structural condition of the
dam, the quality and effectiveness of maintenance, aging, possible effects of external factors such as
frost or earthquakes and any dam design or structural defects. At the completion of the assessment,
the dam condition is rated very good, good, acceptable or poor or unknown.
Table No. 10: Dam condition Classification

Sr. No. Condition Points
1 Very Good 1
2 Good 3
3 Acceptable 5
4 Poor or unknown 10
Very Good: The dam does not show evidence of any deficiency or has minimal confined
deterioration considered normal or of no consequence.
Good: The dam shows evidence of only minor deterioration or deficiencies that do not affect
the proper operation of its components.
66
Acceptable: The dam shows evidence of deterioration requiring repairs without immediately
endangering the structure; a dam in this state requires maintenance and repair work in the
immediate or near future without which the dam would become increasingly vulnerable. The
dam may also show evidence of deficiencies which do not affect its immediate safety but
which require close monitoring.
Poor or unknown : The dam shows evidence of single or multiple severe deterioration that
could affect its stability or make certain parts in operable, or the dam shows evidence of
serious deficiencies likely to endanger its safety or the condition of the dam cannot be
ascertained.
3.0 DAM FAILURE CONSEQUENCES (C)
The numerical value of the consequences of dam failure (C) is based on the failure consequence
category of the dam determined as below
Table No. 11: Dam Failure consequences Classification

Sr. No. Dam Failure Consequences Points
1 Very low 2
2 Low 5
3 Moderate 10
4 High 15
5 Very high 20
6 Severe 25
The dam failure consequence category is determined on the basis of the characteristics of the
downstream area, barring exceptions that would be affected by the dam failure and takes into account,
from among a number of dam failure scenarios, the one that would result in the highest consequence
category. Those characteristics are assessed in terms of population density and the extent of
downstream infrastructure and services that would be destroyed or severely damaged in the event of
dam failure.
The delineation of the area that would be affected by a dam failure and identification of the
characteristics of the area are based on a dam failure analysis that includes inundation maps. Dam
failure analysis consists of a detailed evaluation of the consequences of a dam failure by means of an
accurate delineation of the affected area and identification of the characteristics of the area. The
analysis involves an examination of various dam failure scenarios under normal conditions and in flood
conditions, to determine the dam break flood wave, flood wave arrival times and the extent of the
affected area.
3.1 CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AFFECTED AREA
Consequence Category: Population density and extent of destroyed or severely damaged

infrastructures and services.
3.1.1 Dam Failure Consequence : Condition - Very Low
Uninhabited area
OR
Area containing minimal infrastructures or services such as
a second dam in the Very Low Consequence category

a resources access road
farmland
a commercial facility without accommodations
3.1.2 Dam Failure Consequence : Condition - Low
Occasionally inhabited area containing less than 10 cottages or seasonal residence.
67
OR
Area containing a commercial facility that provides accommodation for less than 25 persons
or that has less than 10 accommodation units (i.e., 10 cottages, 10 campsites, 10 motel
rooms)
OR
Area containing limited infrastructures or services such as
a second dam in the Low Consequence category
a local road
3.1.3 Dam Failure Consequence : Condition - Moderate
Permanently inhabited area containing less than 10 Residences or occasionally inhabited

and containing 10 or more cottages or seasonal residences
OR
Area containing a seasonal commercial facility that provides accommodation for 25 or more
persons or that contains 10 or more accommodation units or that operates year-round and
provides accommodation for less than 25 persons or has less than 10 accommodation unit
OR
Area containing moderate infrastructures or services such as
a second dam in the Moderate Consequence category ;
a feeder road
a railway line (local or regional)
an enterprise with less than 50 employees
a main water intake upstream or downstream of the dam
that supplies a municipality
3.1.4 Dam Failure Consequence : Condition - High
Permanently inhabited area containing 10 or more residences and less than 1,000 residents
OR
Area containing a commercial facility that operates year-round and provides accommodation
for 25 or more persons or has 10 or more accommodation units.
OR
Area containing significant infrastructures or services such as
a second dam in the High Consequence category
a regional road
a railway line (transcontinental or transborder)
a school
an enterprise that has 50 to 499 employees
3.1.5 Dam Failure Consequence : Condition Very High
Permanently inhabited area with a population of more than 1,000 and less than 10,000
OR
Area containing major infrastructures or services such as
a second dam in the Very High Consequence category

an auto route or national highway
an enterprise that has 500 or more employees
an industrial park
a dangerous substances storage site
3.1.6 Dam Failure Consequence : Condition - Severe
Permanently inhabited area with a population of 10,000 or more

OR
Area containing substantial infrastructures or services such as
a second dam in the Severe Consequence category
a hospital
a major industrial complex
68
a large dangerous substances storage site
For the purposes of the above table, commercial facility means a golf Course, bicycle trail, cross-
country ski trail, snowmobile trail, campground, outfitting operation, outdoor recreation centre, holiday
camp, tourist complex or any other similar sports or recreational facility.
4.0 REFERENCES
1) 109th session of American congress,2nd Session 2735AN ACTTo amend the United States and President
of Senate
69
CALCULATIONS SHOWING DEGREE OF RISK FOR SOME MAJOR DAMS IN MAHARASHTRA STATE
Sr.No. Name Of Constant physical parameter Mean Mean V= Dam Degree

Dam Height in Dam Type Capacity in Founda a Dam Age Wier Type Sesmicity Reliability Dam b a*b Failure of risk
M Thousand tion ( Free/Rock Zone Of Condition Conseq 'P'
Mm3 type fill) Spillway uences
Discharge 'C'
a1 a2 a3 a4 Age b1 b2 Zone b3 b4 b5
1 Gangapur 36.6 5.28 TE 10 216 3.4 1 4.91 44 3.5 Gate 10.0 III 2 GS 1 Good 3 3.9 19.14 25 479
2 Ujjani 56.4 5.28 TE 10 3320 6.7 1 5.74 29 5.2 Gate 9.8 II 2 GS 1 Good 3 4.2 22.94 15 361
3 kyona 103 8.01 Conc 2 2797 6.9 1 4.48 35 13.3 Gate 10.0 IV 6 G.S 1 Good 3 6.65 29.77 10 298
4 Jaykwadi 31.4 5.10 TE 10 2909 7.0 1 5.76 35 4.3 Gate 10.0 II 1 GS 1 Good 3 3.86 22.25 15 334
5 Isapur 57 5.31 TE 10 12354 5.4 1 5.42 27 5.6 Gate 9.6 II 1 GS 1 Good 3 4.04 21.91 15 329
6 Girna 54.6 5.99 TE 10 609 4.2 1 5.29 40 4.0 Gate 10.0 III 2 GS 1 Good 3 4 21.17 15 318
7 Mula 48.2 5.70 TE 10 736 4.4 1 5.29 37 2.4 Gate 10.0 III 2 GS 1 Good 3 3.67 19.40 15 291
8 Bhandardara 82.4 7.23 Conc 2 312 3.6 1 3.45 83 20.0 Gate 10.0 III 2 GS 1 Good 5 7.6 26.18 10 262
9 Panzara 33.5 4.65 TE 10 44 1.6 1 4.31 36 2.3 FF 10.0 III 2 UG 1 Good 3 3.66 15.78 15 237
10 Darana 28 4.20 PG 2 227 3.4 1 2.64 93 10.0 Gate 10.0 III 2 GS 1 Good 3 5.2 13.74 10 137
11 Totaladhoh 74.5 6.08 Conc 2 1241 5.4 1 3.61 20 10.0 Gate 8.0 III 2 GS 1 Good 3 4.8 17.33 10 173
12 Hatnur 25.5 4.00 TE/PG 2 388 3.7 1 2.67 27 6.4 Gate 9.4 III 2 GS 1 Good 3 4.36 11.65 15 175
13 Burai 30.6 4.50 TE 10 21 1.5 1 4.24 26 3.0 FF 9.2 III 2 UG 1 Good 3 3.63 15.38 10 154
14 Bori 20 3.50 TE 10 41 1.6 1 4.03 32 5.2 Gated 10.0 II 1 GS 1 Good 3 4.04 16.26 5 81
15 Chankapur 41 5.10 TE 10 80 3.0 1 4.78 98 1.0 Gate 10.0 III 2 GS 1 Good 3 3.4 16.26 5 81
16 Sonwad 18.6 4.78 TE 10 13 1.1 1 4.22 11 6.2 Gated 6.2 III 2 GS 1 Good 3 3.68 15.53 5 78
17 Gosi Kd 22.6 3.76 TE 10 770 4.5 1 4.82 U/c 1.0 Gate 1.0 II 1 GS 1 Good 3 1.4 6.74 5 34
Note
1. Foundation for all dams taken as Treated basalt rock
2. T.E :- Earthen Dam
3. Conc :- Concrete Dam
4. P.G. :- Gravity Dam
5. TE/PG Composite Dam
6. FF :- Free fall wier
7. UG :- Ungated Spillway
8. G.S. :- Gated Spillway
9. Bold case dams are National Importance dams
70
Risk Informed Decision Making for Dam Maintenance and

Rehabilitation in India
B. Dasgupta G. Scott
Southwest Research Institute, San Antonio, Texas, USA Scott Consulting, LLC, Denver, Colorado
bdasgupta@swri.org
G. Wittmeyer
Southwest Research Institute, San Antonio, Texas, USA
ABSTRACT
India has the third largest inventory of large dams, a significant number of which need rehabilitation.
Unmaintained or non-rehabilitated dams are at increased risk of failure and threaten downstream areas with
flooding, resulting in loss of life, economic loss, and environmental damage. Although dams need periodic
evaluation, maintenance, and potential rehabilitation, dam upkeep is expensive and available resources are
limited. Around the world dam risk assessment is increasingly used to allocate resources used to ensure dam
safety. Dam risk analysis helps owners and regulators identify problems and vulnerabilities, prioritize and plan
dam risk reduction actions, develop and propose better risk reduction alternatives, and ensure the dam safety
decision making process is transparent. In the United States, the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (USBR) and
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) have embraced risk assessment as an essential element of their dam
safety management process. In this paper, we discuss a practical dam safety risk analysis process and how the
results are used to make decisions whose implementation will reduce the risk of dam failure.
1. INTRODUCTION
With more than 4,800 in operation and approximately 350 under construction, India has the third
largest large dam inventory in the world (Pandya et. al., 2014). This major infrastructure investment
provides India a wide range of important economic, environmental, and social benefits. According to
data in the National Register of Large Dams, about 23 percent of these dams were built before the
1970s and are now more than 45 years old (http://www.cwc.nic.in/main/downloads/new%20nrld.pdf).
There was significant growth in dam construction in India in the 1970s and 1980s, during which nearly
27 percent of the total dam inventory was completed, while another 26 percent of the dam inventory
was constructed between 1980 and 1990. Aging dams are at increased risk of failure as a result of
degradation of structural capacity because of deterioration of dam or foundation material properties,
operational problems, and to potential increase in the magnitude and frequency of natural hazards.
Because more than 75 percent of the large dams in India are 25 years or older, there is need for a
systematic method to prioritize the inspections, maintenance programs, and rehabilitation efforts
needed to both preserve this important national asset and to protect the communities and industries
that could be endangered by failure of one or more large dams.
Around the world, agencies managing similar inventories of dams are finding it more difficult to keep
up with the standard-based upgrades for dam safety, and must judiciously prioritize dam safety
activities because of resource limitations. In addition, the standards-based dam safety criteria do not
account for all the ways dams can and have failed. Therefore, many agencies have turned to
risk-informed decision making for dam safety management using risk assessment. This includes the
U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (USBR), the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), the Australian
National Committee on Large Dams (ANCOLD), the New South Wales Dam Safety Committee (NSW
DSC), and the Canadian Dam Association (CDA). In addition, the U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) and the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) are in the process of implementing
risk-informed decision-making practices. These agencies are pursuing this approach because risk-
informed decision-making offers several advantages, which include the following (Scott, 2011).
1. Improved understanding of the problems and vulnerabilities of a facility is achieved through failure
mode identification and systematic evaluation of entire dam systems, leading dam safety teams to
develop and propose better risk reduction alternatives or recommend more appropriate courses of
action to address issues that have been raised relative to dam safety.
2. Improved capability to prioritize and plan dam safety risk reduction actions is achieved through the
71
use of semi-quaantitative and

d quantitative e risk evalua
ations relativ
ve to risk as
ssessment guidelines
g
and consideratio
on of site-spe
ecific factors.
etter balance
3. A be e of risk red
duction for th
he funds spe
ent is achievved, allowing
g for more rapid
r and
econ
nomical risk reduction.
r
4. Moree transparen
ncy in dam safety
s decisiion-making is achieved allowing for better justification of
imple
ementing actions and invvolvement off all stake-ho
olders.
5. By d
definition, riskk includes booth the likelih
hood of failurre and the co
onsequencess should failuure occur.
Thuss, there is more
m resoluttion on the downstream m hazard in the decision n making pro ocess as
oppo
osed to the traditional high,h significa
ant, and low w hazard claassifications. Furthermo ore, a full
rang
ge of loading scenarios are examined d, not just sin
ngle determin
nistic events, giving a pe
erspective
on w
which types of o loads and load ranges produce the greatest risk k.
paper, an ovverview of a practical risk analysis process is presented based

In this p b on the
e current
approach hes used byy the USBR and USACE E. The pape er discusses nformed decisions for
s how risk-in
dam saffety prioritizzation are made
m based
d on a riskk assessmen nt. A simiilar process can be
impleme ented in India
a to make risk-informed decision
d for dam
d safety management.
m .
2. RISK ANALYSIS PROCESS
Risk Assessment is s the process of decid ding whetherr the risks are accepta able at currrent level
e) or risk red
(tolerable duction actio
ons are needed, while a Risk R Analysis is the proc
cess of estimmating the
risk. A Risk Analys sis explores three questions known as the risk triplet: (i) What W can go
o wrong?
(ii) How likely is it? and (iii) Wh hat are the consequencces? In the e context of the dam sa afety risk
analysis, it involves a systematicc examination n of the site conditions, the
t hazards, and the dam m design,
construcction performmance, and operations
o to
o address (i) potential wa ays the damm including fooundation
and abuttments, gate es, spillway, and appurtenant systems, can fail in n response too a specific natural
n or
human-in nduced event that mayy lead to po otential release of rese ervoir storag
ge; (ii) the likelihood
l
(including associated d uncertaintiees) of all posssible outcom mes caused byb failures off the dam annd system
interactio
ons; and (iii) consequencces from pote ential reservoir breach suuch as loss of
o life, econo
omic loss,
and enviironmental damage, amo ong others. As A shown in Figure 1, the e major elemments of a quuantitative
dam riskk analysis pro ocess consisst of evaluatio on of Load, System
S Respponse, and Consequence
C es. Each
of the co
omponents of risk analysiis is describe ed next.
Figure 1: Overvview of Risk Analysis

A Proce
ess
2.1 L
Load
Dam riskk analysis re

equires inforrmation abou
ut loadings tthat, if they occur,
o can cause
c damagge to the
dam andd related stru
uctures. The e two most common loa adings for da ams are hydrologic events (under
normal ooperations or
o large floood events), and
a earthquakes. The hazards fro om these evvents are
72
represennted by hazard curves showing pro obability of the loading parameters expected at a a site.
Specializzed technicaal analyses and
a experience-based inssights of floo od hydrologissts and seism mologists
are required to devellop hazard curves.
c For hydrologic hazard curves,, the pertinen nt loading paarameters
could bee reservoir elevation, pea ak flood inflow
ws or flood volumes.
v Figure 2(a) sh
hows an exam mple of a
hydrologgic hazard curve expressed as annu ual probability of exceed dance of resservoir water surface
elevation
ns that coulld occur under normal operations. Hydrostattic and hydrrodynamic lo oads are
ed from the water elevattions. The se
calculate eismic hazard curve rep presents the annual prob bability of
exceeda ance of the peak
p ground acceleration n or the speectral acceleration. An example
e of a seismic
hazard curve
c is showwn in Figure e 2(b). One of the appro oaches used in dam safe ety risk analysis is to
estimatee the annual probability or frequencyy of occurrence per yea ar that a loadd will be in a certain
range. T
The hazard cu urve is divide
ed into desireed intervals as
a shown in Figure 1 and d from the diffferences
in the prrobability of exceedance e for upper and lower lo oads defining the range ( ). The load range
annual pprobability, /year is esttimated for eache interval and then used
u as an initiating eve ent in the
system rresponse analysis to calcculate an ev vent sequencce frequencyy. Although the t results frrom each
load rannge are aggrregated, the contribution ns to the totaal risk from each load range
r are re
etained to
provide aadded risk in
nsights.
(a) (b)
Figure 2: Example Annual Exceeda ance Curves: (a) Reservoirr Level (hydro
ologic hazard)) and (b) Seissmic Peak
Ground Acceleration
A (s
seismic hazard
d)
2.2 Systtem Respon

nse
System Response analysis

a conssists of, iden
ntification of potential failure modes analysis, an
nd failure
progresssion event se
equence moddeling as sho own in Figure e 1.
Potentiall Failure Mo ode Analysiis: The first step in a risk analysis is to iden ntify the sitee-specific
potentiall failure modes. An adeq quate job of identifying potential
p failu
ure modes ca an be performed only
after releevant background informmation for a dam is colle ected and thoroughly revviewed. This includes
informatiion related to
t geology, design,
d analyysis, constru uction, flood and seismicc loading, op perations,
and perfformance monitoring. Photographs, particularly those taken n during con nstruction orr unusual
events, are often vital to identiffying vulneraabilities. It iss essential that
t the reco
ords be reviewed by
more tha an one perso on, as someething mightt have been overlooked, or one perrson may pick up on
critical in
nformation that
t another person mig ght miss. Th his process will typicallyy involve a site visit
aimed att uncovering clues to da am safety vulnerabilities and identifyiing the poten ntial failure modes
m of
the dam, as well as making
m obse
ervations of th
he downstrea am conditionns if the flood
ding from dam m breach
occurred d.
Experiennce shows th hat identifying potential failure

f modess is best don ne in a team m setting, with a small
but technically diverrse group of qualified pe eople. Input from operatting personn nel is essential to the
process.. In a typical case, a facilitator guidess team memb bers in developing the po otential failuree modes,
based on the teams s understand ding of the project
p vulne sulting from the data review and
erabilities res
current ffield conditio
ons. The pote ential failure modes musst be describ bed fully, from initiation to
t breach
(or unco
ontrolled rese ervoir releasse). It is important to scrreen the identified poten ntial failure modes
m so
that morre expensive e detailed qu uantitative riisk analysis is performed for only th hose potentiial failure
modes tthat contribu ute significanntly to risk. Some pote ential failure modes can be screene ed out as
obviouslyy too remote driver potenttial failure modes can
e to contributte significanttly to the riskk. The risk-d
often be identified thhrough a sem mi-quantitativve process th hat uses broa ad order-of-m magnitude categories
73
for likelihood and consequences on a risk matrix. These risk-driver potential failure modes could then
be carried forward for quantitative analysis. Risk reduction measures or additional data collection may
be identified and implemented at this stage as well.
As shown in Figure 1, one or several failure modes ( to ) could be identified for a specific
hazard. For example, some of the potential failure modes for hydrologic load on concrete dam are (i)
overstressing of concrete; (ii) block sliding and overturning along a plane of weakness at the dam and
foundation interface; (iii) block sliding along weak joint lifts; (iv) foundation erosion by piping; (v) dam
overtopping and abutment or foundation erosion; (vi) gate failure; or (vii) human error, such as
improper operation of spillway gates. Sliding on a lift joint in a concrete gravity structure (Scott and
Fiedler, 2010) is shown in Figure 1, as failure mode, , for illustration purpose.
Event Sequence Modeling: The identified potential failure modes that are likely risk drivers are
analyzed quantitatively. For those potential failure modes, a complete and thorough description is
developed as a basis for breaking the failure mode into a series of steps, events, or states of nature
that are necessary to lead to failure. These can be represented on an event tree comprised of a series
of logically linked nodes and branches as shown in Figure 1. This technique is used in risk analysis to
model an initiating event and subsequent failure progression of systems and components, or
operational issues resulting in sequences of events that could lead to potential dam breach. Event
trees are used to quantitatively estimate the frequency of each sequence using probabilities or ranges
of probabilities of events or states of nature obtained by various procedures from subjective expert
estimates and statistical evaluation to rigorous probabilistic analyses including propagation of
uncertainties. Sometimes fault tree techniques are used to model failure probabilities of complex
components and systems. Estimation of uncertainties or variabilities of parameters as input to these
models are considerations in risk analysis.
In the example of the lift joint sliding failure mode shown in Figure 1, the initiating event for the
load range is /year and subsequent nodes examine the probability that (i) the tensile strength of
the concrete at the joint is exceeded due to the load and (ii) a crack propagates and uplift increases
causing sliding instability given that the tensile strength is exceeded (Scott and Fiedler, 2010). If the
tensile strength is not exceeded or there is insufficient cracking to initiate sliding, there is no failure of
the dam as seen in end-states of two branches. Analysis results are used to estimate the conditional
branch probabilities, , that the tensile strength will exceed and that crack growth will take place.
The probability of failure could be input as a point estimate or probability density function. For each
branch that ends with failure, the annual probability of failure can be estimated by multiplying the
branch probabilities through the tree from left to right. Simulation techniques such as Monte-Carlo or
Latin Hypercube Sampling can be used to examine uncertainty when branch probability distributions
are used. This analysis is conducted for all load ranges ( to .
All risk-driver potential failure modes ( to ) can be evaluated in this manner. The potential
failure modes that contribute most to the risk should be identified, and the reasons underlying the
judgment should be enumerated. Sometimes, the largest contributions come from a particular loading
branch of the event tree, and it is useful to know whether this is due to lower conditional failure
probabilities associated with frequent loadings, or higher conditional failure probabilities associated
with infrequent loadings. Event trees also can be used to evaluate the effects of various risk-reduction
measures.
2.3 Consequence Evaluation
Consequences of dam failure primarily focus on loss of life, although there could be other
considerations, including economic, environmental, and sociological factors. As shown in Figure 1, the
consequence analysis is conducted for the branch of the event tree that results in a postulated dam
breach under the specific water elevation associated with the load range. Consequence analysis
consists of dam breach modeling and flood routing from the breach through the downstream river
channel and flood plain. Dam break flood inundation maps are used to identify the population or
properties that will be flooded in different reaches. Estimating the potential loss of life can be based on
case studies of historical dam failures and flash floods or models that have been developed to
simulate population movement and safety relative to flood wave travel.
74
3. RISK--INFORMED
D DECISION PROCESS
Several organization ns have deve eloped risk guidelines

g fo
or evaluating dam safety risks, such as those
shown in n Figure 3 fro om the USBR R (Scott, 201 11). They typically consist of two commponents: an n annual
failure prrobability orr individual risk
r guideline that provid
des a certain level safety for a dam even if the
consequ uences are not large (1.0 0E-04 in Figu ure 3), and an
a annualizeed risk or societal risk guideline
that proovides increa ased safety as the con nsequences become la arger (slopinng line in F Figure 3).
Estimate ed risks obta ained from System Ana alysis and CConsequence e can be plotted relativve to the
guidelinees for risk asssessment.
Figure 3: U.S
S. Bureau of Reclamation
R D
Dam Safety Ris
sk Guidelines
Howeverr, it must be e recognized d that risk annalysis proce edures, altho ough quantittative, do no ot provide
precise numerical re esults. Thus, the nature of the risk a analysis should be advissory, not pre escriptive,
such tha at site-speciffic consideraations, good logic, and alla relevant external
e facto ors can be applied
a in
decision--making, rath her than relia
ance on a ccookbook, nu umerical criteria approacch. The risk estimates
e
for dam safety relate ed potential failure
f modees, regardlesss of the metthods used to t arrive at them,
t are
only app proximate. Iff performed diligently
d in a relatively consistent
c ma a useful in program
anner, they are
managem ment. Howe ever, risk asssessment guidelines arre not intend ded as rigid d decision crriteria for
declaring g a dam sa afe solely on n the basis of
o a risk esttimate. There efore, additioonal reasoniing, often
referred to as the da am safety ca ase, is needded to convin nce decisionn makers tha at (i) the interrpretation
of the co ondition of the structures and their ab bility to withsttand future lo he risk estimates, and
oading, (ii) th
(iii) the re
ecommended actions are e all coheren
nt and make sense.
Going th hrough the process

p of developing
d th
he risk estimmates, if don ne thoroughly y and rigoroously, will
result in n the learning needed to build the case. As part of the e case, three e elements must be
addresse ed: (i) whetther the estim
mated risk ju ustifies action; (ii) if so, the
t urgency of taking acction; and
(iii) the cconfidence in
n the estimatees and whether additiona al information is likely to change percception of
the need d and urgenccy to take acttion. All three
e componentts of the riskk estimates mustm be addressed: (i)
the loadings, (ii) the response off the structures to the lo oadings, and (iii) the consequences. The risk
estimate es and the da am safety caase do not in themselve es ensure the e safety of a facility. Ra
ather, the
dam safe ety case beccomes the basis
b for risk managemen nt: it enabless the dam ow wner/operatoor to take
appropriate actions, including the possib ble need fo or increased monitorin ng, further analysis,
remediattion, and ma aintenance, all
a of which are a integral activities
a rela
ated to propeer long-term operation
o
and care e of the faciility. The unnderstanding g given to all
a those asssociated with h a facility by
b a well-
construccted dam sa afety case iss intended to focus atte ention on te echnical aspe ects essentiial to the
facility's integrity.
75
4. PRIORITIZATION OF ACTIONS BASED ON RISK ASSESSMENT
As a general rule, as the risk increases, the justification and urgency to take action also increase.
Similarly, as the risk decreases, the justification and urgency to take action also decrease. It is
important to strive to develop consistent risk estimates through an established methodology and
review process. However, it must be recognized that risk estimates are likely to come from a variety of
sources, each with its own degree of accuracy and completeness. Consequently, complete
consistency in the estimates cannot be achieved. Therefore, it is important to consider other factors,
such as those listed below, when prioritizing activities. All else being equal, the risk assessment
numbers can then be used as a prioritization tool.
Direct evidence that failure is in progress and the dam is almost certain to fail if action is not
taken quickly would be considered the highest priority.
A case where both the probability of failure and the annualized risk are high (exceeding risk
assessment guidelines) would generally be more critical than a case where only one or the
other is high. Equal weight would be given to cases where one or the other (risk or failure
probability) is in this category.
A case where the high annualized risk or failure probability (above guidelines) is driven by a
single potential failure mode would generally be more critical than a case where several
potential failure modes must be accumulated to arrive at values above guidelines.
A case where the risk is driven by potential failure modes manifesting during normal operating
conditions would typically take priority over cases where the risks stem primarily from low or
very-low probability flood or earthquake loadings.
A case where the uncertainty band is relatively tight and the mean and median estimates are
close to each other would take priority over a case where there is significant scatter in the data
and the mean and median are far apart.
A case where confidence in the risk estimates is high would typically take priority over a case
where the confidence is low. Furthermore, the recommended actions also would be affected
by the confidence in the estimates. For example, additional information would typically be
gathered for high risks with low confidence, whereas risk reduction actions would be
appropriate for a similar case with high confidence.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The aging dam infrastructure, increase in population growth downstream, and limited resources make
development of consistent, thorough, transparent risk assessments an important element of effective
dam safety risk management. Key to making the process effective is beginning with a detailed analysis
of potential failure modes. If shortcuts are taken during this process, the results of the risk analysis
could be unreliable and misleading. Once the potential failure modes are understood, a screening
process can be used to identify those for which quantitative risk estimates are appropriate. A variety
of tools are available for making the quantitative risk estimates. The process of making the estimates
affords the opportunity to learn about the dam and its vulnerabilities in more detail. It is recognized
that risk estimates and risk assessment guidelines are only approximate, and that it is essential to
build the case for why the condition of the structures and their ability to withstand future loadings, the
risk estimates, and the recommended actions are consistent and technically sound and well
supported. If done diligently by a team of qualified experts whose minds are open to a diversity of
failure modes and effects, risk assessment can be a very effective tool for managing the risks
associated with storing large amounts of water upstream of populated areas.
6. REFERENCES
B. Pandya, N.K. Goel, and B.R.K. Pillai. (2014): Management of Design Flood Issues in Existing Dams under
Climate Change, International Symposium on Dams In A Global Environment Challenges, Bali, Indonesia, June
16, 2014.
G.A. Scott and W. Fiedler. (2010), Shedding Some Light On This Thing Called Risk Assessment, Part II, Risk
Analysis, Journal of Dam Safety, Vol. 8, Issue 3, pp 819.
G.A. Scott. (2011), The Practical Application of Risk Assessment to Dam Safety, GeoRisk, ASCE.
76
Emergency Action Plan Implementation for DRIP Dams

Antonio Porcheddu Philippe CLEYET-MERLET
Dam Break Analysis, Egis, New Delhi Hydrologist, Egis, New Delhi
antonio.porcheddu-int@egis.fr
Edward Eugene Flint
Dam Safety Specialist, Egis, New Delhi
ABSTRACT
We describe an Emergency Action Plan (EAP) for a dam and underline its importance when we deal with
catastrophic events such as significant release of water from spillways, dam breaks or even large magnitude
earthquakes. India is a high hazard region because many dams are built close to highly populated urbanized
areas and the dams spillways are frequently designed for events with a return period which is now considered
low for this type of construction, it means that in many cases the discharge capacity of the dams may be
inadequate.. In this paper the general structure of an EAP used within our Dam Rehabilitation and Improvement
Project (DRIP) is described. The EAP contains the basic information regarding the dam and the definition of roles
and responsibility, then a simple and straightforward procedure, articulated in five basic steps, to really manage
the emergency phase is considered. The basic steps are 1) Emergency detection; 2) Emergency Level
determination (or evaluation); 3) Notification and communication (procedures) 4) Expected Action to be
implemented ; 5) Termination step. In the paper it is also described our involvement in Capacity Building (issuing
of new guidelines) and in Institutional Strengthening (training on EAP preparation) that is going on.
Finally paper describes the process of implementation of EAPs within the DRIP project. This activity is a duty of
the Dams Owner (DO), who has to take care of all the necessary study, the State Project Management Unit
(SPMU ) will coordinate the DO and Central Project Management Unit (CPMU) will actively assist and support
both SPMU and DO with dedicated personnel.
1. WHAT IS AN EMERGENCY ACTION PLAN
An Emergency Action Plan, or EAP, is a formal plan that identifies potential emergency conditions at a
dam and prescribes the procedures to be followed to minimize loss of life and property damage. An
emergency in terms of dam operation is defined as a condition which develops unexpectedly,
endangers the structural integrity of the dam and / or safety of lives and properties, at the dam site as
well as in the areas downstream of the dam, and requires immediate responsive action.
The EAP is the document that has to be used in case of emergencies generated by either a dam break
or to a significantly high release of water from gated or ungated spillways. It identifies the roles and
responsibility of the Dams Owner and of the Institution in charge to manage emergency situations and
evacuate people from low-lying areas downstream. Furthermore, it specifies the actions to be taken in
different types of emergency conditions.
2. RISK LIMITATION MEASURES
The risk associated with the presence of a dam on the territory can be reduced by adopting structural
and or non-structural measures. The structural measure include safe design and construction,
rehabilitation of the discharge system, reduction of internal seepage and leakage, rehabilitation of
drainage system, grouting etc.. Also after the implementation of structural measures there are still
some risks, these remaining risks can be further reduced ( but not cancelled) by adopting other
measures, not strictly connected with construction or operation of the dam, these measures are called
non- structural measures and are really effective when planned in conjunction, or in addition to
structural measures. The EAP is a non-structural measure because it is intended to reduce the risk of
loss of peoples life and property damages in case of failure or near-failure of the dam or extremely
high discharges from the spillways.
3. PRESENT SITUATION OF RISK OF DAM FAILURE AND IMPLEMENTATION OF EAPS
At the moment there are potential high risk situations regarding safety of dams in India due to the high
number of existing large dams, (4900) and new dams (350) under construction. Many of these dams
77
are a key source for irrigation and the production of hydropower and many of them provide industrial
and civil water supply. The two main elements of risk are:
The location of a dam is an element of risk itself, when it is located nearby a highly populated
urbanized area where there are civil and industrial dwellings, the risks that affect general
population and property are clear.
The spillways inadequacy is another important concern; in fact, during the review of PST
(Project Screen Template) of the DRIP dams we have realized that many of them are designed
for a 100 years flood, this return period is usually considered non-congruent with the damages
that can be produced downstream, it means that the discharge systems of many of the existing
dams are possibly not in a safe condition and the dams have a potential risk of breaching.
Some other problems are related to seepage (through earth dams), leakage (through concrete and
masonry dams), inadequacy of drainage system and hydro mechanical equipment malfunctioning.
Other elements of risk should also be evaluated and scored in order to be able to categorize the dams
under study and rehabilitation according to a Risk analysis method that is also under preparation
within our project. Element of risk are connected with problems regarding the dam itself and with
external problems like type and density of urbanization, distance of dwellings from the dam and
possible damages caused by failure. These are all elements to be investigated and we are proceeding
in this direction within our DRIP project.
At the moment only a few EAPs have been prepared by the States. Within DRIP we have reviewed
an EAP prepared by the Disaster Management Institute (DMI) of Bhopal and this is the first step
forward by the States in addressing the challenges that face them. Therefore, the preparation of EAPs
to manage and potential emergency is a priority of our project.
4. STRUCTURE OF THE EAP
For the scope of our work the structure of the EAP is articulated through basic components that are
illustrated in this paragraph:
Identification, location and dams info.

Basic information regarding the classification, location and the physical characteristics of the
dam.
Identification of Roles and responsibilities - The EAP should contain the specification of the
roles and responsibilities of the people involved with the management of the dam with a
notification flowchart clearly summarizing the following information:
Who is to be notified in case of emergency?
Who is responsible for notifying Owners staff and public officials?
Prioritized order in which individuals have to be notified.
It is possible to identify two main roles in the management of emergencies:

1. Dam owner : Has to take care of all the procedures regarding the dam
2. Public Authorities: they have to take care of evacuation and to save lives. (the
Collector/District Magistrate and the Civil Protection Service).
After the basic information regarding the dam and the definition of roles and responsibility there is a
simple and straightforward procedure, articulated in 5 steps, to really manage the emergency phase,
that is:
1. Emergency detection
2. Emergency Level determination (or evaluation)
3. Notification and communication (procedures)
4. Expected Action to be implemented
5. Termination step
The general 5 steps can be better depicted in the following chart.
78
F
Figure 1 - Flow
wchart for the Basic steps of
o an Emergen
ncy Action Pla
an
ergency dete
4.1 Eme ection
During th his phase whatever evennt that is unusual and de echnical perrsonnel or either by a
etected by te
visitor to
o the dam siite should be
e investigate ams Owner.. These events may also
ed by the da o include
unusual dam monito oring results (typically fro ntation readings), earthq
om instrumen quakes and or
o severe
weather conditions.
4.2 Eme
ergency Lev
vel determin
nation (evalu
uation)
As the emergency
e i detected it is necessary to careffully assess the situation and deterrmine the
is
Emergenncy level in accordance.
a In our procedure we havve identified three
t emerge
ency levels:
Emergency level 1 - Non emerrgency situattion unusu

ual event und
der control situation de
eveloping
slowly
The situa
ation has not yet become e a serious threat
t for the
e structural in
ntegrity of the
e dam but it may give
problemss if it continu
ues to devellop. The dam ms owner Engineer and the State Government
G Engineer
should be
b contacted d to carefullyy evaluate the
t circumsttances and identify nece essary actio
ons to be
taken. Th
he dam has to be carefully monitored d to detect a potential failure situationn
Emergency level 2 - Potential da

am failure sittuation rapidly developing
g
The even nt may lead to eventual dam

d failure and
a consequent release of o water dow
wnstream, buut, a dam-
break is not imminent. Civil eme ergency authhorities shou
uld be alerte osed and in sensitive
ed, roads clo
locationss, evacuation
n started.
The dam ms Owner Engineer

E andd the State Engineer sh hould be contacted to carefully
c eva
aluate the
situation and monitor the progresss of the pottential dam failure
f and of
o any eventuual remedial works to
minimizee risk. This emergency
e le
evel should also
a be applied to spillwaay releases that,
t in the estimation
e
of the Daam Owner, maym affect areas
a outsidee the rivers channel. If possible
p and if safe, any remedial
actions have
h to be ta
aken to avoid
d, repair, dela
ay, and mode erate the bre
eak.
79
Emergency level 3 - Dam failure is imminent or in progress
This is an extremely dangerous situation and dam failure cannot be avoided. A flood is to be
considered imminent and certain. Civil protection should be alerted, roads closed and evacuation
initiated immediately for all at-risk dwellings, roads and infrastructures. The inundation maps should be
used as a proper tool to conduct evacuation. Emergency level 3 can also be applicable to high
releases from spillways.
4.3 Notification and communication (procedures)
After the emergency level has been evaluated, responsible people, identified in the flowchart (roles
and responsibilities), will be notified and messages should be sent accordingly, indicating the
emergency level. The higher the emergency the more responsible people should be contacted. A
specific notification scheme for every emergency level has been developed within the new Guidelines.
4.4 Expected Action to be implemented
For each emergency condition that is estimated, the plan should describe actions to be taken,
therefore:
Emergency Level 1 - Non-emergency incident; unusual event; slowly developing situation
The Dam Owner should inspect the dam and the reservoir area. If increased seepage, erosion,
cracking, or settlement is observed, should immediately report the observed conditions to the State
Dam Safety Engineer (EE). The Dam Owner should contact the State Dam Safety Engineer and its
own Engineer and request technical staff to investigate the situation and recommend corrective
actions.
Emergency Level 2 - Potential dam failure situation; rapidly developing
The Dam Owner should contact the District Magistrate to inform him/her that the EAP has been
activated on emergency level 2 and, if current conditions get worst, the emergency level may
increase and the emergency situation may require evacuation. Preparations should be made for
road closures and evacuations. The Dam Owner should report the situation to the State Dam
Safety Engineer and to its own Engineer and request investigations and recommended corrective
actions.
If time permits, the Dam Owner should inspect the dam and the reservoir. If increased seepage,
erosion, cracking, or settlement is observed, immediately report the observed conditions to the
District Magistrate and State Dam Safety Engineer.
Emergency Level 3 Urgent - dam failure is imminent or in progress
The Dam Owner shall immediately contact the District Magistrate, and others shown on the
notification flow chart, to inform that the EAP has been activated on emergency level 3.
The District Magistrate will to carry out warnings, close roads, and evacuate people at risk
downstream from the dam.
The Dam Owner will take care of the people in the dams area and surroundings and shall
maintain continuous communication and provide the District Magistrate with updates of the
situation to assist in making timely decisions concerning warnings and evacuation.
4.5 Termination step
Whenever the EAP has been activated, an emergency level has been declared, all EAP actions have
been completed, and the emergency is over, the EAP operations must eventually be terminated and
follow-up procedures completed.
80
Additionally we should insert in the EAP the inundation maps, the basic maps regarding the dam and
access roads, some additional information depending on the particular study (Classification of flooded
areas of example) and some templates for emergency detection report.
Being a dynamic document the EAP should be exercised at least once per year and drills have to be
programmed. It should be regularly updated as personnel in the chain leave or new personnel are
brought on board and conditions of the dam may change.
5. CAPACITY BUILDING AND INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTHENING
Within the DRIP project we are working on capacity building and institutional strengthening aiming to
provide to State units (namely SPMU State Project Management Unit) the necessary tools to
prepare or manage the preparation of the EAPs for all the dams they are in charge. In the framework
of capacity building the main tasks identified are:
Updating of existing guidelines for the preparation of the EAP originally prepared by the CWC.
Preparation of a practical case study that can be used as a reference by the SPMU.
Moreover particular attention has been devoted to the dam break analysis and the release of large
amounts of water from spillways. These two events have to be carefully considered because of the
design flow used (usually 100 year return period) that can be exceeded and the large quantity of water
that can be released in standard operating conditions. Therefore a guideline specially dedicated to a
dam break has been issued. A dedicated paper will describe technique of dam break study that is
essentially the hydraulic study of a flow in an open channel, underlining the features and the
importance of expertise to carry it out.
Regarding the Institutional Strengthening the main activities are related to the training of States
Officials in the preparation of Emergency Action Plans and on Dam Break (DB) Analysis. Within this
framework three training sessions of two days on EAP and DB have been given in Kerala, Tamil Nadu
and Odisha, by Egis and CWC faculty during August and September 2014. A practical training, lasting
one week, on mathematical modelling of dam break with a case study implementation has been given
in New Delhi in September 2014 and officials coming from four States joined the training and actively
participated. Other training in the coming months will be given to other States which have joined
recently the DRIP program.
All the trainings are aimed to give the necessary information and tools regarding the EAP preparation
and to detail the theory and practice of dam break and flood routing.
The expected result of this Institutional Strengthening (IS) activity is to furnish to the SPMUs staff the
necessary basic knowledge to manage the preparation of the EAP themselves or using any external
qualified entity as Academic Institution or private Consultant.
6. FUTURE DEVELOPMENT AND EXPECTATIONS
Considering the high level of potential risk the current program is aimed at the preparation of EAPs for
each dam in the DRIP program. Therefore, after the training sessions and the issuing of Guidelines,
the different States in DRIP will be assisted in the preparation of EAPs, according to a specific
program that has been prepared and is under implementation at the moment.
All activities will be coordinated centrally from CPMU by experienced engineers; in every State the
SPMU will appoint a dedicated team for local coordination. Dams Owners (DO) will have the
responsibility to prepare EAP with their workforce or outsourcing it to external Consultants.
A General Coordinator will guide and assist all the local teams and DOs during the first pilot phase
(consisting in the implementation of EAP for two pilot dams for each CPMU) and during the follow on
standardization phase. Our main expectation is to accomplish the preparation of simple and effective
EAPs for all the dams under study within the schedule of the DRIP project.
81
A two-dimensional dam-break flow simulation model for preparing

Emergency Action Plans
Soumendra Nath Kuiry
Hydraulics and Water Resources Engineering Division
Department of Civil Engineering, IIT Madras, Chennai
Email: snkuiry@iitm.ac.in
ABSTRACT
Approximately 5,125 large dams and several thousand smaller dams in India provide vital socioeconomic and
environmental services such as flood protection, water storage for public, industrial and agricultural use,
hydroelectric power generation, river navigation, mining, industrial waste management and recreation.
However, due to lack of fund dams have started getting lower priority for maintenance. Therefore, dams
constitute serious risk to life, property and environment due to their potential to fail and to cause catastrophic
flooding. Development of Emergency Action Plan (EAP) to mitigate these risks and to plan for emergency
response requires identification of all potential failure modes and the prediction of corresponding inundation
areas at different times, flood arrival times, maximum inundation depths and flood flow velocities. The EAP can
be defined as a formal document that identifies potential emergency conditions at a dam and specifies
preplanned actions to be followed to minimize property damage and loss of life. The precision modeling of dam
break floods can lead to formulation of proper emergency action plan to minimize flood impacts within the
economic lifetime of a dam. To remedy this situation and to forecast flood inundation in real time, mathematical
models are used. Though one-, two- and three-dimensional models for dam-break flow simulation are
available, it is clear from different literature that a two-dimensional model is required as minimum to represent
the associated hydraulics accurately. This paper therefore presents the development of a two-dimensional
dam-break flow model and how this model can be used to prepare EAPs for dam-failure. The model is based
on the solution of the depth-averaged non-linear shallow water equations on uneven bathymetry. The solver is
implemented on unstructured quadrilateral grids so that irregular dam geometry and bathymetry details can be
represented. The solution methodology is based upon a finite volume based Godunov-type second-order
upwind formulation, whereby the inviscid fluxes of the system of equations are obtained using the HLLC
Riemann solver. The HLLC Riemann solver performs better than other available Riemann solvers as far as
two-dimensional aspects of flow and dry-wet conditions are concerned. A number of boundary conditions are
implemented to take care of field requirements. A variety of test cases are presented to study accuracy and
applicability of the model. It is also discussed that the model can be used for preparing inundation maps by
simulating different dam-break scenarios. The model can also be used to prepare EAPs for dam-break failure
by integrating with a GIS platform. Application of GIS techniques in conjunction with the dam-break flow
modelling for mapping of the flood inundated areas can play a tremendous role in further minimizing the risk
and likely damages.
1. INTRODUCTION
Approximately 5,125 large dams (4,728 completed and 397 under construction) and several thousand
smaller dams in India play important roles in providing vital socioeconomic and environmental services
for the nation (Ganju et al. 2012), such as flood protection, water storage for public, industrial and
agricultural use, hydroelectric power generation, river navigation, mining, industrial waste management
and recreation.
However, funds for maintenance have reduced over the time though there is significant increase in
water resources activities (Ganju et al. 2012). Thus, many dam owners are unable to undertake dam
repairs and rehabilitation due to lack of funding. As a consequence, dams constitute serious risk to life,
property and environment due to their potential to fail and to cause catastrophic flooding. The
disruption of the vital services they are providing as critical infrastructures could stress the economy,
public health and national security, which may be amplified by cascading failures triggered in other
critical infrastructures and key resource sectors. Development of Emergency Action Plan (EAP) to
mitigate these risks and to plan for emergency response requires identification of all potential failure
modes and the prediction of corresponding inundation areas at different times, flood arrival times,
maximum inundation depths and flow velocities. In principle, all dams categorized in terms of probable
loss of life in the event of a failure of the structure as significant hazard or as high hazard should have
an EAP. The EAP can be defined as a formal document that identifies potential emergency conditions
at a dam and specifies pre-planned actions to be followed to minimize property damage and loss of
life. The EAP should also contain dynamic inundation maps as well as the procedures and information
82
to assist the dam owner/operator in issuing early warning and notification messages to responsible
downstream emergency management authorities.
To remedy this situation and to forecast flood inundation in real time, mathematical models are used.
The expensive commercial softwares such as MIKE 11, MIKE 21 (www.mikebydhi.com), TUFLOW
(www.tuflow.com) or freely available packages such as HEC-RAS (http://www.hec.usace.army.mil/
software/HEC-RAS/), CLAWPACK (http://depts.washington.edu/clawpack/) can be used for dam-break
flow simulations. The simulations can be done using either one-dimensional (1D) models (MIKE 11,
HEC-RAS) or two-dimensional (2D) models (MIKE-21, TUFLOW, CLAWPACK). The 1D hydrodynamic
modelling is based on the assumption that the water levels are horizontal across the section with a
single dominant flow direction. This may be good enough for a typical channel flow or valley flooding
but is less suitable for complex flows such as flows over a floodplain due to levee break (Hesselink et
al. 2003), or over a flat floodplain (Aronica et al. 1999) or due to dam-break (Kuiry et al. 2008). The
dam-break flow is also discontinuous and trans-critical in nature. Nevertheless, the flow directions
change significantly both spatially and temporally. Therefore, 1D dam-break models can be used if the
flow is restricted to the downstream channel but this is very unlikely situation since most of the dams in
India are large dams. Under these conditions, a 2D model is required as a minimum.
Though the available softwares such as MIKE-21, TUFLOW, CLAWPACK etc. serve some purposes
but may not be suitable for preparing EAP and real time flood forecasting due to large computation
time, restricted input formats and continuous monetary investment for upgradation. The development
of a dam-break flow model, therefore originates from the fact that an indigenous mathematical model
which can be easily modified and upgraded based on the field requirements has not been developed
so far.
The Dam Rehabilitation and Improvement Project (DRIP) has been taken up by the Government of
India with the assistance from World Bank (Ganju et al. 2012). The DRIP project mainly focuses on
improving the structural and non-structural safety measures of the existing dams. However, the project
in its present form does not have scope to develop dam-break tools though flood markings is one of
the primary objectives. The developed dam-break model may be enhanced and integrated with
Geographical Information System (GIS) in order to effectively pre- and post-process data for preparing
EPA.
This paper, therefore, focuses on development of a 2D dam-break flow model and its validation with
experimental observations. The efforts have been made to describe how EPA can be prepared for a
particular dam site using the present model.
2. DAM-BREAK FLOW MODEL
The 2D dam-break model is developed by solving the 2D shallow water equations which are derived
by integrating the Navier-Stokes equations over the flow depth. The assumptions made in the process
are: incompressible fluid, uniform velocity distribution in the vertical direction, hydrostatic pressure
distribution and small bottom slope.
2.1. Governing Equations
Consider the overland flow over a complex topography as depicted in Fig. 1. The horizontal plane is
defined by x- and y-coordinates, and the z-coordinate points in the vertical direction. The bottom
elevation, zb, and the water surface elevation, Z, are measured with respect to an arbitrary common
reference datum. The water depth (h) at any point at any time is defined as
h( x, y, t ) Z ( x, y, t ) zb ( x, y) (1)
The water surface elevation and the flow depth are functions of space and time whereas the bottom
topography is only the function of space and it does not change with time.
83
Fig
gure 1. Definition sketch for model variables.
The 2D depth-averaaged shalloww water equa

ations which
h describe th
he unsteady non-uniform
m flow on
complexx topography can be writte
en as:
h q x q y
0 (2a)
t x y
qx qx2 qx q y Z n 2u u 2 v 2
gh g (2b)
t x h y h x h4 3
q y qx q y qy Z n 2v u 2 v 2
2
gh
h gh (2c)
t x h y h y h4 3
Referring
g to the defiinition sketch
h in Fig. 1, the conservative form of
o the shallow
w water equ
uations in
vector fo
ormat can be written as:
U F(U
U) G(U)
S(U) (3)
t x y
In which,
T
q y2
T
qx2 qx q y qx q y
U ( h , q x , q y ) ; F qx ,
T
, ; G q y , , ;
h h h h
T
n 2u u 2 v 2 n2v u 2 v2
g Z / x
S 0, gh , gh Z / y
h4 3 h4 3
where U represents the vector of conserved d variables, F and G arre the fluxess associated with the
conserveed variables in the x- and y-direction
ns. In additioon, qx = uh and
a qy = vh are the unita ary water
discharg
ges, u and v are depth-avveraged velo ocities in the
e x- and y-dirrections, respectively, whhile Z/x
and Z/y are the water
w surface slopes along
g these direcctions. The frriction slopess are estimated using
the Mann ning relation with n as the
e Mannings roughness coefficient.
c
In the ab
bove form of the governin ng equations s, the driving forces are represented
r by only one term with
the wateer surface grradient, whicch makes it very
v useful for
f treating the
t source te erm because e: (a) the
variation
n of water surface is ge enerally smooother than water depth h and bed toopography and
a (b) it
eliminate
es numericall imbalance that arises dued to using g different methods to evvaluate drivin
ng forces
that are split between the hydrosstatic flux andd bed slope source terms (Nujic 1995; Kuiry et al.
a 2008 &
2010).
84
2.2. Numerical Solution
The governing equations are discretized according to the cell-centered finite volume method on a
quadrilateral grid which form the control volumes. The Eq. (1) is then integrated over an elementary
control volume and discretized by finite volume method. The dependent variables of the system are
assumed to be stored at the center of the cell and represented as piecewise constants and the fluxes
are calculated at the interfaces between the neighbouring cells. It is useful to rewrite Eq. (1) as
U
E(U) S( x, y, U) (4)
t
where E = (F, G)T is the flux tensor. Integrating Eq. (4) over the ith cell, one obtains
U
i t
d ( E)d Sd
i i
(5)
where i the area of the ith cell. The Gauss divergence theorem is applied to the second term of
Eq. (6) and is given by
U
i t
i E nd i Sd
d (6)
where i boundary of the ith cell and n = the unit outward vector normal to the boundary. The
contour integral is approached via a mid-point rule, that is, a numerical flux is defined at the mid-point
of each edge giving
Fn Gn y d
3
i
x E
j 1

ij n ij ij (7)
where j is the cell edge index and E* is the numerical flux vector, the length of an edge of a
quadrilateral cell, nx and ny are the components of unit normal in the x- and y-directions, respectively.
Therefore Eq. (6) can be written as
n
t 3 *
Uin1 Uin
i j 1

Eij nij ij tSi
n
(8)
According to Godunov (1959), the variables are approximated as constant states within each cell and
then the fluxes at interfaces are calculated by solving the Riemann problems that exists at the
interfaces. The explicit expression of E* depends upon the selected Riemann solver (Roe 1981; Valiani
et al. 2002, Kuiry et al. 2008, 2010). In the proposed work, the HLLC Riemann solver (Fraccarollo and
Toro 1995) is used to compute the numerical flux. The HLLC scheme is a modification of the HLL
scheme by defining that the solution to the Riemann problem consists of three waves separating four
states instead of three states. If the cell-centered values of the variables are used to calculate the flux
at an interface a first-order accurate scheme is obtained, which suffers from excessive numerical
dissipation, and accuracy is undermined. A higher-order accuracy in space will be obtained by
reconstructing the variables for the left and right states (Kuiry et al. 2008).
Water surface gradients in the source term are evaluated by using the Greens theorem
Z 1 Z 1

x i i
Zdy and
y i
i
Zdx (9)
It is evident that the proposed solution method does not suffer from numerical instability under no flow
condition which is a common problem in most of the finite volume based flow models. Since the
proposed solution method uses an explicit scheme to solve the shallow water equations, it is subjected
85
to Coura
ant-Friedrichss-Lewy (CFL
L) condition fo
or stability an
nd convergence.
2.3. Bou
undary Conditions
When a face of a cell coincides with

w the boundary of the flow domain n or some ph hysical boundary, it is
necessary to solve a boundary Riemann
R prob
blem (Sleigh et al. 1998; Kuiry et al. 2008;
2 Yoon and
a Kang
T theory of characteristtics provides sufficient infformation to establish a relation
2004). The r to fin
nd out the
unknown n variables at
a the bounda ary. The opeen boundaryy conditions for
f subcritica al or supercritical flow
is implem
mented depe ending upon the local floow regime. The
T no flow through a bo oundary is maintained
by specifying wall bo
oundary cond dition. However, any spe ecific boundaary condition can be implemented
dependinng upon the field requirem
ments.
3. MOD
DEL RESULT
TS
3.1. Parrtial Dam-bre

eak in a labo
oratory flum
me
An experimental parrtial dam-break test cond ducted by Fraaccarolo and d Toro (1995 5) is considered here.
The two--dimensional aspects of the flow and the ability of the mode el to correctlly reproduce
e the flow
behaviou ur can be vaalidated by th
his test. The flume is recctangular in shape
s and coonnected to a tank at
the upstream which can be treated as a res servoir. The flume which is considere ed as a floo
odplain, is
open on all the threee sides. The reservoir
r is 1 m long and 2 m wide while the flood dplain is 3 m long and
2 m wide e. The width of the gate which is sym mmetrically centered,
c is 0.4 m. The gate
g is opera
ated by a
pneumattic cylinder and
a guarante ees a very sh hort opening
g time of lesss than 0.1 s. A number of o gauges
are located at differrent locationss to record the depth evvolution usin ng wave heiight meters and their
locationss are describ
bed in Table 1. Details of o the experimmental set-u up and its opperation can be found
from the cited reference. Fraccao orolo and To oro (1995) coonducted sevveral tests out
o of which a specific
case is selected in which the water
w level inn the reservvoir was kep pt at 0.6 m and the dow wnstream
floodplain was initially dry.
Sttations -5A
A C 4 0 8A
8
x (m) 0.18
8 0.48 1.00
0 1.00 1.7
722
y (m) 1.00
0 0.40 1.16
6 1.00 1.00
Table 1. Lo
ocations of sta
age Gauges
Figure
e 2. Computational mesh for the partial da
am-break test and gauge lo
ocations
hows the computational mesh and th

Fig. 2 sh he locations of the differrent gauges.. The total number of
quadrilatterals used is
i 6141 and finer cells are
a used in the vicinity off the gate where
w the flow
w pattern
changess drastically. The time series of waterr depths at different gaug
ges are comp pared in Fig.. 3. In the
graphs, the
t simulated results of Ying
Y and Waang (2006) are
a also presented to exa amine the accuracy of
86
the pressent model. The time dependent curves are never mon notonically decreasing
d b show
but
oscillatio
ons. This means that though the water w volumme in the re eservoir is strictly
s mono otonically
decreasiing, the free e surface is moving alte ernatively up and down. As soon as s the gate iss opened
suddenlyy, a strong rarefaction
r w
wave is gene erated and moves
m backw ward into the reservoir while
w the
front wavve spreads laterally and flows onto th he floodplain
n. The free surface variattions at statio ons "-5A"
and "C" compare we ell with the exxperimental observationss as well as the simulate ed results of Ying and
Wang (2 2006) and th he RMSE att these stations are 0.01757 and 0.01738. The e gauges "0"" and "4"
shows some initial oscillations
o w
which are alsso confirmedd by the exp perimental ob bservations. At these
stations, the water depth
d reducees drasticallyy to a minim
mum soon affter the gate is opened. After the
minimum m, the plots show
s a rising
g stage whic t contribution of the latteral propaga
ch is due to the ation and
represen nt, therefore, a two-dimen nsional effec
ct. This aspect is well repproduced by the numericcal model.
The sligh ht delay of th
he measured d data can bee attributed to
o the fact tha
at actually th
he gate opening is not
instantanneous as pointed out by Fraccarolo and Toro (19 995). The RMSE
R valuess at these gaauges are
calculateed as 0.0638 86 and 0.054 422 respectivvely. Neverth heless, the discrepancy
d at these stations can
be attribbuted to the three-dimen nsionality of the flow wh hich cannot be exactly captured
c by a depth-
averaged d 2D model.. The depth prediction at station "8A A" is close too the observved depth hyydrograph
and the wave arrival time to this station is qu uite accurate
e. The RMSE E value at thhis station is 0.06571.
The RMS SE values are slightly large but the computed
c re
esults are we ell compared with Ying and Wang
(2006). In spite of the e limitations of the shallo
ow water rep presentation, the overall predictive
p acccuracy is
quite sattisfactory.
(-5A) (C)
(
(0)
(4)
(8A)
87
Fiigure 3. Comp
puted and mea
asured depth evolutions at different gaug
ges
3.2. Dam
m-break flow
w in a slope
ed convergin
ng-diverging
g channel
Bellos ett al. (1992) conducted

c a series of da
am-break test cases unde er various flo
ow conditionss. One of
the expeerimental testt cases is co onsidered heere. This test case can exxamine the accuracy
a of the model
becausee it includes some difficu ulties such as
a an irregular flow dom main and an initially dry bed. The
width of the rectang gular sloped channel varries like a converging-diiverging cha annel. The channel is
20.7 m long with uniform bottom m slope 0.006 6. The Mann ning's roughn ness co-efficcient was rep ported as
-1/3
0.012 m s. A gate is located at a x = 8.5 m from the up pstream and initial water level in the reservoir
section, i.e. upstreamm of the gate e, was set att 0.3 m. Depth evolutionss were meassured by eigh ht probes
located a
along the cen ntre-line of thhe channel. All
A the three sides of the channel are e defined as solid wall
and the downstream m is defined d as free-ouutfall. The simulation
s iss performed d on a grid of 5047
quadrilatteral cells an
nd the converging-divergiing section iss shown in Fig.
F 4. Fig. 5 shows the m measured
and commputed flow depths
d at the three locatio
ons at x = 0.0
0 m, x = 4.5 m and x = 18 8.5 m, respeectively.
Figure
e 4. Convergin
ng-diverging se
ection of the computational
c grid for the da
am-break test case by Bello
os et. al.
(1992)
The com
mputed RMSE at the thre ee probes arre within reasonable limits and are 0.00473,
0 0.00
0203 and
0.00766 respectively
y. In the dowwnstream, th he arrival tim
me of the waater front is accurately predicted.
p
Howeverr, the presen
nt model sligh
htly overestim
mates the floow depth at x = 18.5 m, shown in Fig. 5(c).
(a) (b)
(c)
88
Figure
e 5. Computed
d and measure
ed flow depth comparisons at: (a) x = 0.0 m (b) x = 4.5 m and (c) x = 18.5 m
3.3. Lab
boratory Dam
m-break ove
er a triangullar hump
The num merical mode el is applied tot reproduce e the comple ex laboratory dam-break flow over a triangular t
hump. T The experim ment was re ecommended d by the EU E CADAM project and conducted d at the
Rechercches Hydrauliques Laborratory, Chte elet together with the University
U of Bruxelles (B Belgium).
The experimental se etup is illustra
ated in Fig. 6.
6 A dam is located 15.5 5 m away fro om upstream m end in a
38 m long rectangular channel. The dam has h a reservvoir in the upstream side with the still s water
surface eelevation at 0.75
0 m and the
t downstre eam floodplain is initially dry.
d A triangular hump on n the bed
is located at 13 m aw way from the dam at the downstream
d . The symme etric triangulaar hump is 0.4 m high
and the projected len ngths of the normal and adverse slopes of the hump are botth 3 m. The upstream u
end is soolid wall and the downstre eam end is assumed
a to be
b open. A Manning
M coeffficient 0.012 25 m-1/3s-1
is used throughout
t th
he domain. TheT simulatio on is run for 90 s on a grid with a ressolution of 0.1 m size
square ccells. At t 0 , the dam suddenly
s bre
eaks and the e initial still water
w in the reservoir russhes onto
the downstream floo odplain. As soon
s as the wave front reaches to the hump, due d to the innteraction
between n the incomiing flow and d the bed to opography a shock wav ve gets form med that propagates
upstreamm. During thiis time, a rarefaction wa ave is develo oped, moving g downstrea am, which ca auses the
water de epth above th he hump to decrease. The T shock wa ave which was w develope ed by the bed d hits the
solid wall at the upsttream end at around t 24 s and ge ets reflected d. The reflecttion causes a second
shock too form and propagate
p do
ownstream. AtA the same time, the wa ater on the hump
h starts receding
and the drying-out process
p conttinues at the
e upstream sside before the t second shock
s hits th
he hump.
Then the e shock attaccks the hump and the hu uge momenttum carried by b the shockk pushes the e water to
climb up p the hump so that the e entire hum mp is again submerged d. Another shock
s is immmediately
develope ed and startss to move up pstream. The ese complexx processes associated
a w wave intteractions
with
and wettting and drying continue until the mo omentum of flowf is damped by friction n effects and d the loss
of mass from the dom main through h the downsttream boundary. Time hisstories of wa ater depth reccorded at
five gaugges located ata 4 m (G4), 10 m (G10), 11 m (G11)), 13 m (G13 3) and 20 m (G20) downsstream of
the dam m (Fig. 7). Th he RMSE att different ga auges (G4: 0.02874,
0 G10: 0.05266, G11: 0.046 682, G13:
0.01702 and G20: 0.026488) are a calculate ed for up to o 65 s beca ause after that
t results are very
oscillatorry. The maximum errorss are contribu uted due to under predicction at the peaks. p At all gauges,
the wave e arrival timee is preciselyy predicted. However, co omputed res sults show th hat the time series at
G20 is under
u predictted at all timees and this is
s also prediccted by otherr researchers Brufau et al. a (2004)
using diffferent numerical scheme es. Thereforee, a possible explanation for the disag greement at G20 may
be that tthe flow is highly
h complex and unsttable beyond d the hump and the sha allow water e equations
based on n hydrostaticc assumption n may not be quite suitab ble for this sittuation. Howe ever, the wave arrival
time is accurately mo odelled, whicch is a more important facctor for dam--break simula ations.
Figure
e 6. Definition sketch of the experimental set up for dam
m break over a triangular hu
ump (distorted
d scale)
89
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e)
Figure 7
7. Dam break over
o a triangular hump: time
e histories of w
water depth att different gauges: (a) G4 (b
b) G10 (c)
G11 (d)
( G13 and (e e) G20
3.4. Pre
eparation of Emergency
y action plan
ns for a dam
m-break incid
dent
A dam ssite may be flooded due e to sudden uncontrolled d release orr excessive controlled re elease of
water. The release may
m be caussed by dama age to or failure of the dam. When people
p live in
n an area
that could be affecteed by the opperation or failure
f of a dam,
d there iss the potential for an em mergency
related tto dam safeety incident. The plannin ng should beb carried out based on n the severity of the
situation. Therefore, the dams in India shouldd be classifie
ed at least in
nto two categ
gories: (a) low w-hazard
dams an nd (b) high-hhazard damss. A dam with low or no o potential im
mpact may notn require extensive
e
emergen ncy planning process. Hoowever, a higgh-hazard da am should ha ave extensive
e EAPs.
Residentts of areas th hat could be affected by a dam failurre or operatio

onal incident have a risk of loss of
life, injurries, and dam
mage to prooperty. Theree should be guidelines forf the prepa aration of the
e EAP to
facilitate the develo opment of plans that arre comprehe ensive and consistent during
d a dam safety
incident. An EAP is a formal docu ument that id
dentifies pote
ential emerge ency conditio
ons at a dam
m site and
specifiess actions to be
b followed to
t minimize loss of life annd property damage.
d Thee EAP should include
the followwing six elem
ments (CWC, 2006):
N
Notification flowcharts
f
90
Responsibilities
Emergency identification, evaluation and classification
Notification procedure
Preventive action
Inundation map
Appendices for supporting materials
It is obvious from the elements outlined above that the dam-failure EAP guidelines require the
performance of a dam-break analysis as the basis for delineation of possible flood inundation areas,
i.e. inundation maps. The various dam-break parameters, such as breach size and time to failure, are
normally obtained either from published guidelines by the Central Water Commission, India or need to
be formulated for each high-hazard dam. The dam breach information is required in predicting the
failure mode of a dam. The failure of a dam is seldom instantaneous, but occurs over a finite length of
time, and is usually preceded by noticeable indicators. A detailed discussions on this topic was
presented for variety of dams in USA in Jansen (1980, 1988) and Beard (1984). The breach
development time of a dam mainly depends on type of materials and volume of materials. The studies
on dam-failure incidents have resulted in the development of a series of curves relating breach
material volume to breach development time and quantifying breach outflow characteristics
(MacDonald and Langridge-Monopolis 1984). The water resource engineer should also carefully study
a dam, including any past inspection reports, before selecting dam-breach parameters. For concrete
dams, failure of a single monolith will most likely result in partial failure of adjacent monoliths. Past
areas of dam repair should always be suspected as possible areas of future dam failure. Once the
failure mode and breach information are available for a dam, a dam-break flow simulation model cab
employed to generate various scenarios and corresponding inundation maps.
The proposed dam-break flow simulation model can be upgraded to include breach profiles so that
dam-break flow simulation can be done for different failure modes. The model then can be used to
generate information on (a) the extent of the flooded area, (b) spatial distribution of flood depth at
various times, (c) spatial distribution of flood velocities (in two horizontal directions) at different times,
(d) flood arrival time at each point of the computational domain, and (e) duration of the flood at each
point of the computational domain. In addition, the envelope maps of maximum flood depth and
maximum velocity can also be created for the entire simulation domain. These results can readily be
imported into a GIS software for generating inundation maps. Thus, dam-break flow model is
indispensable for generating inundation maps which are used for preparing EAP. In addition, the dam-
break model can also be used to prepare inundation maps while a flood is in progress and the failure
mode is quite different than that was considered for preparing the EAP for a particular dam.
4. CONCLUSIONS
A 2D dam-break model is presented. The depth-averaged shallow water equations are discretized by
the finite volume method and the HLLC approximate Riemann solver. The model uses unstructured
quadrilateral grids to describe the flow domain and hence real geometry can be considered for
simulation. The model is validated against a number of experimental observations that include dam-
break phenomena with different regimes of flow. It is also discussed that the model can be used for
preparing inundation maps for different dam-break scenarios. The model can also be used to prepare
EAPs for dam-break failure by integrating with a GIS platform. A small upgrade is required to take care
of breach failure mode.
REFERENCES
Aronica, G., Tucciarelli, T., and Nasello, C. (1999): 2D multilevel model for flood wave propagation in flood-
affected areas. J. Water Res. Plann. Manag., 124: 210-217.
Beard, J. (1984): Anatomy of a dam failure. Constr., Associated General Contractors of America, Washington,
D.C., May, 30-34.
Bellos, C. V., Soulis, J. V., and Sakkas, J. G. (1992): Experimental investigation of two-dimensional dam-break
induced flows. J. Hydraul. Res., 30: 4763.
Brufau, P., Garca-Navarro, P., and Vazquez-Cendon, M. E. (2004): Zero mass error using unsteady wetting
drying conditions in shallow flows over dry irregular topography. Int. J. Numer. Methods Fluids, 45: 104782.
91
CWC (2006): Guidelines for development and implementation of emergency action plan (EAP) for dams.
Fraccarollo, L., and Toro, E. F. (1995): Experimental and numerical assessment of the shallow water model for
two-dimensional dam break type problems. J. Hydraul. Res., 33: 843864.
Hesselink, A., Stelling, G., Kwadijk, J., and Middelkoop, H. (2003): Inundation of a Dutch river Polder, sensitivity
analysis of a physically based inundation model using historic data. Water Resou. Res., 39: 9, 1-17.
Jansen, R. B. (1980): Dams and public safetyA water resources technical publication. U.S. Department of the
Interior, Washington, D.C.
Jansen, R. B. (1988): Dam safety in America. Hydro Rev., VII (3), HCI Publications, Kansas City, Mo., May, 10-
20.
Kuiry, S. N., Ding, Y., and Wang, S. S. Y. (2010): Modelling coastal barrier breaching flows with well-balanced
shock-capturing technique. Comput. Fluids, 39: 10, 2051-2068.
Kuiry, S. N., Pramanik, K., and Sen, D. J. (2008): Finite volume model for shallow water equations with improved
treatment of source terms, J. Hydraul. Eng., 134: 2, 231-242.
MacDonald, T. C., and Langridge-Monopolis, J. (1984): Breaching characteristics of dam failures. J. Hydraul.
Eng., 110: 5, 567-586.
Nujic, M. (1995): Efficient implementation of non-oscillatory schemes for the computation of free surface flow. J.
Hydraul. Res., 33: 101111.
Roe, P. L. (1981): Approximate Riemann solvers, parameter vectors and difference schemes. J. Comput. Phys.,
43: 357-372.
Sleigh, P. A., Berzins, M., Gaskell, P. H., and Wright, N. G. (1997): An unstructured finite-volume algorithm for
predicting flow in rivers and estuaries. Comput. Fluids, 27: 4, 479-508.
Valiani, A., Caleffi, V., and Zanni, A. (2002): Case study: Malpasset Dam-break simulation using two-dimensional
finite volume method. J. Hydr. Eng., 128: 5, 460-472.
Ying, X., and Wang, S. S. Y. (2006): Modeling flood inundation due to dam and levee breach. In: Proceedings of
the USChina workshop on advanced computational modelling in hydroscience & engineering, Oxford,
Mississippi, USA; 1921 September, 2006.
Yoon, T. H., and Kang, S. K. (2004): Finite volume model for two-dimensional shallow water flows on unstructured
grids. J. Hydraul. Eng., 130: 7, 678-688.
92
D ety Status of DRIP Dams - Trends and Imp

Dam Safe provemen
nt
Initiatives
Vino
od K Verma
a Yoki Vija
ay
Dam Safety Sp
D pecialist, Egis, New Delhi De
eputy Director (DSR), Centra
al Water Commission
Vinodkumaar.v@egis-ind dia.com
Garance Bla
aut
Engine
eer, Egis, New
w Delhi
ABSTRACT
This pape er deals with overall scena ario of variouss activities invvolved for reh habilitation and improvement of dam
projects in different staates of India under
u DRIP (Dam Rehabiliitation & Imprrovement Project), being co oordinated
and supe ervised by Central
C Water Commission n as a Centrral Project Management
M U
Unit (CPMU). General
deficiencies found in various typess of dam pro ojects includin ng their appurtenant workss along with proposed
improvem ments and rem medial measu ures suggeste ed for executtion involving the latest te echnologies have been
deliberateed in detail. Coommon deficie encies observ ved in Embankkment dams re elate to settlemments found at a different
locations of the dam section
s requiring re-sectioniing as per original design sections includding resetting of rip-rap,
seepage conditions dow wnstream of the
t dam, cond dition of chute drains and to oe drain and suitability of da am section
and reservoir le
to withsta evel of increassed MWL posst revised design flood. As re egards Mason nry/ Concrete dams, the
major issues are with respect to se eepage throug gh dam body, clogging of porous p drainss, concrete da amages in
spillway/eenergy dissipa ation arrangem ment, contracction joint wate er stop failure es and operational issues related to
service/em mergency gattes & hoists. Remedial me easures to brring back the embankmentt dams to the eir original
status inccludes carryingg out the detailed survey of the dams with h reference to a permanent Bench Mark to t pinpoint
settlemen nt areas and tot carry out ap ppropriate filling and compa action repairss; removal of woody vegeta ation from
u/s &d/s slopes
s of the bund
b and reseetting of the sttones of the rip-rap, toe dra ains and rock toe;
t repairs off the chute
drains, thheir cleaning and
a making th hem effective enough
e to faccilitate flow of rain
r water from m dam top to down and
monitoring of the seep page water being
b collectin
ng in the toe drain with re eference to th he reservoir le evels. For
masonry// concrete dam ms, the measu ures include treatment of u/s u face of the e dams with appropriate cem mentitious
and UV rresistant morta ars like Poly Ironite Ceram mic Cemmentittious formulattions to minim mise seepage from dam
body to thhe foundation gallery; treatm ment of contra action joints oof the dam bod dy for leaking water stops by b sealing
the joint w
with water toleerable, hydrop philic polyureth hanes or Acryylamide grout system; groutting of the dam body at
required llow density da am locations using
u grout forrmulations witth appropriate admixtures to o reduce seep pages and
treatmentt of the draina age holes in thhe foundation gallery to rele ease uplift wa ater pressuress. The status of o seeking
approval of Project Sccreening Tem mplate (PST) for execution n of rehabilita ation works fo or different da ams, after
incorporaating the recom mmendations of the state level Dam Safety Review Panels P (DSRP P), from CPMU U and the
World Ba ank has been elaborated. StatusS of Ten ndering Proce ess, after the dam project is granted ap pproval for
undertaking the rehabilitation works by World Ban nk and up to th he award of re ehabilitation works
w to the Contracting
C
Agencies has also bee en covered. Status of rehab bilitation workss under execu ution for differrent dam proje ects along
with workk completion time schedule e and the sta atus of expen nditure incurre ed on each dam d project have
h been
brought oout in this papeer.
1. DRIP DAMS IN VA
ARIOUS STA
ATES
1.1 Ov
verview
Dam Reehabilitation and

a Improvement Projecct (DRIP) hass been taken n up by Government of India with
World Baank assistan
nce and is beeing manage ed and coord dinated by Ce
entral Waterr Commission n (CWC).
The Projject has beco e on 18th Aprril, 2012 for implementation period of six years.
ome effective
DRIP ha ad been ado opted within four states namely Kerrala, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa (Odisha) and
Tamil Naadu. Five moore States/ Organisation
O were also id oin DRIP at a later stage
dentified to jo e: namely
Karnatakka, Punjab, Uttarakhand d Jal Vidyutt Nigam Limmited (UJVNL), Damoda ar Valley Co orporation
(DVC) and Farakka Board (FB) for which a provision of unallocated resources had h been prrovided in
ect estimate.
the proje
Karnatakka became officially

o n 7th Octoberr, 2014. DVC
partt of DRIP on C and UJVNL will join th
he project
during 20
015 and Fara
akka Board & Punjab hav ve finally deccided not to join
j DRIP.
40 dams havve been identified for rehabilitation un

In all, 24 NL and DVC also join,
nder the projject. If UJVN
the total would be 248
2 dams. These
T 240 id
dentified dam ms are unde er the controol of Water Resource
R
93
ments of Mad
Departm dhya Pradessh (29 dams s), Orissa (266 dams), Keerala (16 dams), Tamil Nadu
N (38
dams) an
nd Karnataka
a (27 dams); and State Electricity
E Bo
oards of Tamil Nadu (67 dams)
d and Kerala
K (37
dams un
nder 12 Hydro Electric Prrojects).
These 2 240 dams (c current list) have

h been identified to have substa antial need for rehabilitaation and
improvem ment and will be subject to rehabilitaation and imp provement works
w under DRIP.
D In adddition, the
also aims for the dam saffety institution
project a nal strengtheening in the participating
p States and in Central
Water Commission.
C The implem menting agen ncies (IAs) of
o DRIP are the ownerss of the dam ms, which
comprise e Water Ressource Depa artments (W WRDs) and StateS Electriccity Boards (SEBs)
( of re
espective
states. The
T Implementing Agenciies are respo onsible for th
he implementtation of the works underr DRIP.
Dams arre critical co

omponents of
o the infrasttructure in India. Approxximately 518 87 large damms (4839
completeed and 348 under consstruction) an nd several tthousand sm maller dams provide a range of
economiic, environmental, and social benefitts, including hydroelectric power, irrigation, wate
er supply,
flood control, and tourism.
t Howwever dams age and de eteriorate, posing a poteential threat to life &
property.
Given th
he number an nd widesprea on of dams in India, it is clear that th
ad distributio he potentiallyy affected
populatio
ons and secttors are many, and that th
he effects off dam-relatedd hazards can be seriouss.
ment objectivves of DRIP are to:

The project developm
Imp prove the saffety and perfformance of selected exiisting dams and associated appurten nances in
a su
ustainable manner, and
Streengthen the dam
d safety in
nstitutional setup
s in particcipating Stattes as well ass at Central level.
l
1.2 Sttate-wise de
etails of DRIP dams
There arre currently 240

2 dams in n the scope of DRIP. Inittially 223 da
ams were invvolved in DRRIP within
four stattes. Some dams were deleted
d and others addeed, then Karn nataka joined last Octob
ber 2014,
bringing to 240 the number of DR
RIP dams.
The seleection of dam

ms for DRIP has
h been ma ade by the fo
our states con ncerned. The
e states havve done a
review o of the statuss of their dams
d and ha ave determiined those damsd a most in need of
that are
rehabilita
ation and imp
provement inn order to gu
uarantee theiir future safe
ety and opera
ational capaccity.
Kerala has pro

oposed 28 dams
d projectts, out of which
w 16 dam ms are mannaged by the Water
Ressources Dep
partment (WRD) and 12 2 HEP mana aged by thee Kerala Staate Electricitty Board
(KS
SEB). Some of
o these dam
ms are in rea
ality dam commplexes, with more than one dam (ssee table
belo
ow).
Tammil Nadu has

s proposed 105 dams to be included in DRIP, of which 67 da
ams are man
naged by
the WRD and 388 by the Tam
mil Nadu Elec
ctricity Board
d (TNEB).
Thee number of dams from m Madhya Pradesh, Orissa

O and Karnataka
K are 29, 26 and 27
resp
pectively and
d are managed by Waterr Resources Department of the Statess.
Tamil
T Tam
mil TOTAL
Madhya Kerala Kerala
State/ Organization Orissa N
Nadu Nad
du K
Karnataka HEP
Pradesh WRD SEB
WRD
W SEBB (dams)
Total N
No of DRIP
223
Dam P Projects 50 38 60 44 19 12 (37) -
(248)
Original (April 2012)
Total N
No of DRIP
215
Dam p projects 29 26 67 38 16 12 (37) 27
(240)
Revised (Dec. 2014)
94
State-wisse break-up of DRIP dam

ms is given in
n Figure-1 be
elow:
NoofDRIPdams Stateewise
Madhya
K
Karnataka,27 Pradesh,29
Madhya
Pradesh
Orissa,26 Orissa
Kerala,5
53 TamilNadu
Kerala
TamilNadu,
105
Most DRRIP dams are

e single purp
pose, either providing
p irrigation or hydro-power benefits, but some
s are
multipurp
pose. Some also are useed for potablle water supply or flood control. The majority of the
t dams
(around 59%) are 25
5 to 50 years old, while on
nly 4 dams (a around 2%) are over 100
0 years old.
2. TYPIC
CAL DEFICIIENCIES OF
F DRIP DAMS
2.1 Gen
neral
As per th
he understan nding, SPMUUs are required to work oout revised deesign flood based
b on hyddrological
data avaailable/ obseerved by them or obtaine ed from IMD gn flood for 100 year
D for estimattion of desig
return period or Sta andard Probbable Flood (SPF) or Prrobable Maxximum Flood d (PMF) for different
projects.. It has been
n observed inn general tha
at flood estim
mation is fau
ulty and the routing
r of the
e flood is
also erro
oneous. The e revised Maaximum wate er Level (MWWL) so worke ed out based d on the abo ove flood
routing studies
s often needs to be
e reworked ou ut.
Other da am features which

w attract recurrent comments
c n account of deficiencies observed during site
on
visits of tthe Consulta
ants to variou n the following paras.
us dams are described in
2.2 Emb
bankment Dams
D
Upstreamm & downstrream slopess of the embankments an nd even the road at top of dam are found to
have und dulating surffaces which indicate setttlement. Rip--rap on the u/s
u slopes off the embankkments is
disturbedd and found covered witth thick woody vegetatio on. Chute dra ains and horrizontal drainns on the
downstreeam slopes are seen fillled with deb bris and coveered with veegetation andd also found d cracked
and dammaged. The d/s slopes of o most of thet embankm ment dams are covered d with thick & woody
on. Toe draiins at most of the damss are found ignored and
vegetatio d are seen filled
f with de ebris and
having trees growing g in the drain. Stone pittching of the
e toe drain and
a also tha
at of rock toe e is seen
disturbedd. Deep gullyy cuts on the
e surface of d/s
d slopes on n account of rain water arre quite promminent. V-
notches are found damaged.
d Paarapets on top
t of dam are
a seen in broken state e or are tiltin
ng. Road
surface iis not mainta
ained. The old system of illumination of
o dam areass is non-funcctional.
At some of the damss with longerr length of re

eservoir, the rip-rap stone
es are found
d dislodged from
f their
location on account of
o impact of waves
w due to
o high wind velocities.
v
Concenttrated/ excesssive seepagge/ leakage of

o water throuugh the earth
h dam body into the toe d
drain has
been obsserved at so
ome of the dams and we et spots on th
he downstrream slope of
o the bund hhave also
been fou
und.
Leakagees from the Earth
E d.
dam in to the outlet works are also observed
95
2.3 Masonry / Concrete Dams
The mortar filling and pointing of masonry joints on the upstream face of dams at many projects is
found cracked or missing. This leads to excessive seepage or leakage through the dam body.
Leakage from the transverse contraction joints due to failure of water stops has been noticed. Porous
drains provided in the dam body are found choked on account of calcination. These porous drains are
also found open at the dam top and provided with steel grating. At most of the locations, the drainage
holes provided in the foundation gallery for releasing the uplift pressure are found non-functional. V-
notches provided for measuring the seepage water coming into the foundation gallery are seen
damaged or not provided at appropriate locations. Standby dewatering pumps are not provided in the
gallery sump wells. Concrete surfaces of the Spillway crest and glacis are seen eroded/damaged on
account of abrasion and also detachment of concrete layer is noticed in small patches. Damages to
the concrete surfaces of buckets and to the dented blocks and end sill of the stilling basin arrangement
have been noticed. Slope protection of the water channel d/s of the spillway is inadequate. Instruments
installed at most of the dams are non-functional except manual water level scales and rain gauges.
2.4 Hydro-Mechanical Gates & Hoists
Structural condition of the gates and hoists for spillway and canal/river sluices at various dam projects
has generally been found satisfactory. At most of the projects, rubber seals of the spillway gates and
stop logs, service gates and emergency gates of the canal/ river sluices require replacement.
Periodical maintenance of the gates and hoists is lacking. Electric motors of many gate hoisting
arrangements were found requiring major repairs or replacement. Standby power Generators available
at project sites are very old and require major repairs or replacements.
3 IMPROVEMENT INITIATIVES TAKEN / PROPOSED
Depending upon the condition of the dam and the extent of damages noticed, following measures are
proposed to be taken up ;
3.1 General
The design teams of the SPMU for various states are required to work out design flood as per relevant
I S codes and undertake flood routing studies strictly as per IS:11223 & IS:5477 Part-iv. Training
programs/ workshops had been organized by CPMU for design teams of different states to provide
necessary guide lines for estimation of design flood and for carrying out the flood routing studies in
line with BIS stipulations.
3.2 Embankment dams
It is suggested that the levels of the embankment dam surfaces on u/s, d/s and top should be checked
at about 25m c/c with reference to a permanent Bench Mark. The depressions in dam surfaces must
be filled with the type of soil having similar properties as that of the originally used soil with appropriate
compaction. The dam section should be brought to the original dam design section. Chute drains,
horizontal drains and toe drain are to be cleared of all the muck and vegetation and necessary repairs
of the drains be carried out. Resetting of the stone pitching of toe drain, rock toe and rip-rap must be
undertaken. Necessary repairs of the parapets need to be done. V-notches are to be replaced. Where
ever required the d/s slopes should be provided with turfing to save the slopes from rain water cuts.
Illumination system around dams should be made functional.
Where ever required, the thickness of the rip-rap and the size of stones used in the rip-rap, whether
hand packed or dumped must be checked as per IS: 8237 for wave height being encountered at
particular dam and necessary modification be undertaken.
The quantity of seepage/ leakage being collected in the toe drains needs to be monitored with
reference to the increase or decrease of reservoir levels. Colour of the seepage/ leakage water also
must be observed and should be checked for movement of fine soil particles along with water.
96
Conduits down-stream of the sluice service gates must be inspected thoroughly and repairs required
to arrest leakage from the dam into the conduits be carried out. Also these are vulnerable locations in
the dam and the condition of the dam at these locations need to be specially checked.
3.3 Masonry / Concrete dams
Treatment of stone masonry joints on u/s face of the dams should be carried out using latest cement
based material/ mortars like Poly Ironite Ceramic Cementitious formulations or with suitable
admixtures. Reaming of the porous drains should be done to make them functional. Open end of the
porous drains at the top of dam need to be provided with a removable cap and the lower end in the
foundation gallery with a water seal as per BIS code to minimize calcination process. Treatment of
transverse contraction joints having leaking water stops should be undertaken by sealing with water
tolerable, hydrophilic polyurethanes or Acrylamide grout system, as per the site requirement and
should be undertaken through a recognized agency. Grouting of the masonry dam to minimize the
seepage through the dam body should be undertaken only after identifying the low density pockets
established by carrying out Tomography. The drainage holes provided in the foundation gallery must
be made functional by re-drilling the existing holes. Repairs of the damaged concrete surfaces need to
be undertaken using high strength concrete tested to withstand abrasion on account of high velocities
as per requirement of the site conditions. The seepage coming in to the foundation gallery must be
monitored with reference to the reservoir levels. Necessary protection works to save guard the bank
slopes of the water channel d/s of the spillway are required. Old instruments, installed at approachable
locations of the dam should be replaced with latest instruments and regular observation of data be
ensured.
3.4 Hydro- Mechanical Gates & Hoists
Damage to any structural part of the spillway or canal/ river sluice gates and that of the gate hoisting
arrangement must be attended to on urgent basis. Periodical overhauling / maintenance of all gates
and their hoisting systems including painting works must be undertaken. Efficiency of the old electric
motors of the gate hoisting systems should be checked and necessary repairs or replacement of the
same be carried out. Efficiency of the old standby power generators available at dam sites for supply
of power to the gates should be checked well before on-set of rainy season and necessary repairs or
replacement with latest model be undertaken.
4 STATUS OF STATE DAM SAFETY REVIEW PANEL REPORTS
Dam safety review panels (DSRP) constituted by the respective SPMUs have been visiting various
dams and had been giving recommendation reports on deficiencies observed. Status of DSRP
recommendation reports for dams of different SPMUs is given as under;
198 dams have been inspected by the Dam Safety review panel out of 240 dams up to the end of
February 2015.
The status of DSRP visits and revised targets proposed by Implementing Agencies is brought out
below:
DSRP Visit till

