Professional Documents
Culture Documents
ECJ NO :
034/2004
PARTIES:
RERENCE NUMBERS -
Registrar: 15/2004
JUDGE(S): NEPGEN J
LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES -
Appearances:
for the State/Applicant(s)/Appellant(s): MJ DE JAGER & NC NDZENGU
for the accused/respondent(s): HJ VAN DER LINDE SC
Instructing attorneys:
Applicant(s)/Appellant(s): DULLABH & CO.
Respondent(s): NETTELTONS
CASE INFORMATION -
Nature of proceedings : RETURN DAY OF PROVISIONAL ORDER
INTHEHIGHCOURTOFSOUTHAFRICA
(EASTERNCAPEDIVISION)
CaseNo.:15/2004
Datedelivered:
Inthematterbetween:
THENATIONALDIRECTOROF Applicant
PUBLICPROSECUTIONS
and
ROYDONROYRUDMAN FirstDefendant
ADRIANHENDRICKUSBOTHA SecondDefendant
ELRIKAMATTEE FirstRespondent
SANETTEBOTHA(DEVRIES) SecondRespondent
EXTRADIMENSIONS1072C.C. ThirdRespondent
BLAIZEPOINTTRADING348C.C. FourthRespondent
________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
________________________________________________________________
NEPGEN,J:
[1]TheapplicantistheNationalDirectorofPublicProsecutions.On8January
3
2004Sandi,Jgrantedtheapplicantaprovisionalrestraintorderintermsofthe
provisionsofsection26(3)(a)ofthePreventionofOrganisedCrimeAct,No.121
defendantsandtherespondents(towhomIshallreferinmoredetailhereunder)
toshowcauseon26February2004whytheprovisionalrestraintordershould
notbeconfirmedandwhytheyshouldnotbeorderedtopaythecostsofthe
application in the event of them opposing the relief sought. The application
beforeSandi,Jwasbroughtexparteandwasheardincamera. Byagreement
thereturndaywasextendeduntil25March2004whenthemattercamebefore
me.
[2] The defendants cited in the application are Roydon Roy Rudman (first
defendant)andAdrianHendrickusBotha(seconddefendant). Thereasonwhy
theseindividualshavebeencitedasdefendantsisbecausetheyarebothgoing
tobechargedwith27chargesoffraud,alternativelytheft,andthusfallwithinthe
Mattee,whoismarriedtofirstdefendant.SecondrespondentisSanetteBotha,
thewifeofseconddefendant.ThirdrespondentisExtraDimensions1072C.C.,
interestsinthisclosecorporation.FourthrespondentisBlaizepointTrading348
C.C. Thisclosecorporationwasestablishedbyseconddefendantandheand
firstdefendanteachholda50%interesttherein.
4
respondent.Althoughfirstdefendantgavenoticeofhisintentiontoopposethe
application,hewithdrewhisnoticeofopposition.Forthesakeofcompletenessit
can be mentioned that second defendant and second respondent applied for
condonationforthelatedeliveryoftheiropposingaffidavits,whichapplication
wasnotopposedbytheapplicant.Suchcondonationwasaccordinglygranted.
[4]Annexedtothefoundingaffidavitisadraftchargesheet.Fromthisitappears
that there are four persons who were allegedly defrauded, alternatively from
whommoneywasstolen,byfirstdefendantandseconddefendant.Thesefour
personshavebeenreferredtointhepapersascomplainantsandIshalldo
likewiseinthisjudgment.
[5] Under the heading THE FACTS IN BROAD OUTLINE the following
avermentsaremadeinthefoundingaffidavit:
23.1 AssetoutinthedraftchargesheetannexedheretoandmarkedJGR1
and also in the supporting affidavit herewith, the complainants were
defraudedofR2.697millionintotalarisingfromvariousinstancesfora
purportedinvestmentschemewhichhoweverdidnotexist.
23.2 TheDefendantsrequestedthecomplainantstomakefundsavailableto
theDefendantswhowereinturntousethesaidfundstoprovidebridging
financetoSANDFemployeeswhowereonpensionbutstillawaitingtheir
pension money. The SANDF employees were to repay the amounts
advanced to them plus 30 % interest and the complainants were to
receivetheircapitalanda10%interest.
23.3 Noneofthecomplainantsreceivedanycapitalorinterestaspromisedon
theirinvestmentsandonoraboutthe12thofApril2002bothDefendants
allegedtothecomplainantsthattheirinvestedamountshavebeenlost.
