G.R. Nos.
89224-25 January 23, 1992 Both cases were appealed to the Court of Appeals, where
MAURICIO SAYSON, ROSARIO SAYSON-MALONDA,
BASILISA SAYSON-LIRIO, REMEDIOS SAYSON-REYES
and JUANA C. BAUTISTA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, DELIA SAYSON,
assisted by her husband, CIRILO CEDO, JR., EDMUNDO
SAYSON AND DORIBEL SAYSON, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
At issue in this case is the status of the private respondents
and their capacity to inherit from their alleged parents and
grandparents. The petitioners deny them that right,
asserting if for themselves to the exclusion of all others.
The relevant genealogical facts are as follows.
Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children, namely,
Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios and Teodoro. Eleno
died on November 10, 1952, and Rafaela on May 15, 1976.
Teodoro, who had married Isabel Bautista, died on March
23, 1972. His wife died nine years later, on March 26,
1981. Their properties were left in the possession of Delia,
Edmundo, and Doribel, all surnamed Sayson, who claim to
be their children.
On April 25, 1983, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, and
Remedios, together with Juana C. Bautista, Isabel's mother,
filed a complaint for partition and accounting of the
intestate estate of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson. It was
docketed as Civil Case No. 1030 in Branch 13 of the
Regional Trial Court of Albay. The action was resisted by
Delia, Edmundo and Doribel Sayson, who alleged
successional rights to the disputed estate as the decedents'
lawful descendants.
On July 11, 1983, Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed their
own complaint, this time for the accounting and partition
of the intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, against
the couple's four surviving children. This was docketed as
Civil Case No. 1042 in the Regional Trial Court of Albay,
Branch 12. The complainants asserted the defense they
raised in Civil Case No. 1030, to wit, that Delia and
Edmundo were the adopted children and Doribel was the
legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel. As such, they
were entitled to inherit Teodoro's share in his parents'
estate by right of representation.
Both cases were decided in favor of the herein private
respondents on the basis of practically the same evidence.
Judge Rafael P. Santelices declared in his decision dated
May 26,
1986, 1 that Delia and Edmundo were the legally adopted
children of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson by virtue of the
decree of adoption dated March 9, 1967. 2 Doribel was
their legitimate daughter as evidenced by her birth
certificate dated February 27, 1967. 3 Consequently, the
three children were entitled to inherit from Eleno and
Rafaela by right of representation.
In his decision dated September 30, 1986, 4 Judge Jose S.
Saez dismissed Civil Case No. 1030, holding that the
defendants, being the legitimate heirs of Teodoro and
Isabel as established by the aforementioned evidence,
excluded the plaintiffs from sharing in their estate.
Adoption
they were consolidated. In its own decision dated February
28, 1989, 5 the respondent court disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, in Civil Case No. 1030 (CA-
G.R. No. 11541), the appealed decision is
hereby AFFIRMED. In Civil case No. 1042
(CA-G.R. No. 12364), the appealed
decision is MODIFIED in that Delia and
Edmundo Sayson are disqualified from
inheriting from the estate of the deceased
spouses Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, but is
affirmed in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.
That judgment is now before us in this petition for review
by certiorari. Reversal of the respondent court is sought on
the ground that it disregarded the evidence of the
petitioners and misapplied the pertinent law and
jurisprudence when it declared the private respondents as
the exclusive heirs of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson.
The contention of the petitioners is that Delia and
Edmundo were not legally adopted because Doribel had
already been born on February 27, 1967, when the decree
of adoption was issued on March 9, 1967. The birth of
Doribel disqualified her parents from adopting. The
pertinent provision is Article 335 of the Civil Code, naming
among those who cannot adopt "(1) Those who have
legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or
natural children by legal fiction."
Curiously enough, the petitioners also argue that Doribel
herself is not the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and
Isabel but was in fact born to one Edita Abila, who
manifested in a petition for guardianship of the child that
she was her natural mother. 6
The inconsistency of this position is immediately apparent.
The petitioners seek to annul the adoption of Delia and
Edmundo on the ground that Teodoro and Isabel already
had a legitimate daughter at the time but in the same
breath try to demolish this argument by denying that
Doribel was born to the couple.
On top of this, there is the vital question of timeliness. It is
too late now to challenge the decree of adoption, years
after it became final and executory. That was way back in
1967. 7 Assuming the the petitioners were proper parties,
what they should have done was seasonably appeal the
decree of adoption, pointing to the birth of Doribel that
disqualified Teodoro and Isabel from adopting Delia and
Edmundo. They did not. In fact, they should have done this
earlier, before the decree of adoption was issued. They did
not, although Mauricio claimed he had personal knowledge
of such birth.
As the respondent court correctly observed:
When Doribel was born on February 27,
1967, or about TEN (10) days before the
issuance of the Order of Adoption, the
petitioners could have notified the court
about the fact of birth of DORIBEL and
perhaps withdrew the petition or perhaps
petitioners could have filed a petition for
the revocation or rescission of the
adoption (although the birth of a child is
Page 1
 not one of those provided by law for the
revocation or rescission of an adoption).
The court is of the considered opinion
that the adoption of the plaintiffs DELIA
and EDMUNDO SAYSON is valid,
outstanding and binding to the present,
the same not having been revoked or
rescinded.
Not having any information of Doribel's birth to Teodoro
and Isabel Sayson, the trial judge cannot be faulted for
granting the petition for adoption on the finding inter
alia that the adopting parents were not disqualified.
A no less important argument against the petitioners is
that their challenge to the validity of the adoption cannot
be made collaterally, as in their action for partition, but in
a direct proceeding frontally addressing the issue.
The settled rule is that a finding that the
requisite jurisdictional facts exists,
whether erroneous or not, cannot be
questioned in a collateral proceeding, for a
presumption arises in such cases where
the validity of the judgment is thus
attacked that the necessary jurisdictional
facts were proven [Freeman on
Judgments, Vol. I, Sec. 350, pp. 719-720].
(Emphasis supplied.)
In the case of Santos v. Aranzanso, 8 this Court declared:
Anent this point, the rulings are summed
up in 2 American Jurisprudence, 2nd
Series, Adoption, Sec. 75, p. 922, thus:
An adoption order
implies the finding of the
necessary facts and the
burden of proof is on the
party attacking it; it
cannot be considered
void merely because the
fact needed to show
statutory compliance is
obscure. While a judicial
determination of some
particular fact, such as
the abandonment of his
next of kin to the
adoption, may be
essential to the exercise
of jurisdiction to enter
the order of adoption,
this does not make it
essential to the
jurisdictional validity of
the decree that the fact
be determined upon
proper evidence, or
necessarily in
accordance with the
truth; a mere error
cannot affect the
jurisdiction, and the
determination must
stand until reversed on
appeal, and hence cannot
be collaterally attacked.
Adoption
If this were not the rule,
the status of adopted
children would always
be uncertain, since the
evidence might not be
the same at all
investigations, and might
be regarded with
different effect by
different tribunals, and
the adoption might be
held by one court to have
been valid, while another
court would hold it to
have been of no avail.
(Emphasis supplied.)
On the question of Doribel's legitimacy, we hold that the
findings of the trial courts as affirmed by the respondent
court must be sustained. Doribel's birth certificate is a
formidable piece of evidence. It is one of the prescribed
means of recognition under Article 265 of the Civil Code
and Article 172 of the Family Code. It is true, as the
petitioners stress, that the birth certificate offers
only prima facie evidence 9 of filiation and may be refuted
by contrary evidence. However, such evidence is lacking in
the case at bar.
Mauricio's testimony that he was present when Doribel
was born to Edita Abila was understandbly suspect,
coming as it did from an interested party. The affidavit of
Abila 10 denying her earlier statement in the petition for
the guardianship of Doribel is of course hearsay, let alone
the fact that it was never offered in evidence in the lower
courts. Even without it, however, the birth certificate must
be upheld in line with Legaspi v. Court of Appeals, 11 where
we ruled that "the evidentiary nature of public documents
must be sustained in the absence of strong, complete and
conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity."
Another reason why the petitioners' challenge must fail is
the impropriety of the present proceedings for that
purpose. Doribel's legitimacy cannot be questioned in a
complaint for partition and accounting but in a direct
action seasonably filed by the proper party.
The presumption of legitimacy in the Civil
Code . . . does not have this purely
evidential character. It serves a more
fundamental purpose. It actually fixes a
civil status for the child born in wedlock,
and that civil status cannot be attacked
collaterally. The legitimacy of the
child can be impugned only in a direct
action brought for that purpose, by the
proper parties, and within the period
limited by law.
The legitimacy of the child cannot be
contested by way of defense or as a
collateral issue in another action for a
different purpose. . . . 12 (Emphasis
supplied.)
In consequence of the above observations, we hold that
Doribel, as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel
Sayson, and Delia and Edmundo, as their adopted children,
are the exclusive heirs to the intestate estate of the
Page 2
deceased couple, conformably to the following Article 979
of the Civil Code:
Art. 979. Legitimate children and their
descendants succeed the parents and
other ascendants, without distinction as
to sex or age, and even if they should
come from different marriages.
An adopted child succeeds to the property
of the adopting parents in the same
manner as a legitimate child.
The philosophy underlying this article is that a person's
love descends first to his children and grandchildren
before it ascends to his parents and thereafter spreads
among his collateral relatives. It is also supposed that one
of his purposes in acquiring properties is to leave them
eventually to his children as a token of his love for them
and as a provision for their continued care even after he is
gone from this earth.
Coming now to the right of representation, we stress first
the following pertinent provisions of the Civil Code:
Art. 970. Representation is a right created
by fiction of law, by virtue of which the
representative is raised to the place and
the degree of the person represented, and
acquires the rights which the latter would
have if he were living or if he could have
inherited.
Art. 971. The representative is called to
the succession by the law and not by the
person represented. The representative
does not succeed the person represented
but the one who the person represented
would have succeeded.
Art. 981. Should children of the deceased
and descendants of other children who
are dead, survive, the former shall inherit
in their own right, and the latter by right
of representation.
There is no question that as the legitimate daughter of
Teodoro and thus the granddaughter of Eleno and Rafaela,
Doribel has a right to represent her deceased father in the
distribution of the intestate estate of her grandparents.
Under Article 981, quoted above, she is entitled to the
share her father would have directly inherited had he
survived, which shall be equal to the shares of her
grandparents' other children. 13
But a different conclusion must be reached in the case of
Delia and Edmundo, to whom the grandparents were total
strangers. While it is true that the adopted child shall be
deemed to be a legitimate child and have the same right as
the latter, these rights do not include the right of
representation. The relationship created by the adoption is
between only the adopting parents and the adopted child
and does not extend to the blood relatives of either
party. 14
In sum, we agree with the lower courts that Delia and
Edmundo as the adopted children and Doribel as the
legitimate daughter of Teodoro Sayson and Isabel Bautista,
are their exclusive heirs and are under no obligation to
Adoption
share the estate of their parents with the petitioners. The
Court of Appeals was correct, however, in holding that only
Doribel has the right of representation in the inheritance
of her grandparents' intestate estate, the other private
respondents being only the adoptive children of the
deceased Teodoro.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the challenged
decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto, with
costs against the petitioners.
A.M. No. RTJ-92-802 July 5, 1993
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, complainant,
vs.
HON. GENARO C. GINES, as Presiding Judge, Branch 26;
MA. GORGONIA L. FLORES, Court Interpreter and
Officer-in-Charge, Branch 26; ROSIE M. MUNAR,
Stenographic Reporter, Branch 26, PACITA B. DIAZ,
Staff Assistant IV, Office of the Clerk of Court; MA.
CONCEPCION B. DIAZ, Staff Assistant I, Branch 26, and
ALFREDO V. LACSAMANA, JR., Staff Assistant II, Branch
26, all of the RTC, San Fernando, La Union, respondents.
PER CURIAM:
This case was initiated by the Office of the Court
Administrator with the filing of an administrative
complaint which reads:
Pursuant to the Resolution of the Court En Banc, dated July
30, 1991, the undersigned hereby institutes this
administrative complaint against Judge Genaro C. Gines,
Presiding Judge, Branch 26; Ma. Gorgonia L. Flores, Court
Interpreter and Officer-in- Charge, Branch 26; Rosie M.
Munar, Stenographic Reporter, Branch 26; Pacita B. Diaz,
Staff Assistant IV, Office of the Clerk of Court; Ma.
Concepcion B. Diaz, Staff Assistant I, Branch 26; and Mr.
Alfredo V. Lacsamana, Jr., Staff II, Branch 26, all of the RTC,
San Fernando, La Union, for Dishonesty; Violation of par.
(e), Sec. 3 of R.A. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act) as amended; and Violation of Administrative Order
No. 6, dated June 30, 1975, Circular No. 7, dated September
23, 1974, and Administrative Order No. 1, dated January
28, 1988, by virtue of their collective illegal acts involving
deliberate and surreptitious assignment of cases at the
Docketing and Receiving Section, Office of the Clerk of
Court, RTC, San Fernando, La Union.
1. This complaint is substantially anchored on the Report
submitted by Atty. Aurora P. Sanglay, Clerk of Court, RTC,
San Fernando, La Union, relative to her investigation of the
alleged anomaly in the non-raffling of cases in the said
Court, and the Affidavit-complaint of Ma. Concepcion B.
Diaz dated September 19, 1991, implicating other court
personnel involved in the aforestated irregularity;
2. Atty. Sanglay, in her Report, averred that:
2.1. From April 3, 1989 to April, 1991, there were forty-
four (44) Special Proceedings cases, twenty-seven (27)
Land Registration cases, six (6) Civil Cases, and three (3)
Criminal Cases which were directly assigned to the RTC,
Branch 26, San Fernando, La Union, without passing
through the mandatory, raffling procedure, of cases except
for three (3) special proceedings cases which were
assigned to Branch 27, which anomaly had been going on
since 1986;
Page 3
2.2. Pacita Diaz, Ma. Concepcion Diaz and Alfredo
Lacsamana, Jr. were the court employees in-charge in (sic)
the receiving and docketing of the Land Registration Cases,
Special Proceedings cases and Civil Cases, respectively;
and
2.3. There is a probability that the aforesaid clerks, who
were in-charge of receiving the cases, did not submit
deliberately to the Officer-in-Charge, some of the cases
received from mandatory raffling in compliance with the
Administrative Orders/Circulars of the Supreme Court.
3. In the Affidavit-Complaint dated September 19, 1991, of
Ma. Concepcion B. Diaz, which was received by the Office
of the Court Administrator on September 20,1991, she
asserted, inter alia, that:
3.1. She blamed Judge Genaro C. Gines, Presiding Judge,
RTC, Branch 26, San Fernando, La Union, Ma. Gorgonia
Flores, Court Interpreter and Officer-In-Charge, same
Court, and Rosie Munar, Stenographic Reporter, same
Court, for applying pressures and intimidations to her in
order that the cases of their choice may no longer be
forwarded to the proper Officer-in-Charge;
3.2. Several petitions have been prepared by the (sic) Judge
Gines himself in coordination with his Stenographer Rosie
Munar and Court Interpreter Ma. Gorgonia Flores, some of
which are as follows:
3.2.1. Special Proceeding No. 1965 where the petitioner,
who alleged himself to be a resident of San Fernando, La
Union, is actually a resident of Sta. Cruz, Ilocos Sur and the
Aunt of Judge Gines. The required bond of P500.00 therein
has not yet been posted: and
3.2.2. Special Proceeding No. 1967 where the Office of the
Solicitor General and other parties were not furnished
with copies of the petition upon the instruction of Judge
Gines.
The respondents were then required to answer the
complaint.
Separate motions for an extension of time to file their
answers were made by the respondents, but only
respondents Pacita Diaz and Ma. Concepcion Diaz filed
their Answer within the extended period. The Resolution
which granted the others the extension warned them that
no further postponements would be granted.
Notwithstanding such caveat, however, they again asked
for another extension. In the Resolution of 28 May 1992,
this Court ruled, inter alia, that:
It appearing that said respondents have not taken this case
seriously, and considering the prior warning in the
Resolution of 7 May 1992, the above motions for another
extension of time to file the Answers are hereby DENIED.
The respondent Judge and respondents Flores, Munar and
Lacsamana are deemed to have waived the filing of their
Answer.
As it turned out, respondents Flores, Munar and
Lacsamana were able to post their joint Answers on 15
May 1992 the last day of the additional period they had
prayed for in their second motion which was eventually
denied in the aforementioned Resolution.
Adoption
Respondents then filed a motion to reconsider the
Resolution of 28 May 1992; the same was denied in the
Resolution of 14 July 1992. This latter resolution likewise
denied the respondent Judge's motion to reconsider the 7
May 1992 Resolution wherein he prayed that his answer
(actually a Comment), dated 14 May 1992, be admitted.
However, this Court resolved that the said comment be
attached to the record of the instant case.
In the same 14 July 1992 Resolution, the instant case was
referred to Mr. Justice Nathanael P. De Pano, Jr. of the
Court of Appeals for investigation, report, and
recommendation.
On 31 March 1993, Justice De Pano, Jr. submitted his 26-
page REPORT. It appears therefrom that on 2 September
1992, he issued an order (a) requiring the parties to file
respective affidavits which shall serve as their direct
testimonies in this case subject, however, to cross-
examination by the adverse parties and (b) setting the
initial hearing of the case for 28 September 1992.
Respondents Pacita Diaz and Ma. Concepcion Diaz
submitted their joint affidavit, dated 9 September 1992, as
well as the affidavits of Fortunata Gualberto, retired
branch clerk of court of Branch 27 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in San Fernando, La Union, and Consolacion
M. Dulay, Clerk III of the same Branch 27. Respondents
Gorgonia Flores, Rosie Munar and Alfredo Lacsamana
likewise submitted their individual affidavits which are all
dated 14 September 1992. Respondent Judge Gines, for his
part, filed a manifestation dated 17 September 1992,
adopting his 14 May 1992 Comment as his direct
testimony as well as the aforesaid affidavits of respondents
Flores, Munar and Lacsamana.
At the hearing on 28 September 1992, the parties entered
into a stipulation of facts. They agreed on the status and
personal circumstances of the parties as stated in the
affidavits, as well as the descriptions of their respective
positions in the RTC in San Fernando, La Union; the
assumption into office of the respondent Judge in January
of 1987; the non-membership of the respondent Judge and
the other respondents in the raffle committee; and the
procedure prescribed for the raffling of cases filed with the
RTC in San Fernando, La Union. The respondents then
marked as exhibits their affidavits and other documents.
It further appears from the REPORT that no testimonial
evidence was offered by the parties. While the complainant
wanted to present Atty. Sanglay, the respondents admitted
her report and agreed to dispense with her testimony. The
complainant then marked in evidence the following
documents: (1) the undated Report of Atty. Aurora Sanglay
to the Executive Judge, as Exhibit "A"; (2) the 17 June 1991
Letter of Atty. Aurora Sanglay addressed to the Executive
Judge, with annexes, as Exhibit "B"; (3) the Joint Affidavit
of Pacita and Ma. Concepcion Diaz dated 11 September
1992, as Exhibit "C"; (4) the Compliance of respondents
Flores, Munar and Lacsamana, Jr., as Exhibit "D"; (5) the
Affidavit of respondent Flores dated 14 September 1992,
as Exhibit "E"; (6) the Affidavit of Romeo Hermosura dated
14 September 1992, as Exhibit "F"; (7) the Affidavit of
Teodorico Basilio dated 14 September 1992, as Exhibit
"G"; (8) the Affidavit of respondent Munar, dated 14
September 1992, as Exhibit "H"; (9) the Affidavit of
respondent Lacsamana, Jr. dated 14 September 1992, as
Exhibit "I"; and (10) the Manifestation of respondent Judge
Gines dated 17 September 1992, as Exhibit "J". It appears
that counsel for the complainant expressed a desire to
cross-examine respondents Flores, Munar and Lacsamana
Page 4
but that the latter's counsel objected on the ground of
possible self-incrimination. These three respondents
further manifested that they were not presenting any
evidence against the other respondents. Respondents
Pacita Diaz and Concepcion Diaz likewise manifested,
through counsel, that they will not present evidence on
account of the possibility of self-incrimination. Respondent
Judge Gines did not present his evidence.
Justice De Pano, Jr. then made the following observations,
findings and conclusions in his REPORT:
Executive Judge Braulio Yaranon of the San Fernando, La
Union Regional Trial Court, in a letter dated June 20, 1991,
transmitted to the Court, the report dated June 17, 1991, of
Attorney Aurora Sanglay, the said Court's Clerk of Court,
on the subject of cases that had not been raffled by the
appropriate committee on raffle but which nevertheless,
found their way mostly, to Branch 26 of the said Court
(presided over by respondent Genaro Gines from January
1987) and Branch 27 (the letter and its annexes were later
marked Exhibit B). In 1986, the report states, 6 criminal
cases, 9 civil cases, 51 special proceeding cases and 9 land
registration cases, (a total of 75 cases) did not pass
through the raffle committee but went directly to the
branch which apparently acted on the cases without
question. In 1987, 8 criminal cases, 9 civil cases, 13 special
proceedings cases, 2 land registration cases (a total of 32
cases) did not pass through the raffle committee. In 1988,
9 civil cases, 18 special proceedings cases and 2 land
registration cases (a total of 29 cases) went directly to the
branches mentioned. A total of 136 cases from 1986 to
1988, Attorney Sanglay reports, went from
filing/docketing direct to two branches without
undergoing the mandated raffle by the raffle committee.
The more germane report, one which demonstrates the
continuing perpetuation of the above obviously illegal and
nefarious system of directing cases filed with the Regional
Trial Court of San Fernando, La Union to Branches 26 and
27 of that court, is the undated report of Clerk of Court
Aurora P. Sanglay to Executive Judge Braulio Yaranon, and
received by his office on June 6, 1991. The letter,
uncontroverted, is marked Exhibit A, Court Administrator,
and it reads thus:
In compliance to (sic) your memorandum dated May 23,
1991, directing the undersigned to make an investigation
re the matter of cases filed before my office (Office of the
Clerk of Court), which did not undergo the mandatory
raffle procedure, herewith are my findings:
The period covered by my investigation is from April 3,
1989 to April 1991. In summary, during this period, there
were FORTY-FOUR (44) Special Cases, TWENTY-SEVEN
(27) Land Registration Cases, SIX (6) Civil Cases, and
THREE (3) Criminal Cases which did not pass through
raffle, but which were instead directed to specific RTC
Branches, particularly Branch 26 and Branch 27. A great
majority of these cases however were assigned to Branch
26.
Attached is the list of these cases mentioned for your
reference. This data obtained (sic) by counterchecking the
Minutes of previous raffles covering the period of my
investigation vis-a-vis the corresponding docket books.
Adoption
Until your memorandum dated May 24, 1991, the
following persons were in-charge of receiving and
docketing the following kinds of cases:
Mrs. Pacita Diaz Land Registration Cases
Miss Ma. Concepcion Diaz Special Proceedings Cases
Mr. Alfredo Lacsamana Civil Cases
Criminal Cases were docketed by Mr. Vicente Tatunay of
the Prosecutor's Office and received by either Mr. Alfredo
Lacsamana, Jr., the person handling all cases filed for raffle,
or Mr. Oscarlito Fantastico or any of the clerks in the OCC,
in his absence.
Supposed to be, all these filed cases are to be turned over
to Mr. Alfredo Lacsamana, Jr. for raffle, but as per my
findings, some of these cases were not at all included in the
mandatory raffle, but were instead directed to specific RTC
Branches. The possibility is not remote that these clerks
in-charge of receiving their respective cases deliberately
did not submit some of their received cases for raffle.
A lapse in the system and poor monitoring also provided
for this thing to happen. Instances are common where a
client/lawyer is allowed possession of the papers to be
filed at certain critical stages of the receiving process,
specifically after the docketing and payment of filing fees,
and after said stages, the possibility is not likewise remote
that these papers are not submitted to the person in-
charge of the raffle.
The undersigned had already instituted procedures, i.e.
centralized receiving, payment of filing fees, docketing, and
has strengthen (sic) monitoring of the cases and the
number of cases filed to prevent occurrence (sic) of similar
nature. (Exhibit A, Court Administrator, pp. 76-77, rec., 3rd
Folder.)
Clerk of Court Sanglay's report includes 44 special
proceedings cases, 27 land registration cases, 6 civil cases
and 3 criminal cases or a total of 80 cases that did not pass
through raffle from April, 1989 to April, 1991 but found
their way directly to Branches 26 and 27 of the Regional
Trial Court of San Fernando, La union. Of these 80 cases,
all, except 3, found their way to Branch 26, occupied by
respondent Judge Genaro Gines who, as he admits, was
assigned in (sic) that branch since January, 1987.
The respondents here are Judge Genaro Gines, the
incumbent presiding judge of Branch 26 of the RTC in
Judicial Region No. 1 based in San Fernando, La Union;
Pacita Diaz, a staff member in that court now retired in the
period covered by the Sanglay report, in charge of filing
and docketing of land registration cases; Pacita Diaz's
daughter, Ma. Concepcion Diaz, another staff member in
Branch 26, during the period covered by the Sanglay
report, the clerk in charge of the filing and docketing of
special proceedings cases; Alfredo Lacsamana, Jr., in the
period covered by the Sanglay report the clerk in-charge of
the filing and docketing of civil cases; Rosie Munar, court
stenographic reporter; and Ma. Gorgonia Flores, court
interpreter and the Officer-in-Charge of Branch 26.
Francisco Lacsamana, Jr., additionally, was assigned to
gather all cases filed and docketed in the week civil,
criminal, special proceedings, land one day before the
weekly raffle, and to transmit these newly filed cases to the
Committee on Raffle. Ma. Gorgonia Flores, Officer-in-
Page 5
Charge of Branch 26, oversees the administrative
machinery of Branch 26 (pp. 8-9, t.s.n., September 28,
1992).
The respondents felt that since the Court Administrator
limited himself to the sworn statement and report of Clerk
of Court Attorney Aurora Sanglay, they were not called
upon to present evidence in their behalf as it would
amount to self-incrimination. They refused to testify; they
refused to be cross-examined. Your investigator informs
the Court that the Sanglay affidavit and report are
uncontroverted. Admissions in the sworn statements
forming part of the record are utilized in this report in
addition to the stipulated facts.
The respondents are charged in the administrative
complaint:
(1) for dishonesty, in violation of paragraph (e), section 3
of Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, as amended;
(2) for violation of Administrative Order No. 6, dated June
30, 1975;
(3) for violation of Circular No. 7, dated September 23,
1974; and
(4) for violation of Administrative Order No. 1, dated
January 28, 1988.
The last three, Supreme Court issues, have to do with the
creation of a raffle committee in multi-branch Regional
Trial Courts, with supervision of the raffle of newly-filled
cases; with the manner of raffling cases, and establish the
policy that no case, in multi-branch trial courts, may be
assigned to any branch or sala unless it had undergone the
raffle process.
Supreme Court Circular No. 7, September 23, 1974
mandates that in courts with several branches, cases shall
be assigned to the different branches only by raffle. "No
case may be assigned to any branch without being raffled."
(Part I) And immediately after raffle, the Executive Judge is
mandated by the said Circular to indicate the particular
branch to which the case is raffled, "the same to be written
in words and in figures on the cover of the Rollo and on the
first page of the original complaint or information and
initialled by the Executive Judge and the two other officers
who attended said raffle." (Part III). The same circular
created a raffle committee of three, composed of the
Executive Judge and two other judges of the court. The
Executive Judge, supervises the Raffle. Administrative
Circular No. 1, (January 28, 1988) reiterates strict
compliance with Administrative Order No. 6 (June 30,
1975) and Circular No. 7 (September 23, 1974 Raffle of
cases, this later Circular required, must be "in open session
in the presence of lawyers and spectators . . . . ." (Section
8.1). The Court in this later Circular restated the res ipso
loquitor (sic) rule regarding the conduct and removal of
judges (Section 5.2).
It is therefore, beyond cavil, that under the rules governing
the administration of courts, all cases filed in court must go
through the raffle committee for assignment. No case must
be assigned, in multi-branch courts, unless it is raffled by
the Raffle Committee. The 80 cases involved in this case,
filed from April 1989 to April 1991, were not raffled, but
were directly assigned to, or taken by, Branch 26 (except
Adoption
3) under respondent Judge Gines. Respondent Judge Gines
must know, under the above Supreme Court acts, at a
simple glance on the cover of the rollo and the first page of
every such record, whether a case was assigned to him
after going through raffle or not. Cases assigned to his
branch, after going through the required raffle, show on
the face of the rollo, in words and in figures, the branch to
which the case is assigned, authenticated by the initials of
the Executive Judge and the two other members of the
Committee. From January 1987, when respondent Judge
Gines was appointed to Branch 26, the respondent judge
had received unraffled cases, considered them and decided
them. He had done so, apparently, not because he was a
maniac of a worker, nor because he loved his work but for
reasons unspoken in this case. Why should a sane judge
accept additional cases for study and decision, in addition
to his regular load, without any benefit or consideration?
Here obviously, the res ipso loquitor (sic) doctrine applies.
Among the administrative officers charged here, Alfredo
Lacsamana, Jr., as stipulated, gathers all the cases filed and
docketed in any particular week, for transmittal to the
Committee on Raffle. He prepared the cases for raffle,
including the preparation of the pieces of paper properly
written on, to be picked in the raffle. It was his job to do so.
He was assigned to do so; he admitted so. That he did not
do so is obvious from the Sanglay Report from 1989 to
1991, he failed to transmit 80 cases and these cases
found their way (except for 3) to respondent Judge Gines.
The Sanglay report is not controverted. It was Lacsamana's
job to collect all cases docketed, and to transmit them to
the Raffle Committee. 80 such cases he did collect and
failed to report to the Raffle Committee from April, 1989 to
April, 1991.
The Diazes, in the period covered by the Sanglay report
had apparently fallen out with respondent Judge Gines and
respondents Flores, Munar and Lacsamana. In an affidavit
dated September 18, 1991 executed by respondent Ma.
Concepcion Diaz, the following passages appear, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
The conflict between the Diazes and the other respondents
deem (sic) to have arisen from the suspicion the
respondent Judge entertained that the Diazes had
'squealed' on him to the Executive Judge, the Honorable
Braulio Yaranon. This is contained in the Diazes Joint
Affidavit dated September 9, 1992 (Marked C-Diaz), in the
following passage:
xxx xxx xxx
As to the two other respondents, respondents Ma.
Gorgonia Flores, who is officer-in-charge of Branch 26 and
Rosie Munar, court interpreter, there appears to be no
evidence. The record shows that when the Court
Administrator's lawyers rested their case with the
presentation of the Sanglay report, the respondents
refused to be cross-examined on their sworn statements.
Consequently, each sworn statement lost value as evidence
against the other respondents. However, it may be easily
inferred that as court officer-in-charge, respondent Flores
was in (sic)-duty bound to supervise the work of her
subalterns. The non-raffling of 80 cases during the period
covered from April, 1989 to April 1991 reflects her failure
to do her job.
xxx xxx xxx
Page 6
The Supreme Court orders and circulars complained of as
having been violated, are directed to district judges, while
Section 3, paragraph (e) of RA 3019 is inclusive in scope,
penalizing public officers for causing undue injury to any
party . . . . or giving any private party any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
official, administrative a (sic) judicial functions through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence. . . .
The prosecution had limited itself to presenting the
Sanglay report. It is apparent that we must take the Diazes'
statement that they were pressured to do that which they
had to do, and whatever it was, was done without consent,
and against their will. However, under the facts here, all
the cases filed docketed in Branch 26 were collected by
respondent Lacsamana, Jr., who was in (sic) duty bound to
forward the cases to the Raffle Committee. That 80 such
cases did not find their way to the Committee, but ended
up as 80 extra cases (except 3) in the docket load of the
respondent judge, means at the very least that Lacsamana,
Jr., failed to perform his job. The respondent judge in
accepting or securing, such 80 cases, (minus 3) that did not
pass through raffle, for his action and resolution, and
which he eventually resolved violated all the Supreme
Court circulars on the matter with the help and
cooperation of respondent Lacsamana, Jr. Evidently,
respondent judge must have received undue benefits and
advantages (which have not been demonstrated in this
case) in securing this extra load of cases, benefits and
advantages coming from the party benefited (sic) by his
action, and at the same time, granted the parties involved
in the some (sic) 80 cases that did not undergo raffle,
undue and unwarranted benefits resulting from the bias
and partiality in their favor coming from the respondent
judge. As earlier observed, a single glance at the cover and
first page of each of the 80 or so rollos would show that
they were unraffled, and yet, the respondent judge
knowing that such cases were unraffled, secured the said
cases, considered them and decided or resolved them, in
violation of law.
It would appear, therefore, that the respondent judge is
guilty of the charges in the administrative complaint. Along
with him as guilty, is respondent Alfredo Lacsamana, Jr.
This conclusion is bolstered by, among other things, the
Diazes' statement that cases were indeed directly secured
by the respondent judge without their undergoing raffle.
With respect to the other respondents, it could be deduced
that the respondent Ma. Gorgonia Flores, as officer-in-
charge of Branch 26, would have known that Alfredo
Lacsamana, Jr. was not doing his job of forwarding all
docketed cases to the Raffle Committee faithfully.
He then recommends:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended:
1. That respondent Judge Genaro C. Gines be appropriately
penalized for violation of all the Supreme Court orders and
circulars mentioned in the Administrative Complaint for
the period covered from April 1989 to April 1991, plus
apparent violation of Section 3, paragraph (e) of R.A. 3019;
2. That respondent Alfredo Lacsamana, Jr. for his apparent
failure to do his job, be, likewise appropriately penalized,
at least with a 6-month suspension without pay; and
Adoption
3. That respondent Ma. Gorgonia Flores be likewise
penalized with a 3-month suspension without pay; and
4. That the other respondents be warned against
committing any such violations.
The continuing deliberate violations of Administrative
Order No. 6 (dated 30 June 1975), Circular No. 7 (dated 23
September 1974) and Administrative Order No. 1 (dated
28 January 1988) for the years reported in Atty. Sanglay's
report, and their belated discovery boggle our minds. The
irregularities should have been easily discovered by the
respondent Judge either because the fact that a case has
not been properly raffled off is at once discernible on the
cover of the records and on the first page of the original of
the initial pleading (complaint, information, etc.), or
because plain common sense would have told him that
something was wrong somewhere as an unusual number
of cases of the same class had been "assigned" to his sala.
That he had failed to appreciate the physical evidence or,
at the very least, exhibit surprise at the unusual number of
cases is quite amazing. Thus, we are loathe to grant him
the benefit of the doubt and conclude that he had no
interest whatsoever in having those cases raffled off to him
and that he only loved to work more than the others. Given
the circumstances of this case, we cannot merely cut him
some slack and assume good faith on his part; he deserves
no such treatment. As the investigating Justice himself
assessed the situation:
. . . . The 80 cases involved in this case, filed from April
1989 to April 1991, were not raffled, but were directly
assigned to, or taken by, Branch 26 (except 3) under
respondent Judge Gines. Respondent Judge Gines, must
know, under the above Supreme Court acts, at a simple
glance on the cover of the rollo and the first page of every
such record, whether a case was assigned to him after
going through raffle or not. . . . From January 1987, when
respondent Judge Gines was appointed to Branch 26, the
respondent judge had received unraffled cases, considered
them and decided them. He had done so, apparently, not
because he was a maniac of a worker, nor because he loved
his work but for reasons unspoken in this case. Why
should a sane judge accept additional cases for study and
decision, in addition to his regular load, without any
benefit or consideration? Here, obviously, the res ipso
loquitor (sic) doctrine applies.
The irregularity and violations of the aforementioned
administrative orders and circular could not have been
committed so blatantly, brazenly and openly for an
unusually long period of time if the respondent Judge did
not have the cooperation of some of the court employees.
We therefore agree with the investigating Justice that such
support and cooperation were extended by subordinates
who likewise had something to do with the raffle of cases.
Hence, the findings on the degree of participation, either
by commission or omission, of respondents Flores and
Lacsamana are sustained.
In his report, the investigating Justice absolves the Diazes
and Munar from responsibility in the aforesaid
irregularities.
With respect to respondent Pacita Diaz, the case has
become moot as she died on 10 February 1993. 1 Thus, the
case is dismissed insofar as she is concerned.
Page 7
On the other hand, while we find no evidence to link
respondent Munar to the aforementioned irregularities,
we hold that respondent Ma. Concepcion Diaz is not
entirely blameless. In her affidavit of 18 September 1991,
the relevant portions of which are quoted in the REPORT
of Justice de Pano, she explicitly admitted:
11. In my explanation dated May 27, 1991 to the
Memorandum of Judge Yaranon, while I might have made
an admission that I was the clerk receiving cases that later
turned out to be unraffled, I placed the direct blame on
Judge Gines and my two officemates, namely, Mrs. Ma.
Gorgonia L. Flores and Mrs. Rosie Munar who had applied
all sorts of pressures upon me, including series (sic) of
intimidation and, insinuations in order that cases of their
choice receive (sic) by me may no longer be forwarded to
the proper officer-in-charge of the raffle, but to them
directly in Branch 26. 2
It is to be noted that Ma. Concepcion did not elaborate on
the nature of such intimidation and insinuations. In view of
the fact, however, that she was in charge of receiving and
docketing special proceedings cases, and that out of the
controversial 80 unraffled cases, 44 were special
proceedings cases, her participation could, by no means,
be considered as insignificant. And even if the alleged
"intimidation" and "insinuations" were true, they still
would not exculpate her in view of the length of time
involved, the number of cases questioned and the absence
of proof that such intimidation and insinuations were
persistent, continuous and irresistible. It is thus clear that
she had, by neglecting her duty, allowed herself to be used
by the other respondents.
A far more serious matter which has escaped the attention
of the investigating Justice involves the charges set forth
under paragraph 3 of the Administrative Complaint,
particularly on the preparation by the respondent Judge,
allegedly in coordination with respondents Munar and
Flores, of petitions in certain cases, some of which are (a)
Special Proceeding No. 1965 wherein it is made to appear
that the petitioner therein an aunt of the respondent Judge
and a resident of Sta. Cruz, Ilocos Sur resides in San
Fernando, La Union, and (b) Special Proceeding No. 1967
wherein the Office of the Solicitor General and the other
parties were not furnished with copies of the petition upon
order of the respondent Judge. Not having undergone the
prescribed raffle procedure, these two cases were directly
assigned to the respondent Judge who then acted thereon.
The said petitions, the pertinent orders issued in the
course of the proceedings therein and the minutes thereof
were attached by the respondent Judge to his 14 May 1993
Comment, which he had adopted as his direct testimony
pursuant to his 17 September 1992 Manifestation (Exhibit
"J"). These documents provide conclusive proof of more
serious irregularities amounting to either gross ignorance
or malicious disregard of applicable procedural laws, grave
misconduct, grave abuse of authority and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The
respondent Judge made a mockery of the judicial process
as it is obvious that he had displayed a special interest in
these cases; in fact, he even caused the cases to be
excluded from the raffle. A careful review of the
abovementioned petitions will reveal that the designation
"Branch 26," indicating the branch presided over by the
respondent Judge, has been originally typewritten as part
of the caption, and not merely entered in the blank space
reserved for the branch to which the case may
subsequently be raffled off. It is to be further observed that
the petition in Special Proceeding No. 1965 was subscribed
Adoption
and sworn to before respondent Flores in her capacity as
the Officer-in-Charge of the Office of the Clerk of Court,
Branch 26.
Special Proceeding No. 1965 involves a petition for
guardianship over the person and property of a certain
Juan R. Lagmay. The said petition was filed by Regina
Lagmay Valdez who claims to be a resident of Poblacion,
San Fernando, La Union 3 on 24 September 1990, and
alleges that Juan R. Lagmay is "presently residing at No.
2579 Pamintuan Village, Mabalacat, Pampanga." Upon its
filing, the respondent Judge immediately issued an order
(a) giving due course to the petition, (b) directing that
notices be served to Juan Lagmay's nearest of kin, namely
Bonifacia Lagmay, Lilia Gumangan and Mariano Lagmay,
all residents of Las-ud, Sta. Cruz, Ilocos Sur and (c)
directing the latter to submit their opposition to the
petition, if any, on or before 8 October 1990 at 8:30
a.m. 4 No order setting the case for hearing at that
particular date, time and place was issued. It would
appear, however, that this 24 September 1990 order was
considered by the respondent Judge as the order setting
the case for hearing on 8 October 1990 because
respondent Flores prepared the Minutes of the alleged
proceedings conducted on 8 October
1990. 5 The said Minutes show that the following exhibits
were offered for jurisdictional purposes,: (1) Notice of
hearing, as Exhibit "A" and (b) the dorsal side of Exhibit
"A," purportedly to show that Juan Lagmay's nearest of kin
were furnished with the notice of hearing, as Exhibit "A-1.
" Said Minutes further disclose that the petitioner therein
was not assisted by counsel; that respondent Flores acted
as Interpreter while respondent Munar acted as
Stenographer; and that since no opposition was filed
therein, the testimony of the petitioner was received. The
latter then allegedly declared that she is a resident of
Poblacion, San Fernando, La Union; she is Juan Lagmay's
niece as he is her father's brother; and Juan Lagmay is an
American citizen, single, childless, a resident of 2579
Pamintuan Village, Mabalacat, Pampanga and a retired
seaman receiving pension from the Social Security
Administration of the United States of America in the
amount of $550.00 a month. Thereafter, the respondent
Judge issued an order appointing petitioner Regina Valdez
as the guardian of the person and property of Juan R.
Lagmay, and directing her to take her oath as such upon
the filing of a bond of P500.00, after which she would be
issued letters of guardianship. Without the bond having
first been filed, however, respondent Flores administered
the oath to Regina Valdez. 6 Thereafter, or on 18 October
1990, respondent Flores issued to the latter her letters of
guardianship. 7
A closer examination of the so-called proofs of notice of
hearing to the nearest of kin, consisting supposedly of
"registry return receipts," reveals that there are no entries
in the blanks reserved for information on the name of
sender, name of post office, municipality or province
where the same post office is located, registry number and
case number. It is not likewise indicated therein when the
addressees received the "registered" letter. In view
thereof, the conclusion that the so-called notices were not
sent at all is inevitable.
Respondent Judge knew or ought to have known that his
court was not the proper venue for the case because the
person sought to be placed under guardianship was
alleged to be a resident of Mabalacat, Pampanga. Section 1,
Rule 92 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that:
Page 8
Guardianship of the person or estate of a minor or
incompetent may be instituted in the Court of First
Instance of the province, or in the justice of the peace court
of the municipality, or in the municipal court of the
chartered city where the minor or incompetent resides,. . . .
(emphasis supplied).
Worse, the aforesaid Order of 24 September 1990 did not
even direct that notice be served on Juan Lagmay, the very
party sought to be placed under guardianship. Such an
omission, therefore, clearly violated Section 3, Rule 93 of
the Revised Rules of Court which directs the court to fix
the time and place for hearing and cause reasonable notice
to be given to the person named in the petition, including
the minor if above 14 years of age or the incompetent
himself. We have ruled that service of notice to the minor
above 14 years of age or the incompetent is
jurisdictional. 8 Failing to have notice sent to Juan Lagmay,
respondent Judge had no jurisdiction to proceed with the
hearing on 8 October 1990, receive the petitioner's
testimony, if he did at all, and thereafter appoint her as
Juan Lagmay's guardian. Nor was the respondent Judge
justified in issuing on 22 January 1990 pursuant to the
petitioner's 17 January 1990 motion 9 an order
appointing deputy sheriffs Oscar Fantastico and Romualdo
Baladad as special sheriffs to take custody over the person
of Juan Lagmay from one Florencio "Boy" Cortes of
Bolinao, Pangasinan. In the said order, respondent Judge
further directed Boy Cortes "to release from his custody
and deliver the person of said Juan R. Lagmay, a.k.a. John R.
Lagmay to the aforementioned special sheriffs
immediately upon receipt of this Order, under pain of
contempt." 10 Based on the special sheriffs'
report, 11 however, Boy Cortes did not release Juan Lagmay
because the latter was too weak and sickly to travel. This
refusal prompted the respondent Judge to order Boy
Cortes' arrest (for contempt) and confinement until he
shall have complied with the said order. 12 It was
respondent Flores who forwarded the warrant of arrest to
the PNP Regional Command at San Fernando, La Union for
its service. 13
Having acquired no jurisdiction to hear the case and
appoint Regina Valdez as Juan Lagmay's guardian,
respondent Judge acted clearly beyond his authority when
he designated special sheriffs to take custody of Juan
Lagmay, directed the person who had custody over the
latter to deliver him to the said special sheriffs and
ordered the arrest of the said person who refused to
surrender custody. And even if we are to assume, for the
sake of argument, that the respondent Judge had validly
acquired jurisdiction over the case and appointed Regina
Lagmay as guardian, and that Boy Cortes did in fact refuse
to deliver Juan Lagmay to the special sheriffs, he
(respondent Judge) would still be guilty of gross ignorance
of the law for ordering Cortes' arrest and confinement. In
such a situation, the petitioner's remedy would be to file a
petition for habeas corpus, and not to have Boy Cortes cited
for contempt, much less arrested.
We shall now focus our attention to Special Proceeding No.
1967. It is very strange proceeding. The case involves a
petition for the "judicial confirmation of the de
facto adoption" of Cecilia Averion filed on 11 October
1990. The petitioner therein alleges that she and her late
husband, Fernando Averion who died in 1987
"adopted" Cecilia Averion in 1967; only 1 year and 3
months old at the time, Cecilia was supposedly given up by
her natural parents, the whereabouts of whom remain
unknown. Petitioner further avers that she and her
Adoption
husband, during his lifetime, reared the child and gave her
all their love, attention, care and understanding. They also
provided her with an education and considered her as
their own child. Hence, the petition was filed "for the
purpose of judicially confirming the de facto adoption of
Cecilia Averion by herein petitioner and her late
husband." 14 The said petition was not accompanied by the
written consent of Cecilia Averion who, at the time of filing,
was already of legal age. On the very day the petition was
filed, respondent Judge forthwith issued a Notice of
Hearing which provided that the petition would be heard
on 31 October 1990; it was likewise ordered therein that
"a copy of this notice be published once a week for three
consecutive weeks at the expense of the petitioner in a
newspaper of general circulation in La Union and in the
Philippines." 15
From the so-called Minutes of the proceedings of 31
October 1990, 16 as prepared by respondent, Flores, it
appears that the following exhibits were offered to
establish the jurisdiction of the court: (1) the affidavit of
the Editor of the North Tribune, "a newspaper of general
circulation in La Union and Northern Luzon provinces,"
published in San Fernando, La Union, as Exhibit "A"; (2)
clippings of the published order in the 10, 17 and 24
October 1990 issues of the North Tribune, as Exhibits "A-l,"
"A-2" and "A-3," respectively; and (3) the entire issues of
the North Tribune for 10, 17 and 24 October 1990, as
Exhibits "B," "B-1" and "B-2," respectively. It may further
be gleaned from the said Minutes that since no opposition
was registered by any other party, the petitioner's
testimony was received by the court. On 6 November
1990, the respondent Judge handed down a
decision 17 granting the petition and decreeing as follows:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves the petition and
hereby confirms the de facto adoption of Cecilia Averion by
herein petitioner and her late spouse Fernando Averion
retroactive to the year 1967.
The remedy pursued in Special Proceeding No. 1967 is
certainly unusual as we are not aware of any prescribed
action that may be instituted for the judicial confirmation
of a de facto adoption. Nor do our adjective and
substantive laws on adoption provide for such a
proceeding. In fact, the only proper and authorized
procedure relative to adoption is outlined in the rule on
adoption itself. 18 That Cecilia Averion had been treated by
the petitioner and her husband as their own child during
the former's minority may only provide compelling
reasons to grant the decree of adoption notwithstanding
her (Cecilia's) having attained the age of majority. This is
one of the exceptions provided by the Family Code to the
rule that a person of legal age cannot be adopted. 19
In "confirming" the so-called de facto adoption and
decreeing the same to be "retroactive to the year 1967,"
respondent Judge has carved a name for himself in history
for, as already pointed out, no action or proceeding for
judicial confirmation of a de facto adoption is authorized in
this jurisdiction. Furthermore, by its very nature and