IA No. of Dams Target for Mar 2015
Feb, 14
MP WRD 29 28 29 (100 %)
Orissa WRD 26 26 26 (100%)
T. Nadu - WRD 67 48 67 (100 %)
Tangedco 38 35 38 (100%)
Kerala - WRD 16 16 Done
Kerala EB 37 37 Done
Karnataka - WRD 27 8 14 (50%)
Total 240 198 227
97
5. STAT
TE-WISE ST
TATUS OF D
DAMS
5.1 Key
y activities under
u DRIP
The key activities forr rehabilitatio

on of dams un
nder DRIP are
a summarizzed in the gra
aph below:
For each h dam, Statee Project Maanagement Units

U (SPMUU) send to Central
C Proje
ect Managem ment Unit
(CPMU-C CWC and Eg gis) the design flood for review. Once
e approved, they submit to CPMU th he Project
Screenin ng Template (one for eacch dam). This s document is
i reviewed by
b CPMU an nd sent to Woorld Bank
for approoval.After ap
pproval from WB, the SP PMU prepare es and issue
e bid documments. Bid doocuments
having vvalue of workks exceedin ng Rs.5.0 Crrores (INR) are
a reviewed d by CPMU anda then ten nders are
floated.
The revieew of the Pro

oject Screening Templatees (PST) by CPMU is the e main activitty and all im
mportance
is given to the proce
essing of thiss document. As such, the
e status of review
r of PS
ST is discusssed in the
g paras.
following
5.2 Stattus of Projec

cts Screenin
ng Template
es
After revview by CPMMU and comp

pliance with SPMUs, Pro
ojects Screen
ning Templates are sent to World
Bank forr approval.
5.2.1 PS
STs approve
ed by World Bank
B (state-w
wise)
Progresss achieved up to date is as

a follows
Impllementing Age
ency No. off dams Agreed
d by WB
MP - WRD 2
29 2
24
Orissa - WR
RD 2
26 1
15
T. Nadu - WRD
W 6
67 2
28
Tangedco 3
38 4
Kerala - WRD 16 1
13
Kerala - EB 37 (12
2 HEP) 1
18
Karnataka 2
27 0
Total 2440 102
5.2.2 Da
ams with PSTs under revview with SP
PMUs
No
o. of Dams sta
ate-wise with
Implem
menting Agenccy Total Dams
PSTs underr review
MP - WRD 29 3
Orissa - WR
RD 26 3
T. Nadu - WRD 67 1
Tangedco 38 2
Kerala - WRRD 16 2
Kerala - EB 37 4
Karnataka 27 3
TOTAL 240 18
98
5.2.3 Dams with PST under process with CPMU & WB
No. of Dams state-wise with PST

States Total Dams
under process with CPMU
MP - WRD 29 0
Orissa - WRD 26 1
T. Nadu - WRD 67 2
Tangedco 38 1
Kerala - WRD 16 1
Kerala - EB 37 1
Karnataka 27 0
TOTAL 240 6
5.2.4 PSTs not submitted
So far 120 Projects Screening Templates have been submitted by Implementing Agencies for review
and 120 are yet to be submitted. There are exactly 50% of PSTs which remain to be reviewed.
Implementing Agency No. of dams PSTs not submitted

MP - WRD 29 2
Orissa - WRD 26 7
T. Nadu - WRD 67 36
Tangedco 38 31
Kerala - WRD 16 0
Kerala - EB 37 (12 HEP) 20
Karnataka 27 24
Total 240 120
5.3 Projects Under Tendering Process
Once the World Bank has approved Project Screening Template, SPMUs prepare tender documents
and submit them to CPMU for review.
42 contracts have been awarded so far and 33 more bid documents are under process.
Tender documents under Contracts already awarded

Implementing Agency No. of dams
process (packages) (packages)
MP - WRD 29 5 26
Orissa - WRD 26 11 2
T. Nadu - WRD 67 0 9
Tangedco 38 0 4
Kerala - WRD 16 8 1
Kerala - EB 37 (12 HEP) 9 0
Karnataka 27 0 0
Total 240 33 42
5.4 Projects Undergoing Rehabilitation Works

Once tender documents are awarded, SPMU undertake the rehabilitation and improvement works.
The day-to-day construction supervision is conducted by the field units of concerned State
implementing agency and quality assurance of the works is ensured through quality control unit of the
implementing agency. The Central Project Management Unit is required to provide the third-party
supervision of the construction and quality control.
99
There are currently 23 dams for which works are on-going.
No of dams under Contracts awarded

Implementing Agency No. of dams
rehabilitations works (packages)
MP - WRD 29 12 26
Orissa - WRD 26 2 2
T. Nadu - WRD 67 9 9
Tangedco 38 0 4
Kerala - WRD 16 0 1
Kerala - EB 37 (12 HEP) 0 0
Karnataka 27 0 0
Total 240 23 42
5.5 Project-Wise Status of Expenditure
Details of month wise and cumulative expenditure incurred by each SPMU, based on actual
disbursement till February 2015 are brought out as under in tabular form;
SPMUwiseActualDisbursementtillFebruary15 INRinMillion
Year Jun12 Sep12 Dec12 Mar13 Jun13 Sep13 Dec13 Mar14 Jun14 Sep14 Dec14 Feb15
MPWRD 0.93 2.03 3.61 14.21 24.56 4.74 39.13 55.41 41.09 49.03 55.48 33.447
OdishaWRD 0.11 1.33 1.07 0.71 0.83 0.25 3.02 2.50 3.35 6.29 6.17 16.323
TNWRD 0.00 0.00 0.68 4.91 4.46 5.64 8.62 40.93 0.72 33.90 76.85 30.86
TNSEB 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 18.56 4.60
KeralaWRD 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.66 0.38 0.17 23.72 0.00 16.10 0.85 10.33
KeralaSEB 0.00 0.00 0.48 0.00 21.00 1.07 2.21 3.56 5.53 6.04 9.47 5.81
CWC 0.01 0.35 0.84 3.04 1.67 1.32 7.27 36.07 55.41 1.53 13.65 46.97
Total 1.05 3.71 6.68 22.95 53.17 13.38 60.42 162.18 106.11 112.88 181.03 148.34
CumulativeActualExpendituretillFebruary15
Jun12 Sep12 Dec12 Mar13 Jun13 Sep13 Dec13 Mar14 Jun14 Sep14 Dec14 Feb15
MPWRD 0.93 2.96 6.58 20.78 45.34 50.08 89.21 144.62 185.71 234.74 290.21 323.66
OdishaWRD 0.11 1.44 2.50 3.21 4.04 4.29 7.30 9.80 13.16 19.45 25.62 41.95
TNWRD 0.00 0.00 0.68 5.59 10.05 15.69 24.32 65.25 65.97 99.87 176.72 207.57
TNSEB 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 18.56 23.16
KeralaWRD 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.75 1.12 1.29 25.01 25.01 41.11 41.96 52.28
KeralaSEB 0.00 0.00 0.48 0.48 21.48 22.55 24.75 28.31 33.84 39.88 49.35 55.16
CWC 0.01 0.36 1.20 4.24 5.91 7.23 14.50 50.57 105.98 107.51 121.16 168.14
Total 1.05 4.76 11.44 34.40 87.57 100.96 161.37 323.56 429.67 542.56 723.59 871.92
100
ActualExpendituretillFebruary15
INR inMillion
1000.00
900.00
800.00
Total
700.00
MPWRD
600.00
TNWRD
500.00
CWC
400.00 KeralaSEB
300.00 KeralaWRD
200.00 OdishaWRD
100.00 TNSEB
0.00
Projected expenditure likely to be incurred during the Financial year 2015-16 is given as under;
Projected Disbursement for the Financial Year 2015 - 16 (INR in Crore)
Sl Implementing Fund for Fund for Bids Fund for Awarded Total
No. Agency Approved PST's Issued Contracts
1 MP WRD - 14.92 21.13 36.05
2 Odisha WRD * 14.00 18.56 4.99 37.54
3 Tamilnadu WRD 21.05 - 9.51 30.56
4 Tamilnadu SEB 3.75 - 3.75
5 Kerala WRD 26.05 2.77 10.14 38.97
6 Kerala SEB 4.73 4.80 0.89 10.42
7 CWC - - 15.00 15.00
8 Karnataka 62.47 62.47
9 UJVNL 7.16 7.16
10 DVC 11.97 11.97
Total 151.17 41.06 61.64 253.87
(Rs. 2538.70
million)
* In case of Odisha although only 12 PSTs; are approved but it is assumed that in the coming Financial Year,
work on 15 Dams will start, therefore fund flow of all the 15 Dams have been accounted for.
101
Temghar dam - A case study of Handling of Seepages in Gravity

Dams
Ishwar Chaudhari
Superintending Engineer, Pune Irrigation Projects Circle, Pune
Ishwarch59@gmail.com
ABSTRACT
Many dams have been constructed in Maharashtra in last century for irrigation and hydro power generation. Most
of these dams constructed are of stone masonry being cheaper than concrete one.
Leakages are universal phenomena in masonry dams. However, proper maintenance through regular monitoring
could restrict the same.
It has been experienced that dams built earlier are having less leakage problems than those built in recent 30
years, which are facing severe leakage problems. Main cause for this is dearth of skilled workmanship required
for laying stone masonry which is disappearing day by day.
In some of the cases leakages from masonry dams have assumed enormous proportion involving loss of precious
water stored and creating fear amongst the people residing on the downstream. Profuse leakages from masonry
induce leaching of free lime in cement rendering loss of strength of masonry. Hence it is essential to address
leakages issue properly and timely.
This paper explains issues related to developments of leakages in Temghar dam recently constructed (2010).
Temghar dam is constructed across the river Mutha about 13 Km from the origin of the river Mutha located near
village Temghar.
Leakages in dam are observed from the time of construction in increasing trend with increase in reservoir storage
level.
Detailed Technical study for Leakage controlling measures to be done was referred to Central Water and Power
research Station, Khadakwasla, Pune, Central Designs Organisation, Nasik and Central Water Commission, New
Delhi were also referred for solution to the problem.
Short term measures were carried out on u/s and d/s of dam to certain extent before Monsoon 2014 .It is
observed that the earlier prominent leakages has been stopped or lessened at the location of treatment. However
water is finding way out above or below treated area. Only leakage spot are shifted from one location to another.
It clearly underlines that small portion or patch treatment will not give any significant results as mentioned by
Cwprs in their report. Hence complete u/s face treatment and dam body grouting is necessary to provide solution
in long run. Curtain grouting has been carried out from the foundation gallery from the bore holes drilled at 6 m
interval. However considerable leakages from foundation drainage holes are observed. Hence Secondary curtain
grouting to prevent leakage from foundation drainage holes is to be undertaken from foundation gallery after
making necessary arrangements to dewater the foundation gallery.
Long term measures comprise of complete upstream face treatment to prevent leakages by adopting suitable
methods as discussed above along with dam body grouting from top of dam in order to compensate amount of
cement leached due to excessive leakage and impart density as well as strength to the dam body.
1.0 TEMGHAR DAM
Temghar dam is constructed across the river Mutha about 13 Km from the origin of the river Mutha
located near village Temghar. Mutha River is a right bank tributary of river Bhima in main Krishna
Basin. Temghar project mainly caters irrigation demand of water supply to Pune city and irrigation of
1000 ha through K.T. weirs. Hydro power is also contemplated at the foot of the dam. The total
utilisation of 3.708 T.M.C. planned for this project is accommodated within 599 T.M.C. Krishna water
use permitted to Maharashtra.
102
2.0 CONSTRUCTION
The construction of Temghar Dam was started in 1997 and completed in May 2010. Temghar dam is a
Stone masonry dam with a cover of 5 m thick colgrout masonry on U/S face. It comprises 72 m long
spillway portion in the centre from RD 528 to 600 m and non-overflow portion on either flank. The
salient features of dam are attached herewith (Annexure A).
The Construction of dam was going in full swing from March 1997 to December 2001.However work
was totally stopped by the Forest Department in Jan.2002 due to the 4.5 Ha of forest land coming
under submergence.
Then after receiving the permission from forest Department, construction was started in Apr 2009 and
completed in May 2010 and storage was done against the full reservoir level of 706.50M.
3.0 LEAKAGE PROBLEM
Leakages in dam are observed from the time of construction in increasing trend with increase in
reservoir storage level. Maximum leakages to the tune of 602 LPS were observed in 2011-12 at RWL
of 707 m. After Curtain grouting in 2012 leakages reduced to the extent of 306.90 LPS at RWL of
704.30m. However leakages increased next year again to the extent of 390 LPS at RWL of 706.50m in
2013 monsoon.
4.0 OBSERVATIONS
4.1 Upstream face of dam
There are large holes and cavities observed on the upstream face of dam from ch 45 to 528.
Undulations/uneven surface observed on upstream face of dam from monolith 5 to 13.
The slurry used in grouting of masonry has disintegrated and is accumulated on the entire
u1wxpstream surface of dam
4.2 Downstream face of dam
Heavy leakages are observed from downstream face of dam from ch.350 to 528m and from 600 to
640 m, from spray wall at ch.600 m
White patches of leaching are observed on downstream face of dam.
Removal of pointing in major portion due to leakages.
Leakages from downstream face of dam are mostly from the junction of masonry and colgrout.
At ch.415 to 420 m diagonal cracks and bulging is observed on D/S face of dam, some stones
from masonry are found in dislocated condition.
Boils are observed at ch.38.50,450,456 m on D/S face of dam in the drain on the fillup ground.
However later on it is confirmed that leakages were from the body of the dam and not from
foundation.
4.3 Foundation gallery
Foundation gallery is flooded in portion from ch.415 to 705m

Some drain holes are jetting which shows excessive uplift pressure.
Porous pipes at many places are observed in chocked condition.
Contraction joint pipes at ch.430 m and 600 m flows heavily.
4.4 Inspection gallery
There are heavy leakages from inspection gallery porous blocks at ch 388,528,671,693 m etc.
There are heavy leakages in lift well and staircase at ch 472 to 475 @Rl 664 m and below.
Inspection gallery top slab, side wall at ch.375 to 380,545,550m, mo.jt top slab at ch.545, 574 m
103
4.5 Drainage arrangement
1) Vertical Porous drains at every 3 m c/c are provided from dam top to Inspection Gallery
2) Vertical porous drains at every 3 m C/c are provided from inspection gallery to foundation gallery
3) Drain holes at every 3 m C/C provided from foundation gallery
4) Side gutters of size 30 x30 cm are provided in inspection as well as foundation gallery to collect
the seepage water.
5) Three sumps at ch. 400m, 535m and 705 m are provided as collection pits in foundation gallery.
Sump at ch 400m is opened outside the dam foot the leakage water drawn by gravity from this
sump.The sump at ch.705 m chocked so collected water from right side goes to foundation
gallery whereas sump at ch. 535 is central sump. Three pumps of capacity 2x35 hp and 1X100
hp are provided to draw water.
4.6 Measurement of Leakages
Leakages from gallery are measured in gutter by veleocity area method. Individual leakages from
porous pipes are measured in bucket by stop wach.
There is no arrangement for measurement of leakages provided on the downstream toe of dam as
excavated stuff is deposited at the downstream toe by 8-10 m at the time of construction. 900 mm dia
pipe is provided on downstream in guide wall to measure leakages from D/S face of dam whereas
Reservior level wise leakages at every meter intervals are maintained.
5.0. CAUSES OF LEAKAGES
5.1 Poor construction quality and bad workman ship
The upstream septum of 5m width is provided of col grout masonry to prevent leakages. Also on
downstream col grout masonry zone is provided up to RL 669 m. From the leakages and visual
inspection it is evident that particularly right flank portion and half of the central gorge portion For
which tenders were awarded to the firm, Srinivas Constructions, work has been executed very badly.
Upstream surface undulations and uneven slopes speaks of bad workmanship and cement slurry
accumulated on the upstream surface, percolated from the shuttering for col grout masonry reveals
that cement grout is not able to occupy the space between the stones due to improper packing
between the stages of masonry. Large cavities show the improper laying of stones. From
correspondence made by the supervisory staff to contractor, it reveals that proper mixing equipment
was not used for preparing cement grout.Single drum mixer was used in stead of double drum mixer
which is not able to create colloidal state of the mix. Also use of improper grading of artificial sand
used seems to be responsible for forming a homogenous masonry. The leakages on downstream are
prominent below RL 669 where col grout masonry is provided. All these lacunae in execution of col
grout masonry have defeated the purpose for providing it for imparting impermeability to the dam body.
5.2 Imperfect Stage grouting
There is provision of stage wise grouting to be carried out before laying next season work. The stage
grouting carried out may not have been done effectively to achieve the required impermeability. The
field test results recorded at the time of construction shows the required impermeability results
however the extent of leakages defies it totally. In situ masonry cores were not sent to MERI Nashik
for permeability and strength test, which will reveal real status of strength and permeability parameters
of the dam masonry.
5.3 The Special Investigation Team (SIT) Finding
SIT members visited dam site twice and it has passed hard strictures on the quality of execution,
supervision and quality control aspects of Temghar dam construction and proposed enquiry by a
special squad and also recommended that remedial measures shall be carried out at the risk and cost
of the contractor and due payments shall not be released to him.
104
6.0 STUDIES FOR REMEDIAL MEASURES
Detailed Technical study for Leakage controlling measures to be done was referred to Central Water
and Power research Station, Khadakwasla, Pune, Central Designs Organisation, Nasik and Central
Water Commission, New Delhi were also referred for solution to the problem.
Remedial measures suggested by CWPRS, Pune:
6.1 Upstream surface treatment:
AS there are holes and cracks on upstream surface of dam, to arrest the entry of water, the upstream
surface needs to be made watertight by any one of the suitable methods below-
Method-1:
Clean U/s surface and masonry joints.
Apply Primer coat and pointing with 1:2 cement mortar.
20-25 mm diameter nozzle grouting with spacing of 4-6 m c/c, fixing the nozzle with BECKBOND
or M-seal.
Grouting with varying proportion of cement water from 1:20 to 1:1, the grout pressure should not
exceed 3-4 kg/cm2.
If consumption is more reduce the grouting spacing to 2 m c/c.
After grouting drill hole of 12 mm diameter to a depth of 75 mm at 1000 mm c/c.
Fixing 8 mm dia shear connector.
Cavities if any on the surface shall be filled using repair mortar.
Weld mesh of 50mmx50mmx3mm shall be fixed on shear connector.
Apply 25 mm thick shotcrete mixed with silica fumes and suggested polypropylene fibers followed
by 10 mm thick gunite coat.
Alternative to shotcreting the u/s can be coated with 15 mm thick coat of high strength, non shrink
and impermeable cementitious mortar with seal coat of water repellent material.
Method-2:
Removing the loose material on the u/s face of the dam in order to open up the hidden cavities.
Cleaning the surface with sand blasting or suitable method.
The cavities and the masonry joints shall be packed with cement mortar.
After curing of pointing apply suitable epoxy based primer coat.
Finally a suitable polymer modified high strength non shrink repair mortar of 12 -15 mm thickness
shall be applied on entire u/s face.
A water repellent seal coat should be applied on the entire treated surface.
Method-3:
Existing surface should be sand blasted/roughened by chipping.
Apply cement slurry coat to u/s face.
Provide 25 mm dia, 1.0m long anchors at 1.5 m c/c both ways.
Provide surface reinforcement of 16 mm dia. bars 250mm c/c both ways.
M-20 grade concrete wall having thickness at top 250 mm and at bottom 1.15 m shall be provided.
The wall shall be keyed into hard rock.
Apply suitable bond coat.
6.2 Dam body grouting
After treatment to u/s face, the body of the dam shall be grouted as follows:
50 to 38 mm dia. grout holes with spacing of 6 m c/c and further needed at 3 m c/c and 1.5 m c/c.
Grouting in two rows at 1.5m and at 3 m from u/s face.
Stage grouting method shall be adopted.
Grout pressure shall be between 1.5 to 3.0 kg / cm2.
Grout mix of 1:20 to 1:1 proportion with suitable admixture.
6.3 Foundation curtain grouting
105
As there are leakages in the form of jets from foundation drain holes, foundation curtain grouting has
to be carried out as follows.
Curtain grouting from drainage gallery at 6.0m or lower spacing.
38 mm dia holes with 10o inclination.
Depth of hole shall be (2/3) h + 8m,where h is ht. of reservoir water in meters.
6.4 Cleaning of porous blocks
Porous blocks provided in the dam body are chocked due to leaching material. To release the water
pressure porous pipes has to be cleaned.
6.5 Central Design Organisation comments
Temghar dam leakage issue was also referred to Central Design Organisation, Nashik. CDO 's
comments on remedial measures suggested by CWPRS, Pune are as follows-
Upstream face Treatment:
Method 1:
Shotcreting and guniting shall be carried out as per the required IS.
Care shall be taken while applying grout pressure.
Proper sealing treatment at joints of shotcrete panels may be given.
However previous experience of this method shall be considered.
Method 2:
This method might be faster. However the previous experience of this method where it has
executed shall be considered.
Method 3:
For completed dam this method will be difficult for execution.
The joints of each lift shall be properly treated.
The anchor length in masonry shall be upto 60 D(i.e. 1.5 m)
CDO also suggested that while selecting method of remedial measures on upstream ,deflections of
dam body during filling and depletion shall be considered.
7.0 CENTRAL WATER COMMISSION TEAM INSPECTION
CWC team comprising of-Sh. L A V Nathan, Chief Engineer, Dam safety Dr. B R K Pillai, Director,
Dam Safety Rehabilitation Directorate ,Sh. S K Sibal, Director, Concrete and Masonry Dam
Design(NW&S) Sh. Manoj Kumar, Deputy Director, Dam Safety Rehabilitation Directorate inspected
rd
Temghar dam on 3 July 2014.
During their visit CWC officials suggested one more alternative of upstream face treatment of providing
geomembrane on upstream face.To consider this alternative CARPI India has been contacted to
provide technical and financial proposal for the same in July 2014, which is awaited.
CWC officials also expressed about usefulness of Geophysical studies in implementing leakage
remedial measures. Accordingly proposal of geophysical investigations has been obtained from
Parson Overseas Limited, New Delhi.
8.0 GEOPHYSICAL INVESTIGATIONS
8.1 There are many holes and cavities on the U/S face of the dam. During the site visit of officers
from Central Water Commission New Delhi, they had the opinion that the U/S surface of dam
should be treated first to stop the direct entry of water in the dam body. For that to know the
priority of treatment in various monoliths of dam, non destructive tests should be conducted on
the dam. It is desired to carry out an investigation program to understand the subsurface
106
conditions in the dam body in non-destructive speedy manner, before taking up remedial
measures. Such investigations will help target specific zones for effective treatment and will also
prioritize the remedial works.So it is under consideration to carry out such tests like
TOMOGRAPHY which will locate the exact location of seepage paths and cavities in dam body
before going to take any remedial measures.
8.2 Proposal for carrying out non-destructive geophysical investigations at Temghar dam
It is desired to carry out an investigations program to understand the subsurface conditions in the
dam body in non-destructive speedy manner, before taking up remedial measures. Such
investigations will help target specific zones for effective treatment and will also prioritize the
remedial works. Ideally the investigation should be carried out in following phases:
Phase-1
Immediate and before filling of reservoir: At this time the reservoir is almost empty, and internal weak
zones will show excellent contract in terms of conductive properties and shear wave parameters. This
is the best time to undertake electrical resistivity tomography all along the dam length, and 2D MASW/
ReMi study to determine shear wave velocity in dam structure, throughout the dam length. A study at
this time will also provide excellent information on leakage through the foundation.
Phase-2
The study under phase-2 should be taken up once reservoir is full and various zones are contributing
to leakages. This would be a good time to undertake electrical resistivity tomography along with SP
(streaming potential) all along the dam length, and 2D MASW/ ReMi study to determine shear wave
velocity in dam structure, throughout the dam length. The saturated zones will reflect themselves as
low resistivity zones (as compared to high resistivity zones expected in phase-1 study) and SP will
help quantify amount of leakage attributed by different zones.
Phase-3
Last phase of study should be undertaken after remedial measures have been undertaken. This study
will show effectiveness of remedial measures in terms if strengthening of various zones. The methods
at this stage would be electrical resistivity tomography along with SP (streaming potential) all along the
treated dam length, and 2D MASW/ ReMi study to determine shear wave velocity in dam structure
Geophysical investigations were carried out for reservoir full condition in December 2014. Electrical
Resistivity Imaging Line, U/S, 0-525 meters:The zone between 260-300 seem to be anomalous in
comparison with other blocks. Anomalous zone is observed between Ch 370-420 which well correlates
with the similar zone observed in line conducted in D/S side.
Electrical Resistivity Imaging Line, U/S, 600-1090 meters: The zone between 680-760 seem to be
anomalous in comparison with other blocks. Clear anomalous zone is observed between Ch 680-750
starting at almost top level and extending all the way down till investigated depth of around 50m, and
needs to be attended to.
Electrical Resistivity Imaging Line, D/S, 600-1090 meters: The zone between 620-720 seem to be
anomalous in comparison with other blocks and needs to be attended to.
Electrical Resistivity Imaging Line, Gallery, 400-700 meters: Highly saturated zone is observed
between Ch 440-460 and 480-540m which correspond well with the seepage observed in this zone.
Steaming Potential Data, U/S, 0-525 meters: The SP development from 320m to 410m shows water
flow point at these chainage. This also correlated well with ERI data which shows saturation at these
levels.
Steaming Potential Data, D/S, 0-525 meters: The negative SP development is observed from 265 to
370m, which also correlated with ERI observations.
Steaming Potential Data, Gallery, 400-700 meters: No interpretable SP data is observed in Gallery due
to excessive surface water flow conditions.
107
Steaming Potential Data, U/S, and D/S 600-1090 meters: Multiple minor SP anomalies are observed
between Ch 600 and 840, which might be developing due to multiple flow lines. No SP development is
observed beyond 850 meters.
Refraction Microtremor (ReMi)- 0-525 meters:High shear wave velocities (Red Colour) correlate well
with rock formation in the area. Very low shear wave velocities are observed between Ch 255 to Ch
335m, which indicates low strength of material in this zone.
Refraction Microtremor (ReMi)- 600-1090 meters: Low shear wave velocities are observed between
Ch 675 to Ch 755m, which indicates low strength of material in this zone and correlates well with
results obtained in ERI as well.
The geophysical study of dam ruled out possibilities of large pockets or cavities in dam body and
indicated priority area of treatment However it is not very clear in establishing other parameters like
strength and density of dam body required for evaluating stability of dam.
9.0 ACTION PLAN FOR REMEDIAL MEASURES
Considering severity of the problem and hazard potential of the dam, as it is located just on the
upstream of Khadakwasla dam adjoining City Pune ,it is planned to adopt immediate short term
measures before coming Monsoon to plug excessive leakages which may lead to potential danger of
piping. Long term measures are planned to provide complete solution for leakages as well as
strengthening of the dam if required considering actual in situ strength of the dam body masonry.
9.1 Short term immediate measures
Immediate remedial works to be carried out to control the damages on emergency. These measures
are to be executed by dam construction contractor at his cost as per tender conditions
9.1.1 U/S face treatment to colegrout septum:
Work of removal of loose slurry material from u/s face of the dam was done by deploying three
concrete breakers. The exposed surface gives an impression that possible paths of seepage is from
layer joints as well as monolith joints. After further removal of the dirt and loose mortar, upstream face
of dam to be treated with Poly Ironite Ceramic Cementitious (PICC) mortar as suggested earlier by
Cwprs, since it is cheaper than epoxy mortar and already adopted successfully in Anjumen dam (Goa).
The details of procedure to be adopted shall be as below-
The loose material on the u/s face of the dam is removed in order to open up the hidden cavities.
The surface is cleaned with wire brush, rotary grinding and by water jetting etc.
The cavities and the masonry joints to be packed with cement concrete if there are large cavities.
Application of Nitobod EP two pack system, bond coat on prepared concrete surface for bonding
the old surface to new surface.
Applying Poly Ironite Ceramic Cementitious (PICC) repair mortar Nicomix (100+53 grade cement)
upto 10 mm thickness and filling the honey combing area, cavities.
Applying sealer coat of Poly cementatious material (Niccoat PC+ Kelmer A 80) on PICC repair
mortar.
Then after curing for 8 days, for Nipple grouting holes 20-25 mm m drilled 1m deep in masonry
with spacing of 4-6 m c/c and fixing the nozzle with BECKBOND or M-seal.
Grouting with varying proportion of cement water from 1:20 to 1:1, the grout pressure should not
exceed 2 kg/cm2.
If consumption is more reduce the grouting spacing to 2 m c/c.
9.1.2 D/s face treatment:
It is observed that the masonry is disturbed on the d/s face of dam from ch 375 to 528 m at various
levels is observed at ch 415 to 420 mat Rl 667 to 670.There are large holes on the downstream face
due to excessive seepage and the cavities are increasing day by day. Pointing is also disturbed.
So the d/s face is decided to be treated as follows:
108
The loose material on the d/s face of the dam is to be removed in order to clear it from the weeds
and open up the hidden cavities.
The surface is cleaned with wire brush.
Pointing with CM 1:2 and with mortar in the portion where pointing is disturbed.
Nipple grouting from the downstream Surface by proving the nozzles in drilled holes in similar
manner at upstream face at 2-4 m c/c spacing and 1m deep in masonry.
9.1.3 Dam Body grouting:
The dam body grouting is to be done for both halves. However extent of grouting for right half is
considerably on less scale compared to left half. Dam body grouting is planned from dam top and from
inspection gallery in complete left half portion and in selected monoliths for right half portion.
Directional grouting is to be carried out targeting maximum penetration under low pressure with
reservoir empty condition. Complete body grouting of one half portion (Left half being taken first) to be
completed within one season.
Detailed specification for body grouting in terms of direction, spacing and length of holes, grout mix,
grout pressure and methodology of grouting to be followed as per relevant Indian Standards.
After treatment to u/s face, the body of the dam shall be grouted as follows-
50 to 38 mm dia. grout holes with spacing of 6 m c/c and if further needed at 3 m c/c and 1.5 m c/c.
Grouting in two rows at 1.5m and at 3 m from u/s face.
Stage grouting method shall be adopted.
Grout pressure shall be between 1.5 to 3.0 kg/ cm2.
Grout mix of 1:20 to 1:1 proportion with suitable admixture.
9.1.4 Reaming of Vertical Porous drains and foundation drainage holes
Reaming of all formed drains to be carried out from inspection as well as foundation gallery. This is to
be carried out only after the completion of body grouting as fresh drilling of formed drains where
formed drains are absent seems very difficult as it may further disturb the existing poor quality
masonry.
9.2 Implementation of short term measures
Short term measures were carried out on u/s and d/s of dam to certain extent before Mansoon 2014 .It
is observed that the earlier prominent leakages has been stopped or lessened at the location of
treatment.However water is finding way out above or below treated area.Only leakage spot are shifted
from one location to another. It clearly underlines that small portion or patch treatment will not give any
significant results as mentioned by Cwprs in their report. Hence complete u/s face treatment and dam
body grouting is necessary to provide solution in long run.
9.3 Mid Term measures
Curtain Grouting: Curtain grouting has been carried out from the foundation gallery from the bore holes
drilled at 6 m interval. However considerable leakages from foundation drainage holes are observed.
Hence Secondary curtain grouting to prevent leakage from foundation drainage holes is to be
undertaken from foundation gallery after making necessary arrangements to dewater the foundation
gallery.
9.4 Long Term Measures
Long term measures comprise of complete upstream face treatment to prevent leakages by adopting
suitable methods as discussed above along with dam body grouting from top of dam in order to
compensate amount of cement leached due to excessive leakage and impart density as well as
strength to the dam body.
109
Managing Our Water Conservation Assets-Role of Dam Safety

A B Pandya Dr. B R K Pillai
Chairman, Central Water Commission Director (DSR), Project Director (DRIP)
chairman-cwc@nic.in Central Water Commission
dir-drip-cwc@nic.in
Manoj Kumar
Deputy Director (DSR), Central Water Commission
manojkumar1-cwc@nic.in
ABSTRACT
Dams have played a key role in fostering rapid and sustained agricultural and rural growth and development,
which have been key priorities for the Government of India since independence. Over the last fifty years, India
has invested substantially in infrastructure necessary to store surface runoff in reservoirs formed by large as well
as small dams with associated appurtenances. In terms of large dams, India ranks third in the world after USA
and China (ICOLD, 2011). In India, there are 4846 large dams completed and another 347 dams that are under
construction; while full information on smaller dams numbering several thousand is yet to be catalogued.
More than 76 per cent of Indias 5100-odd dams are over 20 years old and suffer from structural, hydrological
and other deficiencies. They are in urgent need of repair and maintenance. The country has already gone
through at least 36 instances of dam collapse in the past with the recent collapse of Grarda Dam in Rajasthan in
2010. Such disasters can be averted only if dams are well looked after, water stocks are properly monitored and
regulated to keep them at safe levels, and the institutional set-ups to monitor the safety issues are suitably
strengthened and updated. Realizing the importance of dam safety, Govt. of India has taken a number of steps to
reinforce its concerns.
This paper examines the dam safety practices followed in India, institutional arrangement, Governments
initiatives for dam rehabilitation and improvement program, experiences learnt, Dam Safety Legislation and the
Challenges ahead.
1. INTRODUCTION
Dams have played a key role in fostering rapid and sustained agricultural and rural growth and
development, which have been key priorities for the Government of India since independence. Over
the last fifty years, India has invested substantially in infrastructure necessary to store surface runoff in
reservoirs formed by large as well as small dams with associated appurtenances. In terms of large
dams, India ranks third in the world after USA and China (ICOLD, 2011). In India, there are 4846 large
dams completed and another 347 dams that are under construction; while full information on smaller
dams numbering several thousand is yet to be catalogued. Although almost every state of India
has large dams, the major chunk is situated in Maharashtra (1845), Madhya Pradesh (905) and
Gujarat (666) (NRLD, 2014).
A substantial proportion of Indian dams have now become old. Many of these ageing dams have
various structural deficiencies and shortcomings in operation and monitoring facilities, while few of
them do not meet the present design standards both structurally and hydrologically. Thus, an
increasing number of dams fall in the category where they need rehabilitation. Safety of these dams is
very important for safeguarding the national investments and the benefits derived. An unsafe dam also
constitutes a hazard to human life and property in the downstream reaches. The safety of the dam and
allied structures therefore is very necessary for ensuring continued accrual of benefits and for ensuring
protection of the downstream areas from any potential hazards.
2. NEED FOR STORAGE DAMS IN INDIA
Agriculture is the main occupation of the people of rural India contributing nearly one-sixth of the gross
domestic product (GDP). However the irrigated agriculture in India suffers due to erratic rainfall pattern
both over time and space resulting in vagaries of monsoon. More than 80% of annual rainfall occurs
during four monsoon months. Even during the monsoon months distribution of rainfall over time &
space remains uneven and all the precipitation occurs over a couple of hundred hours. It has always
been an accepted proposition that the vulnerable dependence of Indian agriculture on the vagaries of
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the monsoons must be reduced through the storage of water for irrigation. On an average, annual
rainfall of 1170 mm is received over a total geographical area of 3.29 million Sq. km of India and is
transformed into surface runoff of 1869 km3. It is estimated that about 1122 km3 can be beneficially
utilised.
Therefore, for meeting round the year needs of irrigation, hydropower, drinking water and industries in
the country with such a vast population, creation of storages across rivers and streams is vital. It has
been estimated that it is feasible to ultimately create a total storage capacity of about 690 km3 in the
country. However, the projects constructed so far in the country have been able to build up a live
storage capacity of only 253 BCM. Thus, India has a long way to go in order to harness the utilisable
surface water and many more projects need to be constructed. Some of these new projects will come
up in the peninsular region but most of the developments, particularly in hydropower sector, are now
taking place in the Himalayas.
During the last six decades the number, height of dams and capacities of reservoirs behind them have
been increasing steadily as also the technical problems associated with them. The problems have
been compounded particularly because it is increasingly necessary now to locate the new dams at
less favourable sites after having exhausted most of the favourable ones.
Therefore, not only to sustain the growth achieved so far but also to meet the future demand, safety of
the existing dams and reservoirs as well as construction of new storage dams are very much essential.
3. AGEING OF DAMS AND NEED FOR PRIORITIZATION
Although dam failures have been so far infrequent, the factors of age, construction deficiencies,
inadequate maintenance, extreme weather, or seismic events can contribute to its likelihood. However,
extreme seismic events (exceeding the assumed seismic magnitudes for design of structures) and weather
events (leading to larger floods than the assumed ones) are difficult to predict, and hence may not be of
much help in assessing the odds of dam failure. On the other hand, age of dam is a leading indicator of
odds for its potential failure. In particular, the structural integrity and operational effectiveness of dams
may deteriorate with age; and in most case, older dams do not comply with the updated dam safety
standards.
Sometimes certain factors of failures unrelated with ageing process may also get linked with the age of
dam. We know that the reasons for dam failure can be several, and they may get ingrained at any point
of time over the prolonged life cycle of dam. Thus, cause of failure may get implanted at investigation
stage, design stage, construction stage or the post-construction (operational) stage of the dam. However,
the cause may fructify only after a prolonged period; and thus it may get attributed to the ageing of dam.
Even though portrayed as modern-temples of India by Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru, the dams in India
have been in existence since age old times. The 24 m high earthen dam of Thonnur Tank in Karnataka
is over 1000 years old, and it is still in use. Besides, there are 126 large-dams which are over 100
years old. Post independence, a substantial number of dams were added up in the early five-year plan
periods to meet the needs of irrigation, drinking water, hydro-power and supplies to municipalities and
industries. Over 76% of these dams are more than 20 years old a period sufficient to dim the initial
spotlight and political mileage attached with water resource projects. Evidently, most of these projects
are in dire needs of maintenance, for want of adequate budgetary support from the State
Governments.
The large number of Indias ageing dams since not maintained adequately present a grave threat to
the lives and economies of the downstream populations. With increasing number of dams becoming
older and older, the likelihood of dam failures in India is understandably on an ascending path. The
likelihood of dam failures has been further aggravated by the fact that many of the ageing dams lack
qualified (and experienced) supervisory and maintenance staff needed for guaranteeing the structural
safety and the operational integrity to prevent possible failures.
To reduce the risk of dam failures, regular health inspections are necessary to identify the deficiencies;
and, wherever severe deficiencies are observed, comprehensive rehabilitation measures are required
to be taken. However, owing to the large proportion of ageing dams in India, this exercise is skewed
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with the possibility of spreading the limited financial resources too thinly with no meaningful results,
and perhaps, with detrimental effects. To overcome this situation, there is an urgent need for
prioritization of ageing dams for rehabilitation purpose.
4. DAM FAILURES
Any public civil works facility such as dams, buildings or bridges present a degree of risk to loss of life
or damage to property should it fail. However, possible failure of a dam and sudden release of the
stored water poses a larger threat to human life and property, and is a matter of great concern to the
general public. The effect of huge bodies of water suddenly released from restraint causing havoc in
the downstream valley is widespread compared to the effects of other calamities. During the last
century, there has been substantial increase in construction of dam world over, and thereby the risk of
failure of a dam has become one of the inevitable burdens of civilization. By the end of 20th century,
there were over 45000 large dams in over 140 countries (Wrachien and Mambretti, 2009), and it is
evident that many of these structures have not performed as designed or planned. As per an ICOLD
publication Lessons from Dam Incidents (1973) there have been about 200 notable failures of
large dams in the world up to 1965 (see Table 1 below), in which more than 8000 people have died.
Table 1: Year-wise figures for failures of Large Dams worldwide
Year Approximate number of significant failures

Prior to 1900 38
1900 to 1909 15
1910 to 1919 25
1920 to 1929 33
1930 to 1939 15
1940 to 1949 11
1950 to 1959 30
1960 to 1965 25
Date unknown 10
Total 202
A more detailed statistical analysis of 179 dam failures by ICOLD (1995) indicates that the percentage
of failure of large dams has been falling over the last four decades about 2.2% of dams build before
1950 have failed while the failure rate of dams built since 1951 has been less than 0.5%. It was also
noted that most failure involved newly-built dams over 70% failures occurred chiefly in the first ten
years, and more especially in the first year after commissioning. Problems in foundation (internal
erosion and shear strength) have been found to be the most common cause accounting for 42%
failure in case of concrete dams. In case of earth and rock fill dams, the most common cause of
failure is overtopping (31% as primary cause), followed by internal erosion in body of the dam (15%)
and foundation problem (12%) respectively. Overtopping (43%) followed by internal erosion in
foundation (29%) have been the most common causes of masonry dam failures.
India too has had its share of dam failures. The first such failure was recorded in Madhya Pradesh
during 1917 when the Tigra Dam failed due to overtopping. As per dam failure records maintained in
Central Water Commission (CWC), in all there have been 36 reported failures since then, details of
which have been listed in the Appendix-I. Maximum number of dam failures has been reported over
two decades corresponding to the period 1951 to 1970, as illustrated in Figure 1. An analysis of this
data shows that most of the failures have been in respect of earth dams (30 failures) plus a few
composite dams (3failures). Only three failures have been reported for masonry dams in the last 90
years, while none of the concrete dam has failed. Since over 90% of reported failures are of earth or
composite dams, one may argue that the earth dams are more susceptible to failure in India. However,
such a deduction may not be proper because over 90% of Indias large dams are of earth or composite
type. If we look at State-wise records of dam failures (Figure 2), Rajasthan has the dubious distinction
of having maximum failures followed closely by Madhya Pradesh with both the states accounting for
almost 60 percent of the failures that have occurred so far. However, this information needs to be
112
grasped with the rea alisation tha

at there is no o established system off recording and
a reporting
g of dam
n India, and thus, not all the failures get recorded by CWC.
failure in
F
Figure1:Y
Yearwisenumbero
ofdamfailureinIndia
12
10
10
9
8
7
4
3 3 3
2
1
0
Upto1950 19511960
1 1
19611970 19711980 19811990 19912000 20012010
The mosst common causec of dam

m failures in India has be een breachin ng accountting for abouut 44% of
cases followed by y overtoppin
ng that acco ounted for a about 25% failures.
f Prooblems of fooundation
(including piping in foundation), piping throu ugh dam bo ody, and slope failure each accou unting for
about 9% % cases ha ave contributed equally to t the cause e of dam failu ure. Majority of Indian da
ams have
failed im
mmediately affter construcction or at the e time of firsst full-load (se
ee Table 2), which can beb clearly
attributed
d to factors of
o either inaddequate design or poor quality
q of con
nstruction. Knowing the causes
c of
failure an
nd analysing g the available statistics gives
g an imp portant indica ator of how to
t structure the
t future
dam saffety program mme of the country.
c Invvestigations of such failures have also a confirme
ed that a
majority of failures co
ould have beeen avoided by proper de esign, constrruction and regulation. It therefore
113
becomes a national responsibility to see that manmade reasons for the possibility of dam failures are
minimized, and their consequence on the unsuspecting people is avoided.
Table 2: Age of Indian dams at the time of failures
Age of Dam at failure Number of failure % Failure

0 - 5 years 16 44.44%
5 - 10 years 7 19.44%
10 - 15 years 1 2.77%
15 - 20 years 1 2.77%
50 - 100 years 6 16.67%
> 100 years 2 5.56%
Age not defined 3 8.33%
Total 36
5 DEVELOPMENT OF DAM SAFETY ACTIVITIES IN INDIA
It has now been recognised world over that dam safety aspects, particularly of the existing dams, are
not receiving adequate attention. It is so because a large number of existing dams are ageing, and
these dams were constructed using the standards and criteria prevalent at an earlier time and may
either not be safe under todays technology and know-how or may not be acceptable to the present
society which demands absolute safety in terms of life and property. Worldwide, dam safety is
considered an inherent function in the planning, design, construction, maintenance and operation of
dams. It has been also generally recognised within the international dam safety community that a
successful dam safety assurance programme requires a dedicated institutional structure with access
to top management attention. Without the top managements commitment in providing the necessary
resources, the programme will be lost amidst other demands and more dams may become a risk to
the public and society. With the ever-increasing number of dams, Government of India realised the
importance of dam safety and took a number of steps to reinforce its concern.
In India, by and large, dams are owned, constructed and maintained by the State Governments. The
State Governments operate their dams primarily through their Irrigation Department. Other State
Organisations like State Electricity Boards, State Power Corporations, and Municipal Corporations also
own and operate some dams. There are also few Central PSU organizations like Bhakra Beas
Management Board (BBMB), Damodar Valley Corporation (DVC), National Hydroelectric Power
Corporation (NHPC) Ltd., Satluj Jal Vidyut Nigam (SJVNL) Ltd, Tehri Hydro Development Corporation
(THDC) Ltd., NTPC Ltd. etc., who also own dams and operate them. Presently there are very few
dams under private ownership, though their numbers are gradually on the rise with the increasing
private-sector participation in Indias hydropower development.
The safety of the dams in India is the principal concern of the State agencies and other organisations
that own the dams and are involved in various aspects of their investigations, planning, design,
construction operation and maintenance. However the overall responsibility of Dam Safety is that of
the State in which these dams are located. As the practices of dam safety can vary from State to State
and from organization to organization, the centre has been working towards evolving unified practices
of dam safety and has recommended its implementation by all States and dam owning organisations.
5.1 Formation of Dam Safety Organizations
State Ministers of Irrigation in their First Conference held in July 1975 at New Delhi discussed the
question of dam safety and recommended that, in view of the increasing number of large dams in
India, the Government of India may constitute an advisory Dam Safety Service to be operated by the
Central Water Commission (CWC, 1986). Pursuant to the directives of the State Ministers Conference
and realizing the importance of dam safety, a Dam Safety Organization (DSO) was established in
CWC, in May 1979. The Dam Safety Organization in CWC has made great efforts in creating
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awareness in the country and has succeeded to a large extent in convincing the States towards the
concept of dam safety which has now been accepted by a large number of States.
The DSO of CWC has compiled guidelines for the safety inspection of dams; check lists and formats
for data book for the periodical inspection of dams; guidelines for emergency action plan; and a
number of other dam safety literatures. This organization has also been assisting the State
Governments in locating the causes of distress in dams, and to suggest remedial measures for the
same. However, such assistance is rendered only on specific request from State Governments.
Apparently, it is not practical for such a dam safety service at the Centre to cater to the needs of all the
dams in the country. Also, it is important to note that in the present legal framework, DSO of CWC has
substantial authority to issue guidelines and review standards relating to dam safety, but have virtually
no powers for actual enforcement.
Due to a few dam disasters like Machhu II dam (in Gujarat), the attention of the country was drawn on
the systematic management of the dams for safe operations. Consequently, a large number of states
established their own Dam Safety Organisations and have taken up measures for ensuring dam safety
in their respective jurisdictions exercising responsibilities for maintaining an inventory of dams,
compiling a history to reveal areas requiring special attention and monitoring administrative and
technical procedures regarding dam safety. So far, 19 States namely, Andhra Pradesh, Bihar,
Chhattisgarh, Gujarat, Jharkhand, Karnataka, Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh,
Meghalaya, Odisha, Punjab, Himachal Pradesh, Rajasthan, Telangana, Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand
and West Bengal having significant number of dams, have created State level DSOs. Besides, four of
the dam owing organizations namely, NHPC, BBMB, DVC and Kerala State Electricity Board have
also created their own DSOs.
Despite such large number of DSOs in the country, the state-of-affairs of dam safety in the country is not
up to the mark. To begin with, the staffing pattern, capabilities and activities, differs widely in these
States (and in dam owning organizations) due to various limitations. There is no uniformity in the
administrative set-up or functions of these DSOs. Even the size of dams that come under the purview of
DSOs differs from state to state, owing to non-standardization of dam classification. The worst scenario is
with regard to the instrumentation of dam, owing to large communication gap between agencies (and
personnel) involved with design, construction, operation & maintenance, and inspection. Although some
states have gone in a systematic way to evolve appropriate machinery to safe guard their dams, but in
most cases, the DSOs have skeletal staff and somewhat undefined roles. In majority cases, the role of
DSO is restricted to advisory capacity, with little scope for proactive intervention in dam safety and
rehabilitation measures.
5.2 Dam Safety Procedures
Erstwhile Ministry of Irrigation, Government of India constituted a Standing Committee in 1982 to

review the existing practices and to evolve unified procedures on dam safety for all dams in India,
under the Chairmanship of Chairman, CWC. The Committees report titled Report on Dam Safety
Procedure, brought out in July 1986, outlines the existing procedures, their evaluation and
suggestions for administrative set-ups for dam safety cells in the States, their functions and also the
role of dam safety organization in the Centre. The Report also gives guidelines for hydrological and
structural reviews and also for inspection and maintenance of dams (CWC, 1986). Action points
recommended by the Standing Committee, and as ratified by the Ministry of Water Resources,
Government of India constitutes the unified dam safety procedures to be followed for all dams in
India.
5.3 National Committee on Dam Safety
Ministry of Water Resources, Government of India, in 1987 constituted the National Committee on
Dam Safety (NCDS) under the Chairmanship of Chairman, CWC by broad-basing the then existing
Standing Committee to include all the States, having significant number of dams. This Committee has
been reconstituted from time to time to include additional States, organizations and dam owning
agencies. This Committee is represented by the States of Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat, Kerala,
Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh and West
Bengal. The Organizations, namely, Geological Survey of India (GSI), India Meteorological
Department (IMD), BBMB, NHPC, and DVC are also represented in this Committee. The Committee
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oversees dam safety activities in various States and organizations and suggests improvement to bring
dam safety practices in line with latest state-of-the-art technology consistent with Indian conditions. It
acts as forum for exchange of views on techniques adopted for remedial measures to relieve distress,
and also monitors follow-up actions. The National Committee has also set up three sub-committees to
monitor the safety aspects of select inter-state dams.
Thirty three meetings of NCDS have so far taken place, and major issues discussed therein include:
(i) review of national scenario concerning safety of dams; (ii) implementation of recommendations of
Report on Dam Safety Procedures; (iii) strengthening of dam safety cells in the States; (iv) setting up
of hydrological units in the States for review of hydrology of all large dams in the States; (v)
preparation of operation and maintenance manuals; (vi) preparation of completion report of all the
large dams; (vii) compilation of data books for dams of National Importance; (viii) activities of sub-
committees to monitor safety aspects of inter-State dams; (ix) safety review of dams by an
independent panel of experts, once in ten years; (x) instrumentation of dams; (xi) setting up of
Management Information System (MIS) for dam safety.
5.4 National Committee on Seismic Design Parameters
Considering the importance of seismicity in the design of hydraulic structures as well as during their
operation and maintenance stage, the Government of India constituted a National Committee on
Seismic Design Parameters (NCSDP) in October 1991 with Member (Design and Research), CWC, as
its Chairman by broad-basing a previously constituted Standing Committee. The Committee is
represented by experts from IMD, Engineering Geology Division of GSI, Department of Earthquake
Engineering (IIT, Roorkee), National Geophysical Research Institute (NGRI), Indian Institute of
Remote Sensing (IIRS) and Survey of India. The Committee considers various river valley projects put
up by the State Governments and other Organizations and gives suitable recommendations for design
seismic coefficients, seismic risk mapping, attenuation relationships, Maximum Credible Earthquake
(MCE), Design Base Earthquake (DBE), probability of Reservoir Induced Seismicity (RIS), besides
seismic network and specifications for seismic instruments etc. The seismic coefficients recommended
by the NCSDP are to be used in the design of various components of the river valley project. So far,
twenty seven meetings of NCSDP have been held.
6 DAM SAFETY INITIATIVES
6.1 Dam Safety Assurance and Rehabilitation Project
Dam Safety Assurance & Rehabilitation Project (DSARP) assisted by the World Bank was
implemented in four States of the Indian Union, namely Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Rajasthan and Tamil
Nadu, under overall guidance of CWC during the period 1991 to 1999.The Project was completed in
September 1999 at a cost of Rupees 422.95 Crore. The objectives of the project were to: (i) improve
the safety of selected dams in the project states through remedial works; (ii) install basic dam safety-
related facilities; and (iii) strengthen the institutions of the DSO, CWC and project states responsible
for assuring dam safety.
Institutional set-up at the Centre in CWC as well as in the four participating States was strengthened
through training of officers, purchase & installation of modern equipments etc. Formulation and use
of a number of guidelines on dam safety, and preparation of Probable Maximum Precipitation (PMP)
Atlases by CWC with assistance from the implementing agencies and dam owners, have been the
most significant and unique achievements of the project. With the use of PMP Atlases, the uniformity
in methodology/ approach for the estimates of appropriate precipitation values in the various regions
was achieved. Basic dam safety facilities like providing access roads, backup power, instrumentation,
installation of communication system, stockpiling of emergency material, etc., was provided at 182
dam locations in the 4 States.
In 33 dams (out of 55 dams that were proposed at the start of the project) remedial measures were
completed under this project and they have come up to the desired safety level, reducing the risk and
adverse environmental impact on the property and people living downstream. Thus, probable loss of
reservoir capacities was restored to provide for assured irrigation/ water supply/ power generation
which in turn have contributed to the economic development of the respective regions in the country.
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Remaining rehabilitation works of the balance 22 dams were also completed subsequently by the four
State Governments through their own funds.
The project has helped in streamlining data collection at the dam level through standardizing pre- and
post-monsoon reports. The capacity of the CWC (the main implementing agency) and the State DSOs
was enhanced through training and involvement in project activities. The project increased the
awareness of dam safety issues, and improved capacity of implementing agencies to diagnose and
prioritize problems. More importantly, implementation of the DSARP provided an impetus for further
work in the area by creating awareness about dam safety concepts and benefits of their adoption. The
key lessons from the project (World Bank, 2009) are summarized as under:
Institution-building can be a long process when it involves organizations at multiple levels,
establishing new work methods, and upgrading technical expert.
Institutions that carry out regulatory functions require technical expertise and adequate resources
to be able to function in a capable and independent manner. In this project, shortage of
experienced/ qualified staff and inadequate operating budgets contributed to the under-
performance of the state dam safety organizations.
When new monitoring and reporting procedures are instituted, their purpose should be made clear
to all those involved, and appropriate and regular feedback should be given to those originating
the data.
New techniques and equipment should be tailored to the existing level of capacity, facilities and
funds for ongoing maintenance. A significant portion of the relatively sophisticated instrumentation
installed at dams under this project has deteriorated for lack of maintenance or use.
6.2 Central Dam Safety Legislation
In many advanced countries, particularly America, UK, Australia, Canada, Switzerland, etc., dam
safety legislations have been enacted for the purpose of regulating and ensuring the dam safety. In
several other countries, it is still in the proposed stage. Owing to Indias sizeable number of dams of
which substantial proportions are ageing legislation on the dam safety has been desired by various
forums to ensure the safety of the dams in the country. The need of legislation was first underlined by
the Standing Committee constituted in 1982 to review the then existing practices and to evolve unified
procedures on dam safety in India (CWC, 1986). The need has also been repeatedly emphasised by
the National Committee on Dam Safety. The first draft of the Dam Safety Act was prepared by CWC in
1987, and was discussed many times by NCDS. Comments on the same were also received from
twelve states (i.e. Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra,
Orissa, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal) which were incorporated in the Draft
Bill (2002) circulated to all states. Initial efforts for dam safety legislation were directed towards
enactments of appropriate legislation by respective State Governments, and accordingly State of Bihar
enacted the Dam Safety Act, 2006. However, some of the States favored the idea of a uniform Central
Dam Safety Act. The States of Andhra Pradesh and West Bengal have adopted resolutions in their
respective Assemblies for enactment of dam safety legislation for regulation in their States by an Act of
Parliament. In pursuance of the above, the Union Government decided to enact the central dam safety
legislation.
Accordingly, Ministry of Water Resources formulated a (Draft) Dam Safety Bill 2010, which was
introduced in the Parliament on 30th August 2010. The Bill was referred to the Parliamentary Standing
Committee on Water Resources for the examination of the Bill, which had submitted its
recommendations in June 2011. The observation and recommendations of the Parliamentary Standing
Committee on Water Resources were examined by Ministry of Water Resources for necessary
compliance. Dam Safety Bill (2010), has now come to lapse. Hence the Bill needed to be prepared
afresh. Moreover, the (draft) Dam Safety Bill (2010) had the limitation of its initial applicability to the
two States of Andhra Pradesh and West Bengal, and the Union Territories only; and it might have
taken many more years to convince the other States to adopt that Bill. Hence a new draft of the Dam
Safety Bill (2014) seeking national level applicability of the Bill was prepared afresh by the CWC
and sent to the Ministry of Water Resources for its consideration.
The proposed legislation on dam safety is intended to provide for proper surveillance, inspection,
operation and maintenance of all large dams to ensure their safe functioning, and thereby protect
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persons and property against risks associated with dam failures. The legislation seeks to enjoin
responsibility on Central Government, State Governments and owners of specified dams to set up an
institutional mechanism for ensuring safety of such dams and reporting the action taken. It defines the
duties and functions of these institutions in relation to perpetual surveillance, routine inspections,
operation and maintenance, maintenance of log books, instructions, funds for maintenance and
repairs, technical documentation, reporting, qualifications and trainings of concerned manpower etc.
Provisions have been made concerning the necessities of periodical inspections, instrumentations and
establishment of hydrological and seismological stations. The Bill addresses the issues of emergency
action plan and disaster management, and also enlists the requirements of comprehensive dam safety
evaluation.
6.3 Dam Rehabilitation and Improvement Project
The DSARP Project, assisted by the World Bank, was a unique project and first of its kind anywhere in
the world. After seeing the performance and benefits accrued from the project, an imperative need has
been felt that another project covering some more States having significant number of large dams
be implemented through the World Bank assistance on similar terms and conditions.
As part of continuous strengthening of the dam safety activities in India, Dam Rehabilitation and
Improvement Project (DRIP) has been taken up with World Bank assistance. About 223 large dams in
four states i.e. Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Kerala and Tamil Nadu would be rehabilitated under this
project. List of originally targeted DRIP dams with photographs of some of the important dams
identified for rehabilitation under DRIP are given at Appendix-II and Appendix-III respectively. Some
more States/Organisation have also been identified to join DRIP at a later stage, for which a provision
of unallocated resources had been provided in the project estimate. The list of DRIP dams can also
change with addition/deletion of some dams in course of project implementation-latest position can be
seen in DRIP website: http://damsafety.in/ . DRIP is a six-year project. Apart from structural and non-
structural measures for rehabilitation and improvement of identified dams, the scope of project
includes the development of appropriate institutional mechanisms for the safe operation and
maintenance of all large dams in participating states. In addition, strengthening of the institutional
setup for national level dam safety surveillance and guidance would be taken up in Central Water
Commission (CWC) under Ministry of Water Resources (MoWR).
The project implementation agencies for DRIP are the Water Resources Departments (WRD) of the
four participating States and State Electricity Boards of Tamil Nadu and Kerala. The overall
implementation of the project is being coordinated by Central Water Commission with assistance of a
management and engineering consulting firm.
The total project cost is estimated at Rs 2100 Crore, out of which 80% cost will be financed by World
Bank while balance 20% will be financed by respective state government and Ministry of Water
Resources. The break-up of the overall DRIP expenditure is as under
State No of large No of DRIP Total Project Cost

dams in state dams (Rs. Crore)
Kerala 54 31 280
Madhya Pradesh 906 50 314.5
Orissa 163 38 147.76
Tamil Nadu 108 104 745.46
CWC 132
Unallocated* 480
Total 2100
(* for inclusion of some more dams in existing states and for inclusion of new states in DRIP)
The project has become effective from 18th April, 2012 and will be implemented over a period of six-
years. Implementation activity is gearing up, and the achievements till date are highlighted as below:
Central Water Commission has hired the services of an Engineering and Management
Consultant. The contract has been signed with M/s EGIS EAU, France and expert consultants
have been mobilized.
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So far, design flood reviews of 189 DRIP dams have been completed.
Dam Safety Review Panels have inspected 182 DRIP dams.
Project Screening Template in respect of 84 DRIP dams have been approved by the World
Bank.
Works have been awarded for 30 tenders, while 14 more tenders have been invited and
expected to be awarded shortly.
Thirty two trainings have been conducted by the CPMU, wherein about 1000 officials have
been trained on different aspects of DRIP implementation.
World Bank has given their approval for Karnatakas joining the DRIP project as new State for
rehabilitation of their 27 dams.
So far ten meetings of Technical Committee for DRIP have been held for guiding and
expediting the pace of project implementation.
World Bank has also completed five of its Review Missions, wherein road blocks as well as
way forward in project implementation have been discussed. The Mid-term review mission of
the World Bank was held from 7th to 17th October, 2014.
7.0 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
For the disaster risk reduction, United Nations has identified 5 priority actions (known as Hyogo
Framework for Action), and these are: (i) Ensure that disaster risk reduction is a national and a local
priority with a strong institutional basis for implementation; (ii) Identify, assess and monitor disaster
risks and enhance early warning; (iii) Sharing of Knowledge, innovation and education to build a
culture of safety and resilience at all levels; (iv) Reduce the underlying risk factors; and (v) Strengthen
disaster preparedness for effective response at all levels, so that consolidated efforts gets projected
coherently in a synchronized manner at the global platforms (UN, 2005). Understandably, the above
actions are also applicable in case of dam safety activities in India; and, these are being embedded in
Government of Indias recent initiatives for dam safety initiatives.
For countries like India with large stocks of dams, the issue of dam safety is critical. There is an urgent
need for proper organisational arrangement at the national and state levels for ensuring the safety of
such dams. The proposed dam safety bill is expected to ensure proper inspection, maintenance and
surveillance of existing dams and also to ensure proper planning, investigation, design and
construction for safety of new dams. However, there is a need for expediting its approval by the
Parliament; and, also the need for its earliest adoption by different States by passing of resolutions in
this regard by respective Assemblies.
The fundamental dam safety objective is to protect people, property and the environment from harmful
effects of miss-operation or failure of dams and reservoirs (ICOLD, 2010). India has significant
numbers of large dams, many of which are old and some are distressed; and the safe operation of
such dams has social, economic, and environmental relevance. In such a scenario, the importance of
stakeholder involvement in dam safety projects hardly needs any overemphasis. The projects
relationship with its stakeholders is a two-way process: it enables the project to fathom the concerns
and reactions of stakeholders and also allows the stakeholders to comprehend project actions
correctly thus eliminating chances of misinformation (Maheshwari and Pillai, 2004). The earlier
completed Dam Safety Assurance and Rehabilitation project (DSARP) was a novel step in right
direction, which also gave realization of the limitations of our institutional capacities. The now
proposed Dam Rehabilitation and Improvement Project (DRIP) is expected to give new and
stakeholder-inclusive impetus to the dam safety activities of India by helping in the capacity building of
the Dam Safety Organisation of CWC and that of participating states, for fulfilment of important roles
envisaged as per dam safety legislation under formulation.
REFERENCES
1. CWC (Central Water Commission) (1986). Report on Dam Safety Procedures. New Delhi
2. CWC (Central Water Commission) (2009). National Register of Large Dams. New Delhi.
119
3. ICOLD (International Committee on Large Dams) (1973). Lessons from Dam Incidents, Paris.
4. ICOLD (International Committee on Large Dams) (1995). Dam failure statistical analysis, Bulletin 99, Paris.
5. ICOLD (International Committee on Large Dams) (2010). Dam Safety Management: Operational Phase of
the Dam Life Cycle, Paris.
6. ICOLD (International Committee on Large Dams) (2011). Number of Dams by Country Members,
downloaded from http://www.icold-cigb.net/GB/World_register/general_synthesis.asp.
7. Lok Sabha (2010). Draft Dam Safety Bill, 2010, downloaded from http://164.100.47.4/
newlsbios_search/Bill_texts_pre.aspx.
8. Maheshwari, G C and Pillai, B Ravi Kumar (2004). The Stakeholder Model for Water Resource Projects,
Vikalpa, Vol.29, No.1. January March 2004, Ahemedabad: Indian Institute of Management.
9. United Nations (2005), Hyogo Framework for Action (2005-2015), downloaded from http://www.
Unisdr.org/we/coordinate/hfa.
10. Wrachien, D.de and Mambretti, S (2009). Dam-break Problems, Solutions and Case Studies, WIT Press:
Boston.
11. World Bank (2009), Project Performance Assessment Report on Dam Safety Assurance and Rehabilitation
Programme (DSARP). Report No. 48651.
12. World Bank (2010). Project Appraisal Document on Dam Rehabilitation and Improvement Project (DRIP).
Report No. 51061-IN.
120
Appendix-I
Reported failure of dams in India (Year wise)
SL. State Name of Type Maximum Year of Year of Cause of failure

No Project Height Completion Failure
(M)
Up to 1950
1 Madhya Tigra Masonry 24.03 1914-17 1917 # Overtopping followed
Pradesh by slice.
2 Maharashtra Ashti Earth 17.7 1883 1933 Slope failure.
3 Madhya Pagara Composite 27.03 1911-27 1943 # Overtopping followed
Pradesh by breach.
1951-1960
4 Madhya Palakmati Earth 14.6 1942 1953
# Sliding failure.
Pradesh
5 Rajasthan Dakhya Earth N.A 1953 1953 Breaching.
6 Uttar Pradesh Ahrura Earth 22.8 1953 1953 # Breaching.
7 Rajasthan Girinanda Earth 12.20 1954 1955 # Overtopping followed
by breaching.
8 Rajasthan Anwar Earth 12.5 1956 1957 Breaching.
9 Rajasthan Gudah Earth 28.3 1956 1957 # Breached due to bad
workmanship.
10 Rajasthan Sukri Earth N.A N.A 1958 # Breached by leakage
through foundation.
11 Madhya Nawagaon Earth 16 1958 1959 # Overtopping leading to
Pradesh breach.
12 Rajasthan Dervakheda Earth N.A N.A 1959 Breaching.
13 Gujarat Kaila Earth 23.08 1955 1959 Embankment collapsed
due to weak foundation.
1961-1970
14 Maharashtra Panshet Earth 53.8 1961 1961 # Piping failure leading
to breach.
15 Maharashtra Khadakwasla Masonry 60 1875 1961 # Overtopping.
16 Rajasthan Galwania Earth N.A 1960 1961 Breaching.
17 Rajasthan Nawagaza Earth N.A 1955 1961 Breaching.
18 Madhya Sampna Earth 21.3 1956 1964 # Slope failure on
Pradesh account of inappropriate
materials.
19 Madhya Kedarnala Earth 20 1964 1964
# Breaching.
Pradesh
20 UttaraKhand Nanaksagar Earth 16 1962 1967 # Breached due to
foundation piping.
1971-1980
21 Gujarat Dantiwada Earth 60.96 1965 1973 Breach on account of
floods.
22 Tamil Nadu Kodaganar Earth 12.75 1977 1977 Breached on account of
floods.
23 Gujarat Machhu-II Composite 20.00 1972 1979 Overtopping due to
floods.
1981-1990
24 Gujarat Mitti Earth 16.02 1982 1988 Overtopping leading to
breach.
1991 2000
25 Madhya Chandora Earth 27.3 1986 1991
# Breach.
Pradesh
121
SL. State Name of Type Maximum Year of Year of Cause of failure

No Project Height Completion Failure
(M)
26 Andhra Pradesh Kadam Composite 22.5 1958 1995 *Over topping leading to
breach.
27 Rajasthan Bhimlot Masonry 17 1958 - # Breached due to
inadequate spillway
capacity.
2001-2010
28 Gujarat Pratappur Earth 10.67 1891 2001 Breached on account of
floods.
29 Madhya Jamunia Earth 15.40 1921 2002 # Piping leading to
Pradesh breaching.
30 Orissa Gurilijoremip Earth 12.19 1954-55 2004 The abutment structure
along with wing and
return walls got
undermined with
foundation scouring.
31 Rajasthan Jaswant Sagar Earth 43.38 1889 2007 # Piping leading to
breaching.
32 Rajasthan Gararda Earth 31.76 2010 2010 Examination for cause of
failure by state authorities
in progress.
33 Andhra Pradesh Palemvagu Earth 13.0 U/C 2008 Flash flood resulting in
dam overtopping of the earth
dam.
34 Maharashtra Nandgavan Earth 22.51 1998 2005 Excessive rain causing
water flow over the waste
weir to a depth beyond
the design flood lift.
35 Madhya Chandiya Earth 22.50 1926 2008 Breach.
Pradesh
36 Madhya Piplai Earth 16.73 1998 2005 Breach
Pradesh
122
Appendix-II
LIST OF DAMS UNDER DAM REHABILITATION AND IMPROVEMENT PROJECT
TAMIL NADU 51. Perumpallam 98. Bungihalla Earthen Bund

1. Krishnagiri` 52. Amaravathy 99. Vandal
2. Thambalahalli 53. Uppar ( Erode) 100. Vennirar
3. Pambar 54. Palar Porandalar 101. West Varahapallam
4. Vaniar 55. Vattamalalai Karai Odai Western Catchment weir-
5. Shoolagirichinnar 102.
56. Parappalar I
6. Kelavarapalli 57. Kuthiraiyar Western Catchment weir-
103.
7. Chinnar 58. Noyyal Athupalayam II
8. Kesarigulihalla Western Catchment weir-
59. Kodaganar 104.
9. Nagavathi III
60. Upper Nirar Weir
10. Thoppiar KERALA
61. Lower Nirar Weir
11. Sathanur 105. Idukki
62. Parambikulam
12. Vidur 106. sengulam
13. Rajathopekanar 63. Thunakadavu
107. poringalkuthu
14. Mordhana 64. Sholayar
108. sholayar
15. Manimukthanadhi 65. Aliyar
109. SABARIGIRI HEP
16. Gomukinadhi 66. Thirumurthy
110. Idamalayar
17. Veeranam 67. Avalanche
111. Pallivasal
18. Vaigai 68. Chinnakuttiyar
112. Panniaar
19. Manjalar 69. East Varahapallam
113. Neriamangalam
20. Marudhanadhi 70. Emerald
114. Kuttiyadi
21. Sothuparai 71. Eravangalar
115. Lower Periyar
22. Pilavukkal Periyar 72. Glenmorgan( Kariappa)
116. Kakkad
23. Pilavukkal Kovilar 73. Highwavys
117. Siruvani Dam
24. Vembakottai 74. Kadamparai
Kanhirapuzha Irrigation
25. Kullursandai 75. Kodayar -I 118.
Project
26. Anaikuttam 76. Kodayar -II 119. Chimni Project
27. Golwarpatti 77. Kundahapalam 120. Kuttiyadi Irrigation Project
28. Manimuthar 78. Kuttiyar Malapumzha Irrigation
29. Gatana 79. Manalar 121.
Project
30. Ramanadhi
80. Maravakandy Muvattupuzha Irrigation
31. Karuppanadi 122.
81. Moyar Forebay Project
32. Gundar Pothundy Irrigation
82. Mukurthy 123.
33. Adavinainarkoil Project
83. Nirallapallam
34. Vadakkupachayar 124. Neyyar Irrigation Project
Papanasam Diversion
35. Kodumudiyar 84. Vazhani Irrigation Project
weir 125.
36. Nambiar
85. Parson's Valley
37. Pechiparai 126. Peechi Irrigation Project
86. Pegumbahalla Forebay
38. Perunchani Periyar Valley Irrigation
39. Chittar - I 87. Periyar Forebay 127.
Project
40. Chittar - II 88. Pillur
128. Pamba Irrigation Project
41. Poigaiyar 89. Porthimund
Gayathry Project Stage II
42. Anaimadavu 90. Pykara 129.
Chulliyar
43. Kariakoil 91. Pykara New Forebay Gayathry Project Stage I -
92. Sandynallah 130.
44. Mettur Meenkara
45. Ponnaniar 93. Servalar 131. Walayar Irrigation Project
46. Siddhamalli 94. Thambraparani 132. Mangalam Dam
47. Uppar 95. Upper Aliyar Pazhassi Irrigation
133.
48. Bhavanisagar 96. Upper Bhavani Project
49. Gunderipallam Upper Bhavani Pumping 134. Kallada Irrigation Project
97.
50. Varattupallam Weir 135. Moolathara
123
Regulator(Chitturpuzha 165. Kharadi 195. Dhanei

Irrign.Project) 166. Sarathi 196. Kalo
MADHYA PRADESH 167. Moorum nalla 197. Nesa
136. Sanjay Sagar 168. Chawarpani 198. Pilasalki
137. Gopi Krishna sagar 169. Gangulpara 199. Pitamahal
138. Makroda 170. Dhutiweir 200. Salia
139. Kunwar Chain Sagar 171. Nahlesara 201. Sarafgarh
140. Bisoniya Tank 172. Badera 202. Satiguda (UKP)
141. Nallaziri Tank 173. Bamhodi 203. Satiguda (Malkangiri)
142. Lasudiya Kanger 174. Harrai 204. Talsara
143. Kankarkheda 175. Mandwajhiri 205. Ardei
144. Bhagwanpura 176. Dongarbodi 206. Ashokanalla
145. Dhablamata Tank 177. Karhi 207. Bagjharan Dam
146. Manjhi Khedi 178. Surkhi Pondi 208. Balaskumpa
147. Guradia Surdas 179. Sher 209. Banksal
148. Laxmi Kheda 180. Birnai 210. Deojharan
149. Chandrakeshar 181. Marhi 211. Jagadala
150. Jirbhar 182. Umrar 212. Jhumuka
151. Sundrel 183. Chandpatha 213. Kalakala
152. Sampna 184. Kamera 214. Kanheinalla
153. Bundala Birpur 215. Khasbahal
154. Tawa 185.
216. Laigam
155. Kolar ORISSA 217. Liard
156. Barna 186. Balimela 218. Mathanpal
157. Deogaon 187. Hirakud 219. Padampurnallah
158. Sanjay Sarovar 188. Rengali 220. Pipalnallah
159. Thanwar project 189. Salandi 221. Ramaguda
160. Mehgaon tank 190. Upper Kolab 222. Runugaon
161. Barnoo 191. Budhabudhiani 223. Sanamachhakandana
162. Mandai 192. Dadaraghati
163. Sagarnadi 193. Daha
164. Ari 194. Derjang
124
Appendix-III
Photogra
aphs of few select
s dams
s covered un
nder DRIP
Hirakud Da
am of Odisha
a Mettur Dam of Tamil Nadu
Idukkki Dam of Kerrala dra Dam of Karnataka

Tungabhad K
m of Madhya Pradesh
Tigra Dam Maithon Dam of
o Jharkhand
125
Organisational Set up and monitoring Systems for Sustainable

Dam Safety in Maharashtra State
Er. K.S.Vemulkonda Er. Ramesh Nikum
Superintending Engineer Chief Engineer
Dam Safety Organisation, Maharashtra Design, Training, Research & Safety, Maharashtra
se.damsafety@gmail.com
ABSTRACT
Maharashtra State has the distinction of constructing highest number of large dams in the Country. About 35 %
of total populations of large dams are situated in Maharashtra. As on February 2015, the total number of large
dams in Maharashtra is 2132. About 60% of the dams in Maharashtra are older than 25 years. Considering the
history of Dam building in Maharashtra and the number of large dams; it becomes highly imperative to have in
place an elaborate mechanism for Inspection and Monitoring Dam Safety. Maharashtra has been the Pioneer
State to implement comprehensive and sustainable Dam safety assurance program. It is utmost necessary to
inspect, evaluate & determine the safety of dams & allied structures. A systematic approach & working
methodology is very essential to monitor the safety aspects of the dams. Maharashtra state has established an
elaborate set up for effective monitoring by establishing Dam Safety Organisation (DSO) way back in 1980.This
paper discusses the organisational set up, its functions, Mandatory and Test Inspections, Annual Consolidated
Health Status Reports, inspection of mechanical components of dam and review of Health Status Reports. Skill
development training and other best practices being followed by Dam Safety Organisation, Maharashtra. The
elaborate mechanism of Inspection and Monitoring Dam Safety of all the Dams twice a year has helped Water
Resources Department in identifying and rectifying problems timely by effective prioritization of funds, averting
failure and disasters and thereby instilling public confidence in the continued accrual of benefits on the national
investment made. Due to lack of sufficiently trained and expert staff with private dam owner organisations for
carrying out dam safety inspection, DSO carries out these inspections on consultancy basis. DSO is also
entrusted the work of Inspection of Canals & Structures there on of all major and medium Irrigation projects in
Maharashtra in view of safety and uninterrupted service for Irrigation/water supply. To keep a check on the
inspections carried out at field level, test inspections are carried out by DSO as a third party inspection. During
the DSO inspection, several deficiencies pointed out by field officers in their Pre/Post Monsoon Reports are cross
checked. HSR is also prepared for the state & submitted to CWC & Govt. of Maharashtra. This Health
Status Report gives a summary of dams according to deficiency category. The mechanical organisation wing of
Water resources Department which is a specialised agency carries out the inspection of mechanical components
of Large Dams. Status Report of Gates of various gated dams (Including Private Dams) in Maharashtra State is
prepared by Mechanical Organisation. The review of DSO activity is taken by different higher level authorities &
funding prioritisation is done depending upon deficiency & dam category during discussions with field Engineers.
Awareness and expertise dam safety technology is best attained and maintained through effective training given
by Dam Safety Organisation, Maharashtra.
1.0 INTRODUCTION
Maharashtra State has the distinction of constructing highest number of large dams in the country. As
per National Register of large dams (2009), India has 5202 large dams. There are about 1845 large
dams in Maharashtra. These constitute about 35% of the total population of large dams in India. As on
February 2015, the total number of large dams in Maharashtra is 2132. About 60% of the dams in
Maharashtra are older than 25 years (see Table-1).Considering the history of Dam building in
Maharashtra and the number of large dams; it becomes highly imperative to have in place an
elaborate mechanism for inspection and monitoring dam safety.
Table -1: Dams in Maharashtra (Year wise)
Sr.No. Year of completion Age of Dam (years) No. of Dams

1 up to 1914 >100 35
2 1914 to 1939 75 21
3 1940 to 1964 50 48
4 1965 to 1989 25 1163
5 1990 to 2014 <25 865
126
2.0 NEEDFOR MONITORING OF DAM SAFETY
The monitoring of the dams from Dam Safety aspect is utmost necessary,
1) To ensure the Structural, Hydraulic& seismic adequacy of structure to serve the purpose
for which they were designed.
2) To verify the physical state of structure & monitor its behaviour.
3) To investigate the condition that might cause distress and address it.
4) To study the extent of deterioration based on which maintenance & repairs schedule can
be planned.
5) To ascertain the potential hazards to human life &property in downstream reaches.
6) To ensure public confidence in the continued accrual of benefits on the national
investment made.
Hence it is utmost necessary to inspect, evaluate& determine the safety of dams & allied structures. A
systematic approach & working methodology is very essential to monitor the safety aspects of the
dams. Maharashtra which is one of the pioneer states has established an elaborate set up for effective
monitoring by establishing Dam Safety Organisation way back in 1980.
2.1 Dam Safety Organisation (DSO)
The Dam Safety Organisation, Nashik (DSO) Maharashtra state is under control of Director General,
Design, Training, Hydrology, Research & Safety, MERI Nashik and Chief Engineer, Design, Training,
Research & Safety. It is headed by Superintending Engineer and has four divisions. The dams in six
regions of Maharashtra were distributed among three dam safety divisions. Each division is headed by
Executive Engineer with four Deputy Engineers to assist him for monitoring the safety aspect of dams.
The fourth division is dedicated for monitoring safety of canals of all projects in Maharashtra. Apart
from these, there is a cell for Instrumentation data analysis which collects data from dams where
instrumentation is done. Secondly, the Instrumentation Research Division carries out inspection for
checking& calibration of instruments installed in dams and also carries out necessary repairs. The
Seismic Data Analysis Division acts as nodal agency for seismicity in Maharashtra. It analyses data of
various seismographs from 35 observatories spread across Maharashtra. The Mechanical
Organisation carries out safety inspections of Mechanical component (i.e. Gates & allied parts) &
report is furnished to DSO to be incorporated in Health Status Report (HSR).
2.2 Functions of Dam Safety Organisation
The Dam owner i.e. the field Engineers are responsible for the safety of dams under their control and
therefore the prime responsibility of inspection of dams on regular basis lies with field Engineers. Dam
Safety Organisation monitors periodical inspections of dams carried out by field Engineers .The
functions of Dam Safety Organisation are as under:
To overview the process of periodical inspections of specified large dams.

To carryout scrutiny of the Inspection reports received from field officers. Significant &
Important Deficiencies to be intimated to concern authorities to carryout remedial measures.
To prepare the Annual Health Status reports.
To monitor the safety aspects & remedial actions taken by field officers.
To carry out test inspections of dams.
To carryout analysis of Instrumentation data& prepare Instrumentation Analysis Report.
To compile the documents specified by the National Committee on Dam Safety such as
Gate operation schedule ( GOS) / Reservoir operation Schedule ( ROS ) , Data Book ,O
& M Manual , EAP, Record drawing & Completion Report.
To prepare inventory of National Register of Large Dams & compile register of Small Dams
To prepare & update dam safety manuals.
To keep liaison with Central Water Commission & Central Board of Irrigation & Power
New Delhi through : National Committee on Dam Safety & Indian National Committee On
Large Dams Which is sub- Committee of ICOLD
To compile information on dam incidents in the state.
To arrange training courses on Dam safety & Instrumentation with assistance of Maharashtra
Engineering Training Academy, Nashik.
127
To carry out periodical inspection of Private Dams in Maharashtra State & other to monitor
their safety.
Inspection of canals of Irrigation Projects and structures thereon.
2.3 Mandatory Pre & Post Inspection by Field Authorities
The Govt. of Maharashtra has designed systematic approach for monitoring each & every Dam &
allied structure periodically. The Dam Safety Organisation of Maharashtra state has categorised the
large dams in into three sub categories i.e. Category-I, Category-II & Category-III large Dams (see
Table-2). The field authorities are responsible to carry out the inspection of these large dams twice in a
year i.e. pre monsoon & post monsoon. The categorisation & Inspection authorities is as under,
Table -2: Categorisation of Dams & Inspecting Authorities
Height
Impounded
from
gross
general
SR storage Spillway Type of Inspection Inspection Reports be
Type of Dam level of
No capacity Up capacity spillway authority sent to
deepest
to FRL in
foundation
M Cum
in m.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1) Chief Engineer
Above Superintending
Large Dam Above 30 Above 60 Gated 2) Superintending
1 3,000 Engineer/
(Category-I) m MCum Spillway Engineer Dam Safety
Cumecs Administrator
Organisation.
1) Superintending
Engineer/
15 MCum 2,000 to Un-
Large Dam 15 m to 30 Executive Administrator
2 upto 3,000 gated
(Category-II) m Engineer 2) Superintending
60MCum Cumecs Spillway
Engineer, Dam safety
Organisation
Sub-Divisional 1)Superintending
1.0 MCum 2,000 to Un-
Large Dam 10 Eng./Sub Engineer/
3 upto15 3,000 gated
(Category-III) m.to15m Divisional Administrator 2)
MCum Cumecs Spillway
Officer Executive Engineer
The Pre-Monsoon Inspection is expected to be complete before 15th of May of the year and
report sent to concerned authorities before 30th June of same year. The Post Monsoon
Inspection is expected to complete before 30th November of the year &report sent to
concerned authorities before 31st December of same year.
Special Inspection before first filling should be done before 30th April & report should be send
to concerned authorities before 31st May of same year.(Reports need not be sent to DSO).
Special inspection after a severe distressing event or accident or incident should be carryout
immediately after the event is noted and report should be sent to concern authorities within
one week from the date of inspection.
2.4 Scrutiny of Mandatory Pre/Post Monsoon Inspection Reports
Dam Safety Organisation takes overview of the periodical inspections i.e. pre monsoon & post
Monsoon of 1231 large dams (Category I &II) on receipt of inspection reports from field officers.
DSO carries out scrutiny of the Inspection reports received from field officers for Category I &
II dams. Category III dams inspection reports are scrutinised by respective superintending
Engineer.
Significant &Serious Deficiencies are intimated to concerned authorities to carryout remedial
measures.
The deficiencies are categorized as under:
Deficiency Category-1: Dams with major deficiencies which may lead to dam failure
Deficiency Category-2: Dams with major rectifiable deficiencies needing immediate attention
128
Deficiency Category-3: Dams having minor / Nil deficiencies.

DSO monitors the remedial actions taken by field officers through their compliance reports.
DSO prepares the region wise Annual Health Status Reports & sends it to all field CEs, SEs &
EEs. The scrutiny of inspection reports are done meticulously so as to categorise the
deficiency and prepare a synopsis of inspection report in the form of a Health Status Report. A
consolidated HSR is also prepared for the state & submitted to CWC & Govt. of
Maharashtra. This Health Status Report gives a summary of dams according to deficiency
category. This helps Government to prioritise the allocation of funds to dam requiring
immediate attention. The annual health status report of class III dams is prepared /compiled by
regional Chief Engineer and sent to Government & DSO annually.
2.5 Test inspection by DSO
The periodical inspections of the dam under their control become a routine and mundane affair for the
field engineers. To keep a check on the inspections carried out at field level, test inspections are
carried out by DSO as a third party inspection. During the DSO inspection, several deficiencies pointed
out by field officers in their Pre/Post Monsoon Reports are cross checked. The DSO also advices field
officers on the remedial actions to be taken for rectifying deficiencies. Apart from the mandatory pre &
post monsoon inspections carried out by field officers for 1231 large dams, DSO carries out Test
inspections of selected large dams every year. The annual dam inspection programme is prepared
which is sanctioned by D.G., DTHRS, Nashik during annual meeting with all field CEs.
The Annual Dam Inspection program of DSO is prepared by taking into consideration the following
criteria,
Dams suggested by Regional Chief Engineers.

