1AC

Plan
Plan: The United States federal government should substantially increase its diplomatic and economic engagement with the Peoples Republic of China over
the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank with the purpose of joining the bank.
 Poverty ADV
The United States needs to join the AIIB in order to assist in beneficial infrastructure projects
Stephen Olson, 15, 11-9-2015, Over the course of his 20 year international career, Stephen Olson has lived and worked in Asia, the Middle East, and the United States, holding senior executive positions in the private sector, international organizations, and
government. "Time for the US to Join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank," Diplomat, (http://thediplomat.com/2015/11/time-for-the-us-to-join-the-asian-infrastructure-investment-bank/)//UNION-EG

With the AIIB set to commence operations by year-end, U.S. President Barack Obama and whoever will succeed him will need to demonstrate a defter touch in managing the next phase.
Four basic facts should help illuminate the development of U.S. policy as the bank moves from drawing board to reality: Fact #1: There is a need for significant infrastructure funding
throughout Asia, which is beyond what the World Bank or Asian Development Bank (ADB) can deliver. Viewed strictly from that perspective, the establishment of an additional source of
funding through the AIIB could be positive and productive . Fact #2: The exact lending policies and practices of the AIIB are not yet firmly established. Concerns that the AIIB might establish
lower standards than those typically required by either the World Bank or ADB, may or may not ultimately prove to be justified. But at this stage, we simply dont know for certain. What is
certain however is that countries on the outside are unlikely to have much influence. Fact #3: China has already been and will continue to be a significant source of funding for infrastructure
projects throughout Asia. The AIIB does not therefore represent something entirely new on the regional development scene. What is new is that the AIIB would place some portion of
Chinas funding within the framework of a multilateral institution. Fact #4: Chinas voting rights in existing institutions such as the World Bank and IMF are significantly underrepresented,
given the size of its economy. While most member countries in these institutions acknowledge that China deserves a larger say, these sentiments have not yet been fully translated into
concrete reality and it is unclear when or if they ever will be.

Infrastructure focus provided by the AIIB is desperately needed by South Asia to reduce poverty and economic disparity
Haider Khan 15, 4-21-2015, "China's AIIB helps resolve Asia's soaring infrastructure needs," Conversation, (http://theconversation.com/chinas-aiib-helps-resolve-asias-soaring-infrastructure-
needs-40518)//UNION-EG

In my many visits to East Asia most recently China I have seen how national and international linkages can be constructed through infrastructure investment. China itself exemplifies how investing in roads and education can make a
dramatic impact on a countrys long-term growth and lifting millions of people out of poverty . Financing such investment is, therefore, a top strategic priority. The International Monetary Fund, the Asia
Development Bank and the World Bank have all played pivotal roles helping finance such investment in these now prosperous countries. The availability of transport, electricity, schools and hospitals has a tremendous impact on
improving the quality of life, while businesses need more reliable infrastructure to spur growth, which boosts incomes and reduces poverty, according to the ADB report. The addition of the AIIB to
the fold would bring many benefits especially to those parts of Asia in the Southeast and South Asian regions that lag behind in infrastructure investment. Indonesia has the greatest needs,
with the ADB estimating $450 billion will be required through 2020, mostly on transport. China needs just a little less, primarily due to electricity troubles, while another seven countries require at least $100 billion a piece. In addition, the problem of a
global lack of demand for goods and services due to the slowing economy will be mitigated by the hundreds of billions of dollars in extra infrastructure spending in Asia. Thus there are both local and
global benefits that can be reaped from appropriate infrastructure investment projects financed by the AIIB.

Those in poverty are subject to structural violence

Ailsa Wilson 2004 Urban violence: a guide to the literature Environment and Urbanization October 2004 vol. 16 no. 2 165-184//UNION-EG

The now largely accepted argument that deprivation is itself a form of violence gained prominence with John Galtungs (1991) work on structural violence, which extends understandings of violence to include psychological hurt
and, in turn, alienation, repression and deprivation (see McIlwaine, 1999). In urban contexts, it is deprivation as inequality that is the most important form of structural violence, and also that which
relates most significantly to the emergence of everyday reactionary violence.(5) Deprivation in this sense includes not only differences in income but also the lack of access to basic social services,
the lack of universal state security protection, along with the severe corruption, inefficiency and brutality that generally hit the poor hardest, and the lack of social cohesion (Vanderschueren, 1996). It is argued that this structural violence creates
reactive violence be it criminal or political in response (Briceo-Len and Zubillaga, 2002). As Vanderschueren (1996) argues, in situations of widespread and severe inequality, the urban poor are
undervalued and marginalized, and their daily living conditions heighten the potential for the emergence of conflict, crime or violence. Simpson (1993) also notes, in the context of South Africa, that poor social and
economic conditions provide the foundation for pervasive social, political and economic violence. Various manifestations of this reactive violence are explored in following sections. In particular, youth gangs could be seen as an example of the potential effects
of multi-level structural violence (see below).

Poverty is a form of structural violence that creates an ongoing genocide

Mumia Abu Jamal in 1998 (A Quiet and Deadly Violence, 9/19/98, http//www.mumia.nl/TCCDMAJ/quietdv.htm)

It has often been observed that America is a truly violent nation, as shown by the thousands of cases of social and communal violence that occurs daily in the nation. Every year, some 20,000 people are
killed by others, and additional 20,000 folks kill themselves. Add to this the nonlethal violence that Americans daily inflict on each other, and we begin to see the tracings of a nation immersed in a fever of violence. But, as remarkable, and harrowing as this level
and degree of violence is, it is, by far, not the most violent feature of living in the midst of the American empire. We
live, equally immersed, and to a deeper degree, in a nation that condones and ignores wide-ranging
"structural" violence, of a kind that destroys human life with a breathtaking ruthlessness. Former Massachusetts prison official and writer, Dr. James Gilligan observes; "By `structural violence' I mean the increased
rates of death and disability suffered by those who occupy the bottom rungs of society, as contrasted by those who are above them. Those excess deaths (or at least a demonstrably large proportion of
them) are a function of the class structure; and that structure is itself a product of society's collective human choices, concerning how to distribute the collective wealth of the society. These
are not acts of God. I am contrasting `structural' with `behavioral violence' by which I mean the non-natural deaths and injuries that are caused by specific behavioral actions of individuals
against individuals, such as the deaths we attribute to homicide, suicide, soldiers in warfare, capital punishment, and so on." -- (Gilligan, J., MD, Violence: Reflections On a National Epidemic (New York: Vintage, 1996),
192.) This form of violence, not covered by any of the majoritarian, corporate, ruling-class protected media, is invisible to us and because of its invisibility, all the more insidious. How dangerous
is it -- really? Gilligan notes: "[E]very fifteen years, on the average, as many people die because of relative poverty as would be killed in a nuclear war that caused 232 million deaths; and every single year,
two to three times as many people die from poverty throughout the world as were killed by the Nazi genocide of the Jews over a six-year period. This is, in effect, the equivalent of an ongoing,
unending, in fact accelerating, thermonuclear war, or genocide on the weak and poor every year of every decade, throughout the world." [Gilligan, p. 196]
 Warming ADV
Paris climate agreements werent enough Action is the first step
David Roberts 16, Vox writer on energy and climate change, 5-26-2016, "The argument for incrementalism in international climate negotiations," Vox,
http://www.vox.com/2016/5/26/11766252/international-climate-incrementalism

The international community has been talking about climate change since the 1980s, with a continuous procession of meetings, accords, treaties, and declarations. All the while, global carbon
emissions have continued to rise. Even the Paris climate accord signed in December, as promising as it is, falls well short of what the nations involved say is needed. And it is mostly composed
of promises and pledges. Actual, tangible action to restrain carbon emissions remains vanishingly modest relative to the amount of talk and diplomatic attention that have been lavished on
the problem.

Warming is real, reversible, and human caused multiple studies

NASA 16 (NASA; like the space agency; http://climate.nasa.gov/scientific-consensus/; 2016; 6-22-16)
Multiple studies published in peer-reviewed scientific journals1 show that 97 percent or more of actively publishing climate scientists agree: Climate-warming trends over the past century are extremely likely due to
human activities. In addition, most of the leading scientific organizations worldwide have issued public statements endorsing this position. The following is a partial list of these organizations, along with links to their published statements and a selection of related resources. AMERICAN
SCIENTIFIC SOCIETIES Statement on climate change from 18 scientific associations "Observations throughout the world make it clear that climate change is occurring, and rigorous scientific research demonstrates that the greenhouse gases

emitted by human activities are the primary driver." (2009)2 American Association for the Advancement of Science "The scientific evidence is clear: global climate change caused by human activities is occurring now, and it is a growing threat to society."
(2006)3 American Chemical Society "Comprehensive scientific assessments of our current and potential future climates clearly indicate that climate change is real, largely attributable to emissions from human activities, and potentially a very serious problem." (2004)4 American Geophysical Union

" Humaninduced climate change requires urgent action . Humanity is the major influence on the global climate change observed over the past 50 years. Rapid societal responses can significantly lessen negative outcomes ."
(Adopted 2003, revised and reaffirmed 2007, 2012, 2013)5 American Medical Association "Our AMA ... supports the findings of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Changes fourth assessment report and concurs with the scientific consensus that the Earth is undergoing adverse global climate
change and that anthropogenic contributions are significant." (2013)6 American Meteorological Society "It is clear from extensive scientific evidence that the dominant cause of the rapid change in climate of the past half century is human-induced increases in the amount of atmospheric greenhouse
gases, including carbon dioxide (CO2), chlorofluorocarbons, methane, and nitrous oxide." (2012)7 American Physical Society "The evidence is incontrovertible: Global warming is occurring. If
no mitigating actions are taken, significant disruptions in the Earths
physical and ecological systems, social systems, security and human health are likely to occur. We must reduce emissions of greenhouse gases beginning now." (2007)8 The Geological Society of America "The
Geological Society of America (GSA) concurs with assessments by the National Academies of Science (2005), the National Research Council (2006), and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2007) that global climate has warmed and that human activities (mainly greenhousegas
emissions) account for most of the warming since the middle 1900s." (2006; revised 2010)9 SCIENCE ACADEMIES International academies: Joint statement "Climate change is real. There will always be uncertainty in understanding a system as complex as the worlds climate. However there is now
strong evidence that significant global warming is occurring. The evidence comes from direct measurements of rising surface air temperatures and subsurface ocean temperatures and from phenomena such as increases in average global sea levels, retreating glaciers, and changes to many physical
and biological systems. It is likely that most of the warming in recent decades can be attributed to human activities (IPCC 2001)." (2005, 11 international science academies)10 U.S. National Academy of Sciences "The scientific understanding of climate change is now sufficiently clear to justify taking
steps to reduce the amount of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere." (2005)11 U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES U.S. Global Change Research Program " The global warming of the past 50 years is due primarily to human-induced increases in heat-
trapping gases. Human 'fingerprints' also have been identified in many other aspects of the climate system, including changes in ocean heat content, precipitation, atmospheric moisture, and Arctic sea ice." (2009, 13 U.S. government departments and agencies)12 INTERGOVERNMENTAL
BODIES Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, and since the 1950s, many of the observed changes are unprecedented over decades to millennia. The atmosphere and ocean have warmed, the amounts of snow and ice have diminished, and sea
level has risen.13 Human
influence on the climate system is clear, and recent anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases are the highest in history. Recent climate changes have had widespread
impacts on human and natural systems.14

No alt causes anthropogenic CO2 is the main driver of warming

EPA 14 (Environmental Protection Agency; https://www3.epa.gov/climatechange/science/causes.html; 2014; 6-22-16)
Recent climate changes, however, cannot be explained by natural causes alone. Research indicates that natural causes do not explain most observed warming, especially warming since the mid-20th century. Rather, it is
extremely likely that human activities have been the dominant cause of that warming. The Greenhouse Effect causes the atmosphere to retain heat When sunlight reaches Earths surface, it can either be reflected back into space or absorbed by Earth.
Once absorbed, the planet releases some of the energy back into the atmosphere as heat (also called infrared radiation). Greenhouse gases (GHGs) like water vapor (H2O), carbon dioxide (CO2), and methane (CH4) absorb energy, slowing or preventing the loss of heat to space. In this way, GHGs

act like a blanket, making Earth warmer than it would otherwise be. This process is commonly known as the greenhouse effect. The Role of the Greenhouse Effect in the Past Over the last several hundred thousand years, CO2 levels varied in tandem with the
glacial cycles. During warm "interglacial" periods, CO2 levels were higher. During cool "glacial" periods, CO2 levels were lower. [2] The heating or cooling of Earths surface and oceans can cause changes in the natural sources and sinks of these gases, and thus change greenhouse gas concentrations in
the atmosphere. [2] These changing concentrations are thought to have acted as a positive feedback, amplifying the temperature changes caused by long-term shifts in Earths orbit. [ The Recent Role of the Greenhouse Effect Since
the Industrial Revolution began around
1750, human activities have contributed substantially to climate change by adding CO2 and other heat-trapping gases to the atmosphere. These greenhouse gas emissions have increased the
greenhouse effect and caused Earths surface temperature to rise. The primary human activity affecting the amount and rate of climate change is greenhouse gas emissions from the burning of fossil fuels. The Main Greenhouse Gases The most important GHGs
directly emitted by humans include carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), and several others. The sources and recent trends of these gases are detailed below. Carbon dioxide Carbon dioxide is the primary greenhouse gas that is contributing

to recent climate change. CO2 is absorbed and emitted naturally as part of the carbon cycle, through plant and animal respiration, volcanic eruptions, and ocean-atmosphere exchange. Human activities, such as the burning of fossil fuels and changes
in land use, release large amounts of CO2, causing concentrations in the atmosphere to rise. Atmospheric CO2 concentrations have increased by more than 40% since pre-industrial times,
from approximately 280 parts per million by volume (ppmv) in the 18th century to 396 ppmv in 2013. In April of 2014, the monthly average concentration at Mauna Loa exceeding 400 ppm for the first time in human history. The current CO2
level is higher than it has been in at least 800,000 years. [2] Some volcanic eruptions released large quantities of CO2 in the distant past. However, the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) reports that human activities now emit more than 135 times as much CO2 as

volcanoes each year. Human activities currently release over 30 billion tons of CO2 into the atmosphere every year. [2] The resultant build-up of CO2 in the atmosphere is like a tub filling with water, where more water flows from the
faucet than the drain can take away.

AIIB is key to reducing carbon dioxide emissions

Mauro 06/12/15 (Paolo, a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, Why America Should Join the AIIB, 06/12/15, 06/20/16, https://www.project-
syndicate.org/commentary/us-should-join-aiib-by-paolo-mauro-2015-06?barrier=true)//BME

WASHINGTON, DC The United States, along

with Canada and Japan, has been conspicuously absent from the discussions regarding the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). A total of 57 countries from
Europe, Asia, and Latin America have joined the Chinese-led effort to spend $100 billion on roads, rail lines, bridges, and harbors throughout the region. But President Barack Obamas
administration has remained reluctant to join much to the bewilderment of Chinas government. Continuing to maintain that stance would be a mistake. The US has an opportunity to
influence the AIIBs design without looking like it is reversing course. In exchange for participating in the institution, the Obama administration could and should insist that the AIIB focus on financing
infrastructure projects that reduce carbon-dioxide emissions and meet the highest environmental standards. The need for infrastructure investment in Asias emerging economies is vast. Generally, as a countrys household
income rises, the share of spending on food declines, while spending on transportation rises sharply. And most developing countries in Asia have reached an economic stage at which large segments of their populations will soon be able to afford cars and plane
travel for the first time. According to
research I conducted with my colleague, Tomas Hellebrandt, average household income in Asias emerging economies will double over the next two decades; in the meantime, spending on transportation
will quadruple. The
choices being made now regarding what kind of infrastructure to build subway systems or roads; green energy or coal power will have a major impact on the worlds ability
to keep climate change in check.

AIIB wants to invest in green energy and tech United States investment is key
Darius Nassiry and Smita Nakhooda 16, Smita Nakhooda is a leads ODI's work stream on climate finance, and is an expert on climate change and energy policy in developing countries. She currently advises various international organisations
and governments on climate finance issues. She was previously a Senior Associate in the Institutions and Governance Program at the World Resources Institute, where she led programmes to stregnthen governance of electricity in major developing countries, and
on the environmental impacts of development finance. She also developed work to stregnthen governance of forests in the context of global efforts to reduce emissions from deforestation and degradation. Darius has spent nearly 10 years as an investment
banker working with energy and utilities clients in New York, London and Tokyo. He previously designed a public-private renewable energy fund as an investment manager with the Norwegian Investment Fund for Developing Countries (Norfund), and conducted
research on leveraging finance for clean technology as a visiting fellow with the Center for Global Development. 04-2016, "The AIIB and investment in action on climate change " The Overseas Development Institute,
(https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/the_aiib_and_investment_in_action_final_20160413.pdf)//UNION-EG

As the founding member of the AIIB, its largest shareholder, and its prime beneficiary in terms of reach and influence, China has a number of reasons to support the AIIBs focus on clean
energy and low-carbon, climate resilient infrastructure. China can help ensure that new infrastructure built in coming years avoids locking-in an emissions trajectory that threatens future
regional and global prosperity. The opportunity for the AIIB to finance climate change mitigation investments also corresponds to Chinas own self-interest and aligns closely with Chinas own
recent policy decisions to promote green development. A focus on clean energy and low-carbon infrastructure serves the commercial interests of many countries in the region particularly
China as a means to help secure new export markets for key industries, such as solar energy, wind turbines systems, energy efficiency, and electrical grid technologies.23 By emphasizing
renewable energy, China can also help reduce over-capacity in key domestic industries such as solar24 through increased demand in the region, as well as access new markets for
complementary industries such as smart grid technologies.25 By focusing the AIIB on the requirements of an environmentally sustainable future, China can align the new institutions policies
and operations with its own strategic investment priorities, its next Five Year Plan (FYP), and recent steps to green the countrys financial system. Over the past decade, driven by concerns
about reducing air pollution, improving energy security and promoting growth in strategic clean technology industries26 China has pursued a low-carbon investment strategy and has
established itself as a renewable energy leader , fostering dynamics that have lowered prices and have expanded the market. In the five years to 2012, investment in renewable and nuclear
energy rose by 40 percent while investment in fossil fuel generation fell from 50 percent to 25 percent.27 By 2013, wind, hydroelectric and solar comprised 30 percent of generating capacity
and 20 percent of electricity generation,28 enabling China to reach its 2015 target two years ahead of plan.29 In the eight years to 2013, China became the largest wind power generator in
terms of total capacity and capacity added per year.30 In the five years to 2014, non-fossil generation capacity increased 73 percent to 444 GW.3In 2015, China spent USD 110.5 billion on
clean energy technology, 17 percent more than in 201432 and added more wind capacity than the European Union.33 Chinas One Belt, One Road initiative, involving port, railway, road,
power and grid infrastructure, also creates enormous opportunities and needs to ensure that new infrastructure will be sustainable and withstand the foreseeable stresses and shocks
resulting from a warming climate. 34
However, the United States investment is key to successful funding of projects
Raj M. Desai and James Raymond Vreeland 15, 4-6-2015, Raj M. Desai is Associate Professor of International Development at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and in the Department of Government at Georgetown University,
and a Non-resident Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution. He is a specialist on problems of economic reform, foreign aid, and international development. James Raymond Vreeland (Ph.D., New York University, 1999) is Professor of International Relations in
the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University. He holds a joint appointment in the Government Department. He conducts research in the field of international political economy, specializing in international institutions. "How to stop
worrying and love the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank," (https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/04/06/how-to-stop-worrying-and-love-the-asian-infrastructure-investment-bank/)UNION-EG

In fact, the developmental logic behind the AIIB is paramount. Asia faces a massive infrastructure gap. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) estimates that Asia will need $8 trillion over the next decade
for energy, transportation, telecommunication and water/sanitation. Private investment in infrastructure, according to the ADB, hovers at $13 billion a year, the majority of which is concentrated in low-risk projects. Official
development assistance adds another $11 billion a year in financing. If true, this means that the shortfall exceeds $700 billion a year. The United States, as a result, places itself in opposition to regional investments
that can expand trade, support financial market development and macroeconomic stability, and improve environmental, health and social conditions. Were the current group of international financial
institutions capable of plugging the gap, it is unlikely that the AIIB would gather worldwide support. But existing institutions cannot hope to fill this hole. The ADB and the World Bank have a combined capital base of less than $400 billion, which
must support a wide variety of lending programs beyond infrastructure. Moreover, there is little chance that bilateral donors including the biggest bilateral donor, the U.S. government will increase its funding for foreign aid in the current political climate.
The AIIB has an initial capital base of $50 billion, with authorized capital up to $100 billion. According to one estimate, using similar loans-to-equity ratios of the World Bank and ADB, the AIIB could commit some $30
billion in loans devoted exclusively to infrastructure (the World Banks own infrastructure financing was $24 billion in 2014). In effect, the United States is informing fast-growing Asian nations: We are not going
to increase official funding for your important needs anytime soon; we are also going to prevent the institutions we control from increasing their funding for those needs; and lastly, we are going to
admonish others from devising other ways of funding you. No wonder that Asian governments have jumped on the AIIB bandwagon. Australia, Indonesia and South Korea were conspicuously absent from inauguration ceremonies last year when they shared U.S.
concerns. But now they have all warmed to the idea of joining the AIIB (Indonesia became a founding member, while Australia and South Korea have applied for membership). Moreover, ADB
and World Bank officials have extended a cautious
welcome to the new China-led bank, saying they see room for collaboration. But the clearest signal of the AIIBs appeal has come from officials in Taipei, who have announced that Taiwan, too, will join the organization as Taipei, China.
If Japan also joins as is now expected it will leave the United States isolated among major donor nations.

Climate Change is the most likely cause of mass extinction

Meates , 13 (Megan Meates, Public Relations and Communication Consultant at Curtin University, author, December 11th 2013, http://www.reportingclimatescience.com/news-
stories/article/does-global-warming-cause-mass-extinctions.html)

Researchers have discovered two of Earths ancient mass extinctions wiped out life on the planet in a similar way to one another and that both were associated with global warming
conditions. Research led by Curtin University in Perth, Western Australia, and published in Geology, demonstrated the cascade of events during the fourth largest extinction, at the end of the Triassic period 200 million years ago, were remarkably similar to those
of the largest extinction that occurred at the end of the Permian 250 million years ago.The research suggests perhaps all global warming-related mass extinctions show similar patterns of change. From rock samples collected
by colleagues in Plymouth University, lead scientists Professor Kliti Grice, Director of the WA Organic and Isotope Geochemistry Centre (WA-OIGC) program and Dr Caroline Jaraula and Dr Pierre Le Metayer, Research Fellows of the WA-OIGC program from
Curtin, discovered and examined molecular fossils of land plants, algae and green sulfur bacteria (known as Chlorobi).Alongside their international research team, they
were able to determine the oceanic and atmospheric conditions that
caused the end-Triassic extinction 200 million years ago.Back then, the worlds continents were being pulled apart to create what is now the Atlantic Ocean. This event was accompanied by
frequent, massive volcanic eruptions that injected great quantities of CO2 into atmosphere, estimated at four times higher than todays levels based on plant physiology, Professor Grice said.The
high CO2 levels triggered global warming; leading to a cascade of atmospheric and oceanic changes that were very similar to those that we found had caused the largest mass extinction,
which happened 50 million years prior to this one. Of the five mass extinctions to have ever occurred in the past 600 million years, four were associated with global warming. Our
research suggests if two of these had similar processes operating, perhaps all other global warming-related extinctions do too, helping us understand more about Earths history.Dr Jaraula said the research team looked at stable carbon isotopes of molecular fossils of
plant waxes, algae and chlorobi before, during and after the extinction period.Professor Richard Twitchett of Plymouth University said the next step was to compare the results to changes in the fossil record of marine animals, to help understand how future marine
extinctions are likely to occur. Our study has provided a glimpse of how extinctions happen and their rates of change. While ocean circulation and aspects of the carbon cycle will always be different, the general patterns of
change can still be compared, Professor Michael Bttcher, of the Leibniz Institute for Baltic Sea Research, Germany, said. Professor Grice and her research colleagues previously determined the conditions of the largest extinction occurring at the end of
the Permian, 250 million years ago in a report published in Science in 2005.The recently published research in Geology was carried out in conjunction with Plymouth University and Leibniz Institute for Baltic Sea Research, Germany. The research has been funded
by the Australian Research Council under a QEII Discovery Fellowship awarded to Professor Grice and Professor Twitchett. Professor Grice has also recently been awarded a Discovery Outstanding Research Award to continue this research and investigate the
recovery of the largest extinction events and their association with oil and gas resources on a global scale. The paper entitled Elevated pCO2 leading to Late Triassic extinction, persistent photic zone euxinia, and rising sea levels was published in Geology. The

Late Triassic mass extinction event is the most severe global warming-related crisis to have affected important extant marine groups such as scleractinian corals . and offers potential insights
into climate change scenarios. Here we present evidence from Chlorobi-derived biomarkers of episodic and persistent photic zone euxinia. From biomarkers and stable carbon isotopes, we present evidence of rapid mixing of atmospheric and oceanic carbon
reservoirs. Global versus regional trends are resolved in kerogen organic matter type, carbonate 13C, and bulk and pyrite 34S. This suite of data demonstrates for the first time a comprehensive organic and stable isotope geochemical reconstruction of events
leading up to the Late Triassic extinction event and its aftermath. The cascade
of events prior to, during, and after the extinction is remarkably similar to those reported for the Late Permian extinction, the
largest extinction event of the Phanerozoic. We predict that similar conditions will have occurred during all past episodes of rapid global warming and biotic crisis that are associated with
similar rises in CO2.

The international community can check any environmental concerns of the AIIB
Simon Pollock 16, 4-15-2016,Pollock is working on climate change outreach and engagement for the Australian Government. A major part of my job involves liaising with businesses and the general public to help provide two-way paths of knowledge about
Australias climate policies. "Renminbi power: Will China's wallet shape the planet?," Climate Home - climate change news, (http://www.climatechangenews.com/2016/04/15/chinese-investment-has-the-power-to-shape-the-planet/)//UNION-EG

Athena Ballesteros, Director of the World Resource Institutes Finance Centre, agreed the AIIB is likely to fill a need for funding infrastructure projects in Asia, but stressed these must be low-
carbon. On the AIIBs insistence its investments will be lean, clean and green, Ballesteros called for vigilance in monitoring the delicate balance of environmental and social concerns with
keeping financing transaction costs low for energy and infrastructure projects. To many observers, the AIIBs approach to funding projects on the basis of whether they add or decrease
greenhouse gases will be a major test of the banks approach to environmental integrity. Ballesteros is on the whole optimistic about the prospects of the AIIB being able to forge a new path
of low-carbon development in the region, corresponding to an increased international urgency to tackle climate change. As the new kid on the block, the AIIB can help change the way Asia
produces and consumes energy and, it can help shape the way we build infrastructure, she said. Calvin Quek, a Greenpeace sustainable finance expert, said the amount of international focus
on the AIIB means it is likely to follow best environmental practice in funding projects in developing countries. An increasingly interconnected world, not just in terms of shared environmental
problems but also border-crossing communications channels, means international scrutiny is likely to follow the AIIBs investment decisions carefully. It is also likely, given the international
momentum on climate action following a successful agreement at the seminal UN meeting in Paris at the end of last year, the AIIB will be encouraged and win accolades from investing in low-
carbon technology. It is also becoming increasingly clear that good business sense is drawing funders away from high-emissions and financially risky fossil fuel investments.

Other banks are insuffiecient to solve AIIB is key

Gaia Larsen 16, 3-4-2016, Gaia Larsen is a Senior Associate in the WRIs Sustainable Finance Center, where she leads its work on financial institutions and climate finance readiness. She is an attorney whose work focuses primarily on shifting investments
toward protecting people and the environment. At WRI, her work has focused on several issue areas including environmental democracy, climate finance, and the extractive industries. Prior to joining WRI, Gaia was a fellow at the Institute for Policy Integrity at
New York University "Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank Releases New Environmental and Social Standards. How Do They Stack Up?," World Resources Institute, (http://www.wri.org/blog/2016/03/asian-infrastructure-investment-bank-releases-new-
environmental-and-social-standards)//UNION-EG

Last week, the new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)released its Environmental and Social Framework, which will help guide how the bank deals with its investments impacts on
people and the environment. With authorized capital of $100 billion and promises to deliver aid with less bureaucracy, the AIIB could play a big role in re-shaping countries around the region.
Negotiations over its formation have been punctuated by questions over what standards it would apply to govern its investments. For its part, the AIIB has committed to being lean, clean
and green and to applying world-class standards. So what can we see in the newly released Framework? First, the Framework does indeed send a signal that AIIB is acting on its commitment
to meet the international standards used by development banks to consider impacts on people and the environment before committing funds to a development project. The Framework lays
out a vision, a policy, and three supporting standards that are broadly similar in nature to those of the World Bank (WB), Asian Development Bank (ADB) and other established multilateral
development banks. On some issues, the AIIB has embraced more progressive positions than some of its peers. For example, the AIIB excludes financing for commercial logging operations in
tropical or old-growth forests, which goes beyond the current commitment made by the World Bank. On other subjects, the AIIBs commitments are not quite as strong. For example, the AIIB
has not followed the lead of the ADB or International Finance Corporation (IFC) in giving Indigenous Peoples the right to consent to activities taking place on their lands. In general, though,
the Frameworks vision recognizes many of the issues such as climate change, gender, biodiversity and ecosystems, resettlement, labor practices and Indigenous Peoples that AIIB will
encounter as it begins to make investments. It also makes very important commitments around transparency, information disclosure and public participation that exceed those of a number of
national development banks, including key players such as the China Development Bank and the China Export-Import Bank. Following through on these commitments will be critical to
building trust and confidence in the banks approach.
 Multi-Lat ADV
Multilateralism on the brink now only shifting from western centric strategies can solve
Jonathan Dove 16, 4-26-2016, "The AIIB and the NDB: The End of Multilateralism or a New Beginning?" The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2016/04/the-aiib-and-the-ndb-the-end-of-
multilateralism-or-a-new-beginning/ //NV

Multilateral cooperation over the past decade has taken a steep downward turn. From the final demise late last year of the World Trade Organizations protracted Doha Round of multilateral talks, to the growing proliferation of
regional and sectoral trade deals, world powers seem either unable or unwilling to seek common ground like they used to. Indeed, there appears to be a growing universal aversion to the post-World War II forums for negotiation and agreement, which seem
mired in bureaucracy and stasis. Even the United States, the masthead of the Bretton Woods Institutions, shows such inclinations. Washingtons
regional efforts to secure the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Transatlantic
Trade and Investment Partnership are an obvious departure from the principle of universal consensus-based decision-making. Some argue that this shift from the global to the regional
reflects the reality of a diverse and more complex world order, in which a Western-centric, one size fits all approach is no longer tenable.

Fighting cooperation has alienated the US from its allies

Kurlantzick 16 Kurlantzick, Joshua. "Pivot Missteps." Council on Foreign Relations. Council on Foreign Relations, 15 Jan. 2016. Web. 21 June 2016. EP
But wariness toward Beijing has morphed into a muddled, obsessive, and often mindless U.S. policy. It holds that any new Chinese action must be stopped; any new ally must be won back; any
new ambition must be contained. The administration has become so obsessed about countering China that it fails to realize some of the Chinese actions it is fighting do not imperil the United
States interests. Meanwhile, the (largely futile) battle doesnt just alienate allies. It also takes American diplomats, money, and arms away from places that truly matter to the United States. In
some ways, America would do best to let China win.

The US joining AIIB is key to our multilateral legitimacy and influence

Salze-Lozach 15 (Vronique Salze-Lozac'h; Asia Foundation; http://asiafoundation.org/2015/07/22/to-be-or-not-to-be-part-of-aiib/; 7-22-15; 6-22-15)
The need is certainly enormous. In a region that is home to the worlds fastest-growing economies, the infrastructure investment gap has been estimated at $8 trillion between 2010 and 2020, according to figures from
the Asian Development Bank. The emphasis on trade, regional economic cooperation, and connectivity, to sustain high growth rates in the future, calls for huge investment efforts from governments in hard

infrastructure such as roads, railways, harbors, electricity, and telecommunications, but also in soft components such as policies and regulations to ensure that investments are efficient and yield positive results. The AIIBs

intention to support this much-needed infrastructure development is therefore welcomed both by governments and by businesses managing ever-expanding regional and global supply
chains. The Asian-led AIIB also represents a new, distinctively Asian development tool, bringing regional know-how and expertise to the problem of matching the supply of infrastructure to
specific regional needs. This newcomer development actor may also provide opportunities for collaboration with existing multilateral agencies. IMF chief Christine Lagarde, speaking at the opening of the China Development Forum in Beijing earlier this year, said that the IMF and the World Bank would be delighted to cooperate
with the AIIB. Challenges, however, are also numerous. While China likes to present this initiative as a win-win situation for Asia, there are concerns that the new bank may cut corners on environmental, social, and anticorruption standards . It is, in fact,

anticipated that loans will be made at commercial rates with few or no non-economic conditionalities such as environmental protections. Moreover, AIIB will differ from an organization like the Asian Development Bank by focusing on building infrastructure

rather than prioritizing poverty reduction. There is also a risk of misallocation of funds to support mega-projects that have little impact on poverty or inclusive economic growth. Finally, the task of leading a complex, multilateral organization spanning an array of national interests will not be easy. There is no doubt
that the AIIB will give China greater influence within the region and beyond. When calling the AIIB the new type of multilateral bank for the 21st century, Chinese Finance Minister Lou Jiwei made no secret of Chinas intention to play a more predominant role in Asia. However, the question is not whether the AIIB will give a greater role to China in

signatory nations will have an opportunity to influence AIIB governance and operations. Nations deciding to stay out of the
the region, but whether the best way to respond to this development is to join it or to stand apart. As mentioned before,

AIIB, like Japan and the U.S., will have no way to express their concerns or to influence the development of requirements, criteria, and rules of governance. By joining, Japan and the U.S. would also be
able to push for good coordination with the other multilateral development organizations. Finally, on the inside, they would be in a better position to ensure that the AIIB brings truly effective benefits to regional development and regional trade, and to observe carefully how
the AIIB affects the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and its members economies.

Specifically multilateral legitimacy is the only way heg will be sustainable

Finnemore, 9 professor of political science and international affairs at George Washington University (Martha, , Legitimacy, Hypocrisy, and the Social Structure of Unipolarity: Why Being a
Unipole Isnt All Its Cracked Up to Be, World Politics, Volume 61, January 2009, http://home.gwu.edu/~finnemor/articles/2009_unipolarity_wp.pdf, SMS)

Legitimacy is, by its nature, a social and relational phenomenon. One's position or power cannot be legitimate in a vacuum . The concept only has meaning in a particular social context. Actors, even unipoles, can- not create
legitimacy unilaterally . Legitimacy can only be given by others. It is conferred either b y peers, as when great powers accept or reject the actions of another power, or by those upon whom power is exercised. Reasons to confer legitimacy have varied throughout history.
Tradition, blood, and claims of divine right have all provided reasons to confer legitimacy, although in contemporary politics conformity with international norms and law is more influential in determining which actors and actions will be accepted as legitimate.9 Recognizing the legitimacy of power does not mean these others

necessarily like the powerful or their policies, but it implies at least tacit acceptance of the social structure in which power is exercised. One may not like the inequalities of global capitalism but still believe that mar- kets are the only realistic or likely way to organize successful
economic growth. One may not like the P5 vetoes of the Security Council but still understand that the United Nations cannot exist without this conces- sion to power asymmetries. We can see the importance of legitimacy by thinking about its absence. Active rejection of social structures and the withdrawal of recognition of their legitimacy create a

crisis. In domes- tic politics, regimes suffering legitimacy crises face resistance, whether passive or active and armed.Internationally, systems suffering legiti- macy crises tend to be violent and noncooperative. Post-Reformation Europe might be an example of such a system.
Without at least tacit acceptance of power's legitimacy, the wheels of international social life get derailed. Material force alone remains to impose order, and order creation or maintenance by that means is difficult, even under unipolar- ity. Successful and stable orders require the grease of some

legitimation structure to persist and prosper.10 The social and relational character of legitimacy thus strongly colors the nature of any unipolar order and the kinds of orders a unipole can
construct . Yes, unipoles can impose their will, but only to an extent. The willingness of others to recognize the legitimacy of a unipoles actions and defer to its wishes or judgment shapes the character of the order that will emerge. Unipolar power without any underlying legiti- macy will have a very
particular character. The unipoles policies will meet with resistance, either active or passive, at every turn. Coopera- tion will be induced only through material quid pro quo payoffs. Trust will be thin to nonexistent. This is obviously an expensive system to run and few unipoles have tried to do so. More
often unipoles attempt to articulate some set of values and shared interests that induce acquiescence or support from others, there- by legitimating their power and policies. In part this invocation of val- ues may be strategic; acceptance by or overt support from others makes exercise of power by the unipole cheaper and more effective. Smart
leaders know how to "sell" their policies. Wrapping policies in shared values or interests smoothes the path to policy success by reassuring skeptics." Rhetoric about shared interests in prosperity and economic growth accompanies efforts to push free trade deals on unwilling part- ners and publics. Rhetoric about shared love of human rights and de-
mocracy accompanies pushes for political reforms in other states. In their examination of debates leading up to the 2003 Iraq war in this issue of World Politics, Jack Snyder, Robert Shapiro, and Yaeli Bloch-Elkon provide an example of unipolar attempts to create legiti- macy through strategic use of rhetoric. They show how "evocative and evasive
rhetoric" allowed proponents of the war to imply links between the 9/11 attacks, weapons of mass destruction, and Saddam Hussein's regime. Potentially unpopular or controversial policies were rational- ized by situating them in a larger strategic vision built on more widely held values, as when the authors of the 2002 National Security Strategy
memorandum wove together the global war on terror, the promotion of American democratic values abroad, and the struggle against authori- tarian regimes to create a justification for preventive war.12 Indeed, as Ronald Krebs and Patrick Jackson argue, rhetorical "sales pitches" of this kind can be highly coercive. Examining the same case (the
selling of the Iraq war), Krebs and Jennifer Lobasz show how the adminis- tration's "war-on-terror" discourse, which cast the U.S. as a blameless victim (attacked for "who we are" rather than anything we did), was designed in such a way as to leave opponents with very few arguments they could use to rally effective opposition in Congress.13 Usually
this articulation of values is not simply a strategic ploy. Deci- sion makers and publics in the unipole actually hold these values and believe their own rhetoric to some significant degree. Unipole states, like all states, are social creatures. They are composed of domestic soci- eties that cohere around some set of national beliefs. Their leaders are
products of those societies and often share those beliefs. Even where leaders may be skeptical, they likely became leaders by virtue of their abilities to rally publics around shared goals and to construct foreign and domestic policies that reflect domestic values. Even authoritarian (and certainly totalitarian) regimes articulate shared goals and function
only because of the web of social ties that knit people together. Certainly all recent and contemporary strong states that could be candidates for unipolesthe U.S., China, Russia, Germany, and Britaindo.14 Thus unipole states, like all states, find naked self-aggrandizement or even the prescriptions of Machiavellian virtue difficult to pursue.15
Unipoles and the people who lead them pursue a variety of goals de- rived from many different values. Even "national interest" as most people and states conceive of it involves some broader vision of social good beyond mere self-aggrandizement. Americans like to see democ- racy spread around the world in part for instrumental reasonsthey
believe a world of democracies is a safer, more prosperous world for Americansand also for normative onesthey believe in the virtues of democracy for all. Likewise, Americans like to see markets open in part for instrumental reasonsthey believe a world of markets will make Americans richerand also for normative onesthey believe that
markets are the ticket out of poverty. Much of unipolar politics is thus likely to revolve around the degree to which policies promoting the unipoles goals are accepted or resisted by others. Other states and foreign publics may need to be persuaded, but often influential domestic constituencies must also be brought on board. Channels for such
persuasion are many and varied, as is evident from past U.S. diplomatic efforts to sell its policies under bipolarity. The shift from laissez-faire to what John Ruggie terms the "embedded liberal compromise" as the basis for the U.S.-led economic order after WWII required extensive diplomatic effort to persuade other states and New York's financial

elite to go along. The tools of influence used to accomplish this were sometimes material but also intellectual and ideological. It was the "shared social purposes" of these economic ar- rangements that gave them legitimacy among both state and societal actors cross-nationally-16 A unipoles policies are thus circumscribed on two fronts. The poli-
cies must reflect values held at home, making them legitimate domes- tically. At the same time, in order to induce acquiescence or support from abroad, they must appeal to the leaders and publics of other states. Constructing policies across these two
spheresdomestic and inter- nationalmay be more or less difficult, depending on circumstances, but the range of choices satisfying both constituencies is unlikely to be large. Widespread disaffection on either front is likely to create signifi- cant legitimacy costs to leaders, either as electoral or stability threats domestically or as decreased
cooperation and increased resistance in- ternationally. Creating legitimacy for its policies is thus essential for the unipole but it is also difficult, dangerous, and prone to unforeseen consequenc- es. Domestically, the need to cement winning coalitions in place has polarized U.S. politics, creating incentives to exploit wedge issues and ideological
narratives. As Snyder, Shapiro, and BIoch-Elkon describe, neoconservatives, particularly after 9/11, used these tools to great effect to generate support for the Bush administration's policies. Such ideo- logically-driven persuasion efforts entail risks, however. Constructing coherent ideological narratives often involves sidelining inconvenient facts,
what Snyder and his coauthors call "fact bulldozing." This is more than just highlighting some facts at the expense of others. It may (or may not) begin with that aim, but it can also involve changing the facts people believe to be true, as when large numbers of people came to believe that weapons of mass destruction were indeed found in Iraq. Thus,
to the degree that these persuasion efforts are successful, if their ideology does not allow them to entertain contrary facts, policymakers and publics may make decisions based on bad information. This kind of self-delusion would seem unlikely to result in smart policy. To the extent that ideological narratives become entrenched, these delusions may
extend to future generations of policymakers and make them vic- tims of blowback. Even if successors come to terms with the facts, they may be entrapped by the powerful legitimating rhetoric constructed by their predecessors.17 Internationally, this need to construct legitimate policies also creates important opportunities for opponents and
potential challengers to a unipole. As Stephen Walt notes in this issue, opportunities for conven- tional material balancing are limited under our current unipolar situa- tion and, by definition, one would expect this to be so in most, if not all, unipolar systems. What is a challenger to do? With material balancing options limited, one obvious opening

for rival states is to undermine the legitimacy of unipolar power. A creative rival who cannot match or balance a unipole's military or economic strength can easily find strat- egies to undercut the credibility and integrity of the unipole
and to concoct alternative values or political visions that other states may find more attractive. Thus, even as a unipole struggles to construct politi- cal programs that will attract both domestic and international support with an ideology or values that have wide appeal, others may be trying to paint those same programs as self-aggrandizing or selfish.

Attacks on legitimacy are important "weapons of the weak."18 Even actors with limited or no material capability can mount damaging at- tacks on the credibility, reputation, and legitimacy of
the powerful. The tools to mount such attacks are not hard to come by in contemporary politics. Information and the ability to disseminate it strategically are the most potent weapons for delegitimating power in all kinds of situ- ations, domestic and international. Even non-state actors like nongov- ernmental organizations (NGOs) and
activist networks whose material capabilities are negligible in the terms used in this article have been able to challenge the legitimacy of policies of powerful states and the legitimacy of the states themselves. The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (icbl) is one prominent example. Civil society groups and like-minded states were able to attract
signatures from more than 120 governments to ban these devices in 1997 despite opposition from the unipole (U.S.) government. The fact that the ICBL received the Nobel Peace Prize for its efforts is suggestive of its success at dele- gitimating unipole policies on this issue. If legitimacy were irrelevant, the U.S. would have ignored this challenge; it
did not. The Pentagon has begun phasing out these weapons and replacing them with newer, more expensive devices meant to conform to the treaty requirements. Indeed, that the U.S. began touting the superiority of its new mine policy (promulgated in February 2004) over the ICBLs Ottawa treaty requirements highlights the power of this
transnational civil society network to set standards for legitimate behavior in this area.19 Similar cases of NCO pressure on environmental protection (including climate change), human rights, weapons taboos, and democratization amply suggest that this ability to change what is "legitimate" is a common and consequential way to challenge
unipoles.20 The fact that these chal- lenges are mounted on two frontsinternational pressure from foreign governments, international organizations, and NGO activists on the one hand, and domestic pressure from the unipole's own citizens who sup- port the activists' views on the othermakes these challenges doubly difficult to manage. State
actors, too, can use these weapons to attack the unipole's poli- cies and do so regularly. Among states, attempts to delegitimate the policies of others are a staple of foreign policy-making and may be employed more often in states that have fewer material capabilities with which to achieve their goals against a unipole. France may be un- able to

Exploiting multilateralism's legitimacy as a form of action, French attempts since the late
balance effectively against U.S. material power in contemporary politics, but it can (and has) raised questions about U.S. leadership and the legitimacy of U.S. policies, especially U.S. inclinations toward uni- lateralism.

1990s to label the U.S. a "hyperpower" and to promote a more multilateral, even multipolar, vision of world politics are clearly designed to constrain the U.S. by undermining the legitimacy of any U.S.

action that does not receive widespread interna- tional support and meet international standards for "multilateralism."21 Countering such attacks on legitimacy is neither easy nor costless. It requires constant management of the transnational conversation sur-rounding the unipole's behavior and continuing demonstrations of the unipole's
commitment to the values or vision that legitimate its power. To simply dismiss or ignore these attacks is dangerous; it smacks of contempt. It says to others, "You are not even worth my time and at- tention." A unipole need not cater to the wishes of the less powerful to avoid conveying contempt. It can argue, justify, and respectfully dis- agree
but all of these take time, attention, and diplomacy. Dismissal is very different than disagreement, however. Peers disagree and argue; subordinates and servants are dismissed. By treating the less powerful with contempt the unipole communicates that it does not care about their views and, ultimately, does not care about the legitimacy of its own
power. To dismiss or ignore the views of the less capable is a form of self- delegitimation. Contempt is thus a self-defeating strategy for unipoles; by thumbing its metaphorical nose at others, the unipole undercuts the legitimacy needed to create a wide range of policy outcomes.21 Social control is never absolute and material power alone cannot

control requires some amount of recognition, deference, and, preferably, acceptance on the part of those over whom power is exercised. Other parties, not the unipole, thus hold important keys to the establishment of effective and stable order
cre- ate it. Effective and long-lasting social

Paradoxically, then, preponderant power can only be converted into social control if it is diffused. To exercise power to maximum effect, unipoles must give up some of that power
under unipolarity.

to secure legitimacy for their policies.

US leadership prevents great power war and existential governance crises

Brooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth 13 (Stephen, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, John Ikenberry is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of
Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, William C. Wohlforth is the Daniel Webster Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College Dont Come Home America: The Case Against Retrenchment,
International Security, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Winter 2012/13), pp. 751)

A core premise of deep engagement is that it prevents the emergence of a far more dangerous global security environment. For one thing, as noted above, the United States overseas presence gives it the leverage to restrain partners from taking
provocative action. Perhaps more important, its core alliance commitments also deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and make its partners more secure, reducing their incentive to adopt solutions to their security problems that
threaten others and thus stoke security dilemmas. The contention that engaged U.S. power dampens the baleful effects of anarchy is consistent with influential variants of realist theory. Indeed, arguably the scariest portrayal of the war-prone world that would emerge absent the American Pacifier is provided
in the works of John Mearsheimer, who forecasts dangerous multipolar regions replete with security competition, arms races, nuclear proliferation and associated preventive war temptations, regional rivalries, and even runs at regional hegemony and full-
scale great power war. 72 How do retrenchment advocates, the bulk of whom are realists, discount this benefit? Their arguments are complicated, but two capture most of the variation: (1) U.S. security guarantees are not necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries and conflict in Eurasia; or (2) prevention of rivalry and conflict in
Eurasia is not a U.S. interest. Each response is connected to a different theory or set of theories, which makes sense given that the whole debate hinges on a complex future counterfactual (what would happen to Eurasias security setting if the United States truly disengaged?). Although a certain answer is impossible, each of these responses is
nonetheless a weaker argument for retrenchment than advocates acknowledge. The first response flows from defensive realism as well as other international relations theories that discount the conflict-generating potential of anarchy under contemporary conditions. 73 Defensive realists maintain that the high expected costs of territorial conquest,
defense dominance, and an array of policies and practices that can be used credibly to signal benign intent, mean that Eurasias major states could manage regional multipolarity peacefully without the American pacifier. Retrenchment would be a bet on this scholarship, particularly in regions where the kinds of stabilizers that nonrealist theories
point tosuch as democratic governance or dense institutional linkagesare either absent or weakly present. There are three other major bodies of scholarship, however, that might give decisionmakers pause before making this bet. First is regional expertise. Needless to say, there is no consensus on the net security effects of U.S. withdrawal. Regarding each region, there are optimists and

pessimists. Few experts expect a return of intense great power competition in a post-American Europe, but many doubt European governments will pay the political costs of increased EU defense cooperation and the budgetary costs of increasing military outlays. 74 The result might be a Europe that is incapable of securing itself from various threats
that could be destabilizing within the region and beyond (e.g., a regional conflict akin to the 1990s Balkan wars), lacks capacity for global security missions in which U.S. leaders might want European participation, and is vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. What about the other parts of Eurasia where the United
States has a substantial military presence? Regarding the Middle East, the balance begins to swing toward pessimists concerned that states currently backed by Washington notably Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabiamight take actions upon U.S. retrenchment that would

intensify security dilemmas . And concerning East Asia, pessimism regarding the regions prospects without the American pacifier is pronounced. Arguably the principal concern expressed by area experts is that Japan and South Korea are likely to obtain a nuclear capacity and increase
their military commitments, which could stoke a destabilizing reaction from China . It is notable that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan moved to obtain a nuclear weapons capacity and were only constrained from doing so by a still-engaged United States. 75 The second body of
scholarship casting doubt on the bet on defensive realisms sanguine portrayal is all of the research that undermines its conception of state preferences. Defensive realisms optimism about what would happen if the United States retrenched is very much dependent on

its particularand highly restrictiveassumption about state preferences; once we relax this assumption, then much of its basis for optimism vanishes. Specifically, the prediction of post-American tranquility throughout Eurasia rests on the assumption that security is the only relevant
state preference, with security defined narrowly in terms of protection from violent external attacks on the homeland. Under that assumption, the security problem is largely solved as soon as offense and defense are clearly distinguishable, and offense is extremely expensive relative to defense. Burgeoning research across

the social and other sciences, however, undermines that core assumption: states have preferences not only for security but also for prestige, status, and other aims, and they engage in trade-offs among the various objectives. 76 In addition, they
define security not just in terms of territorial protection but in view of many and varied milieu goals. It follows that even states that are relatively secure may nevertheless engage in highly competitive behavior. Empirical studies show that this is indeed sometimes the case. 77 In sum, a bet
on a benign postretrenchment Eurasia is a bet that leaders of major countries will never allow these nonsecurity preferences to influence their strategic choices. To the degree that these bodies of scholarly knowledge have predictive leverage, U.S. retrenchment would result in a significant deterioration in the security environment in at least some of

the worlds key regions. We have already mentioned the third, even more alarming body of scholarship. Offensive realism predicts that the withdrawal of the America n pacifier will yield either a competitive regional multipolarity complete with associated insecurity, arms racing,
crisis instability, nuclear proliferation, and the like, or bids for regional hegemony, which may be beyond the capacity of local great powers to contain (and which in any case would generate intensely competitive behavior, possibly including regional great power war ). Hence it is unsurprising that
retrenchment advocates are prone to focus on the second argument noted above: that avoiding wars and security dilemmas in the worlds core regions is not a U.S. national interest. Few doubt that the United States could survive the return of insecurity and conflict among Eurasian powers, but at what cost? Much of the work in this area has
focused on the economic externalities of a renewed threat of insecurity and war, which we discuss below. Focusing on the pure security ramifications, there are two main reasons why decisionmakers may be rationally reluctant to run the retrenchment experiment. First, overall higher levels of conflict make the world a more dangerous place. Were

Eurasia to return to higher levels of interstate military competition, one would see overall higher levels of military spending and innovation and a higher likelihood of competitive regional proxy wars and arming of client states all of which would be concerning, in part because it would promote a faster
diffusion of military power away from the United States. Greater regional insecurity could well feed proliferation cascades, as states such as Egypt, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Saudi Arabia all might choose to create nuclear forces. 78 It is unlikely that proliferation decisions by any

of these actors would be the end of the game: they would likely generate pressure locally for more proliferation. Following Kenneth Waltz, many retrenchment advocates are proliferation optimists, assuming that nuclear deterrence solves the security problem. 79 Usually carried out in dyadic terms, the debate over the stability of

proliferationchanges as the numbers go up. Proliferation optimism rests on assumptions of rationality and narrow security preferences. In social science, however, such assumptions are inevitably probabilistic. Optimists assume that most states
are led by rational leaders, most will overcome organizational problems and resist the temptation to preempt before feared neighbors nuclearize, and most pursue only security and are risk averse. Confidence in such probabilistic assumptions declines if the world were to move from nine to twenty,

thirty, or forty nuclear states. In addition, many of the other dangers noted by analysts who are concerned about the destabilizing effects of nuclear proliferationincluding the risk of accidents and the prospects that some new nuclear powers will not have truly

survivable forcesseem prone to go up as the number of nuclear powers grows. 80 Moreover, the risk of unforeseen crisis dynamics that could spin out of control is also higher as the number of nuclear powers increases. Finally, add to these concerns the enhanced danger of nuclear leakage,
and a world with overall higher levels of security competition becomes yet more worrisome. The argument that maintaining Eurasian peace is not a U.S. interest faces a second problem. On widely accepted realist assumptions, acknowledging that U.S. engagement preserves peace dramatically narrows the difference between retrenchment and
deep engagement. For many supporters of retrenchment, the optimal strategy for a power such as the United States, which has attained regional hegemony and is separated from other great powers by oceans, is offshore balancing: stay over the horizon and pass the buck to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing any local
rising power. The United States should commit to onshore balancing only when local balancing is likely to fail and a great power appears to be a credible contender for regional hegemony, as in the cases of Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union in the midtwentieth century. The problem is that Chinas rise puts the possibility of its attaining regional

hegemony on the table, at least in the medium to long term. As Mearsheimer notes, The United States will have to play a key role in countering China, because its Asian neighbors are not strong enough to do it by themselves. 81 Therefore, unless Chinas rise stalls, the United States is likely to act toward
China similar to the way it behaved toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War. 82 It follows that the United States should take no action that would compromise its capacity to move to onshore balancing in the future. It will need to maintain key alliance relationships in Asia as well as the formidably expensive military capacity to intervene there.

The implication is to get out of Iraq and Afghanistan, reduce the presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia just what the United States is doing. 83 In sum, the argument that U.S. security commitments are unnecessary for peace is countered by a lot of scholarship ,
including highly influential realist scholarship. In addition, the argument that Eurasian peace is unnecessary for U.S. security is weakened by the potential for a large number of nasty security consequences as well as the need to retain a latent onshore balancing capacity that dramatically reduces the savings retrenchment might bring. Moreover,

the case for retrenchment misses the underlying logic of the deep engagement strategy. By supplying reassurance,
switching between offshore and onshore balancing could well be difcult. Bringing together the thrust of many of the arguments discussed so far underlines the degree to which

deterrence, and active management, the United States lowers security competition in the worlds key regions, thereby preventing the emergence of a hothouse atmosphere for growing new military capabilities. Alliance ties dissuade partners from ramping up and also
provide leverage to prevent military transfers to potential rivals. On top of all this, the United States formidable military machine may deter entry by potential rivals. Current great power military expenditures as a percentage of GDP are at historical lows, and thus far other major powers have shied away from seeking to match top-end U.S. military
capabilities. In addition, they have so far been careful to avoid attracting the focused enmity of the United States. 84 All of the worlds most modern militaries are U.S. allies (Americas alliance system of more than sixty countries now accounts for some 80 percent of global military spending), and the gap between the U.S. military capability and
that of potential rivals is by many measures growing rather than shrinking. 85
 Asian econ ADV
Infrastructure at the brink now investment is needed soon or collapse will happen
ADB 6 (Asian Development Bank; http://www.adb.org/news/infrastructure-investment-key-maintaining-asias-economic-success-vp-tells-hk-meeting; 2006; 6-22-16)
"Adequate, modern and well maintained systems of transportation, energy, sewer and water, telecommunication and other essential services are the backbone of today's economies ," Vice-
President C. Lawrence Greenwood said. "Such networks are vital to provide access to local and global markets, support for private sector development, and opportunities for citizens - especially those in poor and remote communities - to participate in economic

growth and improve their standard of living." He was speaking at the Asia Pacific Infrastructure Congress on Sustaining Growth Through Infrastructure Investment that opened today. At the meeting, Mr. Greenwood pointed out that a recent joint study noted that East Asia alone would

need $1 trillion in infrastructure investment over five years to sustain projected growth rates. While some governments are recognizing these demands and boosting spending, public funds are under serious strain. "Private sector participation,
including foreign investment, is needed to meet these enormous needs," he said. "And it is not only a matter of financing - infrastructure needs to be made more efficient and cost-effective." He said

governments and the private sector have both learned lessons from the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s, when infrastructure investment dropped dramatically in the region. "The need for, and
emergence of, new public-private sector partnerships have ushered in a transformation of government's role - from owner and provider, to facilitator and regulator," he said.