5
(Thesupportingaffidavitreferredtoinparagraph23.1ofthefoundingaffidavitis
theaffidavitdeposedtobyoneBrianClaassen,theinvestigatingofficerinthe
caseagainstfirstandseconddefendants.)
[6]Theallegationsmadeinthefoundingaffidavitinsupportofthereliefsought
againsttherespondentsarethatfirstdefendantestablishedthirdrespondentand
thatthreeofthecomplainantsdepositedmoneyintoitsbankaccount(paragraph
8ofthefoundingaffidavit);thatfourthrespondentwasestablishedbysecond
defendant and may have received some affected gifts (paragraph 9 of the
founding affidavit); that the respondents are cited as persons who probably
receivedaffectedgiftsfromtheDefendant(sic),whomightbeholdingproperty
onbehalfoftheDefendantsorbyoperationoflaw(paragraph10ofthefounding
affidavit);andthatanyaffectedgiftreceivedbyanyoftherespondentswouldbe
subjecttorestraintintermsoftheordersoughtandthattherespondentsshould
thereforebeorderedtodisclose,bywayofaffidavit,thetheexistenceandall
relevant details of any affected gifts they have received, either directly or
indirectly,fromDefendants(paragraph33ofthefoundingaffidavit).
[7] The alleged criminal conduct on the part of first defendant and second
defendantisreferredtoinmoredetailintheaffidavitofClaassen. Healleges
during 2001 and thereafter. Second defendant was well known to the four
complainants. Duringtherelevantperiodthecomplainantswererequestedby
6
bothdefendantstomakefundsavailabletothem,whichfundstheywoulduseto
providebridgingfinancetoSANDFemployeeswhowereonpensionbutwere
stillawaitingpaymentoftheirpensionmoney. Allamountsadvancedtosuch
SANDFemployeeswouldberepaidbytheseemployeestogetherwithintereston
suchamountsattherateof30%. Thecomplainantswereinformedthatthey
Claassen avers that the defendants convinced the complainants that the
aforesaidschemewasfreeofrisk,secureandlegal;thatfirstdefendanthada
contactpersonatthe6th SouthAfricanInfantryCorps(6SAI)inGrahamstown
whoprovidedhimwithdetailsofSANDFemployeeswhoweretoberetrenched
or who were to receive severance packages; that first defendant had legal
access(Iassumethisisintendedtomeanthathewasentitledto)toapproach
such employees and offer them bridging finance while they were awaiting
boardandclearedbyABSAbankandthatthisgavefirstdefendanttherightto
advancedtohimtogetherwiththeinterestreferredtoaboveoncepaymentofthe
amount due had been received; and that both defendants had a list of 200
namesreflectingwhotheSANDFemployeesinquestionwere,aswellastheir
lastdatesintheSANDFandtheamountofthepackagestheyweretoreceive.
ItcanbementionedatthisstagethatthelistannexedtoClaassensaffidavit
containsonlynamesandidentificationnumbers. Claassenfurtherreferstoan
affidavitbyoneParkins,whichaffidavithecontendsconfirmsthatthenamesand
details appearing on the list are fictitious. The two affidavits deposed to by
7
ParkinsandwhichareannexedtoClaassensaffidavitdonotgosofarasto
theseaffidavitsdoindicate,however,isthatduringtherelevantperiodonly6
SANDFemployees,whowerebasedat6SAIinGrahamstown,terminatedtheir
servicecontractsandthatnoneoftheirnamesappearontheaforesaidlist.
[8] Claassensaffidavittakesthecaseagainsttherespondentsnofurther. In
fact,inhisaffidavitheonlyreferstofirstrespondent,statingthatsheismarriedto
seconddefendantandthateachdefendantholdsa50%interesttherein.