100 Years old Dams (once in three Years)
Dams which are not inspected in last 10 year by DSO
Private Dams on consultancy Basis : (Twice in a year, Pre/Post monsoon)
National Importance (NI) Dams: Once every year. (Koyna, Isapur, Pench, Ujjani, Jaikwadi,
Goshikhurd, Middle Vaitarna.) (NI Dams: having height >100 meters or storage capacity >
10,000 million cubic meters)
2.6 Pre-Post Monsoon Inspection of Mechanical Components
In Maharashtra there are 1231 large dams out of which 129 are gated dams. The smooth operation of
the gates during monsoon to route the floods is of critical importance. To keep all spillway gate/outlet
gates and their ancillary parts in fit condition, periodic inspection of the same is utmost necessary. The
mechanical organisation wing of Water resources Department which is a specialised agency carries
out the inspection of mechanical components of Large Dams. Status Report of gates of Various Gated
Dams (Including Private Dams) in Maharashtra State is prepared by Mechanical Organisation. This
status report is sent to Dam Safety Organisation for further inclusion in Annual Consolidated HSR of
large dams in Maharashtra State. This Report consists of following:
Abstract of Deficiencies noticed in Previous year

Statement showing Dams with Deficiency Category-1: Dams having with major deficiencies
which may lead to dam failure
Statement showing Dams with Deficiency Category-2: Dams having major rectifiable
deficiencies needing immediate attention
Statement showing Dams with Deficiency Category-3: Dams having minor / nil deficiencies
noticed.
Remedial Action Suggested on Deficiencies Noticed/ Action taken report.
2.7 Inspection of Private Dams
In Maharashtra apart from government owned dams, many dams are owned by private owners like
TATA Power, Sahara etc. and by urban local bodies like Municipal corporations of Mumbai, Nagpur etc.
& Power generation companies like Mahagenco etc. There are about 45 private dams in Maharashtra
which are operated and maintained by them. Due to lack of sufficiently trained and expert staff with
owner organisation for carrying out dam safety inspection, DSO carries out these inspections on
129
consultancy basis. In addition, DSO also carries out Inspection of Nathpa Jhakri Dam (Himachal
Pradesh) every year on consultancy basis.
2.8 Inspection of Century Old Dams
There are 35 Century old large dams. As per guidelines received from Dam Safety Monitoring unit of
Central Water Commission, New Delhi, Health Status Report of century old dams is prepared
separately once in three years on the same lines as that of Annual Health Status Report of Identified
large dams.
2.9 Annual Consolidated Health Status Report
Annual Consolidated Health Status Report of Identified Large Dams consists of following:
Part-I - Action Taken Report: This part covers the remedial action taken for the deficiencies
pointed out in previous year's HSR.
Part-II - Annual Health Status Report Of Identified Large Dams : Deficiencies reported &
noticed during the course of inspections for the current year & remedial actions suggested
for Cat-I & Cat-II Dams are covered in this part. The deficiencies are categorized according
to their seriousness as mentioned earlier.
Part-III -Annual Report of performance of dam instruments installed on identified large dams.
Part IV- Annual Report of performance of Metrological instruments installed on identified large
dams.
Part-V- Annual Report of inspection done by Mechanical Organisation. Deficiencies Category -
1 & 2 from received Health Status Report of Mechanical Organisation are incorporated in this
part.
2.10 Inspection of Canals & Structures
Canals serve as important carrier of benefits and facilities to the region downstream. However such
canals also form a potential source of hazard in the event of any mishap or failure of the canals.
Due to rapid urbanization, canals of many project run through heavily populated areas. Seepage
through these canals causes unhygienic conditions in these areas; whereas breaches to canals may
cause loss of property and life even. Breaches in canal in rural areas, causes inundation of fields
leading to loss of agricultural produce eventually loss to nation. Considering the hazard potential and
loss of facility in event of failure of canals or structures there as, DSO is entrusted the work of
Inspection of Canals & Structures there on of all major and medium Irrigation projects in Maharashtra
in view of safety and uninterrupted service for Irrigation/water supply. DSO prepares & publishes
Annual Consolidated Health Status Report based on inspections carried out by field officers as well as
test inspections carried out by Dam Safety Organisation, Nashik. DSO has also prepared Canal
Safety manual which is under process of approval.
3.0 REVIEW BY HIGHER AUTHORITIES
In Maharashtra the issue of dam safety is taken on priority. The HSR prepared by DSO is approved by
Director General which then sent to higher authorities i.e. Secretary (CAD) of Govt. of Maharashtra
and CWC for information, suggestions & necessary action.
Periodic meetings/VCs are called by Secretary (CAD). Director General, DTHRS, and Chief Engineer
DTRS with all field Chief Engineers and Superintending Engineers to discuss safety related issues,
compliance of NCDS documents (EAP,GOS,ROS,O&M manual),compliance of deficiencies pointed
out in HSR. Also funding prioritisation is done depending upon deficiency & dam category during
discussions with field Chief Engineers.
4.0 TRAINING
The inspection of dam is an elaborate process which requires high level of technical knowledge of all
aspects of dam & its allied structures. The safety and proper custodial care of dams can be achieved
130
only through an awareness and acceptance of responsibilities and through availability of competent
well trained Engineers, technicians and operators. Such awareness and expertise is best attained and
maintained through effective training in dam safety technology as well as operation & maintenance of
dams.
DSO has carried out trainings in assistance with Maharashtra Engineering Training Academy, Nashik
through Regional Training Centres, at Pune /Nagpur/Aurangabad & Field Chief Engineer of respective
region.
Training & Workshops were carried out on Dam Safety & Procedures for 162 MPSC Direct
recruits AEE/AE-1/AE-2 & 620 in service Engineers EE/SDE / SDO / AE-2/ Sect. Engineer
/Junior Engineer of Water Resources Dept. through DSO.
Non technical personnel working on dams are also being imparted Hands On trainings at dam
site on O & M procedures.
Due to comprehensive training, the field engineers are now more aware about the importance of
procedures / working / Pre-post Monsoon Inspection for the dam safety. This has helped DSO in its
working as it receives good and detailed inspection reports which help in proper categorisation of
deficiencies.
5.0 OTHER ACTIVITIES BY DSO
5.1 National Register of Large Dams In Maharashtra
The Dam Safety Organisation compiles the information required for National Register of large Dams
(NRLD) from field authorities for 2132 large dams in Maharashtra.
5.2 Preparation of Dam Safety Manuals
The Dam Safety Organisation, Nashik is entrusted with the preparation of draft of Dam Safety Manual
for guidance of field officers who are in charge of operation and maintenance of large dams in state. It
is proposed to bring out this Manual in 9 Chapters. Out of these, Chapter No. 7 entitled Flood
Forecasting, Reservoir Operation and gate Operation, chapter No. 8 entitled Preparedness for
dealing with Emergency situations of Dams prepares, and Chapter No. 2 entitled Identification of
Causes of Failure are published by Dam Safety Organisation and circulated to all concerned
departments. Drafts of remaining 6 Chapters are submitted to the government for approval.
5.3 Compilation Of NCDS Documents
Dam Safety Organisation also compiles NCDS documents i.e. EAP, ROS, GOS and Data book and
records drawings. Emergency action plan (EAP) is important to avoid the hazards potential to human
life and property on downstream of dams.
At DSO, compilation of EAPs of 233 Class I dams is taken on priority. So far EAP of 112 dams has
been compiled.. The GOS and ROS of all gated dams have been compiled. ROS is revised after every
five years.
5.4 Preparation of Dam Safety Bill & Flood Zoning Bill
The draft of Dam Safety Bill and Flood Plain Zoning Bill of Maharashtra State was prepared by Dam
Safety Organisation and submitted to all Chief Engineers for confirmation and comments. After
receiving comments the same will be submitted to the Government of Maharashtra for further
necessary action before legislation.
5.5 Safety Review of Large Dams
Government of Maharashtra has formed six region wise dam safety review committees to review
safety aspects of major dams every ten years. SE DSO is member in all committees.
131
6.0 FUTURE ROAD MAP
The Water Resources Department, Government of Maharashtra has embarked on an e-governance

program for Integrated Computerised Information System (ICIS) called as E-Jalseva. This is the first
attempt of Government Process Reengineering (GPR) in Water Resources sector (Portal website,
http://wrd.maharashtra.gov.in). In this portal there are 34 modules covering various aspects of Water
Resources Department. Out of which module M-12 is related to Dam Safety. DSO has started working
on preparation of module wherein inspection reports can be submitted by authorities online as soon as
physical inspection is over. This online submission of inspection reports would also have facility of
uploading pictures and videos of any deficiency noted during inspections. Timely online submission
would help DSO in preparing scrutiny report and send back the deficiencies noted online to field
authorities. Online submission of reports will help in timely publication of better Health Status Reports.
132
Integrated Geophysical Approach for Dam Health Checks & Dam

Condition Monitoring
Dr. Sanjay Rana
PARSAN Overseas Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi
sanjay@parsan.biz
ABSTRACT
Dams in the country represent a major investment and huge benefits to population in terms of irrigation, power
and flood control. Most of the big dams are very old and regular monitoring and maintenance of these dams is of
utmost importance for continuing benefits. Unlike soil investigations, critical nature of dams, does not permit
traditional invasive inspections by means of drilling, and such inspections are best avoided unless extremely
important, and are done only when problem is too grave.
Although long recognized that dams need periodic inspection and monitoring, it has only been recently
recognized that geophysical surveys can supplement the results of standard inspection and monitoring
techniques. Geophysical surveys have been performed on a number of dams around the world, including India,
and have yielded extremely useful insight into dam conditions. Seismic refraction surveys have been performed to
provide a cross-section of the dam embankment and foundation materials in terms of strength characteristics. Self
Potential (SP) surveys have been performed to investigate seepage conditions within dam embankment and
foundation materials, and abutment materials. Electrical Resistivity Tomography is also routinely performed on
dams to determine internal saturation conditions in dams. ReMi is effectively used to determine shear wave
velocities (Vs) in dams.
Present paper discusses various geophysical techniques with emphasis on their integration to provide unique
solutions to subsurface challenges. The paper also presents few case studies where integration of two or more
geophysical techniques helped resolve complex problems. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate as to how
these geophysical techniques are applicable to solve various issues related to health check of existing dams.
These geophysical surveys may find future use as monitoring tools applied to various dams.
INTRODUCTION
In the event of a dam failure, the economic loss as well as the potential hazard to life and property
could be enormous. Typical dam safety surveillance consists of visual inspections supported by limited
instrumentation. However, the problems in dams can become quite advanced before the problem is
detected via these means. Recently, interest has grown regarding the use of non-intrusive geophysical
techniques to facilitate early detection of anomalous seepage, piping, internal erosion and other
degradation issues.
Geophysical methods are sensitive to contrast in the physical properties in the subsurface. Different
methods respond to different physical properties, like material strength, material conductivity (linked to
water saturation), fluid movement (seepage), change in density etc. The application of geophysical
methods to dams enables detection of problems in early stages and hence can become part of dam
safety surveillance program.
Geophysical techniques, by virtue of their non-invasive and non-destructive nature, offer an excellent
solution for investigation or regular monitoring of dams, and detection of anomalous conditions which
might snowball into major problems if left untreated.
Various geophysical methods are available to investigate the problems of earthen, masonry, concrete
or composite dams:
Leak path detection

Internal Erosion
Identification of zone of water accumulation
Cavity/ sinkhole
Concrete degradation
No single geophysical technique can uniquely solve the problem due to a large overlapping of physical
133
propertie
es in variouss subsurfacee materials. To date, the e use of geo ophysical me ethods to investigate
dams ha as produced d mixed results, partly because the e application
n of these methods
m is not well-
understoood and partly because false
f positivees cannot be tolerated. That
T is the reason why it becomes
importannt to use a combination
c of geophysical methodss to uniquelyy resolve the e problem. Following
F
table pre
esents a rangge of choicess available to
o address to various issues and conc cerns:
ISSUES AND CONCERRNS

GEOP
PHYSICAL CONCRE
ETE DAM EARTH EMBANKMENT
E T DAMS MASONRY DAMS
D
ME
ETHODS Water Land Sink Water
Cracks Degradation S
Strength
Leaks Slide Holes Leaks
Ele
ectrical
Resistivity
Streamiing Potential
Geeoradar
Radar TTomography
Seismic
mography
Tom
Seismicc Refraction
ReMi
Table 1. Geophysical Methods

M for C
Common Dam Problems
ELECTR
RICAL RESIS
STIVITY IMA
AGING
The dire ect current resistivity method hass well-estab blished data a acquisition n and interrpretation
techniquues for stand dard survey configuration
c ns. The meth hod uses paairs of electro odes to injecct current
into the ground and d measure the t resulting
g electrical potential disstribution. Its
s applicationn to dam
seepage e investigatioons is two-fold. The me ethod may be b used to monitor spa atial and/or temporal
variation
ns in electrica t changing soil condition
al resistivity in response to ns caused by y internal ero
osion and
anomalo ous seepage e. The metho od also may y be used to o characterizze the electrrical resistivity of the
subsurfaace for the puurposes of in nterpreting SP data.
The metthod can alsso be used to detect cha anges in resistivity with time,
t which may be linke
ed to the
developm
ment of interrnal erosion in the core off the embankkment.
The resuults of electrrical surveys carried out on the crestt of a dam are
a presented d as vertical sections
showing the electric cal properties of the dam m materials. Electrical currents
c travvel along preeferential
pathwayys in the most conductivve materials such as dam m core composed on fin ne grained materials.
m
The metthod provid des picture ofo internal reesistivity dis
stribution of
o the dam structure,
s ide
entifying
areas oof water sa aturation inn the dam m body, an nd thus ide entifying thhe zones o of water
accumuulation and wetting.
w
2D Resiistivity Imagiing uses an array of ele ectrodes (typpically 64) connected

c byy multi-core cable to
provide a linear deppth profile, orr pseudo-sec ction, of the variation in resistivity both
b along thhe survey
line and with depth. Switching
S a potential electrode pairs
of the current and p is done automatically using a
relay boxx. The compputer initially keeps the spacing between the elec ctrodes fixed and moves the pairs
he line until the last electrode is reached. The spacing is then increassed and the
along th e process
repeatedd in order to
o provide an n increased depth of invvestigation. In this way a profile of resistivity
against depth
d do-section') is built up alo
('pseud ong the survey line.
The mod deled results s are displayyed as scale ed resistivity--depth pseud a illustrated below in
do-section as
Fig. 1. B
Blues represe ent areas off low resistiv
vity whilst red vely higher. The wedge shape of
ds are relativ
the plot illustrates th
he gradual reeduction in the
t amount of o data acquuired as the current and potential
electrode
e spacing are increased.
134
Fig
gure 1. Electrical Resistivityy Section Show
wing Zone of Saturation
S (Blue)
The method can be applied

a in tw
wo ways.
nvestigations as a onetim
1. Resistivity in me survey ma ay detect spa
atially anoma alous zones along
a the
d
dam, and ca an be used too investigate suspected structural
s weaaknesses.
2. Long-term re esistivity mo
onitoring makke use of thee seepage-innduced seassonal variatioon inside
t
the embankment to dettect anomalies not only in space, but b more im mportantly in time, by
s
studying devviations from the time-variation patterrn. The seco
ond approach h is more powerful as
repetition of measureme ents providess additional evaluation possibilities
p f seepage analysis.
for
However, the monitoring g approach iss also more demanding as installatio ons are neceessary as
w as long--term instrum
well mentation.
MING POTENTIAL SURV

STREAM VEY
The streaming poten ntial method consists of measuring

m th
he electrical potential
p by flowing
f water within a
e or subsurfa
structure ace. Self-pottential (SP) is
i a passive technique that measure es naturally occurring
o
electrica
al potentials in the ground
d. This is thee only one off these geopphysical techniques that responds
directly to
t fluid flow.. Water flow
wing through the pore sp pace of soil generates electrical currrent flow.
This elecctro-kinetic phenomenon
p n is called strreaming poteential and gives rise to SP
S signals thhat are of
primary interest in daam seepage studies.
SP is measured by determining the voltage across a pa air of non-po

olarizing elecctrodes usingg a high-
impedan nce voltmete er. This inexpensive and d deceptivelyy simple datta acquisition n procedure requires
special ccare and atte ention in ord
der to reliablyy interpret and correct fo
or sources ofo electrical noise
n that
can massk the signal of interest. All noise sou urces inclu
uding time-vaarying telluric
c currents asssociated
with solaar and atmo ospheric acttivity, stray currents,
c and the corros sion of burieed metal must be
recognizzed and mea asured. These noise sourrces can massk the relativvely small sig gnals associated with
seepage e anomalies. For this rea ason, telluric
c measureme ents and ma agnetic surveeys should beb carried
out to asssist in interp
preting the SP
S data. Typ pically, SP annomalies on the order off tens of millivolts are
associatted with seep page anoma alies of intere
est, althoughh anomaly am mplitudes larrgely dependd on site-
specific conditions.
c
Interprettation of SP measuremen nts to infer seepage

s pattterns and concentrated seepage
s flow
ws ranges
from sim
mple qualitativve to more advanced qua antitative nummerical modeeling approaches.
Most com mmon appliccation of SP study is to id

dentify the zo
ones in the dam
d body thrrough which seepage
is taking
g place. The results are correlated with
w resistivityy sections. An
A example of such corrrelation is
shown b below in Fig. 2 wherein zo
one of saturaation in dam body, as notted in electrical resistivityy imaging
section, shows a proofound negative SP development.
135
300
200
100
0
0
200 400 600 800 1000 12
200 1400
0 1600 1800 2000
-100
-200
Chainage
-300
Figure 2. SP Resu
ults along with Resistivity Se
ection
C REFRACT
SEISMIC TION TOMOG
GRAPHY
The seissmic refraction method detects changes in late eral- seismicc velocity an
nd/or layer th
hickness.
Seismic techniques are
a extremelly useful sincce seismic ve
elocity is gen
nerally the most
m sensitive
e to slight
changess in density and
a saturation
n in the types of materials commonly y used in dam
ms.
The com mmon seismiic technique used for da am investigattion is seism n method. A standard
mic refraction
seismic refraction lin eophones at 5m intervalss. Energy is input into the ground
ne is laid outt using 24 ge
us points loca
at variou ated along thhe seismic lin
ne, resulting in a 2D velocity model off the subsurfface.
A minimum of seven n shot points are used for each sprea ad. These incclude two far shots on either side
of the sspread, to provide the true
t seismicc velocity of the sound rock, two end shots to t obtain
reciprocaal times, and
d three mid shots withinn the profile to obtain la
ateral velocityy variation in
n the top
layer(s) (overburden).
The lenggth of geophone spread depends

d upo on the requirred depth of investigationn and the dimmensions
of any suubsurface fe
eatures that area to be ma apped. A leng gth of approxx. three to fo
our times the
e depth of
investiga
ation is usedd. A geophon ne spacing of o 5 m with 24 channelss spread is adequate
a forr detailed
mapping g of subsurfaace condition ns to a depth h of approx. 30m. The geophone
g sp
pacing can beb further
increaseed for greaterr depth of invvestigation, iff required.
The com mpressional wave veloccity is affec cted by ma any conditions. Howeve er, in sedim ments (or
compactted soil) the primary facctors affecting the compressional wa ave velocity are density,, porosity
and satu erials (rock), factors succh as cemen
uration. In liithified mate ntation, fractturing, altera
ation and
stress ge enerally havve a greater effect on thee velocity. Fiig. 3 hereund
der show typ pical results obtained
from Seismic Refracction Tomogrraphy, with blue b to red representing
r increasing seismic velo ocity, and
red line rrepresentingg the bedrockk topographyy.
Figure 3. Geophysical Methods for Common

C Dam Problems
136
REFRACTION MICRO TREMOR (ReMi)
Innovative technique of ReMi (Refraction Micro-tremor) has distinct edge over MASW and SASW in
terms of logistics, execution and results. ReMi can be performed under the same layout as used for
seismic refraction, to obtain excellent shear wave velocity profiles of subsurface.
ReMi is a new, proven seismic method for measuring in-situ shear-wave (S-wave) velocity profiles. It
is economic both in terms of cost and time. Testing is performed at the surface using the same
conventional seismograph and vertical P-wave geophones used for refraction studies. The seismic
source consists of ambient seismic "noise", or micro-tremors, which are constantly being generated by
cultural and natural noise. Because conventional seismic equipment is used to record data, and
ambient noise is used as a seismic source, the ReMi method is less costly, faster and more
convenient than borehole methods and other surface seismic methods, such as SASW and MASW
used to determine shear-wave profiles. Depending on the material properties of the subsurface, ReMi
can determine shear wave velocities down to a minimum of 40 meters (130 feet) and a maximum of
100 meters (300 feet) depth.
The ReMi method offers significant advantages. In contrast to borehole measurements. ReMi tests a
much larger volume of the subsurface. The results represent the average shear wave velocity over
distances as far as 200 meters (600 feet). Because ReMi is non-invasive and nondestructive, and
uses only ambient noise as a seismic source, no permits are required for its use. ReMi seismic lines
can be deployed within road medians, at active construction sites, or along highways, without having
to disturb work or traffic flow. Unlike other seismic methods for determining shear wave velocity, ReMi
will use these ongoing activities as seismic sources. There is no need to close a street or shut down
work for the purpose of data acquisition. And a ReMi survey usually takes less than two hours, from
setup through breakdown. These advantages sum to substantial savings in time and cost. Moreover
the method provides more accurate results compared to conventional effort of picking up shear waves
from records which more often than not lead to errors.
GROUND PENETRATING RADAR- BRIEF
GPR survey is conducted to identify shallow cracks, cavities and voids in the dam body. The survey
also might reveal the stratigraphy in the dam body based on contrast in dielectric constant.
The method can be used to obtain high resolution subsurface images showing buried objects, cables,
pipes and cavities. Following example shows a cavity detected by GPR.
SESIMIC TOMOGRAPHY- BRIEF
Unlike other methods discussed till here, used from the surface of Dam or Ground, Seismic
Tomography is conducted between a pair of boreholes or between upstream and downstream face of
the Dam, to provide high resolution details of internal structure. The resulting tomogram shown
physical property of each unit cell of dam body. In a concrete dam the information can be interpreted
in terms of fractures, weathered concrete etc., as shown in Fig.4 hereunder:
137
eismic Tomography Across Faces of a Co

Figure 4. Se oncrete Dam
USIONS
CONCLU
Geophyssical method ds can be used in order to

t obtain data on internal conditions of dams veryy quickly.
Currentlyy these methhods have be een used to investigate a number of large dams. Indian expe erience of
using theese methods s in various dams
d has alsso been veryy encouragin
ng, resulting in effective treatment
t
of assocciated problem
ms. The key benefits cann be summarrized as undeer:
Geophysical Techniques- Quick as

G ssessment of o subsurfacce conditionns of Dams in non-
d
destructive m
manner
G
Geophysical Techniquess- Detailed an
nd continuouus information as againstt drilling
G
Geophysical Techniquess- Important tool for healtth check of dams,
d regula
ar monitoring
g and pre
& post rehabbilitation insp
pections.
These methods
m mayy also find usse in the futu
ure as monito
oring tools byy establishin
ng a baseline e data file
immedia ately after da
am constructtion. Subseq quent surveyys can be ru un after initia
al filling and
d after an
event su uch as rapid drawdown
d or an earthquake to determmine if any significant
s chhanges have occurred
in the intternal conditiions of damss.
REFERENCES
1. CEATI
C publica
ation- A Guidee to Resistivityy Investigation and Monitorin
ng of Embankkment Dams
2. CEATI
C publica
ation- Investig
gation of Geop physical Metho ods for Assess
sing Seepagee and Internal Erosion in
Embankment Dams: Self-Potential Field Data Acquisitiion Manual
3. Robbilard Claude, Seismic Tomography of o a Concrete Dam in Cana ada (Project Report)
138
Dam Safety Challenge: An Institutional Diagnosis

Akshaya Kumar Das Gopal Prasad Roy
State Dam Safety Organisation, Bhubaneswar, Odisha State Dam Safety Organisation, Bhubaneswar, Odisha
akdas61@gmail.com
ABSTRACT
A safe dam is one which performs its intended functions without imposing unacceptable risks to the public and
society by its presence. Dam safety is now considered as an inherent feature in the planning, design,
construction, maintenance and operation of dams. The operation and maintenance of dams is a very essential
component of sound and sustainable water resources management. Dams potentially provide social and
economic benefits but at the same time pose a threat to lives and livelihoods and environment. Dam owners have
a legal obligation, to ensure that the dams are operated in a way that optimizes economic and social outputs
while not compromising safety. The Dam Safety Programme in the country advocates a comprehensive review of
all existing large dams to ensure that they are optimally delivering benefits in an effective, efficient and equitable
manner. Dam safety has enjoyed varying degree of attention by the international dam safety community and it
has been recognized that a successful dam safety assurance programme requires a dedicated institutional
structure with access to top management attention. Without the top management commitment in providing the
necessary resources, the programme is likely to be lost amidst other demands and more dams may become risky
to the public. Institutions evolve with changing conditions and social needs. The importance of understanding the
institutional context of dam safety management is that whether the existing structure is sufficient to deliver the
intended mandate or the institutional reform is necessary to foster the adoption and diffusion of technical
innovations in dam safety management. Social institutions are determinant to environmental changes and critical
forces in shaping the real world environmental governance. An efficient dam safety management needs
development of effective co-ordination mechanism between users to ensure that their policies, instruments and
objectives are mutually consistent and do not undermine each other. In this paper the author has tried to identify
the institutions relating to dam safety, their linkages, efficiency and further needs for a successful dam safety
programme in the country. An effort has been made to identify the stake holders their need and role in the dam
safety programme. Special mention have been made on the existing dam safety activity in the country,
institutions involved in planning, design, quality control and execution ,their linkages ,the short comings for a
successful dam safety programme. This paper also explores the institutional condition i.e. organizations, related
roles and responsibilities for sustainable dam safety management.
1.0 INTRODUCTION
Water is a scarce resource, which makes its management one of the greatest challenges in the globe.
Water is the basic human right which applies to basic human needs and environmental sustainability.
Indias development vision will only be realized if water resources are managed in a way that is
sensitive and supportive of the many demands on this resource. The operation and maintenance of
dams is a very essential component of sound and sustainable water resources management. Dams
potentially provide social and economic benefits but at the same time pose a threat to lives and
livelihoods and environment. Dam owners have a legal obligation, to ensure that the dams are
operated in a way that optimizes economic and social outputs while not compromising safety. The
Dam Safety Programme in the country advocates a comprehensive review of all existing large dams to
ensure that they are optimally delivering benefits in an effective, efficient and equitable manner.
The importance of understanding the institutional context of dam safety management is that whether
the existing structure is sufficient to deliver the intended mandate or the institutional reform is
necessary to foster the adoption and diffusion of technical innovations in dam safety management.
Social institutions are determinant to environmental changes and critical forces in shaping the real
world environmental governance. This paper explores the institutional condition i.e. organizations,
related roles and responsibilities for sustainable dam safety management.
2.0 EXISTING INSTITUTIONS AND THEIR LINKAGES
International and national organizations of advanced countries have been pioneers in dam safety
management. To name a few who have been followed for various national dam safety programmes
are as follows.
139
ICOLD: The International Commission on Large Dams founded in 1929 has universal support and is
instrumental in collecting and sharing knowledge gained by professionals on dam design and
construction from all countries of the world. The various publications by ICOLD have been guiding
documents in dam engineering including dam safety.
FEMA: The Federal Emergency Management Agency of United States of America provides leadership
and support for a comprehensive, all hazards emergency management programme. Its role is unique
although it neither owns dams nor has regulatory responsibility for dams. FEMA is responsible for
coordinating all the activities of the US National dam safety Programme. FEMA leads the Interagency
Committee on Dam Safety (ICODS), which consists of representatives from Federal departments and
agencies who meet regularly and exclusively to examine dam safety at national level and recommend
mitigation policies that promulgate Dam safety. FEMA is also responsible in preparation of the dam
safety guidelines to be adopted and implemented by federal agencies responsible for operation and
maintenance of Dams in USA.
BOR (USBR): The Bureau of Reclamation of the US Department of the Interior (DOI) is responsible for
the development and conservation of the water resources in 17 Western States of USA. It controls 475
dams and dikes. BOR also provides an overview of dam safety programme in USA and provides
technical assistance to other DOI bureaus.
India has adopted the definition of large dams as per the International Commission on Large Dams
(ICOLD) standards. There are 4858 numbers of completed and 345 numbers of under construction
large dams in the country .These dams are mostly owned by State Irrigation/Water Resources
Departments and public sector power companies or state electricity boards. There are few dams
owned by municipal corporations, other public sector companies and some private companies (source:
National Register of Large Dams).
The Government of India realized the importance of dam safety way back in mid-70s and took a
number of steps to highlight its concern for creating general awareness among the engineering
community and the public at large. The state governments have the autonomy in their list of subjects
which includes the management of their own water resources within the state. As a follow up action to
the recommendations of state irrigation ministers conference held in 1975 the Dam Safety
Organization (DSO) in Central Water Commission (CWC) was created in 1979. The DSO in CWC
performs the coordinating and advisory role for the state governments and lays down guidelines,
compiles technical literature, organizes training and takes necessary steps to create dam safety
awareness in the states. With the initiative of CWC, 12 states in the country with signification number
of large dams have set up the Dam Safety Organisation in the respective states.
National Committee on Dam Safety (NCDS): A standing committee on dam safety was constituted in
early 1980s comprising members from the centre and state governments to meet periodically and
discuss dam safety related issues. In October, 1987, the Government of India constituted the National
Committee on Dam Safety (NCDS) by broad basing the existing standing committee on dam safety to
include all states having significant number of large dams including some of the agencies /
organizations owning sufficient number of large dams. The national committee has been reconstituted
four times since its formation in December 1989, July 1993, November,1997 and in June,2002 so as to
include the new members. This committee meets regularly to discuss issues arising in the field of dam
safety with a view to oversee the dam safety activities in various states and organizations and
suggests improvement to bring these in line with the latest state of the art consistent with the Indian
condition. It also acts as a forum for exchange of views or techniques adopted for remedial measures
besides the committee also monitors follow up action on the recommendations of the Report on Dam
Safety Procedure published in July, 1986. To address the inter-state dam safety issues, the NCDS
has formed sub-committees for inter-state rivers.
The onus of operation and maintenance of these dams lies with the dam owner represented by the
Engineer in charge of the dam.
The State DSOs are headed by a Chief Engineer (for states having relatively large number of dams) or
a Superintending Engineer (Director) with adequate technical and non technical staff to carry out the
following jobs.
140
3.0 INSPECTION OF DAMS
Phase-I Investigation
The State Dam Safety Organisation/Dam Safety Cells conduct Phase-I investigation of all large dams
once in 5 years to identify expeditiously the dams which may pose hazard to human life and property.
The investigation include an assessment of general condition with respect to safety of the project
based on available data and a visual inspection and determines the need for emergency measures
and conclude if additional study, investigation and analysis are necessary and warranted.
The work includes:

(a) review of data book (b) review of available engineering data related to design assumptions and
design of structures, construction records, post construction changes, hydrological and hydraulic
assumptions and features (c) review existing record of operation of dam and appurtenant structure
including mechanical and electrically operated equipments (d) review existing maintenance procedure
(e) review of structural behavior based on reading of instruments mounted or embedded in Dam (f)
review periodical inspection reports (g) conduct detailed field inspection as per proforma (h) record at
the end of investigation, the assessment of safety of dam, need for additional study, investigation,
analysis considered essential to assess the safety of dam, urgency of such additional investigation &
advice for Phase-II investigation, if needed.
Phase-II Investigation
The Phase-II investigation will be supplementary to Phase-I investigation and is conducted when the
results of Phase-I investigation indicates the need for additional in-depth study, investigation and
analysis.
The work includes: (a) additional visual inspection and surveillance (b) measurements through
instrument mounted or embedded in dams (c) foundation exploration (d) material testing (e) hydraulic
and hydrologic analysis & (f) structural stability analysis.
Review of Pre & Post-monsoon inspection reports
Pre-monsoon and Post-monsoon inspections are periodical inspections done every year by the field
engineers as per the guidelines prescribed by the Central Water Commission. The reports are
received by end of June and November, respectively by SDSO or Dam Safety Cell. Each year these
reports of inspections are reviewed at SDSO & the Annual Health status of the dams is published and
sent to Government in Department of Water Resources and Central Water Commission for their
appraisal.
Hydrological Review of Large Dam
Hydrological review of all the large dams are essential with respect to the safety of dam as in case of
most of the dams the design flood has been calculated with the help of some empirical formula based
on regional experience. With the advent of new methodology and development of Hydrological
Sciences, the hydrological review of dams has become essential based on hydro-metrological
approach following the guidelines fixed by the CWC. The adequacies of existing spillways are
reviewed for the enhanced inflow design flood. The method of computation needs specialization of the
subject as many assumption, probability, justification are connected with the subject.
Structural Review
After the hydrological review of a dam, if the spillway is found to be inadequate, alternatives like
putting an auxiliary spillway/fuse plug, adding parapet walls, strengthening the existing spillway ,raising
of dam height etc. are studied and design of such structure are made by appropriate organizations for
execution. The instrumentation data also analyzed to assess the structural safety of the dam.
141
Emergency Action Plan (EAP)
In spite of all precautions and proper maintenance of the dam, sometimes due to unprecedented
natural phenomenon, or due to faulty operation of the reservoir, the dam may face emergency
situation such as dam over topping, dam break etc. which may lead to disaster. To cope up with such
exigency, Emergency Action Plan (EAP) each dam needs to be prepared.
An EAP is a formal document that identifies potential emergency conditions at a dam and specifies
actions to be followed to minimize loss of life and property damage. The EAP includes:
1. Actions the dam owner will take to moderate or alleviate a problem at the dam.
2. Actions the dam owner will take, and in coordination with emergency management authorities, to
respond to incidents or emergencies related to the dam.
3. Procedures dam owners will follow to issue early warning and notification messages to responsible
downstream emergency management authorities.
4. Inundation maps to help dam owners and emergency management authorities identify critical
infrastructure and population-at-risk sites that may require protective measures, warning, and
evacuation planning.
5. Delineation of the responsibilities of all those involved in managing an incident or emergency and
how the responsibilities should be coordinated.
Dam Safety Review Panel (DSRP)
As a part of the Dam Safety procedure, DSRP for each dam owning organization have been
constituted keeping water resources experts, civil engineers, mechanical engineers, hydrologists,
geologists with National and International reputation as its members. The main objective of the panel
is to provide independent expert review of the reports of distress observed in the investigation,
analysis performed and remedial action proposed prior to initiation of rehabilitation activities. The
SDSO organize the meetings, site visits of DSRP, gives the feed back to its member and transmits the
suggestion of the panel to Government for approval.
Inspection of dams once in 10 years
As per the report on dam safety procedures published by CWC, the States arrange the safety review
of dams which are more than 15m in height or which stores 15000ac.ft. or more of water by an
independent panel of experts once in 10 years. The State DSOs also prepare their own guidelines for
safety inspection keeping in view of their requirements but such guidelines draw their basic contents
from the guidelines prepared by the CWC.
State Dam Safety Committee (SDSC)
To carry out the Dam Safety Assurance Programme, high level committee comprising senior
Administrators & Engineers of Water Resources Department, representative of CWC have been
formed in each state. The Secretary of DOWR is the Chairman of the Committee. This committee
reviews the progress of the dam safety works. The head of the State DSO is usually the Member-
Secretary, organizes the committee meeting at regular intervals.
Workshops, Seminars & Trainings
The SDSO is the nodal agency for conducting workshops, trainings and seminars pertaining to Dam
Safety in the State.
Monitoring of rehabilitation work
The SDSO monitors the rehabilitation works of large dams. Regular progress report, expenditure
statements are being sent to Government, Central Water Commission and Funding Agencies at
regular intervals.
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4.0 THE STAKEHOLDERS OF DAM SAFETY PROGRAMME
There are various types of stakeholders in the dam safety programme, depending on their need and
role. Some of them are primary stakeholders (e.g., local people who consume water for domestic and
agricultural needs) while other may be secondary (like, NGOs) or tertiary(like, the World Bank which
intervenes through the government) in nature so far their direct and active relationship with the river
basin dynamics is concerned. Further, some are single-role stakeholders (like, the boatman) whereas
others are multi-role stakeholders (like, state governments).
The simple categorization of stakeholders that has been adopted in this paper is based on their role
either as a user, or contributor, or decision maker. This, in fact corresponds more or less to their
identity as primary or secondary stakeholders because users are generally primary stakeholders
whereas contributors can be secondary or tertiary, and so also the decision makers. Upshot is an
exception implying the negative side of dam safety management.
Various important stakeholders who are involved in the sector and their roles are as follows :
Stakeholder Stakeholder type Role

Govt. of India (MOWR) Decision maker Governs water resources
IMD (Indian Meteorological Dept) Contributor Provides data and analyses storms
CSMRS Contributor Provides technology for construction quality,
laboratory tests and analyses results
CWPRS Contributor Model testing and provide technology
INCOLD/CBIP/National Water Academy Contributor Capacity building of technical staff through
training
IITs, NITs Contributor Provides technology
State Research Institutes Contributor Model testing and provide technology
State Water Resources Dept Decision maker Governs water resources and owns maximum
no of dams
Water Supply Organizations (Urban Decision maker Ensures water for domestic use
Local Bodies / Panchayats)
State Forest & Environment Dept Decision maker Manages the catchment
Disaster Management Authorities Decision maker Coordinates agencies and people during
and contributor emergency
Agriculture Dept Decision maker Governs agriculture
Tourism Dept Decision maker & Governs on tourism development
User
Fishery Dept Decision maker & Policy maker for reservoir fishery
User
World Bank / Funding Agencies Contributors Provides aid/loan for dam rehabilitation works.
Drinking Water Users User Consume water for drinking, cooking and other
household need
Irrigation Water Users User Consume water for agricultural purposes
Fishermen User Use water bodies for fishery
Displaced people Upshot They are the negatively affected people of
water resource development (dams)
Industry User Consume water for industrial production as well
as for non-industrial use by the employees
Navigation Companies / Boatmen User Use rivers for navigational purposes
Contractors User cum Does the remedial works
Contributor
Polluting Agencies Upshot Pollutes the water with activities(mining)
Consultants User cum Provides expert advises ,prepares reports at a
Contributor cost
NGOs/Activists Contributor Raise issues related to peoples safety,
environmental degradation
News Papers / Electronic Media Contributor Information to public
5.0 PRIORITY AND PERFORMANCE
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The water regulated by and stored in dams is considered to be an absolute requirement to meet the
water challenges and the development objectives of other sectors in industry, agriculture, energy and
risk management. Indeed, it is said that in many parts of the world such challenges cannot be
achieved without increased storage, and demand cannot be met by exploitation of natural flow
patterns alone. Dams continue to be seen as a solution across all of the use and demand
challenges. Unfortunately, many of our most powerful and extensive alterations of flow of water have
long run consequences that are unintended, unanticipated and undesirable. Institutions develop over
decades and centuries to fulfill specific social needs. While our institutions have served us well, they
are pressed to cope with a future in which water quality and availability for rapidly changing demands,
ecological health for fresh and coastal waters, integrative use of surface and ground water and land
use patterns must be considered simultaneously in geographical settings of watersheds. At a larger
scale, maintaining sustainable practices in land and water management by building synergies between
social and natural capital can serve security needs effectively. Building social networks of trust and
mutually beneficial interdependence is therefore the social infrastructure of water resources
sustainability.
6.0 STRENGTHENING THE DAM SAFETY INSTITUTIONS
Many large dams are ageing and have various structural deficiencies and shortcomings in operation
and maintenance. In most states, budgets for dam O & M are part of the larger budget for irrigation
system maintenance, which is decided on the basis of irrigated area than the actual need. In practice,
irrigation canal maintenance gets priority over dam maintenance, which has allowed deterioration of
many dams. The dam safety assurance is necessary to reduce risks and assure sustainability and full
operational capacity of existing storage through early identification and rectification of the problem.
During April 1989, the World Bank proposed to establish a centrally funded scheme for a possible
assistance by the Bank as a project with objective (a) to strengthen the institutional frame work for
Dam Safety Assurance b) to upgrade the physical features in and around the selected dams to
enhance the safety status as required through basic safety facilities and remedial works.
Accordingly an agreement was signed in 1991 for an assistance of US $130 Million for Dam Safety
Assurance and Rehabilitation Project (DSARP) in Central Water Commission and 4 participating
States i.e., Orissa, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh and Tamil Nadu. The project completed in September
1999. The key achievement as per the Implementation Completion Report of World Bank is that the
dam safety programme has become generally accepted in India as necessity. In central and state
levels, awareness has grown appreciably. Institutional strengthening in terms of creation and operation
of permanent DSO equipped with requisite staff carrying out periodic inspection of health status of
large dams have been achieved. The CWC has also been strengthened with permanent staff
increased and equipment, training provided. In other words, Indias dam safety assurance programme
has made an important start towards being institutionalized. The hydrological review capability of
CWCs DSO has been strengthened but effective and sustainable. Regional probable maximum
precipitation (PMP) atlases have been prepared for two regions. The CWC reviewed the flood
forecasting facilities in Chambal and Mahanadi basins and improvements have been implemented.
Lessons learnt from DSARP
The project was the first stand alone dam safety project financed by the World Bank and the lessons
learned from the project include the substantial up gradation of institutions at the central level and
within the states. The project brought out many technical and institutional issues as follows:
Hydrological review of dams take a long time to collate data for rainstorms ,decide the PMP and
derive the unit hydrograph of the project catchment. Highly technical components, such as flood
forecasting using telemetry, risk analysis, and some other specialized areas needs to be
thoroughly prepared before appraisal, using international consultants where necessary. The use of
new instrumentation requires training of the personnel concerned. Where practical, the supply and
installation contract should include a component for on-the-job training. The project design should
incorporate development of computer data bases incorporating historical major flood hydrographs
and corresponding storm data, software for analysis, and graphical user friendly interfaces.
144
Training in dam safety should be institutionalized so that all engineers in charge of dams
routinely receive dam safety training. The frequent rotation of experienced staff away from dam
related work should be minimized.
It is important to prioritize investments according to appropriate risk analysis and not on limited
parameters such as dam height and reservoir volume but taking account of the extent of potential
loss of life and physical damage downstream.
Dam safety review panels should be advisory only and should not be required to approve studies
or designs. The selection of members of dam safety review panels should be made very carefully
to ensure that those selected are capable of reaching sensible conclusions quickly.
States generally do not have adequate hydrological capability to estimate design floods and
review flood operating strategies. There is a need for more specialization and the development of
experience in specific fields. Flood analysis, flood forecasting and reservoir operation and the
other aspects of the hydrology of reservoirs is one such field where specialization is desirable.
Frequent transfer of engineers who have received specific training is counter-productive. There is
a need for much more review and analysis of historical events to understand why floods in excess
of previous designs were passed without undue damage or difficulty and as an aid to formation of
future operational strategies.
Systemic problems in project implementation need to be avoided: Uncertainty in the flow of funds
deters good contractors from bidding for the works. Procurement is slow. Contract management
by DOI / DOWR needs improvement. The stakeholders' Workshop drew attention to the need for
more training in Bank procedures and contract management.
O&M manuals should take account of dam safety plans (including O&M, instrumentation, and
emergency preparedness), which should be drafted early in the rehabilitation process and
progressively updated during implementation. Problems identified with the remedial works
should be reflected in revision to O&M manuals. Operating instructions should incorporate
design assumptions, such as expected erosion downstream of spillway energy dissipaters, pore
pressure readings, expected displacement, etc. The results of periodical readings of monitoring
instruments installed in the dams should be analyzed and the findings should be incorporated in
the annual O&M program, if necessary. Although implementation of the project has been
generally satisfactory, assurance against dam safety related disasters is a continuous and
ongoing process and further strengthening of institutions, procedures and technical capacity in
the project states are required.
The staff position of CWC and participating states strengthened and have been very effective in
implementing the dam safety programme, but the staff position in other non participating states were
not satisfactory to carry out the dam safety activity. The capacity to carryout effective dam safety
assurance programs varies from state to state due to staffing levels, training and degree of
experience. Several SDSOs face shortage of staff, capacity, office space, equipment and operating
budgets which limits their ability to adequately carry out their roles and put forth before the higher
management the dam safety needs and the resources.
7.0 NEED OF POLICY FRAME WORK
The competition for water by different sectors, urban and rural pressures, the need for sustainability
and environmental protection, the influence of climate change and climate variability, pressures from
various advocacy groups and partisan approaches, all make water management decisions highly
political. India ,like many nations is beginning to position water management decision making in the
framework of Integrated Water Resources Management(IWRM).The National Water Policy,2012
indicates the step in that direction. It also contains safety issues of hydraulic structures.
National Water Policy, 2012
The National Water Policy has spelt out regarding the water resources infrastructure maintenance and
the suitable percentage of costs of infrastructure development needs to be set aside along with
145
collected water charges for repair and maintenance. Legally empowered dam safety services need to
be ensured in the states as well as at the centre. Appropriate safety measures including downstream
flood management for each dam should be taken on top priority.
Flood forecasting is very important for flood preparedness and should be expanded extensively across
the country and modernized using real time data acquisition system and linked to forecasting models.
Efforts should be towards developing physical models for various basin sections which should be
linked to each other and to medium range weather forecast to enhance lead time.
The operating procedure for reservoirs should be evolved and implemented in such a manner to have
flood cushion and to reduce trapping of sediment during flood season. These procedures should be
based on sound decision support system. Protecting all areas prone to floods and droughts may not
be practicable. Hence, methods for coping with floods and droughts have to be encouraged.
Communities need to be involved in preparing an action plan for dealing with flood / drought situations.
To increase the preparedness for sudden and unexpected flood related disasters, dam break studies
and preparation and updating the emergency action plan should be evolved involving affected
communities.
Regarding the institutional arrangements, the national water policy says there should be a forum at the
national level to deliberate upon issues relating to water and evolve consciousness, cooperation and
reconciliation among party states. A similar mechanism should be established within each state to
amicably resolve differences in competing demands for water amongst different users of water and
also between different parts of the state.
A permanent water dispute tribunal at the centre should be established to resolve the issues
expeditiously in an equitable manner. Apart from using the good offices of the union or the state
governments, as the case may be, the path of the arbitration and mediation may also be tried in
dispute resolution. Water resources projects and services should be managed with community
participation. For improved service delivery on sustainable basis, the stage government / urban local
bodies may associate private sector in public private sector mode with penalties for failure under
regulatory control on prices charged and service standards with full accountability to democratically
elected local bodies.
Integrated water resources management (IWRM) taking river basin / sub-basin as a unit should be the
main principle for planning, development and management of water resources. The departments /
organizations at centre and stage government levels should be restructured and made multi-
disciplinary accordingly.
Appropriate institutional arrangement for each river basin should be developed to collect and collate all
data on regular basis with regard to rain fall, river flows, area irrigated by crop and by source,
utilization for various uses by both surface and ground water and to publish water accounts on ten
daily basis every year for each river basin with appropriate water budgets and water accounts based
on hydrologic balances. In addition, water budgeting and water accounting should be carried out for
each aquifers.
Most of the State water policies also indicate about the proper organizational arrangements for
ensuring the safety of the dams.
8.0 LEGAL INSTRUMENTS
Dam Safety Bill
Government of India is considering bringing out a central legislation on dam safety. The proposed dam
safety legislation will provide for proper surveillance, inspection, operation and maintenance of all large
th
dams in India to ensure their safe functioning. The Dam Safety Bill, 2010 which was introduced in 15
th
Lok Sabha in 30 August, 2010 has now come to lapse. Hence the bill needed to be prepared afresh.
The Dam Safety Bill, 2014 has been prepared by CWC and sent to Ministry of Water Resources for its
consideration. The Dam Safety Bill, 2010 encompasses 1) constitution of national committee on dam
safety; 2) the central dam safety organization in CWC to provide the technical and managerial
146
assistance to the state dam safety organizations or non-state dam safety organizations, all dam safety
cells; 3) constitution of state dam safety committee by state govt. having more than 20 specified dams;
4) establishment of state dam safety organizations in states having 20 or more large dams; 5)
establishment of dam safety cell in states having less than 20 specified dams; 6) establishment of non-
state dam safety organization by dam owners having more than 10 specified dams; 7) establishment
of non-state dam safety cell by dam owners having less than 10 specified dams. The bill elaborates
the duties and functions of these institutions.
9.0 SUSTAINABLE DAM SAFETY AND INTER-GENERATIONAL CHALLENGE
Challenge Fund Mechanism & private sector participation
Inadequate budget allocation, lack of smooth flow of funds has resulted deferred dam maintenance
causing distress to dams and increased risk of failure. Dams with potential to generate hydro power,
aquaculture, and water related recreation and tourism can attract private sector to participate in dam
operation & maintenance. A replenishable challenge fund by responsible financial institution can be
created. A dam qualifying to repay can avail fund for its proper O & M.
Till the Dams are made self sustaining, adequate fund provision for O & M needs to be made by the
dam owners.
Preserving and digitizing the documents and drawings
A most important aspect of dam safety sustainability is upkeepment of the records and drawings. A
well maintained history record guides the decision maker before going for any intervention. The well
preserved documents and drawings not only help the present user generation but also to generations
to come. The State DSOs need to have library containing all digitized documents and drawings.
Link with premier Technical and Management Institutions and Universities
There is a necessity to bridge the gap between the advanced theoretical knowledge gathered in the
technical education institutes and its applications in the field. The country may not withstand the
Business as Usual scenario. To prepare the younger generation to face the challenges of demand for
water for growing population, uncertainties due to climate change and aging of existing structures , the
technical education institutes and Government Departments should plan out suitable programmes to
move shoulder to shoulder not limiting the role as consultants . Likewise the premier management
institutes and universities should evolve suitable conflict management and negotiation skill
development techniques to make dam safety programme sustainable.
Sustainable Catchment Management
Although the construction of more no of storage reservoirs is necessary to meet the ever increasing
water needs, but the best possible sites have already been used. To make the existing reservoirs
sustainable, the sediment flow in to the reservoir needs to be controlled by suitable interventions such
as forestation and appropriate catchment treatment. Existing laws also need to scrupulously enforce to
stop the industries releasing untreated affluent to rivers.
10.0 CONCLUSION
Dams must be designed, built, operated and maintained safe. The responsibility for protecting lives
and property never ends. New approaches and policies must be developed, implemented and
evaluated. New programmes must be promoted and weak programmes need to be revitalized.
Institutions are to be strengthened and interlinked. An efficient dam safety management needs
development of effective co-ordination mechanism between users to ensure that their policies,
instruments and objectives are mutually consistent and do not undermine each other. An important
prerequisite is better availability & access to accurate, consistent data as well as facilitating dialogue
among stakeholders on relevant issue. Given the large capital investment in the large dams, the
substantive evaluations of completed projects are few in number, narrow in scope, poorly integrated
147
across impact categories and inadequately linked to decision on operation. Figuere et al (2005) rightly
advocate for investment in three inter-generational segments of society: the present senior generation,
the present young professional and future professionals. They argue, in this complex jungle of
uncertainties, there is one thing that we know for sure. If we wait for the next generation of water
mangers to do something, it will be too late for too many people. The difference of opinion between the
social activist, the policy maker and the engineers is not insurmountable. Instead of arguing endlessly
on the advantages of one form of water resources development over the other, emphasis should be
given on finding the right balance between the two so that the societal, agricultural and industrial
needs are satisfied in an optimum and efficient way. Hence all concerned with the water resources
sector should relentlessly pursue the objective of overall development with a participatory approach to
maximize the benefits and reduce the negative impacts to the bare minimum possible.
REFERENCES
Figuere Caroline M,Johan Rockstorm and Cecilia Tortajada(2005), Conclusion: The way Forward, in Caroline M
Figueres et al (eds),Rethinking Water Management: Innovative approach to contemporary issues, Earthscan
publication Ltd, London, UK.
Government of India, Central Water Commission; (1986) Report on Dam Safety Procedures, CWC publication;
(1989) Guidelines for safety inspection of dams, CWC publication.
Government of Orissa, Department of Water Resources, State DSO (2007): Dam safety activities and large dams
of Orissa.
ICOLD, 1998, ICOLD World Register of Dams, Computer Database, Paris, International Commission on
Large Dams.
The World Bank,(2000), Implementation completion report. Report no 20399, Rural Development Sector
Management Unit, South Asia Region.
United Nations (2003), World Water Development Report, Water for People Water for Life, UNESCO and
Berghahn Books.
U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation (1995), Safety Evaluation of Existing Dams, Water
Resources Technical Publication, Denver, Colorado
World Commission on Dams, (2000) Dams and Development - A new frame work for decision making; Earthscan
publication Ltd, London.
148
Dam Safety and DRIP Activities in Tamil Nadu

V.D.SURESH
Project Director
SPMU, Tamil Nadu Water Resources Department
tnspmu@gmail.com
P. Gunasekaran V. Veeralakshmi
Executive Engineer Assistant Executive Engineer
SPMU, Tamil Nadu Water Resources Department SPMU, Tamil Nadu Water Resources Department
ABSTRACT
Tamil Nadu, the southernmost state of the Indian peninsula is, spread over 130,058 sq. km. It lies between 800 5"
to 130 35" N and 760 15" to 800 20" E and accounts for about 4 percent of the total area of the country. About 40
per cent of the state population is dependent on agriculture for livelihood. Hence growth in agriculture is important
not only to ensure food security but also for higher living standards as well. The state is heavily dependent on
monsoon rains. It has 17 major river basins. Presently there are about 85 reservoirs under major, medium and
small category which are being used for either irrigation or drinking or both and are maintained by Water
Resources Department (WRD). The existing storage structures were created years before and need improvement
to meet the growing demands and to preserve rainwater for using it efficiently. The state Water Resources
Department through various modernization programmes are attempting to revive them. Also, it is important to
monitor the safety and operational performance of the dams for safe and efficient use. The Dam Safety
Directorate (DSD) was established in the year 1991 in Tamil Nadu with the object of giving assurance to the
safety of large dams in Tamil Nadu. At Present the Dam Safety Directorate is monitoring the health status of 89
WRD dams and 38 Nos. of Tamil Nadu Generation and Corporation (TANGEDCO) large dams and provides
suggestion to improve the safety and operational performance of the dams. Also, being a member in State Dam
Safety and National Dam Safety Committees it reports the government about the health status of dams in the
state and recommends for the various dam safety activities that are to be carried out in the state.
Dam Rehabilitation and Improvement Project (DRIP) have been taken up in India with World Bank Assistance to
ensure the strength, safety and to improve the operational performance of the existing Dams in a sustainable
manner. The project implementation period is six years from 2012 to 2018. Presently, 75 WRD dams and 38
TANGEDCO dams in Tamil Nadu are proposed to be rehabilitated under this project and in few dams the works
are in progress. This paper deals about the dam safety and DRIP activities that are carried out in Tamil Nadu. The
implementation procedure and the activities involved in the Project pertaining to Tamil Nadu are detailed in this
paper in clear manner. The rehabilitation works that are required to be carried out in the DRIP dams are also
outlined.
1. INTRODUCTION
Tamil Nadu, the southernmost state of the Indian peninsula is, spread over 1,30,058 sq.km. It lies
between 800 5" to 130 35" N and 760 15" to 800 20" E. Tamil Nadu constitutes 4 percent of Indias land
area and is inhabited by 6 percent of Indias population, but has only 2.5 percent of Indias Water
resources. About 40 per cent of the state population is dependent on agriculture for livelihood.
Agriculture is the largest consumer of water in the State, using 75 per cent of the States water
resources. Demands from other sectors such as domestic and industries have been growing
significantly.
The State is heavily dependent on monsoon rains. The annual average rainfall is around 930 mm. (47
percent during the north-east monsoon, 35 percent during the south-west monsoon, 14 percent in the
summer and 4 percent in the winter). Hence, it is essential to store the rain water through the existing
storage structures like Dams and tanks. Many dams in Tamil Nadu are constructed years before and
there is an urgent need to revive them to accommodate to the present climatic scenario for safe and
efficient operation of the same.
Dam Rehabilitation and Improvement Project (DRIP) has been taken up in India with World Bank
Assistance in order to ensure the strength, safety and to improve the safety and operational
performance of the existing Dams in a sustainable manner. The project is being supervised and
coordinated by Central Water Commission (CWC) at the National level and the State Project
149
Managem ment Unit (SSPMU) at the e State leve

el. This pape
er aims to hig
ghlight the dam
d safety a
and DRIP
activitiess that are carrried out in Tamil Nadu.
2. DAMS
S IN TAMIL NADU
N
Prior to independen nce only thrree reservoirs, viz., Perriyar, Pechip

parai and Mettur
M reservvoir were
construccted. Presenttly there are about 85 resservoirs majo
or, medium and
a small puut together with a total
storage ccapacity of about
a 6,500 MCM.
M
ution of dams in Tamil Na

The age--wise distribu adu is diagra
ammatically represented
r in Figure 1. 65% of
the damss in Tamil Naadu are moree than 25 yea
ars old and are
a in a needd of rehabilita
ation and
improvem
ment. Hence e, more numb ber of dams is included u
under DRIP in Tamil Nadu.
%
3% 2%
35% 12%
Above100
A Years
75
7 - 100 Yearrs
50
5 - 74 Years
48%
25
2 - 49 Years
Less than 25 Years
Y
Figure
e 1 Age-wise distribution
d of dams in Tamiil Nadu
3. DAM SAFETY IN TAMIL NA

ADU
To give assurance to the safe ety of damss in Tamil Nadu, Dam Safety Dirrectorate (DSD) was
hed in the year
establish y 1991 in Tamil Nadu u headed byy a Director in the rank of a Superrintending
e detailed below.
Engineer. The activitties of the Directorate are
eparation of Health Stattus Reports of dams

3.1 Pre
The periodical monsoon inspection reports prepared
p by the
t field offic
cers of the fo
our regions (Chennai,
(
Madurai,, Trichy and Pollachi) arre reviewed byb the DSD as detailed in the Table e 1 and Health Status
Reports are prepareed prioritizing
g the deficie
encies and submitted to the Governm ment, Regional Chief
Engineers and Chieff Engineer (C Civil Designss), TANGEDDCO. The co onsolidated health
h status report is
nually submiitted to the Central Watter Commisssion as Ann
also ann nual Consolidation Repo ort (ACR)
based on
n Pre-Monso oon and Postt - Monsoon inspection re eports.
Table 1 Inspe
ection by Dam Safety Directtorate
Sl.No. Period Tarrget Date for Inspection

th th
1 Pre Monsoon 10 Apr 14 Jun
n
th th
2 Monsoon I 15 Jun 15 Aug
g
3 Monsoon II 16th Aug 14th No
ov
th th
4 Post Monsoon
n 15 Nov 9 Aprr
chnical inve
3.2 Tec estigation off large dams
s by Multi-Disciplinary Committee
C (
(Phase-I)
Technica al Investigation of all the Dams in the

e state (both WRD and TANGEDCO)
T ) are carried out once
in five yyears by a five member multidisciplinary committee as Pha ase-I Investig
gation of Da ams. The
Director, Dam Safetyy Directorate is the Chairman for Phase I investiga
ation.
150
3.3 Detailed Technical Investigation of dams by National Level Experts (Phase II)
These inspections of dams are being carried out by experts from National level. These experts
recommend their views and comments on specific problems related to dam structures.
3.4 State Dam Safety Committee (SDSC)
The State Dam Safety Committee (SDSC) was reconstituted by the State Government to monitor the
safety aspects of all the dams in the State. The main functions of the Committee are to review the
work done by the Dam Safety Directorate and to keep the State Government informed of its activities
and recommendations. The committee meets twice in a year. The Chairman of the Committee is
Principal Secretary to Government, Public Works Department.
3.5 National Committee on Dam Safety (NCDS)
The Chief Engineer (O & M) and the Director, Dam Safety Directorate are the members of the National
Committee on Dam safety under the Chairmanship of the Chairman Central Water Commission which
reviews the activities of the State Dam Safety Organisations in the states. The National Committee on
Dam safety meets once in a year.
3.6 Preparation of Geological Mapping documents of Dams
The Geological Mapping documents of dams are being prepared through Geological Survey of India.
So far, Geological mapping documents were prepared for 65 PWD dams and 36 large dams of
TANGEDCO. The structural deficiencies observed at the dam site with respect to Geological aspects
are reported in the document with recommendations for remedial works.
3.7 Preparation of History Books of dams
So far, History books of 9 dams namely (1) Vaniar (2) Gomukhi (3) Mettur (4) Uppar (Thiruppur) (5)
Periyar (6) Pechiparai (7) Manjalar (8) Manimuthar and (9) Sholayar have been prepared and printed.
4. DAM REHABILITATION AND IMPROVEMENT PROJECT (DRIP)
The Dam Rehabilitation and Improvement Project with implementation period of six years has become
effective on 18th April 2012 and is under implementation initially in four States, namely: Tamil Nadu,
Kerala, Madhya Pradesh and Odisha, targeting rehabilitation and improvement of 223 identified dams.
These identified dams are of Water Resources Department of the States and in case of Tamil Nadu
and Kerala, also of the State Electricity Boards. The total estimated cost of DRIP is Rs.2100 Crore
which includes share of about Rs.1488 Crore for the initially identified four States, Rs.480 Crore for the
new States/Organizations, and Rs.132 Crore for CWC. World Bank will be funding 80% of the project
cost by way of loan/credit, while remaining 20% will be borne by the respective State Governments
and the Central Government.
The main components of the DRIP Project are; (a) Rehabilitation and Improvement of Dams and
associated appurtenances, (b) Dam Safety Institutional Strengthening and (c) Project Management.
5. DRIP ACTIVITIES IN TAMIL NADU
In Tamil Nadu, the participating Departments in DRIP are Water Resources Department (WRD), Tamil
Nadu Generation and Distribution Corporation Ltd. (TANGEDCO) and Agricultural Engineering
Department (AED). The total number of dams taken under DRIP in Tamil Nadu is 113 of which 75 (i.e.
70 dams + 4 drinking water reservoirs+ 1 Anicut) are WRD dams and 38 are TANGEDCO dams. In
addition, Catchment Area Treatment works are taken up by the AED in two reservoirs, namely
Krishnagiri and Kundah reservoirs to reduce the siltation in dams. State Project Management Unit
(SPMU) in Tamil Nadu is the co-ordinating office for Tamil Nadu State headed by a Project Director.
The implementing agencies are (IA) are WRD, TANGEDCO & AED in Tamil Nadu.
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6. DRIP IMPLEMENTATION PROCEDURE IN TAMILNADU
Certain procedures are followed in Tamil Nadu to rehabilitate the DRIP dams and the implementation
procedure has been detailed as a flow chart in Figure 2.
HYDROLOGICAL REVIEW STUDY

(To be vetted by CWC for Large Dams & by Design Circle for
Small and Intermediate Dams)
FLOOD ROUTING by Design Circle, WRD

(Additional surplus arrangements design stability checks are
to be done if required)
INSPECTION BY DAM SAFETY REVIEW PANEL
PREPARATION OF DETAILED ESTIMATE
PREPARATION OF PROJECT SCREENING TEMPLATE

First level Screening of PST - SPMU
Second level Screening of PST - CPMU
Approval of PST by WB
EMPOWERED COMMITTEE CLEARANCE FOR THE PROPOSAL
ADMINISTRATIVE SANCTION FROM GOVERNMENT
TECHNICAL SANCTION OF THE ESTIMATE
BID APPROVAL
Prior Review works - > Rs.25 Crores- by WB &
Rs.5- 25 Crores by CPMU
Post Review Works < Rs.5 Crores by SPMU
TENDERING PROCESS
(Inviting Tenders, Tender Award Committee approval & Bid
Evaluation report approval by WB for prior review works)
AWARD OF CONTRACT
IMPLEMENTATION
Figure 2. Implementation Procedure of DRIP in Tamil Nadu
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6.1 Hydrology Review Study and Flood Routing
The design flood computed in many dams, especially in older ones are inadequate according to the
new standards since the design floods were arrived based on the limited rainfall details available
during construction period. Now, many rainfall stations were established during the recent past and
hence the design flood can be computed more precisely. Under DRIP, before any rehabilitation and
improvement works are undertaken on a dam, the design flood for the reservoir are being calculated in
accordance with IS: 11223 - 1985. Based on IS: 11223 - 1985, dams are classified as Small,
Intermediate and Large (Table 2). Depending on the type of dam, hydrology review study report is
prepared. If a dam is classified as Large, the hydrology of the dam is prepared taking into the
consideration of Probable Maximum Flood (PMF) and the report is sent to Central Water Commission,
New Delhi for vetting. If a dam is small, 100 year storm is taken as inflow design storm and if the dam
is intermediate, Standard Project Storm is taken as the inflow design storm. The hydrology review
study reports of Small and Intermediate dams are vetted by Designs Circle, the Design Wing of Tamil
Nadu Water Resources Department (TNWRD).
Table 2 Classification of dams as per IS11223-1985
Gross Hydraulic Total No. of

Sl. Classification Total No. of
Storage Head Inflow Design Storm TANGEDCO
No. of Dam WRD dams
(Mcm) (m) dams
1 Small 0.5-10 7.5 -12 100 year Storm 19 2
2 Intermediate 10-60 12 -30 Standard Project Storm 41 17
3 Large >60 >30 Probable Maximum Storm 15 19

Total 75 38
After the approval of hydrology review study, if the revised design flood is greater than the original
design flood, Flood Routing study has to be carried on the vetted inflow hydrograph to access the flood
handling capacity of the existing surplus arrangements to cater the revised inflow peak. Decisions
have to be made on what type of surplus arrangements have to be provided if it needed. Necessary
designs have to be formulated for the additional surplus arrangements and the stability of the existing
structure has to be checked for the revised M.W.L conditions and the availability of free board also be
checked for the rise in water level.
6.2 Dam Safety Review Panel (DSRP) Inspection
DSRP will be advisory in function and provide expert opinion on studies and designs. The objective of
DSRP is to review and advise on complicated design and construction matters related to dam safety
and other critical aspects of project dams, its appurtenant structures, catchment area, area
surrounding the reservoir and downstream areas. There are two DSRP teams constituted in Tamil
Nadu under DRIP consisting of technical experts. The DSRP team inspect in and out of the DRIP
dams and recommend the rehabilitation works needed for the dam and other appurtenant structures.
6.3 Detailed Estimate
Based on the recommendations of the DSRP, detailed estimate for each dam is prepared by the field
Engineers and the estimates are scrutinized by Tamil Nadu SPMU. The following rehabilitation works
have been proposed / taken under DRIP:
Strengthening of Earthen bund

Reaming the Vertical Drainage Shaft
Repairs to revetment/ rip -rap in u/s face
Repairs to Chutes, Parapet walls/kerb walls
Repairs to Toe drain, Rock Toe
Providing additional Surplus Weir
Providing Fuse plug Arrangements
Repair/Improvements to Energy dissipation arrangement
Providing Turfing on D/S
Filter Arrangements
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Repairs to Road on top of dam, approach road, service road.

Construction of protective walls along the sides of the roads, surplus course etc.
Repairs/ replacement of shutter
Construction of Retaining wall at upstream side
Repairs to d/s rubble apron.
Repair works to gallery
Grouting if necessary
Reaming of choked drain holes
Providing Culverts in d/s of the dam
Improvements to existing drain and Retaining Wall
Repairs or providing Instrumentation
Repairing, renewing and providing electrical arrangements
Providing Lightning Conductors
Providing Generator if necessary.
Providing Communication Facilities
Automatic weather stations, Digital water level indicators, Flood warning System (Siren) are
proposed to be installed.
6.4 Project Screening Template (PST)
An important feature of project management is the standard template form which is to be filled by the
concerned Executive Engineer. The template provides the basic parameters of each dam and detailed
information on technical, environmental, social and all implementation related aspects. The PST
consists of six forms namely (1) Form 1-Project Details, (2) Form 2-Dam Specific details, (3) Form 3-
Health Status of dams, (4) Form 4-Rehabilitation Proposals, (5) Form 5-Environmental and Social
Management Framework and (6) Form 6-Implementation arrangement. The preliminary screening of
the PST is done by TNSPMU and after incorporating SPMU comments the same has been sent to
Central Project Management Unit (CPMU) for obtaining World Bank approval.
6.5 Administrative and Technical Sanction
After obtaining the World Bank approval for the PST, the rehabilitation proposal is placed before the
Empowered Committee for DRIP which is headed by the Chief Secretary to Government for getting
approval after which Administrative Sanction is obtained from the Government. After obtaining the
Administrative sanction, Technical sanction is accorded by the concerned regional Chief Engineers.
6.6 Tender Process
Bid document is prepared by the Dam Engineers based on World Bank approval norms and guidelines
and the same is scrutinized and approved by the competent authority. (i.e. Prior Review Works (Rs.5
Crore to Rs. 25 crore) - CPMU approval & above 25 Crores- World Bank approval, Post Review
Works (<Rs.5 Crore) SPMU approval. After the approval of the bid document, tenders are floated.
Tender is awarded after the approval of Bid Evaluation Report by the Tender Award Committee.
6.7 Award of Contract
Once the tender is awarded, the agreement is signed with the approved bidder. The dam site is
handed over for carrying out the rehabilitation works at the dam site as per the specification outlined in
the Bid. Hydromechanical works are being carried out through Public Works Workshops and Stores
which is specialized institution in Water Resources Department having more than 150 years of
experience in this field. Similarly Electrical works are being carried out through Electrical wing of Public
Works Department. The quality of the rehabilitation works are also being checked by the respective
Quality Control divisions functioning in the fours regions of the state.
7. AGRICULTURAL ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT (AED)
Reservoir sedimentation or Reservoir Silting is a major issue in many reservoirs. Sedimentation results
in loss of storage and also reduces the life span of the reservoir. To address these issue necessary
catchment area treatment works are to be carried out. Catchment Area Treatment works in Kundah
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and Krishnagiri reservoirs are proposed to be carried out through AED under DRIP. The Catchment
area treatment works proposed are construction of Terrace Support Wall/Gabion Terrace Support
Wall, Facial Revetment/Gabion Facial Revetment, Drainage Line Treatment and landslide treatment
works etc.
8. OTHER ACTIVITIES OF DRIP IN TAMIL NADU

In addition to the implementation procedure mentioned above, TNSPMU involves in the following
activities;
(1) Sedimentation studies in DRIP dams in Tamil Nadu through Watershed Management Board
Division, Pollachi.
(2) Organizing training programmes on various topics such as Procurement Procedures, Design
Flood Review, Geo-technical investigations, grouting techniques, Preparation of Templates,
Emergency Action Plan, etc. at various cities of Tamil Nadu.
(3) Organizing Technical Committee meetings and World Bank Review Mission meeting meetings
for DRIP on behalf of Tamil Nadu.
9. PROGRESS OF DRIP IN TAMILNADU
Following the implementation procedure, 9 WRD and 3 TANGEDCO works are in progress in Tamil
Nadu. 95% of Hydrology review study, 65% of flood routing study, 87% of DSRP has been completed.
Template approval for 31 dams (26WRD+ 5 TANGEDCO) dams have been obtained from the World
Bank. Action is being taken to implement the Rehabilitation works after adhering the World Bank
procedures for 15 WRD dams, 5 TANGEDCO dams and catchment area works in 2 dams by AED
during the year 2014-2015 and the balance in subsequent years.
10. CONCLUSION
The Progress of DRIP activities in Tamil Nadu are being monitored by the Officials of World Bank,
Central Project Management Unit (CPMU)/ CWC, SPMU, WRD, Dam Safety, Consultants then and
there to check the progress and quality of the work done at the dam site. World Bank Review Mission
review the progress of DRIP works twice in a year. The technical Committee for DRIP review the
progress once in four months and discuss about the bottlenecks in implementation and provide
necessary guidance.
It is expected that after the dams are rehabilitated and brought to its original standards by this project,
the efficiency of the project will be improved and the life of the dam will be extended and thus serve to
the nation through bringing the maximum benefits.
REFERENCES
Project Appraisal Document for Dam Rehabilitation and Improvement Project, World Bank, Report No. 51061- TN,
2010
IS11223-1985 Guidelines for fixing spillway capacity, Indian Standards Institution, New Delhi, 1985.
155
Quality Management Systems in Central Dam Safety Organisation

Yoki Vijay M. Bhaskara Reddy
Deputy Director (DSR), Central Water Commission Institutional Strengthening Specialist (DRIP)
EGIS India Consulting Engineers Pvt. Ltd.
cynosureconsultancyservices@gmail.com
ABSTRACT
Quality Management System (QMS) is a set of interrelated or interacting elements of an organization to establish
policies and objectives and processes to achieve those objectives. QMS manages the interacting processes,
sub-systems, procedures, and resources required to provide value to all relevant interested parties and realize
the outputs, outcomes or results of the whole organization.
Central Dam Safety Organisation (CDSO) decided to establish the Quality Management Systems conforming to
ISO 9001: 2008 and obtain certification from a reputed certification body.
QMS in CDSO was developed by the following process:

1) Investigatory Study/Gap Analysis to assess the existing operational procedures and the methods and
identifying the key processes for defining the procedures;
2) Organizing a two-day training programme on quality management systems and documentation for the
senior and middle level executives;
3) Defining the quality policy and vision, mission and values of CDSO;
4) Developing quality manual, procedures and formats with the active involvement of the personnel directly
implementing or supervising corresponding processes; and
5) Releasing them for implementation with the approval of the Chief Engineer.
A one-day appreciation programme was organized to cover all executives involved in the implementation of QMS
processes to explain the basic concepts and requirements of QMS and to bring awareness about the need to
implement the processes in accordance with the documented quality management system. Appropriate records
maintained as defined in the corresponding procedures to demonstrate the implementation. CDSO monitors
customer views and opinions about the organisation and its services and obtains feedback relating to their
perception of the degree to which their requirements have been met.
Implementation and effectiveness of the QMS were monitored through internal reviews and internal quality
audits. The results were evaluated during the management review process to determine the adequacy, suitability,
implementation and effectiveness of the QMS and appropriate actions taken.
CDSO maintains an ongoing focus on improvement to maintain current levels of performance, to react to
changes in its internal and external conditions and to create new opportunities. CDSO establishes performance
and improvement goals in terms of quality objectives for different functions and levels in CDSO and monitors the
status of their achievement.
The process for certification of CDSO Quality Management System is under way for the identification of a
certification body and submission of application. Implementation of quality management system is a continuing
process which is based on the methodology, known as PDCA; which illustrates the planning (P), executing
according to the plan (D), monitoring the results (C) and implementing improvement activities as necessary (A)
1. INTRODUCTION
Quality Management System (QMS) is a set of interrelated or interacting elements of an organization

to establish policies and objectives and processes to achieve those objectives. QMS manages the
interacting processes, sub-systems, procedures, and resources required to provide value to all
relevant interested parties and realize the outputs, outcomes or results of the whole organization.
Process approach envisaged in the Quality Management Systems defined in ISO 9001: 2008 is the
result of consolidated efforts of worlds practising professionals managing organizations both in public
and private sectors. Sound Quality Management Systems provided the framework for effective
management and is the key to success of any organization. Today, more and more organizations are
establishing sound Quality Management Systems conforming to ISO 9001 in their effort to achieve
excellence in their operations.
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Consistent and predictable results are achieved more effectively and efficiently when activities are
understood and managed as interrelated processes that function as a coherent system. The quality
management system is composed of interrelated processes. Understanding how results are produced
by this system, including all its processes, resources, controls and interactions, allows the organization
to optimize its performance. All processes, including outsourced processes are proactively managed to
ensure that they are effective and efficient.
The Quality Management System is a dynamic living system that evolves over time through periods of
improvement and innovation. Every organization has quality management activities, whether they have
been formally planned or not; ISO 9001 provides a structure that helps the organization to develop a
cohesive quality management system and a framework for planning, executing, monitoring and
improving the performance of various processes.
Central Dam Safety Organisation (CDSO) decided to establish the Quality Management Systems
conforming to ISO 9001: 2008 and obtain certification from a reputed certification body. The
Consultant engaged under the Dam Rehabilitation and Improvement Project (DRIP) was given the
task of facilitating the establishment of QMS.
2. MODUS OPERANDI ADOPTED FOR DEVELOPMENT OF QMS
2.1 Stage 1: Investigatory Study/Gap Analysis
All the processes of CDSO were studied and extensive discussions held with key personnel of each
Directorate to assess the existing operational procedures and the methods. The need for any
improvement in the effectiveness of the processes in achieving desired quality and compliance with
the requirements of ISO 9001: 2008 were identified.
The key processes of CDSO and their extent were determined, interrelationship between the
processes were understood before defining the procedures to specify the way to perform these
processes. The processes were classified as management processes and dam safety related
processes; list of key processes identified for developing procedures is given at Annex 1.
Based on the analyses of existing processes and systems a roadmap for the development of QMS and
an appropriate structure for the implementation of the documented quality management system were
agreed upon with the top management.
2.2 Stage 2: Initiation Phase
To provide for greater awareness, appreciation and understanding of the quality management
systems, documentation requirements and method of their development, a two-day training
programme was organized. Senior and middle level executives of CDSO attended the programme who
together determined the requirements and the structure for the documentation.
Initially the procedures and formats to be developed for the key processes and the personnel
responsible for the same were agreed upon. To monitor and guide in the development and
implementation of the QMS documentation, a Management Review Committee (MRC) was constituted
with the Chief Engineer, CDSO as its Chairman and all the Directors as the Members. A Management
Representative (MR) and an Associate Management Representative (AMR) were designated to
coordinate the establishment of the QMS.
2.3 Stage 3: System Development
Roles and Responsibilities of Chief Engineer, Directors, MR and AMR in relation to QMS were
determined. Quality policy and vision, mission and values of CDSO were defined with the active
involvement of top management. Quality policy and vision, mission and values statements are given at
Annex 2. Fundamental concepts and principles of QMS as well as the Quality policy and vision,
mission and values were used in the development of CDSO Quality Management System. A
numbering system for unique identification of the documents and their revision status and the format,
structure and style of presentation for different types of documents were agreed upon. Draft
157
procedures and formats were developed with the active involvement of the personnel directly
implementing or supervising corresponding processes. The procedures took cognizance of the way
the processes were currently being performed and introduced improvements wherever necessary to
ensure the effectiveness of the processes and conformance with the requirements of ISO 9001: 2008.
The formats were developed as convenience tools to record the evidence for performing the
processes or the results obtained. The procedures and formats were reviewed by concerned Directors,
approved by the Chief Engineer and released for implementation. Quality Manual describing the
quality management system of CDSO was developed, approved by the Chief Engineer and released.
Now the initial documentation of QMS is complete and the next phase would be to implement the QMS
by following the procedures in the performance of various processes and maintaining records as
defined in the procedures to demonstrate compliance with the system.
3. IMPLEMENTATION OF DOCUMENTED QUALITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
A one-day appreciation programmes was organized to cover all executives involved in the
implementation of QMS processes to acquaint them with the basic concepts and requirements of the
QMS, quality policy and vision, mission and values of CDSO, their role in achieving the quality
objectives and their contribution to the effectiveness of the quality management system. They were
also exposed to the documentation to be followed in performing various processes and the
implications of not conforming to the quality management system requirements.
All concerned started implementing the processes in accordance with the documented procedures and
maintaining records as prescribed in the procedures. The effectiveness of the processes is
systematically measured and acted upon. The efficiency and effectiveness of the management system
for the processes is being reviewed on a continuing basis.
Internal external customers were identified by different Directorates and their current and future needs
as well their perception about the extent to which CDSO is meeting their needs and expectations is
being obtained through an invited feedback system.
All process outputs and services that do not conform to requirements are identified and controlled to
prevent their unintended use or delivery. Appropriate controls are exercised to correct the
nonconforming process outputs and services and investigate their causes and eliminate them to
prevent the recurrence of such nonconformities.
4. MONITORING IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTIVENESS OF QUALITY MANAGEMENT

SYSTEM
It is important that the Organisation regularly monitors and evaluate both the implementation and
effectiveness of the QMS. It is important to determine carefully considered indicators facilitate these
monitoring and evaluation activities. CDSO ensures that monitoring activities are implemented in
accordance with the determined requirements and retains appropriate records as evidence of the
results.
CDSO monitors customer views and opinions of the organisation and its services. CDSO obtains
information relating to customer perception of the degree to which their requirements have been met;
the methods for obtaining and using this information defined in the procedure for Customer
Satisfaction Feedback.
Internal quality audits are an essential feature of the quality management systems and are aimed at
maintaining the health of the system and providing an opportunity for timely corrective actions. Internal
quality audits are organized by trained internal auditors to determine the adequacy, implementation,
and effectiveness of the quality management system. A two day structured Internal Quality Auditor
Training Programme was conducted to train a group of middle level Executives for conducting the
internal quality audits. During the internal quality audits, evidences relating to the implementation of
various processes are collected and the gathered evidences are systematically evaluated to determine
any non-compliance with the documented quality management system and reported as Nonconformity
Reports (NCR). NCRs will need to be addressed by the concerned management by taking appropriate
158
corrections and corrective actions to remove the detected nonconformities and their causes. Wherever
required, changes to the process documentation are made to ensure compliance with the
requirements.
Management reviews were conducted at regular intervals initially to monitor the development of the
QMS and later to evaluate the adequacy, suitability, implementation and effectiveness of the QMS.
Results of internal and external audits, customer feedback and customer complaints, process
performance and conformance of services provided by CDSO, formed the inputs to the management
review process. CDSO maintains an ongoing focus on improvement. Improvement is essential even to
maintain current levels of performance, to react to changes in its internal and external conditions and
to create new opportunities. CDSO establishes performance and improvement goals in terms of quality
objectives for different functions and levels in CDSO and status of their achievement will also be
monitored during the management review process. CDSO evaluates the performance and the
effectiveness of the quality management system and determines appropriate actions for correction and
improvement based on analysis of the evidence gathered during the monitoring process thus taking
QMS performance to higher levels.
5. WAY FORWARD
The process for certification of CDSO Quality Management System is under way for the identification
of a certification body and submission of application. Implementation of quality management system is
a continuing process which is based on the methodology, known as PDCA; which illustrates the
planning (P), executing according to the plan (D), monitoring the results (C) and implementing
improvement activities as necessary (A). PDCA is used during the following three levels of
performance:
1) Maintenance: Take action to maintain performance at current levels, meeting objectives.

2) Improvement: Take action to raise performance to a higher level, meeting or exceeding
objectives.
3) Innovation: Take action to fundamentally transform performance, by generating and utilizing
new knowledge.
It is important to address the three levels with proper balance to effectively and efficiently achieve an
organizations purpose and objectives. Addressing only maintenance may not realize the potential
ability of the organizations processes. Likewise, attention to improvement and innovation without
steady maintenance may not retain the desired results.
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Annex 1
Central Dam Safety Organisation - List of Key Processes Identified for Developing Procedures
Management Processes
1. Management Review
2. Control of QMS Documents
3. Control of Documents Generated for External Use
4. Control of Records
5. Internal Quality Auditing
6. Control of Nonconforming Services
7. Corrective & Preventive Actions
8. Customer Satisfaction Feedback
9. Customer Complaint Resolution
10. Evaluation and Engagement of Individual Consultants
11. Purchasing of goods & services
12. IT Services & Support
13. Training
14. Providing Information for Parliament Questions / VIP References.
15. DRIP Website Management
Dam Safety Related Processes

1. Updating National Register of Large Dams (NRLD)
2. Providing Technical and Managerial Assistance to Dam Owners and State Governments
3. Organizing Training Seminars, Conferences and Publications for Promoting Dam Safety
4. Secretarial Assistance to National Committee on Dam Safety (NCDS)
5. Secretarial Assistance to National Committee on Seismic Design Parameters for River Valley
Projects (NCSDP)
6. Comprehensive Dam Safety Evaluation
7. Investigation of dam failures
8. Technical Appraisal of Detailed Project Reports (DPR)
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Annex 2
Central Dam Safety Organisation
Quality Policy
We provide technical and managerial assistance to dam owners and State Dam Safety Organisations
for proper surveillance, inspection, operation and maintenance of all dams and appurtenant works in
India to ensure safe functioning of dams and protecting human life, property and the environment.
We develop and nurture competent manpower and equip ourselves with state of the art technical
infrastructure to provide expert services to all stakeholders.
We continually improve our systems, processes and services to ensure satisfaction of our customers.
01 September 2014 Chief Engineer


Vision, Mission and Values
Vision
To remain as a premier organisation with best technical and managerial expertise for providing
advisory services on matters relating to dam safety.
Mission
To provide expert services to State Dam Safety Organisations, dam owners, dam operating
agencies and others concerned for ensuring safe functioning of dams with a view to protect human
life, property and the environment.
Values
Integrity: Act with integrity and honesty in all our actions and practices.
Commitment: Ensure good working conditions for employees and encourage professional
excellence.
Transparency: Ensure clear, accurate and complete information in communications
with stakeholders and take all decisions openly based on reliable information.
Quality of service: Provide state-of-the-art technical and managerial services within agreed time
frame.
Striving towards excellence: Promote continual improvement as an integral part of our working and
strive towards excellence in all our endeavours.
01 December 2014 Chief Engineer

161
Leveraging Web Based Applications for Monitoring &

Rehabilitation
Amit K Dasgupta Ajjay Arora
MIS / Software Development Specialist Web Developer, Egis-India
Egis-India
Amitkumar.d@egis-india.com
Ankit Kumar
Design Engineer, Egis-India
ABSTRACT
The management of dam safety and its health is a primary focus area for CWC who are mainly interested in
not only leveraging and harnessing vast information related to dams and their rehabilitation, but are keen on
developing and providing IT applications and IT knowledge management tools (KMT). The intent is to foster a
knowledge-sharing culture amongst its various stakeholders and ensure efficient information dissemination,
storage, retrieval and analyses.
This paper provides an overview of the management of information that is needed to ensure efficient
dissemination of dam related information. It further suggests the need for leveraging web based applications
and suggests efficient workflows that allow users to optimally manage all the activities that fall within DRIP. It
provides a document management workflow that integrates robust document management tools such as
Sioux, Comanche & SharePoint. The paper also evaluates the various factors that go into the development of
MIS related websites and applications that are under development. These applications provide a way to
evaluate future directions in integrating the dam related health and rehabilitation information with geospatial
technologies.
1 INTRODUCTION
Coordinated and supervised by Central Water Commission (CWC) and assisted by World Bank, the
Dam Rehabilitation and Improvement Project (DRIP) mainly deal with the development, improvement
and rehabilitation of dams. The objective of the project is to improve the safety and performance of
selected dams and to strengthen dam safety. It involves not only the collection, storage and
dissemination of dam health information, but focuses on providing such information with the help of
analytical tools and functions that allow stakeholders to optimally manage dam safety and operational
capability.
IT plays a significant role in managing existing and future information related to dam rehabilitation
projects and in leveraging web based technologies through the development of applications and KMT.
The objectives of web based applications are manifold and relate mainly to the following:
Integrating and evolving an optimal workflow in the dissemination of dam related information.
Capture and analysis of dam health and rehabilitation data for long-term planning and guiding
of dam operations.
Developing applications that will allow a systematic presentation and interpretation of data for
effective monitoring of dam health and rehabilitation.
This paper provides an overview of the information content of DRIP and discusses how web based
applications can be used to provide technical, environmental, project based information to participating
states.
2 THE NEED FOR LEVERAGING WEB BASED APPLICATIONS
IT has become an inherent part of the DRIP, especially related to the management of information
(MIS). As a turnkey project, the role of MIS within DRIP is to identify information requirements and
provide solutions and applications that will optimise information gathering, sharing and dissemination.
MIS involves optimal management of information not only in data collection and capture but also in
162
providingg an organissed represen ntation of da

ata. It is witth this intentt that variou
us factors ha
ave been
identified
d so as to le everage webb based appllications for smooth funcctioning of da am health monitoring
m
and reha abilitation. Th
hese are as follows:
f
Exhaaustive dam performancce informatio on related to

o dam health h and rehab bilitation nee
eds to be
colla
ated and orga anised from various
v state
e Dam Safetyy Organisatioons (DSO).
Provvide a comm mon coordina ation and commmunication interface that allow all participating
p states to
havee common op perating pictu
ure (COP).
Provvide an orga anised workfflow for docu ument mana agement, financial plannning, project planning
and facilitate the generation and
a storage of data.
Prommote appropriate technollogical skills and use of modern toolss and functio onalities thatt facilitate
smooth functioning of dam he ealth monitoring and reha
abilitation.
With the ever increassing advance ements in IT and the critical role it pla eb based
ays in organising data, we
applications offers significant opp
portunities fo
or exchange of informatio des essential tools for
on and provid
developing effective internal and external com mmunicationss.
Figuree 1: Positives off leveraging Web

We Based Applications
It is enviisaged that the

t positives of leveragin ng web based technologiies within DR RIP would leead to the
developm ment of IT enabled
e servvices; develo
opment of remote and en nterprise applications; in
ntegration
and orga anisation of data;
d and devvelopment ofo mobile andd web based services. Th he intent of CWC
C is to
transformm the functio oning and data dissemin nation of dam health annd rehabilitattion amongsst various
stakeholders. While datad capture e and data shharing form the
t backbone e of the proje
ect, workflow
ws related
to activitties within th
he project annd documentt manageme ent solutions need to be integrated asa part of
the projeect. The nextt sections detail the desig
gn and logic for
f the devellopment of thhe following:
1. D
Developmentt of DHARMA A application
n.
2. MIS
M websitess & financial websites.
w
3 A
APPLICATIO
ONS AND WEBSITES
W DEVELOPME
D ENT PROCE
ESS
The application deve elopment of DHARMA

D an
nd MIS webssites is basedd on an agile
e SDLC mod del where
the focu us is mainly on small in ncremental builds
b in con
nsultation with the CPMMU/ CWC. This is an
iterative process witth functional teams from
m CWC and EGIS workin ng simultaneeously on de eveloping
various tools and fu unctionalities. Once thes
se tools and functionalities have beeen develope ed, these
productss are releaseed and continnuously upgrraded based on user feeddback. Typiccally the development
process follows the following
f seqquence:
ning, gathering and analyysis of requirrements.