purpose, a decree of adoption can never be made to
retroact. Lastly, considering that the petitioner's husband
had died in 1987, or three years before the petition was
filed, he could not now be resurrected for purposes of the
adoption, be in fact declared an adopter and be
subsequently bound by the decree to the prejudice of his
heirs.
Page 9
Then too, respondent Judge completely disregarded the
fact that Cecilia Averion had submitted no written consent
to the adoption at the time of the filing of the petition or at
any subsequent date a manifest infirmity. Nor was
Cecilia called to testify in the case. Moreover there seems
to be an irregularity in the publication of the notice of
hearing. It is to be observed that as indicated in the upper
right hand corner of the first page of the petition, the
proceeding was instituted on 11 October 1990. If this were
so, the notice of hearing which was issued by the
respondent Judge on that same date 20 could not have been
published in the North Tribune in its 10 October 1990
issue. In his affidavit, the Editor of the said newspaper
disclosed that the notice was indeed published on 10
October 1990.
All told, respondent Judge completely ignored the
procedural rules on adoption and promulgated guidelines
for himself to suit his own purpose and design.
Hence, it is evident that Special Proceeding No. 1965 and
Special Proceeding No. 1967 were not only directly filed
with the court of the respondent Judge without passing
through the raffle procedure, the two cases were also
resolved by the latter in a manner that may be
characterized by gross ignorance or the brazen and blatant
disregard of the applicable procedural laws, grave
misconduct, palpable abuse of authority and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service. He is
therefore unfit to continue in the service a day longer. He
has evidently forgotten that the administration of justice is
a sacred task. Upon assumption to office, a judge ceases to
be an ordinary mortal. He becomes "the visible
representation of the law and, more importantly, of
justice." 21 A judge must be the embodiment of
competence, integrity and independence, 22 and should be
studiously careful to avoid even the slightest infraction of
the law, lest it be a demoralizing example to others. 23
As shown in the above disquisitions, respondent Flores
was a willing participant in the commission of the
irregularities in both proceedings. On the other hand,
however, respondent Munar's participation has not been
substantiated.
Before closing, we would like to point out that per our
Resolution of 2 March 1993, we referred to Justice De Pano
for inclusion in his investigation the 29 January 1993 letter
of Executive Judge Braulio Yaranon which was addressed
to Deputy Court Administrator Juanito Bernard. 24 In his
letter, Judge Yaranon informs the latter about matters
discovered in the course of the audit which are more
serious than the "illegal raffling" of cases. He then exposes
alleged case fixing and illegal office practices committed on
a large scale by a syndicate composed principally of court
officers and personnel, and describes the modus
operandi of those involved as follows:
The operation in a particular case, starts with
"AMBULANCE CHASING"; after arrangements are made
with a prospective applicant/petitioner, a petition is
prepared by the syndicate; the same is then signed
personally by the petitioner/applicant; and the oath for
purposes of verification, is administered also by the
syndicate.
The petition/application is then filed with the Office of the
Clerk of Court, where syndicate members receive and
docket the case in the docket book of Branch 26; the case is
Adoption
deliberately separated from the cases that are turned over
to the Raffle Committee, and is directly turned over to
Branch 26. Care is taken that the date of filing is made to
coincide with the scheduled day for raffling of cases
(Tuesdays).
On the same date of filing, the ORDER setting the case for
initial hearing, is issued by Branch 26. On the date of initial
hearing, a lawyer-contact of the syndicate enters an
appearance for the petitioner/applicant, and he then
presents jurisdictional facts.
On the very same day of initial hearing (in special
proceedings) and without any ACTUAL HEARING (in
special proceedings and land registration cases), for the
reception of evidence on the material allegations of facts in
the application/petition, a DECISION is forthwith issued.
Judge Yaranon then partly concludes:
Just one aspect of the matter is herein submitted for
consideration. The issuance of a DECISION without any
previous hearing being held for the reception of evidence
by the applicant/petitioner, constitutes FALSIFICATION OF
A PUBLIC DOCUMENT by a public officer, under Article
171, Revised Penal Code committed by:
2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in an
act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate; .
. . (par. 2, Art. 171, Revised Penal Code).
According to Justice De Pano, he received the 2 March
1993 Resolution just as he was about to write his report in
this case. He then suggests that the matter subject thereof
be treated separately and that "appropriate, charges be
leveled against the respondent Judge principally, and his
cohorts with the Tanod Bayan, for criminal
prosecution." 25 Indeed, the referral of Judge Yaranon's
letter to Justice De Pano may have been too late. In any
event, the charges proffered therein may be separately
dealt with.
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is
hereby rendered:
(1) DISMISSING from the service respondent Judge
GENARO C. GINES with prejudice to re-employment, in the
government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, and with forfeiture of all benefits except
earned leave credits. This dismissal shall be immediately
executory and said respondent Judge is hereby ordered to
forthwith vacate his position and desist from performing
any further official function;
(2) SUSPENDING from office respondents MA. GORGONIA
L. FLORES and ALFREDO V. LACSAMANA, JR. for a period
of six (6) months each, without pay;
(3) SUSPENDING from office respondent MA. CONCEPCION
B. DIAZ, for a period of three (3) months, without, pay.
The foregoing suspensions shall take effect immediately
upon the service of a copy of this Decision on the
aforenamed respondents MA. GORGONIA L. FLORES,
ALFREDO V. LACSAMANA, JR. and MA. CONCEPCION B.
DIAZ. The periods of their respective suspensions shall not
be charged against their leave credits, if any;
Page 10
(4) DISMISSING this case as against respondent PACITA B.
DIAZ in view of her demise; and
(5) DISMISSING this case as against respondent ROSIE M.
MUNAR for lack of substantial evidence.
The Office of the Court Administrator is hereby directed to
evaluate the 29 January 1993 letter of Executive Judge
Braulio Yaranon subject of the 2 March 1993 Resolution
of this Court in this case and to submit to this Court
appropriate recommendations thereon within fifteen (15)
days from receipt of a copy of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 167405 February 16, 2006
ANA JOYCE S. REYES, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. CESAR M. SOTERO, Presiding Judge, RTC of
Paniqui, Tarlac, Branch 67, ATTY. PAULINO SAGUYOD,
the Clerk of Court of Branch 67 of the RTC at Paniqui,
Tarlac in his capacity as Special Administrator,
CORAZON CHICHIOCO, ANGELITO LISING, ERLINDA
ESPACIO, GONZALO ZALZOS and ERNESTO
LISING, Respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review seeks to modify the Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated May 14, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No.
74047 as well as the Resolution dated May 14, 2005
denying the motion for reconsideration. In the assailed
judgment, the Court of Appeals annulled and set aside the
September 18, 2002 and November 12, 2002 Resolutions
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Paniqui, Tarlac, Branch
67 in Spec. Proc. No. 204 but refrained from dismissing the
petition for letters of administration and settlement of
estate on the ground that petitioner must first prove that
she was legally adopted by the decedent, Elena Lising.
On September 15, 1998, respondent Corazon L. Chichioco
filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration
and settlement of estate of the late Elena Lising before the
RTC of Paniqui, Tarlac, where it was docketed as Spec.
Proc. No. 204 and raffled to Branch 67. Chichioco claimed
that she was the niece and heir of Lising who died intestate
on July 31, 1998. Named as co-heirs of Chichioco were
Rosario L. Zalzos, Florante Zalzos, Erlinda Lising, Manuel
Lising, Evelyn Lising, Josephine Lising, Alfredo Lising and
respondents Ernesto Lising and Erlinda Espacio.
According to Chichioco, the deceased left real properties
located in the municipalities of Ramos and Paniqui, Tarlac,
as well as assorted pieces of jewelry and money which
were allegedly in the possession of petitioner Ana Joyce S.
Reyes, a grandniece of the deceased. Chichioco prayed that
she be appointed administrator of the estate, upon
payment of a bond, pending settlement and distribution of
Lisings properties to the legal heirs.1
On November 6, 1998, petitioner Reyes filed an
Opposition2 to the petition, claiming that she was an
adopted child of Lising and the latters husband, Serafin
Delos Santos, who died on November 30, 1970. She
asserted that the petition should be dismissed and that the
Adoption
appointment of an administrator was unnecessary, since
she was the only heir of Lising who passed away without
leaving any debts. She further asserted that Chichioco is
unfit to serve as administrator of Lisings estate because of
her "antagonistic interests" against the decedent.
Chichioco and her alleged co-heirs have questioned the
decedents title to a piece of real property which forms a
large part of the estate.
On November 11, 1998, petitioner filed a Supplement to
the Opposition3 attaching thereto the Certification4issued
by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Paniqui, Tarlac stating
that on page 76, Book No. 01 of the Register of Court
Decrees, Reyes was adopted by Elena Lising and Serafin
Delos Santos pursuant to a decision rendered in Spec. Proc.
No. 1410 by Judge Julian Lustre of the Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Tarlac, Branch 3, promulgated on
December 21, 1968 and duly registered with the Office of
the Civil Registrar on January 29, 1969.
Petitioner also submitted a Certification5 issued by the
Clerk of Court of the RTC-Tarlac City, stating that a
judgment was rendered in Spec. Proc. No. 1410 on
December 21, 1968 decreeing petitioners adoption by
Elena Lising and Serafin Delos Santos. She also presented a
copy of Judicial Form No. 436 indicating that the adoption
decree was on file in the General Docket of the RTC-Tarlac
City, wherein the dispositive portion of the adoption
decree was recorded as follows:
In view of the foregoing, the court finds this petition a
proper case for adoption and therefore grants the same.
Consequently, the Court declares that henceforth, the child
Ana Joyce C. Zalzos is freed from all legal obligations of
obedience and maintenance with respect to her natural
parents Orlando Zalzos and May C. Castro, and is to all
legal intents and purposes the child of the petitioners
Serafin delos Santos and Elena Lising.7
Petitioner likewise submitted a Decree of Final
Distribution8 issued by the Philippine Veterans Affairs
Office (PVAO) showing that, upon the death of Serafin
Delos Santos, death benefits were paid to his widow, Elena
Lising, and his "daughter", Ana Joyce Delos Santos, in
accordance with pertinent provisions of law.
On April 5, 1999, the RTC ordered respondents to submit
documentary evidence to prove the jurisdictional facts of
the case and to comment on petitioners opposition.9 Only
Rosario L. Zalsos appears to have filed a Comment/Reply
to Oppositors Opposition,10 after which the RTC ordered
the parties to submit memoranda thereon.11 On July 22,
1999, the case was deemed submitted for resolution.12
Meanwhile, on June 30, 1999, Chichioco and her alleged
co-heirs filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for
annulment of the adoption decree docketed as SP No.
53457.13 They claimed that no proceedings for the
adoption of petitioner took place in 1968 since the
Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac and the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) had no records of the adoption
case. Petitioners natural mother supposedly connived
with the court personnel to make it appear that petitioner
was adopted by the Delos Santos spouses and that the
CFIs order for initial hearing was published in a weekly
newspaper which was not authorized to publish court
orders in special proceedings.
Page 11
Upon motion of Chichioco, the RTC ordered on October 4,
1999, the suspension of hearings in Spec. Proc. No. 204
pending the outcome of SP No. 53457.14 Subsequently,
however, the Court of Appeals dismissed15 SP No. 53457
for failure to comply with the third paragraph of Section 4,
Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.16 The said dismissal became
final and executory on March 8, 2000.17
Thereafter, on August 22, 2000, petitioner filed a motion
before the RTC praying that the opposition to Spec. Proc.
No. 204 be finally resolved and that the petition be
dismissed.18 This was followed by an Urgent Ex Parte
Motion19 filed by petitioner on October 17, 2000 praying
for the immediate resolution of her opposition.
On November 16, 2000, respondents filed a Comment20 to
the opposition stating that reasonable doubts have been
cast on petitioners claim that she was legally adopted due
allegedly to certain "badges of fraud." Respondents also
informed the RTC that they have filed a criminal complaint
against petitioner before the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor, Tarlac City, for alleged falsification of the
adoption decree and Judicial Form No. 43, docketed as I.S.
No. 00-1016.
Subsequently, the RTC issued a Resolution21 dated
December 12, 2000 deferring resolution of petitioners
opposition to Spec. Proc. No. 204, pending the outcome of
the criminal case filed against the latter. In the meantime,
the parties were enjoined from dissipating or disposing
any or all of the properties included in the estate of Elena
Lising without order from this Court.
On December 13, 2000, Chichioco filed an Urgent Motion
to Appoint Special Administrator22 before the RTC on the
ground that there was yet no true determination and
appraisal of the decedents universal estate. It was prayed
therein that the Branch Clerk of Court, Atty. Paulino
Saguyod, be appointed special administrator as he was "an
experienced and able person in the management of
properties" and is "honest, impartial, competent and
acceptable to the majority of the interested parties."
In the meantime, the Provincial Prosecutor found probable
cause to charge petitioner with falsification of public
documents per resolution dated January 5,
2001.23 Petitioner thus appealed the said finding to the
Office of the Regional State Prosecutor.
On August 8, 2001, the RTC granted respondents motion
for the appointment of a special administrator and
appointed its branch clerk of court, Atty.
Saguyod.24 Petitioner moved for reconsideration on the
grounds that the branch clerk of court was disqualified
from taking on the task of special administrator, and that
Atty. Saguyod was appointed without being required to file
a bond. Petitioner also reiterated that the petition should
be dismissed because she is the sole heir of the
decedent.25 However, the RTC denied petitioners motion
for reconsideration on November 5, 2001.26
On January 14, 2002, the Office of the Regional State
Prosecutor reversed the findings of the Provincial
Prosecutor and dismissed the criminal complaint against
petitioner.27 Undaunted, Chichioco filed a petition for
review before the Department of Justice (DOJ).
Simultaneously, Chichioco and the other alleged co-heirs
filed a motion before the RTC to enjoin petitioner from
Adoption
conducting business in a property belonging to the estate.
Respondent Chichioco alleged that petitioner converted
the basement of Lisings residence into a billiard hall
without authority of the special administrator.28
Acting on said motion, the RTC issued a resolution on
September 18, 2002, the dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Oppositor Ana Joyce Reyes is hereby
enjoined from conducting business activity in any of the
properties left by the decedent. The Special Administrator
is also empowered to take control and possession of the
listed personal and real properties of the decedent and
those that may be found to be owned or registered in the
name of the same.
SO ORDERED.29
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the above
resolution which was denied by the RTC on November 12,
2002. On even date, the DOJ also issued a resolution
dismissing respondent Chichiocos petition for review in
the criminal case.30
Subsequently, petitioner filed a special civil action for
certiorari before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 74047,31 assailing the September 18, 2002 and
November 12, 2002 resolutions of the RTC. Petitioner
alleged that said resolutions were issued with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction
since as sole heir, she had the right to possess and use the
decedents property, title over which automatically passed
on to her upon the latters death. Moreover, the special
administrator, Atty. Saguyod, had yet to file a bond and
submit an inventory of the decedents estate.
Additionally, petitioner insisted that Spec. Proc. No. 204
should be dismissed since the dismissal by the Court of
Appeals of SP No. 53457 constituted res judicata as to the
former. There was likewise no valid challenge to her
adoption and she consequently remains to be the sole heir
of the decedent. Thus, she stressed that there was no need
for the appointment of an administrator or for the
settlement proceedings.
In due course, the Court of Appeals rendered
judgment32 nullifying the resolutions of the trial court. It
held that the presiding judge, Judge Cesar M. Sotero,
gravely abused his discretion in appointing his branch
clerk of court as special administrator. Citing Balanay, Jr. v.
Martinez,33 the appellate court reasoned that such act
could engender a suspicion that Judge Sotero and his clerk
are in cahoots in milking the decedents estate. Moreover,
Atty. Saguyod failed to comply with the requirements of a
bond and inventory and could not therefore take control
and possession of any of the decedents properties.
However, the appellate court refused to dismiss Spec. Proc.
No. 204 since the dismissal of SP No. 53457 was not a
judgment on the merits and did not operate as res judicata
to the former. It was also incumbent upon petitioner to
prove before the trial court that she was indeed adopted
by the Delos Santos spouses since, according to the
appellate court, "imputations of irregularities permeating
the adoption decree render its authenticity under a cloud
of doubt."
Page 12
Petitioners motion for reconsideration having been
denied on March 15, 2005,34 hence this petition on the
following assigned errors:
A. THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
PETITIONER HAD TO PROVE THE VALIDITY OF HER
ADOPTION DUE TO IMPUTATIONS OF IRREGULARITIES
IN VIEW OF SECTION 47 OF RULE 39.35
B. THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE DISMISSAL IN SP NO. 53457 WAS NOT A DISMISSAL
ON THE MERITS.36
The petition is meritorious.
On the first assigned error, we agree with petitioner that
she need not prove her legal adoption by any evidence
other than those which she had already presented before
the trial court. To recall, petitioner submitted a
certification from the local civil registrars office that the
adoption decree was registered therein and also a copy of
Judicial Form No. 43 and a certification issued by the clerk
of court that the decree was on file in the General Docket of
the RTC-Tarlac City. Both certifications were issued under
the seal of the issuing offices and were signed by the
proper officers. These are thus presumed to have been
regularly issued as part of the official duties that said
public officers perform.37
It should be borne in mind that an adoption decree is a
public document38 required by law to be entered into the
public records, the official repository of which, as well as
all other judicial pronouncements affecting the status of
individuals, is the local civil registrars office as well as the
court which rendered the judgment.
Documents consisting of entries in public records made in
the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated.39 As such, the
certifications issued by the local civil registrar and the
clerk of court regarding details of petitioners adoption
which are entered in the records kept under their official
custody, are prima facie evidence of the facts contained
therein. These certifications suffice as proof of the fact of
petitioners adoption by the Delos Santos spouses until
contradicted or overcome by sufficient evidence. Mere
"imputations of irregularities" will not cast a "cloud of
doubt" on the adoption decree since the certifications and
its contents are presumed valid until proof to the contrary
is offered.
In this regard, it must be pointed out that such contrary
proof can be presented only in a separate action brought
principally for the purpose of nullifying the adoption
decree. The latter cannot be assailed collaterally in a
proceeding for the settlement of a decedents estate, as
categorically held in Santos v. Aranzanso.40 Accordingly,
respondents cannot assail in these proceedings the validity
of the adoption decree in order to defeat petitioners claim
that she is the sole heir of the decedent. Absent a
categorical pronouncement in an appropriate proceeding
that the decree of adoption is void, the certifications
regarding the matter, as well as the facts stated therein,
should be deemed legitimate, genuine and real. Petitioners
status as an adopted child of the decedent remains
unrebutted and no serious challenge has been brought
against her standing as such. Therefore, for as long as
petitioners adoption is considered valid, respondents
cannot claim any interest in the decedents estate. For this
Adoption
reason, we agree with petitioner that Spec. Proc. No. 204
should be dismissed.
As succinctly held in Santos v. Aranzanso:41
From all the foregoing it follows that respondents - x x x
and those who, like them x x x, claim an interest in the
estate x x x as alleged first cousins, cannot intervene, as
such, in the settlement proceedings, in view of the fact that
in the order of intestate succession adopted children
exclude first cousins (Articles 979 and 1003, New Civil
Code). The same holds true as long as the adoption must
be - as in the instant case - considered valid. (Emphasis
added)
Petitioner, whose adoption is presumed to be valid, would
necessarily exclude respondents from inheriting from the
decedent since they are mere collateral relatives of the
latter. To allow the proceedings below to continue would
serve no salutary purpose but to delay the resolution of
the instant case. After all, the dismissal of Spec. Proc. No.
204 is the logical consequence of our pronouncement
relative to the presumed validity of petitioners adoption.
Moreover, it must be stressed that all the evidence
pertinent to the resolution of the petitioners opposition,
which is actually a motion to dismiss the petition for
letters of administration and settlement of the estate, is a
matter of record in the instant case. The same has in fact
been submitted for resolution before the RTC more than
six years ago and is so far the only pending incident before
the RTC. The parties have likewise amply ventilated their
positions on the matter through their respective pleadings
filed before the lower courts. No useful purpose will thus
be served if we let the RTC resolve the matter, only for its
ruling to be elevated again to the Court of Appeals and
subsequently to this Court. The remand of the case to the
lower court for further reception of evidence is not
necessary where the Court is in a position to resolve the
dispute based on the evidence before it.42 This is in
keeping with the avowed purpose of the rules of procedure
which is to secure for the parties a just, speedy and
inexpensive determination of every action or
proceeding.43 Hence, since the grounds for the dismissal of
Spec. Proc. No. 204 are extant in the records and there is
no cogent reason to remand the case to the RTC, Spec.
Proc. No. 204 should be dismissed.
Based on the foregoing, the Court sees no need to discuss
petitioners second assigned error.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Special
Proceedings No. 204 pending before the Regional Trial
Court of Tarlac City, Branch 67 is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 155733 January 27, 2006
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATES OF THE
DECEASED JOSEFA DELGADO AND GUILLERMO RUSTIA
CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA and other
HEIRS OF LUIS DELGADO, namely, HEIRS OF CONCHA
VDA. DE AREVALO, HEIRS OF LUISA DELGADO VDA. DE
DANAO, ANGELA DELGADO ARESPACOCHAGA, TERESA
DELGADO PERLAS, CAROLINA DELGADO-
ARESPACOCHAGA, RODOLFO DELGADO, BENJAMIN
DELGADO, GLICERIA DELGADO and CLEOFAS
DELGADO; and HEIRS OF GORGONIO DELGADO,
Page 13
namely, RAMON DELGADO CAMPO, CARLOS DELGADO
CAMPO, CLARITA DELGADO CAMPO-REIZA, YOLANDA
DELGADO ENCINAS, FELISA DELGADO CAMPO-ENCINAS
and MELINDA DELGADO CAMPO-
MADARANG, Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF MARCIANA RUSTIA VDA. DE DAMIAN,
namely, GUILLERMO R. DAMIAN and JOSE R. DAMIAN;
HEIRS OF HORTENCIA RUSTIA CRUZ, namely,
TERESITA CRUZ-SISON, HORACIO R. CRUZ, JOSEFINA
CRUZ-RODIL, AMELIA CRUZ-ENRIQUEZ and FIDEL R.
CRUZ, JR.; HEIRS OF ROMAN RUSTIA, SR., namely,
JOSEFINA RUSTIA ALBANO, VIRGINIA RUSTIA
PARAISO, ROMAN RUSTIA, JR., SERGIO RUSTIA,
FRANCISCO RUSTIA, LETICIA RUSTIA-MIRANDA; and
GUILLERMINA RUSTIA, as Oppositors;1 and
GUILLERMA RUSTIA, as Intervenor, Respondents.3
2
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek to
reinstate the May 11, 1990 decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 55,4 in SP Case No. 97668,
which was reversed and set aside by the Court of Appeals
in its decision5 dated October 24, 2002.
FACTS OF THE CASE
This case concerns the settlement of the intestate estates
of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado.6 The main issue in
this case is relatively simple: who, between petitioners and
respondents, are the lawful heirs of the decedents.
However, it is attended by several collateral issues that
complicate its resolution.
The claimants to the estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa
Delgado may be divided into two groups: (1) the alleged
heirs of Josefa Delgado, consisting of her half- and full-
blood siblings, nephews and nieces, and grandnephews
and grandnieces, and (2) the alleged heirs of Guillermo
Rustia, particularly, his sisters,7 his nephews and
nieces,8 his illegitimate child,9 and the de facto adopted
child10 (ampun-ampunan) of the decedents.
The alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado
The deceased Josefa Delgado was the daughter of
Felisa11 Delgado by one Lucio Campo. Aside from Josefa,
five other children were born to the couple, namely,
Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, and Gorgonio, all
surnamed Delgado. Felisa Delgado was never married to
Lucio Campo, hence, Josefa and her full-blood siblings
were all natural children of Felisa Delgado.
However, Lucio Campo was not the first and only man in
Felisa Delgados life. Before him was Ramon Osorio12with
whom Felisa had a son, Luis Delgado. But, unlike her
relationship with Lucio Campo which was admittedly one
without the benefit of marriage, the legal status of Ramon
Osorios and Felisa Delgados union is in dispute.
The question of whether Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio
ever got married is crucial to the claimants because the
answer will determine whether their successional rights
fall within the ambit of the rule against reciprocal intestate
succession between legitimate and illegitimate
relatives.13 If Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado had been
Adoption
validly married, then their only child Luis Delgado was a
legitimate half-blood brother of Josefa Delgado and
therefore excluded from the latters intestate estate. He
and his heirs would be barred by the principle of absolute
separation between the legitimate and illegitimate
families. Conversely, if the couple were never married, Luis
Delgado and his heirs would be entitled to inherit from
Josefa Delgados intestate estate, as they would all be
within the illegitimate line.
Petitioners allege that Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado
were never married. In support thereof, they assert that no
evidence was ever presented to establish it, not even so
much as an allegation of the date or place of the alleged
marriage. What is clear, however, is that Felisa retained
the surname Delgado. So did Luis, her son with Ramon
Osorio. Later on, when Luis got married, his Partida de
Casamiento14 stated that he was "hijo natural de Felisa
Delgado" (the natural child of Felisa
Delgado),15 significantly omitting any mention of the name
and other circumstances of his father.16 Nevertheless,
oppositors (now respondents) insist that the absence of a
record of the alleged marriage did not necessarily mean
that no marriage ever took place.
Josefa Delgado died on September 8, 1972 without a will.
She was survived by Guillermo Rustia and some collateral
relatives, the petitioners herein. Several months later, on
June 15, 1973, Guillermo Rustia executed an affidavit of
self-
adjudication of the remaining properties comprising her
estate.
The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado
Sometime in 1917, Guillermo Rustia proposed marriage to
Josefa Delgado17 but whether a marriage in fact took place
is disputed. According to petitioners, the two eventually
lived together as husband and wife but were never
married. To prove their assertion, petitioners point out
that no record of the contested marriage existed in the civil
registry. Moreover, a baptismal certificate naming Josefa
Delgado as one of the sponsors referred to her as
"Seorita" or unmarried woman.
The oppositors (respondents here), on the other hand,
insist that the absence of a marriage certificate did not of
necessity mean that no marriage transpired. They
maintain that Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado were
married on June 3, 1919 and from then on lived together
as husband and wife until the death of Josefa on September
8, 1972. During this period spanning more than half a
century, they were known among their relatives and
friends to have in fact been married. To support their
proposition, oppositors presented the following pieces of
evidence:
1. Certificate of Identity No. 9592 dated [December 1,
1944] issued to Mrs. Guillermo J. Rustia by Carlos P.
Romulo, then Resident Commissioner to the United States
of the Commonwealth of the Philippines;
2. Philippine Passport No. 4767 issued to Josefa D. Rustia
on June 25, 1947;
3. Veterans Application for Pension or Compensation for
Disability Resulting from Service in the Active Military or
Naval Forces of the United States- Claim No. C-4, 004, 503
Page 14
(VA Form 526) filed with the Veterans Administration of
the United States of America by Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia
wherein Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia himself [swore] to his
marriage to Josefa Delgado in Manila on 3 June 1919;18
4. Titles to real properties in the name of Guillermo Rustia
indicated that he was married to Josefa Delgado.
The alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado never had any
children. With no children of their own, they took into
their home the youngsters Guillermina Rustia Rustia and
Nanie Rustia. These children, never legally adopted by the
couple, were what was known in the local dialect
as ampun-ampunan.
During his life with Josefa, however, Guillermo Rustia did
manage to father an illegitimate child,19 the intervenor-
respondent Guillerma Rustia, with one Amparo
Sagarbarria. According to Guillerma, Guillermo Rustia
treated her as his daughter, his own flesh and blood, and
she enjoyed open and continuous possession of that status
from her birth in 1920 until her fathers demise. In fact,
Josefa Delgados obituary which was prepared by
Guillermo Rustia, named the intervenor-respondent as one
of their children. Also, her report card from the University
of Santo Tomas identified Guillermo Rustia as her
parent/guardian.20
Oppositors (respondents here) nonetheless posit that
Guillerma Rustia has no interest in the intestate estate of
Guillermo Rustia as she was never duly acknowledged as
an illegitimate child. They contend that her right to
compulsory acknowledgement prescribed when Guillermo
died in 1974 and that she cannot claim voluntary
acknowledgement since the documents she presented
were not the authentic writings prescribed by the new
Civil Code.21
On January 7, 1974, more than a year after the death of
Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia filed a petition for the
adoption22 of their ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia. He
stated under oath "[t]hat he ha[d] no legitimate,
legitimated, acknowledged natural children or natural
children by legal fiction."23 The petition was overtaken by
his death on February 28, 1974.
Like Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia died without a will.
He was survived by his sisters Marciana Rustia vda.
de Damian and Hortencia Rustia-Cruz, and by the children
of his predeceased brother Roman Rustia Sr., namely,
Josefina Rustia Albano, Virginia Rustia Paraiso, Roman
Rustia, Jr., Sergio Rustia, Francisco Rustia and Leticia
Rustia Miranda.24
ANTECEDENT PROCEEDINGS
On May 8, 1975, Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao, the daughter
of Luis Delgado, filed the original petition for letters of
administration of the intestate estates of the "spouses
Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia" with the RTC of
Manila, Branch 55.25 This petition was opposed by the
following: (1) the sisters of Guillermo Rustia, namely,
Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia-
Cruz;26 (2) the heirs of Guillermo Rustias late brother,
Roman Rustia, Sr., and (3) the ampun-
ampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia. The opposition was
grounded on the theory that Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao
Adoption
and the other claimants were barred under the law from
inheriting from their illegitimate half-blood relative Josefa
Delgado.
In November of 1975, Guillerma Rustia filed a motion to
intervene in the proceedings, claiming she was the only
surviving descendant in the direct line of Guillermo Rustia.
Despite the objections of the oppositors (respondents
herein), the motion was granted.
On April 3, 1978, the original petition for letters of
administration was amended to state that Josefa Delgado
and Guillermo Rustia were never married but had merely
lived together as husband and wife.
On January 24, 1980, oppositors (respondents herein) filed
a motion to dismiss the petition in the RTC insofar as the
estate of Guillermo Rustia was concerned. The motion was
denied on the ground that the interests of the petitioners
and the other claimants remained in issue and should be
properly threshed out upon submission of evidence.
On March 14, 1988, Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa
substituted for her sister, Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao,
who had died on May 18, 1987.
On May 11, 1990, the RTC appointed Carlota Delgado vda.
de de la Rosa as administratrix of both estates.27 The
dispositive portion of the decision read:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, petitioner and
her co-claimants to the estate of the late Josefa Delgado
listed in the Petitions, and enumerated elsewhere in this
Decision, are hereby declared as the only legal heirs of the
said Josefa Delgado who died intestate in the City of Manila
on September 8, 1972, and entitled to partition the same
among themselves in accordance with the proportions
referred to in this Decision.
Similarly, the intervenor Guillerma S. Rustia is hereby
declared as the sole and only surviving heir of the late Dr.
Guillermo Rustia, and thus, entitled to the entire estate of
the said decedent, to the exclusion of the oppositors and
the other parties hereto.
The Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of the estate of Josefa
Delgado executed by the late Guillermo J. Rustia on June
15, 1973 is hereby SET ASIDE and declared of no force and
effect.
As the estates of both dece[d]ents have not as yet been
settled, and their settlement [is] considered consolidated
in this proceeding in accordance with law, a single
administrator therefor is both proper and necessary, and,
as the petitioner Carlota Delgado Vda. de dela Rosa has
established her right to the appointment as administratrix
of the estates, the Court hereby APPOINTS her as the
ADMINISTRATRIX of the intestate estate of the decedent
JOSEFA DELGADO in relation to the estate of DR.
GUILLERMO J. RUSTIA.
Accordingly, let the corresponding LETTERS OF
ADMINISTRATION issue to the petitioner CARLOTA
DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA upon her filing of the
requisite bond in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS (P500,000.00).
Page 15
Finally, oppositor GUILLERMINA RUSTIA RUSTIA is
hereby ordered to cease and desist from her acts of
administration of the subject estates, and is likewise
ordered to turn over to the appointed administratix all her
collections of the rentals and income due on the assets of
the estates in question, including all documents, papers,
records and titles pertaining to such estates to the
petitioner and appointed administratix CARLOTA
DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA, immediately upon receipt
of this Decision. The same oppositor is hereby required to
render an accounting of her actual administration of the
estates in controversy within a period of sixty (60) days
from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.28
On May 20, 1990, oppositors filed an appeal which was
denied on the ground that the record on appeal was not
filed on time.29 They then filed a petition for certiorari and
mandamus30 which was dismissed by the Court of
Appeals.31 However, on motion for reconsideration and
after hearing the parties oral arguments, the Court of
Appeals reversed itself and gave due course to oppositors
appeal in the interest of substantial justice.32
In a petition for review to this Court, petitioners assailed
the resolution of the Court of Appeals, on the ground that
oppositors failure to file the record on appeal within the
reglementary period was a jurisdictional defect which
nullified the appeal. On October 10, 1997, this Court
allowed the continuance of the appeal. The pertinent
portion of our decision33 read:
As a rule, periods prescribed to do certain acts must be
followed. However, under exceptional circumstances, a
delay in the filing of an appeal may be excused on grounds
of substantial justice.
xxx xxx xxx
The respondent court likewise pointed out the trial courts
pronouncements as to certain matters of substance,
relating to the determination of the heirs of the decedents
and the party entitled to the administration of their estate,
which were to be raised in the appeal, but were barred
absolutely by the denial of the record on appeal upon too
technical ground of late filing.
xxx xxx xxx
In this instance, private respondents intention to raise
valid issues in the appeal is apparent and should not have
been construed as an attempt to delay or prolong the
administration proceedings.
xxx xxx xxx
A review of the trial courts decision is needed.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the
Court hereby AFFIRMS the Resolution dated November
27, 1991 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 23415,
for the APPROVAL of the private respondents Record on
Appeal and the CONTINUANCE of the appeal from the
Manila, Branch LV Regional Trial Courts May 11, 1990
decision.
Adoption
SO ORDERED.
Acting on the appeal, the Court of Appeals34 partially set
aside the trial courts decision. Upon motion for
reconsideration,35 the Court of Appeals amended its earlier
decision.36 The dispositive portion of the amended
decision read:
With the further modification, our assailed decision
is RECONSIDERED and VACATED. Consequently, the
decision of the trial court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A
new one is hereby RENDERED declaring: 1.) Dr. Guillermo
Rustia and Josefa Delgado Rustia to have been legally
married; 2.) the intestate estate of Dr. Guillermo Rustia,
Jacoba Delgado-Encinas and the children of Gorgonio
Delgado (Campo) entitled to partition among themselves
the intestate estate of Josefa D. Rustia in accordance with
the proportion referred to in this decision; 3.) the
oppositors-appellants as the legal heirs of the late Dr.
Guillermo Rustia and thereby entitled to partition his
estate in accordance with the proportion referred to
herein; and 4.) the intervenor-appellee Guillerma S. Rustia
as ineligible to inherit from the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia;
thus revoking her appointment as administratrix of his
estate.
The letters of administration of the intestate estate of Dr.
Guillermo Rustia in relation to the intestate estate of Josefa
Delgado shall issue to the nominee of the oppositors-
appellants upon his or her qualification and filing of the
requisite bond in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS (P500,000.00).
Oppositor-appellant Guillermina Rustia Rustia is hereby
ordered to cease and desist from her acts of administration
of the subject estates and to turn over to the appointed
administrator all her collections of the rentals and incomes
due on the assets of the estates in question, including all
documents, papers, records and titles pertaining to such
estates to the appointed administrator, immediately upon
notice of his qualification and posting of the requisite
bond, and to render an accounting of her (Guillermina
Rustia Rustia) actual administration of the estates in
controversy within a period of sixty (60) days from notice
of the administrators qualification and posting of the
bond.
The issue of the validity of the affidavit of self-adjudication
executed by Dr. Guillermo Rustia on June 15, 1973
is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings to
determine the extent of the shares of Jacoba Delgado-
Encinas and the children of Gorgonio Delgado (Campo)
affected by the said adjudication.
Hence, this recourse.
The issues for our resolution are:
1. whether there was a valid marriage between Guillermo
Rustia and Josefa Delgado;
2. who the legal heirs of the decedents Guillermo Rustia
and Josefa Delgado are;
3. who should be issued letters of administration.
The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado
Page 16
A presumption is an inference of the existence or non-
existence of a fact which courts are permitted to draw
from proof of other facts. Presumptions are classified into
presumptions of law and presumptions of fact.
Presumptions of law are, in turn, either conclusive or
disputable.37
Rule 131, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. The following
presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may
be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
xxx xxx xxx
(aa) That a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage;
xxx xxx xxx
In this case, several circumstances give rise to the
presumption that a valid marriage existed between
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. Their cohabitation of
more than 50 years cannot be doubted. Their family and
friends knew them to be married. Their reputed status as
husband and wife was such that even the original petition
for letters of administration filed by Luisa Delgado vda.
de Danao in 1975 referred to them as "spouses."
Yet, petitioners maintain that Josefa Delgado and
Guillermo Rustia had simply lived together as husband and
wife without the benefit of marriage. They make much of
the absence of a record of the contested marriage, the
testimony of a witness38 attesting that they were not
married, and a baptismal certificate which referred to
Josefa Delgado as "Seorita" or unmarried woman.39
We are not persuaded.
First, although a marriage contract is considered a primary
evidence of marriage, its absence is not always proof that
no marriage in fact took place.40 Once the presumption of
marriage arises, other evidence may be presented in
support thereof. The evidence need not necessarily or
directly establish the marriage but must at least be enough
to strengthen the presumption of marriage. Here, the
certificate of identity issued to Josefa Delgado as Mrs.
Guillermo Rustia,41 the passport issued to her as Josefa D.
Rustia,42 the declaration under oath of no less than
Guillermo Rustia that he was married to Josefa
Delgado43 and the titles to the properties in the name of
"Guillermo Rustia married to Josefa Delgado," more than
adequately support the presumption of marriage. These
are public documents which are prima facie evidence of
the facts stated therein.44 No clear and convincing evidence
sufficient to overcome the presumption of the truth of the
recitals therein was presented by petitioners.
Second, Elisa vda. de Anson, petitioners own witness
whose testimony they primarily relied upon to support
their position, confirmed that Guillermo Rustia had
proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado and that eventually,
the two had "lived together as husband and wife." This
again could not but strengthen the presumption of
marriage.
Adoption
Third, the baptismal certificate45 was conclusive proof only
of the baptism administered by the priest who baptized
the child. It was no proof of the veracity of the declarations
and statements contained therein,46 such as the alleged
single or unmarried ("Seorita") civil status of Josefa
Delgado who had no hand in its preparation.
Petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of marriage of
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. In this jurisdiction,
every intendment of the law leans toward legitimizing
matrimony. Persons dwelling together apparently in
marriage are presumed to be in fact married. This is the
usual order of things in society and, if the parties are not
what they hold themselves out to be, they would be living
in constant violation of the common rules of law and
propriety. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. Always
presume marriage.47
The Lawful Heirs Of Josefa Delgado
To determine who the lawful heirs of Josefa Delgado are,
the questioned status of the cohabitation of her mother
Felisa Delgado with Ramon Osorio must first be addressed.
As mentioned earlier, presumptions of law are either
conclusive or disputable. Conclusive presumptions are
inferences which the law makes so peremptory that no
contrary proof, no matter how strong, may overturn
them.48 On the other hand, disputable presumptions, one
of which is the presumption of marriage, can be relied on
only in the absence of sufficient evidence to the contrary.
Little was said of the cohabitation or alleged marriage of
Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio. The oppositors (now
respondents) chose merely to rely on the disputable
presumption of marriage even in the face of such
countervailing evidence as (1) the continued use by Felisa
and Luis (her son with Ramon Osorio) of the surname
Delgado and (2) Luis Delgados and Caridad
Concepcions Partida de Casamiento49 identifying Luis as
"hijo natural de Felisa Delgado" (the natural child of Felisa
Delgado).50
All things considered, we rule that these factors
sufficiently overcame the rebuttable presumption of
marriage. Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio were never
married. Hence, all the children born to Felisa Delgado out
of her relations with Ramon Osorio and Lucio Campo,
namely, Luis and his half-blood siblings Nazario, Edilberta,
Jose, Jacoba, Gorgonio and the decedent Josefa, all
surnamed Delgado,51 were her natural children.52
Pertinent to this matter is the following observation:
Suppose, however, that A begets X with B, and Y with
another woman, C; then X and Y would be natural brothers
and sisters, but of half-blood relationship. Can they
succeed each other reciprocally?
The law prohibits reciprocal succession between
illegitimate children and legitimate children of the same
parent, even though there is unquestionably a tie of blood
between them. It seems that to allow an illegitimate child
to succeed ab intestato (from) another illegitimate child
begotten with a parent different from that of the former,
would be allowing the illegitimate child greater rights than
a legitimate child. Notwithstanding this, however, we
submit that
Page 17
succession should be allowed, even when the illegitimate
brothers and sisters are only of the half-blood. The reason
impelling the prohibition on reciprocal successions
between legitimate and illegitimate families does not apply
to the case under consideration. That prohibition has for
its basis the difference in category between illegitimate
and legitimate relatives. There is no such difference when
all the children are illegitimate children of the same
parent, even if begotten with different persons. They all
stand on the same footing before the law, just like
legitimate children of half-blood relation. We submit,
therefore, that the rules regarding succession of legitimate
brothers and sisters should be applicable to them. Full
blood illegitimate brothers and sisters should receive
double the portion of half-blood brothers and sisters; and
if all are either of the full blood or of the half-blood, they
shall share equally.53
Here, the above-named siblings of Josefa Delgado were
related to her by full-blood, except Luis Delgado, her half-
brother. Nonetheless, since they were all illegitimate, they
may inherit from each other. Accordingly, all of them are
entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado.
We note, however, that the petitioners before us are
already the nephews, nieces, grandnephews and
grandnieces of Josefa Delgado. Under Article 972 of the
new Civil Code, the right of representation in the collateral
line takes place only in favor of the children of brothers
and sisters (nephews and nieces). Consequently, it cannot
be exercised by grandnephews and
grandnieces.54 Therefore, the only collateral relatives of
Josefa Delgado who are entitled to partake of her intestate
estate are her brothers and sisters, or their children who
were still alive at the time of her death on September 8,
1972. They have a vested right to participate in the
inheritance.55 The records not being clear on this matter, it
is now for the trial court to determine who were the
surviving brothers and sisters (or their children) of Josefa
Delgado at the time of her death. Together with Guillermo
Rustia,56 they are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado in
accordance with Article 1001 of the new Civil Code:57
Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children
survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be
entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and
sisters or their children to the other one-half.
Since Josefa Delgado had heirs other than Guillermo
Rustia, Guillermo could not have validly adjudicated
Josefas estate all to himself. Rule 74, Section 1 of the Rules
of Court is clear. Adjudication by an heir of the decedents
entire estate to himself by means of an affidavit is allowed
only if he is the sole heir to the estate:
SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between
heirs. If the decedent left no will and no debts and the
heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their
judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the
purpose, the parties may, without securing letters of
administration, divide the estate among themselves as
they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the
office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree,
they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there
is only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the
estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the
register of deeds. x x x (emphasis supplied)
The Lawful Heirs Of Guillermo Rustia
Adoption
Intervenor (now co-respondent) Guillerma Rustia is an
illegitimate child58 of Guillermo Rustia. As such, she may be
entitled to successional rights only upon proof of an
admission or recognition of paternity.59 She, however,
claimed the status of an acknowledged illegitimate child of
Guillermo Rustia only after the death of the latter on
February 28, 1974 at which time it was already the new
Civil Code that was in effect.
Under the old Civil Code (which was in force till August 29,
1950), illegitimate children absolutely had no hereditary
rights. This draconian edict was, however, later relaxed in
the new Civil Code which granted certain successional
rights to illegitimate children but only on condition that
they were first recognized or acknowledged by the parent.
Under the new law, recognition may be compulsory or
voluntary.60 Recognition is compulsory in any of the
following cases:
(1) in cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the
period of the offense coincides more or less with that of
the conception;
(2) when the child is in continuous possession of status of
a child of the alleged father (or mother)61 by the direct acts
of the latter or of his family;
(3) when the child was conceived during the time when
the mother cohabited with the supposed father;
(4) when the child has in his favor any evidence or proof
that the defendant is his father. 62
On the other hand, voluntary recognition may be made in
the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of
record or in any authentic writing.63
Intervenor Guillerma sought recognition on two grounds:
first, compulsory recognition through the open and
continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child
and second, voluntary recognition through authentic
writing.
There was apparently no doubt that she possessed the
status of an illegitimate child from her birth until the death
of her putative father Guillermo Rustia. However, this did
not constitute acknowledgment but a mere ground by
which she could have compelled acknowledgment through
the courts.64 Furthermore, any (judicial) action for
compulsory acknowledgment has a dual limitation: the
lifetime of the child and the lifetime of the putative
parent.65 On the death of either, the action for compulsory
recognition can no longer be filed.66 In this case, intervenor
Guillermas right to claim compulsory acknowledgment
prescribed upon the death of Guillermo Rustia on February
28, 1974.
The claim of voluntary recognition (Guillermas second
ground) must likewise fail. An authentic writing, for
purposes of voluntary recognition, is understood as a
genuine or indubitable writing of the parent (in this case,
Guillermo Rustia). This includes a public instrument or a
private writing admitted by the father to be his.67 Did
intervenors report card from the University of Santo
Tomas and Josefa Delgados obituary prepared by
Guillermo Rustia qualify as authentic writings under the
new Civil Code? Unfortunately not. The report card of
intervenor Guillerma did not bear the signature of
Page 18
Guillermo Rustia. The fact that his name appears there as
intervenors parent/guardian holds no weight since he had
no participation in its preparation. Similarly, while
witnesses testified that it was Guillermo Rustia himself
