Radical Political Economy

Radical Political Economy as a 'Scientific Revolution'
Author(s): Stephen T. Worland

Source: Southern Economic Journal, Vol. 39, No. 2 (Oct., 1972), pp. 274-284
Published by: Southern Economic Association
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RADICAL POLITICAL ECONOMY AS A
'SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION'*
STEPHEN T. WORLAND
University of Notre Dame
The recent groundswell of interest

scientificin
development-by way of paradigm,
radical political economy means different
anomaly, crisis and new paradigm-is very
things to different people. Taking impressive
the de-and has aroused considerable
interest
velopment to be a "surge of new ideas 'whoseamong philosophers [19]. Used to
time has come'," Martin Bronfenbrenner
interpret the "awakening of the sleeping
attributes the revival of radicalism to a dogs" [2, 747] of radicalism in the late sixties,
complex of unresolved social problems, Kuhn's
such analysis proves to be very illuminat-
as inequality, pollution, racism anding.
im-It offers a scientific-as opposed to
sociological-explanation for the emergence
perialism [2, 747-748]. Taking a very differ-
ent tack, Paul Sweezy [33] suggests that ofthe
a radical brand of economics. It suggests
clash between conventional economics and that what has propelled radicalism out of
its radical, neo-Marxian counterpart might the backwaters of heterodoxy into the main-
be understood in terms of the pattern of stream of economic speculation is that con-
scientific development outlined in Thomas ventional economics has worked itself into
the kind of distinctive situation referred to
Kuhn's now classic little book, The Structure
by Kuhn as a "scientific crisis." 3 Finally,
of Scientific Revolutions [18].1 Kuhn's thesis
also provides the background for the high Kuhn's thesis suggests that the underlying
drama at the 1970 meetings of the Americandrive of radical development is toward the
Economic Association when John Gurleydiscovery and conceptualization of a new
[15] confronted the assemblage with a ring-paradigm. If this is correct, today's radical
ing denunciation of the alleged weaknesses,economics may lead to a decisive turning
blindness, and limitations of conventional point-a "revolution"-in the long history
economics.2 of economic science.4
Kuhn's explanation of the process of A basic deficiency of orthodox economics,
* For assistance in exploring Kuhn's thesis and3 With his emphasis on social problems as causal
its application to radical economics, the authorfactors, Bronfenbrenner employs a "relativist"
explanation for the revival of interest in radical
would like to thank the participants in the Notre
Dame Seminar in Political Economy; Professorpolitical economy [5; 28]. Bronfenbrenner [3,
Kenneth Jameson has been especially helpful. 207f] also offers a "relativist" explanation for the
The author would also like to thank an anonymous "vicissitudes" of Marxism, arguing that" the state
referee for helpful comments on an earlier draft.of economic and social malaise," has been more
1 The possibility of applying Kuhn's thesis important
to than "abstract intellectual merit" in
economics has occurred to several economists accounting for the rises and declines of Marxian
[12, 122ff; 6; 32, 223ff; 4; 3, 209, 224; 9, 47f; economics.
25]. It is questionable whether a "rela-
2 Refusing to allow the radicals to preempt tivist"
theexplanation of the radical revival is con-
use of Kuhn's analysis, Solow [27] in a sharp sistent
de- with an explanation in terms of Kuhn's
fense of conventional economics accused the radi- theory of scientific development.
cals of having "corrupted" Kuhn's notion of a 4 Though he says [2, 748] that if interest in radi-
"paradigm" making it a "mere license for loose cal economics continues for a generation "it may
thinking." Put in Kuhn's terms, the difference constitute a scientific revolution," Bronfen-
between Solow and Gurley is that the first con- brenner elsewhere [4, 136] rejects the notion that
siders society's unresolved problems as "puzzles" definitive revolutions, of the kind envisaged in
to be solved by "articulating" the paradigm of Kuhn's thesis, occur in economic thought and con-
conventional economics, while the latter takes cludes [3, 209, 224] that Marxism cannot be ex-
such problems to be "counter-instances" which pected to produce such a revolutionary change in
call for a switch to a new paradigm [18, 79f]. economics. For a similar view, see [25, 9].
274
RADICAL POLITICAL ECONOMY AS A 'SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION' 275
according to its radical critics [7] lies in itsparadigm "displays as particularly reveal-
"irrelevance"-its inability to deal with such ing." This concentration achieves results,
contemporary problems as war, racism,for it leads to a "precision of observation-
worker alienation, and so forth. Failure totheory match that could be achieved in no
come to grips with such issues might, of other way" [18, 23f, 65]. But this process of
course, be explained on ad hominem grounds abstraction and concentration also has its
as reflecting the conventional economist'sprice. Some factors are, thanks to the para-
ideological commitment to capitalism. On digm, a excluded from observation; while some
deeper level, however, economics may notlinkages between variables are illuminated,
be able to deal with some kinds of problems others are obscured. Phenomena that will
(no matter how urgent) because of a funda- not fit into the scheme of the paradigm
mental selective process which controls the"are often not seen at all." "Fundamental
economist's scientific perception. The factsnovelties" that might upset the basic para-
of economic life may filter into the econo- digm are often "suppressed." Thanks to the
mist's range of vision in such a way that paradigm, normal scientific endeavor ap-
crucial dimensions of social reality do notpears as an "attempt to force nature into
register and hence are not built into his basicthe preformed box... that the paradigm
scheme of conceptualization. The latter, assupplies" [18, 5, 24].
a result, may not be adequate for dealing Thus, Kuhn's thesis would explain the
with contemporary real world problems. "irrelevance" of orthodox economics if those
This interpretation of the apparent "ir-critical problems which the standard analysis
relevance" of orthodox economics fits neatly
is accused of overlooking are specified as the
phenomena "not seen at all," or "sup-
into Kuhn's explanation of scientific de-
velopment. A well-developed science works pressed" because of restrictions implicit in
with an accepted "paradigm"-an admix- the paradigm employed. Trying to fit social
ture of basic generalization, law and con- reality into the "preformed box" of the neo-
classical paradigm, conventional economics
cept, illustrated with standard models which
exemplify the laws and give them empirical cannot work a concern for war, racism,
destruction of the environment and similar
content.5 It is the function of the paradigm
to "guide research." It does so by definingfactors into its pattern of analysis. Thus it
problems and methods, leading the scientistmay be true, as the radicals say [7, 352] that
to concentrate on a limited range of prob- orthodox economics "cannot deal with the
important problems of modern society."
lems, to "investigate some part of nature in
detail and depth." It serves to forestallThe reason, Kuhn's analysis suggests,
random fact gathering by directing the derives not from the ideological bias of
scientist toward those facts which the economists, but from the restriction of the
economist's vision caused by the paradigm
6 As might be expected given the subtle issues
involved, considerable difficulty is encounteredemployed.6
in
any effort to produce a clear-cut, adequate notion
of the key concept of "paradigm." In one place6 "A paradigm can ... insulate the community
[18, 43] Kuhn describes a paradigm as a "set fromof . . . socially important problems that ...
recurrent and quasi-standard illustrations ofcannot be stated in terms of the conceptual ..
various theories in their conceptual observations,
tools the paradigm supplies" [18, 37]. Gurley and
and instrumental applications." In his 1970 post-
Sweezy seem to have an argument such as this in
script, a paradigm is characterized as a "matrix"
mind when they indicate that conventional
of shifting elements including basic definitions
economics does not take account of such factors as
and laws, models, and "shared exemplars" illus-
political barriers to economic development,
trating the use of the laws [18, 182-187]. Stigler
[32, 225] argues that Kuhn's notion of paradigmsociety's
is power structure, or widening interna-
tional income differentials because such matters
so lacking in detail that his central thesis cannot
be tested empirically. are "ruled out by the underlying paradigm," or
276 STEPHEN T. WORLAND
It is a fundamental tenet of Kuhn's digm. What are the instances of disconfirma-