Defin
Desiign the conceeptual and physical mode els.
163
Deveelopment based on user requirementts.

Integ
gration and te
esting of pro
ototype and modification
m t meet userr requirements.
to
Deployment and acceptance of solutions.
Mainntenance and d sustenance e of solutionss.
Figure 2: Multiple
M stages of software andd application development.
de
It must be
b reiterated that the weeb based app plications deevelopment uses
u an agile
e based metthodology
since it p
provides opportunities to assess the direction
d of th
he applicatio
ons under development. It I focuses
on repetitive review of
o work done e and the req
quirements are
a continually revisited. It utilises insp
pect-and-
adapt ap pproach to de
evelopment and
a is curren nt and in line with the use
er requirements.
3.1 S
Software De
evelopment Platform
The softtware develoopment platfform has bee en designed d on open so ource since it allows low
w cost of
software
e developmen nt platform. The
T emphassis is towardss collaboratio on with stakeeholders to define
d the
moduless or types of information that
t will be re
equired as pa
art of the varrious solution
ns.
Figure 3: System Archittecture for Development of MIIS website
164
The devvelopment platform

p ado
opted for Dam
D Health and Reha
abilitation Monitoring Ap
pplication
(DHARM
MA) and otheer web sites are
a as follow
ws:
Deveelopment Language PH HP, Ajax, JSON and Java a Script

Data
abase - MySQ QL
Brow
wser Supportt: Internet bro owser Chroome, Firefoxx.
Webbhosting Facility
T The CWC wiill facilitate th
he web hosting facilities for
f the websiite.
E EGIS (for the
e period of Consultancy
C assignment)) - upkeep, periodic
p main
ntenance and
d controls
rregularly.
3.2 E
Enterprise data
d model developmen
d nt
Enterprisse data-mod del developm ment is an im mportant asp pect of web based solutiion developm ment and
has bee en used to develop
d the various web based applications an nd functiona
alities. It invo
olves the
identifica
ation of data attributes, id
dentification of
o entities, domains and classes and the associations that
exist between classses relatio onships, inhe eritance, com mposition, and
a aggregation. Enterprise data
models provide support to ne etwork / ha ardware infra astructure, organization structure, software
infrastruccture, and bu
usiness proccesses.
The deve
elopment of data model involve
i ollowing taskks as shown in the figure below:
the fo
Figure 4: Enterrprise data moddel developmennt
These ta
asks are as fo
ollows:
Iden
ntify entity Types
T It is a collectiion of tabless that are used
u for the development of the
data
abase.
Iden
ntify Attributtes The infformation or structured daata availablee within the entity
e types.
Appplying namin ng conventtions The e naming co onventions based
b on sta andard agile e naming
convventions.
Iden
ntifying Relaationships The real wo orld relationships that exisst within eacch of the entitty types.
Appplying data model
m patterrns The paatterns developed on the types of ana alysis to be pprovided.
Assign keys Identifies
I thee foreign or relationship
r k necessary for identify
key fying the relaationships
and data model patterns.
p
Normmalise to reeduce data redundancy
r y It is the process
p in which
w data atttributes withhin a data
model are organized to increase the cohe esion of entitty types.
Denormalise to o improve performance
p e - Modificattion of normalised data to enhance the data
acce
ess performa ance.
165
3.2 Developing User Interface
One of the most significant elements of a good user interface is visibility of the systems status. Within
the DRIP, UI is designed based on an iterative process that includes the following:
Developing a skeleton UI based on user requirements

Show case the skeleton UI to client
Client provides feedback and modifications
Modification of the skeleton UI based on client feedback.
Final approval of UI design.
Providing a successful user experience requires a balanced approach throughout the development life
cycle and it involves close interaction with CWC so as to ensure that the functionalities provided are in
line with the required tasks. Once the UIs have been developed a prototype application will be
delivered to CWC and with subsequent discussions and modifications a final application will be
approved for use.
4 ABOUT DHARMA AND MIS WEBSITES
Within DRIP, there are two focus areas: one the data capture and storage of information related to
dam and its rehabilitation; second the integration of various workflows that help in the management of
information. Below are brief on DHARMA and MIS based websites that are under construction.
4.1 DHARMA - Dam Health and Rehabilitation Monitoring Application
DHARMA is an application that was under development by CWC to capture dam related information
from various states and represent the information in an organised and standardised manner. A need
was felt to improve upon this application and make it expandable to all participating stakeholders by
developing it into a web based solution.
The basic objectives of developing DHARMA are as follows:
o Develop a web based solution that will help in collecting, storing, analysing, and presenting crucial
Dam Safety related data (historical, inspection, and rehabilitation data) in an organized and
standard manner.
o Development of seven modules with appropriate precautions for data compatibility.
o Allow addition of dams through the use of a unique Project Identification Code (PIC) as per details
provided within National Register for Large Dams (NRLD).
o Allow multiple-level data processing (data entry, data editing, and data deletion) with adequate
password protections.
o Allow DSOs to capture the missing basic/ engineering/ stakeholder data in case of large dams.
o Allow the systematic presentation and interpretation of data for effective monitoring of the health of
dams.
DHARMA will be a multi-tier web based application based on a clientserver architecture in which the
user interface (presentation), functional process logic ("business rules"), computer data storage and
data access are developed and maintained as independent modules. The application will be divided
primarily into seven modules with each module designed for the following purpose(s):
1. Module 1: Project Portfolio - This module will capture a macro view of all components of the
project;
2. Module 2: Basic Feature - This module will contain such fundamental data as appearing in
NRLD;
3. Module 3: Engineering Feature - This module will allow entering of such information as: salient
features, design, hydrology, geology, construction history, operation plan, instrumentation,
maintenance schedule, earlier studies, safety related events, and known deficiencies etc.;
166
4. Moddule 4: Stak keholders - This module will recorrd pertinent information about organ nizations/
agenncies respon nsible as/for owners,
o opeerations, bene eficiaries, co
ontractors, em
mergency acction etc.,
besid
des enlistingg the impactt of possible dam failure, parties affe ected, and the emergency action
plan;
5. Moddule 5: Dam Health Th his module will
w record the e periodical observationss of health in
nspection
team
ms in a standard format.
6. Moddule 6: Dam Rehabilitation This module
m will ca
atalogue succh informatioon on periodiccal repair
type of work, tecchnique involvved, cost of work,
w agencies involved,, extent of mitigation etc.
7. Moddule 7: Analy ysis and Re eport This module will provide variied tools for capturing tim me-series
a of pertinent parameters for the purpo
data ose of analyssis and report preparation.
4.2 IIntegration of Workflow

ws to manag
ge dam relatted informattion
It is enviisioned that the MIS refle ect the vario

ous activities within the DRIP
D need to
o be coordin
nated and
integrateed in a way thhat will allow
w the following:
D
Document co ontrol by asssigning a uniqque document ID for eacch dam.
A centralised
d database fo or storage an
nd backup off all documen nts created within
w the DRRIP.
A user interfa
ace that for the
t managem ment of all doocuments ge enerated duriing the DRIPP.
A
Adequate traaining all stakkeholders in the operatioon of user inte
erface.
E
Evaluate thee status of va
arious activitie
es that are being
b undertaaken by the various
v stake
eholders.
T
The web based facility will
w be based d on user acccess and will
w be integrrated with th he DRIPS
P
Project webssite.
T
The MIS ne eed to be flexible eno ough to be integrated with other MIS and geospatialg
a
applications.
he DRIP folllow two basic workflowss: Activities as

All activiities within th a provided within the D
DRIP, and
Document Managem ment and disssemination workflow.
w A brief
b on each are given be
elow:
ow of DRIP Activities
Workflo A
A custom mised workflow has been designed to t reflect the

e various acttivities that are
a being unndertaken
within the DRIP. A brrief descriptio
on of these workflows
w aree given below
w for better understandin
u ng of how
data is being
b organis
sed and utilissed by the vaarious stakehholders.
There arre approxima ately six actiivities that are presently being undertaken within n the DRIP and
a each
are mon nitored through a web based
b MIS application
a th
hat is being developed. These activvities are
controlle
ed by a doccument conttrol manage er who is re esponsible forf providing
g unique ID
Ds for all
documen nts generated. Metadata is also captu ured so as to
o facilitate ea
asy retrieval of
o documentts.
Fiigure 5: Workfllow of Activitiess for Evaluatingg Dam Health and

a Rehabilitatiion
167
Controlleed by CPMUU and variou us SPMUs, these activitties are conducted for all
a participatiing dams
within the DRIP and include the following:
f
Design Flood Review

R (DFRR) This acctivity involve
es the evaluation of dam ms with resp pect to its
hydrrology analysses and advvising on the various options to caterr for the incrreased desig gn floods,
where applicable e.
Visitts by Dam Safety
S Revie ew Panel (DS SRP) This activity involves the evaluation of the e detailed
desiggn of the dam
m with identified rehabilittation works.
Project Screeniing Templatte (PST) The T PST is based
b on thee findings of DFR and DSPR and
involves various sub activitie es that inclu
ude project details,
d dam specific dettails, health status of
dams, and reha abilitation prooposal. Reviiewed by va arious stakeh holders it neeeds to be approved
a
befo
ore a tender document
d is generated.
Tend der Docume ents This activity
a is rela
ated to the dam
d rehabilitaation propos
sal and is revviewed by
vario
ous stakehold ders before a competitive e bid processs is initiated.
Awa ard of Work k This acttivity relatess to competitive bidding process that is initiate ed by the
conccerned Dam Owners so o as to com mplete the dam
d rehabilitation. Monitored by the project
management units, this inclu udes monitorring physical and financia al progress, and
a preparin ng annual
workk plans and regular
r progrress reports.
Project Comple etion Reportt The progress of the projects
p w the help of a web
are monitored with
baseed tool.
F
Figure 6: Statuss Review of Actiivities within MIS
M
168
For exam mple the above figure provides

p a sa
ample workfflow that is under
u review
w by CWC and
a is as
follows:
1. Userr Logs in usin

ng user / passsword autheentication.
2. Seleects the moduule Workflow w Tracking to find out th
he status of th
he activities.
3. A forrm opens upp that allows the user to select
s the sta
atus of the activity,
a for exxample, all P
PSTs that
havee been approoved.
4. On selecting
s the number of approved
a PS
STs, a new window
w opens up that sho ow the dam name, its
PIC, the impleme enting agenccy and the coompletion sta
atus.
5. Clickking on View
w Details will open a ne ew page tha at will show the status of o the activitty. In this
exammple, the sttatus of the dam in que estion has undergone
u all
a the first fourf activitie
es and is
pressently under rehabilitation
r n contract.
All the above activitie

es have been designed to t facilitate easy
e and effic
cient organis
sational respo
onse and
meet the e project objectives of acctive rehabiliitation and im
mprovement works. It must be reiterrated that
the workkflow is preseently applicable for damss within the DRIP
D and is presently
p under review by
b various
SPMUs.
A. cument Man
Doc nagement System Work
kflow
The document mana agement is mainly

m used for
f managing g various doccuments thatt are being generated
g
he project. Itss uniquenesss lie in providing a uniqu
within th ue id and a defined worrkflow as enu umerated
below:
1. D
Drop document in the dro op zone / cd// email. Alertt by email.
2. C
Codification of documentt (with Sioux) & generatio on of Review w Sheet.
3. T
Transfer of codified
c docuument.
4. C
Collaborativee experts on
nline job.
5. D
Delivery of re
eview letter to
t CPMU (inccluding Revie ew Sheet & Draft Letter to
t SPMU)
6. P
Potential Woorld Bank Re eview
7. T
Transfer to SPMU
S by a le
etter from CP
PMU regarding reviewed documents.
Figure 7: Docu
ument Managem
ment Workflowss
It include
es the integrration of custtomised softwware solution
ns like Siouxx and Comannche that enables the
users to store, make e available and protect th
he informatioon. It uses a scalable we
eb based plattform like
SharePo w collaboratiion amongstt various stakeholders to
oint that allow uments, assign tasks,
o share docu
track teaam events on o a shared web calend dar. Based ono a user login and passsword authe entication
169
system, SharePoint follow

f the sa
ame documen
nt managem
ment process as shown in the above fiigure.
5 U
USER AUTH
HENTICATIO
ON AND ACC
CESS
User autthentication is a critical process thatt allows users to commu unicate with external nettworks. It
has the ability to resstrict users without
w proper user loginn / passwordd credentials
s. Apart from
m security
reasons,, there are many otherr reasons why w adminisstrators must implementt user authe entication
process in the firewaalls before thhe users are allowed to communicate
c e with the ex
xternal netwoork. User
authenticcation withinn CWC will be based on the following prottocols and the system security
architectture would re
eflect the samme.
1. A hierarchy of user authentication willl be provided access to the web

bsites and DHARMA
D
application. The hierarchy will be as follow
ws:
Figuree 8: Hierarchy of
o Users
2. Withhin the hierarrchy the Web b Administrattor (1) will bee mainly resp ponsible for ensuring
e that the web
applications funcction efficienttly and mana age all user accounts.
a
3. The Central Adm ministrator DS SO (2), will be
b located ce entrally at CWWC and mainly responsible for all
dams data.
4. The Central Use er (3) will be able to view w all data rellated to the dams, but will
w not be ab ble to edit
any data.
5. The State Administrator for Dam Safetyy (4) will be e responsible e for the geeneration of PIC and
authenticating all data entere ed.
6. The Dam Inspecction Team (5) ( will be re esponsible fo or entering all
a dam safetty related infformation
like tthe engineerring data, damm health and d rehabilitatio
on.
7. The Data Manag ger (6) will b
be available for
f each of thet participatting state an nd will be ressponsible
for m
management of all data fo or their respeective state.
8. The State Generral User (7) will
w be respon nsible for enttering of all data
d related to
t the dams.
While the above prootocols need to be firmedd up at a latter stage the

e access righ
hts and protoocols are
scalable and are baased on the functions pe erformed by the various users. The access rightts will be
based oon a distributted web arcchitecture wh
here data integrity and confidentialitty will be maintained
using secure commu unication prottocols.
6 ON WITH GEOSPATIAL
IINTEGRATIO L TECHNOLOGIES
Geospattial technologgies provide enhanced management

m t of dam infoormation. It provides nott only the
benefits of MIS but adds
a spatial content to th
he various ap
pplications th
hat are beingg designed. Mapping,
remote ssensing, sateellite imagerry, GPS, and unmanned aerial vehiclles are few of the tools that can
provide dam managers the tech hnology to evvaluate dam m health and monitor its rehabilitatioon. It can
provide additional support
s inforrmation in the
t form of warning systems, locattion of posssible dam
170
breachess, water storage capacityy, and other critical

c meassurements.
Figure 9: Creeating hill shadde for calculatinng catchment arrea for a dam.
7 B
BENEFITS
Web bassed applicatiions as deve eloped for DRIP is geare

ed not only to
t provide th
he participating states
the beneefit of managging the volu
uminous damm related data but will be
e an example
e for other sttates and
agenciess that can leeverage the importance of migrating to a web based application. Som me of the
benefits are as follow
ws:
Crosss platform compatibility

c y - These applications
a will be compatible accross platforrms than
traditiional installed software and
a require only
o a web browser to fun nction efficie
ently. There will
w be no
restricctions on thee OS since th
he applicationn will run on multitude of operating syystems.
Centrrally manage ed and deployable - The managemen
m nt of these we eb sites will be
b centrally managed
m
and nneed not be installed on end user wo orkstations. All
A system and database e manageme ent will be
centra ally managed d and updateed and inform
mation can beb deployed seamlessly
s v the web sserver.
via
Secure live data - While data will be store ed centrally, access
a to the database will
w be monittored and
mana aged at the centrally loccated server. User based authenticcation protocols will enssure that
restriccted data is only
o accessible to authorrised personnel.
Reduced costs - These web b based applications willw dramatica ally lower co osts due to reduced
suppo ort and maintenance, low wer requirements on the ende user sys stem and sim mplified archittecture.
8 C
CONCLUSIO
ON
Leveragiing and deveeloping the correct

c tools, functionalities and web based appliccations allow
w multiple
users to nd connect simultaneously. It provides users the
o interact an t facility to access annd share
informatiion from anywhere whe ere internet is available,, provide oppportunities for
f collaboraation and
ensure in
nstantaneous updates.
DRIP is a pioneering g project wheere web base ed tools and applications will allow ussers to betterr manage
dam relaated informattion to betterr understand dam health and rehabiliitation. It pro
ovides a new direction
for otherr users to em
mulate and co onstruct similar web baseed managem ment solution ns for manag ging large
data.
171
Dam Safety Instrumentation with Case Study

Rajbal Singh
Central Soil and Materials Research Station, New Delhi 110016
rajbal.singh@nic.in
ABSTRACT
Tala Hydroelectric Project is a run of the river scheme on river Wangchu Bhutan. The project consisted of a 92m
high concrete gravity dam; three desilting chambers each of 250m x 13.90m x 18.5m size for removal of
suspended sediments of 0.2mm and above size coming with the river water diverted through the intake structure;
a modified horse shoe head race tunnel (HRT) of 6.8m diameter and 23km in length; a 12m/15m diameter and
184m high surge shaft; 2 inclined steel lined pressure shafts of 4m diameter and 1.1 km length each to carry the
water to underground powerhouse (206m x 20.4m x 44.5m) for utilizing a gross fall of 861.5m for generation of
1020 MW of power (6 x 170 MW); a tail race tunnel of 3.1 km length and 7.75m diameter that discharges the
water back into river Wangchu. The project taken up for execution from the zero level of infrastructure
development on 1st October 1997 and first and last generating units were commissioned on 31st July 2006 and
30th March 2007, respectively. The project was executed by the Tala Hydroelectric Project Authority (THPA),
which was a joint venture of the Govt. of India and the Royal Govt. of Bhutan.
Instrumentation is a tool for evaluating performance of the structure during construction as well as during the
operation stage. A 92m high concrete gravity dam was constructed on river Wangchu at Tala Hydroelectric
Project in Bhutan. This paper deals with planning, procurement, installation, monitoring and analysis of data for
various instruments installed in the body of 92m high concrete gravity dam at Tala Hydroelectric Project in
Bhutan. Vibrating wire instruments consisting of temperature meters, pore pressure meters, concrete pressure
cells or stress meters, strain meters, joint meters, MPBX, normal and inverted plumb lines, automatic water level
recorder and strong motion accelerographs have been installed in the dam during its construction. Behaviour of
these instruments as indicated by observed data was found to be in order and output of instruments was useful in
taking up appropriate remedial measures during construction. Out of 282 instruments installed in dam body, only
5 instruments have gone out of order and 277 instruments were in working order at the time of completion of
construction for dam. This is an excellent rate of survival of instruments for concrete gravity dam. This was
possible only due to proper planning and awarding a separate contact package for supply, installation,
maintenance and monitoring of instruments. All the instruments have been connected with data acquisition
system for further monitoring of the behaviour of dam in control room building at the top of the dam during
operation and maintenance. It is recommended to take care of the instruments at the time of installation and
damage prevention measures during construction. The safe design parameters must be made available and may
be attached with data acquisition system as alarm for further monitoring the safety of dam.
1. INTRODUCTION
Evaluating monitored data is important for dam safety management. The appropriate decisions and
actions must be taken timely, similar to reacting to the traffic signals green, yellow and red lights
(ASCE 2000). Dam instrumentation has also undergone many changes in recent years because of
progress in micro computer technology. International Committee on Large Dams (ICOLD) has always
given utmost importance to collecting dam related data from actual experience. The large number of
reports on this subject as well as the special ICOLD publications on dam instrumentation (ICOLD,
1988; ICOLD, 1989; ICOLD, 1992) clearly show the interest generated by instrumentation and
measuring techniques.
A 92m high concrete gravity dam was constructed on river Wangchu at Tala Hydroelectric Project,
Bhutan. The dam was constructed in 7 construction blocks. Vibrating wire instruments consisting of
temperature meter, pore pressure meter, concrete pressure cell or stress meter, strain meter, joint
meter, multipoint borehole extensometer (MPBX), Strong motion accelerographs and water level
indicators were installed in the dam body. The pipes for inverted and normal plumb lines were installed
during the construction. Tables for measuring deviations were installed in December 2005.
The installation and monitoring works of dam instrumentation were awarded to M/s Encardio-Rite
Electronics Pvt. Ltd., Lucknow (UP), India before commencement of dam construction and was
responsible for the supply, installation, maintenance and monitoring of instruments.
172
Dam co onstruction was

w completted up to a height of 92m with maximumm ele
evation of 1366m
1 in
construcction block 2, while lowesst foundation level of the dam wais 12 275m. The main
m instrume
ents were
embedde ed in blocks 2 and block 5 except some joint metters at construction jointss between blocks 2-3,
3-4, 4-5, and 5-6 andd MPBX in th he left and rig
ght abutmentts in blocks 2 and 7.
per presents briefly insta

This pap allation and monitoring
m off instrumentss taken up during
d constrruction of
dam at Tala
T Hydroele
ectric Projecct in Bhutan Himalayas.
H
TALLATION OF INSTRU
2. INST UMENTS IN DAM
D
Number of instrumen nts proposed

d by WAPCO OS/CWC and d installed in the dam body are given n in Table
1. Out oof 282 instrum
ments installed in dam body,
b only 5 instruments have gone out of orderr and 277
instrumeents were in working
w ordeer at the time
e of completion of construction for daam. This wass possible
only due e to proper planning and
a awarding a separate contact package
p forr supply, insstallation,
maintena ance and monitoring of instruments. This is an excellent ra ate of surviv
val of instrum
ments for
concrete m. Locations of various in
e gravity dam nstruments proposed/insttalled in damm blocks 2 is shown in
Fig. 1.
Table
e 1: Instruments Proposed and
a Installed in
n Dam
Sl. Nam
me of Instrume
ent Total No. of Instrum
ments
No. Propose
ed Installed Woorking R
Remarks
1. Temperature Meter
T M 51 51 51 Monitoring
2. P
Pore Pressure Meter 37 28
8 28 Monitoring
3. Joint Meter/ Crrack Meter 23 19
9 18 Monitoring
4. M
Multi Point Borrehole Extenso
ometer (MPBX
X) 9 9 6 Monitoring
5. N
Normal Plumb Line 2 2 2 Monitoring
6. In
nverted Plumb b Line 1 1 1 Monitoring
7. C
Concrete Presssure Cell 21 21 21 Monitoring
8. V
Vibrating Wire Strain Meter 126 (21 se
ets) 126 (21sets) 125 (21sets) Monitoring
9. U Lift Pressurre Pipe
Up 20 18
8 18 Monitoring
10. S
Strong Motion Accelerograph (SMA) 4 4 4 Monitoring
A
Automatic Watter Level Recoorder
11. 2 2 2 Monitoring
Total Instruments 296 2822 277 *
* O
Only 5 instru
uments were not working
Figu
ure 1. Location
ns of Instrume
ents in Dam Block 2
173
3.0 MONITORING OF INSTRUMENTS
3.1 Temperature
The practice of pre-cooling of concrete materials prior to mixing was started in the early 1940s for
keeping the temperature of mass concrete as low as possible during the heat of hydration period and
has been extensively employed in construction of large dams (ACI, 1987). It has become almost
standard practice to employ pre-cooling of concrete for large dams in regions where the summer
temperatures are high to assure that temperature of concrete as it is placed in the work does not
exceed 100C.
Fifty one temperature meters were installed at Tala dam in blocks 2 and 5. The monitoring data has
been plotted and presented in Fig. 2 for temperature meters in blocks 2. The temperature variations in
mass concrete have been given in Table 2 along with cement content in mass concrete as discussed
in details by Singh et al. (2006a, b).
B2T1 B2T2 B2T3 B2T4

31 30.9 B2T5 B2T6 B2T7 B2T8
B2T9 B2T10 B2T11 B2T12
B2T13 B2T14 B2T15 B2T16
26
Temprature (degree c)
22.6
21
19.0
16 16.8
11 10.3
9.0
6
03/01/2001
06/04/2001
23/05/2001
25/12/2001
02/01/2002
16/03/2002
16/04/2002
01/01/2003
09/02/2003
16/03/2003
24/04/2003
26/01/2004
27/02/2004
06/04/2004
12/05/2004
11/09/2004
21/10/2004
04/12/2004
11/01/2005
23/02/2005
06/04/2005
09/05/2005
28/06/2005
22/08/2005
28/09/2005
02/11/2005
05/12/2005
11/01/2006
Monitoring Time (Date)
Figure 2. Observation of Temperature Meters in Block 2 of 92m High Wangkha Dam
Table 2. Comparison of Variations in Mass Concrete Temperature with Cement Content
0
Block Group of Elevation Temperature Variation C Cement
No. Temperature. m Placement Minimum Maximum Final Content
Meters kg/m3
2 B2T1 to B2T5 1279/1281 10 16 30.9 20.6 - 22.6 210
2 B2T6 to B2T13 1293 10 22 28.4 21.5 - 24.6 200
2 B2T14 to B2T18 1304 10 8.6 14.9 13.6 - 14.5 180
2 B2T19 to B2T24 1319 9.8 9.4 14.6 13.4 - 14.6 160
2 B2T25 to B2 T27 1334.5 9.0 5.2 15.1 12.0 15.1 140
2 B2T28 to B2 T29 1355.5 9.6 9.4 13.1 9.4 - 9.6 140
5 B5T1 to B5T8 1276 10 14.1 30.6 17.0 - 22.1 210

5 B5T9 to B5T15 1292 10 22.4 27.8 19.5 - 23.8 200
5 B5T16 to B5T22 1307 9.9 9.0 16.1 13.7 - 15.5 180
3.2 Pore Pressure
Twenty six pore pressure meters have been installed out of 37 proposed in the design. The pore
pressure meters were installed in blocks 2 and 5. These instruments are being monitored since 1st
March, 2001 onwards. The variations in pore pressure have been shown in Fig. 3. The pore pressure
varied from 0.3 to 3.2 kg/cm2 in Block 2 while it varied from 0.1 to 2.0 kg/cm2 in Block 5 except in B5P3
and B5P9 where it was recorded as 3.8 kg/cm2 and 4.0 kg/cm2, respectively as on 28.01.2006. Both
174
these instruments have shown high pore pressure equal to 5.5 kg/cm2 and 3.6 kg/cm2 up to 9th June
2003, respectively.
6.0
5.6 B5P1 B5P2 B5P3 B5P4
Pore Pressure (kg/cm2) 5.0 B5P5 B5P6 B5P7 B5P8
4.0 B5P9 B5P10 B5P11 B5P12 4.0
3.6 3.8
3.0 2.8
2.52.3
2.0 1.8 2
1.0 1.3
0.0
15/03/2001
26/04/2001
17/11/2001
01/09/2002
17/02/2002
30/03/2002
29/11/2002
16/01/2003
27/02/2003
04/04/2003
05/09/2003
26/10/2003
26/01/2004
27/02/2004
04/06/2004
05/12/2004
09/11/2004
21/10/2004
12/04/2004
01/11/2005
19/02/2005
28/03/2005
06/05/2005
16/06/2005
10/08/2005
22/09/2005
26/10/2005
03/12/2005
05/01/2006
Figure 3. Observation of Pore Pressure Meters in Block 5
3.3 Stresses in Mass Concrete
Twenty one stress meters have been installed as proposed in blocks 2 and 5. The variations of stress
in mass concrete have been shown in Fig. 5 in block 2. The stress varied from 3.8 kg/cm2 to 5.5
kg/cm2 in Block 2 while it varied from 3.1 kg/cm2 to 4.4 kg/cm2 in Block 5 up to 28th January 2006. Five
stress meters installed in block 5 at EL 1305 on 2nd February 2003 have shown the stresses in the
range of 0.5 kg/cm2 to 1.8 kg/cm2 as on 28.01.06. Another set of 5 stress meters installed in block 2 at
EL 1318.25 on 25.01.05 have shown the stresses in the range of 0.8 kg/cm2 to 1.0 kg/cm2 as on
28.01.06.
The density of mass concrete is approximately 2400 kg/m3 and consequently for every additional ten
meter of concrete above the concrete pressure cell the reading should theoretically increase by
approximately 2.4 kg/cm2. The present height of mass concrete above the stress meters installed in
blocks 2 at EL 1281.5m and block 5 at EL 1278m are 84m (EL 1366m) and 87.30m (EL 1365.40m),
respectively. With density of 2400 kg/m3, stresses above the stress meters installed in blocks 2 and 5
theoretically should be 20.16 kg/cm2 and 20.95 kg/cm2, respectively. The maximum stress records by
concrete pressure cells are of the order of 5.5 kg/cm2 and 4.4 kg/cm2, which are up to 3.8 and 4.76
times lower than, expected for blocks 2 and 5, respectively. However, all recent records of pressure
cells have shown increasing trend in stress level. Thermal changes in mass concrete may be one of
the main reasons of showing records on lower side than expected. However, there is increasing trend
in observations and further records may give the true picture of state of stress in mass concrete.
6
B2S1 B2S2 B2S3 B2S4
5.5
Stress (kg/cm2)
5 B2S5 B2S6 B2S7 B2S8

B2S9 B2S10 4.7
4 4.2
3
2
1 1.0
0
03/01/2001
26/04/2001
14/12/2001
09/02/2002
02/04/2002
01/01/2003
27/02/2003
16/04/2003
24/06/2003
17/07/2003
31/08/2003
21/10/2003
11/12/2003
26/01/2004
10/03/2004
05/05/2004
23/09/2004
17/11/2004
11/01/2005
03/05/2005
25/04/2005
28/6/2005
05/09/2005
26/10/2005
12/12/2005

Figure 5. Observation of Stress Meters in Block 2
3.4 Strains in Mass Concrete
Twenty one sets of (126 nos.) strain meters have been installed as proposed. Locations of five sets of
strain meter rosettes mounted from the upstream side to the downstream side of the dam are just
below the gallery in blocks 2 and 5, respectively. It should be noticed that strain meter and stress
175
meter have also been installed in each of these five locations such that the stress and strain readings
can be correlated with each other. At the time of installation, the instruments were fixed on spider with
the help of 200mm rods at correct angular position (00, 450, 900, 1350 and parallel to dam axis).
The plots of monitoring data of vertical strain meters have been shown in Fig. 6 for strain meters
B2SN9A to B2SN9F for blocks 2. The strain meters have been embedded near the instrumentation
gallery of dam body at an elevation of 1281.5m to 1282.05m in block 2 and at elevation of 1278.10m in
block 5. Five strain meters were installed at an elevation of 1305m in block 5.
The vertical strain from first eleven strain meters showed the variation from 13.8 to 356.2 micro-
strains. However, some strain meters have shown tensile strains, which have not been considered for
calculation of modulus of elasticity. Theoretically, the modulus of elasticity of mass concrete is around
2 x 105 kg/cm2 and may vary up to 3 x 105 kg/cm2 (Encardio-Rite, 1996).
40.0
B2SN9A B2SN9B B2SN9C
30.0 B2SN9D B2SN9E B2SN9F
20.0
Strain (micro meter)
10.0
0.0
-10.0
-20.0
-30.0
11/02/2004
10/03/2004
19/04/2004
24/05/2004
01/10/2004
14/11/2004
18/12/2004
25/01/2005
23/02/2005
04/06/2005
05/09/2005
28/06/2005
22/08/2005
28/09/2005
02/11/2005
05/12/2005
11/01/2006
Figure 6. Observation of Strain Meters in Dam Block 2
4.0 CONCLUDING REMARKS FOR DAM INSTRUMENTATION
On the basis of the instruments installed in the dam body, the following conclusions are drawn:
The mass concrete temperature, which was about 100C at the time of placement, has risen up to
30.90C and finally settled down between 21.60C to 22.50C. Due to low ambient temperature (40C)
in the month of January, temperature of mass concrete dropped during 3 days from 9.90C to 5.20C
and started increasing again up to 12.60C after placement of next lift of mass concrete.
The cement content in mass concrete should be optimized to achieve the required strength. High
cement content leads to cracking in mass concrete.
It is recommended that the temperature readings should be monitored from the time of placement
of concrete. Instrument should be calibrated with placement temperature of mass concrete.
The pore pressure meters installed in Blocks 2 and 5 had shown pore pressures in the range of
3.2 kg/cm2 to 4.0 kg/cm2, respectively.
The concrete pressure cells installed in Blocks 2 and 5 had shown pressures in the mass concrete
varying from 5.5 kg/cm2 to 4.4 kg/cm2 which was 3 to 5 time lower than theoretically expected
stresses of 20.16 kg/cm2 and 20.95 kg/cm2 based on mass concrete density of 2400 kg/cm2 and
height of blocks 84m and 87.30m above the pressure cells, respectively.
All the instruments have been connected with data acquisition system for further monitoring of the
behaviour of dam in control room building at the top of the dam during operation and maintenance.
It is recommended to take care of the instruments at the time of installation and damage
prevention measures during construction.
The safe design parameters must be made available and may be attached with data acquisition
system as alarm for further monitoring the safety of dam.
176
The Tala Hydroelectric Project in Bhutan is one of the best instrumented dams. Out of 282
instruments installed in dam body, 277 instruments were in working order during construction. This
was possible by awarding a contract for supply, installation, maintenance and monitoring of
instruments before commencement of dam construction.
REFERENCES
ACI (1987), Mass Concrete and Cracking of Mass Concrete, American Concrete Institute Report No. ACI 207
IR-87, Report by ACI Committee 207, 70p.
ASCE (2002), Guidelines for Instrumentation and Measurements for Monitoring Dam Performance, prepared by
American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE)-Task Committee on Instrumentation and Monitoring Dam
Performance.
Encardio-Rite (1996), Instrumentation of Concrete, Earthfill and Rockfill Dams by Vibrating Wire Technology,
Application Note AN 9603, Lucknow.
ICOLD (1972), Dam Monitoring General Consideration, Bulletin No.60 (1988), revised and edited version of
Bulletins No.21 (1969) and No. 23.
ICOLD (1989), Monitoring of Dam and their Foundations-State of the Art, Bulletin No. 68.
ICOLD (1992),Dam Monitoring Improvement, Bulletin No. 87.
IS456 (2000), Indian Standard Plain and Reinforced Concrete- Code of Practice (Fourth Revision), Bureau of
Indian Standard, l00p.
Singh Rajbal, Sthapak A.K., Dhiman S.M. and Khazanchi R.N. (2006a), Report on Quality Control and
Instrumentation for Concrete Gravity Dam of 1020 MW Tala Hydroelectric Project in Bhutan, Volume I: Quality
Control, Tala Hydroelectric Project Authority, Gedu, Bhutan.
Singh Rajbal, Sthapak A.K., Dhiman S.M. and Khazanchi R.N. (2006b), Report on Quality Control and
Instrumentation for Concrete Gravity Dam of 1020 MW Tala Hydroelectric Project in Bhutan, Volume II:
Instrumentation, Tala Hydroelectric Project Authority, Gedu, Bhutan.
THPA (1997), Technical Specifications Contract Document No. C1/98, Document No. 5, Contract Package C-1:
Construction of Dam, Intake, Desilting Arrangement and Head Race Tunnel from Thiyomachu, Tala Hydroelectric
Project (1020 MW).1.1. Title, author and affiliation
177
Assessment, Instrumentation and Management of Dams

Matthew A. Pavelchak, P.E.
Gabriel A. Jimenez, Ph.D., P.E., S.E.
Andy Young, P.E., CFM
Abhijit Shah, P.E.
Walter P Moore
mpavelchak@walterpmoore.com
ABSTRACT
Dams represent significant infrastructure investments which require assessment, maintenance and periodic
rehabilitation to ensure safe and efficient performance. As highlighted by the Dam Rehabilitation and
Improvement Project (DRIP), many dams throughout India and the world have been in service for 50 years or
more. These structures were constructed for a variety of reasons over many decades with varying structural
configurations and design standards. Over long periods of time, slow acting deterioration mechanisms can take
hold in both earthen and reinforced concrete dams. Successful long term stewardship of dams requires an
emphasis on periodic assessment and monitoring to identify existing and ongoing distress conditions as well as a
long term Capital Asset Management Plans (CAMP) to provide a coordinated management strategy within the
financial constraints of the managing agency. This lecture will highlight best practices for dam assessment
including the use of Non Destructive Evaluation (NDE) techniques, and long term instrumentation to identify
deterioration mechanisms. The use of CAMP for management of dams will also be explored as it relates to
prioritization of rehabilitation efforts, effective budgeting for maintenance tasks, and monitoring of known issues.
A variety of NDE techniques are available to assist in the assessment of dams and apertures and when used
effectively, can help delineate and quantify the extents of known or suspected deficiencies. Common NDE
techniques for the assessment of dams include Ground Penetrating Radar (GPR), impulse response, and
acoustic tomography. When employed strategically, NDE testing can further define the existing condition of the
dam and can also help determine the magnitude of required repairs. Instrumentation of dams offers a great tool
for understanding current structural behavior as well as an effective way to monitor long term performance.
Instrumentation of dams often includes the use of inclinometers, piezometers, extensometers, and, strain gages.
Most assessments identify a number of distress conditions, deterioration mechanisms, and deficiencies with
varying levels of immediate concern. Managing agencies often lack the immediate funding to implement all
recommended repairs immediately. CAMP plans are effective tools in prioritizing repairs to address life safety
issues immediately, and to phase durability repairs and required maintenance over a preset timeframe. This
allows agencies to project required cash flows and move into a proactive management role to minimize future
deterioration and budgetary uncertainty.
1. INTRODUCTION
Dams represent significant infrastructure investments that require assessment, maintenance, and
periodic rehabilitation to ensure safe and efficient performance. With proper maintenance and targeted
improvements the useful and economical lifespan of these structures can be extended far beyond the
initial design life. The risks and costs associated with these assets increases considerably when
maintenance is deferred and deterioration mechanisms are allowed to progress without intervention.
This paper outlines best practices for dam stewardship which provide a road map for extended service
life with reduced financial and safety risks for the facility operators and the general public. Periodic
assessments of the dam and associated apertures are essential to understand the nature of the
existing structure and the existing and ongoing deterioration mechanisms.
Non-Destructive Evaluation (NDE) techniques are powerful tools to extend the breadth and depth of
the available assessment information. When applied in a targeted way NDE enhances the
understanding of deterioration that can be visually observed and/or detects deterioration which is not
plainly visible.
Structural Health Monitoring (SHM) programs are another powerful tool to provide continuous
feedback and warnings if a change in a critical condition, identified during and assessment, occurs.
SHM can provide a critical bridge between periodic in-person assessments and can provide warning of
slow acting or abrupt changes in key parameters.
178
Assessments of complex infrastructure often generate many recommendations for targeted

interventions that address existing deficiencies, enhance durability, or improve functionality. In the
case of large dams, it is likely that many items of concern will be noted and that the operating agency
will not have the resources (time and money) to implement all suggested interventions immediately.
Capital Asset Management Plans (CAMP) aim to set forth an actionable plan for the facility operator
and engineering consultant to execute over a set period, generally 5-10 years. The goals of a CAMP
approach are to prioritize and plan needed repairs and routine maintenance activities in a way that
balances the financial constraints of the operating agency with the needs of the structure. CAMP
plans set forth annual budgets for repair and maintenance tasks that are recommended based on the
results of the assessment. These plans make routine maintenance easier to track and execute and
provide a more reliable mechanism to budget for capital improvements. These plans are living
documents which are routinely updated based on new information obtained by periodic inspections
and long term SHM.
2. ASSESSMENT OF DAMS
Routine assessments are the bedrock of infrastructure stewardship. Dams are subjected to many
environmental deterioration mechanisms and continual changes in water (loading) levels. Periodic
inspections provide the best opportunity to spot both localized and global condition issues. Visual
observations of key portions of the dam, spillways, and related facilities provide a wealth of knowledge
regarding the current condition of the asset. There are however, many drawbacks to relying on visual
assessment alone. Visual observations cannot typically quantify the extents or depths of distress
conditions other than what is apparent on the surface and they fail to detect potential deterioration
mechanisms which have not yet progressed to the member surface. Therefore we recommend the
targeted used of NDE testing to supplement the visual assessment findings. Often a series of different
testing procedures will be used on the same project to assess different material parameters. The NDE
results typically help further characterise the extents of the distress and the severity. This data can
then be used in prioritization of repairs and estimation of potential repair costs.
2.1. Visual Assessment
Visual assessments must be as thorough as possible and should include the dam, spillways and outlet
works, mechanical equipment, abutments and rim, and the downstream area. In reinforced concrete
dams the observation team should focus on noted cracking, spalling, scaling, corrosion, excessive
movement at joints, and water seepage. Typical near-surface spalling and cracking common in mass
concrete installation are shown in Figure 1. Along the spillways and outlet works observations should
focus on signs of erosion, cavitation, undermining of reinforced concrete aprons, concrete
deterioration, or excessive movement of concrete joints. When weep holes are present in concrete
aprons they should be clear and operational. Routine review of mechanical systems, valves, and
controls is essential to ensure that full functionality is maintained even if current operating conditions
do not require full range of use. Along abutments and the rim signs of seepage, sliding, cracking,
bulging, etc. should be noted. Once the results of the visual observations have been compiled, NDE
testing can be developed to provide additional information about the noted distress.
179
Figure 1. Typical near-ssurface concre

ete spalling an
nd cracking
2.2. Gro
ound Penetra
ating Radarr
GPR is a non-destrructive techn nique that emits a shorrt pulse of electromagne

e etic energy, which is
radiated into the sub bsurface. When
W this pullse strikes an
a interface between layyers of materials with
different electrical pro
operties, parrt of the wave e reflects bacck, and the remaining
r ennergy continuues to the
erface. GPR evaluates the reflection
next inte n of electrommagnetic wavves at the in nterface betwween two
different dielectric maaterials as shown in Figu ure 2. The pe enetration off the waves into
i the subssurface is
on of the med
a functio dia relative dielectric consstants (). If a material is dielectrically
y homogeneous, then
the wavee reflections will indicate a single thick layer.
GPR can be used to t detect ste eel reinforcemment in concrete due to o the large difference
d in dialectic
constantts between steel
s and cooncrete as shown
s gure 2. GPR can also be used to estimate
in Fig
member thicknesses s if the signa
al reaches thhe back side of a membe er, or to dete
ect voids bellow slabs
supporteed on grade. GPR can be used to find subsurfface delamin nations, hone ey combing, or other
anomalie es. The primmary limitattion for the use of GP PR is signa al attenuatioon through concrete.
Depending on the sig gnal frequency used, GP PR will generrally only produce useful results at deepths less
than 0.55 meters. Deespite this lim
mitation, GPPR is a wide ely used testt method to assess nea ar-surface
concretee conditions on
o mass con ncrete structures like damms and on th hinner assocciated structu
ures such
as spillw
ways.
Figure 2. Typical
T GPR radargram
r and
d sample 3-D GPR scan showing reinforccing pattern
pulse Response
2.3. Imp
Impulse response is a non-destructive test used to evalu

uate the integ
grity of concrete elementts. A low-
180
strain impact is applied to excite the structure and the response of the structure is measured. The
concrete element is struck using a small hammer which has a built-in load cell that measures the
impulse imparted. The response (vibration) of the concrete element is monitored by a velocity
transducer (geophone) placed adjacent to the impact location. The hammer and the geophone are
connected to a data acquisition and processing system which calculates the dynamic mobility as a
function of the frequency of the excitation. The dynamic mobility is analyzed to characterize the
condition of the concrete and support conditions, and the probability of internal delaminations and/or
voids in the concrete which may not be visible at the surface.
Based on the analysis of the mobility plot, the following characteristics are obtained: average mobility,
dynamic stiffness, mobility slope, and voids index. The average mobility is a function of the density
and thickness of the element. Cracking in concrete might affect the stability of the mobility plot. The
dynamic stiffness is a function of the concrete quality, the element thickness and the element support
conditions. The mobility slope is a function of concrete consolidation and structural shape changes.
The voids index is the ratio between the peak mobility and the average mobility. A high voids index
indicates a higher probability of delaminations within a concrete member. The testing is performed on
a grid pattern and contour plots are developed for the respective characteristics factors. Based on the
analysis of these contour plots, probable locations of delaminations and/or voids are determined.
Impulse response is also limited in effective depth and is generally confined to assessment of near-
surface concrete in mass concrete structures such as dams.
2.4. Acoustic Tomography
Acoustic tomography (AT) is a non-destructive test method that is used to analyse the properties of
mass concrete. The principals of the AT test method are very similar to those of impulse response,
however, direct access to at least two sides of the mass concrete structure are required for this test to
be effective. A matrix of evenly-spaced receiver locations is established on one side of the element of
interest, and a similar evenly-spaced matrix of source locations is established on the opposite side of
the element. Impulse waves are induced at each of the source locations and the resulting signal is
intercepted at the receiver array on the other side of the element. The test is run repetitively with
impacts at each of the source locations. The source signal is typically generated by electrical
actuators or modal hammers. The simultaneous receiver signals measure the arrival time of the
compressive waves at different points along the structure.
Specialized software is utilized to analyse the data sets produced by successive impact tests. The
result is velocity tomographs which indicate the average wave propagation velocity through each
portion of the concrete mass. Review of these tomographs can identify regions where the wave
propagation varies significantly. Areas with high travel velocities are generally considered to indicate
sound concrete while areas with lower velocities can be indicative of low quality concrete,
delamination, cracking, and/or general deterioration. The primary benefit of AT testing is that it
provides a global picture of a mass concrete structure to allow for focusing of efforts to specific regions
of interest. Once anomalies are detected, visual observations or test openings can be performed to
further quantify the type of distress which is contributing to the low velocity values detected. The
biggest challenge with implementation of AT testing is obtaining sufficient access to multiple sides of
the structure.
2.5. Drones
Un-manned aerial drones are an emerging technology with significant potential for dam assessment.
Drones can be used to reduce the access costs associated with dam assessments or supplement up-
close assessment in areas which are too inaccessible or too hazardous for direct observation. Modern
drones pack high definition video cameras and technology in this area is rapidly developing.
3. STRUCTURAL HEALTH MONITORING OF DAMS
SHM techniques are widely used in dams and embankments throughout the world. The principle
benefit of a targeted SHM program is that it provides a measure of continuity between periodic
assessments (visual observation and NDE). A variety of sensor types can be used to monitor key
aspects of the dam performance as well as the loads and environmental conditions to which it is
181
exposed. Review of SHM data can identify slowly occurring trends as well as abrupt changes. Many
SHM systems are configured with alarm systems which alert engineers and owners to data anomalies
or unexpected changes in the data stream. One key to a successful SHM system is to attempt to
measure key inputs such as level of the impounded water and ambient temperature which are likely to
impact the measured parameters. When known forces such as loading and temperature are actively
monitored the data trends observed in the other sensors can be benchmarked. When selecting a
sensor network redundancy is always important especially when access to install new sensors will be
difficult or costly. Unexpected SHM results should trigger a new round of assessments to determine
the underlying deterioration mechanisms. Once the issues are understood immediate repairs and/or
updates to the CAMP can be implemented to address the new conditions.
3.1. Inclinometers
Inclinometers are one of the most commonly used sensors for dam instrumentation. Inclinometers
report changes in inclinations with units of degrees and are helpful in determining movement, rotation,
or bulging of materials. Inclinometers can be mounted on ridged surfaces such as a concrete dam or
wall to measure changes in inclination overtime. The use of down-borehole inclinometers is also
prevalent. These can be used to measure geotechnical movements in the underlying soil or in earthen
embankments. One important consideration for the installation of inclinometers is the length over
which you want to measure. Many models come in different lengths or can be installed on rigid bars.
Longer inclinometer lengths make it more likely that movement will be detected but may also average
localized effects and reduce the certainty of the movement location.
3.2. Piezometers
Piezometers measure pore water pressure or uplift pressure in soils. Pore water pressures in the soils
supporting a dam are critical indicators of performance, as increased pore pressure generally
decreases the overall stability of the dam and can cause severe deterioration. Piezometer readings
are typically closely correlated to reservoir fill heights with pressures increasing as the height of
impounded water increases. Some changes may also be observed with changes in seasonal
temperature. Significant changes in pore water pressure not associated with a change in loading must
be investigated promptly.
3.3. Strain Gages
Strain gages are perhaps one of the most economical sensors and provide essential data to structural
engineers, related to material stress levels. Strain gages are most often used when overloading of an
element or large cyclical changes are suspected. As long as the modulus of elasticity and geometry of
the base material are known, approximations of the loading in a member can be made. A main
consideration in the selection of strain gages is that the state of stress prior to gage application cannot
be determined. Therefore, any dead or live load present at the time of installation will not be included
in the resulting measurements. Strain gage readings on exposed portions of dams will be expected to
see significant strain variations due to thermal cycling and sun exposure of the underlying materials.
4. CAPITAL ASSET MANAGEMENT PLANS
CAMP creates a higher level of predictability of expenses over the useful life of an asset and ensures
that operating agencies have adequate projections of future expenses. There are two distinct portions
of the CAMP process; the expense model and the funding model. The goal of the CAMP process is to
break the cycle of reactive maintenance and create a framework and implementation plan to
proactively maintain infrastructure assets. This philosophy reduces risk of failure while harnessing the
economic benefits of addressing deterioration before it get worse in degree and scope. The results of
an initial assessment are the basic inputs for development of a CAMP. The plan is then periodically
amended based on the results of future assessments or the results of SHM data.
4.1. Expense Model
The expense model is fundamentally based on the assessment, design, and repair cycle that every
asset undergoes as shown in Figure 3. Once an initial assessment is conducted a series of repairs,
182
enhance ements and rehabilitation

r n needs are identified. S Some of thesse needs are e immediate in nature
and otheers can be sccheduled dowwn the road;; many will reequire contin
nuous stewardship everyy 5, 10, or
15 yearss. Since conncrete deterio
oration as weell as coating
g and waterp proofing systtem deterioration can
be predicted based ono case histories and pa ast experiencce it is possible to estima
ate the obsoolescence
date of specific
s comp
ponents. This is where thhe expense model
m begins.
Once req quired rehabbilitation item

ms and mainte enance activvities are identified and planned
p theirr cost can
be budge eted at the appropriate
a future date. In this way required
r cash h flows for co
ontinual maintenance
can be predicted. Taken a ste ep further, th
he principless of life cyccle cost analysis (LCCA A) can be
employeed to compare and conttrast the life cycle costss of various alternative repairs r and durability
enhanceements. The e goal of LCC CA is to empower ownerss to understa and the life cycle
c cost imp plications
of choossing more rob bust and mo ore costly inte
erventions which
w may ha ave a greate er impact on asset life
cycle thaan less costtly repairs. Once the preferred
p reppair alternativves are sele ected based d on their
LCCA m merits, the cassh flow in eaach year can be projected d forward ma any years or decades.
Figure 3. Overvie
ew of Asset Management
M C
Cycle
4.2. Fun
nding Model
The fund ding model picks

p up wherre the expen
nse model en
nds. Once a clear projec
ction of requirred funds
is available the manaaging agencyy can work with
w a clear purpose
p to devise a plan
n to meet the e required
cash flow ws. The objjective of a clearly defined expensee model is to provide clarity
c to the
e funding
obligations of operating the given
n asset.
4.3. CAM
MP Updates
CAMP p plans often provide

p projections 30 yeears or moree in the futurre. As time passes it is essential
that the results of fu
uture periodicc assessmennts and ongo oing SHM arre relayed too the CAMP team for
n in the plan. CAMP updates
inclusion u shou
uld be made every 3-5 5 years in consultation
c with the
consultin
ng engineer and the ope erating agency to include e new informmation, changes in opera ations, or
changess in funding. Continual management
m of the plan provides
p morre accurate projections
p and keeps
the plan relevant to current
c consttraints.
5. CONC
CLUSION
The mosst effective plan of actiion for asse et managem ment is one which holisttically addreesses the
challenges implicit inn continually assessing, monitoring,
m a funding each
and e asset. In-depth asseessments
g state-of-the
including e-art NDE testing
t technniques proviide a clear snapshot in n time of an n assets
strength and liabilitie
es. Howeverr, the certainty with which h the assesssment can bee regarded faades with
time as additional deterioration
d e. SHM provvides an im
takes route mportant bridge between periodic
assessm ment cycles tot provide ea arly warning to changes in system behaviour.
b Once
O all the liabilities
associated with an asset are known, k a caarefully managed CAMP P plan provides a road map for
continuaal maintenanc ucture with predicable cash flows.
ce of the stru
183
Real Time Infrastructure Monitoring for Dams (RTIM): Using

Artificial Intelligence (AI) for data analysis
A Topple G Kilbride
HR Wallingford, UK Siemens, UK
a.topple@hrwallingford.com
ABSTRACT
The EU funded UrbanFlood project has developed a framework for linking smart sensors to real time monitoring
systems using Artificial Intelligence (AI) software. The monitoring software can be used to inform an early warning
system (EWS). This helps to inform asset managers and is a valuable tool for reservoir engineers in their
assessment of the condition and performance of a dam.
Additionally, incident managers alerted by the EWS can then use the vast processing power within the cloud to
run computer models to assess the probability of embankment failure, the likely dam breach scenario, resulting
flood inundation and behaviour of people within the floodplain. The sensors can detect changes below ground
such as temperature, moisture, and movement, which could be the first signs of a potential failure.
This paper provides an overview of the system, highlighting aspects of research considered most relevant to
monitoring of reservoir systems, and the benefits to reservoir owners.
1. BACKGROUND
It has become common practice to install instruments in new dams to monitor performance during
construction and impounding. Many older dams, particularly those showing signs of deterioration,
have had instruments installed subsequent to construction as part of an investigation. It is quite
common to install instruments in dams where no problems have been identified previously, since
regular monitoring of a dams behaviour is a useful element of routine surveillance. Over the years
new technologies have enabled vast amounts of data to be generated from new monitoring
techniques, the Real Time Infrastructure Monitoring (RTIM) system is a tool that can be used to handle
these large volumes of data with the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI).
The RTIM system was developed from the work undertaken in the UrbanFlood project as part of the
EU 7th Framework Programme which started in 2009 and ran for 3 years. The UrbanFlood project
created an Early Warning System framework that could be used to link sensors via the internet to
predictive model and emergency warning systems. The system was developed to predict a failure of
an urban flood embankment. Three pilot sites were selected in Amsterdam (Netherlands), Boston (UK)
and the River Rhine (Germany). On completion of the project HR Wallingford and Siemens identified
how this technology could be taken forward and used in dam engineering. This paper describes the
RTIM technology and the benefits of dams being even smarter in the future.
2. THE RTIM CONCEPT
Real Time Infrastructure Monitoring (RTIM) involves detailed assessment of the issues affecting your
dam and design and holistic specification of a bespoke system of 3rd party sensors for the site to
monitor key properties.
The data feeds from the system of sensors are all directed to a single RTIM secure server where
Artificial Intelligence (AI) software constantly monitors the data streams, compares different sources of
information and looks for anomalies that it cannot explain. Anomalies are then flagged up in the MS
Windows based user interface software for the attention of the dam owner and for anomaly
investigation. Anomalies may for example necessitate IT hardware investigation, geotechnical
engineering like slope stability analyses, or reservoir engineer involvement. See Fig. 1
184
Fiigure 1. Block
k diagram of th
he RTIM syste
em
All data is handled securely

s in accordance
a with currentt regulations, and is sea
amlessly inco
orporated
within the dam owneers particularr security pro
otocols and ssystems.
The holistic nature of

o the system
m design means that yo
ou can use the best sensors for the
e job, no
matter who
w manufactturers them.
The mod dular nature of the systeem means that you can n choose to add additionnal levels of anomaly
investiga
ation supportt, or enhancce your syste
em to includde incident planning
p or incident mannagement
tools succh as dam brreach flood in
nundation modelling to th
he interface.
The flexiible nature of

o the system m means thatt after the inittial set up, itt becomes re
elatively costt-effective
to add a
additional dams on to the RTIM-d syystem. This means that you can mo onitor simultaaneously,
continuo
ously, and ea e same user interface.
asily from the
2. SENSOR NETW
WORK SYSTE
EM
sor Selectio
2.1 Sens on
The senssor network design will vary

v from one dam to an nother. The RTIM system m allows the flexibility
of using
g different sensors, from m multiple manufactures
m s yet all the
e data will be captured d by one
operating
g system. Sensors could d include:
P Piezometerss,
F Flow meters on drainage e flows;
T Tilt meters th
hat if conneccted by a semmi rigid casing, can meassure moveme ent ;
T Temperature e sensors to indicate seepage;
P Pore water pressure
p sensors to meassure seepage;
F Fibre optic fa
abric to mon nitor settleme
ent (See Fig.. 2) althoug
gh at presen
nt this is not real time
m
monitoring;
S Shape acceleration arrayys to measurre horizontal movement;
R Reservoir wa ater level sennsors;
R Rainfall gaugges;
C Crack gauge es;
C CCTV video feed; and
A w a digital output signa
Any sensor with al.
Most existing sensorr installationss which proviide an outputt can be routted through the
t RTIM sysstem.
185
All the ddata from the e sensors is electronically sent to th

he Reservoir Manager annd operatorss and the
Artificial Intelligence software provides a co ontinuously monitored and
a analysedd assessment of the
data. E Emergency triggers can be set up on all the monitoring
m seensors to hiighlight any potential
changess in the reservvoir behaviour.
Figurre 2. Embedde
ed optical cab
bles for measu
urement of stra
ain and tempe
erature
3. DAT
TA CAPTURE
E, STORAGE AND ANA
ALYSIS
a capture
3.1 Data
Data willl be collected once per hour.

h The da
ata being collected is sim
mple analogu
ue data whicch is then
digitised and transmiitted using th
he HART com
mmunicationss protocol.
3.1.1 Wiireless Hart Communicati

C ions
By utilising an indusstry proven standard su uch as Wireless Hart co ommunication ns, a robustt wireless
mesh ne etwork can be established for the transmitting g of the pro ocess meassurements. Outlying
measure ements which are beyon nd normal lin ne of sight communicatio
c ons to the data
d gatherin
ng control
station ccan also be transmitted
t r
reliably via th
he wireless mesh
m back too the desired
d control poiint. Table
3.1 proviides details of
o the two maain elementss for the wireless hart nettwork.
Table 3.1
Wirelesss Hart Adaptors Wireless Hart Gateway

G
The SITRANS AW20 00 WirelessH Hart adapter is a The Siemens
S IE/W
WSN-PA LINK K WirelessHartt Gateway
battery ppowered com mmunication ccomponent, which will enable
e comm munication be etween the distributed
d
integratess HART and the 4 to 20 mA m field connnected sensoors and a Sie emens S7 120 00 PLC which h will then
sensors into the WirelessHart
W network for data handle the require ed communica ations, scalingg and data
transmisssion to the Pro
ogrammable Logic Control (PLC). transfer to the Siem
mens data con ntrol centre via
a. GPRS.
Life expe ectancy of th he internal replaceable

r liithium
battery is up to five yea
ars dependantt on the appliccation
The netw work uses IEEEE 802.15.44 compatible e radios operrating in the 2.4GHz Indu
ustrial, Scien
ntific, and
Medical radio band. The radioss employ dirrect-sequencce spread sp pectrum tech
hnology and d channel
hopping for commun nication secu
urity and relia
ability, as weell as TDMA
A synchronize
ed, latency-ccontrolled
commun nications bettween device
es on the network.
n Thiss technology
y has been proven in real
r plant
installatio
ons across a broad rangee of process control indu ustries.
186
Each device in the mesh network can serve as a router for messages from other devices. This extends
the range of the network and provides a redundancy for the communication routes to increase
reliability of the system.
The network manager within the gateway unit determines the redundant routes based on latency,
efficiency and reliability. To ensure the redundant routes remain open and unobstructed, messages
continuously alternate between the redundant paths with no loss of data. The mesh design also makes
adding or moving devices easy. As long as a device is within range of others in the network, it can
communicate.
For flexibility to meet the application requirements, wireless hart supports multiple messaging modes
including one-way publishing of process and control values, spontaneous notification by exception, ad-
hoc request/response, and auto-segmented block transfers of data sets. These capabilities allow
communications to be tailored to the application requirements thereby reducing power usage and
overhead.
3.1.2 GPRS Communication
Communications for data transfer from the PLC would be provided via GPRS over mobile phone
network to the Siemens data control centre.
3.1.3 Power Supply
Where there is no mains power supply, the RTIM system can operate either a hybrid solar and wind
power system or a micro hydro power scheme.
Hybrid solar and wind power systems are becoming more and more popular as technology becomes
more affordable and efficient. Whereas in the past, wind turbines were costly, a number of companies
now produce quiet, cost-effective turbines which are able to produce a reasonable amount of power
with only a light average wind.
The main benefit of a hybrid system is that it can take advantage of all climatic conditions. This
approach has particularly successful on off grid monitoring and data acquisition. In both of these
cases, power drawn from the batteries is quite cyclic and seasonal, i.e. most battery power is drawn at
night and, if we consider a roadside speed sign, they are activated more often during rush hours (at
the beginning and end of the day). Incorporating a wind turbine into their power production systems
allows batteries to be at least partially charged overnight, whereas this is impossible with just solar.
Micro-hydro schemes extract energy from flowing water; a range of turbines can be used, depending
on the rate of flow and the head available.
3.2 Data Storage
The data once transmitted from site will be stored on a secure remote server platform. Rules will be
applied for security and safety which are in place for remote monitoring and diagnostics services for
confidential data from clients. The system separates the role of the data server and the web server.
The role of the web server is to provide access to online visualisation only. The role of the data server
is to store the data and carry out the real-time analysis and calculations.
3.3 Real-time Data Analysis
The Reservoir Manager and operators can access the reservoir data through preconfigured cockpit
screens which are designed to suit the application or Dam configuration. See Fig 3. The dam
measurement data can be displayed in its own right, or it can be combined with Analytical data which
is the generated output of algorithms which have been specifically developed for Dams, and were
honed during the Urban Flood competition.
By combining analytical and real time data a continuously monitored and analysed assessment of the
data can be achieved which will alert operators to emerging and potentially emerging trends and
situations. Emergency triggers can be set up on all the monitoring sensors to highlight any potential
changes in the reservoir behaviour.
187
The purpose of the real-time da ata analysis is to provid

de a remotee monitoring and alarmin ng of the
reservoirr around the e clock (7/2
24/365). De eviations of online meassurements could
c depend on the
es related to sensors and data transsmission. In order to ide
reservoirr or on issue entify systemm failures,
software
e for sensor data valida ation shall be
e applied foor the data which are collected
c in a central
database e at a data server.
Figure 3. Pre
econfigured co
ockpit screenss
In order to identify de
eviations at and around the reservoirr, software based
b on the
e principles o
of artificial
intelligen
nce will be applied. This software is able
a to distin
nguish betwe een deviation
ns based on changes
of weath her conditionns or reque ested water flow, and deviations ca aused by others influences, e.g.
increase e of leakage rate at the reservoir. This
T software e will first le
earn typical deviations based
b on
historical data and adapt
a its inte
ernal thresholds around typical
t deviattions. The outcome is a one-side
classifierr which knowws the good situations and
a providess information about anom malies whene ever they
occur.
The main goal of the e AI is signall processing of all online measureme ent streams gathered
g from sensor
network installed witthin the dam. See Fig. 4. 4 Applicatioon of data drriven method ds allows dettection of
n of the sys
deviation stem from prreviously known normal behaviour. Any detectted deviation n can be
interpreted as onset of failure orr sensor faullt. (Simm et al, 2013). TheT artificial intelligence software
will conttinuously rea
ad all measured data of o the senso ors, calculate
e the one-side classifica ation and
provide an output, which
w is a classification result. The classification
c n result is a so-called co onfidence
value beetween 100% % and 0%. SuchS a confiddence value will be classsified into thrree classes based
b on
level of deviation: in
nformation, warning,
w ala
arm. Such information will be visua alised on the screen
and/or directly sent to
o the dam owwner.
188
Figure 4. Cloud computing and Arttificial Intellige

ence (AI)
The alarrming of an anomaly

a wouuld be via emmail and/or text.
t Once th
he alarm has s been activa
ated then
there woould need to be a procedure for action. The battery system ca an supply forr 3 days base
ed on the
hourly trransfer and a trickle pow wer supply being
b availab
ble. If we are
e continuoussly sending data
d then
you would only have e 1 day of supply. The GP PRS would beb initiated and
a data wou uld be sent. Generally
G
update time
t for the analogue to o digital con
nversion wou uld be 50ms s. The processing time is about
100ms sso the data would be up pdated in 2000ms. As the e data would d generally be
b monitorinng a slow
moveme ent then this would be more than ade equate. The data is storeed in the Ceentral Processsing Unit
(CPU) on n site so it is
s possible req
quest data fro
om the CPU at any time..
4. BEN
NEFITS
Having rreal time monnitoring can increase the probability of

o spotting signs of poten
ntial failure att an early
stage, w
which in turnn can lead to o improveme ents in prevventative maaintenance ata the reservvoirs, and
reduction
ns in reactive
e maintenancce.
Benefits to reservoir owners inclu ude:

E Enhance surrveillance;
IImproved safety level by 24/7/365 rea al-time monittoring;
IIncreases prreventative maintenance
m and decreasses more cosstly reactive maintenance
e;
IImproves understanding of the value of monitorin ng through vis
sualisation;
A Allows fast easy
e access to historical monitoring datasets;
d
IImproved em mergency inccident manag gement;
S Safeguards corporate
c reputation;
IImproved mo onitoring dataa quality and
d consistencyy;
P Powerful spe ecific reportin
ng from quanntitative data.
5. CON
NCLUSIONS
Such a system will improve the surveillance nagement and hence th

e, asset man he safety of the dam.
Data fee
eds from the system of se mmended in this study will
ensors recom w be directeed to a single
e RTIM-d
secure server wherre Artificial Intelligence (AI) softwa
are constan ntly monitors
s the data streams,
comparees the differe
ent sensors and
a looks for anomalies that it cannot explain.
Anomaliees will be fla

agged up ussing an SMS S or email to the reservvoir owner too initiate an anomaly
investiga
ation. Anommalies may foor example necessitate
n I hardware investigation
IT n, basic geo otechnical
engineerring analysiss or Reservo
oir Panel En
ngineer involvvement. It iss this anoma
aly detectionn that will
189
provide owners with a continual monitoring regime for their dams, even in severe weather when
access to the site is difficult or the site is inaccessible.
The modular nature of this system means that owners can choose to add additional levels of anomaly
investigation support.
The flexible nature of the system means that after the initial set up, it becomes relatively cost-effective
to add additional dams onto the RTIM-d system. This means owners would be able to monitor multiple
dams simultaneously, continuously, and easily from the same user interface.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
BERNHARD LANGE, SIEMENS, GERMANY

JONATHAN SIMM, HR WALLINGFORD, UK
CRAIG GOFF, HR WALLINGFORD, UK
REFERENCES
Simm. J., Jordan. D., Topple.A., Mokhov.I., Pyayt.A., Abdoun.T., Bennett.V., Broekhuijsen.J.,
Meijer.R., (2013) Interpreting sensor measurements in dikes experiences from UrbanFlood pilot
sites,
Comprehensive Flood Risk Management Klijn & Schweckendiek (eds), Taylor & Francis Group,
London, Pp. 327-336
190
Monitoring and Assessing Reservoirs through eDAMs:

A Wireless Field Monitoring Server and Remote Reality Sensors
(RRS) network
Hiromichi FUKUI, Professor, Dr.Sci. Dr. B. Babu Madhavan
Director of International Digital Earth Applied Science SAKURA Geoinformation Software Research Private
Research Center (IDEAS) Limited
Chubu Institute for Advanced Studies, Chubu Kolping India National Office Building, 1st Floor, No.
University, JAPAN. 133, Velachery Main Road, Guindy
fukui@isc.chubu.ac.jp Chennai 600 032,
S. Nishadh
SAKURA Geoinformation Software Research Private Limited
ABSTRACT
The widespread requirement for monitoring Dams is the need to monitor under harsh environmental conditions in
many places over long periods of time. Because of the hostile weather and topographic conditions in catchment
areas, mostly rough geographic locations, it is difficult to perform monitoring of remote dam sites where there are
no infrastructures for providing electric power or networking capabilities.
The present paper describes a Remote Reality Field Server Agent System-RRS called eDAMs which
collectively manages robust monitoring sensors via several built-in Web servers. eDAMs consists of Field
Sensors, data cards, communication systems, data processor and associated software. With eDAMs, it is
possible to monitor disparate parameters related to water and dam environment dynamically.
In our wide-ranging system available, the sensors communicate to a client server at high speed, and acquire
water level, dam worthiness (tremor), Rainfall and other data such as air temperature, humidity, PPFD
(Photosynthesis Photon Flux Density), UV, CO2 concentration, canopy transpiration (EC), leaf-wetness, wind
speed/direction and GPS for several applications. eDAMs is compact, rugged, water-proof, dust-proof, heat-
resistant system and economical.
For our proof of concept (POC) study we developed three eDAM systems (eDAMs) which monitor water level,
Temperature, Humidity and Rainfall. There is also a camera that provides high resolution images to monitor DAM
sites. Regarding power supply, solar panel or battery will be expediently employed in remote FS in order to keep
full wireless. These types of FS will have large solar panels for full-time working. Further, other type of FS will be
equipped with smaller solar panels fixed on the top of the system.
Centralizing the operation of on Agent System (AS) and Agent Program (AP) greatly reduces the amount of effort
and learning involved in setting up a Field Server network in a new location. By applying our proposed AP, which
unifies scientifically and technologically advanced sensor units and operates them efficiently, it is possible to
perform dynamic changes in managing schedules, linkage with other Web Servers and Web Applications. This
agent program will allow user to construct an adaptable and flexible system which can perform various operations
for different purposes. eDAMs provides secure services to owners (the government agencies): data collection
and archiving; control of peripheral equipment; automated warnings; and graphic or simple display for personal
digital assistants (PDAs).
Benefits of eDAMs are several. Significant areas are: a) implementation of eDAMs would tremendously increase
the prestige and confidence level of any agency in international context; b) eDAMs will rapidly help to provide
strong database; c) promotes a new concept of monitoring reservoir automatically; certainly eDAMs based data
collection will replace the conventional methods practised now.
1. INTRODUCTION
The importance of Dam or Reservoir monitoring and conservation has been a hot topic in
governments. In Dam monitoring associated projects, it is essential that various types of information
should be provided in real time in order to prevent the occurrence of damages to structures and allied
events. Thus, a long-term monitoring system should be able to cope with these subjects, reduce the
amount of effort required of the user and acquire useful supporting information. Periodical
maintenance and data collection are difficult to carry out at remote installation sites which often
experience severe weather conditions, and the users must not only devote considerable time to
191
monitorin
ng, but also have accesss to various
s technologiies and specialized knowledge. The e present
study de
eveloped a field Server Agent
A System which collectively manages robusst monitoring g sensors
via several built-in Web
W servers. The servers flexibly and dynamicallyy respond to changes
c in managing
m
schedulees and system parameters.
D SERVER (FS) AND RE

2. FIELD EMOTE REA
ALITY SENSORS (RRS)
eDams is a new brreakthrough which will boost the te echnology even further in Water Resources
R
Managem ment, Reserrvoir manage ement and Policy
P decisioons. A few key
k areas on n the innova
ation front
are interroperability, data
d models,, Web services, and temp poral and moobile Informa ation System
m. Each of
these are eas will help
p hydrologist,, water resou
urces engine eers with theiir work to pro
ovide a found
dation for
continueed success. In order to monitor Dams and acquire environmenta e al informatio
on under
inhospitaable environment over long periodss of time, we e are sugge esting our R Remote Rea ality Field
Server AAgent System m which opeerates senso or units unifo
ormly throughh built-in Weeb servers. The
T agent
system is i designed on the assumption that every compo onent can be accessed through the network.
With succh a system m, it is posssible to monnitor disparaate parameters related to water an nd dams
environmment dynamiccally.
PE AND MET
3. SCOP THODOLOG
GY
The key need for eD DAMs is inforrmation whic ch will allow forecasting WHERE,
W WH HEN and HO OW water
n as well as the state of dams. This can be achieved by colllecting and analysing
condition a on the data
obtainedd from Remo ote Reality Fiield Sensors and serverss. Apart fromm water-level information and dam
status (ssurveillance)), other inforrmation setss (environme ental) such as rainfall, air temperatture, and
humidityy can be obta ainable. A ssample senso or installed by
b the authorrs in Himalayyan region to
o monitor
Glacier LLake and it environment is illustrate ed in figure 1 which sho ows up the characteristics of the
RRS.
Figurre 1. a) Samp
ple eDAMs con
ncept of Field Server data and
a modelling.. b) A general configuration of the
proposed sen nsors and amb bient network..
4. WIRELESS FIELD
D MONITOR
RING SERVE
ER FOR ADV
VANCED SENSORS-NET
TWORK
Small moonitoring rob

bots called R
Remote Reality Field Serrvers which are equippe ed with a Weeb Server
are show
wn in Figure es 1a, 1b an nd 2. It utilizzes Wirelesss LAN to pro
ovide a high h-speed trannsmission
network at low cost. By building a Web Serve er into senso
or-network eq
quipment, it is
i easy to acccess and
manage by using a Web
W Browserr such as Intternet Explorrer.
192
Figure 2.RRS
S field Servers with Sensorss.
4.1. Sen
nsor Agent
In conveentional senssor network devices support only a few f sensors and slow sp peed commu unication.
They aree insufficientt for any app
plications succh as model--base systemms and do not
n meet the needs of
users (H
Hydrologist, Agri,
A safety e
engineers). In the presennt system, th
he sensors communicate
c e with the
server att high speedd, and acquirre other relevvant data such as air tem
mperature, humidity,
h and
d GPS for
several applications.
a . There is allso a camera a that provid
des high ressolution imag
ges to monittor water-
level and
d DAM sites as shown in figure 3.
eDAMs is a multifu unctional ouutdoor serveer, Field Se erver (FS), which is co ompact, rug gged and
economiical. In particular, FS is water-prooff, dust-prooff and heat-re
esistant. Fie
eld Monitorin
ng Server
(FMS) iss FS for mon
nitoring combbined with a Web-server board, sens sors, a wirele
ess-LAN boa ard and a
special h
housing. Solar
S panel or
o battery is expediently employed in n remote FS S in order to keep full
wireless. The figure
e 3 shows the e mode of po
ower supply in remote are eas.
(a) (b)
Figure 3. Field Senso

or with sensorr & Solar paneel and Wirelesss FS. a).FS inn remote areass with dedicate
ed solar
power sensor
s (b) Add
ditional solar cells
c on the top of FS.
4.2. Field Server Ag m Architecture

gent System
The field
d server age ent system is composed d of an agen nt program, configuration file, databbase, and
Field Se
ervers, mana aged throughh a computer connected to the Interrnet (Fig.4). This agent system
s is
designedd on the asssumption tha at every com
mponent can access all others
o via th
he network. Thus,
T the
program environmen nt need not be
b located at
a the site at which the Field
F Serverss are installed (Fig.4).
Users can
c manage their own Field Serve ers from an nywhere in the world by b editing their own
configura
ation file via the Internet.. Measureme
ent data is sttored as a da
atabase in th
he XML formmat on the
network.
193
Figure 4. Standard VP
PN network forr eDAMs Filed
d Servers.
The storred data can n be plainly displayed

d by accessing Web
W pages whichw the aggent programm creates
with the function of easy
e handling to spreadssheet softwa
are such as Excel,
E and easy accessin ng to real
time datta by cellula ar phones w which can usse the Intern
net. With regard
r mage data, the agent
to im
program will create Web pages in which a user can ea asily search out useful immage data from
f vast
databasee. This Web h serial image data which is thumb
b page is diisplayed with b nailed for reducing
mage data can be easily accessed
capacity (Fig 5), whille original im a by clicking thummb nailed im
mage data
which is linked to it.
Figure 5. Combo thumbna

ail images and
d a sample enlarged image.
bGIS server system

4.3. Web
A Web b based GIS sy ystem suppo orts several Dams and builds
b up stru
uctures for efffective main
ntenance,
collection
n and updating of datab base. Our pro oposed eDA AMs-clearingh house is be a repositoryy physical
structure
e, which colleects, stores, and dissem minates informmation, meta adata, and data.
d Our eD
DAMs will
also voluunteer wides spread acce ess to informmation and has
h no organ nizational booundaries. Using
U this
application, several information la ayers can bee dynamicallyy added and/or removed during runtime and it
will be having basic functionalitie
f es like Zoom In, Zoom ou ut & Pan in order
o to view
w the map with clarity.
The que ery window options
o will help
h to select the theme,, attribute tab
ble, and attrribute valuess (Figures
6a, 6 b and 7). An administrato or in each zo one will help
p to maintain n the server as well as the data.
Public innvolvement can
c also be e reckoned to t update th he database.. Permitted user can up pdate the
database e by login to the server.
Figure
e 6. a)Sample
e image of Fielld Server Data
a retrieval inte
erface. b).Data
a for visualisation and downloading
194
Figure
e 7.Linking datta to Google Map
M for easy access.
a
5. BENE
EFITS
eDAMs promotes a new conce ept of monittoring reservvoir automattically. Certaainly FS bassed data
collectionn will replace the conventional meth
hods practise ed now. This s project will reduce con nventional
method of collecting g data. By adapting
a thiss technologyy, will help engineers to o become le eaders in
advance ed analytical stream. Extensive and exhaustive computation nal experimeents will be made to
produce a high qualiity, efficient and
a easy to use solver package
p for engineers, statistician,
s a group
and
of otherr scientists. This can be viewed as one of the scientiffic/technolog gical needs that the
Governm ment currenttly wants. T The outcome e of this project will en nhance future developm ment and
execution of advancced allied te echnology and
a researchh. This project will alsoo greatly exxtend the
strategicc goals of asssociated dep
partments forr reservoir monitoring
m annd controlling
g automatically from a
centralised server at the Head Quarters.
6. SUMM
MARY
In the prresent case of Dam mo onitoring, we constructedd a long-term m remote field monitoring g system
called eDAMs consiisting of a sensor
s network equippe ed with a Web W server fo
or measurem ment and
wireless LAN for dataa transmissio
on. eDAMs sensor
s is a fllexible, adapptable monito
oring system. Efficient
hourly/daaily data such as water level, Tem mperature, Humidity,
H andd Rainfall collection posssible. In
addition, the system can treat la
arge blocks of
o data such h as images that help de etermine Dam, Water
and surrrounding co onditions. Thhe wireless LAN of ou ur proposed system pro ovides a hig gh-speed
transmisssion networkk and long-distance commmunication fo or large imagge and data files robustlyy.
ACKNOW
WLEDGEMEN
NTS
The authors acknowledge the supp port provided by the Chief-Engineer, Operation & Maintenance, PW WD, Tamil
Nadu Govvernment, Ind dia. The authors also apprecciate the help in the form off discussion and site supports offered
aff and engineers in PWD under O&M.
by the sta
195
Case Study on Water Quality and Lime Leaching in Dams

Er. N. Pandian Er. A. Kalimuthu Sri. E. Raju
Executive Engineer, PWD, WRD Research Officer II, PWD, WRD Research Assistant,PWD, WRD
eesmrwro@gmail.com
ABSTRACT
The life span of a dam is determined by the quality of water it stores. If the stored water in acidic nature enters
into the cementitious structures, dissolution of components such as free lime in cement and calcium hydroxide in
hardened products will take place. This leaching process will lead to porosity leading to reduction in strength and
durability in parts or whole of the dam structure. If left unchecked, the leaching of lime will result in complete
deterioration of the structure and hence timely preventive measures are essential in order to restore the dam to
its designed strength. Therefore, the quantity of cement required is to be assessed for the purpose of grouting.
Lime leaching studies by Chemical methods is one of the reliable methods to quantify the amount of lime leached
out. In addition, the extent of deterioration of the dam appurtenances such as shutters of spillway, sluices, etc. by
the quality of water needs to be addressed.
Continuous monitoring in the form of collection and analysis of water samples, quantification of lime leached out
are being carried out for 14 major dams of Tamilnadu and they are Mettur, Sathanur, Krishnagiri Mordhana,
Manimuthar, Bhavani Sagar, Pechiparai, Perunchanai, Vaigai, Periyar, Amaravathy, Parambikulam, Lower Nirar
and Sholayar by Tamil Nadu Public Works Department. To determine the quantity of lime leached out from the
dam, the Water Quality & Lime Leach studies of Masonry Dams is being conducted based on the guidelines
issued by Central Board of Irrigation & Power (CBIP), New Delhi.
In the meantime the problem faced by the field Engineers in the maintenance of the Shutters of Kodaganar Dam
was reported. Accordingly the Superintending Engineer, PWD, Designs Circle, Chennai - 5 after going through
the preliminary test results of the Kodaganar Reservoir Water has instructed the Executive Engineer, PWD, Soil
Mechanics and Research Division, WRO, Chennai 5 to take up this problem as a research study. Therefore in
the year 2012, the Research study on Environmental Impact on River Kodaganar and Kodaganar Dam was
taken up.
This paper discusses the water quality of the river and dam of Kodaganar and lime leaching of Manimuthar Dam
in the state of Tamilnadu. In the chemical analysis, 23 parameters have been considered which are normally
used to analyse the quality of water. The lime leached out of Manimuthar Dam from the date of commissioning
for over a period of about 60 years have been monitored and the quantity of lime lost has been determined.
1.0 WATER QUALITY STUDIES
The Water Quality Studies show that the reservoir waters in the state of Tamilnadu can be classified
under two groups, namely,
1. Excellent Water with very low salinity which are suitable for all uses
2. Good Water with moderate salinity suitable for drinking and for irrigating most types of crops.
Except for very few cases, the total dissolved salts in the water of reservoirs are much lower than the
limit of 500 mg/l, generally allowed for potable waters. Compared to river water, the water of reservoirs
has shown less variation over the years.
1.1 Water Quality Studies on River and Dam of Kodaganar:
Water is the primal element for the existence and sustenance of life on earth. Consequent to the
phenomenal growth of high technology industries all over the state, there is a growing concern among
the environmentalist and ecologist for the need to ensure environment which will be pollution free and
safe for human and animal habitation.
1.1.1. Water Quality of Kodaganar Dam
The water sample from the Kodaganar dam was collected on 04.12.2012 and tested. The test results
shows that the water quality of Kodaganar dam is classified as very high salinity as per US salinity
196
diagram classification which is unsuitable for irrigation purpose. It also belongs to class 2 in terms of
total dissolved salts, that is, good to injurious class which is injurious to most types of crops.
Also, the test result revealed the fact that it is not a water quality of typical surface water quality of
Tamil Nadu. The surface water of Kodaganar Dam is found to be uncharacteristic. The contribution of
Calcium and Magnesium hardness towards the total hardness was very meagre; therefore, higher total
hardness content of the samples other than Calcium and Magnesium hardness indicated industrial
contamination. Hence the study on the water quality of river and dam of Kodaganar has been taken up
to identify the problem in the surface water.
1.1.2 Tests conducted and its Inference
The tests on water samples from 11 locations were collected and chemically analysed. The quality of
water at the originating point (which is the purest form of water) of River Kodaganar can be accessed
from the water stored in either Authur Anicut or Authur Reservoir. The in-situ pH of 7.25 and Electrical
conductivity of 144 micromhos/cm indicate that the water is neutral and belongs to soft water category.
The classification of water for irrigation is C1S1 (based on US Salinity diagram) which is excellent
category suitable for all types of crops. When the pH and alkalinity of the Authur Reservoir water were
plotted in the Baylis Curve, it shows that the water does not induce corrosion on concrete and metal
surfaces.
The quality of water remains the same up to the downstream of Sithalakundu Thamaraikulam Anicut
and resembles the quality of surface water of River Kodaganar. However, the water sample collected
at Boothipuram Anicut (See No.3 in figure 1) revealed high degree of contamination. The sample
contains 0.01 mg/l of chromium (total) which is very low but other salts such as sulphates, chlorides
and total dissolved salts show abnormal values. This confirms the external pollution predominantly by
tannery effluents of industrial units present in Dindigul district.
Tota;DissolvedSallts mg/l
7000
6000
5000
4000 Pollution
3000 Entry
2000 point 2
1000 Pollution entry
point 1
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Location ofsamplestaken
Figure 1 Total Dissolved salts of various Anicut in River Kodaganar
1. Authur Reservoir, 2. Sithalakundu Thamaraikulam Anicut, 3. Boothipuram Anicut, 4. Kodaganar Anicut.

