Ridgeview Publishing Company

What Is "Naturalized Epistemology?"

Author(s): Jaegwon Kim
Source: Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 2, Epistemology (1988), pp. 381-405
Published by: Ridgeview Publishing Company
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2214082
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Philosophical
Perspectives, 1988
2, Epistemology,

WHATIS "NATURAUZED
EPISTEMOLOGY?"

JaegwonKim
BrownUniversity

1. EpistemologyAs a NormativeInquiry

Descartes'epistemological inquiryintheMeditations beginswith

thisquestion:Whatpropositions are worthy ofbelief?In theFirst
MeditationDescartescanvassesbeliefsof variouskindshe had
formerly heldas trueand findshimself forcedto concludethathe
oughtto rejectthem,thathe oughtnottoacceptthemas true.We
can viewCartesian epistemology as consistingofthefollowing two
projects:to identify thecriteria bywhichwe oughtto regulateac-
ceptanceand rejection ofbeliefs,and to determine whatwe may
be saidtoknowaccording tothosecriteria.
Descartes'
epistemological
agendahasbeen theagendaofWestern epistemologyto thisday.
Thetwinproblems ofidentifying criteria
ofjustified
beliefandcom-
ing to termswiththe skepticalchallengeto the possibility of
knowledgehave definedthecentraltasksoftheoryofknowledge
sinceDescartes.Thiswas as trueoftheempiricists, ofLockeand
HumeandMill,as ofthosewhomorecloselyfollowed Descartesin
therationalist path.'
Itisnowonder thenthatmodern epistemology hasbeendominated
bya singleconcept,thatofjustification, andtwofundamental ques-
tionsinvolving it: Whatconditions musta beliefmeetifwe are
inaccepting
justified itas true?andWhatbeliefs arewe infactjustified
inaccepting? Notethatthefirst questiondoesnotaskforan "analysis"
or"meaning" oftheterm"justified Anditisgenerally
belief". assum-
ed, evenifnotalwaysexplicitly stated,thatnotjustanystatement
382/ JaegwonKim

ofa necessary andsufficientcondition fora belieftobe justified will

do.Theimplicit requirement hasbeenthatthestatedconditions must
constitute"criteria"ofjustifiedbelief,andforthisitis necessary that
theconditions be statedwithout theuse ofepistemic terms.Thus,
formulating conditions ofjustifiedbeliefinsuchtermsas "adequate
evidence", "sufficient
ground", "goodreason","beyonda reasonable
doubt",and so on, wouldbe merelyto issuea promissory note
redeemable onlywhentheseepistemic terms arethemselves explain-
ed in a waythataccordswiththerequirement.2
Thisrequirement, whileitpointsin therightdirection, does not
go farenough.Whatis crucialis this:thecriteria ofjustifiedbelief
mustbe formulated on thebasisofdescriptive ornaturalistic terms
alone,without theuseofanyevaluative ornormative ones,whether
epistemic or ofanotherkind.3Thus,an analysisofjustified belief
thatmakesuse of suchtermsas "intellectual requirement"4 and
"havinga rightto be sure"5wouldnotsatisfy thisgeneralized con-
dition;although suchan analysiscanbe informative andenlighten-
ingabouttheinter-relationships ofthesenormative concepts, itwill
not,on thepresentconception, countas a statement ofcriteria of
belief,unlessofcoursethesetermsare themselves
justified provid-
ed withnonnormative Whatisproblematic,
criteria. therefore,about
theuse ofepistemic termsinstating criteriaofjustified beliefis not
itspossible intheusualsense;rather
circularity itisthefactthatthese
epistemic termsarethemselves essentiallynormative. Weshalllater
discusstherationaleofthisstrengthened requirement.
As manyphilosophers haveobserved,6 thetwoquestions we have
setforth,oneaboutthecriteria ofjustified beliefandtheotherabout
whatwe can be saidtoknowaccording to thosecriteria, constrain
eachother. Although somephilosophers havebeenwilling toswallow
skepticism justbecausewhatwe regardas correct criteria
ofjustified
beliefare seen to lead inexorably to theconclusion thatnone,or
veryfew,ofourbeliefsare justified, theusualpresumption is that
ouranswertothefirst question shouldleaveourepistemic situation
largelyunchanged. Thatis tosay,itis expectedtoturnoutthatac-
cording tothecriteria ofjustifiedbeliefwe cometoaccept,we know,
orarejustified inbelieving, pretty muchwhatwe reflectively think
we knowor are entitled to believe.
Whatever theexacthistory, itisevident thattheconcept ofjustifica-
tionhascometo takecenterstageinourreflections on thenature
ofknowledge. Andapartfromhistory, thereis a simplereasonfor
 Whatis "Naturalized / 383
Epistemology"?

our preoccupation withjustification: it is the only specifically

epistemiccomponentin the classic tripartite conceptionof
knowledge. Neither beliefnortruth isa specificallyepistemic notion:
beliefisa psychological conceptandtruth a semantical-metaphysical
one. Theseconceptsmayhavean implicit epistemological dimen-
sion,butiftheydo,itis likelytobe through theirinvolvement with
essentiallynormative epistemic notionslikejustification, evidence,
andrationality.Moreover, iswhatmakesknowledge
justification itself
a normative concept.On surfaceat least,neither truth norbeliefis
normative orevaluative (I shallarguebelow,though, thatbeliefdoes
havean essentialnormative dimension). Butjustification manifestly
is normative. Ifa beliefis justifiedforus,thenitispermissible and
reasonable,fromtheepistemic pointofview,forus to holdit,and
itwouldbe epistemically irresponsible toholdbeliefs thatcontradict
it.Ifwe considerbelieving or accepting a proposition to be an "ac-
tion"in an appropriate sense,beliefjustification wouldthenbe a
specialcase ofjustification ofaction,whichinitsbroadesttermsis
thecentralconcernofnormative ethics.Justas itis thebusinessof
normative ethicsto delineatetheconditions underwhichactsand
decisionsare justified fromthe moralpointof view,so it is the
businessofepistemology toidentifyandanalyzetheconditions under
whichbeliefs, andperhapsotherpropositional attitudes,arejustified
fromthe epistemological pointof view. It probablyis onlyan
historicalaccidentthatwe standardly speakof"normative ethics"
butnotof"normative epistemology". Epistemology is a normative
disciplineas muchas, and inthesamesenseas, normative ethics.
We cansummarize ourdiscussion thusfarinthefollowing points:
thatjustification
isa central conceptofourepistemological tradition,
as itis understood
thatjustification, inthistradition, is a normative
concept, andinconsequencethatepistemology itselfisa normative
inquiry whoseprincipal aimis a systematic studyoftheconditions
ofjustified belief.I take it thatthesepointsare uncontroversial,
although ofcoursetherecouldbe disagreement aboutthedetails-
forexample,aboutwhatitmeanstosaya conceptortheory is "nor-
mative"or "evaluative".

