EU Managing PAR

EUROPEANIZATION IN MANAGING EU
AFFAIRS: BETWEEN DIVERGENCE AND

CONVERGENCE, A COMPARATIVE STUDY
OF ESTONIA, HUNGARY AND SLOVENIA
DANICA FINK-HAFNER
Scholarly research into Estonia, Hungary and Slovenia has shown that the idiosyn-
crasies of the new EU countries (especially with respect to institutionalizing and
centralizing the co-ordination of core executives in managing EU affairs at home)
persist. They are complemented by trends toward convergence (such as growing
co-ordination efforts and a common tendency: that of the prime minister to be the
centre of co-ordination). In this article external Europeanization pressures, national
administrative traditions (the legacies of both pre-communist and communist
systems), and the patterns of party competition that cause variations in politico-
administrative relations, are tested as possible explanatory variables of differences
seen in the three countries when managing EU affairs. While national administrative
traditions play similar roles to those seen in old(er) member states by filtering the
EUs impacts, the effect of patterns of party competition on politico-administrative
relations when managing EU affairs has been filtered by the accession states national
priorities of integrating with the EU.
INTRODUCTION
Research in Western European EU member states has shown that European-
ization means the adaptation of national structures, processes and actors and
not the replacement of the old national ones with something homogenous
that is European-modelled (see, for example, Spanou 1998; Kassim et al.
2000; Bulmer and Burch 2001; Laffan 2001, 2003). Research in fact now re-
veals that Europeanization brings about both convergence and divergence
among national models of co-ordinating EU affairs (Kassim 2000; Larsson
and Trondal 2005; Knill and Lenshow 2005).
A variety of hypotheses exist in the literature on possible explanatory
variables that lead to the very different systems of co-ordination seen in
member states. These include: (1) administrative traditions (see, for example,
Spanou 1998; Kassim et al. 2000; Bulmer and Burch 2001; Laffan 2001; Page
2003); (2) the characteristics of the domestic polity: policy style, policy ambi-
tion, the conception of co-ordination, the nature of the political opportunity
structure, and the administrative opportunity structure (Kassim 2000);
(3) the characteristics of the constitutional system (especially the role and
Danica Fink-Hafner is Professor of Political Parties, Interest Groups and Policy Analysis in the Faculty
of Social Sciences, Ljubljana University.
Public Administration Vol. 85, No. 3, 2007 (805828)

2007 The Author. Journal compilation 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road,
Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
806 DANICA FINK-HAFNER
position of the prime minister relative to other political institutions), politici-

zation of public administration, personnel policy (professionalization of
staff), hierarchies within government, political constellations and progress
in democratic consolidations (Goetz and Wollmann 2001); as well as (4)
the configuration of core executive institutions (particularly the positions
of the prime minister and the finance minister) (Brusis and Dimitrov 2001).
Research that looks at post-communist EU newcomers has failed so far to
appreciate that these countries have not only experienced somewhat varying
state and administrative histories but also differing new political (party)
system developments in the process of consolidating democracy. We expect
therefore that national adaptation to managing EU affairs will also vary,
despite certain similar experiences of communist rule and some special EU
pressures on the newcomers to modernize and adapt their national admin-
istrations and policies. This thesis is based on the comparative analysis by
Laffan (2003) that focused on six states (three EU member states Ireland,
Greece, Finland and three EU newcomer states Hungary, Slovenia and
Estonia). She discovered that patterns of executive adaptation vary accord-
ing both to the level of institutionalization and the relationship between
formal and informal processes. Yet when we investigate specific character-
istics of the institutional adaptation of the executive, procedures and agents
for dealing with EU matters, the EU newcomer states that experienced com-
munist party rule (Estonia, Slovenia and Hungary) do not fall into the same
clusters. Similarly, research into post-communist newcomers confirms the
considerable and continuing diversity in patterns of executive governance,
despite the EU provision of incentives both for the codification of decision-
making practices and for horizontal co-ordination (see, for example, Brusis
2004; Nrgaard and Skovbakke Winding 2005).
In this article we examine what could account for these differences. We
also pinpoint some common trends among the three new EU member states,
where the processes of Europeanization and consolidation of these young
democracies have been relatively lively. We focus on two variables that
(besides the EU factor) could, in our expectations, explain variations in pat-
terns of managing EU affairs in post-communist accession countries. These
are: (1) administrative traditions; and (2) the mode of party competition
as a key element of politico-administrative relations. Given the findings in
old EU member states and variations in historical experiences among
(post)communist countries, we hypothesize that in the field of managing
EU affairs administrative traditions filter Europeanization pressures on
national co-ordinating modes. While we look at public administrations
institutionalization and centralization patterns in managing EU affairs, ad-
ministrative traditions that have survived from both pre-communist and
communist times will be identified. The second variable is closely linked to
some key aspects of the transition to democracy and its consolidation. Since
it is closely linked to the party systems consolidation in the context of a
persisting lack of a division between administration and politics as the

2007 The Author. Journal compilation 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
EUROPEANIZATION IN MANAGING EU AFFAIRS 807
central organizing principle, it also involves the party system developments

impacts on politico-administrative relations. Due to the communist legacies
of public administrations loyalty to the ruling party we expect that the logic
of party competition will spill over onto politico-administrative relations in
the area of managing EU affairs this is similar to what is taking place rela-
tive to the general mode of governance (Brusis 2004).
While we use historical institutionalism to describe institutional solutions
in the process of national administrations adapting in response to the chal-
lenges of EU integration, we also incorporate Spanous (1998) contention that
formal and informal practices matter. Like Bulmer and Burch (1998), we will
combine the institutionalist approach with respect to the wider political con-
text as well as to the socialization of officials. In the research process we
relied on both political science and public administration as suggested by
Bulmer and Burch (1998). To an important extent the analysis is based on:
(1) data gathered in the framework of the European project Organizing for
Enlargement: A Challenge for Member States and Candidate Countries
(HPSE-CT-2001-00083); (2) data gathered in the framework of the project on
Parties and the Party System in New EU Member States conducted at the
Centre for European Studies at the University of Helsinki (Jungerstam-
Mulders 2006); and (3) publications on behalf of the Network of Institutes
and Schools of Public Administration in Central and Eastern Europe
(NISPAcee).
We first discuss the chosen conceptual lenses Europeanization, public
administration traditions and the impact of party system competition pat-
tern on politico-administrative relations, especially in the management of
EU affairs. After describing some key common features of the investigated
countries (to be aware of the at least partially controlled variables) the
countries idiosyncrasies, including variations in administrative traditions,
the institutional adaptation of their core executives and pattern of party
competition, are presented in relation to a countrys mode of managing
EU affairs (institutionalization and centrality of co-ordination). In the con-
cluding part of the article we present tentative findings on divergence/
convergence trends in administrative adaptations to managing EU matters
at home as well as the impact of administrative traditions and patterns of
party competition on variations among the investigated Europeanizing
countries.
CONCEPTUAL LENSES
Europeanization
We agree that Europeanization (which focuses on its impacts on both
member states and accession states) should be distinguished from theories
of European integration processes which try to explain the process of
integration itself (Radaelli 2003, p. 33). Managing EU affairs through
national political systems has increasingly become part of domestic