5. Between kodaganar Anicut and VenkataramaIyengar Anicut near Bridge on NH 7 (Dindigul to Karur Road),
6. VenkataramaIyengar Anicut, 7. Lakshmanampatti Anicut, 8.Bhoothipuram Anicut at Vedasendur
9.Kodaganar Dam, 10. Downstream of Kodaganar Dam, 11.Ground water sample of Karuthapatti Village, Dindigul
District.
The water quality of other anicuts on the downstream of Boothipuram Anicut has similar quality as that
of Boothipuram Anicut but with lesser concentration. Again the water quality of Lakshmanampatti
Anicut shows a rise in the degree of contamination indicating pollution entering on the upstream of
Lakshmanampatti Anicut (see the bar chart below). Comparison of Total dissolved salts (tested at site)
for various anicut / dam of River Kodaganar shown in figure 2.
197
5990 6200 900

59
TotaldissolvedSalts
600
00 580
45 4190 4200
400
00 2700
200
00
91 246
0
Thamar
Anicut,
Iyengar
Kodagana
Brideat
Kodagana
Reservoir
Sithalaku
amAnicut
Venkatara
Lakshana
Bhoothip
Boothipur
mg/l
Authoor
rAnicut
Anicut
Near
NH7
rDam
uram
ndu
patti
ma
Figure
e 2 - Comparison of TDS in
n mg/l for vario
ous Locations of River Koda
aganar
At Bhootthipuram anicut of Veda asendur, the colour of th

he water see
ems to be pa
ale green an nd rise in
his point confirms municipal waste entry
Nitrate ccontent at th e and the
e water quallity of anicutt remains
same ass that of Laksshmanampattti anicut.
At all the
ese anicuts, the pH of thhe water sam
mple varied between
b 8.5 and 9.5. Acccording to th
he Indian
standard ds for variouss uses it wa b National Institute of Hydrology,
as reported by H Ro
oorkee that the
t pH of
the wate er should be between 6.5 and 8.5.
1.1.3 Irrig
igation Purpo
ose
er quality of the following anicut / da

The wate am have sallinity hazardo ous, sodium hazardous, exceeds
pH value
e, higher chlo
oride contentt and higher total dissolve
ed salts resu
ulting in poorr water qualitty.
1. Boothipuram Anicut, 2. Kodaga

anar Anicut, 3. Venkatara
amaIyengar Anicut,
hmanampatti Anicut, 5. Bhoothipuram
4. Laksh m Anicut @ Vedasendur,
V 6.Kodagana
6 r Dam
Water inn the above anicuts/dam ms is classiffied as C4S1 category (classified based b on US
S Salinity
Diagramm) which is unsuitable
u or irrigation. They fall un
fo nder Class 3which
3 is cla
assified base
ed on the
parameters such ass Total disso olved salts, Electrical cconductivity, Chlorides and a Sodium contents
which means injurio ass of irrigation. They have
ous to unsatiisfactory cla h nearly 10
1 to 20 time es higher
Chloride and Total diissolved salts content thaan allowable limits for irrigation.
Chlorides inhibit the growth of plaants, bacteria and fish in surface watters; high lev
vels can leadd to break
downs inn cell structu
ure. If the waater is used for irrigation
n purposes, surface
s salin
nity increasess through
evaporattion and cropp yields fall. When flushe ed from the soil
s by rain, chlorides re--enter the ecco-system
and mayy ultimately end
e up in the ground wate er.
The grouund water off Karuthanpa

atti village on
n the downsttream of Bhooothipuram Anicut
A @ Ved
dasendur
contains 248 mg/l of
o chlorides which
w is more than the allowable lim
mit of 200 mg/l
m as presccribed by
WHO.
1.2 Corrrosion on shutters

s of Kodaganar
K D
Dam
Corrosioon is a comp plex phenommenon which is influence ed by severa al chemical parameters of water.
These p parameters innclude primaary factors such
s alinity, hardness and pH and also secondary
as alka
factors ssuch as oxidizing agents, Carbon-di-o
oxide and disssolved solids.
Whetherr the water will

w produce scale
s or corro
osion or will be
b stable is determined
d b combined action of
by
alkalinityy, hardness and
a pH. Tabble 1 summarizes the cha aracteristics of corrosive water and of
o scale
forming w water.
Table
e 1 - Characte
eristics of co er and of scale forming water.
orrosive wate
Sl. N
No. Corroosive water Sccale forming water
1 Low pHH High pH
2 Soft or with primarily non-carbonatte hardness Hard with primarily carbo
onate hardnesss
3 Low alkkalinity High alkalin
nity
198
The wateer quality of the Kodagan nar dam hass high pH of 8.5 and high h alkalinity off 150 mg/l reesulting in
the properties of sca
ale forming water. The water with a higher pH lowers the so olubility of ca
arbonates
and hencce these carrbonates are more likely to precipitate e out as scalle. Therefore e, scaling onn shutters
resulted from water containing high
h pH, highh alkalinity along
a with high hardnesss (carbonates) of 895
mg/l. The graph be elow is knowwn as the Baylis
B Curve (see figure 3) which sh hows the rellationship
betweenn pH, alkalinitty and water stability. Plotting of thesse parameters of the Kod daganar dam m water in
the grap
ph below sho ows the Kod daganar dam m water fall under scale forming zone, z thus confirming
Kodagan nar Dam watter is not stabble water.
10
pH
7
Corros
sive Zone
6
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 3
350
Alkalinitym
mg/l
Figure 3 Baylis Curve

C
1.2.1 E
Effect of Totall Dissolved Salts,
S pH, Ch
hlorides and Sulphates on
n shutters
Kodagan nar dam water has 1808 mg/l of Chlo orides and 168 mg/l of Sulphates.
S The
T very high h content
of Chloriides and Sullphates in su
urface waterss will be due
e to entry of effluents.
e Th
here are com
mponents
of tannery effluents, emanating from
f the large uses of Su
ulphuric acid or Sodium Sulphate
S and
d Sodium
Chloride. Being high hly soluble and
a stable, th hey are unafffected by efffluent treatm
ment and natture, thus
ng as a burde
remainin en on the envvironment.
ng site in the
A reactin e metal surfa
ace may conccentrate agg gressive anioons such as Chlorides byy virtue of
the neceessity to maintain chargee neutrality. Thus, a fluxx of metal ion
ns in the sollution, will atttract and
concentrrate Chloridee anions, the presence of which willw auto ca atalytically accelerate
a th
he flux of
dissolvin
ng metal ionss.
erobic bacteriium present the soil/earth

An anae hen bund / la ake area will change a Sulphate ion to
t a more
aggressiive Sulphide ion and thus substantially accelerate e corrosion of
o the metal surface. Succh locally
aggressiive environm
ment in the viccinity of bactterial activity cause accellerated attac
ck in water distribution
system. It is to remind
r that municipal waste
w is discharged in nto the Bho oothipuram Anicut
A at
Vedasenndur.
The risee in pH causses formatio on of chalky deposits on n ferrous maaterials. Highh TDS incre eases the
electrical conductivity
y of the wate
er, making th
he electrolyte more effecctive. Thus, they
t will incrrease the
orrosion.
rate of co
199
1.3 Conclusion
a. Regularly monitoring the River Kodaganar is very much necessary as the degree of contamination
is very high so that exact place of contamination may be identified and thereby quality of water can
be assured.
b. Testing of water sample of River Kodaganar immediately after the rainy season may reveal more
information on environmental impact on River Kodaganar.
c. Polluted water is found to be discharged into the River Kodaganar in two places
i. Between Sithalakundu Thamaraikulam anicut and Kodaganar anicut
ii. Between Venkatarama Iyengar anicut and Lakshmanampatti anicut
d. The chemical compounds found in water sample of Kodaganar dam influence the corrosion
process, that is, scale forming.
e. There is some concern in the quality of water stored in the reservoir and action is being taken.
2.0 LIME LEACHING STUDIES
2.1 Leaching process
Leaching in concrete is due to complex mechanism. This is caused by action of aqueous solutions
which is capable of dissolving the ingredients from hardened cement and mortar.
The dissolution rate of different compounds in concrete depends on the solubility of the actual
compound and on how close the compound is to pure water. Except for potassium hydroxide and
sodium hydroxide, which are always in the pore solution, calcium hydroxide is the most soluble
compound in concrete. Calcium silicate hydrates and aluminium ferrite phases are less soluble
compounds, but the more calcium that is incorporated in these phases, the more soluble they are.
When the pore walls become poor of soluble compounds, dissolution to the pore solution will decrease
and the concentration of dissolved ions in the drainage water, flowing through the structure, will
decrease.
2.3 Methodology
The guidelines issued by Central Board of Irrigation and Power (CBIP), New Delhi in its Miscellaneous
Report No. 10, October 1986 under the topic Guidelines for Measurement, Testing and Analysis of
Seepage from Masonry and Concrete Dams have been followed to determine the quantity of lime
leached out from the dam by Water Quality and Lime leaching studies on Manimuthar Dam.
2.3.1 Research Studies conducted by TNPWD (S M & R Division)
In Tamil Nadu, for the past five decades a number of major, medium, and small dams have been
constructed to cater the needs of the people. The main aim is to store and supply water for irrigation,
drinking and industrial purposes. Over the period, the dams may get weakened due to lime leaching
process and hence strengthening measures needs to be taken up at an appropriate time. Therefore,
continuous monitoring in the form of collection and analysis of water samples, quantification of lime
leached out are being carried out for 14 major dams of Tamil Nadu including Mettur, Bhavani Sagar,
Pechiparai and Perunchanai.
The rate of seepage, water level in reservoir, samples of seepage and reservoir water are being sent
periodically to the Chemistry laboratory of SM&R Division by the field Engineers maintaining the dam.
These samples are being tested, analysed and the quantity of lime leached out is calculated. The
results are communicated back to the field Engineers for further remedial measures such as reaming,
grouting, etc.
On analysing the test results, it is established that the quantity of lime leached out is more in the case
of dams which stores soft water than the dams with hard water. The lime leached out per annum from
various dams is furnished below in figure 4.
200
1,620.4
1500
LimeLeachedoutinKg
1000
497.9
500 419.5 362.4
155.1 159.6
86.1 31.4 33.5 55.8
0.2 3.1 5.4 0.8
0
Parambikulam
Pechiparai
Manimuthar
Sholayar
Periyar
Vaigai
Mordhana
LowerNirar
Perunchanai
LowerBhavani
Krishnagiri
Mettur
Sathanur
Amaravathi
Figure 4 - Comparison of Lime leached out from various Dams in Kg
2.4 Lime leaching studies of Manimuthar Dam
The lime leaching studies of Manimuthar dam is being carried out from the date of commissioning of
the dam. Seepage water from 15 Nos. of V-notches of Manimuthar dam is being tested for lime
content and the quantity of lime leached out is calculated as follows:
From the data the quantity of lime leached out will be calculated as follows.
Lime leached out as CaCO3 = (CaCO3)seepage water (CaCO3)reservoir water

Since 56 g of CaO is present in 100 g of CaCO3,
CaO (mg/l) = 0.56 x CaCO3 mg/l
Quantity of lime leached out = CaO x Q kg
106
(where Q Quantity of seepage in litres)
Lime leached out from the Manimuthar Dam from 1959 to August 1984:
1) Quantity of lime leached Feb 1959 to July 1978 = 150.88 MT
2) Quantity of Lime leached Aug 1978 to December 1984 = 13.57 MT
Total Quantity of Lime leached 1959 to 1984 = 164.45 MT
Total Quantity of Cement used for construction of the Manimuthar Dam = 6763.19 MT
Assuming that cement constitutes 62.5% of lime,
Quantity of Lime in Cement = 6763.19 x 62.5
100
= 4226.99 MT (say) 4227 MT
Percentage of Lime leached out = 164.45 x 100 = 3.89 %
4227
Thus Lime leached from 1959 to 1984 = 3.89 %
Lime leached out for the period between April 2006 and March 2014:
Quantity of Lime leached out for 89 months = 10602.59 kg
Average Quantity of Lime leached out per month = 10602.59 =119.13 kg
89
If this is linearly extrapolated,
Total number of months from 01/1985 to 03/2014 = 351 months
Quantity of Lime leached out for 351 months = 351 x 119.13
= 41814.63 kg = 41.81 MT
Percentage of Lime leached out = 41.81 x100= 0.99 %
4227
Total Lime lost (from 1959 to 03/2014) = 3.89 +0.99 = 4.88 %
201
2.5 Conclusion
a. Total Lime lost (from 1959 to 03/2014) in Manimuthar Dam = 4.88 %

b. From the analysed data, it was found that the quantity of lime leached out is more between V-
Notch number - 5 and V-Notch number - 11 for the last 8 years and hence to be grouted.
3.0 REFERENCE
1. F.M. Lea, Third Edition, the Chemistry of Cement and Concrete.

2. Tomas Ekstrom (2001), Experiments and Modeling, Leaching of Concrete, Report TVBM 3090
3. Bureau of Reclamation, TSC, Colorado, Seepage Chemistry Manual, Report DSO 05 03, December
2005
4. M. Bosnic, J. Bulijan & R. P. Daniels (2000), Pollutants in Tannery Effluents, UNIDO, US/RAS/92/120
5. The Corrosion Society (1976), The Journal of Science and Engineering, Corrak 32(6)207-260, Vol. 32
No. 6, June 1976
6. S. S. Phogat (1991), Electro-Chemical Corrosion The Process and Preventive Measures, BHEL
Journal, Vol. 12 No. 2, 1991.
202
Reservoir Sedimentation as a Chunk of Dam Health: A Glimpse of

Real-World Practices and the State-of-the-Art Approaches
Sanjay Giri
DELTARES (Former Delft Hydraulics), Delft, The Netherlands
Seconded to EGIS-Eau, France
E-mail: Sanjay.Giri@deltares.nl
ABSTRACT
Sedimentation in regulated rivers and reservoirs, and associated losses and hazards, are rather common and
long-standing issues, being faced in different part from high mountains to lowland deltas. Apparently due to the
absence of a proper and integrated approach towards sediment management in rivers with structural
interventions like retention basins, hydropower reservoirs, flood control structures etc., these issues have
become more critical all over the world from developing to developed countries. In addition, poor catchment and
land use management give rise to the surface erosion, landslides, debris flows, thereby leading to river
aggradation, degradation and siltation near the interventions like reservoirs and barrages.
Particularly, the reservoir sedimentation is one of the major issues affecting reservoir storage capacity more
rapidly than the initial estimation. Additionally, the sediment related problems appear to induce a number of
adverse hydraulic, morphological and environmental effects in both upstream and downstream areas of river
systems, where such interventions are erected. Such effects could create increased flood levels in the upstream
areas, river bank erosion, bed incision and coastal erosion problems in downstream areas due to decrease in
sediment supply as well as unfavourable conditions for agricultural lands due to lack of fertile silt supply.
Furthermore, sediment deposition in the reservoirs might be a threat to the functionality, stability and safety of the
dams and weirs, such as increase of dynamic loads, malfunctioning of flow control gates and outlets, erosion of
hydro-mechanical equipment like hydropower turbines and so on. Adverse environmental and ecological
consequences, affecting the aquatic system with structural interventions, make these issues more complex to
deal with. These problems are mainly caused by the alterations in flow regimes, interruption of sediment supply,
unrestrained and random desilting operations, and in some cases, the eutrophication due to the quiescent water
bodies triggering poor water and sediment quality.
Despite all these adversities, the structural interventions are inevitable to create alternatives in order to fulfil the
societal demand for water and energy resources. Consequently, these issues are supposed to be addressed in
an integrated manner and with special care already from the beginning (i.e. during selection of the location and
design) as well as during operation and rehabilitation given that they are explicitly associated with dam life and
safety. In many countries, the problems appear to have emerged due to the lack of regular maintenance in view
of the absence of proper regulation and guidelines on sediment management in regulated rivers and reservoirs.
This is very important for increasing the life, effectiveness and safety of structures, and thereby, minimizing the
associated loss and fatality.
In this paper, some examples of existing issues and real-world practices, associated with reservoir
sedimentation, have been previewed as well as the state-of-the-art computational modelling approach to address
these issues has been very briefly presented. It is of importance to be aware of existing issues and experiences,
research and practices, sharing knowledge and cooperation, which could eventually be of help to workout best
practices for on-going and future endeavours so as not to reinvent the wheel from the scratch.
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Background
Multifunctional reservoirs, retention basins, flood control structures etc. and associated with them
losses and hazards are rather common and long-standing issues, being faced in different part of the
world from high mountains to the lowland deltas. The undisturbed river systems have more or less
balanced sediment transport, and any kind of interventions may significantly alter this balance due to
the quiescent water body in front of the structure and resulting backwater effect.
In general, the upstream part of the reservoir contains coarse sediment with less fine grain fraction,
forming an advancing sediment delta, while the downstream deeper part contains the fine sediments
(usually silt and clay), forming a more uniform bottom-set bed. Fig.1 provides a basic schematized
representation of deposition in reservoirs as well as sediment transport processes into the reservoir,
203
within an
nd through th
he reservoir.
Despite the fact thatt fundamenta

ally transportt and deposition process ses in the resservoir appeears to be
unique, tthere is no any
a inimitablle method to o resolve (orr partly resolvve) this issu
ue, and in efffect each
reservoirr should be treated
t sepa
arately on ho ow to deal with these issues based on o many othe er factors
like sed
diment and morphologiccal characte eristics, reservoir type, available facilities etcc. These
approach hes have been presented d in following
g sections.
Figure
e 1. Schema
atic representa
ation of sedime
ent deposition
n in reservoirs and sedimentt transport pro
ocesses
1.2. The
e Issues
Owing to o the absen nce of a pro oper and integrated approach towa ards sedime ent managem ment, the
sedimen nt related issu
ues have beccome criticall for regulate
ed rivers and reservoirs all
a over the world
w from
developing to develo oped countries. Besides,, poor catchment and la and use man nagement givve rise to
the surfa ace erosion, landslides, debris flows s, thereby le
eading to rivver aggradattion, degrada
ation and
siltation near the inte
erventions likke reservoirs and barragees.
The advverse effectss, induced by the sedim d erosion prrocesses in regulated rivers and
mentation and
reservoirrs, can be ou
utlined as follows:
a) RReduction off storage are ea in reservoirs due to siltt deposits

b) F ncrease in upstream area
Flood level in a
c) EErosion and shifting of riiver banks and bed incission in downs stream areass as well as coastline
eerosion due to the lack ofo sediment supply
s
d) AAdverse effe ects on agriccultural activvities in dow
wnstream are eas due to the
t lack of fertile
f silt
ssupply
e) PPossible alteeration of sta
atic and dynaamic loads on n structures
f) MMalfunctioninng of hydro-mechanical equipment, such s as flow
w control gate
es, sluice ou
utlets and
vvents
g) EErosion of hyydropower tu urbines
h) AAdverse effe ects on aqu uatic environ
nments and ecology du ue to irregular maintena ance and
ddesiltation off reservoirs, such as eutrrophication, contaminatio
c on of sedimennts and wateer. On the
oother hand, random desiiltation with large turbidity may have an effect on n water qualitty as well
aas on aquatic environment in downstream area.
Despite all these advversities, the structural interventions are

a inevitable e to create alternatives
a in
n order to
fulfil the societal demand for water
w and ennergy resources. In effecct, all these issues are explicitly
associated with dam m life and saffety as well, so they are e supposed to t be addres ssed in an inntegrated
manner and with sp pecial care in
n design phase as well as during operation.
o In many coun ntries, the
problemss appear to have emerg ged due to th he lack of re
egular mainteenance in vie ew of the abbsence of
proper re egulation and guideliness on sedimen nt management in regula ated rivers and reservoirrs. This is
very imp portant for in
ncreasing thee life, effectivveness and safety of strructures, andd thereby, minimizing
m
the asso ociated loss and
a fatality.
LTING TECH
2. DESIL HNIQUES AN
ND PRACTIC
CES
204
2.1. Desilting Techn

niques
Basicallyy, most exis

sting measurres and techhniques for sediment management in reservoirss can be
grouped into three main
m approaches as follow
ws:
(i) CControl and reduction of sediment yie eld at upstre

eam: The gen neral practice for these measures
m
iis constructio
on of sabo dams
d (or cheeck dams), sllope and ban nk protection
ns work and diversion
wweirs to redu
uce sedimentt inflow to reservoirs.
(ii) RRouting of sediments
s to
owards down nstream: Th his includes sediment byypass tunnel, sluicing
aand density current
c venting.
(iii) SSediment re emoval from the reservo oir: This inclu
udes flushingg (with partial or full dra
awdown),
ssediment re edistribution inside the reservoir, se ediment repplenishment (dumping of o coarse
ssediments att downstream m that is tran
nsported by flood water release), dre edging (hydrraulic and
mmechanical),, and syphon ning.
Some se niques have been briefly mentioned h

elected techn hereafter.
2.1.1. Sa
abo dams (C
Check dam)
In Japan ect translation of Sabo (sa-bo) is "san

nese, the dire nd protection n" (Chanson, 2001). Gene erally this
term refe ers to moun ntain protectiion system. Early sabo works were undertaken during the 17th and
18th cen nturies in Jap
pan. This is basically
b simmilar to checkk dams. Originally these structures ussed to be
construccted to reduc ce the large sediment
s w which causes the dow
flow wnstream riveer aggradatio on. These
days the e sabo or check
c dams are used to o reduce th he debris an nd torrents in hilly areas. These
structurees may not be economica ally effective due to their short lifetimee and higherr cost. The le
eft picture
in Fig. 2 shows a sab bo dam, consstructed in Ja apan.
2.1.2. Se
ediment bypa
ass tunnel
Bypass tunnel or ch hannel is connstructed to divert the approaching

a sediment-laden flow, paarticularly
he flood with
during th h high sedimment transport. This mea asure is costtly, so not ve
ery popular; however
there arre some advvantages of this approa ach, such ass it can be built at anyy stage, no need to
drawdow wn the reservvoir level ass well as low w impact on downstream m environment due to th he natural
sedimennt-laden flow during flood. So far, succh tunnels ha ave been connstructed in Japan
J (3 existing and
2 under construction n) and in Sw witzerland (6 6 existing) (K a 2014). One problema
Kondolf et al., atic issue
related tto the bypasss tunnel is the abrasion n of tunnel surface
s due to sedimentts. Some stu udies are
being ca
arried out to investigate th
he possibilityy to reduce such negativee impact.
Figure 2.. Sabo/check dam

d (Sumi an
nd Kantoush, 2010)
2 from ste
eel pipes (left) and sediment bypass tunnel in Miwa
reserrvoir, Japan (rright sketch, Kondolf
K et al., 2014)
2
2.1.3. Se
ediment sluiccing
The sluiccing is carrie

ed out mainlyy to minimize
e the trapping
g of incoming
g sediment in the reservo
oir during
flood. Th
he operation can also mo obilize the deposited seddiment in some cases. A schematic sketch of
sluicing o
operation is depicted in Fig.
F 3 (left ploot).
205
2.1.4. Se
ediment flush
hing
he sluicing op
Unlike th peration, the
e flushing opeeration with partial or full drawdown isi carried outt so as to
achieve the reservoir bed erosio on and re-susspension of deposited se ediment and transporting g it to the
downstre eam. A sche ematic sketch h of flushing operation iss depicted in Fig. 3 (rightt plot). It is fo
ound that
the ratio of reservoirr storage to mean annua al flow should not excee ed 4% for the successful flushing
due to thhe fact that the
t reservoirr cannot be easily
e drawnn down with larger storag ge (Sumi, 20 008). This
can be sseen from th he diagram a as depicted in Fig. 4. Th he figure sho ows the relattionship betw ween two
parameters, i.e. a pa arameter, inddicating the Reservoir Liife (Total cap pacity/Mean annual runo off) and a
parameter, indicating g Capacity- Inflow Ratio (Total capa acity/Mean annual sedim ment inflow) b based on
existing desilting meaasures in 20 Japanese re eservoirs. Thhis is similar to the Basso
ons diagram m for initial
reservoirr sediment management
m option.
There is also a techn ed to as presssure flushing, without drrawdown of reservoir levvel. In this
nique, referre
case, onnly outlets are open thatt leads to thhe removal ofo sediment within a sho ort area withh a cone-
shape sccour. So, thee removed amount
a of se
ediment is ve ery small, annd not very effective as free flow
flushing.
Figurre 3. Schematic sketches off sluicing (left plot)

p and flush
hing (right plott) operations (Kondolf et al., 2014)
1 Oi D, SP
CAP: Origin
nal totalCstoratgenf
apacity-i capacity vd ReservoiMAR:
volume,
low ratio and r Life Mean 2 Seenzu SG
annual runoff, MAS: Meaan annual sed diment inflow 3
4
Yaasuoka SG, D, PF
Kaasagi SG, PF
100000 5 Ooma SG, PF
No measures (frrom inner factorss) 6 Tookiwa SG
C heck dam 7 Miura SP
8 Hiiraoka D, PF
Flushing 9 Saakuma D
Miwa 10 Haakuwa E, D
Reservoir Life=CAP/MAS
10000 Sakuma Scoring gat

te 11 Ikaawa SP, E, D, PF
Koshibu 12 Yaamaguchi SG, PF
Scoring pipe
e 13 Akkiba E, D, PF
M
Matsukawa 14 Miwa B, E, D, CD
Bypassing 15 Makio E, D, CD
1000 16 Kooshibu E, CD

Excavating 17 Matsukawa B, E, CD

Unazuki D redging
18 Assahi B
19 Daashidaira F

20 Unnazuki F

Sediment check
c dam,
100 Sediment replenishment
r CD Check dam
d

F Flushingg (Draw down)
Sediment byp
pass, Sluicing PF Flushingg (Partial draw down)
Dashid
daira SG Scoringg gate
Sediment flu
ushing, Sedimentt scoring gate SP Scoringg pipe
10 B Bypassiing
01
0.00 0.01 0.1 1 10 E Excavatting
D Dredging
C apaci
a ty-inflow ratio=
=C AP/M AR
Figure 4. Desilting measures in JJapanese reseervoirs, depictted along with the relationsh
hip between Reservoir
R
Life annd Capacity Inflow Ratio (M.E.M. Shahmirzadi, perso onal communication)
2.1.5. De
ensity curren
nt venting
The density current forms

f due too approaching g flow with high
h sedimen nt concentration, which ha as higher
density, and flows along the botttom layer off the reservo oir without mixing
m with upper layer w
with lower
density wwater. Such density currrents occur in many resservoirs, it iss usually possible to allo ow these
sedimen nt-laden flowss to pass thrrough the ve ents (bottom outlets). Thhis operation does not reequire the
drawdow wn. This operation is effe ective in case the incomiing density flow
f has eno ough velocityy and fine
particles to form turbbid flow and it should re each the dam m. Timing off opening an nd closing th
he bottom
outlets a
are very impo ortant in thiss operation. Some
S of the past experieence shows that this ope eration is
successfful in some cases
c and not in others. A number of o researches s are being carried out to
t get the
insight in
nto the behaaviour of den nsity current in a reservo
oir and its re
eplication (ussing experim
ments and
numerica al modelling)).
206
2.1.6. Hyydrosuction Removal

R Sysstem (HSRS)
S)
This is a sediment flushing

f tech
hnique, whicch works as a syphon to o remove th
he sediment from the
reservoirr to downstrream throughh an outlet or
o over the dam. The te echnique maakes use of available
hydraulicc head at the
e dam to rem
move the sediment. Fig. 5 (left plot) sh
hows an exam
mple of HSR
RS.
2.1.7. Ejjector Pump Dredger Sysstem (EPDS))
This is a newly deveeloped technique in Japaan. The EPDS picks the deposited
d se
ediment up by
b means
of the prressure gradient generated by jet wa
ater. This tecchnique can be used for fine sedimen
nt as well
as for gravels with maximum
m size
e of approxim
mately 150 mm.
m
Figure 5.
5 A syphon dredging systtem (left figure
e; 1=submerged pipeline, 2= operation ba arge, 3= connector, 4=
pontoo
ons, 5= outlet equipment,
e 6=
= suction head
d, 7= deposit surface)
s (etin
nkaya, 2006) and
a EPDS (rig ght plot;
M.E.M. Shahmirrzadi, personal communication)
2.1.8. Se
ediment reple
enishment
Sedimennt replenishm
ment is an ap
pproach to reelocate the deposited
d se
ediment to th
he downstrea am. Such
approach
h was testedd in some resservoirs and still in resea
arch phase so
s as to achieve more eff ffects and
minimize
e downstreamm environme ental consequuences. An example
e hass been depictted in Fig. 6.
e 6.
Figure Sedime
ent replenishm
ment in downsttream of Nuno ome dam in Ja apan (left pictu
ure) and a schematic
sketch off the replenish
hment of (right plot; Cajot et al., 2012)
2.2. Real-World Issu

ues and Practices
There a are various real-world experiences

e and examp ples on rese ervoir sedim
mentation isssues and
desilting processes and
a a number of approa aches to add dress them. For instance e, rivers in Japan are
sedimen nt-laden and yield large amount
a of sediments, gooverned by the combina ation of geoggraphical,
hydro-morphological, and geolog gical conditioons. This obvviously causees the transp
port and dep position of
large ammount of seddiments in the reservoirrs. The coun ntry has bee en putting quite some efforts
e on
sedimen nt manageme ent in their rivvers and reservoirs. Basiically, most existing
e meassures and teechniques
have be een used in Japan. The schematic c detail of eexisting sediment mana agement pra actices in
Japanesse reservoirs is depicted in i Fig. 7.
Besides,, there are some

s examples of large sedimentatioon in a coup ple of reservo oirs in Nepal, namely
Kulekhan ni and Midddle Marsyangdi (Fig. 8),, in which several
s attem
mpts were made m to rem
move the
sedimennt by using hydro suction (in Kule ekhani reserrvoir) and dredging
d (in Middle Ma arsyangdi
reservoirr). There are
e several otther reservoirs around the World with
w similar problems
p tha
at can be
considerred as lesso
on learned. The
T reservoirr sedimentattion is an impportant issuee for Indian reservoirs
r
207
as well, and should be considere ed with speccial care considering the sustainabilitty of the app
proach as
an integrral part of da
am rehabilitattion efforts th
hat has prese
ently been go
oing on.
Figure 7. Diagram of sediment mana

agement practtices in Japan
n (M.E.M. Shahmirzadi, perssonal commun
nication)
gure 8. Mecha
Fig anical dredgin
ng to remove the
t silt deposittion in Middle Marsyangdi re
eservoir in Ne
epal
3. STAT
TE-OF-THE-A
ART NUMER
RICAL MODE
ELLING APP
PROACH
Applicatiion of nume erical modelss to address s morpholog gical process

ses of riverss and reservvoirs has
become rather relev vant due to the possibiliity to use high performaance computters and ineexpensive
computa ational time to
t address complex
c probblem. Such physics-base
p ed approach is very useeful to get
insight in
nto the funda
amental processes of commplex phenomena.
An open n source free e modelling system Delfft3D, develop ped by DEL LTARES (form mer Delft Hyydraulics;
http://osss.deltares.nl//), has been applied succ cessfully num
merous times s to river eng
gineering app plications
includingg reservoir sedimentatio
s on, desilting processes, density flow w etc. The model simulates the
hydraulicc and morph ho-dynamic behaviour
b off rivers and reservoirs
r onn time scaless of days to years by
computin ng the complex interactio ons between flow, sediment transportt and bed topography. The model
is two- or three-dim mensional (u usually 2D iss used for optimal com mputation sp peed with ke ey three-
dimensio onal effects through
t a pa
arameterizatiion). The mo odel has all kinds
k of speccial features, such as
uniform and graded d sediment approach,
a a dredging module,
m a case-manage ement tool to handle
208
varying discharges more

m efficien
ntly, the posssibility to de
efine local non-erodible
n layers and hydraulic
es.
structure
Having e evolved from m the first nu

umerical morrphological computations
c s of the riverr Rhine arou
und 1940,
Delft3D is the fruit of
o more than 70 years off research an nd developmment by DEL LTARES (former Delft
Hydraulics), Delft University
U off Technology and Minisstry of Infra astructure and
a Environm
ment the
Netherlaands. This de evelopment has always been strongly rooted in the field exp perience of practising
p
river eng
gineers and hash always been
b supportted by labora
atory experim
ments and real-world situations for
detailed process stu udy and rigo orous model validation. A couple of o examples of model simulation
s
results (ffor the reserv
voirs in Japa
an and Sudan n) have beenn depicted in Fig. 9.
Figure 9. Delft3D morrphological sim mulation of seediment reple

enishment (leftt plot; reservo
oir in Japan) and
a depth
changes in reservoirs (right plot; rese
ervoir in Sudan)
4. CONC
CLUDING RE
EMARKS
Despite the fact thatt the intervenntions, such as dams an nd weirs, in natural
n riverss induce a number of
adverse effects, they
y are inevitabble to create alternatives in order to fuulfil the socieetal demand for water
and energy resource es. In many countries, th he problemss appear to haveh emerge ed due to th
he lack of
regular maintenance e in view of o the absence of prop per regulatioon and guid delines on sediment
managem ulated rivers and reservoirs. Consequ
ment in regu uently, sufficiient attentionn must be prrovided to
address these issue es as an inte egral part off dam operation and reh habilitation, which
w would result in
establish
hment of proper regulatio ons and guid delines on su ustainable seediment management in regulated
r
rivers an
nd reservoirs. This is veryy important fo g the life and safety of da
or increasing ams and structures as
well as effectiveness
e s of their operation, thereby minimizin ng the associated loss and fatality.
he scope of this paper, an

Within th a attempt has
h been ma ade to prese ent existing issues and real-world
r
practicess, associatedd with reservvoir sedimentation, as weell as a brief illustration on
o the state--of-the-art
computa ational mode elling approaach and tech hnique to adddress said issues. It is of importan nce to be
aware off existing issues and exp periences, res
search and practices,
p sh
haring knowle edge and coo operation
including
g capacity bu uilding, whicch could eve
entually be of help to wo orkout best practices
p for on-going
and futurre endeavou urs so as not to reinvent the wheel fro
om the scratch.
AKCNOW
WLEDGEMEN
NT
The author is thankful to Central Water

W Commissions (New Delhi) and EGIS-Eau
E (Fra
ance) for provviding this
opportunity within the scope of Da am Rehabilita ation and Imp provement Prooject (DRIP). The author has been
secondedd to EGIS-Eau u for DRIP during this perio
od. Similarly, the author would like to exppress his gratiitude to all
whom he e has been wo orking with in one way or the other, and thus could make use of the past matterials and
discussions. The auth hor would likke to thank Dr. Kees Slo off (DELTARES, The Nettherlands), D Dr. M.E.M.
209
Shahmirzadi and Dr. Sameh A. Kantoush (Kyoto University, Japan).
REFERENCES
Cajot, S., Schleiss, A., Sumi, T. and Kantoush, S. (2012): Reservoir sediment management using replenishment:
A numerical study of Nunome dam, Int. Sym. on Dam For a Changing World, Kyoto, Japan, pp 1-6.
Chanson, H. (2001): The Hydraulics of Stepped Chutes and Spillways, Balkema, Lisse, The Netherlands (ISBN
90 5809 352 2).
etinkaya, O.K. (2006): Management of Reservoir Sedimentation Case Studies from Turkey, M. Sc. Thesis,
Middle East Technical University.
Kantoush, S. A., and Sumi, T. (2010): The impacts of sediment replenishment below dams on flow behavior and
bed morphology of river channel and river mouth. First International Conference, Coastal Zone management,
River Deltas and Low Land Coastlines, Alexandria, Egypt, 2010.
Kondolf, G.M. et al. (2014): Sustainable Sediment Management in Reservoirs and Regulated Rivers:
Experiences from Five Continents. Earths Future, 2, 256-280, doi:10.1002/2013EF000184.
Sumi, T. (2008): Designing and operating of flood retention Dry dams in Japan and USA, Proc. 8th International
Conference on Hydro-Science and Engineering (ICHE-2008), Japan.
210
SediCon Dredging as Effective Method of Sediment Removal From

Reservoirs
Dr. Tom Jacobsen Sudhir Gupta
Technical Director SediCon AS, Norway M.D, HydroDesign Management Co. Pvt Ltd. Delhi
Email: tom@sedicon.no Email: infor@hdm.co.in
ABSTRACT
Efficient and reliable removal of sand and silt from desilting basins has always been one of the main challenges
during development of run-of-river hydropower on sediment carrying rivers. The Norwegian company SediCon
AS has developed a new and patented method, the SediCon Sluicer, which overcomes problems such as
interrupted power production, high water consumption, risk of mechanical breakdown, risk of mal-operation and
the need for constant attention from operators. The sediment Sluicer has absolutely no movable parts except the
outlet valve, and uses gravity only the driving force.
Removal of sediment through pipelines is not a new idea. Gravity dredging was performed in Algeria as early as
3
from 1892 to 1894, where 1,6 million m sediment was removed by gravity system through a 2 km long, 610 mm
3
pipeline. In the Tianjiiawan reservoir on the Fenghe river in China, 320 000 m of sediment deposits was removed
during 695 hours of operation, through a 230 m long, 550 mm diameter pipeline. The effective head was only 7,9
m. (Bruk, 1985) Conventional dredging has been performed in several reservoirs, and technology and equipment
is being developed to deal particularly with reservoir sedimentation. In the following section an example is
provided, which describes technology for removing sediment from reservoirs.
The patented principle is based on dredging of sediment with a suction head with two inlets. Through the lower
inlet sediments and water is sucked into the pipeline. In case of slide total blocks the lower inlet, water will be
drawn through the upper inlet, thus sufficient velocity is maintained in the pipeline and blocking of the pipeline will
not occur.
1 INTRODUCTION
Efficient and reliable removal of sand and silt from desilting basins has always been one of the main
challenges during development of run-of-river hydropower on sediment carrying rivers. The Norwegian
company SediCon AS has developed a new and patented method, the SediCon Sluicer, which
overcomes problems such as interrupted power production, high water consumption, risk of
mechanical breakdown, risk of mal-operation and the need for constant attention from operators. The
sediment Sluicer has absolutely no movable parts except the outlet valve, and uses gravity only the
driving force.
Recently, the technology has been introduced to India. Through cooperation with HDM Management
Limited, SediCon has proposed the SediCon Sluicers for the 6 MW Baner Sangam project located in
Kangra District of Himachal Pradesh. SediCon has also proposed SediCon Dredge for several
reservoirs in India, enabling efficient removal of sediments from reservoirs using gravity only. Sedicon
has supplied its dredging system to 86 MW hydro power project located in Himachal Pradesh.
2 REMOVAL OF SEDIMENT DEPOSITS THE MALANA EXAMPLE
Removal of sediment through pipelines is not a new idea. Gravity dredging was performed in Algeria
3
as early as from 1892 to 1894, where 1,6 million m sediment was removed by gravity system through
3
a 2 km long, 610 mm pipeline. In the Tianjiiawan reservoir on the Fenghe river in China, 320 000 m of
sediment deposits was removed during 695 hours of operation, through a 230 m long, 550 mm
diameter pipeline. The effective head was only 7,9 m. (Bruk, 1985) Conventional dredging has been
performed in several reservoirs, and technology and equipment is being developed to deal particularly
with reservoir sedimentation. In the following section an example is provided, which describes
technology for removing sediment from reservoirs.
211
Figure: Principle of the reservoir dredge, here shown from a project proposal in Ecuador.
2.1 The SEDICON reservoir dredge principle
The patented principle is based on dredging of sediment with a suction head with two inlets. Through
the lower inlet sediments and water is sucked into the pipeline. In case of slide total blocks the lower
inlet, water will be drawn through the upper inlet, thus sufficient velocity is maintained in the pipeline
and blocking of the pipeline will not occur.
Figure: Raft for operation of suction head. Note that the suction can be lowered by a small crane, and
can rest on the sediments by its own weight.
2.2 Malana hydropower plant
In May 2005 SediCon installed a sediment removal system at Malana Hydropower plant in India,,
allowing sediment removal without input of power of any kind, The Hydrosuction system utilises only
excess water during monsoon, so no water is lost for production. Local recourses were essential in
accomplishing the project as the Norwegian supplier SediCon Sediment delivered only the key
3
components as well as design and specification. During two months in the summer of 2005, 36 000 m
sediments were removed from the storage reservoir. Storage volume was regained, and sediment load
on turbines reduced.
212
The power plant utilises 600 m head on the Malana River, a tributary to Parbati. It consist of head
regulator, four desilting basins, a 249 000 m3 storage reservoir to divert flow of 21m3/s through a 3.3
km long head race tunnel with 7 % slope ending in a 3.65 m diameter inclined surge shaft. Water is
conveyed through a 2.2 m diameter surface penstock to generate 86 MW (2x43 MW) of power in a
surface powerhouse having 2 Vertical shaft pelton turbines.
Figure: Malana hydropower Plant intake and storage reservoir
The river is sloping 1:10 in average and carries substantial bed load and suspended load. Although
practically all sediments above 0.20 mm is excluded in the desilting basins, substantial amount fine
sediment is trapped in the storage reservoir. Initially, this is an advantage as sediment load on the
turbines is reduced. In the long run however, storage volume is lost. New sediments that enter the
reservoir will either be carried directly through the reservoir and into the headrace tunnel or are they
are deposited temporarily in the reservoir. Grain size distribution curve is shown for the storage
reservoir.
2.3 The damage is caused by fine sediments
It can be seen from the grain size distribution in the reservoir that little particles larger than 0.20 mm is
deposited and that average grain size, d50 is 0.09 mm. This indicates that the desilting basins functions
according to design criteria, as practically all particles above 0.20 mm are excluded. The considerable
damage on the turbine runners must therefore be caused by fine particles, less than 0.10 mm and
definitely much smaller than the typical design trapping criteria for the desilting basins of 0.20 mm. The
observed damage pattern on the turbine runners is typical for erosion caused by fine particles, which
confirms the observation.
Figure: Damaged turbines
213
2.4 The sediment removal system

The solution that was supplies to the Malana reservoir was a newly developed hydrosuction system.
The system consists of:
A raft for operation of the suction head. (manufactured locally)

The patented suction head developed and supplied by SEDICON of Norway
An 180 m long flexible suction pipe with buoyancy..
Siphon section passing over the spillway.
Outlet section with valve.
The novelty lies in the special designed suction that ensures a constant high sediment concentration in
the outlet. The forerunner for the suction head was developed during PhD-studies at the Norwegian
University of Science and technology in the mid-nineties by Tom Jacobsen. A balance is maintained
between the sediment concentration and the suction force. Should the sediment concentration tend to
increase, the suction force will automatically decrease, and thus balance is regained. As a result of this
the suction head can be operated in deep waters and inaccessible places without any risk of blocking
of the pipeline.
2.5 Capacity
In situ capacity will inevitably be lower than the theoretical capacity, however the aim will be that the
real capacity is as close as possible to the theoretical.
Theoretical capacity depends on a number of factors, such as energy gradient in the suction pipe,
location of sediment (depth), sediment properties such as grain size and unit weight and whether
sediments are cohesive.
In situ capacity will depend on design of the suction head, operation of the suction head and whether
sediments are cohesive Operation is of greatest importance. The ability to keep the suction head
efficiently working for long and continuous periods is of course crucial to maintain capacity. The
capacity was measured by concentration measurements during sediment removal as well as by
surveying after dredging operations. After two months 36000 m3 sediments was removed. During the
500 operation hours the overall average capacity was 72 m3 / hour.
The concentration measured was measured to be on average 13% by volume, and it became clear
that specified capacity of 70 m3 was more than achieved. (This corresponds to one truckload every 4
to 5 minutes!)
3
Water consumption was very low, approximately 3,5 m water per m3 of sediment removed. As
sediments were removed only during monsoon and when there is excess water, no water was taken
from production. The low water consumption would anyway represent a very moderate additional cost.
Figure: removed sediment deposits Figure: Local employees operating the sediment
removal system
214
Due to the already high sediment concentration in Malana River during monsoon, the discharge of
sediment from the storage reservoir does not influence sediment concentration in the river in any
significant way. No environmental damage due to sediment discharge has been traced.
The ability of the sediment removal system to be used in a controlled manner allows full control of
sediment discharge. Sediment concentration can be adjusted to specified values, and sediment
discharge can be at specified times and intervals.
3
Figure: Discharging 80 m sediment per hour
3 DREDGING AT EL CANADA RESERVOIR IN GUATEMALA
3.1 Background
El Canada HPP, commissioned in November 2003 is a 47 MW peaking plant located in Western

Guatemala using water of Samala River, which drains the city of Quetzaltenango with a highest point
above 3,000 m.a.s.l. It has an annual production of 178 GWh and a load factor of nearly 50%. A
second powerhouse (Montecristo HPP) uses the same flow to produce additional 13 MW, for a total
output of 60 MW. The complex was developed and is owned by ENEL Greenpower Guatemala, a
subsidiary of ENEL Green Power of Italy.
Just a few years after commissioning, the plant started to face serious sedimentation problems in the
hourly peaking reservoir, forcing the owner to take actions earlier than expected. Initially the owner
bought two conventional dredges running on diesel and electricity. Insufficient capacity forced them to
find new technologies and ended up with a SediCon Dredge.
Diversion works include a desander, which performs satisfactory and removes an important amount of
the sediments. However, smaller fractions are carried in suspension pass the desander and through
the waterway before they settle in the hourly peaking reservoir. The reservoir is made off-stream and
is sealed with an impermeable HDPE geomembrane. The total capacity is 200,000 m3 and the live
storage of 185,000 m3, which provides approximately 4 hours of firm power.
Sediments deposited at the reservoir consist mainly of silt and clay fractions and have an average size
of less than 0.05 mm. The river also receives sewage from Quetzaltenango, Guatemalas second
largest city and therefore the sediments carried by the river are heavily polluted. As sediments settle
and become compacted they develop cohesive properties, making them difficult to remove.
Maintenance drawdowns of the reservoir also contribute to consolidate and compact sediments as
they are drained and therefore, void volume is reduced.
215
In December 2011, a SediCon Dredge was put into operation. The 10 - 12 SediCon Dredge is
powered by gravity. The flow in the outlet pipe is unrestricted and blocking due to debris and stones is
avoided. Cohesive sediments are disintegrated by a powerful water jetting system which ensures
removal of material including large particles up to 240 mm and debris. The suction head stands on the
sediment deposits without being blocked, which secures a continuous production. The dredge was
designed for removal of 50.000 m3 sediments per year.
Initial volume of sediments to be dredged was in the order of 110,000 m3. After this initial dredging
campaign, the dredge has proven capable of removing at least 100 000 m3/year twice the contractual
requirement SediCon Dredge probed to be a very cost efficient solution, it is operated by local
labour.
3.2 Capacity of SediCon Dredge
A Site Acceptance Test (SAT) is required as part of the contract signed between SediCon and ENEL
Greenpower Guatemala. Such test took place for the first time on January 2012 obtaining the
following results for the SediCon dredge:
3
Average capacity (sediments): 154 m /hour
Average sediment concentration: 13.5%
3
Estimated net capacity (sediments): 20,000 m /month
Still, at some specific moments, the following maximum figures have been measured:
Maximum capacity (sediments): 270 m3/hour

Maximum sediment concentration: 27%
For the period from January June 2012 (6 months) it is estimated that SediCon dredge has been
able to remove more than 120,000 m3 of sediments from the reservoir, giving an average rate of
20,000 m3/month.
Figure: SediCon Dredge in operation (a) rat (b) outlet
The peak results exceed approximately 3 times the specification stated by ENEL Greenpower
Guatemala in the bidding documents that gave origin to this contract. Verification of performance
parameters is done every 3 months; in addition, the owner takes daily samples to check sediment
concentration. Just after 1 month of operation, a maintenance drawdown in the reservoir was made
and it was clearly visible that SediCon Dredge had already been able to remove an important amount
of sediments (see figure 4). For the period from January June 2012 (6 months) it is estimated that
3
SediCon dredge has been able to remove more than 120,000 m of sediments from the reservoir,
3
giving an average rate of 20,000 m /month. This is a remarkable result considering that on average,
3
the annual sediment inflow was estimated as 50,000 m /year. This means that the owner of the plant
216
finally found a solution for the sedimentation problem in the reservoir; however, today it still maintains
a large volume of sediments due to higher sediment inflow than average, as explained in next lines.
Figure: Sediments in El Canada HPP reservoir (a) before (b) one month after dredging with SediCon technology
4 CONCLUSION
The SediCon dredging has a range of advantages over other systems, and is therefore recommended
for removal of sediments in the reservoirs of hydro power project / irrigation project. The system is
suitable for all sizes of reservoirs and for any type of silt removal in any depth of reservoir. Sedicon
dredging system is tailor made to suit with the project requirement. It works on less consumption of
water thus no loss of production to the power projects.
We have been supplying dredging system to various countries and in India, we have supplied one of
our dredging unit in 2005 to 86 MW Malana Hydro Power project located in Himachal Pradesh. We
have also visited two project sites in Tamil Nadu where sediments deposit in the reservoir is
significant. In addition to the removal of such high sediments from the reservoirs, they also look for a
solution of throwing the collected silt in a land identified by the project as 1. the land surrounded in the
reservoir is owned by forest land 2. There are cascade projects in the river.
217
Use of Pozzollanic Materials for Minimizing the Risk of Alkali-

Aggregate Reaction in Concrete
Murari Ratnam, N. V. Mahure
Central Soil and Materials Research Station, Central Soil and Materials Research Station,
New Delhi New Delhi
director-csmrs@nic.in
Pankaj Sharma
Central Soil and Materials Research Station, New Delhi
ABSTRACT
It is a well known fact that concrete deterioration may have different causes, alkali-aggregate reaction being only
one among many. Some other causes are swelling due to expansion of the cement (from free lime or ettringite)
or swelling clay in the aggregate, external factors such as cycles of freezing and thawing or the attack on
concrete by water in some forms such as extremely pure water, acidic water, and sulphate-rich water. In many
cases, there may be a combination of causes, so that when there is an alkali-aggregate reaction in the concrete
for example, the effects of other factors may thereby be aggravated or accelerated. In case of Rihand Dam, Uttar
Pradesh and Hirakud Dam, Orissa, the durability problem was aggravated due to combination of causes
including alkali aggregate reaction
The alkali aggregate reaction (AAR) in concrete is considered as a great menace to the durability of concrete
structures especially the hydraulic structures. The manifestations of this deleterious reaction appear only a few
years after construction.
Typical indicators of AAR are random map cracking and, in advanced cases, closed joints and attendant spalled
concrete. Cracking due to AAR usually appears in areas with a frequent supply of moisture, such as close to the
waterline in piers, near the ground behind retaining walls, near joints and free edges in pavements, or in piers or
columns subject to wicking action.
Damage to concrete caused by alkali-aggregate reaction takes a variety of forms, the most common being
surface cracking and, sometimes, exudations of gel at the exposed face. Such damage has been reported in
many countries, particularly in those with hot-wet climates. The damage first appears varies from a few months to
several decades after construction. Cracks usually grow wider with time and site repairs are often found to be
quite ineffectual. Alkali-aggregate reaction is a serious form of deterioration and measures need to be taken to
minimize it.
Interest in the Alkali-Aggregate Reaction (AAR) in concrete structures has increased in recent times because of
the risk for dam safety and the high cost of repairs and replacements. One of the first structures identified as
affected by AAR was the Parker Dam (USA) in 1941 and an ICOLD survey in 1985 has shown the worldwide
distribution of damaged dams because of AAR.
This paper covers the precautionary measures to be taken to prevent alkali aggregate reaction in concrete dams.
The main weight was given to reduce the total alkali content of concrete mass to prevent AAR. Case studies of
Rihand Dam, Uttar Pradesh and Hirakud Dam, Orissa have also been incorporated to show the manifestation of
alkali aggregate reaction in concrete.
1.0 INTRODUCTION
Cracking in concrete is essentially the result of the presence of excessive tensile stress within the
concrete, which can be caused by external forces such as load, or by development of a differential
volume change within the concrete. Early contraction, too large thermal gradients during curing of the
concrete, corrosion of embedded reinforcement, freezing & thawing, extremely pure water, acidic
water and internal & external sulfate attack are some of the mechanism that lead to the formation of
cracks in concrete. It is a well known fact that alkali-aggregate reaction being only one among many
other causes of concrete deterioration. Some other causes are swelling due to expansion of the
cement (from free lime or ettringite) or swelling clay in the aggregate. In many cases, there may be a
combination of causes, so that when there is an alkali-aggregate reaction in the concrete for example,
the effects of other factors may thereby be aggravated or accelerated. In case of Rihand Dam, Uttar
Pradesh and Hirakud Dam, Orissa, the durability problem was aggravated due to combination of
218
causes including alkali aggregate reaction.
Swelling due to the uptake of water by alkali-silica reaction product generates tensile stresses that
lead to the local formation of fine cracks in the concrete slab. Since the least restraint occurs in a
direction perpendicular to the surface, the cracks tend to align themselves sub-parallel to the surface.
The expansion occurring within the concrete causes tension to occur in the concrete near the surface
of the slab, where less expansion is taking place due to a lower rate of reaction. These tensile stresses
are relieved by the formation of relatively wider cracks perpendicular to the surface. These cracks tend
to occur in a polygonal pattern that is the basis for the term map-cracking. The relaxation of tension in
the surface concrete allows further cracking sub-parallel to the surface to occur further inward from the
surface. With an excessive supply of external alkali and sufficient amounts of reactive silica in the
aggregate, this sub-parallel cracking could theoretically continue to occur throughout the concrete.
However, field experience shows that the sub-parallel cracking seldom goes deeper than 300 to 400
mm in unreinforced structures. In reinforced concrete, the cracking rarely progresses below the level of
the reinforcement.
The alkali aggregate reaction (AAR) in concrete is considered as a great menace to the durability of
concrete structures especially the hydraulic structures. The manifestations of this deleterious reaction
appear only a few years after construction.
Typical indicators of AAR are random map cracking and, in advanced cases, closed joints and
attendant spalled concrete. Cracking due to AAR usually appears in areas with a frequent supply of
moisture, such as close to the waterline in piers, near the ground behind retaining walls, near joints
and free edges in pavements, or in piers or columns subject to wicking action.
There are two types of alkali aggregate reactions. One is alkali silica reaction and the other one is
alkali carbonate reaction. Alkali-silica reactivity (ASR) was first recognized in concrete pavement in
California by Stanton in 1940 & 1942. Stantons early laboratory work demonstrated that expansion
and cracking resulted when certain combinations of high alkali cement and aggregate were combined
in mortar bars stored in containers at very high relative humidity. Two important conclusions were
drawn from his work. First, expansions resulting from ASR in damp mortar bars were negligible when
alkali levels in cement were less than 0.60 percent expressed as equivalent sodium oxide (percent
Na2Oe = percent Na2O + 0.658 x percent K2O). A second conclusion was that the partial replacement
of high alkali cement with a suitable pozzolanic material prevented excessive expansions. Based on
Stantons work, Meissner in 1941 in the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation conducted investigations of
abnormal cracking in concrete dams. Meissners findings generally corroborated those of Stanton and
lent further credence to the importance of cement alkali level, aggregate composition and
environmental requirements in the development of expansion due to ASR.
Alkali-carbonate reactivity (ACR) was identified as causing a type of progressive deterioration of

carbonate by Swenson in 1957 in Canada. He found that an alkali-carbonate reaction had developed
in concrete containing argillaceous calcitic dolomite aggregate that appeared to be different than the
alkali-silica reaction.
2.0 WHAT IS ALKALI AGGREGATE REACTION?
Alkali-aggregate reaction is a chemical reaction between certain types of aggregates and hydroxyl ions
(OH-) associated with alkalis (Sodium Oxide and Potassium Oxide) in the cement. Usually, the alkalis
come from the Portland cement but they may also come from other ingredients in the concrete or from
the environment. Under some conditions, the reaction may result in damaging expansion and cracking
of the concrete. Concrete deterioration caused by alkali-aggregate reaction is generally slow, but
progressive. Cracking due to alkali aggregate reaction generally becomes visible when concrete is 5 to
10 years old. The cracks facilitate the entry of de-icing salt solutions that may cause corrosion of the
reinforcing steel, thereby accelerating deterioration and weakening a structure.
This alkali-aggregate reaction has two forms:
* Alkali-silica reaction (ASR)

- Alkali reaction with amorphous silica;
- Alkali reaction with silicates caused by reactions in polyphase siliceous aggregates
219
(shale, granite, sandstone);

* Alkali-carbonate reaction (ACR).
- Alkali reaction with dolomitic carbonates.
* Damage to concrete from this reaction will normally occur only when all the following are
present together:-
- A high moisture level, within the concrete;
- A cement with high alkali, content, or another source of alkali;
- Aggregate containing an alkali reactive constituent
2.1 Alkali-Silica Reaction
This is the most common form of alkali aggregate reaction and results from the presence of certain
siliceous aggregates in the concrete found in some granites, gneisses, volcanic rocks, greywackes,
argillites, phyllites, hornfels, tuffs, and siliceous limestones. In ASR, aggregates containing certain
forms of silica will react with alkali hydroxide in concrete to form a gel that swells as it adsorbs water
from the surrounding cement paste or the environment. These gels can swell and induce enough
expansive pressure to damage concrete. The product of the alkali-silica reaction is a gel that absorbs
water and increases in volume. Pressure generated by the swelling gel ruptures the aggregate
particles and causes cracks to extend into the surrounding concrete. Typically, alkali-silica reaction
results in the formation of map-pattern cracking of the concrete.
2.2 Alkali-Carbonate Reaction
With the alkali-carbonate reaction, certain dolomitic limestone aggregates react with the hydroxyl ions
in the cement (or other sources such as de-icing salts) and cause swelling. The swelling of the
limestone particles causes the concrete to expand and crack. Dedolomitisation from reaction of the
calcium and magnesium carbonate with an alkaline solution involves the formation of Brucite [Mg
(OH)2 ] and regeneration of the alkaline hydroxide.
The brucite may be isolated from the interface between aggregate and cement paste or in the middle
of the aggregate. It can also react with the silica around the aggregate and form magnesium silicate.
The porous zone created around the aggregate by extraction of the Mg+ + ions weakens the cement-
aggregate bond. Cracks appear, although some may heal through precipitation of Ca (OH)2.
Dedolomitisation does not produce an expansive gel. The expansion sometimes observed has been
associated with the presence of clays either as inter granular material or as inclusions in the carbonate
crystals. These clays cause the concrete to deteriorate by absorbing the OH- ions.
The deterioration caused by ACR is similar to that caused by ASR; however, ACR is relatively rare
because aggregates susceptible to this phenomenon are less common and are usually unsuitable for
use in concrete for other reasons. Aggregates susceptible to ACR tend to have a characteristic texture
that can be identified by petrographers.
3.0 FACTORS AFFECTING ALKALI-AGGREGATE REACTION
Concrete deterioration from alkali-aggregate reaction is due to the simultaneous effect of several
factors. They may be subdivided in to three groups:
* Material properties: Aggregate and Cement

* External influences: Humidity, Temperature and Compressive Stresses
* Time.
4.0 PREVENTION OF ALKALI-AGGREGATE REACTION
Where the service records of particular cement/ aggregate combination are well established, and do
not include any instances of cracking due to alkali aggregate reaction, no further precautions should
220
be necessary. When the materials are unfamiliar precautions should take one of more of the following
forms
Use of non reactive aggregate from alternate source
Use of low alkali ordinary Portland cement having total alkali content not more than 0.6
percent (as Na2 O equivalent)
Further, advantage can be obtained by use of fly ash (grade I conforming of IS 3812 or
granulated blast furnace slag conforming to IS 12089 as part replacement of ordinary Portland
cement (having total alkali content as Na2O equivalent nor more than 0.6 percent) provided fly
ash content is at least 20 percent or slag content is at least 50 percent
Measures to reduce the degree of saturation of the concrete during service such as use of
impermeable membranes.
Limiting the cement content in the concrete mix and thereby limited total alkali content in the
concrete mix. For more guide specialist literatures may be referred.
5.0 CEMENTITIOUS MATERIALS
5.1 Portland Cement
All Portland cements contain alkalis derived from the raw materials. The basic level of alkalis in the
raw materials is the dominant influence on the ultimate level of alkalis in finished cement. The cement
manufacturing process can also influence cement alkali levels, but this influence is less important than
the influence of the raw materials. The alkali content of Portland cement is normally measured as
sodium and potassium oxides (Na2O and K2O) and is expressed as the equivalent sodium oxide
content; see equation 1.
% equiv. Na2O = % Na2O + (0.658 x % K2O).... (eq. 1)
The alkali content of Portland cement is the acid-soluble equivalent sodium oxide content The annual
average works alkali levels of ordinary Portland cements are normally in the range 0.5% to 1.2%,
expressed as equivalent sodium oxide.
The accuracy of the method of analysis is such that reporting of results to accuracy greater than
0.05% is not justified. The test is quite reproducible but even so, analysis of the same content by two
different competent laboratories could produce test results differing by 0.05%.
Cement manufacturers can make available, on request, monthly mean alkali levels of cements,
expressed as equivalent sodium oxide. An addition of 0.1% to the monthly mean alkali level to allow
for future variation is suggested. Changes greater than 0.1% over a month which may arise from, for
example, changes in raw materials, can normally be foreseen by the cement manufacturer. Users
should consult the manufacturer if they require information on this matter.
The use of Portland cement with an alkali content of 0.6% or less is accepted worldwide as the best
means of minimizing the risk of damage due to ASR. If the alkali content of a particular Portland
cement is known, and is above 0.6%, then the 0.6% limit can be achieved by replacing part of the
Portland cement by the requisite amount of GGBFS or PFA.
5.2 Ground Granulated Blast Furnace Slag (GGBFS) and Pulverized- Fuel Ash (PFA)
Both GGBFS and PFA have comparatively high total alkali levels, but most of this alkali is combined in
the glassy structure of the GGBFS or PFA and is released relatively slowly as the GGBFS or PFA
hydrates in the concrete. The alkalis derived from this source appear to be available to promote the
alkali silica reaction in the same manner as the alkalis derived from Portland cement, though not to
the same extent. The alkali content of the concrete or the cementitious material may, therefore, be
reduced by replacing part of the Portland, cement by GGBFS or PFA.
It is an accepted fact that only 50% of the acid soluble alkali present in GGBFS contribute towards
alkali aggregate reaction so, therefore, contribution of 50% of the acid soluble alkali in GGBFS is to be
th
taken into consideration for the blended cement containing both OPC and GGBFS. Further, only 1/6
of acid soluble alkali present in PFA contribute towards alkali aggregate reaction, therefore,
221
contribution of 1/6th of acid soluble alkali in PFA is to be taken into consideration for blended cements
contains OPC and PFA.
The alkali content of these cements, if measured by the normal methods, will include both the reactive
alkali in the Portland cement and the semi-reactive alkali in the GGBFS or the PFA. In order to
calculate the total reactive alkali in the composite cement it is necessary to know the alkali content of
the Portland cement component and the proportions of the blend. These can be supplied, on request,
by the cement manufacturer. However, if site blending is done, the said information may not be
needed.
5.2.1 Use of 50% or more ground granulated blast furnace slag
How to calculate reactive alkali content in a blended cement containing 50% GGBFS?
If the percentage of reactive alkali in OPC = 0.8%

Percentage of acid soluble alkali in GGBFS = 0.4% (then the percentage of reactive alkali in
GGBFS to be taken into consideration = 0.4% x 0.50 = 0.2%)
Contribution of reactive alkali from GGBFS in the blended cement is 0.2% x 0.5 = 0.1%
Contribution of reactive alkali from OPC component in the blended cement = 0.8% x 0.5% = 0.4%
Total reactive alkali content in blended cement [ Sl. No. (iii) + (iv) ] = 0.4% + 0.1 = 0.5%
5.2.2 Use of 25% or more pulverized-fuel ash
How to calculate reactive alkali content in a blended cement containing 25% PFA?
If the percentage of reactive alkali in OPC = 0.8%

Percentage of acid soluble alkali in PFA = 0.96% (then the percentage of reactive alkali in PFA
taken into consideration = 0.96% x 1/6 = 0.16%)
Contribution of reactive alkali from PFA component in the blended cement is 0.16% x 0.25 =
0.12%
Contribution of reactive alkali from OPC component in the blended cement = 0.8% x 0.75 = 0.6%
Total reactive alkali content in blended cement = 0.6% + 0.12% = 0.72%
6.0 LIMITING THE ALKALI CONTENT OF CONCRETE
The worked out example for determining the alkali content in a meter cube of concrete is given below;
see Table 1:
1) Amount of Portland cement = W1

2) Amount of PFA or GGBFS or
Silica Fume = W2
3) Amount of coarse aggregate (CA) = W3
4) Amount of fine aggregate (FA) = W4
5) Amount of water = W5
6) Amount of admixtures = W6
i) Let percentage of reactive alkali in OPC = A%
ii) Contribution of reactive alkali from mineral admixtures such as GGBFS or PFA are as follows:
a) If the percentage of acid soluble alkali in GGBFS is B% then the active contribution
towards reactive alkali = B % x 0.5
b) If the acid soluble alkali in PFA is B % then the active contribution towards reactive alkali =
B% x 1/6
iii) Percentage of acid soluble alkali in CA = C%
iv) Percentage of acid soluble alkali in FA = D%
v) Percentage of alkali in water = E%
vi) Percentage of alkali in admixtures = F%
Total alkali content in one meter cube of concrete will be (W1A + W2B*+ W3C+ W4D+W5E+ W6F)
/ 100
*Appropriate value taken as indicated above.
222
Table 1: Exa
ample of Mix Proportion
P of Self
S Compactiing Concrete
Materials Quantity
y Ac
cid soluble Contributtion of total re
eactive
(kg/m3) alkali % Alkali (kg/m3)
Cementt 420 0.7 2.9400
Fly Ash 155 0.8 x 1/6 0.2067
Silica Fume 25 0.3 0.0750
Water 180 0.02 0.0360
Fine aggregate 900 0.0003 0.0027
Coarse aggregate 770 0.0002 0.0015
Chemica
al admixture 6.00 0.03 0.0018
Viscosityy Modifying Age
ent 0.900 0.03 0.0003
Total alkkali content of one meter cube of concrete
e 3.2640
7.0 C
CASE STUD
DIES ON ALKALI-AGGR
REGATE REA
ACTION IN DAMS
7.1 R
Rihand Dam
m Project, Utttar Pradesh
h
7.1.1 P Project featu

ures
Consstructed acro oss river Rihhand, a tribu
utary of rive
er Sone durinng 1954-62 at Pipri villa
age, Distt
Soneebhadra, UP P
It is a Concrete gravity dam of height 91.96 m, lengtth 934.45 m which includ des 61 No. ofo blocks,
13 N
No. Spillway Blocks
B and 6 No. intake & powerhousse blocks
Pow wer House ha aving 6 units of generation capacity: 6x50
6 MW = 300
3 MW
Geology of the Area: Rockss at dam sitte mainly co onsists of gra
anite and gn
neiss and allso minor
band
ds of phyllite, schist and quartzite
q
7.1.2 P
Problems fac
ced
Figure 1: View Rihand

R Dam sh
howing the cra
acks
Craccks were noticed in dam and appurten nant works, ssoon after co ommissioning of project in 1962.
Distrresses have been observved in the da am and relateed structures s. See Figuree 1.
In soome of the machines, clearance between b movving and sta ationary partts had gonee beyond
permmissible limitss and there w
were frequen nt tripping.
Aparrt from this, problems were
w also en ncountered in n moving drraft tube cra ane, sealing of intake
gatees, operation of stop log gates,
g spillwaay and passe enger lift. In some of the machines, cclearance
betwween moving and stationa ary parts had d gone beyo ond permissib ble limits and
d there were
e frequent
tripp
ping.
7.1.3 R
Reasons forr problems
223
High level technical experts committee was set up in 1985 for safety of dam. Committee observed
following reasons for development of cracks
Expansion of concrete due to alkali-aggregate reaction.
Effect of temperature variation.
7.1.4 Suggested remedial measures
The remedial measures suggested by the committee are given below:
Closing of emergency passenger lift located in shaft of the block 34 at RL 830 ft

The penstock gallery columns showing distress were rehabilitated by epoxy grouting and steel
jacketing.
Regular monitoring of Cracks in three directions and two directions are being done using these
instruments
7.2 Hirakud Dam Project, Orissa
7.2.1 Project features
Hirakud dam constructed across river Mahanadi

A composite structure of earth, concrete and masonry.
Length of the main dam is 4.80 Km,
Flanked by 21 km earthen dykes on left and right sides, making a total length of 25.8km.
Two concrete spillways of average height 45.75 m and maximum height 60.96 m are located in the
two arms of the river. The spillways are founded on firm rock. The two spillways have 64 Nos. river
level sluices (40 on left+24 on right) and 34 Nos. of crest gates (21 on left + 13 on right) with
maximum release capacity of 42,450 cumecs (15.0 lakh cusecs).The spillway section has a large
opening of size 3.35M x7.01M, named operation gallery, from which vertical sluice gates are
operated, by use of travelling gantry cranes, to discharge flood flow through the river level under
sluices of size 3.66M x 6.20 M each. Vertical gate shafts size 1.04M x 4.98M connects the sluice
barrels to the operation gallery.
1.525M x 2.135M size drainage gallery in the right side spillway and 0.90M dia header pipe in left
side spillway, provided at foundation level, helps drainage of foundation through drainage holes.
Live storage of 5818M cum in Hirakud reservoir, provides direct irrigation to 1,59,100 hect. in
districts of Sambalpur, Bargarh, Subarrnapur and Bolangir.
Generates average annual 956M units of hydropower
Provides flood control benefit to Mahanadi delta area.
7.2.2 Problem encountered
The first impounding of the reservoir in 1956 was accompanied by seepage of water at various
locations, specifically in the galleries, gate shafts and sluice barrels of right spillway, mainly
through construction lift joints, formed drains. These were considered normal for concrete dam
and were treated with shallow depth cement grouting as and when required up to 1974.
Nearly horizontal cracks also appeared in almost all the exposed faces of the openings like
operation gallery, sluice barrels and around the gate shafts.
Cracks were also observed on the upstream face and downstream ogee surface of the concrete
spillway. The crackings were concentrated close to the block joints. Manifestation of cracking were
observed in buckling of steel frame fixed above collapsible gate in entrance of the gallery, touching
of end crest gates to the side steel liners, buckling of embedded steel frames of manhole openings
at the junction of the two road way slabs and failure of large number of M.S. bolts fixing the sluice
gate roller tracks to the concrete Misalignment of the sluice gate roller tracks in the some gate
shafts created difficulty in operation of the sluice gates, warranting immediate remedial measures.
7.2.3 Reasons for problems
The Committee was setup during 1981 to study the problem of cracks in Hirakud dam. After detailed
study, the committee concluded that the principal causes of cracking are.
224
Thermal stress due to rapid construction during summer months, without precooling arrangement
for the mass concrete.
Deterioration of concrete due to Alkali-Aggregate reaction.
7.2.4 Remedial measures recommended
Remedial measures suggested by the committee are
Refixing snapped bolts, removing buldged concrete and resetting side guide rails and roller tracks
of sluice gates. (Total 304 nos bolts snapped up to end of 1992 were refixed)
Drilling new drainage holes in the foundation gallery.
Epoxy grouting of cracks on exposed faces inside operation gallery, gate shafts, sluice barrels and
downstream surface. Total 3104kg of epoxy grade Dobeckot - 505c and Hardner EH-411 was
consumed in treatment of 3615M length of crack.
Resetting of end crest gates.
Resetting buckled embedded frames of manhole openings in road slab.
Upgradation of sluice barrels and bucket surface by epoxy plastering after grouting of cracks.
Renovation of sluice gates and procurement of four numbers of sluice gates for spare. (viii)
Sealing of leakage through formed drain no.39 at joint of block no. 39-40 (2002-03)
Filling of cavities formed close to upstream face of both spillways. (2002-03)
Under water treatment of crack on upstream face.
8.0 CONCLUSIONS
The following components of concrete ingredients shall be examined prior to its use in concrete:
Alkali aggregate reactivity of the aggregates shall be assessed according to the relevant codes
Acid soluble alkali percentages of the cement/ cementitious materials, mixing/ curing water,
admixtures shall be evaluated
Total reactive alkali content of concrete shall be calculated
The maximum permissible alkali contents between 1.8 and 4.0 kg/m3 Na2O equivalent have been
specified by various countries and agencies, with the allowable alkali content sometimes varying
depending on aggregate reactivity. The permissible limits shall strictly be followed in case of reactive
aggregates.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The authors extend their sincere thanks to Rihand Dam and Hirakud Dam project authorities for their cooperation
in conducting investigations. The authors extend our sincere thanks to one and all in Concrete Discipline for the
timely help extended by them. Sincere gratitude is extended to all the authors whose publications provided us
directional information from time to time.
REFERENCES
1 ACI 226.3R-87 Use of Flyash in Concrete, pp 226.3R-1 to 226.3R-29.

2 Alkali Aggregate Reaction in Concrete Dams, Review and Recommendations, ICOLD Bulletin 79
3 American Society for Testing and Materials, Standard Specification for Port land Cement. ASTM C 150-86.
4 American Society for Testing and Materials. Standard Test Method for Fly Ash and Raw or Calcined Natural
Pozzolana for Use as a Mineral Admixture in Portland cement Concrete. ASTM C-618-89.
5 American Society for Testing and Materials. Standard Test Method for Sampling and Testing Fly Ash or
Natural Pozzolana for Use as a Mineral Admixture in Portland Cement Concrete. ASTM C-311-88.
6 Canadian Standards Association (CSA), (2000b). Guide to the Evaluation and Management of Concrete
Structures Affected by Alkali-Aggregate Reactions, CSA A864-00.
7 Datta, O. P., Concrete Expansion at the Rihand Dam, India,. Water Power and Dam Construction,
November 1987
8 ICOLD Bulletin 79 Alkali Aggregate Reaction in Concrete Dams.
225
9 IS 1489 (Pt. 1): 1991, Portland Pozzolana Cement Specification, Flyash based (Third revision).
10 IS 2386 (Pt. VII & VIII):1963 reaffirmed in 1997 Alkali Aggregate Reactivity Test.
11 Jan Bijen, (1996) Benefits of Slag and Flyash, Construction and Building Materials; Vol., 10, No. 5, pp 309-
314,
12 Monograph on Alkali-Aggregate Reaction In Concrete ( 2008), Murari Ratnam and N. V. Mahure, publication of
Central Soil and Materials Research Station, New Delhi
13 Sudhindra, D., Suri, S. B. and Nair, K. N., Strained Quartz - A Menace for Durability of Concrete for Hydraulic
Structures, International Symposium on New Materials and Techniques in Dam Construction, Madras, March
1987.
226
Preventive Measures of Alkali Aggregate Reaction in Hardened

Concrete
Er. Rajeev Kumar Er. Rajeev Gupta
Central Soil & Materials Research Station Central Soil & Materials Research Station
Olof Palme Marg, Hauz Khas, New Delhi 110016 Olof Palme Marg, Hauz Khas, New Delhi 110016.
rajeevcsmrs@nic.in
Er. N K Khoth
Central Soil & Materials Research Station
Olof Palme Marg, Hauz Khas, New Delhi 110016
ABSTRACT
Alkali aggregate reaction causes significant damage to concrete structures worldwide. This harmful reaction can
occur within reactive aggregates if the alkali content in the cement and aggregate is more than the limit and
enough moisture is present to sustain the reaction. The alkali aggregate reaction in strained quartz bearing
aggregates is a very slow chemical reaction, which may take even more than 10 years to manifest its deleterious
effects and can lead to serious deterioration in concrete including expansion, cracking and reduction in the
engineering properties of the concrete. The cracking also exposes the interior of the concrete to aggressive
agents such as moisture, salt solutions and gases. This can then lead to further deterioration, through other
mechanism such as corrosion of steel reinforcement and even frost action in cold climates. The reaction leads to
the formation of a gel that has a tendency to absorb increasing amounts of water, which causes swelling. The
swelling forces the concrete to expand, resulting in gel surfacing and loss of concrete integrity. The alkali
aggregate reaction has been observed in old dams and even building distressing and deterioration of concrete
when the aggregate is susceptible to reaction placed in the alkaline environment. Aggregates that are chemically
stable will neither react chemically with cement in a harmful manner nor be affected chemically by normal
external influences. Reactive aggregates may result serious damage to the concrete by causing abnormal
expansion, cracking and loss of strength. Including fly ash, silica fume, metakaolin or zeolite in the mix design
invariably reduces this reaction, protecting the concrete (and the steel reinforcement) from the deterioration,
which follows expansion. The decrease in alkali aggregate reaction comes partially from the fact that fly ash/silica
fume/metakaolin/ zeolite reacts chemically with and absorbs alkali in the cement, thus making them unavailable
for reaction later with the reactive aggregate. Unlike in some other countries, frequent instances of occurrence of
alkali silica reaction (ASR) in concrete have not been reported in India. There are a large number of hydraulic
structures like concrete dams, bridges, etc in India, which are presently more than 30 to 40 years old, the time by
which problems due to any alkali silica reaction in concrete should manifest. A majority of these structures are in
a satisfactory condition, which bears testimony to the care and attention paid to design, workmanship and quality
control in the projects. Details of multidisciplinary investigations were carried out to identify the causes of distress
in the case of concrete hydraulic structures.
This paper presents the studies to control the alkali aggregate reaction in hardened concrete in their service life
for Water Resources Projects. As we are aware that the alkali aggregate reaction in concrete is just like a cancer
and it is very difficult to control it once started. The pozzolans and other materials can be used to control the
alkali aggregate reaction in concrete. Studies have been conducted using the reactive aggregate, water proofing
agents, geomembrane, pozzolans etc. to control the alkali aggregate reaction in concrete and their effects have
been examined. Results of the study showed that the water proofing agent by crystallization technique noticeably
reduced the residual alkali aggregate reaction in the hardened concrete than the other measures.
INTROCUTION
Many years have passed since the identification of phenomenon of deterioration of concrete structures
due to the damage of cracking by alkali aggregate reaction (AAR). Various measures and test
methods as counter measures against AAR have been researched and inspected by laboratory test
and on-site application. However, most of the measures and the test methods are effective basically
for structures under construction.
ALKALI AGGREGATE REACTION
Alkali-aggregate reactivity (AAR) is a reaction between the active mineral constituents of some
aggregates and the sodium and potassium alkali hydroxides in the concrete. The reactivity is
potentially harmful only when it produces significant expansion. Alkali-aggregate reactivity occurs in
227
two forms -- alkali-silica reaction (ASR) and alkali-carbonate reaction (ACR). Alkali-silica reaction
is of more concern than alkali-carbonate reaction because the occurrence of aggregates containing
reactive silica minerals is more common. Alkali-reactive carbonate aggregates have a specific
composition that is not very common.
Alkali-silica reactivity has been recognized as a potential source of distress in concrete since the late
1930s (Stanton 1940). There are a number of reasons for this:
Most aggregates are chemically stable in hydraulic-cement concrete.
Aggregates with good service records are abundant in many areas.
Most concrete in service is dry enough to inhibit ASR.
Use of certain pozzolans or slags can control ASR.
In many concrete mixtures, the alkali content of the concrete is low enough to control harmful ASR
Some forms of ASR do not produce significant deleterious expansion.
Indications of the presence of deleterious alkali-aggregate reactivity may be in the form of a network of
cracks (map cracking), closed or spalling joints, or displacement of different portions of a structure.
Because deterioration due to alkali-aggregate reaction is a slow process, the risk of catastrophic
failure is low. In fact, in Canada much concrete made with reactive aggregates remains in service.
However, concrete with alkali-aggregate reaction can cause serviceability problems and exacerbate
other deterioration mechanisms, such as those that occur in frost, deicer, or sulphate exposures.
Current practices to mitigate the detrimental effects of alkali-silica reactivity include the use of non-
reactive aggregates, reducing the alkali content of the concrete by using low-alkali cement where
available, and by using supplementary cementing materials or blended cements proven by testing to
control the reaction. Supplementary cementing materials include fly ash, ground granulated blast-
furnace slag, silica fume, and natural pozzolans. Blended cements also contain these materials to
control alkali-silica reactivity. CSA A864-00 provides in-depth information on the identification and
mitigation of alkali silica reactivity in structures.
The use of low-alkali cement, blended cements, or supplementary cementing materials does not
control alkali-carbonate reaction. Fortunately this reaction is rare. If aggregate testing indicates that an
aggregate is susceptible to alkali-carbonate reactivity, the reaction can be controlled through the use
of selective quarrying, aggregate blending, reducing maximum aggregate size, or using special
compounds that inhibit the reaction. The most practical preventative measure for this reaction is to
avoid the use of these aggregates.
Alkali-Silica Reactivity
Alkali-Silica Reactivity, also termed ASR, is the expansive deterioration of concrete due to a chemical
reaction involving components in aggregates and the cement paste. At the natural pH of concrete
(approximately 12.4) and in the presence of calcium hydroxide and water (compounds normally
present in concrete), many siliceous minerals in aggregates eventually will decompose into silica gel.
This may take anywhere from a relatively short to an extremely long time -- from months to centuries --
depending upon the reactivity of the aggregate particles, the internal humidity of the concrete and the
presence or absence of other compounds in the concrete.
The sodium or potassium content of the cement used in concrete strongly influences its potential for
ASR. If the cement contains appreciable amounts of sodium and / or potassium hydroxide, then the
concrete may have a higher pH than normal. (While it is theoretically possible for sodium or potassium
hydroxide to raise the pH to 14, practically the pH of concrete will not exceed about 12.8, which is
more than 250% greater than that of low-alkali cement concrete.) An increase in pH will increase the
rate of the alkali-silica reaction, causing it to occur sooner and faster. Sodium and / or potassium are
essential components of silica gel, the product of the alkali-silica reaction. Silica gel is expansive and
may cause concrete to crack.
Normally, most of the sodium and potassium in cements occur as sulfates rather than as hydroxides.
Sodium and potassium sulfates do not influence the pH of concrete; however, during alkali-silica
reactions, these compounds do contribute ions to produce deleterious, water-absorptive and
expansive sodium or potassium silica gels. After the sodium and potassium ions have been depleted,
calcium often also forms silica gel. Calcium silica gel is much less reactive with water and is unlikely to
cause cracking in the concrete.
Sodium or potassium ions that form silica gel may not necessarily come from the cement. They may
also be derived from concrete admixtures, road salt, or sea or ground waters. These sources contain
dissolved sodium or potassium chlorides. Some rock types may also contain feldspars that partially
dissolve to release sodium and potassium into the concrete pore fluids.
228
Where can ASR be found?
ASR can occur in any structure but occurs most commonly where there is abundant moisture, such as
dams, pilings, and retaining walls. Bridges, roads, airport pavements, and parking garages are also not
immune. ASR is not common in buildings, but it has occurred in a few skyscrapers, office and
residential structures -- especially in foundations and slabs on grade. Deterioration also occurs in
moist parapets and window areas.
How is ASR recognized?
ASR is the expected mechanism when combined pattern cracking and expansion of a structure are
observed in the field. The most common manifestations of this are alligator cracking and compression
of expansion joint materials. In the advanced stages of the reaction, a clear to milky gel (silica gel) is
also extruded from cracks in the concrete. In some older (>50 years) concrete which is affected by
ASR, alligator crack patterns may not appear at the surface. Instead, cracks perpendicular to the
direction of restraint and spaced about 3 feet apart may be present. In these cases, deep carbonation
of the concrete has prevented the development of ASR near the surface, but the reaction has still
occurred at depth.
One widely employed field test for ASR uses uranyl acetate and ultraviolet light. A portion of the
concrete is ground clean and sprayed with a solution of uranyl acetate. This area is then viewed in the
dark with ultraviolet light. Areas with silica gel fluoresce. Some minerals in aggregate, such as fluorite
and calcite, also fluoresce, as does fluorescein dye, the colorant in automobile antifreeze, a material
that is routinely spilled and leaked along all highways. The mineral Ettringite, a common sulfate
mineral in hardened concrete, also fluoresces. Ettringite may have a deleterious effect on concrete, if
the concrete expands and cracks due to delayed ettringite expansion or sulfate attack. Thus, while the
uranyl acetate test allows one to recognize potential ASR in the field, the test does not distinguish
possible evidence for ASR from common concrete contaminants and other expansive forms of
concrete deterioration.
ASR is most-reliably recognized with a petrographic analysis (ASTM C 856 and IS: 2386-Part VIII) of a
core sample. The petrographer will saw and polish of the core and have thin sections made across
any cracks at the edges of aggregate particles. On the polished surface of the core, the petrographer
can determine whether any of the aggregate particles has clarified rims, peripheral cracks, or radial
cracks that extend into the concrete. Sometimes, the concrete expels silica gel to form globules on this
surface. More often, the silica gel can only be recognized in the thin section of the concrete. Thin
sections are 30 microns thick (about the thickness of a human hair) slices of the concrete which are
examined microscopically. The presence of silica gel in association with cracked aggregate particles is
definitive proof that ASR deterioration occurred.
Can ASR damage be repaired?
No, but it can be managed.
Most rigid repairs on ASR-damaged structures will fail. This may happen because continued or
reactivated ASR causes expansion, which in turn reactivates pre-existing cracks. Other repairs fail
because ASR-cracked concrete is unusually permeable. If water penetrates the structure and
becomes trapped behind the patching material, the trapped water may cause hydrostatic detachment
failure or result in freeze/thaw deterioration.
One method of repair of ASR damaged structures is a combination of structural reinforcement and
cosmetic coverings. The structure is first reinforced so that it will not collapse, i.e., a cantilever
retaining wall is converted to a tieback structure. Then, cosmetic repairs are performed, such as facing
with precast concrete, cut stone, or EIFS (Exterior Insulation Finishing System).
It may also be possible to slow ASR deterioration by injecting concrete with lithium compounds. A trial
on an ASR-affected bridge in South Dakota appears to have dramatically slowed the expansion of the
concrete. The treatment causes the non-expansive lithium silica gel to form instead of expansive
sodium or potassium silica gels. A significant problem with this form of treatment is that it is difficult to
achieve complete penetration of the concrete from a solution applied to the surface of the concrete.
229
The proccess does ha ave promise if the concrrete is differe

entially deterriorated, i.e., the exterior concrete
of a build
ding is deteriiorated, but not
n the concrrete that facees the interio
or of a buildinng.
Conventtional Measures to Con

ntrol the Alk
kali Aggrega
ate Reaction
n (AAR)
The AAR counter measures

m fo
or hardened concrete structures in service wh here alkali aggregate
a
reaction have alreaddy occurred are required d to suppress without deestroying the e structures. Ordinary
methodss conventiona ally used so far are main
nly designed to prevent water
w infiltration from the concrete
surface through the application of coating materials on n the structures. This process
p is ccommonly
referred to as passive protecting methods.
RESEAR
RCH STUDY
Y TO CONTR
ROL ASR IN HARDEBED
D CONCRET
TE
A study has been co

onducted to find
f out the effective
e mecchanism to control
c ASR in hardened concrete
as the ASR is cancer to the conccrete and dra
astically reduced the life span
s of the concrete
c structures.
In this sstudy, a highhly reactive aggregate has h been ch hosen for thhe study. Th he rock is essentially
comprise es of quartz and feldsparr with small quantities
q of sericite. Quartz is coarsse to fine gra
ained with
a few poorphyroblastss, quartz graiins are strain ned. Sericite occurs in thin flakes which are orientted in the
direction
n of foliation. Porphyrobla asts of k-feld
dspars and small
s laths of
o plagioclase e are presennt. The k-
feldspar shows perth hitic texture (T
Table 1; Figss. 1A & B).
Table 1
Mineralogiccal assemblag
ge (%) % of Strain Und
dulatory Extinc
ction Angle
Quartz (degreess)
Quartz (85--90), Feldspar (5-8), 70-80% 21-30
Sericite (2-3
3), Iron-oxide (1%).
al Composition
Minera n in Delhi Quarttizte % of Strained
S and Unstrained
U Qua
artz
Unstrained
d
1% Quartz
8% 2% Quartz 20%
S
Strained Quartz
Feldspa
ar
Sericite U
Unstrained Quarttz
Strrained
Iron Oxide Quartz
89
9%
Figu re 1A Figur80%
re 1B
8
The Morrtar-bar test, now adopted
d with slight modification
n as ASTM C1260-94,
C ha
as been usedd to study
the sequ
uential development of aalkali aggregaate reaction for reactive rock. The re
esult of ASR
R is given
below:
0.22
OP
P
0.15
5
%Expansion
0.1
1
10
0.05
5 2%
%
7%
%
0
0 5 No.ofDaays
10 15 20 25
Figure 2: Results of AS
SR control sam
mple and with silica fume, litthium nitrate and
a zeolite
230
Since thee rock is exppansive in na ature, Silica fume,

f lithium
m nitrate and zeolite have e been tried tto control
the expaansions. The e lithium nitra ate and zeolite are effecctive to control ASR. Siliica fume con ntrols the
expansioon and bring down the exxpansion to the limit of 0.1%. 0 All thesse have alsoo been tried tto control
the ASRR in hardened d concrete along
a with immpermeable g geosyntheticc material an nd crystallinee material
(Xypex) coating. Tessts have been carried outt for one yea ar to observee the efficacyy of different materials
in contro
olling the resiidual ASR in hardened concrete. Forr this, a 50 x 50 cm cube has been ca asted and
Nx size ccores have been
b drilled out
o for residu ual ASR testss in the harde ened concreete.
A contro hium nitrate, zeolite and wrapped

ol sample with samples with crystalline material coating, lith
0
with impermeable ge eosynthetic material
m have
e been put in
n the cylinderr containing NaOH solutiion at 60
C and mmonitor the exxpansion for one year.
The sammple has bee en put in lithhium nitrate solution undder pressure
e, so that thhe solution should
s be
absorbedd or penetratte into the sa
ample. Simila
arly, the sam
mple has beeen put in the zeolite solutiion under
pressure
e and tempe erature so as a absorb or penetrate solution into o the samplle. The impe ermeable
geosynth
hetic materiaal has been tried to the best to wrap p, but could not be seale ed at top annd bottom
may get NaOH solution required for reaction.
The resu
ults of all give
en in the figu
ures presente
ed below:
0.09
Contr
0.08
Geosynt
0.07 Zeolite
Lithiu
%Expansion
0.06
0.05
0.04
0.03
0.02
0.01 Crystali
ne
0
0 50 100 150 No.ofDa
200 ays 250 300 35
50 400
Fig
gure 3: Resultts of ASR methods to control
Figure 4 Showing
S reactted aggregatess in plane pola
arized light
231
The section of cores after the test in plane polarized light has been shown in the figure 8 depicting the
reacted aggregates and the gel rim around the aggregates. The EPMA image has been shown in
figure 9 which clearly depicts the reaction taken place and formation of gel rim around the aggregate
surface from where cracks started and may reach the surface. These cracks are visible in many cases
on the surfaces mostly when the concrete is continuously submerged in water.
CONCLUSIONS
Alkali-aggregate reaction causes significant damage to concrete structures worldwide particularly to

hydraulic structures such as dams, barrages etc. This harmful reaction can occur if the alkali content of
the cement and the presence of reactive minerals in the aggregate are high and enough moisture is
present to sustain the reaction. Under some conditions, the reaction may result in slow but progressive
expansion and cracking of the concrete.
In addition to the use of pozzolanic material, it may be suggested that low alkali cement (less than
0.6%) and acceptable non-reactive aggregate may be used in order to prevent alkali aggregate
reaction in the construction.
As ASR may create cracking problems in concrete in dams, it is suggested to make it mandatory that
preventive measures such as lithium nitrate, zeolite, crystalline material, silica fume etc. to control ASR
have to be taken during constructions of such structures.
In the present study, the crystalline material coating has been found suitable to control the ASR in the
hardened concrete in dams, barrages etc. if the preventive measures have not been used during its
construction.
REFERENCES
ASTM C 227 - Standard Test Method for Potential Alkali Reactivity of Cement-Aggregate Combinations (Mortar-
Bar Method)
ASTM C 289 - Standard Test Method for Potential Alkali Reactivity of Aggregates (Chemical)
ASTM C 295 - Standard Guide for Petrographic Examination of Aggregates for Concrete
ASTM-C 586 - Standard Test Method for Potential Alkali Reactivity of Carbonate Rocks for Concrete Aggregates
(Rock Cylinder Method)
ASTM C 856 Standard Practice for Petrographic Examination of Hardened Concrete
ASTM-C 1105 - Standard Test Method for Length Change of Concrete Due to Alkali-Carbonate Rock Reaction
ASTM C 1260 - Standard Test Method for Potential Alkali Reactivity of Aggregates (Mortar-Bar Method)
Buck, A. D. (1975), Control of of Reactive Carbonate Rocks in Concrete, Technical Report C-75-3, U. S. Army
Engineer Waterways Experiment Station, Corps of Engineers, Vicksburg, Miss., September, 36 pp.
Hadley, D. W. (1961), "Alkali Reactivity of Carbonate Rocks-Expansion and Dedolomitization, "Research