who drafted the notice of death of Josefa Delgado which
was published in the Sunday Times on September 10,
1972, that published obituary was not the authentic
writing contemplated by the law. What could have been
admitted as an authentic writing was the original
manuscript of the notice, in the handwriting of Guillermo
Rustia himself and signed by him, not the newspaper
clipping of the obituary. The failure to present the original
signed manuscript was fatal to intervenors claim.
The same misfortune befalls the ampun-ampunan,
Guillermina Rustia Rustia, who was never adopted in
accordance with law. Although a petition for her adoption
was filed by Guillermo Rustia, it never came to fruition and
was dismissed upon the latters death. We affirm the ruling
of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals holding her
a legal stranger to the deceased spouses and therefore not
entitled to inherit from them ab intestato. We quote:
Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem, which
[created] between two persons a relationship similar to
that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation.
Only an adoption made through the court, or in pursuance
with the procedure laid down under Rule 99 of the Rules
of Court is valid in this jurisdiction. It is not of natural law
at all, but is wholly and entirely artificial. To establish the
relation, the statutory requirements must be strictly
carried out, otherwise, the adoption is an absolute nullity.
The fact of adoption is never presumed, but must be
affirmatively [proven] by the person claiming its
existence.68
Premises considered, we rule that two of the claimants to
the estate of Guillermo Rustia, namely, intervenor
Guillerma Rustia and the ampun-ampunan Guillermina
Rustia Rustia, are not lawful heirs of the decedent. Under
Article 1002 of the new Civil Code, if there are no
descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or surviving
spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire
estate of the deceased. Therefore, the lawful heirs of
Guillermo Rustia are the remaining claimants, consisting of
his sisters,69 nieces and nephews.70
Entitlement To Letters Of Administration
An administrator is a person appointed by the court to
administer the intestate estate of the decedent. Rule 78,
Section 6 of the Rules of Court prescribes an order of
preference in the appointment of an administrator:
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted.
If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or
executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give a
bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be
granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be,
or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to
such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of
kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing
to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be,
or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be
incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow or
Adoption
next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of
the person to apply for administration or to request that
the administration be granted to some other person, it may
be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if
competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to
serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court
may select.
In the appointment of an administrator, the principal
consideration is the interest in the estate of the one to be
appointed.71 The order of preference does not rule out the
appointment of co-administrators, specially in cases where
justice and equity demand that opposing parties or
factions be represented in the management of the
estates,72a situation which obtains here.
It is in this light that we see fit to appoint joint
administrators, in the persons of Carlota Delgado vda.
de de la Rosa and a nominee of the nephews and nieces of
Guillermo Rustia. They are the next of kin of the deceased
spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia, respectively.
WHEREFORE, the petition (which seeks to reinstate the
May 11, 1990 decision of the RTC Manila, Branch 55) is
hereby DENIED. The assailed October 24, 2002 decision of
the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the following
modifications:
1. Guillermo Rustias June 15, 1973 affidavit of self-
adjudication is hereby ANNULLED.
2. the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia shall inherit half
of the intestate estate of Josefa Delgado. The remaining
half shall pertain to (a) the full and half-siblings of Josefa
Delgado who survived her and (b) the children of any of
Josefa Delgados full- or half-siblings who may have
predeceased her, also surviving at the time of her death.
Josefa Delgados grandnephews and grandnieces are
excluded from her estate. In this connection, the trial court
is hereby ordered to determine the identities of the
relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to share in her
estate.
3. Guillermo Rustias estate (including its one-half share of
Josefa Delgados estate) shall be inherited by Marciana
Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz (whose
respective shares shall be per capita) and the children of
the late Roman Rustia, Sr. (who survived Guillermo Rustia
and whose respective shares shall be per stirpes).
Considering that Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and
Hortencia Rustia Cruz are now deceased, their respective
shares shall pertain to their estates.
4. Letters of administration over the still unsettled
intestate estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado
shall issue to Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and to a
nominee from among the heirs of Guillermo Rustia, as joint
administrators, upon their qualification and filing of the
requisite bond in such amount as may be determined by
the trial court.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Page 19
G.R. No. 161434 March 3, 2004
MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO,
JR., petitioners,
vs.
The COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RONALD ALLAN
KELLY POE (a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR.) and VICTORINO
X. FORNIER, respondents.
x-----------------------------x
G.R. No. 161634 March 3, 2004
ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, petitioner,
vs.
RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, a.k.a. FERNANDO POE,
JR., respondent.
x-----------------------------x
G. R. No. 161824 March 3, 2004
VICTORINO X. FORNIER, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RONALD ALLAN
KELLEY POE, ALSO KNOWN AS FERNANDO POE
JR., respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Citizenship is a treasured right conferred on those
whom the state believes are deserving of the privilege.
It is a "precious heritage, as well as an inestimable
acquisition,"1 that cannot be taken lightly by anyone -
either by those who enjoy it or by those who dispute it.
Before the Court are three consolidated cases, all of which
raise a single question of profound importance to the
nation. The issue of citizenship is brought up to challenge
the qualifications of a presidential candidate to hold the
highest office of the land. Our people are waiting for the
judgment of the Court with bated breath. Is Fernando Poe,
Jr., the hero of silver screen, and now one of the main
contenders for the presidency, a natural-born Filipino or is
he not?
The moment of introspection takes us face to face with
Spanish and American colonial roots and reminds us of the
rich heritage of civil law and common law traditions, the
fusion resulting in a hybrid of laws and jurisprudence that
could be no less than distinctly Filipino.
Antecedent Case Settings
On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe,
also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (hereinafter "FPJ"), filed
his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of
the Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng
Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the forthcoming
national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ,
representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or
"Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939
and his place of birth to be Manila.
Adoption
Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner in G.R. No. 161824, entitled
"Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission
on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as
Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondents," initiated, on 09 January
2004, a petition docketed SPA No. 04-003 before the
Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") to disqualify FPJ
and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of
candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by
claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in
truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners;
his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his
father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of
Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner
asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he
could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ,
the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother.
Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of
respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe
contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez
before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no
such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married
Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of respondent.
In the hearing before the Third Division of the COMELEC
on 19 January 2004, petitioner, in support of his claim,
presented several documentary exhibits - 1) a copy of the
certificate of birth of FPJ, 2) a certified photocopy of an
affidavit executed in Spanish by Paulita Poe y Gomez
attesting to her having filed a case for bigamy and
concubinage against the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe,
after discovering his bigamous relationship with Bessie
Kelley, 3) an English translation of the affidavit aforesaid,
4) a certified photocopy of the certificate of birth of Allan
F. Poe, 5) a certification issued by the Director of the
Records Management and Archives Office, attesting to the
fact that there was no record in the National Archives that
a Lorenzo Poe or Lorenzo Pou resided or entered the
Philippines before 1907, and 6) a certification from the
Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of the National
Archives to the effect that no available information could
be found in the files of the National Archives regarding the
birth of Allan F. Poe.
On his part, respondent, presented twenty-two
documentary pieces of evidence, the more significant ones
being - a) a certification issued by Estrella M. Domingo of
the Archives Division of the National Archives that there
appeared to be no available information regarding the
birth of Allan F. Poe in the registry of births for San Carlos,
Pangasinan, b) a certification issued by the Officer-In-
Charge of the Archives Division of the National Archives
that no available information about the marriage of Allan
F. Poe and Paulita Gomez could be found, c) a certificate of
birth of Ronald Allan Poe, d) Original Certificate of Title No.
P-2247 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of
Pangasinan, in the name of Lorenzo Pou, e) copies of Tax
Declaration No. 20844, No. 20643, No. 23477 and No.
23478 in the name of Lorenzo Pou, f) a copy of the
certificate of death of Lorenzo Pou, g) a copy of the
purported marriage contract between Fernando Pou and
Bessie Kelley, and h) a certification issued by the City Civil
Registrar of San Carlos City, Pangasinan, stating that the
records of birth in the said office during the period of from
1900 until May 1946 were totally destroyed during World
War II.
On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA No. 04-
003 for lack of merit. Three days later, or on 26 January
2004, Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration. The
Page 20
motion was denied on 06 February 2004 by the COMELEC
en banc. On 10 February 2004, petitioner assailed the
decision of the COMELEC before this Court conformably
with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure. The petition, docketed G. R. No. 161824,
likewise prayed for a temporary restraining order, a writ
of preliminary injunction or any other resolution that
would stay the finality and/or execution of the COMELEC
resolutions.
The other petitions, later consolidated with G. R. No.
161824, would include G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria
Jeanette C. Tecson, and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., vs. The
Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a.
Fernando Poe, Jr.), and Victorino X. Fornier," and the
other, docketed G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio G.
Velez, vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.,"
both challenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and
asserting that, under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of
the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court had
original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic
issue on the case.
Jurisdiction of the Court
In G. R. No. 161824
In seeking the disqualification of the candidacy of FPJ and
to have the COMELEC deny due course to or cancel FPJs
certificate of candidacy for alleged misrepresentation of a
material fact (i.e., that FPJ was a natural-born citizen)
before the COMELEC, petitioner Fornier invoked Section
78 of the Omnibus Election Code
"Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a
certificate of candidacy. --- A verified petition seeking to
deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may
be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any
material representation contained therein as required
under Section 74 hereof is false"
in consonance with the general powers of COMELEC
expressed in Section 52 of the Omnibus Election Code -
"Section 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on
Elections. In addition to the powers and functions
conferred upon it by the Constitution, the Commission
shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and
administration of all laws relative to the conduct of
elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and
honest elections" -
and in relation to Article 69 of the Omnibus Election Code
which would authorize "any interested party" to file a
verified petition to deny or cancel the certificate of
candidacy of any nuisance candidate.
Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification cases may be
reviewed by the Supreme Court per Rule 642 in an action
for certiorari under Rule 653 of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure. Section 7, Article IX, of the 1987 Constitution
also reads
"Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its
Members any case or matter brought before it within sixty
days from the date of its submission for decision or
resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for
decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading,
brief, or memorandum, required by the rules of the
Adoption
Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise
provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision,
order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within
thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof."
Additionally, Section 1, Article VIII, of the same
Constitution provides that judicial power is vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law which power "includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government."
It is sufficiently clear that the petition brought up in G. R.
No. 161824 was aptly elevated to, and could well be taken
cognizance of by, this Court. A contrary view could be a
gross denial to our people of their fundamental right to be
fully informed, and to make a proper choice, on who could
or should be elected to occupy the highest government
post in the land.
In G. R. No. 161434 and G. R. No. 161634
Petitioners Tecson, et al., in G. R. No. 161434, and Velez, in
G. R. No. 161634, invoke the provisions of Article VII,
Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution in
assailing the jurisdiction of the COMELEC when it took
cognizance of SPA No. 04-003 and in urging the Supreme
Court to instead take on the petitions they directly
instituted before it. The Constitutional provision cited
reads:
"The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge
of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may
promulgate its rules for the purpose."
The provision is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution.
The omission in the 1935 and the 1973 Constitution to
designate any tribunal to be the sole judge of presidential
and vice-presidential contests, has constrained this Court
to declare, in Lopez vs. Roxas,4 as "not (being) justiciable"
controversies or disputes involving contests on the
elections, returns and qualifications of the President or
Vice-President. The constitutional lapse prompted
Congress, on 21 June 1957, to enact Republic Act No. 1793,
"An Act Constituting an Independent Presidential Electoral
Tribunal to Try, Hear and Decide Protests Contesting the
Election of the President-Elect and the Vice-President-
Elect of the Philippines and Providing for the Manner of
Hearing the Same." Republic Act 1793 designated the Chief
Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to
be the members of the tribunal. Although the subsequent
adoption of the parliamentary form of government under
the 1973 Constitution might have implicitly affected
Republic Act No. 1793, the statutory set-up, nonetheless,
would now be deemed revived under the present Section
4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.
Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in reference
to a post-election scenario. Election contests consist of
either an election protest or a quo warranto which,
although two distinct remedies, would have one objective
in view, i.e., to dislodge the winning candidate from office.
A perusal of the phraseology in Rule 12, Rule 13, and Rule
Page 21
14 of the "Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal,"
promulgated by the Supreme Court en banc on 18 April
1992, would support this premise -
"Rule 12. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal shall be the sole judge
of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the President or Vice-President of the
Philippines.
"Rule 13. How Initiated. - An election contest is initiated by
the filing of an election protest or a petition for quo
warranto against the President or Vice-President. An
election protest shall not include a petition for quo
warranto. A petition for quo warranto shall not include an
election protest.
"Rule 14. Election Protest. - Only the registered candidate
for President or for Vice-President of the Philippines who
received the second or third highest number of votes may
contest the election of the President or the Vice-President,
as the case may be, by filing a verified petition with the
Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty
(30) days after the proclamation of the winner."
The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the
tribunal over contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the
Philippines, and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-
President. A quo warranto proceeding is generally defined
as being an action against a person who usurps, intrudes
into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office. 5 In
such context, the election contest can only contemplate a
post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered
candidate who would have received either the second or
third highest number of votes could file an election protest.
This rule again presupposes a post-election scenario.
It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, defined by Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987
Constitution, would not include cases directly brought
before it, questioning the qualifications of a candidate for
the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are
held.
Accordingly, G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C.
Tecson, et al., vs. Commission on Elections et al.," and G. R.
No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez vs. Ronald Allan
Kelley Poe a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr." would have to be
dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
The Citizenship Issue
Now, to the basic issue; it should be helpful to first give a
brief historical background on the concept of citizenship.
Perhaps, the earliest understanding of citizenship was that
given by Aristotle, who, sometime in 384 to 322 B.C.,
described the "citizen" to refer to a man who shared in the
administration of justice and in the holding of an
office.6 Aristotle saw its significance if only to determine
the constituency of the "State," which he described as
being composed of such persons who would be adequate
in number to achieve a self-sufficient existence.7 The
concept grew to include one who would both govern and
be governed, for which qualifications like autonomy,
judgment and loyalty could be expected. Citizenship was
seen to deal with rights and entitlements, on the one hand,
and with concomitant obligations, on the other.8 In its ideal
setting, a citizen was active in public life and
Adoption
fundamentally willing to submit his private interests to the
general interest of society.
The concept of citizenship had undergone changes over
the centuries. In the 18th century, the concept was limited,
by and large, to civil citizenship, which established the
rights necessary for individual freedom, such as rights to
property, personal liberty and justice.9 Its meaning
expanded during the 19th century to include political
citizenship, which encompassed the right to participate in
the exercise of political power.10 The 20th century saw the
next stage of the development of social citizenship, which
laid emphasis on the right of the citizen to economic well-
being and social security.11 The idea of citizenship has
gained expression in the modern welfare state as it so
developed in Western Europe. An ongoing and final stage
of development, in keeping with the rapidly shrinking
global village, might well be the internationalization of
citizenship.12
The Local Setting - from Spanish Times to the Present
There was no such term as "Philippine citizens" during the
Spanish regime but "subjects of Spain" or "Spanish
subjects."13 In church records, the natives were called
'indios', denoting a low regard for the inhabitants of the
archipelago. Spanish laws on citizenship became highly
codified during the 19th century but their sheer number
made it difficult to point to one comprehensive law. Not all
of these citizenship laws of Spain however, were made to
apply to the Philippine Islands except for those explicitly
extended by Royal Decrees.14
Spanish laws on citizenship were traced back to the
Novisima Recopilacion, promulgated in Spain on 16 July
1805 but as to whether the law was extended to the
Philippines remained to be the subject of differing views
among experts;15 however, three royal decrees were
undisputably made applicable to Spaniards in the
Philippines - the Order de la Regencia of 14 August
1841,16 the Royal Decree of 23 August 1868 specifically
defining the political status of children born in the
Philippine Islands,17 and finally, the Ley Extranjera de
Ultramar of 04 July 1870, which was expressly made
applicable to the Philippines by the Royal Decree of 13 July
1870.18
The Spanish Constitution of 1876 was never extended to
the Philippine Islands because of the express mandate of
its Article 89, according to which the provisions of the
Ultramar among which this country was included, would
be governed by special laws.19
It was only the Civil Code of Spain, made effective in this
jurisdiction on 18 December 1889, which came out with
the first categorical enumeration of who were Spanish
citizens. -
"(a) Persons born in Spanish territory,
"(b) Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if they
were born outside of Spain,
"(c) Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers,
"(d) Those who, without such papers, may have become
domiciled inhabitants of any town of the Monarchy."20
Page 22
The year 1898 was another turning point in Philippine
history. Already in the state of decline as a superpower,
Spain was forced to so cede her sole colony in the East to
an upcoming world power, the United States. An accepted
principle of international law dictated that a change in
sovereignty, while resulting in an abrogation of all political
laws then in force, would have no effect on civil laws,
which would remain virtually intact.
The Treaty of Paris was entered into on 10 December 1898
between Spain and the United States.21 Under Article IX of
the treaty, the civil rights and political status of the native
inhabitants of the territories ceded to the United States
would be determined by its Congress -
"Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the
territory over which Spain by the present treaty
relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty may remain in such
territory or may remove therefrom, retaining in either
event all their rights of property, including the right to sell
or dispose of such property or of its proceeds; and they
shall also have the right to carry on their industry,
commerce, and professions, being subject in respect
thereof to such laws as are applicable to foreigners. In case
they remain in the territory they may preserve their
allegiance to the Crown of Spain by making, before a court
of record, within a year from the date of the exchange of
ratifications of this treaty, a declaration of their decision to
preserve such allegiance; in default of which declaration
they shall be held to have renounced it and to have
adopted the nationality of the territory in which they
reside.
Thus
"The civil rights and political status of the native
inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the United
States shall be determined by the Congress."22
Upon the ratification of the treaty, and pending legislation
by the United States Congress on the subject, the native
inhabitants of the Philippines ceased to be Spanish
subjects. Although they did not become American citizens,
they, however, also ceased to be "aliens" under American
laws and were thus issued passports describing them to be
citizens of the Philippines entitled to the protection of the
United States.
The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands" appeared for
the first time in the Philippine Bill of 1902, also commonly
referred to as the Philippine Organic Act of 1902, the first
comprehensive legislation of the Congress of the United
States on the Philippines -
".... that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing
to reside therein, who were Spanish subjects on the 11th
day of April, 1891, and then resided in said Islands, and
their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed
and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as
such entitled to the protection of the United States, except
such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to
the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of
the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain,
signed at Paris, December tenth eighteen hundred and
ninety eight."23
Under the organic act, a "citizen of the Philippines" was
one who was an inhabitant of the Philippines, and a
Spanish subject on the 11th day of April 1899. The term
Adoption
"inhabitant" was taken to include 1) a native-born
inhabitant, 2) an inhabitant who was a native of Peninsular
Spain, and 3) an inhabitant who obtained Spanish papers
on or before 11 April 1899.24
Controversy arose on to the status of children born in the
Philippines from 11 April 1899 to 01 July 1902, during
which period no citizenship law was extant in the
Philippines. Weight was given to the view, articulated in
jurisprudential writing at the time, that the common law
principle of jus soli, otherwise also known as the principle
of territoriality, operative in the United States and
England, governed those born in the Philippine
Archipelago within that period.25 More about this later.
In 23 March 1912, the Congress of the United States made
the following amendment to the Philippine Bill of 1902 -
"Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby
authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of
Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine
Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions,
the natives of other insular possession of the United States,
and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands
who would become citizens of the United States, under the
laws of the United States, if residing therein."26
With the adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, the
concept of "Philippine citizens" had for the first time
crystallized. The word "Filipino" was used by William H.
Taft, the first Civil Governor General in the Philippines
when he initially made mention of it in his slogan, "The
Philippines for the Filipinos." In 1916, the Philippine
Autonomy Act, also known as the Jones Law restated
virtually the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902, as so
amended by the Act of Congress in 1912 -
"That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were
Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen
hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands,
and their children born subsequently thereto, shall be
deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands,
except such as shall have elected to preserve their
allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the
provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States
and Spain, signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen
hundred and ninety-eight and except such others as have
since become citizens of some other country; Provided,
That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is
hereby authorized to provide for the acquisition of
Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine
Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions,
the natives of the insular possessions of the United States,
and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands
who are citizens of the United States, or who could become
citizens of the United States under the laws of the United
States, if residing therein."
Under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of the
Philippines was deemed to be a citizen of the Philippines
as of 11 April 1899 if he was 1) a subject of Spain on 11
April 1899, 2) residing in the Philippines on said date, and,
3) since that date, not a citizen of some other country.
While there was, at one brief time, divergent views on
whether or not jus soli was a mode of acquiring
citizenship, the 1935 Constitution brought to an end to any
such link with common law, by adopting, once and for all,
Page 23
jus sanguinis or blood relationship as being the basis of
Filipino citizenship -
"Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution. The following are
citizens of the Philippines -
"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the
time of the adoption of this Constitution
"(2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign
parents who, before the adoption of this Constitution, had
been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.
"(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the
Philippines.
"(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines
and upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine
citizenship.
"(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."
Subsection (4), Article III, of the 1935 Constitution, taken
together with existing civil law provisions at the time,
which provided that women would automatically lose
their Filipino citizenship and acquire that of their foreign
husbands, resulted in discriminatory situations that
effectively incapacitated the women from transmitting
their Filipino citizenship to their legitimate children and
required illegitimate children of Filipino mothers to still
elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
Seeking to correct this anomaly, as well as fully cognizant
of the newly found status of Filipino women as equals to
men, the framers of the 1973 Constitution crafted the
provisions of the new Constitution on citizenship to reflect
such concerns -
"Section 1, Article III, 1973 Constitution - The following are
citizens of the Philippines:
"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time
of the adoption of this Constitution.
"(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the
Philippines.
"(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the
provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and
thirty-five.
"(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."
For good measure, Section 2 of the same article also
further provided that
"A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien
retains her Philippine citizenship, unless by her act or
omission she is deemed, under the law to have renounced
her citizenship."
The 1987 Constitution generally adopted the provisions of
the 1973 Constitution, except for subsection (3) thereof
that aimed to correct the irregular situation generated by
the questionable proviso in the 1935 Constitution.
Section I, Article IV, 1987 Constitution now provides:
Adoption
"The following are citizens of the Philippines:
"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time
of the adoption of this Constitution.
"(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the
Philippines.
"(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino
mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority; and
"(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."
The Case Of FPJ
Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:
"No person may be elected President unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter,
able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day
of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least
ten years immediately preceding such election."
The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include
"those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect
their Philippine citizenship."27
The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20
August 1939 during the regime of the 1935 Constitution.
Through its history, four modes of acquiring citizenship -
naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis 28
had been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis,
could qualify a person to being a "natural-born" citizen of
the Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of
Customs29 (1912), did not last long. With the adoption of
the 1935 Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan
Chong vs. Secretary of Labor30 (1947), jus sanguinis or
blood relationship would now become the primary basis of
citizenship by birth.
Documentary evidence adduced by petitioner would tend
to indicate that the earliest established direct ascendant of
FPJ was his paternal grandfather Lorenzo Pou, married to
Marta Reyes, the father of Allan F. Poe. While the record of
birth of Lorenzo Pou had not been presented in evidence,
his death certificate, however, identified him to be a
Filipino, a resident of San Carlos, Pangasinan, and 84 years
old at the time of his death on 11 September 1954. The
certificate of birth of the father of FPJ, Allan F. Poe, showed
that he was born on 17 May 1915 to an Espaol father,
Lorenzo Pou, and a mestiza Espaol mother, Marta Reyes.
Introduced by petitioner was an "uncertified" copy of a
supposed certificate of the alleged marriage of Allan F. Poe
and Paulita Gomez on 05 July 1936. The marriage
certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley reflected the
date of their marriage to be on 16 September 1940. In the
same certificate, Allan F. Poe was stated to be twenty-five
years old, unmarried, and a Filipino citizen, and Bessie
Kelley to be twenty-two years old, unmarried, and an
American citizen. The birth certificate of FPJ, would
disclose that he was born on 20 August 1939 to Allan F.
Poe, a Filipino, twenty-four years old, married to Bessie
Kelly, an American citizen, twenty-one years old and
married.
Page 24
Considering the reservations made by the parties on the
veracity of some of the entries on the birth certificate of
respondent and the marriage certificate of his parents, the
only conclusions that could be drawn with some degree of
certainty from the documents would be that -
1. The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley;
2. FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939;
3. Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each
other on 16 September, 1940;
4. The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and
5. At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo
Poe was 84 years old.
Would the above facts be sufficient or insufficient to
establish the fact that FPJ is a natural-born Filipino citizen?
The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley,
the birth certificate of FPJ, and the death certificate of
Lorenzo Pou are documents of public record in the custody
of a public officer. The documents have been submitted in
evidence by both contending parties during the
proceedings before the COMELEC.
The birth certificate of FPJ was marked Exhibit "A" for
petitioner and Exhibit "3" for respondent. The marriage
certificate of Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley was submitted as
Exhibit "21" for respondent. The death certificate of
Lorenzo Pou was submitted by respondent as his Exhibit
"5." While the last two documents were submitted in
evidence for respondent, the admissibility thereof,
particularly in reference to the facts which they purported
to show, i.e., the marriage certificate in relation to the date
of marriage of Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley and the death
certificate relative to the death of Lorenzo Pou on 11
September 1954 in San Carlos, Pangasinan, were all
admitted by petitioner, who had utilized those material
statements in his argument. All three documents were
certified true copies of the originals.
Section 3, Rule 130, Rules of Court states that -
"Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When
the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no
evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself, except in the following cases:
"x x x xxx xxx
"(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a
public office or is recorded in a public office."
Being public documents, the death certificate of Lorenzo
Pou, the marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie
Kelly, and the birth certificate of FPJ, constitute prima facie
proof of their contents. Section 44, Rule 130, of the Rules of
Court provides:
"Entries in official records. Entries in official records made
in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the
Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the
facts therein stated."
Adoption
The trustworthiness of public documents and the value
given to the entries made therein could be grounded on 1)
the sense of official duty in the preparation of the
statement made, 2) the penalty which is usually affixed to
a breach of that duty, 3) the routine and disinterested
origin of most such statements, and 4) the publicity of
record which makes more likely the prior exposure of such
errors as might have occurred.31
The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou would indicate that he
died on 11 September 1954, at the age of 84 years, in San
Carlos, Pangasinan. It could thus be assumed that Lorenzo
Pou was born sometime in the year 1870 when the
Philippines was still a colony of Spain. Petitioner would
argue that Lorenzo Pou was not in the Philippines during
the crucial period of from 1898 to 1902 considering that
there was no existing record about such fact in the Records
Management and Archives Office. Petitioner, however,
likewise failed to show that Lorenzo Pou was at any other
place during the same period. In his death certificate, the
residence of Lorenzo Pou was stated to be San Carlos,
Pangasinan. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary,
it should be sound to conclude, or at least to presume, that
the place of residence of a person at the time of his death
was also his residence before death. It would be extremely
doubtful if the Records Management and Archives Office
would have had complete records of all residents of the
Philippines from 1898 to 1902.
Proof of Paternity and Filiation
Under Civil Law.
Petitioner submits, in any case, that in establishing filiation
(relationship or civil status of the child to the father [or
mother]) or paternity (relationship or civil status of the
father to the child) of an illegitimate child, FPJ evidently
being an illegitimate son according to petitioner, the
mandatory rules under civil law must be used.
Under the Civil Code of Spain, which was in force in the
Philippines from 08 December 1889 up until the day prior
to 30 August 1950 when the Civil Code of the Philippines
took effect, acknowledgment was required to establish
filiation or paternity. Acknowledgment was either judicial
(compulsory) or voluntary. Judicial or compulsory
acknowledgment was possible only if done during the
lifetime of the putative parent; voluntary acknowledgment
could only be had in a record of birth, a will, or a public
document.32 Complementary to the new code was Act No.
3753 or the Civil Registry Law expressing in Section 5
thereof, that -
"In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be
signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of the infant or
only by the mother if the father refuses. In the latter case,
it shall not be permissible to state or reveal in the
document the name of the father who refuses to
acknowledge the child, or to give therein any information
by which such father could be identified."
In order that the birth certificate could then be utilized to
prove voluntary acknowledgment of filiation or paternity,
the certificate was required to be signed or sworn to by the
father. The failure of such requirement rendered the same
useless as being an authoritative document of
recognition.33 In Mendoza vs. Mella,34 the Court ruled -
Page 25
"Since Rodolfo was born in 1935, after the registry law was
enacted, the question here really is whether or not his
birth certificate (Exhibit 1), which is merely a certified
copy of the registry record, may be relied upon as
sufficient proof of his having been voluntarily recognized.
No such reliance, in our judgment, may be placed upon it.
While it contains the names of both parents, there is no
showing that they signed the original, let alone swore to its
contents as required in Section 5 of Act No. 3753. For all
that might have happened, it was not even they or either of
them who furnished the data to be entered in the civil
register. Petitioners say that in any event the birth
certificate is in the nature of a public document wherein
voluntary recognition of a natural child may also be made,
according to the same Article 131. True enough, but in
such a case, there must be a clear statement in the
document that the parent recognizes the child as his or her
own."
In the birth certificate of respondent FPJ, presented by
both parties, nowhere in the document was the signature
of Allan F. Poe found. There being no will apparently
executed, or at least shown to have been executed, by
decedent Allan F. Poe, the only other proof of voluntary
recognition remained to be "some other public document."
In Pareja vs. Pareja,35 this Court defined what could
constitute such a document as proof of voluntary
acknowledgment:
"Under the Spanish Civil Code there are two classes of
public documents, those executed by private individuals
which must be authenticated by notaries, and those issued
by competent public officials by reason of their office. The
public document pointed out in Article 131 as one of the
means by which recognition may be made belongs to the
first class."
Let us leave it at that for the moment.
The 1950 Civil Code categorized the acknowledgment or
recognition of illegitimate children into voluntary, legal or
compulsory. Voluntary recognition was required to be
expressedly made in a record of birth, a will, a statement
before a court of record or in any authentic writing. Legal
acknowledgment took place in favor of full blood brothers
and sisters of an illegitimate child who was recognized or
judicially declared as natural. Compulsory
acknowledgment could be demanded generally in cases
when the child had in his favor any evidence to prove
filiation. Unlike an action to claim legitimacy which would
last during the lifetime of the child, and might pass
exceptionally to the heirs of the child, an action to claim
acknowledgment, however, could only be brought during
the lifetime of the presumed parent.
Amicus Curiae Ruben F. Balane defined, during the oral
argument, "authentic writing," so as to be an authentic
writing for purposes of voluntary recognition, simply as
being a genuine or indubitable writing of the father. The
term would include a public instrument (one duly
acknowledged before a notary public or other competent
official) or a private writing admitted by the father to be
his.
The Family Code has further liberalized the rules; Article
172, Article 173, and Article 175 provide:
"Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established
by any of the following:
Adoption
"(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a
final judgment; or
"(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed
by the parent concerned.
"In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate
filiation shall be proved by:
"(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child; or
"(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws.
"Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought
by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be
transmitted to the heirs should the child die during
minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs
shall have a period of five years within which to institute
the action.
"The action already commenced by the child shall survive
notwithstanding the death of either or both of the parties.
"x x x xxx x x x.
"Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their
illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same,
evidence as legitimate children.
"The action must be brought within the same period
specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on
the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the
action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged
parent."
The provisions of the Family Code are retroactively
applied; Article 256 of the code reads:
"Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as
it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws."
Thus, in Vda. de Sy-Quia vs. Court of Appeals,36 the Court
has ruled:
"We hold that whether Jose was a voluntarily recognized
natural child should be decided under Article 278 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines. Article 2260 of that Code
provides that 'the voluntary recognition of a natural child
shall take place according to this Code, even if the child
was born before the effectivity of this body of laws' or
before August 30, 1950. Hence, Article 278 may be given
retroactive effect."
It should be apparent that the growing trend to liberalize
the acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children
is an attempt to break away from the traditional idea of
keeping well apart legitimate and non-legitimate
relationships within the family in favor of the greater
interest and welfare of the child. The provisions are
intended to merely govern the private and personal affairs
of the family. There is little, if any, to indicate that the
legitimate or illegitimate civil status of the individual
would also affect his political rights or, in general, his
relationship to the State. While, indeed, provisions on
Page 26
"citizenship" could be found in the Civil Code, such
provisions must be taken in the context of private
relations, the domain of civil law; particularly -
"Civil Law is that branch of law which has for its double
purpose the organization of the family and the regulation
of property. It has thus [been] defined as the mass of
precepts which determine and regulate the relations of
assistance, authority and obedience among members of a
family, and those which exist among members of a society
for the protection of private interests."37
In Yaez de Barnuevo vs. Fuster,38 the Court has held:
"In accordance with Article 9 of the Civil Code of Spain, x x
x the laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
status, condition and legal capacity of persons, govern
Spaniards although they reside in a foreign country; that,
in consequence, 'all questions of a civil nature, such as
those dealing with the validity or nullity of the
matrimonial bond, the domicile of the husband and wife,
their support, as between them, the separation of their
properties, the rules governing property, marital authority,
division of conjugal property, the classification of their
property, legal causes for divorce, the extent of the latter,
the authority to decree it, and, in general, the civil effects of
marriage and divorce upon the persons and properties of
the spouses, are questions that are governed exclusively
by the national law of the husband and wife."
The relevance of "citizenship" or "nationality" to Civil Law
is best exemplified in Article 15 of the Civil Code, stating
that -
"Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon
citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad" -
that explains the need to incorporate in the code a
reiteration of the Constitutional provisions on citizenship.
Similarly, citizenship is significant in civil relationships
found in different parts of the Civil Code,39 such as on
successional rights and family relations.40 In adoption, for
instance, an adopted child would be considered the child of
his adoptive parents and accorded the same rights as their
legitimate child but such legal fiction extended only to
define his rights under civil law41 and not his political
status.
Civil law provisions point to an obvious bias against
illegitimacy. This discriminatory attitude may be traced to
the Spanish family and property laws, which, while
defining proprietary and successional rights of members of
the family, provided distinctions in the rights of legitimate
and illegitimate children. In the monarchial set-up of old
Spain, the distribution and inheritance of titles and wealth
were strictly according to bloodlines and the concern to
keep these bloodlines uncontaminated by foreign blood
was paramount.
These distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy
were codified in the Spanish Civil Code, and the invidious
discrimination survived when the Spanish Civil Code
became the primary source of our own Civil Code. Such
distinction, however, remains and should remain only in
the sphere of civil law and not unduly impede or impinge
on the domain of political law.
Adoption
The proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of
determining his citizenship status should thus be deemed
independent from and not inextricably tied up with that
prescribed for civil law purposes. The Civil Code or Family
Code provisions on proof of filiation or paternity, although
good law, do not have preclusive effects on matters alien to
personal and family relations. The ordinary rules on
evidence could well and should govern. For instance, the
matter about pedigree is not necessarily precluded from
being applicable by the Civil Code or Family Code
provisions.
Section 39, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides -
"Act or Declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration
of a person deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the
pedigree of another person related to him by birth or
marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred
before the controversy, and the relationship between the
two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration. The word `pedigree includes relationship,
family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when
and the places where these facts occurred, and the names
of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history
intimately connected with pedigree."
For the above rule to apply, it would be necessary that (a)
the declarant is already dead or unable to testify, (b) the
pedigree of a person must be at issue, (c) the declarant
must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in
question, (d) declaration must be made before the
controversy has occurred, and (e) the relationship
between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in
question must be shown by evidence other than such act
or declaration.
Thus, the duly notarized declaration made by Ruby Kelley
Mangahas, sister of Bessie Kelley Poe submitted as Exhibit
20 before the COMELEC, might be accepted to prove the
acts of Allan F. Poe, recognizing his own paternal
relationship with FPJ, i.e, living together with Bessie Kelley
and his children (including respondent FPJ) in one house,
and as one family -
"I, Ruby Kelley Mangahas, of legal age and sound mind,
presently residing in Stockton, California, U.S.A., after
being sworn in accordance with law do hereby declare
that:
"1. I am the sister of the late Bessie Kelley Poe.
"2. Bessie Kelley Poe was the wife of Fernando Poe, Sr.
"3. Fernando and Bessie Poe had a son by the name of
Ronald Allan Poe, more popularly known in the Philippines
as `Fernando Poe, Jr., or `FPJ.
"4. Ronald Allan Poe `FPJ was born on August 20, 1939 at
St. Luke's Hospital, Magdalena Street, Manila.
"x x x xxx xxx
"7. Fernando Poe Sr., and my sister Bessie, met and became
engaged while they were students at the University of the
Philippines in 1936. I was also introduced to Fernando
Poe, Sr., by my sister that same year.
Page 27
"8. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister Bessie had their first
child in 1938.
"9. Fernando Poe, Sr., my sister Bessie and their first three
children, Elizabeth, Ronald, Allan and Fernando II, and
myself lived together with our mother at our family's
house on Dakota St. (now Jorge Bocobo St.), Malate until
the liberation of Manila in 1945, except for some months
between 1943-1944.
"10. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister, Bessie, were blessed
with four (4) more children after Ronald Allan Poe.
"x x x xxx xxx
"18. I am executing this Declaration to attest to the fact
that my nephew, Ronald Allan Poe is a natural born
Filipino, and that he is the legitimate child of Fernando
Poe, Sr.
"Done in City of Stockton, California, U.S.A., this 12th day of
January 2004.
Ruby Kelley Mangahas Declarant DNA Testing
In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to
satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA
testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from body
cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residue of
the long dead parent could be resorted to. A positive match
would clear up filiation or paternity. In Tijing vs. Court of
Appeals,42 this Court has acknowledged the strong weight
of DNA testing -
"Parentage will still be resolved using conventional
methods unless we adopt the modern and scientific ways
available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and
expertise in using DNA test for identification and
