1. TOMAS BERNAL and FORTUNATA ENVERSO v. J. V.
V. HOUSE contributory negligence of the child and her mother, if any, does not operate as a bar
and TACLOBAN ELECTRIC and ICE PLANT, LTD.
FACTS:
In a procession of Holy Friday held in Tacloban, Leyte, Fortunata Enverso
with her daughter Purificacion Bernal came from another municipality to attend the
religious celebration. After the procession was over, the woman and her daughter,
accompanied by two other persons by the names of Fausto and Elias, passed along a
public street named Gran Capitan. The little girl was allowed to get a short distance
in advance of her mother and her friends. When in front of the offices of the
Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., and automobile appeared from the opposite
direction which so frightened the child that she turned to run, with the result that she
fell into the street gutter. At that time there was hot water in this gutter or ditch
coming from the Electric Ice Plant of J.V. House. When the mother and her
companions reached the child, they found her face downward in the hot water. Her
clothes were immediately removed and, then covered with a garment, the girl was
taken to the provincial hospital. There she was attended by the resident physician,
Dr. Victoriano A. Benitez. Despite his efforts, the child died that same night. Dr.
Benitez certified that the cause of death was "Burns, 3rd Degree, whole Body", and
that the contributory causes were "Congestion of the Brain and visceras of the chest
& abdomen". The defense was that the hot water was permitted to flow down the
side of the street Gran Captain with the knowledge and consent of the authorities;
that the cause of death was other than the hot water; and that in the death the
plaintiffs contributed by their own fault and negligence. The trial judge, however,
after examination of the evidence presented by the defendants, failed to sustain their
theory of the case, except as to the last mentioned special defense. Although the trial
judge made the findings of fact hereinbefore outlined, he nevertheless was led to
order the dismissal of the action because of the contributory negligence of the
plaintiffs.
ISSUE:
Is the accident foreseeable to relieve J.V. House of liability?
Was there contributory negligence on the part of the victims mother?
RULING:
NO. We are shown no good reason for the departing from the conclusion of
the trial judge to the effect that the sudden death of the child Purification Bernal was
due principally to the nervous shock and organic calefaction produced by the
extensive burns from the hot water. The mother and her child had a perfect right to
be on the principal street of Tacloban, Leyte, on the evening when the religious
procession was held. There was nothing abnormal in allowing the child to run along
a few paces in advance of the mother. No one could foresee the coincidence of an
automobile appearing and of a frightened child running and falling into a ditch filled
with hot water. Article 1902 of the Civil Code must again be enforced. The
to recovery, but in its strictest sense could only result in reduction of the damages.
Having reached the conclusion that liability exists, we next turn to discover
who can recover damages for the obligation, and against whom the action will lie.
The plaintiffs are Tomas Bernal and Fortunata Enverso. The latter was the mother of
Purificacion Bernal and the former was the natural father, who had never legally
recognized his child. The daughter lived with the mother, and presumably was
supported by her. Under these facts, recovery should be permitted the mother but not
the father. As to the defendants, they are J.V. House and the Tacloban Electric & Ice
Plant, Ltd., J.V. House was granted a franchise by Act No. 2700 of the Philippine
Legislature approved on March 9, 1917. He only transferred this franchise formally
to the Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd. on March 30, 1926, that is, nearly a year
after the death of the child Purificacion Bernal. Under these facts, J.V. House is
solely responsible. Counsel for appellees point out that there is no satisfactory proof
to establish the pecuniary loss. That is true. But in cases of this character the law
presumes a loss because of the impossibility of exact computation. There is not
enough money in the entire world to compensate a mother for the death of her child.
In criminal cases, the rule has been to allow as a matter of course P1,000 as
indemnity to the heirs of the deceased.
2. Teodora Astudillo vs. Manila Electric Co.
G.R. No. L-33380. 17 December 1930.
Facts:
In August, 1928, a young man by the name of Juan Astudillo met his death
through electrocution, when he placed his right hand on a wire connected
with an electric light pole situated near Sta Lucia Gate, Intramuros, in the
City of Manila. Shortly thereafter, the mother of the deceased instituted an
action in the CFI Mla to secure from the defendant, Manila Electric
Company, damages. After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of the
plaintiff.
Issue:
WON defendant did not exercise due care and diligence so as to render it
liable for damages.
Ruling:
The SC concludes that the plaintiff is entitled to damages.
It is well established that the liability of electric light companies for
damages for personal injuries is governed by the rules of negligence. Such
companies are, however, not insurers of the safety of the public. But
considering that electricity is an agency, subtle and deadly, the measure of
care required of electric companies must be commensurate with or
 proportionate to the danger. The duty of exercising this high degree of RULING:
diligence and care extends to every place where persons have a right to be. No.
In the case at ber, the cause of the injury was one which could have been The issue in Civil Case No. 3490 was whether Salva and his driver Verena were
foreseen and guarded against. The negligence came from the act of the liable for quasi-delict for the damage caused to petitioner's jeepney. On the other
defendant in so placing its pole and wires as to be w/n proximity to a place hand, the issue in this case is whether petitioner is liable on his contract of carriage.
frequented by many people, with the possibility ever present of one of them
losing his life by coming in contact with a highly charged and defectively Quasi-delict / culpa aquiliana / culpa extra contractual
insulated wire. 1. Has as its source the negligence of the tortfeasor
2. negligence or fault should be clearly established because it is the basis of the
3. Calalas v CA (Torts) action
3. doctrine of proximate cause is applicable
FACTS: (device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between him and
At 10 o'clock in the morning of August 23, 1989, private respondent Eliza Jujeurche another party, obligation is created by law itself)
G. Sunga, then a college freshman majoring in Physical Education at the Siliman
University, took a passenger jeepney owned and operated by petitioner Vicente Breach of contract / culpa contractual
Calalas. As the jeepney was filled to capacity of about 24 passengers, Sunga was 1. premised upon the negligence in the performance of a contractual obligation
given by the conductor an "extension seat," a wooden stool at the back of the door at 2. action can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the contract and the
the rear end of the vehicle. fact that the obligor (here, the common carrier) failed to transport his passenger
On the way to Poblacion Sibulan, Negros Occidental, the jeepney stopped to let a safely to his destination
passenger off. As she was seated at the rear of the vehicle, Sunga gave way to the 3. not available; it is the parties themselves who create the obligation and the
outgoing passenger. Just as she was doing so, an Isuzu truck driven by Iglecerio function of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus created
Verena and owned by Francisco Salva bumped the left rear portion of the jeepney. In case of death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code provides that
As a result, Sunga was injured. common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently
On October 9, 1989, Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas, alleging unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts. 1733
violation of the contract of carriage by the former in failing to exercise the diligence and 1755 of the Code. This provision necessarily shifts to the common carrier the
required of him as a common carrier. Calalas, on the other hand, filed a third-party burden of proof.
complaint against Francisco Salva, the owner of the Isuzu truck.
Hence, Vicente Calalas (operator) is liable since he did not exercise utmost
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS: diligence.
1. RTC Dumaguete rendered judgment against Salva holding that the driver of
the Isuzu truck was responsible 4. GABETO VS. ARANETA
It took cognizance of another case (Civil Case No. 3490), filed by Calalas against
Salva and Verena, for quasi-delict, in which Branch 37 of the same court held Salva FACTS:
and his driver Verena jointly liable to Calalas for the damage to his jeepney.
2. CA reversed the RTC, awarding damages instead to Sunga as plaintiff in an In 1918, Basilio Ilano and Proceso Gayetano took a carromata with a view
action for breach of contract of carriage since the cause of action was based on such to going to a cockpit. When the driver of the carromata had started in the
and not quasi delict. direction indicated, the defendant, Agaton Araneta, stopped the horse, at the
Hence, current petition for review on certiorari. same time protesting to the driver that he himself had called this carromata
first. The driver, Julio Pagnaya, replied that he had not heard or seen the call
ISSUE: of Araneta. Pagnaya pulled on the reins of the bridle to free the horse from
Whether (per ruling in Civil Case) negligence of Verena was the proximate cause of the control of Araneta, in order that the vehicle might pass on. Owing to the
the accident negates his liability and that to rule otherwise would be to make the looseness of the bridle on the horse's head or to the rottenness of the
common carrier an insurer of the safety of its passengers material of which it was made, the bit came out of the horse's mouth; and it
In relation thereto, does the principle of res judicata apply? became necessary for the driver to get out in order to find the bridle.
Meanwhile one of the passengers, Ilano, had alighted but the other,
Gayetano, had unfortunately retained his seat, and after the runaway horse
 had proceeded up the street Gayetano jumped or fell from the rig, and in so
doing received injuries from which he soon died.
ISSUE:
W/N the proximate cause of the accident was the stopping of the horse by
Araneta.
RULING:
Judgement reversed and defendant absolved from the complaint.
RATIO: The stopping of the rig by Araneta was too remote from the
accident that presently ensued to be considered the legal or proximate cause
thereof. Moreover, by getting out and taking his post at the head of the
horse, the driver was the person primarily responsible for the control of the
animal, and the defendant cannot be charged with liability for the accident
resulting from the action of the horse thereafter. The evidence indicates that
the bridle was old, and the leather of which it was made was probably so
weak as to be easily broken. According to the witnesses for the defendant, it
was Julio who jerked the rein, thereby causing the bit to come out of the
horse's mouth; and that after alighting, led the horse over to the curb, and
proceeded to fix the bridle; and that in so doing the bridle was slipped
entirely off, when the horse, feeling himself free from control, started to go
away as previously stated.