[9] The answering affidavit of second defendant and second respondent was
deposedtobyseconddefendant.Aconfirmatoryaffidavitbysecondrespondent
affidavitwouldappeartobesecondrespondent.Bethatasitmay,itisclearthat
seconddefendantdenieshavingcommittedanyoffence.Hehaschosennotto
setouthisversionindetailintheansweringaffidavit,buthasreferredtowhathe
statedwhenhemadeastatementtothepoliceon18April2002andintwo
affidavitsmadebyhiminoppositiontosummaryjudgmentapplicationsbrought
by two of the complainants, namely Michau (in case no. 1519/2002) and Du
Plessis(incaseno.1020/2002).Itisclearthatseconddefendantadmitsthathe
wasinvolvedwithfirstdefendantinaventurewherebymoneywasobtainedfrom
thecomplainantsonthebasisthatitwouldbeusedtoprovidebridgingfinance
8
for SANDF employees in the circumstances referred to above, and that the
complainants were told that they would receive repayment of their capital
employeeswerepaidintothebankaccountsofsuchemployees.Itisalsoclear
thatseconddefendantdoesnotdisputethatsuchventurewasnotagenuine
defendantallegesthatfirstdefendantwastheinstigatorofthisschemeandthatit
washe(firstdefendant)whoprovidedseconddefendantwiththedetailsofhow
theschemewouldoperate.Accordingtoseconddefendanthehadnoreasonto
mistrustfirstdefendantandhonestlybelievedthattheventurewasalegitimate
one.Itisnotdisputedthatheapproachedthecomplainantsandinformedthem
oftheschemeandtherebyinducedthemtomakewhattheyconsideredtobe
investments.ItwasonlytowardstheendofMarch2002thatseconddefendant
realisedthatsomethingmightbeamiss. Insummary,thus,seconddefendant
doesnotdisputehisinvolvementinwhatwasundoubtedlyanillegalventurebut
contendsthathedidsowithoutanyguiltyknowledgeandbecauseheaccepted
whathehadbeentoldbyfirstdefendant.Heaccordinglydeniesthathehadany
intenttodefraudthecomplainantsortostealmoneyfromthem.
[10]Thegroundsuponwhichthegrantingofarestraintorderisopposedarethe
following:
disclosureoffactswhichitwashisdutytodisclose.
9
2. Theapplicationshouldnothavebeenbroughtonanexpartebasis
therewasnourgencynoranydangerofassetsbeingdissipated.
3. Therearenoreasonablegroundsforbelievingthataconfiscation
ordermaybemadeagainstseconddefendant.
[11]Thefactswhichitisallegedtheapplicantshouldhavedisclosedwerethat
ServicesinHumewood,inwhichhesetoutfullyhisversionoftherelationship
betweenhimandfirstdefendant.ThisisthepolicestatementtowhichIreferred
above. Inaddition,referenceismadetothefactthatseconddefendantmade
the two affidavits, which have also been referred to above, in opposition to
summaryjudgmentapplicationsandinwhichhisdefencewasagainsetout,the
contentionbeingthattheinvestigatingofficermusthavebeenaware,priortothe
applicationbeinglaunched,ofthefactthatcivilproceedingshadbeeninstituted
against second defendant and that he had made these affidavits. It was
submittedthatseconddefendantsversionissuchanintegralpartofthecase
againsthimthatitshouldhavebeendisclosed.
[12] The applicant contends that the fact that second defendant made the
10
statementsconcerned,andthecontentsthereof,arenotmaterialandcouldnot
have influenced Sandi, J in any way in deciding whether or not to grant the
provisionalrestraintorder.
[13]InPhillipsvNationalDirectorofPublicProsecutions,2003(6)SA447(SCA)
(forconveniencehereinafterreferredtoasPhillips(SCA))at455B[29],Howie,P
pointedoutthatitistritethatanexparteapplicantmustdiscloseallmaterialfacts
DirectorofPublicProsecutionsvBasson,2002(1)SA419(SCA)at428I[21].)
InthepassagereferredtothelearnedPresidentoftheSupremeCourtofAppeal
dealtwiththesituationthatarisesiftherehasbeenamaterialnondisclosurein
thefollowingterms:
Iftheapplicantfailsinthisregardandtheapplicationisneverthelessgrantedin
provisionalform,theCourthearingthematteronthereturndayhasadiscretion,
when given the full facts, to set aside the provisional order or confirm it. In
exercisingthatdiscretionthelaterCourtwillhaveregardtotheextentofthenon
disclosure;thequestionwhetherthefirstCourtmighthavebeeninfluencedby
proper disclosure; the reasons for nondisclosure and the consequences of
settingtheprovisionalorderaside.
[14] The first question that must be decided is whether the fact that second
defendant made the statements referred to, and the contents of those
statements,shouldhavebeendisclosed.Inthisregardwhatmustbedecidedis
whether those facts might (not would) have influenced Sandi, J in deciding
whetherornottograntaprovisionalrestraintorder.