tion
analysis that a science progresses by which have accumulated and coalesced
passing
through special, critical developmental
so as to bring about a "transition to crisis"
phases referred to as "crises" [18,
in 52-92].
the science of economics? Economics has
Use of a standard paradigm leads science encountered
to anomalies before-the water-
concentrate on a limited range of problems and-diamonds paradox in Adam Smith's
and to develop the specialized toolsday; needed
the Giffen good case at a later stage;
to deal with them. However, the verythe ambiguity of Keynesian underemploy-
success
with which a science "articulates" its exist- ment equilibrium; plus countless instances
ing paradigm guarantees that, soonerwhere or the results of econometric research do
later, inadequacies in the paradigm itself
not fit neatly into the framework of con-
will begin to emerge. The deepening vision
ventional theory. In instances such as these,
articulation of the basic paradigm has
attained by employing a successful paradigm
eventually leads the science to encountereventually resolved the difficulty so that the
"anomaly"-instances of disconfirmation anomalous came to appear as a special case,
wherein scientists become aware that "na-
recognition of which served to c-arify and
extend the basic paradigm. Thus, to assert
ture has somehow violated paradigm-induced
expectations" [18, 52f]. Many times, that
an conventional economics is now in crisis,
"anomaly" is eventually cleared up and
implies that a new intractable species of
anomaly must have been encountered, the
assimilated into the existing body of theory.
kind of anomaly whose characteristic fea-
On other occasions, however, the anomalies
ture is a "stubborn refusal to be assimilated
persist and accumulate. When this happens
scientists begin to question the adequacy
to of
existing paradigms" [18, 97]. Furthermore,
the current paradigm. Instead of forcingto make the interpretation fit Kuhn's thesis,
nature into the preformed conceptual it boxmust be shown that the crisis-provoking
provided by the paradigm, they begin anomalies
to are discovered, not by accident,
tamper with the structure and dimensionsbutof as a consequence of developing the
original paradigm; for it is an essential
the box itself. The original paradigm becomes
feature of Kuhn's notion of crisis, that
blurred and the rules for its interpretation
and employment are loosened.7 When "anomaly appears only against the back-
anomalies persist and accumulate to this ground provided by the paradigm" [18, 65].
extent, the science in question undergoes aAmong the factors listed by Bronfenbren-
"transition to crisis" [18, 82]. ner [2, 748] as contributing to the revival of
To explain the emergence of radical radicalism are the failure to achieve full
political economy in terms of Kuhn's notion employment, the race problem, pollution,
of crisis requires that one specify the "anom- and war. Radicals [7, 352f; 25, 9] find ortho-
alies" which have caused economists to begindox economics unable to "deal with the
losing confidence in the conventional para- important problems of modern society," and
because the paradigm employed "excludes a large include among the problems such factors as
part of reality" [15, 54f; 33, 8]. imperialism, destruction of the environment,
Gurley's reference [15, 53] to a "challenge" and inequality. Perhaps it can be argued that
of "assumptions and methods," to radical efforts
which "strike at the very heart of conventional the persistence of such unresolved problems
economics," strongly suggests that economics is constitute those anomalies the cumulative
going through a development very much like the impact of which has pushed conventional
"deep debate over legitimate methods, problems economics into crisis.8 Thus unemployment,
and standards of solution," the "expression of
explicit discontent . . .the debate over funda- 8 If the social problems cited by Bronfenbrenner
mentals" which, according to Kuhn [18, 481 char-are taken to be the "anomalies" that have caused
acterize a science in crisis. a crisis, the difference between his "relativist"
the existence of which could hardly be elements:

per- (i) a statement of antecedent
conditions; and (ii) a set of general laws.9
ceived in the days when Say's Law controlled
economic thinking, is spotlighted as Thusan an anomaly would be encountered
when the facts observed contradict what a
"anomaly" after the development of Keyne-
deductive linkage of antecedent conditions
sian macrotheory which explains how to cure
it. The articulation of neo-classical welfare with general laws would lead the investigator
economics has illuminated the divergence to expect. In order for disconfirmation (and
between private and social costs-and thushence anomaly) to occur, then, both the
led economists to discover that the pursuitantecedent conditions and the general laws
of economic self interest can, in a mannerspecified in the explanans must be taken to
unknown to Adam Smith, generate sociallybe true.?1 This being the case, it is doubtful
undesirable side effects. Inequality andwhether the occurrence of unresolved social
racial discrimination that might once haveproblems can be said to constitute an anom-
been accepted as natural, appear anomalousaly for conventional economics. Such would
against the background of a theory whichbe the case only if (i) the paradigm of con-
attributes income differentials to differences ventional economics included a specification
in factor productivity. And imperialism is,of the appropriate antecedent conditions,
perhaps, an anomaly for those taught toand (ii) there was empirical evidence to
believe that capital mobility between nationsindicate that the specified antecedent condi-
is mutually beneficial. Observing realitytions do, in fact, obtain. With enough in-
through the paradigm provided by conven-genuity one could specify a set of antecedent
tional economics, economists might be led toconditions which, in conjunction with the
view each of these unresolved problems as an standard micro and macro laws of conven-
anomaly. It may be the distinctive achieve-tional economics, would prohibit the occur-
ment of today's radicals to have realized that rence of those social problems taken to be
their solution is to be found, not by further "anomalies." However, it could always be
articulation of the neo-classical paradigm, argued that, as a matter of fact, such ante-
but by some more primordial type of de- cedent conditions are not fulfilled in today's
velopment that will eventually replace theeconomy-which would imply that the
conventional paradigm with a revolutionaryoccurrence of an unsolved problem does not
new model. disconfirm the conventional theory and,
The preceding line of argument leads, therefore, cannot be considered an "anom-
however, to difficulties. If unemployment, aly" in Kuhn's sense."
racism, pollution and similar problems are to 9 For an application of Hempel's analysis to
be considered "anomalies," then they pre- economics see [14; 20, 15f].
sumably constitute instances when expecta- 10 Friedman's well known assertion [10, 14]
that lack of "realism" in a theory's " assumptions"
tions derived from the paradigm of conven-does not affect the validity of the theory has been
tional economics are disconfirmed. But criticized precisely on the grounds that, if the
investigator
according to a well-known analysis of does not know the antecedent condi-
tions are fulfilled, it would be impossible to tell
scientific explanation [16] empiricalwhen
phe-a theory is disconfirmed [22, 41-44].
nomena (the explananda) are explained when
11 According to Sweezy, the antecedent condi-
their occurrence is deduced from an ex-tions necessary for orthodox economics to produce
satisfactory results may have been fulfilled at an
planans-with the latter consisting of two
earlier stage of history, but "whatever relative
validity its underlying paradigm may have had a
explanation of radical political economy and an
hundred years ago has largely disappeared as a
explanation offered in terms of Kuhn's analysis
result of intervening changes in ... the capitalist
would dissolve. However, as noted below, there system" [33, 6]. However, a crisis produced by the
are difficulties involved in trying to treat suchevolution of capitalism, as Sweezy is aware, is not
social problems as "anomalies." the same thing as a crisis produced by the develop-
The suggestion that attempts to radicalize