United States investment is key to closing infrastructure gaps

Wu Zhenglong, Research Fellow, China Foundation For Int'L Studies, 7-28-2014, "The Benefits of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank," No Publication,
http://www.chinausfocus.com/finance-economy/the-benefits-of-the-asian-infrastructure-investment-bank/ (EG)
Last October, just before the annual meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) Forum in Bali, Indonesia, President Xi Jinping announced Chinas proposal to establish an Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Within a few months, China has held three rounds of talks with
interested Asian countries, and is helping to circule a memo on setting up the bank. What is leading China and its Asian partners to join hands to work for creating this new Bank? First, with
the current Asian economy under mounting downward pressure, strong
infrastructure spending will help to create demand, increase jobs and bring about a smoother and more effective production, circulation, and consumption environment for the overall economic
operation. It will also contribute to an enhanced regional infrastructure connectivity which will then facilitate regional economic cooperation and integration. Therefore, as the driver of
sustainable growth and regional economic integration, infrastructure investment will empower economic expansion in Asia. Second, Asia is now facing a dilemma of a gap between great demand and severe capital supply,
especially in developing countries. On the one hand, the current infrastructure of Asian economies falls far short of meeting the needs for sustainable economic development. On the other hand, most Asian countries suffer from a

capital bottleneck in infrastructure investment, which seriously restricts their infrastructure development and construction. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) estimates that developing countries need to invest US$8 trillion from 2010 to 2020, just

to keep pace with expected infrastructure needs. Third, what Asia lacks is not really capital, but the capability to channel it. There is a comparably massive accumulation of savings, which see China
and ASEAN countries respectively controlling $US3.99 trillion and $US700 billion in reserves, not to mention other Asian countries. The supply of savings, much of which is generated in Asia, is more than adequate to begin to fill
some of the demand for infrastructure. The capital bottleneck therefore does not refer to a capital shortage, but the lack of a practical financing platform and business mode, which are both essential to effectively turn
the huge capital potential inside and outside Asia into investment in infrastructure. Fourth, the World Bank and the ADB and other well-established institutions have the expertise to lend a lot more for infrastructure, but have prioritized more on poverty reduction and moved in a different direction.
Net lending by multilateral development banks on commercial terms has been negative in five of the last ten years, including 2011 and 2012. The
World Bank and the ADB are now focusing on concessional lending and knowledge sharing with low-income
countries, leaving an important niche to be filled by a new financial institution. And here comes the AIIB. As a financial catalyst of the region, it plans to start with $50 billion from governments and at least
another $50 billion from financial institutions and private capital. Its mandate is to focus on financing in infrastructure development that helps Asia at both the national and regional levels. The AIIB,
as a multilateral development institution, will be a highly professional and efficient platform of infrastructure financing. It will tap into the expertise of experienced MDBs to build the capacity to assess and implement projects
successfully.

Asia is key to the global economy because of trade infrastructure gaps risk corrupting trade
Liqun 16 (Jin Liqun is President-designate of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.; 1-20-16; https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/01/how-will-the-new-asian-infrastructure-
investment-bank-boost-development; 6-22-16)

The answers are clear. The role and importance of Asia in the international arena have increased , yet the region faces severe infrastructure gaps and thorny bottlenecks. Asias infrastructure
investment needs have grown exponentially , and the AIIBs resources , quite simply, will increase the pool of multilateral resources available to help meet them . There is, moreover, ample space
for the AIIB to help its members to modernize roads, rails, and ports; enhance access to electricity; expand telecommunications services; advance urban planning; and provide clean water and
sanitation services. We will do it well. We will do it right. And we will do it collaboratively, as a reliable and complementary development partner. The AIIBs founding members have a clear management vision: We will set a clear and high bar for organizational performance and governance,
by upholding openness, transparency, accountability, and independence as its core institutional principles. Our charter places direct accountability with the AIIBs management to ensure that these principles become organic values, not simply slogans. I embrace this challenge, and I am firmly
committed to fostering an institutional culture grounded in the highest principles and ethical standards. How will we do this? In drafting the AIIBs Articles of Agreement and policy framework, we have worked with a diverse group of international experts to draw lessons from the existing multilateral
institutions and from successful private-sector companies. We have held extensive rounds of technical discussions with our shareholders to ensure that the Bank reflects its owners goals and aspirations in both its lending activities and internal operations. I am confident that the Banks policy
foundation meets world-class standards. We are now recruiting a top-caliber management team and expert staff to ensure their effective implementation. In executing our mandate, our shareholders will see to it that the Bank learns from the past and recognizes the possibilities of the future to do
things differently and to do different things. Several of the AIIBs distinguishing features will facilitate this. For starters, the AIIBs unique ownership and shareholding structures reflect the institutions regional character and provide members with a greater voice in policy direction and decision-
making. The rich dialogue among founding members during the development of the AIIBs Articles of Agreement and policy framework attests to our shareholders strong ownership of, and commitment to, the Banks mandate and mission. Moreover, the
AIIBs specialized
geographic and sectoral mandate will enable it to offer niche skills, focused expertise, and concentrated market knowledge, and its organizational structure, staffing flexibility, and efficient
decision-making processes will position it to respond with agility to client demand and emerging needs. Our approach to research will be selective and strategic, and our results-focused business model will allow us to deliver state-of-the-art
knowledge and tailored financial services. The AIIB will play a catalytic role. We will leverage and mobilize public and private financing, including from institutional investors, and help clients to enhance project bankability by promoting

transparency, efficiency, and adherence to accepted standards including environmental and social standards thereby reducing risk.

Asia is key to the global economy infrastructure investment is crucial

AFP 16 (AFP News; http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/asia-reforms-key-for-global-economic-growth-imf-chief-.aspx?pageID=238&nid=96370; Asia reforms key for global economic
growth: IMF chief; 3-16-16; 6-23-16)

Asia is the worlds most dynamic region but structural reforms are key given its increasing importance to the global economy, International Monetary Fund chief Christine Lagarde said in New Delhi on March 12 . Asia
already accounts for 40 percent of the world economy and stands to deliver nearly two-thirds of global growth over the next four years, Lagarde, the IMF managing director, told the Advancing Asia conference in the Indian
capital. Given this vital economic role, making the most of Asias dynamism is of great interest to the entire world, Lagarde, on stage with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, said. Increased interconnectedness
means that Asia now affects the world more than ever before , she said. By the same token, Asia is now more deeply affected by global economic developments than ever before -- and must respond
to them. With the global economy facing challenges, it is key that Asian countries carry out structural reforms to boost competitiveness and jobs and ensure growth in future , she said.

Global economic decline causes war

Royal 10 Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense
Jedediah, Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises?, Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and
Brauer, p. 213-215
Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict . Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and
defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson's (1996) work on
leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next.
As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin, 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of
miscalculation (Fearon, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power
(Werner, 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between
global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and
states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the
security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent

expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain
access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states .4
Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic
downturn. They write, The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the
presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002, p. 89) Economic decline has also been linked with
an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the
popularity of a sitting government. 'Diversionary theory' suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external
military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995), and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated.
Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed
from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically
linked to an increase in the use of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with
external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels.5 This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention. This observation is not contradictory to
other perspectives that link economic interdependence with a decrease in the likelihood of external conflict, such as those mentioned in the first paragraph of this chapter. Those studies tend to focus on dyadic interdependence instead of global interdependence
and do not specifically consider the occurrence of and conditions created by economic crises. As such, the view presented here should be considered ancillary to those views.
Infrastructure investment is key to growing Asian economies
Bhattasali 16 (Deepak Bhattasali; Senior Advisor, Independent Evaluation, Asian Development Bank; http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/future-development/posts/2016/04/05-
infrastructure-investment-economic-growth-bhattasali-thomas; 4-5-16; 6-22-16)

The crucial question is whether the push for more infrastructure will raise economic growth and peoples well-being. It couldbut only if the focus is on quality and impact and not on the quantity and volume of investment. Economic policymakers
assume that infrastructureenergy, transport, communication, irrigation, and water supply propels economic output. The direct effect is raising the productivity of land, labor, and other physical capital. For example, steady supply of

electricity reduces disruptions and time wasted at the work place. It complements the contributions of education, health, marketing, and finance. The immediate effect of new infrastructure can be substantial, either by
increasing output or stimulating new investment in machinery and equipment. When electricity supply disruptions are eliminated or available hours increased, as seen in Bangladesh or the Philippines, farmers and firms respond with greater supply.
There is a case for sizable investment because a threshold amount is often needed before assets yield services. An example from South Asia is the need to construct a number of tube wells in
an unirrigated farming district to affect food output. Scale also becomes important for the delivery of services through connected networks. Returns to investment at one node, such as electricity, depend on the capacity
at others, say, roads. As a review of nearly 300 projects shows, the impact of infrastructure varies considerably by sectors (that is, across energy, transport, water, and sanitation), by types of arrangements (for example, public or private sector) and by countries or sub-regions (see Figure 1). It is such
divergences in the results that provide the following lessons on quality. First, project weaknesses affect efficiency and sustainability and pull down the payoffs to infrastructure investments. Delays in project execution are a perennial problem, exacerbated by lenders bureaucratic processes and
borrowers weak management capacity. Adequate financing for operations and maintenance and management of assets are vital for sustainability. Such financing has been a problemfor example in transport and waterpartly because of budget limits. Second, achieving higher payoffs from
infrastructure investment is not going to be a matter of just keeping the projects simple. With multiple players, it will be essential to strike partnerships and coordinate. A recent ADB study indicates that the returns to partnerships can be higher than solo
efforts because of the gains from synergies. Some ADB supported projects that must have great care, for example those implemented as part of environmental and social safeguard Category A, have also performed relatively well signaling the value of due diligence. Third, equity of access is also
important for the quality of infrastructure. The rich are able to make up for shortfalls in public provision by having water delivered to homes and running residential electricity generators. The poor cannot offset failures in public service delivery as easily. Therefore, for infrastructure to improve
economic and social welfare requires equitable access. Fourth, quality will also be determined by how well the best technologies are employed. The paradigm in which technology rose linearly alongside income levels can give way to leapfrogging, whereby countries can proceed to advanced
technologies before passing through income stages. Low- and lower-middle income countries could tap new off-the-shelf technologies in irrigation or renewable energy. Energy, transport, and land use are primary sources of CO2 emissions, so the use of better technology is urgent. Fifth, it matters
how infrastructure projects are financed. When they are funded through public borrowing, we need to also account for the effect of debt servicing on other investment. For example, use of the capital budget or government borrowing for power and transport could reduce the amount of resources
available for funding other government spending, and sometimes lead to macroeconomic instability. Shifting investments from the governments books to the private sector is not necessarily the answer, as the experience of public-private partnerships and private infrastructure is decidedly mixed.
Sixth, unstable policy environments and weak governance affect returns, especially as the gestation of infrastructure is long. A liberal and predictable business environment is beneficial for reaping investment returns. Studies have shown the links between the success of projects and the clarity and
predictability of the climate for investments and good governance. ADBs infrastructure projects, especially in energy, have done relatively well in both the public and private sectors, but regulatory environments are a factor in explaining the large differences across countries. Multilateral

development banks (MDBs) play a unique role by responding quickly to financing needs with maximum due diligence. But their role goes much further by going beyond what market forces
can achieve on their own. In this regard, MDBs must help countries foster high-quality infrastructure, especially in terms of inclusion and sustainability.
 Solvency
China would say yes and adhere to environmental, transparency, and other concerns
Donnan 15 (Shawn Donnan; Financial Times contributors; http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/23c51438-64ca-11e5-a28b-50226830d644.html#axzz4CGLBwB8y; 9-27-15; 6-22-160
US officials have declared what amounts to a truce in their campaign over Chinas Asian infrastructure bank, claiming they have secured commitments from Beijing to address Washingtons
concerns as well as a meaningfully increase its financial contributions to the World Bank and other potential regional rivals to the new institution. The US has declined to join the Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank and been leading what many allies and others see as a failed campaign against it. Together with the New Development Bank being founded with other Brics economies, the AIIB represents perhaps the biggest challenge yet mounted to the Bretton
Woods international financial architecture established in 1944. The latest move highlights how eager US president Barack Obama and his administration are to put that chapter of their engagement with China behind them and resume normal relations on international economics. During last weeks
state visit by Xi Jinping, the Chinese president, the Obama administration also reiterated its pledge to back Chinas bid for the inclusion of its currency, the renminbi, in an elite International Monetary Fund basket of reserve currencies as long as Beijing is declared worthy by the IMF. Senior
administration officials said that during Mr Xis visit, Washington had secured a pledge from Beijing to increase its financial contributions to the World Bank and regional development banks. The first step, they said, would be an increase in Chinas contribution to the International Development
Association, the World Banks main concessional lending facility for its poorest client countries and similar ones at regional development banks. China had also made a commitment that the AIIB, and any other new and future institutions it was
involved in, would abide by the highest international environmental and governance standards, addressing what the US and campaign groups have said is one of its concerns about the new
bank. We feel that is extremely positive, said one senior administration official. That is a breakthrough. The commitments were laid out, albeit in vague terms, in a joint fact sheet about the two countries economic discussions during Mr Xis two-day visit to Washington. In it, the two
countries reaffirmed their commitment to existing international financial institutions and pledged to further strengthen the World Bank as well as regional banks in Asia, Africa and Latin America. China intends to meaningfully increase its role as a donor in all

these institutions, the joint statement said. Both sides acknowledge that for new and future institutions to be significant contributors to the international financial architecture, these institutions, like
the existing international financial institutions, are to be operated with the existing high environmental and governance standards, it said. That both sides are keen to put the AIIB dispute and any conflict over the
governance of the existing institutions behind them was also evident in Mr Xis public statements during his visit. At a press conference with Mr Obama on Friday, the Chinese president said the US and China had agreed to step up their co-operation in areas such as the G20, World Bank and IMF.

China is the current international systems builder , contributor and developer and participant, and also beneficiary, he said. We are willing to work with all other countries to firmly defend the
fruits of victory of the second world war, and the existing international system. He also defended the establishment of the AIIB and Beijings One Belt One Road plan to build a new Silk Road to Europe, which many experts see as a potential strategic rival
to the US-led 12-country Trans-Pacific Partnership. These initiatives are open, transparent, inclusive , he said. And we welcome the US and other parties to actively participate in them .

The US could help propel AIIB to success/IMF wont cut it

Runde 15 (Daniel Runde; Contributor at Forbes; http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielrunde/2015/04/30/aiib-us-development-leadership/#5d641b477b19; 4-30-15; 6-22-16)
The rapid rise of Chinas Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) should be a wakeup call for the United States, and requires a well thought out response. The AIIB and other Chinese development
agencies represent a new form of strategic competition that can help to drive progress at the multilateral level. Its emergence was spurred forward by growing infrastructure needs in Asia,
and a lack of strategic vision to ensure that our existing multilateral institutions fit the changing global landscape. The AIIB, however, will undoubtedly face challenges and growing pains. There is an opportunity for the
United States and its partners to help the new institution face these implementation challenges, and establish the fledgling infrastructure fund as a positive player in global development. An
effective approach will require coordinated action with Japan and other allies. The good news is that with some legislative actions, increased U.S. leadership within existing multilateral development banks (MDBs), and relatively small

amounts of money, the United States could respond in a serious and constructive way to the AIIB. The AIIB was just an idea two years ago. Its rapid success is a result of major gaps in what the established international architecture is offering in
terms of global progress, Chinas new status as one of the top trading partners to dozens of countries, and unmet development needs around the world. Tone deaf efforts by the U.S. to pressure allies into steering clear of AIIB membership represent both

bad policy and lack of understanding for the global context which led to the AIIBs creation. Apart from these broad conditions, however, there are two specific U.S. (in)decisions which served to create political cover and practical demand for the
new institution. First, the United States has failed to pass Quota Reform at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) since 2010. As agreed to in 2010, IMF quota reform would result in a slight rejiggering of IMF shareholder votes away from Europe to emerging economies, and a doubling of the money
available for global crises. The United States would see its voting share drop from 17.7 percent to 17.3 percent, but would remain the largest shareholder and retain its veto. Although
the United States agreed to these terms at the 2010 summit, it has so
far failed to implement them because it requires Congressional approval. IMF Quota Reform has been mishandled by the Administration, which has been reluctant to address concerns, and
the issue has been largely ignored by the Republican-controlled Congress. The possible $300 million dollar impact related to changes from one IMF account to another has not helped. Unfortunately, China has used IMF quota reform as political cover to create
the AIIB

The United States is key to the AIIBs success

Brown 06/01/15 (Kerry, Professor of Chinese Studies and Director of the Lau China Institute at King's College, The US Should Make Sure China's AIIB Succeeds, 06/01/15, 06/21/16,
http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/the-us-should-make-sure-chinas-aiib-succeeds/)//BME
The first formal meeting of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) will be held sometime in mid-June. This is the moment when its somewhat abstract current nature will start to move toward more concrete actuality. At the moment, the Chinese-led AIIB,
with its 57 members, has been a grand idea in search of practical form. Starting in June, the bank will start to focus on doing what it was ostensibly set up to do investing in core assets in the worlds most dynamic region. There are three broad
scenarios for how the AIIB tale might unfold. Each of them will pose challenges for the United States in particular, as the most vocal skeptic about the AIIB venture. Whether the bank fails or
succeeds, the world is a different place now that it exists. The first scenario is that the bank proves, quickly, to be a success. The naysayers who wondered about its ability to conform to high
standards of governance and transparency will see an entity operating entirely in line with international norms, and fulfilling a hugely important function. In this scenario, the AIIB will be challenge
one of the stronger arguments used by supporters of the China threat theory, particularly in the United States. It will give powerful evidence that China is a status quo power, that it is able to play the
international game according to rules largely laid down by others, and that it can show real leadership and work with other countries. This would be a huge fillip to Chinas soft power credentials and a problem to those who constantly
accuse it of holding more nefarious motives. The second scenario is that the bank quickly shows it is unable to operate, and that it was far too ambitious and bold an idea for a latecomer to the finance
sector like China to contemplate. The 56 other partners will show vocal antipathy and the whole projects failure will fall like a gift to those who dislike Chinas prominence and feel that it is existentially unable to operate according to global standards.
The downside of this scenario however, even for the U.S. hardline opponents and skeptics, is that the major economy in the worlds most critical growth area, where there is a projected $8 trillion in infrastructure
needs, is unable to optimally contribute where help is most needed. It would mean that Chinas knowledge of developmental economics would not be translatable and easily usable outside its own country. This would be a depressing
outcome, and in the long term, a bad one for the region and the world. The third scenario is simply that nothing happens. The AIIB becomes another sclerotic bureaucracy lined up with many
others, mired in politics, stymied by internal divisions, and a monument to Chinas love of soothing rhetoric over real action. Skeptics win in this scenario too, up to a point, but once more its long-term meaning is good for no one. This
outcome would mean that in a hugely important and visible initiative, in which the Chinese leadership have invested enormous political capital, they are exposed in the end as people who cannot execute what
they promise. Doubts will start to creep from this into their success in domestic policy, where, once more, they have said a lot, but so far done little. We would be increasingly inclined to see an inactive AIIB as representative of Chinese leaders who talk big,
but cant follow through. In view of how much now depends on these same leaders steering the Chinese economy to a stable , sustainable condition for the region and the world, this is also not a

good result for anyone. Looking at these three broad scenarios, theres one more conclusion to be drawn: the United States gets far more from being involved and making sure the bank succeeds
then from staying outside . A successful AIIB with the U.S. eventually joining in means no more than a bit of hurt pride for Washington. But after enduring this, the United States can bask in reflected
glory by being associated with a successful and much-needed project, which Washington can argue it made work. A failed bank, or an inactive, empty one, is not in the United States or anyone elses long
term interests. Whatever the outcome, initiatives like the AIIB are not likely to go away as China seeks to play a role in the wider world to support its own interests. The key thing now is to
align those projects as much as possible with the interests of others. The AIIB is a real opportunity to do this, in an area where success is easy to deal with, and failure in fact a problem for everyone. The
United States should now plot its way in and play a role. It really has nothing to lose.

China has invited the US to the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.

Finbarr Bermingham Global Trade Review (GTR), 09-23-2015, "Xi Xinping invites US to join AIIB," http://www.gtreview.com/news/asia/xi-jinping-reiterates-us-invitation-to-aiib/ (EG)

Chinese President Xi Jinping has confirmed his governments position that the US is welcome to join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). In an interview with the Wall Street
Journal, published on the eve of Xis state visit to America, he wrote, in emailed answers: In addition to Asian countries, countries outside Asia such as Germany, France and the UK have also
joined the AIIB. China welcomes the US to join the AIIB. This has been our position from the very outset. The development of the AIIB has led many to conclude that it is a response to Chinas
relative isolation from the Bretton Woods architecture which has dominated global development and trade for the past half century. Along with the One Belt One Road programme, it is
viewed as part of Chinas efforts to create a development lending platform in its own image.
AIIB Aff
Add On Advantages
 US Asian Pivot Add on
US joining AIIB key to Asia Pivot success
Lazarus 3/2
(Why the U.S. Should Embrace the AIIB There are compelling reasons for the U.S. to join Chinas new development bank. By Leland Lazarus March 02, 2016 http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/why-the-u-s-should-embrace-the-aiib/ - ES - )

Tobias Harris of the Sasakawa Peace Foundation believes that U.S. opposition to the AIIB was a knee-jerk reaction to Chinas growing influence in Asia, and missed an opportunity to help China with technical
assistance to improve the bank. Specifically, the White House was wary about the AIIBs standards, and the Treasury Department steadfastly rejected China-led initiative that might rival the existing Bretton Woods system. By shunning the AIIB, the U.S.
disregarded the principles of its own Asia strategy and contributed to the impression that it seeks to contain China. AIIB president Jin Liqun had this to say about U.S. opposition to the AIIB: The U.S. risks forfeiting its international relevance
while stuck in its domestic political quagmire. He warned the U.S. that history has never set any precedent that an empire is capable of governing the world forever. If the U.S. is serious about its
Asian rebalance strategy, it should work with China to improve the AIIB as a member, instead of opposing the bank altogether.

US pivot is vital to solve multiple scenarios for nuclear war

Hiatt 13 (Fred, editorial page editor of The Post, Asian tensions add urgency to Obamas pivot, Washington Post, February 10, 2013, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-02-
10/opinions/37026174_1_kim-jong-eun-diaoyu-islands-young-leader)

As President Obama ponders his second-term foreign policy, he faces

jihadists spreading across North Africa, Syria dissolving into chaos, Israelis and Palestinians further apart than ever, Iraq trending toward civil
war, Afghanistan mired in corruption and Iran relentlessly accelerating its nuclear program. That may turn out to be the easy stuff . In Asia, things could get really scary. Since he entered the White House, Obama has
wanted to shift attention and resources to the Pacific. The biggest opportunities are there: economic growth, innovation, potential for cross-border investment and trade. That the 21st century will be a Pacific century has become a
cliche. The cliche may still prove out. But rather suddenly, the region of economic miracles has become a zone of frightening confrontation . The North Koreans are turning out videos depicting New
York in flames. Chinese warships have fixed their weapon-targeting radar on a Japanese ship and helicopter. Quarrels have intensified between South Korea and Japan, North Korea and South
Korea, China and the Philippines, India and China. Taiwan is always a possible flashpoint. Any one of these could drag the United States in. The scariest development may be in North Korea, the worlds only
hereditary prison camp, where the young leader the third-generation Kim seems determined to expand and improve his nuclear arsenal until he becomes a genuine threat not only to South Korea and
Japan but to the U nited S tates as well. Chinese officials are said to be alarmed by his intransigence but unwilling to try to rein him in, fearing even more the instability that might result. Obama in his first term adopted a reasonable policy
of ignoring North Korea as much as possible, while making clear that he would reciprocate if it became more accommodating. Kim Jong Eun, who is thought to be in his late 20s, could find ways to make that stance untenable. Meanwhile, Chinas increasing assertiveness

discomfits neighbors throughout Southeast and East Asia . China has claimed pretty much the whole South China Sea, though its coastline is farther from much of it than that of Vietnam, Malaysia or the Philippines . It has sent
planes and ships to challenge Japan over a few rocky outcroppings that Japan calls the Senkakus and China the Diaoyu Islands. It has been steadily increasing the size and capability of its military
forces; for the first time in many years, a neighbor, Japan, is following suit . If all this seems decidedly last century, maybe its because new leaders in every key country are second- or third-generation, bearing the burdens of their past. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is
the grandson of a leader of imperial Japanincluding in occupied China who remade himself as a pro-American prime minister after World War II. South Koreas president-elect, Park Geun-hye, is the daughter of a longtime president; her mother was killed by a devotee of North Korea. (The bullet
was intended for her father, who was later assassinated by his intelligence chief.) Xi Jinping, Chinas new president, is the son of a revolutionary colleague of Mao Tsetung who helped battle the Japanese during World War II. North Koreas Kim Jong Eun is the grandson of Kim Il-sung, who according to
North Korean mythology fought the Japanese in the 1930s and 1940s and the Americans and South Koreans in the 1950s. Its
intriguing to speculate on the ghostly whisperings these leaders may hear. It may be more useful, though, to focus
on the national weaknesses that may propel them to act. North Korea is a failed and hungry state for which blackmail and bluster have long been the only survival strategy . China is a rising
power and a growing economy but led by a one-party regime that may be tempted to use nationalism to distract a restive population from domestic troubles. Japan has discarded one prime
minister after another, pretty much on an annual basis, for most of the past decade, an instability that leaves it punching below its economic and military weight. All of this makes the region hungry for
U.S. presence and leadership , which Obama understood with his first-term promise of a pivot to Asia. Regional leaders hope he can make good on that promise in a second term but wonder whether U.S. policy, too, will be shaped by
political weakness. They notice when the Navy announces that it is, again, reducing its planned number of ships or Defense Secretary Leon Panetta orders an aircraft carrier kept in port because of budgetary constraints. They wonder who will inherit the Asia focus of former secretary of state Hillary

Rodham Clinton and departing assistant secretary Kurt Campbell. They see the dangers, from Mali to Kandahar, that pull Obamas attention. They hope it wont take a more dangerous crisis in their region to make the
pivot a reality.
 US-China Cyber add on
Joining the AIIB will increase US-China coop on cybersecurity
Kurlantzick 16 Kurlantzick, Joshua. "Let China Win. It's Good for America." Washington Post. The Washington Post, 15 Jan. 2016. Web. 21 June 2016. EP
Beijings influence has also expanded in Southeast Asia. China has become the leading trading partner with many nations in the region, as well as the biggest donor to some poorer states. In
November, it launched its first joint military exercises with U.S. treaty ally Thailand. The Obama administration has overreacted to these perceived dangers by devoting significant resources to improving ties with
mainland Southeast Asian states, several of which have deeply undemocratic or illiberal governments. It has worked hard for rapprochement with Burma, including visits from then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Obama himself. The
administration has upgraded defense ties with authoritarian or semi-authoritarian Cambodia, Laos and Malaysia, and may soon do so with Burma as well. Obama has built a close personal relationship with Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak, now in trouble for
allegedly taking$600 million from a government fund. What
strategic imbalance would result if Washingtons influence in these parts of the region diminished? Countries like Cambodia and Burma are still
largely irrelevant to U.S. investors and strategic interests. The United States began boosting ties with Burma five years ago, but American investors have sunk only $2 million in officially counted investment into the country since 2011, largely
because the business climate there remains atrocious. In Cambodia, U.S. companies invested about $85 million in 2014, the last year for which figures are available. (By contrast, American executives sent $290 million to tiny Luxembourg in 2015, a nation whose
population is 4 percent of Cambodias.) Its
AIIB failure may have made the United States look weak and miserly, but its focus on competition in unimportant parts of Southeast Asia has real
consequences. Washington needs Chinese help to halt Irans nuclear program, combat climate change and protect global cybersecurity. The White House can fairly complain about Xis repressive regime and his
rapid military buildup, but needlessly alienating Beijing only makes the worlds most important bilateral relationship harder. China has responded harshly to U.S. attempts to mitigate its influence in
its own neighborhood, repeatedly delivering veiled public warnings to Southeast Asian nations that side with Washington on major issues and offering massive assistance to countries like
Cambodia for moving closer to China. Sparking confrontation over important issues such as the South China Sea is worth it, but raising disputes over places like Cambodia is not.

Cyberterror is coming now most qualified experts

Ellyati 15 (Holly Ellyati; Assistant Producer; Cyberterrorists to target critical infrastructure; http://www.cnbc.com/id/102367777; 1-27-15; 6-23-16)
A cyberterror attack on vital national infrastructure such as power facilities, transport networks and the financial sector could be imminentand international governments are ill-prepared,
cybersecurity experts have warned. "It's not easy to predict what will happen, but the worst terrorist attacks are not expected," Eugene Kaspersky, the co-founder and chief executive of global IT security firm Kaspersky Labs, told CNBC.
"So I am afraid that if we face this cyberterrorism, it will be very unpredictable in a very unpredictable place, but with very visible damage. Unfortunately, there are many possible victims." In
recent months, the business world and political establishment has seen an uptick in the use of debilitating digital attacks. As well as the Sony attacks, allegedly by North Korea, and the widespread
hacking of international news agencies by the "Syrian Electronic Army," On Monday, Malaysian Airlines refuted that its website had been hacked by a group calling itself the "Cyber Caliphate" and claiming affiliation with the Islamic State
(ISIS). 'Critical infrastructure' Now, there are concerns that the next big attack will be against national critical infrastructure and could cripple a country's ability to function. Kaspersky told CNBC that each
country needed to make a "very serious audit" of the critical infrastructure within its borders. In order of importance, he noted that the infrastructure most vulnerable was the power
network, "because if the power plants and power grid don't work, then nothing else works," followed by telecommunications, financial services and transportation. "A security strategy needs to be
made for all of these components," Kaspersky said. He warned that governments needed to allocate a good part of their budgets over the next decade to making critical infrastructure systems more secure.
"Technically it's possible to make them immune from attacks, but it's complicated, it's expensive and it will take time and budgets," Kaspersky said. Budget cuts in the U.K. and Europe have
undoubtedly challenged government attempts to counter cyberterrorism, but a spokesperson for the U.K. Cabinet Office told CNBC that cybersecurity was a priority. "Cybersecurity is already a tier-
one national security priority and our investment of 860 million ($1.3 billion) over five years in the National Cyber Security Programme (NCSP) supports a wide range of projects to develop the U.K.'s cyber security capabilities. This is a clear signal of just
how seriously the Government is treating the threat," the spokesperson said. Kaspersky noted that there needed to be far stronger international cooperation against cyberterrorism,
including in the sharing of information, in order to relay early warnings ahead of potential attacks. The U.K. and U.S. have already pledged to work together in a bid to remain one step ahead of terrorism groups like Islamic
State that are increasingly using computers as means of attack. In particular, there are the so-called war games involve "cybercells" of U.S. and U.K. intelligence agents staging attacks against each another, in
order to test the resilience of certain sectors to cyberattacks. The first exercise will test the financial sector, with simulated attacks on the City of London, including the Bank of England, and
Wall Street. E.J. Hilbert, the heads Kroll's cyber unit for Europe, the Middle East and Africa, told CNBC that hundred, if not thousands attacks were already taking placeand that more attacks
were coming. "There are hundreds of attacks taking place against the U.K. and U.S. nuclear industry and financial system every day. There is this non-stop badgering of the system by hackers
who are hoping that one day the system will crack," said Hilbert, a former FBI agent in the cybercrime and counterterrorism field. He was emphatic that national governments were unprepared for a cyberattack
on critical infrastructure. He said that the proposed "war games" would have limited effect in acting as a pre-warning to governments on the weaknesses of critical systems. "These tests don't
do what the bad guys are going to do, they don't go far enough. If the bad guys want to shut a system down, they'll shut it down and unless you've tested for that, you don't actually know if
there's a way of bringing a system back," Hilbert said. If an attack is so bad that all else has failed, governments can always choose to shut down their own infrastructure systems. But taking such
steps can have alarming consequences, such as lack of power if power plants are shut down, lack of water if water facilities are closed, and permanent system failure. With that in mind, Hilbert said "it
might be better to fight the attack then shut down the system."
 South Asia Econ Add On
AIIB investment would stimulate economic growth in South Asia.
Bishal Chalise, 3-9-2016, "AIIB to unlock South Asias economic potential," East Asia Forum, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/03/09/aiib-to-unlock-south-asias-economic-potential/ (EG)

South Asias economic potential has long been constrained by low levels of economic integration. Despite being closely linked geographically, culturally and historically, intra-regional trade is
very low. A major problem has, of course, been political difficulties within and between South Asian countries. But an important, and overlooked, barrier to greater economic integration is the
poor quality and inadequate investment in infrastructure in the region. The newly established Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) can play a pivotal role in fixing this problem. For a
long time, infrastructure bottlenecks have been recognised as a barrier to regional trade and economic integration. Access to infrastructure in South Asian countries is limited and the quality
of available infrastructure is also poor. In Bangladesh, for example, only 39 per cent of the rural population has access to road transportation. India has the second largest road and rail
network in the world, but half of these roads are not paved and cannot be used in all seasons. Despite huge potential in electricity generation, people in the region consume less than 655
kilowatts per capita in intermittent electricity supply in 2012, which is less than one fifth of that in East Asia. The situation for cross-border infrastructure is even less encouraging. A telephone
call from Nepal to India is more expensive than calling to the United States or Europe. Cargo trucks waiting 35 days at the border for clearance from customs is normal. Despite sharing a
nearly 3000 kilometre-long land border, shipping between India and Pakistan has to go via Dubai. As a result, the cost of trading across borders in South Asia is prohibitively high. According to
the World Bank, South Asia has nearly US$2.6 trillion in shared GDP. While overall trade flows are growing, intra-regional trade among countries is still less than 5 per cent of total trade. This
is far less than that within ASEAN (25 per cent) or NAFTA (58 per cent). Despite this, investment in in-country and cross-border infrastructure has been inadequate over the years. This has
created a huge infrastructure investment gap in the region with supply trailing far below demand. It is estimated that South Asian countries need to invest around 7.6 per cent of GDP in
infrastructure per year if they are to achieve economic growth of 7.5 per cent. This amounts to an annual capital investment of US$88 billion in new investment and in maintaining existing
capital stock. Currently, actual average investment in infrastructure is around US$28 billion per annum the lowest in the world, excepting sub-Saharan Africa. The South Asian Association
for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) which is comprised of Afghanistan, Bhutan, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Maldives, Nepal and Sri Lanka made an attempt to narrow the investment gap
recently. For a decade, SAARC negotiated a free-trade agreement called the South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA). Coming into effect in 2006, SAFTA aims to facilitate the development
of communication systems and transport infrastructure to facilitate intra-regional trade. Still, the pace of infrastructural reform envisioned by the agreement has been slow. Other similar
initiatives include the establishment of the South Asian Development Fund (SADF) in 1996. Later reworked as the SAARC Development Fund (SDF), its aim is to act as an umbrella funding
mechanism for all regional development projects, including infrastructure. But with capital of only US$300 million, the SDF has been unable to go beyond funding some social projects. The
idea of setting-up a South Asian Development Bank (SDB), led by India, has also been proposed to provide low-cost funding to member countries for infrastructure projects. But this idea has
never taken-off. There have been some unilateral efforts to improve infrastructure. India, for example, has pledged to invest US$138 billion in railways alone in the next five years. It has also
been experimenting with the creation of a National Investment in Infrastructure Fund. On the bilateral front, projects like the Central AsiaSouth Asia Electricity Transmission Project, the
NepalIndia Regional Trade and Transport Project, and the BangladeshBhutanIndiaNepal (BBIN) initiatives are currently underway with support from multilateral organisations like the
World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Still, there are no major cross-country highway or railway projects currently underway. With this backdrop, the creation of the AIIB has
come at the right time. The bank was established with an explicit objective to provide financing for developmental infrastructure like roads, railways, sea and airports, and power generation
plants to facilitate greater economic integration in the Asia Pacific. Although US$100 billion in paid-up capital may not look like much in comparison to the investment demand, the AIIB can
play a key role in complementing the work of traditional multilateral lenders like the ADB and the International Finance Corporation. The AIIB is also expected to have a longer term
investment horizon, recognising the fact that returns to infrastructure spending in developing countries can be slow and sometimes low. If the AIIB can also shorten the loan assessment and
approval procedures, South Asia could see an investment boom. The involvement of the AIIB in South Asia will be welcome news for the region. Six out of the eight countries in South Asia (the
exceptions are Afghanistan and Bhutan) are founding members of the Bank. India, which was recently elected as a member of the board of the bank, is also likely to prefer the AIIB with its
multi-nation oversight rather than a situation where China acts alone in what India considers its backyard. With mutual trust and support, the AIIB can help South Asia realise its shared
dream of greater economic prosperity.

Low economic growth in Asia can be a trigger for conflict.

Ejaz Ghani, 3-23-2010, "Conflict and development: Lessons from South Asia," No Publication, http://voxeu.org/article/conflict-and-development-lessons-south-asia (EG)

Conflicts can be triggered by low economic growth which leads to a lower economic opportunity cost of rebellion against state in poor areas. Low economic growth in certain areas can be the result of unequal
distribution in gains from development or political marginalisation. A second trigger for conflicts is a natural disaster. The lagging regions of South Asia suffer from both types of problems low economic growth and
higher vulnerability to natural disasters. The lagging regions have experienced much slower economic growth compared to leading regions. They are also more vulnerable to droughts and floods. The consequences of
conflict on development are more severe in lagging regions because they have weak institutions, poor geography, and are poorly integrated with global markets. These are also the characteristics that limit economic
growth in lagging regions. Leading regions also suffer from conflict and poverty in South Asia but they have managed them better because of rapid economic growth, job creation, and better safety net programmes.
 Poverty Adv
The United States needs to join the AIIB in order to assist in beneficial infrastructure projects
Stephen Olson, 15, 11-9-2015, Over the course of his 20 year international career, Stephen Olson has lived and worked in Asia, the Middle East, and the United States, holding senior executive positions in the private sector, international organizations, and
government. "Time for the US to Join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank," Diplomat, (http://thediplomat.com/2015/11/time-for-the-us-to-join-the-asian-infrastructure-investment-bank/)//UNION-EG

With the AIIB set to commence operations by year-end, U.S. President Barack Obama and whoever will succeed him will need to demonstrate a defter touch in managing the next phase.
Four basic facts should help illuminate the development of U.S. policy as the bank moves from drawing board to reality: Fact #1: There is a need for significant infrastructure funding
throughout Asia, which is beyond what the World Bank or Asian Development Bank (ADB) can deliver. Viewed strictly from that perspective, the establishment of an additional source of
funding through the AIIB could be positive and productive . Fact #2: The exact lending policies and practices of the AIIB are not yet firmly established. Concerns that the AIIB might establish
lower standards than those typically required by either the World Bank or ADB, may or may not ultimately prove to be justified. But at this stage, we simply dont know for certain. What is
certain however is that countries on the outside are unlikely to have much influence. Fact #3: China has already been and will continue to be a significant source of funding for infrastructure
projects throughout Asia. The AIIB does not therefore represent something entirely new on the regional development scene. What is new is that the AIIB would place some portion of
Chinas funding within the framework of a multilateral institution. Fact #4: Chinas voting rights in existing institutions such as the World Bank and IMF are significantly underrepresented,
given the size of its economy. While most member countries in these institutions acknowledge that China deserves a larger say, these sentiments have not yet been fully translated into
concrete reality and it is unclear when or if they ever will be.

Infrastructure focus provided by the AIIB is desperately needed by South Asia to reduce poverty and economic disparity
Haider Khan 15, 4-21-2015, "China's AIIB helps resolve Asia's soaring infrastructure needs," Conversation, (http://theconversation.com/chinas-aiib-helps-resolve-asias-soaring-infrastructure-
needs-40518)//UNION-EG

In my many visits to East Asia most recently China I have seen how national and international linkages can be constructed through infrastructure investment. China itself exemplifies how investing in roads and education can make a
dramatic impact on a countrys long-term growth and lifting millions of people out of poverty . Financing such investment is, therefore, a top strategic priority. The International Monetary Fund, the Asia
Development Bank and the World Bank have all played pivotal roles helping finance such investment in these now prosperous countries. The availability of transport, electricity, schools and hospitals has a tremendous impact on
improving the quality of life, while businesses need more reliable infrastructure to spur growth, which boosts incomes and reduces poverty, according to the ADB report. The addition of the AIIB to
the fold would bring many benefits especially to those parts of Asia in the Southeast and South Asian regions that lag behind in infrastructure investment. Indonesia has the greatest needs,
with the ADB estimating $450 billion will be required through 2020, mostly on transport. China needs just a little less, primarily due to electricity troubles, while another seven countries require at least $100 billion a piece. In addition, the problem of a
global lack of demand for goods and services due to the slowing economy will be mitigated by the hundreds of billions of dollars in extra infrastructure spending in Asia. Thus there are both local and
global benefits that can be reaped from appropriate infrastructure investment projects financed by the AIIB.

Those in poverty are subject to structural violence

Ailsa Wilson 2004 Urban violence: a guide to the literature Environment and Urbanization October 2004 vol. 16 no. 2 165-184//UNION-EG

The now largely accepted argument that deprivation is itself a form of violence gained prominence with John Galtungs (1991) work on structural violence, which extends understandings of violence to include psychological hurt
and, in turn, alienation, repression and deprivation (see McIlwaine, 1999). In urban contexts, it is deprivation as inequality that is the most important form of structural violence, and also that which
relates most significantly to the emergence of everyday reactionary violence.(5) Deprivation in this sense includes not only differences in income but also the lack of access to basic social services,
the lack of universal state security protection, along with the severe corruption, inefficiency and brutality that generally hit the poor hardest, and the lack of social cohesion (Vanderschueren, 1996). It is argued that this structural violence creates
reactive violence be it criminal or political in response (Briceo-Len and Zubillaga, 2002). As Vanderschueren (1996) argues, in situations of widespread and severe inequality, the urban poor are
undervalued and marginalized, and their daily living conditions heighten the potential for the emergence of conflict, crime or violence. Simpson (1993) also notes, in the context of South Africa, that poor social and
economic conditions provide the foundation for pervasive social, political and economic violence. Various manifestations of this reactive violence are explored in following sections. In particular, youth gangs could be seen as an example of the potential effects
of multi-level structural violence (see below).

Poverty is a form of structural violence that creates an ongoing genocide

Mumia Abu Jamal in 1998 (A Quiet and Deadly Violence, 9/19/98, http//www.mumia.nl/TCCDMAJ/quietdv.htm)

It has often been observed that America is a truly violent nation, as shown by the thousands of cases of social and communal violence that occurs daily in the nation. Every year, some 20,000 people are
killed by others, and additional 20,000 folks kill themselves. Add to this the nonlethal violence that Americans daily inflict on each other, and we begin to see the tracings of a nation immersed in a fever of violence. But, as remarkable, and harrowing as this level
and degree of violence is, it is, by far, not the most violent feature of living in the midst of the American empire. We
live, equally immersed, and to a deeper degree, in a nation that condones and ignores wide-ranging
"structural" violence, of a kind that destroys human life with a breathtaking ruthlessness. Former Massachusetts prison official and writer, Dr. James Gilligan observes; "By `structural violence' I mean the increased
rates of death and disability suffered by those who occupy the bottom rungs of society, as contrasted by those who are above them. Those excess deaths (or at least a demonstrably large proportion of
them) are a function of the class structure; and that structure is itself a product of society's collective human choices, concerning how to distribute the collective wealth of the society. These
are not acts of God. I am contrasting `structural' with `behavioral violence' by which I mean the non-natural deaths and injuries that are caused by specific behavioral actions of individuals
against individuals, such as the deaths we attribute to homicide, suicide, soldiers in warfare, capital punishment, and so on." -- (Gilligan, J., MD, Violence: Reflections On a National Epidemic (New York: Vintage, 1996),
192.) This form of violence, not covered by any of the majoritarian, corporate, ruling-class protected media, is invisible to us and because of its invisibility, all the more insidious. How dangerous
is it -- really? Gilligan notes: "[E]very fifteen years, on the average, as many people die because of relative poverty as would be killed in a nuclear war that caused 232 million deaths; and every single year,
two to three times as many people die from poverty throughout the world as were killed by the Nazi genocide of the Jews over a six-year period. This is, in effect, the equivalent of an ongoing,
unending, in fact accelerating, thermonuclear war, or genocide on the weak and poor every year of every decade, throughout the world." [Gilligan, p. 196]
 Warming Adv
AIIB is key to reducing GHG and preventing CC
Mauro 06/12/15 (Paolo, a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, Why America Should Join the AIIB, 06/12/15, 06/20/16, https://www.project-
syndicate.org/commentary/us-should-join-aiib-by-paolo-mauro-2015-06?barrier=true)//BME

WASHINGTON, DC The United States, along

with Canada and Japan, has been conspicuously absent from the discussions regarding the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). A total of 57 countries from
Europe, Asia, and Latin America have joined the Chinese-led effort to spend $100 billion on roads, rail lines, bridges, and harbors throughout the region. But President Barack Obamas
administration has remained reluctant to join much to the bewilderment of Chinas government. Continuing to maintain that stance would be a mistake. The US has an opportunity to
influence the AIIBs design without looking like it is reversing course. In exchange for participating in the institution, the Obama administration could and should insist that the AIIB focus on financing
infrastructure projects that reduce carbon-dioxide emissions and meet the highest environmental standards. The need for infrastructure investment in Asias emerging economies is vast. Generally, as a countrys household
income rises, the share of spending on food declines, while spending on transportation rises sharply. And most developing countries in Asia have reached an economic stage at which large segments of their populations will soon be able to afford cars and plane
travel for the first time. According to
research I conducted with my colleague, Tomas Hellebrandt, average household income in Asias emerging economies will double over the next two decades; in the meantime, spending on transportation
will quadruple. The
choices being made now regarding what kind of infrastructure to build subway systems or roads; green energy or coal power will have a major impact on the worlds ability
to keep climate change in check.

The Infrastructure aims of the AIIB will fail without sufficient funds
Raj M. Desai and James Raymond Vreeland 15, 4-6-2015, Raj M. Desai is Associate Professor of International Development at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and in the Department of Government at Georgetown University,
and a Non-resident Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution. He is a specialist on problems of economic reform, foreign aid, and international development. James Raymond Vreeland (Ph.D., New York University, 1999) is Professor of International Relations in
the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University. He holds a joint appointment in the Government Department. He conducts research in the field of international political economy, specializing in international institutions. "How to stop
worrying and love the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank," (https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/04/06/how-to-stop-worrying-and-love-the-asian-infrastructure-investment-bank/)UNION-EG

In fact, the developmental logic behind the AIIB is paramount. Asia faces a massive infrastructure gap. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) estimates that Asia will need $8 trillion over the next decade
for energy, transportation, telecommunication and water/sanitation. Private investment in infrastructure, according to the ADB, hovers at $13 billion a year, the majority of which is concentrated in low-risk projects. Official
development assistance adds another $11 billion a year in financing. If true, this means that the shortfall exceeds $700 billion a year. The United States, as a result, places itself in opposition to regional investments
that can expand trade, support financial market development and macroeconomic stability, and improve environmental, health and social conditions. Were the current group of international financial
institutions capable of plugging the gap, it is unlikely that the AIIB would gather worldwide support. But existing institutions cannot hope to fill this hole. The ADB and the World Bank have a combined capital base of less than $400 billion, which
must support a wide variety of lending programs beyond infrastructure. Moreover, there is little chance that bilateral donors including the biggest bilateral donor, the U.S. government will increase its funding for foreign aid in the current political climate.
The AIIB has an initial capital base of $50 billion, with authorized capital up to $100 billion. According to one estimate, using similar loans-to-equity ratios of the World Bank and ADB, the AIIB could commit some $30
billion in loans devoted exclusively to infrastructure (the World Banks own infrastructure financing was $24 billion in 2014). In effect, the United States is informing fast-growing Asian nations: We are not going
to increase official funding for your important needs anytime soon; we are also going to prevent the institutions we control from increasing their funding for those needs; and lastly, we are going to
admonish others from devising other ways of funding you. No wonder that Asian governments have jumped on the AIIB bandwagon. Australia, Indonesia and South Korea were conspicuously absent from inauguration ceremonies last year when they shared U.S.
concerns. But now they have all warmed to the idea of joining the AIIB (Indonesia became a founding member, while Australia and South Korea have applied for membership). Moreover, ADB and World Bank officials have extended a cautious
welcome to the new China-led bank, saying they see room for collaboration. But the clearest signal of the AIIBs appeal has come from officials in Taipei, who have announced that Taiwan, too, will join the organization as Taipei, China.
If Japan also joins as is now expected it will leave the United States isolated among major donor nations.

The AIIB will be able to bring environmentally friendly infrastructure investment to South Asia- Checked by the international community
Simon Pollock 16, 4-15-2016,Pollock is working on climate change outreach and engagement for the Australian Government. A major part of my job involves liaising with businesses and the general public to help provide two-way paths of knowledge about
Australias climate policies. "Renminbi power: Will China's wallet shape the planet?," Climate Home - climate change news, (http://www.climatechangenews.com/2016/04/15/chinese-investment-has-the-power-to-shape-the-planet/)//UNION-EG

Athena Ballesteros, Director of the World Resource Institutes Finance Centre, agreed the AIIB is likely to fill a need for funding infrastructure projects in Asia, but stressed these must be low-
carbon. On the AIIBs insistence its investments will be lean, clean and green, Ballesteros called for vigilance in monitoring the delicate balance of environmental and social concerns with
keeping financing transaction costs low for energy and infrastructure projects. To many observers, the AIIBs approach to funding projects on the basis of whether they add or decrease
greenhouse gases will be a major test of the banks approach to environmental integrity. Ballesteros is on the whole optimistic about the prospects of the AIIB being able to forge a new path
of low-carbon development in the region, corresponding to an increased international urgency to tackle climate change. As the new kid on the block, the AIIB can help change the way Asia
produces and consumes energy and, it can help shape the way we build infrastructure, she said. Calvin Quek, a Greenpeace sustainable finance expert, said the amount of international focus
on the AIIB means it is likely to follow best environmental practice in funding projects in developing countries. An increasingly interconnected world, not just in terms of shared environmental
problems but also border-crossing communications channels, means international scrutiny is likely to follow the AIIBs investment decisions carefully. It is also likely, given the international
momentum on climate action following a successful agreement at the seminal UN meeting in Paris at the end of last year, the AIIB will be encouraged and win accolades from investing in low-
carbon technology. It is also becoming increasingly clear that good business sense is drawing funders away from high-emissions and financially risky fossil fuel investments.

US co-op in the AIIB critical to check climate change

Paolo Mauro 16, 6-22-2016, Mauro is Assistant Director and Division Chief, Fiscal Operations 2, Fiscal Affairs Department, International Monetary Fund Ph.D. in Economics, Harvard "Why America Should Join the AIIB," Project Syndicate,
(https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/us-should-join-aiib-by-paolo-mauro-2015-06?barrier=true)//UNION-EG

Continuing to maintain that stance would be a mistake. The US has an opportunity to influence the AIIBs design without looking like it is reversing course. In exchange for
participating in the institution, the Obama administration could and should insist that the AIIB focus on financing infrastructure projects that reduce carbon-dioxide emissions and meet the
highest environmental standards. The need for infrastructure investment in Asias emerging economies is vast. Generally, as a countrys household income rises, the share of spending
on food declines, while spending on transportation rises sharply. And most developing countries in Asia have reached an economic stage at which large segments of their
populations will soon be able to afford cars and plane travel for the first time. According to research I conducted with my colleague, Tomas Hellebrandt, average household
income in Asias emerging economies will double over the next two decades; in the meantime, spending on transportation will quadruple. The choices being made now regarding
what kind of infrastructure to build subway systems or roads; green energy or coal power will have a major impact on the worlds ability to keep climate change in check.

AIIB green infrastructure projects key to checking climate change

Darius Nassiry and Smita Nakhooda 16, Smita Nakhooda is a leads ODI's work stream on climate finance, and is an expert on climate change and energy policy in developing countries. She currently advises various international organisations
and governments on climate finance issues. She was previously a Senior Associate in the Institutions and Governance Program at the World Resources Institute, where she led programmes to stregnthen governance of electricity in major developing countries, and
on the environmental impacts of development finance. She also developed work to stregnthen governance of forests in the context of global efforts to reduce emissions from deforestation and degradation. Darius has spent nearly 10 years as an investment
banker working with energy and utilities clients in New York, London and Tokyo. He previously designed a public-private renewable energy fund as an investment manager with the Norwegian Investment Fund for Developing Countries (Norfund), and conducted
research on leveraging finance for clean technology as a visiting fellow with the Center for Global Development. 04-2016, "The AIIB and investment in action on climate change " The Overseas Development Institute,
(https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/the_aiib_and_investment_in_action_final_20160413.pdf)//UNION-EG

As the founding member of the AIIB, its largest shareholder, and its prime beneficiary in terms of reach and influence, China has a number of reasons to support the AIIBs focus on clean
energy and low-carbon, climate resilient infrastructure. China can help ensure that new infrastructure built in coming years avoids locking-in an emissions trajectory that threatens future
regional and global prosperity. The opportunity for the AIIB to finance climate change mitigation investments also corresponds to Chinas own self-interest and aligns closely with Chinas own
recent policy decisions to promote green development. A focus on clean energy and low-carbon infrastructure serves the commercial interests of many countries in the region particularly
China as a means to help secure new export markets for key industries, such as solar energy, wind turbines systems, energy efficiency, and electrical grid technologies.23 By emphasizing
renewable energy, China can also help reduce over-capacity in key domestic industries such as solar24 through increased demand in the region, as well as access new markets for
complementary industries such as smart grid technologies.25 By focusing the AIIB on the requirements of an environmentally sustainable future, China can align the new institutions policies
and operations with its own strategic investment priorities, its next Five Year Plan (FYP), and recent steps to green the countrys financial system. Over the past decade, driven by concerns
about reducing air pollution, improving energy security and promoting growth in strategic clean technology industries26 China has pursued a low-carbon investment strategy and has
established itself as a renewable energy leader , fostering dynamics that have lowered prices and have expanded the market. In the five years to 2012, investment in renewable and nuclear
energy rose by 40 percent while investment in fossil fuel generation fell from 50 percent to 25 percent.27 By 2013, wind, hydroelectric and solar comprised 30 percent of generating capacity
and 20 percent of electricity generation,28 enabling China to reach its 2015 target two years ahead of plan.29 In the eight years to 2013, China became the largest wind power generator in
terms of total capacity and capacity added per year.30 In the five years to 2014, non-fossil generation capacity increased 73 percent to 444 GW.3In 2015, China spent USD 110.5 billion on
clean energy technology, 17 percent more than in 201432 and added more wind capacity than the European Union.33 Chinas One Belt, One Road initiative, involving port, railway, road,
power and grid infrastructure, also creates enormous opportunities and needs to ensure that new infrastructure will be sustainable and withstand the foreseeable stresses and shocks
resulting from a warming climate. 34

Climate Change is the most likely cause of mass extinction

Meates , 13 (Megan Meates, Public Relations and Communication Consultant at Curtin University, author, December 11th 2013, http://www.reportingclimatescience.com/news-
stories/article/does-global-warming-cause-mass-extinctions.html)
Researchers have discovered two of Earths ancient mass extinctions wiped out life on the planet in a similar way to one another and that both were associated with global warming
conditions. Research led by Curtin University in Perth, Western Australia, and published in Geology, demonstrated the cascade of events during the fourth largest extinction, at the end of the Triassic period 200 million years ago, were remarkably similar to those
of the largest extinction that occurred at the end of the Permian 250 million years ago. The research suggests perhaps all global warming-related mass extinctions show similar patterns of change. From rock samples collected
by colleagues in Plymouth University, lead scientists Professor Kliti Grice, Director of the WA Organic and Isotope Geochemistry Centre (WA-OIGC) program and Dr Caroline Jaraula and Dr Pierre Le Metayer, Research Fellows of the WA-OIGC program from
Curtin, discovered and examined molecular fossils of land plants, algae and green sulfur bacteria (known as Chlorobi).Alongside their international research team, they
were able to determine the oceanic and atmospheric conditions that
caused the end-Triassic extinction 200 million years ago.Back then, the worlds continents were being pulled apart to create what is now the Atlantic Ocean. This event was accompanied by
frequent, massive volcanic eruptions that injected great quantities of CO2 into atmosphere, estimated at four times higher than todays levels based on plant physiology, Professor Grice said.The
high CO2 levels triggered global warming; leading to a cascade of atmospheric and oceanic changes that were very similar to those that we found had caused the largest mass extinction,
which happened 50 million years prior to this one. Of the five mass extinctions to have ever occurred in the past 600 million years, four were associated with global warming. Our
research suggests if two of these had similar processes operating, perhaps all other global warming-related extinctions do too, helping us understand more about Earths history.Dr Jaraula said the research team looked at stable carbon isotopes of molecular fossils of
plant waxes, algae and chlorobi before, during and after the extinction period.Professor Richard Twitchett of Plymouth University said the next step was to compare the results to changes in the fossil record of marine animals, to help understand how future marine
While ocean circulation and aspects of the carbon cycle will always be different, the general patterns of
extinctions are likely to occur. Our study has provided a glimpse of how extinctions happen and their rates of change.
change can still be compared, Professor Michael Bttcher, of the Leibniz Institute for Baltic Sea Research, Germany, said. Professor Grice and her research colleagues previously determined the conditions of the largest extinction occurring at the end of
the Permian, 250 million years ago in a report published in Science in 2005.The recently published research in Geology was carried out in conjunction with Plymouth University and Leibniz Institute for Baltic Sea Research, Germany. The research has been funded
by the Australian Research Council under a QEII Discovery Fellowship awarded to Professor Grice and Professor Twitchett. Professor Grice has also recently been awarded a Discovery Outstanding Research Award to continue this research and investigate the
recovery of the largest extinction events and their association with oil and gas resources on a global scale. The paper entitled Elevated pCO2 leading to Late Triassic extinction, persistent photic zone euxinia, and rising sea levels was published in Geology. The

Late Triassic mass extinction event is the most severe global warming-related crisis to have affected important extant marine groups such as scleractinian corals . and offers potential insights
into climate change scenarios. Here we present evidence from Chlorobi-derived biomarkers of episodic and persistent photic zone euxinia. From biomarkers and stable carbon isotopes, we present evidence of rapid mixing of atmospheric and oceanic carbon
reservoirs. Global versus regional trends are resolved in kerogen organic matter type, carbonate 13C, and bulk and pyrite 34S. This suite of data demonstrates for the first time a comprehensive organic and stable isotope geochemical reconstruction of events
leading up to the Late Triassic extinction event and its aftermath. The cascade
of events prior to, during, and after the extinction is remarkably similar to those reported for the Late Permian extinction, the
largest extinction event of the Phanerozoic. We predict that similar conditions will have occurred during all past episodes of rapid global warming and biotic crisis that are associated with
similar rises in CO2.
 Asian Economics Advantage
The AIIB is not meant to rival the World Bank or IMF.
Finbarr Bermingham Global Trade Review (GTR), 09-23-2015, "Xi Xinping invites US to join AIIB," http://www.gtreview.com/news/asia/xi-jinping-reiterates-us-invitation-to-aiib/ (EG)

The US failure to join some of its key western allies as a founder member was criticised by analysts at home and abroad. Niels Marquardt, the CEO of the US Chamber of Commerce in
Australia, described it to GTR as a case of how not to advance the national interest in diplomatic terms adding that it didnt work, so we ended up looking silly. However Xi denied claims
that Chinas new US$100bn development bank was designed to replace or rival the existing US-backed institutions such as the World Bank and IMF, saying that such reform is not about
dismantling the existing system and creating a new one to replace it. Rather, it aims to improve the global governance system in an innovative way.