Department Bulletin RX139, Portland Cement Association,
IS: 2386 (Part VII). Indian Standard Methods of Tests for Aggregates for Concrete Alkali Aggregate Reaction
Newlon, H. H. Jr. and Sherwood, W. C. (1962), An Occurrence of Alkali-Reactive Carbonate Rock in Virginia,
Bulletin 355, Highway Research Board, Washington, D.C., pp. 27-44.
Newlon, H. H. Jr., Sherwood, W. C. and Cullen (1964), Methods for Reducing Expansion of Concrete Caused by
Alkali-Carbonate Rock Reactions, Highway Research Record No. 45, Highway Research Board, Washington,
D.C., pp. 134-150.
232
Ozol, Michael A.(1994), "Alkali-Carbonate Rock Reaction," Significance of Tests and Properties of Concrete and
Concrete-Making Materials, ASTM STP 169C, edited by Klieger, Paul and Lamond, Joseph F., American Society
for Testing and Materials, Philadelphia, pages 372 - 387.
Stanton, T.E. (1940), Expansion of Concrete through Reaction between Cement and Aggregates, Proceedings,
American Society of Civil Engineers, pp. 1781-1811.
Swenson, E.G. (1957), A Reactive Aggregate Undetected by ASTM Tests, Bulletin No. 266, ASTM, West
Conshohocken, Pa., PP. 48-51.
Swenson, E. G., and Gillott, J. E.(1967), "Alkali Reactivity of Dolomitic Limestone Aggregate," Magazine of
Concrete Research, Vol. 19, No. 59, Cement and Concrete Association, London, June 1967, pages 95 to 104.
Tang, Mingshu; Deng, Min; Lon, Xianghui; and Han, Sufeng (1994), "Studies on Alkali-Carbonate Reaction," ACI
Materials Journal, American Concrete Institute, Farmington Hills, Michigan, January-February 1994, pages 26 to
29.
233
Basalt Fiber and Rebar: A Construction Material of Future

Sudhir Gupta N. Nalini
HDM Co. Pvt. Ltd. HDM Co. Pvt. Ltd.
G-52, Sector-6, Noida 201 301 G-52, Sector-6, Noida 201 301
hdm@hydrodesign.net
ABSTRACT
Basalt Fiber is made from fine grained hard igneous rock formed by Volcanoes. Basalt Fiber and Basalt
reinforcement bars and other composite products made of Basalt fibers and a resin epoxy binder are primarily
used for reinforcement of concrete structures. They are non corrosive, and have tensile strength much higher
than the steel. Rock Rebars are 2.5 times stronger than steel and one fourth in weight of Steel. The concrete
structures having Basalt fiber can withstand high temperatures, corrosion and abrasion, and Crack & Leakage
resistant to highly aggressive environments, no service ageing problems and many other useful characteristics
make it outshine the other reinforcement materials. The Basalt Rebars have the potential to replace/ supplement
steel bars. Compared to other fibers used today, Basalt fibers are cost effective apart from providing better
durability under extreme conditions. In short, Basalt fibers and other composite products are of great interest for
the construction industry particularly for Dams, Stilling Basins, Desilting basins, tunnels lined canals, roads ,
highways and other water resources and marine and coastal works.
Concrete is weak in tension and cracks easily when it shrinks or creeps under sustained loading. When concrete
falls, it breaks suddenly without warning. That is why it has to be reinforced to make it purposeful. Reinforcement
provides tensile strength, stiffness, and ductility to concrete. It also makes it an efficient, versatile, and safe
building material.
Steel is most commonly used material for concrete reinforcement in India. Besides steel many other discrete
Fibers and their Fiber Reinforced Bars are widely used viz Carbon Fibers, Polypropylene, E-Glass, S- Glass
fibers etc. However, these materials are subject to corrosion in strong aggressive environments, and cannot
withstand high temperatures for long time periods, are service ageing, very heavy to handle, etc, Such
characteristics tend to make them not very effective to corrosion and abrasion etc. Among the fibers, Basalt fiber
provides many additional advantages which makes it place special among the other fibers.
INTRODUCTION TO BASALT FIBER
The Basalt fiber is made of igneous Basalt from volcanoes which have magmatic origin, having high
chemical, thermal and natural resistance. Its homogenization is a result of ancient volcanic activity. In
contrast to the raw materials used for manufacturing steel and fibers from other material, this Basalt is
a ready natural raw material for the fiber production.
It has a high natural strength, durability, insulating properties, resistance to corrosion in chemicals and
other aggressive environment. The Basalt fiber is made of natural, environment friendly raw materials,
have great prospect of application in different industries and construction works.
Basalt Fiber as Reinforcing additive
Basalt fiber is an effective reinforcing additive component to any cement solution, including for any
type of concrete.
It is a unique construction material which provides high compressive and tensile strength to concrete
and cement mortar. It has heat and sound insulating properties. It does not react to temperature
changes, is stable in all aggressive environments, which property makes it an excellent facing
material.
Basalt fiber is compatible with cement and as opposed to metal, polypropylene and polyester fibers, it
has better adhesion with the cement matrix. Basalt fiber doesnt have the shortcomings which
polypropylene, Steel and glass fibers have. The fiber types that have been used in some countries for
construction purposes are the fibers with an average monofilament diameter of 13 to 24 microns.
234
Basalt Fiber Reinforced Concrete
Basalt Fiber Reinforced Concrete is one with addition of discrete reinforcing fibers made from Basalt.
At appropriate dosages, the addition of fiber provides increased strength and resistance to plastic and
drying shrinkage cracking, reduced crack widths and enhanced energy absorption, abrasion and
impact resistance. The major benefit derived from the use of Basalt fiber reinforced concrete is
improved concrete durability.
Mixing Technique
For stationary concrete mixing machines:

Basalt fiber reinforced concrete mixture is recommended to be prepared in batching plants
For a uniform distribution of Basalt fiber in concrete, Basalt fiber is recommended to be introduced
(automatically or manually) with sand and coarse aggregates by gradual doses in dry form only.
It is recommended to increase the mixing time of concrete mixture by about 20% of normal mixing
time, of concrete without fibers;
For on-site concrete mixers (agitators):

Dry sand, cement, coarse aggregates are added into the rotary mixer and Basalt fiber must be
added gradually. Water is added only after a uniform distribution of fibers throughout the mixture.
For a uniform distribution of Basalt fiber throughout the volume of concrete, Basalt fibers shall be
added manually while adding sand into the mixer;
It is recommended to set the optimum mixing time of Basalt fiber and sand for its uniform
distribution in the concrete mix.
Recommended dosage is from 1 to 5 kg of Basalt fiber for 1 m3 of concrete mixture.
Comparison of Physical and Mechanical Properties
E-Glass S-Glass Polypropylene Carbon

Item Basalt Fibers Steel Fiber
Fibers Fibers Fibers Fiber
Density (gm/cm3) 2.63 2.54 2.54 0.91 1.78 7.8
Tensile Strength (Mpa) 3200-3850 3100-3200 3200-4100 420 3500-6000 360-550
Elastic Modulus (Gpa) 93 72.5 86 3.5 230-430 250
Elongation at break (%) 3.1 4.7 5.3 10 1.5-2.0 -
Softening Point
1050 850 850 100 - 800
(Deg. Celcius)
Working Temperature
-260 - 650 380 380 60 500 500
(Deg. Celcius)
Temporary Temperature
1100 1000 950 120 800 950
(Deg. Celcius)
Thermal Conductivity
0.031- 0.038 0.026 - 0.034
(W/m.K)
Electrical Specific Volume
1x1012
(ohm.m)
Accoustic Normal
Coefficient of sound 0.9 - 0.99
absorption
TEST RESULTS
Given below are results of tests conducted at various experimental research laboratories:
235
Technical characteristics of Basalt fiber:

Monofilament diameter: 13-20 microns,
Fiber length: 3-100 mm,
Rupture strength 50-55 cN / tex*,
Linear density - 70-4800 tex,
Long duration temperature range - up to 680 C
Withstands intermittent temperature up to 1000 C
Hardness due to the Moh scale - 8-9 (diamond - 10).
*Tex means mass of yarn in grams per 1000meter length.
Advantages of Basalt fibers and roving in concrete:

Easy Concrete pouring (formwork can be removed after a few hours)
Provide a proportional three-dimensional reinforcement;
Lightweight, high mechanical strength, high corrosion and chemical resistance to alkalis, acids
and other aggressive environments;
Frost resistant, waterproof;
Sound absorption;
Resistance to salt sea water;
Resistance to ultraviolet radiation;
Dielectric;
High Friction, frost, heat and moisture resistance
Ecologic.
BASALT FIBER SPECIFICATIONS
Item Dimension Application

3mm Plastering, Flooring, for Crack resistance
For Asphalt and Concrete Roads, 6mm is
6mm, 9mm, 12mm
most commonly used
9mm, 12mm Shotcreting
Chopped Basalt Fiber
12mm Tunnel Lining/ Canal Lining
16mm Normal Concreting
18mm Normal Concreting
25mm Steel Fiber Replacement
236
Typical Physical Properties
Properties Values
Thermal
Sustained operating temperature, C 680

Minimum operating temperature, C -260
Melting temperature, C 1450
Physical/ Mechanical
Density, g/cm3 2.8

Filament Diameter, microns 13-20
Elastic Modulus, Gpa 89
Elongation at break, % 3.15
Chemical Resistance
% weight loss after 3 hrs boiling in:
H2O, % 1.6
2n NaOH (Sodium Hydroxide),% 2.75
2n HCl (Hydrochloric acid), % 2.2
Standard Product line:
Monofilament diameter, micron 13,16,18

Fiber Length, mm 3,5,10,12,24,25,36,50,72,100
Sizing type All types depending on the application
Sizing Content, % 0.4
Moisture Content, % 0.1-12
BASALT GEOMESH
Basalt Fiber Geo Mesh is useful for reinforcing asphalt-concrete (covering in construction,
reconstruction and repair of airports, runways, and highways and any pavements, pedestrian ways,
roads, Hill sloping surfaces and banks. Geomesh is very useful in treatment of excavated hill slopes,
concreting over the existing concrete and ensures proper grip with existing concrete. The
reinforcement of disc cutters with Geo Mesh increases their reliability, safety and the cutting process
output. The strength of the net is as good as metal reinforcement, however, it is 2.6 times lighter, thus
simplifying transportation and handling in construction. Basalt Fiber Geo Mesh is more durable than
metallic and glass fiber reinforcement.
Technical Specification of Basalt Fiber Geomesh
Size (mm) 5x5 10x10 25x25 50x50

Width (mm) 1000 1000 1000 1000
Roll Length(m) 100 100 100 100
APPLICATION AREAS FOR BASALT FIBERS AND OTHER BASALT PRODUCTS
Basalt fibers are most suitable in terms of price and quality ratio. In some spheres there is no
alternative to Basalt fibers. These are being used in USA, some European countries, Russia, Ukraine
as well as in China. The fibers reinforce the concrete, three dimensionally and improve the strength of
concrete tremendously. The following are the fields where Basalt fibers are being used:
237
Construction - disperse concrete, mortar, dry mixes and structural products reinforcement for
improving concretes and mortar crack resistance , waterproofing, easy concrete pouring, tensile direct
strength and in bending and in compression, abrasion, & corrosion resistance and as a result -
increased durability of concrete structures.
The Basalt fiber has been tried at Baise Hydro Junction Multi Purpose Dam Project in China, for
construction of Dam Spillway and the Stilling Basin of Roller Compacted Concrete Dam. The project
authorities have observed that Basalt fibers mixed in concrete mix are 44.7 47.5% more effective
against abrasion and impact toughness increased by 43.1%.
Thickness of shotcrete and concrete lining in tunnels/ desilting basins can be reduced apart from
reduction in cement quantity in concrete mix which can reduce the excavated diameter of tunnels. The
use of Basalt bolts for tunnel excavation, slope protection, and for forepoling purposes reduce the drill
hole diameter because of higher tensile strength of Basalt bolts. Use of Basalt fibers in asphalt or
concrete roads/ highways can make the roads more durable, crack, shrinkage and leakage proof
under all climatic conditions. Similar would be effect in canal lining, railway sleepers, etc.
Because of the non-corrosive property, these Basalt products like fibers, reinforcement bars, Basalt
bolts, and Geomesh are extremely useful for marine and off-shore works and for buildings in coastal
cities like Mumbai, Chennai, Kolkata etc where sea water (surface and underground) corrodes the
metallic steel bars. These Basalt products are almost essential in heat proofing of building and fire
proofing of industrial buildings and kitchens of hotels etc. The Basalt fibers and rebars make the works
more durable and cost- effective.
Basalt fiber products for Construction Industry:
Building construction and facing;

Reinforcing plaster mesh, waterproofing materials for roofs and underground structures;
Reinforcing mesh for cut-off walls;
Basalt rebar, construction materials that ensure the seismic resistance of buildings fire resistant
materials for the construction of high buildings and critical facilities;
Basalt rebar for bridges, tunnels, canal lining, desilting basins, Dams, railway sleepers and subway
construction.
CONCLUSION
Because of its inherent qualities and properties, the Basalt fibers and other composite products have a
tremendous scope in Construction Industry, Water resources projects, in particular and other spheres
of our day to day life. It may not be wrong to say that Basalt fibers and its composite products are
construction materials of future.
REFERENCE
Brochures of various suppliers
Reports from Research Institutions and Laboratories
Observations of some users.
238
Microfine Cement Grouts & its Application

Dr. A. V. Shroff
Professor Emeritus
M S University Baroda
ABSTRACT
Ultrafine Alkali Activated Slag (AAS) & Portland / Slag cements have been commercially available Ultrafine
cements have been subject of research at M.S University of Baroda, Gujarat, India for Six Years (2000-2006)
under the supervision of Emeritus Professor A.V Shroff.
Particle size of the Ultrafine slag cement is characterized by 98% passing 7 microns & D50 at 3 microns is
contrast to the ultrafine Portland / slag cement which has 98 % passing at 10 micron at D50 at 4 microns.
The chemical composition of the slag used in the cement is 35 % SiO2 , 16 % Al2O3 & 43 % CaO. The
composition of Portland / slag cement, which is a 25 / 75, is therefore between the bulk composition of Portland
cement & the slag.
Both of the ultrafine cements permeate fine sands & micro cracks of rocks formulated at high water to cement
ratios. Viscosity plays an important part in the permeation mechanism & both cements exhibit viscosities below
10 cPs at water to cement ratio of 2. The low viscosity is obtained through the use of super plasticizing with
Naphthalene Sulphonate & Acrylic Acid Polymers.
Microfine cement silicate grout can be tailored to meet a wide variety of Geotechnical Challenges by modifying
mix ratios & pumping rates.
Its applications include dam grout curtain, rehabilitation, consolidation grouting and nuclear & hazardous waste
containment.
INTRODUCTION
In the context of ground engineering the term grouting is used for the process of pressure injection of
setting fluids into pores and cavities. The process is widely used in the construction of tunnels, shafts
and dams for the purpose of either reducing percolation or increasing the mechanical stability in water-
bearing soil or rock. If a useful engineering purpose is to be achieved, the sealing and strengthening
actions must extend a considerable distance into the formation, and it is, therefore, general practice to
inject the grout into a special array of boreholes drilled into the rock or the soil.
Current grouting methods are effective in sealing cavities and both coarse and fine fissures in rock,
and in sealing pores in granular materials typical of all soils short of fine sands and very silty sands.
With the development of high-pressure pumps, cement grouts came to predominate, and they were
frequently associated with the sinking of mine shafts.
239
Fig. 1. Yield Value of the Grout-DST Plot Fig.2. Penetrability of various grouts
GROUTABILITY RATIO
It reveals that the size of the grout particle and the size of opening or pore spaces of the mass to be
grouted should be in such a proportion that blockage and filtering of the grout can be minimized. It can
also occur at low viscosity of these grouts which tends to gravitate towards the bottom space of
passage. Rough & adhesion between passage & particles will decide the blockage criteria
To avoid filtering of grout material from the void space, the ratio between D10 and d95 should be more
than 6 (Kravetz, 1958).
From the experimental study of (Shroff, Joshi, 2005) penetrability of newly developed micro fine (MC)
cement-grouts in different sand gradations, it is found that D15 / d85 >40 ( D for sand & d for MC ).
(Fig.1 & 2).
Criteria presented above provides only guide lines because of heterogeneity in pore, crack & fracture
sizes of alluvium / rock & swelling characteristic of some grout materials ( Shroff, Joshi,1994)
nevertheless it controls upper & lower limits of size of grout particles & the size of discontinuity of
formation to be grouted. At the same time it guards against washing out of injected grout from the
grouted formation. The penetrability of various grouts in relation to soil grain size is shown in Fig. 2.
MICRO FINE CEMENT BASED & SLAG BASED GROUTS
These grouts can be used for following applications: Dam curtain grouting, Foundation consolidation,
nuclear waste secondary containment, Hazardous waste, plume stabilization, preventing heave and
boiling condition in cofferdams, Water sealing during tunnel construction, pipe insertion work, dam
bottom ducts, reservoir bottoms, preventing seepage in river embankments in fine sands to coarse silt
where cement grouts are impenetrable.
These grouts are prepared indigenously by grinding OPC and for blast furnace Slag in ball mill to a
required specific surface area of particle (5000 to 8000 cm2 /gm). The special measurements are
240
particle size
s analysiss by blain aiir permeabiliity, Laser pa
article size analyzer
a & trrue permeation under
gravity.
MICRO F
FINE CEMENT DUST GROUTS (MC
CD)
Superfine cement iss used at va arious Dam sites

s of Gujaarat particula
arly in curtain grouting at a Sardar
sarovar project. MCD D grouts are developed having
h fines: 8115cm2/gm m with partic cle 50% grain size 13
m. Gel time with 1% % dispersant (Naphthale ene sulphona ate) varies 60 to 120 min n. at 0.6 to 4
4w:c ratio
can be further
f reducced to 30 to 100minutes with 1% sod e along with decrease in bleeding
dium silicate
potentiall. It is observved that MC CD grouts po ossess consistence lowe er initial visccosity compa ared OPC
grouts (F
Fig. 3a) (Fig..3b) shows UCSU & initial E value of MCD
M gel whhich is higherr at all w:c raatio when
compare ed to OPC. The cohesio on imparted d to grouted sand with OPC, & MC CD are 70, 125 kPa
respectivvely. It is ressisting threshold hydraulic gradient of 260 again nst wash ou ut forces sub bjected to
grouted ssand.
qcMCD=1.33qcOPC
Fig. 3 a. t- relation MCD,OPC grout Fig. 3 b. qc-tiime relation OPC,MCD

O grou
ut
SLAG B
BASED MICR
RO FINE CEMENT GROUTS
(Group-1)Grouts (MC-I, MC-II & MC-III) are developed by

b adding 25
5%, 50 % & 757 % Slag to
o 75% 50
% & 25%% OPC respectively in various proportions of solid to watter in presen
nce 1% Napphthalene
sulphona
ate as a disp
persants.
(Group-2 2) MC-III grrouts, Sodium m silicate arre mixed ass componentt 1:1 proporttion- MC:SSS & also
MC_III iss mixed with 1, 2 & 3% off bentonite (MC-bentoonite)and Siliica fume 4, 12
1 & 20% (M
MC-SF) as
admixturres to improvve its grouting performance.
1
Group-1
Time- visscosity & Tim

me-Strength:: MC-II rema
ain watery- Newtonian
N lo
onger time (100 min) com mpared to
60 min in
n case of MC C-I at same w:s
w ratio, & grout
g MC- III solidify slowwly at 200 min
m compared d 150 min
in MC-I. MC-I grout (75%OPC+2
( 5% Slag) seems to be ideal with resp pect to initial & gel time (F
Fig 4)
241
Fig. 4. t-- relation MC

C-I, MC-II
The streess-strain cuurves for all neat groutss indicates elastic-plastic

e c behavior with
w maximum failure
strain off 4.66%.For grouts prepa ared from 755% OPC +25 5% slag sho owed maximum UCS of 6315kPa
after 90 days of curiing at w:c = 0.8 which decreased
d to
o 2587kPa att w:c =5. For grouted sa and these
strength are 3768 kP Pa at w:c=0.88 and 96 KPPa at w:c=5. For slag +OPC grouts higher per cent of slag
gives beetter strength
h of grouted sand for loww w:c and higher per ce ent OPC give
es better strrength for
high w:c ratio (Table--1).
Triaxial compressive
c e strength off slag+OPC grouts are tested
t with confining
c pre
essure of 10
00kP and
200kPa. 50%OPC +50% slag gives highe est deviatorr stress (5860kPa) with h cohesion 1050Kpa
amongstt various wa ater cement ratio (0.8 to 5) for any OPCO and sla
ag variation.. In MC-I & MC-III of
grouted ssand it is obsserved that there
t is no much
m variationn in value (400 to 450).
hows indirectt tensile stre

Fig.5 sh ength vs. timme relationship. MC-I grrout gives higher
h indirecct tensile
strength (3275kPa) among
a otherr variation off slag with OPC and w:c ratio(Table 1). It is obseerved that
maximum m deviator stress of triiaxial comprression strength is abo out 1.6-1.9 times
t indirecct tensile
strength.
242
Table-1:- Effects of per cent OPC on Ground Granulated (microfine) blast furnace Slag Grout
(Shroff, Joshi, Ghrisma, 2005), Group-1
Proportion Unconfined Compressive Strength, kPa IndirectTensile Flexural Adherent

slag+OPC Strength, kPa strength washout
kPa strength,kPa
Raw gel Grouted sand (RD=30%) Grouted sand Grouted Grouted
sand sand
0.8W 2W 5W 0.8W 2W 5W 0.8W 2W 5W 2W 5W
3* 90* 3 90 3 90 3 90 3 90 3 90 90 90 90 90 7
25%+75% 3685 8156 1022 4665 615 2611 516 3661 308 1196 296 986 3275 1594 -
50%+50% 1050 5036 883 3978 650 2527 2955 1380 -
75%+25% 1060 15935 626 8124 418 4800 1060 4810 575 2100 108 361 450 260 125 810
Table-2: MCIII+SS as component & MC with Bentonite & Silica fume admixture (Shroff & Joshi, 2005), Group-2
$
SS = Sodium Silicate; Adherent wash out strength of MC-III with20%SS grouted sand at w:s=2 is 660kPa,while at w:s ratio 5 give 171 &231 at 40% and 60% SS
C:SS$ =1:1
MC + Triaxial compression test kPa
Bentonite & 28 days
Silica Fume Unconfined Compressive Strength, kPa 3 =196.2
as Admixtures
% Raw gel Grouted sand (RD=30%) Raw grout Grouted sand
0.8W 2W 5W 0.8W 2W 5W 0.8W 2W 5W 0.8W
7* 28 7 28 7 28 7 28 7 28 7 28 d C d C d C d C
Bentonite 1 3250 1900 8200 600 62 1900 360 51
Bentonite 2 2400 400 5100 550 55 1175 110 34
Bentonite 3 2000 380 5000 490 51 660 130 21
Silica fume 4 4810 4075 8225 750 61 7400 560 61
Silica fume 12 4250 2750 7250 500 56 6100 490 58
Silica fume 20 4000 1480 5750 700 61 3500 250 53
sodiumsilicate 20 2225 2950 2400 2250 2200 3800 1200 1800 5000 820 54 3300 505 43 4500 955 38
sodiumsilicate 40 4100 4900 2200 3150 3400 4800 1800 2000 8100 920 55 4200 491 50 7250 1090 49
sodiumsilicate 60 4400 6500 2300 2850 458 4500 5500 2000 2200 7500 950 55 4500 600 46 825 150 26 6550 1175 48
Sodiumsilicate 80 5500 6780 2500 4150 820 3300 3350 2400 3110 7500 1120 50 4750 1005 40 680 220 25 4400 - -
243
Fig. 5. Indirect tensile strength-time relation of MC-I,

II and III.
Fig. 6 .t- relation of MC+Bentonite grout Fig. 7. t- relation of MC-SF grout
Group-2
MC-SS as component grouts and MC + Bentonite &MC+ Silica fume (SF) admixture (Shroff& Joshi,
2005):
Time viscosity relationship: MC grout with silica fume (Fig.6) and bentonite (Fig.7) additives reflect
pseudo plastic behavior with deflection of flow curve increases towards shear stress axis with progress
of time. Time viscosity curve of MC-SF grout remain towards viscosity axis compared to that of MC-
bentonite showing elastic dominancy while bentonite curve shows more zero displacement and gel
time.
Time-strength relationship: Stress-strain curve of MC bentonite and MC-SF grout illustrate more
elastic-plastic behavior. Increase of % bentonite and silica fume content shift the stress-strain curve
towards strain axis and peak stress and corresponding strain decreases. Also MC-bentonite and MC-
SF grout offer residual stress to some extent for further increase of strain. MC with bentonite and silica
fume grouts exhibit elastic-plastic failure unlike neat MC grout.
MC-SF failed samples indicate more towards elastic failure tending to elastic-plastic failure while MC-
bentonite samples exhibit more towards plastic failure.
Cohesion and -value decreased with increase of bentonite/silica fume content. Cohesion decreases
continuously (19% drop with W:C=2) with addition of 1 to 3% bentonite while -value decreased to
17% at W:C=2 and 59% with W:C=5. When SF content increased from 4% to 20% cohesion reduces
33% with w:c=2 and 55% with w:c=5.
UCS of MC with SF grouted sand shows increase with curing time while MC with Bentonite, though it
is increasing with time but remain less than MC-SF and neat MC grout (Table 2).
244
Bentonite addition hampers the process of hydration of MC grout. The increase in unconfined strength
or peak deviator stress up to optimum silica fume is due to pozolonic activity of silica fume.
MC with sodium silicate (MC-SS): In MC-SS, UCS of 60%ss increases from 60kPa @ 1day to 680kPa
at 28 days with w:c=5.
Specific gravity and time of extraction decreases with increase of w:c ratio and decrease of silicate
content. Gel time of MC-SS grout is within few seconds which can be lengthen up to 30 min by adding
1 to 3% phosphoric acid (by wt of MC). The grout is most stable with minimum bleeding in very lean
mixes. Depth of true permeation increase with increase of permeability of sand, W:C ratio and
decrease of SS content.
Time- viscosity relationship: Viscosity of MC-SS grout increase with increase of time, % SS
concentration and decrease of W:C ratio. Time-viscosity curve of MC-SS grout is extreme left of the
cement based grouts. The addition of phosphoric acid (PA) shifts these curves towards right side
showing distinct behavior conforming to ideal grout as compared to OPC, MCD and MC grouts. (Fig.
8)
Fig.8.t- relation of MC-SS grout Fig. 9.qc-time relation of MC-SS grout
Time-strength relationship (Fig.9): Sudden increase of unconfined compressive strength and E-value
up to 7 days, thereafter it remains constant in thin mixes and increases gradually in thick grouts. The
unconfined compressive strength of MC-SS grout is 4211 kPa with 0.8W at 80% SS concentration
after 3 days of curing (Fig 9). The above values for neat MC grout are below 1000 kPa which indicates
early high strength gain due to addition of sodium silicate in MC grout.
Peak deviator stress at 7 days, with 40% SS increases from 665 kPa to 6529 kPa as W:C ratio
decreases from 5 to 0.8. For 2W grout at 7 days, it increases from 3204 kPa to 4186 kPa as % SS
increase from 20 to 80% (Table 2). MC-SS material follow Mohr-Coulomb failure criteria.
Cohesion of raw MC-SS grout increase at faster rate up to 7 days and increases gradually or remain
constant afterwards. Per cent increase it from 0 to 3 days is bout 70% and between 7 to 28 days it is
21%. value of raw MC-SS ground ranged from 250 to 550. The increase in value between 3 to 7
days is 15-25% and between 7 to 28 days, it is 0 to 15%. -values are 350 and 550 for 2W and 0.8W
grouts,
More content of sodium silicate help shifting stress-strain curves towards stress-axis of MC-SS
grouted sand. MC-SS grouted sand exhibit average E-value of 443 MPa when grouted with thick grout
while average value of 162 MPa for thinner grouts. Strength of MC-SS grouted sand increase with
curing time and % SS concentration (Table 2). MC-SS grouted sand exhibits 1.5 time strength than
MC grouted sand.
After 7 days of curing, cohesion of 0.8W grouted sand with % SS = 20, 40 and 60 is 675 kPa, 970 kPa
and 1050 kPa respectively. Increase in cohesion from 7 to 28 days is around 7 to 41% while %
increase in cohesion from 3 to 7 days is between 24 to 35%. SS component impart cohesive bond
245
bridging between micro cement flocs while MC contributes overall stiffness of MC-SS matrix. -value
of MC-SS grouted sand ranged from 370 to 490. MC-SS grouted sand resist the threshold hydraulic
gradient of 236 (660 kPa) against washout forces with W:C-2 and 20% SS concentration.
Creep study
New Creep test setup is developed for grouted sand mass and to study the creep behavior of MC
grouted sand with W:C ratio 2 and MC-SS grouted sand with W:C ratio 5 and 60% SS concentration.
(Shroff, Joshi, 2004).
Fig.10 Creep study with Mortar and Normal Fig.11 Creep study with MC-SS and only MC grouted
concrete sand
The rate of increase of creep diminishes with progress of time. The creep of MC grouted sand lower
than 40% load of UCS is 0.00148 after 12 days which remains constant up to 17 days. After that,
fewer than 70% load of UCS; additional creep up to 42 days is 0.00119. At the end of the test, the
specimen is deformed up to 0.62 mm. The specific creep is 7.2210-7 m2/kN (under 40% of ultimate
load) after 12 days.
Creep increases continuously for MC-SS grouted sand up to 42 days but the rate of increase of creep
diminishes with progress of time. The creep of MC-SS grouted sand is more compared to that of MC-
grouted sand. MC-SS grouted sand specimen shows initial strain of 0.002375 on loading and creep is
0.00345. At the end of test, the specimen is deformed up to 0.699 mm. The specific creep is 1.5310-6
m2/kN after 42 days. Creep of MC or MC-SS grouted sand is 3 to 6 fold that of ordinary
concrete/mortar (sand-cement grout) (Fig 10 &11)
Liquefaction Potential of Sand Grouted with and Micro fine Cement (MC) & MC with Chemical
Grouts (Shroff & Joshi, 2004):
Soil liquefaction during earthquakes can cause severe damage to all types of overlying or buried soil
structure systems.
Among the treatment methods used for reduction of liquefaction potential, chemical grouting may be
the most effective in cases wherein the soil to be treated is difficult to reach, as in the case of soils
under existing foundations (Maher, Ro and Welsh, 1994).
The undrained cyclic test results were used to evaluate the effect of grouting on the potential for initial
liquefaction (i. e. pore pressure generated equals confining stress and effective stress becomes zero)
and cyclic mobility by measuring the cyclic stress ratio and number of cycles required to reach initial
liquefaction and 5% strain cyclic mobility. There are basically two approaches in the literature for
defining liquefaction (1) flow failure liquefaction and (2) initial liquefaction and cyclic mobility.
246
1. Both sodium silicate and acrylate polymer grouts (with concentrations ranging from 20 to 60% in
the grout solution) increase the resistance of sand to both initial liquefaction and 5% cyclic
mobility. The increase was three to six folds with sodium silicate and two to four fold with
acrylate polymer respectively.
2. Addition of microfine cement (MC), MC-SS, MC+bentonite and MC+silica fumes grouts. In water
cement ratio ranging from 3:1 to 5:1 caused the sand to experience no initial liquefaction at 5%
cyclic mobility for the ranges of stress ratios and cycle numbers tested. The standard vibration
triaxial compression testing machine is used for the investigation. Fig. 12.(a, b) shows the
results for sand grouted with MC-SS grouts with one day and three day curing time which shows
less susceptibility to liquefaction with increase in percentage of SS and decrease in w. c. ratio.
sand samples grouted with MC grout and MC+SF grout were completely resistant to liquefaction
and were rock hard even at one day curing and could not be liquefied. The susceptibility of sand
decreases with increase in curing time since the grout has gained more strength.
The fracture surface in HCP containing slag suggested that crack propagated preferentially through
the C-S-H and calcium hydroxide. The fracture toughness accompanied with instantaneous fracture
was probably dependent on mechanical properties of hydrates. While, the fatigue behaviors was
mainly dependent on the property of C-S-H.
Liquefaction flow failure in grouted sand, a higher load or excitation is needed to push the sand over
the peak of the undrained stress-strain curve and reach steady state levels. Cyclic resistance
ratio(CRR) at W:C=10 is above 0.4 of virgin sand indicating safe state of grouted mass after 1 day and
3 days curing period.
Fig. 12 a: Liquefaction potential for grouted sand Fig. 12 b: Liquefaction potential for grouted sand
1 day strength 3 day strength
CRR Vs W:C ratio with bentonite
Fig. 13 show that for same W:C ratio and cycle number, as bentonite concentration increases, CRR
decreases, though CRR remains higher than that of pure sand. At low and high % of bentonite, in very
thin grout exhibit about 0.65 and 0.57 cyclic resistance ratio respectively during strong ground motion
(N=30). With W:C ratio of 10 and 3% bentonite minimum CRR of 0.54 is observed while at W:C=2 with
1% bentonite maximum CRR of 0.83 is observed when samples cured for 3 days.
247
Fig.13: Liquefaction potential of grouted sand (1 day strength) and of pure sand
MC-SS grouted sand
The pattern of the curve indicate that irrespective of % SS concentration, initially CRR reduces
significantly with little change in cycles required for liquefaction which alter wards become gradual. At
30 cycles, CRR values are above 0.6 at 1 day and 3 days curing time which indicates safe state of
grouted mass with reference to liquefaction. Compared to pure sand, the cyclic strength of MC-SS
grouted mass is more than 3 times after 1 day curing time
As % SS concentration decreases, CRR decreases for same W:C ratio. The cyclic strength of grouted
mass increases by about 10 to 15% as % SS concentration increased from 20% to 80%. This increase
in strength is attributed to bridging of sand particles with network of silica gel preventing any
contraction of sand mass.
Time history of cyclic loading
Under high frequency and relatively high cyclic resistance ratio, pore pressure increased suddenly and
pore pressure ratio reached to 1 quickly in pure sand. Immediately, initial liquefaction and 5% axial
strain occurred simultaneously. While MC bentonite grouted specimen took quite longer time (210
seconds) and MC-SS grouted specimen took maximum (350 seconds) in the entire three specimen
under consideration to reach initial liquefaction.(Fig.14 )
248
F 14 Typicall time history of

Fig. o cyclic loadin
ng
CASE S
STUDY
Design of grouted factor of sa afety and im

mprovementt index of a soil at Gan
ndhidham, Kutchchh
K
area, Gu
ujarat (Hosp
pital Building
g)
Soil data
a: moderatelyy stiff uniform
m fine sand deposit,
d othe
er input data: earthquakee magnitude of 6.5 on
Richter scale with 5 km dista ance from seismic
s eneergy source, input pea ak horizonta al ground
accelera
ation, amax = 0.998
0 m/s2 (ffrom Gandhidham meteo orological lab
boratory), Un
nit weight of saturated
s
sand, = 20.2 kN/m3, Depth below w ground lev
vel, z =5 m.
Stress re
eduction facttor computedd as Sd=1-0.00765 z (reffer paper T L Tyoud et al, 2001), therefore Sd
= 0.96177
o = h = 20.2 x 5 = 101 kPa, 0=h = 10.2 2 x 5 = 51 kPa,
Induced o) = 0.65 (amax/g)/( o/0)S
d-CSR (Cyclic stress ratio ) d , g=gra avity
= 0.65x (0 0.998/9.81) x (101/51) x 0.9617
0
= 0.1259
From Se eed & Idriss Table,
T equivalent initial liiquefaction cycle
c (Ni equi) at earthquake magnituude of 6.5
is 8.33
CRR value from cycclic triaxial te
est on virgin n uniform sand = 0.251 (Fig. 13) forr equivalent cycles of
8.33.
Applyingg correction factor, Cr= 0.642 for effective
e confining pressure 400 kPa a, corrected value of
CRR,
CRRc (Corrected Cycclic Resistance Ratio) = 0.251
0 x 0.6422 = 0.161
Factory oof safety = CRR/CSR

C = 0.161/0.1259=1.28, this is low, which
h is required to be increased
When sa ame soil grou uted with MC C-SS grout with
w W:C =5 and a SS=20% % after one daay, CRR incrreased to
0.81 at 8.33
8 cycles (ffig. 12.a). Ap
pplying samee correction factor
f Cr=0.6
642,
CRRc =0 0.642 x 0.81 = 0.52
Groute ed factor of safety
s after one day curing = 0.52/0.1259 = 4.1
And improvement ind dex = CRRc after
a grouting
g /CRRc befoore grouting
= 0.52/00.161=3.23
Factor off safety with respect to liq

quefaction in
ncreased fromm 1.28 to 4.1
1 with improvvement indexx of 3.23,
when puure sand is grrouted with MC-SS
M groutt.
When sa ame soil grouted with MC C-bentonite grout with W:C=5
W and bentonite=1%
b % after one day,
d CRR
increase
ed to 0.99 (ex xtrapolated value)
v at 8.333 cycles (Fig. 13).
CRRc = 0.642x0.99=
0 =0.635
Grouteed factor of safety
s after one day curing=0.635/0.1259=5.04
and imprrovement ind dex=0.635/0..161=3.94
249
Factor of safety with respect to liquefaction increased from 1.28 to 5.04 with improvement index of
3.94, when pure sand is grouted with MC with 1% bentonite grout
In brief, the danger of liquefaction in grouted sand is too remote as set grout fills the pores and
adheres to surface contact of void space which displaces the pore water imparting cohesive
component.
Cyclic Plate Load Test
For sand grouted with MC(w:c=5), the ultimate load intensity obtained from load settlement curve that
after 28 days of curing is 50kPa which 4.67 times in dry sand and 5.53 times that of 30% saturated
sand. In grouted sand (MC-W:C=2, 14 days curing) Ei, En & Cu increased from 44.4kPa/mm,
77kPa/mm, 65200KN/m3 at dry sand to 50kPa/mm, 93.3kPa/mm and 90000KN/m3 respectively, which
gives improved Ei ratio, En ratio and Cu ratio equal to be 1.31, 1.21 and 1.44 respectively.(Fig.15(a,b))
Fig.15(a) Static cyclic plate load test results on dry sand Fig. 15(b) Static cyclic plate load test results on dry
(RD=40%) sand (RD=40%, MC grout, W:C=2 curing time =14
days)
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The Faculty of Technology and Engineering, M. S. University of Baroda, Vadodara provides the ideal ambience
for academic and research activities. I have been most fortunate in being one of the faculty members of Applied
Mechanics Department of this outstanding Institute. The author gratefully acknowledges the books, journals and
proceedings of conferences for their use in the preparation of the manuscript. The research reported in this lecture
would not have been possible without the enthusiasm and active support extended by my past doctoral student
Dr. Nitin Joshi.
REFERENCE
N H Joshi (2003) PhD thesis: Rheology of Microfine cement grouts submitted to M S University of Baroda under
Guidance of Prof (Dr.) A. V Shroff
250
Repair of damages in distressed Masonry dams - a case study

A V Patil S J Pillai
Central Water and Power Research Station, Pune Central Water and Power Research Station, Pune
akvrpatil@gmail.com
R Vigneswaran K Balachandran
S D Pingale Rizwan Ali

ABSTRACT
Dams play important role in the development of nation and contribute a lot in the economic growth of the country.
Construction of these dams involves huge financial investments. Distressed dams may pose threat to safety of life
and property and huge economic loss in case of any failure. The ageing effect, bad construction practices and
adverse environmental conditions may cause distress in the dams in the form of cracks, excessive settlements,
peeling of cement mortar and excessive seepage through dam body. Such distressed conditions necessitates
urgent repair of damages in the masonry dams. Several steps such as assessment of damages, selection of
suitable repair material through laboratory studies and development of proper methodology are involved before
actual execution of repair of distress in dams. The present paper describes the methodology adopted during the
repair of Anjunem Masonry Dam, Goa, India. The quantity of seepage has been observed to reduce considerably
after repairing the damages on upstream face of the Anjunem Dam.
1. INTRODUCTION
In spite of taking due care in planning, design and execution stages, the decay and deterioration in
dam material due to ageing effect and on account of frequent earthquakes, some distress are
observed in old dams. The repair of damages in such existing gravity dams becomes necessary to
safeguard the safety of the people and property at downstream of the dam. The deterioration in dams
results in many distress in the dam body in the form of cracks, heavy seepage, settlement and
deformation, malfunctioning of gates etc. The distress developed in dams is monitored by project
authority through dam instrumentation and visual inspection from time to time. One of the most
important aim of repair includes control of seepage through dam body. Mitigation measures for
seepage depend upon conditions and causes of seepage. Very often costly repair works undertaken
using conventional methods may not be adequate in mitigating the problem.
The art of placing of quality mortar in joints and packing joints by mason is most important factor
governing quality of joints with respect to seepage. Since the quantity of stones (rubble) and the sand
for making mortar is required in abundant, these materials have to be extracted from a number of
quarries as such quality of these ingredients varies to large extent. Seals of rubber or copper are
sometimes provided at joints to serve as water stops. Breakage of these seals is more likely during
construction giving way to water.
Seepage water carries lime resulting in the formation of encrustations which block the drain pipes
rendering them ineffective in relieving uplift pressure. Leaching is revealed by lime deposits on
exposed surfaces of dams. It is a process wherein the seepage water enters pores of mortar and takes
away soluble particles and increases porosity. Leaching depends upon cement used and quality/rate
of flow of water.
Integration of conventional (site geology, water balance studies, instrumentation data) and
nonconventional methods (tracer, borehole logging, geophysical, hydrogeological, remote sensing) for
seepage investigation enables a better understanding of whether the dam is performing as
expected or whether it is providing a warning of developing conditions that can endanger the safety
of the dam and also offer cost effective solutions.
Estimation of seepage and evaluation of seepage parameters will serve as inputs to repair or remedial
measures applied for reducing seepage through hydraulic structures. The scientific way of carrying out
251
repairs of damages in dams involves lot of studies towards selection of proper repair material and
evolving proper methodology for repairing the damages.
2. SEEPAGE CONTROL MEASURES
2.1 Concrete Dams
Concrete dams are considered to be more homogeneous as compared to masonry dams. The causes
of seepage in concrete dams differ from that of the masonry dams. Cracking due to alkali aggregate
reaction, thermal gradients and structural loading are the main causes leading to seepage in concrete
dams. Because epoxy compounds have exceptionally good strength and bond properties they are well
suited for grouting cracks in concrete dams. Remedial measures such as strengthening of structure
are resorted in case of cracks developed due to excessive structural loading. A number of methods
such as buttressing, concrete backing, anchoring etc are available for strengthening the structures.
Seepage can be effectively controlled either by; Lengthening the path of the Seepage, Providing
Drainage Galleries, Reservoir Silt, Strengthening of Foundation, and by Periodical Review.
2.2 Masonry Dams
Since seepage in masonry dams is more pronounced than in concrete dams, remedial measures to
arrest the seepage in masonry dams are;
Grouting - It involves filling of the cavities/ fissures with selected material (cement/ epoxy/
polymer grouts) to impart impermeability by blocking the water passages from upstream to
downstream and improve strength. Choices of grout/modified grout materials and grout mixes are
dependent on shape, size and continuity of the cavities/ fissures, seepage water velocities and the
strength requirement.
Steel/concrete Jacketing- This is one of the most preventative measures for arresting entry of water
through upstream face of dam. It can be quickly adopted particularly when emergent remedial
measures are required. Concrete membrane involves shuttering and it shall be assured that the thin
membrane does not get separated from the massive masonry due to different properties of the
masonry and cover concrete and also due to their behavior under stress.
Cable Anchoring- Addition of vertical anchors force near the upstream face reduces overturning
moment and imparts greater frictional resistance against sliding. The technique is particularly best
suited for carrying out emergency treatment.
Geo-membrane- In this method, upstream face of the dam is jacketed with geo-membrane by
clamping it to upstream surface which stops the entry of water through the upstream face of dam thus
arresting seepage.
Guniting- It is quick and easy process in which, flowable concrete is pressed on upstream surface. A
steel wire mesh is fixed on surface to be gunited by anchors as a provision for tensile stresses.
Raking and Pointing - In pointing process, voids in between the stones are first filled with stone chips
by placing cement mortar as binding material; the joints are filled with mortar extending on both sides
of joint. Damaged/deteriorated pointing should be repaired with modified repair mortars like epoxy
mortar, polymer modified mortar etc.
The remedial measures like filling cavities, pointing and limited grouting are economical and serve
better to control seepage in masonry dams. If these measures are attempted flawlessly they would
certainly enhance the life of dam and restore functionality. If pointing and grouting are carried out
successfully with skilled workmanship, even though process is slow, it will definitely help in reducing
seepage. Guniting appears to have an edge over pointing, as work is quicker and management of
quality control is better. But guniting shall not be considered as a preventive measure and can be
considered as a remedial measure since it acts as an additional line of defense. The repairs of
damages in Masonry dams will also contribute to the structural integrity of the dam by improving
252
and elastic properties.

p The aesthetic view of the repaired dam will removve the appre
ehensions
e safety of th
he dam from the mind of the people residing downnstream of th
he dam.
per describess the selectio

on of suitable
e repair mate
erial through
h evaluation of
o physical p
properties
atory and thee methodology adopted to repair dam mages in An njunem maso onry dam, lo
ocated on
er in North Goa,
G India.
SE STUDY ANJUNEM DAM, GOA
m masonry damd is 176.0 m in leng gth and 42.8

8 m in
rom the dee epest founda ation level. The dam has
h 11
ncluding a sppillway compprising four bays each of
o 7.62
and 5 pierss each of 3.0
0 m width. The
T upstream
m (u/s)
of the dam is shown in fig
gure 1.
g on the d/ss surface and the seepa age of the orrder of

er/minute including aboout 525 literr per minutee from
e foundation
n gallery wass observed.
Figure 1. Anjunem
A Dam
the inspection, it was noticed tha at: at few places
ation of gunitting, battering of pointing avities formattions are obsserved. The damages
g material, ca
wn in figuress 2 to 5. Diischarge thro ough the drain holes in the foundation gallery indicates
portion in ma
asonry below w the founda ation gallery level or dislocations at interface of dam and
on rock.
Figure 2. Delamination
n of guniting Figure 3. Loss of pointing
g material
Figure
e 4. Cavities in
n body of dam
m Figure 5. Seepage
S wate
er in gallery
air Methodo
ology and Repair
R Material
for identifica
ation of suita
able repair materials
m andd repair meth hodology to repair the dam
d have
nducted in laaboratory at Central
C Wate er & Power Research
R Sta
ation (CW&P PRS), Pune.
arious alternaative methodds for repairss such as den
nsification off masonry, fillling of deep
p cavities
sonry joints,, re-gunitingg, body/foundation groutting etc, it wasw proposed to underrtake the
253
rehabilitation of upstream surface by filling of cavities with concrete or mortar with additive and pointing
of the joints followed by curtain grouting and then observe the seepage conditions.
Considering the requirement of treatment, following tests were conducted in the CWPRS laboratory on
repair material received from three leading manufacturers.
3.2 Tests on Repair Material
Compressive Strength - 5 cm Cube specimens were cast using the repair mortar and compressive
strength was determined by loading the specimen in a uniaxial compression testing machine.
Bond Strength with Rock and Concrete with a Primer Coat. - In this test, repair mortar was
compacted in between two cylindrical rock specimens by applying primer on bonding surfaces of rock.
Specimens thus prepared were cured and capped in steel caps. The assembly was tested in a
universal testing machine to determine bond strength (Figure 6).
Figure 6. Bond strength test Figure 7. Briquette testing Figure 8. Slant cone test
Tensile Strength - For determining tensile strength, standard size briquette specimens were cast. The
cast specimens were tested in a Universal testing machine (Figure 7).
Abrasion Resistance - This test is conducted using Dorys abrasion testing machine. Cured repair
mortar cube samples were subjected to in Dorys abrasion testing machine using abrasive charge.
Loss in weight was compared with loss in weight of similar size concrete specimen under identical test
conditions.
Shear Strength (Slant Cone and Double Shear) - The test is prescribed in ASTM C 882-99 to
determine bond strength of bonding material. Two equal sections of a 75mm by 150 mm cylinder
made from materials (in this case concrete and repair mortar) were bonded at an angle of 300,
applying primer at bonding face. The specimens were cured and tested under compression mode in a
compression testing machine (Figure 8).
Double Shear Test - This test was conducted as per procedure developed by US Army Corps of
Engineers. Three cubes of size 100 x 100 x100 mm are bonded together with test material applied to
half surface of two cubes and placing third cube in between. The assembly was then held in a clamp
and tightened. After a curing period of 7 days the assembly as such in clamped condition was held
between platens of a compression testing machine. The central cube which is bonded on either side is
then pushed down against the other two cubes. The bond strength under shear is the compressive
stress at which the middle cube slides breaking its bond on either side.
3.3 Selection of Repair Material
On the basis of test results and in view of the exposure of repaired surface to sun light, the modified
cementitious repair mortar was selected for use, which consists of cement, polymer, ironite ceramic
material and water. Test results of the tested systems are shown in table 1.
On the basis of laboratory test results and site conditions, System No. 3 was selected for racking and
pointing of damaged masonry joints. This compound has been used in mixture form consisting of
254
cement, polymer, irronite ceram mic material and water. The repair material was
w found to
o have a
minimumm compressiv ve strength of m2 and bond strength
o 300 kg/cm s of 9 kg/cm2. The
e abrasion re
esistance
(loss perr unit surface m2 as against value of 0.4 gm/cm2 fo
e area) was found to be 0.30 gm/cm or cement
concrete
e surface.
Table 1 Pro
operties of Rep
pair Systems
System Syste
em stem
Sys
T
Tests Conduc
cted
No. 1 No. 2 No
o. 3
Densitty of repair mortar ( gm/cc) 2.28-2.32 2.24-2.32 2.26
6-2.31
2
Compressive streng gth of mortar ( Kg/cm ) 800-900 100-150 300
0-348
Tensile strength of mortar
m
150-180 9-16
6 34
4-40
g/cm2)
(Briquette test ) ( Kg
Abrasiion resistance
e expressed ass More th
han
Mortar syystem 0.20- 0.22 0.30
0- 0.36
loss in
n weight expre
essed as concreete
gm/sq.cm. Concrete
e 0.44 to 0.5
54
Pot life
e of primer/bonding agent (mminutes) 40 30-60 30
0-60
Bond sstrength of prrimer with rockk core and mo ortar in
90-100 6-10
0 9-15
direct tension ( Kg/ccm2)
Bond sstrength of prrimer with Conncrete and mo ortar
160 20 2
23
g/cm2)
slant sshear test ( Kg
2
Double e shear strenggth with Concrrete ( Kg/cm ) 51 5 5
3.4 Repair Methodo

ology
Following methodolo
ogy has been
n adopted forr pointing of masonry join
nts above the
e water level.
Rem
move the delaminated
d d gunite po
ortion and clean the masonry
m join
nts to remo
ove loose
mateerials.
Afterr cleaning an
nd drying, ap
pply primer/bond coat on inside surfacce of rock an nd extended on either
side of masonry joint on rockk surface by about
a 2 cm.
Rakiing and pointting of masonry dry jointss with repair material afte
er application
n of primer.
A co
oat of cementtitious sealin
ng material ovver the pointting work to cover
c openinngs left if anyy (parallel
and perpendicula ar).
The pointed surfaace was cure ed for recom
mmended perriod.
3.5 Field
d Observatio
ons
eam surface of the dam followed by curtain grou

Repairs of the upstre uting were caarried out. A
An area of
about 6223 m2 was repaired
r outt of total ups
stream face area of 540 00 m2. Thesse repairs re esulted in
reducing
g the seepag ge by about 25-30% which is quite significant. If the repairrs of entire damaged
d
area inccluding those
e under watter are unde ertaken, the seepage would
w reducee further. In order to
assess the efficacy of
o repair workk, cores weree also extraccted from the
e repaired are
eas.
Repair work
w being ca
arried out on upstream su
urface is sho
own in the fig
gure 9.
Figu
ure 9: Pointing
g work in Prog
gress
255
4. CONCLUSION
Repair materials and the repair methodology suggested in this paper are only to masonry joints
which are above water and in dry condition. The treatment for underwater surface is generally
taken after observing effects of treatment above water. The repair materials for under water
masonry joint treatment are different and needs to be evaluated.
The characteristics properties of the selected repair material namely, strength parameters and
bonding properties with concrete and rock designate it to be suitable for filling cavities and also for
use as pointing material.
Repairs of the upstream surface of the dam followed by curtain grouting were carried out and an
2 2
area of about 623 m was repaired out of total upstream face area of 5400 m . These repairs
resulted in reducing the seepage by about 25-30% which is quite significant.
The efficacy of the repairs carried out by suitable material may be assessed through its
performance at full reservoir water level and its durability under adverse climatic conditions.
Non-invasive and non destructive geophysical techniques offer an excellent guide for regular
monitoring and detection of anomalous condition such as weak zone, seepage path and saturated
zones of hydraulic structure. Hence it was suggested to carry out these studies so as to undertake
further repair work to improve structural stability of the dam.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The authors express their sincere gratitude to Shri. S. Govindan, Director, CWPRS, Pune for continuous day to
day encouragement and valuable guidance during preparation of the paper. Authors also thank Shri P C Pethe,
Scientist E for his active support. The authors are further grateful to Shri S T Nadkarni, Chief Engineer, Water
Resources Department, Goa for sponsoring the studies. The authors are also thankful to Shri S C Khamkar, LA-I
and other staff of Concrete Technology Division for their assistance during studies and preparation of this paper.
REFERENCES
1. ACI Committee 503 R, Use of Epoxy Compounds with Concrete, (1998).

2. ASTM C 882, Test method for Bond Strength of Epoxy-Resin Systems used with Concrete.
3. BIS-9162 Methods of tests for Epoxy Resins, Hardeners and Epoxy Resin Composition for Floor Toppings
(1969).
4. Desai, V.T., Patil, A.V. & Pillai, S.J. Repairs to the Damage in the Baffle Blocks of Salauli dam using PICC
Materials, Journal of Dam Engineering Sister Magazine of International Water Power & Dam Construction,
Vol XXV, issue 1, January 2015, pp 37 81.
5. Proceeding of Short Course on Rehabilitation of Distressed Hydraulic Structures Diagnosis, Repair
Materials & Remedial Measures organized by CWPRS (June -2004).
6. proceeding of training course on dam safety and rehabilitation organized by cwprs (february -2013).
7. Technical Memorandum titled Strengthening of Damaged Hydraulic Structures by Epoxy Grouting of
CW&PRS, (August 2007).
8. Technical Report no. 5019 titled Identification of Repair Materials and Repair Methodology for Arresting
Seepage in Anjunem Masonry Dam, Goa of CW&PRS, (November 2012).
256
State-of-the-Art on the Applications of Geosynthetics for Dam

Repair and Rehabilitation
K. Rajagopal D.N. Arnepalli
Department of Civil Engineering, Indian Institute of Department of Civil Engineering, Indian Institute
Technology Madras, Chennai -600 036 of Technology Madras, Chennai -600 036
gopalkr@iitm.ac.in Email: arnepalli@iitm.ac.in
ABSTRACT
The geosynthetics have become common construction materials in several construction projects including the
dams. The family of geosynthetic products consists of geotextiles, geogrids, geomembranes, geocells, geotubes,
geosynthetic clay liners, geocomposites, etc. The varieties of geosynthetics and their engineering applications
are increasing rapidly every year. The geosynthetics were mostly tarpaulin sheets in the mid 1930s. Next, the
PVC membranes were introduced, and were widely applied in Europe for canal linings and landfill linings. Most of
the early applications of geosynthetics were for construction of haul roads in forests, landfill linings, etc.
Following, the reinforcement applications also started in field practice from late 1960s. From the early 1970s
more varieties of the geosynthetics have come into the market.
The particular geosynthetics that are most relevant to dams are the geomembranes and the geotextiles. The
geomembranes are impermeable polymeric sheets made of PVC, High Density Polyethylene (HDPE), LDPE, etc.
The geotextiles are of two varieties, woven and nonwoven. The woven geotextiles are mainly used for
reinforcement applications while the nonwoven geotextiles are mainly used for filtration, drainage and separation
applications. In the context of dams, the filter and drain applications are important for ensuring their safety.
Over the past forty years or more, the geosynthetics have been applied for the repair of several dams across the
world. The Kadamparai dam operated by Tamil Nadu Electricity Board (TNEB) in the state of Tamil Nadu was
repaired recently by lining it with PVC geomembrane to significantly reduce the seepage rate from a whopping
38,000 liters per minute to about 30 liters per minute.
This paper will discuss the different varieties of the geosynthetics, their functions and engineering applications
particular to dams. The different applications of the geosynthetics for repair of different dams all over the world
will be summarized in detail. The presentations will include the brief details of the dams, the particular problems
faced and how the solutions were achieved at using the geosynthetics. The manuscript also highlights the role of
ageing mechanism and durability of individual geosynthetic components to accomplish the required overall
performance of the dam.
1. INTRODUCTION
Dams are water impounding structures, and are generally constructed using locally available soils,
rocks and concrete. One of the principal advantages of dams that are made up of earth is that their
construction is very economical compared to the construction costs of concrete dams. In recent times
the use of geosynthetics, in conjunction with the conventional construction materials is increasing. This
imposes a challenging task to the civil engineering practices. Further, the use of geosynthetics in earth
dams affects their construction procedure and stability. In fact, the efficient use of geosynthetics
requires special attention. The properties of geosynthetics must be evaluated based on specific
criterion and functional requirements, such as acting as barrier, filter, drainage medium, protection,
reinforcement and separator, etc.
In recent past, geosynthetics have also been used very widely and successfully in the rehabilitation of
the existing concrete/ masonry /earth dams. Primarily, the requirements for these materials to work in
an efficient manner are imperviousness, flexibility, mechanical strength, frost and heat resistance,
availability by industrial production and easy workability. With the above background an attempt is
made in this manuscript, to discuss various features related to the use of geosynthetics in dam
construction.
In addition to this, the long term performance of dam as a whole is quite dependent on the service life
of individual components; in particular the geosynthetic systems of the dam. Hence, it is very much
essential to estimate the service life of these components under simulated realistic field conditions by
identifying the critical ageing mechanism. For this purpose, the manuscript highlights the various
257
ageing m
mechanisms s to which th
he geosynth hetic materia
al may be subjected
s to, and describes brief
account of the studie
es conducted
d in this area.
2. GEO
OSYNTHETIC
C MATERIA
ALS AND PO
OTENTIAL APPLICATIONS
Several varieties of geosynthetic

g c products arre manufactuured for use in geotechnical applicatiions. The
applications include soil reinforccement, erossion control, filtration an
nd drainage,, barrier aga ainst fluid
transmisssion, etc. The various tyypes of geossynthetics an
nd their potenntial applicattions are sum
mmarized
in Figure e 1 and Ta able 1. The graphical sy ymbols used d to denote the differen nt products are also
highlightted in Figure 1.
Figure 1. Different
D variieties of geossynthetics (IInternational Geosynthetics Society)
Ta
able 1. Differe
ent functions of
o geosynthetiics
Letter Symb
bol of function Functio on Suitable
e geosynthetic
cs
B Barrier Geome embranes, GC CLs
D Drainage Geotexxtiles, geonetss, geocomposites
E Erosion Geocells, geonets, geotextiles,
g geeotubes,
control gabions
F Filtration Geotexxtiles
P Protection n Thick nonwoven
n geootextiles
R Reinforceme Geogrids, geotextiless, polymeric strips
s
nt
S Separation Geogrids, geotextiless
The geo osynthetics coould be broa

adly classifie
ed into planar and three-d
dimensional products. Th
he planar
productss include geeotextiles, ge
eogrids, geo omembraness, geonets, etc. while th he three-dim
mensional
productss include the geocells an T three-dimensional products coulld be used in
nd gabions. The n erosion
control a
applications in the dam prrojects.
The geootextiles are sheet like planar

p produccts. These are
a of two tyypes, woven and nonwo oven. The
woven ggeotextiles haave higher strength
s and are manufactured using g high strenggth yarns. Th he weave
pattern is similar to
o the clothess that we all wear. Due e to the uniform weave e pattern, thhe woven
geotextile will have a more or lesss uniform poore opening size. The noonwoven geo otextiles are made by
needle punching,
p he
eat bonding or
o by resin bonding
b processes. The nonwoven
n geotextiles ha ave lower
strength but have large thicknessses and diffferent pore opening
o sizess. Due to the
eir large thiccknesses,
they havve good in-p plane flow capacity.
c Du
ue to the larrger numberr of pore op penings and different
258
opening sizes, they are not easily clogged by the fine soil particles. Hence, the nonwoven geotextiles
are ideally suited for drainage and filtration applications. Suitable nonwoven geotextile product can be
easily selected for site specific conditions based on the grain size distribution of the soil and the
required flow rates.
The geogrids are planar grid type products with open apertures. They consist of longitudinal and
transverse members at right angles to each other. Based on the manufacturing process, the geogrids
can be classified as woven, knitted, thermally bonded and extruded. The extruded geogrids are also
subjected to stretching whereby higher strengths are achieved by preferential orientation of the
polymer molecules. The extruded geogrids are made of polyethylene and polypropylene and the
knitted and woven geogrids are usually made of polyester. The geogrids are useful for construction of
steep soil embankments like earth dams.
The geonets are products with large thickness and open apertures. These are made up of longitudinal
and transverse members intersecting at acute angle to give diamond shaped aperture openings.
These are ideally suited for in-plane drainage applications in the dams. The geonets are also used in
surface erosion control works.
The geomembranes are thick impermeable polymeric sheets. These sheets are practically
impermeable to both gases and fluids. These are made of polyethylene or PVC and have thickness
ranging from as low as 0.25 mm to as much as 3 mm thickness. They find applications in the lining of
irrigation canals, dams, water bodies like lakes and ponds, tunnels, landfills storing hazardous
chemicals, etc.
The geocells are three dimensional interconnected cells forming a honeycombed structure which are
held together by welds. The soil is directly confined within the open pockets. The gabions are wire
baskets which are filled with boulders or sand bags to provide lateral stability or erosion control
protection. These baskets could be made of thin metal wires or polymeric ropes.
3. CASE STUDIES OF USE OF GEOSYNTHETICS FOR DAM CONSTRUCTION AND REPAIRS
The geosynthetics can play an important role in both construction and repair/rehabilitation of dams.
Especially during the construction of earth dams, geosynthetic reinforcement layers could be used to
strengthen the earth dams and to construct steep side slopes to minimize the usage of natural
geological materials. The drainage within the dam section can be enabled by providing geosynthetic
layers like geonets or geotextiles or a combination of both.
There are a number of reported cases of successful applications of geosynthetics for dam
construction. Gautier et al. (2002) have described the application of bituminous geomembrane for
lining of La Galaube dam on Alzeau river in the south of France. They have described the actual
construction and the quality control measures taken during the placement of more than 23,000 sq. m
of the impervious geomembrane on the upstream face of the dam. Tao et al. (1994) have described
the use of a geotextile composite in the core of a rockfill dam in China. Cazzuffi et al. (2009) have
described the use of different geosynthetics in the construction of Boussiaba Dam in Algeria. Raju
(2010) has described the different case studies of the use of geosynthetics in earthen dams and
embankments. An extensive summary of the application of geosynthetic based barrier systems in the
dams was presented by Cazzuffi et al. (2010). Close to home, the heavy leakage of more than 38000
liters per minute through Kadambarai dam was reduced to about 30 liters per minute using the PVC
geomembrane lining on the dam section (Cazzuffi et al., 2010). In this project, a thick nonwoven
geotextile was used as a protection layer to prevent punching damage of the geomembrane. The
world wide applications of geosynthetics in dams is summarized in Appendix. Cazzuffi (2000) has
presented an excellent document on the use of geosynthetics for dam applications.
4. DEGRADATION MECHANISMS OF GEOSYNTHETIC MATERIALS
Geosynthetic materials are considered to undergo degradation when there is substantial measurable
change in their properties like tensile strength, discoloration, stress crack resistance, etc., under the
influence of one or more ageing mechanisms (Hsuan and Koerner, 1998; Brachman et al. 2008). With
259
reference to high density polyethylene (HDPE) material, degradation occurs due to swelling of the
polymer, extraction of the additives/stabilizers, biological and thermal decay of the polymer resin,
exposure to the ultra-violet and radioactive radiation, and chemical oxidation of the backbone polymer
(Hsuan and Koerner, 1995; Koerner, 2005; Brachman and Gudina, 2002). In view of the above
mentioned possible degradation mechanisms, by which the polymeric geomembranes undergo
ageing, the previous researchers have conducted both laboratory and field studies (Hsuan and Guan,
1998; Lodi et al., 2002 and 2010). To aid the reader a brief account of all these studies is presented in
the following.
2.1 Photo Degradation
Photo degradation is induced when polymeric geosynthetic material is irradiated by ultra-violet (UV), or
visible light. As a consequence of prolonged exposure to UV radiation, the polymer undergoes
discoloration, surface stress cracking, brittleness and deterioration in mechanical characteristics
(Guillet, 1972; Fedor and Brennan, 1996; Lodi et al., 2002). In order to impede the photo degradation
carbon black is commonly added to polymer structure during its manufacturing process (Sangam and
Rowe, 2002; Koerner, 2005).
A very few studies were conducted to understand the photo degradation of geosynthetic material due
to the UV radiation, in terms of change in its physical appearance and loss of mechanical properties.
The discoloration together with formation of the wrinkle/waves may lead to damage of liner material
functionality during its service life (Lodi et al., 2002; Suits et al., 2003; Koerner, 2005). In view of the
above, researchers have developed various traditional weathering tests by exposing the materials to
sun light, and accelerated test methods by exposing to intense artificial radiations emitted either from
the fluorescent UV lamps or xenon arc lamps (Fedor and Brennan, 1996; Jacques, 2000; Arnepalli and
Rejoice, 2012). The accelerated weathering test procedure involves basically subjecting specimens to
repetitive cycles of radiation (artificial light source) as well as moisture under controlled environmental
conditions. Results of the light and moisture exposure cycle under accelerated conditions give better
correlation with the natural weathering results when compared that of light only cycle. With this in view,
researchers have focused more on understanding the correlation between the different degradation
mechanisms that may prevail in both natural and accelerated testing methodologies. In addition,
attempts must be made to develop accelerated weathering test that may closely simulate the end use
environmental conditions and anticipated damage to the geosynthetic material under these
environmental conditions (Arnepalli and Rejoice, 2012).
Suits et al. (2003) brings highlights of various weathering methods and associated benefits and
limitations of these methods in assessing the photo degradation of polymer geosynthetic materials. A
comparison is made between weathering mechanisms simulated using xenon arc and UV fluorescent
weathering chambers. This study suggests that the radiation from the xenon arc lamp degrades
polymer geosynthetic material at a faster rate, which is considered to be aggressive when compared to
that happens in real-life scenario. In view of this, it is appropriate to use the UV fluorescent lamp to
conduct accelerated weathering tests. When a comparison was made between geotextile and
geomembrane in natural weathering test, it was found that in case of geotextile, onset of degradation
occurs within 12-24 months, but geomembrane may take at least 10 years to start degradation (Suits
et al., 2003). In such a scenario, the accelerated outdoor weathering method is preferable to assess
the severity of the degradation of high density polyethylene geomembrane, as it will be reduce time
required to complete the test. The accelerated outdoor weathering method for non metallic material
using concentrated natural sunlight is described in ASTM G90 (2010). This method uses Fresnel solar
concentrator, FSC, exposure technique to concentrate sunlight onto the sample with an intensity of
approximately eight times that of natural sunlight radiation. An acceleration factor can be applied to
compare the degradation processes that may have occurred in traditional and outdoor accelerated
weathering tests. The results obtained from outdoor accelerated test can be used to find the service
life of the polymer geomembranes under specified field conditions. With reference to durability of
geosynthetic material when exposed to UV light under natural or accelerated weathering conditions,
the variation of mechanical properties have to be evaluated to understand the severity of degradation.
With this in view, Lodi et al. (2002 and 2010) has studied ageing and degradation mechanism of HDPE
(0.8 and 2.5 mm thick) and PVC (1.0 and 2.0 mm thick) geomembranes by exposing to different
ageing conditions like solar radiation, wind, humidity, rain and leachate. Attempts were made to
compare the mechanical properties of the virgin and aged geomembrane samples. The results
260
revealed the fact that, HDPE geomembranes exhibited higher deformations compared to PVC
geomembrane under the similar testing conditions, and they also found that exposed/aged
geomembranes became stiffer compared with virgin sample.
To elucidate the chemical changes that may take place during ageing of various polyethylene
geomembranes Gulmine et al. (2003) conducted accelerated weathering tests. The changes that
might have taken place due to the weathering were quantified using sophisticated analytical
equipments such as differential scanning calorimeter, scanning electron microscopy, FTIR-
spectroscopy, and density and hardness measurement devices. The results revealed that an increase
in density with time of weathering is ascribed to increase in its crystallinity and cross-linking reaction. A
higher value of hardness with ageing indicates close packing of polymeric chains at macroscopic
scale. The results also indicated that the level of resistance to photo degradation is of order
HDPE>LLDPE>LDPE.
2.2 Degradation by Extraction of Additives
The long term performance of geosynthetic material is very much influenced by the additives used
during manufacturing process, i.e. antioxidants, UV stabilizers, pigments, plasticizers, fillers (Sangam,
2001; Dominique et al., 2004). Extraction of additives occurs when material is exposed to critical
environmental conditions, due to leaching and volatilization of polymer. Water and some other agents
can leach additives from the surface of the geosynthetic material which may occur if the level of
interaction between the additive and solvent is higher than additive and polymer chain (Sangam,
2001). Further, extraction follows diffusion of the additive from the bulk of the material to its surface.
The rate at which diffusion of an additive occur in a given polymer resin is characterized by molecular
size of the additive, interaction between additive and polymer chain and polymer morphology, and
chains mobility. If the additives removed from surface are involved in stabilization process, the level of
protection at surface gets altered. This may lead to change in colour, micro-cracking etc., which
depicts the onset of local degradation (Dominique et al., 2004). In case of HDPE geomembrane, the
additives get removed during extraction process which makes the geomembrane vulnerable to other
degradation agents. This in turn causes onset of oxidation and other degradation mechanisms in
geomembrane. This degradation process also increases the brittleness of geomembrane (Sangam,
2001).
2.3 Thermal Degradation
In recent times, polymeric geosynthetic materials are popularly used along with natural materials like
wood and traditional construction materials like steel and concrete due to their unique properties.
However, the thermal degradation is induced by heat which involves alteration of molecular bonds
along polymer chains. The different types of bonds found in geosynthetic polymers are carbon-carbon,
carbon-hydrogen, carbon-chloride etc with specified bond energy (Dominique et al., 2004). The energy
supplied by heat induces vibration at the molecular level and when this vibration energy reaches the
energy of liaison, bond dissociation may occur. This process may lead to chain scission which in turn
results in formation of free radicals. The surrounding liaison may react with free radical which will
propagate degradation mechanism (Dominique et al., 2004). Thermal stress on polymeric membrane
causes chain reorganization processes and variation is related to thermal expansion coefficient of a
polymer. In geomembrane, thermal expansion and contraction may lead to a change in overall
dimension of panel, creating wrinkles when temperature increases or creating a stress when
temperature decreases. Failure due to thermal stress can occur at junction of geomembranes or at
welded points during its service life (Dominique et al., 2004).
2.4 Oxidation Degradation
Polymer oxidation is considered to be the most significant degradation mechanism by which

geosynthetic materials loses their physical, chemical as well as mechanical properties (Hsuan and
Koerner, 1995). During the manufacturing process of geosynthetic materials, the formation of free
radicals is inevitable. For example, oxygen is created during the progressive long term degradation of
carbon atoms present in the polyethylene chain. Oxygen, present in the surrounding environment,
combines with the free radical to form hydroperoxy free radical, which is passed around in the
molecular structure (Sangam and Rowe, 2002; Dominique et al., 2004). Eventually, the hydroperoxy
free radical reacts with another polymer chain, creating a new free radical and causing chain scission
(Dominique et al., 2004). Due to the oxidation of the polymer, the physical and mechanical properties
261
of geomembrane decrease, and consequently lead to its failure. In order to retard the oxidation
mechanism of geosynthetic materials various antioxidants such as hindered amine stabilizers are
added to the backbone resin during their manufacture (Fay et al., 1994 and Hsuan and Koerner,
1998).
To understand the polymer oxidation mechanism, Hsuan and Koerner (1998) have proposed three-
stage conceptual model. The first stage (represented as stage-I) is the depletion of antioxidants due to
the chemical reactions of antioxidants with oxygen. During this stage the engineering/mechanical
properties of the geomembrane may not change significantly. The second stage of the oxidation
mechanism is called the induction time to the onset of the degradation (represented as stage-II). In the
initial period of stage-II of oxidation the deterioration of the material property starts very slowly and in
the final period the oxidation process accelerates to the point where there are measurable changes in
the properties. The third stage of oxidation mechanism causes significant changes to the physical and
mechanical properties which will eventually lead to the failure. When a particular design property such
as tensile stress and strain at break reaches a specific value (typically fifty percent of its virgin value),
the polymer is considered to be failed and attained its service life. Service life of the geosynthetic
material includes the time required to deplete antioxidants, the induction time to the onset of polymer
degradation, and the time for degradation of the polymer to decrease its properties to unacceptable
levels.
Mller and Jacob (2003) have conducted ageing tests using the air and water as media by ageing
HDPE GMs in hot air oven and water baths, and authors have concluded that the service life of the
geomembrane is essentially determined by the slow loss of stabilizers due to migration. Sangam and
Rowe (2002) investigated the antioxidant depletion rates of unstressed specimens immersed in air,

water and synthetic leachate (at 22-85 C) and demonstrated that, the antioxidant depletion in leachate
is two to four times faster than in water and air. Hsuan and Koerner (1995) have conducted a detailed
study to find the long term durability of HDPE geomembrane. The authors discussed the two different
types of ageing of the polymer: one is physical ageing which involves change in the crystallinity of
polymeric material and other one is chemical ageing which involves degradation due to breaking of
covalent bonds of the polymer chain, which in turn results in decrease of engineering properties of
geomembrane such as tensile properties, stress crack resistance, etc. Grassie and Scott (1985)
suggested that oxidation is the principal mechanism of chemical ageing for HDPE and to halt the
oxidation reactions, antioxidants are added during manufacturing in order to have longer service lives.
The authors also reported that, it is not feasible to measure the length of these stages under actual
field conditions, as the time required to obtain useful results to measure the service life is substantially
high (centuries).
In view of these limitation, Rowe et al. (2010) have developed state-of-the-art geosynthetic liner
longevity simulator (in short called as GLLS) to perform accelerated laboratory ageing tests. The
authors reported that due to temperature and vertical stress numerous permanent deformations and
indentations were evident on all geomembranes tested. It has been observed that, the rate of
depletion of antioxidants from the geomembranes when tested in GLLS is quite low when compared to
those tested in the traditional immersion ageing baths. However, it is concluded that the predicted
geomembrane service life based on the GLLS test data is more realistic when compared to those
prediction made based on conventional leachate/water/air ageing baths.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper has described the different varieties of the geosynthetics that could potentially be used in
dam construction and repair works. A brief summary of different applications of the geosynthetics for
dam rehabilitation is presented in the paper. The degradation aspects of the geomembrane barrier
systems are discussed in the paper. The degradation aspects are important for the satisfactory
performance of the barrier systems in dams.
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264
Sl. No. Name of the dam and location Nature of the Problem and Geosynthetic solution Reference
$ $$
Earthen or Earthfill Dams
1. Dobsina Dam$$ PVC geomembrane of 0.9 mm thick is placed on upstream face, during construction Cazzuffi et al., 2010
Slovakia (1960)
2. Canary Islands Reinforced PVC geomembranes as a water proofing material to control the seepages losses from irrigation Fayoux and Potie, 2006
Morocco water storage reservoirs, during construction
3. Brugnens earth dam A thick PET needle-punched nonwoven geotextile was used as a chimney drain, during construction Giroud, 1992
France (1973)
4. La Parade dam A geocomposite shaft drain (includes a nonwoven geotextile draining core between two PP nonwoven Navassartian et al., 1993
France (1987) geotextile filters) was used instead of a granular drain, during construction
5. Reeves Lake Dam The dam exhibited excessive Seepage. Wilson, 1992
USA Repaired in 1990 with geocomposite drain (PE geonet core between two PP thermally bonded nonwoven
geotextile filters), which is connected with the new toe of the dam by outlet pipes and drainage blanket.
$$
6. Banegon Dam A bituminous geomembrane of 4 mm thick on face of embankment dam. In lower part of dam face a Cazzuffi et al., 2010
France (1973) geomembrane was placed on needle punched non-woven geotextile, during the construction
$$
7. Gold Camp Dam Leakage in the reservoir has been mitigated by lining the upstream face with a geomembrane. Cazzuffi et al., 2010
USA
$
8. Valcros Dam Non-woven geotextile was used as a filter for toe drain and on the upstream slope below rip rap, during the Giroud et al., 1977
France construction.
9. Maraval Dam The sloping upstream face is lined with a bituminous geomembrane of 4.8 mm thick. A vertical downstream Kern, 1977
France (1976) face has been constructed using a multi-layered geotextilesoil mass, reinforced with a high strength PET
woven geotextile of 750 gsm and tensile strength of 210 kN/m, during the construction.
10. Davis Creek Dam The upper part of the downstream slope is constructed with six layers of geogrid-reinforcement, during the Engemoen and Hensley,
USA (1990) construction. 1989
11. Moochalabra dam The dam has already been overtopped several times, without any substantial damage. Johnson, 1973
Australia (1971) The downstream slope protection was carried out with metallic grids and meshes to reinforce the downstream
face.
$
12. Miel Dam 1 mm thick butyl rubber membrane is placed on upstream face, during the construction. ICOLD, 1993
France (1967)
$$
13. Obecnie Dam 0.9 mm thick geomembrane is used to repair the dam. Cazzuffi et al., 2010
Czech Republic (1971)
$$
14. Moravka Dam PVC composite geomembrane placed on bituminous concrete facing exhibited leakage. Cazzuffi et al., 2010
Czech Republic Bituminous concrete face doesnt allow usage of type of anchors used on concrete. Chemical anchors were
developed to ensure stability. Two bottom perimeter seals were installed at concrete block to confine the
drainage.
$
15. Murayama-Shimo Reservoir Crest of the dam would settle when subjected to intensive seismic motion. Maruyama et al., 2006
Japan The seismic stability of the dam was enhanced by reinforcing it using a geogrid.
$
16. Les Arcs Reservoir Double geomembrane liner system with a double drainage system was installed during construction Cazzuffi et al., 2010
France (2008)
Rockfill Dams
17. Bovilla Dam The cracking of concrete face and there was a need to reduce construction time and cost. Cazzuffi et al., 2010
Albania Concrete face of the dam was changed to include geomembrane. Cast-in-situ concrete slabs were preferred
265
over prefabricated blocks. Anchorage was made in trenches.
18. Cofferdam of Three Georges To control the seepage through the cofferdam, two vertical concrete diaphragms along with composite Bao, et al., 2006
Dam geomembrane was constructed in the middle of the cofferdam, during construction.
China
19. Xixiayuan reservoir on Yellow Composite geomembrane to control the seepage at prevent the seepage from the reservoir, the upstream face Shu et al. 2010
river of the Xixiayuan earth-rock dam of 20.2 m high and 2609 m long crest was treated with composite
China. geomembrane, during construction
20. Hans Strijdom Dam Non-availability filter sand in sufficient quantity. Hollingwarth and Druyts,
South Africa PET nonwoven geotextile filter of 340 gsm between the core material and the sand filter was used. The 1982
reduced the thickness of the sand filter to 1 m on the upstream and downstream sides of the core zone.
21. New Esna Barrage Dam The new dam was constructed in 1994, to replace the Esna Barrage Dam, built in 1908, which had been Sembenelli and
Egypt suffering from scouring and age-related damage. Sembenelli, 1994
Geotextiles have been used between the fine, alluvial sand of the Nile and the uniform cobbles of the stream
cutting dyke, forming the free-draining toe of the dam; between the well-graded sand and gravel dumped in
the water to create the body of the embankment, and the toe cobbles; under the rounded riprap protection
specified on the upstream slope; under the granular slope protection specified on the downstream side of the
dam
22. Cofferdams, Shuikou The upper part, in the centre of the cofferdam body, is a composite geomembrane and the lower part is a Tao et al., 1994
hydroelectric power station concrete seepage prevention wall were installed during the construction
China
23. Contrada Sabetta Dam Two sheets of polyisobutylene geomembrane of 2 mm thickness were installed on the upper stream face of Cazzuffi, 1987
Italy (1959) the dam during the initial construction
24. Codole Dam 1.9 mm PVC geomembrane bonded to needle punched non-woven geotextile was uplifted by wind. Cazzuffi et al., 2010
France (1983) A composite geomembrane was repositioned.
25. Figari dam Geotextile beneath the geomembrane displaced by wind and geomembrane at the toe crept down the slope Cazzuffi et al., 2010
France (1991) during construction.
26. La Galaube Dam Bituminous geomembrane was used for the construction of upstream water proofing face, during the initial Cazzuffi et al., 2010
France construction.
27. LOspedale Dam When the reservoir was full, a storm removed the concrete blocks placed on needle punched non-woven Cazzuffi et al., 2010
France (1978) geotextile near the water surface and displaced the geotextile
Replaced missing blocks by identical blocks with better interlocking. However, geomembranes were not
damaged and was protected by geotextiles.
28. Mission Dam (Terzaghi Dam) Cracking of 1.5m thick clay layer, which acted as water barrier, and large differential settlement in the Cazzuffi et al., 2010
Canada (1960) transition zone.
0.75 mm thick PVC geomembrane was placed on top of the clay
29. Salt Springs Dam Due to incorrect rock placement procedures and consolidation, larger settlement occurred which caused Cazzuffi et al., 2010
California repeated cracks to the upstream face. Weak zone was created in the transition zone.
2.5 mm thick PVC geomembrane laminated to needle punched non-woven geotextile was used as liner.
Needle punched non-woven geotextile was placed on the deteriorated concrete to smoothen the dam face
30. Sar Cheshmeh Dam had an impervious clay core and exhibited excessive seepage. Cazzuffi et al., 2010
Iran (2008) Geomembranes was used for liner and anchor strips. Facing is formed by extruded porous concrete curbs.
Combining extruded curbs construction method with anchor strip installation made the installation of PVC
266
geocomposite faster.
31. Odiel Dam Chlorinated Polyethelene geomembrane used on slope inside the dam, during the construction. Cazzuffi et al., 2010
Spain (1970)
32. Paradela Dam Gluing of insitu geomembranes has resulted in failure. Continuous gluing would result in uplift pressure and Cazzuffi et al., 2010
Portugal damage the geomembrane.
Nailing the geomembrane to the supporting layer.
33. Strawberry Dam There was leakage due to deterioration of concrete in the exposed face. Joints didnt have water stops. Cazzuffi et al., 2010
USA Synthetic liner option was selected. 6 out of 9 joints had been repaired with external water stop system and
leakage reduced considerably.
34. Turimiquire Dam Severe leakage which couldnt be stopped by repeated repair measures over years. Cazzuffi et al., 2010
Venezula Adopted geomembrane system to repair the most deteriorated part of the upstream face.
35. Zhushou Reservoir It was noticed that the soil used for the core had a considerable gravel content, which resulted in a very high Tao et al., 1994
China permeability of 110-5 m/s.
Geomembrane composite was used as an additional hydraulic barrier over the clay core of the dam.
Geotextile was adopted as filter and geotextile/geomembrane composite liner was used.
36. Bilancino Dam The upstream face of the cofferdam has been waterproofed using 1.2 mm thick PVC geomembrane, during Baldovin, 1993.
Italy construction. PP nonwoven geotextile of 350 gsm used as mechanical protection against any possible
damage due to puncturing by the underneath rockfill.
& && &&&
Masonry or Concrete or Reinforced Concrete Dams
37. Diaoda Reservoir& Leakage in the downstream face.
Upstream face was covered with composite geomembrane.
38. Boussiaba Dam&&& An impervious PVC geocomposite and a drainage geonet was installed during the construction Cazzuffi et al., 2010
Algeria
&&
39. Heimbach Dam Vertical face of the dam had cracks. Cazzuffi et al., 2010
Germany Nailing of the geomembrane to the supporting layer.
40. Kadamparai Dam& Deteriorated joints between the stones of the masonry and caused formation of cavities. Seepage through the Cazzuffi et al., 2010
India foundation rock.
PVC composite geomembrane was used as waterproofing system. Polyester needle punched non-woven
geotextile was placed on sharp stone masonry to protect geomembrane against puncturing.
&&
41. Lago Miller Dam 2 mm thick PVC geomembrane used, during the construction. Cazzuffi et al., 2010
Italy (1976)
&&
42. Lago Nero Dam 2 mm thick PVC geomembrane covered by needle punched non-woven geotextile. Cazzuffi et al., 2010
Italy (1980)
&
43. Longtan Reservoir Upstream face was lined with cement mortar. Leakage existed even though lining mortar was thickened twice. Cazzuffi et al., 2010
China Dam surface was reconstructed using composite geomembrane.
44. Lost Creek Dam&& Loss of concrete at the downstream side due to freeze/ thaw cycles. Cazzuffi et al., 2010
USA Solution was to tension the upstream geomembrane.
45. Miel I Dam&&& Upstream face made of slip formed reinforced concrete. Cazzuffi et al., 2010
Colombia Drained exposed PVC composite geomembrane system placed on a grout enriched vibrated RCC.
267
Waterproofing liner is composite geomembrane.
46. Olivenhain Dam&&& Upstream face had to be designed to provide water during emergency considering seismic stability and Cazzuffi et al., 2010
California seepage control.
The exposed geomembrane liner and face drainage system was adopted to improve the seismic stability.
Shaping blocks and plinths were waterproofed with composite geomembranes.
&&&
47. Paradise Dam Geotextile component of composite geomembrane detach from PVC geomembrane due to relative movement Cazzuffi et al., 2010
Australia between dam body and panels. Finally, geomembranes get detached from the panels on the side where there
are no anchor rods.
Geomembrane system was adopted. PVC geomembrane was sandwiched between two protective and
independent concrete layers: concrete and geotextile on one side and RCC on the other.
&&&
48. Platanovryssi Dam Increase in seepage due to 25 mm wide crack extending from upstream to downstream face. Also pumped Cazzuffi et al., 2010
Greece storage didnt work when reservoir was empty.
&&&
49. Porce II Dam Cracks appeared in the thick impervious concrete facing. Two major cracks through whole height of the dam Cazzuffi et al., 2010
Colombia and other smaller cracks due to thermal shrinkage and foundation settlement.
Geomembrane system was adopted. External water stops were placed on large and small cracks. PVC
geomembrane heat coupled to a polyester geotextile was used as support layer and waterproofing layer.
50. Pracana Dam&&& Concrete swelling experiences due to alkali-aggregate reaction. Cazzuffi et al., 2010
Portugal An exposed drained composite geomembrane system installed for proper drainage. Drainage layer is a geonet
located on the upstream face underneath the geomembrane.
51. Serra Dam&&& Cracks in the dam due to displacement of crest. Heaving of crest is because of expansion of concrete due to Cazzuffi et al., 2010
Switzerland alkali-silica reaction.
Feasible solution was construction of a new dam at the downstream toe of the old dam.
52. Lago Bianco Dam& Cracks in the masonry and seepage through the dam body. This was due to deformation of crest due to frost Cazzuffi et al., 2010
Switzerland and alkali aggregate reaction.
New method of sealing of concrete adopted which consists of a multiple layered fully bonding polyurethane-
synthetic material that is applied in a viscous condition on various grounds.
53. Itiquira Dam Channel Damage of geomembrane due to irregularities in the surface since unprotected excavated surface suffered Cazzuffi et al., 2010
Brazil severe erosion.
Use of geotextile to protect geomembrane was an effective solution
268
An Overview of Konar Dam on Need of Rehabilitation