policy-making. A shift from international relations with the EC/EU as a

territorial-political unit towards the domestication of EU matters has clearly
been witnessed within a relatively short time in the case of the recent EU
newcomers.
Even the above clarification leaves space for variety in how we under-
stand the Europeanization concept (see, for example, Bulmer and Burch
1998; Hix and Goetz 2001; Olsen 2002a) as well as its direction top-down,
bottom-up or a combination of both directions (see, for example, Ladrech
1994; Bulmer and Burch 1998; Knill 2001; Goetz 2001; Demmke 2002;
Radaelli 2003; gh 2003a). Due to the quite distinct definitions of
Europeanization used by various scholars, Radaelli (2003) emphasizes that
such a definition is a stretching concept. One of the very broad definitions
is Olsens (2002a, pp. 9234) identification of five relatively extensive as-
pects of Europeanization involving changes of external boundaries, the
development of political institutions at the EU level, central penetration
of national systems of governance, exporting forms of political organiza-
tion, and a political unification project. In this article, we follow Radaelli,
who defines Europeanization as the processes of: (1) construction; (2)
diffusion; and (3) institutionalization of formal and informal rules. These
include procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ways of doing things and
shared beliefs and norms, all of which are, firstly, defined and consolidated
in the EU policy process and, secondly, incorporated within the logic of
domestic (national and sub-national) discourse, identities, political struc-
tures and public policies (Radaelli 2003, p. 30). Our research interest is first
narrowed to the top-down Europeanization of the national administration
perspective (Knill 2001) and further to the impact of European integration
on national executives understood as national central administrations,
comprising both the political and the administrative parts of the ministe-
rial executive (as defined by Goetz 2001, p. 211). According to Goetz, in
the debate on executive Europeanization, three broad categories can be
distinguished that are concerned with linkage, implementation and
executive ecology. This article fits into the linkage category; this covers the
majority of contributions to the Europeanization debate (Goetz 2001,
p. 212). So, for our purposes here, we use the narrowed definition of
Europeanization as the development of the institutional arrangements
that link national executives and EU authorities and the institutional prac-
tices that have evolved on the national level to support national-EU
connections (Goetz 2001, p. 212). Our analysis belongs to a cluster of
typical studies in the linkage category (for a broader range of such studies,
see Goetz 2001, pp. 21213) research on national administrative arrange-
ments for negotiating accession to the EU and on how national govern-
ments co-ordinate their stance on European policies in the frame of
diverging national co-ordinating traditions (see, for example, Bulmer and
Burch 1998, 2001; Kassim et al. 2000; Goetz and Wollmann 2001; Laffan
2001, 2003).

National administrative traditions

Administrative traditions are patterns of institutional, behavioural and ide-
ational legacies, born out of a countrys history and experiences (Peters 2000;
Nrgaard and Skovbakke Winding 2005). These are relevant when we are
interested in the level to which a public administration has been institution-
alized (guided by formal rules), in habitual patterns of behaviours or the
values and beliefs built into the public administration (ideational tradition).
The four main traditions in Western Europe and North America (Anglo-
Saxon, Germanic continental European; French continental European and a
mixture of the latter two Scandinavian) (Peters 2000) do not respond equally
to Europeanization pressures. So far, the pre-existing structures, values and
patterns of behaviour have persisted in the adaptation of the national admin-
istration as well as in the adaptation of patterns of managing European affairs
(see, for example, Spanou 1998; Bulmer and Burch 2001; Laffan 2001, 2003).
European continental traditions are visible in most post-communist EU
newcomers. Despite this, and given the communist systems legacies, post-
communist administrations are generally characterized by continuing inter-
sectoral segmentation and fragmentation (see, for example, Goetz and
Wollmann 2001). However, recent research has revealed quite important
variations between them (gh 2003b). Verheijen and Rabrenovic (2001) esti-
mated that the German model had generally emerged as a dominant influ-
ence, while the Baltic States have been influenced by the Swedish model; in
addition, in some states, the influence of the French system of political cab-
inets can be seen. Nrgaard and Skovbakke Winding (2005) reveal an insight
into variations among the new Baltic States as well. Although in general,
relicts of (or reactions to) the Soviet system in the form of institutions, infor-
mal networks, ideas and values, were influential, in the 1993 research on
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, the differences were quite distinct. They had
persisted by the second wave of the mentioned research in the 200003
period (involving varying degrees of Soviet legacy) despite the European-
ization process. According to Nrgaard and Skovbakke Windings (2005)
findings, Estonia leans toward the contractual tradition (typical of Anglo-
Saxon countries), Lithuania towards the statist continental tradition (here
usually the German, French and Russian examples are quoted) while in
Latvia they discovered the predomination of legacies of the Soviet era over
any traditions that may have existed there.
We expect that differences in the administrative traditions in Slovenia,
Hungary and Estonia affect their domestic managing of EU affairs as
well. In the article we will only look at several characteristics of adminis-
trative traditions: the administrative structure (co-ordination) and politico-
administrative relations as expressed during the accession stage.
Patterns of party competition and politico-administrative relations

Research into the impact of the pattern of party competition on managing
EU affairs has so far been quite rare, even in the old member states.