Huge gaps exist in infrastructure funding, leaving room for a new development bank.
Andrew Elek, 2-11-2014, "The potential role of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank," East Asia Forum, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2014/02/11/the-potential-%20role-of-%20the-
asian-%20infrastructure-investment-%20bank/ (EG)

Chinas president, Xi Jinping, announced the creation of an Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) just before the October 2013 APEC meeting in Bali. If the new bank is managed
professionally to finance commercially viable investments in economic infrastructure, it can begin to correct a very significant failure of global financial markets. At present, despite very low
interest rates, as Mahendra Siregar says, huge gaps in infrastructure coexist with a comparably massive accumulation of savings and under-used global economic capacity. There is vast unmet
demand for productive economic infrastructure, especially in the emerging economies of Asia. In 2011, the OECD estimated that global infrastructure requirements over the next two decades
will cost around US$50 trillion. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) estimates that developing Asian economies need to invest US$8 trillion from 2010 to 2020, just to keep pace with expected
infrastructure needs. The supply of savings, much of which is generated in Asia, is more than adequate to begin to fill some of the demand for infrastructure. Yet it will not be easy to steer
more savings towards infrastructure, either globally or in Asia. The investments needed are typically for public goods, which are large-scale, long term and illiquid, and present challenging
cost-recovery problems. The constraints on investment, especially attracting private investment in infrastructure, include problems of project selection and preparation, implementation risks,
the need to translate sound economic rates of return into financial returns, and intermediation challenges. These formidable problems can be overcome if political leaders and international
financial institutions are determined to do so, and APEC leaders are now committed to improving connectivity in the Asia Pacific. China certainly needs far better links to its neighbours: the
supply of cheap factory labour from the countryside is drying up and labour costs are rising rapidly, creating an urgent need to re-orient supply chains. The opening of Myanmar makes it
possible to meet this need and allow more economies at various stages of development to participate in international production networks in line with their evolving comparative advantage.
There is room for a new development bank, specialised in financing large-scale economic infrastructure on commercial terms, working alongside existing multilateral development banks,
including the World Bank and the ADB.

The AIIB is meant to strengthen Asian economies.

Mike Bastin, 7-26-2015, "With the AIIB, there is no pain for the West, only gain," Telegraph.co.uk, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sponsored/china-watch/business/11763107/aiib-investment-
will-benefit-the-west.html (EG)

The United States also claims the AIIB will diminish the role of the IMF. Once again, this argument flies directly in the face of the facts. First and foremost, the AIIB is about long-term
development with persistent pumping of investment into the poorest Asian economies. The AIIB has been set up to support sustainable economic growth across the region, too, and is
unlikely to focus investment on one country. Instead, critically important infrastructure projects across many of the poorest Asian nations will be established. The IMF, on the other hand, is
there to support specific governments with short-term liquidity challenges. The IMF is also not far behind the World Bank with the volume of increasingly vociferous criticism. Witness the
Greek debt crisis for a perfect example of the IMFs failings. Clearly, the World Bank and the IMF need to be redesigned totally to meet the challenges facing todays world economy.

The AIIB provides a stable platform to channel money into infrastructure investment, but Asian countries dont have enough money to meet their
infrastructure needs, more investment is necessary to close that gap.
Wu Zhenglong, Research Fellow, China Foundation For Int'L Studies, 7-28-2014, "The Benefits of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank," No Publication,
http://www.chinausfocus.com/finance-economy/the-benefits-of-the-asian-infrastructure-investment-bank/ (EG)

Last October, just before the annual meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) Forum in Bali, Indonesia, President Xi Jinping announced Chinas proposal to establish an Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Within a few months, China has held three rounds of talks with interested Asian countries, and is helping to circule a memo on setting up the bank.
What is leading China and its Asian partners to join hands to work for creating this new Bank? First, with the current Asian economy under mounting downward pressure, strong infrastructure
spending will help to create demand, increase jobs and bring about a smoother and more effective production, circulation, and consumption environment for the overall economic operation.
It will also contribute to an enhanced regional infrastructure connectivity which will then facilitate regional economic cooperation and integration. Therefore, as the driver of sustainable
growth and regional economic integration, infrastructure investment will empower economic expansion in Asia. Second, Asia is now facing a dilemma of a gap between great demand and
severe capital supply, especially in developing countries. On the one hand, the current infrastructure of Asian economies falls far short of meeting the needs for sustainable economic
development. On the other hand, most Asian countries suffer from a capital bottleneck in infrastructure investment, which seriously restricts their infrastructure development and
construction. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) estimates that developing countries need to invest US$8 trillion from 2010 to 2020, just to keep pace with expected infrastructure needs.
Third, what Asia lacks is not really capital, but the capability to channel it. There is a comparably massive accumulation of savings, which see China and ASEAN countries respectively
controlling $US3.99 trillion and $US700 billion in reserves, not to mention other Asian countries. The supply of savings, much of which is generated in Asia, is more than adequate to begin to
fill some of the demand for infrastructure. The capital bottleneck therefore does not refer to a capital shortage, but the lack of a practical financing platform and business mode, which are
both essential to effectively turn the huge capital potential inside and outside Asia into investment in infrastructure. Fourth, the World Bank and the ADB and other well-established
institutions have the expertise to lend a lot more for infrastructure, but have prioritized more on poverty reduction and moved in a different direction. Net lending by multilateral
development banks on commercial terms has been negative in five of the last ten years, including 2011 and 2012. The World Bank and the ADB are now focusing on concessional lending and
knowledge sharing with low-income countries, leaving an important niche to be filled by a new financial institution. And here comes the AIIB. As a financial catalyst of the region, it plans to
start with $50 billion from governments and at least another $50 billion from financial institutions and private capital. Its mandate is to focus on financing in infrastructure development that
helps Asia at both the national and regional levels. The AIIB, as a multilateral development institution, will be a highly professional and efficient platform of infrastructure financing. It will tap
into the expertise of experienced MDBs to build the capacity to assess and implement projects successfully.
Inherency
 US Hasnt joined yet
US has yet to join AIIB
Mauro 15
(Why America Should Join the AIIB, Paolo Mauro is a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/us-should-join-aiib-
by-paolo-mauro-2015-06?barrier=true JUN 12, 2015 1 ES - )

The United States, along with Canada and Japan, has been conspicuously absent from the discussions regarding the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). A total of 57 countries from Europe,
Asia, and Latin America have joined the Chinese-led effort to spend $100 billion on roads, rail lines, bridges, and harbors throughout the region. But President Barack Obamas administration has remained
reluctant to join much to the bewilderment of Chinas government. Continuing to maintain that stance would be a mistake . The US has an opportunity to influence the AIIBs design without looking like it
is reversing course. In exchange for participating in the institution, the Obama administration could and should insist that the AIIB focus on financing infrastructure projects that reduce
carbon-dioxide emissions and meet the highest environmental standards. The need for infrastructure investment in Asias emerging economies is vast. Generally, as a countrys household income rises, the share of spending on food
declines, while spending on transportation rises sharply. And most developing countries in Asia have reached an economic stage at which large segments of their populations will soon be able to afford cars and plane travel for the first time. According to research I
conducted with my colleague, Tomas Hellebrandt, average household income in Asias emerging economies will double over the next two decades; in the meantime, spending on transportation will quadruple. The choices being made now regarding what kind of
infrastructure to build subway systems or roads; green energy or coal power will have a major impact on the worlds ability to keep climate change in check.
 Other Countries Joined
57 countries have already joined the AIIB
AIIB 15, "What is the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank?," No Publication, http://euweb.aiib.org/html/aboutus/AIIB/?show=0 //NV
Discussions among Prospective Founding Members (PFMs) on the establishment of AIIB commenced with the 1st Chief Negotiators' Meeting (CNM) in Kunming, China, in November 2014.
Discussions about the proposed Articles of Agreement (AOA) were launched at the second CNM, which was held in Mumbai, India, in January 2015. The AOA was discussed further at the 3rd
CNM meeting that was held in Almaty, Kazakhstan, in March 2015 and at the 4th CNM meeting which took place in Beijing in April 2015. The final text of the AoA was adopted on May 22,
2015 at the 5th CNM held in Singapore. Representatives from the 57 PFMs gathered on June 29, 2015 in Beijing at a Signing Ceremony of the Bank's Articles of Agreement at the Great Hall of
the People and 50 PFMs signed the Articles, including: Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, China, Egypt, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany,
Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea, Kyrgyz Republic, Lao PDR, Luxembourg, Maldives, Malta, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Portugal, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom,
Uzbekistan, and Vietnam. The Articles remain open for signing by PFMs Until December 31, 2015 and it is expected that the AIIB would be operational by the end of this year.
 AIIB Exists
Xi Jinping has created the AIIB in to change rules in global finance
Sue-Lin Wong 16, 1-17-2016, "China launches new AIIB development bank as power balance shifts," Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-asia-aiib-investment-idUSKCN0UU03Y //NV

Chinese President Xi Jinping launched a new international development bank seen as a rival to the U.S.-led World Bank at a lavish ceremony on Saturday, as Beijing seeks to change the
unwritten rules of global development finance. Despite opposition from Washington, U.S. allies including Australia, Britain, German, Italy, the Philippines and South Korea have agreed to join
the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in recognition of China's growing economic clout. "Asia's financing needs for basic infrastructure are absolutely enormous," Xi said in a speech
at the launch, adding the bank would aim to invest in projects that were "high-quality, low-cost". In order for Asia to continue to be the most dynamic region for global growth, it needs to
invest in infrastructure and connectivity, Premier Li Keqiang said, during the afternoon session of the opening ceremony.
MultiLat / Environment Adv
 MultiLat Low Regional Deals
Multilateralism low TTP, TTIP, and other regional deals are failing. Western-centric approaches no longer work
Jonathan Dove 16, 4-26-2016, "The AIIB and the NDB: The End of Multilateralism or a New Beginning?" The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2016/04/the-aiib-and-the-ndb-the-end-of-
multilateralism-or-a-new-beginning/ //NV

Multilateral cooperation over the past decade has taken a steep downward turn. From the final demise late last year of the World Trade Organizations protracted Doha Round of multilateral
talks, to the growing proliferation of regional and sectoral trade deals, world powers seem either unable or unwilling to seek common ground like they used to. Indeed, there appears to be a
growing universal aversion to the post-World War II forums for negotiation and agreement, which seem mired in bureaucracy and stasis. Even the United States, the masthead of the Bretton
Woods Institutions, shows such inclinations. Washingtons regional efforts to secure the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership are an obvious
departure from the principle of universal consensus-based decision-making. Some argue that this shift from the global to the regional reflects the reality of a diverse and more complex world
order, in which a Western-centric, one size fits all approach is no longer tenable.
 AIIB -> Climate Coop

AIIB is the perfect chance to create multilateral environment protection deals

Elizabeth Economy 14, 10-20-2014, "A Chance to Introduce Social and Environmental Protections," No Publication, http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/10/20/a-chinese-rival-
to-the-world-bank/a-chance-to-introduce-social-and-environmental-protections Elizabeth Economy, the C.V. Starr senior fellow and director of Asia Studies at the Council on Foreign
Relations, is the author, with Michael Levi, of "By All Means Necessary: How China's Resource Quest is Changing the World." //NV

Chinas creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (A.I.I.B.) is an important opportunity not only for spurring much needed infrastructure investment in Asia but also for ensuring
that such investment incorporates robust environmental standards. Most of Asia suffers from chart-topping levels of air pollution, water contamination and scarcity and land degradation,
factors that must be accounted for in further development. Instead of opposing its creation, the U.S. should consider joining the bank as a means of guaranteeing that it matches world-class
financing strength with world-class environmental practices. Chinese officials have referenced their desire to address environmental and other governance issues through the A.I.I.B. The
strength of their commitment, however, remains uncertain. Beijing has not made such concerns a priority in its overseas investment practices in the past, although growing demand for better
environmental protection, labor and governance practices at home and abroad is pushing Chinese officials to take these issues more seriously. Prioritizing these issues within the A.I.I.B. can
help ensure that bidding for investment projects is transparent and open only to firms that operate with high corporate social responsibility standards. The bank could establish an
independent auditing process that insists that broader health, social welfare and environmental considerations are fully addressed. Such measures, however, are only likely to be adopted
with guidance from other countries with much stronger corporate social responsibility histories than that of China, such as Singapore, Australia and South Korea not to mention the United
States. The United States has long sought to have China step up to the plate to share the burden of global leadership. Now that China is taking just such a step, it deserves the chance to show
what it can do, but it will need more, rather than less, involvement of others to get it right. Undermining the A.I.I.B. would only undermine Asias chance at a sustainable environmental future.

The US has the power to influence the AIIB to focus on emissions

Paolo Mauro 16, 6-22-2016, "Why America Should Join the AIIB," Project Syndicate, https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/us-should-join-aiib-by-paolo-mauro-2015-
06?barrier=true Paolo Mauro is a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. //NV

WASHINGTON, DC The United States, along with Canada and Japan, has been conspicuously absent from the discussions regarding the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment
Bank (AIIB). A total of 57 countries from Europe, Asia, and Latin America have joined the Chinese-led effort to spend $100 billion on roads, rail lines, bridges, and harbors throughout the
region. But President Barack Obamas administration has remained reluctant to join much to the bewilderment of Chinas government. Continuing to maintain that stance would be a
mistake. The US has an opportunity to influence the AIIBs design without looking like it is reversing course. In exchange for participating in the institution, the Obama administration could
and should insist that the AIIB focus on financing infrastructure projects that reduce carbon-dioxide emissions and meet the highest environmental standards. The need for infrastructure
investment in Asias emerging economies is vast. Generally, as a countrys household income rises, the share of spending on food declines, while spending on transportation rises sharply. And
most developing countries in Asia have reached an economic stage at which large segments of their populations will soon be able to afford cars and plane travel for the first time. According to
research I conducted with my colleague, Tomas Hellebrandt, average household income in Asias emerging economies will double over the next two decades; in the meantime, spending on
transportation will quadruple. The choices being made now regarding what kind of infrastructure to build subway systems or roads; green energy or coal power will have a major impact
on the worlds ability to keep climate change in check.

AIIB can keep temperature changes below 2 degrees Celsius

Nassiry, Darius, and Smita Nakhooda 16. "The AIIB and Investment in Action on Climate Change." Working Paper 443 (2016): 1. Web. 21 June 2016 //NV

The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (the AIIB or the Bank) is poised to be an important new actor in international development finance, led by developing countries to scale up
investment in infrastructure. The choices that Asian countries make about how to meet their infrastructure needs, particularly in key sectors such as energy and transport, will fundamentally
affect the planets ability to achieve low emission and climate resilient development, and keep global temperature changes to well below 2C degrees above pre-industrial temperatures, as
stated in the Paris Agreement on climate change. As a new multilateral development bank (MDB) conceived to tackle pressing development challenges of the 21st century, the AIIB has an
opportunity establish a new approach to infrastructure investment that prioritizes renewable energy, climate resilience and sustainable development. Indeed, the AIIB has the potential to
exceed the practices of other MDBs in these areas by finding new approaches that resonate with member needs and priorities. As the founding member of the AIIB and its largest shareholder,
there is a strong case for China to support such an emphasis given its leadership in clean energy industries. The AIIBs investments can help expand markets for renewable energy, and change
the narrative around the emphasis of Chinas overseas investments as one focused on clean sustainable development, rather than resource extraction. Asian countries are already emerging as
leaders in clean energy with new business models that meet the needs of poor people within poor countries. Most countries in the region are also highly vulnerable to the impacts of climate
change. A focus on low emission paths to sustainable development represents an investment in a future with major long-term commercial benefits for many members of the AIIB. The
Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) that Asian countries have proposed and their emerging priorities with respect to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
provide a basis for the AIIB to develop its investment strategies. The AIIB should set targets around clean energy investment, and developed country members could make concessional funds
available to support the achievement of these goals. Incentives should be structured so staff emphasise low emission development options and climate resilience. Tools such as the use of
carbon footprinting and shadow pricing to reflect the externalities of fossil fuel emissions should be used to inform the AIIBs investment decisions. Such measures could enable the Bank to
achieve its stated aim to be lean, clean and green.
 MultiLat K2 Solve Warming
Multilateral regime is key to solve warmingno turns because US response is inevitable, question of effectiveness
Gallarotti 10Prof of Govt @Wesleyan Giulio M., The Power Curse, p. 145 //NV
Multilateralism also appears superior to unilateralism in promoting environmentalism. The Kyoto Protocol shows similar opportunities lost with respect to US business and economic interests. As in the International Criminal
So a weakening of Kyoto due to US departure interrupted the exportation of US
Court, the United States used its participation in the Kyoto Protocol to shape it significantly to its own interests (staggered cuts, emissions trading).
environmental policies to other countries, leaving the fate of multilateral environmental control in the hands of othersclearly an inferior position from which to prevent undesirable
international policies. In short, departure enervated US international environmental influence. The argument that adhering to the emission limits of Kyoto would burden US businesses with extra costs and reduce economic growth fails to appreci-ate the
opportuniites that Kyoto carries for the United States. First, greater environmentalism would promote the US environmental industry, an industry in which the United States has absolute and a comparative advantage. Hence, what some industries burdened by
environmental costs might lose in international sales will at least in part be recovered through increased sales in other industries. Moreover, since US firms are highly adaptable to changing environmental standards, because of stricter and frequent changes in
domestic regulations, gerneal limits may give US companies an international competitive advantage if they can adapt to the limits faster than other companies in other nations. It is therefore not certain that the US economy would suffer a net decrease in growth
as a result of stricter emissions standards. On the contrary, a stricter environmental milieu may carry opportunites both for the macroeconomy and US business (Gallarotti, 1995b; Assuncao 2003). Above and beyond the comparative advantage in environmental
technologies and production methods enjoyed by the United States, it is clear that the call for reductions in greenhouse-gas emissions has become politically compelling in all developed nations. The United States itself is faced with political pressure to enact
these reductions even in the absence fo a Kyoto treaty. 62 Interestingly, much of this pressure to consolidate some national initiative to curb greenhouse gases has come from US industry itself, which feared more draconian measures by a new administration and
hence pushed to lock the nation into a system of more moderate cuts before future administrations could propose more drastic regimes. Bush, however, opted for a more decentralized system of cuts whereby nations would
unilaterally select appropriate levels. In conjunction with its own unilateral cuts, the United States would prod other nations (first China and India, in this iteration) to follow suit and thus
generate a sort of additive regime for promoting a solution to global warming. Such a regime would be far inferior to a multilateral regime; its decentralized character makes it inefficient and ineffective in
dealing with the main problem of carbon emissions: the collective level of such emissions across nations. Appropriate collective levels can only be determined and managed within a multilateral regime , as iterated-additve
diplomacy lacks the institutional capacity to set such levels. A multilateral regime provides the obvious advantages of an international market for emissions trading, opportunities for the United States to
negotiate relief through quota realignments, and the domestic political capital needed for US politicians to sell painful cuts to their constituents. A decentralized regime such as that championed by Bush,
based on unilateral and limited multilateral standards, would in fact introduce a type of moral hazard, locking nations into an essentially bounded free-for-all system whose existence would dampen initatives for other international greenhouse-gas regimes
(McKinnon and Power 2008; Assuncao 2003).

Multilateral cooperation is necessary 3 reasons

Figueres 12, 18 October 2012 Christiana Figueres, Executive Secretary of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Lecture: "Climate Change: Why We Need a
Multilateral Solution" //NV

Aside from the fact that I would then have to choose with which set of countries I would work because I could not work with all as I do now, let me share with you three key reasons why a
multilateral process is admittedly cumbersome, but crucial. 1. Climate change is a global problem. There is no one single country that is not adversely affected in some way. What happens on
greenhouse gas emissions in one country does not stay in that country; emissions do not respect national boundaries. Building an adaptive response to the adverse effects of climate without
including all countries is analogous to building a hospital where the sick are not allowed in. 2. Every country can contribute to the solution in some way, whether through reducing its own
emissions, increased efficiency, developing, disseminating or installing clean technologies, etc. Global participation makes the negotiations more complex, but it also makes the eventual
solution- low carbon living- more cost effective, and more durable. A low carbon tipping point that only involves the largest economies would condemn the smaller or poorer economies to
the double burden of growing their economy for overall wellbeing or worse yet, raising their population out of poverty, and doing so with technologies that are obsolete and ineffective. 3. We
need to know where we are along the way. In order to monitor progress, or lack thereof, we need a global accounting system under which all countries follow the same rules for measuring
and reporting.
AT: AIIB Bad
 Environment
AIIB framework takes climate friendly action- going above the environment regulation of other global banks
-Serves as a solvency deficit for an AVB, IMF, or World Bank CP

Gaia Larsen 16, 3-4-2016, Gaia Larsen is a Senior Associate in the WRIs Sustainable Finance Center, where she leads its work on financial institutions and climate finance readiness. She is an attorney whose work focuses primarily on shifting investments
toward protecting people and the environment. At WRI, her work has focused on several issue areas including environmental democracy, climate finance, and the extractive industries. Prior to joining WRI, Gaia was a fellow at the Institute for Policy Integrity at
New York University "Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank Releases New Environmental and Social Standards. How Do They Stack Up?," World Resources Institute, (http://www.wri.org/blog/2016/03/asian-infrastructure-investment-bank-releases-new-
environmental-and-social-standards)//UNION-EG

Last week, the new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)released its Environmental and Social Framework, which will help guide how the bank deals with its investments impacts on
people and the environment. With authorized capital of $100 billion and promises to deliver aid with less bureaucracy, the AIIB could play a big role in re-shaping countries around the region.
Negotiations over its formation have been punctuated by questions over what standards it would apply to govern its investments. For its part, the AIIB has committed to being lean, clean
and green and to applying world-class standards. So what can we see in the newly released Framework? First, the Framework does indeed send a signal that AIIB is acting on its commitment
to meet the international standards used by development banks to consider impacts on people and the environment before committing funds to a development project. The Framework lays
out a vision, a policy, and three supporting standards that are broadly similar in nature to those of the World Bank (WB), Asian Development Bank (ADB) and other established multilateral
development banks. On some issues, the AIIB has embraced more progressive positions than some of its peers. For example, the AIIB excludes financing for commercial logging operations in
tropical or old-growth forests, which goes beyond the current commitment made by the World Bank. On other subjects, the AIIBs commitments are not quite as strong. For example, the AIIB
has not followed the lead of the ADB or International Finance Corporation (IFC) in giving Indigenous Peoples the right to consent to activities taking place on their lands. In general, though,
the Frameworks vision recognizes many of the issues such as climate change, gender, biodiversity and ecosystems, resettlement, labor practices and Indigenous Peoples that AIIB will
encounter as it begins to make investments. It also makes very important commitments around transparency, information disclosure and public participation that exceed those of a number of
national development banks, including key players such as the China Development Bank and the China Export-Import Bank. Following through on these commitments will be critical to
building trust and confidence in the banks approach.
 Corruption
United States would be isolated AIIB wont be corrupt
BTS 15 (Business Times Singapore; The United States should not oppose, but support and even join, the AIIB; 3-31-15; :Lexis; JLW)
THE United States risks being isolated following the decision of several of its allies to sign up to the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Britain, France, Germany and Italy reportedly ignored direct pleas from the
Obama administration in order to become "founding" members of the China-led institution which is seen as a rival to the pre-eminence of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Washington fears that the Bretton Wood institutions, which set up the world's financial system 70
years ago, will be diminished both in stature and reach. Indeed, Washington even finds objectionable that Beijing set March 31 as the deadline to join up. Any change to the status quo is always something of a jolt to those who have thrived in it. The American reaction to the new development bank is
entirely predictable since Washington tends to see much of what Beijing does these days as attempt to rewrite the rules of an international order that has served it so well. However, the
financial order in East Asia has been undergoing change for a
considerable time. The 1997/98 East Asian financial crisis was the turning point. After the admitted failure of IMF policy prescriptions, especially in Indonesia, it was proposed that there should be an Asian Monetary Fund to manage temporary balance of payments difficulties among
members. The idea was shot down by then US treasury secretary Lawrence Summers. But Asian nations were determined not to be caught out again and created a system of bilateral support - later multilateralised - known as the Chiang Mai Initiative. It has been the bulwark against speculative
attacks on regional currencies for more than a decade. Now the AIIB is coming to pass. It would be a mistake, however, to see it entirely as an attempt to break the grip of the US on world financial institutions and to set up a rival Sino-centric system. While
Beijing is certainly playing
a central role in the founding of this lending institution, it should really be seen as an attempt to supplement the work of the World Bank and other infrastructure leading organisations. After all,
Asia's infrastructure needs in the coming decades have been variously estimated at between US$2 trillion and US$8 trillion. There is enough potential business for everyone. Besides, China has been severely criticised about its
lending practices for infrastructure projects in Africa which benefit Chinese firms. Beijing seems to have taken on board the criticism and is now working in a multilateral setting. The bank has been welcomed by Christine Lagarde of the IMF, as
well as the managing director of the World Bank, Mulyani Indrawati. Asian Development Bank (ADB) president Takehiko Nakao and China's Finance Minister Lou Jiwei said that they had held discussions on possible cooperation. More importantly, the Chinese have emphasised that, unlike the World
Bank and the ADB where Washington (and Japan, in the case of the ADB) can exercise a veto, the AIIB will not have any veto-wielding member. As a commentary in Xinhua, the official Beijing news agency, put it: "Unlike
existing global lending bodies such as the World
Bank, in which the United States has a dominant role and also the power to veto, the AIIB will give the Asian nation no such privilege. Instead, all members will participate in the decision-
making process so as to achieve win-win results." American interests - and its own position in the global financial architecture - would be best served if Washington joined the AIIB rather
than moan about its allies from outside.
Solvency
 US KEY
US should join AIIB laundry list
Lazarus 3/2
(Why the U.S. Should Embrace the AIIB There are compelling reasons for the U.S. to join Chinas new development bank. By Leland Lazarus March 02, 2016 http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/why-the-u-s-should-embrace-the-aiib/ - ES - )

Despite all its misgivings about the AIIB, the

United States should join the bank to ensure its financial influence in Asia. First, it would limit Chinas voting power in the bank by coordinating with like-minded developing
member countries such as Great Britain, Australia, and New Zealand, thus prodding China toward pursuing cooperative behavior. Second, the
U.S. could help raise the AIIBs quality of governance, credit and banking culture and
environmental and social standards. Third, the U.S. could better integrate the AIIB with existing major multilateral development banks, such as the World Bank and Asian Development Bank, in
the form of co-financing and joint project preparation and supervision. Fourth, the U.S. would be in a good position as a reliable partner in Asias infrastructure building and economic
development. And fifth, it would ensure that American businesses will be well informed about infrastructure projects financed by AIIB. Finally, if the U.S. continues to dig in its heels about the AIIB,
it may miss out on an important chance to put teeth behind its Asian rebalance strategy. Tobias Harris of the Sasakawa Peace Foundation believes that U.S. opposition to the AIIB was a knee-jerk reaction to Chinas growing
influence in Asia, and missed an opportunity to help China with technical assistance to improve the bank. Specifically, the White House was wary about the AIIBs standards, and the Treasury Department steadfastly rejected China-led initiative that might rival the
existing Bretton Woods system. By shunning the AIIB, the U.S. disregarded the principles of its own Asia strategy and contributed to the impression that it seeks to contain China. AIIB president Jin Liqun had this to say about U.S. opposition to the AIIB: The U.S.
risks forfeiting its international relevance while stuck in its domestic political quagmire. He warned the U.S. that history has never set any precedent that an empire is capable of governing the world forever. If the U.S. is serious about its Asian rebalance
strategy, it should work with China to improve the AIIB as a member, instead of opposing the bank altogether.

AIIB bridges infrastructure gap and solves the deficit

The Asia Foundation 01/27/16 (a nonprofit international development organization committed to improving lives across a dynamic and developing Asia, New Asian Infrastructure and
Investment Bank Breaks Ground: What You Need to Know, 01/27/2016, 06/20/16, http://asiafoundation.org/2016/01/27/new-asian-infrastructure-and-investment-bank-breaks-ground-
what-you-need-to-know/)//BME

Whether its traffic gridlock in Jakarta or power outages in Nepal, Asia

has an infrastructure deficit. A 2012 ADB report notes that in Asia, 1.8 billion people are not connected to basic sanitation services, 800 million lack
electricity, and 600 million do not have access to potable water. This infrastructure problem multiplies as the rate of urbanization increases. According to the World Resources Institute, in 2014
the World Banks overall spending on infrastructure was $24.2 billion, and the Asian Development Banks total spending across all sectors was $21 billion. Despite the fact that China has
contributed $30 trillion to development over the past 30 years, Asia still has an infrastructure deficit of $8 trillion. The AIIB alone will not bridge this divide but it will certainly help to address
Asias current challenges in transport, power, and urban development. If the AIIB is able to bridge the infrastructure gap, it will make a huge contribution to growth and inclusion in Asia and
beyond.

The United States must join the AIIB to maintain the balance of power
Lazarus 03/02/16 (Leland, A scholar in International Politics with two regional specialties: East Asia and Latin America, Why the U.S. Should Embrace the AIIB, 03/02/16, 06/20/16,
http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/why-the-u-s-should-embrace-the-aiib/)//BME

Despite all its misgivings about the AIIB, the

United States should join the bank to ensure its financial influence in Asia. First, it would limit Chinas voting power in the bank by coordinating with like-
minded developing member countries such as Great Britain, Australia, and New Zealand, thus prodding China toward pursuing cooperative behavior. Second, the U.S. could help raise the
AIIBs quality of governance, credit and banking culture and environmental and social standards. Third, the U.S. could better integrate the AIIB with existing major multilateral development
banks, such as the World Bank and Asian Development Bank, in the form of co-financing and joint project preparation and supervision. Fourth, the U.S. would be in a good position as a
reliable partner in Asias infrastructure building and economic development. And fifth, it would ensure that American businesses will be well informed about infrastructure projects financed
by AIIB. Finally, if the U.S. continues to dig in its heels about the AIIB, it may miss out on an important chance to put teeth behind its Asian rebalance strategy. Tobias Harris of the Sasakawa Peace
Foundation believes that U.S. opposition to the AIIB was a knee-jerk reaction to Chinas growing influence in Asia, and missed an opportunity to help China with technical assistance to improve the bank. Specifically, the White House was wary about the AIIBs
standards, and the Treasury Department steadfastly rejected China-led initiative that might rival the existing Bretton Woods system. By shunning the AIIB, the U.S. disregarded the principles of its own Asia strategy and contributed to the impression that it seeks
to contain China. AIIB president Jin Liqun had this to say about U.S. opposition to the AIIB: The U.S. risks forfeiting its international relevance while stuck in its domestic political quagmire. He warned the U.S. that history has never set any precedent that an
empire is capable of governing the world forever. If the U.S. is serious about its Asian rebalance strategy, it should work with China to improve the AIIB as a member, instead of opposing the bank
altogether.

The United States is key to the AIIBs success

Brown 06/01/15 (Kerry, Professor of Chinese Studies and Director of the Lau China Institute at King's College, The US Should Make Sure China's AIIB Succeeds, 06/01/15, 06/21/16,
http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/the-us-should-make-sure-chinas-aiib-succeeds/)//BME
The first formal meeting of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) will be held sometime in mid-June. This is the moment when its somewhat abstract current nature will start to move toward more concrete actuality. At the moment, the Chinese-led AIIB,
with its 57 members, has been a grand idea in search of practical form. Starting in June, the bank will start to focus on doing what it was ostensibly set up to do investing in core assets in the worlds most dynamic region. There are three broad
scenarios for how the AIIB tale might unfold. Each of them will pose challenges for the United States in particular, as the most vocal skeptic about the AIIB venture. Whether the bank fails or
succeeds, the world is a different place now that it exists. The first scenario is that the bank proves, quickly, to be a success. The naysayers who wondered about its ability to conform to high
standards of governance and transparency will see an entity operating entirely in line with international norms, and fulfilling a hugely important function. In this scenario, the AIIB will be challenge
one of the stronger arguments used by supporters of the China threat theory, particularly in the United States. It will give powerful evidence that China is a status quo power, that it is able to play the
international game according to rules largely laid down by others, and that it can show real leadership and work with other countries. This would be a huge fillip to Chinas soft power credentials and a problem to those who constantly
accuse it of holding more nefarious motives. The second scenario is that the bank quickly shows it is unable to operate, and that it was far too ambitious and bold an idea for a latecomer to the finance
sector like China to contemplate. The 56 other partners will show vocal antipathy and the whole projects failure will fall like a gift to those who dislike Chinas prominence and feel that it is existentially unable to operate according to global standards.
The downside of this scenario however, even for the U.S. hardline opponents and skeptics, is that the major economy in the worlds most critical growth area, where there is a projected $8 trillion in infrastructure
needs, is unable to optimally contribute where help is most needed. It would mean that Chinas knowledge of developmental economics would not be translatable and easily usable outside its own country. This would be a depressing
outcome, and in the long term, a bad one for the region and the world. The third scenario is simply that nothing happens. The AIIB becomes another sclerotic bureaucracy lined up with many
others, mired in politics, stymied by internal divisions, and a monument to Chinas love of soothing rhetoric over real action. Skeptics win in this scenario too, up to a point, but once more its long-term meaning is good for no one. This
outcome would mean that in a hugely important and visible initiative, in which the Chinese leadership have invested enormous political capital, they are exposed in the end as people who cannot execute what
they promise. Doubts will start to creep from this into their success in domestic policy, where, once more, they have said a lot, but so far done little. We would be increasingly inclined to see an inactive AIIB as representative of Chinese leaders who talk big,
but cant follow through. In view of how much now depends on these same leaders steering the Chinese economy to a stable , sustainable condition for the region and the world, this is also not a
good result for anyone. Looking at these three broad scenarios, theres one more conclusion to be drawn: the United States gets far more from being involved and making sure the bank succeeds
then from staying outside. A successful AIIB with the U.S. eventually joining in means no more than a bit of hurt pride for Washington. But after enduring this, the United States can bask in reflected
glory by being associated with a successful and much-needed project, which Washington can argue it made work. A failed bank, or an inactive, empty one, is not in the United States or anyone elses long
term interests. Whatever the outcome, initiatives like the AIIB are not likely to go away as China seeks to play a role in the wider world to support its own interests. The key thing now is to
align those projects as much as possible with the interests of others. The AIIB is a real opportunity to do this, in an area where success is easy to deal with, and failure in fact a problem for everyone. The
United States should now plot its way in and play a role. It really has nothing to lose.
 A2: China Voting Power
International pressure checks weighted voting
Lazarus 03/02/16 (Leland, A scholar in International Politics with two regional specialties: East Asia and Latin America, Why the U.S. Should Embrace the AIIB, 03/02/16, 06/20/16,
http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/why-the-u-s-should-embrace-the-aiib/)//BME

While China has a 30 percent weighted voting share, its influence in the AIIB can be checked by international pressure. In many ways, China has already altered the AIIB due to pressure from the
international community. The AIIB Founding Members were able to use their collective bargaining power to revise the banks Articles of Agreement and enmesh China in a network of
international norms and standards. This forced China to become more flexible and alter the AIIB rules. Suspicion and opposition by the United States and Japan also checked Chinas ambitions with the AIIB. The evidence
suggests that the AIIBs member states can make China play by the rules. Currently, China has a poor track record in terms of following high standards when it comes to the projects it funds around the world. From oil and resource
extraction projects in Cambodia, Burma, and Mongolia, to railroad and canal construction projects in Brazil, Peru, and Nicaragua, to bridge and other infrastructure projects in Mali and Ethiopia, the Chinese Development Bank and its Export-Import Bank have
given loans to unstable governments, signed construction deals for unnecessary infrastructure, and ignored villagers who have been abruptly uprooted with little compensation. U.S. officials believe that the AIIB will adopt the same low standards as Chinas
national banks. They point out that, since the AIIB will not have a resident staff involved in the day-to-day project oversight, the bank could not possibly ensure that its clients will follow through on high standards and transparency.
 A2: Current Banks Solve
The AIIB is key to solve infrastructure- only bank that focuses on it
Weijia 09/20/15 (Hu, a reporter with the Global Times, US should wake up to benefits of AIIB and reconsider its strategy during Xis visit, 09/20/15, 06/21/16,
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/943485.shtml)//BME
The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) has once again attracted a lot of global media attention as Jin Liqun, president-designate of the bank, said over the weekend that up to 20 countries are waiting to join the AIIB. Jin also noted earlier this month that
the door is still open for the US to become a member of the bank. The remarks came ahead of President Xi Jinping's State visit to the US, fueling speculation about whether the US will seize the opportunity to cement its economic ties with China and join the
China-led AIIB. As more countries in the world welcome the AIIB and see joining it as participation in a major initiative in the fast-growing region, the US needs to break the shackles of its old ideas, under which it sees the founding of the AIIB in geopolitical terms,
without paying attention to its actual meaning from an economic perspective. It
may not be enough for the US to acquiesce in potential cooperation between the AIIB and the World Bank. Furthermore, the US will
need to work with the AIIB directly in the foreseeable future. The AIIB vowed on Saturday to engage with private sectors across the world to promote infrastructure investment in Asia. Jin
said the AIIB would act as a platform to create bankable projects and could provide security to the private sector when working with local governments in the region, according to the Xinhua
News Agency. Asia needs $700-800 billion of investment in infrastructure each year, but the market has so far not been fully developed, partly due to red tape and the fact that infrastructure
projects usually take a long time to provide returns on investment. If the AIIB can act as a matchmaker between the private sector and local authorities and offer financial support, it will be a
big help for multinational firms, which engage not only in construction but also in the upstream steel and cement industries. Jin said Saturday that the AIIB would not select projects that favor Chinese companies and
it is clear that the bank will welcome private investment from the whole world. But if the US has a skeptical or hostile attitude toward cooperating with the new bank, it may put US firms at a disadvantage in terms of exploring the market in Asia. A lot of Western
observers have criticized the US for its indifferent attitude toward the AIIB. Robert Zoellick, former president of the World Bank, said in an article published in the Financial Times in June that the Obama administration's negative response to the AIIB was a
strategic mistake. The US chose not to join the AIIB because it was concerned that the US-dominated World Bank would be marginalized. The decision also showed the US' desire to maintain its hegemony in the global financial system as well as its unease about
the global expansion of China's financial sector. However, the US should handle the AIIB issue carefully. It should be noted that the US can no longer prevent the growth of the AIIB's influence. If the US still wants to exclude itself from the AIIB, it will end up simply
watching the rise of China's financial sector globally as well as dwindling benefits in a huge market like China. But if it joins the AIIB, it could not only gain huge benefits from emerging Asian markets but also exert its influence in the global financial system. The
pros of joining the AIIB outweigh the cons. It's time for the US to reflect on its strategy toward the AIIB during Xi's State visit.

Current IFIs are too slow and lack focus

Dollar 15 (David, leading expert on China's economy and U.S.-China economic relations, China's rise as a regional and global power: The AIIB and the 'one belt, one road', Summer 2015,
06/21/16, http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2015/07/china-regional-global-power-dollar)//BME

Some of the impetus for China to launch the new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank was Beijings concern that the governance structure of existing International Financial Institutions (IFIs)
was evolving too slowly. An important agreement to increase the resources of the IMF, and to raise the voting shares of fast-growing emerging markets, has been stalled in the U.S. Congress,
whereas all other nations have already ratified it. There is a certain irony that one of Chinas frustrations with the American-dominated institutions is that China thinks that they need more resources and is willing to

contribute, whereas the different parts of the United States government cannot agree to this expansion. Chinas frustration is not just about the size of the IFIs and Chinas weight within them. In the case of the World Bank, China has argued for years for
more focus on infrastructure and growth. Several years ago, former Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo chaired what was called a High-Level Commission on Modernization of World Bank Group Governance. It is worth looking at its key recommendations, because this was a
serious effort by a distinguished international committee that included good representation from major developing countries (e.g., Zhou Xiaochuan from China, Arminio Fraga from Brazil, Montek Ahluwalia from India, and Ernesto Zedillo from Mexico). The Zedillo Report is quite

critical of the current World Bank arrangement of a resident board that approves all loans. The resident board represents both a large financial cost to the bank ($70 million per year) and an
extra layer of management that slows down project preparation and makes the bank less efficient. Slowness of project preparation is one of the main criticisms of clients concerning the poor
performance of the Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs). The Chinese officials charged with developing the AIIB are looking at the Zedillo Report for good ideas. The AIIB will have a non-resident board that meets periodically both in Beijing and via
videoconference. Given its newness, a likely compromise among the countries that have signed up is that its board will approve many of the initial projects and eventually delegate more decisionmaking to management. The Zedillo Report recognizes the importance of environmental and social
safeguards, but argues that the World Bank has become so risk-averse that the implementation of these policies imposes an unnecessary burden on borrowing countries. In
practice, developing countries have moved away from using the existing MDBs to finance
infrastructure, because the institutions are so slow and bureaucratic. I think that the enthusiastic response of developing countries in Asia to the AIIB concept reflects their sympathy with the idea that a
new MDB can have good safeguards and still be quicker and more efficient than existing ones. Some of the Western commentary on the AIIB expresses a fear that China will use it for narrow political or economic ends. Now that a diverse group of
nearly 60 countries have signed up, it would be difficult for China to use the AIIB to finance projects in favored countries over the exclusion of other members. And the idea that this would help with Chinas over-capacity problems does not make any sense at all. If the AIIB is very successful, then in
five years it might lend $20 billion per yearthat is to say, on a scale with the World Banks IBRD lending. But just in steel alone, China would need $60 billion per year of extra demand to absorb excess capacity. This figure excludes excess capacity in cement, construction, and heavy machinery; the
point is that the bank is, simply put, much too small to make any dent in Chinas excess capacity problemeven if it were the sole supplier for these projects, which it wont be. The One Belt, One Road initiative is larger than the AIIB. It started with the idea that nearby countries in Central Asia
spread along the traditional Silk Roadcould benefit from more transport infrastructure, some of which China could finance bilaterally. However, the economies of Central Asia are not that large, and the potential for investment is limited. Overland transportation will remain expensive, compared to
sea-going shipments. For that reason, China added the idea of a maritime roadthat is, the expansion of infrastructure along the sea-going routes from the Chinese coast through Southeast Asia to the Indian Ocean and all the way to Europe. A vast amount of world trade already traverses this route.
Because One Belt, One Road will be implemented bilaterally between China and different partners, it may seem that there is more potential for China to use this initiative to vent some of its surplus. But I still doubt that this will be on a scale that would make a macroeconomic difference for China.
Among the various developing countries along One Belt, One Road routes, there are some with relatively strong governanceIndia, Indonesia, and Vietnam, for examplewhich will be hard for China to push around. Those countries will not want to accept large numbers of Chinese workers or take
on large amounts of debt relative to their GDP. On the other hand, there are weak governance countriesCambodia and Pakistan, for instance. It may be more feasible for China to send some of its surplus production to these countries, but there is a reasonable prospect that in the long run, China
will not be paid. The West has a long history of debt forgiveness to weakly governed states. It would be smart for China to learn from that history.

China is currently being denied deserved recognition in IFIs

Orr 16 (Robert, on the Board of Governors of the Pacific Forum/CSIS and previous the U.S. Executive Director for the ADB, The Asian Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank: Conditional Collaboration?, Spring 2016, 06/21/16, https://www.americanambassadors.org/publications/ambassadors-review/spring-2016/the-asian-development-bank-
and-the-asian-infrastructure-investment-bank-conditional-collaboration)//BME
Chinese President Xi Jinping announced the AIIB initiative in October 2013 during a visit to Southeast Asia. The factors that led to the announcement are no doubt multi-faceted. Some suspected a commercial rationale to push for more Chinese market opportunities. Japan encountered the same suspicion when the ADB was created. Others

the Chinese that, despite their rise as a great power and emergence as the second
speculated about larger geopolitical objectives and wondered about what is perceived as tighter control of the governance structures by Beijing. To my mind, an important element was the feeling by

largest economy in the world, they had not been sufficiently rewarded with capital share and voting power rights in the World Bank and the ADB. In other words, the Chinese felt they were
being denied an opportunity participate at their weight level.Initially, little attention was paid to the AIIB. Some even thought that it might not get off the ground. By the time it was apparent that the AIIB was here to stay, there wasnt too much any nation could do about itwhether they wished it
good will or not. The main concerns about the AIIB were and remain related to governance and safe-guard policies. In fact, contrary to some media reports, the US position was not to discourage other countries from joining the AIIB but to sayif we were askedthese are the questions we would raise with Beijing. And they basically related to
what I cited above. The political to and fro surrounding the creation of the AIIB was intense, as some countries worried about either Washingtons reaction or Tokyos or both. In October 2014, 22 Asian countries met in Beijing to sign a Memorandum of Understanding to establish the AIIB; rapid progress in creating the bank ensued. The big break was
when the United Kingdom announced its intention to join the AIIBnot necessarily pleasing other European nations who felt London had jumped the gun. However, shortly thereafter other Europeans signed up. Japan and the United States have not. At this point in time, it is difficult to see a near-term chance of their joining despite many voices in

Tokyo and Washington advocating just that. To the AIIBs credit, it seems to have heard the concerns about safeguard policy and has engaged former officials from other MDBs to help craft practical policiesor at least deploy
the right buzz words.They have an emphasis on transparency, account-a-bility, openness, and independence. As the new President and a former ADB Vice President Jin Liqun has said, the AIIB will be
lean, clean, and green. The AIIB Secretariat plans to have 700 personnel, which is substantially less than the 2,000 employees at the ADB headquarters in Manila. It is too early to tell whether or not the AIIB will adhere to these precepts, as it only opened its doors in January of this year. The proof will be in the pudding, but there
are already good signs. I am encouraged at the extent to which the AIIB has reached out even before opening for business to consult with the other MDBs such as the ADB and World Bank. Already AIIB officials are

studying the feasibility of co-financing 18 projects proposed by the World Bank and eight submitted by the ADB. Many of these could be approved by the AIIB Board as early as this summer.
The ADB has made it clear that there will be no co-financing with the AIIB until ADB safe-guards are accepted, and this does not seem to have given the AIIB any pause. The AIIB whose current
membership counts 57 countries will have a different emphasis than the ADB, with its expanded capital base moving into new areas such as education and healthcare. This will be a small step
away from the ADBs comfort zone of infrastructure; some have said that ADB really stands for Asian Dams and Bridges. That said, the AIIB clearly looks to remain in the infrastructure and connectivity space. One area of governance
that many have viewed with discomfort is the AIIBs insistence on a non-resident Board of 12 members. A resident Board is viewed, apparently, as an unnecessary cost. I would argue quite the opposite in terms of conducting efficient oversight. When I served on the ADB Board and I or my staff had concerns, arranging a face-to-face meeting with
management could be done in minutes. Emails and long distance phone calls were insufficient. For sure, smaller MDBs like the Caribbean Development Bank with a capital base of around $3 billion can handle this. But its hard to see how a mega-bank like what the AIIB envisions will be able to sustain such fragile governance. It will be interesting to
see how nongovernmental organizations react to not having Board-level points of contact at the AIIB headquarters year round and how that will manifest itself in member country capitals. Pretty quickly, there could be calls to allow for Board residency. Despite frequent denials, MDBs are fundamentally political institutions. It is difficult to make
decisions for Vice Presidents based purely on a merit basis at that level. Its hard to see how political factors could ever be totally excluded. This is true at the ADB. And the AIIB got its first taste of this when a European government assumed it would receive one of the two VP slots that Europe was to get and it wound up going to another. That capital
thought it looked like a classic bait and switch. And already friction ensued. I see many potentially positive outcomes with the AIIB. Surely the infrastructure demands in developing Asia far outstrip what the ADB and World Bank can provide so another player, governed correctly, should be a welcome addition. At the end of the day it will have to be
private capital that provides the lions share of the developmental and infrastructure tools. But the MDBs can send signals of stability and safer investment returns to potential private investorssort of good housekeeping seals if you will.

The ADB is currently failing to solve in the status quo

Simms 2014 (Christopher, assistant professor at the School of Health Administration and previously worked for the Department for International Development in the UK, Asian
Development Bank failing in mission to protect poor and vulnerable, 03/02/14, 06/21/16, http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2014/mar/03/asian-
development-bank-failing-protect-poor-vulnerable)//BME

the Asian Development Bank (ADB) has placed good governance, civil society, accountability and information disclosure among its key themes. In a recent speech, the bank's president stated that
In its efforts to reduce poverty in Asia and the Pacific,

improving "governance in our developing member countries is one of the central aspects of our work in promoting inclusive development". According to a 180-page report released late February on a project to repair Cambodia's rail system, ADB is not, however, adhering to its own polices and procedure in these areas. The bank's

internal watchdog, the Compliance Review Panel (CRP), said management needed to undergo a "mind-shift" in the way it deals with vulnerable populations. Its findings are similar to those
identified more than a decade ago in relation to ADB's performance in Indonesia. The panel was convened to investigate complaints from NGOs that the rail project, which entailed
compulsory resettlement, impoverished hundreds of families and contributed to three child deaths. The report found that the bank had failed to consult the families affected in the design of
the project, and did not provide adequate compensation, suitable replacement housing or basic services at resettlement sites. Neither did it establish an effective mechanism to redress
grievances. The panel recommended ADB pay up to $4m in compensation for loss of income and land. CRP's finding that the case was not an anomaly but represented systemic failure is particularly striking. It said ADB's operational, sectoral and regional staff needed to undergo a
fundamental change in their approach to vulnerable populations and the handling of "resettlement, environment, and public disclosure and consultation". It was not acceptable that the bank's management tended to treat these priority issues as afterthoughts, it added. CRP also found that when ADB was provided with evidence as early

as 2010 that vulnerable households were being impoverished by the project, it chose to ignore it. It did seek the expert opinion of Michael Cernea from the LSE-Brookings Institute project on internal displacement in 2012, but when he submitted his findings, the bank refused to release the full report.
Instead, it published only Cernea's recommendations and launched a video that touted the project's benefits while dismissing the notion that households were being harmed. It has so far refused to pay compensation. CRP's findings are similar to those of a 2003 review of ADB's leadership in Indonesia's health sector during east Asia's financial crisis in that it failed in its mission to protect the poor and, having done so,
sought to obfuscate the results. During the crisis, the IMF persuaded Indonesia's government to cut spending in order to help repay western banks. Given concerns that poor households should not be seen to be bearing the burden of such austerity measures, an ADB plan was implemented to protect their access to healthcare. In 2000 the bank reported that it had succeeded in its main objectives, maintaining spending
on primary healthcare and access and on the uptake of services targeting the poor. Its report led the donor community to conclude that the worst fears of catastrophic health impacts had been overstated. Advertisement In reality, primary healthcare spending fell by 25%, as did the number of children vaccinated. The use of services such as clinics and health centres generally frequented by the poor fell between 26%
and 47%. After decades of steady improvement in life expectancy, infant mortality increased in 22 of 26 provinces by an average of 14% between 1996 and 1999. The quality of ADB's response to the CRP report is notable given the bank's emphasis on information disclosure in its new public communications policy, which promises to strengthen its response and its appeals mechanisms. It is also remarkable given the
uncomfortable finding that while ordinary people were impoverished, the Australian private sector benefited from the Cambodia rail project. In Indonesia, while primary healthcare spending was slashed, private companies in rich donor nations benefited from a dramatic increase in hospital spending, mostly on expensive equipment a deplorable and unjust allocation of scarce resource, according to the World Bank.
For obvious moral and practical reasons, ADB ought to reverse its stance and pay the compensation CRP recommended for families affected by the Cambodia rail project. Not to do so would imply that it does not accept the panel's findings and that it has failed to acquire the insight it is accused of lacking. This in turn implies a continued risk of it making egregious errors without redress for ordinary people.

The World Bank is currently failing and admits faulty methods

Steffen 15 (Sarah, staff writer for DW which is an international news site, World Bank failed to protect the poor, research shows, 04/16/15, 06/21/16, http://www.dw.com/en/world-
bank-failed-to-protect-the-poor-research-shows/a-18388491)//BME

Dams, power plants, conservation programs and other projects financed by the World Bank have pushed an estimated 3.4 million people out of their homes, off their lands, or threatened
their livelihoods, according to research by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists and other media organizations published on Thursday. In Nigeria, state authorities evicted
people living in Badia East, a slum in the country's largest city Lagos. They were cast out without warning or compensation, the report said. Thousands of Kenyans claim to have been forced
out of their homes in their ancestral forests in favor of a conservation program sponsored by the World Bank. Communities in other developing countries told similar stories of eviction and poverty to a team of 50
international journalists. Human rights organizations have long criticized the bank for failing to monitor the effects on communities of the programs it sponsors. 'Serious shortcomings' The World Bank
admitted to "serious shortcomings in the implementation of its resettlement policies" after it had ordered an internal review of its actions. "I believe that we must do better in implementing our resettlement
policies," World Bank President Jim Yong Kim said Thursday at a press conference in Washington, D.C. "We are now reviewing our safeguard policies, and I am determined that we will learn from the past, and that we will do all in our own power to protect people
and the environment," he added. However, identifying these shortcomings is not enough, says Jessica Evans, senior researcher and advocate for international financial institutions with Human Rights Watch (HRW). "After the World Bank has
done its own review, it hasn't gone back and worked to identify these people. And find out how they were harmed and work for these people to properly remedy the harm," she told DW. "But they can't just
promise to not make these mistakes in the future. It needs to go back and fix the mistakes that it's made in the past." People searching through rubble in Lagos (photo: AP Photo/Sunday Alamba) People search through the rubble of their demolished houses in
Lagos after bulldozers destroyed their homes The World Bank was unable to track down how many people were affected by its policies, says Amnesty International's business and human rights analyst Alessandra Masci. And it would rely too heavily on
information provided by the borrower, she added. "The bank does not really verify the information that has been provided by the borrower. And obviously, the borrower has an economic advantage of not
presenting the potential problems and the potential negative impact on communities because they want to get the loan. The bank is pushing this loan out the door in a much more rushed
way." Staff is needed on the ground to independently verify information provided by creditors. That view is echoed by HRW's Evans who says one of the biggest concerns was the World Bank's emphasis on "getting money out the door rather than properly
implementing projects, monitoring how they are implemented and ensuring no harm is being done in the context of them." Protecting the world's most vulnerable people Poor people are most vulnerable to activities funded by the World
Bank - the very same people the institution is trying to lift out of poverty. "People who are resettled often lose many of their livelihood opportunities. For instance, if they rely on subsistence agriculture,
sometimes it takes some time to rebuild that agriculture in a new place. This is something that takes a significant amount of time to monitor and the [World] Bank needs to really invest in that," Evans said. In the case of evictions in
Nigeria, "it should have been foreseeable to the bank that these evictions would happen," said Ashfaq Khalfan, AI adviser on human rights beyond borders. Women on field in Burundi (photo: picture alliance) People who rely on farming for their livelihoods
struggle if they have to relocate "They [evictions] had happened before in a previous project it had funded. And yet it lent funds again without putting in place adequate measures, without ensuring basically a guarantee from the Lagos state government that
these evictions would not be carried out." The World Bank is currently reviewing its safeguards - and the first draft was heavily criticized by civil society groups, saying it would dilute existing safeguards. The bank pointed out that "persons affected by land
acquisition are not affected in the same way, or to the same extent, or are not equally vulnerable to hardship as a result." Germany pushes for human rights Germany - the World Bank's fourth largest donor - has come forward and said it wants to see priority
given to addressing human rights in an appropriate manner - which includes the rights of indigenous people, land rights and greater transparency, as well as including communities in the process. "Germany can play an important role by ensuring that the World
Bank commits to respect human rights," HRW's Evans said. "Germany needs to work with all other governments that are represented through the board of the World Bank to ensure that human rights become a key priority under the bank's new standards."
"Many say the changing of the safeguards is also due to the fact that the bank doesn't feel it's financially relevant anymore, because they have to compete with economies from the BRICS countries that actually are able to provide loans with no strings attached in
a much shorter time frame and without many requirements," AI's Masci said. 'Race to the bottom' "It's a race to the bottom and that's why we feel that the World Bank, being a standard-setting institution, should not
play that role." In its report published in March, the World Bank acknowledged the fact that oversight of projects often had poor or no documentation and lacked to ensure that protection measures were implemented. Some projects were not sufficiently
identified as high-risk for populations, the report stated. Meanwhile, the World Bank has come up with a plan to reform its policies. "We must and will do better," a spokesperson told DW in a statement. However, human rights activists remain skeptical. "The
ultimate problem is: the bank is an institution that prioritizes economic growth over human rights," Khalfan said.
 Benefits
Joining the AIIB is economically advantageous for the US
David Dollar 15, Summer 2015, "China's rise as a regional and global power," Brookings Institution, (http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2015/07/china-regional-global-power-
dollar)UNION-EG
Chinas recent economic initiatives appear to be a diplomatic victory for Beijing and a diplomatic setback for Washington. Certainly, the United States handled badly the emergence of the AIIB. The United States made a mild effort to dissuade some allies from
joining, and was then caught flat-footed when European and Asian allies chose to join. The United States should be pleased that China is shouldering some global responsibility. With nearly 60 countries joining the
AIIB, it is likely to have governance and standards similar to existing MDBs, and may well be able to improve on their efficiency through competition. Rather than a challenge to the American-led system, the
AIIB is likely to be a useful complement to the existing system. More generally, the AIIB episode reveals clearly that Asian and European countries do not want to choose between China and the United States, and nor is there any reason why
they should have to. The United States made a mistake in its handling of the AIIB, but we should not exaggerate the importance of this incident. America now looks well-positioned to complete TPP negotiations. The AIIB will be funding infrastructure
that can be thought of as the hardware of integration. Equallyif not moreimportant is the software, that is, the rules and regulations that govern international trade and investment. TPP
aims to expand trade into new areas, such as services, whilst laying the foundation for twenty-first-century trade. Notice that countries such as Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, South Korea, Malaysia, and Vietnam do not hesitate to participate in both Chinese
and American initiatives. This is clearly the smart strategy. ForVietnam, for instance, a turn to the AIIB should improve infrastructure, whereas using the TPP framework ought to enable Hanoi to integrate with the vast and innovative
U.S. economy. There is a risk that these competing initiatives will result in the development of trade blocs, but I think it is more likely that the end result will be cooperation. China would benefit
enormously from joining the TPP, because it is still extremely closed in many sectors. The United States would benefit from joining the AIIB because it is an important new institution in the fastest growing region of
the world economy.