Dipankar Chaudhuri A. K. Dubey
Damodar Valley Corporation Damodar Valley Corporation
Civil Engineering Department Civil Engineering Department
PO: Maithon Dam, Pin: 828207
dipankar_chaudhuri@dvcindia.org
S. B. Pandey
Damodar Valley Corporation
Civil Engineering Department
ABSTRACT
Article discusses about the need of rehabilitation of the Konar dam, built in the year 1955 across the river Konar -
a tributary of river Damodar, in Hazaribagh district of Jharkhand. Prime aim of this project was to feed to Bokaro
thermal plant through Bokaro barrage and to other downstream industries. Obviously, flood control was other
purpose. In 1962-63, cracks were first observed in the galleries of the dam, mostly in the inspection gallery which
further expanded with time. Several studies were carried out in past, to understand the cause, nature and
behaviour of the cracks and various experts recommendations were also obtained for taking its safety measures.
Recent probable maximum flood study indicates the design flood as 9551 cumec which is greater than the
originally considered design flood as 6796 cumec. Flood routing study confirms that the dam could absorb this
revised flood safely with little encroachment in the available freeboard. Water availability study was also carried out
for different duration inflows to this reservoir, considering a long term data 1961-2014; which gives a wide view
about the nature and amount of the available flows. Full potential of this dam could not be achieved till date. It is
expected, consequent upon its rehabilitation under the DRIP scheme of CWC, GOI; Konar dam will achieve its
prolonged life to serve the Nation in better ways.
KEY WORDS: Design-flood; Routing; Cracks; Inflow; Dam
1. INTRODUCTION
The river Konar rises at west of Hazaribagh town, a part of the Chhotanagpur plateau and traverses a
meandering course in a south-easterly direction. Konar dam is situated on it amidst the picturesque
surroundings of the forests of Hazaribagh district at about 30 km above its confluence with the river
Damodar. It is the second of the four dams, included in the first phase programme of unified
development of the Damodar Valley. It is an earth-cum-concrete dam about 3682 m long where a 277 m
long concrete gravity structure is constructed across the river channel of bed width 76.2 m, flanked by
rolled fill earthen sections on each bank. Reservoir inundates an area of 2701 hectare at EL. 428.5 m
which is 0.6 m above the level of the top of spillway gates.
Construction of the dam was let out on contract to M/s. Hind-Patel Engineering Co., they arrived at site in
March 1950 and construction of the earth dam was started in October 1950. Concreting of the central
spillway section was started in March 1951 and same was raised to a sufficient height by June 1952 to
store sufficient water for supplying cooling water to the first unit of the steam plant at Bokaro which was
completed in February 1953. The erection of the spillway gates and hoists was commenced in January
1955 and completed in the following June. The then cost of the dam including appurtenant works,
acquisition of submergence area and that of rehabilitating the displaced people was worked out to
Rs.9.75 crores.
Cracks in the Inspection Gallery were reported to have been first observed in 1962-63 which however,
were considered as old cracks. Though, it is very difficult to ascertain accurately the exact time when
cracks appeared first. Concurrently, cracks were also observed in the other two galleries, but
comparatively less dominant in nature. Cracks appeared on both downstream and upstream faces of the
galleries and found in almost all the blocks. Sweating on the down-stream face of the left embankment of
the Konar Earth Dam was also noticed in November 1963. Remedial measure or treatment could not be
taken up before 1970, except restricting the operational level of the reservoir.
269
2. GEOLOGY OF DAMSITE
The dam area encounters a complex suite of ancient (Achaean) metamorphic rocks of both igneous and
sedimentary origin. Predominant rock type consists of biotite granite gneiss ranging to hornblende
gneiss. The granites are rather coarse grained and occasionally highly porphyritic with large crystals of
feldspar. As a result of assimilation of schistose country rock by the invading granitic magma, interesting
hybrid rocks have been formed. Quartz veins and pegmatite bodies are common and when the latter are
intruded into schistose rock, they carry books of white mica (books are small; less than 50 mm across).
Associated basic intrusive and lavas are now found as amphibolite and equidorite. A thin band of
crystalline limestone was also noticed. While the rocks are exposed in the river bed, outcrops are rare in
the abutments which are generally covered over with soil and moorum.
3. PROJECT DESIGN AND CONCEPTION
Design of the concrete dam is unique (Technical Completion Report of Konar dam 1966) in planning.
Hollow spaces are left inside it between blocks in spillway and abutments, which accounted a saving in
concrete to the extent of about 6% and also facilitated curing of concrete during construction. A concrete
roadway 5.8 m. wide runs at the top of the dam at EL. 431.3 m. Inspection gallery (1.2 m x 2.1 m),
operating gallery (1.5 m x 2.7 m) and drainage gallery (2.4 m x 3.1 m) are provided at EL. 408.4 m, 394.7
m. and 383.7 m respectively where river bed level is at EL. 382.2 m. Inspection shafts (0.9 m x 0.9 m)
between blocks are also provided at different levels.
Hydro-electric power station has not yet been built at this dam. But, provision was made in the concrete
dam for an intake penstock of 3 m in diameter. The recommended plan of development consisted of 20
MW reversible pump turbine to be installed at the base of Konar dam and 15 MW Francis turbine to be
located at the confluence of the river Konar with the Boronala. Original plan indicates that prospect of
Konar water for using in irrigation to the large areas in the upper valley at a reasonable cost is not
encouraging as surrounding terrain is hilly and undulating. Later on, investigation reveals that it will be
possible to irrigate kharif and rabi crops to an area 47849 and 14074 hectare respectively using water of
Konar. However, the dam will supply cooling water to BTPS; also, it will cater the need of domestic and
industrial users in the Bokaro-Sindri region. Obviously, same water will be used for irrigation and other
uses in the lower valley.
Economic life of the reservoir was considered 100 years. Silt sampling data after inception of the project,
as measured at the dam site and at Hurlong showed that the average annual sediment loads passing the
dam site is about 0.37 MCM. But, reservoir capacity survey data in 1997 indicates actual deposition rate
as 2.1 MCM/year, which differs a lot from the silt sampling loads as observed. Further, 1997 survey
indicates loss of storage in different zone of dead, conservation and flood as 41.67%, 20.81% and
32.14% respectively.
4. HYDROLOGY AND METEOROLOGY
Records (1891-1966) reveal average annual rainfall over the drainage area of 997 sq. km at upstream of
the dam as 127 cm; out of which, 112 cm (about 88%) occurs during the monsoon season (June -
October), where rainfall varies from 193 to 58 cm in different years. After project completion, average
yearly inflow to the reservoir is worked out as 398 MCM since 1954-55 to 1966-67. The ratio of runoff to
annual rainfall varies widely in dry and wet years ranging 30% to 50%. The range of temperature in the
vicinity of the dam fluctuates from 5 C in January to 47 C in May. Soon after impounding, the maximum
temperature drops to below 35 C after the commencement of the monsoon in June and rarely rises
above this point until the following April.
Recently, long term (19612014) inflow series were analysed for different duration (10 day, month,
water-year, monsoon and dry period). Inflows to the reservoir were estimated from the reservoir
parameters, where evaporation losses were also considered. To calculate evaporation losses, pan
evaporation data as measured after inception of the project and obtained from the old records was used.
Exceedance inflow study indicates that a good amount of flow is available in different 10-daily duration
(Table. 1) throughout the year in 75% occasions during the entire period. Even in 90% occasions of the
entire period, reasonable flow is available in most of the 10-daily duration. Monthly exceedance inflow
270
(Table. 2) also indicates that a good amount of flow prevails in every month. Average water year,
monsoon and dry period inflow (Table. 3) to the konar reservoir is observed as 459, 394 and 65 MCM
respectively, where corresponding average annual evaporation losses are observed as 24, 9, and 15
MCM. Further, it is observed that the water-year flows amounting 345 and 265 MCM were exceeded for
75 and 90% times respectively during the entire study period. Non-monsoon inflows are observed to
vary between 1 69% of the monsoon flows in different years. Where, monsoon flows itself vary
between 59 99% of the water years flows as observed from the record of 54 years. Study indicates
that mean and median flows during different duration vary a lot, especially mean values are observed to
be much higher than median values almost in all cases due to the effect of extreme events. Again, it is
observed that smaller duration flow series are highly skewed. Coefficients of variation for different
10-daily and monthly flows during monsoon period are observed to be lesser in comparison to the dry
period flows.
5. DESIGN FLOOD
During planning stage, in absence of the long-term direct discharge data near the dam site, Inglis
formula was used (Technical Completion Report of Konar dam 1966) to estimate extra-ordinary floods
for Konar reservoir and peak design flood was assessed as 5805 cumec, which is 1.5 times of the
extra-ordinary flood. Based on time-area-depth curve, rainfall corresponding to design storm is found as
76 cm and runoff is estimated as 68 cm (76 cm x 0.9) where runoff factor is considered as 90%. Total
duration of the storm is considered as 3 days (period of rise: 1 day, period of fall: 2 days).
Accordingly, design flood hydrograph was constructed and same was routed through the Konar
reservoir. Result indicated that maximum water level may reach at EL. 429.2 m. Total discharging
capacity at this level including sluices is found as 6796 cumec. Top of dam is fixed at EL 431.3 m after
providing 2.1 m free board. It is thus seen that against a design discharge of 5805 cumec, the
discharging capacity corresponding to the maximum design water level is more. This is due to the
consideration that Konar is an earth dam unlike a concrete dam at Tilaiya. The spillway capacity in this
case therefore has been influenced more from conservative consideration.
Recently, design flood of this dam was reviewed (Manual on Estimate of Design Flood 2001) adopting
hydro-meteorological approach through derivation of Synthetic Unit Hydrograph (SUG) as per
guidelines of FER for Lower Ganga Plain subzone-1(g). The physiological parameters were obtained by
processing SRTM_52_08 DEM in GIS software. Design storm duration was fixed as two days for a base
flow of 40 hours as obtained from SUG (Fig.1). Design storm was derived from draft final report of PMP
atlas of Ganga river basin, where 1-day and 2-day Probable Maximum Precipitation (PMP) depths are
found as 69.4 cm and 98.6 cm respectively, considering the moisture adjustment factor as 1.36. The
PMP depths have been arranged in 2 (two) bells per day and rainfall increment in each bell was
computed using the time distribution coefficient. The critical sequencing within bells has been carried out
as per guidelines (Estimate of Design Flood 1972) followed by bell arrangement to generate maximum
flood. A loss rate 0.27 cm/hour (FER for Lower Ganga Plain (Revised) Subzone 1(g) 1994) was
subtracted from the ordinate of critical sequencing of rainfall increment to obtain excess rainfall
hyetograph (Fig. 2). Finally, Direct Surface Runoff (DSRO) hydrograph was obtained through
convolution of the unit hydrograph with excess rainfall following the principle of linearity and
superposition. A base flow 0.05 m3/sec per sq. km was adopted as per revised FER subzone 1(g) and
was added to obtain PMF of 9551 cumec, which is observed to be much higher than original
consideration and same has been approved by Central Water Commission (CWC).
Flood routing study was carried out using modified Puls Method. The PMF hydrograph (Fig. 3) was used
as the design flood hydrograph. Two cases were considered for reservoir routing of Konar dam; first,
when only the crest gates are open and the second, where under sluices are also open along with the
crest gates. Flood routing was started from the top of conservation level as per standard practice,
pertinent to multi zoning reservoir. During routing, maximum routed discharge was observed as 7756.61
cumec in first case, corresponding to the maximum reservoir water level as EL. 429.77 m, where
available freeboard is 1.53 m. In second case, maximum water level reached to EL. 429.64 m
corresponding to a routed discharge of 7750.08 cumec. In this case, freeboard is available as 1.66 m.
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6. CRACKS AND DAM HEALTH
Time to time, lot of inspections were carried out by various experts and committees viz. A. K. Char
(December 1968), P. M. Mane (December 1969; October 1970; August 1982), M. G. K. Murti (November
1970), K. Mueller (1976), C.M.D.D. (CWC, May, 1977), SA & I Directorate (CWC, September 1977),
Edward Gruner (November 1979), Chief Engineer (DSO, CWC, March 1981). An expert committee
comprising of members of CWC and DVC, formed as per advice of CWC & appointed by DVC inspected
the dam during June 1981, August 1982 and September 1984. A team comprising of members from
Ministry of Power, Central Electricity Authority, Central Water Commission, DVC and Irrigation
Department (Government of Jharkhand) visited Konar dam in April 2010. Also, a high level team of Dam
Safety Review Panel (DSRP) inspected the dam in 2013 and recommended to take up various
measures. A few major recommendations towards investigation of the dam health as made by different
experts and committees are given below.
7. MAJOR RECOMMENDATIONS
Suggestion was made to monitor the movement of the cracks using deflection measuring devices or dial
gauges and to plot the same along with reservoir operational level. It was also proposed to measure
deformation of the dam body, if any, by inserting clinometers into the inspection shafts under varying
reservoir operational levels; as existing arrangement for observing the deflection through plumb bob is
ineffective. Sonic experiment was also suggested to assess the depth of extended cracks. Proposal was
made to install temperature recording devices to keep the records of external and internal concrete
temperature. Also, suggestion was made to explore the possibility of providing self-closing door shutter
in the gallery to avoid steep temperature gradient. It was proposed to carryout photo-elastic and detailed
analytical studies by trial led analysis to assess the nature of forces likely to be acting at or around the
plane of the cracks. For this, overflow section, non-overflow section and section through the Bridge
diaphragm wall of the dam were recommended. Advice was made to measure uplift pressure from the
drainage holes at the level of the drainage gallery, also to clean all the blocked (due to leaching) vertical
formed drains, as well, to keep a continuous record of drainage discharge from the concrete dam.
Suggestion was made to grout the cracks using epoxy with suitable hardener to ensure a sufficient
strong bonding to restore the loss of shear strength. It was also suggested to review the hydrological
aspects at present scenario with the updated available hydrological data and recommendation was
made to carry out silt measurements regularly to know the extent of silting in the reservoir. As,
construction of dam was carried out in two phases, mainly to obtain early cooling water for Bokaro
Thermal Plant, so it was suggested to investigate by careful drilling to obtain the core for observation, if
there is any gap at the interface leading to relative movement. The team (April 2010) suggested that
proposed hydro unit can be taken up only after rehabilitation of the dam and repair of penstock leakages
as observed during inspection. Only after ascertaining water availability and safety of the dam,
preparation of Detailed Project Report for the proposed Hydro Electric Project should be considered.
DSRP (2013) members suggested (DSRP report 2013) for geophysical investigation of the dam body
and to evaluate its quality of concrete. Under water examination was also proposed especially at inlet of
the under-sluices from upstream. They opined that all the hydro mechanical equipment should be made
functional.
8. CAUSES OF CRACKS
Records (Konar dam inspection reports - Compilation 2012) reveal that probable cause of cracks was
attributed to one or combination of different factors like temperature differential, alkali-aggregate
reaction in concrete and excessive uplift pressure in the foundation. Different experts opined different
views behind formation of these cracks. Mr. Mueller (1976) described that width of the cracks changes
according to the variation of the water load. Temperature shrinkage which occurred during the
construction phase induced initial formation of the vertical cracks in the upper part of the dam. As the
dam acts partly as an arch-dam, these vertical cracks were opened and closed in course of time
depending on the water load. Further, cracks widened and were visible in the inspection gallery due to
drying out action of the normal air circulation. C.M.D.D. (1977) stated the apparent cause of the cracks
as tensile stress, induced by temperature drop and shrinkage. He also described, that fluctuation of the
stress due to seasonal variation would continue indefinitely. Changes in stresses due to seasonal
variation of temperature would be cyclic in nature and therefore, should not cause any cumulative
272
widening of the width of the cracks, unless tensile stresses are developed due to dead weight and water
load. Mr. Gruner (1979) indicated that either upstream part of the dam or its foundation has been
expanding or downstream part of the dam or its foundation has been shrinking; as upstream part being
always moist while the downstream part is dry. Mr. P. M. Mane (1982) viewed that if the cracks in the
gallery were due to drop in temperature and shrinkage, widening of cracks should be stabilised when
they were grouted in 1970. The reappearance of the cracks including its widening to almost same order
indicates that it is a structural problem. DVC entrusted Water Resources Development Training Centre
at University of Roorkee, Roorkee, to conduct a finite element analysis for a typical dam section as per
expert committees view (1982). The report (1984) prepared by Dr. B. Pant, Professor, WRDTC,
Roorkee, indicates that the cracking of concrete in the inspection gallery is predominantly due to high
thermal gradient on account of heating of the downstream face of the dam in summer. Thermal stress
calculations showed the existence of tensions on both faces of the gallery in summer. Downstream face
of the gallery is subjected to a much higher tensile stress compared to the upstream face of the gallery.
The trend is reversed in winter when both faces of the gallery are in compression.
9. NATURE AND BEHAVIOUR OF THE CRACKS
Cracks were found mostly horizontal and running continuous throughout all the galleries particularly in
the inspection gallery. Numbers of cracks and their width sizes in the upstream face of the galleries were
lesser than that of the cracks in downstream face which were more in numbers and also wider in size.
Further, cracks were found wider in the central blocks of the dam (blocks 13 & 14) and narrower near the
abutment ends. Cracks in the inspection gallery were observed nearly at the same level (about 1.81 m
above the floor) across all the blocks and maximum width of the crack was found 54.36 mm in the central
portion at downstream face. Vertical cracks were also visible in the inspection gallery in block 3 to 5 and
in block 19 to 20. Approximate depth of the cracks was found to vary from 0.9 m to 3.81 m as obtained
from core drilling in 1968. A few horizontal cracks were also observed in the upstream and downstream
faces of the outer dam body especially at locations coinciding with the lift joints.
Numbers of dial gauges were installed across all major cracks in the galleries particularly in the
inspection gallery to measure vertical as well as horizontal displacement of the cracks. Study of dial
gauge reading from 1983 to 1993 showed that amount of opening of most of the cracks was more than
that of closing almost in every annual cycle and as a result cracks were getting wider gradually, year
after year. Studies of a few cracks (Fig. 4) at different locations (V7, V9, V16 and V20) in downstream
face of the inspection gallery indicate that width of the cracks were maximum in the month of June or
Julywhen the ambient temperature is high and reservoir level is low, whereas minimum openings were
found during winter. Report (1982) prepared by expert committee also indicates the same behaviour of
the cracks. However, overall sharp increasing trend of the crack width was observed in all the said
locations. But, same studies for other locations at the downstream (Fig. 5)andupstream (Fig. 6) face of
the inspection gallery indicate no such sharp rising trend of widening. Rather, at one location V21 (Fig.
5), maximum widening was observed during winter throughout the study period and it is observed that
widening increased with rise of reservoir level. Tell-tales installed over the cracks at many locations
indicate thatcrack formation was active up to 2009. However, tell-tales installed in 2009 or onwards, are
appeared to be still intact indicating that perhaps cracks are stabilised.
10. INITIATIVES BY DVC
Records reveal thatsince first observation of the cracks, DVC has taken continuous efforts and various
steps till date, to monitor and take remedial measures. On request of DVC, CWPRS, Pune, Government
of India, investigated the cracks by Sonic Tests. On the basis of this report (1970-71), cracks were
grouted with epoxy in consultation with the Central Water Commission (then CW&PC) and CWPRS,
Pune. Charting of the cracks of inspection gallery was done in January 1976 and external temperature
observations were started later on in 1983. However, seepage water is being measured regularly. It was
also reported that heavy vibration was felt during partial operation of the under-sluices in 1965.
However, partial opening of the under-sluice gate is prohibited since 1979.A team of divers from Bhakra
Beas Management Board examined (1980-85) the upstream faces of the dam and it was reported that
no crack was observed. An attempt was made (around 1985) to establish interface between the two
stages of concrete by core drilling. Due to limitation of space, drilling was done from the downstream wall
of the access gallery (55 m length from the entrance of operating gallery) up to 6 m in under-sluices
273
block. Another hole was also drilled from the floor of the inspection gallery. But, the interface could not
be established. The project authorities fixed (1984) brass pins on the top of the dam at suitable
locations to observe these regularly by theodolite from a fixed point on the abutment to get an idea on
relative deflection of the dam at various reservoir levels and at various time of the day in different
seasons. These observations were carried out for a few years up to 1990. But, no deflection was
observed. Later on, stability analysis was also carried out, which shows tension on the upstream face
and same was jointly checked by DVC & CWC. Currently, DVC has taken initiative to include Konar Dam
under the Dam Rehabilitation and Improvement Project (DRIP) a World Bank funding scheme of CWC,
Government of India. Project screening template has been approved by the World Bank in December
2014. Major works like repairing of cracks, restoring of hydro-mechanical equipment like crest and
under-sluice gates, stop log, gantry crane and penstock, upstream and downstream slope protection
works, automatic gate operation, dam instrumentation etc. are included in the said programme. Total
estimated (2014) cost is involved about 26.71 Crore.
11. CONCLUSION
Water availability study indicates that sufficient inflow is available in this reservoir. It is also observed that
revised PMF will be absorbed safely in the available space with slight encroachment of the free board
within the existing flood cushionof this reservoir. However, certainly there are some problems especially
partial functioning of the existing hydro mechanical equipment, as well as cracks in the dam body and
leakage of penstock etc. So, if these deficiencies are rectified under DRIP, the dam will definitely get a
prolonged life. Simultaneously, it will also be possible to extract the full benefits of this reservoir;
obviously same will be beneficial to the Nation.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
Authors whole heartedly acknowledge with gratitude to Er. P. Kiran, Executive Director (HR) and Er. A.
Bhattacharya, Chief Engineer (Civil) of Damodar Valley Corporation for their kind consents to present this paper in
the conference. Authors also like to acknowledge Er. Abhishek Shukla, AE (Civil) for his spontaneous assistance in
preparing this article.
REFERENCES
12. Chaudhuri, D. and Banerjee, S. (2013), Challenges in efficient water management in Damodar river valley -
Role of DVC, India Water Week 2013, New Delhi.
13. Dam Safety Review Panel Report for Konar Dam (2013), DVC, Maithon dam, Jharkhand.
14. Estimate of Design Flood (1972), CWPC.
15. Flood Estimation Report for Lower Ganga Plain (Revised) Subzone 1(g) (1994), CWC, Sewa Bhawan, R. K.
Puram, New Delhi.
16. Konar dam inspection reports - Compilation (2012), Engineering Circle, DVC, Maithon dam, Jharkhand.
17. Manual on Estimate of Design Flood (2001), CWC, Sewa Bhawan, R. K. Puram, New Delhi.
18. Technical Completion Report of Konar dam (1966), DVC, Maithon dam, Jharkhand.
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Table 1. Statistical properties of 10 daily inflow (19612014) of Konar reservoir
Series properties
Exceedance
Period Inflow Inflow Coefficients Evaporation
10 day Max Min Mean Median 75% 90% Var. Skew. Kurt. Mean Median
I 2431 9 342 144 43 25 1.54 2.87 8.61 50 55
JAN II 1206 0 244 148 65 30 1.03 1.71 3.41 49 53
III 940 0 268 189 55 17 0.92 1.00 0.21 54 59
I 1246 0 270 151 66 3 1.00 1.44 2.23 63 67
FEB II 1409 0 272 155 80 5 1.18 2.11 4.72 62 66
III 2197 0 211 119 47 25 1.52 4.80 28.68 53 54
I 1038 0 238 157 60 19 0.93 1.34 1.89 86 87
MAR II 5033 0 317 133 46 23 2.22 6.07 40.69 84 86
III 1065 0 275 185 78 25 0.91 1.28 1.21 91 96
I 6622 0 415 141 78 21 2.25 5.95 39.30 102 106
APR II 1152 0 307 212 94 32 0.89 1.18 0.95 99 102
III 1322 6 292 224 93 33 0.88 1.66 3.91 96 100
I 2395 8 365 252 120 43 1.05 3.11 14.25 100 103
MAY II 3411 0 470 297 180 68 1.14 3.52 16.84 96 97
III 2001 4 443 349 182 97 0.83 1.81 5.03 99 102
I 8871 40 1056 605 198 88 1.44 3.49 14.39 66 68
JUN II 8158 127 1456 910 521 221 1.09 2.43 6.78 66 67
III 9826 174 2121 1414 863 541 0.94 2.25 5.64 66 65
I 13921 93 2467 1493 981 529 1.04 2.35 6.85 40 39
JUL II 11584 378 2987 2217 1242 775 0.83 1.76 3.54 43 43
III 18752 256 3742 2569 1913 957 0.88 2.31 7.58 50 50
I 11860 261 4048 3361 1517 1044 0.71 0.94 0.28 46 44
AUG II 11830 70 3556 3139 1788 1021 0.70 1.32 1.95 48 46
III 10617 356 3721 3057 1753 1262 0.67 1.08 0.62 57 59
I 18347 75 3674 2479 1156 492 0.98 2.01 4.89 60 64
SEP II 19036 381 3260 2337 1625 672 0.95 3.02 12.53 63 69
III 14649 125 2946 1843 927 517 0.96 1.97 4.96 65 69
I 12416 49 2220 1322 610 167 1.14 2.14 5.09 64 69
OCT II 7307 19 1176 781 265 76 1.37 2.94 8.88 62 67
III 11082 20 983 659 191 85 1.70 4.76 26.60 70 75
I 1757 0 363 239 80 25 1.12 1.77 2.91 65 68
NOV II 1918 0 303 156 60 29 1.20 2.65 8.95 65 67
III 1196 0 264 178 74 0 0.98 1.48 2.47 65 67
I 850 0 200 144 56 33 0.95 1.59 2.40 56 59
DEC II 2214 0 290 178 56 11 1.24 3.38 15.72 53 57
III 6911 0 373 165 69 19 2.58 6.31 42.89 57 62
NB: Inflow and evaporation in HM; Var.: Variation; Skew.: Skewness; Kurt.: Kurtosis
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Table 2. Statistical properties of monthly inflow (19612014) of Konar reservoir
Series properties
Exceedance
Inflow Inflow Coefficients Evaporation
Month Max Min Mean Median 75% 90% Var. Skew. Kurt. Mean Median
JAN 4217 15 854 540 229 132 1.01 1.89 4.17 154 166
FEB 4416 0 754 536 246 85 1.07 2.48 8.00 179 187
MAR 5229 23 830 526 231 92 1.08 2.80 10.85 262 270
APR 6857 116 1014 678 396 217 1.06 3.40 16.07 297 305
MAY 4118 87 1277 1010 553 278 0.73 1.25 1.24 295 297
JUN 16295 903 4633 3699 2423 1453 0.66 1.51 3.01 198 199
JUL 36751 1882 9196 7420 4422 3630 0.70 1.87 5.26 134 129
AUG 27459 1526 11325 10145 6766 4600 0.50 0.65 0.03 151 147
SEP 25245 1014 9880 8139 4841 2436 0.61 0.65 -0.37 189 202
OCT 20105 129 4380 2964 1478 772 1.04 1.94 3.57 197 211
NOV 4447 58 931 536 228 129 0.93 1.68 4.19 195 201
DEC 9255 28 863 509 273 125 1.56 5.03 30.07 165 177
NB: Inflow and evaporation in HM; Var.: Variation; Skew.: Skewness; Kurt.: Kurtosis
Table 3. Statistical properties of water year, monsoon and dry period inflow (19612014) of Konar reservoir
Series properties
Exceedance
Inflow Inflow Coefficients Evaporation
Series Max Min Mean Median 75% 90% Var. Skew. Kurt. Mean Median
Water Yr. 966 142 459 446 345 265 0.36 0.82 1.16 24 25
Monsoon 910 127 394 370 273 206 0.40 0.96 1.49 9 8
Dry 209 5 65 61 33 17 0.62 1.02 1.72 15 16
NB: Inflow and evaporation in MCM; Var.: Variation; Skew.: Skewness; Kurt.: Kurtosis
Table 4. Storage status of the reservoir in different zones
Capacity (MCM) Loss in % Loss Rate of

Capacity deposition
Reservoir zone 1955 1997
(MCM) (MCM/year)
Dead (up to EL 410.6 m) 60 35 25 41.67% 0.60

Conservation (EL. 410.6 m - 425.8 m) 221 175 46 20.81% 1.10
Flood (EL 425.8 m - 427.94 m) 56 38 18 32.14% 0.43
Gross 337 248 89 26.41% 2.12
Ref:(Chaudhuri2013);Secondarysurveyyearhasbeencorrected
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Geosynthetics Water Barriers in Kadamparai Dam: Observed

Behaviour of its Exposed Geomembrane after 10 Years of
Installation
V. Subramanian,
Director, Carpi India Waterproofing, Chennai
ABSTRACT
One of the uses of geosynthetics is to act as water barriers. Geosynthetic water barriers are called
geomembranes when consisting of one material providing water tightness, and geocomposites when consisting
of two materials, the geomembrane providing water tightness + a backing geotextile providing anti-puncture
protection, high friction angle to facilitate placement on inclined surfaces, and some drainage capability. The use
of impervious geomembranes and geocomposites in dams is a major application, since the water tightness of
dams is a major requirement for their safe operation.
Geomembranes were used as barriers in hydraulic structures since the 1940s, when the US Bureau of
Reclamation (USBR) carried out research and field experimentation on various types of canal linings including
geomembranes; in 1959, the first installation of a geomembrane on a dam was performed. Polymeric materials
(low density polyethylene, LDPE, and polyvinylchloride, PVC) and butyl rubber were used in early applications.
Due to their tensile characteristics that make them particularly suitable for use on hydraulic structures, the use of
PVC geomembranes gradually extended to waterproofing of all types of dams. PVC geomembranes are feasible
to accommodate and adapt to possible large deformations of deformable base layers, or to differential
settlements between deformable slopes and rigid concrete appurtenances, or to movements/rotation of joints,
caused by the high hydrostatic pressure that large dams entail. At present, according to the latest theme bulletin
on geomembranes sealing systems for dams prepared by ICOLD, the International Commission on Large Dams
[ICOLD 2010], PVC is by far the most used synthetic material for waterproofing of dams. The diagram in Figure 1
shows the number of applications of the various types of geomembranes in dams, according to the database of
the bulletin, updated to the present date.
Figure 1. Applications of different types of geomembranes in dams. Numbers relate to a 2014 updating of ICOLD
2010 database.
The concept of use of watertight flexible PVC geomembranes instead of conventional impervious materials such
as concrete, bituminous concrete, masonry, or clay, obviously derived, among other considerations, is from the
good performance of embedded PVC waterstops in a very large number of concrete dams worldwide. A PVC
geomembrane placed on the upstream face of a dam can be considered, from a conceptual viewpoint, as one
wide waterstop sealed at the bottom, at the abutments and at crest.
The main purpose of this paper is to present the state-of-the-art systems for rehabilitation of dams with specific
reference to the first PVC Geomembrane Waterproofing system installed in Kadamparai Dam in Tamil Nadu and
its performance over the period of 10 years.
1 GEOMEMBRANES IN REHABILITATION OF DAMS
PVC geomembranes since 1960s have been regularly used in many hydraulic applications and
especially for the purpose of rehabilitation of all types of dams. Rehabilitation has been made in the
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dry as well as underwater, either waterproofing the entire face of the dam, or only areas of higher
water infiltration, or only cracks or failing joints.
In this paper we would be discussing on the experience of TANGEDCO on their prestigious project of
Rehabiliation of Kadamparai Dam with PVC Geomembrane, the first of its kind in India.
1.1 Rehabilitation of Kadamparai, Masonry Dam - A Case Study
The water tightness of masonry dams relies on the water tightness of the joints between masonry
blocks, which is granted by mortar. Over time, the mortar deteriorates; in some cases also part of the
masonry blocks exhibit decreased imperviousness, and water infiltrates into the dam. Bulletin 117
[ICOLD 2000] puts special emphasis on gravity masonry dams as being particularly vulnerable due
to the fact that masonry is a weaker material than concrete ... (lower tensile strength, higher
perviousness etc.) and that this weakness is most probably accentuated by the ageing process.
Bulletin 117 states Poor quality of water tightness has been responsible for 50 % of the failures of
masonry dams, and Water percolation through the dam body is the main factor of ageing Water
can dissolve the cementitious component of mortar in masonry, concrete or RCC. This results in a loss
of material with three main consequences:
Decrease in the relative density of the material

Decrease in its mechanical strength
Decrease of water tightness.
Like for any other type of dam, the objective in this case is to restore water tightness. Local packing
and pointing of joints is generally a short-term repair, which must be repeated and is generally
performed in the dry, implying high costs for frequent dewatering of the reservoir. Installation of a
geocomposite system, besides being possible also underwater, provides permanent restoration of
water tightness.
An outstanding example of this type of rehabilitation is Kadamparai masonry dam in India. Kadamparai
is a remarkable example of a high-tech geomembrane system, installed on a very rough stone
masonry upstream face, including tensioning fastening mechanical profiles that facilitate drainage, a
watertight double seal at bottom and abutments, and a sophisticated monitoring system.
Kadamparai dam is in Tamil Nadu and is owned by the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board (TNEB). Located
at el. 1150.50 in the Anamalai Hills of the Coimbatore District, it forms the forebay reservoir to the
400MW Kadamparai pumped-storage hydro electric scheme. Completed in 1983, the dam is a
composite structure consisting of a central stone masonry gravity dam with earthen embankment
sections. The masonry dam is 67m high and 478m long, with a central spillway, a scour vent tower
and one inspection gallery. The rock masonry has offsets up to 8cm.
The dam was first impounded in 1984. During the first years of operation of the reservoir, seepage was
within the expected and acceptable limits. Starting in 1995, seepage rates gradually began to increase
until the autumn of 2002. Main seepage sources were identified in distributed seepage entering
through the masonry facing system, at deteriorated joints between the stones of the masonry, and
through cavities that formed in the masonry, in concentrated seepage at joints between monoliths, and
in seepage through the foundation rock. Seepage occurring through the embankment section into, or
around, the gravity section was estimated to be extremely small compared with the other identified
paths.
Several repairs were carried out from 1990 to 2000, consisting of packing and pointing at selective
locations on the upstream face, vertical drilling from the crest and grouting at close intervals. These
methods were unsuccessful and the seepage kept on increasing. Underwater treatment of the leaking
areas by chemicals and cement, performed in 1999 and 2000, at first reduced the leakage from 4200
to 800 l/min, but eventually also proved to be unsuccessful, because it became detached from the
masonry and it peeled off. The chemical grout came out through the drainage gallery, as shown by
cementitious materials and fines eroded and collected in the drainage gallery as the grout came out
through it, leaving more cavities inside the masonry body of the dam, and the leakage increased
again. Further repairs during 2002 somehow controlled the increase in seepage. But from the autumn
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of 2002 the seepage rates increased again, in 2003 reaching 11,800 l/min with water level at el.
1140.55m, and a peak seepage of 38,000 l/min
Since the conventional methods already adopted had failed at Kadamparai, various entities such as
Electricity Boards, the Central Electricity Authority, the Central Water Commission and the Central
Board of Irrigation and Power in New Delhi, the Hydraulic Institute at Pune, the National Institute of
Ocean Technology at Chennai, Anna University at Chennai, were consulted to find a suitable long-
term solution. The final suggestion was the adoption of an upstream geomembrane.
An international tender was issued in 2003, and the waterproofing works were awarded in July 2004 to
Carpi Tech, a Swizz based firm, who started the waterproofing works at site by middle of January
2005.
Based on leakage sources, and taking into account the cost/benefit ratio and the need to limit the
outage time, TNEB had foreseen to install the new waterproofing system only in the exposed area of
the gravity dam. The Zone Quantification Method, developed in the USA by Gannett Fleming Inc. to
predict seepage quantities, was used to verify that the area where the waterproofing geocomposite
was to be installed was appropriate to optimize the reduction of seepage.
Kadamparai is an example of successful use of different geosynthetic materials to achieve different

scopes. Proceeding from the masonry upstream, the layering of the waterproofing system is in stages
as below:
First : Geonet for drainage

Second :Geotextile for anti-puncture protection
Third : Geocomposite (geomembrane + geotextile) for waterproofing.
The drainage geonet was installed as a longitudinal band at the bottom of the drainage compartments,
to act as a collector conveying water drained between the masonry and the waterproofing liner to
transverse pipes discharging into the gallery. The anti-puncture layer, a 2000g/m2 nonwoven, needle
punched geotextile was installed on the existing masonry surface and fastened by impact anchors, to
protect the waterproofing liner from puncturing by the stones. The use of the geotextile allowed
minimizing heavy civil works to make the surface smooth. See Figures 2 and 3.
Figures 2 Kadamparai dam: inspecting the masonry to Figure 3. Installation of longitudinal bands of drainage
verify conditions geonet (black material along the bottom) and of anti-
puncture geotextile .
The waterproofing liner consists of a 2.5mm thick PVC geomembrane laminated during extrusion to a
500g/m2 polyester geotextile, supplied in sheets manufactured with length such as to cover the dam
face without transversal joints.
The anchorage system consists of two stainless steel profiles, U and Omega shaped, placed along
parallel vertical lines, and allowing continuous linear fastening and pre-tensioning of the geocomposite.
The U profile is fastened to the stone masonry with stainless steel anchor rods embedded in chemical
phials at site-specific spacing, adjacent vertical geocomposite sheets are placed and punctured over a
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special coupling device, and then coupling of the Omega profile to the U profile achieves tensioning of
the geocomposite. The assembly is then made watertight by a PVC geomembrane strip watertight
heat-seamed over the geocomposite.
Figure 4. The U profile installed over the upstream face (left), the omega profile achieving tensioning of the
geocomposite (right).
The PVC geocomposite is anchored at all peripheries by seals that are watertight against the local
water pressure, i.e. watertight to water in pressure at bottom, water intakes and outlets, spillway, and
against rain and snowmelt at crest. The seals are mechanical, and consist of stainless steel batten
strips fastened to the concrete with chemical phials or mechanical anchors, depending on submersible
or not submersible.
In Kadamparai Dam, the U profiles were installed directly on the original exposed facing, at 5.70m
centres. The geocomposite sheets were lowered from the dam crest and positioned on top of the
geotextile (Figure 5), by crews working from suspended platforms. The geocomposite sheets were
placed in exposed position, with the geomembrane side in contact with the reservoir water; adjacent
sheets were watertight heat-welded. The geocomposite was punched on the rods securing the U
profiles to the dam, and fixed by the omega profiles fastened unto the U ones. The profiles were
waterproofed with a strip of geomembrane, 2.5mm thick, watertight heat-seamed unto the
geocomposite (Figure 6). All welding of the waterproofing geocomposite and geomembrane strips was
made by the hot-air method, using manual one-track heat-seaming guns.
Figures 5 and 6. Kadamparai dam: installation of the geocomposite over the anti-puncture geotextile, and the
PVC sheets tightly anchored to the dam by the vertical tensioning profiles.
At the perimeter the geocomposite is confined by a mechanical seal that is watertight against water in
pressure at submersible peripheries, and watertight against rain and waves above maximum water
level.At bottom two watertight perimeter seals have been installed: a primary seal at the bottom of the
upstream face, and a secondary seal underneath it, to reduce the water head on the primary seal.
Both seals are made with flat stainless steel batten strips, 80 x 8mm, compressing the geocomposite
with an EPDM rubber gasket and stainless steel splice plates to ensure even compression. To achieve
the seal, the subgrade must be plane: where the seal was made on masonry surface, having large
280
offsets that would have made it impossible to achieve even compression, a layer of shotcrete and
levelling mortar was provided to even the surface in the area of the seal. The same type of seal was
installed around the submersible peripheries, i.e. trashracks at the scour vent tower, and spillway. No
levelling layer was necessary for seals made on concrete (at spillway). Perimeter seals watertight
against rain and waves are made by a 50 x 3mm stainless steel flat profile compressing the
geocomposite against the sub-grade, smoothed by a layer of epoxy mortar.
An integrated monitoring system controls the performance of the waterproofing liner. The first control is
made by measuring the drained water: for this purpose the drainage system has been divided into four
compartments discharging separately into the gallery, two compartments for the upstream face, and
two compartments for foundations. Measuring the drained water allows a rough localization of the area
(compartment) of the leak, if the average "normal" drained water flow changes. The second control is
made by two piezometers, placed at the lowest point of the two compartments of the upstream face,
measuring the water standing behind the geocomposite if any. The third control is made by an optical
fibre cable system, placed in two separate loops at right and left of the scour vent tower: this system
allows a finer localization of the area of presence of water if any.
2
Waterproofing works at Kadamparai involved > 17,300 m , which were completed in 3 months, 6
weeks ahead of schedule.
Figure 7. Kadamparai masonry dam, pumped storage, waterproofed with an exposed PVC geocomposite. Total
leakage before rehabilitation reached 38,000 l/min, total leakage after installation of the geocomposite is about 80
l/m at same reservoir level.
After the installation of the system with exposed PVC geocomposite, mechanically anchored and with
a drainage system, the expectations of TNEB was met to its full and was confirmed that this
technology of geomembrane usage for rehabilitation of dams could act as an effective method for
seepage control in the coming future. Seepage that was in the order of 30,000 l/min has been reduced
to around 100 l/min. The installation of the system has been completed within a very short time, ahead
of schedule, allowing for the generation of power much earlier than expected. A geomembrane
system, adequately designed and installed, is an advantageous alternative to traditional repair
systems in terms of technical and financial effectiveness.
The rehabilitation of Kadamparai dam using an exposed geomembrane was the first project of its kind
in India, and has been proved to be an effective way of reducing seepage in dams and hydraulic
structures and even after nearly 10 years of operation, the leakage remains around 100 liters/min and
there is no need for any maintenance for the system.
The Kadamparai project was awarded the India Power Awards 2008, issued by the Council of Power
Utilities of India, " in recognition of Excellence in Water and Energy Management for designing and
installing first PVC geomembrane waterproofing system in Kadamparai dam".
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2 CONCLUSIONS
The performance of the geomembrane system for the application of seepage controls in Dams, has
been proved to be successful then and even now after nearly 10 years of service, the installed system
is well in shape and with no maintenance required. This case study is adequate enough to prove that
an exposed geomembrane systems adequately designed and installed can provide a technically
sound and cost effective solution to restore imperviousness in hydraulic structures.
3 REFERENCES
International Commission on Large Dams (2000). Bulletin 117. The gravity dam A dam for the future.
International Commission on Large Dams (2010). Bulletin 135. Geomembrane sealing systems for dams - Design
principles and return of experience.
Sadagopan, A.A and Kolappan, V.P. (2005). Rehabilitation of Kadamparai dam, India. The International Journal
on Hydropower & Dams, Issue 4.
Scuero A.M., Vaschetti G.L., Bacchelli M. Carpi Tech, Switzerland, Subramanian V. (2014), Carpi India, Chennai.
Geosynthetic Water Barriers in Dams and Canals state of Art. Central Board of Irrigation and Power, New Delhi-
October 15-17, 2014
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A Brief Study of Arch Dams Behaviour

Dr. B. R. K. Pillai Zika Smiljkovic Dr. A. K. Dhawan
Project Director (DRIP) Dam Design Engineer Specialist, Dam Instrumentation
Central Water Commission, New Delhi EGIS Eau EGIS India
dir-drip-cwc@nic.in Montpellier, France
ABSTRACT
The paper presents the arch dams deformation behaviour under the effects or conditions other than those
envisaged at original design reports. In addition, the inventory of existing dams which were monitored and which
exhibited unexpected behaviour is summarised as well. There are a number of unexpected events influencing
arch dams which deserve discussion throughout the paper. First, those of chemical origin, known as alkali silica
slow reaction (ASSR), internal sulphate attack of concrete (ISA) which generates delayed ettrengites formation
(DEF) and carbonation or, calcification of upstream blocks joints whilst their seasonal separation. In addition to
these, the mechanical process aligned with creeping of concrete which originates as accompanying effect of
dams aging are discussed too. Besides, due to service stresses redistribution caused by swelling stresses
ensued after ASSR or DEF, some sections of dams may be then subjected the creeping process as well. The
paper discusses different possibilities which may bring the arch dams under distress, after being subjected to the
foregoing influences.
BASIC DEFINTION OF ARCH DAMS
The arch dams are discontinuous structural systems with arches and cantilevers as load carrying
elements. In addition, they are compound structural systems, having been composed of upper-
unreinforced concrete part and a part of supporting rock mass interacting with upper part. The hinge
type joints allowing rotation but not sliding are constructed in between the cantilevers and at their
contact with supporting rock mass. Upon material properties, the concrete part is considered as
homogenous and isotropic. The dam sites for arch dams are usually selected to be of quasi-
homogenous setup. In addition, the dam sites should be free from active and passive faults, and weak
shear zones. The sites with post construction neo-tectonic effects then time-delayed rock mass
decompressions due to long term release of in situ stresses, are also avoided. No sites with quasi-
homogenous modulus of elasticity less than 500 000 psi3) or 3500 MPa are generally recommended
for construction of arch dams.
The shape of valley dictates the load carrying system of an arch dam. For narrow-V sites, narrow-U
3)
sites and wide-V sites , having designed with crest length-to-height ratios up to 5:1, the service loads
are to be imparted to foundations mainly by arch action. For wider-U sites of crest length-to-height
(cl:h) ratios higher than 5:1 a redistribution of carrying load to dam cantilevers for lower sections of
3) 3)
dam ought to be expected . The upper limit for cl:h for arch dams is about 10:1 . Gravity arch dams
are becoming an option for cl:h greater than 10:1. Another criterion for arch dam categorisation is
based on ratio of base width (tb)-to-crest width (tc). Thus, the said ratios of 2.9-5, 5-10, and 8-15,
classify an arch dam to be respectively thin, moderately thin or gravity arch dam3). As for first two
types of dams, the double curvature shape usually proves to be an optimum in view of service
stresses diffusion.
FACTORS PREVALENTLY AFFECTING ARCH DAMS BEHAVIOUR
As described above, thin to moderately thin arch dams belong to flexible civil structures which by
implication react more quickly to service loads with reference to their rigid alliances. Hence, under the
term behaviour in this paper, the deformation response of an arch dam to service loads will be
discussed. According to general arch dam codes, the service loads are usually aligned with usual,
unusual and extreme load conditions. As for usual and unusual of them, the emphasis is on their
seasonal-cyclic trend. One of the most pronounced extreme load conditions may be that involving
earthquake load. The subject of this paper will be unusual, post-construction deformation behaviours
of existing arch dams i.e. those which are beyond behaviour envisaged by the dam original design
283
reports for long-term static load conditions. Understanding of causes that might be reasons for that is
the aim of this paper.
CREEPING OF CONCRETE
Due to exceedance of creeping stress level with
service loads
Delayed Dam Deformation CREEPING OF ROCK MASS

1 Due to Mechanical Stresses Due to exceedance of creeping stress level with
service loads
FOUNDATION MOUVEMENTS
Neo-tectonic pressures or time delayed rock mass
decompression
CONCRETE SWELLING
Due to Alkali Silica Slow Reaction (ASSR)
CONCRETE SWELLING
Delayed Dam Deformation Due to Delayed Ettringite Formation (DEF)
2 Due to Chemical Processes
developed in the concrete and the
developing in the process of sulfate attack
block joints
OPEN JOINTS CARBONATION
Developing while seasonal joints opening and
precipitation of cement paste lime into calcium
carbonate in the presence of water
Combination of Deformation
3 Processes 1 and 2
Figure 1: Flow chart of events that may cause unexpected behaviour of arch dams during their aging life
The arch dam deformation due to plasticity of concrete or rock mass will not be the subject of this
paper. This is because the range of stresses exceeding elastic level, are for safety reasons usually
avoided in the designs of these dams whilst their response to seasonal-cyclic load conditions during
their service life. The exception might be the cyclic load due to earthquake, for which only very limited
zones of arch dams could be allowed to suffer plastic deformation without putting in jeopardy the dam
service function.
BASIC THEORY OF ARCH DAMS AGING DEFORMATION
Here, while discussing the arch dams deformation, the focus will be put on delayed alias time-variant
deformation. Within an ideal, elastic and homogenous structural pattern, dam deformation is expected
to be fully recoverable during the time, with its cyclic trend contingent to fluctuation of hydrostatic and
thermal loads. However, in case of secondary effects (see Figure 1) that might occur over dams
lifespan, they may suffer irrecoverable (i.e. non-returnable) deformation, too. In these conditions, it is
to note that total deformation of an arch dam at a point of its service life may be the aggregate of cyclic
and irrecoverable deformation. Contingent to type of arch dam and prevailing service load conditions,
the irrecoverable deformation line of an arch dam crest can be upstream or downstream drifting with
reference to crest arch centreline.
Alkali Silica Slow Reaction (ASSR)
Nowadays, the most disseminated irrecoverable arch dams deformation is that caused by alkali silica
slow reaction generated between the cement paste in concrete and some minerals of concrete
2)
aggregate. According to Reference alkali solution in cement paste pores attacks reactive minerals of
concrete aggregate producing thus alkali silica gel which in presence of water swells. The gel usually
builds up in the aggregate fragments which then swells causing expansion of concrete and cracking of
surrounding cement paste. The basic ASSR mechanism is further presented in Figure 2.
284
The alkali threshold in concrete is reported to be 1% of the cement by weight or 3-4kg/m3 of concrete1)
2)
. However, the long term tests and field studies showed that the threshold may be even lower, i.e. 1.5
kg/m3 or less. In addition, the temperature of concrete, particularly that above 600C can have additional
effects to building up ASSR. In existing arch dams, it appears that apart from alkali supply from
cement, the alkalis may be supplied by feldspar mineral which is present in aggregate and they may
maintain ASSR for indefinite future.
Alkali Suppliers Reactive Minerals Catalysts Rocks containing reactive minerals
Alkali of Cement Concrete

Opal, Granite, granodiorite, rhyolite, dacite, andesite,
Chalcedony, temperature basalt, obsidian, tuff, gneiss, schist, slate,
0
Strained Quartz above 60 C, quartzite, sandstone, siltstone, chert, silex,
Alkali of Aggregate pore water, limestone, dolomite
Feldspar,
1)
Figure 2: Flow chart of stages of alkali silica formation in a reactive concrete environment
The ASSR chemistry is by an implication an irreversible process. This in turn means that the swelling
stress-strains field induced thereby in arch body acquires its irrecoverableness as well. Consequently,
the appropriate dam drift is also becoming non-returnable. Here, it is to note that swelling stress strain
field interacts with service stress-strain field and that the total dam deformation is contingent to
prevalence of these two fields. It is time variant process, whereas the alterations of service stress-
strain field are caused by fluctuation of service loads acting on dam. The resulting effect is differential
stress conditions of the dam body which becomes affected by differential swelling process. In many
cases reported, the swelling stresses induced by ASSR, had as a consequence the upheaval and
upstream deflection of dam body, then cracking of inspection galleries, all encountered within upper
stretches of arch dams.
By its nature, the ASSR swelling stress field is less effective when interacting with compressive service
stress field of an arch body. It was reported12) that swelling stress can reach 5 to 6 MPa in its full
capacity. Hence, the service stress field of an arch body with principal stresses exceeding that level
are assumed to counteract the expanding stresses and then to diminish the ASSR swelling effects.
Completely otherwise deformation kinetics is to be expected as governing for the zones of dam body
with tensile principal stresses. Here, it should be noted that for the most of fluctuating service loads,
the upstream faces of majority of cantilevers and of greater sections of dam arches for thin arch dams,
are tensile stress related. Consequently, the ASSR swelling effects in these zones can contribute to
irreversible upstream deflection of dam arches. Again, the middle and downstream sections of upper
stretches of thin arch dams are far less compressive field stressed versus the lower-more massive
dam zones, meaning that they can be far more impacted by alkali expansion. In substance, that could
be a reasonable mechanism which forces upper sections of thin arch dams to drift irreversibly
upstream and even to upheave. In addition to that, the lower hydrostatic loads and higher concrete
temperature mainly seasonally dependant, may cause tensile stress fields in the zones of upper
inspection galleries of thin arch dams. As such, they become more prone to alkali swelling. There,
superposition of service tensile stresses with those of alkali swelling may exceed the tensile strength
of concrete, resulting thus to structural cracking of concrete in response to its swelling. Further on, by
its upstream drift due to expansion the dam is changing its equilibrium state whereby the stresses
about upper galleries are subsequently redistributed leading to cracking of gallery walls. That, in
conjunction with differential swelling cracks, is another potential mechanism for cracking of upper
inspection hollows of thin arch dams as reported by a number of publications.
The ASSR action is as reported, a long lasting process. As it was reported, over 100 large dams and
hydroelectric projects have been identified as seriously affected by ASSR. There, the concrete quality
remained mainly unaffected but some of dams have changed the equilibrium state of their structures.
Concrete swelling led to upheaval of dam crest central part for gravity and arch dams. In addition, it led
to drifting upstream of arch dams. Besides, the cracks of relative continuity in inspection galleries were
reported to occur at several dams. They were observed as not, or less visible on dam faces 2). As
reported, the start of expansive reaction varies between a few years up to 30 years2).
285
There are a number of dams that are quoted as

Barrage Du Chambon,
comparative examples for arch dams
France
Gravity Arch Dam
performance with or without ASSR effects.
Height: 136.70m Chambon dam 1), France, is a gravity arch dam.
Central part of the dam exhibited heaving of
Crest Length: 293.60m
Base Thickness: 70m
3.6mm/yr, rather an appreciable value. By its
Completed in 1934
Status: In use
height, it comes to be: 2.63 m/m/yr. In arch
Age: 80 Yr dams of Alpine region 1), the U/S drift of 0.5 to
1.0 mm/yr was monitored. The measured
displacements of dams affected by slow
Karun Dam, Iran expansive phenomena generally show an initial
Double-curvature
arch dam
period of normal behaviour of dam without
Height: 205m concrete swelling. In addition, accompanying
Crest Length: 462m phenomena of arch concrete swelling are the
Base Thickness: cracks in inspection galleries which were
29.5m 1)
Completed in 2005
observed for example in a number of dams :
Status: In use including Pian Telesio Dam, Italy, and
Age: 14 Yr Portodemouros Dam, Spain. The cracks were
characterised by a relative continuity along the
Figure 3: Inventory of a number of arch dams analysed in galleries, but they were not visible on dam
view of ASSR potential formation faces. Besides the cracks, the rest of concrete
quality of ASSR affected dams, remains
mechanically unaffected. Another example of
ASSR impact is 205 m high Karun Dam, Iran.
In reference 14) it was specifically indicated that the dam body is under the effect of alkali-silica
reaction. The reference 14) further concludes that thermo-static numerical model was doubling the
upstream deflection of dam.
As for ASSR, the reference 6) defined three stages of its development: initiation phase, development
phase and slow down phase which originates due to exhaustion of alkali solution in cement. The
specific S curve resulting therefrom is still to be better defined on the basis of further monitoring of
arch dams.
The pathology of alkali-swelling process has not yet been fully understood. Therefore, the remedial
medicine for ASSR affected arch dams is not yet fully researched. Meanwhile, epoxy resin injection of
concrete cracks in conjunction of moisture repellents or injection of carbon dioxide into arch dams
under swelling, are some of the mitigating measures suggested by ACI 221.1R-98.
Internal Sulphate Attack (ISA) effects to behaviour of arch dams
This reaction, leading to arch concrete expansion, is caused by sulphate ions. The expansion is
caused by formation of ettringite 2). The most common form of sulphate attack is that externally
originated by reservoir water containing high concentrations of sulphate ions. However, it is a surficial
concrete effect which is not expected to lead to massive expansion of the whole arch dam. The form of
ISA which can cause the expansive problems in arch dams is due to release of sulphate from the
concrete aggregate containing iron sulphides. There, the minerals such as pyrrhotite (FeS,
ironmonosulfide) and pyrite (FeS2 irondisulfide) may both oxidise to give iron oxide and sulphate ions.
These sulphate ions may then react with cement paste producing thus ettringites.
Iron
Pyrrohotite Oxide
Concrete Concrete
Aggregate Oxidation
Swelling
Pyrite Concrete super
Sulphate Reaction with Formation of saturation and
Ions cement paste Ettringites service stresses
became small
Figure 4: One of potential Flow Chart of DEF 2)
286
Large deposit of ettringites may certainly be found in affected concrete. The phenomenon is known as
delayed ettringites formation (DEF). Here, the expansion can be related (a) to degree of concrete
super saturation and the restraints due to service stress which are likely to be low enough, or (b) to
formation of iron oxides within the concrete aggregate which also entails an increase of concrete
volume and cracking of aggregate2). Unlike ASSR causing expansion of aggregate, the DEF causes
expansion of concrete paste and where DEF is largely developed, it can cause serious damage of
concrete structures. There, since the paste expands and the aggregate not, the cracks used to form
around the non-expansive aggregate fragments in which the ettringite crystals form. The bigger
fragments of aggregate, the bigger the gap. In case the ettringites crystals are widely dispersed
throughout the paste, then they can grow under the conditions described under para (a) above, and
exert expansive force in the gaps causing expansion of concrete followed by cracking and spalling of
it.
It is reported by reference 2) that smaller number of DEF dams swelling may be attributed to iron
sulphide contained in concrete aggregate, but greater number of dams attributed to ASSR. On the
other hand, the reference 6) indicated the range of 150 monitored dams in France with upward and
upstream movements due to swelling reactions originated by ASSR and DEF.
Concrete Creeping effects to behaviour of arch dams

Creep of concrete of arch dams is aligned with static load conditions, combined mainly of hydrostatic
loads, thermal loads, both in conjunction with gravity load. When foundation conditions of lesser
stiffness than that of concrete, the stresses induced to dam due to foundation movements due to load
of dam, is taken into account as well. The static loads mentioned herein are also assigned the
meaning of service loads. Hence, by their nature, they are subjected to cyclic seasonal changes
which results in seasonal fluctuations of stresses in dam body. There are two stress-strains states
which are of interest for creeping process analysis: tensile and compressive stress field. The creeping
process is always related to dam body areas in which the current stresses exceed the creeping stress
level. If critical or appreciable dam body is affected by, then it is to expect a dam to suffer irreversible
downstream deformation 6). This is conversely to what is to be expected to upstream dams drifting with
ASSR or DEF evolutions. In case those processes are simultaneously lasting then, often the swelling
of arch dams can be masked by creeping dam deformation.
Within thin arch dam structures, the tensile stresses are usually more pronounced in upstream face of
dam whilst the higher concrete temperature and lower reservoir levels. Conversely, higher
compressive stresses are originated while max water level and minimum concrete temperature and
they gravitate towards downstream face of dam and dam-rock contact. Thus, the creeping process, if
any, is expected to develop first there. So far, there is not much information on concrete creeping due
to tensile stresses. Hence, focus of this section will be put on creeping of arch dams under
compressive stresses.
Pursuant to reference 12), it is generally accepted that concrete creep is a cement paste property i.e.
rheological phenomenon associated with gel-like structure of cement paste. Here, the aggregate
whereas possessing much higher stiffness, is generally considered as not creeping constituent.
Concurrently, the fineness of cement affects the concrete strength development at early stages and
thus influences the creep12). Also, it is to note that creep of arch dams increases with decrease in the
ambient relative humidity. Again, the concrete creep increases for concrete temperatures higher than
placement temperature. The tests results12) indicated the creep of concrete increases approximately 3
times for concrete temperatures elevations from 210C to 700C. Finally, it is generally accepted that
there is a nearly linear relation between creep rate and sustained stresses up to stress strength ratio
0.35 to 0.40. Above that limit, the creep increases at an increasing rate which after reaching the rate
0.8 to 0.9 may result in failure of dam. Subject to lab test results for a concrete dam, initial creeping
stress level for arch dam concrete could be taken as (0.35-0.40)*fc. Here, the fc has been assigned
the meaning of compressive strength of concrete.
Creeping of arch dam concrete, where applicable, is a time-variant process which produces
irreversible creep strains with age of an arch dam. Creeping deformation of an arch dam under
seasonal cyclic load is larger compared to gravity concrete dams and usually needs careful
considerations. The most extensive consideration of creep should be in static-thermal analysis of
existing arch dams. There are a number of empirical creep models which have been used for existing
287
288
The seasonal presence of pond water in the upstream section of joints may have a number of
accompanying effects to dam concrete such as amongst others, those already described for ASSR
and DEF developments in the concrete substance.
In addition to the foregoing, the long standing water in joints may start leaching the lime from concrete
and precipitate it to calcium carbonate which over the time gets deposited on the joint walls. The
stiffness of generally insoluble calcium carbonate becomes appreciable, and it may perform later as a
peg placed in the open joint, preventing thus cycling closing of joints and then recoverable deformation
of dam.
In concrete technology, the foregoing process was defined to be carbonation of concrete substance or
calcification of concrete joints, the chemical formula of which is:
Ca (OH)2 + CO2 = Ca CO3 + H2O
The process develops when the calcium hydroxide comes in contact with carbon dioxide dissolved in
water producing thus calcium carbonate and water. On long term basis, the process can locally
weaken the concrete strength from one side, but from the other side, to prevent the joints to close or to
come to their original construction position. The latter may have as a consequence differential
upstream drifting of an arch dam during its service life. In the absence of tests dealing with joints
calcification, this process may be masked by suspected effects of ASSR or DEF or upstream dams
drifts due to climate changes induced concrete temperature, and the like.
Calcification deposit in joint

formed whilst seasonal opening Pond Water
Base line dam Deformed dam

arch arch
Dam
contraction joint
Figure 6: Illustration of behavior of dam contraction joints whilst lower water level and higher concrete
Temperatures (not to scale, distorted scales for arch outlines and joint opening were applied for presentation
purposes)
Hence, examination of calcification of arch dams contraction joint deserves a careful consideration
before pathology of irrecoverable arch dams drifting is finally concluded.
Other Factors influencing upstream deformation of Arch Dams
The seasonal radiation of arch dams should not be a neglecting factor. Typical example in this
instance might be Dez Dam, Iran 4).
Dez Dam, Iran

Double-curvature arch
Jinping I Dam,
dam
China
Height: 203m
Double-curvature
Crest Length: 380m
arch dam
Base Thickness: 27m
Height: 305m
Completed in 1963
Crest Length: 552m
Status: In use
Base Thickness:
Age: 51 Yr
63m
Completed in 2013
Status: In use
Age: 1 Yr
289
Figure 7: Currently the highest Jinping I Dam, China, and Dez Dam, Iran
Monitoring of Dez dam showed increase of concrete temperature even up to 450C. Although no
information in the reference4) was indicated about any alkali silica swelling in dam, it was worth to
emphasise max temperature level the concrete of an arch dam can be exposed to. This is because the
downstream face cracking of arch dams can be related to ambient and solar radiation conditions too5).
Another example is currently the highest arch dam in the world, Jinping dam, China. It is a very young
dam for which numerical thermo-static model showed upstream deflection of dam to be 27.8 mm.
6)
The reference also attributed the irreversibility of upstream movements of arch dams, to global
irreversible heating which are often linked with global decrease of reservoir level. It is also to note that
significant internal stresses due to temperature variations may develop because of difference in the
thermal coefficients of the cement paste and aggregates. The relative importance of this incompatibility
and its effects to arch dam deformation still has to be researched.
CONCLUSIONS
The behaviour of arch dams as previously discussed, can be a complex mechanical, chemical or
combined process which is usually beyond the original design criteria for arch dams and which in
some cases can indicate the dams distress conditions.
The ASSR is a chemical process developed in concrete for considerable part of dam service life. It
develops within aggregate of concrete. It used drifting the upper stretches of arch dams towards
upstream and simultaneously their upheaving. Monitoring of a number of arch dams indicated their
max upstream drift of 1mm/Yr. Some of them exhibited upheaval of max 3.6mm/Yr. The concrete
temperatures and moistures were suspected to be catalysts for ASSR formation and development. No
fully sustainable therapy for this sort of dam distress has been invented as yet.
The ISA is another chemical process which may be attacking the arch dams in which ending effect is
swelling ettringites. It develops within concrete paste. The main source of DEF is the presence of iron-
sulphide mineral in concrete aggregate fragments. Low Concrete water saturation and low restraints
due to service stress can speed-up DEF. Again, they used to generate irrecoverable upstream drifts of
arch dams. No fully sustainable medicine inhibiting this chemical process has been researched as yet.
Creeping of concrete is solely a mechanical process which usually contributes to downstream
deflection of arch dams. It can be distinctive to arch dams affected by considerable aging effects, as a
result of which the mechanical properties of concrete became inferior. Sometimes, they can
accompany ASSR, given the increase of service tensile stresses due to ASSR. Structural grouting of
arch dams under creeping may be a successful remedial mechanism.
Block joints carbonation while their seasonal upstream separations my prevent joints subsequent
closing. This, in turn may contribute to differential upstream arch dams drifting. Chemical grouting of
upstream section of block joints may act remedially in regard of development of this process during
lifespan of a dam.
REFERENCES
1. Francesco Amberg, 2011. Performance of dams affected by expanding concrete. ICOLD Edition 2011, page
115.
2. R. Charlwood, K. Scrivener, 2011. Expanding concrete in damslong term challenges. ICOLD Edition 2011,
page 179.
3. Department of the Army, US Army Corps of Engineers, 1994. Engineering and Design Arch Dam Design.
4. H. Mirzabozorg, M. A. Hariri-Ardebili, M. Shirkhan, and S.M. Seyed-Kolbadi, 2014. Mathematical Modeling
and Numerical Analysis of Thermal Distribution in Arch Dams considering Solar Radiation Effect. Hindawi
Publishing Corporation, the Scientific World Journal, Volume 2014, Article ID 597393.
5. A. Mellal, A. Koliji & M. Balissat, 2011. Numerical modelling investigation of an existing crack within an arch-
gravity dam. ICOLD Edition 2011, page 99.
6. J. Sausse, J.P. Fabre, 2011. Diagnosis of dams affected by swelling reactions. International Water Power
and Dam Construction, 2011, Page 35.
290
7. Javier Rodrguez, Patricia Gonzlez, Francisco Martnez, and Joaqun Mart, 2011. Concrete Swelling in
Existing Dams. 2011 SIMULIA Customer Conference.
8. US Army Corps of Engineers, 2007. Earthquake Design and Evaluation of Concrete Hydraulic structures.
Engineer Manual.
th
9. Anil K. Chopra 1988. Earthquake response analysis of Concrete dams, 15 Section of Advanced Dam
Engineering for Design, published by Van Nostrand Reinhold and edited by Robert B. Jansen, 1988. ISBN-
13:978-1-4612-8205-1.
10. Bulletin of ICOLD Committee on Concrete Dams, 2008. The Physical Properties of Hardened Conventional
Concrete in Dams. Draft Copy.
11. Rebecka Johansson & Emma Kronberg, 2011. Stability analysis of the hydropower arch dam Jinping I in
China. Master of Science Thesis in Applied Physics.
12. M. Labibzadeh and A. Khajehdezfuly, 2011. Effect of Vertical Contraction Joints on Thermo-Static Stability
of Karun-1 Arch Dam. Trends in Applied Sciences Research 6 (1): 34-46, 2011 ISSN 1819-3579. 2011
Academic Journals Inc.
291
Failure of spillway radial gate of Narayanapur Dam

in Karnataka a case study
N.Srinivas
Superintending Engineer, Water Resources Development Organization, GOK, Bangalore, Karnataka
E-mail: srinivasn65@gmail.com
ABSTRACT
The hydro-mechanical components of dam are as important as the main structure and need utmost attention
towards their upkeep and maintenance with systematic regular inspections .They are the life lines for storage and
effective discharge of floods. This case study pertains to Narayanapur dam in Karnataka which witnessed the
failure of main spillway radial gate No.5.
Narayanapur dam, across river Krishna is located at siddapur, Bijapur District. The gross and live storage
capacity is 37.646 TMC ft. and 30.473 TMC ft. respectively. The total length of the dam is 10637.52 M and height
is 25.812 M, with a water spread area of 134.50 Sq.km.
The dam is provided with 30 Nos. spillway radial gates of size 15 m x 12 m height operated by rope drum hoists
(including 5 Nos. Auxiliary gates). All the gates were installed and in operation since 1982-84.
On 6-10-2005 gate No.5 of main spillway got dislodged when in closed position at FRL level of 492.252 M and
was pushed into the river bed downstream resulting in large flow which was stopped on 10-10-2005 by lowering
stop log elements under flowing water conditions.
The investigating committee attributed the failure of the gate, to the failure of the fillet welded joints at the junction
of the tie beam between trunnions and trunnion proper, resulting in a chain reaction causing dislodging of the gate
and being thrown into the river on the downstream. The failure of the weld was due to progressive rusting along
the inside surface of the weld over a period of time due to ingress of moisture and water.
The committee observed that though the inspection report of all the gates by M/s TSPL in 1993 had revealed that
the welding at all critical locations was poor with scale formation, no concrete action was taken to address the
issue and instead the maintenance was limited to lubrication, replacement of wire ropes & seals and periodic
painting in the successive years and concluded that the failure of gate No.5 was due to absence of proper
inspection and maintenance which was not given adequate importance and has been neglected over the years.
The committee recommended that all weld joints be redone to the designed thickness, scale formations on skin
plates to be removed and painted, to replace stiffeners which have lost thickness by more than 2 mm and to
strengthen the joints of trunnion tie and joint between tie beam and the trunnions.
The committee recommended inspections during pre-monsoon, post-monsoon and once during other times and
mandated the verification by all level of officers up to the level of Chief Engineer. It suggested to stock welding
equipment, gas cylinders & gas cutting equipments, released wire ropes & clamps and chain & pulley blocks to
tide over the emergency in case of failure of gates.
The damaged gate was replaced with a new radial gate during 2007 and other recommendations of the
committee were implemented in a phased manner from 2007 to 2011.
1. INTRODUCTION
The Narayanpur dam is constructed across Krishna River near Bachihal and Siddapur villages of
Muddebihal Taluk, Bijapur District. The construction work of Dam was taken up from 1969 and
completed during 1982. The impounding of water in the reservoir was commenced from July 1983.
The dam mainly serves as diversion dam, with main storage at Almatti Dam on the upstream.
The Narayanpur dam serves the most essential aspect of providing irrigation through a canal and
distributory network on both left & right bank ayacuts to the tune of 5,50,000 Ha of Bijapur, Gulburga,
Yadagir and Raichur districts of Karnataka.
The catchment area of the dam is 47850 Sq.Km and the annual yield at 75% dependability is 806.50
TMC ft. The gross and live storage capacity is 37.646 TMC ft and 30.473 TMC ft respectively. The
292
total length of the dam is 10637.52 M and height is 25.812 M from the lowest river bed level, with a
water spread area of 134.50 Sq.km. The design flood intensity is 13,40,000 cusecs.
2. SPILLWAY GATES
The spillway capacity of Narayanpur Dam is designed for a surplussing discharge of 13,40,000 cusecs
with a frequency of 1 in 10,000 years with 10% of the gates in non-operation condition. The spillway
portion is provided with 30 Nos. of radial gates of size 15m x 12m height, electrically operated by rope
drum hoist.
The main spillway gates 25 Nos. were designed, fabricated, erected & commissioned by M/s. Tunga
bhadra Steel Products Ltd. (TSPL), Hospet during 1982. The additional spillway 5 Nos.spillway gates
were designed and fabricated by M/s. Sikka and Sikka and were later on erected and commissioned
by M/s TSPL during 1984. The Additional spillway vents were closed by using 3 Nos. of stop log gates
and 2 Nos. of Bulk head gates before erection of Radial gates. All the 30 Nos. of Spillway gates are in
operation since 1984.
3. GENESIS OF GATES FAILURE DISTRESS SIGNALS

a) No deficiencies/problems were noticed in the weld joints or in the component of spillway gates till
october-1990.
b) Failure of weld joints between trunnion and tie beam of gate Nos. 3, 6, and 15 was noticed during
Nov 1990 & 1991 respectively. The rectification work to these failed weld joints have been attended
by M/s TSP Ltd by way of providing additional plates for the failed weld joints.
c) The additional spillway gate No. 5 was damaged on 3-11-1992 due to failure of the bulk head gate.
The bulk head gate erected in additional bay No. 5 was not removed after commissioning of
additional spillway radial gates.
The committee constituted in 1992 to investigate the cause of damage to gate No. 5 in the additional
spillway observed that cracks in defective welds of structures though not visible initially do propagate
progressively over a period of time due to stress and corrosion and may end up in failure.The
committee strongly recommended for periodical inspection, servicing, painting of spillway gates and
thorough inspection of all gate components including all the critical weld joints.
Accordingly M/s TSPL was commissioned to inspect 25 Nos. of spillway gates during April to June
1993. M/s TSPL report of August 1993 noted mainly that :
i) All the crucial location welding to be poor and formation of scale

ii)Additional stiffener plates should be welded on both sides of the tie girder and trunnion
iii)
Alignment of trunnion centre to centre is to be checked
iv)Bottom portion of the pedestal lifted up to 10 mm and gap exists between rest beam and
pedestal.
v) Since there is no horizontal thrust support, thrust block arrangement is required.
Even though M/s TSPL had themselves erected and commissioned the radial gates, the
recommendations of TSPL report were largely in the nature of attending maintenance works without
specific solutions with reference to deficiency in the welds, distress in the critical joints of gate,
erection defects like non-matching of skin plate & wall plate, improper fixing of wall plate to the
designed vent width, loss of curvature of skin plate during erection process.
The dam authorities therefore have attended to the maintenance works of rubber seals, wire ropes,
gates painting & replacement of turn buckles to all the 25 Nos. of spillway gates during summer 1995
by depleting the reservoir completely. In the subsequent years also, the annual maintenance works
like lubrication and periodical painting, replacement of rubber seals and wire ropes were only being
carried out.
293
4. FAILURE OF MA
AIN SPILLWA
AY GATE NO
O.5 ON 6-10
0-2005
On 6-10-2005 Gate No.5 of main n spillway go

ot dislodged when in clossed position from its loca
ation and
was pushed into the river bed do
ownstream with
w storage at FRL level of 492.252 M. The flow w through
the vent No. 5 was stopped afte er sustained efforts by lo
owering the stop log ele
ements unde er flowing
onditions on 10-10-2005.
water co 1
The Govt. of Karnataka

uted a committtee under
constitu
the Cha airmanship off Sri D. N.
Desai, Principal Ad dvisor, to
gate the ca
investig auses of
failure of Gate No.5, to
examin ne the conditio
on of other
gates, to suggest measures
for p
prevention of such
incidents & better up keep of
gates, proper ma aintenance
and da am safety in n general.
The co ommittee insp pected the
failed gate
g No.5 and assessed
the co ondition of thet other
gates and
a submitted
d its report
in April-- 2006.
Figure1. Flow through vent no.5 wass stopped by lowering

l stop log elements
4.1 Cau
uses for failure of the gate No.5 Committees
C s findings
The design and layo out of the rad

dial crest gatte is such tha
at the load due
d to water pressure onn the skin
plate is ultimately trransferred to
o the pier concrete.
c ansfer of this load take
Tra es place thro
ough the
al girders to
horizonta o the yolk girders through the incclined arms and then throught the trunnion
assembly.
The Inveestigation Coommittee opined that the e probable reason for fa ailure of the gate is failu
ure of the
welded joints
j of junc t beam bettween trunniions & trunnion proper which
ction of the tie w in turnn resulted
into a ssort of chainn reaction causing
c dislo
odging of gaate and bein ng thrown into the rive er on the
downstreeam. The fa ailure of the weld
w is due to
t progressivve rusting alo
ong the insid
de surface off the weld
over a period
p of timee due to ingress of moiisture and water
w and waas not easily susceptible to visual
observattions.
The commmittee obse erved that th hough the in nspection report of 25 gates
g by M/ss TSPL in 1993
1 had
revealed
d that weldin
ng at all criticcal locations
s was poor with
w scale fo ormation, no concrete acction was
taken to address the issue and innstead the maintenance
m w limited to
was n, replacement of wire
t lubrication
ropes & seals and periodic
p painting in the successive
s years and heence conclud ded that the failure of
gate No..5 was due to
t absence of o proper insspection and maintenancce which wass not given adequate
a
importannce and has been negleccted over the years.
4.2 Seq
quence of fa
ailure of gate
e No.5 - Com
mmittees findings
a) Failu
ure of joint beetween the yoke
y a trunnion - trunnion disturbed resu
girder and ulting in hugee strain at
the junction of arrms and trunnion.
b) Entirre load of the gate came e on the left arm assemb bly - bolts co
onnecting the e trunnion to o the rest
beamm snapped.
c) Skin plate assem mbly along with
w horizonta al girder, in the
t absence e of support on downstre eam side
was held only byy wire ropess on upstream m side, whicch could not hold the ga ate in position against
the h
huge water lo oad and eventually snapp ped its conne ection with thhe skin plate
e.
d) Due to high velo ocity of flowiing water the e entire skin plate asse embly with horizontal
h girrders, left
side arm assem mbly with trunnnion slided along the spillway
s proffile & pushed out of the e spillway
buckket and move ed nearly 100 0 feet into the river.
e) Similarly right arrm assemblyy with trunnio on also transsported by high velocity flow
f into the river bed
294
nearr about the skin plate asssembly.
4.3 Phottos of comp

ponents of main
m spillwa
ay gate No.5
5 prior and after
a failure
Figure2. Damaged skin

n plate assem
mbly of gate no
o.5 Figure3. Tie beam
m joint before failure
f of gate no.5
Figure 4.Tie beam Leftt side joint Spillway gate No

o.5 Figu
ure 5.Tie beam
m Right side weld
w joint gate
e No.5
(The left side tie beam
m weld joint is
s not to the (weld
d is not prope
erly penetrate
ed upto the trrunnion
Designed d penetrationn thickness) prop
per .Rods andd plates are placed
p in weld
d gaps)
5. COM
MMITTEE RECOMMEND
R DATIONS
a) T
To procure and
a install a newn gate asssembly in veent No.5 of main
m spillway..
b) T
To take up strengthening
s g measure to o remaining 292 spillway gates mainlyy:
1 Scale fo
1) ormation notticed in skin n plate and stiffeners in n general iss to be rem
moved by
chemical solvents an nd provide pa ainting simila
ar to first pain
nting.
2 Rusted horizontal
2) h stifffeners whichh have lost thickness by more than 2 mm be removed
and neww stiffeners are
a to be prov vided with prroper welding g.
3 All the weld
3) w joints to be redone to o the designe ed thickness.
4 Replacement of guide rollers, nutts and bolts e
4) etc.
5 Strengthening of tie b
5) beam weld jo oints betwee en tie & trunn nion proper.
295
6 Replacement of wo
6) orn out partss in Hoist assembly, re-conditionin
r ng of gate positions
indicatorrs and hand operation
o arrrangements, brakes etc.,,
7 Replacement of bentt tie flats in Gate No. 3,, 6 & 15 & jo
7) oining with new tie flats tto the cut
end and welded to thhe web of new w yoke girde
ers.
6. IMPL
LEMENTATION OF COM
MMITTEE RE
ECOMMEND
DATIONS
6.1. Firs
st Phase 20
006- 07
a) New radial spillwa ay gate fabriccated, erecteed and comm missioned in vent No.5 du uring 2007.
b) Strenggthening worrk of tie beam m & replacem ment of nuts and bolts to all the jointss between hoorizontal
girder and arm, arm & trunnion, trunnion bracket
b & resst beam, tru
unnion & yoke e girder witth high
tensio
on bolts and nuts.
n
c) Replacement of gu uide rollers to
o all the 29 Nos.
N spillwayy gates
d) Rectiffication to cra
acked welds in the critica 1 20, 24 & 25 .
al weld joints of Gate No. 3, 4, 6, 15, 16,
cond Phase - 2008 to 20