parentage testing. The University of the Philippines
Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA
Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct
DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The
analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person
has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the
other from the father. The DNA from the mother, the
alleged father and the child are analyzed to establish
parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the
use of DNA test as evidence is still open to challenge.
Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should
not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence.
For it was said, that courts should apply the results of
science when competently obtained in aid of situations
presented, since to reject said result is to deny progress."
Petitioners Argument For Jurisprudential
Conclusiveness
Petitioner would have it that even if Allan F. Poe were a
Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his
citizenship to respondent FPJ, the latter being an
illegitimate child. According to petitioner, prior to his
marriage to Bessie Kelley, Allan F. Poe, on July 5, 1936,
contracted marriage with a certain Paulita Gomez, making
his subsequent marriage to Bessie Kelley bigamous and
respondent FPJ an illegitimate child. The veracity of the
supposed certificate of marriage between Allan F. Poe and
Paulita Gomez could be most doubtful at best. But the
documentary evidence introduced by no less than
respondent himself, consisting of a birth certificate of
Adoption
respondent and a marriage certificate of his parents
showed that FPJ was born on 20 August 1939 to a Filipino
father and an American mother who were married to each
other a year later, or on 16 September 1940. Birth to
unmarried parents would make FPJ an illegitimate child.
Petitioner contended that as an illegitimate child, FPJ so
followed the citizenship of his mother, Bessie Kelley, an
American citizen, basing his stand on the ruling of this
Court in Morano vs. Vivo,43 citing Chiongbian vs. de
Leo44 and Serra vs. Republic.45
On the above score, the disquisition made by amicus curiae
Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ, is most convincing; he states -
"We must analyze these cases and ask what the lis mota
was in each of them. If the pronouncement of the Court on
jus sanguinis was on the lis mota, the pronouncement
would be a decision constituting doctrine under the rule of
stare decisis. But if the pronouncement was irrelevant to
the lis mota, the pronouncement would not be a decision
but a mere obiter dictum which did not establish doctrine.
I therefore invite the Court to look closely into these cases.
"First, Morano vs. Vivo. The case was not about an
illegitimate child of a Filipino father. It was about a stepson
of a Filipino, a stepson who was the child of a Chinese
mother and a Chinese father. The issue was whether the
stepson followed the naturalization of the stepfather.
Nothing about jus sanguinis there. The stepson did not
have the blood of the naturalized stepfather.
"Second, Chiongbian vs. de Leon. This case was not about
the illegitimate son of a Filipino father. It was about a
legitimate son of a father who had become Filipino by
election to public office before the 1935 Constitution
pursuant to Article IV, Section 1(2) of the 1935
Constitution. No one was illegitimate here.
"Third, Serra vs. Republic. The case was not about the
illegitimate son of a Filipino father. Serra was an
illegitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother.
The issue was whether one who was already a Filipino
because of his mother who still needed to be naturalized.
There is nothing there about invidious jus sanguinis.
"Finally, Paa vs. Chan.46 This is a more complicated case.
The case was about the citizenship of Quintin Chan who
was the son of Leoncio Chan. Quintin Chan claimed that his
father, Leoncio, was the illegitimate son of a Chinese father
and a Filipino mother. Quintin therefore argued that he got
his citizenship from Leoncio, his father. But the Supreme
Court said that there was no valid proof that Leoncio was
in fact the son of a Filipina mother. The Court therefore
concluded that Leoncio was not Filipino. If Leoncio was not
Filipino, neither was his son Quintin. Quintin therefore was
not only not a natural-born Filipino but was not even a
Filipino.
"The Court should have stopped there. But instead it
followed with an obiter dictum. The Court said obiter that
even if Leoncio, Quintin's father, were Filipino, Quintin
would not be Filipino because Quintin was illegitimate.
This statement about Quintin, based on a contrary to fact
assumption, was absolutely unnecessary for the case. x x x
It was obiter dictum, pure and simple, simply repeating the
obiter dictum in Morano vs. Vivo.
"x x x xxx xxx
Page 28
"Aside from the fact that such a pronouncement would
have no textual foundation in the Constitution, it would
also violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution
not once but twice. First, it would make an illegitimate
distinction between a legitimate child and an illegitimate
child, and second, it would make an illegitimate distinction
between the illegitimate child of a Filipino father and the
illegitimate child of a Filipino mother.
"The doctrine on constitutionally allowable distinctions
was established long ago by People vs. Cayat.47 I would
grant that the distinction between legitimate children and
illegitimate children rests on real differences. x x x But real
differences alone do not justify invidious distinction. Real
differences may justify distinction for one purpose but not
for another purpose.
"x x x What is the relevance of legitimacy or illegitimacy to
elective public service? What possible state interest can
there be for disqualifying an illegitimate child from
becoming a public officer. It was not the fault of the child
that his parents had illicit liaison. Why deprive the child of
the fullness of political rights for no fault of his own? To
disqualify an illegitimate child from holding an important
public office is to punish him for the indiscretion of his
parents. There is neither justice nor rationality in that. And
if there is neither justice nor rationality in the distinction,
then the distinction transgresses the equal protection
clause and must be reprobated."
The other amici curiae, Mr. Justice Vicente Mendoza (a
former member of this Court), Professor Ruben Balane and
Dean Martin Magallona, at bottom, have expressed similar
views. The thesis of petitioner, unfortunately hinging
solely on pure obiter dicta, should indeed fail.
Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as
taking after the citizenship of its mother, it did so for the
benefit the child. It was to ensure a Filipino nationality for
the illegitimate child of an alien father in line with the
assumption that the mother had custody, would exercise
parental authority and had the duty to support her
illegitimate child. It was to help the child, not to prejudice
or discriminate against him.
The fact of the matter perhaps the most significant
consideration is that the 1935 Constitution, the
fundamental law prevailing on the day, month and year of
birth of respondent FPJ, can never be more explicit than it
is. Providing neither conditions nor distinctions, the
Constitution states that among the citizens of the
Philippines are "those whose fathers are citizens of the
Philippines." There utterly is no cogent justification to
prescribe conditions or distinctions where there clearly
are none provided.
In Sum
(1) The Court, in the exercise of its power of judicial
review, possesses jurisdiction over the petition in G. R. No.
161824, filed under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. G.R. No. 161824 assails
the resolution of the COMELEC for alleged grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing, for lack of merit, the petition in
SPA No. 04-003 which has prayed for the disqualification
of respondent FPJ from running for the position of
President in the 10th May 2004 national elections on the
contention that FPJ has committed material representation
Adoption
in his certificate of candidacy by representing himself to be
a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
(2) The Court must dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction and
prematurity, the petitions in G. R. No. 161434 and No.
161634 both having been directly elevated to this Court in
the latters capacity as the only tribunal to resolve a
presidential and vice-presidential election contest under
the Constitution. Evidently, the primary jurisdiction of the
Court can directly be invoked only after, not before, the
elections are held.
(3) In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave
abuse of discretion has been committed by the COMELEC,
it is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not
respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn,
depended on whether or not the father of respondent,
Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen
and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged
illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after
the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any
conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could
only be drawn from the presumption that having died in
1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born
sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was
under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his
place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence
of any other evidence, could have well been his place of
residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have
benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the
Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of
Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son,
Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935
Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has
seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose
fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such
children are legitimate or illegitimate.
(4) But while the totality of the evidence may not establish
conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen
of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would
preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be
held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in
his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in
relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code.
Petitioner has utterly failed to substantiate his case before
the Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to
the parties to present their position and evidence, and to
prove whether or not there has been material
misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-
Marcos vs. COMELEC,48 must not only be material, but also
deliberate and willful.
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS
1. G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson and
Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., Petitioners, versus Commission on
Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. "Fernando Poe,
Jr.,) and Victorino X. Fornier, Respondents," and G. R. No.
161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez, Petitioner, versus
Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.,
Respondent," for want of jurisdiction.
2. G. R. No. 161824, entitled "Victorino X. Fornier,
Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission on Elections and
Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr.,"
for failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of
respondent Commission on Elections in dismissing the
petition in SPA No. 04-003.
Page 29
No Costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 143989 July 14, 2003
ISABELITA S. LAHOM, petitioner,
vs.
JOSE MELVIN SIBULO (previously referred to as "DR.
MELVIN S. LAHOM"), respondent.
VITUG, J.:
The bliss of marriage and family would be to most less
than complete without children. The realization could have
likely prodded the spouses Dr. Diosdado Lahom and
Isabelita Lahom to take into their care Isabelita's nephew
Jose Melvin Sibulo and to bring him up as their own. At the
tender age of two, Jose Melvin enjoyed the warmth, love
and support of the couple who treated the child like their
own. Indeed, for years, Dr. and Mrs. Lahom fancied on
legally adopting Jose Melvin. Finally, in 1971, the couple
decided to file a petition for adoption. On 05 May 1972, an
order granting the petition was issued that made all the
more intense than before the feeling of affection of the
spouses for Melvin. In keeping with the court order, the
Civil Registrar of Naga City changed the name "Jose Melvin
Sibulo" to "Jose Melvin Lahom."
A sad turn of events came many years later. Eventually, in
December of 1999, Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to
rescind the decree of adoption before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 22, of Naga City. In her petition, she
averred
"7. That x x x despite the proddings and pleadings of said
spouses, respondent refused to change his surname from
Sibulo to Lahom, to the frustrations of petitioner
particularly her husband until the latter died, and even
before his death he had made known his desire to revoke
respondent's adoption, but was prevented by petitioner's
supplication, however with his further request upon
petitioner to give to charity whatever properties or
interest may pertain to respondent in the future.
xxx xxx xxx
"10. That respondent continued using his surname Sibulo
to the utter disregard of the feelings of herein petitioner,
and his records with the Professional Regulation
Commission showed his name as Jose Melvin M. Sibulo
originally issued in 1978 until the present, and in all his
dealings and activities in connection with his practice of
his profession, he is Jose Melvin M. Sibulo.
xxx xxx xxx
"13. That herein petitioner being a widow, and living alone
in this city with only her household helps to attend to her,
has yearned for the care and show of concern from a son,
but respondent remained indifferent and would only come
to Naga to see her once a year.
"14. That for the last three or four years, the medical
check-up of petitioner in Manila became more frequent in
view of a leg ailment, and those were the times when
petitioner would need most the care and support from a
love one, but respondent all the more remained callous
Adoption
and utterly indifferent towards petitioner which is not
expected of a son.
"15. That herein respondent has recently been jealous of
petitioner's nephews and nieces whenever they would find
time to visit her, respondent alleging that they were only
motivated by their desire for some material benefits from
petitioner.
"16. That in view of respondent's insensible attitude
resulting in a strained and uncomfortable relationship
between him and petitioner, the latter has suffered
wounded feelings, knowing that after all respondent's only
motive to his adoption is his expectancy of his alleged
rights over the properties of herein petitioner and her late
husband, clearly shown by his recent filing of Civil Case No.
99-4463 for partition against petitioner, thereby totally
eroding her love and affection towards respondent,
rendering the decree of adoption, considering respondent
to be the child of petitioner, for all legal purposes, has been
negated for which reason there is no more basis for its
existence, hence this petition for revocation,"1
Prior to the institution of the case, specifically on 22 March
1998, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8552, also known as the
Domestic Adoption Act, went into effect. The new statute
deleted from the law the right of adopters to rescind a
decree of adoption.
Section 19 of Article VI of R.A. No. 8552 now reads:
"SEC. 19. Grounds for Rescission of Adoption. Upon
petition of the adoptee, with the assistance of the
Department if a minor or if over eighteen (18) years of age
but is incapacitated, as guardian/counsel, the adoption
may be rescinded on any of the following grounds
committed by the adopter(s): (a) repeated physical and
verbal maltreatment by the adopter(s) despite having
undergone counseling; (b) attempt on the life of the
adoptee; (c) sexual assault or violence; or (d)
abandonment and failure to comply with parental
obligations.
"Adoption, being in the best interest of the child, shall not be
subject to rescission by the adopter(s). However, the
adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in
Article 919 of the Civil Code." (emphasis supplied)
Jose Melvin moved for the dismissal of the petition,
contending principally (a) that the trial court had no
jurisdiction over the case and (b) that the petitioner had
no cause of action in view of the aforequoted provisions of
R.A. No. 8552. Petitioner asseverated, by way of
opposition, that the proscription in R.A. No. 8552 should
not retroactively apply, i.e., to cases where the ground for
rescission of the adoption vested under the regime of then
Article 3482of the Civil Code and Article 1923 of the Family
Code.
In an order, dated 28 April 2000, the trial court held
thusly:
"On the issue of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
suit, Section 5(c) of R.A. No. 8369 confers jurisdiction to
this Court, having been designated Family Court in A.M.
No. 99-11-07 SC.
"On the matter of no cause of action, the test on the
sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint, is whether
Page 30
or not, admitting the facts alleged, the Court could render a
valid judgment in accordance with the prayer of said
complaint (De Jesus, et al. vs. Belarmino, et al., 95 Phil. 365).
"Admittedly, Section 19, Article VI of R.A. No. 8552 deleted
the right of an adopter to rescind an adoption earlier
granted under the Family Code. Conformably, on the face
of the petition, indeed there is lack of cause of action.
"Petitioner however, insists that her right to rescind long
acquired under the provisions of the Family Code should
be respected. Assuming for the sake of argument, that
petitioner is entitled to rescind the adoption of respondent
granted on May 5, 1972, said right should have been
exercised within the period allowed by the Rules. From the
averments in the petition, it appears clear that the legal
grounds for the petition have been discovered and known
to petitioner for more than five (5) years, prior to the filing
of the instant petition on December 1, 1999, hence, the
action if any, had already prescribed. (Sec. 5, Rule 100
Revised Rules of Court)
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, the
petition is ordered dismissed."4
Via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Court, petitioner raises the following
questions; viz:
1. May the subject adoption, decreed on 05 May 1972, still
be revoked or rescinded by an adopter after the effectivity
of R.A. No. 8552?
2. In the affirmative, has the adopter's action prescribed?
A brief background on the law and its origins could
provide some insights on the subject. In ancient times, the
Romans undertook adoption to assure male heirs in the
family.5 The continuity of the adopter's family was the
primary purpose of adoption and all matters relating to it
basically focused on the rights of the adopter. There was
hardly any mention about the rights of the
adopted.6 Countries, like Greece, France, Spain and
England, in an effort to preserve inheritance within the
family, neither allowed nor recognized adoption.7 It was
only much later when adoption was given an impetus in
law and still later when the welfare of the child became a
paramount concern.8 Spain itself which previously
disfavored adoption ultimately relented and accepted the
Roman law concept of adoption which, subsequently, was
to find its way to the archipelago. The Americans came and
introduced their own ideas on adoption which, unlike most
countries in Europe, made the interests of the child an
overriding consideration.9 In the early part of the century
just passed, the rights of children invited universal
attention; the Geneva Declaration of Rights of the Child of
1924 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of
1948,10 followed by the United Nations Declarations of the
Rights of the Child,11 were written instruments that would
also protect and safeguard the rights of adopted children.
The Civil Code of the Philippines12 of 1950 on adoption,
later modified by the Child and Youth Welfare Code13 and
then by the Family Code of the Philippines,14gave
immediate statutory acknowledgment to the rights of the
adopted. In 1989, the United Nations initiated the
Convention of the Rights of the Child. The Philippines, a
State Party to the Convention, accepted the principle that
adoption was impressed with social and moral
responsibility, and that its underlying intent was geared to
Adoption
favor the adopted child. R.A. No. 8552 secured these rights
and privileges for the adopted. Most importantly, it
affirmed the legitimate status of the adopted child, not
only in his new family but also in the society as well. The
new law withdrew the right of an adopter to rescind the
adoption decree and gave to the adopted child the sole
right to sever the legal ties created by adoption.
Petitioner, however, would insist that R.A. No. 8552 should
not adversely affect her right to annul the adoption decree,
nor deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction to hear the
case, both being vested under the Civil Code and the
Family Code, the laws then in force.
The concept of "vested right" is a consequence of the
constitutional guaranty of due process15 that expresses
a present fixed interest which in right reason and natural
justice is protected against arbitrary state action;16 it
includes not only legal or equitable title to the
enforcement of a demand but also exemptions from new
obligations created after the right has become
vested.17 Rights are considered vested when the right to
enjoyment is a present interest,18 absolute, unconditional,
and perfect19 or fixed and irrefutable.
In Republic vs. Court of Appeals,20 a petition to adopt Jason
Condat was filed by Zenaida C. Bobiles on 02 February
1988 when the Child and Youth Welfare Code (Presidential
Decree No. 603) allowed an adoption to be sought
by either spouse or both of them. After the trial court had
rendered its decision and while the case was still pending
on appeal, the Family Code of the Philippines (Executive
Order No. 209), mandating joint adoption by the husband
and wife, took effect. Petitioner Republic argued that the
case should be dismissed for having been filed by Mrs.
Bobiles alone and without being joined by the husband.
The Court concluded that the jurisdiction of the court is
determined by the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action. The petition to adopt Jason,
having been filed with the court at the time when P.D. No.
603 was still in effect, the right of Mrs. Bobiles to file the
petition, without being joined by her husband, according to
the Court had become vested. In Republic vs.
Miller,21 spouses Claude and Jumrus Miller, both aliens,
sought to adopt Michael Madayag. On 29 July 1988, the
couple filed a petition to formalize Michael's adoption
having theretofore been taken into their care. At the time
the action was commenced, P.D. No. 603 allowed aliens to
adopt. After the decree of adoption and while on appeal
before the Court of Appeals, the Family Code was enacted
into law on 08 August 1988 disqualifying aliens from
adopting Filipino children. The Republic then prayed for
the withdrawal of the adoption decree. In discarding the
argument posed by the Republic, the Supreme Court ruled
that the controversy should be resolved in the light of the
law governing at the time the petition was filed.
It was months after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 that
herein petitioner filed an action to revoke the decree of
adoption granted in 1975. By then, the new law,22 had
already abrogated and repealed the right of an adopter
under the Civil Code and the Family Code to rescind a
decree of adoption. Consistently with its earlier
pronouncements, the Court should now hold that the
action for rescission of the adoption decree, having been
initiated by petitioner after R.A. No. 8552 had come into
force, no longer could be pursued.
Interestingly, even before the passage of the statute, an
action to set aside the adoption is subject to the five-year
Page 31
bar rule under Rule 10023 of the Rules of Court and that the
adopter would lose the right to revoke the adoption decree
after the lapse of that period. The exercise of the right
within a prescriptive period is a condition that could not
fulfill the requirements of a vested right entitled to
protection. It must also be acknowledged that a person has
no vested right in statutory privileges.24 While adoption
has often been referred to in the context of a "right," the
privilege to adopt is itself not naturally innate or
fundamental but rather a right merely created by
statute.25 It is a privilege that is governed by the state's
determination on what it may deem to be for the best
interest and welfare of the child.26 Matters relating to
adoption, including the withdrawal of the right of an
adopter to nullify the adoption decree, are subject to
regulation by the State.27 Concomitantly, a right of
action given by statute may be taken away at anytime
before it has been exercised.28
While R.A. No. 8552 has unqualifiedly withdrawn from an
adopter a consequential right to rescind the adoption
decree even in cases where the adoption might clearly turn
out to be undesirable, it remains, nevertheless, the
bounden duty of the Court to apply the law. Dura lex sed
lex would be the hackneyed truism that those caught in the
law have to live with. It is still noteworthy, however, that
an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of
adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture
of certain benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving
child. For instance, upon the grounds recognized by law, an
adopter may deny to an adopted child his legitime and, by
a will and testament, may freely exclude him from having a
share in the disposable portion of his estate.
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the court a quo is
AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE
NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA
HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural
father, use the surname of her natural mother as her
middle name? This is the issue raised in the instant case.
The facts are undisputed.
On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein
petitioner, filed a petition1 to adopt his minor illegitimate
child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged
therein, among others, that Stephanie was born on June 26,
1994;2 that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that
Stephanie has been using her mothers middle name and
surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified to be
her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanies middle
name Astorga be changed to "Garcia," her mothers
surname, and that her surname "Garcia" be changed to
"Catindig," his surname.
Adoption
On March 23, 2001,3 the trial court rendered the assailed
Decision granting the adoption, thus:
"After a careful consideration of the evidence presented by
the petitioner, and in the absence of any opposition to the
petition, this Court finds that the petitioner possesses all
the qualifications and none of the disqualification provided
for by law as an adoptive parent, and that as such he is
qualified to maintain, care for and educate the child to be
adopted; that the grant of this petition would redound to
the best interest and welfare of the minor Stephanie Nathy
Astorga Garcia. The Court further holds that the
petitioners care and custody of the child since her birth up
to the present constitute more than enough compliance
with the requirement of Article 35 of Presidential Decree
No. 603.
WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious, the
same is GRANTED. Henceforth, Stephanie Nathy Astorga
Garcia is hereby freed from all obligations of obedience
and maintenance with respect to her natural mother, and
for civil purposes, shall henceforth be the petitioners
legitimate child and legal heir. Pursuant to Article 189 of
the Family Code of the Philippines, the minor shall be
known as STEPHANIE NATHY CATINDIG.
Upon finality of this Decision, let the same be entered in
the Local Civil Registrar concerned pursuant to Rule 99 of
the Rules of Court.
Let copy of this Decision be furnished the National
Statistics Office for record purposes.
SO ORDERED."4
On April 20, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for clarification
and/or reconsideration5 praying that Stephanie should be
allowed to use the surname of her natural mother
(GARCIA) as her middle name.
On May 28, 2001,6 the trial court denied petitioners
motion for reconsideration holding that there is no law or
jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the
surname of his biological mother as his middle name.
Hence, the present petition raising the issue of whether an
illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as
her middle name when she is subsequently adopted by her
natural father.
Petitioner submits that the trial court erred in depriving
Stephanie of a middle name as a consequence of adoption
because: (1) there is no law prohibiting an adopted child
from having a middle name in case there is only one
adopting parent; (2) it is customary for every Filipino to
have as middle name the surname of the mother; (3) the
middle name or initial is a part of the name of a person; (4)
adoption is for the benefit and best interest of the adopted
child, hence, her right to bear a proper name should not be
violated; (5) permitting Stephanie to use the middle name
"Garcia" (her mothers surname) avoids the stigma of her
illegitimacy; and; (6) her continued use of "Garcia" as her
middle name is not opposed by either the Catindig or
Garcia families.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), agrees with petitioner that Stephanie should be
permitted to use, as her middle name, the surname of her
natural mother for the following reasons:
Page 32
First, it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanies
filiation with her natural mother because under Article
189 of the Family Code, she remains to be an intestate heir
of the latter. Thus, to prevent any confusion and needless
hardship in the future, her relationship or proof of that
relationship with her natural mother should be
maintained.
Second, there is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to
use the surname of her natural mother as her middle
name. What the law does not prohibit, it allows.
Last, it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle
name, which is ordinarily the surname of the mother. This
custom has been recognized by the Civil Code and Family
Code. In fact, the Family Law Committees agreed that "the
initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede
the surname of the father so that the second name, if any,
will be before the surname of the mother."7
We find merit in the petition.
Use Of Surname Is Fixed By Law
For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the
designation by which he is known and called in the
community in which he lives and is best known. It is
defined as the word or combination of words by which a
person is distinguished from other individuals and, also, as
the label or appellation which he bears for the convenience
of the world at large addressing him, or in speaking of or
dealing with him.8 It is both of personal as well as public
interest that every person must have a name.
The name of an individual has two parts: (1) the given or
proper name and (2) the surname or family name. The
given or proper name is that which is given to the
individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish him from
other individuals. The surname or family name is that
which identifies the family to which he belongs and is
continued from parent to child. The given name may be
freely selected by the parents for the child, but the
surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law.9
Thus, Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code provides the
substantive rules which regulate the use of surname10 of
an individual whatever may be his status in life, i.e.,
whether he may be legitimate or illegitimate, an adopted
child, a married woman or a previously married woman, or
a widow, thus:
"Art. 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall
principally use the surname of the father.
Art. 365. An adopted child shall bear the surname of the
adopter.
xxx
Art. 369. Children conceived before the decree annulling a
voidable marriage shall principally use the surname of the
father.
Art. 370. A married woman may use:
(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her
husband's surname, or
Adoption
(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname or
(3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word
indicating that she is his wife, such as Mrs.
Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is
the guilty party, she shall resume her maiden name
and surname. If she is the innocent spouse, she may
resume her maiden name and surname. However, she may
choose to continue employing her former husband's
surname, unless:
(1) The court decrees otherwise, or
(2) She or the former husband is married again to another
person.
Art. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife
shall continue using her name and surname employed
before the legal separation.
Art. 373. A widow may use the deceased
husband's surname as though he were still living, in
accordance with Article 370.
Art. 374. In case of identity of names and surnames, the
younger person shall be obliged to use such additional
name or surname as will avoid confusion.
Art. 375. In case of identity of names and surnames
between ascendants and descendants, the word Junior
can be used only by a son. Grandsons and other direct male
descendants shall either:
(1) Add a middle name or the mother's surname,
(2) Add the Roman numerals II, III, and so on.
x x x"
Law Is Silent As To The Use Of
Middle Name
As correctly submitted by both parties, there is no law
regulating the use of a middle name. Even Article 176 11 of
the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255,
otherwise known as "An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children
To Use The Surname Of Their Father," is silent as to what
middle name a child may use.
The middle name or the mothers surname is only
considered in Article 375(1), quoted above, in case there is
identity of names and surnames between ascendants and
descendants, in which case, the middle name or the
mothers surname shall be added.
Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle
name an adoptee may use. Article 365 of the Civil Code
merely provides that "an adopted child shall bear the
surname of the adopter." Also, Article 189 of the Family
Code, enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is likewise
silent on the matter, thus:
"(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be
a legitimate child of the adopters and both shall acquire
the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the
Page 33
relationship of parent and child, including the right of the
adopted to use the surname of the adopters;
x x x"
However, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, the
members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees
that drafted the Family Code recognized the Filipino
custom of adding the surname of the childs mother as
his middle name. In the Minutes of the Joint Meeting of
the Civil Code and Family Law Committees, the members
approved the suggestion that the initial or surname of
the mother should immediately precede the surname
of the father, thus
"Justice Caguioa commented that there is a difference
between the use by the wife of the surname and that of the
child because the fathers surname indicates the family
to which he belongs, for which reason he would insist
on the use of the fathers surname by the child but that,
if he wants to, the child may also use the surname of
the mother.
Justice Puno posed the question: If the child chooses to use
the surname of the mother, how will his name be written?
Justice Caguioa replied that it is up to him but that his
point is that it should be mandatory that the child uses
the surname of the father and permissive in the case of
the surname of the mother.
Prof. Baviera remarked that Justice Caguioas point is
covered by the present Article 364, which reads:
Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use
the surname of the father.
Justice Puno pointed out that many names change through
no choice of the person himself precisely because of this
misunderstanding. He then cited the following example:
Alfonso Ponce Enriles correct surname is Ponce since the
mothers surname is Enrile but everybody calls him Atty.
Enrile. Justice Jose Gutierrez Davids family name is
Gutierrez and his mothers surname is David but they all
call him Justice David.
Justice Caguioa suggested that the proposed Article
(12) be modified to the effect that it shall be
mandatory on the child to use the surname of the
father but he may use the surname of the mother by
way of an initial or a middle name. Prof. Balane stated
that they take note of this for inclusion in the Chapter on
Use of Surnames since in the proposed Article (10) they
are just enumerating the rights of legitimate children so
that the details can be covered in the appropriate chapter.
xxx
Justice Puno remarked that there is logic in the
simplification suggested by Justice Caguioa that the
surname of the father should always be last because there
are so many traditions like the American tradition where
they like to use their second given name and the Latin
tradition, which is also followed by the Chinese wherein
they even include the Clan name.
xxx
Adoption
Justice Puno suggested that they agree in principle
that in the Chapter on the Use of Surnames, they
should say that initial or surname of the mother
should immediately precede the surname of the father
so that the second name, if any, will be before the
surname of the mother. Prof. Balane added that this is
really the Filipino way. The Committee approved the
suggestion."12 (Emphasis supplied)
In the case of an adopted child, the law provides that "the
adopted shall bear the surname of the adopters."13Again, it
is silent whether he can use a middle name. What it only
expressly allows, as a matter of right and obligation, is for
the adoptee to bear the surname of the adopter, upon
issuance of the decree of adoption.14
The Underlying Intent of
Adoption Is In Favor of the
Adopted Child
Adoption is defined as the process of making a child,
whether related or not to the adopter, possess in general,
the rights accorded to a legitimate child.15 It is a juridical
act, a proceeding in rem which creates between two persons
a relationship similar to that which results from legitimate
paternity and filiation.16 The modern trend is to consider
adoption not merely as an act to establish a relationship of
paternity and filiation, but also as an act which endows the
child with a legitimate status.17 This was, indeed, confirmed
in 1989, when the Philippines, as a State Party to the
Convention of the Rights of the Child initiated by the
United Nations, accepted the principle that adoption is
impressed with social and moral responsibility, and
that its underlying intent is geared to favor the
adopted child.18 Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known
as the "Domestic Adoption Act of 1998,"19 secures these
rights and privileges for the adopted.20
One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is
deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopter for all
intents and purposes pursuant to Article 18921 of the
Family Code and Section 1722 Article V of RA 8552.23
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it
follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights
provided by law to a legitimate child without
discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear
the surname of her father and her mother, as
discussed above. This is consistent with the intention of
the members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees
as earlier discussed. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the
initial or surname of the mother should immediately
precede the surname of the father.
Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanies
continued use of her mothers surname (Garcia) as her
middle name will maintain her maternal lineage. It is to be
noted that Article 189(3) of the Family Code and Section
1824, Article V of RA 8552 (law on adoption) provide that
the adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her biological
parent. Hence, Stephanie can well assert or claim her
hereditary rights from her natural mother in the future.
Moreover, records show that Stephanie and her mother
are living together in the house built by petitioner for them
at 390 Tumana, San Jose, Baliuag, Bulacan. Petitioner
provides for all their needs. Stephanie is closely attached
Page 34
to both her mother and father. She calls them "Mama" and
"Papa". Indeed, they are one normal happy family. Hence,
to allow Stephanie to use her mothers surname as her
middle name will not only sustain her continued loving
relationship with her mother but will also eliminate the
stigma of her illegitimacy.
Liberal Construction of
Adoption Statutes In Favor Of
Adoption
It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane
and salutary, should be liberally construed to carry out the
beneficent purposes of adoption.25 The interests and
welfare of the adopted child are of primary and paramount
consideration,26 hence, every reasonable intendment
should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and
compassionate objectives of the law.27
Lastly, Art. 10 of the New Civil Code provides that:
"In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of
laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended
right and justice to prevail."
This provision, according to the Code Commission, "is
necessary so that it may tip the scales in favor of right and
justice when the law is doubtful or obscure. It will
strengthen the determination of the courts to avoid an
injustice which may apparently be authorized by some
way of interpreting the law."28
Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate
child adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie, to use,
as middle name her mothers surname, we find no reason
why she should not be allowed to do so.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Decision is partly MODIFIED in the sense that Stephanie
should be allowed to use her mothers surname "GARCIA"
as her middle name.
Let the corresponding entry of her correct and complete
name be entered in the decree of adoption.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 164948 June 27, 2006
DIWATA RAMOS LANDINGIN Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the Decision1 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 77826 which reversed the
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac City,
Branch 63 in Civil Case No. 2733 granting the Petition for
Adoption of the petitioner herein.
The Antecedents
Adoption
On February 4, 2002, Diwata Ramos Landingin, a citizen of
the United States of America (USA), of Filipino parentage
and a resident of Guam, USA, filed a petition3 for the
adoption of minors Elaine Dizon Ramos who was born on
August 31, 1986;4 Elma Dizon Ramos, who was born on
September 7, 1987;5 and Eugene Dizon Ramos who was
born on August 5, 1989.6 The minors are the natural
children of Manuel Ramos, petitioners brother, and Amelia
Ramos.
Landingin, as petitioner, alleged in her petition that when
Manuel died on May 19, 1990,7 the children were left to
their paternal grandmother, Maria Taruc Ramos; their
biological mother, Amelia, went to Italy, re-married there
and now has two children by her second marriage and no
longer communicated with her children by Manuel Ramos
nor with her in-laws from the time she left up to the
institution of the adoption; the minors are being financially
supported by the petitioner and her children, and relatives
abroad; as Maria passed away on November 23, 2000,
petitioner desires to adopt the children; the minors have
given their written consent8 to the adoption; she is
qualified to adopt as shown by the fact that she is a 57-
year-old widow, has children of her own who are already
married, gainfully employed and have their respective
families; she lives alone in her own home in Guam, USA,
where she acquired citizenship, and works as a restaurant
server. She came back to the Philippines to spend time
with the minors; her children gave their written
consent9 to the adoption of the minors. Petitioners
brother, Mariano Ramos, who earns substantial income,
signified his willingness and commitment to support the
minors while in petitioners custody.
Petitioner prayed that, after due hearing, judgment be
rendered in her favor, as follows:
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed to this
Honorable Court that after publication and hearing,
judgment be rendered allowing the adoption of the minor
children Elaine Dizon Ramos, Elma Dizon Ramos, and
Eugene Dizon Ramos by the petitioner, and ordering that
the minor childrens name follow the family name of
petitioner.
Petitioner prays for such other reliefs, just and equitable
under the premises.10
On March 5, 2002, the court ordered the Department of
Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) to conduct a case
study as mandated by Article 34 of Presidential Decree No.
603, as amended, and to submit a report thereon not later
than April 4, 2002, the date set for the initial hearing of the
petition.11 The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered
its appearance12 but deputized the City Prosecutor of
Tarlac to appear in its behalf.13Since her petition was
unopposed, petitioner was allowed to present her
evidence ex parte.14
The petitioner testified in her behalf. She also presented
Elaine Ramos, the eldest of the adoptees, to testify on the
written consent executed by her and her siblings.15 The
petitioner marked in evidence the Affidavit of Consent
purportedly executed by her children Ann, Errol, Dennis
and Ricfel Branitley, all surnamed Landingin, and
notarized by a notary public in Guam, USA, as proof of said
consent.16
Page 35
On May 24, 2002, Elizabeth Pagbilao, Social Welfare Officer
II of the DSWD, Field Office III, Tarlac, submitted a Child
Study Report, with the following recommendation:
In view of the foregoing, undersigned finds minors Elaine,
Elma & Eugene all surnamed Ramos, eligible for adoption
because of the following reasons:
1. Minors surviving parent, the mother has voluntarily
consented to their adoption by the paternal aunt, Diwata
Landingin this is in view of her inability to provide the
parental care, guidance and support they need. An
Affidavit of Consent was executed by the mother which is
hereto attached.
2. The three minors subject for adoption have also
expressed their willingness to be adopted and joins the
petitioners in Guam, USA in the future. A joint Affidavit of
consent is hereto attached. The minors developed close
attachment to the petitioners and they regarded her as
second parent.
3. The minors are present under the care of a temporary
guardian who has also family to look after. As young
adolescents they really need parental love, care, guidance
and support to ensure their protection and well being.
In view of the foregoing, it is hereby respectfully
recommended that minors Elaine D. Ramos, Elma D.
Ramos and Eugene D. Ramos be adopted by their maternal
aunt Diwata Landingin. Trial custody is hereby further
recommended to be dispensed with considering that they
are close relatives and that close attachments was already
developed between the petitioner and the 3 minors.17
Pagbilao narrated what transpired during her interview, as
follows:
The mother of minors came home together with her son
John Mario, this May 2002 for 3 weeks vacation. This is to
enable her appear for the personal interview concerning
the adoption of her children.
The plan for the adoption of minors by their paternal aunt
Diwata Landingin was conceived after the death of their
paternal grandmother and guardian. The paternal relatives
including the petitioner who attended the wake of their
mother were very much concerned about the well-being of
the three minors. While preparing for their adoption, they
have asked a cousin who has a family to stay with minors
and act as their temporary guardian.
The mother of minors was consulted about the adoption
plan and after weighing the benefits of adoption to her
children, she voluntarily consented. She realized that her
children need parental love, guidance and support which
she could not provide as she already has a second family &
residing in Italy. Knowing also that the petitioners & her
children have been supporting her children up to the
present and truly care for them, she believes her children
will be in good hands. She also finds petitioners in a better
position to provide a secured and bright future to her
children.18
However, petitioner failed to present Pagbilao as witness
and offer in evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia
Ramos to the adoption; petitioner, likewise, failed to
present any documentary evidence to prove that Amelia
assents to the adoption.
Adoption
On November 23, 2002, the court, finding merit in the
petition for adoption, rendered a decision granting said
petition. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that henceforth, minors
Elaine Dizon Ramos, Elma Dizon Ramos, Eugene Dizon
Ramos be freed from all legal obligations obedience and
maintenance from their natural parents and that they be
declared for all legal intents and purposes the children of
Diwata Ramos Landingin. Trial custody is dispensed with
considering that parent-children relationship has long
been established between the children and the adoptive
parents. Let the surnames of the children be changed from
"Dizon-Ramos" to "Ramos-Landingin."
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil
Registrar of Tarlac, Tarlac for him to effect the
corresponding changes/amendment in the birth
certificates of the above-mentioned minors.
SO ORDERED.19
The OSG appealed20 the decision to the Court of Appeals on
December 2, 2002. In its brief21 for the oppositor-
appellant, the OSG raised the following arguments:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION
FOR ADOPTION DESPITE THE LACK OF CONSENT OF THE
PROPOSED ADOPTEES BIOLOGICAL MOTHER.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION
FOR ADOPTION DESPITE THE LACK OF THE WRITTEN
CONSENT OF THE PETITIONERS CHILDREN AS
REQUIRED BY LAW.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION
FOR ADOPTION DESPITE PETITIONERS FAILURE TO
ESTABLISH THAT SHE IS IN A POSITION TO SUPPORT THE
PROPOSED ADOPTEES.
On April 29, 2004, the CA rendered a decision22 reversing
the ruling of the RTC. It held that petitioner failed to
adduce in evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia
Ramos, the childrens natural mother. Moreover, the
affidavit of consent of the petitioners children could not
also be admitted in evidence as the same was executed in
Guam, USA and was not authenticated or acknowledged
before a Philippine consular office, and although petitioner
has a job, she was not stable enough to support the
children. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision
dated November 25, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 63, Tarlac City in Spec. Proc. No. 2733 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.23
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration24 on May 21,
2004, which the CA denied in its Resolution dated August
12, 2004.25
Page 36
Petitioner, thus, filed the instant petition for review on
certiorari26 on September 7, 2004, assigning the following
errors:
1. THAT THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT HAS
OVERLOOKED AND MISAPPLIED SOME FACTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH ARE OF WEIGHT AND
IMPORTANCE AND WHICH IF CONSIDERED WOULD HAVE
AFFECTED THE RESULT OF THE CASE.
2. THAT THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
CONCLUDING THAT THE PETITIONER-APPELLEE IS NOT
FINANCIALLY CAPABLE TO SUPPORT THE THREE
CHILDREN.27
The issues raised by the parties in their pleadings are the
following: (a) whether the petitioner is entitled to adopt
the minors without the written consent of their biological
mother, Amelia Ramos; (b) whether or not the affidavit of
consent purportedly executed by the petitioner-adopters
children sufficiently complies with the law; and (c)
whether or not petitioner is financially capable of
supporting the adoptees.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
It has been the policy of the Court to adhere to the liberal
concept, as stated in Malkinson v. Agrava, 28 that adoption
statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interest and
welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration and
are designed to provide homes, parental care and
education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and
give them the protection of society and family in the
person of the adopter as well as to allow childless couples
or persons to experience the joys of parenthood and give
them legally a child in the person of the adopted for the
manifestation of their natural parental instincts. Every
reasonable intendment should thus be sustained to
promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate
objectives of the law.29
However, in Cang v. Court of Appeals,30 the Court also
ruled that the liberality with which this Court treats
matters leading to adoption insofar as it carries out the
beneficent purposes of the law to ensure the rights and
privileges of the adopted child arising therefrom, ever
mindful that the paramount consideration is the overall
benefit and interest of the adopted child, should be
understood in its proper context and perspective. The
Courts position should not be misconstrued or
misinterpreted as to extend to inferences beyond the
contemplation of law and jurisprudence. Thus, the
discretion to approve adoption proceedings is not to be
anchored solely on best interests of the child but likewise,
with due regard to the natural rights of the parents over
the child.31
Section 9 of Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as
the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998, provides:
Sec. 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the Adoption. - After
being properly counseled and informed of his/her right to
give or withhold his/her approval of the adoption, the
written consent of the following to the adoption is hereby
required:
(a) The adoptee, if ten (10) years of age or over;
Adoption
(b) The biological parent(s) of the child, if known, or the
legal guardian, or the proper government instrumentality
which has legal custody of the child;
(c) The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten (10)
years of age or over, of the adopter(s) and adoptee, if any;
(d) The illegitimate sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age
or over, of the adopter, if living with said adopter and the
latters souse, if any;
(e) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be
adopted.
The general requirement of consent and notice to the
natural parents is intended to protect the natural parental
relationship from unwarranted interference by
interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to safeguard the