Opposing the AIIB counteracts US interests and gives up US say in international economics
Edwards and Qahir 15 Edwards, Martin, and Katayon Qahir. "US Should Stop Blocking China's AIIB and Join Allies in New Club." The Conversation. N.p., 6 Apr. 2015. Web. 22 June 2016.
EP

The creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), established last year by China and many other Asian countries, has brought this challenge and how to address it front and center. The AIIB is similar to the Asian
Development Bank (ADB) and the World Bank in that its intended to finance infrastructure investments except that it will serve more as an instrument of Chinese rather than Western influence. Thus far, the US has reacted by trying to
marginalize the banks impact, urging other Western powers to follow its lead and steer clear. As weve seen in recent weeks, that strategy has failed miserably, with Australia, the United Kingdom, France, Germany and even
Taiwan now interestedin becoming founding members. Of the major powers, only Japan has continued to follow its allys lead. This represents a serious setback for the White Houses ability to lead the international economic
order on its own terms. While the narrative of the day is that of a policy defeat for the Obama administration, some larger points are worth noting. Manage multilateralism, dont block it First, the very existence of the AIIB is a
self-inflicted problem for the US. It could have been avoided had the US been willing to cede some power at the IMF and ADB. Second, objections to European and other Western countries joining it are shortsighted
because the best way to influence its actions is by being on the inside. Finally, the AIIB is a good thing for both China and the US over the long term as it shows the rising powers interest in taking on more global
responsibilities exactly what the White House has sought so arguments against it are counterproductive.

US caused the rise of AIIB by not allowing China to have a say in current institutions
Edwards and Qahir 15 Edwards, Martin, and Katayon Qahir. "US Should Stop Blocking China's AIIB and Join Allies in New Club." The Conversation. N.p., 6 Apr. 2015. Web. 22 June 2016.
EP

But China would not have been so willing to create its own international bank had it felt appropriately valued in the ones that already exist. What is frequently omitted in the discussion of the AIIB is the extent to
which this problem was created by dysfunction between Washington and Tokyo over reforming the Asian Development Bank, as well as within Washington around International Monetary Fund reform. The
Asian Development Bank has been
dominated by the US and Japan since its creation in 1966. China is the largest economy in Asia, while only the third-largest shareholder in the Asian Development Bank. As it has been custom that the president
of the ADB is Japanese, Chinese attempts to gain influence within the bank commensurate with its economys size have been blocked. Similarly, IMF reform was proposed in 2010 by the G20. Under the proposed reforms,
Chinas voting power was to double, making it the third-largest shareholder at the IMF behind only the US and Japan. Brazil and India would both become top-ten quota-holders as well, displacing Saudi Arabia and the Netherlands. In this manner, global
economic governance would be reinvigorated, as these emerging economies would receive a voice at the IMF equivalent to their influence. Though IMF reform has been approved by more than 150 countries, including many that would lose influence under the
proposals, the US Congress has refused to budge. Despite warnings from the rest of the G20 underscoring the urgency of passing the reforms, Congress has sought to squeeze compromises on the IRS and healthcare from the White House in exchange for its
support. While the Obama Administration wants the reforms, it has refused to sacrifice its signature health care law or link it to other measures. So at this point, IMF reform simply wont happen in the current Congress. Given Chinas inability to
produce reforms of the existing development banks that would address Chinas concerns, its move to create its own development bank was its only way forward.

Lack of US AIIB involvement prevents involvement in reform and safeguards

Edwards and Qahir 15 Edwards, Martin, and Katayon Qahir. "US Should Stop Blocking China's AIIB and Join Allies in New Club." The Conversation. N.p., 6 Apr. 2015. Web. 22 June 2016.
EP

Washington has been on the wrong side of this issue by dismissing the AIIB rather than celebrating it. For the past year, the White House has raised concerns about how the new bank would operate, suggesting that the AIIB would have
insufficient safeguards. The AIIB might undercut the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, the argument goes, as countries might prefer the promise of cheap money from Beijing without the strings the other lenders attach. But questioning
Chinese governance of the bank not only reminds our allies of our shortcomings in IMF reform, it also overlooks the surest route to reforming the AIIB. Cooperation is always more difficult in large groups
with divergent preferences than smaller ones. The growing list of AIIB members (including South Korea, Norway and Denmark) means that the Chinese will have to accommodate those countries concerned about
safeguards. Rather than push back on AIIB, the US should welcome the participation of many countries. It will fall to China to figure out how to reconcile this diverse membership. This will ensure that fighting climate change
and improving environmental standards will not be sacrificed in favor of growth at any cost.

By not engaging the US misses out on an opportunity to shape the ideologies of this institution
Olson 15 Olson, Stephen. "Time for the US to Join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank." The Diplomat. N.p., 9 Nov. 2015. Web. 22 June 2016. EP
The U.S. standoffishness towards the AIIB is driven therefore by broader concerns about the long-term impact of growing Chinese leadership in international institutions. This leaves Washington with a
difficult, but unavoidable question: What should the U.S. policy response be to Chinas desire to play a more proactive leadership role in the global system of multilateral institutions, and specifically the AIIB? The evidence thus far suggests that sitting
on the sidelines is probably not the smart option. Engagement, and a full-throated advocacy for the principles upon which the current system is built, makes more sense. The U.S. fumbled the opening
kick-off, but its time to move on. Initial discussions on joining the AIIB should be commenced as soon as is practical.

AIIB will be more cost efficient than other multilateral institutions

Mandakini Devasher Surie 16, 1-27-2016, "New Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank Breaks Ground: What You Need to Know," Asia Foundation,
(://asiafoundation.org/2016/01/27/new-asian-infrastructure-and-investment-bank-breaks-ground-what-you-need-to-know/)//UNION-EG

There are in fact many similarities between the AIIB and existing multilateral finance institutions like the World Bank and ADB. The AIIB has a similar governing body to existing multilateral banks, including
an international board of governors, board of directors, and board of management. However, the AIIB governance structure will be leaner. The World Banks resident board is criticized as being both costly ($70 million
a year) and inefficient. Mindful of these criticisms of counterpart institutions, the AIIB has established its board of directors as non- resident. Board members will correspond electronically and meet physically as
needed. The AIIB will also have environmental and social safeguards in place and has set high standards for integrity and compliance. The bank labels itself lean, clean, and green.
 China Says Yes
China Says Yes The infrastructure investment gap in Asia calls for investments from governments.
Vronique Salze-Lozac'h, 7-22-2015, "To Be or Not To Be Part of AIIB," Asia Foundation, http://asiafoundation.org/2015/07/22/to-be-or-not-to-be-part-of-aiib/ (EG)

Indeed, while there is little argument about Asias need for infrastructure, there is much concern over how this need will be addressed by a new organization with no history and in which the
rules of governance, criteria for selecting projects, and environmental standards are still being developed. The need is certainly enormous. In a region that is home to the worlds fastest-
growing economies, the infrastructure investment gap has been estimated at $8 trillion between 2010 and 2020, according to figures from the Asian Development Bank. The emphasis on
trade, regional economic cooperation, and connectivity, to sustain high growth rates in the future, calls for huge investment efforts from governments in hard infrastructure such as roads,
railways, harbors, electricity, and telecommunications, but also in soft components such as policies and regulations to ensure that investments are efficient and yield positive results. The
AIIBs intention to support this much-needed infrastructure development is therefore welcomed both by governments and by businesses managing ever-expanding regional and global supply
chains. The Asian-led AIIB also represents a new, distinctively Asian development tool, bringing regional know-how and expertise to the problem of matching the supply of infrastructure to
specific regional needs. This newcomer development actor may also provide opportunities for collaboration with existing multilateral agencies. IMF chief Christine Lagarde, speaking at the
opening of the China Development Forum in Beijing earlier this year, said that the IMF and the World Bank would be delighted to cooperate with the AIIB.

China has invited the US to the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.

Finbarr Bermingham Global Trade Review (GTR), 09-23-2015, "Xi Xinping invites US to join AIIB," http://www.gtreview.com/news/asia/xi-jinping-reiterates-us-invitation-to-aiib/ (EG)

Chinese President Xi Jinping has confirmed his governments position that the US is welcome to join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). In an interview with the Wall Street
Journal, published on the eve of Xis state visit to America, he wrote, in emailed answers: In addition to Asian countries, countries outside Asia such as Germany, France and the UK have also
joined the AIIB. China welcomes the US to join the AIIB. This has been our position from the very outset. The development of the AIIB has led many to conclude that it is a response to Chinas
relative isolation from the Bretton Woods architecture which has dominated global development and trade for the past half century. Along with the One Belt One Road programme, it is
viewed as part of Chinas efforts to create a development lending platform in its own image.
 Should Join
The US government is only concerned about the AIIB because it differs from traditional institution philosophies
Olson 15 Olson, Stephen. "Time for the US to Join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank." The Diplomat. N.p., 9 Nov. 2015. Web. 22 June 2016. EP
In reality, the
heart of the debate, at least from the U.S. perspective, has less to do with the development agenda and more to do with global leadership in multilateral institutions. Since the founding of the Bretton
Woods system in the aftermath of WWII, the United States and its philosophically like-minded partners have been mostly successful in crafting a set of global institutions which reflect their values and priorities. And the governance structures of these
institutions have unapologetically tilted towards developed-world, free-market democracies: The World Bank is always run by an American, the IMF is always run by a European, and the ADB is always run by a Japanese. But
Chinas stunning economic rise now puts it in a position where it can credibly aspire to reconfigure the game board both in terms of existing institutions, as well as with the establishment of
new ones. The AIIB, obviously, is the most consequential gambit thus far. Since Chinas rise was predicated on a very different form of government, a very different view on the role of the state in the
economy, and trade and investment politics that sometimes seem closer to mercantilism than free trade, the philosophical foundations of the postwar system of global institutions could increasingly be challenged
by these alternative philosophies, as Chinas role and influence increases.

Joining the bank would be a wise move as many other US allies are already members
Keatley 15 Keatley, Robert. "China's AIIB Challenge: How Should America Respond?"The National Interest. N.p., 18 Apr. 2015. Web. 21 June 2016. EP
The well-worn advice that if you cant beat them, join them may be the right counsel as Washington ponders what to do next about the new China-backed investment bank intended to finance
Asian infrastructure needs while also promoting Chinese influence. And as they think about it, U.S. officials might also relax a bit. Doing so would be much wiser than the Obama Administrations first reactionattempting to
block the banks creation, or failing that, prevent it from becoming an important financial agency with broad membership and significant influence. That effort failed miserably, due either to bad
judgment or inattention, so now, the new bank is off and running at high speed. Fifty-seven nations, including most of Americas closest friends and allies, have joined China as founding members of
what is officially the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), with even Taiwan trying to devise what Beijing would consider an appropriate name so it too can be a member. Of the worlds major economies, only the United States and
Japan remain outside (and Tokyo is considering a plan to join later with a $1.5 billion capital contribution).

The US must participate in regional institutions like the AIIB in order to ensure our interests are met
Smith 15 Smith, Sheila. "Regional Institutions Can Be Good for World Policy." The New York Times. N.p., 6 Apr. 2015. Web. EP
Second, Australia's decision, perhaps even more than that of our European allies, reveals the new complexities in Asia. Other Asian allies too see their own interests as being served by joining rather than sitting on the outside
of this new Chinese initiative. Self-interest dictates working with China in the realm of commerce, trade and now development. Finally, not all Chinese initiatives challenge the interests of the
region, and thus the U.S. should think carefully about how to participate in new regional initiatives while it continues to encourage strong and constructive Chinese presence in existing global
institutions. After the Asian Financial crisis in the 1990s, the U.S. opposed a reasonable and helpful Japanese initiative to build a regional source of liquidity in case of a crisis. Later, it became clear that this could have been a help to the smaller nations of Asia
that needed access to funding, and it would have established a valuable precedent. Designing regional institutions that meet the needs of the economically vibrant Asian region while complementing existing global
financial and development institutions is possible and should be the basis for U.S. policy response.

Fighting cooperation with China is primarily mindless policy that has alienated allies
Kurlantzick 16 Kurlantzick, Joshua. "Pivot Missteps." Council on Foreign Relations. Council on Foreign Relations, 15 Jan. 2016. Web. 21 June 2016. EP
But wariness toward Beijing has morphed into a muddled, obsessive, and often mindless U.S. policy. It holds that any new Chinese action must be stopped; any new ally must be won back; any
new ambition must be contained. The administration has become so obsessed about countering China that it fails to realize some of the Chinese actions it is fighting do not imperil the United
States interests. Meanwhile, the (largely futile) battle doesnt just alienate allies. It also takes American diplomats, money, and arms away from places that truly matter to the United States. In
some ways, America would do best to let China win.

Concerns about China abusing power with AIIB is checked by participating nations
Lazarus 3/2 Lazarus, Leland. "Why the U.S. Should Embrace the AIIB." The Diplomat. N.p., 2 Mar. 2016. Web. EP
Does the AIIBs legal structure really give China so much power and influence? Not necessarily. External and internal pressure will cause the AIIB to act independently and give itself powers in order to safeguard its
independence from China, and U.S. involvement will expedite that process. International Pressure While China has a 30 percent weighted voting share, its influence in the AIIB can be checked by international pressure. In many ways,
China has already altered the AIIB due to pressure from the international community. The AIIB Founding Members were able to use their collective bargaining power to revise the banks Articles of Agreement and enmesh China in a network of international
norms and standards. This forced China to become more flexible and alter the AIIB rules. Suspicion and opposition by the United States and Japan also checked Chinas ambitions with the AIIB. The evidence suggests that the
AIIBs member states can make China play by the rules.

By joining AIIB the US will be able to influence the bank to become more transparent and adopt higher standards
Lazarus 3/2 Lazarus, Leland. "Why the U.S. Should Embrace the AIIB." The Diplomat. N.p., 2 Mar. 2016. Web. EP
Higher Standards It is still uncertain which standards the bank will use, since the AIIB
has yet to choose which projects it will fund. For example, the bank still has not decided whether it should approve coal-fired power plants, projects that are
shunned by existing institutions. However, recent changes in the AIIBs governance structure may suggest that China is amenable to change. Originally, the Chinese did not want a board of directors to be in charge of projects
because they thought a board would just slow down the project with superfluous oversight. After consulting with the British, however, the Chinese changed their minds and added the board. This suggests that, if the U.S. joins the AIIB, it can
persuade the bank to adopt higher standards and transparency, just as the British persuaded the bank to form a board of directors.

Joining the AIIB will ensure US financial influence in Asia

Lazarus 3/2 Lazarus, Leland. "Why the U.S. Should Embrace the AIIB." The Diplomat. N.p., 2 Mar. 2016. Web. EP
Why the United States Should Join the AIIB Despite
all its misgivings about the AIIB, the United States should join the bank to ensure its financial influence in Asia. First, it would limit Chinas voting power
in the bank by coordinating with like-minded developing member countries such as Great Britain, Australia, and New Zealand, thus prodding China toward pursuing cooperative behavior.
Second, the U.S. could help raise the AIIBs quality of governance, credit and banking culture and environmental and social standards. Third, the U.S. could better integrate the AIIB with
existing major multilateral development banks, such as the World Bank and Asian Development Bank, in the form of co-financing and joint project preparation and supervision. Fourth, the U.S. would
be in a good position as a reliable partner in Asias infrastructure building and economic development. And fifth, it would ensure that American businesses will be well informed about
infrastructure projects financed by AIIB.

U.S. firms will be at a disadvantage without the AIIB

Weijia 09/20/15 (Hu, a reporter with the Global Times, US should wake up to benefits of AIIB and reconsider its strategy during Xis visit, 09/20/15, 06/21/16,
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/943485.shtml)//BME

The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) has once again attracted a lot of global media attention as Jin Liqun, president-designate of the bank, said over the weekend that up to 20
countries are waiting to join the AIIB. Jin also noted earlier this month that the door is still open for the US to become a member of the bank. The remarks came ahead of President Xi Jinping's
State visit to the US, fueling speculation about whether the US will seize the opportunity to cement its economic ties with China and join the China-led AIIB. As more countries in the world
welcome the AIIB and see joining it as participation in a major initiative in the fast-growing region, the US needs to break the shackles of its old ideas, under which it sees the founding of the
AIIB in geopolitical terms, without paying attention to its actual meaning from an economic perspective. It may not be enough for the US to acquiesce in potential cooperation between the AIIB and the World
Bank. Furthermore, the US will need to work with the AIIB directly in the foreseeable future. The AIIB vowed on Saturday to engage with private sectors across the world to promote infrastructure
investment in Asia. Jin said the AIIB would act as a platform to create bankable projects and could provide security to the private sector when working with local governments in the region,
according to the Xinhua News Agency. Asia needs $700-800 billion of investment in infrastructure each year, but the market has so far not been fully developed, partly due to red tape and the fact that infrastructure projects
usually take a long time to provide returns on investment. If the AIIB can act as a matchmaker between the private sector and local authorities and offer financial support, it will be a big help for multinational
firms, which engage not only in construction but also in the upstream steel and cement industries. Jin said Saturday that the AIIB would not select projects that favor Chinese companies and it is clear that the bank will
welcome private investment from the whole world. But if the US has a skeptical or hostile attitude toward cooperating with the new bank, it may put US firms at a disadvantage in terms of
exploring the market in Asia. A lot of Western observers have criticized the US for its indifferent attitude toward the AIIB. Robert Zoellick, former president of the World Bank, said in an article
published in the Financial Times in June that the Obama administration's negative response to the AIIB was a strategic mistake. The US chose not to join the AIIB because it was concerned that
the US-dominated World Bank would be marginalized. The decision also showed the US' desire to maintain its hegemony in the global financial system as well as its unease about the global
expansion of China's financial sector. However, the US should handle the AIIB issue carefully. It should be noted that the US can no longer prevent the growth of the AIIB's influence. If the US still
wants to exclude itself from the AIIB, it will end up simply watching the rise of China's financial sector globally as well as dwindling benefits in a huge market like China. But if it joins the AIIB, it
could not only gain huge benefits from emerging Asian markets but also exert its influence in the global financial system. The pros of joining the AIIB outweigh the cons. It's time for the US to reflect on its strategy toward the
AIIB during Xi's State visit.
 Inherency
AIIB will be useful to Asias economy and development, without replacing current banking structures
Keatley 15 Keatley, Robert. "China's AIIB Challenge: How Should America Respond?"The National Interest. N.p., 18 Apr. 2015. Web. 21 June 2016. EP
Whatever American officials do about the bank eventually, they could well relax a bit. If it does operate on promised terms, the AIIB should be a useful contributor to Asias economic development. But it cannot possibly dominate the
Asian financial arena, nor replace other institutions. According to the ADB, Asia needs $800 billion annually for a decade to meet its infrastructure needs, a vast sum far beyond the combined capabilities of all
international agencies. (The ADB, for example, has provided only $13 billion annually in recent times though it hopes to do more.) Huge amounts of national and private capital are also needed, and no single
government or institution can provide it alone. If the United States works to remain engaged in Asia, it will; even a successful AIIB will not let China displace it. So Washingtons best course could be to join up if possible. If a Republican Congress
blocks the effort, the administration should work with the AIIB directly, as well as through friendly members and agencies like the World Bank and ADB, to keep it on the promised lean, clean and green course. If the
new bank succeeds, Asia will benefit significantly. And if it degenerates into another corrupt organization designed to extract resources for Chinese industry, Beijing will suffer the political consequences.

AIIB will serve complimentary with current banking structures

Olson 15 Olson, Stephen. "Time for the US to Join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank." The Diplomat. N.p., 9 Nov. 2015. Web. 22 June 2016. EP
While these four points are essential to frame the discussion, they generate little debate. The real debate about the AIIB revolves around the rather ill-defined question of whether the AIIB
will be a competitor to the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. Of course, this is a somewhat loaded question depending on the precise definition of competitor. If making
additional sources of funding available for infrastructure projects is viewed as competing with the World Bank or ADB, then, yes, clearly the AIIB is a competitor. But since the mission of the
AIIB will overlap with the mission of these other institutions, the question arises as to why its efforts would not be seen as complimentary. And indeed, the Presidents of both the World Bank
and the ADB have already signaled their desire to work cooperatively with the AIIB.
 AT Other Development Banks solve
World bank and ADB ineffective
Nabili 16 (Teymoor Nabili is a Singapore-based journalist and commentator, and CEO of TheSignal.Asia; http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/01/aiib-dramatically-change-
economic-power-asia-160113110945238.html; 1-14-16; 6-21-16; JLW)

For AIIB supporters, the practical need for a new global lender was self-evident, glaringly so. According to the Asian Development Bank (ADB): "Only three out of 10 people [in the Asia-Pacific] have access to telephone services and only 53.4 percent of the total road
network in Asia of 5.66 million km is paved." (The total road network in the US is 6.5 million km in an area the size of China alone.) By the ADB's own estimate, developing Asia needs a mind-boggling $800bn each year in infrastructure investment,

and until now the ADB itself has been the primary source of those funds. But ADB resources are and have been woefully inadequate. From a total capital base of just over $175bn, the ADB
made direct loans of just $13bn in 2014, up from $7.5bn in 2012. Even if you added in the resources of the World Bank, and allocated them all to Asia, the gap would remain huge. The World
Bank lent $42bn last year, across all sectors, across the globe. It is pretty obvious, then, why the developing countries were quick to jump at the possibility of a new bank with an estimated $30bn a year to lend, and even those nations with reasons to be wary of China can appreciate the
knock-on benefits of regional economic development.

AIIB will be more cost efficient than other multilateral institutions

Mandakini Devasher Surie 16, 1-27-2016, "New Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank Breaks Ground: What You Need to Know," Asia Foundation,
(://asiafoundation.org/2016/01/27/new-asian-infrastructure-and-investment-bank-breaks-ground-what-you-need-to-know/)//UNION-EG

There are in fact many similarities between the AIIB and existing multilateral finance institutions like the World Bank and ADB. The AIIB has a similar governing body to existing multilateral banks, including
an international board of governors, board of directors, and board of management. However, the AIIB governance structure will be leaner. The World Banks resident board is criticized as being both costly ($70 million
a year) and inefficient. Mindful of these criticisms of counterpart institutions, the AIIB has established its board of directors as non- resident. Board members will correspond electronically and meet physically as
needed. The AIIB will also have environmental and social safeguards in place and has set high standards for integrity and compliance. The bank labels itself lean, clean, and green.
 AT IMF Solves
The US could help propel AIIB to success/IMF wont cut it
Runde 15 (Daniel Runde; Contributor at Forbes; http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielrunde/2015/04/30/aiib-us-development-leadership/#5d641b477b19; 4-30-15; 6-22-16)
The rapid rise of Chinas Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) should be a wakeup call for the United States, and requires a well thought out response. The AIIB and other Chinese development
agencies represent a new form of strategic competition that can help to drive progress at the multilateral level. Its emergence was spurred forward by growing infrastructure needs in Asia,
and a lack of strategic vision to ensure that our existing multilateral institutions fit the changing global landscape. The AIIB, however, will undoubtedly face challenges and growing pains. There is an opportunity for the
United States and its partners to help the new institution face these implementation challenges, and establish the fledgling infrastructure fund as a positive player in global development. An
effective approach will require coordinated action with Japan and other allies. The good news is that with some legislative actions, increased U.S. leadership within existing multilateral development banks (MDBs), and relatively small

amounts of money, the United States could respond in a serious and constructive way to the AIIB. The AIIB was just an idea two years ago. Its rapid success is a result of major gaps in what the established international architecture is offering in
terms of global progress, Chinas new status as one of the top trading partners to dozens of countries, and unmet development needs around the world. Tone deaf efforts by the U.S. to pressure allies into steering clear of AIIB membership represent both

bad policy and lack of understanding for the global context which led to the AIIBs creation. Apart from these broad conditions, however, there are two specific U.S. (in)decisions which served to create political cover and practical demand for the
new institution. First, the United States has failed to pass Quota Reform at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) since 2010. As agreed to in 2010, IMF quota reform would result in a slight rejiggering of IMF shareholder votes away from Europe to emerging economies, and a doubling of the money
available for global crises. The United States would see its voting share drop from 17.7 percent to 17.3 percent, but would remain the largest shareholder and retain its veto. Although
the United States agreed to these terms at the 2010 summit, it has so
far failed to implement them because it requires Congressional approval. IMF Quota Reform has been mishandled by the Administration, which has been reluctant to address concerns, and
the issue has been largely ignored by the Republican-controlled Congress. The possible $300 million dollar impact related to changes from one IMF account to another has not helped. Unfortunately, China has used IMF quota reform as political cover to create
the AIIB.
2AC Answer
AT ADB CP
 Perm do both
The AIIB is meant to cooperate with the ADB to meet Asian infrastructural demands.
Finbarr Bermingham Global Trade Review (GTR), 09-23-2015, "Xi Xinping invites US to join AIIB," http://www.gtreview.com/news/asia/xi-jinping-reiterates-us-invitation-to-aiib/ (EG)

He cited the Asian Development Bank (ADB) statistics, which show that from 2010 to 2020, the annual shortfall in funding for Asian infrastructural development is around US$800bn. Xi wrote:
The AIIB serves as a new option to meet this shortfall, and it is therefore welcomed by both Asian countries and the wider international community. But as the funding shortage is huge, it is
clear that the AIIB alone cannot possibly meet such demand. As an open and inclusive multilateral development agency, the AIIB will complement other multilateral development banks.
There is a potential economic part. There is money to be made if you can increase the infrastructure, in both delivering and using said infrastructure, Deborah Elms, Asia Trade Centre While
the glaring infrastructural gap is undeniable and the need for additional funding is acknowledged by virtually everyone involved in trade in Asia, others are more realistic about the potential
political aims of the AIIB. I think with the AIIB, there is a potential economic part. There is money to be made if you can increase the infrastructure, in both delivering and using said
infrastructure. But there is a political part of this, saying: we want to show that we can play a role since weve been so cut out of leadership positions in things like the ADB, World Bank, IMF,
we will just make our own thank you very much, Deborah Elms, chair of the Asia Trade Centre, tells GTR. Overall, Xis words had a conciliatory tone: China and the United States account for
one third of the world economy, one fourth of the global population, and one fifth of global trade. If two big countries like ours do not co-operate with each other, just imagine what will
happen to the world. The co-operative stance was outlined further this week, when AIIB President elect Liqun Jin met ADB President Takehiko Nakao in Beijing, with the pair renewing their
commitment to working together for the development of Asia, and agreed to start the process to identify ADBs future projects that AIIB may be able to co-finance, according to a
statement. Meanwhile, speaking at a conference in Singapore on Saturday, Jin claimed that the AIIB has been approached by 20 additional countries, which hope to become future members.
He denied that the AIIB would be a China bank, favouring Chinese companies, instead saying that it would act in the regional interest. The bank already has 57 member states and is
expected to start lending to projects in 2016
AT World Bank CP
 Perm do both
Coop is gucci
Andrew Elek, 2-11-2014, "The potential role of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank," East Asia Forum, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2014/02/11/the-potential-%20role-of-%20the-
asian-%20infrastructure-investment-%20bank/ (EG)

These well-established institutions have the expertise to lend a lot more for infrastructure, but have moved in a different direction. Net lending by multilateral development banks on
commercial terms has been negative in five of the last ten years, including 2011 and 2012. The World Bank and the ADB are now focusing on concessional lending and knowledge sharing with low-
income countries, leaving an important niche to be filled by a new financial institution. Following Chinas decision to set up the AIIB, consultations are likely to take place around the Asia Pacific, encouraging governments as well as private investors to
become foundation shareholders. Potential investors in the AIIB will want to be assured that the management of the new bank will be of high quality, preferably selected on a competitive basis, and will

be overseen by independent, commercially experienced directors. Sound procedures for project selection, designing financing plans and tendering for project implementation can be based on those developed by existing multilateral development banks. It should
also be possible to clarify that the AIIB will operate on commercial principles. Subsidising the capital costs of some infrastructure can be justified by externalities that are created, but these subsidies should be injected by the governments of the economies which expect to reap the benefits, not by the
new bank. The world does not need yet another window for overseas development assistance. If it is carefully set up and well managed, the AIIB should be able to attract shareholding from Asia Pacific governments committed to their new APEC Framework on Connectivity, as well as from some
private sources. If APEC governments on both sides of the Pacific participate in the new infrastructure development bank, the AIIB could be transformed into an Asia Pacific Infrastructure Investment Bank, which could invest in projects to upgrade connectivity among all Asia Pacific economies. The
composition of foundation shareholders and the official launch of operations could be announced at the 2014 meeting of APEC leaders in China. Early initiatives could be to finance a high-quality APEC Master Plan on Connectivity and improved trade logistics in the region for example by lending to
improve some of the regions ports and airports. To have a significant impact on the need for economic infrastructure, the AIIB would have to expand as rapidly as it can acquire the necessary expertise. In time, its impact on the region could be greater than the ADB or the World Bank, depending on
whether those institutions decide to rediscover their capacity to finance productive infrastructure on commercial terms. The
AIIB will create new competition for the World Bank and the ADB, but the new bank will also have a strong
incentive to cooperate with them. Tapping into the expertise of experienced development banks is the most efficient way, and perhaps the only way, to build the capacity of the new bank to
assess and implement projects successfully.
A2 Heg Good DA Zero Sum
 **Explanation
Essentially, US sees AIIB as a loss of leadership being taken over by China. Not the case, its actually win-win.
Alvin Cheng-Hin Lim 15, 3-12-2015, "IPP Review," No Publication, http://ippreview.com/index.php/Home/Blog/single/id/40.html //NV

In March 12, 2015, the White House issued a surprising public rebuke of the UK for agreeing to join Chinas Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) as a founding member. This breach of
the US-UK special relationship signaled the US unease with Chinas growing influence as a rising power, as well as the US belief that constant accommodation was the wrong way to
relate to China (Watt, Lewis, & Branigan, 2015). This suggests that the US sees its relationship with China over the AIIB through the lens of zero-sum logic, such that the gains in global
influence China earns through the AIIB automatically translate into losses in global influence for the US . As we shall see, this is not the first time the US has seen a non-Western global
initiative as a threat to its influence. In the case of the AIIB, the UKs decision to join opened the way for other US allies to follow suit. Among the G-7 group of the worlds most industrialized
economies, the UK was quickly joined by France, Germany and Italy as founding members of the AIIB, leaving out the US, Canada and Japan (Japanese govt criticized, 2015). By April 15,
2015, when the list of the AIIBs founding members was finalized, 57 countries had joined the AIIB as founding members. While most were located in Asia, particularly in the regions along
Chinas Belt and Road development zones, the potential for synergistic economic growth attracted countries from outside these regions to join the AIIB as founding members, including
Western Europe and South America (Dai, 2015; Chen & Yang, 2015). The sudden wave of last-minute applications to join the AIIB as founding members reportedly surprised China, especially
given the hostility of the US to the AIIB (Perlez, 2015). This unexpected support shows that many countries dont share the US understanding of the AIIB as representing a zero-sum
competition for global influence, but that instead they share Chinas view of the AIIB as representing a significant opportunity for win-win cooperation, with economic development for all
participants as the primary goal.
 SQ = Winner Takes All
The status quo is zero-sum in terms of competition There are winners and losers. AIIB evens the playing field.
Alvin Cheng-Hin Lim 15, 3-12-2015, "IPP Review," No Publication, http://ippreview.com/index.php/Home/Blog/single/id/40.html //NV

In a zero-sum game, a gain for one participant means a loss for another participant, and there is no net gain or loss for the games participants (Colman, 1995, p. 53). In the case of the US and
its relations with the Asia-Pacific, its actions indicate that it sees certain situations in terms of zero-sum logic. In the late 1990s the US was opposed to an Asian-led initiative to create an Asian
Monetary Fund, and succeeded in terminating the initiative. In that case and in the case of the AIIB, the US feared the loss of influence that it believed would result from multilateralism (El-
Erian, 2015). Zero-sum logic can also be seen in the US exclusion of China from its proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership with Asia-Pacific economies (Derewlany, 2015). In addition, proposed
reforms to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to grant a greater share of votes to China and other emerging economies have been blocked by the US Congress for the past 5 years
(Summers, 2015; Weisman, 2015; IMF members frustrated, 2015). Zero-sum logic can also be perceived in policy analyses which view Beijing as establishing a parallel international
structure, of which the AIIB is one component, to challenge and constrain US and European predominance (Heilmann, Rudolf, Huotari, & Buckow, 2014). As we shall see, Beijings actions
with regard to the AIIB indicate it does not intend to use the AIIB to subvert the established international system of infrastructure financing, but instead seeks to use the AIIB to complement
this existing system. Ironically, by killing the Asian Monetary Fund, and by attempting to kill the AIIB, the US, whose rhetoric positions itself as the champion of global capitalism, is effectively
maintaining a monopoly on the global market for infrastructure financing, whereas China is trying to open up this market and introduce competition with the introduction of the AIIB. As
Joseph Stiglitz, Nobel laureate in economics and former World Bank Chief Economist, points out, US opposition to the AIIB reflects the common phenomenon of firms wanting competition
everywhere except in their own industry (Stiglitz, 2015). South Korean economist Ha-Joon Chang offers another perspective on this issue in his observation that, after having ascended the
ladder of economic development, the US has effectively kicked away this ladder, and is forcing developing countries to achieve development through a method which it did not itself go
through (Chang, 2003). In contrast, China seeks to share its actual development experience with other developing countries (Lim, 2015a). The AIIB is one of the mechanisms it has set up to
achieve this. This reflects Chinas understanding of the AIIB as a mechanism for win-win cooperation, which, unlike zero-sum logic, allows all the participants in the situation to achieve gains
without penalty for anyone. In the case of the AIIB, the infrastructural development it finances can potentially stimulate economic growth throughout the region (Reynolds & Curran, 2015).
Before we consider how the different founding members of the AIIB understand how they can partake in this possible growth, we will first consider how the AIIB fits in with the existing group
of international financial institutions (IFIs).
A2: AIIB Will Fail/Become Corrupt
 Corruption
(If they say Japan thinks its corrupt) Japan is not actually worried about corruption with AIIB. They dont want to join because its a rival to the Asian
Development Bank.
Martin, 15 (Michelle Martin, reporter. June 8th, 2015. Japan Clarifies it Did Not Talk About Corruption in Context of AIIB. Reuters. http://www.reuters.com/article/g7-summit-japan-aiib-idUSL1N0YU06V20150608. Accessed 6/21/16)
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe did not refer to corruption in the context of the new Chinese-led Asian investment bank but the issue of corruption was discussed by Group of Seven (G7)
leaders in a general sense, his spokesman clarified on Monday. A total of 57 countries, including G7 members Britain, Germany and France, have joined the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) as
founding members. Japan and the United States have stayed out of the venture, which is seen as a rival to the US-dominated World Bank and Japan-led Asian Development Bank (ADB).
"Several comments were made but the AIIB and anti-corruption were not directly linked ," the spokesman Yasuhisa Kawamura said. Kawamura had mentioned the AIIB and corruption at a briefing on Sunday. "Abe said the anti-
corruption issue, the prevention of corruption should be responded (to) by G7 countries and the point of prevention of corruption has been pointed out by G7 leaders in the context of
general high-quality infrastructure building," Kawamura clarified on

US Key to preventing corruption of AIIB

Keatley, 15 (Robert Keatley, consultant for the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations. April 18th, 2015. China's AIIB Challenge: How Should America Respond? The National
Interest Magazine. http://nationalinterest.org/feature/americas-big-strategic-blunder-not-joining-chinas-aiib-12666)

The well-worn advice that if you cant beat them, join them may be the right counsel as Washington ponders what to do next about the new China-backed investment bank intended to
finance Asian infrastructure needs while also promoting Chinese influence . And as they think about it, U.S. officials might also relax a bit. Doing so would be much wiser than the Obama Administrations first
reactionattempting to block the banks creation, or failing that, prevent it from becoming an important financial agency with broad membership and significant influence. That effort failed
miserably, due either to bad judgment or inattention, so now, the new bank is off and running at high speed. Fifty-seven nations, including most of Americas closest friends and allies,
havejoined China as founding members of what is officially the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), with even Taiwan trying to devise what Beijing would consider an appropriate
name so it too can be a member. Of the worlds major economies, only the United States and Japan remain outside (and Tokyo is considering a plan to join later with a $1.5 billion capital contribution). As a former
American ambassador to China noted recently, American policy has proven to be a major strategic blunder. The initial U.S. response had no possible upside but did promiseand delivereda great deal of downside. The new development bank, in
fact, is still being developed and just how it will operate remains to be determined. But the broad outlines are clear. First proposed by Chinese President Xi Jinping in late 2013, it is supposed
to provide financing for seaports, airports, roads, railroads and other infrastructure needs across Asia and thereby stimulate the regions economic growth. China has promised to provide up
to $50 billion of its initial capital and hopes others will match that total . The headquarters will be in Beijing and its first leader (already chosen) will be Chinese; to some degree, it will be a rival of the American-led World Bank in
Washington and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), a Japanese-led institution based in Manila. Though not openly stated, but obviously true, Chinas motives include using the bank to increase its political influence in neighboring nations, where Beijings
sometimes aggressive diplomatic and military actions have caused great worry. In any case, theres no doubt that the proposed AIIB will become reality, perhaps by the end of the year. Realizing that it chose a faulty course, the Obama Administration has already
begun tacking in the new banks direction . After a recent Beijing visit, Treasury Secretary Jack Lew said the US stands ready to welcome new additions to the international development architecture
a sharp contrast to late last year when senior White House officials were criticizing the AIIB as unsound and unneeded, and pressuring allies to stay away. But Lew repeated a major American
caveat: to be truly worthwhile, the AIIB must share the international communitys strong commitment to genuine multilateral decision-making and ever-improving lending standards and
safeguards. In other words, member states must not let the bank become an agency for advancing narrow Chinese economic interests in corrupt ways at the expense of local citizens and
the environment. These concerns show that the initial American reaction, however unwise, was not irrational. The Chinese record as a lender to developing nations is spotty at best. Too often it has provided loans to kleptocratic regimes that finance
Chinese companies using imported Chinese workers on projects that mainly ship energy and raw materials back to Chinese industry; sometimes bribes grease the way, while the local environment and economy can suffer. Some experts say the Chinese record in
Africa, for example, is no better than that of 19th century European colonialists. Other Chinese loans, such as $86 billion to Venezuela, were made primarily for political reasons and may never be repaid. A few countries, most recently Sri Lanka and Myanmar,
have canceled Chinese-funded projects on grounds that corruption paved their way and they serve no basic local purpose. During his successful campaign, Sri Lankas new president, Maithripala Sirisena, described local Chinese projects as robbery taking place
before everybody and in broad daylight.if this trend continues for another six years our country would become a colony and we would become slaves. Since taking office, he has suspended work on a $1.5 billion Beijing-funded port project. But from the first ,

the AIIB was promised as something quite different, a bank that would follow international norms and be devoted to economically sound projects of value to the borrowers. Jin Liqun, the
Chinese official expected to become its first secretary general, has vowed that operations will be lean, clean and green, with at least half its staff recruited from overseas. Jin, a former Chinese deputy
finance minister and ADB vice president, also has said its operations will be both corruption-free and transparent, two traits seldom found in Chinese governance . Governing board members
elected from other member states, such as Great Britain and Canada, are expected to ensure those guidelines are followed. Washingtons next move is unclear. To join would require a capital commitment,
something a Republican Congress is unlikely to provide even if President Obama asks. After all, the AIIB was born partly because Congress consistently has refused to authorize a larger voice for Beijing in international agencies that the United States dominates,
which would give China a role reflecting its new economic strength. For example, for five years it has ignored legislation authorizing a cost-free (to U.S. taxpayers) revision of International Monetary Fund quotas despite administration urging. Even so, the
administration should swallow its pride and explore the possibility of getting inside the tent, perhaps with Japan, rather than remain a lonely outsider. On the positive side, Jim Yong Kim, the American who leads the World Bank, already
plans talks about future cooperation with the AIIB . To date, the political payoff for Washington has been entirely negative.According to Singapore academic and former diplomat Kishore Mahbubani, a persistent America-basher, the AIIBs
creation marks the end of the American century and the arrival of the Asian century. The claim is nonsensethe bank is not that important, and the United States remains the worlds leading economy, most powerful military force, and a central figure in the
region; most Asian states want to keep close relations with America. But Washingtons efforts to stiff the new bank, and persuade friends to do the same, made it seem churlish, while Beijing appeared outgoing and generous. It also fed the political divide
between Japan and China, a major U.S. worry. Most countries ignored Washingtons advice and signed up for their own reasons; Britain perhaps to ensure that London (rather than Frankfurt) remains a center for trading the Chinese yuan, while others saw
investment opportunities or a source of needed finance. All this produced soft diplomacy gains for China at Americas expense, undermining the official U.S. policy of tilting Asias way. Whatever American officials do about the bank eventually, they could well
relax a bit . If it does operate on promised terms, the AIIB should be a useful contributor to Asias economic development . But it cannot possibly dominate the Asian financial arena, nor replace other institutions. According
to the ADB, Asia needs $800 billion annually for a decade to meet its infrastructure needs, a vast sum far beyond the combined capabilities of all international agencies. (The ADB, for example, has provided only $13 billion annually in recent times though it hopes
to do more .) Huge amounts of national and private capital are also needed, and no single government or institution can provide it alone. If the United States works to remain engaged in Asia, it
will; even a successful AIIB will not let China displace it. So Washingtons best course could be to join up if possible. If a Republican Congress blocks the effort, the administration should work with the AIIB directly, as well
as through friendly members and agencies like the World Bank and ADB, to keep it on the promised lean, clean and green course. If the new bank succeeds, Asia will benefit significantly. And if it degenerates into another
corrupt organization designed to extract resources for Chinese industry, Beijing will suffer the political consequences.

China taking multiple steps to ensure that AIIB doesnt become corrupt
Chunyan, 15 (Zhang Chunyan, 10/11/15. AIIB will include an ethics integrity department China Daily. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2015-11/10/content_22423177_2.htm)

The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank will set up an ethics integrity department and encourage employees to report to stamp out corruption, said Jin Liqun , president-designate of the institution.
The bank will launch its first projects in the second quarter of next year , Jin said, adding that projects will focus on electricity, transportation and water supply, as these are in high demand. Jin
vowed to take a "zero tolerance" approach toward corruption in the AIIB at a conference organized by the Boao Forum for Asia in London on Monday. "In the future we will set up an ethics
integrity department to inspect corruption," Jin told China Daily, adding that the leader of the department must have a good reputation. "In order to avoid any conflict of interests, we cannot have a
Chinese to be the leader of the integrity department when the bank president is a Chinese. It does not mean that Chinese officials are not good enough to be at this position, but we need to
avoid skepticism ." Jin said that the president cannot lay off the leader of the integrity department without providing the board with concrete evidence. This is to avoid the president having
absolute power, or else the leader of the integrity department will not to report any improper behavior of the president. Also, employees will be encouraged to report corrupt behavior in the
bank, Jin said, adding that once such an infringement was confirmed, the person responsible for it would be disciplined . The AIIB was proposed by China two years ago and is due to launch by the end of the year. As a former
Chinese vice-finance minister and veteran of development banks such as the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank, Jin was named the inaugural president in August. The AIIB will be built into a new type of development bank with first-class standards, Jin
noted. However, he said that "the best international standard" do not equal Western standards. "We are working on establishing this bank and our standards, which must be formed with experiences of both developed and developing countries, especially
China ." The AIIB will learn from the good experiences of the existing multilateral development institutions, and avoid their shortcomings, Jin said. The bank will have universal recruitment and universal
procurement, said Jin. "AIIB can invest in any country," Jin said, giving the example of funding for irrigation projects in Australia that could improve Asia's food security. Even lending to countries such as Egypt, the first African state to join the bank, "shouldn't be
any problem", he said. Taiwan's entry into AIIB was "a domestic affair", Jin said, adding that "family members" can discuss it, and it doesn't require intervention from others. Now the bank has 57 prospective founding members . Jin said that 10
minutes before the midnight deadline on Mar 31, applications to join the bank were still coming in. More than 30 countries that missed the deadline are on the waiting list to join . Some member countries which Jin referred to as
"sleeping beauties," have yet to ratify the AIIB agreement, with this likely to take until the end of next year. "But this won't affact AIIB's target to become operational by the end of the year," Jin said, adding that "we respect every country's situation."
 Wont Fail
China knows that the AIIB is under close scrutiny-this will push them to keep their promises and keep them from failing.
S.R. 14 (S.R., writer for The Economist. 10/11/14. Why China is Creating a New World for Asia)
TO THE alphabet soup of international development banks (ADB, AfDB, CAF, EBRD, IADB), add one more set of initials: AIIB, or for the uninitiated, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. On October 24th, representatives from 21 Asian
nations (pictured above) signed an agreement to establish the AIIB, which, as its name suggests, will lend money to build roads, mobile phone towers and other forms of infrastructure in poorer
parts of Asia. China spearheaded the bank and hopes to formally launch it by the end of next year. More money for critical projects might seem unambiguously good, but the AIIB has stoked controversy because Asia already
has a multilateral lender, the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Why is China creating a new development bank for Asia? Chinas official answer is that Asia has a massive infrastructure funding gap. The ADB
has pegged the hole at some $8 trillion between 2010 and 2020. Existing institutions cannot hope to fill it: the ADB has a capital base (money both paid-in and pledged by member nations) of just over $160
billion and the World Bank has $223 billion. The AIIB will start with $50 billion in capital hardly enough for what is needed but still a helpful boost. Moreover, while ADB and World Bank loans support everything from
environmental protection to gender equality, the AIIB will concentrate its firepower on infrastructure. Officially at least, ADB and World Bank officials have extended a cautious welcome to the new China-led bank, saying they see room for collaboration. Behind
the scenes, though, the Chinese initiative has set off a heated diplomatic battle. America has lobbied allies not to join the AIIB, while Jin Liqun, the Chinese official who will head the bank, has shuttled between countries to persuade them to sign up. At the banks
inauguration ceremony, Australia, Indonesia and South Korea were conspicuously absent. In public, the concern cited by America and some of the hold-outs has been a lack of clarity about AIIBs governance. Critics warn that the China-led bank
may fail to live up to the environmental, labour and procurement standards that are essential to the mission of development lenders. However, China has insisted that AIIB will be rigorous in
adopting the best practices of institutions such as the World Bank. Given that the bank will be placed under such a close microscope, there is good reason to believe China on this .

The AIIB has too many checks to be environmentally harmful. The claims that the bank would be harmful or unsuccessful is speculative. (This is a really long
one but there are some really good warrants for it)
Hu, Wu and Zu, 15 (Tao Hu, Yanyang Wu, Li Zhu. Environmental Safeguards: Is AIIB going to Follow the Rules? Wharton University of Pennsylvania.
https://whartonigel.wordpress.com/2015/07/01/environmental-safeguards-is-aiib-going-to-follow-the-rules/)

Since this is the first time China has led a multilateral financial mechanism, whether the Chinese government will follow the international standards and principles has been the center of
attention for the international media . The United States has seen the AIIB as a potential competitor and challenger to the West-dominated international financial institutions established after the World War II, such as the World Bank and IMF where
the US has the veto power, and the US/Japan-led Asian Development Bank (ADB). In one statement in response to UKs move to join AIIB, the White House National Security Council said: Based on many discussions, we have concerns about
whether the AIIB will meet these high standards, particularly related to governance, and environmental and social safeguards The international community has a stake in seeing the AIIB
complement the existing architecture, and to work effectively alongside the World Bank and Asian Development Bank .[i] In a similar fashion, the United States Treasury Department has also raised its concern that AIIB
might not meet the environmental standards, procurement requirements and other safeguards embraced by the World Bank and the ADB.[ii] Many other interested parties in the West continue to watch the progress of AIIB
closely to see how it will be structured and governed so that it doesnt undercut the existing environmental standards . Because they believe failure to do so will likely prompt multilateral development banks to race to
the bottom in weakening environmental safeguards in order to attract clients. AIIBs Pledges and Actions Mr. Jin Liqun, the secretary-general of the AIIBs interim secretariat and possibly first president, clearly stated that the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
would ensure that projects it funds are sustainable and environmentally friendly. At a think tank summit in Beijing last week, he said that the regulations on AIIB lay out a set of environmental criteria for projects it will fund. It
will explore a new development model that will try to address the conflict between improving peoples livelihood and environmental protection . He also said that the green principle is to
design a set of high-standard rules: The bank has already drafted an environment-related document to be approved by member countries. It will also promote adoption of energy saving
and environmentally-friendly technologies in its projects . Mr. Jin also mentioned that the AIIBs headquarters in Beijing will be an eco-friendly building. AIIB is also actively cooperating with its
international peers . Since last year, AIIB has been exchanging experience and lessons learned actively with the World Bank, IMF and ADB. In 2014, AIIB also invited former World Bank senior official and well-respected
impact assessment expert, Stephen F. Lintner, to assist in crafting its environmental and social sustainability criteria. This gesture is very much an indication of AIIBs intention to adopt high
standards for environmental assessment, procurement process, and social impact of investment projects from the beginning .[iii] Is AIIB Going to Fulfill its Pledges ? One major aspect of Chinas mission
to establish AIIB is to create a new governing model for multilateral financial institutions in contrast to the existing models of the World Bank and Asian Development Bank. Given the
extraordinarily high stakes China has in this ambitious undertaking, China has every intention to ensure the success of this endeavor. And China has a very good track record in delivering such
success stories, where it clearly has the political will and determination to deploy all resources at its disposal. The 2008 Beijing Olympic Games and Shanghai WorldExpo 2010 are perfect
examples. Therefore, when the international community raises concerns over AIIBs environmental and social safeguards, China listens and responds. For the Chinese policy makers, AIIB is as
much a political and symbolic proposition as an economic and substantive one. Given this broad political context, it is therefore fair to say that to think that AIIB tends to automatically
downgrade the environmental and social safeguards is purely speculative and misguided. Also Chinas credibility and reputation is staked on stewarding AIIB into an inclusive, transparent,
and efficient multilateral organization that is built on a solid suite of policies, procedures, and best practices that have proven to stand the test of time. Without such building blocks in place,
it would be very hard for AIIB to attract AAA rated countries, or to borrow competitively in the credit market. Given this, the belief that AIIB would be the convenient cash machine to finance Chinas newly unveiled One
Belt One Road Strategy is also unsubstantiated. For project financing that involves higher environmental and social risks under the One Belt One Road, its reasonable to believe that AIIB would tread very cautiously and exercise abundant restraint. From
Chinas perspective, it has ample choices in terms of financing vehicles in their toolbox, ranging from the China Development Bank, China ExIm Bank, to the Silkroad Fund, for such more contentious projects. Besides, eight of the nine countries rated
AAA by all main rating agencies (Standard & Poors, Moodys, and Fitch ) are AIIB members . These include Australia, Denmark, Germany, Luxembourg, Norway, Singapore, and Sweden. Given their shared values on and
approach to environmental and social safeguards, they will likely act in unison when reviewing and deciding on such issues. Together their combined voting shares would enable them to
effectively veto any lending proposals under AIIB they deem inappropriate or unacceptable. Therefore the alleged scenario where China would abuse its vetoing power to push through
environmentally damaging projects is more a myth than reality . Others in the US argue that AIIB would export the adverse side-effects of Chinas industrialization to other parts of the region.
Again this is highly speculative and unfounded. If we take a look at Chinas commitment and performance under many international environmental treaties, China is doing quite
commendably. China is one of the countries in the world that have signed most of the multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs), which is quite remarkable even compared to many
Western countries. Based on the analysis above, it is our belief that the environmental performance of AIIB in the future should be much more encouraging and positive than many people
currently believe . Of course, for anything thats just emerging, there is still a steep learning curve ahead
A2: TPP DA
 AIIB must come first
The AIIB is better than the TPP.
Andrew Elek, 4-1-2015, "AIIB miles ahead of TPP in promoting integration," East Asia Forum, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/04/14/aiib-miles-ahead-of-tpp-in-promoting-integration/
(EG)

The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) is a far more economically efficient option than the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) for integrating Asian economies to each other and to the rest of the
world. While the United States is attempting to thwart Chinas AIIB by completing the TPP, it is likely to result in net costs to countries other than the US. In 2015, very few products face significant transparent barriers such as tariffs when they cross international borders. The most
important constraints to the flow of products along modern supply chains are due to weaknesses in transport and communications infrastructure . A 2013 study by the World Economic Forum found that supply
chain barriers to international trade are far more significant impediments to trade than tariffs. Reducing supply chain barriers could increase world GDP over six times more than removing all
tariffs. This study confirms the experience of business people. For more than a decade they have urged governments to stop obsessing about traditional trade barriers that only affect some agricultural commodities and low-tech manufactures. Those managing ever-expanding supply chains want
governments to shift attention to the widening gaps in Asias transport and communications infrastructure. Chinas AIIB initiative responds to these realities. It aims squarely at the real obstacles to economic integration. The new multilateral development bank will mobilise finance from international
capital markets to reduce the vast gaps in economic infrastructure. It is a timely move to take advantage of the current low borrowing costs to invest in projects with potentially high economic returns. With its vast current
financial strength, China could have chosen to go it alone. Instead, it sought to draw in as many shareholders as possible to ensure that it is able to expand urgently needed investment as fast as possible. Drawing in other governments will also help the AIIB to draw on the expertise of existing
multilateral development banks to acquire and sustain its own AAA rating. The
proposed TPP has a very different agenda. It comes from the United States Trade Representative, which responds to the wishes of its
domestic business interests. The most widely publicised objective is to eliminate all remaining traditional trade barriers. Even such an impossibly ambitious trade deal would onlyadd 0.5 per cent of income to the nations
involved. Paul Krugman believes even that is an overestimate. And any actual TPP outcome will fall far short of fully eliminating all trade barriers. There is a more important reason for the US push for the TPP. The US is seeking to impose rules that suit
its economy on those that are very different. Much-leaked drafts for the TPP reveal many chapters defining new rules for issues such as intellectual property rights, labour and environmental standards, management of state-owned enterprises and many other matters. But even if United States views
were appropriate for 21st century commerce, they would not create any new trade. If accepted, they would impose costs on emerging economies, weakening their capacity to compete. In practice, if the TPP is signed, United States producers will be able to challenge and disrupt imports that they
claim to contravene any of its rules. ANU economist Philippa Dee has argued that the TPP may lead to net costs, rather than benefits, for participants other than the United States. The TPP is likely to be a multiplicity of bilateral preferential trade deals, adding new layers to
rules of origin. It hopes to route supply chains around rather than through China, the largest trading partner of Asia Pacific economies. By contrast, the AIIB will finance infrastructure to facilitate the creation of essential new production

networks. This is necessary as Chinas labour costs will continue to rise and labour-intensive production will shift into other countries. When the AIIB becomes operational in 2016 it will certainly boost much-needed economic infrastructure and integration in the region. The TPP is far less certain.
Even if it is ever agreed upon, the deal will need ratification by the US Congress and many other legislatures and will not make a significant contribution to the market-driven integration of the region.
 TPP Wont Pass
TPP wont pass, more evidence
a) insider statements and vote count
Buxbaum, 6-6 Freelance journalist
Peter, Global Trade.com, TPP Faces Uphill Battle in Congressional Lame Duck Session, http://www.globaltrademag.com/global-trade-daily/commentary/tpp-faces-uphill-battle-in-
congressional-lame-duck-session

The Obama administration is making a last-ditch effort to get Congress to approve the Trans-Pacific Partnership in a lame duck session after the November elections. The reasoning is that,
with the current president and congressional leaders in both houses of Congress being pro-trade, the time is ripe for passage. And, conversely, the likelihood of passage in 2017, after a new
president takes office, is diminished. But a growing number of voices in Washington are expressing pessimism that the TPP will receive a vote in Congress, let alone passage, in 2016. The fact
that the presumptive Republican nominee for president, Donald Trump, and the likely Democratic nominee, Hillary Clinton, have said they are against the deal, doesnt help its chances,
according to Rep. Tom Reed (R-New York). Reed recently told National Public Radio that the votes to pass TPP simply dont exist. The two magic numbers down here being 218 and 60 with
the House and Senate needed to pass the legislation, he said. And with both candidates being opposed to TPP, I dont know how you get that number. Senator Bernie Sanders (D-Vermont),
who is still in the race for the Democratic nomination, has also expressed opposition to the TPP. Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Kentucky), a backer of fast-track trade authority
and generally perceived as pro-trade agreements told AgriPulse that the political environment to pass a trade bill is worse than any time in the time I have been in the Senate. It looks bleak
for this year to have a TPP vote. Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), or fast track, which passed Congress and was signed by President Obama a year ago, gives the White House the ability to
negotiate trade agreements subject to an up-or-down vote in Congress and without the introduction of congressional amendments. In a Bloomberg article, Senator Dick Durbin (D-Illinois): the
Assistant Senate Minority Leader, said the White House shouldnt even bother bringing the TPP for a vote in a lame duck session. I would counsel the White House, dont even try , he said.
I dont think thats even within the realm of possibility moving the TPP this year, said Senator Claire McCaskill (D-Missouri), who voted for fast track last June, in an interview with Politico.
Probably even in the lame duck .

b) prefer our evidence, theirs cites Obama officials with an incentive to overestimate the chances for passage not happening
Guebert 6-5 award-winning agricultural journalist and expert
Alan, Journal Star, Farm and Food File: White House trade deals fading away, http://www.pjstar.com/news/20160605/farm-and-food-file-white-house-trade-deals-fading-away?page=3

As the politics of this election year heat up, the chances of Congress debating let alone passing either of the White Houses marque trade deals continue to melt away. Oh, theres
plenty of talk about the westward-looking Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Euro-centered Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, or TPP and TTIP, respectively. Most of the yakking,
however, flows from Obama Administration officials; nary a word trickles out of Congress. Worse than Capitol Hill silence is the vocal pounding that free trade takes when any of President
Obamas would-be successors talks trade. Bernie Sanders, a Democrat by name but socialist by heart, makes it crystal clear that he would rather eat glass than back to free trade. Hillary
Clinton, who three years ago called the TPP exciting, innovative, and ambitious, now sees it as an agreement that has failed to provide the basic safety net support needed for
American workers. Take that as an innovative no. And The Donald? Hes against TPP because, as he noted in one Republican debate this spring, Its a deal that was designed for China to
come in, as they always do, through the back door China, however, is not part of the Trans-Pacific Partnership so whatever Trump meant must have been more of a suggestion than a
fact. Whatever. Even chatted-about vice presidential candidates are split on the White Houses trade deals. Ohios Sen. Sherrod Brown, a possible Clinton veep candidate, is an outspoken
critic of all past and most future trade deals. Another mentioned Clinton running mate, U.S. Secretary of Agriculture Tom Vilsack, is Browns opposite, a strong supporter of both TPP and TTIP
who cant leave his Washington, D.C. office or American shores without offering a quick sermon on the virtues of free trade. The typical Vilsack sermon leans more on free trade law than free
trade gospel: American farmers and ranchers have a birthright to sell whatever they can wherever they can. As such, groups like the American Soybean Association (ASA) hold every farm state
member of Congress and every USDA boss accountable for any hiccup in ag export sales. The ASA made that hard line perfectly clear again in a toughly worded April 11 letter to Vilsack
and U.S. Trade Representative Michael Froman. It was really more of a to-do list for the Administration to complete before, ASA implied, it would bless any TTIP deal with the European Union.
Some of the problems TTIP needs to resolve, ASA wrote, center on the need to reform or eliminate the EUs significant non-tariff trade barriers like its current approval process for new
biotechnology, its arbitrary restrictions on imports of U.S. soy-based biodiesel and biodiesel feedstocks, and its trade-constraining biotech labeling requirements Talking ag biotech rule
changes with the EU is like talking wish lists with Santa Claus: Its foolish not to ask for the moon, but only a fool would expect it. ASA and Vilsack, however, are neither fools nor foolish. They
now see TTIP as an opening to impose a working biotech approval system on the EU, a phrase ASA used in an April 8 letter to Vilsack that pressed hard for him to lean on the EU
Commission to approve three biotech soybean products. (Steve Suppan, senior policy analyst at the Institute for Agriculture & Trade Policy, examines the letter and its implications in a
May 2 blog post thats linked at farmandfood.com/in-the-news/.) Big Ags big push for the pending trade deals is understandable given the two changed realities of todays election year
politics. First, even as we lean on the EU to alter its biotech food rules, the U.S. Senate still cant agree on how to write a biotech food labeling law here. Members know the tide has turned on
labeling; 89 out of 100 Americans want it. Majority Republicans, however, dont and they continue to search for a way to be anti-labeling without becoming anti-incumbents. Second, not one
presidential contender sees free trade as a vote-winning issue. Taken together, its hard to see how any trade deal goes anywhere this year . After that, you have to take the word of Hillary or
Bernie or Donald. Well, maybe not Donald. Or Hillary.

c) no momentum, not enough time, and not enough votes

Palmer, 6-6 15 years covering trade issues
Doug, Politico, TPP mired as Congress returns, http://www.politico.com/tipsheets/morning-trade/2016/06/tpp-mired-as-congress-returns-214657

TPP MIRED AS CONGRESS RETURNS: It could be a long, sleepy summer for the Trans-Pacific Partnership one year after Congress nearly ripped itself apart to give President Barack Obama fast
track authority to finish the landmark Asia-Pacific deal. The administration is trying to sell Congress and the American public on the economic and geostrategic benefits of TPP. But both
Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell and House Speaker Paul Ryan are keeping their distance, while Donald Trump is promising to walk away from the 12-nation pact. Lawmakers return
this week from their Memorial Day break with no indication that either House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Kevin Brady or Senate Finance Committee Chairman Orrin Hatch will
take any action on the agreement before Congress leaves town in mid-July for a prolonged summer break because of the party nominating conventions. For its part, the Obama
administration still hasnt given Congress a draft statement of how it plans to implement the agreement, something its required to do 30 days before submitting the pact for a vote. The
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative says its working on a handful of issues that have jeopardized support for the trade deal, but theres no sign of progress on Hatchs main concern that
TPP doesnt provide 12 years of data protection for biologics medicine. The longer it takes for outstanding TPP issues to be addressed, the less likely it is that TPP will be voted on during the
Obama administration, one industry official said. And one Senate Democratic aide similarly noted that it isnt clear whether theres enough time in a lame-duck session of Congress to do
hearings, the mock markup, and the vote. Working backwards, that means key issues need to be resolved by August to hold hearings by September, the aide said.