and tries to uncover its effects. In an open
economics reflect a crisis within the discipline
system such as a society, where causal factors
embraced
can be salvaged by a line of argument by one science interact in a non-
which
systematic
deliberately modifies Kuhn's analysis fashion with causal factors em-
adapt-
ing it to the special case of social science.
braced in another, the cause-to-effect con-
It is no doubt true that, since nections
economics
discovered by science will not con-
vert directly
must do its work in an "open system" where into the means-to-ends rules
exogenous factors can always interfere with
required for art. If seeking a particular end,
the operation of economic forces,policy has to allow for the fact that the
the econo-
mist can never be sure that the antecedent causal forces embraced in one science can
conditions necessary to test his theory collide adventitiously with those of another;
actually obtain [13, 150f; 14, 338ff]. For thisart must concern itself with the joint result
reason, observation never suffices to demon- of more than one causal linkage.l3 Further-
strate that his theory is disconfirmed and, more, the end sought by art may be compre-
hence, it is not possible for economics to hensive, a composite of the effects studied in
encounter "anomaly" if the latter is con- several sciences. For these reasons, failure
ceived in the strict sense appropriate to theto achieve a given end cannot be said to dis-
harder physical sciences. However, the confirm a finding of any one of the separate
history of economics suggests a looser con- sciences. Nevertheless, failure to achieve a
ception of "anomaly," one which reflects the given end could be said to disconfirm the
basic distinction between theory and policy.policy rules adopted for its achievement-
That is, whereas economics can never bepolicy rules which would be based, not only
said to encounter a strict theoretical anom- on the causal linkages discovered in each
aly, there is such a thing as policy anomaly.separate science, but also on some estimate
Furthermore, it is possible that the "articu-of the interaction between separate linkages.
lation" of policy could produce a situation According to this line of argument, the
which resembles the crisis phase characteris- persistence of such problems as pollution,
tic of a developing science. widening income differentials, and unem-
The distinction between a policy anomalyployment might be considered anomalies,
and the kind of theoretical anomaly en- not in the sense that their occurrence dis-
visioned by Kuhn as characteristic of a confirms the theoretical findings of conven-
developing physical science, parellels thetional economics, but the sense that they
classic methodological distinction [23; 17]tend to disconfirm the policy rules based,
between science and art.12 Whereas art partially, on such findings. Suppose that
establishes an end and searches for the public policy is to be concerned with es-
means to achieve it, science takes a cause tablishing a set of antecedent conditions
ment (in the pattern outlined by Kuhn) of science
which, in conjunction with the forces out-
lined in the conventional paradigm, would
itself. Indeed, though there is a strong resemblance
between the Marxian dialectic which explains the forestall the further occurrence of such
evolution of reality and Kuhn's dialectic which
explains the development of science, the resem-
anomalies. What the final upshot of such a
blance is only superficial. It would take an heroicprocedure would be depends upon the nature
brand of Hegelianism to identify the two. and extent to which economic reality in fact
12 According to E. Nagel [24, 327] "there are ...
an indefinite number of distinct causal determi- 13 For classic recognition of this problem, see
nants for the occurrence of any specific event."Adam Smith's well-known reference to the connec-
Since the function of social policy is to cause de-tion between economic policy and a non-economic,
sirable "specific events" to occur and prevent objective "defense" [30, 431]. See also A. C.
undesirable ones, the art of policy making mustPigou's discussion of the difficulties caused by the
consider the independent causal series which fact that economic causes may affect non-eco-
interact to produce them. nomic welfare [26].
departs from the required antecedent condi-to Kuhn, is encountered by a developing