2. The FoundationalistStrategy

In orderto identify
thetargetofthenaturalistic
critique-inpar-
384/ JaegwonKim

ticular, Quine's-itwillbe usefulto takea brieflookat theclassic

responseto the epistemological programset forthby Descartes.
Descartes' approachtotheproblem isa familiar
ofjustification story,
at leastas thetextbook tellsit:ittakestheform ofwhatisnowcom-
monlycalled"foundationalism". The foundationalist strategy is to
dividethetaskofexplaining intotwostages:first,
justification toiden-
tifya setofbeliefs thatare"directly" inthattheyarejustified
justified
without deriving theirjustified statusfromthatofanyotherbelief,
and thento explainhowotherbeliefsmaybe "indirectly" or "in-
ferentially" justified bystanding inan appropriate relation to those
alreadyjustified. Directly justifiedbeliefs,or "basicbeliefs", are to
constitute thefoundation uponwhichthesuperstructure of"nonbasic"
or"derived" beliefsis torest.Whatbeliefs thenaredirectly justified,
according toDescartes? Subtleties aside,heclaimedthatbeliefs about
ourownpresent conscious statesareamongthem.Inwhatdoestheir
justification consist? Whatis itaboutthesebeliefsthatmakethem
directly justified?Somewhat simplisticallyagain,Descartes'answer
isthattheyarejustified becausetheyareindubitable, thattheatten-
tiveand reflective mindcannotbutassentto them.How are non-
basicbeliefs justified?By"deduction"-that is,bya seriesofinferen-
tialsteps,or"intuitions", eachofwhichis indubitable. If,therefore,
we takeCartesian indubitability as a psychologicalnotion, Descartes'
epistemological theory can be saidtomeetthedesideratum ofpro-
vidingnonepistemic, naturalisticcriteriaofjustified belief.
Descartes'foundationalist program was inherited, initsessential
outlines, bytheempiricists. Inparticular, his"mentalism", thatbeliefs
aboutone's owncurrent mentalstateare epistemologically basic,
wentessentially unchallenged by the empiricists and positivists,
untilthiscentury. Epistemologists havediffered fromone another
chiefly in regardto twoquestions: whatelse belongedin our
first,
corpusofbasicbeliefs, andsecond,howthederivation ofthenon-
basic partof our knowledgewas to proceed.Even the Logical
Positivists were,by and large,foundationalists, althoughsome of
them came to renounceCartesianmentalismin favor of a
"physicalistic basis".7In fact,thePositivists werefoundationalists
twiceover:forthem"observation", whether phenomenological or
physical, servednotonlyas thefoundation ofknowledge butas the
foundationof all "cognitivemeaning"-thatis, as both an
epistemological and a semanticfoundation.
 Whatis "Naturalized / 385
Epistemology"?

3. Quine's Arguments

Ithasbecomecustomary forepistemologists
whoprofess allegiance
toa "naturalistic" conception ofknowledge topayhomagetoQuine
as thechiefcontemporary provenance oftheirinspiration-especially
to hisinfluential paper"Epistemology Naturalized".8 Quine'sprin-
cipalargument inthispaperagainsttraditional epistemology is bas-
ed on the claimthatthe Cartesianfoundationalist programhas
failed-that theCartesian "questforcertainty"is"a lostcause".While
thisclaimaboutthehopelessness oftheCartesian "questforcertain-
ty"is nothing new,usingitto discredit theveryconception ofnor-
mativeepistemology is new,something thatanyseriousstudent of
epistemology mustcontendwith.
Quinedividestheclassicepistemological program intotwoparts:
conceptualreductionwherebyphysicalterms,including thoseof
theoretical science,are reduced,via definition, to termsreferring
tophenomenal features ofsensory experience, anddoctrinal reduc-
tionwhereby truths aboutthephysical worldare appropriately ob-
tainedfrom truths aboutsensory experience. The"appropriateness"
justalludedto refers to therequirement thatthefavoredepistemic
status("certainty" forclassicepistemologists,according toQuine)of
ourbasicbeliefsbe transferred, undiminished,
essentially to deriv-
ed beliefs,a necessary requirement ifthederivational processis to
yieldknowledge from knowledge. Whatderivational methods have
thisproperty ofpreserving epistemic Perhapstherearenone,
status?
givenourproneness toerrinframing derivationsas inanything else,
notto mention thepossibility oflapsesofattention andmemory in
following lengthy proofs. Butlogicaldeduction comesas closetobe-
ingone as any;itcan at leastbe reliedon to transmit truth, ifnot
epistemic status.It couldperhapsbe arguedthatno methodcan
preserve certainty unlessitpreserves (orisknowntopreserve) truth;
andifthisisso,logicaldeduction istheonlymethod worthconsider-
ing.I do notknowwhetherthiswas theattitude of mostclassic
epistemologists; if
butQuineassumesthat deduction doesn'tfilltheir
bill,nothing will.
Quinesees theprojectofconceptual reduction as culminating in
Carnap'sDer LogischeAufbauder Welt.As Quinesees it,Carnap
"came nearestto executing"the conceptualhalfof the classic
epistemological project.But comingclose is not good enough.
Because of the holisticmannerin whichempiricalmeaningis
386/ JaegwonKim

generated byexperience, noreduction ofthesortCarnapandothers

so eagerlysoughtcouldinprinciple be completed. Fordefinitional
reductionrequirespoint-to-point meaningrelations9between
physical terms andphenomenal terms, something thatQuine'sholism
tellsus cannotbe had.The secondhalfoftheprogram, doctrinal
reduction, is in no bettershape;in fact,itwas theone to stumble
first,for,accordingto Quine, its impossibility was decisively
demonstrated longbeforetheAufbau,by Humein hiscelebrated
discussionof induction. The "Humeanpredicament" showsthat
theory cannotbe logically deducedfromobservation; theresimply
is nowayofderiving theory from observation thatwilltransmit the
latter'sepistemic statusintactto theformer.
I don'tthink anyonewantstodisagreewithQuineintheseclaims.
It is notpossibleto "validate"scienceon thebasisofsensoryex-
perience, if"validation" meansjustification through logicaldeduc-
tion.Quineofcoursedoes notdenythatourtheoriesdependon
observation forevidential support; he hassaidthatsensory evidence
is theonlyevidencethereis. To be sure,Quine'sargument against
thepossibility ofconceptual reduction hasa newtwist:theapplica-
tionofhis"holism". Buthisconclusion is no surprise; "translational
phenomenalism" has been moribund formanyyears.10 And,as
Quinehimself notes,hisargument againstthedoctrinal reduction,
the"questforcertainty", is onlya restatement ofHume's"skeptical"
conclusions concerning induction: induction afterall is notdeduc-
tion.Mostof us are inclined, I think,to viewthesituation Quine
describes withno greatalarm,andI ratherdoubtthattheseconclu-
sions of Quine's came as news to most epistemologists when
"Epistemology Naturalized" was firstpublished. We are tempted to
respond: ofcoursewecan'tdefine physical concepts interms ofsense-
data;ofcourseobservation "underdetermines" theory. Thatis why
observation is observation and nottheory.
So itis agreedon all handsthattheclassicalepistemological pro-
ject,conceivedas oneofdeductively validating physical knowledge
from indubitable sensory data,cannotsucceed.Butwhatisthemoral
ofthisfailure? Whatshouldbe itsphilosophical lessontous?Having
notedthefailureoftheCartesianprogram, Quinegoes on:11
of hissensoryreceptors
The stimulation is all theevidence
in arriving
anybodyhas had to go on, ultimately, at his
pictureoftheworld.Whynotjustsee howthisconstruction
 Whatis "Naturalized / 387
Epistemology"?