best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed
adoption.32
Clearly, the written consent of the biological parents is
indispensable for the validity of a decree of adoption.
Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child requires
that his consent must be obtained before his parental
rights and duties may be terminated and re-established in
adoptive parents. In this case, petitioner failed to submit
the written consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption.
We note that in her Report, Pagbilao declared that she was
able to interview Amelia Ramos who arrived in the
Philippines with her son, John Mario in May 2002. If said
Amelia Ramos was in the Philippines and Pagbilao was
able to interview her, it is incredible that the latter would
not require Amelia Ramos to execute a Written Consent to
the adoption of her minor children. Neither did the
petitioner bother to present Amelia Ramos as witness in
support of the petition.
Petitioner, nonetheless, argues that the written consent of
the biological mother is no longer necessary because when
Amelias husband died in 1990, she left for Italy and never
came back. The children were then left to the guidance and
care of their paternal grandmother. It is the paternal
relatives, including petitioner, who provided for the
childrens financial needs. Hence, Amelia, the biological
mother, had effectively abandoned the children. Petitioner
further contends that it was by twist of fate that after 12
years, when the petition for adoption was pending with
the RTC that Amelia and her child by her second marriage
were on vacation in the Philippines. Pagbilao, the DSWD
social worker, was able to meet her, and during the
meeting, Amelia intimated to the social worker that she
conformed to the adoption of her three children by the
petitioner.
Petitioners contention must be rejected. When she filed
her petition with the trial court, Rep. Act No. 8552 was
already in effect. Section 9 thereof provides that if the
written consent of the biological parents cannot be
obtained, the written consent of the legal guardian of the
minors will suffice. If, as claimed by petitioner, that the
biological mother of the minors had indeed abandoned
them, she should, thus have adduced the written consent
of their legal guardian.
Ordinarily, abandonment by a parent to justify the
adoption of his child without his consent, is a conduct
which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental
Page 37
duties.33 The term means neglect and refusal to perform
the filial and legal obligations of love and support. If a
parent withholds presence, love, care, the opportunity to
display filial affection, and neglects to lend support and
maintenance, the parent, in effect, abandons the child.34
Merely permitting the child to remain for a time
undisturbed in the care of others is not such an
abandonment.35To dispense with the requirement of
consent, the abandonment must be shown to have existed
at the time of adoption.36
In this case, petitioner relied solely on her testimony and
that of Elaine Ramos to prove her claim that Amelia Ramos
had abandoned her children. Petitioners testimony on that
matter follows:
Q Where is the mother of these three children now?
A She left for Italy on November 20, 1990, sir.
Q At the time when Amelia Ramos left for Italy, was there
an instance where she communicated with the family?
A None, sir.
Q How about with her children?
A None, sir.
Q Do you know what place in Italy did she reside?
A I do not know, sir.
Q Did you receive any news about Amelia Ramos?
A What I know, sir, was that she was already married with
another man.
Q From whom did you learn that?
A From others who came from Italy, sir.
Q Did you come to know whether she has children by her
second marriage?
A Yes, sir, she got two kids.37
Elaine, the eldest of the minors, testified, thus:
Q Where is your mother now?
A In Italy, sir.
Q When did your mother left for Italy?
A After my father died, sir.
Q How old were you when your mother left for Italy in
1990?
A Two years old, sir.
Q At the time when your mother left for Italy, did your
mother communicate with you?
A No, sir.38
However, the Home Study Report of the DSWD Social
Worker also stated the following:
IV. Background of the Case:
xxxx
Since the mother left for Italy, minors siblings had been
under the care and custody of their maternal grandmother.
However, she died in Nov. 2001 and an uncle, cousin of
their deceased father now serves as their guardian. The
petitioner, together with her children and other relatives
abroad have been supporting the minor children
financially, even during the time that they were still living
with their natural parents. Their mother also sends
financial support but very minimal.39
xxxx
V. Background Information about the Minors Being Sought
for Adoption:
xxxx
Adoption
As the eldest she tries her best to be a role model to her
younger siblings. She helps them in their lessons, works
and has fun with them. She also encourages openness on
their problems and concerns and provides petty
counseling. In serious problems she already consult (sic)
her mother and petitioner-aunt.40
xxxx
In their 5 years of married life, they begot 3 children,
herein minors, Amelia recalled that they had a happy and
comfortable life. After the death of her husband, her in-
laws which include the petitioner had continued providing
support for them. However being ashamed of just
depending on the support of her husbands relatives, she
decided to work abroad. Her parents are also in need of
financial help as they are undergoing maintenance
medication. Her parents mortgaged their farm land which
she used in going to Italy and worked as domestic helper.
When she left for Italy in November 1990, she entrusted
her 3 children to the care & custody of her mother-in-law
who returned home for good, however she died on
November 2000.
While working in Italy, she met Jun Tayag, a married man
from Tarlac. They became live-in partners since 1995 and
have a son John Mario who is now 2 years old. The three of
them are considered Italian residents. Amelia claimed that
Mr. Tayag is planning to file an annulment of his marriage
and his wife is amenable to it. He is providing his
legitimate family regular support.
Amelia also sends financial support ranging from P10,000-
P15,000 a month through her parents who share minimal
amount of P3,000-P5,000 a month to his (sic) children. The
petitioner and other paternal relatives are continuously
providing support for most of the needs & education of
minors up to present.41
Thus, when Amelia left for Italy, she had not intended to
abandon her children, or to permanently sever their
mother-child relationship. She was merely impelled to
leave the country by financial constraints. Yet, even while
abroad, she did not surrender or relinquish entirely her
motherly obligations of rearing the children to her now
deceased mother-in-law, for, as claimed by Elaine herself,
she consulted her mother, Amelia, for serious personal
problems. Likewise, Amelia continues to send financial
support to the children, though in minimal amounts as
compared to what her affluent in-laws provide.
Let it be emphasized, nevertheless, that the adoption of the
minors herein will have the effect of severing all legal ties
between the biological mother, Amelia, and the adoptees,
and that the same shall then be vested on the adopter. 42 It
would thus be against the spirit of the law if financial
consideration were to be the paramount consideration in
deciding whether to deprive a person of parental authority
over his/her children. More proof has to be adduced that
Amelia has emotionally abandoned the children, and that
the latter will not miss her guidance and counsel if they are
given to an adopting parent.43 Again, it is the best interest
of the child that takes precedence in adoption.
Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that the
Court shall consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is
offered must be specified. The offer of evidence is
Page 38
necessary because it is the duty of the Court to rest its
findings of fact and its judgment only and strictly upon the
evidence offered by the parties. Unless and until admitted
by the court in evidence for the purpose or purposes for
which such document is offered, the same is merely a scrap
of paper barren of probative weight. Mere identification of
documents and the markings thereof as exhibits do not
confer any evidentiary weight on documents unless
formally offered.44
Petitioner failed to offer in evidence Pagbilaos Report and
of the Joint Affidavit of Consent purportedly executed by
her children; the authenticity of which she, likewise, failed
to prove. The joint written consent of petitioners
children45 was notarized on January 16, 2002 in Guam,
USA; for it to be treated by the Rules of Court in the same
way as a document notarized in this country it needs to
comply with Section 2 of Act No. 2103,46 which states:
Section 2. An instrument or document acknowledged and
authenticated in a foreign country shall be considered
authentic if the acknowledgment and authentication are
made in accordance with the following requirements:
(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before (1) an
ambassador, minister, secretary of legation, charg d
affaires, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the
Republic of the Philippines, acting within the country or
place to which he is accredited, or (2) a notary public or
officer duly authorized by law of the country to take
acknowledgments of instruments or documents in the
place where the act is done.
(b) The person taking the acknowledgment shall certify
that the person acknowledging the instrument or
document is known to him, and that he is the same person
who executed it, and acknowledged that the same is his
free act and deed. The certificate shall be under his official
seal, if he is by law required to keep a seal, and if not, his
certificate shall so state. In case the acknowledgment is
made before a notary public or an officer mentioned in
subdivision (2) of the preceding paragraph, the certificate
of the notary public or the officer taking the
acknowledgment shall be authenticated by an ambassador,
minister, secretary of legation, charg de affaires, consul,
vice-consul, or consular agent of the Republic of the
Philippines, acting within the country or place to which he
is accredited. The officer making the authentication shall
certify under his official seal that the person who took the
acknowledgment was at the time duly authorized to act as
notary public or that he was duly exercising the functions
of the office by virtue of which he assumed to act, and that
as such he had authority under the law to take
acknowledgment of instruments or documents in the place
where the acknowledgment was taken, and that his
signature and seal, if any, are genuine.
As the alleged written consent of petitioners legitimate
children did not comply with the afore-cited law, the same
can at best be treated by the Rules as a private document
whose authenticity must be proved either by anyone who
saw the document executed or written; or by evidence of
the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the
makers.47
Since, in the instant case, no further proof was introduced
by petitioner to authenticate the written consent of her
legitimate children, the same is inadmissible in evidence.
Adoption
In reversing the ruling of the RTC, the CA ruled that
petitioner was not stable enough to support the children
and is only relying on the financial backing, support and
commitment of her children and her siblings.48 Petitioner
contradicts this by claiming that she is financially capable
as she has worked in Guam for 14 years, has savings, a
house, and currently earns $5.15 an hour with tips of not
less than $1,000.00 a month. Her children and siblings
have likewise committed themselves to provide financial
backing should the need arise. The OSG, again in its
comment, banks on the statement in the Home Study
Report that "petitioner has limited income." Accordingly, it
appears that she will rely on the financial backing of her
children and siblings in order to support the minor
adoptees. The law, however, states that it is the adopter
who should be in a position to provide support in keeping
with the means of the family.
Since the primary consideration in adoption is the best
interest of the child, it follows that the financial capacity of
prospective parents should also
be carefully evaluated and considered. Certainly, the
adopter should be in a position to support the would-be
adopted child or children, in keeping with the means of the
family.
According to the Adoption Home Study
Report49 forwarded by the Department of Public Health &
Social Services of the Government of Guam to the DSWD,
petitioner is no longer supporting her legitimate children,
as the latter are already adults, have individual lives and
families. At the time of the filing of the petition, petitioner
was 57 years old, employed on a part-time basis as a
waitress, earning $5.15 an hour and tips of around $1,000
a month. Petitioners main intention in adopting the
children is to bring the latter to Guam, USA. She has a
house at Quitugua Subdivision in Yigo, Guam, but the same
is still being amortized. Petitioner likewise knows that the
limited income might be a hindrance to the adoption
proceedings.
Given these limited facts, it is indeed doubtful whether
petitioner will be able to sufficiently handle the financial
aspect of rearing the three children in the US. She only has
a part-time job, and she is rather of age. While petitioner
claims that she has the financial support and backing of
her children and siblings, the OSG is correct in stating that
the ability to support the adoptees is personal to the
adopter, as adoption only creates a legal relation between
the former and the latter. Moreover, the records do not
prove nor support petitioners allegation that her siblings
and her children are financially able and that they are
willing to support the minors herein. The Court, therefore,
again sustains the ruling of the CA on this issue.
While the Court recognizes that petitioner has only the
best of intentions for her nieces and nephew, there are
legal infirmities that militate against reversing the ruling of
the CA. In any case, petitioner is not prevented from filing
a new petition for adoption of the herein minors.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby
DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 159374 July 12, 2007
Page 39
FELIPE N. MADRIAN, Petitioner,
vs.
FRANCISCA R. MADRIAN, Respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
When a family breaks up, the children are always the
victims. The ensuing battle for custody of the minor
children is not only a thorny issue but also a highly
sensitive and heart-rending affair. Such is the case here.
Even the usually technical subject of jurisdiction became
emotionally charged.
Petitioner Felipe N. Madrian and respondent Francisca R.
Madrian were married on July 7, 1993 in Paraaque City.
They resided in San Agustin Village, Brgy. Moonwalk,
Paraaque City.
Their union was blessed with three sons and a daughter:
Ronnick, born on January 30, 1994; Phillip, born on
November 19, 1996; Francis Angelo, born on May 12, 1998
and Krizia Ann, born on December 12, 2000.
After a bitter quarrel on May 18, 2002, petitioner allegedly
left their conjugal abode and took their three sons with
him to Ligao City, Albay and subsequently to Sta. Rosa,
Laguna. Respondent sought the help of her parents and
parents-in-law to patch things up between her and
petitioner to no avail. She then brought the matter to
the Lupong Tagapamayapa in their barangay but this too
proved futile.
Thus respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus of
Ronnick, Phillip and Francis Angelo in the Court of
Appeals, alleging that petitioners act of leaving the
conjugal dwelling and going to Albay and then to Laguna
disrupted the education of their children and deprived
them of their mothers care. She prayed that petitioner be
ordered to appear and produce their sons before the court
and to explain why they should not be returned to her
custody.
Petitioner and respondent appeared at the hearing on
September 17, 2002. They initially agreed that petitioner
would return the custody of their three sons to
respondent. Petitioner, however, had a change of
heart1 and decided to file a memorandum.
On September 3, 2002, petitioner filed his
memorandum2 alleging that respondent was unfit to take
custody of their three sons because she was habitually
drunk, frequently went home late at night or in the wee
hours of the morning, spent much of her time at a beer
house and neglected her duties as a mother. He claimed
that, after their squabble on May 18, 2002, it was
respondent who left, taking their daughter with her. It was
only then that he went to Sta. Rosa, Laguna where he
worked as a tricycle driver. He submitted a certification
from the principal of the Dila Elementary School in Sta.
Rosa, Laguna that Ronnick and Phillip were enrolled there.
He also questioned the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
claiming that under Section 5(b) of RA 8369 (otherwise
known as the "Family Courts Act of 1997") family courts
have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the
petition for habeas corpus filed by respondent.3
Adoption
For her part, respondent averred that she did not leave
their home on May 18, 2002 but was driven out by
petitioner. She alleged that it was petitioner who was an
alcoholic, gambler and drug addict. Petitioners alcoholism
and drug addiction impaired his mental faculties, causing
him to commit acts of violence against her and their
children. The situation was aggravated by the fact that
their home was adjacent to that of her in-laws who
frequently meddled in their personal problems.4
On October 21, 2002, the Court of Appeals5 rendered a
decision6 asserting its authority to take cognizance of the
petition and ruling that, under Article 213 of the Family
Code, respondent was entitled to the custody of Phillip and
Francis Angelo who were at that time aged six and four,
respectively, subject to the visitation rights of petitioner.
With respect to Ronnick who was then eight years old, the
court ruled that his custody should be determined by the
proper family court in a special proceeding on custody of
minors under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Court of
Appeals decision but it was denied. Hence, this recourse.
Petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals over the petition for habeas corpus and insists that
jurisdiction over the case is lodged in the family courts
under RA 8369. He invokes Section 5(b) of RA 8369:
Section 5. Jurisdiction of Family Courts. The Family Courts
shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide
the following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
b) Petitions for guardianship, custody of children, habeas
corpus in relation to the latter;
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioner is wrong.
In Thornton v. Thornton,7 this Court resolved the issue of
the Court of Appeals jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas
corpus in cases involving custody of minors in the light of
the provision in RA 8369 giving family courts exclusive
original jurisdiction over such petitions:
The Court of Appeals should take cognizance of the
case since there is nothing in RA 8369 that revoked its
jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving
the custody of minors.
xxx xxx xxx
We rule therefore that RA 8369 did not divest the Court
of Appeals and the Supreme Court of their jurisdiction
over habeas corpus cases involving the custody of
minors.
xxx xxx xxx
The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to
revoke the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and
Supreme Court to issue writs of habeas corpus relating to
the custody of minors. Further, it cannot be said that the
provisions of RA 8369, RA 7092 [An Act Expanding the
Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals] and BP 129 [The
Page 40
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980] are absolutely
incompatible since RA 8369 does not prohibit the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court from issuing writs
of habeas corpus in cases involving the custody of minors.
Thus, the provisions of RA 8369 must be read in harmony
with RA 7029 and BP 129 that family courts have
concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and
the Supreme Court in petitions for habeas
corpus where the custody of minors is at
issue.8 (emphases supplied)
The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over petitions
for habeas corpus was further affirmed by A.M. No. 03-03-
04-SC (April 22, 2004) in Re: Rule on Custody of Minors
and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of
Minors:
In any case, whatever uncertainty there was has been
settled with the adoption of A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC Re:
Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus
in Relation to Custody of Minors. Section 20 of the rule
provides that:
Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus. A verified
petition for a writ of habeas corpus involving custody of
minors shall be filed with the Family Court. The writ shall
be enforceable within its judicial region to which the
Family Court belongs.
xxx xxx xxx
The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme
Court, Court of Appeals, or with any of its members and,
if so granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere
in the Philippines. The writ may be made returnable to a
Family Court or to any regular court within the region
where the petitioner resides or where the minor may be
found for hearing and decision on the merits.
From the foregoing, there is no doubt that the Court of
Appeals and Supreme Court have concurrent
jurisdiction with family courts in habeas corpus cases
where the custody of minors is involved.9(emphases
supplied)1avvphi1
We note that after petitioner moved out of their Paraaque
residence on May 18, 2002, he twice transferred his sons
to provinces covered by different judicial regions. This
situation is what the Thornton interpretation of RA 8369s
provision on jurisdiction precisely addressed:
[The reasoning that by giving family courts exclusive
jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases, the lawmakers
intended them to be the sole courts which can issue writs
of habeas corpus] will result in an iniquitous situation,
leaving individuals like [respondent] without legal
recourse in obtaining custody of their children. Individuals
who do not know the whereabouts of minors they are
looking for would be helpless since they cannot seek
redress from family courts whose writs are enforceable
only in their respective territorial jurisdictions. Thus, if a
minor is being transferred from one place to another,
which seems to be the case here, the petitioner in
a habeas corpus case will be left without legal remedy.
This lack of recourse could not have been the intention
of the lawmakers when they passed [RA 8369].10
Moreover, a careful reading of Section 5(b) of RA 8369
reveals that family courts are vested with original
Adoption
exclusive jurisdiction in custody cases, not in habeas
corpus cases. Writs of habeas corpus which may be issued
exclusively by family courts under Section 5(b) of RA 8369
pertain to the ancillary remedy that may be availed of in
conjunction with a petition for custody of minors under
Rule 99 of the Rules of Court. In other words, the issuance
of the writ is merely ancillary to the custody case pending
before the family court. The writ must be issued by the
same court to avoid splitting of jurisdiction, conflicting
decisions, interference by a co-equal court and judicial
instability.
The rule therefore is: when by law jurisdiction is conferred
on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes
and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be
employed by such court or officer.11 Once a court acquires
jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case, it does so to
the exclusion of all other courts, including related
incidents and ancillary matters.
Accordingly, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 144763. September 3, 2002]
REYMOND B. LAXAMANA, petitioner, vs. MA.
LOURDES* D. LAXAMANA, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is another sad tale of an estranged couples tug-of-war
over the custody of their minor children. Petitioner
Reymond B. Laxamana and respondent Ma. Lourdes D.
Laxamana met sometime in 1983. Petitioner, who came
from a well-to-do family, was a graduate of Bachelor of
Laws, while respondent, a holder of a degree in banking
and finance, worked in a bank.After a whirlwind courtship,
petitioner, 31 years old and respondent, 33, got married on
June 6, 1984.[1] Respondent quit her job and became a full-
time housewife. Petitioner, on the other hand, operated
buy and sell, fishpond, and restaurant businesses for a
living. The union was blessed with three children twin
brothers Joseph and Vincent, born on March 15, 1985, and
Michael, born on June 19, 1986.[2]
All went well until petitioner became a drug dependent. In
October 1991, he was confined at the Estrellas Home Care
Clinic in Quezon City. He underwent psychotherapy and
psychopharmacological treatment and was discharged on
November 16, 1991.[3] Upon petition of respondent, the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 101, ordered
petitioners confinement at the NARCOM-DRC for
treatment and rehabilitation.[4] Again, on October 30, 1996,
the trial court granted petitioners voluntary confinement
for treatment and rehabilitation at the National Bureau of
Investigation-TRC.[5]
On April 25, 1997, the court issued an order declaring
petitioner already drug-free and directing him to report to
a certain Dr. Casimiro for out-patient counseling for 6
months to one (1) year.[6]
Page 41
Despite several confinements, respondent claimed
petitioner was not fully rehabilitated. His drug dependence
worsened and it became difficult for respondent and her
children to live with him. Petitioner allegedly became
violent and irritable. On some occasions, he even
physically assaulted respondent. Thus, on June 17, 1999,
respondent and her 3 children abandoned petitioner and
transferred to the house of her relatives.
On August 31, 1999, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 107, the instant petition
for habeas corpus praying for custody of his three
children.[7]Respondent opposed the petition, citing the
drug dependence of petitioner.[8]
Meanwhile, on September 24, 1999, respondent filed a
petition for annulment of marriage with Branch 102 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.[9]
On September 27, 1999, petitioner filed in the habeas
corpus case, a motion seeking visitation rights over his
children.[10] On December 7, 1999, after the parties
reached an agreement, the court issued an order granting
visitation rights to petitioner and directing the parties to
undergo psychiatric and psychological examination by a
psychiatrist of their common choice. The parties further
agreed to submit the case for resolution after the trial
courts receipt of the results of their psychiatric
examination. The full text of said order reads:
The parties appeared with their respective lawyers. A
conference was held in open Court and the parties agreed
on the following:
Effective this Saturday and every Saturday thereafter until
further order the petitioner shall fetch the children every
Saturday and Sunday at 9:00 oclock in the morning from
the house of the sister of respondent, Mrs. Corazon Soriano
and to be returned at 5:00 oclock in the afternoon of the
same days.
That the parties agreed to submit themselves to Dr.
Teresito Ocampo for psychiatric/psychological
examination. Dr. Ocampo is hereby advised to go over the
records of this case to enable him to have a thorough
background of the problem. He is hereby ordered to
submit his findings directly to this Court without
furnishing the parties copies of his report. And after the
receipt of that report, thereafter, the case shall be deemed
submitted for decision.[11]
On January 6, 2000, Dr. Ocampo submitted the results of
his psychiatric evaluation on the parties and their
children. Pertinent portions thereof state:
SINGLY and COLLECTIVELY, the following information was
obtained in the interview of the 3 children:
(1) THEY were affected psychologically by the drug-
related behavior of their father:
a. they have a difficult time concentrating on their studies.
b. they are envious of their classmates whose families live
in peace and harmony.
c. once, MICHAEL had to quit school temporarily.
Adoption
(2) THEY witnessed their father when he was under the
influence of shabu.
(3) THEY think their father had been angry at their
paternal grandmother and this anger was displaced to
their mother.
(4) THEY hope their father will completely and
permanently recover from his drug habit; and their criteria
of his full recovery include:
a. he will regain his easy-going attitude.
b. he wont be hot-headed anymore and would not drive
their van recklessly.
c. he would not tell unverifiable stories anymore.
d. he would not poke a gun on his own head and ask the
children who they love better, mom or dad.
(5) At one point one of the sons, became very emotional
while he was narrating his story and he cried. I had to stop
the interview.
(6) THEIR mother was fearful and terrified when their
father quarreled with her.
(7) THEY hope their visits to their father will not interfere
with their school and academic schedules.
xxxxxxxxx
(3) MARILOU is one of 4 siblings. She graduated from
college with a degree in banking and finance. SHE was a
carreer (sic) woman; worked for a bank for ten years;
subsequently quit her job to devote more time to her
family.
(4) REYMOND is one of 5 siblings in a well-to-do
family. His father was a physician. During his
developmental years, he recalled how his mother
complained incessantly about how bad the father was;
only to find later that the truth was opposite to the
complaints of his mother; that his father was nice, logical
and understanding. He recalled how he unselfishly served
his father --- he opened the door when he arrived home; he
got his portfolio; he brought the days newspaper; he
removed his shoes; he brought his glass of beer or his shot
of whisky. In short, he served him like a servant. His father
died of stroke in 1990.
REYMOND graduated from college with a degree in LAW in
1984; he did not pass the bar.
His work history is as follows:
a. 1985 to 1989 he operated fishponds.
b. 1976 to 1991 simultaneously, he operated restaurant.
c. 1991 he engaged in the trading of vegetable, cooking oil,
and mangos.
d. HE handled the leasing of a family property to a fast food
company.
Page 42
The findings on the examination of the MENTAL STATUS
and MENTAL PROCESSES OF MARILOU showed a woman
who showed the psychological effects of the trauma she
had in the past. She is slightly edgy and fidgety with any
external noise. SHE answered all my questions
coherently. Her emotional state was stable throughout the
interview. She is of average intelligence. She was oriented
to person, place and date. Her memory for recent and
remote events was intact. She could process sets of figures
and sets of similarities and differences. Her content of
thought was negative for delusions, hallucinations,
paranoia, suicidal and homicidal ideation. She could
process abstract ideas and general information. Her
attention span was adequate. There was no evidence of
impaired judgment.
The Rorschach ink blot test gave responses such as man
touching a woman, 2 people on a hi-five , 2 women
chatting, beast, stuffed animal, etc. Her past reflected on
her psyche. There is no creative process.There were no
bizarre ideas.
The ZUNG anxiety/depression test highlighted I get tired
for no reason; I feel that I am useful and needed (re,
son). There is moderate depression. However, she could
still make competent decisions.
The Social Adaptation Scale scored well in her capacity to
adapt to her situation. There is no evidence of losing
control.
The findings on the examination of the MENTAL STATUS
and MENTAL PROCESSES of REYMOND showed an
individual who presented himself in the best situation he
could possibly be. He is cool, calm and collected. He
answered all my questions coherently. He is of average
intelligence. He was oriented to person, place and date. His
memory for recent and remote events was intace (sic). His
content of thought was negative for delusions,
hallucinations, paranoia, suicidal and homicidal
ideation. His attention span was adequate. He could
process abstract ideas, sets of figures, and general
information.
The Rorschach ink blot test gave responses such as
distorted chest , butterfly with scattered color, cat ran over
by a car, nothing 2 people, monster etc. There is no central
theme in his responses. There were no bizarre ideas.
The Zung anxiety/depression test: My mind is as clear as it
used to be (most of the time). There was no evidence of
brain damage. There is no significant affective response
that would affect his rationality.
The Social Adaptive Scale scored well in his capacity to
adapt to his situation. He reached out well to others. He is
in very good control of his emotions.
BASED ON MY FINDINGS I MADE THE FOLLOWING
COMMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS:
I. The CRITERIA for cure in drug addiction consist of:
1. 5-years and 10-years intervals of drug-free periods.
2. change for the better of the maladaptive behaviors of the
addict consisting of telling lies, manipulative behavior,
melodramatic and hysterical actions.
Adoption
3. constructive and reproductive outlets for the mental and
physical energies of the addict.
4. behavior oriented towards spiritual values and other
things.
II BASED on such scientific and observable criteria, I
do not yet consider REYMOND LAXAMANA completely
cured even though his drug urine test at Medical City
for shabu was negative. (Emphasis supplied)
III I DO NOT DETECT any evidence that the paternal visits
of the sons would be harmful or they would be in any
danger. The academic schedules of the sons has be taken
into account in determining the length and frequency of
their visits.
x x x x x x x x x.[12]
On January 14, 2000, the trial court rendered the assailed
decision awarding the custody of the three children to
respondent and giving visitation rights to petitioner. The
dispositive portion thereof states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered:
1. The children, Joseph, Michael and Vincent all surnamed
Laxamana are hereby ordered to remain under the custody
of the respondent.
2. The visitation arrangement as per Order of December 7,
1999 is hereby incorporated and forms part of this
Decision. The parties are enjoined to comply with the
terms stated therein.
3. The petitioner is hereby ordered to undergo urine drug
screen for shabu for three times (3x) per month every ten
(10) days, with the Dangerous Drugs Board. The said
Board is hereby ordered to submit the results of all tests
immediately as directed to this Court.
4. The petitioner is hereby referred to undergo regular
counseling at the Free-Clinic at the East Avenue Medical
Center, Department of Health Out Patient Psychiatry
Department until further order. For this purpose, it is
suggested that he should see Dr. Teresito P. Ocampo to
make arrangements for said counseling.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Dangerous
Drugs Board and the Free-Clinic, Out Patient Psychiatry
Department, East Avenue Medical Center, Department of
Health for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.[13]
Aggrieved, petitioner filed the instant petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, based on
the following:
I
THE COURT A QUO HAS DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED
AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS WHEN
IT RESOLVED THE ISSUE OF CUSTODY WITHOUT
CONDUCTING A TRIAL TO DETERMINE FACTUAL ISSUES.
Page 43
II
THE COURT A QUO HAS RESOLVED THE ISSUE OF
CUSTODY IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND
WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE
SUPREME COURT WHEN IT RESOLVED THE ISSUE OF
CUSTODY WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE PARAMOUNT
INTEREST AND WELFARE OF HEREIN PARTIES THREE (3)
MINOR CHILDREN.
III
THE ASSAILED DECISION IS NULL AND VOID AS IT DOES
NOT COMPLY WITH SECTION 14 ARTICLE VIII OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES.[14]
The core issue for resolution in the instant petition is
whether or not the trial court considered the paramount
interest and welfare of the children in awarding their
custody to respondent.
In controversies involving the care, custody and control of
their minor children, the contending parents stand on
equal footing before the court who shall make the selection
according to the best interest of the child. The child if over
seven years of age may be permitted to choose which
parent he/she prefers to live with, but the court is not
bound by such choice if the parent so chosen is unfit. In all
cases, the sole and foremost consideration is the
physical, educational, social and moral welfare of the child
concerned, taking into account the respective resources as
well as social and moral situations of the opposing
parents.[15]
In Medina v. Makabali,[16] we stressed that this is as it
should be, for in the continual evolution of legal
institutions, the patria potestas has been transformed from
the jus vitae ac necis(right of life and death) of the Roman
law, under which the offspring was virtually a chattel of his
parents, into a radically different institution, due to the
influence of Christian faith and doctrines. The obligational
aspect is now supreme. There is no power, but a task; no
complex rights of parents but a sum of duties; no
sovereignty, but a sacred trust for the welfare of the minor.
Mindful of the nature of the case at bar, the court a
quo should have conducted a trial notwithstanding the
agreement of the parties to submit the case for resolution
on the basis, inter alia, of the psychiatric report of Dr.
Teresito. Thus, petitioner is not estopped from questioning
the absence of a trial considering that said psychiatric
report, which was the courts primary basis in awarding
custody to respondent, is insufficient to justify the
decision. The fundamental policy of the State to promote
and protect the welfare of children shall not be
disregarded by mere technicality in resolving disputes
which involve the family and the youth.[17] While petitioner
may have a history of drug dependence, the records are
inadequate as to his moral, financial and social well-
being. The results of the psychiatric evaluation showing
that he is not yet completely cured may render him unfit to
take custody of the children, but there is no evidence to
show that respondent is unfit to provide the children with
adequate support, education, as well as moral and
intellectual training and development. Moreover, the
children in this case were 14 and 15 years old at the time
of the promulgation of the decision, yet the court did not
ascertain their choice as to which parent they want to live
Adoption
with. In its September 8, 1999 order, the trial court merely
stated that: The children were asked as to whether they
would like to be with petitioner but there are indications
that they entertain fears in their hearts and want to be
sure that their father is no longer a drug
dependent.[18] There is no showing that the court
ascertained the categorical choice of the children. These
inadequacies could have been remedied by an exhaustive
trial probing into the accuracy of Dr. Ocampos report and
the capacity of both parties to raise their children. The trial
court was remiss in the fulfillment of its duties when it
approved the agreement of the parties to submit the case
for decision on the basis of sketchy findings of facts.
In Lacson v. Lacson,[19] the case was remanded to the trial
court with respect to the issue of custody. In the said case,
the court a quo resolved the question of the childrens
custody based on the amicable settlement of the
spouses. Stressing the need for presentation of evidence
and a thorough proceedings, we explained
It is clear that every child [has] rights which are not and
should not be dependent solely on the wishes, much less
the whims and caprices, of his parents. His welfare should
not be subject to the parents' say-so or mutual agreement
alone. Where, as in this case, the parents are already
separated in fact, the courts must step in to determine in
whose custody the child can better be assured the rights
granted to him by law. The need, therefore, to present
evidence regarding this matter, becomes imperative. A
careful scrutiny of the records reveals that no such
evidence was introduced in the CFI. This latter court relied
merely on the mutual agreement of the spouses-parents.
To be sure, this was not sufficient basis to determine the
fitness of each parent to be the custodian of the children.
Besides, at least one of the children Enrique, the eldest is
now eleven years of age and should be given the choice of
the parent he wishes to live with. x x x.
In the instant case, the proceedings before the trial court
leave much to be desired. While a remand of this case
would mean further delay, the childrens paramount
interest demand that further proceedings be conducted to
determine the fitness of both petitioner and respondent to
assume custody of their minor children.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant case
is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 107, for the purpose of receiving evidence to
determine the fitness of petitioner and respondent to take
custody of their children. Pending the final disposition of
this case, custody shall remain with respondent but subject
to petitioners visitation rights in accordance with the
December 7, 1999 order of the trial court.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-26953 March 28, 1969
ZENAIDA MEDINA, assisted by her husband, FELICIANO
CASERO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
DRA. VENANCIA L. MAKABALI, respondent-appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Page 44
 Once more Courts are asked to arbitrate between rights
and duties of parents and children, and between parent
and foster parent.
Appellant's claim for custody of a minor boy, Joseph
Casero, was sought to be enforced by habeas
corpus proceedings in the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga, in its Special Proceeding No. 1947. After
hearing, the writ was denied by the Court, and the case
was appealed directly to this Supreme Court exclusively on
points of law.
Uncontested facts found by the Court below are that on
February 4, 1961, petitioner Zenaida Medina gave birth to
a baby boy named Joseph Casero in the Makabali Clinic in
San Fernando, Pampanga, owned and operated by
respondent Dra. Venancia Makabali, single, who assisted at
the delivery. The boy was Zenaida's third, had with a
married man, Feliciano Casero.
The mother left the child with Dra. Makabali from his
birth. The latter took care and reared Joseph as her own
son; had him treated at her expense for poliomyelitis by
Dra. Fe del Mundo, in Manila, until he recovered his health;
and sent him to school. From birth until August 1966, the
real mother never visited her child, and never paid for his
expenses.
The trial disclosed that petitioner Zenaida Medina lived
with Feliciano Casero with her two other children
apparently with the tolerance, if not the acquiescence, of
Caseros lawful wife who resides elsewhere, albeit the
offspring of both women are in good terms with each
other; that Casero makes about P400.00 a month as a
mechanic, and Zenaida herself earns from 4 to 5 pesos a
day.
The Court, upon calling Joseph on the witness stand,
observed that the boy is fairly intelligent as a witness. He
never knew his mother, Zenaida. He was calling the
respondent his "Mammy". The Court informed him that his
real mother is Zenaida. He was asked with whom to stay
with his real mother or the respondent. The boy pointed to
the respondent and said "Mammy!" The Court asked him,
"Why do you choose to stay with your "Mammy?" He
answered, "She is the one rearing me." This confrontation
was made in the presence of the two women, Zenaida, the
petitioner, and the respondent, Dra. Makabali, in open
court. (C.F.I. Rollo, p. 39).
After extracting from Dra. Makabali a promise to allow
the minor a free choice with whom to live when he reaches
the age of 14, the Court held that it was for the child's best
interest to be left with his foster mother and denied the
writ prayed for. The real mother appealed, as already
stated.
We see no reason to disturb the order appealed from.
While our law recognizes the right of a parent to the
custody of her child, Courts must not lose sight of the basic
principle that "in all questions on the care, custody,
education and property of children, the latter's welfare
shall be paramount" (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art.
363), and that for compelling reasons, even a child under
seven may be ordered separated from the mother (Do.)
This is as it should be, for in the continual evolution of
legal institutions, the patria potestas has been transformed
from the jus vitae ac necis (right of life and death) of the
Roman law, under which the offspring was virtually a
Adoption
chattel of his parents, into a radically different institution,
due to the influence of Christian faith and doctrines. The
obligational aspect is now supreme. As pointed out by Puig
Pea, now "there is no power, but a task; no complex of
rights (of parents) but a sum of duties; no sovereignty, but
a sacred trust for the welfare of the minor." 1
As a result, the right of parents to the company and
custody of their children is but ancillary to the proper
discharge of parental duties to provide the children with
adequate support, education, moral, intellectual and civic
training and development (Civil Code, Art. 356). As
remarked by the Court below, petitioner Zenaida Medina
proved remiss in these sacred duties; she not only failed to
provide the child with love and care but actually deserted
him, with not even a visit, in his tenderest years, when he
needed his mother the most. It may well be doubted what
advantage the child could derive from being coerced to
abandon respondent's care and love to be compelled to
stay with his mother and witness her irregular menage a
trois with Casero and the latter's legitimate wife.
It is hinted that respondent's motivation in refusing to
surrender the boy is to coerce petitioner to pay for the
rearing of the child. This is not acceptable, for Dra.
Makabali knew (at least at the trial) that any expectation
on her part is illusory, given Zenaida's meager resources,
yet expressed willingness to care and educate him.
No abuse of discretion being shown, but on the contrary,
the appealed order being justified in fact and law, we hold
that said order should be, and hereby is, affirmed. Costs
against appellant.
G.R. No. L-23482 August 30, 1968
ALFONSO LACSON, petitioner,
vs.
CARMEN SAN JOSE-LACSON and THE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
-----------------------------
G.R. No. L-23767 August 30, 1968
CARMEN SAN JOSE-LACSON, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
ALFONSO LACSON, defendant-appellee.
-----------------------------
G.R. No. L-24259 August 30, 1968
ALFONSO LACSON, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
CARMEN SAN JOSE-LACSON, petitioner-appellant.
CASTRO, J.:
These three cases (G.R. L-23482, L-23767 and L-24259)
involving the same parties pose a common fundamental
issue the resolution of which will necessarily and
inescapably resolve all the other issues. Thus their joinder
in this decision.
The antecedent facts are not disputed.
Page 45
Alfonso Lacson (hereinafter referred to as the petitioner
spouse) and Carmen San Jose-Lacson (hereinafter referred
to as the respondent spouse) were married on February
14, 1953. To them were born four children, all alive.
On January 9, 1963 the respondent spouse left the conjugal
home in Santa Clara Subdivision, Bacolod City, and
commenced to reside in Manila. She filed on March 12,
1963 a complaint docketed as civil case E-00030 in the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila
(hereinafter referred to as the JDRC) for custody of all their
children as well as support for them and herself.
However, the spouses, thru the assistance of their
respective attorneys, succeeded in reaching an amicable
settlement respecting custody of the children, support, and
separation of property. On April 27, 1963 they filed a joint
petition dated April 21, 1963, docketed as special
proceeding 6978 of the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental (hereinafter referred to as the CFI).
The important and pertinent portions of the petition,
embodying their amicable settlement, read as follows:
3. Petitioners have separated last January 9, 1963 when
petitioner Carmen San Jose-Lacson left their conjugal
home at the Santa Clara Subdivision, Bacolod City, did not
return, and decided to reside in Manila.
4. Petitioners have mutually agreed upon the dissolution of
their conjugal partnership subject to judicial approval as
required by Article 191 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
the particular terms and conditions of their mutual
agreement being as follows:
(a) There will be separation of property petitioner
Carmen San Jose-Lacson hereby waiving any and all claims
for a share in property that may be held by petitioner
Alfonso Lacson since they have acquired no property of
any consequence.
(b) Hereafter, each of them shall own, dispose of, possess,
administer and enjoy such separate estate as they may
acquire without the consent of the other and all earnings
from any profession, business or industry as may be
derived by each petitioner shall belong to that petitioner
exclusively.
(c) The custody of the two elder children named Enrique
and Maria Teresa shall be awarded to petitioner Alfonso
Lacson and the custody of the younger children named
Gerrard and Ramon shall be awarded to petitioner Carmen
San Jose-Lacson.
(d) Petitioner Alfonso Lacson shall pay petitioner Carmen
San Jose-Lacson a monthly allowance of P300.00 for the
support of the children in her custody.
(e) Each petitioner shall have reciprocal rights of visitation
of the children in the custody of the other at their
respective residences and, during the summer months, the
two children in the custody of each petitioner shall be
given to the other except that, for this year's summer
months, all four children shall be delivered to and remain
with petitioner Carmen San Jose-Lacson until June 15,
1963 on which date, she shall return the two elder
children Enrique and Maria Teresa to petitioner Alfonso
Lacson this judgment of course being subject to
enforcement by execution writ and contempt.
Adoption
5. Petitioners have no creditors.
WHEREFORE, they respectfully pray that notice of this
petition be given to creditors and third parties pursuant to
Article 191 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and
thereafter that the Court enter its judicial approval of the
foregoing agreement for the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership and for separation of property, except that the
Court shall immediately approve the terms set out in
paragraph 4 above and embody the same in a judgment
immediately binding on the parties hereto to the end that
any non-compliance or violation of its terms by one party
shall entitle the other to enforcement by execution writ
and contempt even though the proceedings as to creditors
have not been terminated.".
Finding the foregoing joint petition to be "conformable to
law," the CFI (Judge Jose F. Fernandez, presiding) issued an
order on April 27, 1963, rendering judgment (hereinafter
referred to as the compromise judgment) approving and
incorporating in toto their compromise agreement. In
compliance with paragraph 4 (e) of their mutual
agreement (par. 3[e] of the compromise judgment), the
petitioner spouse delivered all the four children to the
respondent spouse and remitted money for their support.
On May 7, 1963 the respondent spouse filed in the JDRC a
motion wherein she alleged that she "entered into and
signed the ... Joint Petition as the only means by which she
could have immediate custody of the ... minor children who
are all below the age of 7," and thereafter prayed that she
"be considered relieved of the ... agreement pertaining to
the custody and visitation of her minor children ... and that
since all the children are now in her custody, the said
custody in her favor be confirmed pendente lite." On May
24, 1963 the petitioner spouse opposed the said motion
and moved to dismiss the complaint based, among other
things, on the grounds of res judicata and lis pendens. The
JDRC on May 28, 1963, issued an order which sustained
the petitioner spouse's plea of bar by prior judgment
and lis pendens, and dismissed the case. After the denial of
her motion for reconsideration, the respondent spouse
interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No.
32608-R) wherein she raised, among others, the issue of
validity or legality of the compromise agreement in
connection only with the custody of their minor children.
On October 14, 1964 the Court of Appeals certified the said
appeal to the Supreme Court (G.R. No. L-23767), since "no
hearing on the facts was ever held in the court below no
evidence, testimonial or documentary, presented only a
question of law pends resolution in the appeal." .
The respondent spouse likewise filed a motion dated May
15, 1963 for reconsideration of the compromise judgment
dated April 27, 1963 rendered in special proceeding 6978
of the CFI, wherein she also alleged, among others, that she
entered into the joint petition as the only means by which
she could have immediate custody of her minor children,
and thereafter prayed the CFI to reconsider its judgment
pertaining to the custody and visitation of her minor
children and to relieve her from the said agreement. The
petitioner spouse opposed the said motion and, on June 1,
1963, filed a motion for execution of the compromise
judgment and a charge for contempt. The CFI (Judge Jose
R. Querubin, presiding), in its order dated June 22, 1963,
denied the respondent spouse's motion for
reconsideration, granted the petitioner spouse's motion
for execution, and ordered that upon "failure on the part of
Carmen San Jose-Lacson to deliver the said children [i.e., to
return the two older children Enrique and Maria Teresa in
Page 46
accordance with her agreement with Alfonso Lacson] to
the special sheriff on or before June 29, 1963, she may be
held for contempt pursuant to the provisions of Rule 39
sections 9 and 10, and Rule 64 section 7 of the (old) Rules
of Court." From the aforesaid compromise judgment dated
April 27, 1963 and execution order dated June 22, 1963,
the respondent spouse interposed an appeal to the Court
of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 32798-R) wherein she likewise
questioned the validity or legality of her agreement with
the petitioner spouse respecting custody of their children.
On February 11, 1965 the Court of Appeals also certified
the said appeal to the Supreme Court (G.R. No. L-24259),
since "no evidence of any kind was introduced before the
trial court and ... appellant did not specifically ask to be
allowed to present evidence on her behalf." .
The respondent spouse also instituted certiorari
proceedings before the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No.
32384R), now the subject of an appeal by certiorari to this
Court (G.R. No. L-23482). In her petition for certiorari