Kassim et al. (2000, pp. 1617) stress that the party system and the relation-
ship of parties to the cabinet are likely to influence the capacity of a political
systems co-ordination of EU policy. Fragmentation of the party system is
expected to produce a more fragmented executive, but this effect may be
milder where the capacity for compromise and co-ordination is well devel-
oped. Among the mechanisms for increasing the co-ordination capacity a
more powerful prime ministerial role is mentioned.
One of the few more detailed case studies of Western European countries
is that by Andeweg (1992). The author showed that, in the relatively frag-
mented party arena and coalitional character of governments in The
Netherlands, the national pattern of party interactions reveals a long-term
tendency of the spilling over from domestic issues into the field of the
domestic management of EU affairs. Only recently has more significant
research interest in the impact of a coalition government on the civil service
evolved probably since most Western and Southern European states with
long coalition government traditions had well-established institutional and
managerial rules and procedures to mitigate the impact of coalitions on the
stability and professional development of the civil service (Verheijen 2005,
p. 5). In addition, the predominant mode of governance showed relatively
little difference from that in states where a single-party government was the
rule (Verheijen 2005, p. 5). However, to date, the research testing of these
general findings regarding politico-administrative relations in managing EU
affairs has been lacking.
Expectations that the logic of party competition in an extremely dynamic
process of democratic (including party) institution building will have an
impact on how the national administration manages EU affairs are especially
plausible in post-communist countries. Namely, a specific political charac-
teristic of post-communist accession countries is that processes of social,
economic, administrative and political modernization have been taking
place simultaneously. A dynamic political process of constitution building
and deep socio-economic reforms have been directly interlinked with the
processes of consolidating party systems and modernizing governance. It is
therefore no surprise that research interest in politico-administrative rela-
tions developed more recently and has focused more on the post-communist
cluster of EU newcomers (see, for example, Jabes 2001; Verheijen 2001; Peters
et al. 2005). A special NISPAcee Working Group on politico-administrative
relations was established in 1997 with the aim of developing theoretical models
for a comparative study of politico-administrative relations applicable to post-
communist states, research into politico-administrative relations at the local
government level as well as politico-administrative relations in the context of
coalition government (details of their activities and publications are listed at
the NISPAcee home page http://www.nispa.sk/_portal/homepage.php).
Looking at the existing research, we could say that in post-communist
states (contrary to experiences in old EU member states), political instability
(see, for example, Lewis 2000; Peters et al. 2005; Jungerstam-Mulders 2006),

as well as the involvement of politics in public administration, have been

some of the key characteristics of administrative reforms (see, for example,
Dimitrova 2001; Jabes 2001; Verheijen 2001; Peters et al. 2005). The separation
of politics from top-level civil service appointments something that leaves
relatively little space for politically motivated appointments (as in the Nordic
States and The Netherlands) is quite distant from similar attempts in post-
communist countries. The pressures of newly developed and modernized
old political parties in their struggle for control over the state have existed
parallel to legacies of the institutional politicization and political subordina-
tion of the public administration under the old regime. In this article we test
if these over-politicized patterns of relations can also be found in the field
of managing EU affairs, which had a special political status in the countries
investigated during the accession stage.
SOME COMMON FEATURES OF THE INSTITUTIONAL

ADAPTATION OF POST-COMMUNIST
EU-NEWCOMER COUNTRIES
In the past 15 years, most post-communist countries have not only been
confronted with adapting their institutions to Europeanization processes. At
the same time, they have also encountered several other big challenges:
building the institutions and practices of a democratic political system and
a market economy and, in some cases (such as in Slovenia and Estonia), even
building an independent state, including the establishment of institutions
previously set up in the political centres of the former multinational states
to which they used to belong.
Like older member states, the newcomers have also passed through several
stages of EU Europeanization (Lippert et al. 2001). While old(er) EU members
were involved in creating the EU in terms of its polity and policies, the latest
newcomers (such as Slovenia, Estonia and Hungary) have had to incorporate
EU policies and adapt institutionally before having any say in their formation.
Under the pressure of the constant EU monitoring and evaluation, foreign
affairs (relative to the EU) were in some respects made domestic before
formal EU membership. The most obvious need for institutional adaptation
at the national level is the inter-ministerial co-ordination of EU affairs.
All three investigated countries (Slovenia, Hungary and Estonia) may be
regarded as happy success stories in several respects. These include a suc-
cessful transition to democracy, either a minor or no involvement in war,
and good economic development; in the case of Slovenia and Estonia, they
also include the international recognition of new independent states together
with their inclusion in various international integrations, including European
integration processes. An evaluation of accession states and their achieve-
ments, relative to various criteria set by the EU, had been taking place, but
with a variety of results. Slovenia, Hungary and Estonia were among those
EU accession countries that formed a group with relatively favourable socio-
economic conditions (for details, see Fink Hafner 1999).

In Agenda 2000 it was concluded equally for all three countries that they
had fulfilled the political and economic criteria but that they needed to do
more in both the process of implementing the acquis and in the reform of
public administration (Fink-Hafner 1999, p. 791). As with other last-wave
accession countries, Slovenia, Hungary and Estonia have been under strong
EU pressure to reform their public administrations, even involving the idea
of a European Administrative Space (Olsen 2002b). The latter has been
suggested by SIGMA (Support for Improvement in Governance and
Management in Central and East European Countries), which, since 1998,
has been linked to the EUs PHARE programme; further support was pro-
vided by the International Institute of Administrative Sciences European
Group of Public Administration (EGPA) in 2002 (EIPA et al. 2005, p. 12).
External pressures and the roles of international agencies (such as the World
Bank, the Council of Europe, the OECD), as well as Western governments,
have been significant; to some extent, the New Public Management (NPM)
approach has also been involved (Dimitrova 2001; Demmke 2002; Verheijen
2003; Vass 2001; Viks 2002; gh 2003b; Nrgaard and Skovbakke Winding
2005). Although it is impossible to identify a systematically defined European
model of public administration recommended to the accession countries,
the Commissions opinions show clearly the importance that the Commission
attaches to administrative reform and provide a number of elements that
help describe the public administration model that the Commission has
in mind (Fournier 1998, p. 111). Among them were, for example, the laying
down of positive rules that the Commission believes the countries should
follow: the Commission taking more definite positions on certain aspects of
the organization and functioning of the public administration; referencing
the desirability of effective co-ordination between ministries; the implicit
favouring of a career civil service, emphasizing the need to ensure that the
public administration is independent of political authorities; approving of
the fact that some countries have created a body responsible for designing
and monitoring the implementation of reform; finding it unfortunate that
there are as yet no such solutions in other countries, and so on (Fournier
1998, pp. 11118). Although the Commissions guidelines have remained
relatively general, critical opinions from the European Commission for the
accession states to modernize their civil services during the accession nego-
tiations have been perceived as quite strong pressures by these countries.
This is understandable since fulfilment of the political criteria and the
criteria administrative capacity to apply the acquis were some of the
conditions for joining the EU.
Unlike the pressures to reform public administration, no specific EU
model has been suggested for managing EU affairs at home. Similarly (in
spite of monitoring the fulfilment of the political criteria for EU member-
ship), autonomy could also be observed in the development of accession
states party systems. For the countries investigated there were no direct
recommendations regarding the development of their domestic political

systems, including their electoral systems, patterns of party competition

or government formation. In other words, these things were left to the
domestic processes of consolidating these young democracies. A few partial
exceptions were EU pre-election political pressures: for example, in the
case of Slovakia.
We investigated whether, for all three states, integration with the EU was
a political priority. The key critical juncture in the institutional adaptation of
their executives was the start of pre-accession negotiations. All three states
were faced with a co-ordination challenge in the process of preparing nego-
tiating positions for the numerous policy fields covered by the acquis. Their
adaptations resulted in a variety of national co-ordination responses.
VARIATIONS IN NATIONAL ADAPTATIONS:

THE ROLE OF ADMINISTRATIVE TRADITIONS
National variations
While all three countries share some pre-modern communist system lega-
cies, they differ somewhat in terms of their deeper historical experiences.
Slovenia and Hungary share some important similarities that date back to
the Austrian and Austro-Hungarian empires. Estonia stands out with its
relatively rare (for post-socialist EU newcomers) Scandinavian-like admin-
istrative tradition (Verheijen and Rabrenovic 2001).
Slovenia
Slovenia, as a former part of the Austrian (and Austro-Hungarian) empires,
shares the heritage of the Central European tradition. Austrian legacies
endured until World War II. Living as it did in the framework of several
multinational states, it was impossible to talk about a complete Slovenian
administration. This situation pertained until the countrys independence
in 1991. What was especially new for the independent Slovenia relative to
the EU was that for the first time foreign affairs became part of the national
political system. This happened at almost the same time as Slovenia started
to take part in the European integration processes (Fink-Hafner and Lajh
2003). Administrative legacies include that of the former Yugoslav commu-
nist system which Slovenia had formed part of until June 1991. This was
influenced both by the continental and French administrative examples,
combined with typical pre-modern communist party system characteristics.
The notion that co-ordination is neither necessary nor desired (interviews
conducted in 2002 and 2003 within the Slovenian Executive) impeded the
formation of effective co-ordination in the context of the Europeanization
process and the transition to democracy (Fink-Hafner and Lajh 2003). The
lack both of co-ordination and a teamwork culture gradually, over time,
became consciously regarded as a serious problem. Gradually, and in line
with the continental tradition, this was taken care of; NPM reform itself,
however, was subjected to yet further delay. Although Slovenia is usually

regarded as a laggard in reforming its public administration, it has some-

how muddled through, with an occasionally gradualist approach to change
(for a report, see the UNDP comparative study on Civil Service Training in
the Context of Public Administration Reform (2003, June) and for a further ex-
ample, see Fournier 1998; Verheijen 2000; Brezovek 2001). More significant
changes in that respect did occur but only under long-term external pressure.
These changes can now be observed: as, for example, in the new Civil Service
Law which was adopted in 2002.
Hungary
Hungarian administrative traditions are mainly continental in nature and go
back to the ideas and practices of the Austro-Hungarian empire, and with
residuals of the communist legacy. Vass (2001, p. 83) stresses that the old,
Weberian type of tradition was somehow maintained during the state-
communist regime and that, although it was controlled by the Communist
party, Hungary had enjoyed at least physical separation. In the constitution
building processes (1989), the rules adopted on government reflected the
German and Spanish constitutional regulations but, according to the Sigma
report of 1997, in practice more and more experts believe that the political
transition reduced further the efficiency of the public administration (gh
and Rzss 2003). While there has also been some influence from the British
and American ways of developing the public administration (namely, NPM),
this has had less impact (Vass 2001, p. 86).
Estonia
Sootla (2001) stresses that, historically in Estonia, two competing paradigms
of government and administration developed. One emerged from foreign
rule and has been expressed as a view of government as a coercive state
organization. The other experience (self-government) supported a view of
government as the provider of public goods and social security (Sootla 2001,
p. 124). At the beginning of the twentieth century, when Estonians first ex-
perienced access to the government of their own country, the intensive in-
stitutionalization was influenced by the concepts and (legal) traditions of the
Russian-German bureaucracy. The 1934 coup, together with the fact of living
within the framework of the Soviet regime, prevented Estonias develop-
ment of a legitimate structural configuration: in other words, a solid basis
for democratic governance (Sootla 2001, pp. 1246). According to Nrgaard
and Skovbakke Winding (2005, p. 12), Estonia leans towards the contractual
state epitomized by the Anglo-Saxon countries, or perhaps rather the mixed
Scandinavian model. According to the above-mentioned research, the dis-
tinct division between state and society is explained by a historical leaning
by Estonians to isolate themselves from foreign pressure and influence. The
disappearance of the former co-ordinating (party) centre in Estonia was
reflected both in a lack of co-ordination and in competition among the key
political institutions (the presidency, government and parliament) for control.

Even when the difficulties of a broad horizontal co-ordination among the

ministries are taken into account, the prevailing local opinion so far is that
there is no need for the further formalization of procedures. Estonia contin-
ues to face the problem of strategic planning within ministries and a lack of
co-ordination (Sootla 2001, pp. 1348; for a discussion of the 1999 World Bank
report on Estonia, see Viks 2002; for a discussion of the 2003 SIGMA report
on Estonia, see Drechsler et al.). This latter shortfall has been described as
the biggest problem faced by the Estonian civil service by both the European
Commission and the OECD (see Drechsler et al. 2003, pp. 1516). Overall, in
terms of recent reforms introduced to this extremely small administration,
it represents something still in the process of being resolved.
Adaptation of national administrations co-ordination for

managing EU affairs
EU demands on particular domestic departments for candidate countries
to prepare the contents of the 31 separate negotiating chapters formed the
crucial turning point in national adaptations to Europeanization processes.
These processes reflected the EUs agreed position in particular policy areas
(see table 1).
Slovenia
In Slovenia, the government appointed 31 working groups to prepare nego-
tiating positions, as well as other platforms for negotiations on particular
negotiating chapters. These comprised representatives of individual minis-
tries and other relevant institutions. The head of a working group was usu-
ally a higher official of a ministry (that is, state secretary) or other government
institution that was responsible for the chapter in question. Although some
working groups were more or less completely uni-sectoral, they were in fact
mainly inter-sectoral. Moreover, in some of them, almost all the ministries
were represented. In October 1995, the Slovenian government obliged all
ministries and other governmental institutions to establish special units
within particular departments for handling European business. In the com-
plicated web of institutions and roles, the informal contacts seen in vertical
and horizontal communications have significantly modified (even rectified)
the (somewhat) rigid and inefficient formal channels and ways of commu-
nicating. Due to the challenge of managing European matters, Slovenian
public administration has developed new ways of working, with more co-
ordination and teamwork. The strategy has been to add European business
to officials existing tasks: thus, the dispersion of EU tasks has prevailed over
the creation of a special public administration segment of an EU-knowledgeable
elite for dealing with EU matters. With the somewhat late start to the in-
tensive EU training of civil servants (an official strategy of EU training
for officials was adopted in 2000), this has been accomplished by a
learning-by-doing style during the implementing of EU tasks and by attending