5. MANILA ELECTRIC CO. vs. REMOQUILLO
Facts:
Efren Magno went to repair a media agua of the three-story house of his
stepbrother. While making the repair, a galvanized iron roofing which Magno was
holding came into contact with the electric wire of the petitioner Manila Electric Co.
strung parallel by 2 and a half feet from the edge of the media agua. He was
electrocuted and died as a result thereof.
An action for damages for the death of Magno against the petitioner
company was brought before the trial court. The trial court ruled in favor of the
plaintiffs and awarded the following : P10,000 as compensatory damages; P784 as
actual damages; P2,000 as moral and exemplary damages; and P3,000 as attorneys
fees, with costs. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed the judgment
with slight modification by reducing the attorneys fees from P3,000 to P1,000 with
costs.
Hence, this petition.
Issue: WON Manila Electric Co. shall be held liable for damages
Held:
NO. Manila Electric Co., shall not be held liable for damages.
To us it is clear that the principal and proximate cause of the electrocution was not
the electric wire, evidently a remote cause, but rather the reckless and negligent act
of Magno in turning around and swinging the galvanized iron sheet without taking
any precaution, such as looking back toward the street and at the wire to avoid its
contacting said iron sheet, considering the latters length of 6 feet. For a better
understanding of the rule on remote and proximate cause with respect to injuries, we
find the following citation helpful:
A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote
cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by
which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote
cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the
injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or
occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent
cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent
act or defective condition sets into operation the circumstances which result in injury
because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the
proximate cause.
6. Vda. De Gregorio et al v. Go Chong Bing
Facts:
Defendant, owner of trucks, had a driver and a "cargador" by the name of Francisco
Romera. In the afternoon of June 2, 1952, defendant ordered Romera to drive his
tuck with instructions that he follow another truck which was to be driven by the
defendant's driver. On its way, some persons boarded the truck, one of them was a
uniformed policeman by the name of Venana Orfanel. After a while, Orfanel asked
and insisted on driving the truck. Romera, out of respect and belief that Orfanel
knew how to drive well, allowed Orfanel to take the wheel. While Orfanel was
driving, they came near a truck that was about to park on the left side of the road. To
avoid collision, Orfanel swerved to the right and hit two pedestrians and ran over one
of them named Quirico Gregorio. Orfanel was prosecuted for homicide with reckless
imprudence. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced accordingly.
The heirs of Gregorio brought present case for damages against the
defendant, owner of the truck that ran over Gregorio. The CFI dismissed the case on
the ground that the death of Gregorio was caused by a negligent act/omission of a
person that is not, in any way, related to the defendant.
Plaintiffs witness claims that Romera gave the truck voluntarily to the
policeman. On the other hand, defendant testified that he gave positive instructions
to Romera not to allow anybody to drive the truck, and Romera himself testified that
he had warned Orfanel that his master prohibited him from allowing anybody to
drive the truck, but that as Orfanel was a uniformed policeman and insisted that he
drive the truck, and that as he believed that the policeman knew how to drive, he let
him drive the truck.
Issue:
WON defendant may be held liable for damages.
Ruling:
No. Defendant is not liable for damages. We are of the belief that defendant's claim
that Romera gave the wheel to the policeman for fear of, or out of respect for, the
latter, has been proved by a preponderance of the evidence. The testimony of
plaintiffs witness is not corroborated by any other testimony. As he testified that he
was two meters behind Romera, he could not have noticed with exactness the
circumstances under which the policeman was able to get hold of the wheel and
drive the truck and his testimony in that respect cannot be believed. We are,
therefore, forced to the conclusion that Romera gave the wheel to Orfanel out of
respect for the latter, who was a uniformed policeman and because he believed that
the latter had both the ability and the authority to drive the truck, especially as he
himself had only a student's permit and not a driver's license.
The court a quo dismissed the action on the ground that as the death or
accident was caused by an act or omission of a person who is not in any way related
to the defendant, and as such act or omission was punishable by law, and as a matter
of fact he had already been punished therefor, no civil liability should be imposed
upon the defendant. Against this decision the plaintiffs have appealed to this Court,
contending that when defendant permitted his cargador, who was not provided with a
driver's license, to drive the truck, he thereby violated the provisions of the Revised
Motor Vehicle Law (section 28., Act No. 3992), and that this constitutes negligence
per se. (People vs. Santos, et al., CA-G.R. No. 1088-1089R.) But admitting for the
sake of argument that the defendant had so violated the law, or may be deemed
negligent in entrusting the truck to one who is not provided with a driver's license, it
is clear that he may not be declared liable for the accident because his negligence
was not the direct and proximate cause thereof.
It is evident that the proximate, immediate and direct cause of the death of
the plaintiffs' intestate was the negligence of Orfanel, a uniformed policeman, who
took the wheel of the truck from defendant's cargador, in spite of the protest of the
latter. The reason for absolving the defendant therefor is not because the one
responsible for the accident had already received indemnification for the accident,
but because there is no direct and proximate causal connection between the
negligence or violation of the law by the defendant to the death of the plaintiff's
intestate.
7. NAKPIL & SONS v. CA
To be exempt from liability due to an act of God, the engineer/architect/contractor
must not have been negligent in the construction of the building.
FACTS:
Private respondents Philippine Bar Association (PBA) a non-profit organization
formed under the corporation law decided to put up a building in Intramuros, Manila.
Hired to plan the specifications of the building were Juan Nakpil & Sons, while
United Construction was hired to construct it. The proposal was approved by the
Board of Directors and signed by the President, Ramon Ozaeta. The building was
completed in 1966.
In 1968, there was an unusually strong earthquake which caused the building heavy
damage, which led the building to tilt forward, leading the tenants to vacate the
premises. United Construction took remedial measures to sustain the building.
PBA filed a suit for damages against United Construction, but United Construction
subsequently filed a suit against Nakpil and Sons, alleging defects in the plans and
specifications.
Technical Issues in the case were referred to Mr. Hizon, as a court appointed
Commissioner. PBA moved for the demolition of the building, but was opposed.
PBA eventually paid for the demolition after the building suffered more damages in
1970 due to previous earthquakes. The Commissioner found that there were
deviations in the specifications and plans, as well as defects in the construction of the
building.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an act of God (fortuitous event) exempts from liability parties who
would otherwise be due to negligence?
HELD:
Art. 1723 dictates that the engineer/architect and contractor are liable for damages
should the building collapse within 15 years from completion.
Art. 1174 of the NCC, however, states that no person shall be responsible for events,
which could not be foreseen. But to be exempt from liability due to an act of God,
the ff must occur:
1) cause of breach must be independent of the will of the debtor
2) event must be unforeseeable or unavoidable
3) event must be such that it would render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill the
obligation
4) debtor must be free from any participation or aggravation of the industry to the
creditor.
In the case at bar, although the damage was ultimately caused by the earthquake
which was an act of God, the defects in the construction, as well as the deviations in
the specifications and plans aggravated the damage, and lessened the preventive
measures that the building would otherwise have had.
8. Urbano vs IAC
STATEMENT OF FACTS:
At about 8:00 o'clock in the morning of October 23, 1980, petitioner
Filomeno Urbano went to his ricefield at Barangay Anonang, San Fabian,
Pangasinan located at about 100 meters from the tobacco seedbed of Marcelo Javier.
He found the place where he stored his palay flooded with water coming from the
irrigation canal nearby which had overflowed. Urbano went to the elevated portion
of the canal to see what happened and there he saw Marcelo Javier and Emilio Erfe
cutting grass. He asked them who was responsible for the opening of the irrigation
canal and Javier admitted that he was the one. Urbano then got angry and demanded
that Javier pay for his soaked palay. A quarrel between them ensued. Urbano
unsheathed his bolo (about 2 feet long, including the handle, by 2 inches wide) and
hacked Javier hitting him on the right palm of his hand, which was used in parrying
the bolo hack. Javier who was then unarmed ran away from Urbano but was
overtaken by Urbano who hacked him again hitting Javier on the left leg with the
back portion of said bolo, causing a swelling on said leg. When Urbano tried to hack
and inflict further injury, his daughter embraced and prevented him from hacking
Javier.
Immediately thereafter, Antonio Erfe, Emilio Erfe, and Felipe Erfe brought
Javier to his house about 50 meters away from where the incident happened. Emilio
then went to the house of Barangay Captain Menardo Soliven but not finding him
there, Emilio looked for barrio councilman Felipe Solis instead. Upon the advice of
Solis, the Erfes together with Javier went to the police station of San Fabian to report
the incident. As suggested by Corporal Torio, Javier was brought to a physician. The
group went to Dr. Guillermo Padilla, rural health physician of San Fabian, who did
not attend to Javier but instead suggested that they go to Dr. Mario Meneses because
Padilla had no available medicine.
After Javier was treated by Dr. Meneses, he and his companions returned to Dr.
Guillermo Padilla who conducted a medico-legal examination. Dr. Padilla issued a
medico-legal certificate which found the following:
1 -Incised wound 2 inches in length at the upper portion of the lesser
palmar prominence, right.
As to my observation the incapacitation is from (7-9) days period. This wound was
presented to me only for medico-legal examination, as it was already treated by the
other doctor.
Upon the intercession of Councilman Solis, Urbano and Javier agreed to
settle their differences. Urbano promised to pay P700.00 for the medical expenses of
Javier. Hence, on October 27, 1980, the two accompanied by Solis appeared before
the San Fabian Police to formalize their amicable settlement. Patrolman Torio
recorded the event in the police blotter. Urbano advanced P400.00 to Javier at the
police station. On November 3, 1980, the additional P300.00 was given to Javier at
Urbano's house in the presence of barangay captain Soliven.