6.2. Sec 011
a) Repaiirs and testinng of weld joints and stren ngthening measures to all a the weld jo
oints.
b) Strenggthening of skin
s plate by providing ad dditional horizzontal stiffen
ners.
c) Strenggthening of end
e vertical girders
g and tiie beam centtral joint, clam mping system
m to trunnion
n
brackeet.
d) Rectiffying bent upp tie flats in gate
g Nos. 3, 6 and 15 and d buckled stifffeners in yoke girders.
e) Repa airs to rest be
eam.
Figure 6. Beam
B strength
hening attended to all the spillway gates after failure off gate no.5
7. WAY
Y FORWARD
D
Narayan napur dam is included in the Dam m Rehabilitaation and Improvementt Project (D DRIP) for
compreh hensive Interrventions, bo
oth for civil structures
s and Electro-Me
echanical co omponents. Based
B on
the recommendation ns of the CWC gates specialist team, provision ha as been mad de for Zinc Metallizing
M
to the co
orroded gatee components such as skkin plate, stifffeners, vertical girders and
a horizonta al girders
at an esttimated cost of 10.16 cro
ore.
Further a
as part of em
mergency pre
eparedness provision haas also been made for de esign, fabrica
ation and
erection of 84 ton ca
apacity Ganttry crane and one set off stop log ga
ates at an esstimated cosst of 5.35
296
crore. All the envisaged rehabilitation and improvement works of Civil and Electro-Mechanical
components of the Narayanapur dam under DRIP are scheduled to be completed over a time period of
3 years after the award of contract.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I am highly obliged to the Government of Karnataka and all my superior officers for nominating me to the first
National Dam Safety Conference and providing me an opportunity to submit and present this technical paper. I
wish to thank the Chairman and members of the 1992 and the 2005 investigating Committees constituted to study
the causes of failure to radial gates for their in depth study & analysis of the failure of electro-mechanical
components and who have provided valuable recommendations for the upkeep of the Narayanapur dam. I wish to
place on record my sincere thanks to the officers of Narayanapur dam zone for furnishing the technical details and
photographs required for the preparation of this technical paper.
REFERENCES
1. Report of the investigating committee under the chairmanship of Sri.S.Venkatesh,I.A.S, Secretary,PWD

(Retired) on failure of gate No.5 of additional spillway of Narayanapur Dam,1992.
2. Inspection Reports of the radial spillway gates of Narayanapur dam by M/s Tungabhadra Steel Products
Limited, 1993.
3. Report of the investigating committee under the chairmanship of Sri.D.N.Desai, Principal Advisor to
Government, Water Resources Department on failure of gate No.5 of main spillway of Narayanpur Dam, 2006.
4. DRIP- Project Screening Template of Narayanapur Dam, 2014.
297
Faillure of barrage g
gates: Ca
ase study
y of Farra
aka Barrrage Projject
Gu
ulshan Raj, Amit Ranja
an,
Directorr, Gates (E&
&NE) Dy. Diirector, Gate
es (E&NE)
gulshanraj1964@yaho oo.co.in
ABSTRACT
Farakka BBarrage Project situated in north of Kolka ata at Murshidabad district of
o West Benga al on river Gan
nga, was
commissioned in the year
y 1975. The total length of the barrag ge from abutmment to abutm ment is 2245m m and the
clear watterway provide
ed in the barrrage is 1990m m. The Farakkka Barrage an nd other ancilllary works haave been
constructeed with the main
m objectivve of preserva ation and ma aintenance off the Kolkata Port and to improve
navigability of the Bha
agirathi-Hoogh hly-Ganga Riv ver system. The surplus wa ater is allowed to flow dowwnstream
towards BBangladesh. The
T Project has
h internation
nal ramificatio
ons and at prresent the sharing of Gang ga water
between India & Bangla adesh is being g done as per Treaty of 19996.
The barraage consists ofo 24 undersluice bays proviided with vertical lift gates each,
e 2 fish locck bays with 4 nos. fish
pass gatees each and 84 8 spillway baays with vertical crest gatess each. The fe eeder canal he ead regulator has been
provided with 11 sets of o regulator gates. Gates ata Farraka havve served theiir intended ob bjective for ove
er last 40
years. Hoowever, the prrocess of aging had set-in over
o last decade and corrossive action had d further weakkened the
structural members re esulting in fa
ailures of gatte componen nts. Comprehensive inspecction of entirre hydro-
mechaniccal equipmentss of project wa as carried out by FBP & outtside Agency and a it was dec cided to rehabbilitate the
gates. Thhe preventive actions are likkely to improvve the longevity of gated co omponents; th hereby allowing smooth
operation of Project to o serve its objective. This article
a mainly states failures
s & repair/ ma aintenance acctivities of
gates carrried out in piecemeal manner after their commissioning
c g in chronologgical order.
ODUCTION
1. INTRO
Farakka Barrage Pro oject on riverr Ganga wass commissioned in the ye ear 1975. Th
he Project is situated
at aboutt 220 Km. north of Ko olkata in Murshidabad d district of West
W Bengal. The operation and
maintena ance of varrious compo onents of the barrage iss being don ne by Farakkka Barrage e Project
Authorityy (FBP) undeer MoWR, RD&GR.
R The total length of the barragge from abutment to abu utment is
2245m a and the cleaar waterway provided in the barrage e is 1990m. The Farakka a Barrage and other
ancillary works have been constrructed with th he main objeective of pres
servation andd maintenance of the
Kolkata Port and to improve navvigability of the Bhagiratthi-Hooghly-Ganga River system. Th he water
from ma ain barrage iss diverted to
o Bhagirathi through a 36 6 Km long feeeder canal, off-taking frrom right
bank, with a design discharge off about 1130 0cumec. The e desired purrpose is achieved by ma aintaining
the pond d level on th
he upstream m of barrage. The designed pond le evel as envissaged in thee plan is
21.95m (72.00 feet)). When watter in the river is in exxcess, the surplus
s wateer is allowed
d to flow
downstre eam towardss Bangladesh by opening g the gates and during lean season,, the flow of water to
the dow wnstream is either redu uced or cut off to main ntain desiredd pond leve el. The Prooject has
internatio
onal ramifica
ations and att present thee sharing of Ganga
G water between Inndia & Bangladesh is
being doone as per Treaty
T of 199
96. The sharring of waterr between tw wo countries during Janu uary-May
period (le
ean season)) is governed d by provision
ns of Treaty.
The Ho oogly-Bhagira
athi-Ganga
waterway between Haldia &
Allahaba ad (1620Km m) is an
inter-statte naavigational
waterway and has been
declared d as a National
waterway (NW) No.1 by
Governm ment of India.
Navigatio onal Lock at
a Farakka
was con nstructed as a part of
Farakka Barrage Project
P to
facilitate movement of vessels
on NW W-1 through h Feeder
298
Canal. The Project is also the lifeline for North-East Indian states as these are connected via NH-34
and rail line running over the barrage. The entire development of NTPC Super Thermal Power Station
(2100MW) at Farakka has happened due to the barrage.
The barrage consists of 24 undersluice bays provided with vertical lift gates of size 18.29m (60.00
feet) x 7.93m (25.00 feet) each, 2 fish lock bays with 4 nos. fish pass gates of size 7.62m x 2.90m
each and 84 spillway bays with vertical crest gates of 18.29m (60.00 feet) x 6.40m (21.00 feet) each.
The gates have been provided with electrically operated rope drum hoists with counter weights
attached between gates and their hoists to reduce the hoisting effort. The provision of ten set of stop
logs with 8 pieces per set has been made for the maintenance of main gates. These stop logs are
operated with the help of 25T gantry crane under balanced head conditions except the top unit which
is raised under unbalanced head of water. The feeder canal head regulator has been provided with 11
sets of regulator gates in three tiers with each tier operated with the help of independent rope drum
hoist.
2. GENERAL CONDITION OF BARRAGE GATES
Gates at Farraka have served their intended objective for over last 40 years. However, these gates
developed operational difficulties as well as structural issues affecting their integrity. Comprehensive
inspection of entire hydro-mechanical equipments of project was carried out by FBP & outside Agency
and it was concluded that most of the gates would need replacement as these were in dilapidated
condition with visible signs of distress manifesting in form of ruptured webs of horizontal girders,
failure of vertical stiffeners, holes in skin plate, misalignment of shoes and guide rails, dragging of
bogie wheel assemblies, profuse leakage through side and bottom seals, mal-functioning of electrical
control panels, etc. It was also deduced that large scale pitting and rusting was common in more than
80% of gates. The electrical hoisting systems also required much needed overhauling and servicing.
3. INITIAL ACTIONS TAKEN BY FBP FOR MAINTENANCE OF GATES
The process of aging had set-in over last decade and corrosive action had further weakened the
structural members resulting in failures of gate components. Maintenance of gates had been carried
st
out in piecemeal manner after their commissioning. The 1 reported problem occurred in 1994 with
gate no. 70. Thereafter, the work of special repairs of 110 main barrage gates and their painting was
entrusted to M/s NPCC Ltd. and M/s Jessop & Co. in February, 1996 (50:50 basis). The special
repairs including mechanical & electrical on all gates but excluding hoist ropes were eventually
accomplished in Dec, 2005. But 42 gates & 46 units of stoplogs were left unpainted because of
contractual issues related to payment for work to M/s NPCC and M/s Jessop as the total cost has
exceeded beyond the Tender Value.
In spite of special repairs carried out, the gates further underwent significant reduction in their strength
due to aging and many other factors including non-painting, inadequate preventative maintenance
measures etc. This had been attributed to shortage of staff in FBP and unavailability of requisite
infrastructure. Overall impact of all these on gates was visible in form of more structural failures as
enumerated below.
4. CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF FAILURE OF BARRAGE GATES AND ACTION TAKEN
a. Gate No. 8:
i. Case-I: Originally installed undersluice gate no. 8 of Farakka Barrage was washed-out in
December 1999 due to weakness of structural elements caused by substantial corrosion. The
work of lowering the spare gate in Bay no. 8 was completed in March, 2000. In the meanwhile,
a committee was constituted under the Chairmanship of Chairman, Central Water Commission
(CWC) by MoWR to investigate the causes of failure of gate no. 8, review the existing
condition of various gated structures, review the progress of ongoing repair works on existing
gates being done by M/s NPCC & M/s Jessop and any allied matter. The Committee held two
meetings and made wide ranging recommendations for comprehensive rehabilitation of gated
299
sstructures to
o avoid a futu
ure mishap like Bay no. 8.
8 The Comm mittee had allso stressed upon the
nneed to carryy out a compprehensive health
h status of all gates so
s that the re
eplacement/rrepairs of
hhighly distre
essed gates could be ta aken-up on priority
p basis
s. However, this could never be
iimplemented d.
ii. CCase-II: The e said gate no.

n 8 again developed
d operational prroblems in December,
D 2003. The
ggate had rem mained stucck in lower reegion (approox 7 from siill) and its fu
urther movem ment had
cceased. Exp perts from CWWC inspecte ed the gate in
n April, 20044 and suggessted to lowerr the stop
llogs in the baay and take remedial me easures to make the gate e operational. The non-fu unctioning
ggate was liftted above wa ater level an
nd the causee was found to be failure e of right sid
de bottom
eend-box asssembly. Subsequently, the bay wass plugged with stop logss. All the 4 end box
aassemblies were
w modifie
ed and repaired by M/s TSPL
T finally in Dec, 2005. However, the gate
ccould not be e made fully operational and Techniccal Advisory Committee (TAC) recom mmended
ffor its replacement as peer advice of CWC.
C
b. Gate
e No. 17:
It wa
as reported in February, 2007 that debris in the form of heavvy log of wood/stumps carried
c by
swiftt water curre
ent from upsttream of Barrrage struck the
t Gate no.. 17 in its boottom portion resulting
in beending/buckling of the horizontal me ember at the e bottom. The movement of debris reportedly
occuurred due to sudden incre ease of flow following rainfall in the upper
u catchmments of rive
er Ganga.
Expe ert Team of CWC after inspection
i atttributed the failure of ga
ate no. 17 to
o weakness & loss of
stren
ngth of structtural membe
ers caused du ue to extensive corrosion n.
c. Gate
e No. 74:
In June,
J 2008,, top centraal portion of
spillw
way gate in Bay no. 74 got bent in V-V
notch shape in downstre eam directio on
resulting in wate
er flowing ovver the top of
gatee. Expert Team from CW WC inspecte ed
the gate and re ecommended d lowering of
stop logs to prrevent furtheer damage to
gatee. The team was
w of the op pinion that th
his
damage could haveh been either due to
suddden impact by floating g objects or o
gene eral weakkening off structurral
components. Th he work for lowering sto op
logs in flowing g water co onditions wa as
awarded to M/s s Jessop & Co. who ha ad
been n associated
d with original fabrication,
erecction and subbsequent repairs of thes se gates & hoists. The lowering of stop logs was
w finally
accoomplished thus completely blocking th he bay.
d. Gate
e Nos. 13 & 16:
In June, 2011 and December, 2011,

the undersluice gates at Bay B no. 13
and Bay No. 16 respectivvely failed
struccturally. Exppert team from
f CWC
inspeected the ga ate and foundd the gates
to bbe in buckle ed and man ngled state
lying
g downstream m of its gro
ooves, held
by wwire ropes tied to hoist.. The gate
was found dama aged beyond d economic
repaair and wa as recomme ended for
replaacement. Th he bays werre plugged
usingg spare gattes available e with FBP
afterr strengthening and asse embling the
unitss at bay site.
300
The replacement of gates in bay Nos. 13 3 & 16 posed d numerous problems du ue to acute prevailing
p
umstances re
circu esulting in lim
mited accesss to the gate
e grooves. The access frrom downstrream was
hindered due to o busy rail-cu um-road briddge running over barrag ge and hencce handling of gates
segm ments and erection
e aid material from m d/s side was
w totally ruled
r out. The high flow w velocity
throuugh these bays
b made it practicallyy impossible to transporrt the gate segments and a other
mate erials from upstream. The availabilityy of barge mounted with heavy duty crane and ca apable to
stay stable unde er flowing wa ater may haave helped to some exte ent. Howeveer, the same e was not
readdily available
e for the tassk at hand. The Farakka Barrage Project had d neither me eans nor
machinery to exe ecute this task in flowing
g water cond ditions. The only
o materiall handling de
evice that
couldd be of some e use and avvailable at sitte was a 25T
T Gantry cran ne meant forr operation of stop log
unitss.
In addittion to limited resource es availablee, the task required tra ained manp power for execution.
e
Mechaniical staff of FBP,
F comprissing of a few persons, waas neither tra
ained for this job nor did tthey have
compete ency to undertake such a difficult taskk. The only other
o alternative was to hire an outside agency
specializzed to execuute such worrks. The situ uation was fu
urther aggravvated due to o paucity of time with
FBP as lean season n was fast approaching
a and pond water
w level was
w continuo ously reducin ng due to
uncontro olled discharg
ge through thhe bays. It did
d affect the navigability of NW-1 for short span of o time till
the bayss were blockked. Initially, the pluggingg of bays waas tried by lowering stop plogs units in flowing
water coonditions withh adequate precautions but did not succeed
s as these stop logs are dessigned for
operation n under balanced head condition. Eventually,
E a outside specialized
an s a
agency wass hired to
execute the works.
5. CAUS
SES OF GAT
TE FAILURE
ES AT FARA
AKKA
1. Corrrosion of ga
ate structura
al componen
nts
Corrosio
on is destrucction of metal by electtro-chemical or simple chemical acction. It is the most
destructiive cause of failure of majority of barrrage gates. Corrosion needs
n moistu ure and oxyggen, both
of which are abunda antly presentt in atmosphere. Corrosion attacks th he inter-crysstalline bound
daries of
metal an
nd thus cause es pitting at the
t interface.
If two metals of o nt chemical

differen
compositions are in contact in presence off
any med dia or waterr, an electroo-potential is
s
establish hed betwee en them leading to o
initiation of corrossion. This phenomena a
causes ccorrosion at weld joints ofo two pieces s
of steel, as the we elding material does nott
have the e same chem mical compossition as thatt
of the me etals joined together.
t
Stressess in the barrage gatess caused by y

static waater pressure gets multiiplied due to o
effects of dynamicc (i.e., flow wing water))
pressuree and natura al vibrations produced att
high disccharges of water.
w Added d to this are
e
vibration
ns caused by y heavy traffiic across the
e
road and d rail bridge
e at Farakka a. The reverrsal of stresss either (periodic or non n-periodic) in nature
causes g gates to fail at a stress much below w its UTS du ue to fatigue failure. The
e combined action
a of
corrosionn and repeatted stresses is called corrrosion fatigu
ue.
At Farakkka, the corrrosion action

n on gate coomponents got accelerate ed due to da
amage of paaint films
and non--painting. In some of thee cases, the gates
g remainned unpainte ed for more than
t 20yearss. Timely
interventtion could ha
ave increasedd the econom
mic life of gattes considerrably.
301
2. Inaccessibility of the gates
Inaccessibility of the gated structure due to absence or weakening of inspection platforms, ladder
rungs and hand rails etc. lead to neglect in their regular inspection and maintenance which will
ultimately cause their failures. Absence of inspection walkway and presence of rail-cum-road bridge at
Farakka accentuated the neglect of gates.
3. Accumulation of silt/ slush on downstream gate components
The accumulation of silt/ slush and other floating debris on gate girders etc. caused damage to the
painted surfaces and this in turn accelerated their corrosion leading to loss of strength in structural
components. The silt or slush accumulated between seals and their mating surfaces also caused
damage to the seals and operational problems due to increased friction. Their accumulation in the
wheel assemblies' resulted in resistance to roller movement or unequal movement; leading to
jamming or sliding of wheels.
4. Missing oil caps or grease nipples
The greasing and lubrication of bearings of wheel assemblies is essential and if not attended to as per
maintenance provisions may lead to their seizure or jamming thus jeopardizing the safety of gates.
The missing lubrication oil caps and grease nipples in assemblies of gates or their hoists allowed
ingress of water, dirt or silt which blocked the narrow passages meant for the lubrication. Non-supply
of lubricants to the bearing increased the frictional forces causing generation of heat which led to
damages of the bearings. Excessive heat generation further disintegrated the additives used for the
lubrication leading to negative impacts on lubricating efficacy.
5. Missing and Loose fasteners
The fasteners (bolts, screws, studs, nuts, etc.) which are missing or not properly tightened to the
required torque are vulnerable areas in maintenance of joints. The bolted joints between various
components of the gate leaf if loosely fixed or missing may result in failures of adjoining components
or gate itself, due to insufficient strength of joint.
6. Choking of drain holes
Girder webs are susceptible to water accumulation due to choked drain holes on account of trash
intrusion. These may have resulted in corrosion and loss of load bearing capacity of barrage gates.
7. Weakening of welds
All weld joints undergo cracking or rusting due to aging factors and leading to structural failures. Weld
repairs should be performed as per standards during the inspection/ maintenance at regular intervals.
This is likely to be a major factor of failures at Farakka.
8. Misalignment of Guide shoe
Loose fastening of guide shoe assembly to gate body affects the path of travel on the track leading to
gate sway or jamming. Further, they offer additional friction; resulting in greater hoisting effort.
6. RECOMMENDATIONS
As evident from failures cited in above Para, corrosion has been the most significant cause leading to
loss of design strength of gates and eventually resulting in structural failures. This stage has been
reached due to lack or near absence of preventive maintenance program. A brief recommendation
was made to avoid such mishaps in future and to keep the Barrage functional in order to achieve the
intended objectives:
Strengthening & refurbishing of 3 spare spillway gates lying in parts in storage yard and
placing them in bays where the gates are in severely distressed condition.
302
PProcurementt of additiona al sets of stoplogs, if felt necessary.

AAll the bays must be we ell lit with adequate lumin nescence to enable insp pection and operation
o
eeven during night. Catwa alks to be fabbricated and erected on downstream side of gate e for easy
aaccess for reegular mainte enance workks.
IImmediate re epair of availlable 2nd Ganntry crane for reducing th he turn-aroun nd time for movement
m
oof stoplog unnits and sparre gate parts.
AAll necessarry equipmentts such as chainc pulley block, weldin ng sets, drilling machine es etc. for
ccarrying out regular main ntenance & emergency
e re
epair works beb procured.
FFormulation of Preventive maintenan nce program and strict ad dherence to provisions
p fo
or existing
aas well as expected
e ne
ew gates. Lo og-books forr all gates anda equipme ent should b be strictly
mmaintained.
DDeployment of dedicated d and trained d staff for carrrying out rou
utine mainten nance works.
IImmediate filling of vacant posts and d posting of additional
a sta
aff for mainte
enance program. The
eexisting stafff needs to be
e motivated to t take the re espective ressponsibilities.
IIdentification
n of distresssed gates and timely action for repairing them, t if any, either
ddepartmenta ally or through outside agencies.
OINGWORKSSANDFUTU
7. ONGO UREROADMAP
Based on recommen ndations, FBP

P has initiate
ed and implemented certa
ain short & lo
ong measure
es:
Short-terrm measuress:
a. RRepair and overhauling
o o Gantry cra
of anes and railss,
b. RRepair, overhauling and servicing of rope drum hoists,
c. RReplacemen nt of electrica
al control pan
nels of hoistss,
d. PProcurementt of additiona al stoplog setts,
e. RRepair & streengthening ofo distressed gates,
f. PPainting of structures,
g. FFrequency ofo inspection of gates, hoiists
& associate ed equipme ents including
ssupport strucctures and appurtenants
a s of
MMain Barrage and Head Regulator has h
bbeen increassed to keep a tight vigil on
aany developm ment of distrress,
h. CCreation of o log-books or history
rregisters of gates,
g
i. JJammed bog gie wheels on n non-
ffunctional gaates are being lubricated,
j. FFlood lights have
h been in
nstalled over
bbarrage,
k. TTraining and shop visits of o staff,
l. SStrengthenin ng of resourcces at FBP:
i. Proccurement of tools
t & tackle
es.
ii. Reinnforcement ofo manpower,
iii. Adeq quate instrummentation.
Long-terrm measures
s:
a. BBased on the assessme ent, it was de
ecided to repplace & reha abilitate all th
he gates in a phased
mmanner; with h most distre
essed ones ta aken up on priority.
p Since
e there is co onsiderable number
n of
ggates, the entire
e work of
o replacement is propo osed to be carried out in three Phases. To
iimprove the structural ru uggedness of o gate, the design for newn gates has
h been mo odified to
rreduce the top
t cantileve
er portion. Phase-I comp prising 6 gattes has alrea ady been co ompleted.
PPhase-II com mprising 33 gates
g is under progress and is likelyy to be comp pleted in FY--2015-16.
TThe tender for replacem ment of remaining gatess of main ba arrage (Phase-III) is like ely to be
ffloated this financial
f yea
ar. The replaacement/ reh habilitation of
o Head regu ulator gates and their
hhoists shall be
b taken up after
a complettion of main barrage gate es.
b. TTender for supply
s & ereection of insspection walkway over main barrag ge has alreaady been
ffloated.
303
c. Remote operation and automation for gates is envisaged to be taken-up in Phase-III.

d. Third party inspection and Annual Maintenance of gates is likely to be outsourced after
complete replacement of gates.
8. CONCLUSION
Farraka Barrage Project is of international importance as it governs the water sharing between India &
Bangladesh. Most of the gates of main barrage and head regulator are in precarious condition and
unless some urgent measures were adopted to restore their design strength, their collapse seemed
inevitable at any time. The existing gates have already lived their economic life and any future special
repairs on these gates could only postpone the disaster in waiting for a couple of years. The onsite
inspection of the project revealed that the gates were losing its functionalities, strength and objectives
for which these were designed. Instead of tackling the problems in a solitary & piece-meal basis, the
complete revival plan in terms of replacement of gates in phased manner had been finalised by the
expert committee set up under the chairmanship of Member (D&R), CWC under Ministry of Water
Resources, River Development & Ganga Rejuvenation (MoWR, RD&GR). Considering the degree of
distressed condition of the gates, the most stressed gates have been given priority over least
distressed gates while implementing gate replacement schedule.
The important lesson drawn from Farakka experience is the formulation of a comprehensive
maintenance protocol for hydro-mechanical equipments of the Project and subsequent implementation
of its provisions both in letter & spirit. The preventive actions are likely to improve the longevity of
gated components; thereby allowing smooth operation of Project to serve its objective.
304
Basic Approach for Analysis of Earthquake Response of Dams

Zika Smiljkovic Dr. A. K. Dhawan
Dam Design Engineer Specialist, Dam Instrumentation,
EGIS Eau EGIS India
Montpellier, France
zika.smiljkovicint@egis.fr
ABSTRACT
The paper is intended to present the domains of application of available approaches and methods for evaluation
of response of dams to earthquake vibratory loads. The priority is particularly given to dams as compound i.e. as
dam-foundation entities. Yet, focus is given to usability of outputs of limit equilibrium approach and dam-
foundation models both having as an input the lateral forces which are product of spectral seismic coefficient and
unit weight of dam body. Comparison of these outputs with those obtained from dam-foundation models with elas-
tic spectra inputs, is further discussed, as well. The benefits and outputs confidence of each particular approach
are compared in view of their use for preliminary design phase of a new or rehabilitated dams. A number of inter-
nationally recognised publications underline preliminary design phase as appropriate to expectedly conservative
outputs arising out from seismic coefficient and elastic spectra approaches.
GENERAL
Maximum Design Earthquake (MDE) is a ground motion for which the stability of vital dam structures
should be designed for new dams or, checked up for the existing dams. This is a hazard event for
which significant damage of a dam is still acceptable but without considerable failure causing loss of
life and severe economic loss. The Operational Basis Earthquake (OBE) is on the other hand, usually
taken as 0.5 intensity of that rated for MDE. The OBE could also be considered for design but its ap-
plication is limited to secondary dam-not-integrated structures such as outlet structures, switchyard
structures, irrigation outlets, associated gate structures, spillway chutes and accompanying stilling ba-
sins and such like structures. The economic reasons led the consultants to adopt these criteria for
secondary dam structures. Besides the dam, the dam structures such as dam overflow spillway, intake
tower, dam steel gates, gantry cranes for tail water gates when power house is embedded within a
dam, and the like, vitally affecting operation of dam, should be always subjected to verification for MDE
ground motions.
Throughout the internationally recognised seismic codes, three modalities are accepted when subject-
ing the dam structures to earthquake resistant design. They are: pseudo-static or seismic coefficient
method, elastic response spectra and time history approach. The latter one is specifically intended
when a dam may suffer appreciable nonlinear strains throughout its carrying domain due to earth-
quake impacts. The large arch dams located in the region of strong earthquake shakings may be typi-
cal representatives of this necessity. According to the same codes, the other two approaches custom-
ised to be pseudo-static and elastic spectrum, are declared as appropriate to preliminary dams design
or check-up phase. The main benefit of them is however their sufficiency to judge the necessity to take
up or not the non-linear approach and if not, as an appropriately safety margin for dam design. Often,
the preliminary dam design i.e. the said two approaches are taken as final dam stability consideration.
The flow chart of two approaches is illustrated in Figure 1 hereafter. This paper does not cover time
history analyses of large dams.
Standard Response Spectra method is usually based on peak ground acceleration values for a dam
location taken either from the national hazard standards or from the national hazard earthquake maps.
At the same time, the site response spectra method necessitates special studies for a particular dam
site. Regional geologic and seismo-tectonic setting, seismic history and local geological setting are on-
ly main inputs for site specific response spectra evaluation. Apart from accompanying uncertainties,
the inventory of as recorded earthquakes, including magnitude, distance, focal depth, ground motion
attenuation, elastic and shear modulus, and then damping characteristics of terrain, should be studied
in the first instance.
305
STANDARD RESPONSE SPECTRA
Till to date publications about dams, Standard Response Spectra is termed to be traditional method for
earthquake design of dams. Here, MDE free field ground motions in their full intensity are adopted to
act upstream and downstream along the streambed i.e. along the dam reference plane coinciding to
deepest dam section. Yet, there will be another MDE with vertical free-field ground motions acting non-
instantly with those of horizontal ones, which amplitudes may be taken as a fraction of those acting
horizontally. Cross-stream ground motions are neglected within the traditional approach.
Max Design Earthquake
Standard Response Spectra Site Specific Response

Max PGA from Natural Hazard Spectra
Max PGA, Velocity and /or De-
Earthquake Maps
formation from Site Specific
Studies
A
A1 B
A2
Untied Dam Model Compound Dam- Compound Dam-
(On Rigid Foundation Space) Foundation Model Foundation Model
PSEUDO-STATIC PSEUDO-STATIC ELASTIC RESPONSE SPECTRA

Limit Equilibrium Approach Linear Dam-Foundation Model Linear Dam-Foundation Model
based on pseudo-static i.e. seismic Pseudo-static i.e. seismic coefficient Dam Response to Earthquake
coefficient method used for evalua- method used for evaluation of lateral evaluated directly from Response
tion of lateral forces forces Spectrum Inputs
Rigid or massless Rock-Base Exci-
tation Model
Preliminary Design Preliminary Design

Preliminary Design Stability and Stress Stability and Stress
Stability Analysis of Dams Analysis of Dams Analysis of Dam
Figure 1: Earthquake response flow chart associated with preliminary dam design phase
There are two branches of application of traditional method [A] both associated with pseudo-static or
seismic coefficient method. First one [A1] is untied dam model i.e. model of a dam founded on non-
deformable base and intended mainly for stability analysis of solid dams. Hence, the method was cus-
tomised to be suitable for Limit Equilibrium Approach within which, the stability of dam structure as a
non-deformable body is subjected to stability kinematics. In case of gravity dams made of conventional
or roller compacted concrete or of masonry composite, the stability of dam body to sliding, overturning
and floating is usually examined. In traditional practice, there were established safety factors as a ratio
between the forces resisting instability and those triggering instability. See Table 1 hereafter for more
details. The table applies to dam bases which are rigid and thus free from inhomogeneity such as
weak planes. It is well known that safety factor method for rigid body models is not applicable to em-
bankments and arch dams. Yet, the usual, unusual and extreme load conditions are respectively
aligned with max operation level of the reservoir, OBE loads, and probable max flood (PMF) loads or
max design earthquake(MDE) loads. The simultaneous combination of PMF and MDE loads is not
customised as a design criterion. The Traditional Limit Equilibrium Method is often applied as a first
trial for new dams design or for rehabilitation design of existing dams, and its role is found there as ra-
ther beneficial primarily because of its time effectiveness. However its application is often limited to
checking the dams stability within preliminary design phase of a dam.
Although it is not generally dominated, only the approximate fundamental mode of vibration of dam,
known also as equivalent lateral force method, is customized within the pseudo-static approach of
seismic response of a dam [A1, A2]. Here, fundamental mode of vibration is represented by equivalent
306
lateral fo
orce acting ono dam. Hence, the seismic coefficient applicab ble for a dam is expressed as a
product of fundamen ntal mode off vibration an nd peak grou und accelera ation, resultin
ng in pseudo o-spectral
seismic coefficient. Consequent
C to approximmate base mode of vibra ation adopted d for checkin ng up the
dam response, pseu udo-spectral seismic coeffficient is to be linearly height-varied
h d beginning from
f zero
value at the dam botttom to full vvalue at the damd crest. Hence,
H the lateral force co omes as a product
p of
spectral seismic coefficient and weight
w of dam per unit surface area. No dam dam mping ratio is aligned
with this method of seismic
s analyysis. Here, it is worth to note
n that initial phases off traditional procedure
p
ignored tthe dynamicc behavior off a dam by adopting unifo orm distributtion of spectrral seismic coefficient
c
effects aalong the heiight of dam. That resulte ed in not fullyy consistent stress distrib bution along the dam
height wwhich gives higher stresse es nearby th he dam base [A2] and the eir decrease
e with the dam m height.
In compo ound modelss, more conssistent dam stress
s analyssis would be with height-w wise variable e pseudo-
spectral seismic coeffficient. Figure 2 hereafte er is more illu
ustrative to this effect. Sttill, the heigh
ht-uniform
seismic coefficient may
m give safe er margin wh hen limit equuilibrium analysis [A1] is conducted fo or exami-
nation off dam stabilitty safety aga
ainst sliding.
Safety Faactor (SF) Safety Factoor (SF) Resultant

Load Con
nditions ocation at Base
Lo e
Against ovverturning Against slid
ding
Ussual Load Con
nditions 2 2 Middle 1/3
Unusual Load Conditions
C 1.7 1.5 Middle 1/2
Exxtreme Load Conditions
C 1.3 1.1 W
Within the base
e
Ta
able 1: Averag
ge overturning
g and sliding criteria
c recomm
mended by inte
ernationally re
ecognised cod
des
Along w with the foreg

going princip
ples, Central Water Com mmission (CCWC) recommended the e Seismic
Hazard Guidelines
G in
ntended to se
erve the Statte Design Offfices while dealing
d with rehabilitation
n designs
of dams included in Dams Reha abilitation an
nd Improvem ment Program m (DRIP). Whereas
W PGA valued
seismic coefficients are
a much sm maller than thhe ordinatess of pseudo-aacceleration response sp pectra for
range off intense groound motions with vibration periods up to 1 secc, the height-variable diagram of
those wa as assumed to range fromm zero value e at the dam footing until 1.5 times of PGA specified in Na-
tional Se
eismic Map. The
T Table 2 and Figure 2 herein give e more details about the issue.
i
Notes:
av, ah Compponents of Peak Grround
Accelleration
* ah Max Value of Pseudo-S Spectral Seismic
Coeffficient acting upstreeam and down-
stream along the stream mbed
* av Max Value of Pseudo-S Spectral Seismic
Coeffficient acting height-wise up and
downn along the deepestt dam section
Figure 2
2: Distribution of seismic coefficient along
g the dam heig
ght following th
he simplified Fundamental
F V
Vibration
Mode
The secoond branch of

o standard response
r spectra [A2] load condition
ns is dealing with compou und dam-
foundatio
on models of
o dams. Althhough it is sttill aligned with
w preliminaary design consideration, this ap-
proach is more conffident than that
t discussed for limit equilibrium models. With modern computing
technolo
ogy at our thresholds, the dam-found dation model offers muc ch more posssibility to analyse the
stress ou
utputs throug
ghout the da
am body and d the interactting rock ma
ass for overa all range of static
s and
combineed static-dyna
amic load co
onditions. This may be applicable forr all type of dams,
d including those
designedd to be embaankment andd arch dams.
What still remained to be resolvved for comp pound dam-ffoundation models,

m theyy are codes-rregulated
stability ccriteria for th
heir numerica
al alliances. Here,
H it is we
ell known pre
emise that nu
umerical convvergence
307
of the model strictly correspondss to physical stability of compound

c da
am structure. However, in case of
convergiing models, the
t quantificaation of stability criterion remains to be
b still evalua
ated.
PGA Inducced Ground Motions Pseudo-Spectral Seismic Coeffficients correspoonding to dam crrest
As a fractionn of acceleration coonstant (Simplified fundam
mental vibration moode)
Seism
mic
Zonee Concrete Dams Earthen Dams Concretee Dams Earrthen Dams
ah av ah av Dh = 1.5*ah Dv = 1.5* av Dh = 1.5*ah Dv = 1.55* av
II 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.066
III 0.12 0.08 0.12 0.08 0.18 0.12 0.18 0.122
IV 0.15 0.10 0.15 0.10 0.225 0.15 0.225 0.155
V 0.24 0.16 0.24 0.16 0.36 0.24 0.36 0.244
Figu
ure 2: Seismic Coefficients
C for a dam crest derrived from the a
assumptions of pseudo
p -acceleration responsse
spectra within
w the CWC
C method
The difficculty may arrise due to separate

s appproaches cusstomised forr subsurface medium of a dam to
solid onee extending above-surfacce. The leasst separation n can be loca ated for earthfill and rockkfill dams
which m may be soil-ro ock and rockfill-rock stru uctures. Morre pronounce ed separatioon currently e exists for
gravity ddams and arc ch dams which can be ro ock mass un nderlined. Thhe stability off subsurface
e sections
of dam structures
s is construed
c byy stress levels which are defined by Coulomb-Mo
C hr, Drucker-Prager or
Hoek-Brown failure criteria. At the t same timme, the conccrete mecha anics approach used deffining the
stability of a concrette dam main nly using alloowable stresss approach as a basis. Here, the allowable
a
stresses are prescrib bed for expected service load conditions which are usually classified as u usual, un-
usual an nd extreme ones. Often, as a criterrion for linea ar analysis ofo a concrete dam, the demand-
capacity ratio is insttituted too. The
T demand d-capacity raatio (DCR) represents
r th
he ratio betwween the
compute ed tensile strress for a paarticular discreet point off a model, an nd designed d tensile strength of a
concrete e. According to customise ed practice, the DCR 2 would be general
g prereequisite for linear law
applied tthroughout a concrete model
m subjeccted to extreme load con nditions whicch are combined with
MDE. Co oncurrently, the linearity//nonlinearity of subsurfacce part of thee model is customised
c to
o be con-
tingent too non-exceedance /exceedance of ad dopted failure criterion.
Figure 3: Safety Factorrs for an earthfill dam model. Combined static

s and seismic load condditions. Max Operation
O
Level off the reservoirr. Uniform Seissmic Coefficie n along the dam height with rate of 0.225. Com-
ent distribution
pounnd model of da am in elasto-pplasticity doma
ain.
Under such multidis proaches forr compound structures and

sciplinary app a their nu
umerical mod dels, it is
recomme ended to hav ve dual defin
nition of safety factors, i.e
e. (a) as the ratio of computed stresss and that
resulting
g from Coulom mb-Mohr faillure criterion, for the entire dam foundation mode el, and (b) ass the ratio
of compu uted compre essive stress and adopted d allowable compressive
c e stress for concrete,
c wheere appli-
cable, orr as the ratio
o of computed d tensile stre
ess and adop pted allowabble tensile strress, again where
w ap-
evant codes, the margin of 1 for sa
plicable. Until the rele afety factors for
f both apprroaches (a) and a (b) is
308
recomme ended for dyynamic load conditions.

c T
There, only very isolated and limited areas
a of a model hav-
ing outpu
utted Fs < 1 can
c still secu
ure the stability of a comppound dam structure.
s
Safety fa
actors are ex xemplified on
n a compound earth-fill da am model, illustrated herre before. Be ecause of
software
e limitations, instead of triangular disttribution of psseudo-spectral seismic coefficient
c wiith rate of
0.18 coin
ncident to da am crest, thee uniform vaalue of 0.22 was
w adopted d along the dam
d height. This was
assumed d as still perm
missible depaarture from pseudo-spec
p ctral linearity when analyssing earth-filll dams.
SITE SP
PECIFIC ALIA
AS ELASTIC
C RESPONS
SE SPECTRA
A
Here, the e reference is made to flow chart [B]] of Figure 1, remaining with
w site specific respon nse spec-
tra. Acccording to prractice customised so far, response spectrum an nalysis is an approach estimating
e
peak ressponse of a dam structu ure due to trransient basee motions. It is a peak of linear dynnamic re-
sponse ofo a single frreedom oscillator over a range of nattural frequen ncies. It may be a spectruum of ac-
celeratio
on, the velociity or displaccement. It is premised tha
at a dam struucture naturaal frequencie
es and vi-
bratory mmode shapess are represe entative of a single degre
ee of freedom
m oscillator.
The resp ponse spectrrum procedure is inheren ntly an approxximate solutiion method. Typically, the
e method
is used when a con nservative esstimate of pe eak dam ressponse is re equired for design
d purpo
oses. It is
strictly a linear desig
gn procedure e, often termed as elasttic response spectra. Altthough the method
m is
then stilll aligned with
h preliminaryy design pha ase, it is taken as more confident than those of standard
response e spectra eaarlier discusssed in this paper. To thiss effect, the method whe ereas always aligned
with coupled dam-foundation mo odels, would require disccretization annd idealisatio
on of these models
m in
ance. The fin
first insta nal elementss discretizatioon method iss an integral part of new or rehabilitatted dams
design. Meanwhile, there were so s far customised the tw wo approach hes for evaluuation of site
e specific
spectra, the determin nistic and pro
obabilistic on
ne.
Theoreticcally, the elastic spectrrum method d is con-

ducted foor a known transient basse motion by perform-
ing transsient dynamic c analysis on
n a number of
o spring-
mass-damper system ms, each representing a single
s re-
sponse frequency.
f In other worrds, when a dam vi-
brates under the ba ase excitation force, it d
dissipates
energy byb damping the motion. The well-kn nown mo-
tion equaation contain
ning mass matrix, dampin ng matrix
ness matrix, which summ
and stiffn mation is equivalent to
applied forces
f matrixx, describes the aforesa
aid transi-
ent dynamic analysiss.
In practicce, the stan ndard numerrical approaches are

accountin ng for the efffects of foun ndation interraction, in
order to analyse
a com
mbined dam-ffoundation systems by
including the rock in finite element idealisatio on. As for
elastic sppectrum apprroach, the ea arth crest mootion may
be repre esented as a rigid body translation of base-
ment rock or rigid soil, under the effects of gro ound mo-
tions. Unnder presump ption of rigid foundation base,
b the
elastic sppectra inputs s can be ap pplied to enttire dam-
foundatioon model. Fig gure 4 is illu
ustrating a tyypical ex-
Fig
gure 4
ample of it. In additio
on, there is another
a approoach with
ground base
b complettely free from m earthquakke motion
excitationns, including translation by
b involving mass-
m
-less rocck. In that case, elastic spectrum inpu uts are limite
ed to upper part
p of the model
m i.e. onlyy to dam.
Here, the e damping ofo natural freq quencies for particular type of dam sttructure is an n integral parrt of elas-
tic specttra inputs. Soome of code es of practice
e assign the dam dampin ng ratios app propriated too stiffness
of dam ssupporting base. Again, some otherss allocate sp pecific elasticc spectra gra aphs to dam m different
damping g ratios which h are expecte ed to corresp
pond to particular dam sttructure. The e average rep presenta-
tives of those
t two aree illustrated on
o Figure 5.
309
e of limited re
esearch quan ntum for eartthquake motion along the e depth of eaarth crest, the
e subsur-
ctions of nummerical mode els are not asssigned the damping rattio i.e. they can
c be mode elled as a
ase which da amping is close to critical one. As ffor the above e-surface se ections i.e. th
he dams,
e different coodes regulatting the damping ratios. They are ma ainly put in contingency
c of a dam
e to dissipatee vibrating structure enerrgy by sheariing capacity and of volummes of reservvoir inter-
ith dam, andd they usuallyy range from 5% to 15%.
A
B
5: [A] Averagee Acceleration

n Spectra. US Corps of Enggineers, Respoonse Spectra for
f Concrete Hydraulic
H
ctures, p57; [B
B] Indian Stand
dard IS:1893-1984. Criteria for Earthquakke Resistant Design
D of Strucctures.
issue that re b discussed is the moda

emained to be al superpositiion method which
w is usedd to com-
rthquake resp ponse of damms within theeir elastic be
ehaviour. Here, primary fe eature of mo odal anal-
hat total resp
ponse of a dam
d is obtain
ned by comb bining the ressponse of inndividual mod des of vi-
calculated separately.
s It is always im
mplied that ea ach mode off vibration saay of X, Y an nd Z com-
s accompan nied by max response ou utput. In these situationss, the dam structure
s can
n be ana-
a simplified response-spe
r ectrum moda al-superposittion method. Here, the re esponse qua antities of
are peak dissplacements,, element strresses, elem ment forces and
a moments s. Since thesse modal
es do not occcur at the sa
ame time during the eartthquake exciitation, they can be comb bined us-
plete quadraatic combinattion (CQC) or o the square e of root of sum
s of the squares
s (SRRSS). The
odal combina ation can be used if the duration of strong
s motionn portion of shaking
s event is sev-
es longer tha an fundamen ntal period of
o dam and if the design n response ordinates
o va
ary slowly
e range of periods.
p On the other han nd, the SRSS S method co ould be better fitting the structures
s
h the modal periods are well separated. Each da am modal su uperposition case should d be con-
appropriately
y contingent to dam struccture responsse and durattion of the vib bration eventt.
he dams staability criteria

a and safetyy factors for compound models,
m the recommenda
ations as
ed with previious sectionss of this pape
er, fully applies here.
he total resp
ponse of a daam is alwayss under combbination of sttatic and dyn
namic load co
onditions.
the response e quantities evaluated byb means of CQC or SR RSS superpo osition shoulld be still
ed with quanttities due to static load. The
T main isssue here mig ght be involving the rock mass re-
o a unique analysis.
a Thee rock mass region interracting with dam
d may be
e subjected to elastic
310
stresses, elasto-plastic stresses or visco-elastic stresses whilst static load conditions. In addition, the
rock mass may be subjected to in situ stresses with differing of their componential values. Under the
circumstances, the software intended to dam analyses with elastic response spectra inputs should be
enabled to combine the resulting stress in a dam structure by modelling staged properties of underly-
ing rock as gravity, and rigid or massless medium. Unlike the dam structure, the max stresses in the
rock mass due to dam vibratory loads still remain a question. There, until the new theory arrival, it
should be resorted to pseudo-static method for compound dam models based on seismic coefficient
method (branch A2 of Figure 1).
CONCLUSIONS
The paper focused on three methods which can be suitable for linear elastic analysis of dams under
vibratory loads.
Limit equilibrium approach [A1] is using the standard response spectra as input. This is a modality of
pseudo-static method with height-variable pseudo-spectral seismic coefficient. The limit equilibrium
method is taken as more practical to stability analysis of solid dams. There are a number of interna-
tional codes specifying safety factors against sliding and overturning of solid dams.
Again, there is compound dam-foundation model which is standard response spectra inputted too [A2].
This is second model of pseudo-static method with height-variable pseudo-spectral seismic coefficient.
Seismic Coefficient method is another name customised for this approach. As above, the lateral
force here is again a product of pseudo-spectral seismic coefficient and unit weight of a dam. The [A2]
approach is more comprehensive than [A1] since dealing with deformable bodies and it is applicable
both for stability and stress analysis of dams.
The third approach defined to be [B] line of Figure 1, is elastic response spectra. Its output is con-
servative dam response to earthquake excitation. This approach is conducted for known transient dam
motions. Superposition method is applied for combining the stresses and displacement of interest be-
longing to different time modes of vibration. The earthquake loads impacts to supporting rock mass
should be further researched. In spite of its conservative outputs, the elastic spectra approach [B] is
taken as more confident than those of seismic coefficient ones [A2].
REFERENCES
1. Indian Standard IS 1893 (Part 1):2002, Criteria for Earthquake Resistant Design of Structures.
2. Indian Standard IS 6512-1984 (Part 1):2002, Criteria for Design of Solid Gravity Dams.
th
3. Anil K. Chopra 1988. Earthquake response analysis of Concrete dams, 15 Section of Advanced Dam
Engineering for Design, Construction, Engineering Book, edited by Robert B. Jansen, 1988.
4. United States Society on Dams Materials for Embankment Dams, January 20011. Materials for Embankment
Dams.
5. Robin Fell, Patrick MacGregor, David Stapledon, Graeme Bell, 2005. Geotechnical Engineering of Dams. A.A.
Balkema Publishers.
6. Robert D. Cook, David S. Malkus, Michael E. Plesha, Robert J. Witt, 2002. Concept and Applications of Finite
Element Analysis, fourth edition.
7. E. Yldz & A.F. Grdil, 2012. Review on Seismic Design of Concrete Gravity or RCC Dams with Design
Examples. Temelsu International Engineering Services Inc., Ankara, Turkey.
8. US Army Corps of Engineers, 2007. Earthquake Design and Evaluation of Concrete Hydraulic Structures. En-
gineer Manual.
311
Managing Geotechnical Instabilities of Abutments for Dam Safety

R.K. Gupta
Chief Engineer, Central Water Commission, New Delhi
rkg62@hotmail.com
ABSTRACT
Geotechnical problems of dam site are the most serious cause for ensuring dam safety. Thick overburden,
weathered rock, shear zones, faults, old slides etc. are adverse geological features, which endanger foundation
and abutment stability. These adverse geological features in dam abutments may lead to rock slide or movement
during or after the dam construction. Managing these rock slides or instabilities of abutments is a challenging task
for ensuring dam safety. Many dams have been built world over either on the existing rock slides or on the slides
which occurred during construction.Various mitigation measures have been taken to ensure abutment safety.
Abutment stability problems have also occurred in many dams after their construction, which required
implementation of remedial measures and continuous monitoring. Safety of constructed dams shall be ensured
after proper evaluation of geotechnical instabilities of dam abutments. This paper highlights the importance of
managing geotechnical instabilities of dam abutments. A case study of rock mass movement occurred in
Punatsangchhu I Hydroelectric Project has also been presented.
1. INTRODUCTION
Most dam safety problems can be grouped into three categories; hydrological, structural and
geotechnical. The first two causes have been solved by use of latest technologies in the field of
hydrology and structural engineering. But, geotechnical problems still remain the most serious cause
of dam safety problems. Geotechnical problems related to a dam site may be many and varied in
nature. Thick mantle of overburden and weathered rock,presence of soft layered strata, structural
defects likefault, thrust, shear zones and joints,old slides, deep zones of kaolinisation, permeable
boulder bed, buried channel and karstic condition are some of thecommon geotechnical problems
faced during damconstruction. These geological adverse features lead to many foundation
relatedproblems like seepage, subsidence, stability, piping, uplift, settlement etc. These problems are
generally tackled by proper foundation treatment. However, these adverse geological features in dam
abutments may lead to rock slide or movement during or after the dam construction. Managing these
rock slides or instabilities of abutments is a challenging task for ensuring dam safety.
A dam is made up of two parts: the artificial dam, man-made, and the natural dam, which continues it,
surrounds it, and on which it is founded. The more important of the two is the latter which is sometimes
not given due attention. Any movement (rockslide activity) in the foundation or an abutment of a dam
is of critical importance. Because many (if not most) such movements are reactivations of all or parts
of pre- existing slides, it is extremely important to identify these morphological elements and to realize
their possible effects on the dams involved.
Many major slides in abutments have in the past blocked up river valleys, the resulting constrictions
giving dam sites which appear at first sight to be admirable. In view of the of the nature of the material
in slides, andits unconsolidated and often disturbed conditions, sites of this kind may often prove to be
very far from ideal. Dams have, however, been successfully founded at such sites. In the early part of
the 20th century, a few experts recognized and presented the problems posed by pre-existing slides in
dam foundations or abutments. However, in spite of this technical expertise and warning, many dams
were built without expert examination ofdamsites; only the most important projects were subjected to
careful geologic studies. Today, however, every effort is usually made to select a damsite in whichthe
abutments and foundation are relatively stable, It has often been found to be technically feasible and
economically desirable to site and construct dams on known slides or on their partial remnants after
most of the material has been stripped from the site. The stability of the slide or its remnant can be
enhanced by the buttressing effect of the dam itself, which can be augmented by berms acting as
buttresses, by anchors, or by retaining structures. In addition, problems caused by seepage through
the slide materials usually can be remedied by means of surface or subsurface drains, grout curtains,
impervious membranes, or other preventive or remedial measures.
312
2. ROCK
K SLIDES IN
N ABUTMENT AND DAM
M CONSTRU
UCTION
Various types of rocck slides havve been enccountered du uring dam construction
c w
world over based
b on
geologiccal set up of the
t site. Theese slides occurred beforre, during or after dam co
onstruction. Based
B on
the information available, this section outlines various typ
pes of abutm
ment slides and
a its impacct on dam
construcction.
2.1. Abu
utment Slide
e in Competent Rock
Concrete e dams requ uire competeent rock founndations; while earthfill and
a rockfill dams
d can bee founded
satisfactorily on lesss-competent materials.However, man ny concrete dams were built on pre e-existing
slides orr had slides occur during
g or after con
nstruction. As would be expected,
e most of these concrete
dams we ere built on what
w ginally thought to be com
was orig mpetent rock.
Gross Dam, Colorad do, United Sttates, is an example

e of a concrete-grravity dam th
hat was foun
nded on a
pre-existting deep-se
eated slide in n competent rock. Completed in 1955 m-high dam is seated
5, this 104-m
on deep p-seated gra
avity-slip surrfaces in bo oth granite abutments
a Figure 1). Although thessegravity
(F
faults w
were closely watched
w durring construcction, they po
ose no hazarrd to the commpleted damm, whichis
expected d to buttress any possible future movement.
m Thus, even though the dam is a relatively
inflexible e was primarrily a textbook case tha
e concrete sttructure, this type of slide at posed no danger
d to
the dam,, and the dam m continues to perform well.
w
F
Figure 1.Gravity-slip surface
es (marked byy thick arrows)) in granitic fou
undation rockss at Gross Dam
Beaureg gard Dam, a 132m high arch-gravity

a dam comple eted in 1960 in Italy, is a major conccrete dam
that has experienced d reactivation of a rock slide
s in an abutment.
a Thhe left abutmment for this dam is a
massive rock slide in mica schist, which be efore constru
uction overla
aid a deep pocket
p of gla
aciofluvial
sedimen nts (Figure 2).
2 During th he first filling
g of the resservoir, the landslide
l reaactivated, atttaining a
displacement rate off 20 mm/mon nth. As a rem medial measure, some off the sedime ents were rep placed by
concretee. In addition, a watertiight membra ane was pla aced througgh the left abutment
a byy cement
injection. The dam iss performing well.
Figure 2. Cross
C section through
t the exxisting rock slide at left abuttment of Beau
uregard Dam
Durlassb
boden Dam, an 83-m-high structure e in Austria,, was built ono a large rock slide. TheT right
abutmennt of this hyd
dropower dam
m is on a large block off graphitic scchists and qu
uartzites thatt had slid
down th ey wall and sunk into valley depo
he right valle osits of glac ciofluvial san
nds and gra avels and
313
lacustrine silts. Thee abutment and foundattion were su ubsequently sealed by a grout currtain that
extends into silts abo
out 50 m ben
neath the valley floor.
Dalesice e Dam, a 100-m-high rocckfill dam in the Czech Republic, which was co ompleted in 1979,was
1
founded on suppose edly stable amphibolite
a and granulitte. Howeverr, during exccavation for the right
abutmen nt of the da am, failure occurred
o in schistose mylonite
m along a fault contact
c betwween the
amphibo olite and the granulite (F
Figure 3). Thhe failure ressulted in suddden movemment of a 150,000 m3
block of amphibolite along the mylonite zone. As remedia al measures,,a temporaryy stabilizing berm
b was
he toe of the
built at th e slope and m
material was removed at the head of theslide. Subsequently, the slope
was furth her stabilized by making g horizontal benches from which ancchors were installed
i into
o the firm
granulitee.
Figure
F 3. Simplified cross-vvalley cross se
ection through Dalesice Dam
m
Tablacha
aca dam of Peru, Lake Harriet Damm, Platoro daam and Bonneville Dam of US are few
f other
example
es among maany of dam construction interacting with
w abutmentt slides havin
ng competen
nt rock.
2.2. Abu
utment Slide
e in Incompe
etent Rock
Several dams have been built on slides in poorly

p induratted, relatively incompeteent rocks. Moost of the
slides in this category haveoccurred in soft sedimentary
s y rocks, main nly shales, mudstones,
m ssiltstones,
and poorly indurated d sandstoness, and in weeathered sch
hists and wea ak volcanicss. Embankme ent dams
have co ommonly bee en constructted at sites where incompetent ma aterials form dam foundations or
abutmen nts.
In the Czech Rep public, Nech hranice, SleezskaHarta, Terlicko, and a Zermanice Dams have all
encounte ered problemms with soft rock abutmments. Especially well kno own are the problems
p in the shale
left abuttment of SlezskaHarta Dam,
D a 65-m
m-high rockfill structuree, which wass completed in 1997.
During cconstruction of this dam m, movementt occurred in n shale slide e deposits th
hat made up p the left
abutmen nt. The stability problem was
w mitigated by excavattion of slide material
m m the upper left slope,
from
construcction of a berm at the toe of the slope, and installa
ation of surfa
ace and undeerground drains.
wers Damwa
Fruitgrow as built in 1939,
1 and itts left abutm
ment is on a large land dslide in shaale. Slow
moveme ent began inn this shale mass in the late 1990 0s. This abuutment is cuurrently being
g closely
monitoreed to determiine if remedia
al measures will be needded, but othe
erwise the da
am is perform
ming well.
Gardinerr Dam, an eaarthfill dam inn Canada is 69-m-high completed

c in 1968. The shale
s left abu
utment of
the dam included a large
l prehisttoric slide. Lo
ocal failure occurred
o in this abutmen nt during construction,
d to excavattion of much of the unsta
which led able shale unnder the centtral zone of thet dam. To increase
the stab
bility of the abutment, the t slopes ofo the rema aining landslide deposit were flatten ned, and
extensive berms werre added as buttresses. The T dam is performing
p saatisfactorily.
Oahe D Dam, 75m high

h earthfill dam in th States, has been built on soft sed
he United S dimentary
rocks.Du
uring constru
uction, probleems were en
ncountered that
t were caused by pre
e-existing sha
ale slides
314
in the right abutment, and construction triggered a slide in the left abutment. After the left-abutment
slide occurred, 5.0 million m3 of slide material was removed; of this, 3.5 million m3 was placed at the
toe of the slope as a berm that acts as a buttress. Part of a small slide remains in the right abutment.
Both abutments are now completely stable because of the buttressing effect of the dam itself, and the
dam continues to perform well.
2.3. Earth and Debris Slide in Abutment
Many dams have been constructed on earth or debris slide material in the foundation or abutments.
Grand Coulee dam of US and Vodo dam of Italy are famous successful examples of concrete dams
built on earth slide material. Various earthfill dams have been built on earth slide occurred in
abutments.
3. PROBLEMS DUE TO INTERACTION BETWEEN DAM AND ABUTMENT ROCKSLIDE
Slides in dam foundations or abutments may lead to instability of the dam or seepage within these
units.
Abutment rock slide causes abutment-slope or foundation instabilities or movement either during
construction or after completion of the dam. Generally, in most construction-triggered cases, all or
most of the active material is removed. Sometimes, it is left in place and stabilized, often by the
buttressing effect provided by construction of berms or by the dam itself. There are onlya very few
known cases in which postconstruction movement affected or threatened the overall stability of the
dam; St.Francis Dam and B.F. Sisk Dam, both in United States, are outstanding examples.
Many dams which had interaction with abutment slide, have anticipated seepage problems, most
commonly through an abutment. Site specific mitigation measures are generally taken to tackle the
problems of stability and seepage through abutment.
4. MITIGATIVE MEASURES FOR ABUTMENT STABILIZATION
Procedures used to prevent or alleviate problems encountered because of the existence of landslides
at potential or actual damsites can be broadly subdivided into two main categories: planning measures
and physical measures.
4.1. Planning Measures
These include those measures that avoid or alleviate the problems as part of the planning process
(passive measures). Common measures are avoidance, dam-type selection, control of reservoir level,
and/or relocation of the spillway.A very basic passive preventive measure is avoidance if a landslide
has been recognized in a planned foundation or abutment area during the siting process, that is,
relocation to a morefavorable site nearby, or, in extreme cases, complete abandonment of the
site.Several cases have been noted in which a damsite was relocated because the original site
included a hazardous slide in the foundation or an abutment.A few dams have been redesigned when
a slide was discovered in the foundation or an abutment. Excellent examples are Selevir Dam in
western Turkey and Sweasey Dam, California, United States.An effective means of increasing
abutment stability by reducing abutment pore pressures and reducing seepage through the abutment
by lowering the head or reducing its rate of increase has also been implemented in few cases.
4.2. Physical Measures
Various physical measures are generally can be taken to stabilize the foundation and abutments,
which have experienced slide. These measures are:
Removal of slide material (total or partial)

Flattening abutment slopes
Earthfill or rockfill berms serving as buttresses
Dam serving as buttress
315
CCutoffs or ke
eys
RRetaining waalls
PPiles and caissons
AAnchors
GGrouting
IImpervious curtains,
c mem
mbranes and
d blankets
DDrainage sysstem
5. PUNA
ATSANGCHH
HU I HE PRO
OJECT A CASE
C STUD
DY
Punatsangchhu I hyd droelectric Project

P is undder construcction in Bhuta
an. A 136m high concrette gravity
dam hass been plann ned. The pro oject involvess excavation of 75m dee ep overburde en at dam foundation.
When e excavation ofo dam pit reached
r 40m
m below NS SL, rock ma ass moveme ent occurredd in right
abutmen nt of the prooject. Thorou ugh geologic cal investigattions were carried
c out in the right abutment
a
through bore holes anda geophyssical methodss. A numberr of shear zones with varried thicknessses were
observed d in differentt boreholes at different levels.
l Effortts were madde to correlate these she ears. The
correlatio
on of these major shears zones ind dicated presence of two o major shea ars; SZ1 & SZ2.
S The
principal plane of slip is formed by the thick shear zone with the cla ay gouge (SZ Z-2). This sh
hear zone
dips tow
wards the riveer. Shear Zon ne SZ1 dips inside the hill and in factt supports SZ2 or try to hold
h slide
caused byb SZ2. In ge eneral, the strata
s was found to be ha aving a bandd of fractured
d rock masso of varying
thickness below aa band
b of comppetent rock (Figure 4).
An elasto-plastic finitte element analysis

a of rig
ght bank slope was carriied out with the
t objective e to know
its stability, cause off slide and poossible stabilization measures.Numerical modelin ng was carrieed out on
Phase2. A FEM grid with 6 noded triangular 6722 6 elemennts was cons sidered in the
e analysis. In
n order to
simulate far field con nditions, model was prepared upto a depth mucch below the e expected frresh rock
and incluuding left bank slope alsso. For in-situ u stress generation, the actual groun nd surface (NNSL) was
considerred in the ana alysis. The vertical
v stresss correspondding to the ro
ock mass is considered
c a vertical
as
in-situ stress
s and in-situ
i stress ratio (Ko) of 1 is considered fo or horizontaal and lateral stress
direction
ns.Conservattive values fo or geo techn mulate the worst-case
nical properties are consiidered to sim
scenarioo. Excavation n of right bank was simula ated in stage
es as per actual excavatio on sequence e.
Figure 4.Geolo
ogical cross se
ection at dam axis showing slope profiles before & afte
er the moveme
ent
Through numerical analysis, acctual rock mass m movem ment which occurred at site was simulated.
Results show
s that paartial saturation of fracturred rock masss triggered the
t abutmentt movement (Figure 5
& 6). Thiis was due to o reduction in shear strength of fractu ured rock maass. Further,, analysis wa
as carried
heck the effiicacy of various conside
out to ch ered stabiliza
ation measurres. It was foound that injjection of
cement g grout in fracttured rock mass is most effective wayy to stabilize he right abuutment as it increases
the sheaar strength off the poor rocck mass.
316
Besides grouting, va
arious stabiliization meassures like ca
able anchoring, micropiliing, drainage
e etc are
mplemented.
being im
Figure 5.Model
5 stage
e before actual rock mass movement
m
Figure 6.Results of numerical analysis show

wing deformed
d slope due to partial saturattion of shear zone
z
6. CONC
CLUSIONS
Geologissts sometime es feel that it

i is impossibble to safelyy construct a dam on a pre-existing
p a
abutment
slide. Co onversely, so ome enginee ers have bee en known to o assume tha at todays ad dvanced con nstruction
and prevvention techn niques can overcome
o anny slide prob blem. A studdy of dams that
t either ha
ave been
built on p pre-existing slides or were subjected d to slides duuring or after constructionn shows thatt reality is
some- w where in bettween these extremes. Some S damss have been n built on slides with no o ensuing
difficultie
es, even in caases where preventive measures
m were not used; others have e encountered serious
seepage e or stability problems, most
m of whicch have bee en at least partly
p allevia
ated by instaallation of
remediall measures,, such as berms, cuttoff walls, drainage d sy
ystems, grou uting, or immpervious
membranes.Inmost cases, dams built on sliides have op perated for many
m years without
w majo
or stability
or seepa age problems.However, seepage thrrough an abu utment has been the mo ost common negative
result of building a da am on a slidee. This requires proper re emedial mea asures.
An thoroough geotec chnical asse essment of dam site in term of exxisting or po otential rockk slide is
necessary for ensuring long termm dam safety. Geotechniccal considera
ations for enssuring dam safety
s are
most complex and serious
s in na
ature and th
he same sha all be given due importa ance during and after
construcction of dams
s. Safety of already constructed damms from geo otechnical coonsiderationss shall be
evaluate
ed through weell planned in
nvestigation programs an
nd continuouus monitoringg.
317
Basic Design Provisions for Existing Dams
C.S. Mathur, Manoj Kumar,

Dam Design Engineer, Deputy Director (DSR dtc.)
EGIS-India Central Water Commission
(Ex. Chief Engineer, Central Water Commission)
Ankit Kumar,
Dam Design Engineer,
EGIS-India
ABSTRACT
There are more than 5000 large dams in the country. About 164 are more than 100 years old. Though the dams
built in the country have by and large performed well, but there have been a few dam failures like Kaddam,
Panshet, Khadakwasla, Chikkhole, Machhu-II etc.
It is therefore of paramount importance to carry out a comprehensive dam safety review of existing dams on
regular basis from dam safety considerations. The frequency for the same has been proposed as after every 10
years by Central Water Commission. The various aspects which are required to be reviewed/studied are design
flood review, calculations of revised MWL based on flood routing studies, working out revised freeboard,
examination of the need or otherwise for additional spillway or solid parapet wall (in case it is not already
existing),examination of the causes and working out suitable treatment in cases of distress viz. excessive
seepage through dam, damages to concrete in spillway/energy dissipation arrangements, cracking in the dam,
other issues, checking the stability of dam and spillway for the revised MWL due to revision in design flood,
changes in seismic parameters etc. besides looking into other issues related to hydro-mechanical equipments,
outlet works etc.
In this paper the design provisions of some basic aspects both for new dams vis--vis changes proposed in
respect of existing dams are discussed.
1.0 INTRODUCTION
There are more than 5000 large dams in the country. About 164 are more than 100 years old. Though,
the dams built in the country have by and large performed well, there have been a few dam failures
like Kaddam, Panshet, Khadakwasla, Chikkhole, Machhu-II etc.
It is therefore of paramount importance to carry out a comprehensive dam safety review of existing
dams on regular basis from dam safety considerations. The frequency for the same has been
generally proposed as after every 10 years by the Central Water Commission.
The various aspects which are required to be studied are:
Design Flood Review

Flood Routing studies to arrive at the revised maximum water level (MWL)
Checking of the adequacy of freeboard available
Examination of the need or otherwise to provide an additional spillway, solid parapet wall (if not
already existing), non-structural measures etc.
Examination of the causes of distress in the gravity dam like excessive seepage/leakage through
the dam body/foundations, wet spots in the d/s face/gallery, cracking in the dam, damages to
concrete in spillway/energy dissipation arrangements, choking of drains in galleries, leaching etc.
and working out suitable treatment.
Examination of the condition in the embankment dam viz. its u/s and d/s slopes, u/s rip-rap,
surface drainage arrangements, d/s toe drain, settlements/cracks in the dam evidence of any
piping/boiling etc.
Examination of instrumentation data.
318
Checking the stability of the dam and spillway for the revised parameters like revised MWL due to
revision in flood, changes in seismic parameters etc.
Examination of the condition of hydro-mechanical equipments viz. gates, hoists etc.
Examination of the condition of outlet works etc.
2.0 GUIDELINES PROPOSED FOR EVALUATION OF EXISTING DAMS IN RESPECT OF SOME

BASIC ASPECTS
While carrying out a comprehensive dam safety review for an existing dam it may sometimes be
necessary to make deviations from the guidelines /criteria laid down for designing a new dam. Our BIS
codes generally provide guidelines for designing new dams. Deviations from the guidelines/criteria for
an existing dam, in respect of some basic design aspects, are proposed below for adoption after due
diligence and deliberations.
2.1 Freeboard aspect - Consideration of u/s solid parapet wall as part of the freeboard.
As per IS-10635-Freeboard requirement for Embankment dam and IS 6512-Criteria for Design of Solid
Gravity dams, a 1m high solid parapet wall is required to be provided on the top of the dam on the u/s
side which is not to be considered as part of the freeboard. The extract of relevant codal provisions
is reproduced below:
IS-10635
Clause 6.1- 1.0 m high parapet wall may be provided in all embankment dams but the same is not to
be considered as a part of freeboard.
IS-6512
Clause 5.8.3 Free Board-Free board is the vertical distance between the top of the dam and still water
level. The free board shall be wind set-up plus 1 times wave height above normal pool elevation or
above maximum reservoir level corresponding to the design flood, whichever gives higher crest
elevation for the dam. The free board shall not however, be less than 1.0 m above mean water level
(MWL) corresponding to the design flood. If design flood is not same as probable maximum flood
(PMF) then the top of dam shall not be lower than MWL corresponding to PMF. Notwithstanding the
above requirement, 1.0m high solid parapet shall be provided on the upstream side above the top of
the dam in all cases.
However, for existing dams the following is proposed:
(i) For an existing embankment dam, the u/s solid parapet wall may be taken as part of the free
board, in case the parapet wall is otherwise structurally safe.
(ii) The maximum water level for the revised flood should however be lower than the top of
impervious core of the embankment dam. In case, it is not so then the impervious core needs
to be extended upwards as suggested in 2.3 below.
(iii) For existing gravity dams the revised maximum water level could be allowed to reach upto the
dam top, where 1 m high solid parapet wall is provided.
2.2 Issue of consideration of 10% gates as inoperative
As per provisions laid down in IS-11223-Guidelines for fixation of spillway capacity ,in respect of gated
spillways, the contingency of 10% of gates with a minimum of one gate being inoperative may be
considered as an emergency condition (like earthquake) & a reduced freeboard can be accepted
under this condition. These guidelines are considered while designing/constructing new dams.
However, in an existing dam while carrying out its safety evaluation, an idea of the inoperative gates
to be considered, can be ascertained from the actual operation of the gates during the past. The
number of inoperative gates can be considered as per actual site specific conditions in the safety
review of an existing dam. However, it needs to be ensured that all the gates are in working condition
319
before every monsoon and to follow the O&M guidelines meticulously. If this can be ensured then it is
felt that it may not be necessary to check the maximum reservoir level & freeboard for inoperative
gates condition for an existing dam.
2.3 Aspects to be taken care of in Embankment dams with respect the revised maximum
water level attained especially in regard to the top of core
While designing new dams it is required that the top of the impervious core of the embankment dam is
kept at least 1 m higher than the Maximum Water Level (MWL) refer Clause no 4.2.4 of IS 8826 -
Guidelines for design of large earth and rock fill dams. For an existing embankment dam also it is
considered necessary to check that the top of the impervious core of the dam is above the revised
MWL calculated corresponding to the revised design flood. In case the top elevation of the impervious
core of the existing embankment dam is lower than the revised MWL, then a suitable impervious
trench can be considered for provision from the dam top so as to merge with the existing impervious
core of the dam.
Further for embankment dams with ungated spillway, for the stability of upstream slope in draw down
condition, the draw down is considered from a level midway between the revised MWL & FRL up to
the lowest water level (LWL) as per clause 5.4.6 of IS 7894-1995 (reaffirmed in 1997).
2.4 Stability consideration for an existing Embankment dam with reference to the method
to be used for analysis.
The IS 7894-Code of practice for stability analysis of Earth dams covers basically two methods of
analysis viz. Swedish slip circle (Fellenius) method and the sliding wedge method. The Fellenius
method does not take into consideration inter slice forces. It considers only the moment equilibrium &
not the force equilibrium. It thus provides the moment factor of safety & not the force factor of safety. It
also does not provide the closed force polygon in free body diagram for the individual slice within the
failure zone of earth mass. It therefore does not satisfy the equilibrium conditions for the individual
slices in the failure mass.
Further, the Fellenius method provides a factor of safety on the lower side & results in conservative
design of embankment slopes. However this method is most commonly used in our country for the
design of all embankment dams
There are various other methods of stability analysis all of which come under the limit equilibrium
analysis. Some of these methods consider only force equilibrium and some only the moment
equilibrium whereas some consider both.
Different methods of stability analysis indicating equilibrium conditions, forces & factor of safety
considered are tabulated below:
Table-1: Different methods of stability analysis indicating equilibrium conditions, forces and FOS considered
S. Method Moment Force Inter Inter Moment Force Inter slice

No. equilibrium equilib slice slice factor of factor Force
rium normal shear safety of function
force force safety
1. Culmann wedge No Yes No No No Yes No
block method
(no-slice)
2. Fellenius, Swedish Yes No No No Yes No No
circle or ordinary
method (1936)
3. Bishop Simplified Yes No Yes No Yes No No
method (1955)
4. Janbu Simplified No Yes Yes No No Yes No
method (1954)
5. Spencer method Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Constant
(1967) function
6. Morgenstern-Price Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Constant,Hal
320
method (1965) f-Sine,

Clipped-Sine
functiond
7. Corps of Engineers No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
# 1 method
8. Corps of Engineers No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
# 2 method
9. Lowe-Karafiath No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
method
10. Sarma method Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(1973)
11. Janbu Generalized No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
method(1957)
It is preferable to adopt a method which:-
Satisfies both moment equilibrium as well as force equilibrium

Takes into account the inter slice forces (normal & shear) into account & results in a closed
polygon indicating equilibrium conditions of the slice in a free body force diagram.
As such while checking the stability of an existing embankment dam from dam safety considerations, it
is recommended to use such methods like the Morgenstern-Price method & Spencer method. All
these methods can be analyzed using softwares available like SLOPE/W of GEO-SLOPE
International.
2.5 Stability considerations for existing Concrete/Masonry Solid Gravity Dams with
reference to permitting cracking or otherwise in the dam
As per IS 6512-Criteria for Design of Concrete /Masonry solid gravity dams, cracking is not permitted.
The relevant provisions in the above IS Code are as under:
Tensile strength
a) No tensile stress shall be permitted at the upstream face of the dam for load combination B
(Normal Loading Combination). Nominal tensile stresses however, may be permitted in other load
combinations and their permissible values shall not exceed the values given in Table below.
Table: Values of permissible tensile stress in concrete and masonry

Permissible tensile stress
Load Combination
Concrete Masonry
C (Reservoir at MWL with drains operative) 0.01fc 0.005 fc
E (Reservoir at FRL with drains operative and Earthquake) 0.02 fc 0.01 fc
F ((Reservoir at MWL with drains inoperative) 0.02 fc 0.01 fc
G (Reservoir at FRL with drains inoperative and Earthquake) 0.04 fc 0.02 fc
where,
fc = compressive strength of concrete/mortar for masonry.
b) Small values of tension on the downstream face may be permitted since it is very improbable that
a fully constructed dam is kept empty and downstream cracks which are not extensive and for
limited depths from the surface may not be detrimental to the safety of the structure.
However, for existing dams, when the tensile stresses in respect of Load combination F (Reservoir at
MWL with drains inoperative) & load combination G (Reservoir at FRL with Earthquake & with drains
inoperative) exceed the values stated in the above table, it is suggested that cracking may be allowed
and the internal stress and sliding stability of the dam checked as per the procedure laid down by
USBR.
2.5.1 Load Combination F (Reservoir at MWL with Drains Inoperative)
The following assumptions are associated
321
VVertical stresss distribution along a hoorizontal planne without up plift is linear between
b the u/s & d/s
ffaces of damm.
TThe uplift pressure in the t entire crracked width h portion is equal to th he reservoir pressure
ccorrespondin ng to MWL. Thereafter
T th
he uplift varie om crack tip to tail water pressure
es linearly fro
aat d/s face.
CCrack extend ds up to the point of no stress.
s The uncracked len ngth is entire ely in comparrison.
The stattic pressure diagrams

d alo
ong the base
e on any horizontal plane of the grav
vity dam are
e given in
Figure 1
The net vvertical pressure diagram

m is given byy C45.
owing equations may be

The follo b used to calculate the
t cracked length & the
t resultant vertical
compresssive stress at
a the d/s facce

e
e = .
T1 = 3(
.
Net compressive stre
ess 5 = 2 + ( 3- )
Fiigure 1
w
where,
322
e = Eccentricity of vertical stress diagram after cracking. It is the distance of the

resultant force from the centre of gravity of the base.
e= Eccentricity of vertical stress diagram without uplift. It is the distance of the

resultant force from the C.G of the base
M= Summation of moments of the all forces ( W & V) about the C.G of the base
but excluding uplift force & resultant force.
H Summation of all horizontal forces
V Summation of all vertical forces excluding uplift force & resultant force
3 = Water pressure at u/s face which is equal to the reservoir water pressure corresponding
to MWL at the elevation in question.
= Tail water pressure at the d/s face which is equal to the tail water pressure corresponding
to MWL condition at the elevation in question
5 = Net vertical compressive stress at d/s face after cracking
The net vertical compressive stress should not exceed the allowable compressive stress & the sliding stability of
the dam should be checked using uncracked length of the base of the dam.
2.5.2 Load Combination G (Reservoir at FRL with Earthquake but drains inoperative)
There is one major difference in the assumptions associated with the earthquake cracked section analysis. In the
cracked length the uplift pressures are assumed to be zero. This assumption is based on the studies which show
that the opening of a crack during an earthquake event, relieves uplift water pressures and the rapidly cyclic
nature of opening & closing of the crack does not allow reservoir water and the associated pressure to penetrate.
The pseudo-static vertical pressure diagrams along the base or any other horizontal plane of gravity dam based
on the above additional assumption are given in Figure 2
The net vertical pressure diagram is given by C 45
The following equations may be used to calculate the cracked length & the resultant vertical
compressive stress at the d/s face.
323
Figure
e2

e =
T1= 3 (
5= 2 (W- 4. T1) + ( 4- )
TT1
where,
e= Eccentricity of vertical stress diagram

m after crackking. It is the
e distance
o
of the resulta
ant force from
m the centre of gravity off the base.
e= Eccentricity of vertical sttress diagram

m without up plift. It is the distance
o
of the resulta
ant force from
m the centre of gravity off the base.
324
= Summation of moments of all force ( & including the

earthquake forces above the C.G of the base but excluding the uplift
force & resultant force.
Mu= Moment from rectangle ABB4 portion of combined pressure diagram

about the C.G of the base
= Summation of vertical forces excluding uplift & resultant force
= Summation of all horizontal forces
4= Uplift pressure at the end of the crack
T1= Uncracked length of the base
BC = Tail water pressure at the d/s face which is equal to the tail water
pressure corresponding to FRL at the elevation in question
C5 = Net vertical compressive stress at d/s face after cracking
Determination of uncracked length of the base (T1) is an iterative process. A value of T1 is assumed.
Corresponding value of A4 can be found from the uplift diagram before the earthquake event. Then
Mu which is the moment of the uplift pressure diagram A4 CB is found about the C.G of the base.
Using the first equation e can be found in which ( Mu is to be taken algebraically with due
consideration of the direction of moments about the C.G of the base ( i.e. clockwise moment/
anticlockwise moment). Then from the second equation T1 can be found . If the assumed value of T1
& the calculated value of T1 are same then the assumed value is okay. Otherwise another value of T1
is assumed & the above process repeated till the assumed & calculated values of T1 are equal.
Thereafter from the third equation, the net vertical compressive stress at the d/s face i.e 5 can be
determined.
If the sliding stability & stress levels are found to be satisfactory for the cracked section during the
earthquake event, post-earthquake static conditions should also be checked. Post-earthquake analysis
should include full uplift pressure throughout the crack.
325
2425March,2015IC&SRAuditorium,IITM,CHENNAI
OrganizedbyCWC,TNWRDandIITM
Website:www.damsafety.in
TechnicalCommitteethatGuidedtheTechnicalAspectsoftheConference
andCompilationoftheCompendium
Chairman: ShriC.K.Agrawal,Member(D&R),CWC
Members: ShriL.A.V.Nathan,ChiefEngineer,CDSO,CWC
Shri.VinayKumar,ChiefEngineer(Hydrology),CWC
Shri.Y.K.Handa,ChiefEngineer,(Design,NW&S),CWC
ShriAtulJain,ChiefEngineer,(HRM),CWC
Dr.B.R.K.Pillai,ProjectDirector(DRIP)&Director(DSR),CWC
Shri.D.JohnBritto,ChiefEngineer(O&M),TNWRD
Shri.R.Selvam,ChiefEngineer(PlanFormulation),TNWRD
Prof.K.Rajagopal,IITM,Chennai
Prof.K.Srinivasan,IITM,Chennai
ShriManojKumar,DeputyDirector(DSR),CWC(MemberSecretary)
Organizing Shri.M.BhaskaraReddy,EGIS,India(DRIP)
Secretary
Central Damm Safety Organissation
Ceentral Water
W Coommissioon
Vision
To rremain as a premier organisatiion with be
est technical and managerial exxpertise
for providing
p advisory
a se
ervices on matters re
elating to da
am safety..
Missio
on
To p
provide exxpert servicces to Statte Dam Sa
afety Organ
nisations, dam
d owne
ers, dam
opeerating age
encies and d others cooncerned for
f ensurinng safe funnctioning of
o dams
with
h a view to protect hu
uman life, property
p an
nd the environment.
Values
s
Inte
egrity: Act with
w integrity and hon
nesty in all our action
ns and pracctices.
Com
mmitment: Ensure good
g workking conditions for employeess and enccourage
proffessional excellence.
e .
Tran
nsparency
y: Ensure e clear, accurate e and complete information in
commmunicatio akeholderss and take all decisio
ons with sta ons openly based on reliable
information.
Qua
ality of se
ervice: Pro
ovide state
e-of-the-artt technica
al and ma
anagerial services
s
with
hin agreed time frame
e.
Striv
ving towarrds excellence: Prom
mote continual improv
vement as an integral part of
our working and strive to
owards exc
cellence in
n all our endeavours.
y Policy
Quality
We pro ovide tech
hnical and manageriial assistance to da am ownerss and Statte Dam
Safety Organisations for prroper surve eillance, in
nspection, operation and mainttenance
of all dams
d and appurtena
a nt works inn India to ensure sa ning of dams and
afe function
protecting human erty and the environm
n life, prope ment.
We devvelop and nurture co ompetent manpower
m and equipp ourselvess with state
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We con ntinually im
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Compiled and publis shed by Cen ntral Water Commission

C under Dam
m Rehabilitatiion and Imprrovement
Project ((DRIP) as an
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First Nation

First National Dam Safety Conference was jointly organized by

To create a repository of the knowledge and experience reflected in the technical

C.K. Agrawal, Member (D&R)

Chennai Dr. B.R.K. Pillai

Recommendations based on the deliberations during the Conference

TS-II: Risk assessment and emergency preparedness

TS-III: Institutional arrangements and good management practices for sustainable

Recommendations based on the deliberations during the Conference

TS-IV: Latest Innovations and Methods for Monitoring Dam Health

TS-V: New Materials and Methods for Dam Rehabilitation

Periodic maintenance and adherence to codal requirements in dam construction is

Technical Session 2: Risk Assessment and Emergency Preparedness

Technical Session 3: Institutional Arrangements and Good Management Practices for

Technical Session 5: New Materials and Methods for Dam Rehabilitation

S.N. Titleofpaper Page#

S.N. Titleofpaper Page#

22. DamSafetyInstrumentationwithCaseStudy 172

Frequency Analysis for Non-stationary Flood Series

2. DESCRIPTION OF STUDY AREA

Table 1: Summary of annual flood data used

Sub- Number of Catchment Record Length

3 (a) Mahi and Sabarmati 4 30.1- 1094 20 25

3 (b) Lower Narmada and Tapi 9 17.2- 284.9 21-28

3 (c) Upper Narmada and Tapi 12 41.8- 2110.8 20 30

Table 2: Summary of rainfall data used in the study

State Number of rain gauge stations Record length (years)

Andhra Pradesh 24 20-96

5. IMPACT OF NON-STATIONARITY ON FREQUENCY ESTIMATES

Planning of Flood Storage Capacities of Upstream Reservoirs for

Arun R. Naik Sunanda N. Jagtap

Keywords: Flood Storage, Flood Mitigation, Inflow Hydrograph, Restricted Inflow

1. CASE STUDY: FLOOD MITIGATION AT AKOLA CITY, MAHARASHTRA

Protection work of Akola city included a scheme as under :

estrict the flo

2.1 Triall Studies to Restrict the

The interrcepted catchment area upto Akola city

4. DESIGN FLOOD CONSIDERED

5. ESTIMATION OF 1 IN 100 YEAR FLOOD AT AKOLA CITY

Clarks method is used for developing unit hydrograph. (Kolher)

5.1 Time of Travel

Table 2: Travel Time

Sr.No. Time of Travel Time of Travel

5.2 Base Flow

Sr.N C.A. Base flow

Table 4: Catchment wise Flood Peak

Sr.No. Sub Catchment Peak Corresponding To 1 In 100 Year

6. FLOOD STORAGE CAPACITIES PLANNED

c) Lower Morna Project

reservoirrs are operatted well, utilizing their flood storage capacity, th

1. IIS : 5477 - 197

Flood Estimate for possible Dam Break Scenario

Figure 2. Catchment area of Sun Ko

River Chainaage River bed

Figure 3. Possible fetch of

For the estimated volume

Figure 4. Mike11 model set up for dam break

For the breach width of 80m, breach

dam location and upp to the Kossi barrage lo

The estimated flood peak due to o landslide dam

Table 2. Estimated floo od peak due tto landslide da

Note: Kossi 10500.00 deenotes the loccation 10500 m downstream

Locatiomm (m) Initial flood Initial floo

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, HEC ( 2011): HEC-GeoRAS Users Manual