816
TABLE 1 Consultation, co-ordination and centralization processes for dealing with EU matters in Slovenia, Hungary and Estonia
Public administration Public administration Creation of an Co-ordination style* Core management of
tradition adaptation EU-elite within PA EU affairs
Slovenia Continental A trend towards general A trend towards broad Growing centralization/ A gradually growing
DANICA FINK-HAFNER
inclusion of European learning-by-doing formalization tendency from more

affairs in the public adminis- and communication of technical co- polycentric manage-
trations functioning ordination combined ment towards being
with socialization Prime Minister-led
Hungary Continental Fragmentation (stable EU A stable and better paid Centralization/ Foreign ministry-
(weakened) core in the frame of group of EU officials socialization led with a recent
general public administra- dominating in the EU tendency to be Prime
tion alternation) field in the context of Minister-led

a dynamic public
administration change
Estonia Scandinavian (mixture of Segmentation (strong min- Person-centred expertise Decentralization/ A tendency towards
Anglo-Saxon and istries) lacking horizontal and communication socialization being Prime Minister-
Germanic) co-ordination led with still strong
individual ministries
* Characteristics of co-ordination style as presented in Laffan (2003).

occasional seminars during the accession stage (Fink-Hafner and Lajh 2003).
Slovenias European cadre capacity has persisted as one of the core prob-
lems and concerns of managing European business.
Hungary
In the case of Hungary, it is interesting that the administrative structures the
country established in 1996 to manage EU business have largely remained
stable, although their operations have been influenced by both the various
steps of the accession process (which during the 1990s demanded ever more
comprehensive institutional structures) and by the styles of the different
governments (gh and Rzss 2003; Vass 2005). The critical junction was the
European Agreement: this stimulated the establishment of three institutions
(the Association Council, the Association Committee and the Joint Parlia-
mentary Committee). During the implementation of the Europe Agreement,
a variety of working bodies was set up in line with the specific chapters and
obligations of the agreement. The EU-specialized part of the Hungarian ad-
ministration has developed processes and procedures that differ from the
general national administration pattern. This development has involved
both financial incentives and the maintenance of staff continuity at home as
well as among diplomatic staff, including the head of mission, in Hungarys
Mission to the EU (gh and Rzss 2003, p. 36). The group of civil servants
working on EU issues became so specific that Nunberg (quoted by gh and
Rzss 2003, p. 40) has described it as a split, a deep fragmentation of the
Hungarian public administration. The relatively early EU training of civil
servants in public administration in general has lost some of its momentum
since many civil servants have left public administration as a result of
changes in government after the elections or the attractiveness of the private
sector which promises better financial compensation as well as personal sat-
isfaction (Vass 2001a, p. 87). Negotiations with the EU mostly took place in
informal meetings with the European Commissions Services, together with
ambassadors and staff members of the permanent representations of mem-
ber states. The Chief Negotiator prepared proposals for the Hungarian
government (who were also informed via the Chief Negotiator s personal
contacts with his counterparts in Brussels) on the basis of his assessment of
the specific situation (gh and Rzss 2003, p. 36).
Estonia
In Estonia, even after the March 2003 reforms, general decentralization, and
the personalization of roles and information pathways (Randma 1999;
Drechsler et al. 2003), remained the key characteristics of managing EU
affairs. During the negotiating stage, the management of EU affairs that
involved powerful ministries, responsible for harmonization of EU law, led
to extensive decentralization (Viks 2002; Drechsler et al. 2003). On the basis
of a 1996 government order, all ministries were obliged to establish special
units or indicate a special person responsible for EU business. European

issues in Estonia are often handled as part of the regular order and the usual
hierarchies established in the ministries (Viks 2002; Drechsler et al. 2003).
Since nearly all ministries took part in the negotiating process in some way,
almost all civil servants in every central government institution (ministries,
agencies, boards, inspectorates, and so on) have to some extent been in-
volved in EU matters. In 1996, the Council of Senior Civil Servants (CSCS)
was established and developed to become the main forum for the horizontal
management of EU issues for the intermediation and exchange of informa-
tion between ministers. On 1 March 2003, it was officially renamed the Inter-
ministerial Co-ordination Council. According to interview findings presented
by Drechsler and colleagues, official recognition at the ministerial level that
EU matters should be part of the everyday work of most ministerial officials
took place only in 2001 and 2002 (Dreschsler et al. 2003, p. 11). The accession
process helped to introduce a co-ordination culture into the Estonian civil
service. The organizations problem, however, of significant unrecorded in-
formation loss, remains due to the personalization of the predominantly
informal process. Furthermore, the increasing mobility between the private
and public sectors (Nrgaard and Skovbakke Winding 2005, p. 12) has
probably been responsible for partly eroding the effects of the public admin-
istrations EU-training.
Modes of executive adaptation: the centrality of the Minister for