At about 1:30 a.m. on November 14, 1980, Javier was rushed to the
Nazareth General Hospital in a very serious condition. When admitted to the
hospital, Javier had lockjaw and was having convulsions. Dr. Edmundo Exconde
who personally attended to Javier found that the latter's serious condition was caused
by tetanus toxin. He noticed the presence of a healing wound in Javier's palm which
could have been infected by tetanus.
On November 15, 1980 at exactly 4:18 p.m., Javier died in the hospital.
In an information dated April 10, 1981, Filomeno Urbano was charged with the
crime of homicide before the then Circuit Criminal Court of Dagupan City, Third
Judicial District.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE:
Upon arraignment, Urbano pleaded "not guilty." After trial, the trial court
found Urbano guilty as charged. He was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
prison term of from TWELVE (12) YEARS of prision mayor, as minimum to
SEVENTEEN (17) years, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, together with the accessories of the law, to indemnify the
heirs of the victim, Marcelo Javier, in the amount of P12,000.00 without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. He was ordered confined at
the New Bilibid Prison, in Muntinlupa, Rizal upon finality of the decision, in view of
the nature of his penalty.
The then Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the conviction of Urbano on
appeal but raised the award of indemnity to the heirs of the deceased to
P30,000.00 with costs against the appellant.
The appellant filed a motion for reconsideration and/or new trial based on an
affidavit by Soliven.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not there was an efficient intervening cause from the time
Javier was wounded until his death which would exculpate Urbano
from any liability for Javier's death.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
No. There is reasonable doubt over the true cause of the tetanus that killed
Javier. While there is doubt over his criminal liability that warrants acquittal, he may
still be civilly liable to Javiers heirs.
The lower courts ruled that Javier's death was the natural and logical
consequence of Urbano's unlawful act. Hence, he was declared responsible for
Javier's death.
The petitioner reiterates his position that the proximate cause of the death
of Marcelo Javier was due to his own negligence, that Dr. Mario Meneses found no
tetanus in the injury, and that Javier got infected with tetanus when after two weeks
he returned to his farm and tended his tobacco plants with his bare hands exposing
the wound to harmful elements like tetanus germs.
The evidence on record does not clearly show that the wound inflicted by
Urbano was infected with tetanus at the time of the infliction of the wound. The
evidence merely confirms that the wound, which was already healing at the time
Javier suffered the symptoms of the fatal ailment, somehow got infected with tetanus
However, as to when the wound was infected is not clear from the record.
The nature of Tetanus is that the incubation period of tetanus, i.e., the time
between injury and the appearance of unmistakable symptoms, ranges from 2 to 56
days. However, over 80 percent of patients become symptomatic within 14 days. A
short incubation period indicates severe disease, and when symptoms occur within 2
or 3 days of injury the mortality rate approaches 100 percent. Mild tetanus is
characterized by an incubation period of at least 14 days and an onset time of more
than 6 days.
Medically speaking, the reaction to tetanus found inside a man's body
depends on the incubation period of the disease.
In the case at bar, Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm
when he parried the bolo which Urbano used in hacking him on October 23, 1980.
After 22 days, or on November 14, 1980, he suffered the symptoms of tetanus, like
lockjaw and muscle spasms. The following day, November 15, 1980, he died.
If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already
infected by tetanus germs at the time, it is more medically probable that Javier
should have been infected with only a mild cause of tetanus because the symptoms of
tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking incident or more than 14 days
after the infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset time should have been more
than six days. Javier, however, died on the second day from the onset time. The more
credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the
appellant, the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present.
Consequently, Javier's wound could have been infected with tetanus after the
hacking incident. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his
wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days
before he died.
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and
logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. The medical
findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound
by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier
was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and
foreign to the crime.
A prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of an action if such
remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the
occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between
such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and
efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened
but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except
because of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause.
We must stress, however, that our discussion of proximate cause and remote
cause is limited to the criminal aspects of this rather unusual case. It does not
necessarily follow that the petitioner is also free of civil liability. The well-settled
doctrine is that a person, while not criminally liable, may still be civilly liable.
The respondent court increased the P12,000.00 indemnification imposed by
the trial court to P30,000.00. However, since the indemnification was based solely
on the finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt in the homicide case, the civil
liability of the petitioner was not thoroughly examined. This aspect of the case calls
for fuller development if the heirs of the victim are so minded.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned decision
of the then Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime of homicide. Costs de
oficio.
SO ORDERED.
9. National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals 161 SCRA 334,
G.R. No. L-47379 (May 16, 1998)
Facts:
Engineering Construction, Inc. (petitioner, ECI for brevity), being a successful
bidder, executed a contract in Manila with the National Waterworks and Sewerage
Authority (NAWASA), whereby the former undertook:
1. to furnish all tools, labor, equipment and materials, and
2. to construct the proposed 2nd Ipo-Bicti Tunnel, Intake and Outlet Structures, and
Appurtenant Structures, and Appurtenant Features at Norzagaray, Bulacan and 10. Rakes v. The Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Company
to complete said works within 800 calendar days. (Angat Hydro-electric Project
and Dam) Facts:
The project involves two (2) major phases: (1) tunnel work covering a distance of 7
kilometres and (2) the outworks at both ends of the tunnel.
Rakes, respondents employee, was at work transporting iron rails from a barge in
The ECI already had completed the first major phase of the work (Tunnel Excavation the harbour to the companys yard. At a certain spot near the waters edge, the track
Work), all the equipment no longer needed there were transferred to another site sagged, the car canted, the rails slid off and caught Rakes. He was amputated at
where some projects were yet to be completed. Some portion of the Bicti site were
about the knee. Rakes claims that only one hand car was used in his work. Atlantic
still under construction (2nd phase).
has proved that there were two, so that the end of the rails lay upon sills secured to
On November 4, 1967, Typhoon Welming hit Central Luzon, passing through
the cars, but without side pieces to prevent them from slipping off.
corporations Angat Hydro-electric Project and Dam.
Due to the heavy downpour, the water in the reservoir of the Angat Dam was rising
perilously at the rate of 60 cm per hour. To prevent an overflow of water from the Issue:
dam, the National Power Corporation(NPC) caused the opening of the spillway
gates. Whether there is contributory negligence on the part of petitioner
Extraordinary large volume of water rushed out of the gates, and hit the installations
and construction works of ECI at Ipo site with terrific impact, as a result of which the Held:
latters stockpile of materials supplies, camp facilities and permanent structures and
accessories whether washed away, lost or destroyed. While Atlantic was negligent in failing to repair the bed of the track, Rakes was
Issue: guilty of contributory negligence in walking at the side instead of being in front or
Whether or not the destruction and loss of ECIs equipment and facilities were due to behind. The amount of damages should be reduced.
force majeure, which will exempt NPC from liability.
Ruling:
11. Sabido v Custodio
No, NPC will not be exempted from liability. NPC was undoubtedly negligent
because it opened the spillway gates of the Angat Dam only at the height of typhoon
Facts:
Welming when it knew very well that it was safer to have opened the same
The case stemmed when the truck owned by petitioner Prospero Sabido and being
gradually and earlier, as it was also undeniable that NPC know of the coming
driven by his co-petitioner Aser Lagunda, while transversing a sharp curve,
typhoon at least four days before it actually struck.
sideswiped the bus owned by Laguna-Tayabas Bus Co. (LTB) being driven by its
The typhoon was an act of God or what we may call force majeure, NPC cannot
employee Nicasio Mudales. The accident caused the demise of Agripino Custodio,
escape liability because its negligence was the proximate cause of the loss and
the husband of respondent Belen Custodio, who was hanging at the left side of the
damage.
LTB bus when the accident happened.
As we have ruled in Juan F. Nakpil & Sons v. Court of Appeals:
A complaint was filed with the CFI of Laguna against both the LTB Co. and Sabido
If upon the happening of a fortuitous event or an act of God, there concurs a
and Lagunda. The lower court later ruled that both the company and the petitioners
corresponding fraud, negligence, delay or violation or contravention in any manner
were negligent in causing the death of Custodio. It was later elevated to the CA
of the tenor of the obligation, which results in loss or damage, the obligor cannot
which affirmed the decision of the trial court. The appellate court found the bus
escape liability.
company liable because of the fact that they allowed Custodio to hang on the side of
The principle embodied in the act of God doctrine strictly requires that the act must
the bus while transporting load of passengers. Likewise, CA also found the
be one occasioned exclusively by the violence of nature and human agencies are to
petitioners liable since the truck was running fast when it met the LTB bus and that
be excluded from creating or entering into the cause of the mischief. When the effect,
driver Lagunda had the opportunity to avoid the mishap if he had been more careful
the cause of which is to be considered, is found to be in part the result of the
and cautious. Thus, the Court of Appeals concluded that the bus Company and its
participation of man, whether it be from active intervention or neglect, or failure to
driver Nicasio Mudales (none of whom has appealed), had violated the contract
act, the whole occurrence is thereby HUMANIZED, as it were, and removed from
of carriage with Agripino Custodio, whereas petitioners Sabido and Lagunda were
the rules applicable to the acts of God.
guilty of a quasi delict, by reason of which all of them were held solidarity liable.
Petitioners are now contending that they should not be liable because the death of
Custodio was exclusively due to the negligence of the bus company. Petitioners also
argued that they should not be held solidarily liable with the carrier and the driver
because the latter's liability arose from a breach of contract whereas the former
sprung from a quasi delict.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners should be held solidarily liable with the bus company in
view of the demise of the latter's passenger despite the difference as to the basis of
their respective liability
Ruling:
YES. The petitioners are liable.