[15]Itisnotcleartomeinwhatwaytheaforementionedfacts,whichwerenot
11
disclosed,mighthaveinfluencedthedecisionofSandi,Jinthismatter.Itisclear
thathemusthavebeensatisfiedthatthejurisdictionalfactsreferredtoinsection
25(1)(b),namelythathehadtobesatisfiedthatseconddefendantwastobe
chargedwithanoffenceandthatitappearedthattherewerereasonablegrounds
forbelievingthataconfiscationordermaybemadeagainstseconddefendant,
hadbeenestablished.Theinformationreferredtowouldonlyhaveindicatedthat
seconddefendanthasconsistentlydeniedhavingbeeninvolvedinanycriminal
activityandwouldhaveprovideddetailsofhisdefence.This,accordingly,would
have given rise to a dispute of fact. It is not appropriate for a court, when
consideringwhetherornottograntaprovisionalrestraintorder,orforthatmatter
afinalrestraintorder,toattempttoresolvedisputedfactsinrelationtotheguiltor
otherwiseofadefendant.Thiswillbedonebythetrialcourt.Furthermore,the
usualruleinmotionproceedingsassetoutin PlasconEvansPaintsLimitedv
VanRiebeekPaints(Pty_Limited,1984(3)SA623(AD),doesnotapplywhenit
comestodeterminingwhetherornotreasonablegroundsexistforbelievingthat
aconfiscationordermaybemade(seeNationalDirectorofPublicProsecutionsv
Kyriacou,2003(2)SACR524(SCA)at529fh[10]). Thepositionmayhave
beendifferenthadtheapplicantbeenawareoffactswhichindicatedthatthere
wasatleastastrongprobabilitythatseconddefendantwouldnotbeconvicted
andhadfailedtodisclosesuchfacts.That,however,isnotthepositioninthis
matter.Inthecircumstancesitismyviewthatthereisnomeritinthispointtaken
onbehalfofseconddefendant.
12
[16] Inanyevent,evenifmyconclusionshouldhavebeenthattheaforesaid
factsshouldhavebeendisclosed,thisdoesnotinitselfmeanthatafinalrestraint
ordershouldnotbegranted.Istillhaveadiscretion,whichistobeexercisedin
nondisclosureisconcerned,Ihavealreadypointedoutthatitrelatesmerelyto
seconddefendantsexculpatoryversionoftherelationshipbetweenhimselfand
firstdefendant. Iamunabletoconcludethatafailuretosetoutadefendants
denialofguiltisinitselfamatterwhichshouldhavetheresultthattheapplication
shouldbedismissed.Afterall,everyoneispresumedtobeinnocentuntilacourt
finds that his guilt has been established beyond reasonable doubt. I have
alreadystatedthatitismyviewthatSandi,Jwouldnothavebeeninfluencedin
makingtheorderwhichhedidmakehadhebeenawareofthefactswhichitis
contendedshouldhavebeenreferredtointhefoundingpapers. Byreasonof
the applicants denial that there was any material nondisclosure no specific
reasonfornotannexingtheaforementionedstatementstothefoundingaffidavits
has been advanced, although the applicant, in reply, annexed a copy of the
wholeofthepolicedocket,statingthatthisamountedtoanoverburdeningof
thesepapersbothbywayofnaturethereofandvolume.Inthelightofmyviews
onthesematters,whichinmyjudgmentarenotsufficientformetoexercisemy
discretioninfavourofseconddefendantandsetasidetheprovisionalrestraint
order,itisnotnecessarytoconsidertheconsequencesofdoingso.
[17] Iturnnowtoconsiderthesubmissionthattheapplicationshouldnothave
13
beengrantedbecauseofthefailuretohavegivennoticetothedefendantsand
therespondents,whichwasbasedonthefurthersubmissionofanallegedlack
ofurgencyaswellasalackofanydangerthatanyoftheassetsrestrained
wouldbedissipated.
restraintorder.Itswordingisalmostidenticaltothatofsection38(1)oftheAct,
order. In NationalDirectorofPublicProsecutions&AnothervMohamedNo&
Others, 2003 (4) SA 1 (CC) Ackermann, J, when dealing with the proper
constructionofsection38oftheAct,saidthefollowingat15DF[33]:
Theseremarksmustapplyequallytosection26oftheAct.Thisdisposesofthe
argumentadvancedonbehalfofseconddefendantandsecondrespondentin
thisregard.Iwouldpointout,inanyevent,thaturgencyisnotaprerequisitefor
thebringingofanapplicationundersection26(1)oftheAct.Similarly,itisnot
essential that a case be made out that there is a threat that assets will be
disposedof(see NationalDirectorofPublicProsecutionsvPhillips&Others,
2002(4)SA60(W)(hereinafterreferredtoasPhillips(WLD))at76H77E).