Foreign Affairs versus the Prime Minister
In all three countries, the co-ordination of European affairs developed dy-
namically in response to needs that emerged during the integration process.
Although institutional solutions regarding the co-ordinating centre have sig-
nificantly differed, recent developments point to the trend towards the
prime-minister model as opposed to a dynamic led by the relevant Minister
for Foreign Affairs. However, variations remain considerable.
Slovenia
In Slovenia, the relatively dispersed and decentralized system needed to
be adapted to the circumstances of the greater intensity and deepening of
European integration. In December 1997, a special independent office was
established. the Government Office for European Affairs, which was led by
a minister without portfolio. This new office took on the responsibility of
managing and helping to co-ordinate the entire process of Slovenias acces-
sion to the EU, including the personnel, tasks and main facilities of the
former Office for European Affairs located within the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. Parallel to this Office, the Negotiating Team of the Republic of
Slovenia for Accession to the EU, was formed, as were 31 Working Groups for
preparing negotiating positions. At the end of 1997 and start of 1998, there-
fore, this key (and radical) change brought about a shift towards a central-
ized system of EU co-ordination. It also brought the onset of tendencies
leading towards the systemic dispersion of European business while the

formal position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as the chief negotiator was
maintained. The prime minister represented the top of the co-ordination
pyramid in managing European business. Representation also involved the
line ministers (the lead ministers) and focused mostly on strategic issues.
These included the resolution of inter-ministerial conflicts arising during
the negotiation process. Informal contacts complemented the formalized
co-ordination. The government, led by the Liberal Democracy of Slovenia,
decided to institutionalize the central co-ordinating unit (the reformed
Government Office for European Affairs) in February 2003, and to maintain
the minister without portfolio in full EU membership. The radical ideologi-
cal change in government seen in December 2004, however, led to the aboli-
tion of this ministerial position. The state secretary responsible for European
affairs then became a member of the prime ministers cabinet.
Hungary
Unlike Slovenia, where the European integration process took place within
a climate of a broad political consensus, in Hungary the politicization of
European matters contributed to institutional and procedural shifts under
several governments. In the early 1990s, the management of EU business
was two-centred, that is, it involved the Office of European Affairs in the
Ministry of Industry and Trade as well as the EU Department of the Foreign
Ministry. The formal engagement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was
unique when compared to other segments of Hungarian public administra-
tion. When a detailed Commission questionnaire needed to be answered it
was the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that became the key co-ordinator. In
February 1996, the European Integration Agreement Cabinet was estab-
lished, composed of the ministers of foreign affairs, the interior, justice, the
economy, and finance, and chaired by the prime minister. A Strategic Task
Force on Integration was established as part of the Prime Minister s Office
in order to give advice to the Integration Cabinet. In 1996, the State Secre-
tariat for Integration (SSI) was established within the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. While the European Integration Cabinet briefed Prime Minister
Horn on EU issues that could not be resolved at a lower level, the SSI took
care of the central administrative and co-ordinating functions previously
dealt with by the former Office of European Affairs and the European Union
Department (gh and Rzss 2003, p. 23). To ensure cross-sectoral policy
co-ordination, an Inter-ministerial Committee for European Integration
(ICEI) was established. The structures described above were later altered by
the Orbn and Medgyessy governments. Overall, changes of government in
Hungary brought about variations in the involvement by the Prime Minister s
Office and the prime minister in the following: (1) managing European af-
fairs; (2) government policy on Europe; and, eventually (3) in the level of
politicization of European matters. In addition, the Medgyessy government
in 2002 enhanced the role of the Prime Minister and his Office. Political and
administrative dualism seen in the Orbn administration was abolished and

a new post of Minister of European Affairs was created. After Pter Medgyessys
resignation in September 2004, the new government of Ferenc Gyurcsny,
based on the same party coalition and formed in October 2004, shifted the
responsibility for European affairs. As from 1 January 2005, and except for
affairs related to the common foreign and security policy, an important part
of the EU cadre was moved from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Office
for European Affairs of the Prime Ministers Office.
Estonia
In 1995, when Estonia became the first post-communist country to hold the
status of an associate member without any transition period, a special EU
unit (the Group of the EU) was established at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
At the same time, a Minister of European Affairs without portfolio was cre-
ated. Due to the growing pressures on legal harmonization and problems
related to how the co-ordination structure functioned (Drechsler et al. 2003,
p. 3), it was the prime minister who took over the management of EU mat-
ters and in addition became the chief negotiator. The Estonian Negotiation
Delegation involved representatives of each ministry with the exception of
the Ministry of Defence. The Delegation involved the Office for European
Integration, the Prime Minister s Office, and the Estonian Mission to the EU,
based in Brussels. A total of 33 negotiation working groups prepared analy-
ses which formed the basis for shaping the negotiating positions of the main
Delegation. From 1996, dual co-ordination developed since functions were
divided between the State Chancellery (involving the Office of European
Integration, the Council of Senior Civil Servants, and the EU Information
Secretariat) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (involving the Under-secretary
for European Integration, the Department of European Integration, and
the Estonian Mission to the EU). Since the dual internal structures occasion-
ally created difficulties in preparations to join the EU and for negotiations
with the EU (Viks 2002), the Hungarian government opted for a clear shift
towards prime ministerial co-ordination, starting with the new Kallas gov-
ernment in 2002 (Drechsler et al. 2003, p. 8). The 2003 government reform
identified the prime minister as the centre of co-ordination while maintain-
ing the decentralized system of individual ministries.
PATTERNS OF PARTY COMPETITION AND POLITICO-

ADMINISTRATIVE RELATIONS IN MANAGING EU AFFAIRS
IN THE THREE COUNTRIES EXAMINED
As the research findings of the project on parties and the party system in new
EU member states reveal (see Jungerstam-Mulders 2006), in Hungary, the
mixed electoral system and power relations among the parties supported the
development of a two-party system. In Slovenia and Estonia, proportional
representation systems, together with party system fragmentation, for a rela-
tively long time, produced power relations and coalition governments that
lacked alternative ideological coalitions. While Slovenia had the same

Centre-Left, party-led coalition governments in the 19922004 period, with

a break of just 6 months in 2000, Estonia only experienced an intermezzo of
a government of experts (March 1997 to March 1999) in otherwise a series of
the same prime-minister-led Right governments (October 1992 to November
1994 and March 1999 to January 2002). In spite of some partial changes within
the governing coalitions in Slovenia and Estonia, we can say that Hungary,
with its clear ideological shifts in governments, is an exception here. A mixed
electoral system has contributed to an early freezing of the party system,
where a two-block mentality has become increasingly consolidated in spite of
some movement from bipolar competition to tripolar competition and back
again (see table 2). The above-mentioned characteristics of the Hungarian party
system have therefore had an impact on politico-administrative relations.
Slovenia
In Slovenia, politico-administrative relations are (as is typical of post-
communist countries) still regarded as being too subordinated to political
power. This relationship has been especially important in terms of the pub-
lic administration reform processes, where politicians have disagreed on the
need for and directions of reform (Brezovek 2001, p. 423). According to the
UNDP study on Civil Service Training in the Context of Public Administration
Reform of June 2003 already cited (United Nations Development Programme
2003, p. 18), in Slovenia, the overarching goal of accession to the European
Union was significant, but political structures seem to have been strength-
ened when reform had stalled or was proceeding too slowly and political
support was used to correct the situation rather than lead it. Comparative
empirical research has shown that in Slovenia (as with other post-communist
EU newcomers), good collaboration between ministers and civil servants is
the common currency of relationships (Kraovec and Kovacic 2007). A closer
look at this phenomenon in Slovenia shows that it is probably due to po-
liticization of the public administration system. One of the indicators of this
is the relatively high density of political officials in relation to public officials
(although the number dropped significantly by the end of 2004), and the
predominance in terms of membership of civil servants in government coali-
tion parties (within what would otherwise be a relatively low share of party
members among national public officials) (Hacek 2005). In spite of opposing
general expectations that the introduction of NPM would reduce the level
of politicization of the public administration (see, for example, Verheijen
2005) - a relatively strong stress on implementation of the NPM-based pub-
lic administration reform after the 2004 change in government occurred. This
was the first ideological shift in Slovenian government on the basis of na-
tional elections since 1992 (Fink-Hafner 2006). With growing perceptions of
a relatively wide public administration purge by the new political leaders,
it has at least partially gained the opposite image as a tool helping the
new government in the purging business. Since the management of EU
affairs was depoliticized in the accession state, it remains to be seen to what