tions. science. Perhaps today's radicals, contem-
If the initial disparity between reality plating
and the social malaise of the present age,
required antecedent conditions is slight, canthe
be said to have discerned this inadequacy
attempt to eliminate the disparity might be paradigm of conventional economics.
in the
achieved by following a few basic simple
At any rate, given the difficulty of achieving
policy rules.l4 But if that disparity isa con- disconfirmation in economics comparable
siderable-e.g., due to externalities; in- to that which can provoke crisis in physical
equities in the pattern of factor ownership; science, an interpretation such as this seems
complicated interaction between economic to be the only way to justify the belief that
and political forces; a technology that the rise of radicalism reflects a "crisis" in
inevitably produces worker alienation-no conventional economics.
simple, clear cut generalizations would According to Kuhn, a "crisis" begins with
emerge to serve as policy guide lines. Trying a growing recognition of the inadequacies of
to establish a set of conditions that would a given paradigm and closes when a new
forestall the occurrence of such problemsparadigm has been formulated to replace the
might require that an unlimited seriesold of one. It is a basic principle of his explana-
ad hoc adjustments be made, one after tion of scientific development that the old
another, in the operation of the economicparadigm will not be discarded until a new
system. There is no guarantee that, in onethishas emerged to take its place. "The
process of policy "articulation," the separate
decision to reject one paradigm is always
policy moves could be systematized and simultaneously the decision to accept an-
other one..." [18, 77]. This observation
rendered consistent with one another. Every
attempt to correct one policy anomaly might
raises one last question concerning the con-
create other anomalies-the way introduc- nection between Kuhn's analysis and radical
tion of an additional epicycle in Ptolemaic
economics. Granted that economics finds
astronomy created the need for yet another
itself in crisis, would it be possible for radical
epicycle.l5 Anomaly would pile up on top political
of economy to produce the kind of
anomaly and the ultimate result could be
paradigm switch necessary to terminate the
cumulative social disorder. Trying to patch
crisis? Will the current controversy over
up capitalist reality so as to make the para-
radicalism ultimately lead economic science
digm of conventional economics produce
to the kind of decisive shift in fundamental
socially acceptable results could produce an
outlook referred to, in Kuhn's analysis, as a
accumulation of policy anomalies and, ulti-"scientific revolution"?
mately, crisis-the practical counterpart of Applying Kuhn's interpretation of science
to economics, Donald Gordon has pointed
the kind of theoretical crisis which, according
14 The presumption that adherence to a out
few[12, 122-125] that the paradigm em-
ployed
basic rules would direct a market economy toward in contemporary economics is the
optimal results underlies Adam Smith's recom- basic maximizing model initially provided by
mendation of the "obvious and simple system of
Adam Smith, and that the development of
natural liberty"-a system which leaves only three
economics since Smith's day has been con-
"plain and intelligible" functions for public policy
to perform [30, 6511. cerned with the "articulation" of this origi-
15 As an illustration, consider the train of events
whereby (i) a special tax on imported textilesnalisparadigm.16 The historical high points in
imposed to offset the competitive advantagethis con-process of articulation are well known-
ferred on foreign textile producers by the e.g.(ii) utility theory introduced to explain the
subsidy paid exporters of American cotton, which
subsidy was needed because (iii) the support price16 Gordon holds that economics may have had
paid American cotton producers was out of linesome "unsuccessful rebellions," but has never had
with world commodity markets [34]. a major revolution [12, 124].
shape of demand curves; the synthesis of