While it is true that the bus company and the driver were gulity of negligence for
having allowed Custodio to ride on the running board of the bus which was the
proximate cause of the Agripino's death, it must be noted that the petitioners were
likewise guilty of contributory negligence, which was as much a proximate cause of
the accident as the carrier's negligence as their truck was running at a considerable
speed, despite the fact that it was negotiating a sharp curve, and, instead of being
close to right side of the road, said truck was driven on its middle portion and so near
the passenger bus coming from the opposite direction as to sideswipe a passenger
riding on its running board.
Although the negligence of the carrier and its driver is independent, in its
execution, of the negligence of the truck driver and its owner, both acts of
negligence are the proximate cause of the death of Custodio. In fact, the
negligence of the first two (2) would not have produced this result without
the negligence of the petitioners. As such, petitioners had the ample time to prevent
or avoid the accident and thus they had the last clear chance.
As to petitioners' contention that they should not be held solidarily liable with
the bus company and its driver, because the latter's liability arises from a
breach of contract, whereas that of the former springs from a quasi delict.
The rule is, however, that:
"According to the great weight of authority, where the concurrent or
successive negligent acts or omission of two or more persons, although acting
independently of each other, are, in combination, the direct and proximate
cause of a single injury to a third person, and it is impossible to determine
in what proportion each contributed to the injury, either is responsible for the
whole injury, even though his act alone might not have caused the entire
injury, or the same damage might have resulted from the acts of the other
tort-feasor..."
12. Umali v Bacani
Facts:
On May 14, 1972, a storm with strong rain hit the Municipality of Alcala
Pangasinan. During the storm, the banana plants standing near the transmission line
of the Alcala Electric Plant (AEP) were blown down and fell on the electric wire.
The live electric wire was cut, one end of which was left hanging on the electric post
and the other fell to the ground. The following morning, barrio captain saw Cipriano
Baldomero, a laborer of the AEP, asked him to fix it, but the latter told the barrio
captain that he could not do it but that he was going to look for the lineman to fix it.
Sometime thereafter, a small boy of 3 years and 8 months old by the name of Manuel
P. Saynes, whose house is just on the opposite side of the road, went to the place
where the broken line wire was and got in contact with it. The boy was electrocuted
and he subsequently died. It was only after the electrocution that the broken wire was
fixed.
Issues:
(1) WON the proximate cause of the boy's death is due to a fortuitous event- storm;
(2) WON boys parents negligence exempts petitioner from liability.
Ruling: Decision affirmed.
(1) A careful examination of the records convinces the SC that a series of negligence
on the part of defendants' employees in the AEP resulted in the death of the victim
by electrocution. With ordinary foresight, the employees of the petitioner could have
easily seen that even in case of moderate winds the electric line would be endangered
by banana plants being blown down.
(2) Art. 2179 CC provides that if the negligence of the plaintiff (parents of the victim
in this case) was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury
being the defendants' (petitioners) lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover
damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. This law may be
availed of by the petitioner but does not exempt him from liability. Petitioner's
liability for injury caused by his employees negligence is well defined in par. 4, of
Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
13. Allied Bank v Lim Sio Wan
FACTS:
Lim Sio Wan (deposited 1st money market) > Allied Bank > (pre-terminated and
withdrawn) Santos > (through forged indorsement of Lim Sio Wan deposited in FCC
account) Metrobank > (release in exchange of undertaking of reimbursement) FCC
> (through Santos, as officer of Producers bank, deposited money market) Producers
Bank
September 21, 1983: FCC had deposited a money market placement for P 2M
with Producers Bank
Santos was the money market trader assigned to handle FCCs account
 Such deposit is evidenced by Official Receipt and a Letter
When the placement matured, FCC demanded the payment of the proceeds of
the placement
November 14, 1983: Lim Sio Wan deposited with Allied Banking Corporation
(Allied) a money market placement of P 1,152,597.35 for a term of 31 days
December 5, 1983: a person claiming to be Lim Sio Wan called up Cristina So,
an officer of Allied, and instructed the latter to pre-terminate Lim Sio Wans
money market placement, to issue a managers check representing the proceeds
of the placement, and to give the check to Deborah Dee Santos who would pick
up the check. Lim Sio Wan described the appearance of Santos
Santos arrived at the bank and signed the application form for a managers
check to be issued
The bank issued Managers Check representing the proceeds of Lim Sio Wans
money market placement in the name of Lim Sio Wan, as payee, cross-checked
"For Payees Account Only" and given to Santos
Allied managers check was deposited in the account of Filipinas Cement
Corporation (FCC) at Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. (Metrobank), with the
forged signature of Lim Sio Wan as indorser
Metrobank stamped a guaranty on the check, which reads: "All prior
endorsements and/or lack of endorsement guaranteed."
Upon the presentment of the check, Allied funded the check even without
checking the authenticity of Lim Sio Wans purported indorsement.
amount on the face of the check was credited to the account of FCC
December 9, 1983: Lim Sio Wan deposited with Allied a second money market
placement to mature on January 9, 1984
December 14, 1983: upon the maturity date of the first money market
placement, Lim Sio Wan went to Allied to withdraw it. She was then informed
that the placement had been pre-terminated upon her instructions which she
denied
Lim Sio Wan filed with the RTC against Allied to recover the proceeds of her
first money market placement
Allied filed a third party complaint against Metrobank and Santos
Metrobank filed a fourth party complainagainst FCC
FCC for its part filed a fifth party complaint against Producers Bank.
Summonses were duly served upon all the parties except for Santos, who was no
longer connected with Producers Bank
May 15, 1984: Allied informed Metrobank that the signature on the check was
forged
Metrobank withheld the amount represented by the check from FCC.
Metrobank agreed to release the amount to FCC after the FCC executed an
undertaking, promising to indemnify Metrobank in case it was made to
reimburse the amount
Lim Sio Wan thereafter filed an amended complaint to include Metrobank as a
party-defendant, along with Allied.
RTC : Allied Bank to pay Lim Sio Wan plus damages and atty. fees
Allied Banks cross-claim against Metrobank is DISMISSED.
Metrobanks third-party complaint as against Filipinas Cement Corporation is
DISMISSED
Filipinas Cement Corporations fourth-party complaint against Producers Bank
is DISMISSED
CA: Modified. Allied Banking Corporation to pay 60% and Metropolitan Bank
and Trust Company 40%
ISSUE: W/N Allied should be solely liable to Lim Sio Wan.
HELD: YES. CA affirmed. Modified Porudcers Bank to reimburse Allied and
Metrobank.
Articles 1953 and 1980 of the Civil Code
Art. 1953. A person who receives a loan of money or any other fungible thing
acquires the ownership thereof, and is bound to pay to the creditor an equal amount
of the same kind and quality.

Art. 1980. Fixed, savings, and current deposits of money in banks and similar
institutions shall be governed by the provisions concerning simple loan.
bank deposit is in the nature of a simple loan or mutuum
money market is a market dealing in standardized short-term credit instruments
(involving large amounts) where lenders and borrowers do not deal directly with
each other but through a middle man or dealer in open market. In a money
market transaction, the investor is a lender who loans his money to a borrower
through a middleman or dealer.
Lim Sio Wan, as creditor of the bank for her money market placement, is
entitled to payment upon her request, or upon maturity of the placement, or until
the bank is released from its obligation as debtor
GR: collecting bank which indorses a check bearing a forged indorsement and
presents it to the drawee bank guarantees all prior indorsements, including the
forged indorsement itself, and ultimately should be held liable therefor
EX: when the issuance of the check itself was attended with negligence.
Allied negligent in issuing the managers check and in transmitting it to Santos
without even a written authorization
Allied did not even ask for the certificate evidencing the money market
placement or call up Lim Sio Wan at her residence or office to confirm her
instructions.
Allieds negligence must be considered as the proximate cause of the resulting
loss.
When Metrobank indorsed the check without verifying the authenticity of Lim
Sio Wans indorsement and when it accepted the check despite the fact that it
was cross-checked payable to payees account only
contributed to the easier release of Lim Sio Wans money and perpetuation of
the fraud
Given the relative participation of Allied and Metrobank to the instant case, both
banks cannot be adjudged as equally liable. Hence, the 60:40 ratio of the
liabilities of Allied and Metrobank, as ruled by the CA, must be upheld.
FCC, having no participation in the negotiation of the check and in the forgery
of Lim Sio Wans indorsement, can raise the real defense of forgery as against
both banks
Producers Bank was unjustly enriched at the expense of Lim Sio Wan
Producers Bank should reimburse Allied and Metrobank for the amounts
ordered to pay Lim Sio Wan
14. People vs Iligan
Facts
At around 2:00 oclock in the morning, Esmeraldo Quiones, Jr. and his
companions, Zaldy Asis and Felix Lukban, were walking home after attending a
barrio fiesta dance. They met the accused Fernando Iligan, his nephew, Edmundo
Asis, and Juan Macandog. Edmundo Asis pushed them aside thereby prompting
Zaldy Asis to box him. Felix Lukban quickly told the group of the accused that they
had no desire to fight. Fernando Iligan, upon seeing his nephew fall, hacked Zaldy
Asis with a bolo but missed. Terrified, the trio ran and were able to flee. After about
half an hour, the three accused suddenly emerged on the roadside and without a
word, Fernando Iligan hacked Quiones, Jr. with his bolo hitting him on the forehead
and causing him to fall down. Horrified, Felix Lukban and Zaldy Asis fled but
returned walking after they heard shouts of people. On the spot where Quiones, Jr.
was hacked, Zaldy Asis and Felix Lukban saw him already dead with his head
busted.