dated June 27, 1963, she averred that the CFI (thru Judge
Querubin) committed grave abuse of discretion and acted
in excess of jurisdiction in ordering the immediate
execution of the compromise judgment in its order of June
22, 1963, thus in effect depriving her of the right to appeal.
She prayed for (1) the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining the respondents therein and any
person acting under them from enforcing, by contempt
proceedings and other means, the writ of execution issued
pursuant to the order of the respondent Judge Querubin
dated June 22, 1963 in special proceeding 6978 of the CFI,
(2) the setting aside, after hearing, of the compromise
judgment dated April 27, 1963 and the order dated June
22, 1963, and (3) the awarding of the custody of Enrique
and Maria Teresa to her, their mother. As prayed for, the
Court of Appeals issued ex parte a writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining the enforcement of the order dated
June 22, 1963 for execution of the compromise judgment
rendered in special proceeding 6978. The petitioner
spouse filed an urgent motion dated July 5, 1963 for the
dissolution of the writ of preliminary injunction ex
parte which urgent motion was denied by the Court of
Appeals in its resolution dated July 9, 1963. The petitioner
spouse likewise filed his answer. After hearing, the Court
of Appeals on May 11, 1964 promulgated in said certiorari
case (CA-G.R. No. 32384-R) its decision granting the
petition for certiorari and declaring null and void both (a)
the compromise judgment dated April 27, 1963 in so far as
it relates to the custody and right of visitation over the two
children, Enrique and Teresa, and (b) the order dated June
22, 1963 for execution of said judgment. The petitioner
spouse moved to reconsider, but his motion for
reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in its
resolution dated July 31, 1964. From the decision dated
May 11, 1964 and the resolution dated July 31, 1964, the
petitioner spouse interposed an appeal to this Court, as
abovestated, and assigned the following errors:
(1) The Court of Appeals erred in annulling thru certiorari
the lower court's order of execution of the compromise
judgment.
(2) The Court of Appeals erred in resolving in the
certiorari case the issue of the legality of the compromise
judgment which is involved in two appeals, instead of the
issue of grave abuse of discretion in ordering its execution.
(3) The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the
compromise agreement upon which the judgment is based
violates article 363 of the Civil Code. 1wph1.t to douse the momentary seething emotions of couples
Adoption
As heretofore adverted, the aforecited three appeals
converge on one focal issue: whether the compromise
agreement entered into by the parties and the judgment of
the CFI grounded on the said agreement, are conformable
to law.
We hold that the compromise agreement and the judgment
of the CFI grounded on the said agreement are valid with
respect to the separation of property of the spouses and
the dissolution of the conjugal partnership.
The law allows separation of property of the spouses and
the dissolution of their conjugal partnership provided
judicial sanction is secured beforehand. Thus the new Civil
Code provides:
In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage
settlements, the separation of property between spouses
during the marriage shall not take place save in virtue of a
judicial order. (Art. 190, emphasis supplied)
The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution
of the conjugal partnership during the marriage, subject to
judicial approval. All the creditors of the husband and of
the wife, as well as of the conjugal partnership, shall be
notified of any petition for judicial approval of the
voluntary dissolution of the conjugal partnership, so that
any such creditors may appear at the hearing to safeguard
his interests. Upon approval of the petition for dissolution
of the conjugal partnership, the court shall take such
measures as may protect the creditors and other third
persons. (Art. 191, par. 4, emphasis supplied).
In the case at bar, the spouses obtained judicial
imprimatur of their separation of property and the
dissolution of their conjugal partnership. It does not
appeal that they have creditors who will be prejudiced by
the said arrangements.
It is likewise undisputed that the couple have been
separated in fact for at least five years - the wife's
residence being in Manila, and the husband's in the
conjugal home in Bacolod City. Therefore, inasmuch as a
lengthy separation has supervened between them, the
propriety of severing their financial and proprietary
interests is manifest.
Besides, this Court cannot constrain the spouses to live
together, as
[I]t is not within the province of the courts of this country
to attempt to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with,
and render conjugal rights to, the other. .. At best such an
order can be effective for no other purpose than to compel
the spouse to live under the same roof; and the experience
of those countries where the courts of justice have
assumed to compel the cohabitation of married couple
shows that the policy of the practice is extremely
questionable. (Arroyo v. Vasquez de Arroyo, 42 Phil. 54,
60).
However, in so approving the regime of separation of
property of the spouses and the dissolution of their
conjugal partnership, this Court does not thereby accord
recognition to nor legalize the de facto separation of the
spouses, which again in the language of Arroyo v. Vasquez
de Arroyo, supra is a "state which is abnormal and
fraught with grave danger to all concerned." We would like
Page 47
who, at the slightest ruffling of domestic tranquility
brought about by "mere austerity of temper, petulance of
manners, rudeness of language, a want of civil attention
and accommodation, even occasional sallies of passion"
without more would be minded to separate from each
other. In this jurisdiction, the husband and the wife are
obliged to live together, observe mutual respect and
fidelity, and render mutual help and support (art. 109, new
Civil Code). There is, therefore, virtue in making it as
difficult as possible for married couples impelled by no
better cause than their whims and caprices to abandon
each other's company.
'... For though in particular cases the repugnance of the law
to dissolve the obligations of matrimonial cohabitation
may operate with great severity upon individuals, yet it
must be carefully remembered that the general happiness
of the married life is secured by its indissolubility. When
people understand that they must live together, except for
a very few reasons known to the law, they learn to soften
by mutual accommodation that yoke which they know
they cannot shake off; they become good husbands and
good wives from the necessity of remaining husbands and
wives; for necessity is a powerful master in teaching the
duties which it imposes ..." (Evans vs. Evans, 1 Hag. Con.,
35; 161 Eng. Reprint, 466, 467.) (Arroyo vs. Vasquez de
Arroyo, Id., pp. 58-59).
We now come to the question of the custody and support
of the children.
It is not disputed that it was the JDRC which first acquired
jurisdiction over the matter of custody and support of the
children. The complaint docketed as civil case E-00030 in
the JDRC was filed by the respondent spouse on March 12,
1963, whereas the joint petition of the parties docketed as
special proceeding 6978 in the CFI was filed on April 27,
1963. However, when the respondent spouse signed the
joint petition on the same matter of custody and support of
the children and filed the same with the CFI of Negros
Occidental, she in effect abandoned her action in the JDRC.
The petitioner spouse who could have raised the issue
of lis pendens in abatement of the case filed in the CFI, but
did not do so - had the right, therefore, to cite the decision
of the CFI and to ask for the dismissal of the action filed by
the respondent spouse in the JDRC, on the grounds of res
judicata and lis pendens. And the JDRC acted correctly and
justifiably in dismissing the case for custody and support
of the children based on those grounds. For it is no defense
against the dismissal of the action that the case before the
CFI was filed later than the action before the JDRC,
considering:.
... [T]hat the Rules do not require as a ground for dismissal
of a complaint that there is a prior pending action. They
provide only that there is a pending action, not a pending
prior action. 1
We agree with the Court of Appeals, however, that the CFI
erred in depriving the mother, the respondent spouse, of
the custody of the two older children (both then below the
age of 7).
The Civil Code specifically commands in the second
sentence of its article 363 that "No mother shall be
separated from her child under seven years of age, unless
the court finds compelling reasons for such measure." The
rationale of this new provision was explained by the Code
Commission thus:
Adoption
The general rule is recommended in order to avoid many a
tragedy where a mother has seen her baby torn away from
her. No man can sound the deep sorrows of a mother who
is deprived of her child of tender age. The exception
allowed by the rule has to be for "compelling reasons" for
the good of the child: those cases must indeed be rare, if
the mother's heart is not to be unduly hurt. If she has
erred, as in cases of adultery, the penalty of imprisonment
and the (relative) divorce decree will ordinarily be
sufficient punishment for her. Moreover, her moral
dereliction will not have any effect upon the baby who is as
yet unable to understand the situation." (Report of the
Code Commission, p. 12).
The use of the word shall2 in article 363 of the Civil Code,
coupled with the observations made by the Code
Commission in respect to the said legal provision,
underscores its mandatory character. It prohibits in no
uncertain: terms the separation of a mother and her child
below seven years, unless such separation is grounded
upon compelling reasons as determined by a court.
The order dated April 27, 1963 of the CFI, in so far as it
awarded custody of the two older children who were 6 and
5 years old, respectively, to the father, in effect sought to
separate them from their mother. To that extent therefore,
it was null and void because clearly violative of article 363
of the Civil Code.
Neither does the said award of custody fall within the
exception because the record is bereft of any compelling
reason to support the lower court's order depriving the
wife of her minor children's company. True, the CFI stated
in its order dated June 22, 1963, denying the respondent
spouse's motion for reconsideration of its order dated
April 27, 1963, that .
... If the parties have agreed to file a joint petition, it was
because they wanted to avoid the exposure of the bitter
truths which serve as succulent morsel for scandal
mongers and idle gossipers and to save their children from
embarrassment and inferiority complex which may
inevitably stain their lives. ..
If the parties agreed to submit the matter of custody of the
minor children to the Court for incorporation in the final
judgment, they purposely suppressed the "compelling
reasons for such measure" from appearing in the public
records. This is for the sake and for the welfare of the
minor children.".
But the foregoing statement is at best a mere hint that
there were compelling reasons. The lower court's order is
eloquently silent on what these compelling reasons are.
Needless to state, courts cannot proceed on mere
insinuations; they must be confronted with facts before
they can properly adjudicate.
It might be argued and correctly that since five years
have elapsed since the filing of these cases in 1963, the
ages of the four children should now be as follows: Enrique
11, Maria Teresa 10, Gerrard 9, and Ramon 5.
Therefore, the issue regarding the award of the custody of
Enrique and Maria Teresa to the petitioner spouse has
become moot and academic. The passage of time has
removed the prop which supports the respondent spouse's
position.
Page 48
Nonetheless, this Court is loath to uphold the couple's
agreement regarding the custody of the
children. 1wph1.t
Article 356 of the new Civil Code provides:
Every child:
(1) Is entitled to parental care;
(2) Shall receive at least elementary education;
(3) Shall be given moral and civic training by the parents
or guardian;
(4) Has a right to live in an atmosphere conducive to his
physical, moral and intellectual development.
It is clear that the abovequoted legal provision grants to
every child rights which are not and should not be
dependent solely on the wishes, much less the whims and
caprices, of his parents. His welfare should not be subject
to the parents' say-so or mutual agreement alone. Where,
as in this case, the parents are already separated in fact,
the courts must step in to determine in whose custody the
child can better be assured the right granted to him by law.
The need, therefore, to present evidence regarding this
matter, becomes imperative. A careful scrutiny of the
records reveals that no such evidence was introduced in
the CFI. This latter court relied merely on the mutual
agreement of the spouses-parents. To be sure, this was not
a sufficient basis to determine the fitness of each parent to
be the custodian of the children.
Besides, at least one of the children Enrique, the eldest
is now eleven years of age and should be given the
choice of the parent he wishes to live with. This is the clear
mandate of sec. 6, Rule 99 of the Rules of Court which,
states, inter alia:
... When husband and wife are divorced or living separately
and apart from each other, and the question as to the care,
custody, and control of a child or children of their marriage
is brought before a Court of First Instance by petition or as
an incident to any other proceeding, the court, upon
hearing testimony as may be pertinent, shall award the
care, custody and control of each such child as will be for
its best interest permitting the child to choose which parent
it prefers to live with if it be over ten years of age, unless the
parent so chosen be unfit to take charge of the child by
reason of moral depravity, habitual drunkenness,
incapacity, or poverty... (Emphasis supplied).
One last point regarding the matter of support for the
children assuming that the custody of any or more of
the children will be finally awarded to the mother.
Although the spouses have agreed upon the monthly
support of P150 to be given by the petitioner spouse for
each child, still this Court must speak out its mind on the
insufficiency of this amount. We, take judicial notice of the
devaluation of the peso in 1962 and the steady
skyrocketing of prices of all commodities, goods, and
services, not to mention the fact that all the children are
already of school age. We believe, therefore, that the CFI
may increase this amount of P150 according to the needs
of each child.
Adoption
With the view that we take of this case, we find it
unnecessary to pass upon the other errors assigned in the
three appeals.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision dated May 11, 1964 and the
resolution dated July 31, 1964 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. 32384-R (subject matter of G.R. L-23482), and the
orders dated May 28, 1963 and June 24, 1963 of the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court (subject matter of
G.R. L-23767) are affirmed. G.R. L-24259 is hereby
remanded to the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental for further proceedings, in accordance with this
decision. No pronouncement as to costs.
March 8, 2016
G.R. No. 221697
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-
LLAMANZARES, Petitioners,
vs.
COMELEC AND ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 221698-700
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-
LLAMANZARES, Petitioners,
vs.
COMELEC, FRANCISCO S. TATAD, ANTONIO P.
CONTRERAS AND AMADO D. VALDEZ Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before the Court are two consolidated petitions under Rule
64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with
extremely urgent application for an ex parte issuance of
temporary restraining order/status quo ante order and/or
writ of preliminary injunction assailing the following: (1) 1
December 2015 Resolution of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) Second Division; (2) 23 December 2015
Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc, in SPA No. 15-001
(DC); (3) 11 December 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC
First Division; and ( 4) 23 December 2015 Resolution of
the COMELEC En Banc, in SPA No. 15-002 (DC), SPA No.
15-007 (DC) and SPA No. 15-139 (DC) for having been
issued without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The Facts
Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares (petitioner) was
found abandoned as a newborn infant in the Parish Church
of Jaro, Iloilo by a certain Edgardo Militar (Edgardo) on 3
September 1968. Parental care and custody over
petitioner was passed on by Edgardo to his relatives,
Emiliano Militar (Emiliano) and his wife. Three days after,
6 September 1968, Emiliano reported and registered
petitioner as a foundling with the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Iloilo City (OCR-Iloilo). In her Foundling
Certificate and Certificate of Live Birth, the petitioner was
given the name "Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar." 1
When petitioner was five (5) years old, celebrity spouses
Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fenando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa
Sonora Poe (a.k.a. Susan Roces) filed a petition for her
adoption with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Juan
City. On 13 May 1974, the trial court granted their petition
and ordered that petitioner's name be changed from "Mary
Page 49
Grace Natividad Contreras Militar" to "Mary Grace
Natividad Sonora Poe." Although necessary notations were
made by OCR-Iloilo on petitioner's foundling certificate
reflecting the court decreed adoption,2 the petitioner's
adoptive mother discovered only sometime in the second
half of 2005 that the lawyer who handled petitioner's
adoption failed to secure from the OCR-Iloilo a new
Certificate of Live Birth indicating petitioner's new name
and the name of her adoptive parents. 3 Without delay,
petitioner's mother executed an affidavit attesting to the
lawyer's omission which she submitted to the OCR-Iloilo.
On 4 May 2006, OCR-Iloilo issued a new Certificate of Live
Birth in the name of Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe.4
Having reached the age of eighteen (18) years in 1986,
petitioner registered as a voter with the local COMELEC
Office in San Juan City. On 13 December 1986, she received
her COMELEC Voter's Identification Card for Precinct No.
196 in Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila.5
On 4 April 1988, petitioner applied for and was issued
Philippine Passport No. F9272876 by the Department of
Foreign Affairs (DFA). Subsequently, on 5 April 1993 and
19 May 1998, she renewed her Philippine passport and
respectively secured Philippine Passport Nos. L881511
and DD156616.7
Initially, the petitioner enrolled and pursued a degree in
Development Studies at the University of the
Philippines8but she opted to continue her studies abroad
and left for the United States of America (U.S.) in 1988.
Petitioner graduated in 1991 from Boston College in
Chestnuts Hill, Massachusetts where she earned her
Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Studies.9
On 27 July 1991, petitioner married Teodoro Misael Daniel
V. Llamanzares (Llamanzares), a citizen of both the
Philippines and the U.S., at Sanctuario de San Jose Parish in
San Juan City. 10 Desirous of being with her husband who
was then based in the U.S., the couple flew back to the U.S.
two days after the wedding ceremony or on 29 July
1991. 11
While in the U.S., the petitioner gave birth to her eldest
child Brian Daniel (Brian) on 16 April 1992.12 Her two
daughters Hanna MacKenzie (Hanna) and Jesusa Anika
(Anika) were both born in the Philippines on 10 July 1998
and 5 June 2004, respectively. 13
On 18 October 2001, petitioner became a naturalized
American citizen. 14 She obtained U.S. Passport No.
017037793 on 19 December 2001. 15
On 8 April 2004, the petitioner came back to the
Philippines together with Hanna to support her father's
candidacy for President in the May 2004 elections. It was
during this time that she gave birth to her youngest
daughter Anika. She returned to the U.S. with her two
daughters on 8 July 2004. 16
After a few months, specifically on 13 December 2004,
petitioner rushed back to the Philippines upon learning of
her father's deteriorating medical condition. 17 Her father
slipped into a coma and eventually expired. The petitioner
stayed in the country until 3 February 2005 to take care of
her father's funeral arrangements as well as to assist in the
settlement of his estate.18
According to the petitioner, the untimely demise of her
father was a severe blow to her entire family. In her
earnest desire to be with her grieving mother, the
petitioner and her husband decided to move and reside
Adoption
permanently in the Philippines sometime in the first
quarter of 2005.19 The couple began preparing for their
resettlement including notification of their children's
schools that they will be transferring to Philippine schools
for the next semester;20 coordination with property
movers for the relocation of their household goods,
furniture and cars from the U.S. to the Philippines;21 and
inquiry with Philippine authorities as to the proper
procedure to be followed in bringing their pet dog into the
country.22 As early as 2004, the petitioner already quit her
job in the U.S.23
Finally, petitioner came home to the Philippines on 24 May
200524 and without delay, secured a Tax Identification
Number from the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Her three
(3) children immediately followed25 while her husband
was forced to stay in the U.S. to complete pending projects
as well as to arrange the sale of their family home there.26
The petitioner and her children briefly stayed at her
mother's place until she and her husband purchased a
condominium unit with a parking slot at One Wilson Place
Condominium in San Juan City in the second half of
2005.27 The corresponding Condominium Certificates of
Title covering the unit and parking slot were issued by the
Register of Deeds of San Juan City to petitioner and her
husband on 20 February 2006.28 Meanwhile, her children
of school age began attending Philippine private schools.
On 14 February 2006, the petitioner made a quick trip to
the U.S. to supervise the disposal of some of the family's
remaining household belongings.29 She travelled back to
the Philippines on 11 March 2006.30
In late March 2006, petitioner's husband officially
informed the U.S. Postal Service of the family's change and
abandonment of their address in the U.S.31 The family
home was eventually sold on 27 April 2006.32 Petitioner's
husband resigned from his job in the U.S. in April 2006,
arrived in the country on 4 May 2006 and started working
for a major Philippine company in July 2006.33
In early 2006, petitioner and her husband acquired a 509-
square meter lot in Corinthian Hills, Quezon City where
they built their family home34 and to this day, is where the
couple and their children have been residing.35 A Transfer
Certificate of Title covering said property was issued in the
couple's name by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City on
1June 2006.
On 7 July 2006, petitioner took her Oath of Allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-
acquisition Act of 2003.36 Under the same Act, she filed
with the Bureau of Immigration (BI) a sworn petition to
reacquire Philippine citizenship together with petitions for
derivative citizenship on behalf of her three minor
children on 10 July 2006.37 As can be gathered from its 18
July 2006 Order, the BI acted favorably on petitioner's
petitions and declared that she is deemed to have
reacquired her Philippine citizenship while her children
are considered as citizens of the
Philippines.38 Consequently, the BI issued Identification
Certificates (ICs) in petitioner's name and in the names of
her three (3) children. 39
Again, petitioner registered as a voter of Barangay Santa
Lucia, San Juan City on 31 August 2006.40 She also secured
from the DFA a new Philippine Passport bearing the No.
XX4731999.41 This passport was renewed on 18 March
2014 and she was issued Philippine Passport No.
EC0588861 by the DFA.42
Page 50
On 6 October 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III
appointed petitioner as Chairperson of the Movie and
Television Review and Classification Board
(MTRCB).43 Before assuming her post, petitioner executed
an "Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United
States of America and Renunciation of American
Citizenship" before a notary public in Pasig City on 20
October 2010,44 in satisfaction of the legal requisites stated
in Section 5 of R.A. No. 9225.45 The following day, 21
October 2010 petitioner submitted the said affidavit to the
BI46 and took her oath of office as Chairperson of the
MTRCB.47 From then on, petitioner stopped using her
American passport.48
On 12 July 2011, the petitioner executed before the Vice
Consul of the U.S. Embassy in Manila an "Oath/Affirmation
of Renunciation of Nationality of the United States."49 On
that day, she accomplished a sworn questionnaire before
the U.S. Vice Consul wherein she stated that she had taken
her oath as MTRCB Chairperson on 21 October 2010 with
the intent, among others, of relinquishing her American
citizenship.50 In the same questionnaire, the petitioner
stated that she had resided outside of the U.S., specifically
in the Philippines, from 3 September 1968 to 29 July 1991
and from May 2005 to present.51
On 9 December 2011, the U.S. Vice Consul issued to
petitioner a "Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the United
States" effective 21 October 2010.52
On 2 October 2012, the petitioner filed with the COMELEC
her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Senator for the 2013
Elections wherein she answered "6 years and 6 months" to
the question "Period of residence in the Philippines before
May 13, 2013."53 Petitioner obtained the highest number
of votes and was proclaimed Senator on 16 May 2013. 54
On 19 December 2013, petitioner obtained Philippine
Diplomatic Passport No. DE0004530. 55
On 15 October 2015, petitioner filed her COC for the
Presidency for the May 2016 Elections. 56 In her COC, the
petitioner declared that she is a natural-born citizen and
that her residence in the Philippines up to the day before 9
May 2016 would be ten (10) years and eleven (11) months
counted from 24 May 2005.57 The petitioner attached to
her COC an "Affidavit Affirming Renunciation of U.S.A.
Citizenship" subscribed and sworn to before a notary
public in Quezon City on 14 October 2015. 58
Petitioner's filing of her COC for President in the upcoming
elections triggered the filing of several COMELEC cases
against her which were the subject of these consolidated
cases.
Origin of Petition for Certiorari in G.R. No. 221697
A day after petitioner filed her COC for President, Estrella
Elamparo (Elamparo) filed a petition to deny due course or
cancel said COC which was docketed as SPA No. 15-001
(DC) and raffled to the COMELEC Second Division. 59She is
convinced that the COMELEC has jurisdiction over her
petition.60 Essentially, Elamparo's contention is that
petitioner committed material misrepresentation when
she stated in her COC that she is a natural-born Filipino
citizen and that she is a resident of the Philippines for at
least ten (10) years and eleven (11) months up to the day
before the 9 May 2016 Elections.61
On the issue of citizenship, Elamparo argued that
petitioner cannot be considered as a natural-born Filipino
on account of the fact that she was a foundling.62 Elamparo
Adoption
claimed that international law does not confer natural-
born status and Filipino citizenship on
foundlings.63 Following this line of reasoning, petitioner is
not qualified to apply for reacquisition of Filipino
citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 for she is not a natural-
born Filipino citizen to begin with.64 Even
assuming arguendo that petitioner was a natural-born
Filipino, she is deemed to have lost that status when she
became a naturalized American citizen.65 According to
Elamparo, natural-born citizenship must be continuous
from birth.66
On the matter of petitioner's residency, Elamparo pointed
out that petitioner was bound by the sworn declaration
she made in her 2012 COC for Senator wherein she
indicated that she had resided in the country for only six (
6) years and six ( 6) months as of May 2013 Elections.
Elamparo likewise insisted that assuming arguendo that
petitioner is qualified to regain her natural-born status
under R.A. No. 9225, she still fell short of the ten-year
residency requirement of the Constitution as her residence
could only be counted at the earliest from July 2006, when
she reacquired Philippine citizenship under the said Act.
Also on the assumption that petitioner is qualified to
reacquire lost Philippine Citizenship, Elamparo is of the
belief that she failed to reestablish her domicile in the
Philippines.67
Petitioner seasonably filed her Answer wherein she
countered that:
(1) the COMELEC did not have jurisdiction over
Elamparo's petition as it was actually a petition for quo
warranto which could only be filed if Grace Poe wins in the
Presidential elections, and that the Department of Justice
(DOJ) has primary jurisdiction to revoke the BI's July 18,
2006 Order;
(2) the petition failed to state a cause of action because it
did not contain allegations which, if hypothetically
admitted, would make false the statement in her COC that
she is a natural-born Filipino citizen nor was there any
allegation that there was a willful or deliberate intent to
misrepresent on her part;
(3) she did not make any material misrepresentation in the
COC regarding her citizenship and residency qualifications
for:
a. the 1934 Constitutional Convention deliberations show
that foundlings were considered citizens;
b. foundlings are presumed under international law to
have been born of citizens of the place where they are
found;
c. she reacquired her natural-born Philippine citizenship
under the provisions of R.A. No. 9225;
d. she executed a sworn renunciation of her American
citizenship prior to the filing of her COC for President in
the May 9, 2016 Elections and that the same is in full force
and effect and has not been withdrawn or recanted;
e. the burden was on Elamparo in proving that she did not
possess natural-born status;
f. residence is a matter of evidence and that she
reestablished her domicile in the Philippines as early as
May 24, 2005;
Page 51
g. she could reestablish residence even before she
reacquired natural-born citizenship under R.A. No. 9225;
h. statement regarding the period of residence in her 2012
COC for Senator was an honest mistake, not binding and
should give way to evidence on her true date of
reacquisition of domicile;
i. Elamparo's petition is merely an action to usurp the
sovereign right of the Filipino people to decide a purely
political question, that is, should she serve as the country's
next leader.68
After the parties submitted their respective Memoranda,
the petition was deemed submitted for resolution.
On 1 December 2015, the COMELEC Second Division
promulgated a Resolution finding that petitioner's COC,
filed for the purpose of running for the President of the
Republic of the Philippines in the 9 May 2016 National and
Local Elections, contained material representations which
are false. The fallo of the aforesaid Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations,
the instant Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel
Certificate of Candidacy is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly,
the Certificate of Candidacy for President of the Republic
of the Philippines in the May 9, 2016 National and Local
Elections filed by respondent Mary Grace Natividad Sonora
Poe Llamanzares is hereby CANCELLED.69
Motion for Reconsideration of the 1 December 2015
Resolution was filed by petitioner which the COMELEC En
Banc resolved in its 23 December 2015 Resolution by
denying the same.70
Origin of Petition for Certiorari in G.R. Nos. 221698-
700
This case stemmed from three (3) separate petitions filed
by Francisco S. Tatad (Tatad), Antonio P. Contreras
(Contreras) and Amado D. Valdez (Valdez) against
petitioner before the COMELEC which were consolidated
and raffled to its First Division.
In his petition to disqualify petitioner under Rule 25 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure,71 docketed as SPA No. 15-
002 (DC), Tatad alleged that petitioner lacks the requisite
residency and citizenship to qualify her for the
Presidency.72
Tatad theorized that since the Philippines adheres to the
principle of jus sanguinis, persons of unknown parentage,
particularly foundlings, cannot be considered natural-born
Filipino citizens since blood relationship is determinative
of natural-born status.73 Tatad invoked the rule of
statutory construction that what is not included is
excluded. He averred that the fact that foundlings were not
expressly included in the categories of citizens in the 193 5
Constitution is indicative of the framers' intent to exclude
them.74 Therefore, the burden lies on petitioner to prove
that she is a natural-born citizen.75
Neither can petitioner seek refuge under international
conventions or treaties to support her claim that
foundlings have a nationality.76 According to Tatad,
international conventions and treaties are not self-
executory and that local legislations are necessary in order
to give effect to treaty obligations assumed by the
Philippines.77 He also stressed that there is no standard
state practice that automatically confers natural-born
status to foundlings.78
Adoption
Similar to Elamparo's argument, Tatad claimed that
petitioner cannot avail of the option to reacquire
Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 because it only
applies to former natural-born citizens and petitioner was
not as she was a foundling.79
Referring to petitioner's COC for Senator, Tatad concluded
that she did not comply with the ten (10) year residency
requirement.80 Tatad opined that petitioner acquired her
domicile in Quezon City only from the time she renounced
her American citizenship which was sometime in 2010 or
2011.81 Additionally, Tatad questioned petitioner's lack of
intention to abandon her U.S. domicile as evinced by the
fact that her husband stayed thereat and her frequent trips
to the U.S.82
In support of his petition to deny due course or cancel the
COC of petitioner, docketed as SPA No. 15-139 (DC), Valdez
alleged that her repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 did not
bestow upon her the status of a natural-born citizen.83 He
advanced the view that former natural-born citizens who
are repatriated under the said Act reacquires only their
Philippine citizenship and will not revert to their original
status as natural-born citizens.84
He further argued that petitioner's own admission in her
COC for Senator that she had only been a resident of the
Philippines for at least six (6) years and six (6) months
prior to the 13 May 2013 Elections operates against her.
Valdez rejected petitioner's claim that she could have
validly reestablished her domicile in the Philippines prior
to her reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In effect, his
position was that petitioner did not meet the ten (10) year
residency requirement for President.
Unlike the previous COMELEC cases filed against
petitioner, Contreras' petition,85 docketed as SPA No. 15-
007 (DC), limited the attack to the residency issue. He
claimed that petitioner's 2015 COC for President should be
cancelled on the ground that she did not possess the ten-
year period of residency required for said candidacy and
that she made false entry in her COC when she stated that
she is a legal resident of the Philippines for ten (10) years
and eleven (11) months by 9 May 2016.86 Contreras
contended that the reckoning period for computing
petitioner's residency in the Philippines should be from 18
July 2006, the date when her petition to reacquire
Philippine citizenship was approved by the BI.87 He
asserted that petitioner's physical presence in the country
before 18 July 2006 could not be valid evidence of
reacquisition of her Philippine domicile since she was then
living here as an American citizen and as such, she was
governed by the Philippine immigration laws.88
In her defense, petitioner raised the following arguments:
First, Tatad's petition should be dismissed outright for
failure to state a cause of action. His petition did not invoke
grounds proper for a disqualification case as enumerated
under Sections 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code.89 Instead, Tatad completely relied on the alleged lack
of residency and natural-born status of petitioner which
are not among the recognized grounds for the
disqualification of a candidate to an elective office.90
Second, the petitions filed against her are basically
petitions for quo warranto as they focus on establishing
her ineligibility for the Presidency.91 A petition for quo
warranto falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) and not the
COMELEC.92
Page 52
Third, the burden to prove that she is not a natural-born
Filipino citizen is on the respondents.93 Otherwise stated,
she has a presumption in her favor that she is a natural-
born citizen of this country.
Fourth, customary international law dictates that
foundlings are entitled to a nationality and are presumed
to be citizens of the country where they are
found.94 Consequently, the petitioner is considered as a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines.95
Fifth, she claimed that as a natural-born citizen, she has
every right to be repatriated under R.A. No. 9225 or the
right to reacquire her natural-born status.96 Moreover, the
official acts of the Philippine Government enjoy the
presumption of regularity, to wit: the issuance of the 18
July 2006 Order of the BI declaring her as natural-born
citizen, her appointment as MTRCB Chair and the issuance
of the decree of adoption of San Juan RTC.97 She believed
that all these acts reinforced her position that she is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines.98
Sixth, she maintained that as early as the first quarter of
2005, she started reestablishing her domicile of choice in
the Philippines as demonstrated by her children's
resettlement and schooling in the country, purchase of a
condominium unit in San Juan City and the construction of
their family home in Corinthian Hills.99
Seventh, she insisted that she could legally reestablish her
domicile of choice in the Philippines even before she
renounced her American citizenship as long as the three
determinants for a change of domicile are complied
with.100 She reasoned out that there was no requirement
that renunciation of foreign citizenship is a prerequisite
for the acquisition of a new domicile of choice.101
Eighth, she reiterated that the period appearing in the
residency portion of her COC for Senator was a mistake
made in good faith.102
In a Resolution103 promulgated on 11 December 2015, the
COMELEC First Division ruled that petitioner is not a
natural-born citizen, that she failed to complete the ten
(10) year residency requirement, and that she committed
material misrepresentation in her COC when she declared
therein that she has been a resident of the Philippines for a
period of ten (10) years and eleven (11) months as of the
day of the elections on 9 May 2016. The COMELEC First
Division concluded that she is not qualified for the elective
position of President of the Republic of the Philippines.
The dispositive portion of said Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES,
to GRANT the Petitions and cancel the Certificate of
Candidacy of MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-
LLAMANZARES for the elective position of President of
the Republic of the Philippines in connection with the 9
May 2016 Synchronized Local and National Elections.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration seeking a
reversal of the COMELEC First Division's Resolution. On 23
December 2015, the COMELEC En Banc issued a
Resolution denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
Alarmed by the adverse rulings of the COMELEC, petitioner
instituted the present petitions for certiorari with urgent
prayer for the issuance of an ex parte temporary
restraining order/status quo ante order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction. On 28 December 2015, temporary
Adoption
restraining orders were issued by the Court enjoining the
COMELEC and its representatives from implementing the
assailed COMELEC Resolutions until further orders from
the Court. The Court also ordered the consolidation of the
two petitions filed by petitioner in its Resolution of 12
January 2016. Thereafter, oral arguments were held in
these cases.
The Court GRANTS the petition of Mary Grace Natividad S.
Poe-Llamanzares and to ANNUL and SET ASIDE the:
1. Resolution dated 1 December 2015 rendered through its
Second Division, in SPA No. 15-001 (DC),
entitled Estrella C. Elamparo, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace
Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares.
2. Resolution dated 11 December 2015, rendered through
its First Division, in the consolidated cases SPA No. 15-002
(DC) entitled Francisco S. Tatad, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace
Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; SPA No.
15-007 (DC) entitled Antonio P. Contreras, petitioner, vs.
Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares,
respondent; and SPA No. 15-139 (DC) entitled Amado D.
Valdez, petitioner, v. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-
Llamanzares, respondent.
3. Resolution dated 23 December 2015 of the Commission
En Banc, upholding the 1 December 2015 Resolution of the
Second Division.
4. Resolution dated 23 December 2015 of the Commission
En Banc, upholding the 11 December 2015 Resolution of
the First Division.
The procedure and the conclusions from which the
questioned Resolutions emanated are tainted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The
petitioner is a QUALIFIED CANDIDATE for President in the
9 May 2016 National Elections.
The issue before the COMELEC is whether or not the COC
of petitioner should be denied due course or cancelled "on
the exclusive ground" that she made in the certificate a
false material representation. The exclusivity of the
ground should hedge in the discretion of the COMELEC and
restrain it from going into the issue of the qualifications of
the candidate for the position, if, as in this case, such issue
is yet undecided or undetermined by the proper authority.
The COMELEC cannot itself, in the same cancellation case,
decide the qualification or lack thereof of the candidate.
We rely, first of all, on the Constitution of our Republic,
particularly its provisions in Article IX, C, Section 2:
Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the
following powers and functions:
(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum, and recall.
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests
relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all
elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and
appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective
municipal officials decided by trial courts of general
jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials
decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on
election contests involving elective municipal and
Page 53
barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not
appealable.
(3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all
questions affecting elections, including determination of
the number and location of polling places, appointment of
election officials and inspectors, and registration of voters.
(4) Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law
enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the
Government, including the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, for the exclusive purpose of ensuring free,
orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties,
organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to other
requirements, must present their platform or program of
government; and accredit citizens' arms of the Commission
on Elections. Religious denominations and sects shall not
be registered. Those which seek to achieve their goals
through violence or unlawful means, or refuse to uphold
and adhere to this Constitution, or which are supported by
any foreign government shall likewise be refused
registration.
Financial contributions from foreign governments and
their agencies to political parties, organizations, coalitions,
or candidates related to elections constitute interference
in national affairs, and, when accepted, shall be an
additional ground for the cancellation of their registration
with the Commission, in addition to other penalties that
may be prescribed by law.
(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative,
petitions in court for inclusion or exclusion of voters;
investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of
violations of election laws, including acts or omissions
constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.
(7) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to
minimize election spending, including limitation of places
where propaganda materials shall be posted, and to
prevent and penalize all forms of election frauds, offenses,
malpractices, and nuisance candidacies.
(8) Recommend to the President the removal of any officer
or employee it has deputized, or the imposition of any
other disciplinary action, for violation or disregard of, or
disobedience to its directive, order, or decision.
(9) Submit to the President and the Congress a
comprehensive report on the conduct of each election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, or recall.
Not any one of the enumerated powers approximate the
exactitude of the provisions of Article VI, Section 17 of the
same basic law stating that:
The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each
have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral
Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of
whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be
designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall
be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives,
as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and
the parties or organizations registered under the party-list
system represented therein. The senior Justice in the
Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
Adoption
or of the last paragraph of Article VII, Section 4 which
provides that:
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge
of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may
promulgate its rules for the purpose.
The tribunals which have jurisdiction over the question of
the qualifications of the President, the Vice-President,
Senators and the Members of the House of Representatives
was made clear by the Constitution. There is no such
provision for candidates for these positions.
Can the COMELEC be such judge?
The opinion of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in Romualdez-
Marcos v. Commission on Elections,104 which was
affirmatively cited in the En Banc decision in Fermin v.
COMELEC105 is our guide. The citation in Fermin reads:
Apparently realizing the lack of an authorized proceeding
for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, the COMELEC
amended its rules on February 15, 1993 so as to provide in
Rule 25 1, the following:
Grounds for disqualification. - Any candidate who does not
possess all the qualifications of a candidate as provided for
by the Constitution or by existing law or who commits any
act declared by law to be grounds for disqualification may
be disqualified from continuing as a candidate.
The lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of
candidates, however, cannot be supplied by a mere rule.
Such an act is equivalent to the creation of a cause of action
which is a substantive matter which the COMELEC, in the
exercise of its rule-making power under Art. IX, A, 6 of the
Constitution, cannot do it. It is noteworthy that the
Constitution withholds from the COMELEC even the power
to decide cases involving the right to vote, which
essentially involves an inquiry into qualifications based
on age, residence and citizenship of voters. [Art. IX, C,
2(3)]
The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of
grounds for ineligibility into grounds for disqualification is
contrary to the evident intention of the law. For not only in
their grounds but also in their consequences are
proceedings for "disqualification" different from those for
a declaration of "ineligibility." "Disqualification"
proceedings, as already stated, are based on grounds
specified in 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and
in 40 of the Local Government Code and are for the
purpose of barring an individual from becoming a
candidate or from continuing as a candidate for public
office. In a word, their purpose is to eliminate a candidate
from the race either from the start or during its progress.
"Ineligibility," on the other hand, refers to the lack of the
qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes
for holding public office and the purpose of the proceedings
for declaration of ineligibility is to remove the incumbent
from office.
Consequently, that an individual possesses the
qualifications for a public office does not imply that he is
not disqualified from becoming a candidate or continuing
as a candidate for a public office and vice versa. We have
this sort of dichotomy in our Naturalization Law. (C.A. No.
473) That an alien has the qualifications prescribed in 2
of the Law does not imply that he does not suffer from any
of [the] disqualifications provided in 4.
Page 54
Before we get derailed by the distinction as to grounds and
the consequences of the respective proceedings, the
importance of the opinion is in its statement that "the lack
of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates,
however, cannot be supplied by a mere rule". Justice
Mendoza lectured in Romualdez-Marcos that:
Three reasons may be cited to explain the absence of an
authorized proceeding for determining before election the
qualifications of a candidate.
First is the fact that unless a candidate wins and is
proclaimed elected, there is no necessity for determining
his eligibility for the office. In contrast, whether an
individual should be disqualified as a candidate for acts
constituting election offenses (e.g., vote buying, over
spending, commission of prohibited acts) is a prejudicial
question which should be determined lest he wins because
of the very acts for which his disqualification is being
sought. That is why it is provided that if the grounds for
disqualification are established, a candidate will not be
voted for; if he has been voted for, the votes in his favor
will not be counted; and if for some reason he has been
voted for and he has won, either he will not be proclaimed
or his proclamation will be set aside.
Second is the fact that the determination of a candidates'
eligibility, e.g., his citizenship or, as in this case, his
domicile, may take a long time to make, extending beyond
the beginning of the term of the office. This is amply
demonstrated in the companion case (G.R. No.
120265, Agapito A. Aquino v. COMELEC) where the
determination of Aquino's residence was still pending in the
COMELEC even after the elections of May 8, 1995. This is
contrary to the summary character proceedings relating to
certificates of candidacy. That is why the law makes the
receipt of certificates of candidacy a ministerial duty of the
COMELEC and its officers. The law is satisfied if candidates
state in their certificates of candidacy that they are eligible
for the position which they seek to fill, leaving the
determination of their qualifications to be made after the
election and only in the event they are elected. Only in
cases involving charges of false representations made in
certificates of candidacy is the COMELEC given
jurisdiction.
Third is the policy underlying the prohibition against pre-
proclamation cases in elections for President, Vice
President, Senators and members of the House of
Representatives. (R.A. No. 7166, 15) The purpose is to
preserve the prerogatives of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal and the other Tribunals as "sole judges"
under the Constitution of the election,
returns and qualifications of members of Congress of the
President and Vice President, as the case may be.106
To be sure, the authoritativeness of
the Romualdez pronouncements as reiterated
in Fermin, led to the amendment through COMELEC
Resolution No. 9523, on 25 September 2012 of its Rule 25.
This, the 15 February1993 version of Rule 25, which states
that:
Grounds for disqualification. -Any candidate who does not
possess all the qualifications of a candidate as provided for
by the Constitution or by existing law or who commits any
act declared by law to be grounds for disqualification may
be disqualified from continuing as a candidate.107
was in the 2012 rendition, drastically changed to:
Adoption
Grounds. - Any candidate who, in action or protest in which
he is a party, is declared by final decision of a competent
court, guilty of, or found by the Commission to be suffering
from any disqualification provided by law or the
Constitution.
A Petition to Disqualify a Candidate invoking grounds for a
Petition to Deny to or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy or
Petition to Declare a Candidate as a Nuisance Candidate, or
a combination thereof, shall be summarily dismissed.
Clearly, the amendment done in 2012 is an acceptance of
the reality of absence of an authorized proceeding for
determining before election the qualifications of candidate.
Such that, as presently required, to disqualify a candidate
there must be a declaration by a final judgment of a
competent court that the candidate sought to be
disqualified "is guilty of or found by the Commission to be
suffering from any disqualification provided by law or the
Constitution."
Insofar as the qualification of a candidate is concerned,
Rule 25 and Rule 23 are flipsides of one to the other.
Both do not allow, are not authorizations, are not vestment
of jurisdiction, for the COMELEC to determine the
qualification of a candidate. The facts of qualification must
beforehand be established in a prior proceeding before an
authority properly vested with jurisdiction. The prior
determination of qualification may be by statute, by
executive order or by a judgment of a competent court or
tribunal.
If a candidate cannot be disqualified without a prior
finding that he or she is suffering from a disqualification
"provided by law or the Constitution," neither can the
certificate of candidacy be cancelled or denied due course
on grounds of false representations regarding his or her
qualifications, without a prior authoritative finding that he
or she is not qualified, such prior authority being the
necessary measure by which the falsity of the
representation can be found. The only exception that can
be conceded are self-evident facts of unquestioned or
unquestionable veracity and judicial confessions. Such are,
anyway, bases equivalent to prior decisions against which
the falsity of representation can be determined.
The need for a predicate finding or final pronouncement in