No TPP before or after the election

Frasure 5-18
William G., Professor of Government at Connecticut College, The Diplomat, U.S. Presidential Election Campaign Dims Prospects for TPP, http://thediplomat.com/2016/05/u-s-presidential-
election-campaign-dims-prospects-for-tpp/

In the spring of 2015, an assemblage of Vietnamese government officials were clearly taken aback when, in the course of a workshop, I explained that criticism of the TPP had become so
widespread in U.S. politics that passage was not at all certain, and that in the presidential election year of 2016, politics will be so feverish that adoption of something as controversial as the
TPP will be impossible. Today, it is clear that this unhappy forecast has come to pass. This years election campaign is even more feverish than usual, and any hope for the TPPs adoption
before the election has long since vanished. The larger problem, however, is that, even once the election campaign is behind us, its residue will diminish the chances for successful adoption
of the TPP for a long time to come. Protectionist themes dominate the policy rhetoric of all the principal candidates. Three contenders remain two Democrats and a Republican. All three
proclaim opposition to the TPP. Donald Trump, the Republican, and Bernie Sanders, a Democrat, are long-standing opponents of trade agreements. Hillary Clinton, a Democrat, has only
recently announced opposition to the agreement, which she had previously supported. Bernie Sanders describes himself as a Democratic Socialist. As such, his position on the TPP is
staunchly protectionist. He is a defender of the labor unions, most of which are opposed free-trade in general and the TPP in particular. Moreover, he denounces the TPP as a device intended
only to benefit large corporations and Wall Street, institutions which are the principal targets of his campaign attacks. It is, at this time, very unlikely that Senator Sanders can win the
Democratic nomination and be elected president. Were he to be elected, it would represent a major leftward shift in American politics, probably accompanied by large Democratic gains in
congressional elections. Under a Sanders presidency, the TPP would most likely be forgotten. Donald Trump is running a populist campaign. He is a very unusual candidate for the
Republican Party. For many years, most Republican leaders have supported trade agreements, such as NAFTA. Trade agreements have usually been adopted with large support from the
Republicans in Congress and somewhat lesser support from Democrats. Donald Trump, however, is basing his campaign on the support of angry middle and working-class Americans who
have not done well in the new economy. He tells the disappearing middle class that the TPP is very bad for them. This suggests that if Trump is elected, there would be no chance of the TPP
being adopted. At present, however, Trump and prominent leaders of the Republican Party are engaged in an effort to unify the party, which was completely unprepared for the success of
his populist campaign. The principal actor in the unification effort is the speaker of the House, Paul Ryan, who is a strong proponent of free trade, including the TPP. It is possible, though not
likely, that as part of the party-unification process, Trump might be persuaded to soften his opposition to the TPP somewhat. In that case, a Republican Congress would probably go forward
with it. It is very unlikely that Trump would alter his opposition, however, without some provision for greater protections for American workers. The most promising election result, in terms of
the TPP, would be the election of Hillary Clinton, even though she currently professes opposition to the agreement. She was usually a proponent of free trade in the past. She is by far the
most internationalist of the three remaining candidates. It is widely assumed that her recent opposition to the TPP is merely expedient, a necessary, albeit insincere, gesture to forestall
defections from the left wing of the Democratic Party. She was, after all, among the architects of the TPP. Now, however, she faces strong opposition to the TPP within the Democratic Party,
which she must placate in order to win the nomination. If she is elected, she may be able, after a decent interval, to revert to her previous position of support for the TPP, especially if she can
take credit for concessions from other participating countries. She may then be able to count on greater support from Democrats in Congress and also from the significant number of
remaining free-trade Republicans. One scenario that deserves discussion is the possibility of the TPP being considered by a lame duck Congress in the fall. That is, consideration by the
current Congress after the election, but before the new Congress and president take office in January. This is an unlikely course because it is has many uncertainties and difficulties for either
political party. If Trump is elected, it would be an act of open defiance for this Republican-controlled Congress to pass the TPP during a lame-duck session. If Clinton is elected, however, it
might be possible for free-trade Republicans and some Democrats to pass the TPP, in spite of her present opposition, provided that President Barack Obama resolutely pushes the issue in a
way that does not implicate her in a repudiation of her campaign posture.
 Plan Popular
US officials are warming up to the plan not unpopular
Panda 15 (Ankit Panda; The Diplomat. He writes on security, politics, economics, and culture.; http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/have-the-us-and-china-come-to-an-understanding-on-the-
aiib/; 9-28-15; 6-21-16; JLW)

Has Washington made its peace with Chinas Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) at last? An official fact sheet on U.S.-China economic relations, issued after Chinese President Xi Jinpings meetings with U.S. President Barack Obama at the White House notes
that the United States welcomes Chinas growing contributions to financing development and infrastructure in Asia and beyond. The introduction to the fact sheet also noted that the international financial architecture has
evolved over time to meet the changing scale, scope, and diversity of challenges and to include new institutions as they incorporate its core principles of high standards and good governance. Though the AIIB wasnt mentioned explicitly in the statement, the introductory language

suggests that Washington is easing its tone on the new China-led financial institution which launched earlier this year with a founding membership comprising over 50 countries, including several Western European states and U.S. partners and allies.
The fact sheet notes that both countries resolve to further strengthen the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, African Development Bank, and Inter-American Development Bank by enhancing their financial capacity, reforming their governance, and improving their effectiveness and efficiency.
in the wake of Xis visit as well, noting that the U.S. officials had declared what amounts to a truce in their campaign
The AIIB is notably excluded from this list. The Financial Times reported on the shifting U.S. position on the AIIB

over Chinas new Asian infrastructure bank. Per the FTs report, U.S. officials have noted that Xi gave his assurances that the AIIB would abide by the highest international environmental and
governance standards. U.S. officials cited concerns about the AIIBs governance standards as one of their primary concerns when its allies started joining the institution. When the UK joined, for example, the White House issued a statement noting that We hope and expect that the UK
will use its voice to push for adoption of high standards. The AIIB his its deadline for prospective founding members on March 31, 2015. A framework agreement for the banks operations was signed on June 29, bringing some much-needed clarity on how the AIIB would manage capital and voting
rights. The bank launched with 57 countries, comprising a quarter of the worlds nations and 16 of the worlds 20 largest economies. The United States, along with Japan, represent two notable economies that chose not to join the AIIB. The AIIBs appealing doesnt appear to be waning anytime soon

too. Up to 20 countries are still waiting for their opportunity to join the AIIB, demonstrating that the institutions appeal is far from having achieved global saturation with its inaugural founding members. That Washington is coming around to the AIIB and softening
its position on the institution is a good thing. With a bevy of pressing challenges in the U.S.-China relations, including cyber espionage, freedom of navigation in the East and South China Seas, and growing military competition, the United States is better off
expending less diplomatic capital on opposition to institutions like the AIIBwhich could ultimately serve as a net positive for a region where infrastructure financing is very much neededand focusing its efforts on other issues.

Plan gaining popularity in the U.S.

Manning 15 (John, Professor of Law at Harvard Law School, How the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank Is Changing the Global Financial Landscape, 09/03/15, 06/21/16,
http://internationalbanker.com/banking/how-the-asian-infrastructure-investment-bank-is-changing-the-global-financial-landscape/)//BME

Given the failures on the part of the US to contain the AIIBs emergence, Obamas position on the bank appears to have relaxed since the second quarter of the year, stating more recently that he is all for it,
provided that international lending regulations are followed. Indeed, it may be beneficial to the US to appease China and the AIIB at this stage, or perhaps even to join as a new member of the bank. Given the large number of
countries that have signed up, it could be in the best interests of the US to influence the AIIBs decision-making process as a recognised partner, especially regarding environmental matters.
The commonalities that exist between US and Chinese interests include the desire to ensure Asian economic growth stays strong and that their respective climate-change policies are adhered
to, as evidenced by the joint announcement last November by Presidents Obama and Jinping of their shared environmental initiatives. By joining the AIIB, the US might be able to sway China
into financing more infrastructure projects that lower CO2 emissions than if it remains outside. There are also those who believe that the AIIBs ostensible impact on the global financial system is being overstated. Michael Pettis,
finance professor at Peking University and a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, stated in April that in order for the AIIB to be considered a world-beater, Chinas economy would have to be similar in relative size to that of the US
in the 1940s and 1950s, when America experienced a significant gain in economic and political influence, and that the renminbi would have to be the worlds premier reserve currency. According to Pettis, the chances of either occurring are slim, especially as
Chinas central bank would have to take on trillions of dollars of risk of sub-investment grade countries orrun large current account deficits, both of which are highly unlikely. From Chinas perspective, it also makes little sense to not cooperate with the likes of
the ADB and World Bank. The knowledge, experience and expertise that will be on hand at these institutions, and from which China
will be able to tap, will provide the AIIB with an extremely efficient way to build capacity and
ensure the smooth running of projects, in accordance with the high standards of governance that the world is now expecting.

President Obama likes AIIB

Dyer 15 (Geoff, the Financial Times for over a decade in China, Brazil, the UK and now the US, Obama says AIIB could be positive for Asia, 04/28/15, 06/21/16,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/80271e0c-eddc-11e4-90d2-00144feab7de.html#axzz4CGOxO4hu)//BME

President Barack Obama said the new China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank could be a good thing for the region if it adopts high standards for lending projects. The Obama administration
has come in for intense criticism for the way it has handled the AIIB, with some former officials warning that it represented a blow to American leadership in the international economy. More The US initially urged its allies not to join as founding members of the
bank, which is in the process of being established in Beijing with initial capital of $50bn, arguing that they could have more influence over the standards it adopts by staying on the outside and lobbying the Chinese as a group. Speaking at a White House press
conference with Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe on Tuesday, Mr Obama said that the US was not opposed to the new bank but warned that money could be misused if there was little transparency in
the way the AIIB was managed. This could be a positive thing, he said. But if its not run well, then it could be a negative thing. However, after Britain announced in March that it intended to become a member, a rush of European
and Asian countries signed up to the AIIB. Earlier this month, China said it had received 47 applications to join. The only two major economies which have so far not asked to join are the US and Japan. Mr Obama said that it was natural for China
to play a much larger role in development finance in the region. Asia needs infrastructure, he said. And Chinas got a lot of money. Its been running a big surplus for quite some time. So, to
the extent that China wants to put capital into development projects around the region, that is a good thing. Asia needs infrastructure, and Chinas got a lot of money...to the extent that China wants to put capital into
development projects around the region, that is a good thing - Barack Obama Mr Abe said that it was important the new bank adopted fair governance and that its lending adopted strong environmental standards.
 Winners Win
WINNERS WIN ON CONTROVERSIAL POLICIES.
Ornstein 1 (Norman, American Enterprise Institute, How is Bush Governing? May 15, http://www.aei.org/events/filter.,eventID.281/transcript.asp)

The best plan is to pick two significant priorities, things that can move relatively quickly. And in an ideal world, one of them is going to be a little bit tough, where it's a battle, where you've got to fight, but then your
victory is all the sweeter. The other matters but you can sweep through fairly quickly with a broad base of support and show that you're a winner and can accomplish something. Bush did just that, picking one, education, where there was a fairly strong chance. Something he
campaigned on, people care about, and a pretty strong chance that he could get a bill through with 80, 85 percent support of both houses of Congress and both parties. And the other that he picked, and there were other choices, but he picked the tax cuts. What flows from that as well is, use

every bit of p olitical c apital you have to achieve early victories that will both establish you as a winner, because the key to political power is not the formal power that you have. Your ability to coerce people to
do what they otherwise would not do. Presidents don't have a lot of that formal power. It's as much psychological as it is real. If you're a winner and people think you're a winner, and that issues come up
and theyre tough but somehow you're going to prevail, they will act in anticipation of that. Winners win . If it looks like you can't get things done, then you have a steeply higher hill to climb with what follows. And as you
use your political capital, you have to recognize that for presidents, p olitical c apital is a perishable quality, that it evaporates if it isn't used. That's a lesson, by the way, George W. Bush learned firsthand from
his father. That if you use it and you succeed, it's a gamble, to be sure, you'll get it back with a very healthy premium.

Even if they win a link, that just magnifies the steamroller effect
Green 10 professor of political science at Hofstra University
David Michael Green, 6/11/10, " The Do-Nothing 44th President ", http://www.opednews.com/articles/The-Do-Nothing-44th-Presid-by-David-Michael-Gree-100611-648.html

Moreover, there is a continuously evolving and reciprocal relationship between presidential boldness and achievement. In the same way that nothing breeds success like success, nothing sets the president up for
achieving his or her next goal better than succeeding dramatically on the last go around. This is absolutely a matter of perception , and you can see it best in the way that Congress and especially the Washington press corps fawn over bold

and intimidating presidents like Reagan and George W. Bush. The political teams surrounding these presidents understood the psychology of power all too well. They knew that by simultaneously creating a steamroller effect and
feigning a clubby atmosphere for Congress and the press, they could leave such hapless hangers-on with only one remaining way to pretend to preserve their dignities. By jumping on board the freight train, they could be
given the illusion of being next to power , of being part of the winning team. And so, with virtually the sole exception of the now retired Helen Thomas, this is precisely what they did.
 Thumpers
Gun control debate thumps the disad
NYT 06/13/16 (Orlando Shooting Reignites Gun Control Debate in Congress, 06/13/16, 06/21/16, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/14/us/politics/terrorist-watch-list.html)//BME
WASHINGTON The Orlando, Fla., massacre reignited on Monday the debate over whether Americans like Omar Mateen who have appeared on the governments terrorist watch lists, or
who were otherwise suspected by the authorities of ties to terrorist groups, should be allowed to buy a gun. In Congress, even some supporters of gun rights seemed to be having second
thoughts. Six months after Republicans in Congress defeated a measure that would have closed the so-called terror gap after the San Bernardino, Calif., attack, Senate Democrats moved
swiftly on Monday to renew the debate over tightening federal gun laws. As a first step, the Democrats demanded that Republicans take up legislation aimed at banning the sale of guns or
explosives to people who have appeared on watch lists, or who have been suspected by the Justice Department of ties to terrorist organizations. I hope every member of the House and
Senate had time for quiet reflection yesterday to ask what we could have done to prevent this tragedy, Senator Harry Reid of Nevada, the Democratic leader, said on Monday. Im so sorry.
Im heartsick, Im basically sick by our inaction. Its shameful the United States Senate has done nothing nothing to stop these mass shootings. Mr. Reid said Democrats would force a
vote as soon as possible on the measure that Republicans defeated in December. There is no excuse for allowing suspected terrorists to buy guns, Mr. Reid said. Other Democrats, including
Senator Chuck Schumer of New York, insisted that the legislation that failed in December could have prevented Mr. Mateen, identified as the Orlando gunman, from buying the weapons used
in the attack. We are now living with the consequences of that vote, Mr. Schumer said. How many more people have to die at the hands of a terrorist with a gun before the Senate acts?
Just one Republican, Senator Mark S. Kirk of Illinois, voted in favor of the legislation in December, but Democrats said on Monday they believed that Republicans would come under new
pressure. Indeed, there were signs that some Republicans might be reconsidering. Representative Michael McCaul, Republican of Texas and the chairman of the House Homeland Security
Committee, said Monday that the F.B.I. should have the ability to interview people like Mr. Mateen who had been terrorism suspects and to obtain full access to their records as part of a
gun-purchase application an idea at odds with the National Rifle Associations position on the issue. If, indeed, these were terrorism leads that opened up, I think the F.B.I. should have
access to interview him, as they did on multiple occasions during two earlier investigations, Mr. McCaul said on CNN. Criminal histories and documented mental health problems did not
prevent at least eight of the gunmen in 16 recent mass shootings from obtaining their weapons. I dont think that would preclude them from interviewing him, Mr. McCaul said. Lets not
forget what the real threat is. Many of these terrorism cases involve stolen firearms, AK-47s. An outright ban is not going to solve the problem. But I do think that the F.B.I. should have full
access to any potential terrorist in this country that is looking to purchasing a firearm. Also on Monday, the nonprofit Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence renewed its call to impose
tougher restrictions on the sales of high-powered rifles and other firearms. We cant allow it anymore, Dan Gross, the organizations president, told reporters. We cant let it be so easy for
people to get guns. We can do so much better than this. He acknowledged the gun industrys powerful support in Congress. Theyre only concerned about selling more guns, he said. We
have to reject and call out the politicians who support that dark vision for America. The Rev. Dr. Betty Deas Clark, the pastor of the Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in
Charleston, S.C., where an attacker killed nine people last year, said, Its a duty to speak up against the violence that were experiencing. Representative Michael McCaul, Republican of
Texas and the chairman of the House Homeland Security Committee, last month. He said Monday that the F.B.I. should have the ability to interview people who have been terrorism suspects.
Credit Zach Gibson/The New York Times Ms. Clark added, Its a call that has been placed upon us, and we must collectively answer that call. While Senate Democrats, including Dianne
Feinstein of California and Bill Nelson of Florida, said they would begin by pushing for a vote on the measure to bar the sale of weapons to those suspected of ties to terrorist groups, Senator
Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut, a Democrat, also called for an all-out ban on assault weapons. They are designed for the battlefield, which is where they belong, Mr. Blumenthal said
during the conference call with Mr. Schumer and reporters. They are weapons of war, designed for mass destruction, not hunting or recreating. After meeting in Pittsburgh with gay and
lesbian constituents, Senator Bob Casey, Democrat of Pennsylvania, also proposed banning the sale of guns to anyone convicted of a misdemeanor hate crime as defined in state, federal or
tribal law. The push for new legislation, nonetheless, seemed like it would continue to be an uphill climb. Republican lawmakers largely focused their remarks on the need to combat Islamist
extremism and to prevent terrorists from reaching the United States or militarizing Americans. The mass shooting at an Orlando nightclub early Sunday was the deadliest in United States
history. One out of every three people at the crowded Pulse nightclub was killed or injured. There may be an element of homegrown extremism to the Orlando attack, Senator John
McCain, Republican of Arizona, said in a statement. But there is little question that this massacre was inspired by the foreign terrorist ideology that ISIL espouses from its physical sanctuaries
in the Middle East, he said, using another name for the Islamic State. Congress has refused repeatedly to take any significant legislative action to tighten gun laws after other mass shootings,
including the murder of 26 people, mostly schoolchildren, in Newtown, Conn., in December 2012. James B. Comey, the director of the F.B.I., said that Mr. Mateen had been on a watch list
beginning in 2013, but that he had been removed from it in 2014 after an investigation of him was closed. The fact that Mr. Mateen had come to the attention of the authorities and was still
permitted to buy high-powered weapons presented a remarkably different set of circumstances from previous attacks by lone gunmen previously unknown to the police. Some security
experts have cautioned against legislation that would block the sale of weapons to people who are on government watch lists, saying it could alert suspects that they are under scrutiny. Other
experts have pushed for banning the sale of weapons to anyone on the no-fly list, since those people already know they are prohibited from air travel. Josh Earnest, the White House press
secretary, noted that President Obama has long supported banning assault weapons that would bar people from buying weapons of war, and said he would renew his push for a measure
that would block those on no-fly lists because of suspected links to terrorism from purchasing a firearm. The responsibility right now lies with Congress, Mr. Earnest said.
 A2: AIIB Prevents Passage
TPP and AIIB can mutually happen and are supported
Dollar 15 (David, leading expert on China's economy and U.S.-China economic relations, China's rise as a regional and global power: The AIIB and the 'one belt, one road', Summer 2015,
06/21/16, http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2015/07/china-regional-global-power-dollar)//BME
Chinas recent economic initiatives appear to be a diplomatic victory for Beijing and a diplomatic setback for Washington. Certainly, the United States handled badly the emergence of the AIIB. The United States made a mild effort to dissuade some allies from
joining, and was then caught flat-footed when European and Asian allies chose to join. The United States should be pleased that China is shouldering some global responsibility. With nearly 60 countries joining the AIIB, it is likely to have governance and standards
similar to existing MDBs, and may well be able to improve on their efficiency through competition. Rather than a challenge to the American-led system, the AIIB is likely to be a useful complement to the existing system. More generally, the AIIB episode reveals
clearly that Asian and European countries do not want to choose between China and the United States, and nor is there any reason why they should have to. The United States made a mistake in its handling of the AIIB, but we should not exaggerate the
importance of this incident. America now looks well-positioned to complete TPP negotiations. The AIIB will be funding infrastructure that can be thought of as the hardware of integration.
Equallyif not moreimportant is the software, that is, the rules and regulations that govern international trade and investment. TPP aims to expand trade into new areas, such as
services, whilst laying the foundation for twenty-first-century trade. Notice that countries such as Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, South Korea, Malaysia, and Vietnam do not hesitate to participate in both Chinese and American
initiatives. This is clearly the smart strategy. For Vietnam, for instance, a turn to the AIIB should improve infrastructure, whereas using the TPP framework ought to enable Hanoi to integrate with the vast and
innovative U.S. economy. There is a risk that these competing initiatives will result in the development of trade blocs, but I think it is more likely that the end result will be cooperation. China would benefit enormously
from joining the TPP, because it is still extremely closed in many sectors. The United States would benefit from joining the AIIB because it is an important new institution in the fastest growing
region of the world economy.
 Impact Defense
Multiple factors make Asia war unlikely
Vannarith 10Executive Director of the Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace. PhD in Asia Pacific Studies, Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific U (Chheang, Asia Pacific Security Issues:
Challenges and Adaptive Mechanism, http://www.cicp.org.kh/download/CICP%20Policy%20brief/CICP%20Policy%20brief%20No%203.pdf)

Some people look to China for economic and strategic interests while others still stick to the US. Since, as a human nature, change is not widely acceptable due to the high level of uncertainty.
It is therefore logical to say that most of the regional leaders prefer to see the status quo of security architecture in the Asia Pacific Region in which US is the hub of security provision. But it is
impossible to preserve the status quo since China needs to strategically outreach to the wider region in order to get necessary resources especially energy and raw materials to maintain her
economic growth in the home country. It is understandable that China needs to have stable high economic growth of about 8 percent GDP growth per year for her own economic and political
survival. Widening development gap and employment are the two main issues facing China. Without China, the world will not enjoy peace, stability, and development. China is the locomotive
of global and regional economic development and contributes to global and regional peace and stability. It is understandable that China is struggling to break the so-called containment
strategy imposed by the US since the post Cold War. Whether this tendency can lead to the greater strategic division is still unknown. Nevertheless, many observers agree that whatever
changes may take place, a multi-polar world and multilateralism prevail. The reasons or logics supporting multilateralism are mainly based on the fact that no one country can really address
the security issues embedded with international dimension, no one country has the capacity to adapt and adopt to new changes alone, and it needs cooperation and coordination among the
nation states and relevant stakeholders including the private sector and civil societies. Large scale interstate war or armed conflict is unthinkable in the region due to the high level of
interdependency and democratization. It is believed that economic interdependency can reduce conflicts and prevent war. Democracy can lead to more transparency, accountability, and
participation that can reduce collective fears and create more confidence and trust among the people in the region. In addition, globalism and regionalism are taking the center stage of
national and foreign policy of many governments in the region except North Korea. The combination of those elements of peace is necessary for peace and stability in the region and those
elements are present and being improved in this region.

Despite multiple flashpoints Asian war unlikely

Bitzinger and Desker 8 Senior Fellow @ International Studies Perspectives
Richard and Barry, PhD from UCLA and Senior Fellow @ International Studies Perspectives, Dean of the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Why East Asian War is Unlikely, Survival,
Volume 50, Issue 6 December 2008 , pages 105 128

The Asia-Pacific region can be regarded as a zone of both relative insecurity and strategic stability. It contains some of the world's most significant flashpoints - the Korean peninsula, the Taiwan Strait,
the Siachen Glacier - where tensions between nations could escalate to the point of major war. It is replete with unresolved border issues; is a breeding ground for transnational terrorism and the site of many terrorist activities (the Bali bombings, the Manila
superferry bombing); and contains overlapping claims for maritime territories (the Spratly Islands, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands) with considerable actual or potential wealth in resources such as oil, gas and fisheries. Finally, the Asia-Pacific is an area of strategic
significance with many key sea lines of communication and important chokepoints. Yet despite all these potential crucibles of conflict, the Asia-Pacific , if not an area of serenity and calm, is certainly more stable than
one might expect. To be sure, there are separatist movements and internal struggles, particularly with insurgencies, as in Thailand, the Philippines and Tibet. Since the resolution of the East Timor crisis, however, the region has been relatively free of open armed
warfare. Separatism remains a challenge, but the break-up of states is unlikely. Terrorism is a nuisance, but its impact is contained. The North Korean nuclear issue, while not fully resolved, is at least moving toward a
conclusion with the likely denuclearisation of the peninsula. Tensions between China and Taiwan, while always just beneath the surface, seem unlikely to erupt in open conflict any time soon, especially given recent
Kuomintang Party victories in Taiwan and efforts by Taiwan and China to re-open informal channels of consultation as well as institutional relationships between organisations responsible
for cross-strait relations. And while in Asia there is no strong supranational political entity like the European Union, there are many multilateral organisations and international initiatives dedicated to enhancing peace and
stability, including the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation. In Southeast Asia, countries are united in a common geopolitical and economic organisation -
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) - which is dedicated to peaceful economic, social and cultural development, and to the promotion of regional peace and stability. ASEAN has played a key role in conceiving and establishing broader
regional institutions such as the East Asian Summit, ASEAN+3 (China, Japan and South Korea) and the ASEAN Regional Forum. All this suggests that war in Asia - while not inconceivable - is unlikely .
ELECTIONS ANSWERS
 UQ
There is actually no way that Trump will win this election
Weiner, 6/21/16 (John Weiner, 6/21/16. Relax, Donald Trump Cant Win. The Nation: Investigating Progress Daily. https://www.thenation.com/article/trump-cant-win/AB Accessed
6/22/16)

People say this time its differentbecause weve never had a woman candidate, and sexism is a powerful force in American politics. But we never had a black candidate until 2008, and
racism has certainly been a powerful force in American politics. Is there more hostility to women than to blacks in American politics? Right now there are 20 women in the Senate, and only two blacks (Republican Tim Scott from South
Carolina, and Democrat Corey Booker from New Jersey). Hillary, we are told, has a man problem: One recent poll showed Trump winning among men 49-40 percent. But the same poll showed women choosing Hillary by a larger margin, 51-38 percent. Thats
consistent with the historical pattern. Romney won the male vote by 8 pointsbasically the same as Trumps lead among men in polls now. Its way too early to pay a lot of attention to the current polls, butthe Trump-Clinton gender gap is likely
to be much larger this year than it was for Romney-Obama, and since more women vote than men, the historic Democratic advantage will likely remain. Its different this time, we are also told, because the
Bernie/Hillary primary fight was so intense . What if some of Bernies supporters wont vote for Hillary ? Could the Democratic vote fall by 4 million and give Trump the margin he needs in the swing states?
Again, that seems extremely unlikely. In 2008, the people who voted for Hillary in the Democratic primary were very much against Obama when the primaries ended. They regarded him as
unqualified. But on election day six months later, almost all ended up voting for him. This fall Bernie will be campaigning against Trump, and Elizabeth Warren will be campaigning against
Trump. The long-term patterns suggest that almost all Democrats and Democratic leaners will vote for the Democratic candidate again this November. Its the job of the news media to
make it seem that its different this time, so that we need to tune in and keep up. But the political scientists say its probably not going to be different this time. Whatever the polls say now
(and right now they show Hillary ahead), the long-term patterns of American politics tell us that Trump is not going to get millions more votes than Romney did, and hes not going to carry
enough swing states to overcome the historic pattern of Democratic advantage. Hillary will win in November, and she will be sworn in as our next president on January 20

If Trump wants the Presidency, he would need to win almost EVERY swing state
Brown, 16 (Cliston Brown, 05/03/16. No Amount of Working Class Whites Can Win Trump the White House. The Observer. http://observer.com/2016/05/no-amount-of-working-class-
whites-can-win-trump-the-white-house/AB Accessed on 6/22/16)

An election is the ultimate numbers game. No matter how much the punditocracy talks about intangibles such as momentum and various bits of anecdotal evidence, in the end, it comes down to one
simple question: can the candidate can get the votes? More specifically: can the candidate get the votes in the right states to win a majority in the Electoral College? With Donald Trump poised to capture the Republican
nomination, we hear a lot about intangibles, but there has been very little analysis of the numbers. And the more we dig into the numbers, the less likely it seems that Mr. Trump can actually
win the general election in November. Yes, it is true that his Democratic opponent, Hillary Clinton, has problems of her own. Ms. Clinton herself admits that she is not a natural politician. Her own shortcomings, coupled with a quarter-century of
Republicans hammering her with endless accusations, innuendoes and insinuations, has taken an unmistakable toll on the publics perception of her character. An average of 10 polls compiled by Real Clear Politics between March 19 and April 26 shows Ms.
Clinton with an average favorable/unfavorable rating of 38.4/54.9, a negative spread of 16.5 percentage points. While such numbers would typically spell doom for any political candidate, 11 polls taken over the same time period show Mr. Trump at 28.4
favorable, 65.4 unfavorable, a negative spread of 37 points. If it comes down to a question of whom the public views more favorably, Mr. Trump starts out in a huge hole. But there are other numbers that
should be even more troubling to supporters of Mr. Trump, and some of them have nothing to do with him, or with his merits or demerits as a candidate . Lets start with the Electoral College, which is how
presidents are actually elected in the United States. Any Republican nominee would start out in a disadvantaged position in this all-important category. To explain: there are 18 states, plus the District of Columbia, which have voted for
Democratic presidential candidates in every single election since 1988. These states combine for 242 of the 270 electoral votes required to win the election. Republicans, conversely, have won only 13 states in each of the last six elections, and these states
combine for just 101 electoral votes. Even if we add in 10 more states that may have voted Democratic once or twice during that span, but could now be considered solidly Republican, the GOP only gets to a starting position of 191 electors. These starting
positions mean that a Republican nominee either has to win nearly all of the swing states, or pick off one or more states that havent gone to the GOP since 1988 or earlier. A Democrat merely has
to hold the states that have gone into the blue column over the last six elections and add Florida, or some combination of two or more swing states, perhaps Ohio and Virginia. The red team
simply has a harder path to victory than the blue team does.

Obamas Foreign Policy Approval Ratings are Low Now. Engagement with China doesnt trigger the link any more than all of Obamas foreign policy endeavors in office.
Gearson 14 (Michael Gearson. October 13th, 2014. U.S. isolation is bad policy, even if Americans say they want it. Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/michael-gerson-us-isolation-is-bad-policy-even-if-americans-say-they-
want-it/2014/10/13/651fad6c-5300-11e4-892e-602188e70e9c_story.htmlAB Accessed 6/22/16)

The value of U.S. foreign policy conducted by majority vote which might have resulted in a Nazi-occupied London is once again evident . In 2013, 52 percent of Americans agreed that their country should mind its own
business internationally. (In 1964, the figure was 20 percent.) This robust consensus for disengagement was soon followed by the rapid expansion of the Islamic State in a vacuum left by U.S.
inattention, and then by an outbreak of Ebola in West Africa that should have been confronted months earlier with larger resources. In recent years, Americans have generally gotten what
they wanted on foreign policy issues and they now ruthlessly punish those who implemented their will. A recent poll has President Obamas foreign policy approval rating at a sorry 34
percent. Americans may applaud nation-building at home, but they eventually make judgments based on outcomes in Mosul and Monrovia. And this is fair. A commander in chief does not sign on to reflect public consensus but to defend
the country and the Constitution. This interplay between an often-reluctant public and a chief executive energetically pursuing the national interest has generally served the country well. Presidents since World War II have possessed broad powers to exercise
American influence on a global stage declaring strategic doctrines, enforcing red lines, arming proxies, sending emergency assistance, striking enemies with drones while trying to persuade Congress to fund such efforts and Americans to support them. This
is a different role for a U.S. president than in Jeffersons old republic. But it emerged when it did for a reason. German philosopher Karl Jaspers argued that history before World War II had been a dispersed field of unconnected ventures. With the war, it became
the totality, which has become the problem and the task. The world, for the first time, had a meaningfully unified history. A variety of challenges nuclear proliferation, environmental degradation, terrorism eventually became global in nature. And some
old problems, including pandemic disease, gained the speed of air travel and the momentum of growing, tightly packed populations. Since World War II, the United States has been the only nation willing enough, capable
enough and responsible enough to keep a semblance of order. The divided states of Europe will sometimes join a coalition but seldom lead it. Russia and China remain engaged in Great Power games.
International institutions are weak at best. The United States has consistently encouraged the capabilities of other responsible actors. But it is still the U.S. 7th Fleet that deploys near Japan; the 2nd Infantry Division that stands guard at the Korean Demilitarized
Zone; the U.S. Central Command that conducts most of the airstrikes in Iraq and Syria. Some naturally complain about these burdens. But without the United States bearing them, the horrors of the 20th century would have been infinitely more horrible. The death
camps emptied only by ruthless efficiency. Or Europe unified under Soviet rule, with gulags outside Berlin and Paris. Threats to the United States have shifted or perhaps diversified. The 9/11 attacks originated in the failed and distant state of Afghanistan.
Afterward, some academics argued that this case was unique and that the problem of failed states was exaggerated. Now the Islamic State feeds off governing failure across two countries. And Ebola spreads in the absence of effective health-care structures
across three countries. So the United States has no real interest in the problem of failed states except when it results in al-Qaeda, the Islamic State and Ebola. President Obamas embrace of these duties has been two-sided. He is,
intellectually, an internationalist who speaks of the dangers of globalized threats. But he ran for office promising national retrenchment in order to focus on domestic concerns, and he has
cited the polls (on Syria in particular) as confirmation of his own instinct for inaction . His prosecution of war against the Islamic State seems (so far) constrained and half-hearted. Some conservatives are no better imagining that
global problems can be contained by the isolation of Syrian chaos (baddies vs. baddies anyway), or by the effective quarantine of Liberia. But 200,000 dead in Syria, along with 9 million displaced, proved to be an uncontainable regional catastrophe. And the
isolation of Ebola-affected nations could accelerate economic and political collapse, increase suffering and death, and result in further spread of the disease. It will not work and it cannot be right to allow these countries to die behind a curtain. The
United States has problems that cant be isolated, only confronted. And the longer it takes to realize it, the harder our tasks become .
 Link
Swing Voters already know who theyre voting for. The aff wont make a difference.
Campbell, No date (James Campbell. Do Swing Voters Swing Elections? University at Buffalo. https://www.acsu.buffalo.edu/~jcampbel/documents/SwingVoterChapter.pdfAB Accessed
6/22/16)

'' The marginal character or the importance of swing Voters to presidential elections is also consistent with the findings of the National Election Studies that typically two-thirds of voters say
they decided how they would vote at or before the national nominating conventions in the summer of the election year. " It is also consistent with the marginal impact of the independent vote on presidential
elections; late deciding voters splitting evenly between the major-party candidates with a tilt toward returning to vote for their party's standard bearer; the greater importance of precampaign party unity to the election results; the importance of precampaign
fundamentals to the accuracy of election forecasts; and the infrequency with which campaign effects have decided which party has won the presidency." Given the abundance of evidence indicating that swing voters (or late deciders,
preference changers, and independents) have a very limited impact on presidential elections, why do they receive the enormous attention that they do? One reason may be the democratic belief that elections should not
be decided until voters go into the polling booth to cast their ballots, that voters should keep open minds and listen to all that the candidates have to say before they reach a final decision . Journalists, political junkies, and supporters of
trailing candidates also want to keep the election story alive

The American People are not Isolationists and do not care about the U.S.-China foreign policy
Fontana 14 (David Fontana, Associate Professor of Law at George Washington University School of Law in Washington, D.C. 10/30/14. Americans are not Isolationists. Huffington Post.
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-fontana/americans-are-not-isolati_b_6076720.htmlAB)

It is a standard move for a politician to dodge responsibility for deciding how to respond to an international crisis by saying that the American people want to avoid intervening. In the name
of listening to an isolationist public, politicians of both parties say their hands are tied . In his State of the Union speech in 2012, President Barack Obama stated that Americans want to avoid foreign intervention because they want
to focus on nation-building right here at home. Republican Senator Rand Paul of Kentucky said on Meet The Press in August that the American people are tired of war. These statements are based on a misunderstanding of how
Americans think about foreign policy . The evidence of the past few months indicates that Americans are willing to intervene overseas, so long as they are told why they need to do so. Some issues in our political life evoke strongly held beliefs in the
American people. Americans therefore follow these matters closely, and have strong policy positions. Their positions are stable even as political debates and political leaders change. For instance, Americans tend to have strong feelings about abortion, and these
feelings tend not to change over the course of their lives regardless of how political leaders might try to persuade them. By contrast, foreign policy is not a high-salience issue for most Americans. Most Americans do not
follow the latest developments in the Arab Spring or in Hong Kong . Most of the time, foreign policy involves abstract issues transpiring far away. Foreign policy is an issue to borrow a phrase from another context that seems to
involve human beings with the tears dried off. Because of that, Americans do not bring as many strong priorities to the table in foreign policy. These foreign policy instincts do not lead Americans to
support or oppose doing something about Hong Kong, for instance, in the same way that instincts about the government leads them to support or oppose ObamaCare.

United States Public does not want isolationism, they just want less military presence throughout the world
Freidman and Preble, 13 (Benjamin Freidman and Christopher Preble, 12/27/13. Americans favor not isolationism but restraint. LA Times.
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/dec/27/opinion/la-oe-friedman-isolationism-military-restraint-20131227AB. Accessed 6/22/16)

A recent Pew Research poll finds that historically high numbers of Americans want their government to do less abroad. That worries many foreign policy elites, who fear that bad wars and
growing debt are reviving old-fashioned isolationism. But the public is neither isolationist nor misguided when it comes to foreign policy. Americans do not want to withdraw from the world;
they just prefer not to try to run it with their military. A security strategy made to match those preferences what we and others call restraint would keep us out of avoidable trouble and husband our resources, ultimately making us safer
and richer. Pew found that 52% of the respondents agree that "the U.S. should mind its own business internationally and let other countries get along the best they can on their own," and that 80% want to "concentrate more on our own national problems" while
focusing less on international troubles. Both totals are highs in the 50 years that Pew has periodically asked those questions.

Also: The matter of AIIB is not one that the public is super knowledgeable about. This one policy will not have an impact on how people vote, especially if
more controversial foreign policies tied to Obama, like TPP or the Iran Deal, have not caused any change in the election.
Additionally: The U.S. currently holds a sustained investment with the Asian Development Bank. An investment with the AIIB would hold similar if not exact
public opinions as the sustained investment with the ADP. This puts the negative in a double bind. Either A) They concede that the ADP has not had any
impact on the elections and neither will the aff or B) The ADP HAS had an impact on the elections. Now looking at the polling numbers we can see the Hillary
is winning which means that the ADP has had an impact on the elections to Hillarys favor, which means the aff will do the same. This turns their link.
 Impacts
There is really good impact defense and aff answers for the impacts in the actual elections da file.
A2: Agenda DA
 A2 : Focus Link
Agenda focus constantly shifts- plan wont disrupt top priorities
Light 99
Paul Light, Director of Governmental Studies at Brookings Institute, The Presidents Agenda)
The Presidents agenda is a remarkable list. It is rarely written down. It constantly shifts and evolves. It is often in flux even for the President and the top staff. Items move onto the agenda one day
and off the next. Because of its status in the policy process, the Presidents agenda is the subject of intense conflict. The infighting is resolved sometimes through mutual consent and collegial bargaining, sometimes through marked struggle and
domination. It is not surprising that we know so little about it.
 Plan Popular
Plan gaining popularity in the U.S.
Manning 15 (John, Professor of Law at Harvard Law School, How the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank Is Changing the Global Financial Landscape, 09/03/15, 06/21/16,
http://internationalbanker.com/banking/how-the-asian-infrastructure-investment-bank-is-changing-the-global-financial-landscape/)//BME

Given the failures on the part of the US to contain the AIIBs emergence, Obamas position on
the bank appears to have relaxed since the second quarter of the year, stating more recently that he is all for it,
provided that international lending regulations are followed. Indeed, it
may be beneficial to the US to appease China and the AIIB at this stage, or perhaps even to join as a new member of the bank. Given the large number of
countries that have signed up, it could be in the best interests of the US to influence the AIIBs decision-making process as a recognised partner, especially regarding environmental matters.
The commonalities that exist between US and Chinese interests include the desire to ensure Asian economic growth stays strong and that their respective climate-change policies are adhered
to, as evidenced by the joint announcement last November by Presidents Obama and Jinping of their shared environmental initiatives. By joining the AIIB, the US might be able to sway China
into financing more infrastructure projects that lower CO2 emissions than if it remains outside. There are also those who believe that the AIIBs ostensible impact on the global financial system is being overstated. Michael Pettis,
finance professor at Peking University and a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, stated in April that in order for the AIIB to be considered a world-beater, Chinas economy would have to be similar in relative size to that of the US
in the 1940s and 1950s, when America experienced a significant gain in economic and political influence, and that the renminbi would have to be the worlds premier reserve currency. According to Pettis, the chances of either occurring are slim, especially as
Chinas central bank would have to take on trillions of dollars of risk of sub-investment grade countries orrun large current account deficits, both of which are highly unlikely. From Chinas perspective, it also makes little sense to not cooperate with the likes of
the ADB and World Bank. The knowledge, experience and expertise that will be on hand at these institutions, and from which China
will be able to tap, will provide the AIIB with an extremely efficient way to build capacity and
ensure the smooth running of projects, in accordance with the high standards of governance that the world is now expecting.

President Obama likes AIIB

Dyer 15 (Geoff, the Financial Times for over a decade in China, Brazil, the UK and now the US, Obama says AIIB could be positive for Asia, 04/28/15, 06/21/16,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/80271e0c-eddc-11e4-90d2-00144feab7de.html#axzz4CGOxO4hu)//BME

President Barack Obama said the new China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank could be a good thing for the region if it adopts high standards for lending projects. The Obama administration
has come in for intense criticism for the way it has handled the AIIB, with some former officials warning that it represented a blow to American leadership in the international economy. More The US initially urged its allies not to join as founding members of the
bank, which is in the process of being established in Beijing with initial capital of $50bn, arguing that they could have more influence over the standards it adopts by staying on the outside and lobbying the Chinese as a group. Speaking at a White House press
conference with Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe on Tuesday, Mr Obama said that the US was not opposed to the new bank but warned that money could be misused if there was little transparency in
the way the AIIB was managed. This could be a positive thing, he said. But if its not run well, then it could be a negative thing. However, after Britain announced in March that it intended to become a member, a rush of European
and Asian countries signed up to the AIIB. Earlier this month, China said it had received 47 applications to join. The only two major economies which have so far not asked to join are the US and Japan. Mr Obama said that it was natural for China
to play a much larger role in development finance in the region. Asia needs infrastructure, he said. And Chinas got a lot of money. Its been running a big surplus for quite some time. So, to
the extent that China wants to put capital into development projects around the region, that is a good thing. Asia needs infrastructure, and Chinas got a lot of money...to the extent that China wants to put capital into
development projects around the region, that is a good thing - Barack Obama Mr Abe said that it was important the new bank adopted fair governance and that its lending adopted strong environmental standards.
 PC Not Key
Political capital not key to the agenda
-their evidence misuses the term

-ideological and partisan leanings outweigh

Dickinson 9 Professor of Political Science

Matthew, professor of political science at Middlebury College and taught previously at Harvard University where he worked under the supervision of presidential scholar Richard Neustadt, 5-
26-2009, Presidential Power: A NonPartisan Analysis of Presidential Politics, Sotomayor, Obama and Presidential Power,
http://blogs.middlebury.edu/presidentialpower/2009/05/26/sotamayor-obama-and-presidential-power/
As for Sotomayor, from here the path toward almost certain confirmation goes as follows: the Senate Judiciary Committee is slated to hold hearings sometime this summer (this involves both written depositions and of course open hearings), which should lead to
formal Senate approval before Congress adjourns 1for its summer recess in early August. So Sotomayor will likely take her seat in time for the start of the new Court session on October 5. (I talk briefly about the likely politics of the nomination process below).
What is of more interest to me, however, is what her selection reveals about the basis of presidential power. Political scientists, like baseball writers evaluating hitters, have devised numerous means of measuring a presidents
influence in Congress. I will devote a separate post to discussing these, but in brief, they often center on the creation of legislative box scores designed to measure how many times a presidents preferred
piece of legislation, or nominee to the executive branch or the courts, is approved by Congress. That is, how many pieces of legislation that the president supports actually pass Congress? How often do members of Congress
vote with the presidents preferences? How often is a presidents policy position supported by roll call outcomes? These measures, however, are a misleading gauge of presidential power they are a better indicator of congressional
power. This is because how members of Congress vote on a nominee or legislative item is rarely influenced by anything a president does. Although journalists (and political scientists) often focus
on the legislative endgame to gauge presidential influence will the President swing enough votes to get his preferred legislation enacted? this mistakes an outcome with actual evidence
of presidential influence. Once we control for other factors a member of Congress ideological and partisan leanings, the political leanings of her constituency, whether shes up for
reelection or not we can usually predict how she will vote without needing to know much of anything about what the president wants. (I am ignoring the importance of a presidents veto power for the moment.)
Despite the much publicized and celebrated instances of presidential arm-twisting during the legislative endgame, then, most legislative outcomes dont depend on presidential lobbying. But
this is not to say that presidents lack influence. Instead, the primary means by which presidents influence what Congress does is through their ability to determine the alternatives from which Congress must choose. That is, presidential power is largely
an exercise in agenda-setting not arm-twisting. And we see this in the Sotomayer nomination. Barring a major scandal, she will almost certainly be confirmed to the Supreme Court whether Obama spends the confirmation hearings calling
every Senator or instead spends the next few weeks ignoring the Senate debate in order to play Halo III on his Xbox. That is, how senators decide to vote on Sotomayor will have almost nothing to do with Obamas lobbying from here on in (or lack thereof). His
real influence has already occurred, in the decision to present Sotomayor as his nominee.
 Winners Win
WINNERS WIN ON CONTROVERSIAL POLICIES.
Ornstein 1 (Norman, American Enterprise Institute, How is Bush Governing? May 15, http://www.aei.org/events/filter.,eventID.281/transcript.asp)

The best plan is to pick two significant priorities, things that can move relatively quickly. And in an ideal world, one of them is going to be a little bit tough, where it's a battle, where you've got to fight, but then your
victory is all the sweeter. The other matters but you can sweep through fairly quickly with a broad base of support and show that you're a winner and can accomplish something. Bush did just that, picking one, education, where there was a fairly strong chance. Something he
campaigned on, people care about, and a pretty strong chance that he could get a bill through with 80, 85 percent support of both houses of Congress and both parties. And the other that he picked, and there were other choices, but he picked the tax cuts. What flows from that as well is, use

every bit of p olitical c apital you have to achieve early victories that will both establish you as a winner, because the key to political power is not the formal power that you have. Your ability to coerce people to
do what they otherwise would not do. Presidents don't have a lot of that formal power. It's as much psychological as it is real. If you're a winner and people think you're a winner, and that issues come up
and theyre tough but somehow you're going to prevail, they will act in anticipation of that. Winners win . If it looks like you can't get things done, then you have a steeply higher hill to climb with what follows. And as you
use your political capital, you have to recognize that for presidents, p olitical c apital is a perishable quality, that it evaporates if it isn't used. That's a lesson, by the way, George W. Bush learned firsthand from
his father. That if you use it and you succeed, it's a gamble, to be sure, you'll get it back with a very healthy premium.
A2 japan da
 No UQ - Relations bad now
No UQ relations bad now
(Could Okinawa Derail U.S.-Japan Relations? Jennifer Lind April 2, 2015 http://nationalinterest.org/feature/could-okinawa-derail-us-japan-relations-12526 - ES -)

Okinawa also belonged on that stage because it still remains a vexing challenge in the U.S.-Japan alliance. In the past few years, as Japans dispute with China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands grows more heated, with aircraft and
ships from each side circling around the disputed islands, Shinzo Abes government has emphasized the dangers that Chinese military modernization and territorial claims pose to Japan. In this environment,
the U.S.-Japan alliance and Okinawas bases acquire even more significance than in the past. But also in the past few years, Okinawas anti-base movement has accelerated, and in general alliance managers face a more complex
political environment.
 Relations are Resilient
US-Japan Relations stronger than ever before UQ overwhelms
SPFUSA 16
(Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA February 2016, The U.S.-Japan Alliance to 2030 Power and Principle Report of the Commission on the Future of the Alliance http://spfusa.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/02/US-Japan-Commission-Full-Report.pdf - ES -)

The U.S.-Japan Alliance has helped to provide security and prosperity to the Asia-Pacific region and the broader international community for more than half a century. The Alliance enabled the United States and Japan
to prevail in the Cold War, based on the principles of deterrence, democratic values, and free market dynamism. Today, the U.S.-Japan Alliance is as strong as it has been at any time during its existence. The Commission believes the
Alliance will need all of its current strength and more, since the international security environment over the next 15 years will be as challenging and uncertain as any the United States and Japan have faced. In addition to challenges from a rising China and
aggrieved Russia, the
United States and Japan both have vital interests in the Middle East, which is an increasingly unstable and violent region. Global challenges such as terrorism, nuclear
proliferation, and climate change will also require wise policy and firm action.
 Japan is okay with AIIB
Japan considered joining AIIB themselves besides concerns over US relations
Kajimoto 15 Kajimoto, Tetsushi. "Japan Split on Joining AIIB Bank, Caught between US, China." Reuters. Thomson Reuters, 20 Mar. 2015. Web. 24 June 2016. EP
Japan is split over joining a China-led development bank, concerned about missing out on the rapidly coalescing global movement for the institution while also worried about alienating ally
United States and helping bolster rival China, officials said. Finance Minister Taro Aso signaled for the first time on Friday that Tokyo could be part of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) if it can
guarantee a credible mechanism for providing loans. But other top officials took a more skeptical stance, reflecting a split in the government of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe over whether the AIIB would help or hinder Japan's interests. "We have a cautious position
about participation," said top government spokesman Yoshihide Suga. Around 30 countries, including Britain and Germany, have decided to participate in Beijing's flagship economic outreach project, but Washington, Japan's main ally, has urged countries to think
twice before joining, citing worries about governance and environmental safeguards. "Views are split within the Japanese government on whether to join the AIIB," said a person with close knowledge of Japan's financial policy-making. The result of the standoff
within the government, said a senior official in the ruling coalition, is that Japan's participation "is not going to happen under the Abe administration." Japan is hesitant to join out of concern over China-led lending practices, over its
relations with Washington and over the AIIB's potential rivalry with the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the Manila-based multilateral institution dominated by Japan and the United States, officials said.

Japan is still open to joining the AIIB

Callaghan and Hubbard 16 Callaghan, Mike, and Paul Hubbard. "The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: Multilateralism on the Silk Road." China Economic Journal 9.2 (2016): 116-
39. China Economic Journal. 11 May 2016. Web. EP

Japans response to the AIIB was similar to that of the United States, although Japans strategic interests in international financial institutions are more concentrated in its leading position at
the ADB. Japans Foreign Minister questioned the additional value of the AIIB, and noted that its governance and lending conditions were unclear (Japans Kishida Questions, Jiji Press, August 9, 2014). When the deadline passed on signing the initial non-
binding memorandum of understanding on the AIIB, Japans vice minister of finance said Japan still needed to clarify the structure, or the governance, of this new bank. That said, there were competing views in Japan with some
focusing on the commercial opportunities for Japanese business (Japan and the AIIB, Nikkei Report, March 21, 2015). Japan officially remains open to joining the bank at some future time (Japan Says Could Join, Reuters, March 20,
2015), but remains cautious until the governance structure is clear (Japan Still Cautious, Reuters, March 26, 2015).
AT China DA
 Aff is good for relations
Joining the AIIB is key to maintaining US-China relations
Edwards and Qahir 15 Edwards, Martin, and Katayon Qahir. "US Should Stop Blocking China's AIIB and Join Allies in New Club." The Conversation. N.p., 6 Apr. 2015. Web. 22 June 2016.
EP

For years, Washington has sought to encourage China to be a responsible stakeholder in the global economy. The AIIB demonstrates that China seeks to embrace this challenge, and the fact that
it is doing so multilaterally rather than bilaterally should not be overlooked. The US has helped to support regional development banks in Africa and Europe, so a new one in Asia should not be the threat that it is made out to be. The need for
infrastructure in emerging Asian economies is so acute that the two banks need not be in competition. Embracing AIIB will help keep US-Chinese relations moving forward by moving beyond
the sharp rhetoric of recent weeks. It will also give us a means to smooth over relations with European allies. More importantly, joining the AIIB gives the US a seat at the table, and a way to work
with allies to moderate Chinese behavior. What will make the difference in the long term in shaping US relationships with Asia is working with allies to address common challenges. Multilateral
diplomacy is not just a means to an end, but an end in itself, and enmeshing China in a network of international organizations, regardless of who created them, provides the best route for deepening cooperation
between the US and the Peoples Republic of China.