Subsequently, an information for murder against herein appellants were filed. The
defendants denied having perpetrated the crime. They alleged that they were in their
respective houses at the time the crime was committed. During the trial, the defense
made capital of the testimony of prosecution witness Dr. Abas who swore that the
multiple fracture on the head of Quiones, Jr. was caused by a vehicular accident
which opinion was earlier put in writing by the same witness in the postmortem
examination. The trial court convicted the appellants stating the fact of the alleged
vehicular accident has not been fully established, that the photograph of the victim
taken immediately after his body had been brought home shows that the entire head
was not crushed by any vehicle. The lower court also found that Iligans group
conspired to kill anyone or all members of the group of the victim to vindicate the
boxing on the face of Edmundo Asis. It appreciated the aggravating circumstances of
evident premeditation and treachery.
ISSUE: WON herein appellants Iligan et. al are guilty of murder.
RULING: Not murder but guilty of homicide.
The Court is convinced that indeed, after Quiones, Jr. had fallen from the
bolo-hacking perpetrated by Iligan, he was run over by a vehicle (the incident
happened in a national highway). This finding, however, does not in any way
exonerate Iligan from liability for the death of Quiones, Jr.
Under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability shall be
incurred "by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done
be different from that which he intended." Based on the doctrine that "el que es causa
de la causa es causa del mal causado" (he who is the cause of the cause is the cause
of the evil caused), the essential requisites of Article 4 are: (a) that an intentional
felony has been committed, and (b) that the wrong done to the aggrieved party be the
direct, natural and logical consequence of the felony committed by the offender.
These requisites are present in this case. The Court held that while Iligans hacking
of Quiones, Jr.s head might not have been the direct cause, it was the
proximate cause of the latters death. Proximate legal cause is defined as "that
acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other
events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each
having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event
in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of
the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent
person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default
that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.
As to the aggravating circumstances of treachery and premeditation, the Court ruled
that there was no showing of such circumstances. Suddenness of such attack does not
by itself show treachery. There must be evidence that the mode of attack was
consciously adopted by the appellant to make it impossible or hard for the person
attacked to defend himself. In this case, the hacking of Edmundo Asis by Iligan
followed by the chasing of the trio by the group of Iligan was a warning to the
deceased and his companions of the hostile attitude of the appellants. The requisites
necessary to appreciate evident premeditation have likewise not been met in this
case. Thus, the prosecution failed to prove all of the following: (a) the time when the
accused determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the
accused had clung to their determination to commit the crime; and (c) the lapse of
sufficient length of time between the determination and execution to allow him to
reflect upon the consequences of his act.
15. PLDT V CA
FACTS
Sps. Esteban were riding their jeep along the inside lane of Lacson Street where they
resided [at 25km/hr as Antonio Esteban claimed; CA said jeep ran fast; if the jeep
braked at that speed, the spouses would not have been thrown against the
windshield]. The jeep abruptly swerved from the inside lane, then it ran over a
mound of earth and fell into an open trench, an excavation allegedly undertaken by
PLDT for the installation of its underground conduit system. Antonio failed to notice
the open trench which was left uncovered because of the darkness and the lack of
any warning light or signs. The spouses were thrown against the windshield. Gloria
Esteban allegedly sustained injuries on her arms, legs and face, leaving a permanent
scar on her cheek, while Antonio suffered cut lips. The jeeps windshield was also
shattered.
PLDT denies liability, contending that the injuries sustained by the spouses
were due to their own negligence, and that it should be the independent contractor
L.R. Barte and Co. [Barte] who should be held liable. PLDT filed a third-party
complaint against Barte, alleging that under the terms of their agreement, PLDT
should not be answerable for any accident or injuries arising from the negligence of
Barte or its employees. Barte claimed that it was not aware, nor was it notified of the
accident, and that it complied with its contract with PLDT by installing the necessary
and appropriate signs.
RTC ruled in favor of the spouses. CA reversed RTC and dismissed the
spouses complaint, saying that the spouses were negligent. Later, it set aside its
earlier decision and affirmed in totoRTCs decision. (SC declared this later decision
null and void. The first decision already became final and executory because no
appeal was taken seasonably.)
ISSUE AND HOLDING
WON PLDT is liable for the injuries sustained by Sps. Esteban. NO
RATIO
The accident which befell the spouses was due to the lack of diligence of Antonio,
and was not imputable to the negligent omission on the part of PLDT. If the accident
did not happen because thejeep was running quite fast on the inside lane and for
some reason or other it had to swerve suddenly to the right and had to climb over the
accident mound, then Antonio had not exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family to avoid the accident. With the drizzle, he should not have run on dim lights,
but should have put on his regular lights which should have made him see the
accident mound in time. The mound was relatively big and visible, being 2-3 ft high
and 1-1/2 ft wide. Also, he knew of the existence and location of the mound, having
seen it many previous times.
The negligence of Antonio was not only contributory to his and his wifes
injuries but goes to thevery cause of the occurrence of the accident, as one of its
determining factors, and therebyprecludes their right to recover damages. The
perils of the road were known to the spouses. By exercising reasonable care and
prudence, Antonio could have avoided the injurious consequences of his act, even
assuming arguendo that there was some alleged negligence on the part of PLDT.
The omission to perform a duty, such as the placing of warning signs on the
site of the excavation, constitutes the proximate cause only when the doing of the
said omitted act would have prevented the injury. As a resident of Lacson Street,
he passed on that street almost everyday and had knowledge of the presence and
location of the excavations there; hence, the presence of warning signs could not
have completely prevented the accident. Furthermore, Antonio had the last clear
chance to avoid the accident, notwithstanding the negligence he imputes to PLDT.
 A person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the burden
of proving the existence of such fault or negligence causative thereof, otherwise,
his action must fail. The facts constitutive of negligence must be affirmatively
established by competent evidence. In this case, there was insufficient evidence to
prove any negligence on the part of PLDT. What was presented was just the self-
serving testimony of Antonio and the unverified photograph of a portion of the scene
of the accident. The absence of a police report and the non-submission of a medical
report from the hospital where the spouses were allegedly treated have not even been
explained.
16. ST. MARYS ACADEMY, petitioner, vs. WILLIAM CARPITANOS
and LUCIA S. CARPITANOS, GUADA DANIEL, JAMES
DANIEL II, JAMES DANIEL, SR., and VIVENCIO
VILLANUEVA, respondents.
FACTS:
St. Mary's Academy of Dipolog City conducted an enrollment drive for the school
year 1995-1996. A facet of the enrollment campaign was the visitation of schools
from where prospective enrollees were studying. As a student of St. Marys
Academy, Sherwin Carpitanos was part of the campaigning group. Accordingly, on
the fateful day, Sherwin, along with other high school students were riding in a
Mitsubishi jeep owned by Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary
School, Larayan, Dapitan City. The jeep was driven by James Daniel II then 15 years
old and a student of the same school. Allegedly, the latter drove the jeep in a reckless
manner and as a result the jeep turned turtle. Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result of
the injuries he sustained from the accident.
Claiming damages for the death of their only son, Sherwin Carpitanos, spouses
William Carpitanos and Lucia Carpitanos filed a case against James Daniel II and his
parents, James Daniel Sr. and Guada Daniel, the vehicle owner, Vivencio Villanueva
and St. Marys Academy before the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City.
RTC:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered in the
following manner:
1. Defendant St. Marys Academy of Dipolog City, is hereby ordered to pay William
Carpitanos and Luisa Carpitanos:
a. 50,000.00 indemnity for the loss of life of Sherwin S. Carpitanos;
b. P40,000.00 actual damages incurred by plaintiffs for burial and related expenses;
c. P10,000.00 for attorneys fees;
d. P500,000.00 for moral damages; and to pay costs.
2. Their liability being only subsidiary, James Daniel, Sr. and Guada Daniel are
hereby ordered to pay herein plaintiffs the amount of damages above-stated in the
event of insolvency of principal obligor St. Marys Academy of Dipolog City;
3. James Daniel II, being a minor at the time of the commission of the tort and who
was under special parental authority of defendant St. Marys Academy, is
ABSOLVED from paying the above-stated damages, same being adjudged against
defendants St. Marys Academy, and subsidiarily, against his parents;
4. Vivencio Villanueva is hereby ABSOLVED of any liability.
CA: reduced the actual damages to P25,000.00 but otherwise affirming the decision
a quo, in toto. MR was denied.
Issues:
1. Whether the St. Mary's liable for damages for the death of Sherwin
Carpitanos.
2. Whether the moral damages were properly awarded.
Held:
1. 1. NO.
Respondents failed to show that the negligence of petitioner was the proximate cause
of the death of the victim. Spouses Daniel and Villanueva admitted that the
immediate cause of the accident was not the negligence of St. Mary's or the reckless
driving of James Daniel II, but the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the
jeep. The cause of the accident was not the recklessness of James Daniel II but the
mechanical defect in the jeep of Vivencio Villanueva. Respondents, including the
Spouses Carpitanos, parents of the deceased Sherwin Carpitanos, did not dispute the
report and testimony of the traffic investigator who stated that the cause of the
accident was the detachment of the steering wheel guide that caused the jeep to turn
turtle. Significantly, respondents did not present any evidence to show that the
proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the school authorities, or the
reckless driving of James Daniel II. Hence, the respondents reliance on Article 219
of the Family Code that those given the authority and responsibility under the
preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by
acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor was unfounded.