a proceeding under Rule 23 that deals with, as in this case,
alleged false representations regarding the candidate's
citizenship and residence, forced the COMELEC to rule
essentially that since foundlings108 are not mentioned in
the enumeration of citizens under the 1935
Constitution,109 they then cannot be citizens. As the
COMELEC stated in oral arguments, when petitioner
admitted that she is a foundling, she said it all. This
borders on bigotry. Oddly, in an effort at tolerance, the
COMELEC, after saying that it cannot rule that herein
petitioner possesses blood relationship with a Filipino
citizen when "it is certain that such relationship is
indemonstrable," proceeded to say that "she now has the
burden to present evidence to prove her natural filiation
with a Filipino parent."
The fact is that petitioner's blood relationship with a
Filipino citizen is DEMONSTRABLE.
At the outset, it must be noted that presumptions
regarding paternity is neither unknown nor unaccepted in
Philippine Law. The Family Code of the Philippines has a
whole chapter on Paternity and Filiation.110 That said,
there is more than sufficient evider1ce that petitioner has
Filipino parents and is therefore a natural-born Filipino.
Page 55
Parenthetically, the burden of proof was on private
respondents to show that petitioner is not a Filipino
citizen. The private respondents should have shown that
both of petitioner's parents were aliens. Her admission
that she is a foundling did not shift the burden to her
because such status did not exclude the possibility that her
parents were Filipinos, especially as in this case where
there is a high probability, if not certainty, that her parents
are Filipinos.
The factual issue is not who the parents of petitioner are,
as their identities are unknown, but whether such parents
are Filipinos. Under Section 4, Rule 128:
Sect. 4. Relevancy, collateral matters - Evidence must have
such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its
existence or no-existence. Evidence on collateral matters
shall not be allowed, except when it tends in any
reasonable degree to establish the probability of
improbability of the fact in issue.
The Solicitor General offered official statistics from the
Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA)111 that from 1965 to
1975, the total number of foreigners born in the
Philippines was 15,986 while the total number of Filipinos
born in the country was 10,558,278. The statistical
probability that any child born in the Philippines in that
decade is natural-born Filipino was 99.83%. For her part,
petitioner presented census statistics for Iloilo Province
for 1960 and 1970, also from the PSA. In 1960, there were
962,532 Filipinos and 4,734 foreigners in the
province; 99.62% of the population were Filipinos. In
1970, the figures were 1,162,669 Filipinos and 5,304
foreigners, or 99.55%. Also presented were figures for the
child producing ages (15-49). In 1960, there were 230,528
female Filipinos as against 730 female foreigners
or 99.68%. In the same year, there were 210,349 Filipino
males and 886 male aliens, or 99.58%. In 1970, there
were 270,299 Filipino females versus 1, 190 female aliens,
or 99.56%. That same year, there were 245,740 Filipino
males as against only 1,165 male aliens
or 99.53%. COMELEC did not dispute these figures.
Notably, Commissioner Arthur Lim admitted, during the
oral arguments, that at the time petitioner was found in
1968, the majority of the population in Iloilo was
Filipino.112
Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of
petitioner's parents are the fact that she was abandoned as
an infant in a Roman Catholic Church in Iloilo
City.1wphi1 She also has typical Filipino features: height,
flat nasal bridge, straight black hair, almond shaped eyes
and an oval face.
There is a disputable presumption that things have
happened according to the ordinary course of nature and
the ordinary habits of life.113 All of the foregoing evidence,
that a person with typical Filipino features is abandoned in
Catholic Church in a municipality where the population of
the Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there
would be more than a 99% chance that a child born in the
province would be a Filipino, would indicate more than
ample probability if not statistical certainty, that
petitioner's parents are Filipinos. That probability and the
evidence on which it is based are admissible under Rule
128, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
To assume otherwise is to accept the absurd, if not the
virtually impossible, as the norm. In the words of the
Solicitor General:
Adoption
Second. It is contrary to common sense because foreigners
do not come to the Philippines so they can get pregnant
and leave their newborn babies behind. We do not face a
situation where the probability is such that every
foundling would have a 50% chance of being a Filipino and
a 50% chance of being a foreigner. We need to frame our
questions properly. What are the chances that the parents
of anyone born in the Philippines would be foreigners?
Almost zero. What are the chances that the parents of
anyone born in the Philippines would be Filipinos? 99.9%.
According to the Philippine Statistics Authority, from 2010
to 2014, on a yearly average, there were 1,766,046
children born in the Philippines to Filipino parents, as
opposed to 1,301 children in the Philippines of foreign
parents. Thus, for that sample period, the ratio of non-
Filipino children to natural born Filipino children is
1:1357. This means that the statistical probability that any
child born in the Philippines would be a natural born
Filipino is 99.93%.
From 1965 to 1975, the total number of foreigners born in
the Philippines is 15,986 while the total number of
Filipinos born in the Philippines is 15,558,278. For this
period, the ratio of non-Filipino children is 1:661. This
means that the statistical probability that any child born in
the Philippines on that decade would be a natural born
Filipino is 99.83%.
We can invite statisticians and social anthropologists to
crunch the numbers for us, but I am confident that the
statistical probability that a child born in the Philippines
would be a natural born Filipino will not be affected by
whether or not the parents are known. If at all, the
likelihood that a foundling would have a Filipino parent
might even be higher than 99.9%. Filipinos abandon their
children out of poverty or perhaps, shame. We do not
imagine foreigners abandoning their children here in the
Philippines thinking those infants would have better
economic opportunities or believing that this country is a
tropical paradise suitable for raising abandoned children. I
certainly doubt whether a foreign couple has ever
considered their child excess baggage that is best left
behind.
To deny full Filipino citizenship to all foundlings and
render them stateless just because there may be a
theoretical chance that one among the thousands of these
foundlings might be the child of not just one, but two,
foreigners is downright discriminatory, irrational, and
unjust. It just doesn't make any sense. Given the statistical
certainty - 99.9% - that any child born in the Philippines
would be a natural born citizen, a decision denying
foundlings such status is effectively a denial of their
birthright. There is no reason why this Honorable Court
should use an improbable hypothetical to sacrifice the
fundamental political rights of an entire class of human
beings. Your Honor, constitutional interpretation and the
use of common sense are not separate disciplines.
As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born
citizens. While the 1935 Constitution's enumeration is
silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language
which would definitely exclude foundlings either. Because
of silence and ambiguity in the enumeration with respect
to foundlings, there is a need to examine the intent of the
framers. In Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue,114 this Court held that:
The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the
fundamental principle of constitutional construction that
Page 56
the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the
people adopting it should be given effect. The primary task
in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter
assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of
the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also
be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the
Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation
offered by the framers.115
As pointed out by petitioner as well as the Solicitor
General, the deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional
Convention show that the framers intended foundlings to
be covered by the enumeration. The following exchange is
recorded:
Sr. Rafols: For an amendment. I propose that after
subsection 2, the following is inserted: "The natural
children of a foreign father and a Filipino mother not
recognized by the father.
xxxx
President:
[We] would like to request a clarification from the
proponent of the amendment. The gentleman refers to
natural children or to any kind of illegitimate children?
Sr. Rafols:
To all kinds of illegitimate children. It also includes
natural children of unknown parentage, natural or
illegitimate children of unknown parents.
Sr. Montinola:
For clarification. The gentleman said "of unknown
parents." Current codes consider them Filipino, that is, I
refer to the Spanish Code wherein all children of unknown
parentage born in Spanish territory are considered
Spaniards, because the presumption is that a child of
unknown parentage is the son of a Spaniard. This may be
applied in the Philippines in that a child of unknown
parentage born in the Philippines is deemed to be Filipino,
and there is no need ...
Sr. Rafols:
There is a need, because we are relating the conditions
that are [required] to be Filipino.
Sr. Montinola:
But that is the interpretation of the law, therefore, there is
no [more] need for amendment.
Sr. Rafols:
The amendment should read thus:
"Natural or illegitimate of a foreign father and a Filipino
mother recognized by one, or the children of unknown
parentage."
Sr. Briones:
The amendment [should] mean children born in the
Philippines of unknown parentage.
Sr. Rafols:
The son of a Filipina to a Foreigner, although this [person]
does not recognize the child, is not unknown.
President:
Does the gentleman accept the amendment or not?
Sr. Rafols:
I do not accept the amendment because the amendment
would exclude the children of a Filipina with a foreigner
who does not recognize the child. Their parentage is not
Adoption
unknown and I think those of overseas Filipino mother and
father [whom the latter] does not recognize, should also be
considered as Filipinos.
President:
The question in order is the amendment to the amendment
from the Gentleman from Cebu, Mr. Briones.
Sr. Busion:
Mr. President, don't you think it would be better to leave
this matter in the hands of the Legislature?
Sr. Roxas:
Mr. President, my humble opinion is that these cases
are few and far in between, that the constitution need [not]
refer to them. By international law the principle that
children or people born in a country of unknown parents are
citizens in this nation is recognized, and it is not necessary to
include a provision on the subject exhaustively.116
Though the Rafols amendment was not carried out, it was
not because there was any objection to the notion that
persons of "unknown parentage" are not citizens but only
because their number was not enough to merit specific
mention. Such was the account,117 cited by petitioner, of
delegate and constitution law author Jose Aruego who
said:
During the debates on this provision, Delegate Rafols
presented an amendment to include as Filipino citizens the
illegitimate children with a foreign father of a mother who
was a citizen of the Philippines, and also foundlings; but
this amendment was defeated primarily because the
Convention believed that the cases, being too few to
warrant the inclusion of a provision in the Constitution to
apply to them, should be governed by statutory legislation.
Moreover, it was believed that the rules of international
law were already clear to the effect that illegitimate
children followed the citizenship of the mother, and
that foundlings followed the nationality of the place where
they were found, thereby making unnecessary the
inclusion in the Constitution of the proposed amendment.
This explanation was likewise the position of the Solicitor
General during the 16 February 2016 Oral Arguments:
We all know that the Rafols proposal was rejected. But
note that what was declined was the proposal for a textual
and explicit recognition of foundlings as Filipinos. And so,
the way to explain the constitutional silence is by saying
that it was the view of Montinola and Roxas which
prevailed that there is no more need to expressly declare
foundlings as Filipinos.
Obviously, it doesn't matter whether Montinola's or Roxas'
views were legally correct. Framers of a constitution can
constitutionalize rules based on assumptions that are
imperfect or even wrong. They can even overturn existing
rules. This is basic. What matters here is that Montinola
and Roxas were able to convince their colleagues in the
convention that there is no more need to expressly declare
foundlings as Filipinos because they are already impliedly
so recognized.
In other words, the constitutional silence is fully explained
in terms of linguistic efficiency and the avoidance of
redundancy. The policy is clear: it is to recognize
foundlings, as a class, as Filipinos under Art. IV, Section 1
(3) of the 1935 Constitution. This inclusive policy is
carried over into the 1973 and 1987 Constitution. It is
appropriate to invoke a famous scholar as he was
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paraphrased by Chief Justice Fernando: the constitution is
not silently silent, it is silently vocal. 118
The Solicitor General makes the further point that the
framers "worked to create a just and humane society," that
"they were reasonable patriots and that it would be unfair
to impute upon them a discriminatory intent against
foundlings." He exhorts that, given the grave implications
of the argument that foundlings are not natural-born
Filipinos, the Court must search the records of the 1935,
1973 and 1987 Constitutions "for an express intention to
deny foundlings the status of Filipinos. The burden is on
those who wish to use the constitution to discriminate
against foundlings to show that the constitution really
intended to take this path to the dark side and inflict this
across the board marginalization."
We find no such intent or language permitting
discrimination against foundlings. On the contrary, all
three Constitutions guarantee the basic right to equal
protection of the laws. All exhort the State to render social
justice. Of special consideration are several provisions in
the present charter: Article II, Section 11 which provides
that the "State values the dignity of every human person
and guarantees full respect for human rights," Article XIII,
Section 1 which mandates Congress to "give highest
priority to the enactment of measures that protect and
enhance the right of all the people to human dignity,
reduce social, economic, and political inequalities x x x"
and Article XV, Section 3 which requires the State to
defend the "right of children to assistance, including
proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all
forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other
conditions prejudicial to their development." Certainly,
these provisions contradict an intent to discriminate
against foundlings on account of their unfortunate status.
Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that
foundlings are Filipinos. These laws do not provide that
adoption confers citizenship upon the adoptee. Rather, the
adoptee must be a Filipino in the first place to be adopted.
The most basic of such laws is Article 15 of the Civil Code
which provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights,
duties, status, conditions, legal capacity of persons are
binding on citizens of the Philippines even though living
abroad." Adoption deals with status, and a Philippine
adoption court will have jurisdiction only if the adoptee is
a Filipino. In Ellis and Ellis v. Republic,119 a child left by an
unidentified mother was sought to be adopted by aliens.
This Court said:
In this connection, it should be noted that this is a
proceedings in rem, which no court may entertain unless it
has jurisdiction, not only over the subject matter of the
case and over the parties, but also over the res, which is the
personal status of Baby Rose as well as that of petitioners
herein. Our Civil Code (Art. 15) adheres to the theory that
jurisdiction over the status of a natural person is
determined by the latter's nationality. Pursuant to this
theory, we have jurisdiction over the status of Baby Rose,
she being a citizen of the Philippines, but not over the
status of the petitioners, who are
foreigners.120 (Underlining supplied)
Recent legislation is more direct. R.A. No. 8043 entitled
"An Act Establishing the Rules to Govern the Inter-Country
Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other Purposes"
(otherwise known as the "Inter-Country Adoption Act of
1995"), R.A. No. 8552, entitled "An Act Establishing the
Rules and Policies on the Adoption of Filipino Children and
For Other Purposes" (otherwise known as the Domestic
Adoption
Adoption Act of 1998) and this Court's A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC
or the "Rule on Adoption," all expressly refer to "Filipino
children" and include foundlings as among Filipino
children who may be adopted.
It has been argued that the process to determine that the
child is a foundling leading to the issuance of a foundling
certificate under these laws and the issuance of said
certificate are acts to acquire or perfect Philippine
citizenship which make the foundling a naturalized
Filipino at best. This is erroneous. Under Article IV, Section
2 "Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act
to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship." In the
first place, "having to perform an act" means that the act
must be personally done by the citizen. In this instance, the
determination of foundling status is done not by the child
but by the authorities.121 Secondly, the object of the
process is the determination of the whereabouts of the
parents, not the citizenship of the child. Lastly, the process
is certainly not analogous to naturalization proceedings to
acquire Philippine citizenship, or the election of such
citizenship by one born of an alien father and a Filipino
mother under the 1935 Constitution, which is an act to
perfect it.
In this instance, such issue is moot because there is no
dispute that petitioner is a foundling, as evidenced by a
Foundling Certificate issued in her favor.122 The Decree of
Adoption issued on 13 May 1974, which approved
petitioner's adoption by Jesusa Sonora Poe and Ronald
Allan Kelley Poe, expressly refers to Emiliano and his wife,
Rosario Militar, as her "foundling parents," hence
effectively affirming petitioner's status as a foundling.123
Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law.
Under the 1987 Constitution, an international law can
become part of the sphere of domestic law either by
transformation or incorporation. The transformation
method requires that an international law be transformed
into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism
such as local legislation.124 On the other hand, generally
accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the
incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the
laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty
obligations. Generally accepted principles of international
law include international custom as evidence of a general
practice accepted as law, and general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations.125 International customary
rules are accepted as binding as a result from the
combination of two elements: the established, widespread,
and consistent practice on the part of States; and a
psychological element known as the opinionjuris sive
necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the
latter element is a belief that the practice in question is
rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law
requiring it.126 "General principles of law recognized by
civilized nations" are principles "established by a process
of reasoning" or judicial logic, based on principles which
are "basic to legal systems generally," 127 such as "general
principles of equity, i.e., the general principles of fairness
and justice," and the "general principle against
discrimination" which is embodied in the "Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, the Convention Against Discrimination in
Education, the Convention (No. 111) Concerning
Discrimination in Respect of Employment and
Occupation."128 These are the same core principles which
underlie the Philippine Constitution itself, as embodied in
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the due process and equal protection clauses of the Bill of
Rights.129
Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR") has been
interpreted by this Court as part of the generally accepted
principles of international law and binding on the
State.130 Article 15 thereof states:
1. Everyone has the right to a nationality.
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality
nor denied the right to change his nationality.
The Philippines has also ratified the UN Convention on the
Rights of the Child (UNCRC). Article 7 of the UNCRC
imposes the following obligations on our country:
Article 7
1. The child shall be registered immediately after birth and
shall have the right from birth to a name, the right to
acquire a nationality and as far as possible, the right to
know and be cared for by his or her parents.
2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these
rights in accordance with their national law and their
obligations under the relevant international instruments in
this field, in particular where the child would otherwise be
stateless.
In 1986, the country also ratified the 1966 International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Article 24
thereof provide for the right of every child "to acquire a
nationality:"
Article 24
1. Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to
race, colour, sex, language, religion, national or social
origin, property or birth, the right, to such measures of
protection as are required by his status as a minor, on the
part of his family, society and the State.
2. Every child shall be registered immediately after birth
and shall have a name.
3. Every child has the right to acquire a nationality.
The common thread of the UDHR, UNCRC and ICCPR is to
obligate the Philippines to grant nationality from birth and
ensure that no child is stateless. This grant of nationality
must be at the time of birth, and it cannot be accomplished
by the application of our present naturalization laws,
Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended, and R.A. No.
9139, both of which require the applicant to be at least
eighteen (18) years old.
The principles found in two conventions, while yet
unratified by the Philippines, are generally accepted
principles of international law. The first is Article 14 of the
1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to
the Conflict of Nationality Laws under which a foundling is
presumed to have the "nationality of the country of birth,"
to wit:
Article 14
A child whose parents are both unknown shall have
the nationality of the country of birth. If the child's
parentage is established, its nationality shall be
determined by the rules applicable in cases where the
parentage is known.
Adoption
A foundling is, until the contrary is proved, presumed to
have been born on the territory of the State in which it was
found. (Underlining supplied)
The second is the principle that a foundling is presumed
born of citizens of the country where he is found, contained
in Article 2 of the 1961 United Nations Convention on the
Reduction of Statelessness:
Article 2
A foundling found in the territory of a Contracting State
shall, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be considered
to have been born within the territory of parents
possessing the nationality of that State.
That the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague
Convention nor to the 1961 Convention on the Reduction
of Statelessness does not mean that their principles are not
binding. While the Philippines is not a party to the 1930
Hague Convention, it is a signatory to the Universal
Declaration on Human Rights, Article 15(1)
ofwhich131effectively affirms Article 14 of the 1930 Hague
Convention. Article 2 of the 1961 "United Nations
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness" merely
"gives effect" to Article 15(1) of the UDHR.132 In Razon v.
Tagitis, 133 this Court noted that the Philippines had not
signed or ratified the "International Convention for the
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance."
Yet, we ruled that the proscription against enforced
disappearances in the said convention was nonetheless
binding as a "generally accepted principle of international
law." Razon v. Tagitis is likewise notable for declaring the
ban as a generally accepted principle of international law
although the convention had been ratified by only sixteen
states and had not even come into force and which needed
the ratification of a minimum of twenty states.
Additionally, as petitioner points out, the Court was
content with the practice of international and regional
state organs, regional state practice in Latin America, and
State Practice in the United States.
Another case where the number of ratifying countries was
not determinative is Mijares v. Ranada, 134 where
only four countries had "either ratified or acceded
to"135 the 1966 "Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters" when the case was decided in 2005.
The Court also pointed out that that nine member
countries of the European Common Market had acceded to
the Judgments Convention. The Court also cited U.S. laws
and jurisprudence on recognition of foreign judgments. In
all, only the practices of fourteen countries were
considered and yet, there was pronouncement that
recognition of foreign judgments was widespread practice.
Our approach in Razon and Mijares effectively takes into
account the fact that "generally accepted principles of
international law" are based not only on international
custom, but also on "general principles of law recognized
by civilized nations," as the phrase is understood in Article
38.1 paragraph (c) of the ICJ Statute. Justice, fairness,
equity and the policy against discrimination, which are
fundamental principles underlying the Bill of Rights and
which are "basic to legal systems generally," 136 support the
notion that the right against enforced disappearances and
the recognition of foreign judgments, were correctly
considered as "generally accepted principles of
international law" under the incorporation clause.
Petitioner's evidence137 shows that at least sixty countries
in Asia, North and South America, and Europe have passed
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legislation recognizing foundlings as its citizen. Forty-two
(42) of those countries follow the jus sanguinis regime. Of
the sixty, only thirty-three (33) are parties to the 1961
Convention on Statelessness; twenty-six (26) are not
signatories to the Convention. Also, the Chief Justice, at the
2 February 2016 Oral Arguments pointed out that in 166
out of 189 countries surveyed (or 87.83%), foundlings are
recognized as citizens. These circumstances, including the
practice of jus sanguinis countries, show that it is a
generally accepted principle of international law to
presume foundlings as having been born of nationals of the
country in which the foundling is found.
Current legislation reveals the adherence of the
Philippines to this generally accepted principle of
international law. In particular, R.A. No. 8552, R.A. No.
8042 and this Court's Rules on Adoption, expressly refer to
"Filipino children." In all of them, foundlings are among the
Filipino children who could be adopted. Likewise, it has
been pointed that the DFA issues passports to foundlings.
Passports are by law, issued only to citizens. This shows
that even the executive department, acting through the
DFA, considers foundlings as Philippine citizens.
Adopting these legal principles from the 1930 Hague
Convention and the 1961 Convention on Statelessness is
rational and reasonable and consistent with the jus
sanguinis regime in our Constitution. The presumption of
natural-born citizenship of foundlings stems from the
presumption that their parents are nationals of the
Philippines. As the empirical data provided by the PSA
show, that presumption is at more than 99% and is a
virtual certainty.
In sum, all of the international law conventions and
instruments on the matter of nationality of foundlings
were designed to address the plight of a defenseless class
which suffers from a misfortune not of their own making.
We cannot be restrictive as to their application if we are a
country which calls itself civilized and a member of the
community of nations. The Solicitor General's warning in
his opening statement is relevant:
.... the total effect of those documents is to signify to this
Honorable Court that those treaties and conventions were
drafted because the world community is concerned that
the situation of foundlings renders them legally invisible. It
would be tragically ironic if this Honorable Court ended up
using the international instruments which seek to protect
and uplift foundlings a tool to deny them political status or
to accord them second-class citizenship.138
The COMELEC also ruled139 that petitioner's repatriation in
July 2006 under the provisions of R.A. No. 9225 did not
result in the reacquisition of natural-born citizenship. The
COMELEC reasoned that since the applicant must perform
an act, what is reacquired is not "natural-born" citizenship
but only plain "Philippine citizenship."
The COMELEC's rule arrogantly disregards consistent
jurisprudence on the matter of repatriation statutes in
general and of R.A. No. 9225 in particular.
In the seminal case of Bengson Ill v. HRET, 140 repatriation
was explained as follows:
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the
original nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino
who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status
as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he
was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his
Adoption
Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former
status as a natural-born Filipino.
R.A. No. 9225 is a repatriation statute and has been
described as such in several cases. They include Sobejana-
Condon v. COMELEC141 where we described it as an
"abbreviated repatriation process that restores one's
Filipino citizenship x x x." Also included is Parreno v.
Commission on Audit,142 which cited Tabasa v. Court of
Appeals,143where we said that "[t]he repatriation of the
former Filipino will allow him to recover his natural-born
citizenship. Parreno v. Commission on Audit144 is
categorical that "if petitioner reacquires his Filipino
citizenship (under R.A. No. 9225), he will ... recover his
natural-born citizenship."
The COMELEC construed the phrase "from birth" in the
definition of natural citizens as implying "that natural-
born citizenship must begin at birth and remain
uninterrupted and continuous from birth." R.A. No. 9225
was obviously passed in line with Congress' sole
prerogative to determine how citizenship may be lost or
reacquired. Congress saw it fit to decree that natural-born
citizenship may be reacquired even if it had been once lost.
It is not for the COMELEC to disagree with the Congress'
determination.
More importantly, COMELEC's position that natural-born
status must be continuous was already rejected in Bengson
III v. HRET145 where the phrase "from birth" was clarified
to mean at the time of birth: "A person who at the time of
his birth, is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-
born citizen thereof." Neither is "repatriation" an act to
"acquire or perfect" one's citizenship. In Bengson III v.
HRET, this Court pointed out that there are only two types
of citizens under the 1987 Constitution: natural-born
citizen and naturalized, and that there is no third category
for repatriated citizens:
It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens
under the present Constitution that there are only two
classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2)
those who are naturalized in accordance with law. A
citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, ie., did not have to
undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine
citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born Filipino.
Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a
separate category for persons who, after losing Philippine
citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor
is clear: as to such persons, they would either be natural-
born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss
of their citizenship and the mode prescribed by the
applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As respondent
Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization
proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is
perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he possessed all
the necessary qualifications to be elected as member of the
House of Representatives.146
The COMELEC cannot reverse a judicial precedent. That is
reserved to this Court. And while we may always revisit a
doctrine, a new rule reversing standing doctrine cannot be
retroactively applied. In Morales v. Court of Appeals and
Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr.,147 where we decreed reversed
the condonation doctrine, we cautioned that it "should be
prospective in application for the reason that judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the laws of the
Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the legal
system of the Philippines." This Court also said that "while
the future may ultimately uncover a doctrine's error, it
should be, as a general rule, recognized as good law prior
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to its abandonment. Consequently, the people's reliance
thereupon should be respected."148
Lastly, it was repeatedly pointed out during the oral
arguments that petitioner committed a falsehood when
she put in the spaces for "born to" in her application for
repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 the names of her
adoptive parents, and this misled the BI to presume that
she was a natural-born Filipino. It has been contended that
the data required were the names of her biological parents
which are precisely unknown.
This position disregards one important fact - petitioner
was legally adopted. One of the effects of adoption is "to
sever all legal ties between the biological parents and the
adoptee, except when the biological parent is the spouse of
the adoptee."149 Under R.A. No. 8552, petitioner was also
entitled to an amended birth certificate "attesting to the
fact that the adoptee is the child of the adopter(s)" and
which certificate "shall not bear any notation that it is an
amended issue."150 That law also requires that "[a]ll
records, books, and papers relating to the adoption cases
in the files of the court, the Department [of Social Welfare
and Development], or any other agency or institution
participating in the adoption proceedings shall be kept
strictly confidential."151 The law therefore allows
petitioner to state that her adoptive parents were her birth
parents as that was what would be stated in her birth
certificate anyway. And given the policy of strict
confidentiality of adoption records, petitioner was not
obligated to disclose that she was an adoptee.
Clearly, to avoid a direct ruling on the qualifications of
petitioner, which it cannot make in the same case for
cancellation of COC, it resorted to opinionatedness which
is, moreover, erroneous. The whole process undertaken by
COMELEC is wrapped in grave abuse of discretion.
On Residence
The tainted process was repeated in disposing of the issue
of whether or not petitioner committed false material
representation when she stated in her COC that she has
before and until 9 May 2016 been a resident of the
Philippines for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months.
Petitioner's claim that she will have been a resident for ten
(10) years and eleven (11) months on the day before
the 2016 elections, is true.
The Constitution requires presidential candidates to have
ten (10) years' residence in the Philippines before the day
of the elections. Since the forthcoming elections will be
held on 9 May 2016, petitioner must have been a resident
of the Philippines prior to 9 May 2016 for ten (10) years.
In answer to the requested information of "Period of
Residence in the Philippines up to the day before May 09,
2016," she put in "10 years 11 months" which according to
her pleadings in these cases corresponds to a beginning
date of 25 May 2005 when she returned for good from the
U.S.
When petitioner immigrated to the U.S. in 1991, she lost
her original domicile, which is the Philippines. There are
three requisites to acquire a new domicile: 1. Residence or
bodily presence in a new locality; 2. an intention to remain
there; and 3. an intention to abandon the old
domicile.152 To successfully effect a change of domicile, one
must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of
domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former
place of residence and establishing a new one and definite
acts which correspond with the purpose. In other words,
Adoption
there must basically be animus manendi coupled
with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at
the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of
time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the
residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be
actual.153
Petitioner presented voluminous evidence showing that
she and her family abandoned their U.S. domicile and
relocated to the Philippines for good. These evidence
include petitioner's former U.S. passport showing her
arrival on 24 May 2005 and her return to the Philippines
every time she travelled abroad; e-mail correspondences
starting in March 2005 to September 2006 with a freight
company to arrange for the shipment of their household
items weighing about 28,000 pounds to the Philippines; e-
mail with the Philippine Bureau of Animal Industry
inquiring how to ship their dog to the Philippines; school
records of her children showing enrollment in Philippine
schools starting June 2005 and for succeeding years; tax
identification card for petitioner issued on July 2005; titles
for condominium and parking slot issued in February 2006
and their corresponding tax declarations issued in April
2006; receipts dated 23 February 2005 from the Salvation
Army in the U.S. acknowledging donation of items from
petitioner's family; March 2006 e-mail to the U.S. Postal
Service confirming request for change of address; final
statement from the First American Title Insurance
Company showing sale of their U.S. home on 27 April
2006; 12 July 2011 filled-up questionnaire submitted to
the U.S. Embassy where petitioner indicated that she had
been a Philippine resident since May 2005; affidavit from
Jesusa Sonora Poe (attesting to the return of petitioner on
24 May 2005 and that she and her family stayed with
affiant until the condominium was purchased); and
Affidavit from petitioner's husband (confirming that the
spouses jointly decided to relocate to the Philippines in
2005 and that he stayed behind in the U.S. only to finish
some work and to sell the family home).
The foregoing evidence were undisputed and the facts
were even listed by the COMELEC, particularly in its
Resolution in the Tatad, Contreras and Valdez cases.
However, the COMELEC refused to consider that
petitioner's domicile had been timely changed as of 24
May 2005. At the oral arguments, COMELEC Commissioner
Arthur Lim conceded the presence of the first two
requisites, namely, physical presence and animus
manendi, but maintained there was no animus non-
revertendi.154 The COMELEC disregarded the import of all
the evidence presented by petitioner on the basis of the
position that the earliest date that petitioner could have
started residence in the Philippines was in July 2006 when
her application under R.A. No. 9225 was approved by the
BI. In this regard, COMELEC relied on Coquilla v.
COMELEC,155 Japzon v. COMELEC156 and Caballero v.
COMELEC. 157 During the oral arguments, the private
respondents also added Reyes v. COMELEC.158 Respondents
contend that these cases decree that the stay of an alien
former Filipino cannot be counted until he/she obtains a
permanent resident visa or reacquires Philippine
citizenship, a visa-free entry under a balikbayan stamp
being insufficient. Since petitioner was still an American
(without any resident visa) until her reacquisition of
citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, her stay from 24 May
2005 to 7 July 2006 cannot be counted.
But as the petitioner pointed out, the facts in these four
cases are very different from her situation. In Coquilla v.
COMELEC,159 the only evidence presented was a
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community tax certificate secured by the candidate and his
declaration that he would be running in the
elections. Japzon v. COMELEC160 did not involve a candidate
who wanted to count residence prior to his reacquisition
of Philippine citizenship. With the Court decreeing that
residence is distinct from citizenship, the issue there was
whether the candidate's acts after reacquisition sufficed to
establish residence. In Caballero v. COMELEC, 161 the
candidate admitted that his place of work was abroad and
that he only visited during his frequent vacations. In Reyes
v. COMELEC,162 the candidate was found to be an American
citizen who had not even reacquired Philippine citizenship
under R.A. No. 9225 or had renounced her U.S. citizenship.
She was disqualified on the citizenship issue. On residence,
the only proof she offered was a seven-month stint as
provincial officer. The COMELEC, quoted with approval by
this Court, said that "such fact alone is not sufficient to
prove her one-year residency."
It is obvious that because of the sparse evidence on
residence in the four cases cited by the respondents, the
Court had no choice but to hold that residence could be
counted only from acquisition of a permanent resident visa
or from reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In contrast,
the evidence of petitioner is overwhelming and taken
together leads to no other conclusion that she decided to
permanently abandon her U.S. residence (selling the
house, taking the children from U.S. schools, getting quotes
from the freight company, notifying the U.S. Post Office of
the abandonment of their address in the U.S., donating
excess items to the Salvation Army, her husband resigning
from U.S. employment right after selling the U.S. house)
and permanently relocate to the Philippines and actually
re-established her residence here on 24 May 2005
(securing T.I.N, enrolling her children in Philippine
schools, buying property here, constructing a residence
here, returning to the Philippines after all trips abroad, her
husband getting employed here). Indeed, coupled with her
eventual application to reacquire Philippine citizenship
and her family's actual continuous stay in the Philippines
over the years, it is clear that when petitioner returned on
24 May 2005 it was for good.
In this connection, the COMELEC also took it against
petitioner that she had entered the Philippines visa-free as
a balikbayan. A closer look at R.A. No. 6768 as amended,
otherwise known as the "An Act Instituting a Balikbayan
Program," shows that there is no overriding intent to
treat balikbayans as temporary visitors who must leave
after one year. Included in the law is a former Filipino who
has been naturalized abroad and "comes or returns to the
Philippines." 163 The law institutes a balikbayan program
"providing the opportunity to avail of the necessary
training to enable the balikbayan to become economically
self-reliant members of society upon their return to the
country"164 in line with the government's "reintegration
program."165 Obviously, balikbayans are not ordinary
transients.
Given the law's express policy to facilitate the return of
a balikbayan and help him reintegrate into society, it
would be an unduly harsh conclusion to say in absolute
terms that the balikbayan must leave after one year. That
visa-free period is obviously granted him to allow him to
re-establish his life and reintegrate himself into the
community before he attends to the necessary formal and
legal requirements of repatriation. And that is exactly what
petitioner did - she reestablished life here by enrolling her
children and buying property while awaiting the return of
her husband and then applying for repatriation shortly
thereafter.
Adoption
No case similar to petitioner's, where the former Filipino's
evidence of change in domicile is extensive and
overwhelming, has as yet been decided by the Court.
Petitioner's evidence of residence is unprecedented. There
is no judicial precedent that comes close to the facts of
residence of petitioner. There is no indication in Coquilla v.
COMELEC,166 and the other cases cited by the respondents
that the Court intended to have its rulings there apply to a
situation where the facts are different. Surely, the issue of
residence has been decided particularly on the facts-of-the
case basis.
To avoid the logical conclusion pointed out by the evidence
of residence of petitioner, the COMELEC ruled that
petitioner's claim of residence of ten (10) years and eleven
(11) months by 9 May 2016 in her 2015 COC was false
because she put six ( 6) years and six ( 6) months as
"period of residence before May 13, 2013" in her 2012 COC
for Senator. Thus, according to the COMELEC, she started
being a Philippine resident only in November 2006. In
doing so, the COMELEC automatically assumed as true the
statement in the 2012 COC and the 2015 COC as false.
As explained by petitioner in her verified pleadings, she
misunderstood the date required in the 2013 COC as the
period of residence as of the day she submitted that COC in
2012. She said that she reckoned residency from April-May
2006 which was the period when the U.S. house was sold
and her husband returned to the Philippines. In that
regard, she was advised by her lawyers in 2015 that
residence could be counted from 25 May 2005.
Petitioner's explanation that she misunderstood the query
in 2012 (period of residence before 13 May 2013) as
inquiring about residence as of the time she submitted the
COC, is bolstered by the change which the COMELEC itself
introduced in the 2015 COC which is now "period of
residence in the Philippines up to the day before May 09,
2016." The COMELEC would not have revised the query if
it did not acknowledge that the first version was vague.
That petitioner could have reckoned residence from a date
earlier than the sale of her U.S. house and the return of her
husband is plausible given the evidence that she had
returned a year before. Such evidence, to repeat, would
include her passport and the school records of her
children.
It was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to treat
the 2012 COC as a binding and conclusive admission
against petitioner. It could be given in evidence against
her, yes, but it was by no means conclusive. There is
precedent after all where a candidate's mistake as to
period of residence made in a COC was overcome by
evidence. In Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC,167 the
candidate mistakenly put seven (7) months as her period
of residence where the required period was a minimum of
one year. We said that "[i]t is the fact of residence, not a
statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be
decisive in determining whether or not an individual has
satisfied the constitutions residency qualification
requirement." The COMELEC ought to have looked at the
evidence presented and see if petitioner was telling the
truth that she was in the Philippines from 24 May 2005.
Had the COMELEC done its duty, it would have seen that
the 2012 COC and the 2015 COC both correctly stated
the pertinent period of residency.
The COMELEC, by its own admission, disregarded the
evidence that petitioner actually and physically returned
here on 24 May 2005 not because it was false, but only
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because COMELEC took the position that domicile could be
established only from petitioner's repatriation under R.A.
No. 9225 in July 2006. However, it does not take away the
fact that in reality, petitioner had returned from the U.S.
and was here to stay permanently, on 24 May 2005. When
she claimed to have been a resident for ten (10) years and
eleven (11) months, she could do so in good faith.
For another, it could not be said that petitioner was
attempting to hide anything. As already stated, a petition
for quo warranto had been filed against her with the SET
as early as August 2015. The event from which the
COMELEC pegged the commencement of residence,
petitioner's repatriation in July 2006 under R.A. No. 9225,
was an established fact to repeat, for purposes of her
senatorial candidacy.
Notably, on the statement of residence of six (6) years and
six (6) months in the 2012 COC, petitioner recounted that
this was first brought up in the media on 2 June 2015 by
Rep. Tobias Tiangco of the United Nationalist Alliance.
Petitioner appears to have answered the issue
immediately, also in the press. Respondents have not
disputed petitioner's evidence on this point. From that
time therefore when Rep. Tiangco discussed it in the
media, the stated period of residence in the 2012 COC and
the circumstances that surrounded the statement were
already matters of public record and were not hidden.
Petitioner likewise proved that the 2012 COC was also
brought up in the SET petition for quo warranto. Her
Verified Answer, which was filed on 1 September 2015,
admitted that she made a mistake in the 2012 COC when
she put in six ( 6) years and six ( 6) months as she
misunderstood the question and could have truthfully
indicated a longer period. Her answer in the SET case was a
matter of public record. Therefore, when petitioner
accomplished her COC for President on 15 October 2015, she
could not be said to have been attempting to hide her
erroneous statement in her 2012 COC for Senator which was
expressly mentioned in her Verified Answer.
The facts now, if not stretched to distortion, do not show
or even hint at an intention to hide the 2012 statement and
have it covered by the 2015 representation. Petitioner,
moreover, has on her side this Court's pronouncement
that:
Concededly, a candidate's disqualification to run for public
office does not necessarily constitute material
misrepresentation which is the sole ground for denying
due course to, and for the cancellation of, a COC. Further,
as already discussed, the candidate's misrepresentation in
his COC must not only refer to a material fact (eligibility
and qualifications for elective office), but should evince a
deliberate intent to mislead, misinform or hide a fact
which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It
must be made with an intention to deceive the electorate
as to one's qualifications to run for public office.168
In sum, the COMELEC, with the same posture of
infallibilism, virtually ignored a good number of evidenced
dates all of which can evince animus manendi to the
Philippines and animus non revertedi to the United States
of America. The veracity of the events of coming and
staying home was as much as dismissed as
inconsequential, the focus having been fixed at the
petitioner's "sworn declaration in her COC for Senator"
which the COMELEC said "amounts to a declaration and
therefore an admission that her residence in the
Philippines only commence sometime in November 2006";
Adoption
such that "based on this declaration, [petitioner] fails to
meet the residency requirement for President." This
conclusion, as already shown, ignores the standing
jurisprudence that it is the fact of residence, not the
statement of the person that determines residence for
purposes of compliance with the constitutional
requirement of residency for election as President. It
ignores the easily researched matter that cases on
questions of residency have been decided favorably for the
candidate on the basis of facts of residence far less in
number, weight and substance than that presented by
petitioner.169 It ignores, above all else, what we consider as
a primary reason why petitioner cannot be bound by her
declaration in her COC for Senator which declaration was
not even considered by the SET as an issue against her
eligibility for Senator. When petitioner made the
declaration in her COC for Senator that she has been a
resident for a period of six (6) years and six (6) months
counted up to the 13 May 2013 Elections, she naturally
had as reference the residency requirements for election
as Senator which was satisfied by her declared years of
residence. It was uncontested during the oral arguments
before us that at the time the declaration for Senator was
made, petitioner did not have as yet any intention to vie
for the Presidency in 2016 and that the general public was
never made aware by petitioner, by word or action, that
she would run for President in 2016. Presidential
candidacy has a length-of-residence different from that of
a senatorial candidacy. There are facts of residence other
than that which was mentioned in the COC for Senator.
Such other facts of residence have never been proven to be
false, and these, to repeat include:
[Petitioner] returned to the Philippines on 24 May 2005.
(petitioner's] husband however stayed in the USA to finish
pending projects and arrange the sale of their family home.
Meanwhile [petitioner] and her children lived with her
mother in San Juan City. [Petitioner] enrolled Brian in
Beacon School in Taguig City in 2005 and Hanna in
Assumption College in Makati City in 2005. Anika was
enrolled in Learning Connection in San Juan in 2007, when
she was already old enough to go to school.
In the second half of 2005, [petitioner] and her husband
acquired Unit 7F of One Wilson Place Condominium in San
Juan. [Petitioner] and her family lived in Unit 7F until the
construction of their family home in Corinthian Hills was
completed.
Sometime in the second half of 2005, [petitioner's] mother
discovered that her former lawyer who handled
[petitioner's] adoption in 1974 failed to secure from the
Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo a new Certificate of
Live Birth indicating [petitioner's] new name and stating
that her parents are "Ronald Allan K. Poe" and "Jesusa L.
Sonora."
In February 2006, [petitioner] travelled briefly to the US in
order to supervise the disposal of some of the family's
remaining household belongings.1a\^/phi1 [Petitioner]
returned to the Philippines on 11 March 2006.
In late March 2006, [petitioner's] husband informed the
United States Postal Service of the family's abandonment
of their address in the US.
The family home in the US was sole on 27 April 2006.
In April 2006, [petitioner's] husband resigned from his
work in the US. He returned to the Philippines on 4 May
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2006 and began working for a Philippine company in July
2006.