14
[19]Ashasbeenmentioned,thethirdgroundrelieduponforthesubmissionthat
a final restraint order should not be granted is that there are no reasonable
grounds for believing that a confiscation order may be made against second
convicted,whatmustbeconsidered,therefore,iswhetherreasonablegrounds
existforbelievingthatseconddefendant may,notwill,beconvictedandthata
concerned,tobeadoptedwascorrectlysetoutinPhillips(WLD)at81DH.The
followingwasstatedinthepassagereferredto:
Ofcourse,attheendoftheday,allthatisrequiredisevidencethatsatisfiesa
courtthattherearereasonablegroundsforbelievingthataconfiscationorderwill
supra,at529h).
15
[20]Ihavealreadyreferredtotheconductonthepartofseconddefendantwhich
theapplicantallegesconstitutesfraud,alternativelytheft. Seconddefendants
participationintheschemeisnotdisputed.Infact,itisclearthatheplayedan
activepartandthathewasthepersonwhoapproachedthecomplainantsand
furnishedthemwithdetailsofthescheme.Itseemsclearthatitwasasaresult
inducedtoadvancemoneytofirstdefendant.Theillegalityofthewholeventure
isalsonotdisputed.IngeneralIagreewiththesubmissionmadebyapplicants
counsel that the papers establish all the elements of fraud or theft, with the
exceptionofknowledgeofwrongfulnessonthepartofseconddefendantand
thuscriminalintent.Whetherornottherewassuchknowledgeofunlawfulness
andcriminalintentissomethingthatthecourthearingthecriminaltrialwillhave
todecide. Whatrequiresconsiderationatthisstageiswhetherthereareany
knowledgeofunlawfulnessandcriminalintent.Inthisregardapplicantscounsel
referredmetoastatement,whichiscontainedinthepolicedocket,madebyfirst
defendantandfromwhichitappearsthatitishisversionthatseconddefendant
approachedhimandsuggestedthattheyenterintoajointventurewhichwould
involvetheprovisionofbridgingfinance. Accordingtofirstdefendantaninitial
amountofR160000,00wasprovidedbyseconddefendantinordertosetupthis
business. Applicantscounselfurtherreferredmetoastatementinthepolice
docketmadebyPaulinaDaSilva,oneofthecomplainants.Inthisstatementshe
16
avers, interalia,thatseconddefendantcontactedherontwooccasionsduring
March2002andpersuadedhertoinvesttwoamountsofR55000,00.Onthe
first of these occasions second defendant allegedly told her that he had an
amountofR2millioninthebusinessandthathewouldnothaveapproachedher
ifhethoughttherewouldbeanyproblems.Althoughseconddefendanthasnot
dealtwithwhatisallegedbyDaSilvainherpolicestatement,itcanbeaccepted
thatherallegationthathehadtoldherthathehadR2millioninthebusinessis
inconsistentwithhisversion. AsIhavepointedout,seconddefendantalleges
thatfirstdefendantwastheinstigatororarchitectofthewholescheme,andwhat
firstdefendantstatedinhisstatementisthereforealsoinconsistentwithsecond
defendantsversion.Itwouldbeinappropriatetoattempttoresolvetheaforesaid
disputes,somethingwhichcaninanyeventnotbedoneonthepapersbefore
me. Allthatneedbesaidaboutthesedisputesisthatiftheversionsoffirst
defendantandDaSilva,ortheversionofoneofthem,isacceptedthismayhave
theresultofpersuadingthetrialcourtthatseconddefendanthadtherequisite
conviction.Iamthereforeunabletoagreewiththesubmissionmadeonbehalf
ofseconddefendantthatthedefencesetoutbyhim,asdiscussedmorefully
above,cannotbedisputedbytheapplicantandthatifoneappliesthetestsetout
bytheHighCourtinPhillips(WLD)afinalrestraintordershouldnotbemade.It
is accordingly my view that there are reasonable grounds for believing that
confiscationordermaybemadeagainsthim.