Further, there was no evidence that St. Mary's allowed the minor James Daniel II to
drive the jeep of Vivencio Villanueva. It was Ched Villanueva, grandson of Vivencio
Villanueva, who had possession and control of the jeep. He was driving the vehicle
and he allowed James Daniel II, a minor, to drive the jeep at the time of the accident.
Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence of the minor
driver or mechanical detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, must be
pinned on the minors parents primarily. The negligence of St. Mary's Academy was
only a remote cause of the accident. Between the remote cause and the injury, there
intervened the negligence of the minors parents or the detachment of the steering
wheel guide of the jeep. Considering that the negligence of the minor driver or the
detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep owned by Villanueva was an
event over which St. Marys Academy had no control, and which was the proximate
cause of the accident, St. Mary's may not be held liable for the death resulting from
such accident.
2. 2. NO.
St. Mary's cannot be held liable for moral damages in the amount of P500,000.00.
Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if
they are the proximate result of the defendants wrongful act or omission. In this case,
the proximate cause of the accident was not attributable to St. Mary's.
The grant of attorneys fees as part of damages is the exception rather than the rule.
The power of the court to award attorneys fees under Article 2208 of the Civil Code
demands factual, legal and equitable justification. Thus, the grant of attorneys fees
against the St. Mary's is deleted.
Incidentally, there was no question that the registered owner of the vehicle was
respondent Villanueva. He never denied and in fact admitted this fact. We have held
that the registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would
primarily be responsible to the public or to third persons for injuries caused the latter
while the vehicle was being driven on the highways or streets. Hence, with the
overwhelming evidence presented by St. Mary's and the Spouses Daniel that the
accident occurred because of the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep,
it is not the school, but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held
responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.
17. ROLLIE CALIMUTAN, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.
TOPIC: Proximate Cause
FACTS:
The victim Cantre and his companion, Saano were heading back home from a
videoke bar when they met petitioner Calimutan and his helper Bulalacao along the
road. Cantre, of big built and at 26 years old, had a grudge against Bulalacao, of
small built and of 15 years old due to the latter allegedly stoning the formers house.
Thus, upon seeing Bulalacao, Cantre punched him. Calimutan came to his helpers
rescue and picked up a stone, as big as a mans fist, and threw it to Cantre which hit
the left side of his back. Saano came to pacify the two. Afterwards, they proceeded
to their respective destinations.
After the incident, at home, Cantre complained of pain on his back. He suffered fever
and alternate feeling of warmness and coldness. The next day, Cantre died. Right
after, the corpse of Cantre was examined by Dr. Ulanday, Municiapl Doctor, who
made a report that Cantre died due to food poisoning. He was buried.
Not satisfied, the family of Cantre requested for exhumation and autopsy of the
body. The autopsy was conducted Dr. Mendez of the NBI which concluded that the
cause of the death was traumatic injury of the abdomen due to internal hemorrhage
and massive accumulation of blood in his abdominal cavity due to his lacerated
spleen.
Petitioner argued that due to the inconsistent findings of the two government
physicians, he cannot be convicted beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Homicide.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the stoning of Calimutan is the proximate cause of the death
of Cantre.
(2) Whether or not Cantre can be convicted of Homicide beyond reasonable
doubt.
RULING:
(1) Yes.
Before the encounter with petitioner Calimutan and Bulalacao, the victim Cantre
seemed to be physically fine. However, after being hit at the back by the stone
thrown at him by petitioner Calimutan, the victim Cantre had continuously
complained of backache. Subsequently, his physical condition rapidly deteriorated,
until finally, he died. Other than being stoned by petitioner Calimutan, there was no
other instance when the victim Cantre may have been hit by another blunt instrument
which could have caused the laceration of his spleen.
Dr. Mendez was presented by the prosecution as an expert witness, whose
"competency and academic qualification and background" was admitted by the
defense itself. As a Senior Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI, Dr. Mendez is
presumed to possess sufficient knowledge of pathology, surgery, gynecology,
toxicology, and such other branches of medicine germane to the issues involved in a
case.
(2) No.
Calimutan can only be convicted of Reckless Imprudence resulting to Homicide.
Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code classifies felonies according to the means by
which they are committed, in particular: (1) intentional felonies, and (2) culpable
felonies. These two types of felonies are distinguished from each other by the
existence or absence of malicious intent of the offender.
The Court cannot attribute to petitioner Calimutan any malicious intent to injure,
much less to kill, the victim Cantre; and in the absence of such intent, this Court
cannot sustain the conviction of petitioner Calimutan for the intentional crime of
homicide. The meeting between the parties was a chance encounter as the two parties
were on their way to different destinations. That he threw the stone at the back of the
victim Cantre does not automatically imply treachery on the part of petitioner
Calimutan as it is highly probable that in the midst of the fray, he threw the stone
rashly and impulsively, with no regard as to the position of the victim Cantre.

18. VAMADOR CORPUZ and ROMEO GONZALES, Petitioners,vs.
EDISON LUGUE and CATHERINE BALUYOT, Respondents.
FACTS:
On 14 September 1984, at around 7:15 in the morning, while an Isuzu KC-20
passenger jeep (KC-20), then being driven by Jimmy Basilio, was traversing the
right side of the Roman Highway in Barangay Pias, Orion, Bataan, it collided with a
tanker truck driven by Gerardo Lim, which was then moving from the right shoulder
of the highway. As a result of the collision, the KC-20 was thrown towards the left
lane of the highway where it was bumped by a Mazda minibus (minibus) being
driven by herein petitioner Gonzales who was then trying to overtake the KC-20. At
that point, the KC-20 spun and bumped a Transcon service truck parked on the left
side of the highway. As a result of the impact, the KC-20 was thrown across the
highway where it was again hit by the minibus pushing the former towards a deep
portion on the left side of the road. As a consequence of the accident, passengers of
the KC-20, including respondent Lugue, suffered physical injuries.
Respondent Lugue then filed an action for damages arising from the vehicular
incident before the Bataan RTC, against herein petitioners Amador Corpuz and
Romeo Gonzales, owner and driver of the minibus, respectively, and Oscar Jaring
and Gerardo Lim, owner and driver of the tanker truck, respectively. Therein
defendants filed a third-party complaint against Ricardo Santiago and Jimmy Basilio,
owner/operator and driver of the KC-20, respectively.
After trial, the lower court rendered a decision holding jointly and severally liable
Ricardo Santiago, Jimmy Basilio, Oscar Jaring, Gerardo Lim, Amador Corpuz, and
Romeo Gonzales.
The Court of Appeals granted the appeal of Oscar Jaring and Gerardo Lim, while it
dismissed that of plaintiffs Santiago and Basilio in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is MODIFIED as follows:
1.) Defendants Ricardo Santiago and Jimmy Basilio are declared jointly and
severally liable with defendants-appellants Amador Corpuz and Romeo Gonzales;
and
2.) Defendants-appellants Oscar Jaring and Gerardo Lim are absolved from liability
and the Complaint as against them is DISMISSED.
ISSUE: whether or not the appellate court erred in holding them liable for damages
based on the findings of facts adduced by the trial court.
HELD: It is clear that the proximate cause of the injuries suffered by respondent
Lugue was the collision between the KC-20 and the tanker truck. As correctly
pointed out by the lower court, proximate legal cause is that acting first and
producing the injury either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all
constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal
connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately
effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted,
under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an
ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the
moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result
therefrom.
This conclusion of the appellate court of recklessness on the part of petitioner
Gonzales is, however, unwarranted. Based on the unchallenged testimony of
petitioner Gonzales, he signaled to overtake the KC-20 because the way was clear.
That despite his best effort to do everything to avoid hitting the KC-20, petitioner
failed to do so because the KC-20 had moved to a position blocking the way of the
minibus as a result of the tanker bumping the KC-20. Furthermore, based on the
unrebutted testimony of both Remigio Gervacio and Patrocinio Carillo, at the time
when the minibus hit the KC-20, the former was already moving towards the middle
portion of the highway, occupying the left portion of the road, a little beyond the
center line. Certainly, even assuming that petitioner Gonzales had a few seconds
before actual collision, he no longer had any opportunity to avoid it. Petitioner
Gonzales cannot be deemed negligent for failing to prevent the collision even after
applying all means available to him within the few instants when he had discovered
the impending peril. In a similar case where a jeepney bound for Isabela collided
with a bus on its regular route to Manila when the latter encroached upon the
jeepneys lane while it was negotiating a curve, the Court declared that:
Even assuming that the jeepney driver perceived the danger a few seconds
before the actual collision, he had no opportunity to avoid it. This Court has held that
the last clear chance doctrine "can never apply where the party charged is required to
act instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all
means at hand after the peril is or should have been discovered.
19. NONE
20. EMMANUEL B. AZNAR, Petitioner, vs.CITIBANK, N.A.,
(Philippines), Respondent.
Facts:
Emmanuel B. Aznar (Aznar), a known businessman in Cebu, is a holder of a
Preferred Master Credit Card (Mastercard) bearing number 5423-3920-0786-7012
issued by Citibank with a credit limit of P150,000.00. As he and his wife, Zoraida,
planned to take their two grandchildren, Melissa and Richard Beane, on an Asian
tour, Aznar made a total advance deposit of P485,000.00 with Citibank with the
intention of increasing his credit limit to P635,000.00.