Not joining the bank only sends signals of distrust; becoming a member will restore relations with China
Osnos 15 Osnos, Evan. "How to Save the U.S.-China Relationship." The New Yorker. N.p., 24 June 2015. Web. 21 June 2016. EP
The United States has also done its share to contribute to the distrust. Last year, Beijing launched the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, an alternative to the World Bank and other U.S.-dominated
international financial institutions. Washington urged its allies to shun the bank until its rules became clearer, but Britain and other countries joined anywaya miserable result that left the U.S. looking
weak and likely strengthened the position of Chinese hawks. They push the argument, described in a Communist Party document last year, that the U.S. has five objectives: to isolate, contain, diminish, and divide China, and to sabotage its
political leadership. At its essence, the tension is not about policy disagreements; it is about a historic change. Xi Jinping, the Chinese President, has called on the U.S. to embrace China in what he calls a new type of major
power relationship. To Kenneth Lieberthal, a China specialist at the Brookings Institution, that phrase conveys a relationship between equals, each of whom respects the fact that the other has its own system
and interests. But the U.S. has been reluctant to adopt a slogan intended to alter the status quo. Lieberthal told me, The U.S. is much more transactional: Do we treat you as an equal? We dont bully you, and we want to
negotiate agreements on both substance and rules of engagement. And China is thinking, Wait a minute, no, were talking about respecting us. Were not trying to overthrow the American system of governance,
so why is it that you pay what we do so little respect?

China is willing to compromise, but not joining in on the bank could cause it to become more of a revisionist state
Bendini 16 Bendini, Roberto. "United States - China Relations: A Complex Balance between Cooperation and Confrontation." United States - China Relations: A Complex Balance between
Cooperation and Confrontation(n.d.): n. pag. European Parliament. Mar. 2016. Web. EP

This approach is also particularly highlighted by one of the biggest challenges faced yet by the Bretton Woods international order: theAsian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). This Chinese initiative - officially launched on 16 January
2016 - sets up an international development bank with an initial holding of USD 100 billion in capital drawn at 75 % from Asian countries. The Bank is supposed to invest in infrastructures all over Asia. Chinas initial goal was to facilitate
investments in economic partners infrastructures in order to improve its export capacities and tackle issues of overproduction. This explicit goal has apparently been abandoned since then52, due to an increased international presence among the Banks
stakeholders - especially with western European countries such as France, the UK and Germany joining the Bank. Given the
fact of its overlapping with the Asian Development Bank, established in 1966 with Japan and the
US as its pre-eminent stakeholders, the creation of the AIIB led to a number of tensions with the US. US officials indeed reacted quite strongly to the news of the UK joining the AIIB as a founder member53. The US has
seen the AIIB as a potential Chinese geo-economic tool created to reflect and legitimise Chinas own economic policy in Asia. Concerns over Chinas weight in the institution and its potential veto power were the main
reasons prompting criticism and wariness from Washington54. China seems to have taken these opinions into account and modified its initial claims to favour enhanced international support 55. China has
indeed now scaled back its voting rights to 26.06 %, maintaining a veto only over supermajority votes (relating to Banks board, its president and other major policies). These changes impelled the US to declare a
truce over the AIIB by welcoming Chinas new involvement in dealing with global issues 56, while still refusing to join this China-led institution. China is involved in the post-war world order
shaped and largely sustained by the US. However, growing frustration at its under-representation in these institutions is liable to push China to try to circumvent them by setting up
alternative arrangements better suited to defend its national interests. China is not a revisionist state, but could become one in the future if the western powers fail to meet its will to play a
greater role in the already-established institutions.
 Not joining = conflict inevitable
Confusing Chinas growing contribution in the world with power assertion risks the possibility of conflict
Osnos 15 Osnos, Evan. "How to Save the U.S.-China Relationship." The New Yorker. N.p., 24 June 2015. Web. 21 June 2016. EP
Stopping the erosion of goodwill will rest on unglamorous talks like those going on at the State Department nowthe final major negotiations before Xi makes his first state visit to Washington in September. The U.S. and China have well-known areas of common
interest: a treaty to lower investment hurdles to each others economies, the Iran nuclear talks, forging peace in Afghanistan, and, most of all, reducing greenhouse-gas emissions. But those are not enough. Insuring peace will mean giving something up. Lampton,
of Johns Hopkins, argues that each side can afford to make a significant compromise: the U.S.must acknowledge Chinas legitimate aspirations for a voice in the international system, and Beijing should take some maritime
disputes off the table. The U.S. must differentiate between controversial assertions of power, like those in the South China Sea, and fair reflections of Chinas growing contribution to the world, such as the
new banks. Likewise, China cannot afford to pretend that the world is unruffled by the profound, if inevitable, change it has introduced in the international order. For both parties, a willful focus on the strengths risks underplaying the weaknesses in their
respective positions. Even after four decades, American officials are sometimes startled when Chinese counterparts pose basic questions about American governance. A senior official told me recently, That clearly expresses a kind of curiosity, along the lines of,
How does it really work here? Which you can read as a heartening curiosity about the other guy, and what that means for the possibility of interactions down the road. But, he added, Its also frightening, given the possibility of conflict. We
are entering a more dangerous era, in which neither side can afford to misread the other.

Not partnering with AIIB sends an anti-cooperation signal to China

Revere 16 Revere, Evans. "U.S. Policy and East Asian Security: Challenge and Response." The Brookings Institution. N.p., 25 Jan. 2016. Web. 21 June 2016. EP
Washingtons response to China thus far in this area has been problematic. U.S. rejection of AIIB membership sent the wrong signal to Beijing about U.S. willingness to cooperate with a more
activist China. It also appeared to contradict Washingtons longstanding stakeholder argument. Washingtons decision not to join meant that the United States would not be a part of the decision-making fabric of
the organization -- preventing the United States from exercising leverage and from helping to shape the organizations development. One task for future policy makers will be to revisit this ill-advised decision.[i]

The relationship between US and China is critical to world security, a fallout could cause disastrous conflict
Bendini 16 Bendini, Roberto. "United States - China Relations: A Complex Balance between Cooperation and Confrontation." United States - China Relations: A Complex Balance between
Cooperation and Confrontation(n.d.): n. pag. European Parliament. Mar. 2016. Web. EP

US-China relations are of great significance for the entire world. The two countries respective economic weight, global influence and military capacities make them key actors in the effective
resolution of the different issues at stake. Chinas greater involvement in these issues, and its use of multilateral institutions to do so, are positive news for the stability and security of the world. On
the other hand, tensions and potential conflicts arising from diverging interests between China and the US represent threats to the world order, and require improved mutual understanding and
level-headed pragmatism. Officials and politicians from both countries could be tempted to paint Chinas rise as a zero-sum game for domestic political purposes. On such a basis, China and the US could not be equal great powers
without each having to fight the other to become or remain so. This way of thinking could eventually result in a disastrous conflict or a Cold War- type stand-off.

Within rising China power there is a potential for conflict without proper US cooperation
Bendini 16 Bendini, Roberto. "United States - China Relations: A Complex Balance between Cooperation and Confrontation." United States - China Relations: A Complex Balance between
Cooperation and Confrontation(n.d.): n. pag. European Parliament. Mar. 2016. Web. EP

Chinas rise is a real game-changer both economically and geopolitically, and represents both an opportunity and a challenge for the major global power, namely the United States. Chinas new economic
and political weight fosters further cooperation with the US on a number of global issues, as well as increased collaboration within multilateral organisations. Given their sheer influence, both countries have global interests that make it
difficult to find a solution for one without the consent of the other. Chinas rise and expanding global interests have resulted in a drastic change in the global geopolitical order. Frustrations over the USs
predominance, especially in Asia, have raised tensions between the two powers. Under the leadership of President Xi Jinping, China has adopted a more assertive approach towards multilateral
organisations which it sees as controlled by and for Western powers, but also towards its direct neighbours. This approach represents a direct challenge to the world order established and
sustained by the US and is therefore a potential reason for conflict.
AT OSW Adv CP
 OSW Fails
OSW fails empirics
Durkin, 14. (Barbara Durkin. "Offshore wind farms are no public benefit." TheHill. 2-4-2016 Web. Accessed: 6-24-2016. http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/energy-
environment/226050-offshore-wind-farms-are-no-public-benefit)
The Obama administration and Department of Interior (DOI) have announced their planned Jan 29, 2015 auction of hundreds of thousands of acres of North Atlantic ocean area to wind developers under President Obamas Climate Action Plan. While U.S. energy policy should address the needs of

citizens for reliable energy sources that are commercially reasonable and reasonably safe, offshore wind has historically failed to deliver these public benefits to Europeans . UKs offshore wind energy projects' results should
serve as the catalyst for termination by the administration of its proposed ocean auction to wind limited liabilities corporations. U.S. rate and taxpayers are unacceptably exposed by this administrations blind eye to the UKs failed offshore
wind program. Neither the ocean area the federal government holds in trust for U.S. citizens, nor U.S. citizens themselves, should be exploited by an industry that historically fails to deliver public benefits. Germanys flagship BARD Offshore I is a 400MW wind project

intended to supply the energy needs of 400,000 households. But Bard Offshore 1 remains out of operation according to industry source Offshore Wind Biz (June 2014) citing: frequent technical problems with the converter substation, a

smoldering fire, failure of the system, five unplanned outages since the beginning of 2014 and transmission problems. WindPowerOffshore (September 19, 2014) reports the Danish company Vattenfall is going to dismantle the Yttre
Stengrund in Swedish waters after only 13 years of operation. Only one in (5) turbines is currently operational. Europes offshore wind energy endeavors reveal the challenges of the harsh and corrosive marine environment . GE
deployed the Cape Wind prototype GE 3.6 MW wind turbines at Arklow, the wind farm offshore of Ireland. GE subsequently discontinued the Cape Wind 3.6 MW wind turbine even while Cape Wind, the wind farm planned for offshore Massachusetts, was under permit review by the DOI. That
review advanced Cape Wind as a reliable energy source. Cape Wind changed specifications to Siemens 3.6 MW during their power purchase contract negotiations with the national grid. But Siemens is not boasting offshore wind success, according to the Wall Street Journal [1/08/14]:

Siemens, the worlds largest manufacturer of offshore wind turbines, and its partners concede they underestimated the challenges behind offshore wind . The financial fallout from these
challenges was highlighted on Thursday, when Siemens said it booked 128 million ($171 million) in new charges related to connecting offshore wind farms to the power grid. It blamed unexpectedly high costs for shipping,
installing and starting up grid components. A Spiegel International article Turbine Trouble: Ill Wind Blows for German Offshore Industry says, Operators of offshore wind farms depend on sufficiently high electricity prices to refinance their investments. This runs contrary to public interest. Citizens

need commercially reasonable energy sources that are reliable, while offshore wind energy technology is historically not reliable, yet its price is high. The stunning and sobering candor of an executive of the worlds largest manufacturer of wind
turbines, Vestas, would be comical if not for the serious context billions in public funding along with the sacrifice of the thousands of ocean acres that DOI intends to grant to wind LLCs. In 2011, Anders Se-Jensen, then president of the offshore division at Vestas said, Its a bit like buying an old
crappy car. Its starts cheap, but spends most of the time in the workshop costing you a fortune, so you didnt drive much, and your cost per driven mile is staggeringly high. Its the same with the cost of energy when you look at capital expense and operating costs with overall production. While

President Obamas energy goals should be to deploy energy sources that are commercially reasonable, reliable, and reasonably safe, based on the best science, offshore wind has miserably failed to deliver public benefits to Europeans . U.S.
citizens are entitled to a fair return for the use of the nations oceanic resources. Its not too late for President Obama to call off the January 29, 2015 DOI North Atlantic auction that would exclusively serve the interests of wind developers.

Wind energy fails generally

The Telegraph, 13. (N.a . "Wind power has failed to deliver what it promised." Telegraph.co.uk. 6-15-2013 Web. Accessed: 6-24-2016. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/telegraph-
view/10121584/Wind-power-has-failed-to-deliver-what-it-promised.html)
Today, The Sunday Telegraph reveals how many ''green jobs the wind-power industry really generates in exchange for its generous subsidies. The figures show that for 12 months until February 2013, a little over 1.2 billion was paid out to wind farms through a consumer subsidy financed by a
supplement on electricity bills. During that period, the industry employed just 12,000 people, which means that each wind-farm job cost consumers 100,000 an astonishing figure. Of course, we all want to preserve the environment and, in an ideal world, we would invest in energy production that
is as clean as possible. But before pouring money into any potential power source we need to discuss honestly its costs, its potential to create jobs and its efficiency. Our story shows that the claims of the green lobby that wind farms will generate abundant energy and economic growth are not
consistent with the facts. Regarding costs, the 1.2billion figure is merely a starting point. According to the Renewable Energy Foundation, the subsidy is likely to rise to 6 billion by 2020 if the Government is to meet its target of providing for 15 per cent of the countrys needs with renewable
energy. Finding space to build the wind farms has created a veritable racket landowners can expect to receive payments worth an average 40,000 a year for each large, three-megawatt turbine built on their land. And what is the benefit of all this expense? In terms of jobs, disappointingly little.
Greater Gabbard, an offshore wind farm, employs 100 people at its headquarters in Lowestoft, Suffolk. Divide Greater Gabbards subsidy of 129 million by 100, and each job is worth an incredible 1.29million. The spend might be more justifiable if wind were an efficient and abundant energy
source but it simply is not. Its output fluctuates wildly depending on the amount of wind available. This week, our thousands of wind turbines managed to generate an impressive 12 per cent of our total energy production. But during our last cold, windless winter when electricity demand was at
its greatest that fell to lows of 0.1 per cent. Wind
farms can end up being surprisingly environmentally unfriendly, too. When the wind does not blow and the turbines fail to do their job, consumers have to fall
back on the very fossil fuels that they were designed to replace. The result is that we come to rely on foreign imports of oil and gas that hit the household budget hard (domestic coal stations that ought to supply more of the demand
have been closed in order to meet carbon-emission reduction targets). Moreover, wind farms can be a blot on the landscape: the dormant turbines take up large tracts of land and kill wildlife ; it is the visual pollution of our beautiful
countryside that has led some communities to protest against their presence. The Government has shown recognition of public concern by announcing that residents will be able to stop the construction of wind farms. It is welcome news that when planning applications are submitted, officials will
have to take into account both the views of those living nearby and the impact upon the landscape a proposal that is being sold as giving locals the power of veto over wind turbines. But things may not work out that way. Under the plans, energy firms will be able to offer ''incentives to residents
such as reductions in energy bills in order to encourage them to say ''yes to a new wind farm. This amounts to a bribe, and a very tempting bribe, too, given that we live in an age of austerity when many home owners are looking for ways to cut costs and save money. The Liberal Democrats,
including Ed Davey, the Energy Secretary, believe that the planning-rule changes could actually result in more wind farms being built rather than less. Therefore, there is a troubling risk that the Governments plans might prove to be a golden opportunity for wind-power providers to buy their way to
installing yet more turbines. That is worrying because aside from concerns about the damage to our countryside our report shows that this industry is expensive, passes costs on to the consumer and does not create many jobs in return. Wind power is far from the panacea that its supporters claim
it to be.

US offshore wind farm fails.

Hollingsworth, 15. (Barbara Hollingsworth. "Mass. Stuck With $113M Marine Terminal Built for Failed Offshore Wind Farm." CNS News. 4-23-2015 Web. Accessed: 6-24-2016.
http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/barbara-hollingsworth/mass-stuck-113m-marine-terminal-built-failed-offshore-wind-farm)

Touted as Americas first offshore wind farm, Cape Wind planned to erect 130 Siemens wind turbines five miles off the coast of Cape Cod and harness the strong winds blowing through Nantucket Sound to produce electricity. But
the $2.6 billion projects contracts with the states two largest utilities were terminated in January after Cape Wind missed its December 31 financing deadline. Last July, Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz heralded Cape Wind, which was awarded a $150
million loan guarantee by his department, as the beginning of a strong U.S. offshore wind industry. With this agreement and with the investments we have made in infrastructure like the South Coast Marine Commerce Terminal, we have positioned Massachusetts as a first-in-the-nation hub for a
new offshore wind industry that will bring jobs and a clean source of Massachusetts-made energy for future generations, Patrick said last September when he announced a lease agreement for the terminal. I
am very happy Cape Wind will be built in New Bedford Governor Patricks
administration deserves credit for its work to support this project and to make Massachusetts a leader in clean energy, echoed Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-MA), just three months before the wind farm project collapsed. The project faced stiff opposition
from local communities and wealthy residents ranging from the late Sen. Ted Kennedy to billionaire William Koch, both of whom had family compounds on Cape Cod. The Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound complained that the 440-foot high wind turbines would have been visible from the shore
and would look like LaGuardia Airport at night. The group also said the wind farm would be a threat to navigation and commercial fishing in the sound while significantly increasing local residents electricity bills. Instead of creating hundreds of new jobs and 360-million megawatts of clean energy,
Cape Wind created a new problem for state officials: What to do with the unfinished $113 million marine terminal? Last month, the Massachusetts Clean Energy Center (MassCEC), a quasi-governmental agency, announced it had terminated its $4.5 million, two-year contract with Cape Wind to rent
the 28-acre terminal, which is located in New Bedford, Mass. MassCEC has since received three bids for operation of the terminal, which is still under construction and $10 million over budget. The winning bidder is expected to be announced by this summer. But Massachusetts Energy and
Environmental Affairs Secretary Matthew Beaton, who chairs MassCEC, says renting the empty terminal will likely not bring in the same amount of revenue as the Cape Wind deal promised. I think it will be less. I think its just a question of how much less, he told The Boston Herald. According

to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), the estimated levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) for new generation resources in 2019 defined as the per-kilowatt hour cost (in real dollars) of building and operating a
generating plant over an assumed financial life and duty cycle will be $204.10 for offshore wind, or more than three times the $66.30 cost for producing electricity using natural gas.
Topicality
 Diplomatic
We meet by the standards of the resolution; diplomatic engagement is two countries working together for a common goal.
Mauro 15 Paolo Mauro, June 12, 2015 Project-Syndicate; Why America Should Join the AIIB https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/us-should-join-aiib-by-paolo-mauro-2015-06?barrier=true AG
The United States, along with Canada and Japan, has been conspicuously absent from the discussions regarding the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). A total of 57 countries from Europe, Asia, and Latin
America have joined the Chinese-led effort to spend $100 billion on roads, rail lines, bridges, and harbors throughout the region. But President Barack Obamas administration has remained reluctant to join
much to the bewilderment of Chinas government. Continuing to maintain that stance would be a mistake. The US has an opportunity to influence the AIIBs design without looking like it is reversing course. In exchange
for participating in the institution, the Obama administration could and should insist that the AIIB focus on financing infrastructure projects that reduce carbon-dioxide emissions and meet
the highest environmental standards. The need for infrastructure investment in Asias emerging economies is vast. Generally, as a countrys household income rises, the share of spending on food declines, while spending on transportation rises
sharply. And most developing countries in Asia have reached an economic stage at which large segments of their populations will soon be able to afford cars and plane travel for the first time.

Counter Interpretation- The US joining the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank is a good diplomatic investment.
Lieberthal and Jisi 12 Kenneth Lieberthal, Foreign Policy and Global Economy and Development at Brookings, and Wang Jisi, Dean of the School of International Studies Addressing US-China Strategic Distrust March 4 2012
http://yahuwshua.org/en/Resource-584/0330_china_lieberthal.pdf AG

Both Beijing and Washington seek to build a constructive partnership for the long run. U.S.-China relations are, more-over, mature. The two sides understand well each others' position on all
major issues and deal with each other extensively. The highest level leaders meet relatively frequently, and there are more than sixty regular govemment-to-government dialogues between
agencies in the two governments each year.

Standards- There are no limits being exploited in the debate because both teams are still learning in the round. There is no ground is lost because the neg
team was still able to do research and read off case arguments in the debate educating both teams.
Voters should not be held against the aff in this debate because the interpretation presented by the neg team is over limiting and leads to restrictions on aff
cases, leading to the same few affs being read repeatedly which diminishes the opportunities for education in debate rounds.
 Economic
We Meet The US involvement in the Bank positively affects the economic status of China and the US.
Lazarus 16 Leland Lazarus, March 2, 2016; The Diplomat Why the US should Embrace the AIIB http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/why-the-u-s-should-embrace-the-aiib/ AG
Despite all its misgivings about the AIIB, the United States should join the bank to ensure its financial influence in Asia. First, it would limit Chinas voting power in the bank by coordinating with like-minded developing member
countries such as Great Britain, Australia, and New Zealand, thus prodding China toward pursuing cooperative behavior. Second, the U.S. could help raise the AIIBs quality of governance, credit and banking culture and
environmental and social standards. Third, the U.S. could better integrate the AIIB with existing major multilateral development banks, such as the World Bank and Asian Development Bank, in
the form of co-financing and joint project preparation and supervision. Fourth, the U.S. would be in a good position as a reliable partner in Asias infrastructure building and economic development. And fifth, it would ensure that
American businesses will be well informed about infrastructure projects financed by AIIB.

Counter interpretation-
Starr 16 Council on foreign Relations, C.V. Starr Senior Fellow and Director, Asia Studies, Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission; Objectives and Future Direction for Rebalance Economic Policies
March 31,2016 USCC http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Elizabeth%20Economy%20Testimony_033116.pdf AG

Chinas energies in the Asia Pacific have been devoted to advancing its own economic centrality in the region. Chinese President Xi Jinping has pressed forward with a trade, investment, and
security architecture that, if fully implemented, will reshape the political and economic landscape of the Asia Pacific. Beijing has successfully established the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), with
participation from almost sixty countries. The AIIB expects to lend $1015 billion annually for the first several years, and the banks leadership has stated that it will maintain high standards
for transparency as well as social and environmental safeguards, although it will not enforce IMF lending standards.12 According to one Chinese analyst, Chinese officials see the AIIB as helping with overcapacity, increasing demand for
Chinese commodities, spurring RMB internationalization, and helping China increase its influence in setting world economic and financial rules.
Case neg
AT Asian Econ ADV
 I/L
AIIB risk undermining the regions economy through poor management.
Roach et al 2015(Stephen S. Roach, Zha Daojiong, Scott Kennedy, Patrick Chovanec, 3-26-2015, "Washingtons Big China Screw-up," Foreign Policy,
http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/03/26/washingtons-big-china-screw-up-aiib-asia-infrastructure-investment-bank-china-containment-chinafile/, Stephen S. Roach, a faculty member at Yale
University and former chairman of Morgan Stanley Asia, Dr. Zha Daojiong is a Professor of International Political Economy at the School of International Studies, Peking University, and an
expert in Chinese energy policies and food and water security in Asia, Scott Kennedy is director of the Research Center for Chinese Politics & Business and associate professor of political
science and East Asian studies at Indiana University. Patrick Chovanec is chief strategist and managing director at Silvercrest Asset Management and is an adjunct professor at Columbia
Universitys School of International and Public Affairs.)//PH

Many of the concerns the U.S. has with Chinas AIIB are valid. The problem with developing much-needed infrastructure in Asia is not moneythe world is floating in money right nowbut
selecting and managing projects in way that will deliver the desired results. Given the track record of development lending by Chinas existing policy banks (the China Ex-Im Bank and China
Development Bank), at best the AIIB risks being merely a vehicle to buy business for Chinese companies and absorb Chinas huge overcapacity. At worst, it threatens to undermine the
good governance that is key to the regions genuine economic development. Many of the U.S. allies who broke ranks to join the bank appearlike the U.K., eager to win Chinas blessing
as an offshore RMB trading hubto have done so for deeply misguided and even delusional reasons.

The AIIB has no economic significance, will be prone to the same problems as earlier banks and likely will fail harder in its goals
Nyshka Chandran 4.16.15 Why the US shouldnt worry about the AIIB Publisher: CNBC (Nshka Chandran-Writer, Cites Michael Pettis in interview [He is a finance professor at Peking
University]) Date Accessed: 6.22.16 http://www.cnbc.com/2015/04/16/why-the-us-shouldnt-worry-about-the-aiib.html -AR

The China-led Asian Investment Infrastructure Bank (AIIB) is a symbolic institution with no real significance for the global financial system, according to some economists. "We keep hearing that this
bank is an unprecedented move by China, we've never seen anything like this before, it represents a dramatic change in governance of the global trade and capital flow regime - that's all
nonsense," Michael Pettis, finance professor at Peking University, told CNBC on Thursday. Many experts have said the bank is a threat to America's current dominance within international financial institutions like the World Bank. 57 countries are founding
members of the new bank, 37 of which are Asian countries, China announced on Wednesday. The U.S., Canada and Japan are the sole Group of Seven (G-7) countries that remain absent. Read MoreChina says no to Taiwan on AIIB: What it means "I think this
whole discussion of the AIIB has simply been overblown," said Fraser Howie, managing director at Newedge Singapore. "If China is trying to use this Trojan Horse to undermine the U.S. dollar and take its rightful place in the financial world, it's just not going to
happen using [the AIIB]." 'Implausibilities' Pettis, a longtime China-watcher and senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, highlighted
two major requirements for the AIIB to become an important
institution: China's economy would have to rival the size of the U.S. in the 1940s and 1950s - a period of profound political and economic clout for America - and the renminbi would have to
become the world's top reserve currency. The chances of both those events occurring are slim, according to Pettis. "Maybe China will one day become the largest economy in the world - and I'm
skeptical it will - but even if it does, it will never achieve the size that the U.S. did in the 1940s." Furthermore, the renminbi will be at best a minor reserve currency, in Pettis's view. "There are only two ways
how the world can accumulate renminbi: either China's central bank takes on trillions of dollars of risk of sub-investment grade countries or China must be willing to run large current account deficits, and it probably won't do that." The signing ceremony of the
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on October 24, 2014. Getty Images - Takaki Yajima-Pool The signing ceremony of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on October 24,
2014. What makes the AIIB special? The
AIIB will be prone to the same challenges as the much-hyped initiatives that preceded it, according to Newedge's Howie. "In the past decade, China has invested in Africa, Latin America
and its struggling just as developed countries did before them to get paid back." Moreover, the
bank's lack of clear intentions is a key challenge in its quest for global relevance, he added. "When the World Bank was set
up, its goal was poverty reduction. That is not the goal of [the AIIB], there isn't a clear goal. They're talking about building Asian infrastructure, but are you really trying to tell me the world doesn't have
enough capital to fund Asian infrastructure?" Wait and see The general consensus among experts is that it's still too early to say just how momentous the creation of the AIIB is. Details on the bank's funding as well as governance have yet to be
laid out in precise form, leading the U.S. to state it will only welcome the AIIB if its standards match those of existing institutions. "There are still a lot of uncertainties. There hasn't been a new institution like this in many years," warned Philippe Le Corre, fellow at
The Brookings Institution. "China is conscious of the fact that it cannot fail. Washington and Tokyo are both watching, so it's a big challenge."
 Currency Turn
Chinese led AIIB will adopt the yuan leading to yuan hegemony weakening the value of the dollar
Tyler Durden 4.15.15 Writer China takes aim at dollar reserve status: promotes yuan in investment bank Date Accessed: 6.21.16 Publisher: Zero Hedge (Financial Site)
http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2015-04-15/china-takes-aim-dollar-reserve-status-promotes-yuan-new-bank -AR

As regular readers know, weve variously described the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank as representing both an attempt by China to cement its regional dominance by implicitly adopting a sino-
Monroe Doctrine, as indicative of Beijings desire to supplant to US-dominated multinational institutions that have been a fixture of the post WWII economic world order, and, perhaps most importantly, as a not-so-subtle indication that
dollar hegemony may be on the way out and yuan hegemony may be around the corner. Essentially the AIIB will (either intentionally or unintentionally depending on who you believe) serve as an instrument of Chinese foreign
policy and any hope of keeping this between the people who are privy to the countrys various hidden agendas (because all countries have agendas), went out the window early last month when the UK staged a coup by breaking with Washington and joining the
development bank triggering a flood of applications from Western countries and culminating in membership bids from US allies Australia, Israel, and even Canada. Adding insult to injury, the AIIB is now looking to hire officials away from the World Bank and
rival ADB. Amid the March membership frenzy, Beijing sought to play down the degree to which the venture would serve to help establish a new world economic order with China at the helm. An article which appeared in The Global Times (a paper run by the
state-controlled Peoples Daily) very specifically denied any notion that China has designed on establishing a yuan-based global economic system. Heres an excerpt: The establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) has been depicted by a few
overseas media outlets as if China is building its own version of the Bretton Woods system... Some foreign observers claim that the AIIB is the beginning of the Chinese yuan's hegemony. What they are actually trying to imply is that "China is another US." This kind
of statement is nonsensical, which uses historical experience to fool readers. It is divorced from the truth and shows no common sense and doesn't stand up to any scrutiny. Through the Bretton Woods system, the US was able to wield supreme influence over its
allies which had been severely battered during the war. China today is in a totally different position. The AIIB will not confront the WB or IMF, nor will it turn the current international monetary order upside down. The spirit of the AIIB is diversity and justice.
Perhaps, but as we noted at the time, it was on the very same day that the following came across the wires: China
plans to push for yuan to take prominence in loans under the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and
the Silk Road Fund, people familiar with the matter said. China may encourage $100b AIIB and $40b Silk Road Fund to issue loans directly in yuan or set up yuan-denominated funds under the two institutions,
according to the people, who ask not to be identified because deliberations are private. This prompted us to suggest that actions speak louder than words. Today, The South China Morning Post reports that the bank will establish an AIIB currency basket with
China set to push for the yuan to take a prominent role and for special currency funds to be established in order to issue yuan-denominated loans through the fund. Heres more: Beijing will push for the
yuan to be included in a basket of currencies used to denominate and settle loans from the Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), according to think tank sources. Beijing will also encourage the AIIB and the Silk Road Fund to set up special
currency funds and issue yuan-denominated loans through both institutions, the sources said. If the US dollar is used, it weakens Chinas bid for the yuan to be a global currency. The efforts are part of a drive to internationalise the Chinese currency and come as
the International Monetary Fund prepares to discuss the possible inclusion of the yuan as its fifth reserve currency and as part of the basket that forms the IMF's Special Drawing Rights. The sources' claims appeared to be confirmed by a state media report, which
said that a basket of currencies called the "AIIB currency" would most likely be adopted as the bank's currency of settlement Hao Hong, chief economist and managing director of research at Bocom International, said the AIIB's grand vision for infrastructure
investment came with challenges but China should do its best to establish the yuan as a currency for settlement and denomination. "If the US dollar is used instead, it weakens China's bid for the yuan to become a truly global currency and to challenge the
hegemony of the US dollar," Hong said. Yifan Hu, chief economist with Haitong Securities International, said it would be too hard to reach a consensus on an AIIB currency basket... "In my view, the US dollar will be used in the early stages of the AIIB, and then [the
bank] will gradually move to a mix of the yuan and US dollar," Hu said. The sources said China would push for broader use of the yuan at the AIIB and the Silk Road Fund, as part
of efforts to promote the yuan as an international currency
The sources said that there was still a long way to go in the internationalisation of the yuan and the greenback would continue to dominate the global financial system for the next few years. Yes, for the next few
years, which really isnt that long, especially when compared with how long the dollar has dominated the global economic order. Perhaps even more interesting and more alarming for Washington is that the move by China to expand the yuans influence
via a fund that is now backed by nearly every major country on the planet save the US and Japan, comes just as petrodollar mecantilism, which has been perhaps the driving force behind dollar dominance for decades, crumbles in the face of slumping oil prices. As
weve reported on several occasions, 2014 marked the first year in nearly two decades that oil producers' petrodollar exports (i.e. the recycling of oil proceeds into USD assets) turned negative. In other words, falling oil prices mean producing nations are now
removing liquidity from the system rather than adding it, a process Goldman estimates will will sum to nearly $900 billion by 2018. The combination of these two forces could serve to cause a dramatic shakeup in a world that heretofore
functioned on a unilateral system, both politically and economically.

Weak U.S. Dollar helps Asian economies by increasing Asian export value, Asian consumer spending, and ending deflation
Patrick Gillespie 3.31.15 Biggest loser from strong dollar: emerging markets Publisher: CNN Money Patrick Gillespie->Writer Date Accessed: 6.21.16
http://money.cnn.com/2015/03/31/investing/us-dollar-strong-emerging-markets/ -AR
Will a weaker U.S. dollar wreak havoc with company sales and stock prices in Asia? The scenario would have seemed unthinkable even three months ago, when the dollar was approaching 138 yen, and the U.S. economy looked to be on the mend. Now, much of
the economic data from the U.S. paints contradictory pictures about the state of the economy. On Tuesday, for example, the outlook seemed good, with the U.S. Labor Department reporting that productivity grew at the fastest rate in 19 years. But last Friday, it
reported the jobless rate hit an eight-year high of 6%. After that last piece of news, the dollar's steady decline of the past few weeks accelerated: On Tuesday, it dipped under the 127-yen mark, although by late Wednesday, it was back around 128. Look no further
than Tuesday's Tokyo stock prices to see how a strong yen would affect Asian exporters. Shares of Toyota Motor fell 2% to 3,400 yen ($26.58), before rebounding 1.8% to 3,460 yen on Wednesday. Advantest, which makes chip-testing devices, shed 7% to close at
8,600 yen, before rebounding to 8,640 yen. The same fate could well befall exporters in other countries, too. After all, for
most Asian countries the U.S. is a key export market. A weaker dollar would make Asian products
more expensive for U.S. consumers. It is hard to predict what would happen if the dollar weakened another 10% or 15%. "We have no history here," says Arup Raha, chief economist for Asia at UBS Warburg, pointing out that the last time the
dollar weakened significantly, at the end of 1998 and the beginning of 1999, Asian economies were much weaker than they are now. While Asian currencies strengthened against the dollar back then, they were
coming from such a low base that they would have strengthened anyway as their economies recovered from the 1997 financial crisis. In the prior era of dollar weakness, in the years leading up to and including 1995, most Asian currencies were pegged to the U.S.
dollar, so they fell along with it. Now, only three currencies remain pegged to the dollar: China's yuan, the Hong Kong dollar, and Malaysia's ringgit. These are the economies that will benefit most from dollar weakness, as their goods
will remain affordable for U.S. consumers while becoming less expensive for consumers in other Asian markets. That is a key point, because non-Japan Asia is the leading destination of exports for all Asian economies.
Other Asian economies, excluding Japan, bought 31% of last year's exports from China, according to UBS Warburg. Nearby importers bought 42% of Malaysian exports, and 47% of Hong Kong exports. Of course, many of these goods are intermediate -- clothes cut
in one Asian country, for example, that are stitched together in a second country before being shipped on to their final destination in Europe or the U.S. But even for intermediate goods, if one step is through a country with an inexpensive currency, it could help
lower the end-price. Outside the three pegged-exchange-rate economies, Asian currencies, generally speaking, will probably rise against the dollar if the dollar weakens against major world currencies. Given that Asia
is in recovery mode, says Mr. Raha, governments will try to cushion the strengthening of their currencies by making sure there is lots of cash around at home. The greater the supply of a currency, the less likely it is to rise in value. But one country that won't be
able to loosen domestic liquidity is South Korea -- in fact, to cool an economy it feared could be overheating, it raised short-term rates a quarter point on Tuesday. The won, along with the yen, will
likely strengthen more than most Asian
currencies against the dollar, economists say. As Asian goods grow more expensive in the U.S., there is always the danger that U.S. consumers will slow their buying spree. Of course, some disagree: Tim Condon, chief economist
for Asia at ING Barings, for one, who forecasts that U.S. shoppers will keep spending, even with moderately higher prices. To some extent, local consumers could pick up the slack from any decline in exports to the U.S. That is already happening in much of Asia,
notably, South Korea. It
might even start to happen in Asia's largest economy, Japan. With a stronger yen, its imports from the rest of Asia will seem less expensive, encouraging its consumers to
buy more. As for Hong Kong, a strong yen, along with stronger regional currencies, could mean the end to deflation as the goods it imports from other countries become more expensive in Hong Kong dollar terms. A 10%-15%
depreciation in the dollar, Mr. Raha says, would wipe out Hong Kong's deflation by the end of the year. A main point to keep in mind amid talk of strong and weak currencies is perspective. After all, the dollar is coming off exceptional strength at the end of 2001
and the beginning of 2002; keep in mind that last July and August, the dollar was much weaker than now, hovering in the low 120s range against the yen. And it is worth remembering as well that benefits from a weaker dollar would take
months to kick in. Connell Brothers, a big U.S. exporter of industrial chemicals to Asia, makes a case in point. Silverio Ambrosio, the general manager for the Manila branch, says customers are already hounding him for lower prices because of the decline of
the dollar against the peso, even though he is selling from inventory bought when the peso was weaker. It will take about four months to wipe out that inventory and benefit from a weaker dollar, he says.

Chinese world bank uses the yuan to oust the U.S. dollar
Money Morning Staff 6.4.15 Warning: Chinas new World Bank Threatens U.S. Dollar Publisher: Money Morning Date Accessed: 6.21.16 http://moneymorning.com/2015/06/04/warning-
chinas-new-world-bank-threatens-u-s-dollar/ -AR

China has just made another strike against the U.S. dollar with a new "world bank" the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). china's new world bank By now 57 countries have been approved to join forces
in this $50 billion global economic "superpower" cooperative and the United States is not one of them. India, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Britain, and Germany are among the founding members in China's AIIB. Washington officials have declined to join. They say this
bank will rival the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank and fear Beijing will use this new bank to strengthen its economic power. China's
AIIB is just the latest in a string of moves from the Red
Dragon to promote its currency, the yuan, and remove the U.S. dollar as the world's reserve currency. The fallout of these deals has such dangerous economic consequences that the CIA's Asymmetric Threat Advisor Jim
Rickards has just released warnings for Americans to get prepared today "China is actually putting yuan bilateral trade agreements in place all over the world," said Rickards. "Once there's enough trade and
enough volume in a certain currency, it can become a reserve currency. These are all straws in the wind, leading to the collapse of the dollar as the global reserve currency." Just look at these historic
deals China has made recently to challenge the U.S. economy: In May 2014, China signed a 30-year $400 billion energy alliance with Russia. The BBC wrote at the time, "this deal could symbolize an important moment of transition when both in economic and
geo-political terms, Russia's gaze begins to look more towards the East than towards the West." In November 2014, China and Russia deepened their economic ties with a second natural gas deal valued at $284 billion. Also in November 2014, China signed a deal
with Australia that eased restrictions on Chinese investment in Australia's plentiful resource sector. The deal removes tariffs on 85% of Australian exports to China. Australia called the deal the "best ever between Beijing and a Western country" These deals are
just one way China aims to take down the dollar. In fact, there are five dangerous catalysts that will destroy the dollar and trigger a massive economic collapse. Continue here to find out from Rickards how these five
"flashpoints" will trigger the U.S. dollar demise
Human Rights/Environment
 I/L
AIIB would increase human rights issues and environmental damages through Chinese construction contracts. Zambia proves.
Weeks 15(John Weeks, 4-1-2015, Real News Network, "Economics for the 99% Asian Infrastructure Development Bank in Beijing: Now, that's a seriously bad idea," No Publication,
http://www.therealnews.com/t2/latest-news/2330-economics-for-the-99-asian-infrastructure-development-bank-in-beijing-now-thats-a-seriously-bad-idea)//PH

The major influence of China in any such institution is a very serious problem that cannot be exaggerated. Chinese state and private capital, and the distinction is slight, includes some of the
world's largest construction companies. With the AIIB overwhelmingly funded by the Chinese government that will have the largest voting share, it would be nave to think that Chinese
companies will not enjoy privileged access to construction contracts. More serious is the rather poor behavior of the Chinese businesses toward economic "cooperation" in less powerful
countries. MY experience of this is in Africa, where its record is frequently appalling. In Zambia trade unions singled out Chinese companies as especially guilty of abusing workers, and the
Zambian government suspended the operation of a Chinese company for gross environmental infractions. I was in Zambia working with the central bank (Bank of Zambia, BoZ) in February
2015. I met with mining owners to discuss the government's exchange rate policy. Attending the meeting was the manager of the largest Chinese company in mining (he was Chinese), who in
a short speech managed to offend both the BoZ officials and his private sector colleagues with his apparent disregard for Zambian exchange rate and labor regulations. The systemic
indifference of the Chinese government and companies to the sensitivities of their counterparts in economically weaker countries emerged clearly in a report I did for the United Nations
Development Program about its funding for the China Africa Business Forum. About 25 business representatives awaited me in the meeting I attended in 2008 -- held in Communist Party
headquarters in Beijing lest I have any confusion about who was in charge -- and not one was from Africa (the only African being a minor employee of the Forum). The main topics of the
meeting were the loans and technical assistance from China to African governments and businesses. At one point I suggested that the Chinese tourist industry -- then gearing up for the
Olympics -- might seek technical assistance from the very successful local tourist companies in Kenya, Zambia and South Africa. The suggestion that Chinese business might learn from African
business brought a round of laughter. I did not press the point. It may be that Chinese officials are more understanding in their dealings with Asian partners. I have not reason to think so.
AT Poverty ADV
 I/L

AIIB will fail to balance societal problems while only benefiting the elite.
Rogoff 15(Kenneth Rogoff, 4-1-2015, Kenneth Rogoff is a professor of economics and public policy at Harvard University, "Will China's infrastructure bank work?" Guardian,
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/apr/07/will-chinas-infrastructure-bank-work,)//PH

With China set to lead a new $50bn international financial institution, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), most of the debate has centred on the USs futile efforts to discourage
other advanced economies from joining. Far too little attention has been devoted to understanding why multilateral development lending has so often failed, and what might be done to
make it work better. Multilateral development institutions have probably had their most consistent success when they serve as knowledge banks, helping to share experience, best
practices, and technical knowledge across regions. By contrast, their greatest failures have come from funding grandiose projects that benefit the current elite, but do not properly balance
environmental, social, and development priorities. Dam construction is a leading historical example. In general, there is a tendency to overestimate the economic benefits of big infrastructure
projects in countries riddled by poor governance and corruption, and to underestimate the long-run social costs of having to repay loans whether or not promised revenues materialise.
Obviously, the AIIB runs this risk.

Financial institutions empirically fail to properly address poverty through Infrastructure, often end up going to corrupt
Regimes -empirics prove
Aiyar 15. "Why US Allies Are Happy to Join China's AIIB." The Diplomat. N.p., 15. Web. 21 June 2016. <http://thediplomat.com/2015/07/why-us-allies-are-happy-to-join-chinas-aiib/>. NW
On June 29, representatives of 50 countries gathered in Beijing to sign the legal framework agreement to establish the $100 billion Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Seven more
countries are expected to sign, bringing the total number of founding AIIB members to 57. The institution will launch with China having a 30.4 percent share of the AIIBs equity, followed by
India (8.5 percent) and Russia (6.7 percent). The two notable absentees are the United States and Japan. Key NATO allies of the U.S., like Germany, France and the United Kingdom, have
opted to join the AIIB. Germany will have the largest non-Asian stake (4.1 percent). Of all its allies, why did only Japan stand with the United States on an issue with strategic implications? The
new AIIB will symbolize Chinas rise as a financial superpower, guiding the worlds biggest infrastructure financing institution. Whatever their reservations about Chinas financial rise, most
countries see it as a fact of life that cannot be stalled by staying out of the AIIB. They would rather be inside it, getting a share of the infrastructure orders that the AIIB will finance. U.S.
President Barack Obama says China may steer AIIB loans to meet political or strategic considerations rather than economic. So, the AIIB will have lower lending standards than existing
multilateral institutions like the World Bank and Asian Development Bank, and undercut their effectiveness. Japan echoes this sentiment. Enjoying this article? Click here to subscribe for full
access. Just $5 a month. Why have other major donors shrugged away this objection? Because their diplomats smile at the notion that the World Bank or ADB have always had the highest
lending standards. The U.S. as chief shareholder of the World Bank has always viewed it as a foreign policy tool. Ditto for Japan, chief shareholder of the ADB. Besides, as a development
institution, the World Bank measures its success by its top linelending volumeand not the bottom line. It has financed huge public sector undertakings of dubious quality across
developing countries. When I first worked for the Bank in 1985, one staffer explained to me the pressures to lend. In the first quarter of the year, we promise to be really tough. By the
second quarter, we worry that disbursements are behind schedule. By the last quarter, we are shoveling money as fast as possible. If we dont meet disbursement targets, we risk losing
allocations and staff next year. The Economist gave a delightful example of Bank lending as it really was in its issue of August 19, 1995: Over the past few years, Kenya has performed a
curious mating ritual with its aid donors. The steps are: One, Kenya wins its yearly pledges of foreign aid. Two, the government begins to misbehave, backtracking on economic reform and
behaving in an authoritarian manner. Three, a new meeting of donor counties looms with exasperated foreign governments preparing their sharp rebukes. Four, Kenya pulls a placatory rabbit
out of its hat. Five, the donors are mollified and the aid is pledged. The whole dance then starts again. During the Cold War, the U.S. happily backed loans to Third World kleptocrats willing to
toe U.S. foreign policy. One U.S. diplomat said of the Democratic Republic of the Congos odious ruler and kleptocrat, General Mobutu, Hes a son of a bitch, but hes our son of a bitch. Bank
projects in the Congo failed consistently. Why? Because aid to that country mostly ended up in Mobutus Swiss bank accounts. Many Third World dictators stole vast sums, yet in evaluating
project performance, Bank staff were prohibited from mentioning corruption as a reason. Only after the Cold War ended was this taboo lifted. Bank President Wolfensohn (1995-2005)
admitted that corruption had long been a major cause of failed loans, and pledged to curb it in future. Will China similarly use its dominant position in the AIIB to promote its foreign policy
aims, and wink at the peccadilloes of friendly governments? Of course. But this will be no more distortionary than World Bank behavior during the Cold War. Thats why so many countries are
unworried about the AIIBs lending standards, and have happily signed up. They acknowledge the emergence of China as a new financial power, and seek a slice of the economic action
financed by that new power. Obama sees the AIIB as a lending rival that will reduce the leverage the United States gets through domination of the World Bank. Japan has kept out of AIIB for
the same reason: it too will suffer erosion of its leverage as chief financier of the Asian Development Bank. But other donor countries, long used to playing second fiddle to the U.S. and Japan
in these two institutions, are just as willing to play second fiddle to China in the AIIB. Nothing personal, they will tell Obama, its just business.
 Impact
Poverty decreasing now increased economic growth has halved poverty rates since 1990.
The Economist 13 (Towards the end of poverty,, 1 June 2013, http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21578665-nearly-1-billion-people-have-been-taken-out-extreme-poverty-20-
years-world-should-aim; 6-23-16)

The worlds achievement in the field of poverty reduction is, by almost any measure, impressive. Although many of the original MDGssuch as cutting maternal mortality by three-quarters and child mortality by two-thirdswill not be met, the aim of
halving global poverty between 1990 and 2015 was achieved five years early. The MDGs may have helped marginally, by creating a yardstick for measuring progress, and by focusing minds on the evil of poverty. Most of the credit, however,
must go to capitalism and free trade, for they enable economies to growand it was growth, principally, that has eased destitution. Poverty rates started to collapse towards the end of the 20th
century largely because developing-country growth accelerated, from an average annual rate of 4.3% in 1960-2000 to 6% in 2000-10. Around two-thirds of poverty reduction within a country comes from growth. Greater
equality also helps, contributing the other third. A 1% increase in incomes in the most unequal countries produces a mere 0.6% reduction in poverty; in the most equal countries, it yields a 4.3% cut. China (which has never shown any interest in MDGs) is responsible for three-quarters of the
achievement. Its economy has been growing so fast that, even though inequality is rising fast, extreme poverty is disappearing. China pulled 680m people out of misery in 1981-2010, and reduced its extreme-poverty rate from 84% in 1980 to 10% now.

Poverty decreasing now aid and development projects are providing education and resources.
McVeigh 13 (Tracy McVeigh, Chief reporter at the Observer, World poverty is shrinking rapidly, new index reveals, The Guardian, 16 March 2013,
http://www.theguardian.com/society/2013/mar/17/aid-trade-reduce-acute-poverty; 6-23-16)

Some of the poorest

people in the world are becoming significantly less poor, according to a groundbreaking academic study which has taken a new approach to measuring deprivation. The report, by Oxford University's poverty and human development initiative,
predicts that countries
among the most impoverished in the world could see acute poverty eradicated within 20 years if they continue at present rates. It identifies "star performer" nations such
as Rwanda, Nepal and Bangladesh as places where deprivation could disappear within the lifetime of present generations. Close on their heels with reductions in poverty levels were Ghana, Tanzania,
Cambodia and Bolivia. The study comes after the UN's latest development report published last week which stated that poverty reduction drives in the developing world were exceeding all expectations. It says: "The world is
witnessing a epochal 'global rebalancing' with higher growth in at least 40 poor countries helping lift hundreds of millions out of poverty and into a new 'global middle class'. Never in history have the
living conditions and prospects of so many people changed so dramatically and so fast."
AT Warming ADV
 I/L
China led bank will result in more environmental impacts
Yuge Ma 12.05.14 Yuge Ma is a DPhil Candidate at the Environmental Change Institute (ECI), University of Oxford. She is co-founder of the Juxtapose Project, which focuses on interdisciplinary
China-India comparative studies. Her latest book is Grow Up in India (Beijing, 2013). A longer version of this article first appeared on China-Outlook. The Environmental Implications of Chinas
New Bank Date Accessed: 6.20.16 Publisher: The Diplomat http://thediplomat.com/2014/12/the-environmental-implications-of-chinas-new-bank/ -AR
On October 24 this year, 21 Asian countries signed an agreement in Beijing that signaled the launch of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), whose main backer is China. The agreement authorized $100 billion in capital for the new bank, with an initial
subscribed capital of around $50 billion. But will the new bank be able to implement best practice when it comes to governance and environmental concerns? According to the Asian Development Bank (ADB) Japan-led and the largest existing multilateral
development bank in Asia between now and 2020 the Asia and Pacific regions will require infrastructure investment of at least $8 trillion. As Chinas Xinhua news agency commented, the existing international financial system is insufficient to meet this huge
demand. This gives China ample scope to play a crucial role. While the Western world might fear losing influence in the growing Asian market or a potential challenge to the U.S.-led international order, the AIIB raises another concern: the potential threat Chinese
money might represent to established international standards of foreign aid. Enjoying this article? Click here to subscribe for full access. Just $5 a month. In her book By All Means Necessary: How Chinas Resource Quest Is Changing the World (Oxford University
Press, 2014), Elizabeth Economy, senior fellow and director for Asia studies at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, and her colleague Michael Levi argue that the best
way to understand the local implications of Chinese overseas
investments is to observe how it operates at home, where neither the Chinese government nor companies pay much attention to environmental protection. Despite the fact that China had established a
nationwide system of environmental impact assessment (EIA), in practice it is hamstrung by widespread data fraud, corruption, and political intervention from local officials. Only now is the Chinese government beginning to govern this
chaotic field. However, the authors have also observed some improvements in Chinese companies social and environmental awareness in recent years. The first is top down: in order to reduce unsustainable development, Chinas leadership has been encouraging
companies, especially state-owned enterprises, to engage in more corporate social responsibility-related international initiatives by launching a set of policy incentives that apply to both domestic and overseas investments. The second change is coming from
outside. As more Chinese companies go abroad, they are receiving more exposure to the best practices of their foreign counterparts. In addition, Chinas Ministry of Commerce has encouraged Chinese companies to be more active in the United Nations Global
Compact and other international rating systems to improve their international image. Finally, the third change is from the bottom up, and refers to the growing public awareness of the negative environmental and social impact of Chinese investment and active
NGO participation in pushing Chinese companies to change their behavior. Still, none of the above motivations have been sufficient to meaningfully alter the fundamental logic of growth-at-any-cost. Without
strict environmental regulations and effective enforcement from their host countries, Chinese corporations still cant stop using the tried and tested albeit outdated methods they have
used over decades. When Chinese energy-related projects have entered more mature markets, such as Australia, Canada, and even Poland and Brazil, the host countries environmental authorities and
vibrant civil society groups have forced them to accept much stricter environmental laws. As a result Chinese investors have had to pay a very high price to learn those lessons, leading to
unforeseen profit losses. Cai Jinyong, the first Chinese national to become CEO of the International Finance Corporation (IFC) said in a recent interview that Chinese overseas investment projects are generally good at
construction, but weak at long-term management. The environmental impact is an important component of managing a sustainable project in terms of both financial and social consequences. Put simply, even though Chinese companies want to
improve their environmental practices not always the case in countries without de facto environmental regulations a lack of expertise and experience remains a significant obstacle. Xi Jinping has promised that the principles of AIIB will
be equality, inclusiveness and efficiency, while Chinese Finance Minister Lou Jiwei has declared that AIIB will learn from the best practice in the world and adopt international standards of environmental protection. Yet, infrastructure-hungry Asian
countries are themselves causing severe environmental degradation air pollution, water scarcity and soil contamination to name a few. They also suffer from weak government
accountability and lack of civil society participation in environmental issues. It is unlikely they will be able to enforce international standards on Chinese-financed projects solely on their own. Elizabeth Economy argued in a recent
opinion article that the international world, especially the US, should see the creation of the AIIB as a chance to introduce robust environmental standards to China-led infrastructure investments in Asia. An editorial in The Hindu urged India, presumably the AIIBs
second largest shareholder, to work closely with China to ensure that best practices are followed in projects for procurement and materials and in terms of labour and environmental standards. But
will China readily accept involvement from
the U.S., its close allies, and other emerging countries in its ambitious multilateral initiative, which aims to increase its political and economic influence in the region? One thing we can be sure about is
the Chinese leadership understands very well that its long-term international influence does not solely depend on hard power; it also relies on soft power, mainly the social and environmental consequences of its extensive global presence. As Joseph Nye, creator
of the popular soft power concept said last year: The development of soft power need not be a zero-sum game. All countries can gain from finding each other attractive. Leaders from the U.S., China, and other Asian countries, developed or developing, will
need political wisdom as well as professional collaboration to ensure the sustainable development of the most populous and fastest-growing region in the world.

No check to Chinese corruption- AIIB is bad for the environment, turns their impacts
Ma 14. "The Environmental Implications of China's New Bank." The Diplomat. N.p., 14. Web. 21 June 2016. <http://thediplomat.com/2014/12/the-environmental-implications-of-chinas-
new-bank/>.NW

According to the Asian Development Bank (ADB) Japan-led and the largest existing multilateral development bank in Asia between now and 2020 the Asia and Pacific regions will require
infrastructure investment of at least $8 trillion. As Chinas Xinhua news agency commented, the existing international financial system is insufficient to meet this huge demand. This gives
China ample scope to play a crucial role. While the Western world might fear losing influence in the growing Asian market or a potential challenge to the U.S.-led international order, the AIIB
raises another concern: the potential threat Chinese money might represent to established international standards of foreign aid. Enjoying this article? Click here to subscribe for full access. Just $5 a month. In her
book By All Means Necessary: How Chinas Resource Quest Is Changing the World (Oxford University Press, 2014), Elizabeth Economy, senior fellow and director for Asia studies at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, and her colleague Michael Levi argue
thatthe best way to understand the local implications of Chinese overseas investments is to observe how it operates at home, where neither the Chinese government nor companies pay much
attention to environmental protection. Despite the fact that China had established a nationwide system of environmental impact assessment (EIA), in practice it is hamstrung by widespread
data fraud, corruption, and political intervention from local officials. Only now is the Chinese government beginning to govern this chaotic field. However, the authors have also observed some improvements in Chinese companies social
and environmental awareness in recent years. The first is top down: in order to reduce unsustainable development, Chinas leadership has been encouraging companies, especially state-owned enterprises, to engage in more corporate social responsibility-related
international initiatives by launching a set of policy incentives that apply to both domestic and overseas investments. The second change is coming from outside. As more Chinese companies go abroad, they are receiving more exposure to the best practices of
their foreign counterparts. In addition, Chinas Ministry of Commerce has encouraged Chinese companies to be more active in the United Nations Global Compact and other international rating systems to improve their international image. Finally, the third
change is from the bottom up, and refers to the growing public awareness of the negative environmental and social impact of Chinese investment and active NGO participation in pushing Chinese companies to change their behavior.
Still, none of the
above motivations have been sufficient to meaningfully alter the fundamental logic of growth-at-any-cost. Without strict environmental regulations and effective enforcement from their host
countries, Chinese corporations still cant stop using the tried and tested albeit outdated methods they have used over decades. When Chinese energy-related projects have entered more
mature markets, such as Australia, Canada, and even Poland and Brazil, the host countries environmental authorities and vibrant civil society groups have forced them to accept much stricter
environmental laws. As a result Chinese investors have had to pay a very high price to learn those lessons, leading to unforeseen profit losses. Cai Jinyong, the first Chinese national to become
CEO of the International Finance Corporation (IFC) said in a recent interview that Chinese overseas investment projects are generally good at construction, but weak at long-term
management. The environmental impact is an important component of managing a sustainable project in terms of both financial and social consequences. Put simply, even though Chinese
companies want to improve their environmental practices not always the case in countries without de facto environmental regulations a lack of expertise and experience remains a
significant obstacle. Xi Jinping has promised that the principles of AIIB will be equality, inclusiveness and efficiency, while Chinese Finance Minister Lou Jiwei has declared that AIIB will learn
from the best practice in the world and adopt international standards of environmental protection. Yet, infrastructure-hungry Asian countries are themselves causing severe environmental
degradation air pollution, water scarcity and soil contamination to name a few. They also suffer from weak government accountability and lack of civil society participation in environmental
issues. It is unlikely they will be able to enforce international standards on Chinese-financed projects solely on their own. Elizabeth Economy argued in a recent opinion article that the international world, especially
the US, should see the creation of the AIIB as a chance to introduce robust environmental standards to China-led infrastructure investments in Asia. An editorial in The Hindu urged India, presumably the AIIBs second largest shareholder, to work closely with
China to ensure that best practices are followed in projects for procurement and materials and in terms of labour and environmental standards. But will China readily accept involvement from the U.S., its close allies, and other emerging countries in its
ambitious multilateral initiative, which aims to increase its political and economic influence in the region? One thing we can be sure about is the Chinese leadership understands very well that its long-term international influence does not solely depend on hard
power; it also relies on soft power, mainly the social and environmental consequences of its extensive global presence.