reallyproceeds?Whynotsettleforpsychology? Sucha
surrender oftheepistemological burdento psychology is a
movethatwas disallowedin earliertimesas circular
reasoning. Iftheepistemologist's
goal is validation
ofthe
groundsofempirical science,he defeatshispurposeby
usingpsychology or otherempiricalsciencein the
validation.However,suchscruplesagainstcircularity have
littlepointonce we havestoppeddreaming ofdeducing
sciencefromobservation. Ifwe are outsimplyto understand
thelinkbetweenobservation and science,we are well
advisedto use anyavailableinformation, includingthat
providedby theverysciencewhoselinkwithobservation
we are seekingto understand.
to say aboutthefailureofCarnap's
AndQuinehas thefollowing
reductive
programin theAufbau:12
To relaxthedemandfordefinition, and settlefora kindof
reduction thatdoes noteliminate, is to renouncethelast
remaining advantagethatwe supposedrationalrecon-
structionto have overstraight psychology; namely,the
advantageoftranslational reduction. Ifall we hopeforis a
reconstruction thatlinksscienceto experiencein explicit
waysshortoftranslation, thenit wouldseemmoresensible
to settleforpsychology. Betterto discoverhowscienceis in
factdevelopedand learnedthanto fabricate a fictitious
structure to a similareffect.
Ifa taskis entirelyhopeless,ifwe knowitcannotbe executed,no
doubtit is rationalto abandonit; we wouldbe betteroffdoing
something else thathas somehopeofsuccess.We can agreewith
Quinethatthe"validation"-that is,logicaldeduction-of scienceon
thebasisofobservation cannotbe had;so itis rationalto abandon
thisparticularepistemologicalprogram, ifindeediteverwasa pro-
gramthatanyoneseriously undertook. ButQuine'srecommenda-
tionsgo further. thereare twoaspectsofQuine'spro-
Inparticular,
posalsthatare ofspecialinterest he is notonlyadvising
to us:first,
us toquittheprogram of"validatingscience",buturging us totake
up anotherspecific an empirical
project, psychologicalstudyofour
cognitiveprocesses;second,he is also claimihg thatthisnewpro-
gramreplacestheold,thatbothprograms arepartofsomething ap-
388/ JaegwonKim

propriately called"epistemology". Naturalizedepistemology is tobe

a kindofepistemology afterall,a "successor subject"'13to classical
epistemology.
How shouldwe reactto Quine'surgings? Whatshouldbe our
response? TheCartesian projectofvalidating sciencestarting from
the indubitable foundation of first-person psychological reports
(perhapswiththehelpofcertainindubitable firstprinciples) is not
thewholeofclassicalepistemology-or so itwouldseematfirst blush.
Inourcharacterization ofclassicalepistemology, theCartesian pro-
gramwasseenas onepossibleresponsetotheproblem ofepistemic
justification,the two-partprojectof identifying the criteriaof
epistemic anddetermining
justification whatbeliefs areinfactjustified
according tothosecriteria. Inurging "naturalized epistemology" on
us,Quineis notsuggesting thatwe giveup theCartesianfounda-
tionalist solution and explore others within the same
framework14-perhaps, to adoptsomesortof"coherentist" strategy,
ortorequireofourbasicbeliefs onlysomedegreeof"initial credibil-
ity"ratherthanCartesiancertainty, or to permitsome sortof
probabilistic derivationin additionto deductive derivation ofnon-
basicknowledge, ortoconsider theuseofspecialrulesofevidence,
likeChisholm's "principlesofevidence",15 orto giveup thesearch
fora derivational processthattransmits undiminished certainty in
favorofone thatcan transmit diminished butstillusefuldegreesof
justification.Quine'sproposalismoreradicalthanthat.He is asking
us to set aside the entireframework of justification-centered
epistemology. ThatiswhatisnewinQuine'sproposals. Quineisask-
ingus to putin itsplace a purelydescriptive, causal-nomological
scienceof humancognition.16
How shouldwe characterize in generaltermsthedifference be-
tweentraditional epistemological programs, suchas foundationalism
and coherencetheory, on theone handand Quine'sprogramof
naturalized epistemology on theother?Quine'sstressis on thefac-
tualanddescriptive character ofhisprogram; hesays,"Whynotsee
how[theconstruction from
oftheory observation] actuallyproceeds?
Whynotsettleforpsychology?";17 again, "Better to discover how
scienceis infactdevelopedandlearnedthan..."18 We are givento
understand thatincontrast traditionalepistemology is nota descrip-
tive,factual inquiry.Rather,itis an attempt at a "validation" or"ra-
tionalreconstruction" ofscience.Validation, according toQuine,pro-
ceeds via deduction,and rationalreconstruction via definition.
 Whatis "Naturalized
Epistemology"?
/ 389

However,theirpointis justificatory-that is,to rationalize oursun-

dryknowledge claims.So Quineis askingustosetasidewhatis "ra-
tional"in rationalreconstruction.
Thus,itisnormativitythatQuineisaskingustorepudiate. Although
Quinedoes notexplicitly characterizetraditional epistemology as
"normative"or "prescriptive", his meaningis ,unmistakable.
Epistemology is to be "a chapterof psychology", a law-based
predictive-explanatory
theory, likeanyothertheory within empirical
science;itsprincipaljob is to see how humancognizersdevelop
theories(their
"pictureoftheworld") fromobservation ("thestimula-
tionoftheirsensoryreceptors"). Epistemology is to go outofthe
businessof justification. We earlier characterizedtraditional
epistemology as essentiallynormative;we see whyQuinewantsus
torejectit.Quineisurging ustoreplacea normative theory ofcogni-
tionwitha descriptive science.

4. Losing KnowledgefromEpistemology

dropsoutofepistemology,
Ifjustification knowledge itselfdrops
outofepistemology. Forourconceptofknowledge is inseparably
tiedtothatofjustification.
As earliernoted,knowledge itselfisa nor-
mativenotion.Quine'snonnormative, naturalizedepistemology has
no roomforourconceptofknowledge. Itis notsurprising that,in
describingnaturalizedepistemology, Quine seldomtalksabout
knowledge;instead,he talksabout"science"and "theories" and
"representations". Quinewouldhave us investigate howsensory
stimulation "leads"to"theories"and"representation" oftheworld.
I take it thatwithinthe traditional schemethese"theories" and
"representations" correspond tobeliefs,orsystems ofbeliefs; thus,
whatQuinewouldhaveus do istoinvestigate howsensory stimula-
tionleads to theformation ofbeliefsabouttheworld.
Butinwhatsenseof"lead"?I takeitthatQuinehasinminda causal
or nomological sense.He is urgingus to developa theory, an em-
piricaltheory, thatuncoverslawfulregularities governing thepro-
cessesthrough whichorganisms cometodevelopbeliefs abouttheir
environment as a causalresultof havingtheirsensoryreceptors
stimulated in certainways.Quinesays:19
[Naturalized studiesa naturalphenomenon,
epistemology]
viz.,a physicalhumansubject.Thishumansubjectis
390/ JaegwonKim