Petitioner claims that when he presented his credit card in some establishments in
Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, the same was not honored. And when he tried to
use the same in Ingtan Tour and Travel Agency (Ingtan Agency) in Indonesia to
purchase plane tickets to Bali, it was again dishonored for the reason that his card
was blacklisted by the respondent bank.
Aznar filed a complaint for damages against Citibank at RTC Cebu City, claiming
that Citibank fraudulently or with gross negligence blacklisted his Mastercard which
forced him, his wife and grandchildren to abort important tour destinations and
prevented them from buying certain items in their tour. 9 He further claimed that he
suffered mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, besmirched reputation
and social humiliation due to the wrongful blacklisting of his card. To prove that
respondent blacklisted his credit card, Petitioner presented a computer print-out,
denominated as ON-LINE AUTHORIZATIONS FOREIGN ACCOUNT
ACTIVITY REPORT, issued to him by Ingtan Agency with the signature of one
Victrina Elnado Nubi which shows that his card in question was
DECL OVERLIMIT or declared over the limit.
The Regional Trial Court (through JUDGE FERDINAND MARCOS), rendered its
decision dismissing petitioners complaint for lack of merit. It held that as between
the computer print-out presented by petitioner and the Warning Cancellation
Bulletins presented by respondent, the latter had more weight as their due execution
and authenticity was duly established by respondent.
Upon motion for reconsideration, the decision was reversed. Judge De la Pea ruled
that the computer print-out was printed out by Nubi in the ordinary or regular course
of business in the modern credit card industry and Nubi was not able to testify as she
was in a foreign country and cannot be reached by subpoena. The same took judicial
notice of the practice of automated teller machines (ATMs) and credit card facilities
which readily print out bank account status, therefore the print-out can be received as
prima facie evidence of the dishonor of petitioners credit card. Judge De la Pena
awarded 10,000,000.00 as moral damages;, P5,000,000.00 as exemplary damages;
P1,000,000.00 as attorneys fees; and P200,000.00 as litigation expenses.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled that the computer print-out is an electronic
document which must be authenticated pursuant to Section 2, Rule 5 of the Rules on
Electronic Evidence or under Section 20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court by
anyone who saw the document executed or written; Petitioner, however, failed to
prove its authenticity, thus it must be excluded.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the On Line Authorization Report is an electronic
document?
2. WON the paragraph 15 of CITIBANKs terms and conditions which limits
its liability to P1,000.00 or the actual damage proven is valid
Held:
1. The petition was denied by the Supreme Court for lack of merit.
It is basic that in civil cases, the burden of proof rests on the plaintiff to establish his
case based on a preponderance of evidence. The party that alleges a fact also has the
burden of proving it.
Petitioner puts much weight on the ON-LINE AUTHORIZATION FOREIGN
ACCOUNT ACTIVITY REPORT, a computer print-out handed to petitioner by
Ingtan Agency, to prove that his credit card was dishonored for being blacklisted. On
said print-out appears the words DECL OVERLIMIT.
As correctly pointed out by the RTC and the CA, such exhibit cannot be considered
admissible as its authenticity and due execution were not sufficiently established by
petitioner.
The prevailing rule at the time of the promulgation of the RTC Decision is Section
20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. It provides that whenever any private
document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and
authenticity must be proved either by (a) anyone who saw the document executed or
written; or (b) by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the
maker.
Petitioner, who testified on the authenticity did not actually see the document
executed or written, neither was he able to provide evidence on the genuineness of
the signature or handwriting of Nubi, who handed to him said computer print-out.
Even if examined under the Rules on Electronic Evidence, which took effect on
August 1, 2001, and which is being invoked by petitioner in this case, the
authentication of the computer print-out would still be found wanting.
Petitioner claims that his testimony complies with par. (c), i.e., it constitutes the
other evidence showing integrity and reliability of Exh. G to the satisfaction
of the judge. The Court is not convinced. Petitioners testimony that the person
from Ingtan Agency merely handed him the computer print-out and that he thereafter
asked said person to sign the same cannot be considered as sufficient to show said
print-outs integrity and reliability. As correctly pointed out by Judge Marcos, Exh.
G does not show on its face that it was issued by Ingtan Agency as petitioner
merely mentioned in passing how he was able to secure the print-out from the
agency. Petitioner also failed to show the specific business address of the source of
the computer print-out because while the name of Ingtan Agency was mentioned by
petitioner, its business address was not reflected in the print-out.
Indeed, petitioner failed to demonstrate how the information reflected on the print-
out was generated and how the said information could be relied upon as true.
2. Such stipulation cannot be considered as valid for being unconscionable as
it precludes payment of a larger amount even though damage may be clearly
proven. This Court is not precluded from ruling out blind adherence to the
terms of a contract if the attendant facts and circumstances show that they
should be ignored for being obviously too one-sided.
The invalidity of the terms and conditions being invoked by Citibank,
notwithstanding, SC still cannot award damages in favor of petitioner.
It is settled that in order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of
which he complains, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of
duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff a concurrence of injury to the
plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing it. The underlying basis for
the award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was injured in
contemplation of law; thus there must first be a breach before damages may be
awarded and the breach of such duty should be the proximate cause of the injury. 57
It is not enough that one merely suffered sleepless nights, mental anguish or serious
anxiety as a result of the actuations of the other party. It is also required that a
culpable act or omission was factually established, that proof that the wrongful act or
omission of the defendant is shown as the proximate cause of the damage sustained
by the claimant and that the case is predicated on any of the instances expressed or
envisioned by Arts. 2219 and 2220 of the Civil Code.
In culpa contractual or breach of contract, moral damages are recoverable only if the
defendant has acted fraudulently or in bad faith, or is found guilty of gross
negligence amounting to bad faith, or in wanton disregard of his contractual
obligations. The breach must be wanton, reckless, malicious or in bad faith,
oppressive or abusive.
While the Court commiserates with Aznar for whatever undue embarrassment he
suffered when his credit card was dishonored by Ingtan Agency, especially when the
agencys personnel insinuated that he could be a swindler trying to use blacklisted
cards, the Court cannot grant his present petition as he failed to show by
preponderance of evidence that Citibank breached any obligation that would make it
answerable for said suffering.
There is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal
invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the
injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage
suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury to those instances in which the
loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. In such cases, the
consequences must be borne by the injured person alone, the law affords no remedy
for damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong.
These situations are often called damnum absque injuria.
21. Dapar v. Biascan, G.R. No. 141880, September 27, 2004.
Facts: Spouses Gloria and Mario Biascan were married in civil rights in Quezon
City. They had four (4) children. Mario Biascan worked in Saudi Arabia as an
overseas contract worker from 1977 to 1981. In 1979 he met Zenaida Dapar, who
was working as a domestic helper. That meeting ripened into an intimate
relationship, which resulted in Marios failure to give support to his wife and family.
Zenaida returned to the Philippines in 1981. Upon Marios return, he joined
Zenaida to live in a rented house in Valenzuela. They opened a joint account with the
Philippine National Bank (PNB), Valenzuela Branch. Mario returned to Saudi
Arabia in February 1984, while Zenaida stayed behind. He remitted his earnings to
Zenaida, and the latter deposited the said amounts in the PNB joint savings account.
On July 8, 1985, a contract to sell was executed by and between State Land
Investment Corporation and Sps. Mario M. Biascan/& Zenaida D. Biascan over a
parcel of land in Caloocan City. A Deed of Sale was executed in favor of the Sps.
Mario M. Biascan and Zenaida D. Biascan, as vendees, as a result of which Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 207197 was issued under their names.
On November 15, 1993, Gloria L. Biascan filed a complaint before the RTC of
Caloocan (RTC Br. 120) against Zenaida (later on impleading Mario also) for
annulment of title, reconveyance and damages alleging that Mario M. Biascan, with
the use of his earnings, purchased a lot and house situated atCaloocan City, covered
by TCT No. 207197; that said TCT was issued to Spouses Mario M. Biascan and
Zenaida D. Biascan, thru the fraudulent misrepresentation of defendant that she is the
legal wife of Mario M. Biascan; that defendant is not the legal wife of Mario M.
Biascan, and that the money used in acquiring the lot and house belonged to Mario
M. Biascan; that defendants use of the surname Biascan is a usurpation of surname
under Article 377 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines, and as such, plaintiff,
the legal wife is entitled to recover damages from defendant; that plaintiff, the legal
wife of Mario M. Biascan, is unduly deprived of her right over the property covered
by said title and declaration.
Zenaida filed a Motion to Dismiss principally on the ground that a married
woman cannot sue or be sued alone without joining her husband, and that, as
registered co-owner of the subject property, the latter was an indispensable party.
According to Zenaida, she was fraudulently and maliciously forced by Mario
and his family to vacate the house and lot in question. Thus, she instituted an action
for partition before the RTC of Caloocan (RTC Br. 129). Thereafter the RTC Br. 129
declared that she was a co-owner of the subject lot.
Zenaida claimed that Mario filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals, which was dismissed on the ground that the decision rendered by the RTC
Br. 129 had long since become final and executory; thus, based on the doctrine of res
judicata, her ownership of the one-half portion of the lot covered by TCT No.
207197 could no longer be questioned.
The RTC Br. 120 denied the motion to dismiss in an Order.
In her answer, Zenaida alleged that RTC Br. 120 had no jurisdiction over the
case, as the cause of action therein was barred by prior judgment. She likewise
averred that most of the money used for the amortization and purchase of the subject
lot and on the improvements thereon, was sourced from her earnings and income and
not solely from Mario Biascan. She further alleged that Mario was, in fact,
unemployed from the later part of 1985 to the early part of 1988, and that they had to
secure a loan in the total amount of P80,000 from her mother, which was used to pay
part of the amortization of the property and, which to date, has remained unpaid.