theory of investment and money-much the
Austrian demand theory with classical real of energy conservation is
way the principle
cost doctrines; clarification of said the[18,short
95] to unite disparate branches of
run-long distinction; the marginalist physical science.l8 These considerations
theory
of the firm which establishes the connection suggest that if economics is to be rescued
between factor and product pricing; the from crisis by a paradigm switch, the process
integration of monetary theory into the basic must involve a drastic reinterpretation of
model. In this process of articulation, eco- the utility-max postulate. A transfer from
nomics has come to take on the charac- one paradigm to another, Kuhn notes [18,
teristics of a "developed theoretical system" 85] involves a change in "the field's most
elementary theoretical generalizations." For
[13, 158ff]. That is, empirical generalizations
are shown to be deducible from higher-level economics, the generalization to be altered
hypotheses, which in turn are shownwould to beseem to be the utility-max assump-
deducible from yet higher-level hypotheses, tion.
and generalizations from one branch of Atthethis point Gurley's remarks at the 1970
science are linked indirectly with generaliza-meetings of the American Economic Associa-
tions from other branches. Ultimately, tionthetake on a deeper significance. For
process of paradigm articulation led Gurley to the not only passes in scathing review
realization that the whole body of economic the deficiencies of conventional economics;
analysis is based upon one, fundamental his remarks also suggest what the axiomatic
behavioral postulate-the utility maximiza- base of a new economic paradigm might be.
tion assumption. As the implications of Making
thisthe contrast between conventional
basic postulate came to be recognized,and radical economics, Gurley points out
those
special ad hoc explanatory principles formerly[15, 54f; see also 7] that "Political economics
required-e.g., Smith's "propensity to ... studies economic problems by systemati-
truck
and barter" invoked to explain exchange; cally taking into account... the pervasive-
the Malthusian population principle ness needed of ruler-subject relations in society."
Quoting the political scientist Robert
to determine the wage rate; the Physiocratic
notion of a physical "produit net" used to he notes that ruler-subject power
Tucker,
explain the psychological incentive whichrelations obtain in "all established human
induces men to engage in economic activity
groups and institutions." It would seem to
-could be dispensed with. The entire require
dis- only a shift of conceptual viewpoint
to convert Gurley's proposition that power
cipline acquired finally the kind of systematic
deductive unity said [24, 4] to characterize
relations emerge in every human institution
successful scientific enquiry.l7 Eventually,
into the axiomatic principle that all aspects
utility maximization comes to unifyof andeconomic activity are ultimately deter-
systematize the various branches of eco- by "power conflicts." Perhaps the
mined
nomic enquiry-consumer theory; supply
utility-max postulate could be replaced by a
and demand in the product market; theory
18 For conventional economic theory, "utility'
of the firm; theory of factor prices; the be what Nagel [24, 85ff] refers to as a "basic
would
term." That is, the term itself may not have an
17 One of the functions of a paradigm, Kuhn
empirical content fixed by definite experimental
says [18, 109] is that of "telling the scientist about
the entities that nature does and does not contain procedures, but may be related to empirical
and about the ways in which those entities be- phenomena by way of various intervening, lower-
have." The paradigm of conventional economics level hypotheses. Thus utility maximization could
tells the economist that the "entities" at work support the hypothesis that consumers maximize
consist of utility maximizing consumers, ordinal firms,utility; that firms maximize profits or,
and resource owners and that they "behave" alternatively,
by sales revenue; or that labor sup-
interacting with one another through a system pliers seek
of optimal trade-offs betwe.en leisure and
markets. income.
different axiom-one asserting that theother" within the new paradigm [18, 149].
ultimate factors controlling economic ac- Furthermore, a new paradigm must fulfill
tivity are the shifting power relationships two crucial conditions: (i) it must resolve
within the social system. Radicals [21] some outstanding problem; and (ii) it must
emphasize the difference between neo-classi- "preserve a large part of the concrete prob-
cal economics which deals in market rela- lem-solving ability" of its predecessor [18,
tionships (i.e., those determined by utility 169]. These remarks are enough to suggest
maximization) and Marxian economics how, in a manner consistent with Kuhn's
which emphasizes power. Perhaps today's theory of scientific development, a "power
radical political economy can bring the
conflict" model derived from radical political
economics profession to a paradigm shift
economy might replace the conventional
whereby "power conflicts" come to be utility-max analysis and thereby produce a
considered the basic force which governs "scientific revolution" in economics.
the play of economic variables. The power conflict model could subsume
Kuhn's explanation of how a science the utility-max model as a special case. As a
revolutionizes itself by shifting from one matter of history, the utility-max explana-
paradigm to a new one is subtle, involvingtion a was discovered and articulated first,
blend of philosophical, psychological, and just as the simpler physical theory of New-
scientific considerations.'9 Quoting Herbert ton was discovered before that of Einstein.
Butterfield, he indicates [18, 85] that theThe historical priority of the utility-max
transition to a new paradigm involves model might be explained by the fact that,
handling the same data as before "but when economics was groping its way toward
placing them in a new system of relations by a first definitive paradigm, power was so
giving them a different framework." Also, widely diffused throughout the market
using the transition from Newton to Ein- system that its deep, pervasive influence
stein as an example, Kuhn notes [18, 95] went unnoticed. Power conflicts might have
that a new theory may be "simply a higher been so nicely balanced that the economist
level theory than those known before, one did not perceive their influence and was led,