accordedexperimentally controlledinput-certainpatterns of
forinstance-andin the
in assortedfrequencies,
irradiation
fullnessoftimethesubjectdeliversas outputa description
ofthethree-dimensional externalworldand itshistory.The
relationbetween themeager inputand output
torrential is a
relationthatwe are promptedto study forsomewhat the
same reasonsthatalwaysprompted namely,
epistemology;
and in what
in orderto see how evidencerelatesto theory,
waysone'stheoryofnaturetranscends anyavailable
evidence.
Therelation Quinespeaksofbetween"meagerinput"and"torren-
tialoutput" is a causalrelation; at leastitis qua causalrelation that
the naturalizedepistemologist investigates it. It is none of the
naturalized epistemologist's business toassesswhether, andtowhat
degree,theinput"justifies" theoutput,howa givenirradiation of
thesubject's retinas makesit"reasonable" or"rational" forthesub-
jectto emitcertainrepresentational output.His interest is strictly
causalandnomological: he wantsus to lookforpatterns oflawlike
dependencies characterizing theinput-output relations forthispar-
ticularorganism and othersofa likephysicalstructure.
Ifthisis right, itmakesQuine'sattempt to relatehisnaturalized
epistemology to traditionalepistemology lookat bestlame.Forin
whatsense is the studyof causal relationships betweenphysical
stimulation ofsensoryreceptors and theresulting cognitive output
a way of "seeing how evidence relates to theory"in an
epistemologically relevantsense?The causalrelationbetweensen-
soryinputandcognitive outputisa relation between"evidence" and
"theory"; however, itis notan evidential relation. Thiscan be seen
from thefollowing consideration:thenomological patterns thatQuine
urgesus to look forare certainto varyfromspeciesto species,
depending on theparticular wayeachbiological(andpossibly non-
biological)speciesprocessesinformation, buttheevidential relation
in itspropernormative sensemustabstractfromsuchfactors and
concernitselfonlywiththe degreeto whichevidencesupports
hypothesis.
In anyevent,theconceptofevidenceis inseparable fromthatof
Whenwe talkof"evidence"
justification. inan epistemological sense
we aretalking aboutjustification:onething is"evidence" foranother
justincase thefirst tendstoenhancethereasonableness orjustifica-
 Whatis "Naturalized / 391
Epistemology"?

tionofthesecond.Andsuchevidential relations holdinpartbecause

ofthe"contents" oftheitemsinvolved, notmerelybecauseofthe
causalornomological connections betweenthem.A strictly nonnor-
mativeconceptof evidenceis notour conceptof evidence;it is
something thatwe do notunderstand.20
Noneofus,I think, wouldwantto quarrelwithQuineaboutthe
interest or importance ofthepsychological studyofhowoursen-
soryinputcausesourepistemic output.Thisis onlytosaythatthe
studyofhuman(orotherkindsof)cognition is ofinterest.Thatisn't
ourdifficulty; ourdifficulty is whether, andinwhatsense,pursuing
Quine's"epistemology" is a wayofdoingepistemology-that is,a
wayofstudying "howevidencerelatestotheory". Perhaps,Quine's
recommendation thatwe discardjustification-centered epistemology
is worthpondering; and his exhortation to takeup the studyof
psychology perhapsdeservestobe heededalso.Whatismysterious
is whythisrecommendation has to be coupledwiththerejection
ofnormative epistemology (ifnormative epistemology isnota possi-
ble inquiry, whyshouldn't thewould-be epistemologist turnto,say,
hydrodynamics or ornithology ratherthanpsychology?). But of
courseQuineis sayingmore;he is sayingthatan understandable,
ifmisguided, motivation (thatis, seeing"howevidencerelatesto
theory") does underlie ourproclivities forindulgence innormative
epistemology, butthatwewouldbe better servedbya scientificstudy
of humancognition thannormative epistemology.
Butitis difficult tosee howan "epistemology" thathasbeenpurg-
ed ofnormativity, onethatlacksan appropriate normative concept
ofjustification or evidence,can haveanything to do withthecon-
cerns of traditionalepistemology.And unless naturalized
epistemology andclassicalepistemology sharesomeoftheircentral
concerns, it'sdifficulttosee howonecouldreplace theother,orbe
a way(a betterway)ofdoingtheother.21 To be sure,theybothin-
vestigate "howevidencerelatesto theory". Butputting thematter
thiswaycan be misleading, andhasperhapsmisledQuine:thetwo
disciplines do notinvestigate thesamerelation. Aslatelynoted,nor-
mativeepistemology is concerned withtheevidential relation
prop-
erlyso-called-thatis, the relationof justification-and Quine's
naturalized epistemology is meanttostudythecausal-nomological
relation. Forepistemology to go outofthebusinessofjustification
is forit to go outofbusiness.
392/ JaegwonKim

and Rationality
5. BeliefAttribution

Perhapswe havesaidenoughtopersuadeourselvesthatQuine's
naturalized epistemology, whileitmaybe a legitimate scientificin-
quiry,is nota kindofepistemology, and,therefore, thattheques-
tionwhetherit is a betterkindof epistemology cannotarise.In
reply,however,it mightbe said thattherewas a sensein which
Quine'sepistemology andtraditional epistemology couldbe viewed
as sharinga common subjectmatter, namelythis:theybothconcern
beliefsor "representations". The onlydifference is thattheformer
investigatestheircausalhistories and connections whereasthelat-
teris concerned withtheirevidential orjustificatory properties and
relations.Thisdifference, ifQuineis right, leadstoanother(so con-
tinuesthereply):theformer is a feasibleinquiry, thelatteris not.
I nowwanttotakemyargument a stepfurther: I shallarguethat
theconceptofbeliefis itselfan essentially normative one,and in
consequencethatifnormativity is whollyexcludedfromnaturaliz-
ed epistemology itcannotevenbe thought ofas beingaboutbeliefs.
Thatis,ifnaturalized epistemology is tobe a scienceofbeliefsprop-
erlyso called,it mustpresuppose a normative conceptofbelief.
Briefly,theargument is this.In orderto implement Quine'spro-
gramofnaturalized epistemology, we shallneedtoidentify, andin-
dividuate, theinputand outputofcognizers. The input,forQuine,
consists ofphysicalevents("thestimulation ofsensoryreceptors")
andtheoutputis saidto be a "theory" or "picture oftheworld"-
thatis,a setof "representations" of the cognizer's environment. Let
In
usfocuson theoutput. order study to thesensory input-cognitive
outputrelations forthegivencognizer, therefore, we mustfindout
what"representations" he has formed as a resultoftheparticular
stimulations thathavebeenappliedto hissensory transducers. Set-
tingasidethejargon,whatwe need be to able to do is to attribute
beliefs,andothercontentful intentional states,to thecognizer.But
beliefattributionultimately requires a "radicalinterpretation" ofthe
cognizer, of hisspeech and intentional states;that is, we must con-
structan "interpretivetheory" thatsimultaneously assignsmeanings
tohisutterances andattributes tohimbeliefs andotherpropositional
attitudes.22
Evena cursory
consideration thatsuchan interpretation
indicates
cannotbegin-we cannotget a in oursubject'srealmof
foothold
meanings we
states-unless
andintentional assumehistotalsystem
 Whatis "Naturalized / 393
Epistemology"?