822
TABLE 2 Selected key characteristics of constitutional and political developments in the transition to a democracy in Slovenia, Estonia and
Hungary by 2004
Country Model of Mode of Constitutional Creating a new Electoral system Party system Ideological change
communist rule transition to system independent state? competition in government
democracy during the process
DANICA FINK-HAFNER
of EU integration

Slovenia National- Trans-placement Parliamentary Yes Proportional A combination No significant
(Yugoslavia) accommodative of multi-polar change by the
communism and bipolar 2004 elections
competition
Hungary National- Trans-placement Parliamentary No Mixed (semi- Bipolar Tendency towards

accommodative proportional) regular alter-
communism nation between
two blocs
Estonia A mixture of Trans-placement Parliamentary Yes Proportional Multi-polar Intermediate
(Soviet Union) patrimonial (elements of government of
communism rupture) experts within a
and national- longer period of
accommodative the same PM-led
communism governments
extent if any this political move in the circumstances of full EU member-

ship will affect the management of EU affairs in the future.
Hungary
Although Hungarys modern civil service started to develop in the time of
the Austro-Hungarian dualist state, on the basis of a consensus on the need
for the separation and protection of the state employers, Vass (2001b,
pp. 1523) stresses that in Hungary the Civil Service never existed as an
independent corps. After an extremely short period of Hungarys republican
and parliamentary democratic system in 194548 (within which a profes-
sional, politically neutral, civil service could not have developed), the com-
munist takeover brought about a unified system, one that did not clearly
distinguish between the political leadership and the professional public
administration. In spite of Hungarys relatively early public administration
reforms during the 1980s (Vass 2001; gh 2003b), the dual role of politicians
and ministers (that is, ministers could be members of Parliament), together
with residuals of the communist legacy, helped to develop ministers require-
ments that the ministerial bureaucracy be loyal to the governing political
party. This tendency was challenged by establishing divisions between the
political leadership and the professional executive level. This was achieved
through the introduction of dual state secretaries the limited-term political
leadership (in practice the appointment of political state secretaries) and the
professional executive level (in practice the appointment of administrative
state secretaries as professional deputies to ministers and heads of ministries
apparatuses). A separate personal staff that worked directly for the respective
ministers was informally established, a similar example being the French
cabinet system. Special organizational units were also created in order
to support the prime minister. These innovations led to a duplication of
the professional and political leadership of the ministries in the form of
a shadow-organization in the Prime Ministers Office. Vass (2001b, p. 168)
estimates that, in general, political elements play a dominant role in the
public administration of Hungary. In the complicated circumstances of high
party system polarization, the bipolar pattern of party competition (Brusis
2004; Vass 2005; Enyedi 2006; Jungerstam-Mulders 2006) was also reflected in
competition between the dual administrations. As we saw in the discussion,
above, this competition did not affect the core of the EU-managing segment
of public administration.
Estonia
It seems that Estonia has experienced even more dynamic changes in its
politico-administrative relations than either Slovenia or Hungary. On the
basis of a thorough comparative study of politico-administrative relations in
various governmental contexts/stages, Sootla (2001) discovered several
shifts during the 1990s between various types of politico-administrative
relations. These included a shift from the administrative state model to the

formal-legal model; there was then a shift to the functional village model
and finally to the hybrid model. On one hand, the situation in Estonia fol-
lowing abolition of the communist system of political control over the pub-
lic administration, allowed civil servants to take political decisions in spite
of a clear ambition to separate the bureaucracy from politics. On the other
hand, Estonia is familiar both with neutral civil servants and with politicized
state servants (Nrgaard and Skovbakke Winding 2005, p. 15). This unbal-
anced hybrid of politico-administrative structures (Sootla 2005, p. 33) in
Estonia produces a certain level of mutual blocking between ministers and
civil servants, something which is quite unique among the post-communist
EU newcomers (Kraovec and Kovacic 2007). In the circumstances the inten-
sive path of officials in and out of the civil service, including mobility be-
tween private and public sectors and rejuvenation of the civil service (Sootla
2001, pp. 1289; Nrgaard and Skovbakke Winding 2005, p. 12) two esti-
mations emerge: (1) that the actual division of politico-administrative roles
seems to be more like an ad hoc private deal (Sootla 2005); and (2) that the
vision of the civil servant being an independent manager rather than a sub-
servient bureaucrat seems to prevail (Nrgaard and Skovbakke Winding
2005). In spite of Sootla (2005) pointing out the growing politicization of
appointments made in Estonia during the 1990s, and his finding that the types
of coalition cabinets in Estonia significantly determined the characteristics
of politico-administrative relations, these are not comparable to the Hungarian
case due to the quite different pattern of party competition. In other words,
the consolidation of the still relatively open party system has preserved the
overwhelming domination of right-wing parties (Mikkel 2006). Here it
should be stressed that, due to dealing with European issues as political
priorities, key personnel in the EU-management structures were granted
both positions and status that carried high level of stability (Drechsler et al.
2003); there has been considerable turnover at the lower levels (Viks 2002).
COMPARISONS AND TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS

The investigated countries have all been going through processes of mod-
ernization and Europeanization. EU-related structures and processes were
primarily determined by pressures from the EU. In the early stages of inte-
gration, when EU foreign ministers were central due to the character of the
negotiation processes, the problem of the (at least to some extent) polycentric
characteristics of the early co-ordination structures was common to Slovenia,
Hungary and Estonia. With growing EU integration and the domestification
of EU matters, a tendency towards the central role of the prime minister can
be detected in all three countries joining similar trends in older EU member
states.
Despite the lack of specific formal EU rules on co-ordination, executives
managing EU affairs during the negotiation period pushed national govern-
ments in candidate states to search for better internal co-ordination. We saw
the dynamic introduction of new mechanisms as well as the adaptation of

existing structures or procedures. There was a shift towards greater co-

ordination in all the investigated countries while, at the same time, variations
existed, such as: (1) laying more stress on formalization or informal patterns
of administrative behaviour linked to socialization; and (2) in modes of ex-
ecutive governance centralization for managing EU affairs. Administrative
traditions have filtered EU pressure in the direction of increasing administra-
tive and inter-ministerial co-ordination as well as the centralization of EU-
related management within the executive. In Slovenia, formalization and
centralization could already be observed as an indigenous trend at the ac-
cession stage. In Hungary, the divergence between its continental traditions
and national chancellor-type governance (Vass 2005) and, from the accession
period, the foreign-minister model, has recently decreased, becoming more
aligned with the general domestic type of governance. Estonia seems to be
adhering to its decentralized and personalized traditions despite formal
stress on the bigger co-ordinating role of the prime minister.
The pattern of the development of party systems (and party competition
affecting politico-administrative relations) has been a more dynamic variable
in the investigated countries than have public administration traditions. It
seems to have had a much greater impact on general politico-administrative
relations than on the management of EU affairs. In other words, the national
prioritization of integration with the EU seems to have interfered in that
correlation. Atypical for Estonia, the EU core of experts has been surprisingly
stable and in Slovenia (even to the extent of forming a special agreement
among parliamentary parties), the area of dealing with European matters
was depoliticized at the accession stage. Hungary is an exception here, with
the politicization of EU policy in the context of a bipolar party competition.
Nevertheless, even in Hungary, the impact of this variable has been filtered
by the national political priority to integrate with the EU, practically giving
special status to the EU-specialized politically untouchable segment of pub-
lic administration in the accession stage.
The research results presented here support Kassims (2000, p. 237) thesis
about the combination of partial similarity and significant diversity in man-
aging EU affairs in the domestic sphere. It remains to be seen whether, due
to EU pressures on domestic public administration reform processes, con-
vergent changes in managing EU affairs will take place more quickly in the
accession countries than in the more established member countries (gh
2003b, p. 541). What we can expect from full EU membership is that
the socialization of an ever bigger share of public administration officials
involved in day-to-day contact with the Commission will have at least
some impact on public administration domestically as well as on the politico-
administrative leadership.
In the case of recent EU newcomers especially we point to the need for
more thorough future research into: (1) the impact of the externally encour-
aged introduction of NPM to national administrations; and (2) the influence
of the EU institutions day-to-day functioning on domestic relations between

public administration and politics. For example, Larsson and Trondal (2005)
show that the European Commission tends to strengthen the lower echelons
of domestic government hierarchies in Norway and Sweden, notably sector
experts within sector agencies and sector ministries. While this contributes
to a weaker politico-administrative leadership in both countries, in the case
of Sweden (as a full EU member), this tendency is somewhat counterbalanced
by the inter-sectorally interlocking effect of the Council of Ministers. The
latter strengthens the domestic politico-administrative leadership of the
Foreign Office and the Prime Minister s office. Future research should there-
fore more carefully examine the impact of the multi-level characteristics of
the EU political system on national public administration changes as well as
the politico-administrative relations in countries involved in European inte-
gration processes.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The author thanks the anonymous reviewers for their comments.
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Date received 18 September 2005. Date accepted 11 June 2006.


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EUROPEANIZATION IN MANAGING EU

AFFAIRS: BETWEEN DIVERGENCE AND

Public Administration Vol. 85, No. 3, 2007 (805828)

position of the prime minister relative to other political institutions), politici-

Public Administration Vol. 85, No. 3, 2007 (805828)

central organizing principle, it also involves the party system developments

Public Administration Vol. 85, No. 3, 2007 (805828)

policy-making. A shift from international relations with the EC/EU as a

Public Administration Vol. 85, No. 3, 2007 (805828)

National administrative traditions

Patterns of party competition and politico-administrative relations

Public Administration Vol. 85, No. 3, 2007 (805828)

Public Administration Vol. 85, No. 3, 2007 (805828)

as well as the involvement of politics in public administration, have been

SOME COMMON FEATURES OF THE INSTITUTIONAL

Public Administration Vol. 85, No. 3, 2007 (805828)

Public Administration Vol. 85, No. 3, 2007 (805828)

systems, including their electoral systems, patterns of party competition

VARIATIONS IN NATIONAL ADAPTATIONS:

Public Administration Vol. 85, No. 3, 2007 (805828)

regarded as a laggard in reforming its public administration, it has some-

Public Administration Vol. 85, No. 3, 2007 (805828)

Even when the difficulties of a broad horizontal co-ordination among the

Adaptation of national administrations co-ordination for

Public Administration Vol. 85, No. 3, 2007 (805828)

inclusion of European learning-by-doing formalization tendency from more

Public Administration Vol. 85, No. 3, 2007 (805828)

2007 The Author. Journal compilation 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

* Characteristics of co-ordination style as presented in Laffan (2003).

Public Administration Vol. 85, No. 3, 2007 (805828)

Modes of executive adaptation: the centrality of the Minister for

Public Administration Vol. 85, No. 3, 2007 (805828)

Public Administration Vol. 85, No. 3, 2007 (805828)

PATTERNS OF PARTY COMPETITION AND POLITICO-

Public Administration Vol. 85, No. 3, 2007 (805828)

Centre-Left, party-led coalition governments in the 19922004 period, with

Public Administration Vol. 85, No. 3, 2007 (805828)

Public Administration Vol. 85, No. 3, 2007 (805828)

2007 The Author. Journal compilation 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

extent if any this political move in the circumstances of full EU member-

Public Administration Vol. 85, No. 3, 2007 (805828)

COMPARISONS AND TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS

Public Administration Vol. 85, No. 3, 2007 (805828)

existing structures or procedures. There was a shift towards greater co-

Public Administration Vol. 85, No. 3, 2007 (805828)

Public Administration Vol. 85, No. 3, 2007 (805828)

Public Administration Vol. 85, No. 3, 2007 (805828)

Date received 18 September 2005. Date accepted 11 June 2006.

Public Administration Vol. 85, No. 3, 2007 (805828)

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