that linked together a whole group of lower therefore, to base his theorizing on the
level theories without substantially changing postulate (later found to be derivative and
any." In such an instance of paradigm shift, special, rather than fundamental) that
a fundamental change in the basic concepts utility maximization is the major force at
of the science takes place. However, the old work in economic activity.20 Thus, the first
theory, properly interpreted, may be taken paradigm adopted in economic science came
as a special case of its successor and can be to be based upon a utility-max postulate,
said to retain its validity over a limited although as indicated above a long process of
range of phenomena [18, 95; cf24, 86f]. A "paradigm articulation" was required before
new paradigm ordinarily incorporates much the fundamental significance of this basic
of the terminology and apparatus of its assumption became apparent.21
predecessor, but old terms and concepts 20 Cf. the explanation [31] of how systematic
"fall into new relationships one with the economics emerged during a "classical situation"
when the contestants in the market tug-of-war
19 The transition from one paradigm to another were about equal so that they were led to a com-
is compared to a shift in visual gestalt; proponents promise which "reconciles . . opposing tenden-
of opposing paradigms are said to find themselves cies."
at "cross-purposes" and to "talk through each 21 Economists working in the orthodox tradition
other"; a paradigm shift is referred to as a "con- have on occasion come close to adopting a pattern
version experience" that cannot "be forced by of interpretation which postulates power conflict
logic and neutral experience" [18, 85, 11, 109, as the basic force controlling economic activity
148ff]. [8, 192ff]. See also the reference to Bohm-Bawerk
Fitted into
Furthermore, even though subsumed by the
a "new framework" of a
power
more comprehensive alternative, the conflict paradigm, conventional neo-
utility-
max paradigm might still retain classical analysis would maintain a limited
its validity
when applied to a limited range ofexplanatory
phenom-usefulness. However, as re-
ena. That is, the neo-classical model
quiredofbyaKuhn's analysis of the kind of
market economy could be said to provide
paradigm a occurring when an original
shift
satisfactory explanation of the model
pattern of as a special case of a later one
is taken
outputs, prices and resource allocation
[18, 98ff] in
the basic concepts of the utility-
those particular historical situations where
max model would be transformed. Buying
the play of economic activity and
leaves theproducing and exchanging
selling,
basic power relations of the surrounding
would be conceived as ultimately determined
social matrix undisturbed. Whenever the by a power struggle between economic
overall social system-political institutions; agents. Thus, the basic force determining
class divisions; the legal system-retains economic
its variables would be the same as
original structure unaltered, power conflicts that which causes conflict between nations,
can be said to cancel each other out (as in the clash between classes, friction between
the "classical situation" depicted by Stark) one social group and another.23 However, for
and the operation of utility-max forces, as a special case power conflicts would interact
explained in conventional economic theory, in such a way that the impact on economic
would control the performance of the system. variables could be accurately explained by
Thus, though superseded by a higher level conventional analysis. For instance, an
explanation, the conventional utility-max equilibrium price which in the last analysis
model would retain its "concrete problem- is the product of an immensely complicated
solving ability" for a special case.22 system of socio-political relationships
[29, 217]. According to Adam Smith, the short run through which a primordial power struggle
wage rate is determined by a power conflict be- operates, would appear in the special case
tween masters and workmen [30, 60f]. As subse- when power conflicts cancel each other out,
quent theorizing becomes more systematic, the
reference to power conflict as a determinant of as determined by utility-maximization.
wages drops out, to be replaced by an explanation However, emergence of the policy anom-
which incorporates the wage rate into the margina- alies referred to earlier-racism; inequality;
list, neo-classical utility-max analysis. The fact
that the utility-max postulate could thus be ex- pollution-may eventually bring the eco-
tended illustrates the axiom's explanatory fruit- nomics profession to the realization that
fulness. However, Kuhn's analysis allows for the circumstances when economic activity can
possibility that a principle of explanation sup-
pressed in favor of an alternative principle at one
take place without setting off considerable
stage of a science's development may be revived power shifts in the social system may be a
at a later stage when, due to intervening progress, special case, rather than, as assumed in the
its explanatory power can be better utilized. See
formative years of conventional economics,
the reference [18, 105f] to reversion to the scholas-
tic concept of innate attractions involved in the the general rule. If so, economics may have
development of Newtonian mechanics. Current reached the stage when it is time, in Butter-
attempts to produce a radical version of political
economy suggest that the insight involved in 28 One aspect of paradigm shift, Kuhn notes
Smith's use of power conflict as a determinant of [18, 200] is a shift in the pattern according to which
wage rates might be due for a similar revival. objects of scientific investigation are grouped into
22 According to Sweezy [33, 4f; also 15, 54] the sets. Thus, if economics shifts to a power conflict
paradigm of orthodox economics "takes the exist- paradigm, political relationships and market rela-
ing social order for granted," assuming that tionships once considered as sharply distinct from
diverse interests can be harmonized and equilib- one another may come to be treated within one
rium achieved within such an order. The error in common set. The shift in the boundaries of eco-
the conventional approach, so Kuhn's theory of nomic science might also simplify somewhat the
relationship referred to earlier between the causal
science suggests, lies in the failure to realize that
this paradigm is adequate only for a special case. findings of science and the policy rules of art.
phenomena as widening international in-