ofbeliefsandotherpropositional attitudes to be largelyandessen-

tiallyrationaland coherent. As Davidsonhas emphasized, a given
beliefhasthecontent ithasinpartbecauseofitslocationin a net-
workofotherbeliefsand propositional attitudes;and whatat bot-
tomgrounds thisnetwork is theevidential relation,a relationthat
regulates whatisreasonable tobelievegivenotherbeliefs oneholds.
Thatis, unlessour cognizeris a "rationalbeing",a beingwhose
cognitive"output"is regulatedand constrained by normsof
rationality-typically,thesenormsholistically constrainhisproposi-
tionalattitudes invirtueoftheircontents-wecannotintelligibly in-
terpret his"output" as consisting ofbeliefs.Conversely, ifwe are
unabletointerpret oursubject's meanings andpropositional attitudes
ina waythatsatisfies a minimal standard ofrationality,thereis lit-
tlereasontoregardhimas a "cognizer", a beingthatforms represen-
tationsand constructs theories. Thismeansthatthereis a senseof
"rational"in whichtheexpression"rationalbelief"is redundant;
everybeliefmustbe rationalin certainminimalways.It is not
important forthe purposesof the presentargument whatthese
minimal standards ofrationality are; theonlypointthatmatters is
thatunlesstheoutputofourcognizeris subjectto evaluation inac-
cordancewithnormsofrationality, thatoutput cannotbe considered
as consisting of beliefsand hence cannotbe the objectof an
epistemological inquiry, whetherplainor naturalized.
We canseparatethecoreoftheseconsiderations from controver-
sialissuesinvolving theso-called"principle ofcharity",minimal ra-
tionality,and othermatters in thetheoryofradicalinterpretation.
Whatiscrucialisthis:fortheinterpretation andattribution ofbeliefs
to be possible,notonlymustwe assumetheoverallrationality of
cognizers, butalsowe mustcontinually evaluateandre-evaluate the
putative beliefsofa cognizerintheirevidential relationship to one
anotherandotherpropositional attitudes.Itisnotmerely thatbelief
attribution requirestheumbrellaassumption abouttheoverallra-
tionalityofcognizers. Rather, thepointis thatbeliefattribution re-
quiresbeliefevaluation, inaccordancewithnormative standards of
evidenceand justification. Ifthisis correct, in
rationality itsbroad
and fundamental senseis notan optionalproperty ofbeliefs, a vir-
tuethatsomebeliefsmayenjoyandotherslack;itis a precondition
of the attribution and individuation of belief-thatis, a property
withoutwhichthe conceptof beliefwouldbe unintelligible and
pointless.
394 / JaegwonKim

Two objections mightbe raisedto countertheseconsiderations.

First,
onemight arguethatatbesttheyshowonlythatthenormativity
ofbeliefis an epistemological assumption-that we needto assume
therationality andcoherenceofbeliefsystems whenwe are trying
tofindoutwhatbeliefstoattribute toa cognizer. Itdoesnotfollow
from thisepistemological point,theobjection continues, thatthecon-
ceptofbeliefis itselfnormative.23 In replying to thisobjection,we
can by-passtheentireissueofwhether therationality assumption
concernsonlytheepistemology of beliefattribution. Even ifthis
premise (whichI think is incorrect)is granted, thepointhasalready
beenmade.Foritis an essentialpartofthebusinessofnaturalized
epistemology, as a theoryofhowbeliefsare formed as a resultof
sensorystimulation, to findout whatparticular beliefsthegiven
cognizershaveformed. Butthisis precisely whatcannotbe done,
if our considerations show anything at all, unlessthe would-be
naturalized epistemologist continually evaluatestheputative beliefs
ofhissubjectsin regardto theirrationality and coherence, subject
to theoverallconstraint oftheassumption thatthecognizersare
largelyrational.Thenaturalized epistemologist cannotdispense with
normative concepts ordisengage himself from valuationalactivities.
Second,itmight be thought thatwe couldsimply avoidthesecon-
siderations stemming frombeliefattribution byrefusing tothinkof
cognitive outputas consisting of"beliefs", namelyas stateshaving
propositional contents.The"representations" Quinespeaksofshould
be takenas appropriate neuralstates, andthismeansthatallwe need
istobe abletodiscernneuralstatesoforganisms. Thisrequires only
neurophysiology andthelike,notthenormative theory ofrational
belief.
Myreplytakestheform ofa dilemma: either the"appropriate"
neuralstatesare identified by seeing how theycorrelatewith
inwhichcase we stillneedto contendwiththeproblem
beliefs,24
ofradicalinterpretation, orbeliefsareentirely by-passed. Inthelat-
ter case, belief,along withjustification, dropsout of Quinean
epistemology, anditis unclearinwhatsensewe are leftwithan in-
quirythathas anything to do withknowledge.25

6. The "Psychologistic"Approachto Epistemology

Manyphilosophersnow workingin theoryof knowledgehave

stressedtheimportance
ofsystematic
psychologyto philosophical
 Whatis "Naturalized / 395
Epistemology"?

epistemology. Reasonsproffered forthisarevarious,andso arethe

conceptions of the properrelationship betweenpsychology and
epistemology.26 Buttheyare virtually unanimous intheirrejection
ofwhattheytaketo be theepistemological tradition ofDescartes
anditsmodern in
embodimentsphilosophers likeRussell, C. I. Lewis,
Roderick Chisholm, andA. J.Ayer;andtheyareunitedintheiren-
dorsement thenaturalisticapproach ofQuinewe havebeenconsider-
ing.Traditional epistemology is oftencondemned as "aprioristic",
andas havinglostsightofhumanknowledge as a product ofnatural
causalprocesses and itsfunction in the survivalof the organism and
thespecies.Sometimes, theadherents ofthetraditional approach
are takento taskfortheirimplicit biasorindifference
antiscientific
tothenewdevelopments inpsychology andrelateddisciplines. Their
ownapproachincontrast is hailedas "naturalistic" and"scientific",
betterattuned tosignificantadvancesintherelevant scientific fields
such as "cognitivescience" and "neuroscience",promising
philosophical returns farricherthanwhattheaprioristic methodof
traditionalepistemology hasbeenabletodeliver. Weshallherebrief-
ly considerhow thisnew naturalism in epistemology is to be
understood in relationto theclassicepistemological program and
Quine'snaturalized epistemology.
Letus see howonearticulate proponent ofthenewapproachex-
plainsthedistinctiveness of hispositionvis-a-vis thatofthetradi-
tionalepistemologists. According toPhilipKitcher, theapproachhe
rejectsis characterized byan "apsychologistic" attitudethattakes
the difference between knowledgeand true belief-thatis,
justification-toconsistin"wayswhichareindependent ofthecausal
antecedents ofa subject'sstates".27 Kitcher writes:28
...we can presenttheheartof [theapsychologisticapproach]
by considering theway in whichit wouldtacklethe
questionofwhethera person'struebeliefthatp countsas
knowledgethatp. The idea wouldbe to disregard the
psychologicallifeofthesubject,lookingjustat thevarious
propositions in therightway'
she believes.Ifp is 'connected
to otherpropositionswhichare believed,thenwe countthe
subjectas knowing thatp. Ofcourse,apsychologisitc
epistemology willhaveto supplya criterion forpropositions
to be 'connectedin the rightway' ... but proponentsof this
viewofknowledge is to be
willemphasizethatthecriterion
396/ JaegwonKim

giveninlogicalterms.We are concernedwithlogical

relations notwithpsychological
amongpropositions,
amongmentalstates.
relations
Ontheotherhand,thepsychologistic approachconsiders thecrucial
difference betweenknowledgeand truebelief-thatis, epistemic
justification-toturnon"thefactors whichproduced thebelief", focus-
ingon"processes whichproducebelief, processes whichwillalways
contain,at theirlatterend,psychological events".29
It is not entirelyclear fromthischaracterization whethera
psychologistic theoryofjustification is to be prohibited frommak-
inganyreference tologicalrelations amongbeliefcontents (itis dif-
ficulttobelievehowa theory ofjustificationrespectingsucha blanket
prohibition couldsucceed);noris itclearwhether, conversely, an
apsychologistic theory willbe permitted torefer at all tobeliefs qua
psychological states,orexactlywhatitis fora theory todo so. But
suchpointsofdetailare unimportant here;it is clearenough,for
example, thatGoldman's proposaltoexplicate justifiedbeliefas belief
generated bya reliablebelief-forming process30 nicelyfitsKitcher's
characterization ofthepsychologistic approach.Thisaccount,one
form oftheso-called theory"
"reliability ofjustification, probably was
whatKitcherhad in mindwhenhe was formulating his general
characterization ofepistemological naturalism. However, another in-
fluentialform ofthereliabilitytheorydoesnotqualify underKitcher's
characterization. Thisis Armstrong's proposalto explainthedif-
ferencebetweenknowledgeand true belief,at least fornon-
inferentialknowledge, in termsof"a law-likeconnection between
thestateofaffairs [ofa subject'sbelieving thatp] and thestateof
affairsthatmakes'p' truesuchthat,giventhestateofaffairs [ofthe
subject'sbelievingthatp],itmustbe thecasethatp."31 Thereis here
no reference to thecausalantecedents of beliefs,something that
Kitcher requiresofapsychologistic theories.
Perhaps,Kitcher'spreliminary characterization needs to be
broadenedandsharpened. However,a salientcharacteristic ofthe
naturalisticapproachhas alreadyemerged,whichwe can putas
follows:justification is to be characterized in termsofcausal or
nomological connections involvingbeliefs aspsychological statesor
processes, andnotintermsofthelogicalproperties orrelations per-
tainingto thecontents ofthesebeliefs.32
Ifwe understand current epistemological naturalism in thisway,
 Whatis "Naturalized
Epistemology"?
/ 397