Chinese contractors will be favored by AIIB and increase environmental damage.

Dreyer 2015(June Teufel Dreyer, April 2015, "The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: Who Will Benefit?," Foreign Policy Research Institute, http://www.fpri.org/article/2015/04/the-
asian-infrastructure-investment-bank-who-will-benefit/, June Teufel Dreyer a Senior Fellow in FPRIs Asia Program as well as a member of the Orbis Board of Editors. She is Professor of
Political Science at the University of Miami, Coral Gables, Florida)//PH

Environmental and quality issues are a further concern. It seems likely that Chinese companies will receive the bulk of contracts for infrastructure improvement. There have been complaints
from Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia of inattention to both ecosystems and quality controls. Indonesia has complained about the construction standards of Chinese-built power
plants. Burma is seeking to back away from controversial projects that were contracted for by its former junta government. Under the junta, Burma was treated as a pariah state by much of
the world, and hence became heavily dependent on Chinese aid. In, 2011, its successor government, responding to widespread citizen opposition, suspended a Chinese-backed dam project;
in 2014 it delayed a plan for a $20 billion rail line between Yunnan province in China and Burmas Rakhine state. A controversial copper mine that caused pollution, forced relocation of
residents, and illegal land confiscation led to charges that Beijings real aim in not, as advertised, mutual benefit but the extraction of Burmas natural resources for its own benefit.[8] Sri
Lanka has suspended a major project to develop the port of Colombo over environmental and sovereignty issues.[9] Vietnamese note that Chinese traders who contract for a variety of star
anise flowers that is used for medicinal purposes have removed not only the flowers but the roots, thus both harming the environment and depriving farmers of an important source of
revenue.[10]
 Impact
Warming inevitable even if we cut emissions to zerooceanic thermal inertia
Grimsrud 13 [Eric, Visiting Scientist at Atmospheric Research Laboratory at Washington State University, Is warming by CO2 irreversible, unstoppable, and/or inevitable?, ericgrimsrud,
April 20 2013, https://ericgrimsrud.wordpress.com/2013/04/20/is-warming-by-co2-irreversible-unstoppable-andor-inevitable-2/; 6-23-16)

First, is the global warming caused by CO2 emissions irreversible? Unfortunately, on any time scale of relevance to existing human civilizations, the answer to this question is no, the
warming we cause is not reversible. There are two reasons for
this. One is that even if we stopped all man-causes CO2 emissions today, it would take about 200 years for todays elevated level of atmospheric CO2, approaching 400 ppm, to naturally decay down to a level
of about 340 ppm, a level we had in 1980 still much higher than the preindustrial level of 280 ppm. Yes, it takes a long time for the extra biological carbon we put into the Earths carbon cycle to dissipate into stable
geological reservoirs of carbon such as limestone. And yes, it will take about 200 years to undo the CO2 increase we have caused over the last 30 years. In addition, the heating of the Earth is delayed by the huge thermal inertia of
our oceans , and the timescale of that delay just happens to be nearly equal to the rate of CO2 decay just described. Thus, these two slow processes described above go in opposite
directions and tend to cancel each others effect so that the Earths temperature will remain approximately constant after that envisioned point in time when all anthropogenic CO2
emissions have been eliminated. Then, of course, what has taken a long time to warm up (the oceans primary) also takes a long time to cool off. Putting all of this together, the warming we have created to date is approximately what we are stuck with
in the future. That is, the temperature change that has been caused up to present is already set and is not reversible.

Cease in Gases Wont Stop Warming From Being Inevitable

Solomon, Atmospheric Chemist at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 2010
[Susan, 11-11-10, National Academy of Sciences, Persistence of Climate Changes Due To A Range Of Greenhouse Gases, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2972948/]

Carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and other greenhouse

gases increased over the course of the 20th century due to human activities. The human-caused increases in these gases are the primary forcing that
accounts for much of the global warming of the past fifty years, with carbon dioxide being the most important single radiative forcing agent (1). Recent studies have shown that the human-caused warming linked to carbon dioxide is nearly
irreversible for more than 1,000 y, even if emissions of the gas were to cease entirely (25). The importance of the ocean in taking up heat and slowing the response of the climate system to radiative forcing changes has been noted in many studies
(e.g., refs. 6 and 7). The key role of the oceans thermal lag has also been highlighted by recent approaches to proposed metrics for comparing the warming of different greenhouse gases (8, 9). Among the observations attesting to the importance of these effects are those showing that climate
changes caused by transient volcanic aerosol loading persist for more than 5 y (7, 10), and a portion can be expected to last more than a century in the ocean (1113); clearly these signals persist far longer than the radiative forcing decay timescale of about 1218 mo for the volcanic aerosol (14, 15).
Thus the observed climate response to volcanic events suggests that some persistence of climate change should be expected even for quite short-lived radiative forcing perturbations. It follows that the
climate changes induced by short-lived anthropogenic
greenhouse gases such as methane or hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) may not decrease in concert with decreases in concentration if the anthropogenic emissions of those gases were to be
eliminated. In this paper, our primary goal is to show how different processes and timescales contribute to determining how long the climate changes due to various greenhouse gases could be expected to remain if anthropogenic emissions were to cease. Advances in modeling have led to
improved AtmosphereOcean General Circulation Models (AOGCMs) as well as to Earth Models of Intermediate Complexity (EMICs). Although a detailed representation of the climate system changes on regional scales can only be provided by AOGCMs, the simpler EMICs have been shown to be
useful, particularly to examine phenomena on a global average basis. In this work, we use the Bern 2.5CC EMIC (see Materials and Methods and SI Text), which has been extensively intercompared to other EMICs and to complex AOGCMs (3, 4). It should be noted that, although the Bern 2.5CC EMIC
includes a representation of the surface and deep ocean, it does not include processes such as ice sheet losses or changes in the Earths albedo linked to evolution of vegetation. However, it is noteworthy that this EMIC, although parameterized and simplified, includes 14 levels in the ocean; further,
its global ocean heat uptake and climate sensitivity are near the mean of available complex models, and its computed timescales for uptake of tracers into the ocean have been shown to compare well to observations (16). A recent study (17) explored the response of one AOGCM to a sudden stop of
all forcing, and the Bern 2.5CC EMIC shows broad similarities in computed warming to that study (see Fig. S1), although there are also differences in detail. The climate sensitivity (which characterizes the long-term absolute warming response to a doubling of atmospheric carbon dioxide
concentrations) is 3 C for the model used here. Our results should be considered illustrative and exploratory rather than fully quantitative given the limitations of the EMIC and the uncertainties in climate sensitivity. Results One Illustrative Scenario to 2050. In the absence of mitigation policy,
concentrations of the three major greenhouse gases, carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide can be expected to increase in this century. If emissions were to cease, anthropogenic CO2 would be removed from the atmosphere by a series of processes operating at different timescales (18). Over
timescales of decades, both the land and upper ocean are important sinks. Over centuries to millennia, deep oceanic processes become dominant and are controlled by relatively well-understood physics and chemistry that provide broad consistency across models (see, for example, Fig. S2 showing
how the removal of a pulse of carbon compares across a range of models). About 20% of the emitted anthropogenic carbon remains in the atmosphere for many thousands of years (with a range across models including the Bern 2.5CC model being
about 19 4% at year 1000 after a pulse emission; see ref. 19), until much slower weathering processes affect the carbonate balance in the ocean (e.g., ref. 18). Models with stronger carbon/climate feedbacks than the one considered here could display larger and more persistent warmings due to both
CO2 and non-CO2 greenhouse gases, through reduced land and ocean uptake of carbon in a warmer world. Here our focus is not on the strength of carbon/climate feedbacks that can lead to differences in the carbon concentration decay, but rather on the factors that control the climate response to
a given decay. The removal processes of other anthropogenic gases including methane and nitrous oxide are much more simply described by exponential decay constants of about 10 and 114 y, respectively (1), due mainly to known chemical reactions in the atmosphere. In this illustrative study, we
do not include the feedback of changes in methane upon its own lifetime (20). We also do not account for potential interactions between CO2 and other gases, such as the production of carbon dioxide from methane oxidation (21), or changes to the carbon cycle through, e.g., methane/ozone
chemistry (22). Fig. 1 shows the computed future global warming contributions for carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide for a midrange scenario (23) of projected future anthropogenic emissions of these gases to 2050. Radiative forcings for all three of these gases, and their spectral overlaps,
are represented in this work using the expressions assessed in ref. 24. In 2050, the anthropogenic emissions are stopped entirely for illustration purposes. The figure shows nearly irreversible warming for at least 1,000 y due to the imposed carbon dioxide increases, as in previous work. All published
studies to date, which use multiple EMICs and one AOGCM, show largely irreversible warming due to future carbon dioxide increases (to within about 0.5 C) on a timescale of at least 1,000 y (35, 25, 26). Fig. 1 shows that the calculated future warmings due to anthropogenic CH4 and N2O also
persist notably longer than the lifetimes of these gases. The figure illustrates that emissions of key non-CO2 greenhouse gases such as CH4 or N2O could lead to warming that both temporarily exceeds a given stabilization target (e.g., 2 C as proposed by the G8 group of nations and in the
Copenhagen goals) and remains present longer than the gas lifetimes even if emissions were to cease. A number of recent studies have underscored the important point that reductions of non-CO2 greenhouse gas emissions are an approach that can indeed reverse some past climate changes (e.g.,
ref. 27). Understanding how quickly such reversal could happen and why is an important policy and science question. Fig. 1 implies that the use of policy measures to reduce emissions of short-lived gases will be less effective as a rapid climate mitigation strategy than would be thought if based only
upon the gas lifetime. Fig. 2 illustrates the factors influencing the warming contributions of each gas for the test case in Fig. 1 in more detail, by showing normalized values (relative to one at their peaks) of the warming along with the radiative forcings and concentrations of CO2 , N2O, and CH4 . For
example, about
two-thirds of the calculated warming due to N2O is still present 114 y (one atmospheric lifetime) after emissions are halted, despite the fact that its excess concentration and associated
radiative forcing at that time has dropped to about one-third of the peak value.

Consensus of experts agree that there is no impact to warming

Hsu 10
(Jeremy, Live Science Staff, July 19, pg. http://www.livescience.com/culture/can-humans-survive-extinction-doomsday-100719.html)

His views deviate sharply from those of most experts, who don't view climate change as the end for humans. Even the worst-case scenarios discussed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change don't
foresee human extinction. "The scenarios that the mainstream climate community are advancing are not end-of-humanity, catastrophic scenarios," said Roger Pielke Jr., a climate policy analyst at the University of Colorado at Boulder. Humans have the technological
tools to begin tackling climate change, if not quite enough yet to solve the problem, Pielke said. He added that doom-mongering did little to encourage people to take action. "My view of politics is that the long-term, high-risk
scenarios are really difficult to use to motivate short-term, incremental action," Pielke explained. "The rhetoric of fear and alarm that some people tend toward is counterproductive." Searching for solutions
One technological solution to climate change already exists through carbon capture and storage, according to Wallace Broecker, a geochemist and renowned climate scientist at Columbia University's Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory in New
York City. But Broecker remained skeptical that governments or industry would commit the resources needed to slow the rise of carbon dioxide (CO2) levels, and predicted that more drastic geoengineering might become necessary to stabilize the planet. " The rise in CO2 isn't going to

kill people, and it's not going to kill humanity," Broecker said. "But it's going to change the entire wild ecology of the planet, melt a lot of ice, acidify the ocean, change the availability of water and change crop yields, so we're essentially doing an experiment whose result remains uncertain."

Asia pollution offsets any US action global warming is inevitable

Knappenberger, assistant director of the Center for the Study of Science at the Cato Institute, 12
(Chip, Asian Air Pollution Warms U.S More than Our GHG Emissions 7/12/06, http://www.masterresource.org/2012/, 06/asian-air-pollution-warming/)

The whims of foreign nations, not to mention Mother Nature, can completely offset any climate changes induced by U.S. greenhouse gas emissions reductions. So, whats the point of forcing Americans into different energy choices?
A new study provides evidence that air pollution emanating from Asia will warm the U.S. as much or more than warming from U.S. greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The implication? Efforts by the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (and otherwise) to mitigate anthropogenic climate change is moot. If the future temperature rise in the U.S. is subject to the whims of Asian environmental and energy policy, then what sense does it make for Americans to
have their energy choices regulated by efforts aimed at mitigating future temperature increases across the countryefforts which will have less of an impact on temperatures than the policies
enacted across Asia? Maybe the EPA should reconsider the perceived effectiveness of its greenhouse gas emission regulationsat least when it comes to impacting temperatures across the U.S. New Study A new study just published in the scientific journal Geophysical Research Letters is
authored by a team led by Haiyan Teng from the National Center for Atmospheric Research, in Boulder, Colorado. The paper is titled Potential Impacts of Asian Carbon Aerosols on Future US Warming. Skipping the details of this climate modeling study and cutting to the chase, here is the abstract
of the paper: This study uses an atmosphere-ocean fully coupled climate model to investigate possible remote impacts of Asian carbonaceous aerosols on US climate change. We took a 21st century mitigation scenario as a reference, and carried out three sets of sensitivity experiments in which the
prescribed carbonaceous aerosol concentrations over a selected Asian domain are increased by a factor of two, six, and ten respectively during the period of 20052024. The resulting enhancement of atmospheric solar absorption (only the direct effect of aerosols is included) over Asia induces
tropospheric heating anomalies that force large-scale circulation changes which, averaged over the twenty-year period, add as much as an additional 0.4C warming over the eastern US during winter and over most of the US during summer. Such remote impacts are confirmed by an atmosphere
stand-alone experiment with specified heating anomalies over Asia that represent the direct effect of the carbon aerosols. Usually, when considering the climate impact from carbon aerosol emissions (primarily in the form of black carbon, or soot), the
effect is thought to be largely contained to the local or regional scale because the atmospheric lifetime of these particulates is only on the order of a week (before they are rained out). Since Asia lies on the far side of the Pacific
Oceana distance which requires about a week for air masses to navigatewe usually arent overly concerned about the quality of Asian air or the quantity of junk that they emit into it. By the time it gets here, it has largely been naturally scrubbed clean. But in the Teng et al. study,

the authors find that, according to their climate model, the local heating of the atmosphere by the Asian carbon aerosols (which are quite good at absorbing sunlight) can impart changes to the character of the larger-scale

atmospheric circulation patterns. And these changes to the broader atmospheric flow produce an effect on the weather patterns in the U.S. and thus induce a change in the climate here characterized by 0.4C [surface air temperature]
warming on average over the eastern US during winter and over almost the entire US during summer averaged over the 20052024 period. While most of the summer warming doesnt start to kick in until Asian carbonaceous aerosol emissions are upped in the model to 10 times what they are
today, the winter warming over the eastern half of the country is large (several tenths of a C) even at twice the current rate of Asian emissions. Now lets revisit just how much global warming that stringent U.S. greenhouse gas emissions reductions may avoid averaged across the country. In my
Master Resource post Climate Impacts of Waxman-Markey (the IPCC-based arithmetic of no gain) I calculated that a more than 80% reduction of greenhouse gas emissions in the U.S. by the year 2050 would result in a reduction of global temperatures (from where they otherwise would be) of
about 0.05C. Since the U.S. is projected to warm slightly more than the global average (land warms faster than the oceans), a 0.05C of global temperature reduction probably amounts to about 0.075C of temperature savings averaged across the U.S., by the year 2050. Comparing the
amount of warming in the U.S. saved by reducing our greenhouse gas emissions by some 80% to the amount of warming added in the U.S. by increases in Asian black carbon (soot) aerosol emissions (at least according
to Teng et al.) and there is no clear winner. Which points out the anemic effect that U.S. greenhouse gas reductions will have on the climate of the U.S. and just how easily the whims of foreign nations, not to mention Mother Nature,

can completely offset any climate changes induced by our greenhouse gas emissions reductions. And even if the traditional form of air pollution (e.g., soot) does not increase across Asia (a slim chance of that), greenhouse gases

emitted there certainly will. For example, at the current growth rate, new greenhouse gas emissions from China will completely subsume an 80% reduction in U.S. greenhouse gas emission in just over a decade. Once again, pointing out that a reduction in domestic
greenhouse gases is for naught, at least when it comes to mitigating climate change. So, whats the point, really, of forcing Americans into different energy choices? As I have repeatedly pointed out, nothing we do here (when it comes to greenhouse gas emissions) will make any
difference either domestically, or globally, when it comes to influences on the climate. What the powers-that-be behind emissions reduction schemes in the U.S. are hoping for is that 1) it doesnt hurt us too much, and 2)

that China and other large developing nations will follow our lead. Both outcomes seem dubious at time scales that make a difference.
 Not Anthropogenic
Climate change is naturallead IPCC author
Bastasch 15 [Michael, reporter for the Daily Caller, Former UN Lead Author: Global Warming Caused By Natural Variations In Climate The Daily Caller, May 22 2015,
http://dailycaller.com/2015/05/22/former-un-lead-author-global-warming-caused-by-natural-variations-in-climate/; 6-23-16)

Global temperature change observed over the last hundred years or so is well within the natural variability of the last 8,000 years, according to a new paper by a former Intergovernmental Panel On Climate
Change (IPCC)lead author. Dr. Philip Lloyd, a South Africa-based physicist and climate researcher, examined ice core-based temperature data going back 8,000 years to gain perspective on the magnitude of global temperature changes over the 20th
Century. What Lloyd found was that the standard deviation of the temperature over the last 8,000 years was about 0.98 degrees Celsius higher than the 0.85 degrees climate scientists say the world has warmed
over the last century. This suggests that while some portion of the temperature change observed in the 20th century was probably caused by greenhouse gases, there is a strong likelihood
that the major portion was due to natural variations, Lloyd wrote in his study. The United Nations IPCC claims theres been 0.85 degrees Celsius of warming since the late 1800s, and concludes that most of this warming is due to human
activities mainly, the burning of fossil fuels and changes in land use. The IPCC says that more than half of the observed increase in global average surface temperature from 1951 to 2010 have been caused by human activity. If Lloyds results hold, the IPCC may
have to revise how much warming it attributes to mankind. In any case, the
IPCCs estimate of man-made and natural warming (0.85 degrees) is still below the standard deviation for the last 8,000, according to
Lloyds results. This means that warming is not very significant within the context of the Earths recent climate history.

Warming is naturalIPCC models are flawedignore decadal cycles

Bell 12 [Larry, Professor of space architecture at the University of Huston, Global Warming? No, Natural, Predictable Climate Change, Forbes, Jan 10 2012,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/larrybell/2012/01/10/global-warming-no-natural-predictable-climate-change/; 6-23-16)

An extensively peer-reviewed study published last December in the Journal of Atmospheric and Solar-Terrestrial Physics indicates that observed climate changes since 1850 are linked to cyclical, predictable, naturally
occurring events in Earths solar system with little or no help from us. The research was conducted by Nicola Scafetta, a scientist at Duke University and at the Active Cavity Radiometer Solar Irradiance Monitor Lab (ACRIM), which
is associated with the NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory in California. It takes issue with methodologies applied by the U.N.s Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change (IPCC) using general circulation climate models (GCMs) that, by
ignoring these important influences, are found to fail to reproduce the observed decadal and multi-decadal climatic cycles. As noted in the paper, the IPCC models also fail to incorporate climate
modulating effects of solar changes such as cloud-forming influences of cosmic rays throughout periods of reduced sunspot activity. More clouds tend to make conditions cooler, while fewer
often cause warming. At least 50-70% of observed 20th century warming might be associated with increased solar activity witnessed since the Maunder Minimum of the last 17th century. Dr. Scafettas study applies an astronomically-based
model that reconstructs and correlates known warming and cooling phases with decadal and multi-decadal cycles associated with influences of planetary motions, most particularly those of Jupiter and Saturn. This
astronomical harmonics model was used to address various cycles lasting 9.1, 10-10.5, 20-21, and 60-62 year-long periods. The 9.1-year cycle was shown to be likely related to decadal solar/lunar tidal oscillations, while those of ten years and longer duration
relate to planetary movements about the Sun that may have solar influences that modulate electromagnetic properties of Earths upper atmosphere which can regulate the cloud system. Scafettas findings contradict IPCC claims that all
warming observed from 1970 to 2000 has been man-made (anthropogenically-induced) based upon models that exclude natural quasi 20-year and 60-year climate cycle contributions. These cycles
have been clearly detected in all global surface temperature records of both hemispheres since 1850, and are also evident in numerous astronomical records. The 60-year cycle is particularly easy to
observe in significant surface temperature maxima that occurred in 1880-1881, 1940-1941, and 2000-2001. These momentarily warmer periods coincided with times when orbital positions of Jupiter and Saturn were relatively close to the Sun and Earth. A 60-
year modulation cycle also corresponds with warming/cooling induced in the ocean surface which appears to correlate with the frequency of major Atlantic hurricanes, and is seen in the sea
level rise since 1700 as well as in numerous ocean and terrestrial records dating back centuries. Further evidence of a 60-year cycle is referenced in ancient Sanskrit texts among observed
monsoon rainfall cycles. Scafetta believes that a natural 60-year climate cycle associated with astronomical cycles may also explain calendars adopted in traditional Chinese, Tamil and Tibetan civilizations, since all major ancient civilizations knew about
20-year and 60-year Jupiter and Saturn cycles. Indeed, Scafetta pointed out to me that in the Hindu tradition, the 60-year cycle is known as the cycle of Brihaspati, the name of Jupiter, and that every 60 years special ceremonies are celebrated by some
populations, such as the Sigui ceremony among the Dogon people of Africa. Proper reconstructions of natural 20-year and 60-year cycles, along with other independent studies, indicate that the IPCC has seriously
overestimated human climate contributions. For example, according to all GCM simulations, increased CO2 concentrations should have produced an increased tropical warming trend with altitude, which is contrary to what balloon and satellites
observations actually show. GCM interpretations also allege that volcano activity may have contributed an offsetting 0.1-0.2 degrees of cooling influence between from 1970 to 2000. However, that conclusion appears to significantly
overestimate the volcano signal because the models predicted deep and large cooling spikes associated with eruptions which are observed to be much smaller in global surface temperature
records. Accordingly, this too suggests that the 1970-2000 warming effect attributed to anthropogenic influences should be reduced. Moreover, some of the observed 0.5 degrees of warming recorded by surface stations during the 1970-2000 period which
IPCC models associated with human greenhouse gases emissions, may be explained by improperly corrected urban heat island effects and other land use change influences. Finally, three major available global surface temperature record
sources report a steady-to-cooling trend since 2001. These measurements contradict the strong warming predicted by all IPCC models during the same period that are attributed primarily to a
continuing increase in CO2 emissions. Indeed, only one global surface record source shows a slight increase in the temperature since 2001. This occurred because missing temperature data needed to be adjusted or filled in to complete the
recordswhich appears to be the case with NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies model data resulting from poor sampling during the last decade for Antarctic and Arctic regions and the use of a 1200 km smoothing methodology. The Duke University/NASA
JPL study estimates that as
much as 0.3 degrees of warming from 1970 to 2000 may have been naturally induced by the 60-year modulation during the warming phase, amounting to at least 43-60%
of the 0.5-0.7 degrees allegedly caused by human greenhouse emissions. Additional natural warming can be explained by increased solar activity during the last four centuries, as well as simply
being part of a natural and persistent warming recovery since the end of the Little Ice Age of AD 1300-1900.
AT Cyber add on
 Impact
No impact to cyberterror
BICCHIERAI 15 [ LORENZO FRANCESCHI - staff writer at VICE Motherboard in Brooklyn, New York, where he covers hacking, information security, and digital rights. The 'ISIS Cyberwar'
Hype Machine Is Doing More Harm Than Good, MotherBoard; 5-18-15; 6-23-16]

Yet, that didnt stop a new round of breathless hype. On Sunday, The Hill wrote that ISIS was preparing for cyberwar and an all-out cyber crusade. Looks like ISIS wannabes successfully hacked the media once again. Toss out a shitty
video that claims that you do things that youre notdoesnt matter, well still overreact, Peter W. Singer, an author and well-known expert in cybersecurity, told Motherboard. Instead of responding with a keep calm and carry on attitude we lose our shit. That being said, its worth pointing out
that ISIS could do real damage by doing espionage online, monitoring and tracking down dissidents who live in ISIS-controlled territories. That might have already happened. Last November someone targeted a Syrian citizen media group known as Raqqa Is Being Slaughtered Silently (RSS), which
documents human rights crimes in Raqqa, the self-proclaimed capital of the ISIS caliphate. To
date, however, there hasnt been a case of actual cyberterrorisman act targeting computers systems that result in physical violence,
as the FBI defines it. In fact, squirrels have been way more damaging to US critical infrastructure than cyberterrorists. Singer criticized the article, which he said is good for a cyber laugh. But
jokes apart, Singer warned that hyping ISIS hacking abilities rewards the group with useful attention that it can turn into recruiting power. Instead of responding with a keep calm and carry on attitude, Singer added, we lose our shit. This encourages and incentivizes ISIS to keep attacking, or at
least claim attackssomething that doesnt help anyone. Robert M. Lee, an active duty Air Force cyber warfare operations officer, agreed with Singer, and dismissed the hype on Twitter. Terrorist groups will continue to use the internet to spread their message and perform hacktivist-type acts but

nothing of significant damage, he wrote. Performing significant damage requires more than just internet connected devices. It requires advanced logistical support and expertise. Describing savvy use of
social media as cyberwar is akin to describing Miley Cyrus as the Clausewitz of cyberwar. In other words, being good at social media, as ISIS is, doesnt mean youll be a good hacker. The truth, as
we reported before, is that all the cyberattacks attributed to ISIS in the recent past have been unsophisticated attacks carried out by what looks like online fanboys not at all affiliated with the group. As Singer put it, its either sympathizers or people doing it for shits

and giggles. As Singer explained in 2012, cyberterrorism is overhyped, just like our obsessive fear of sharks. As he put it, we are 15,000 times more likely to be hurt or killed by an accident
involving a toilet, yet Discovery Channel has Shark Week and not Toilet Week.

Cyberattacks have no impact

Lee 15 [Robert - a US Cyber Warfare Operations Officer, and is studying for a PhD in Cyber Security at King's College London. Is cyber-warfare really that scary?, BBC News, 5/6/15,
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-32534923]

"A lot of my research debunks stories. I can't cite them because they're not true. There's a general narrative that horrible things are happening all the time: cyber-war, nation states are crumbling. That's not true. "If you hear, 'There's been some recent research around aviation
and planes are going to be hacked and fall out of the sky,' or, 'People are going to cyber-attack trains and derail them,' that's not realistic. "Security companies are ramping up the threat. The military's relabelled a

lot of things 'cyber-warfare' because they want to get the budget from Congress. Nato and the different alliances ramp up the threat to encourage other countries to invest in security. " One of the narratives that gets built around
critical infrastructure is that we're going to have these cascading power failures; someone's going to break in and very easily take down the power grid. While it's true there's vulnerable infrastructure, you can't just
take down the entirety of the power grid from a cyber-capability. "[And] we all have the same threat. If the US wants to be able to do that against Russia, or China wants to do that against the US, they have to accept their own
vulnerability and do things that would impact themselves as well. "The head of Cyber Command and the head of the National Security Agency say, 'OK, we need to invest in offensive capabilities to be able to secure our critical infrastructure'. Those capabilities trickle down to fringe groups. "If
you developed a cyber-capability that could take down the Chinese power grid, it would be nearly identical to the capability you would need to take down the US power grid. We use the same systems. The hype is forcing us to look into offence, which is exactly what

we should not be doing. "We actually saw a very concerning case recently, where a company said, 'Iran, they're attacking the US hundreds of thousands of times a year'. But they redefined
'attack': they used ways of describing the events in a way that no-one else in the security world support. The way they framed it was very dangerous."
AT Asian Pivot Add on
 Impact
Asia pivot increases the chances of war with China
Wilson Quartley 13 (Wilson Quartley; http://wilsonquarterly.com/quarterly/winter-2013-is-democracy-worth-it/is-americas-pivot-to-asia-a-bad-idea/; Winter 2013; 6-24-13)
Since 2010, Washington has responded to Chinas new nerve by rekindling old friendships in the Pacific and bolstering defense ties with offshore nations such as New Zealand, Japan, and the Philippines. These moves were necessary, Ross says, and in some ways were consistent with a long-standing
trend toward increased engagement in the region. But Ross feels that the pivot has spun too far, citing Chinas displeasure with Obama administration policies such as refurbishing ties between Seoul and Washington
(which had weakened somewhat under George W. Bush) and expanding military cooperation with Cambodia and especially Vietnam, which borders China. In 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton openly expressed support for the Philippines

and Vietnam in their spat with China over the Spratly Islands a break with the past U.S. policy of staying out of territorial disputes. Beijing is livid. China halted cooperation with the West in dealing with belligerent states such as Iran and

North Korea. Also, in 2012 China announced plans to drill for oil in disputed waters in the South China Sea, and it has taken steps to enhance its military capabilities there. In short, the pivot appears to
be a dangerous flop. A strategy that was meant to check a rising China has sparked its combativeness and damaged its faith in cooperation, Ross argues. Chinese leaders have concluded that the United States has
abandoned its decades-old policy of strategic engagement. Nor is it only Americas position in Asia that could suffer. Josef Joffe, editor of the German weekly Die Zeit and a professor of international politics at Stanford,warns that Americas turn away from Europe

greeted so far with astounding silence on both sides of the Atlanticis an invitation to trouble. It is true that Europe is no longer the worlds strategic fulcrum and that the Soviet threat is gone. The core of Europe is stable. But the fringes
are brittle,Joffe says. If fighting breaks out in the Balkans, the former Soviet states, or nearby neighborhoods such as the Levant and North Africa, Europe will need much more than a few brigades of

American soldiers to restore stability. (Only 30,000 U.S. troops remain in Europe, one tenth of the peak total during the Cold War.) The fact is that the Europeans are not up to the job themselves. Except for France and Britain, the European states invest little in their militaries.
Only with the help of the United States and the NATO alliance, which has built a precious edifice of command and training, can Europe accomplish much of anything militarily. France led a European charge into Libya in 2011, but the effort sputtered until the United States arrived with crucial
surveillance technology, smart bombs, and know-how. Yet for all their maddening feebleness, the Europeans are stauncher allies than other candidates India, Australia, Saudi Arabia. Finally, Joffe argues, Europe is simply closer to the theaters where the U.S. might need to fight tomorrow. Thats
important for more than one reason. Forces in situ are even better for not having to fight; they are there for deterrence. Michael Wesley, a professor at the University of Sydney in Australia and a nonresident fellow at the Brookings Institution, warns that Americans must be more clear eyed about
Asian realities. The Asian order that predominated between 1975 and 2000, in which the United States presided over a regional system of alliances without a clear Asian leader, is vanishing, Wesley says. What he calls hegemony lite is history. Chinas rise has awakened old tensions throughout Asia,
stirred new conflicts, and pushed up military budgets as well as the level of belligerent rhetoric. For the United States, Asia is becoming a much more complicated place. Petty disputes between Americas friends in the region and Beijing, for example, pose a never-ending dilemma over when to
demonstrate commitment to allies and when to stay silent to keep Chinas neighbors from becoming too assertive. Wesley recommends that the
United States rise above the fray and let others in the area keep China in check. This, he argues,
will present China with a much more complicated challenge than direct military competition with the United States.
AT South Asian Econ add on
 Impact
South Asian economies resilient and expanding
World Bank 15 (World Bank; http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2015/10/04/south-asia-grows-strongly-fiscal-financial-weakness-remain; 10-4-15; 6-24-16)
Led by a resilient India, South Asia is expected to maintain its lead as the fastest-growing region in the world, with economic growth forecasted to accelerate from 7 percent in 2015 to 7.4
percent in 2016, a World Bank report said. According to the twice-a-year South Asia Economic Focus, this positive performance hinges on solid growth in services, domestic consumption, and a gradual rise of investments. Limited exposure to the financial turmoil and an improved external
position have given most South Asian countries important policy space. Given Indias weight in the region, its performance greatly influences the projections for South Asia as a whole. Improved investor sentiment and

resilience to external shocks are expected to increase Indias growth rate to 7.5 percent in fiscal year (FY) 2015 and further to 7.8 percent in FY2016. Thanks to low food and commodity prices, as well as a slowdown in
the growth of administered prices, inflationary pressures have eased markedly in South Asia. Yet the pace of disinflation varies depending on the price index considered. Revisions to national accounts, together with new comparable data on purchasing power around

the world, also raise questions regarding the measurement of prices in the region. According to the report, South Asia could actually have cheaper prices, faster growth and bigger economies than previously thought .
AT Multilaterism
 I/L
AIIB risk fragmenting multilateralism and the economy.
Subacchi 15(Paola Subacchi, 3-31-2015, "The AIIB Is a Threat to Global Economic Governance," Foreign Policy, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/03/31/the-aiib-is-a-threat-to-global-economic-
governance-china/ Paola Subacchi is director of international economics research at Chatham House.) //PH

But even if the AIIBs creation is in Chinas interest as the new regional power, the move does little to respond to the need to improve multilateralism and to strengthen global economic
governance. In fact, it may do the opposite. The risk now is the creation of two blocs of economic influence in Asia: one led by China and the other by the United States and Japan. Demand for
infrastructure investment is large enough to accommodate both even a third development bank could probably find demand but this is not the point. At stake is good governance and
multilateralism for instance, in a world of fragmented governance what would be the incentive for Congress to finally approve the IMF reform? In addition to fragmented institutions and
governance, the AIIB could present a risk of establishing divergent investment standards a risk already significant in trade as China has reacted to the Trans-Pacific Partnership, of which it is
not part, by accelerating its own trade arrangements in the region. Can the rest of the world not only the United States afford to leave China to set up its own standards on both trade
and investment? The concern here is not on the quality of these standards and the assumption is not that Chinese-set standards are by definition inadequate. It is on maintaining a
harmonized, consistent, and multilateral framework of rules and standards that help integrate, rather than fragment, the world economy.
 Impact Defense
SQUO is shifting away from multilateralism to mini-lateralism to solve problems
Picciotto 11 (Robert Picciotto is a Visiting Professor at Kings College in London and a member of the Academy of Social Sciences. He sits on the boards of the United Kingdom
Evaluation Society and the European Evaluation Society. "MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION AND THE PARIS PROCESS: THE ROAD TO BUSAN," http://cso-
effectiveness.org/IMG/pdf/cdr2011_rpicciotto.pdf~~)

Multilateralism takes different forms. Statecentric international conventions set precise principles of conduct, regulate governments behaviour and coordinate their actions. But they are open to challenge by a wide range of influential private and voluntary associations. When
binding comprehensive global agreements come into conflict with powerful special interests, they often fail to materialize. For example, it has not been possible to make significant progress with
respect to agricultural protectionism, nuclear proliferation, climate change or the harmonization of national tax regimes. Absent ties of loyalty, trust and shared values, the larger and more diverse the group, the harder it becomes to
achieve consensus. Getting all 193 UN members to agree on what needs to be done, let alone how to do it, is rarely feasible. As a result, international conventions are very hard to design and negotiate and they are not always complied with since they can restrain freedom of action and imply a
reciprocity that may not beforthcoming. They also raise expectations, often unmet, that joint action will yield a rough equivalence of benefits to all participants (Ruggie 1993). From this perspective, traditional
multilateralism that imposes universal constraints on
governments is not a panacea. In order to minimize transaction costs and information asymmetries, the management and funding of development activities is best left to the lowest level at
which it can be handled efficiently or, in other words, in line with the principle of subsidiarity. Partial multilateralism, admittedly a second best, may be the only feasible solution. Thus, the collective action dilemmas embedded in classical
multilateralism have given rise to a pragmatic approach to global diplomacy that entails assembling the smallest number of parties needed to have a positive impact on a given problem. This is
known as minilateralism (Naim 2009). Reliance on this approach has spread and explains the rise in trust fund arrangements managed through multilateral agencies by tailor made coalitions of states, private interests and voluntary organizations. Failing universal agreement
 Fails
Multilateralism fails countries wont cooperate, causing fragmentation.
Young et al 13 (Kevin Young, Assistant Professor in the University of Massachusetts Amhersts Department of Political Science, Thomas Hale, Postdoctoral research fellow at the Blavatnik
School of Government, Oxford University, David Held, Professor of politics and international relations at Durham University, Global Cooperation Buckling Under Past Successes, The
Globalist, Global Cooperation Buckling Under Past Successes)

While the need for global cooperation continues to grow, the ability of multilateral institutions to deliver the policy coordination we need has not kept pace. The provision of effective global
governance isnt just lacking in one area like, say, climate change. It is systematically underperforming across a range of issues. These include the management of the global economy to
human security and environmental problems. While many have pondered the many pressing global dilemmas facing the world today, there is a paradox accompanying the global situation as a whole. We are failing
under the weight of our own success. Decades of multilateral agreements, new institutions and an increasingly robust system of international law have enabled a radical increase in economic
globalization, with substantial benefits for a wide range of countries. But our ability to manage all this complexity of progress has not kept pace. Our more integrated global economy demands more, and
more effective, collective management. The problems that confront us now are challenges we never would have encountered without the progress made by the existing network of institutions. The various committees based in
Basel, the IMF, the G20, and beyond facilitated a sharp deepening of financial interdependence. When the crisis arrived, they proved adequate albeit just adequate to coordinate a
minimally sufficient series of policy responses to avoid another Great Depression. Instead of an unmitigated disaster we got a mitigated one. They were of course unable to prevent the crisis from occurring
in the first place and have not been able to take the measures needed to prevent the next one. Moreover, just as existing international institutions are useful vehicles for cooperation, they can
also come to hinder it. International institutions like the IMF, for example, contain a vast array of resources and expertise for addressing global problems. Yet because of their past behavior and the lock-in of US
dominance that was secured over six decades ago, many countries do not trust the IMF as a global governor. Newer institutions like the G20 are a testament to successful development of countries like Brazil, India and

China, who have been able to strategically engage with economic globalization in recent years. Yet, with a greater plurality of voices at the negotiation table, cooperation becomes more difficult. Fragmentation From

Cooperation When institutions proliferate, the overall system may slide toward dysfunctional fragmentation. Our current set of institutions arose from ad hoc crisis management over the postwar period. Each crisis saw the
addition of a new committee, a new joint task force or some other institutional addition. But the sum is not greater than the parts. Indeed, the lack of coherence in global economic governance is directly responsible for a number
of the challenges we now face. For example, the reform efforts surrounding complex financial instruments like derivatives are as complex as the instruments themselves. There is not one international
institution handling the reform process. Rather, there are five different organizations all handling different pieces, separate initiatives at the EU level and a panoply of different countries all acting simultaneously. Some claim that global economic governance has
utterly failed, pointing to the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression and a sluggish recovery. Others regard global economic governance as good enough. They point out that we averted an even worse disaster and despite a global recession didnt
collapse. In fact, both views are correct: global
economic cooperation is failing under the weight of its own success. Across a range of issue areas, the remarkable success of global cooperation in the last
several decades has made human interconnectedness weigh much more heavily on politics and the economy than it did in the past. But that process of growing cooperation has now stalled,
unable to manage the deep interdependence it has created.
 Cant Solve Climate Change
Multilateralism not key to solve climate change individual countries are already taking action.
Levi 14 (Michael Levi, Senior Fellow for Energy and the Environment and Director of the Maurice R. Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies at the Council of
Foreign Relations with a Ph.D. in war studies from the University of London, Why climate change policy wont hinge on international talks, Fortune, 25
September 2014, http://fortune.com/author/michael-levi/)
individual countries are already taking action to reduce carbon emissions for various reasons beyond worries about climate change. World leaders
Its not that international diplomacy wont matter, but

gathered at a United Nations summit this week to kick off 15 months of negotiations aimed at finalizing a climate pact next December in Paris. If you focus on those international climate talks, though, youll
miss most of the real action. The fate of global efforts to tackle climate change and of the businesses that will win and lose as a result depends far more on what countries do at home. Climate change
has long been approached as the ultimate foreign policy problem. Greenhouse gas emissions anywhere raise temperatures everywhere. What that means for climate policy is that emissions cuts anywhere curb global warming everywhere. Since cutting emissions
usually costs money, it makes sense for each country to ask other countries to act while trying to do as little as possible themselves: that way, they keep their costs to a minimum, but still benefit from reduced climate change because of what others have done.
The danger is that if every country adopts this attitude, no one will do much of anything. The only way out of this beggar-thy-neighbor quagmire, strategists have long assumed, is for countries to reach a legally binding pact in which they all curb greenhouse gas
emissions at the same time. Thats why people have long paid attention to the international climate talks. Its also why, after the last big talks at Copenhagen in 2009 failed to produce a legally binding climate treaty, so many people assumed that climate action
was dead. Yet something perplexing happened in the nearly five years since. Leaders from the United States to China moved forward with domestic climate policies despite the absence of a solid international
foundation. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), for example, announced regulations aimed at coal-fired power plants earlier this year despite no international agreement requiring
that it do so. Three things explain whats going on. Countries are taking actions that cut carbon emissions for all sorts of reasons that have nothing to do with climate change. China, for
example, is facing massive challenges as a result of its dependence on coal. Suffocating pollution is wrecking public health, hurting productivity, and boosting the risk of social unrest. Chinese
leaders have responded with a plan that includes a gradual shift toward natural gas and renewable energy and away from coal. A happy byproduct of this set of policies is reduced greenhouse gas emissions. But China isnt waiting for an
international deal to take these steps, because it has other reasons to pursue them. And if businesses and investors focus on diplomatic negotiations to divine where China is heading on
climate policy, theyll be inevitably surprised. Policymakers around the world are also discovering that its possible to loosely coordinate their climate efforts with each other even absent an
international deal. Conventional wisdom about climate diplomacy owes a lot to experience with nuclear arms. During the Cold War, if the United States wanted to cut its nuclear arsenal, it needed iron-clad assurances that the Soviet Union was cutting its
arsenal too. That meant not only tough legal requirements but also extensive and mandatory monitoring and verification to ensure that the secretive Soviet military wasnt cheating. Many have long assumed that something similar was needed for climate change
in order to ensure that every country was doing its part. But the
United States doesnt need a treaty or a complex inspections system to know roughly what Chinese emissions are and what policies China has
adopted to reduce them it can rely largely on a mix of market data, news reports, and intelligence. (China has an even easier time tracking the United States.) Each country can adjust its national policy as it
sees shifts elsewhere in the world even without a treaty. The last reason that climate policy will be determined mainly at the national level is that thats where the most important political
forces lie. Take the United States as an example. The biggest sources of opposition to strong U.S. climate action are skepticism that it is a serious problem and concern by some industries (notably coal and oil
producers as well as energy-intensive manufacturers) that theyll lose out as a result of robust climate policy. Whether or not theres an international deal doesnt matter much to them they have
independent reasons to oppose aggressive action. This means that watching domestic politics, rather than international diplomacy, will give far more insight into where policy is heading.
 Occurring Now
Multilateral agreements occurring now China initiating reforms now.
Rudd 15 (Kevin Rudd, Prime Minister of Australia with a Bachelor of Arts in Asian Studies from the Australian National University in Canberra, U.S.-China 21: The
Future of U.S.-China Relations Under Xi Jinping, Harvard Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, April 2015,
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Summary%20Report%20US-China%2021.pdf)

Beyond Asia, and in the reform of the global order more broadly, China has a long-standing commitment to greater multipolarity in the international order. For this reason, it has long been a member of most
multilateral institutions within the UN and the Bretton Woods systems. China has used multilateralism as a means to expanding its diplomatic influence in the world, particularly through its
membership of the UN Security Council, at a time when its national power was limited. This has now begun to change. Xi Jinping stated clearly in his November 2014 address to the Partys international policy work conference: China is now
engaged in a struggle for the international order (guoji zhixu zhizheng ). This is an unusually sharp statement from the Chinese leadership and suggests that the international community should prepare
for a number of new Chinese reform proposals of the current multilateral system. This may manifest itself through the normal review processes of the UN and other multilateral agencies as
their treaty or regulatory systems come up for periodic review. China is now committed to becoming an active participant in the reform of the current global order. There is no evidence to suggest that
China wishes to abandon the current order. What is clear, however, is that China does not see the current system as set in stone. What we will therefore see is an increasing tempo in Chinas multilateral policy
activism, and a growing range of Chinese institutional initiatives. This represents a new, forthright Chinese voice in the world, in radical contrast to its previous approach of hide your strength, bide your time, never take the lead.
AT Heg
 Chinas Not a Threat to Heg.
The AIIB is not to challenge the US
Chen, 15. (Dingding Chen. Dingding Chen is an assistant professor of Government and Public Administration at the University of Macau, Non-Resident Fellow at the Global Public Policy
Institute (GPPi) Berlin, Germany. He is also the Founding Director of Intellisia Institute, a newly established independent think tank focusing on international affairs in
China. His research interests include: Chinese foreign policy, Asian security, Chinese politics, and human rights."Relax, China Won't Challenge US Hegemony." Diplomat. 1-14-2015 Web.
Accessed: 6-21-2016. http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/relax-china-wont-challenge-us-hegemony/)
Needless to say, the Sino-U.S. relationship is one of the most important yet complicated bilateral relationships in the world today. This explains why Chinese Vice Premier Wang Yangs recent comments on Sino-U.S. relations have stirred up a debate online (here and here). Wang Yang stated that
China [has] neither the ability nor the intent to challenge the United States. Partly because it is rare for a senior Chinese leader to make such soft remarks with regard to Sino-U.S. relations and partly because Wangs remarks are seemingly inconsistent
with Chinas recent assertive foreign policies, there has been a fierce debate about the true meaning of Wangs remarks in the United States. Most American analysts, however, are skeptical toward Wangs conciliatory remarks and continue to believe that Chinas ultimate aim is to establish a China-
centric order in Asia at the expense of the U.S. influence in Asia. In other words, China seeks to replace the U.S. as the new global hegemon. The
reactions from the U.S. side, again, reveal the deep mistrust with regard to Chinas long term goals.
But such skepticism is misguided and even dangerous to Asias peace and stability if left uncorrected. Why? Because Wang Yang was sincere when he said that China does not have the capabilities and desires to
challenge the United States. The evidence of his sincerity is apparent. First let us look at Chinas capabilities, which need to be especially formidable if China wants to challenge the United States. Although Chinas comprehensive capabilities
have been growing rapidly for the past three decades, almost all analysts inside and outside of China agree that there is still a huge gap between China and the U.S. in terms of comprehensive capabilities,
particularly when the U.S. is far ahead of China in military and technological realms. Chinas economy might have already passed the U.S. economy as the largest one in 2014, but the quality of Chinas economy still remains a major
weakness for Beijing. Thus, it would be a serious mistake for China to challenge the U.S. directly given the wide gap of capabilities between the two. Even if one day Chinas comprehensive capabilities catch up with the United States, it
would still be a huge mistake for China to challenge the U.S. because by then the two economies would be much more closely interconnected, creating a situation of mutual dependence benefiting both countries.
Besides limited capabilities, China also has limited ambitions which have not been properly understood by many U.S. analysts. It is true that Chinas grand strategy is to realize the China dream a dream that will bring wealth, glory,
and power to China again but this, by no means, suggests that China wants to become a hegemon in Asia , or to create a Sino-centric tributary system around which all smaller states must obey Chinas orders. Perhaps these perceptions
exist in the United States because many U.S. analysts have unconsciously let ultra-realist thinking slip into their minds, thereby believing that states are constantly engaged in the ruthless
pursuit of power and influence. But the structure of international politics has fundamentally changed since the end of the Cold War, thus rendering any serious possibility of world hegemony ineffective or even impossible. In essence, the costs of hegemony
outweigh the benefits of hegemony in this new era of international politics, thanks to rising nationalism, nuclear weapons, and increasing economic interdependence between major powers. The Chinese leaders understand this
new and changed structure of international politics and based on their assessments, they have decided not to seek hegemony, which is a losing business in this new era. Unfortunately, the U.S. is still obsessed
with the concept (or illusion) of hegemony, as Simon Reich and Richard Ned Lebow have pointed out recently. The hegemony mentality is precisely the reason why the United States has declined (slowly) in the post-Cold War era. Wrongly believing that a stable global order needs U.S.
hegemony, American leaders have adopted a grand strategy of liberal interventionism, which has only caused self-inflicted wounds for the U.S. economy and its global status. The tragedy, however, is that within U.S. elite circles, this misperception about U.S. hegemony (here and here) sticks and is
unlikely to go away for a long time barring a major failure or crisis. At the end of the day, our
world can survive and prosper without a hegemon, regardless of whether the hegemon is American or Chinese. The sooner
American leaders understand this point and believe Chinese leaders words, the higher the chances of peace and stability worldwide.