After trial, RTC Br. 120 ruled in favor of defendant Zenaida and dismissed the
complaint.
The court ruled that the law on co-ownership governed the property relations of
Mario and Zenaida, who were living in an illicit relationship at the time the house
and lot was acquired. It explained that under Article 148 of the Family Code,
properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of
money shall be owned in common in proportion to their respective contributions, and
in the event that the amount of such contributions could not be determined, they shall
be presumed to be equal. The trial court concluded that the shares of Mario and
Zenaida as described in TCT No. 207197 was in accordance with the sharing
prescribed in Article 148.
Anent Zenaidas use of the surname Biascan, the trial court ruled that Gloria
was not entitled to damages since Mario consented thereto.
On appeal, however, the appellate court reversed the decision of the trial court
and ruled in favor of Gloria, both with respect to the right to the subject property as
well as for damages due to usurpation of surname.
It ruled that since Zenaida failed to prove by satisfactory evidence that she
contributed money to the purchase of the subject property, there is no basis to justify
her co-ownership; the same must revert to the conjugal partnership [of] Mario
Biascan and his lawful wife. The entry in the TCT of the word Spouses Mario M.
Biascan and Zenaida D. Biascan, where the latter is not legally married to the former,
is no proof that she contributed her money for the purchase of the property in
question. In the case at bar, no iota of evidence was adduced to prove contribution.
In the determination of the nature of the property acquired during their live-in partner
status, the controlling factor is the source of the money utilized in the purchase.
Zenaidas motion for reconsideration was, likewise, denied.
Issue:
1) WON the action of Gloria is barred by res judicata.
2) TORT issue: WON Gloria may recover damages for the alleged usurpation of
surname by Zenaida.
Ruling:
1) YES.
We find and so hold that the action of respondent Gloria Biascan was barred by
the decision of the RTC Br. 129 declaring Zenaida co-owner of the subject property.
For res judicata to bar the institution of subsequent action, the following
requisites must concur: (1) the former judgment must be final; (2) it must have
been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and the
parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be, between
the first and second actions (a) identity of parties, (b) identity of subject matter,
and (c) identity of cause of action.
The principle of res judicata has two aspects, namely: (a) bar by prior judgment
(Rule 39, Section 49(b)); and (b) conclusiveness of judgment (Rule 39, Section
47(c)).
There is bar by prior judgment when, as between the first case where the
judgment was rendered and the second case that is sought to be barred, there is
identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. In this instance, the
judgment in the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the second action.
Otherwise put, the judgment or decree of the court of competent jurisdiction on the
merits concludes the litigation between the parties, as well as their privies, and
constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same cause of action before the
same or other tribunal.
But where there is identity of parties in the first and second cases, but no
identity of causes of action, the first judgment is conclusive only as to those
matters actually and directly controverted and determined and not as to
matters merely involved therein. This is the concept of res judicata known as
conclusiveness of judgment.
Petitioner consistently invoked the finality of the judgment of the RTC Br. 129
for partition of the property under TCT No. 207197. Eighty-three (83) days after
learning of the said decision, respondent Mario Biascan filed a petition for relief
from judgment, which the trial court dismissed, and which dismissal was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals. The decision of RTC Br.129 became final and executory, thus
satisfying the first requisite. Furthermore, such judgment was on the merits and was
rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties. In the
meantime, respondent Gloria Biascan filed an action for annulment and
reconveyance.
It may be argued that there is no identity of parties in the first and second case.
In the first case for partition, the plaintiff was the petitioner, while the defendant was
respondent Mario Biascan; in the second case for annulment of title and
reconveyance of the same property, respondent Gloria Biascan was the plaintiff,
while the defendants were the petitioner and respondent Mario Biascan. However,
absolute identity of parties is not required for the principle of res judicata to
apply. Mere substantial identity of parties, or a community of interests between
a party in the first case and a party in the subsequent case, even if the latter was
not impleaded in the first case, is sufficient.
2) NO.
Anent respondent Gloria Biascans claim for damages for the petitioners
alleged usurpation of her husbands name, we rule that she is not entitled to an
award therefor.
The usurpation of name under Article 377 of the Civil Code implies some
injury to the interests of the owner of the name. It consists in the possibility of
confusion of identity between the owner and the usurper, and exists when a
person designates himself by another name.
The elements are as follows: (1) there is an actual use of anothers name by
the defendant; (2) the use is unauthorized; and (3) the use of anothers name is to
designate personality or identify a person.
 None of the foregoing exist in the case at bar. Respondent Gloria did not
claim that the petitioner ever attempted to impersonate her. In fact, the trial
court found that respondent Mario Biascan allowed the petitioner to use his
surname:
x x x x there is evidence to show that defendant Mario Biascan was the one
who suggested, and in fact authorized Zenaida Dapar to use said family name. It
would appear that the very first time that Zenaida Dapars name had the surname
Biascan was when defendant Mario Biascan had executed the affidavit of
undertaking in connection with his employment in Saudi Arabia, wherein he
designated as his beneficiary Zenaida Dapar Biascan. The undertaking was sworn to
by the defendant on April 7, 1982 and which also showed that his effective date of
employment in Saudi Arabia was April 1982 and to expire on February 1984
(Exhibit A). This is an extrajudicial admission that would not allow proof to the
contrary. Zenaida appeared to have no participation in the preparation of said
document. Moreover, when the contract to sell and the deed of sale of the property in
question were executed, Zenaida Dapar used the surname Biascan and defendant
Mario Biascan did not object to the use of such surname. Also, in the joint bank
account with the PNB Valenzuela, the name Zenaida Dapar Biascan is described as a
joint depositor.
Defendant Zenaida Dapar testified that she used the surname Biascan because
she was instructed by her co-defendant to do so and she thought the latter was not
married. She only became aware of his civil status a few years later after their living
together in 1981.
The use by Zenaida Dapar of the surname of her co-defendant Mario
Biascan was allowed by the latter and in no case could it be considered
usurpation of surname.
The mere use of a surname cannot be enjoined; it is the use thereof
coupled with the representation that one is the lawful wife, or the usurpation of
the wifes status, which gives rise to an action for damages.
22. Safeguard Security Agency, Inc vs Tangco G.R. No.165732
December 14, 2006
Facts:
On November 3, 1997, at about 2:50 p.m., Evangeline Tangco (Evangeline) went to
Ecology Bank, Katipunan Branch, Quezon City, to renew her time deposit.
Evangeline, a duly licensed firearm holder with correspondingpermit to carry the
same outside her residence, approached security guard Pajarillo, who was stationed
outside the bank, and pulled out her firearm from her bag to deposit the same for
safekeeping. Suddenly, Pajarillo shot Evangeline with his service shotgun hitting her
in the abdomen instantly causing her death. Lauro Tangco, Evangeline's husband,
together with his six minor children (respondents) filed with the RTC of Quezon
City, a criminal case of Homicide against Pajarillo. Respondents reserved their right
to file a separate civil action in the said criminal case. The RTC convicted Pajarillo
of Homicide in its Decision dated January 19, 2000. On appeal to the CA, the RTC
decision was affirmed with modification as to the penalty in a Decision dated July
31, 2000. Entry of Judgment was made on August 25, 2001. Meanwhile, on January
14, 1998, respondents filed with RTC, Branch 273, Marikina City, a complaint for
damages against Pajarillo for negligently shooting Evangeline and against Safeguard
for failing to observe the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage
committed by its security guard. Respondents prayed for actual, moral and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees. Petitioners denied the material allegations in
the complaint and alleged that Safeguard exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of Pajarillo; that Evangeline's death was not
due to Pajarillo's negligence as the latter acted only in self-defense. Petitioners set up
a compulsory counterclaim for moral damages and attorney's fees.
Issues:
(a) Whether respondent can file civil liability ex delito under Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code?
(b) Whether independent civil liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or
omission complained of as a felony, e.g., culpa contractual or obligations arising
from law under Article 31 of the Civil Code, intentional torts under Articles 32 and
34, and culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code?
(c) Whether the injured party is granted a right to file an action independent and
distinct from the criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. Either of these
liabilities may be enforced against the offender subject to the caveat under Article
2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the
same act or omission or under both causes?
Held: Court upholds RTC's finding and modifies the CA ruling.
The RTC found respondents to be entitled to damages. It rejected Pajarillo's claim
that he merely acted in self-defense. It gave no credence to Pajarillo's bare claim that
Evangeline was seen roaming around the area prior to theshooting incident since
Pajarillo had not made such report to the head office and the police authorities. The
RTC further ruled that being the guard on duty, the situation demanded that he
should have exercised proper prudence and necessary care by asking Evangeline for
him to ascertain the matter instead of shooting her instantly; that Pajarillo had
already been convicted of Homicide in Criminal Case No. 0-97-73806; and that he
also failed to proffer proof negating liability in the instant case.
The RTC also found Safeguard as employer of Pajarillo to be jointly and severally
liable with Pajarillo. It ruled that while it may be conceded that Safeguard had
perhaps exercised care in the selection of its employees, particularly of Pajarillo,
there was no sufficient evidence to show that Safeguard exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in the supervision of its employee; that Safeguard's evidence
simply showed that it required its guards to attend trainings and seminars which is
not the supervision contemplated under the law; that supervision includes not only
the issuance of regulations and instructions designed for the protection of persons
and property, for the guidance of their servants and employees, but also the duty to
see to it that such regulations and instructions are faithfully complied with.