how closelyis it relatedto Quine'sconceptionof naturalized

epistemology? The answer,I think, is obvious:notverycloselyat
all.Infact,itseemsa gooddealclosertotheCartesian traditionthan
toQuine.For,as we saw,thedifference thatmatters between Quine's
epistemological program andthetraditional program is theformer's
totalrenouncement of the latter'snormativity, its rejectionof
epistemology as a normativeinquiry.The talk of "replacing"
epistemology withpsychology is irrelevant andat bestmisleading,
thoughitcouldgiveus a momentary relieffrom a senseofdepriva-
tion.Whenoneabandons justificationandothervaluational concepts,
oneabandons theentire framework ofnormative epistemology. What
remains isa descriptive empirical theory ofhumancognition which,
ifQuinehashisway,willbe entirely devoidofthenotionofjustifica-
tionor anyotherevaluativeconcept.
As I takeit,thisis notwhatmostadvocatesofepistemological
naturalism are aimingat. By and large theyare not Quinean
eliminativists in regardto justification, and justification in itsfull-
fledgednormative sensecontinues to playa centralrolein their
epistemological Wheretheydiffer
reflections. from their nonnaturalist
adversaries is thespecific wayin whichcriteria of-justification are
to be formulated. Naturalistsand nonnaturalists ("apsychologists")
can agreethatthesecriteria mustbe statedin descriptive terms-
thatis,without theuse ofepistemic oranyotherkindofnormative
terms.According to Kitcher,an apsychologistic theoryofjustifica-
tionwouldstatethemprimarily in termsoflogicalproperties and
relationsholdingforpropositional contents ofbeliefs, whereasthe
psychologistic approachadvocatestheexclusiveuse ofcausalpro-
pertiesandrelations holdingforbeliefs as eventsorstates.Manytradi-
tionalepistemologists mayprefer criteria thatconfer upona cognizer
a positionofspecialprivilege andresponsibility withregardto the
epistemic statusofhisbeliefs, whereasmostself-avowed naturalists
prefer"objective"or "externalist" criteriawithno such special
privilegesforthecognizer.Butthesedifferences are amongthose
thatarisewithin thefamiliarnormative framework, andareconsis-
tentwiththeexclusionofnormative termsin thestatement ofthe
criteriaofjustification.
Normative ethicscan serveas a usefulmodelhere.To claimthat
basicethicalterms, like"good"and"right", aredefinable onthebasis
ofdescriptive ornaturalistic terms isonething; toinsist thatitis the
businessof normative ethicsto provideconditions or criteriafor
398/ JaegwonKim

"good"and"right" indescriptive
ornaturalistic
termsisanother.One
mayproperly rejecttheformer,theso-called"ethicalnaturalism",
as manymoralphilosophers havedone,and holdthelatter;there
here.G. E. Mooreis a philosopher
is no obviousinconsistency who
didjustthat.As is wellknown,he was a powerful criticofethical
naturalism,holdingthatgoodnessis a "simple"and "nonnatural"
property. At the same time,he held thata thing'sbeinggood
"follows"fromits possessingcertainnaturalistic properties.He
wrote:33
I shouldneverhave thought ofsuggestingthatgoodnesswas
unlessI had supposedthatit was 'derivative'
'non-natural', in
thesensethat,whenevera thingis good (in thesensein
question)itsgoodness...'dependson thepresenceofcertain
non-ethical possessedby thethingin
characteristics'
question:I have alwayssupposedthatit didso 'depend',in
thesensethat,ifa thingis good (in mysense),thenthatit is
so followsfromthe factthatit possesses certainnatural
intrinsicproperties...
Itmakessenseto thinkofthese"natural properties"
intrinsic from
whicha thing'sbeinggood is thoughtto followas constituting
naturalistic ofgoodness,
criteria oratleastpointing totheexistence
ofsuchcriteria.Onecan rejectethicalnaturalism, thedoctrine that
ethicalconceptsare definitionally
eliminable infavorofnaturalistic
terms,andatthesametimeholdthatethical properties,ortheascrip-
tionofethicalterms, mustbe governed bynaturalistic criteria.
Itis
clear,then,thatwe are hereusing "naturalism" ambiguously in
"epistemologicalnaturalism" and "ethicalnaturalism". In ourpre-
sentusage,epistemological naturalism does notinclude(nordoes
itnecessarily
exclude)theclaimthatepistemic terms aredefinitionally
terms.(Quine'snaturalism
reducibleto naturalistic is eliminative,
thoughit is nota definitionaleliminativism.)
If,therefore,we locatethesplitbetweenQuineand traditional
epistemology atthedescriptive vs.normative divide,thencurrently
influential
naturalisminepistemology is notlikelytofallon Quine's
side.Onthisdescriptivevs.normative issue,onecansidewithQuine
in one of two ways: first,one rejects,withQuine,the entire
epistemological
justification-based program; or second,likeethical
butunlikeQuine,one believesthatepistemic
naturalists concepts
arenaturalistically I doubtthatverymanyepistemological
definable.
 Whatis "Naturalized / 399
Epistemology"?

willembraceeitherofthesealternatives.34
naturalists

Epistemology
7. EpistemicSupervenience-OrWhyNormative
Is Possible

Butwhyshouldwe thinkthattheremustbe naturalistic criteria

ofjustifiedbeliefandothertermsofepistemic appraisal? Ifwe take
thediscovery andsystematization ofsuchcriteria to be thecentral
taskofnormative epistemology, is thereanyreasonto thinkthat
thistaskcan be fruitfully pursued, thatnormative epistemology is
a possiblefieldofinquiry? Quine'spointis thatit is not.We have
alreadynotedthe limitation of Quine'snegativearguments in
"Epistemology Naturalized",butis therea positive reasonforthink-
ingthatnormative epistemology isa viableprogram? Onecouldcon-
sidera similarquestionaboutthepossibility ofnormative ethics.
I thinkthereisa short andplausible initial
answer, although a detail-
ed defenseofitwouldinvolvecomplexgeneralissuesaboutnorms
andvalues.Theshortansweristhis:we believeinthesupervenience
ofepistemic properties on naturalistic ones,andmoregenerally, in
thesupervenience ofall valuationaland normative properties on
naturalisticconditions. Thiscomesoutin variousways.We think,
withR.M.Hare,35 thatiftwopersonsoractscoincideinall descrip-
tiveornaturalisticdetails,theycannotdiffer inrespect ofbeinggood
or right,or any othervaluationalaspects.We also thinkthatif
something is "good" a "goodcar","gooddropshot","goodargu-
ment"-then thatmustbe so "invirtueof"itsbeinga "certain way",
thatis,itshavingcertain"factual properties". Beinga goodcar,say,
cannotbe a bruteand ultimate fact:a car is goodbecauseit has a
certain contextuallyindicatedsetofproperties havingtodo withper-
formance, comfort,
reliability, styling, economy, etc.Thesamegoes
forjustifiedbelief:ifa beliefis justified,thatmustbe so becauseit
has certainfactual, nonepistemic properties, suchas perhapsthat
thatitisseentobe entailedbyanother
itis "indubitable", beliefthat
is independently thatitis appropriately
justified, causedbypercep-
tualexperience, orwhatever. Thatitis a justified beliefcannotbe
a brutefundamental factunrelated to thekindofbeliefitis. There
mustbe a reasonforit,and thisreasonmustbe groundedin the
factual descriptive
properties ofthatparticular belief.Something like
this,I think,is whatwe believe.
400 / JaegwonKim