field's phrase, to "pick up the other end of
the stick"-to realize that power conflict is
come disparities, or the persistence of pov-
a more primordial force than utility maxi- erty among disadvantaged minority groups.
mization and that economic science needs A power conflict postulate might supplement
to be reformulated accordingly. Conven-
conventional marginal productivity theory
tional economics might retain its validity so as to provide a more satisfactory expla-
for a special case. However, in those circum- nation of income differentials-and, in the
stances when economic activity has an process, foster among economists a more
appreciable impact on the surrounding social critical attitude toward the institutional
system-e.g., when operation of the marketstatus quo [see 15, 60].
system contributes to the transition from a Much remains to be done, of course, be-
peasant to a capitalist society-abstracting fore radical political economy can be said to
from power conflicts would lead to inaccu-have produced a significant shift in the
rate explanation. For such circumstances, boundaries and structure of economic
a paradigm more comprehensive than the science. The time is not ripe for a fruitful
utility-max model would be called for. testing of low-level empirical hypotheses de-
A shift to a more comprehensive powerrived from radical economics, since a theo-
conflict paradigm might permit a revitalized retical base for such hypotheses different
economic science to deal more effectivelyfrom that already provided by the conven-
with some of those issues which, accordingtional model, is not available. Nor will
to the radicals, reveal the inadequacy ofprogress toward a new brand of radical eco-
conventional analysis. Specifically, such nomics a be served by purely abstract, philo-
shift might enable economics to meet thesophical speculation. The literature of radi-
charge that it makes an "artificial cleavage" calism attests to how easily such specula-
between economics and other disciplines tion can degenerate into metaphysical rhe-
and thus forestalls the development of a toric. What radical economists must do is to
unified social science [2, 749ff; also 11, 75f, produce the kind of definitive shift of con-
96f]. Philosophers [24, 448; 13, 151; 1,296] ceptualization which will lead economists to
warn that a social science which strives for a see unity and cohesion where they now see
pattern of explanation so comprehensive plurality and diversity, systematic connec-
that every shift of the social variables can tions where they now see only ad hoc inter-
be accounted for within the confines of one action.
unitary system of explanation is not likely In short, though radical speculation about
to be successful. Nevertheless, some useful the role of power in economic relationships is
extension of the boundaries of economic ex- suggestive of future developments; though
planation might be achieved if power conflict current controversy over fundamentals sug-
were postulated as the basic force controlling gests that economics needs a new paradigm,
economic activity, with utility maximiza- one must conclude that radical economists
tion seen as applicable only to a special case. have yet to produce one.
Within the perspective of a power conflict
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Radical Political Economy

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Radical Political Economy

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Radical Political Economy as a 'Scientific Revolution'

Author(s): Stephen T. Worland

University of Notre Dame

The recent groundswell of interest

It is a fundamental tenet of Kuhn's digm. What are the instances of disconfirma-

the existence of which could hardly be elements:

The suggestion that attempts to radicalize

departs from the required antecedent condi-to Kuhn, is encountered by a developing

shape of demand curves; the synthesis of

phenomena as widening international in-

nomics," History of Political Economy, EconomyFall Considered as an Art," Scope and

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