In early 2006, [petitioner] and her husband acquired a

vacant lot in Corinthian Hills, where they eventually built
their family home.170

In light of all these, it was arbitrary for the COMELEC to

satisfy its intention to let the case fall under the exclusive
ground of false representation, to consider no other date
than that mentioned by petitioner in her COC for Senator.

All put together, in the matter of the citizenship and

residence of petitioner for her candidacy as President of
the Republic, the questioned Resolutions of the COMELEC
in Division and En Banc are, one and all, deadly diseased
with grave abuse of discretion from root to fruits.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions,

to wit:

1. dated 1 December 2015 rendered through the COMELEC

Second Division, in SPA No. 15-001 (DC),
entitled Estrella C. Elamparo, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace
Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent, stating
that:

[T]he Certificate of Candidacy for President of the Republic

of the Philippines in the May 9, 2016 National and Local
Elections filed by respondent Mary Grace Natividad Sonora
Poe-Llamanzares is hereby GRANTED.

2. dated 11 December 2015, rendered through the

COMELEC First Division, in the consolidated cases SPA No.
15-002 (DC) entitled Francisco S. Tatad, petitioner, vs. Mary
Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; SPA
No. 15-007 (DC) entitled Antonio P. Contreras, petitioner,
vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares,
respondent; and SPA No. 15-139 (DC) entitled Amado D.
Valdez, petitioner, v. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-
Llamanzares, respondent; stating that:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission

RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to GRANT the petitions
and cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of MARY GRACE
NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES for the elective
position of President of the Republic of the Philippines in
connection with the 9 May 2016 Synchronized Local and
National Elections.

3. dated 23 December 2015 of the COMELEC En

Banc, upholding the 1 December 2015 Resolution of the
Second Division stating that:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission

RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to DENY the Verified
Motion for Reconsideration of SENATOR MARY GRACE
NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES. The Resolution
dated 11 December 2015 of the Commission First Division
is AFFIRMED.

4. dated 23 December 2015 of the COMELEC En

Banc, upholding the 11 December 2015 Resolution of the
First Division.

are hereby ANNULED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner MARY

GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES
is DECLARED QUALIFIED to be a candidate for President
in the National and Local Elections of 9 May 2016.

SO ORDERED.

Adoption Page 64