Two important themesunderlietheseconvictions: first, values,

though perhaps notreducible tofacts,mustbe "consistent" withthem
inthatobjectsthatareindiscernible inregard tofactmustbe indiscer-
niblein regardto value; second,theremustbe nonvaluational
"reasons"or "grounds"forthe attribution of values,and these
"reasons"or "grounds"mustbe generalizable-that is, theyare
coveredby rules or norms. These two ideas correspond to "weak
supervenience" and "strong supervenience" thatI have discussed
elsewhere.36 Beliefin the supervenience of value upon fact,
arguably, is fundamental to theveryconceptsofvalueand valua-
tion.37Anyvaluational concept,to be significant, mustbe govern-
ed bya setofcriteria, andthesecriteria mustultimately reston fac-
tualcharacteristics and relationships of objectsand eventsbeing
evaluated.Thereis something deeplyincoherent abouttheidea of
an infinitely descending seriesof valuational concepts, eachdepen-
dingon theone belowitas itscriterion ofapplication.38
It seemsto me,therefore, thatepistemological supervenience is
whatunderlies ourbelief inthepossibilityofnormative epistemology,
and thatwe do not need new inspirations fromthe sciencesto
acknowledge theexistenceofnaturalistic criteriaforepistemic and
othervaluational concepts. Thecase ofnormative ethicsis entirely
parallel:beliefinthepossibility ofnormative ethicsis rootedinthe
beliefthatmoralproperties andrelations aresupervenient uponnon-
moralones.Unlesswe are preparedto disownnormative ethicsas
a viablephilosophical inquiry, we hadbetterrecognizenormative
epistemology as one,too.39We shouldnote,too,thatepistemology
islikelytoparallelnormative ethicsinregardtothedegreetowhich
scientificresults are relevant or usefulto itsdevelopment.40 Saying
thisofcourseleaveslargeroomfordisagreement concerning how
relevant anduseful, ifatall,empirical psychology ofhumanmotiva-
tionandactioncanbe tothedevelopment andconfirmation ofnor-
mativeethicaltheories.41 In any event,once the normativity of
epistemology is clearlytaken note of, it is no surprisethat
epistemology andnormative ethicssharethesamemetaphilosophical
fate.Naturalized epistemology makesno more,and no less,sense
thannaturalized normative ethics.42

Notes

1. In makingtheseremarks
I am onlyrepeating
thefamiliar
textbook
 Whatis "NaturalizedEpistemology"?/ 401

historyofphilosophy; however, whatourtextbooks sayaboutthehistory

ofa philosophical concepthas muchto do withourunderstanding of
thatconcept.
2. AlvinGoldman explicitly statesthisrequirement as a desideratum of
hisownanalysis ofjustified belief in"WhatisJustified Belief?", inGeorge
S. Pappas(ed.),Justification andKnowledge (Dordrecht: Reidel,1979),
p. 1.Roderick M.Chisholm's definition of"beingevident" inhisTheory
ofKnowledge, 2nded. (Englewood N.J.:Prentice-Hall,1977)
Cliffs, does
notsatisfy thisrequirement as it restsultimately on an unanalyzed
epistemic conceptofone beliefbeingmorereasonablethananother.
Whatdoesthereal"criteriological" workforChisholm is his"principles
ofevidence". See especially (A)onp. 73ofTheory ofKnowledge, which
canusefully be regarded as an attempt toprovide nonnormative, descrip-
tiveconditions forcertaintypesofjustified beliefs.
3. Thebasicideaofthisstronger requirement seemsimplicit inRoderick
Firth'snotionof"warrant-increasing property" inhis"Coherence, Cer-
tainty,andEpistemic Priority", Journal ofPhilosophy 61 (1964):545-57.
ItseemsthatWilliam P. Alstonhassomething similar inmindwhenhe
says,"...likeanyevaluative property, epistemic justification isa superve-
nientproperty, theapplication ofwhichis basedon morefundamental
properties" (atthispointAlstonrefers to Firth's papercitedabove),in
"TwoTypesofFoundationalism", Journal ofPhilosophy 73(1976):165-85
(thequotedremark occurson p. 170).Although Alstondoesn'tfurther
explainwhathemeansby"morefundamental properties", thecontext
makesitplausible tosupposethathehasinmindnonnormative, descrip-
tiveproperties. See Section7 belowforfurther discussion.
4. See Chisholm, ibid.,p. 14.HereChisholm refers toa "person's respon-
sibilityor dutyqua intellectual being".
5. ThistermwasusedbyA.J.Ayertocharacterize thedifference between
luckyguessing andknowing; see TheProblem ofKnowledge (NewYork
& London:PenguinBooks,1956),p. 33.
6. Notablyby Chisholm in TheoryofKnowledge,1sted.,ch. 4.
7. See RudolfCarnap,"Testability and Meaning", Philosophy ofScience
3 (1936),and 4 (1937).We shouldalso notethepresenceofa strong
coherentist streakamongsomepositivists; see, e.g.,CarlG. Hempel,
"OntheLogicalPositivists' TheoryofTruth", Analysis 2 (1935):49-59,
and"SomeRemarks on'Facts'andPropositions", Analysis 2 (1935):93-96.
8. InW.V.Quine,Ontological Relativity andOtherEssays(NewYork:Col-
umbiaUniversity Press,1969).Alsosee hisWordandObject(Cambridge:
MITPress,1960);TheRootsofReference (LaSalle,Ill.:OpenCourt, 1973);
(with Joseph Ullian) TheWebofBelief(NewYork:Random House,1970);
andespecially "TheNature ofNatural Knowledge" inSamuelGuttenplan
(ed.),MindandLanguage(Oxford: Clarendon Press,1975).See Frederick
F. Schmitt's excellent bibliography onnaturalistic epistemology inHilary
Kornblith (ed.),Naturalizing Epistemology (Cambridge: MIT/Bradford,
1985).
9. Orconfirmational relations, giventhePositivists' verificationist theory
ofmeaning.
402 / JaegwonKim