17
referredtotheallegationsmadeinthefoundingaffidavitinsupportoftherelief
soughtagainsttherespondents. Dealingspecificallywithsecondrespondent,
theonlyallegationwhichisrelevanttoheristhatinparagraph10ofthefounding
affidavit,namelythatsheisapersonwhoprobablyreceivedaffectedgifts,or
whomightbeholdingpropertyonbehalfofseconddefendant(ontheassumption
thatthatwaswhatwasintendedtobealleged).Inthescheduleofassets,which
respondentistobefoundinparagraph3(b)(iv),(whichdealswiththedefendants
INTERESTINENTITIES)wherethereisreferencetoseconddefendanthaving
interest therein. In the founding affidavit nothing is said about this close
corporation.However,whenthematterwasarguedapplicantscounselreliedon
thefactthatsecondrespondenthada50%interestinthatclosecorporation,
statingthatitwasclearfromtheallegationsmadeintheansweringaffidavitof
seconddefendantthatsecondrespondenthadreceivedanaffectedgift.Inthis
regard it appears from such affidavit that second defendant allegedly lent an
amountinexcessofR160000,00totheclosecorporation,whichamounthad
beenobtainedfromatotalamountofR250000,00thatseconddefendanthad
receivedfromthescam.
[22]Anaffectedgiftisdefinedinsection12(1)oftheActasmeaning
anygift
a) madebythedefendantconcernednotmorethansevenyearsbeforethe
fixeddate;or
18
b) madebythedefendantconcernedatanytime,ifitwasagift
i) of property received by that defendant in connection with an
offencecommittedbyhimorheroranyotherperson;or
ii) of property, or any part thereof, which directly or indirectly
representedinthatdefendantshandspropertyreceivedbyhimor
herinthatconnection,
whetheranysuchgiftwasmadebeforeorafterthecommencementof
thisAct.
Itremains,however,agift,subjecttotheprovisionsofsection16oftheAct,
whichprovidethatforthepurposesofchapter5oftheAct
[23]Itisclearfromtheallegationsmadebyseconddefendantintheanswering
affidavit,whicharetheallegationsrelieduponbyapplicantscounselinargument
beforeme,thattheaforesaidmoneywasnotpaidtosecondrespondentbutto
theclosecorporation.Itwasalsonottransferredtotheclosecorporationfora
consideration having a value significantly less than the amount ofthe money
advanced.Onthebasisofwhatisallegedinthepapersbeforemethemoney
wasloanedtotheclosecorporationandwasutilisedbytheclosecorporationto
transactionscanbebroughtwithintheextendeddefinitionofagiftascontained
insection16oftheAct,andevenlessreasonforholdingthatthismeansthatthe
moneywasindirectlytransferredtosecondrespondentforaconsiderationsuch
asthatreferredto. Thereisnoevidencetosuggestthatsecondrespondent
acceptedanyofthismoneyinherpersonalcapacity,noristhefactthatsheand
19
seconddefendantaremarriedtoeachotherandthateachhold50%interestin
theclosecorporationindicativethatshedidso. Inmyjudgmentthepositionis
thatthesomewhatspeculativecase,toputitatitshighest,madeoutagainst
answeringaffidavit.Inmyjudgmentnocasehasbeenmadeoutforthegrantof
anyreliefagainstsecondrespondent.
[24] Itwasnotsuggestedbyeithercounselthattheprovisionalrestraintorder
shouldinanywaybevariedintheeventoftherulenisibeingconfirmed.Forthe
reasonssetoutaboveIamoftheviewthatafinalrestraintordershouldbe
grantedagainstseconddefendant.Insofarassecondrespondentisconcerned,
itismyviewthattherulenisishouldbedischarged.
[25]Theonlyremainingissuerelatestocosts.Applicantscounselrequestedme
toawardcoststotheapplicantintheeventofitbeingsuccessfulinobtaininga
finalrestraintorder.Inmyviewitwouldbeinappropriatetodosoatthisstage,
thatthecostsofthisapplicationarereservedfordeterminationbythiscourtafter
finalisation of the criminal trial and, in the event of both or either of the
defendantsbeingconvicted,theoutcomeofanyapplicationforaconfiscation
order.Astheapplicanthasbeenunsuccessfulinsofarassecondrespondentis
concerned,itismyviewthatheshouldbeorderedtopayhercosts.
20
Thefollowingorderismade:
respondent.
criminaltrialand,intheeventofaconvictionoffirstdefendantand/
orseconddefendant,theoutcomeofanysubsequentapplication
foraconfiscationorder.
3. Theruleisdischargedagainstsecondrespondent,withcosts.
_________________________
J.J.NEPGEN
JUDGEOFTHEHIGHCOURT