10. I knowofnoseriousdefenseofitsinceAyer'sTheFoundations ofEm-

piricalKnowledge(London:Macmillan, 1940).
11. "Epistemology Naturalized", pp. 75-76.
12. Ibid.,p. 78.
13. To use an expression ofRichardRorty's inPhilosophy and theMirror
ofNature(Princeton: Princeton University Press,1979),p. 11.
14. ElliottSobermakesa similarpoint:"Andon thequestionofwhether
the failureof a foundationalist programme showsthatquestionsof
cannotbe answered,
justification itisworthnoting thatQuine'sadvice
'SinceCarnap'sfoundationalism failed,whynotsettleforpsychology'
carriesweight onlytothedegreethatCarnapian epistemology exhausts
thepossibilitiesofepistemology", in"Psychologism", JoumalofTheory
ofSocialBehaviour8 (1978):165-191.
15, See Chisholm, TheoryofKnowledge, 2nded.,ch. 4.
16. "Ifwe areseekingonlythecausalmechanism ofourknowledge ofthe
external world,andnota justification ofthatknowledge intermsprior
to science...", Quine,"GradesofTheoreticity", in L. Fosterand J.W.
Swanson(eds.), Experienceand Theory(Amherst:University of
Massachusetts Press,1970),p. 2.
17. Ibid.,p. 75. Emphasisadded.
18. Ibid.,p. 78. Emphasis added.
19. Ibid.,p. 83. Emphasisadded.
20. Butaren'ttherethosewhoadvocatea "causaltheory" ofevidenceor
justification?I wantto maketwo briefpointsaboutthis.First,the
nomological or causal input/output relationsare notin themselves
evidential relations,whether theselatterare understood causallyor
otherwise. Second,a causaltheory ofevidenceattempts tostatecriteria
for"e is evidenceforh"incausalterms; evenifthisissuccessful, itdoes
notnecessarily giveus a causal"definition" or "reduction" ofthecon-
ceptofevidence.Formoredetailssee section6 below.
21. 1amnotsaying thatQuineisunderanyillusion onthispoint. Myremarks
aredirected rather atthosewhoendorse Quinewithout, itseems,a clear
appreciation ofwhatis involved.
22. HereI amdrawing chiefly on DonaldDavidson'swritings onradicalin-
terpretation. See Essays9, 10,and 11 in hisInquiries intoTruthand
Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon Press,1984).See also DavidLewis,
"RadicalInterpretation", Synthese27 (1974):33144.
23. RobertAudisuggested thisas a possibleobjection.
24. Forsomeconsiderations tending to showthatthesecorrelations can-
notbe lawlike seemy"Psychophysical Laws",inErnest LePoreandBrian
McLaughlin (eds.),ActionsandEvents:Perspectives on thePhilosophy
ofDonaldDavidson(Oxford: Blackwell, 1985).
25. Fora moresympathetic accountofQuinethanmine,see HilaryKorn-
blith's
introductory essay,"Whatis Naturalistic Epistemology?", inKorn-
blith(ed.),Naturalizing Epistemology.
26. See formoredetails Alvin1.Goldman, Epistemology andCognition (Cam-
bridge:HarvardUniversity Press,1986).
27. TheNatureofMathematical Knowledge (NewYork:Oxford University
 Whatis "NaturalizedEpistemology"?/ 403

Press,1983),p. 14.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.,p. 13.I shouldnotethatKitcher considers theapsychologistic ap-
proachto be an aberration ofthetwentieth century epistemology, as
represented by philosophers like Russell,Moore,C.I. Lewis,and
Chisholm, rather thanan historical characteristic oftheCartesian tradi-
tion.In "ThePsychological Turn", Australasian Journal ofPhilosophy
60 (1982):238-253,HilaryKornblith givesan analogouscharacteriza-
tionofthetwoapproaches tojustification; he associates"justification-
conferring processes" withthepsychologistic approachand"epistemic
rules"withtheapsychologistic approach.
30. See Goldman, "Whatis Justified Belief?".
31. DavidM.Armstrong, Truth,BeliefandKnowledge (London: Cambridge
University Press,1973),p. 166.
32. Theaptnessofthischaracterization ofthe"apsychologistic" approach
forphilosophers likeRussell,Chisholm, KeithLehrer, JohnPollock, etc.
canbe debated. Also,thereistheissueof"internalism" vs."externalism"
concerning whichI believemustbe distinguished
justification, from the
psychologistic vs. apsychologistic division.
33. Moore,"A Replyto MyCritics", in P.A.Schilpp(ed.),ThePhilosophy
ofG.E.Moore(Chicago& Evanston: OpenCourt,1942),p. 588.
34. RichardRorty's claim,whichplaysa prominent rolein hisarguments
againsttraditional epistemology inPhilosophy andtheMirror ofNature,
thatLockeandothermodernepistemologists conflated thenormative
conceptofjustification withcausal-mechanical concepts is itself
based,
I believe,on a conflationofjustthekindI amdescribing here.See Ror-
ty,ibid.,pp. 139ff. Again,thecritical conflation consistsin notseeing
thattheview,whichI believeiscorrect, thatepistemic like
justification,
anyothernormative concept,musthavefactual, naturalisticcriteria,
is entirelyconsistent withtherejection ofthedoctrine, whichI think
is incorrect,thatjustificationitselfis, or isreducibleto,a naturalistic-
nonnormative concept.
35. TheLanguageofMorals(London: Oxford University Press,1952),p.145.
36. See "ConceptsofSupervenience", Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research65 (1984):153-176.
37. ErnestSosa,too,considers epistemological supervenience as a special
case ofthesupervenience ofvaluational properties on naturalisticcon-
ditions,in"TheFoundation ofFoundationalism", Nous14(1980):547-64;
especially p. 551.See alsoJamesVanCleve'sinstructive discussion in
his"Epistemic Supervenience andtheCircleofBelief", TheMonist68
(1985):90-104;especially, pp. 97-99.
38. Perhapsonecouldavoidthiskindofcriteriological regress byembrac-
ingdirectly apprehended valuational properties (asinethicalintuitionism)
on thebasisofwhichcriteria forothervaluational properties couldbe
formulated. Thedenialofthesupervenience ofvaluational concepts on
factualcharacteristics, however, wouldsevertheessential connection
between valueandfactonwhich, itseems,thewholepointofourvalua-
tionalactivitiesdepends.Intheabsenceofsuchsupervenience, thevery
404 / JaegwonKim

notionof valuationwouldlose its significance and relevance.The

elaborationofthesepoints,however, wouldhaveto waitforanother
occasion;butseeVanCleve'spapercitedinthepreceding noteformore
details.
39. Quinewillnotdisagreewiththis:he will"naturalize" themboth.For
hisviewsonvaluessee"TheNature ofMoralValues"inAlvin1.Goldman
andJaegwon Kim(eds.),ValuesandMorals(Dordrecht: Reidel,1978).
Fora discussionoftherelationship betweenepistemic andethicalcon-
ceptssee Roderick Firth,"AreEpistemic Concepts Reducible toEthical
Concepts?" in thesamevolume.
40. Fordiscussions ofthisand relatedissuessee Goldman, Epistemology
and Cognition.
41. Fora detaileddevelopment ofa normative ethical
theory thatexemplifies
theviewthatitis crucially relevant,see RichardB. Brandt, A Theory
oftheGoodand theRight(Oxford: The Clarendon Press,1979).
42. Anearlyversion ofthispaperwasreadata meeting oftheKoreanSocie-
tyforAnalytic Philosophy in 1984inSeoul.Anexpandedversionwas
presented at a symposium at theWesternDivisionmeetings of the
AmericanPhilosophicalAssociationin April,1985, and at the
epistemology conference at BrownUniversity in honorof Roderick
Chisholm in 1986.1 amgrateful toRichard FoleyandRobert Audiwho
presented helpfulcomments attheAPAsessionandtheChisholm Con-
ferencerespectively.I amalsoindebted toTerenceHorganandRobert
Meyersforhelpful comments and suggestions.

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