China wont challenge the US

Smith, 15. (Jack A. Smith. ""The Hegemony Games": the United States of America (USA) vs. The People's Republic of China (PRC)." Global Research. 5-31-2015 Web. Accessed: 6-21-2016.
http://www.globalresearch.ca/tthe-hegemony-games-the-united-states-of-america-usa-vs-the-peoples-republic-of-china-prc/5452656) PN
The Chinese Communist government is calibrating its rise very carefully, intent upon avoiding offense to the crouching, tail twitching American imperial dragon. On May 21, Peoples Daily quoted a recent talk by
President Xi Jinping: China aims to become stronger but not seek hegemony; the strategic choice of cooperation and win-win [for all sides] is the path that China chooses. China has always been a peace-loving nation that cherishes harmonious relations.
Its adherence to the five principles of peaceful coexistence and anti-hegemonism has shown Chinas determination to stick to peaceful development. The five principles have governed New China since the
revolution. They are: Mutual respect for each others sovereignty and territorial integrity; mutual non-aggression; non-interference in each others internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit; and peaceful co-existence. There have been a few minor lapses, but these principles have remained stable
and effective all these years. Chinas concept of harmonious relations is of ancient philosophical extraction. Frankly, in this writers view, there are times when Chinas criticism of an extremely inhumane aspect of one or another states internal affairs would do some good but non-interference,
much less non-aggression, is vastly superior to Washingtons endless interference and aggression. Xis statement is an accurate representation of Chinas foreign relations. This is the PRCs long-term global strategy of development. It needs and
wants peace. Washington knows all this, but thats not the point. Xi declared that Beijing opposed the very concept of global hegemony by any nation, including itself, and, of course, the U.S.. President Obamas primary foreign policy
objective, and assuredly that of succeeding administrations, is the retention of global rule. This contradiction will eventually have to be resolved through negotiation or hostilities. China will certainly not confront the U.S. on this matter within the foreseeable
future. Beijings reading of the tea leaves suggests that world trends will encourage the incoming tide of multipolar world order and displace the outgoing tide of unipolar dominion. Such thinking emerges from Americas evident decline, the imminent rise of the developing nations, and the
mounting dissatisfaction with the results of Washingtons global rule among countries not dependent upon Fortress Americana. Writing in Time June 1, Ian Bremmer noted: Emerging countries are not strong enough to overthrow U.S. dominance, but they have more than enough strength and self-
confidence to refuse to follow Washingtons lead. This is a recent development that will continue to unfold in the next decade or two. At this point, equipped with the seven league boots only possessed by a superpower, the U.S. is far ahead of its detractors in the emerging competition to determine
whether only one, or many nations in combination, will shape the future. The UN may figure in this, but only after the preponderant influence of the U.S. and certain other countries is reduced and more evenly shared with the rising countries, a number of which surely realize its time for a change.
They wish to avoid a dreadful future of devastating wars, rampant climate change, poverty and scandalous inequality. The fact remains: Washington is determined to keep the keys to the kingdom, and it is taking measures daily to strengthen its intention to constrain China by depriving it of exercising
even the regional power to which it is entitled on the basis of its huge economy, a population of 1.4 billion people, and its peaceful rise and intentions. President
Obama is quite visibly seeking to confront China, politically, militarily, and economically and politically in
the Asia/Pacific region. This is what the pivot to Asia is about, containing Chinese influence within its own geographical environment. The U.S. is at least two decades ahead of China in war
technology, equipment, nuclear weapons, various missiles, planes, ships everything. John Reed wrote in DefenseTech a few years ago: Even Chinas newest military gear is reminiscent of Western or Soviet technology from about 20 years ago, or more. Peoples Liberation Army (PLA)
leaders certainly want to catch up and are making progress, but they can only approach near proximity if Pentagon scientists decide to sleep for the next two decades. Instead, Washingtons immense military, several times that of China, is increasing the gap in real time. U.S. military spending this
year will amount to 4.5% of GNP, and that does not count a number of military expenses concealed in nonmilitary budgets such as the new 20-year multi-billion dollar program to modernize U.S. nuclear weapons and delivery systems (charged to the Department of Energy). Chinas spending this year,
with four times the American population, is 1.5% of GDP. Chinas extremely important cyber warfare advances may or may not be equal to those of the U.S., but it is the only area of relative equivalence, and its causing headaches in the Pentagon. The U.S. is frantically surrounding China with military
weapons, advanced aircraft, naval fleets and a multitude of military bases from Japan, South Korea and the Philippines through several nearby smaller Pacific islands to its new and enlarged base in Australia and, of course, intercontinental ballistic missiles from the United States. The U.S. naval fleet,
aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines patrol Chinas nearby waters. Warplanes, surveillance planes, drones and spying satellites cover the skies, creating a symbolic darkness at noon. By 2017, the Pentagon plans to encircle China with the most advanced stealth warplanes in the world, according
to RT. The Air Forces F-22s and B-2s, as well as a fleet of the Marine Corps F-35, will all be deployed. This buildup has been going on for three years and it is hardly ever mentioned in the U.S. Washington seems to fear Chinas military defense capability more than its potential offensive abilities,
though that remains a serious concern. In the Pentagons annual report to Congress May 8, all 31,000 words were devoted to Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoples Republic of China 2015, including these: China is investing in capabilities designed to defeat adversary power
projection and counter third-party including U.S. intervention during a crisis or conflict. The PLA is developing and testing new intermediate- and medium-range conventional ballistic missiles, as well as long- range, land-attack, and anti-ship cruise missiles that extend Chinas operational reach,
attempting to push adversary forces including the United States farther from potential regional conflicts. China is also focusing on counter-space, offensive cyber operations, and electronic warfare capabilities meant to deny adversaries the advantages of modern, informationized warfare.
Chinas military modernization has the potential to reduce core U.S. military technological advantages. Concern was also expressed for Chinas development and testing of missile defense. Much of the Pentagon report is far more objective and informative about China than statements from the
White House, Congress and the provocative corporate mass media: First of all it describes Chinas political goal realistically: Securing Chinas status as a great power and, ultimately, reacquiring regional preeminence. Question Why is the Obama Administration doing everything possible to thwart
Chinas regional preeminence? Answer Because it is unwilling to share a regional portion of its own world preeminence with any country that will not bend a knee to Washingtons supremacy. The report says accurately: China
continues to regard stable relations with
the United States and Chinas neighbors as key to its development. China sees the U.S. as the dominant regional and global actor with the greatest potential to both support and, potentially,
disrupt Chinas rise. Top Chinese leaders, including President Xi Jinping, continued to advocate for a new type of major power relations with the United States throughout 2014. Chinas new type of relations concept
urges a cooperative U.S.- China partnership based on equality, mutual respect, and mutual benefit. Most interestingly, the Pentagon also recognized that Chinese leaders see a strong military as critical to prevent other countries from taking
steps that would damage Chinas interests and to ensure China can defend itself, should deterrence fail. China seeks to ensure basic stability along its periphery and avoid direct confrontation with the United States in order to focus on domestic development and smooth Chinas rise. Despite this,
Chinese leaders in 2014 demonstrated a willingness to tolerate a higher level of regional tension as China sought to advance its interests, such as in competing territorial claims in the East China Sea and South China Sea. The Wall Street Journal May 13 defined the South China Sea as one of the
worlds busiest shipping routes and a strategic passage between the rich economies of Northeast Asia and the Indian Ocean. As much as 50% of global oil-tanker shipments pass through its waters. China often intercepts and protests over U.S. naval ships and aircraft conducting surveillance near its
coastline in the South China Sea. Six governments China, Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, Taiwan and the Philippines claim the waters, islands, reefs and atolls in whole or in part, making the area a potential flashpoint. Two countries, Japan and South Korea, have claims in the East China Sea to the
northwest, so eight nations are involved. China has long claimed authority over almost all the islands on the basis of evidence the other states consider inadequate. The Obama Administration is navigating with abandon and roiling the political waters throughout both seas, enthusiastically supporting
the claims of all the smaller nations against Chinas claims. This is a very important and delicate matter because verified claimants are entitled to exploit energy, mineral and other abundant resources in the proximity as well as to deploy them for military purposes, if large enough, but most are tiny.
This is clearly a complex matter that should be resolved over time through peaceful negotiations, and give and take dispute resolution. The continuation of Americas self-appointed role as advocate and protector of the counter-claims of smaller countries against China will only cause more trouble.
The U.S. has absolutely no authority in this matter, and it even refuses to ratify the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which is equipped to mediate territorial disputes in the South and East China Seas. Actually, Obama doesnt give a fig about the claims. The only purpose of his
intervention against Chinas claims is to consolidate and expand Washingtons large and growing cheaper-by-the dozen gaggle of regional client states some of which (Japan, S. Korea, the Philippines) have been U.S. protectorates since the end of World War II. All these countries will support
Americas global political, economic and military intentions in East Asia, including that of confining Chinas influence within its own borders to the extent possible. If not, they will be escorted to the door. In this connection the U.S. is also exaggerating the fact that China is
involved in land reclamation efforts in five small reefs in the Spratly Islands. Its expanding them by adding sand and making infrastructure additions, including an airfield in one. The White house says up to is about 2,000 acres are at issue. Obama said a month ago that China was flexing its muscles to browbeat
smaller nations into accepting Beijings sovereignty over disputed islands, and more recently Washington implied it might send navy ships and aircraft to the islands but soon backed off because Chinas actions were entirely legal. In mid-May, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia Daniel Russel told the Washington Post: Reclamation isnt necessarily a violation of international law, but its certainly violating the harmony, the feng shui, of Southeast Asia, and its certainly violating Chinas claim to be a good neighbor
and a benign and non-threatening power. At that point, the heavens finally intervened with a lighter moment. Wrote the Wall Street Journal May 21: Chinese Taoist priest Liang Xingyang is rebutting the U.S. officials understanding of feng shui. The term, which translates directly as wind water, refers to the Chinese philosophical system of harmonizing the human being with the surrounding environment. In fact, claims Mr. Liang, Chinas reclamation efforts are improving the regions feng shui. Mr. Liang maintained
that feng shui belongs to the whole world, but the power of interpretation stays with China. Soon after the Pentagon report, China outlined a new military strategy to boost its naval reach May 26. In a policy document issued by the State Council, China vowed to increase its open seas protection, switching from air defense to both offense and defense, and criticized neighbors who take provocative actions on its reefs and islands. A statement in the document declared: In todays world, the global trends toward
multipolarity and economic globalization are intensifying. The forces for world peace are on the rise, so are the factors against war. There are, however, new threats from hegemonism, power politics and neo-interventionism. China will speed up the development of a cyber force to tackle grave security threats to its cyber infrastructure. Cyberspace is highlighted as one of Chinas four critical security domains, other than the ocean, outer space and nuclear force. In addition to military threats, and encouraging allies
to assist in containing China, Washingtons pivot includes strong intervention intended to increase Americas economic clout in East Asia and reduce Beijings. Obamas chosen vehicle the Trans Pacific Partnership so favors corporations at the expense of U.S. jobs, the interests of working people, the environment and national sovereignty that many Democrats in Congress, led by Sen. Elizabeth Warren, are sharply opposed. In the words of Public Citizen: The TPP is a massive, controversial free trade agreement
currently being pushed by big corporations and negotiated behind closed doors by officials from the United States and 11 other countries Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam.The TPP would expand the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) trade pact model that has spurred massive U.S. trade deficits and job loss, downward pressure on wages, unprecedented levels of inequality and new floods of agricultural imports. The TPP not only
replicates, but expands NAFTAs special protections for firms that offshore U.S. jobs. And U.S. TPP negotiators literally used the 2011 Korea FTA under which exports have fallen and trade deficits have surged as the template for the TPP.In one fell swoop, this secretive deal could: offshore American jobs and increase income inequality, jack up the cost of medicines, sneak in SOPA-like threats to Internet freedom (i.e., Stop Online Piracy Act), and empower corporations to attack our environmental and health
safeguards, expose the U.S. to unsafe food and products, roll back Wall Street reforms, and ban Buy American policies needed to create green jobs. The Japan Times sounded like recalcitrant U.S. Democrats when it reported May 15: One big problem with the TPP talks is the secrecy of the negotiating process. The participants are required not to publicize developments in the talks and draft agreements while they are still being negotiated. The talks are going forward without the Japanese public and lawmakers being
given relevant information on what is being discussed or agreed upon. For example, it is impossible to know the details of discussions on regulations the TPP nations can adopt for environmental protection and food safety. Even when the trade pact takes effect, the participants will be forbidden from disclosing internal documents on the negotiation process for four years. Japan has not signed the TPP deal yet. It is demanding concessions on automobiles and agricultural products. The Senate rejected Obamas demand for
a fast track arrangement in mid-May, 52 to 45, but after corporate howls, promises and dollars it was passed days later 62-37. Most Republicans supported the trade plan from the beginning. Winning over his own party has proven so difficult that Obama has introduced the false patriotis m of anti-China rhetoric to shame recalcitrant Democrats into changing their views. Speaking in May he said: If we dont write the rules for trade around the world, guess what? China will. Actually, China is far more cooperative with U.S.
trade proposals than obstructive. On the TPP Beijing simply understands that it is aimed against China and that it has many shortcomings, as Warren has repeatedly pointed out. Although China earlier appeared deeply concerned about the TPP, it now seems indifferent. Over the last several months, President Xi has combined a well-financed, spectacular package of trade, banking, and infrastructure projects that are bound to significantly advance Chinas power and prestige in Asia, Europe and North Africa as well. The two
most important and far reaching projects are the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and the visionary, immensely expensive One Belt, One Road (OBOR) project. The latter initiative is also referred to as the New Silk Road after the 4,000-mile trade route between China and the West that developed from 114 BCE to the 1450s. The accompanying maritime trade lanes were called the Spice Route. OBOR, too, consists of a land and sea route. When New China does things its often in a big way, often with a touch of
long-past history in mind. Chinas recent creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) an exceptionally powerful economic initiative destined to benefit all of Asia and the world was perceived by the White House as a humiliating affront. Washington worked for months to undermine the impending venture, a dvising allies and underlings far and near to keep out. Beijing proposed the AIIB in October 2013; a year later, 21 nations, all Asian, gathered in Beijing and signed the memorandum esta blishing the
bank. Six months later, the membership has expanded to 57. In mid-March, Washingtons closest ally, the United Kingdom, was among the first major western economies to join the bank, prompting an extraordinary outburst by an anonymous high official of the Obama Administration, who declared for publication: We are wary about a trend toward constant accommodation of China, which is not the best way to engage a rising power. President Obama had to give permission for anonymous to deliver so pet ulant and
insulting a remark. Within a couple of weeks all the major world nations had joined except Japan and the U.S. The rest knew a good deal when they saw it in the midst of prolonged economic stagnation, particularly in Europe. Remember Willy Suttons answer when asked why he robbed banks? Thats where the money is. Their economies will profit. The international news analyst M.K. Bhadrakumar reported in Asia Times May 26: The AIIB Charter is still under discussion. The media report that China is not seeking a
veto in the decision-making comes as a pleasant surprise. Equally, China is actively consulting other founding members (UK, Germany, France, Italy, etc.). These would suggest that Beijing has a much bigger game plan of scattering the U.S. containment strategy. Clearly, the Trans-Pacific Partnership free-trade deal is already looking more absurd if China were to be kept out of it. The point is, AIIB gives financial underpinning for the Belt and Road initiative, which now the European countries and Russia have embraced, as
they expect much business spin-off. China benefits immensely, in terms of international prestige and politically as well, from the new venture. The AIIB has become a strong rival to the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, two powerful U.S.-controlled financial organizations, as well as the regional Asian Development Bank, ruled by Japan and America. China is not interested in debasing these associations but in collegial modernization with Beijing having a voice. Whats the oddly named named One Belt, One
Road (OBOR) project stand for? The Belt refers to the Silk Road Economic Belt, largely composed of countries situated on the original Silk Road from China through Central Asia, West Asia, the Middle East and Europe. The Road refers to the new maritime Silk Road. The initiative calls for the integration of the region into a cohesive ec onomic area through building infrastructure, increasing cultural exchanges and broadening trade. Many of the countries that are part of the belt are also signed up with the AIIB. The
Maritime Road is aimed at investing and fostering collaboration in Southeast Asia, Oceania, and North Africa through several contiguous bodies of water. Journalist Binoy Kampmark points out in Global Research: The economic belt, as Xi terms it, features such concrete manifestations as high-speed rail lines [including one between Beijing and Moscow], highways, bridges, and Internet connectivity. These, in turn, will be complemented by port development that is already seeing a presence in the Mediterranean and Indian
Ocean. Spearheading the drive are Chinas state-owned enterprises. Two other countries play important supporting roles in the U.S.-China exchange Russia and Japan. President Xi said recently that China is devoted to promoting a new model of major-country relationship with the U.S., keeping its comprehensive strategic partnership with Russia, [and] strengthening its partnership with the EU. Chinas partnership with Europe involves trade, investment, environmental issues and the like. With Russia its broader,
specifically: Energy, Business and Trade, High Technology and Industry, Finance, Military and Political/Diplomatic. China has military and political/diplomatic relations with the U.S. as well, but of a different character. According to Russian Insider: Military: China and Russia are engaging in military exercises of increasing scale and frequency. Their respective General Staffs closely coordinate with each other. Russia has resumed arms and technology sales to China. Political and Diplomatic: China and Russia are joint founder
members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. They actively coordinate their foreign policy positions with each other. They also work closely together and support each other in the UN Security Council. Moscows partnership with Beijing has become much stronger in recent years. Russia is a major nuclear power, roughly equivalent to America, with sophisticated military technology and hardware exceeding that of China, to which it is now selling offensive and defensive weaponry after a lapse of decades. The
worlds two biggest countries (size and population) have long been wary of each other, but a perceived need to strengthen their defenses brings them closer. Whet her they will ever form a binding formal alliance is not known, but Russias power adds to that of China and vice versa. Commenting on the relationship a couple of weeks ago Xi declared: We are strong if united but weak if isolated. At the same time the PRC is trying to calm an aroused Washington. Michael Swaine, a China expert at the Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace in Washington recently told the press: The Chinese are trying to convey a more moderate and softer message. They are trying to promote the image of a more flexible power. Chinese Vice Premier Wang Yang recently declared in a widely publicized speech t hat that the PRC does not have any ideas or capabilities with which to challenge or displace Americas global command. Russia shares with China the threat of U.S. military power on its periphery. Stratfor noted March 30: From the Baltics to
the Black Sea and now the Caspian, the United States is on the search for recruits to encircle Russia. Romania threw its lot in with the United States last year, but this year, Turkey and Turkmenistan are the ones to watch. All along Russias frontier with Europe, the U.S. military is bustling with activity. Bit by bit, the United States is expanding various military exercises under the banner of Operation Atlantic Resolve. The exercises began in the Baltics and Poland and, as of last week, expanded into Romania with plans to
move into Bulgaria. So far, most of these missions are on the smaller side, consisting of only a few hundred troops at any given time, and are meant to test the U.S. ability to rapidly deploy units to countries that can then practice receiving and working with these forces. Additionally, various headquarter units from U.S. Army infantry brigades have been rotating in and assuming control of Operation Atlantic Resolve in order to practice joint command and control. Several hundred American troops are in Ukraine training
Kievs military. It was symbolically significant that that Xi Jinping was seated next to President Putin at the May 9 Victory Day Parade in Moscow and that a Chinese military detachment was part of the event celebrating the 70th anniversary of the allied victory in Europe. Putin and Russian troops have been invited to participate in Chinas celebration of Japans defeat in September. The U.S., Britain and France, Russias former allies, boycotted the Moscow event. The new U.S.-Japan expanded military guidelines for defense
cooperation that was agreed in Washington between Japanese Prime Minster Shinz Abe and the Obama Administration April 27 is of major geopolitical significance. Tokyo will now increase its military role in the region and assume a more robust international posture, in response to growing Chinese influence. The guidelines allow for global Washington-Tokyo cooperation militarily, ranging from defense against ballistic missiles, cyber and space attacks as well as maritime security. China has sharply criticized the new
guidelines, calling them an attempt to undermine Beijing, as well as the geopolitical architecture of the Asia-Pacific. Global Times, which is affiliated with the CPC, declared: The new guidelines have struck a threatening pose toward China, which is the strongest driver for East Asias development. They should know that their aggression has sent a dangerous signal to regional stability. Washington also renewed and strengthened Americas iron-clad commitment to support Japan and all territories under Tokyos
administration. Japan and China are locked in a sharp disagreement about their rival claims to tiny East China Sea islets and reefs, some no more than large rocks sticking out of the water. Should the conflict become a serious confrontation the Obama Administration evidently will intervene on behalf of Japan. The daily Indian newspaper The Hindu reported May 1: Officials from the United States have been quoted as saying that the latest guidelines updated for the first time since 1997 end the geographic limits on
the Japanese military to operate. Following permission from Parliament, Japanese forces can participate in military operations across the globe. The current guidelines are unrestricted with respect to geography, U.S. Defense Secretary Ash Carter has been quoted as saying. That is a very big change from being locally focused to globally focused, he observed. Analysts point out that the changes to the U.S.-Japan pact inject more substance into President Barack Obamas Pivot to Asia doctrine, which the Chinese say
lays the military groundwork for containing Beijings peaceful rise. Heretofore the terms of the pacifist constitution imposed on Japan after it was defeated in World War I confined the Japanese military to fight only in Japan and in self-defense. The right wing Abe government has sought to dispense with this constitution entirely, but a majority of the Japanese people strongly oppose such a step. Abe envisions Japan once again becoming a major military power in Asia. Actually Tokyo already wields the ninth largest
military force in the world, replete with high technology weaponry. China has just made an amazing overture to Japan in an effort to reduce tensions. M.K. Bhadrakumar reported May 27 that China has decided to extend the hand of friendship to Japan, describing a precedent-breaking event in Beijing May 23. A heavyweight politician from Japans ruling party leads a 3,000-member delegation (yes, 3,000) to Beijing; the Chinese hosts spread out a grand dinner for the 3,000 Japanese guests at the Great Hall of People;
President Xi Jinping makes an apparently surprise but carefully choreographed appearance at the dinner; Xi makes an extraordinarily warm speech full of conciliatory sentiments belying his fame as an assertive leader, stressing the imperatives of Sino-Japanese friendship not only for the two countries but for the region and the world at large; the heavyweight Japanese politician steps forward in front of his 3,000-strong delegation and hands over to Xi a hand-written letter from Prime Minister Shinzo Abe; Xi reciprocates by
conveying his best regards to Abe a thaw in China-Japan ties seems to be at work. Cynics might say Abe has a habit of sending hand-written letters to counterparts in countries with which Japan has strained relations, such as South Korea. But there is something beyond the calls of public diplomacy here, as is apparent from the contents and tone of the speech Xi made while addressing the goodwill delegation from Japan. A Xinhua commentary noted, The onus is now on the leaders of Japan to reciprocate the friendly
tone and take concrete actions to mend frayed ties with China. The two neighbors are showing a spirit of pragmatism that was considered unthinkable as recently as last November when on the sidelines of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation summit Xi and Ab e held a frosty meeting. The Financial Times reported April 30 Washington is giving up on the idea that a risen China can be co-opted as a stakeholder in the present global order, implicitly suggesting that Washington is going to adopt a much tougher stance
toward China to preserve its geopolitical superiority. The article references a new report on China from the Council on Foreign Relations, the leading establishment voice in foreign affairs. Titled, Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China, the newspaper reports it outlines a plan to draw together all the elements of U.S. power with the goal of maintaining Americas primacy in East Asia. But balancing Beijings weight is one thing. Nervous as they are, Chinas neighbors have a powerful economic interest in getting on
with Beijing. A U.S. that sought permanent preponderance would be inviting a collision. Unstoppable forces and immovable objects come to mind. Both China and the United States want to keep their disputes within bounds in the proximate future, if possible. This was demonstrated after weeks of public squabbling May 16 and 17 when Secretary of State John Kerry paid his fifth visit to China. According to a May 26 report in China-U.S. Focus by Zhang Zhixin, chief of American Political Studies at the China Institutes of
Contemporary International Relations, this is the meaning: As the highest-level American official who visited China this year, with a hot China policy debate going on in the U.S., and the Obama administration strongly criticizing Chinas reclamation in South China Sea, [Kerry's] visit has been regarded as a trip aimed at denouncing Beijing. However, judging from the result, Kerrys visit is better characterized as a trip of in-depth communication. Early this year, American strategic circles started another round of China policy
debate. From the so-called cracking up of the CPC to the familiar rhetoric of the China threat it made some American China watchers believe the consensus underlying the U.S. China policy is collapsing. Kerrys constructive visit has been of great importance at this critical moment. First, it shows that both countries would like to manage differences before crises occur. Chinese leaders tried to reassure the U.S. side they are still committed to building a new major power relationship. Second, this visit made timely
preparation for the coming bilateral and multilateral events including President Xi Jinpings first State visit to the U.S. in September that could shape the following two years Sino-U.S. relations. Third, Secretary Kerrys visit is a success as it deepened the understanding between two countries at this critical time, but it reminds both countries consensus is easy to reach but hard to actualize. The disputes between two countries highlighted the U.S. misinterpretation of Chinas plans for future development. The U.S.
side should neither overestimate its influence upon Chinas future, nor underestimate Chinas ability to explore its own way of development with Chinese character istics. Interestingly, a similar situation to the Beijing surprise occurred weeks earlier when Kerry was sent to Moscow for talks with President Putin. Washingtons advance leaks suggested that he would read the riot act to the Russian leader because of the Ukraine situation but the opposite happened, evidently not least because of U.S. concerns of a
developing alliance between Russia and China. Kerry turned on a dime just before both meetings, as though receiving late instructions. Apparently, the White House concluded its policy of pouting and denouncing China is churlish and demonstrably counterproductive. Even some of Washingtons allies were beginning to look askance at Oval Office shoot-from-the-hip decisions. However, nothing else has changed. The quest to retain global rule is more pronounced than ever and the danger level is getting higher. Both the
U.S. and China are strong and intelligent countries. But as Darwin said, It is not the strongest of the species that survives, nor the most intelligent that survives. It is the one that is the most adaptable to change. Great changes have already started and the pace will intensify in coming decades politically, economically, environmentally and in terms of social systems and world order. One needed change is replacing single-country global hegemony with multi-country cooperation for the advancement of humankind. The
governments of several rising countries will help bring this about, if possible, but it wont be easy. Systemic changes are needed in our societies, as well. We cannot simply paper over the class exploitation, gross inequality, racism, poverty, state violence and the shredding of our ecology and say thats change. Billions of human beings alive today want a world where wealth is sufficiently shared so everyone has at least enough. Thats no exaggeration. Billions live in poverty. They all want out. Whether in poverty or not,
who prefers to live in a world where the richest 1% of the global population own more than the remaining 99%? Thats our world today, and it must change.

TPP solves plus AIIB is bad for us

Washington Post, 15. (Editorial Board. "Chinas new development bank bodes poorly for the U.S." Washington Post. 3-22-2015 Web. Accessed: 6-21-2016.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/chinas-new-development-bank-bodes-poorly-for-the-us/2015/03/22/6f19e4ec-cf31-11e4-8a46-b1dc9be5a8ff_story.html) PN
THE OBAMA administration suffered a foreign policy setback last week when three European allies Germany, France and Italy decided to join a fourth, Britain, as shareholders in a new Chinese-sponsored multilateral
development agency for Asia. When Beijing first proposed the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in 2013, Washington viewed it, not unreasonably, as a Chinese attempt to set up a rival to the U.S.-led World Bank, with the goal
of expanding the influence of the Peoples Republic across the region. A foreseeable negative consequence of a successful AIIB could be project funding ungoverned by the environmental and anti-corruption safeguards that World Bank borrowers must meet. The fact that four key
European allies found it advantageous to join, despite U.S. insistence, speaks volumes about the ebb and flow of American influence in a region toward which President Obama had promised to
pivot. Indeed, the Europeans moves make it more likely that South Korea and Australia will feel compelled to join the Chinese-led agency, leaving the United States and Japan on the outside looking in. For now, the AIIB is more about symbolism than substance. With an initial capital of just $50
billion, one third that of the Japan-led Asian Development Bank, and none of the World Banks expertise or institutional heft, its unclear how much of a dent the new bank could make in the regions multi-trillion-dollar needs for roads, dams, bridges and ports. Its governance structure
remains ill-defined and, potentially, a subject of controversy if and when the projects it backs start to have negative environmental or social consequences. (Heres hoping that the myriad nongovernmental
organizations that regularly criticize the World Banks practices and procedures do not give Chinas bank a pass.) The question for Washington now is how to respond. This turn of events might have been avoided if Congress had approved the Obama administrations request for International
Monetary Fund financing that included a formula for greater Chinese power at the IMF. In that sense, Washington has itself to blame. Yet approving the IMF money now would probably be too little too late to reverse the AIIBs momentum and its not clear that Beijing would have been appeased
by a greater IMF role. Nor
does the United States have much to gain by joining the AIIB itself, on the off chance Congress would approve. Some have suggested this would enable Washington to shape the institution
from within; better, though, to see what impact the Europeans have before lending AIIB a U.S. imprimatur. Mr. Obamas best bet is to redouble efforts to shore up World Bank funding, and to
win congressional approval for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) free-trade arrangement, which would tie the United States and East Asia more closely together, while establishing a regional economic
framework built on Western-style economics rather than Chinese mercantilism. If, as the administration suspects, the AIIB represents an aggressive Chinese geopolitical thrust, then TPP is the
appropriate way to parry it.
 China Rise inevitable (UQ overwhelms the link)
Hegemony is declining China rise proves
Keck 14 Zachary Keck is Associate Editor of The Diplomat. Previously, he worked as Deputy Editor of e-International Relations and has interned at the Center for a New American Security
and in the U.S. Congress, where he worked on defense issues. (Zachary, 2014 Chinas Growing Hegemonic Bent, The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2014/06/chinas-growing-hegemonic-
bent/)

The Peoples Republic of China has been nothing if not consistent about its views on hegemony. From the time of Mao Zedong to present time, Chinese leaders have repeatedly and consistently denounced hegemony in all its forms. Indeed, the word hegemony is
little more than a synonym for countries or actions that Beijing dislikes. But even as China continues to denounce hegemony rhetorically, it increasingly embraces it in action. This is true across a whole host of issues. None more so than Beijings
New Security Concept, which President Xi Jinping announced last month at the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) summit in Shanghai. David Cohen reminds us that the New Security Concept is likely more multi-faceted than it may appear at first glance.
Nonetheless, at its core, the
New Security Concept is that security in Asia should be maintained by Asians themselves. As the Global Times reported about Xis speech, it stressed the role played by Asians
themselves in building security, viewed as a rejection of interference from outside the region. During the speech, Xi also denounced alliances in the region. It makes good sense that China would want a U.S.-
free Asia-Pacific as Chinas rise has proceeded, the U.S. has increasingly become the only viable counterbalance to Beijing in the region. Chinas relative influence would therefore be greatly enhanced by Americas exit from the region.
The same goes for an end to alliances to the region not only does China lack any formal allies, but its size ensures it will dominate any bilateral interactions with Asian nations. At the same time, the New Security Concept is transparently hegemonic. To begin with, the realization of the primary goals
of the New Security Concept namely, the exit of the U.S. from Asia and the end of alliances would ensure Chinas hegemony over the region. Equally important, these goals are at odds with the views of the overwhelming majority of Asian nations. Specifically, China is alone in wanting the U.S.
out of the strategic order in Asia. Every other Asia-Pacific nation with the exception of North Korea wants the U.S. to maintain a strong presence in the regional security architecture. In fact, most states want the U.S. to get its head out of the sand and play a bigger role in Asian security. Similarly,
other Asian nations are strongly in favor of alliances in the region as evidenced by the fact that they are strengthening their ties to the U.S. and with each other. A related but different manifestation of Chinas growing hegemonic ambitions is the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), a
multilateral development body that China is proposing as an alternative to the World Bank and Asian Development Bank (ADB). On the surface, the AIIB is even less malign than the New Security Concept and in some ways this is true. However, a closer examination reveals that the AIIB is in many
ways just the economic equivalent of the New Security Concept. To begin with, China wants to establish the AIIB to counterbalance the influence of the World Bank and ADB, which Beijing views as too dominated by the U.S. and Japan respectively. Given the U.S. Congresss intransigence on IMF
reforms, the desire to work around the World Bank can be justified. But Chinas apparent need to spurn the ADB instead of simply seeking a greater role in it by raising its contributions is less defensible. Indeed, a stronger commitment to the ADB would be an important indication of Chinas interest
in seeking a larger role in the existing order rather than trying to upend it. Instead, China is taking the later course with the AIIB. Much like the New Security Concept, it is doing so because Beijing is crafting the institution to ensure it dominates it completely. For example, all reports suggest that China
is trying to exclude Japan, India and the United States from the AIIB. This means that the institution while ostensibly multilateral will be funded almost entirely by China. As Oliver Rui, a professor of finance and accounting at the China Europe International Business School in Shanghai, puts it:
China wants to play a more pivotal role in these kinds of organizations so the best way is to establish an organization by itself. This is another way to think from a broad perspective in order to counterbalance Japan and the U.S. Chinas hegemonic ambitions are also apparent from the way
Beijing intends to push the AIIB. As the Financial Times quotes a participant in the AIIB discussions (whose nationality is not given) as saying: There is a lot of interest from across Asia but China is going to go ahead with this even if nobody else joins it. It should also be noted that, although the
mutual benefits of the projects it will fund cannot be ignored, the ultimate objective of the AIIB is hegemonic in nature. Namely, China is seeking to build up infrastructure throughout the greater Asian region to more tightly tie its smaller neighbors economic livelihoods to trade with China. And as
China has already made clear in its territorial disputes with countries like Japan and the Philippines, Beijing is quite willing to exploit other nations economic dependencies on it to force them to comply with its political mandates. Perhaps the
greatest expression of Chinas new
hegemonic ambitions is to force foreign nations and businesses to serve the interests of China as a nation or the narrow goals of the Communist Party. At times, this includes interfering in the domestic affairs of
other states. For example, China has a long history of pressuring Southeast and South Asian nations to forcibly repatriate Uyghurs back to China. In recent years, Beijing has stepped up the pressure on these kinds of issues. Most notably, China appears to be all
but actually drafting Nepals laws for Tibetans itself. More widespread are Chinas efforts to force foreign companies to serve the ends of China and the CCP. This usually done by threatening to deny these companies access to Chinas growing
consumer markets. As a result, this kind of pressure has become more effective in recent years, as seen by Hollywood and international media outlets (to name just two examples) becoming increasingly subservient to Beijing. As Chinas domestic market
grows, so too will the frequency and success of this kind of pressure. None of this is to demonize China. As history has shown, rising powers seem to reflexively grow more hegemonic the stronger they become. Indeed, the U.S. once led the world in denouncing
European intervention in the non-Western world. During the Cold War, however, it became more involved in the affairs of the so-called third world than any of the major former colonial powers like France and Britain. Only a fool (or town of them) would therefore expect a rising China to shy away
from hegemony and instead join the existing international order. Still, Chinas near constant denouncements of the supposed hegemonic tendencies of others which, ironically, were especially prevalent in Xis CICA and General Wangs Shangri-La Dialogue speeches are becoming increasingly
hypocritical.

China wont back down in their inevitable quest to undermine US hegemony

Keck Jun 26, 2014 Zachary Keck is Associate Editor of The Diplomat. Previously, he worked as Deputy Editor of e-International Relations and has interned at the Center for a New American
Security and in the U.S. Congress, where he worked on defense issues. (Zachary, Chinas Growing Hegemonic Bent, The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2014/06/chinas-growing-
hegemonic-bent/)

The Peoples Republic of China has been nothing if not consistent about its views on hegemony. From the time of Mao Zedong to present time, Chinese leaders have repeatedly and consistently denounced hegemony in all its forms. Indeed, the word hegemony
is little more than a synonym for countries or actions that Beijing dislikes. But even as China continues to denounce hegemony rhetorically, it increasingly embraces it in action. This is true across a whole host of issues. None more so than Beijings New Security
Concept, which President Xi Jinping announced last month at the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) summit in Shanghai. David Cohen reminds us that the New Security Concept is likely more multi-faceted than it may
appear at first glance. Nonetheless, at its core, the New Security Concept is that security in Asia should be maintained by Asians themselves. As the Global Times reported about Xis speech, it stressed the role played by Asians themselves in building security,
viewed as a rejection of interference from outside the region. During the speech, Xi also denounced alliances in the region. It makes good sense that China would want a U.S.-free Asia-Pacific as Chinas rise has proceeded, the U.S. has increasingly become the
only viable counterbalance to Beijing in the region. Chinas relative influence would therefore be greatly enhanced by Americas exit from the region. The same goes for an end to alliances to the region not only does China lack any formal allies, but its size
ensures it will dominate any bilateral interactions with Asian nations. At the same time, the New Security Concept is transparently hegemonic. To begin with, the realization of the primary goals of the New Security Concept namely, the exit of the U.S. from Asia
and the end of alliances would ensure Chinas hegemony over the region. Equally important, these goals are at odds with the views of the overwhelming majority of Asian nations. Specifically, China is alone in wanting the U.S. out of the strategic order in Asia.
Every other Asia-Pacific nation with the exception of North Korea wants the U.S. to maintain a strong presence in the regional security architecture. In fact, most states want the U.S. to get its head out of the sand and play a bigger role in Asian security.
Similarly, other Asian nations are strongly in favor of alliances in the region as evidenced by the fact that they are strengthening their ties to the U.S. and with each other. A related but different manifestation of Chinas growing hegemonic ambitions is the Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), a multilateral development body that China is proposing as an alternative to the World Bank and Asian Development Bank (ADB). On the surface, the AIIB is even less malign than the New Security Concept and in some
ways this is true. However, a closer examination reveals that the AIIB is in many ways just the economic equivalent of the New Security Concept. To begin with, China wants to establish the AIIB to counterbalance the influence of the World Bank and ADB, which
Beijing views as too dominated by the U.S. and Japan respectively. Given the U.S. Congresss intransigence on IMF reforms, the desire to work around the World Bank can be justified. But Chinas apparent need to spurn the ADB instead of simply seeking a greater
role in it by raising its contributions is less defensible. Indeed, a stronger commitment to the ADB would be an important indication of Chinas interest in seeking a larger role in the existing order rather than trying to upend it. Instead, China is taking the later
course with the AIIB. Much like the New Security Concept, it is doing so because Beijing is crafting the institution to ensure it dominates it completely. For example, all reports suggest that China is trying to exclude Japan, India and the United States from the AIIB.
This means that the institution while ostensibly multilateral will be funded almost entirely by China. As Oliver Rui, a professor of finance and accounting at the China Europe International Business School in Shanghai, puts it: China wants to play a more
pivotal role in these kinds of organizations so the best way is to establish an organization by itself. This is another way to think from a broad perspective in order to counterbalance Japan and the U.S. Chinas hegemonic ambitions are also apparent from the
way Beijing intends to push the AIIB. As the Financial Times quotes a participant in the AIIB discussions (whose nationality is not given) as saying: There is a lot of interest from across Asia but China is going to go ahead with this even if nobody else joins it. It
should also be noted that, although the mutual benefits of the projects it will fund cannot be ignored, the ultimate objective of the AIIB is hegemonic in nature. Namely, China is seeking to build up infrastructure throughout the greater Asian region to more tightly
tie its smaller neighbors economic livelihoods to trade with China. And as China has already made clear in its territorial disputes with countries like Japan and the Philippines, Beijing is quite willing to exploit other nations economic dependencies on it to force
them to comply with its political mandates. Perhaps the greatest expression of Chinas new hegemonic ambitions is to force foreign nations and businesses to serve the interests of China as a nation or the narrow goals of the Communist Party. At times, this
includes interfering in the domestic affairs of other states. For example, China has a long history of pressuring Southeast and South Asian nations to forcibly repatriate Uyghurs back to China. In recent years, Beijing has stepped up the pressure on these kinds of
issues. Most notably, China appears to be all but actually drafting Nepals laws for Tibetans itself. More widespread are Chinas efforts to force foreign companies to serve the ends of China and the CCP. This usually done by threatening to deny these companies
access to Chinas growing consumer markets. As a result, this kind of pressure has become more effective in recent years, as seen by Hollywood and international media outlets (to name just two examples) becoming increasingly subservient to Beijing. As Chinas
domestic market grows, so too will the frequency and success of this kind of pressure. None of this is to demonize China. As
history has shown, rising powers seem to reflexively grow more hegemonic the stronger they
become. Indeed, the U.S. once led the world in denouncing European intervention in the non-Western world. During the Cold War, however, it became more involved in the affairs of the so-called third world than any of the major former colonial powers like
France and Britain. Only a fool (or town of them) would therefore expect a rising China to shy away from hegemony and instead join the existing international order. Still, Chinas near constant denouncements of
the supposed hegemonic tendencies of others which, ironically, were especially prevalent in Xis CICA and General Wangs Shangri-La Dialogue speeches are becoming increasingly hypocritical.
 Impact
Heg doesnt solve war the international community is resilient and disruptions are temporary
Preble Aug 3, 2010 - Christopher A. Preble is the vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute. He holds a Ph.D in History from Temple University (Christopher A.,
U.S. Military Power: Preeminence for What Purpose? The Cato Institute, http://www.cato.org/blog/us-military-power-preeminence-what-purpose)

Over at National Journals National Security Experts blog, this weeks question focuses on the recently released Hadley-Perry alternative QDR. Sydney J. Freedberg Jr. of NationalJournal.com asks: The U.S. military is already unaffordable and yet it needs to be
larger to sustain Americas global leadership, especially in the face of a rising China. Thats the bottom line from a congressionally chartered bipartisan panel, co-chaired by Stephen Hadley, George W. Bushs national security adviser, and William Perry, Bill
Clintons Defense secretary. The report, released July 29, is the independent panels assessment of and commentary on the Pentagons own Quadrennial Defense Review, released earlier this year. Frequent expert blog contributor Gordon Adams, among others,
has already blasted the Hadley-Perry report for making the underlying assumption that the U.S. can and should continue to invest heavily in being a global policeman. Is Adams right that the Hadley-Perry report calls for an unaffordable answer to the wrong
question? Or are the reports authors correct when they argue that the U.S. must be the leading guarantor of global security? And if the U.S. must lead, has the Hadley-Perry panel laid out the right path to doing so? My response: Dan Goure says that U.S. military
preeminence is not unaffordable. That is probably correct. Even though we spend in excess of $800 billion annually on national security (including the cost of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the Departments of Homeland Security and Veterans Affairs) we
could choose to spend as much, or more, for a while longer. We could choose to shift money out of other government programs; we could raise taxes; or we could continue to finance the whole thing on debt, and stick our children and grandchildren with the bill.
But what is the point? Why do Americans spend so much more on our military than does any other country, or any other combination of countries? Goure and the Hadley-Perry commissioners who produced the alternate QDR argue that the purpose of American
military power is to provide global public goods, to defend other countries so that they dont have to defend themselves, and otherwise shape the international order to suit our ends. In other words, the same justifications offered for American military
dominance since the end of the Cold War. Most in Washington still embraces the notion that America is, and forever will be, the worlds indispensable nation. Some scholars, however, questioned the logic of hegemonic stability theory from
the very beginning. A number continue to do so today. They advance arguments diametrically at odds with the primacist consensus. Trade routes need not be policed by a single dominant power; the international
economy is complex and resilient. Supply disruptions are likely to be temporary, and the costs of mitigating their effects should be borne by those who stand to lose or gain the most. Islamic
extremists are scary, but hardly comparable to the threat posed by a globe-straddling Soviet Union armed with thousands of nuclear weapons. It is frankly absurd that we spend more today to fight Osama bin Laden and his tiny band of
murderous thugs than we spent to face down Joseph Stalin and Chairman Mao. Many factors have contributed to the dramatic decline in the number of wars between nation-states; it is unrealistic to expect that a new spasm of global
conflict would erupt if the United States were to modestly refocus its efforts, draw down its military power, and call on other countries to play a larger role in their own defense, and in the security of
their respective regions. But while there are credible alternatives to the United States serving in its current dual role as world policeman / armed social worker, the foreign policy establishment in Washington has no interest in exploring them. The people here
have grown accustomed to living at the center of the earth, and indeed, of the universe. The tangible benefits of all this military spending flow disproportionately to this tiny corner of the United States while the schlubs in fly-over country pick up the tab. In short,
we shouldnt have expected that a group of Washington insiders would seek to overturn the judgments of another group of Washington insiders. A genuinely independent assessment of U.S. military spending, and of the strategy the military is designed to
implement, must come from other quarters.

The drive for US hegemony makes war against Russia and China inevitable that goes nuclear
Roberts 5-26 Paul Craig Roberts has had careers in scholarship and academia, journalism, public service, and business. He is chairman of The Institute for Political Economy.
Dr. Roberts has held academic appointments at Virginia Tech, Tulane University, University of New Mexico, Stanford University where he was Senior Research Fellow in the
Hoover Institution, George Mason University where he had a joint appointment as professor of economics and professor of business administration, and Georgetown
University where he held the William E. Simon Chair in Political Economy in the Center for Strategic and International Studies. (Paul Craig, US hegemonic drive makes war with
Russia/China inevitable PressTV, http://jhaines6.wordpress.com/2014/05/27/presstv-us-hegemonic-drive-makes-war-with-russiachina-inevitable-by-paul-craig-roberts/#)

Memorial Day is when we commemorate our war dead. Like the Fourth of July, Memorial Day is being turned into a celebration of war. Those who lose family members and dear friends to war dont want the deaths to have been in vain. Consequently, wars
become glorious deeds performed by noble soldiers fighting for truth, justice, and the American way. Patriotic speeches tell us how much we owe to those who gave their lives so that America could remain free. The speeches are well-intentioned, but the
speeches create a false reality that supports ever more wars. None of Americas wars had anything to do with keeping America free. To the contrary, the wars swept away our civil liberties, making us unfree. President Lincoln issued an executive order for the
arrest and imprisonment of northern newspaper reporters and editors. He shut down 300 northern newspapers and held 14,000 political prisoners. Lincoln arrested war critic US Representative Clement Vallandigham from Ohio and exiled him to the Confederacy.
President Woodrow Wilson used WWI to suppress free speech, and President Franklin D. Roosevelt used WWII to intern 120,000 US citizens of Japanese descent on the grounds that race made them suspect. Professor Samuel Walker concluded that President
George W. Bush used the war on terror for an across the board assault on US civil liberty, making the Bush regime the greatest danger American liberty has ever faced. Lincoln forever destroyed states rights, but the suspension of habeas corpus and free speech
that went hand in hand with Americas three largest wars was lifted at wars end. However, President George W. Bushs repeal of the Constitution has been expanded by President Obama and codified by Congress and executive orders into law. Far from
defending our liberties, our soldiers who died in the war on terror died so that the president can indefinitely detain US citizens without due process of law and murder US citizens on suspicion alone without any accountability to law or the Constitution. The
conclusion is unavoidable that Americas wars have not protected our liberty but, instead, destroyed liberty. As Alexander Solzhenitsyn said, A state of war only serves as an excuse for domestic tyranny. Southern secession did pose a threat to Washingtons
empire, but not to the American people. Neither the Germans of WWI vintage nor the Germans and Japanese of WWII vintage posed any threat to the US. As historians have made completely clear, Germany did not start WWI and did not go to war for the
purpose of territorial expansion. Japans ambitions were in Asia. Hitler did not want war with England and France. Hitlers territorial ambitions were mainly to restore German provinces stripped from Germany as WWI booty in violation of President Wilsons
guarantees. Any other German ambitions were to the East. Neither country had any plans to invade the US. Japan attacked the US fleet at Pearl Harbor hoping to remove an obstacle to its activities in Asia, not as a precursor to an invasion of America. Certainly the
countries ravaged by Bush and Obama in the 21st centuryIraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Somalia, Syria, Pakistan, and Yemen posed no military threat to the US. Indeed, these were wars used by a tyrannical executive branch to establish the basis of the Stasi State that
now exists in the US. The truth is hard to bear, but the facts are clear. Americas wars have been fought in order to advance Washingtons power, the profits of bankers and armaments industries, and the fortunes of US companies. Marine General Smedley Butler
said, I served in all commissioned ranks from a second Lieutenant to a Major General. And during that time, I spent most of my time being a high-class muscle man for Big Business, for Wall Street, and for the bankers. In short, I was a racketeer for capitalism. It
is more or less impossible to commemorate the war dead without glorifying them, and it is impossible to glorify them without glorifying their wars. For the entirety of the 21st century the US has been at war, not war against massed armies or threats to American
freedom, but wars against civilians, against women, children, and village elders, and wars against our own liberty. Elites with a vested interest in these wars tell us that the wars will have to go on for another 20 to 30 years before we defeat the terrorist threat.
This, of course, is nonsense. There was no terrorist threat until Washington began trying to create terrorists by military attacks, justified by lies, on Muslim populations. Washington succeeded with its war lies to the point that Washingtons audacity and hubris
have outgrown Washingtons judgment. By overthrowing the democratically elected government in Ukraine, Washington has brought the United States into confrontation with Russia. This is a confrontation
that could end badly, perhaps for Washington and perhaps for the entire world. If Gaddafi and Assad would not roll over for Washington, why does Washington think Russia will? The Bush and Obama regimes have destroyed
Americas reputation with their incessant lies and violence against other peoples. The world sees Washington as the prime threat. Worldwide polls consistently show that people around the world regard the US
and Israel as posing the greatest threat to peace. (see here and here) The countries that Washingtons propaganda declares to be rogue states and the axis of evil, such as Iran and North Korea, are far down the list when the peoples in the
world are consulted. It could not be more clear that the world does not believe Washingtons self-serving propaganda. The world sees the US and Israel as the rogue elements. The US and Israel are the only two in the world that are in the grip of ideologies. The
US is in the grip of the Neoconservative ideology which has declared the US to be the exceptional, indispensable country chosen by history to exercise hegemony over all others. This ideology is buttressed by the Brzezinski and Wolfowitz doctrines that are the
basis of US foreign policy. The Israeli government is in the grip of the Zionist ideology that declares a greater Israel from the Nile to the Euphrates. Many Israelis themselves do not accept this ideology, but it is the ideology of the settlers and those who control
the Israeli government. Ideologies are important causes of war. Just as the Hitlerian ideology of German superiority is mirrored in the Neoconservative ideology of US superiority, the Communist ideology that the working class is superior to the capitalist class is
mirrored in the Zionist ideology that Israelis are superior to Palestinians. Zionists have never heard of squatters rights and claim that recent Jewish immigrants into Palestine invaders really have the right to land occupied by others for millennia.
Washingtons and Israels doctrines of superiority over others do not sit very well with the others. When Obama declared in a speech that Americans are the exceptional people, Russias President Putin responded, God created
us all equal. To the detriment of its population, the Israeli government has made endless enemies. Israel has effectively isolated itself in the world. Israels continued existence depends entirely on the willingness and
ability of Washington to protect Israel. This means that Israels power is derivative of Washingtons power. Washingtons power is a different story. As the only economy standing after WWII, the US dollar became the world
money. This role for the dollar has given Washington financial hegemony over the world, the main source of Washingtons power. As other countries rise, Washingtons hegemony is imperiled. To prevent other countries from rising,
Washington invokes the Brzezinski and Wolfowitz doctrines. To be brief, the Brzezinski doctrine says that in order to remain the only superpower, Washington must control the Eurasian land mass. Brzezinski is willing for this to occur peacefully
by suborning the Russian government into Washingtons empire. A loosely confederated Russia . . . a decentralized Russia would be less susceptible to imperial mobilization. In other words, break up Russia into associations of semi-autonomous states whose
politicians can be suborned by Washingtons money. Brzezinski propounded a geo-strategy for Eurasia. In
Brzezinskis strategy, China and a confederated Russia are part of a transcontinental security framework,
managed by Washington in order to perpetuate the role of the US as the worlds only superpower. I once asked my colleague, Brzezinski, that if everyone was allied with us, who were we organized against? My question
surprised him, because I think that Brzezinski remains caught up in Cold War strategy even after the demise of the Soviet Union. In Cold War thinking it was important to have the upper hand or else be at risk of being eliminated as a player. The importance of
prevailing became all consuming, and this consuming drive survived the Soviet collapse. Prevailing over others is the only foreign policy that Washington knows. The mindset that America must prevail set the stage for the Neoconservatives and
their 21st century wars, which, with Washingtons overthrow of the democratically elected government of Ukraine, has resulted in a crisis that has brought Washington into direct conflict with Russia. I know the strategic institutes that serve
Washington. I was the occupant of the William E.Simon Chair in Political Economy, Center for Strategic and International Studies, for a dozen years. The idea is prevalent that Washington must prevail over Russia in Ukraine or Washington will lose prestige and its
superpower status. The idea of prevailing always leads to war once one power thinks it has prevailed. The path to war is reinforced by the Wolfowitz Doctrine. Paul Wolfowitz, the neoconservative intellectual who formulated US
military and foreign policy doctrine, wrote among many similar passages: Our first objective is
to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival, either on the territory of the former Soviet Union or elsewhere [China] that poses
a threat on the order of that posed formerly by the Soviet Union. This is a dominant consideration underlying the new regional defense strategy and requires that we endeavor to prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would,
under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power. In the Wolfowitz Doctrine, any other strong country is defined as a threat and a power hostile to the US regardless of how willing that country
is to get along with the US for mutual benefit. The difference between Brzezinski and the Neoconservatives is that Brzezinski wants to suborn Russia and China by including them in the empire as important elements whose voices would be heard,
If only for diplomatic reasons, whereas the Neoconservatives are prepared to rely on military force combined with internal subversion orchestrated with US financed NGOs and even terrorist organizations. Neither the US nor Israel is embarrassed
by their worldwide reputations as posing the greatest threat. In fact, both are proud to be recognized as the greatest threats. The foreign policy of both is devoid of any diplomacy. US and Israeli foreign policy rests on violence alone.
Washington tells countries to do as Washington says or be bombed into the stone age. Israel declares all Palestinians, even women and children, to be terrorists, and proceeds to shoot them down in the streets, claiming that
Israel is merely protecting itself against terrorists. Israel, which does not recognize the existence of Palestine as a country, covers up its crimes with the claim that Palestinians do not accept the existence of Israel. We dont need no stinking diplomacy. We got
power. This is the attitude that guarantees war, and that is where the US is taking the world. The prime minister of Britain, the chancellor of Germany, and the president of France are Washingtons enablers. They provide the cover for
Washington. Instead of war crimes, Washington has coalitions of the willing and military invasions that bring democracy and womens rights to non-compliant countries. China gets much the same
treatment. A country with four times the US population but a smaller prison population, China is constantly criticized by Washington as an authoritarian state. China is accused of human rights abuses while US police brutalize the US
population. The problem for humanity is that Russia and China are not Libya and Iraq. These two countries possess strategic nuclear weapons. Their land mass greatly exceeds that of the US. The US, which was unable to
successfully occupy Baghdad or Afghanistan, has no prospect of prevailing against Russia and China in conventional warfare. Washington will push the nuclear button. What else can we expect from a
government devoid of morality? The world has never experienced rogue elements comparable to Washington and Israel. Both governments are prepared to murder anyone and everyone. Look at the crisis that Washington has created in
Ukraine and the dangers thereof. On May 23, 2014, Russias President Putin spoke to the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, a three-day gathering of delegations from 62 countries and CEOs from 146 of the largest Western corporations. Putin did not
speak of the billions of dollars in trade deals that were being formalized. Instead Putin
spoke of the crisis that Washington had brought to Russia, and he criticized Europe for being Washingtons vassals for supporting
Washingtons propaganda against Russia and Washingtons interference in vital Russian interests. Putin was diplomatic in his language, but the
message that powerful economic interests from the US and Europe received is that it will lead to
trouble if Washington and European governments continue to ignore Russias concerns and continue to act as if they can interfere in Russias vital interests as if Russia did not exist. The heads of these large
corporations will carry this message back to Washington and European capitals. Putin made it clear that the lack of dialogue with Russia could lead to the West making the mistake of putting Ukraine in NATO and establishing missile bases on Russias border with
Ukraine. Putin has learned that Russia cannot rely on good will from the West, and Putin made it clear, short of issuing a threat, that Western military bases in Ukraine are unacceptable. Washington will continue to ignore Russia. However, European capitals will
have to decide whether Washington is pushing them into conflict with Russia that is against European interests. Thus, Putin is testing European politicians to determine if there is sufficient intelligence and independence in Europe for a rapprochement. If
Washington in its overbearing arrogance and hubris forces Putin to write off the West, the Russian/Chinese strategic alliance, which is forming to counteract Washingtons hostile policy of surrounding both countries with military bases, will harden into
preparation for the inevitable war. The survivors, if any, can thank the Neoconservatives, the Wolfowitz doctrine, and the Brzezinski strategy for the destruction of life on earth. The American public contains a large number of misinformed people who think they
know everything. These people have been programmed by US and Israeli propaganda. They are led to believe that Islam, a religion, is a militarist doctrine that calls for the overthrow of Western civilization, as if anything remains of Western civilization. Many
believe this propaganda. The US has departed Iraq, but the carnage today is as high as or higher than during the US invasion and occupation. The daily death tolls from the conflict are extraordinary. The West has overthrown itself. In the US the Constitution has
been murdered by the Bush and Obama regimes. Nothing remains. As the US is the Constitution, what was once the United States no longer exists. A different entity has taken its place. Europe died with the European Union, which requires the termination of
sovereignty of all member countries. A few unaccountable bureaucrats in Brussels have become superior to the wills of the French, German, British, Italian, Dutch, Spanish, Greek, and Portuguese peoples. Western civilization is a skeleton. It still stands, barely, but
there is no life in it. The blood of liberty has departed. Western peoples look at their governments and see nothing but enemies. Why else has Washington militarized local police forces, equipping them as if they were occupying armies? Why else has Homeland
Security, the Department of Agriculture, and even the Postal Service and Social Security Administration ordered billions of rounds of ammunition and even submachine guns? What is this taxpayer-paid-for arsenal for if not to suppress US citizens? As the
prominent trends forecaster Gerald Celente spells out in the current Trends Journal, uprisings span four corners of the globe. Throughout Europe angry, desperate and outraged peoples march against EU financial policies that are driving the peoples into the
ground. Despite all of Washingtons efforts with its well funded fifth columns known as NGOs to destabilize Russia and China, both the Russian and Chinese governments have far more support from their people than do the US and Europe. In the 20th century
Russia and China learned what tyranny is, and they have rejected it. In the US tyranny has entered under the guise of the war on terror, a hoax used to scare the sheeple into abandoning their civil liberties, thus freeing Washington from accountability to law and
permitting Washington to erect a militarist police state. Ever since WWII, Washington has used its financial hegemony and the Soviet threat, now converted into the Russian threat, to absorb Europe into Washingtons empire. Putin is hoping that the interests
of European countries will prevail over subservience to Washington. This is Putins current bet. This is the reason Putin remains unprovoked by Washingtons provocations in Ukraine. If Europe fails Russia, Putin and China will prepare for the war
that Washingtons drive for hegemony makes inevitable.
Solvency
 No U.S. Influence
No matter if the U.S. joins or not, China will call all the shots
Curtis S. Chin 7.07.15 Beyond the AIIB Signing Ceremony Curtis S. Chin, a former US Ambassador to the Asian Development Bank, is managing director of advisory firm RiverPeak Group, LLC
and Asia Fellow at the Milken Institute. Publisher: China US Focus, Date Accessed: 6.21.16 http://www.chinausfocus.com/finance-economy/beyond-the-signing-ceremony-at-a-chinas-own-
asian-development-bank/ -AR
China knows signing ceremonies. This was clearly the case amidst the pomp and circumstance surrounding the recent Great Hall of the People signing ceremony for a new China-led version of the World Bank. Representatives from some 50 founding members of the new Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank were present, including representatives from Europe and South Asia as well as Australia. But the show was clearly Chinas. As one era ends, another begins. Or so, China would have it. This was most decidedly evident as China championed a new kind of international financial
institution that it may well hope marks the dawn of an Asia-led economic order if not perhaps a return to an older order, with the Middle Kingdom at its core. Distinct and different from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, which were established under Western leadership as part
of a post-World War II financial architecture envisioned at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, the new China-led version of an Asian development bank has quickly taken shape without either Washington or Tokyos support. Both nations were notably absent from the recent celebrations in Beijing given
their governments decision to refrain from joining the AIIB, even as almost every major economy, including European and Asian allies, did so. Ostensibly to help fill an annual infrastructure financing shortfall in Asia of some US$800 billion, this new lender could also contribute a multilateral veneer
and funds to realize Beijings vision of a new Silk Road and new maritime Silk Road, better connecting China to markets and resources in and outside of Asia. Loans may well go to fund ports, railways, bridges, airports and roads across the region as well as to replace aging infrastructure. This
follows the announcement last year of the establishment of a New Development Bank, or so-called BRICS bank, by founding members Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. This bank, like the AIIB, will be headquartered in China. Each of these
new multilateral lenders are
direct challenges to existing institutions that China and other nations argue have been too slow to evolve as Europe and the United States share of global GDP has declined. The AIIB is also a pointed
response and potentially potent competitor to Japan and the Asian Development Bank, a Philippines-based multilateral lender focused on poverty reduction. Since its 1966 founding, the ADB has always been led by a Japanese president, with strong U.S. support. At an initial approved capital base of
US$100 billion, the
AIIB at establishment will be nearly two-thirds the size of the decades-old ADB. China will provide some 30 percent of the new banks initial capital. The debate may well
continue over whether or not the establishment of the AIIB is a reflection of failed U.S. diplomacy and, most cynically, a Chinese wolf in multilateral sheeps clothing, or simply an institution whose time has come given Chinas economic
rise. As I have argued in the Wall Street Journal and elsewhere, there are several key points all signatories to the AIIB Charter should be on the lookout for, if they are to work from the inside to establish an institution that is less corrupt and wasteful, and more green and respectful of rights, than it
might otherwise have been. During my own time serving as U.S. Ambassador to and member of the Board of Directors of the Asian Development Bank for three-and-a half years under Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama, I saw how management and staff of this Japan-led institution were
able to undercut or slow walk initiatives that the United States and European shareholders had long advocated for. This included the advancement of qualified, senior women, and also the hiring and promotion of personnel based on merit, not nationality. Strikingly, the head of the ADBs then
budget and personnel management systems department, one of the most important senior roles at the bank, was typically a secondee from the Japanese government. To this day, spots in senior management at the vice-president level are informally reserved for specific nationalities, including
the United States. An informal quota also exists for staff by nationality level, based on shareholding. As AIIBs personnel policies are written, shareholders will want to understand how the AIIB will learn from, follow and as appropriate improve upon what Japan, Europe and the United States have
wrought elsewhere. During my time at the ADB, a new standing committee of the board was ultimately created to provide greater oversight of the institutions human resources after a protracted negotiation with Japan and given persistent concerns about less-than-best practices. The
degree
to which the AIIB will find budget for experts in areas ranging from environmental impact and resettlement typically major issues on large-scale infrastructure projects to world-class
human resources and an office for an ombudsman will speak immensely to the new banks priorities. What gets measured does indeed get managed. China has made clear that a lean, clean and green AIIB will not be subject to what it and
other borrowers have viewed as overly bureaucratic systems for approval and evaluation at the ADB and World Bank. Shareholders will want to focus on what rules and procedures will and will not be adopted from the established multilateral lenders. Critical will be the system that will be put in place
to evaluate the AIIBs impact. Metrics such as how many, how large and how quickly disbursed are the new institutions loans must be complemented by a stringent assessment system of the results of such lending. A truly independent evaluations department that reports not to bank management
but to the AIIB Board even a non-resident board will be vital, as will be a process to hold borrowers and the AIIB accountable should there be non-compliance with the new institutions standards, however strong or weak they might be. Accountability mechanisms will need to be strong and
effective. At the ADB, there have been instances where borrowers, including China, have undercut or ignored the work of that institutions Compliance Review Panel. In one case in the city of Fuzhou, the government of China declined to give permission for ADB staff to investigate an allegation of
non-compliance with bank standards. As the panels chair made clear in a public report from my time on the banks board, Our view of ADB compliance in the Fuzhou case concluded that we could not safely draw any conclusions or make recommendations after permission for a site visit was refused
by the PRC. Simply stated, Chinas control of freedom of movement worked to its advantage in quashing an investigation. Shareholders will want to fight for access and data for effective measurement and evaluation systems. Third, dont be fooled by sweet promises. The Wall Street Journal
reported that a Chinese promise that it would not have veto power at the AIIB had helped sway some European nations to join. Yet, the lesson of the ADB is simple: Money matters, and the shareholders that contribute the most have the most influence, regardless of any actual, explicit veto power.
At times derided as a rubber stamp board akin to Chinas National Peoples Congress, the ADB board works by consensus, with there being little chance that anything that comes to the board will not be approved. There, Japan maintains significant control over the ADB agenda despite having only
about 16 percent of the banks shares. This is likely to be no different at the AIIB, but there China as the dominant, if not majority, shareholder will call the shots. Shareholders will want to pay close attention to ensuring a means to influence policies and shape
project lending proposals early on, well prior to what is likely to be eventual rubber-stamp board approval. Transparency starts at the top, and that includes preventing corruption and avoiding conflicts of interest. My former ADB colleague, Jin Liqun, now tasked as the Secretary-General of AIIBs
interim secretariat, was often an eloquent advocate for the role of the private sector and strong public-private-partnerships in development. This is likely to continue at the AIIB. Whether the AIIB, however, will be used as a means by China to strengthen its own state-owned-enterprises and other
Chinese entities via China-friendly procurement rules at the expense of other nations will need to be scrutinized. The AIIB also might show the World Bank and the ADB how real transparency works, and have its senior management subject to financial disclosure rules. As Chinas President Xi Jinping
continues his much vaunted fight on corruption, AIIB can go a step further and make clear that board, management, and staff will not directly benefit from decisions they make at the new institution. Strong restrictions should also be put in place to limit a revolving door of future former AIIB staff
becoming high-paid consultants to the organization. At the ADB, there has been a general commitment that no individual should be made worse off by bank-funded projects. People are compensated if affected, though there is no guarantee that such individuals will be made better off. It is a high and
difficult goal for any multilateral lender, even with the best board oversight and management intent. That is one reason for safeguards and periodic policy reviews at the new AIIB. As recent as early this March, the World Bank identified serious shortcomings in implementation of its resettlement
policies and said it would improve oversight and management of its practices to better protect people and businesses affected by projects it funds. Nathans Sheets, the U.S. Treasury Under Secretary for International Affairs, has called for support of the World Bank and ADBs high
quality, time-tested standards. China has made clear that those standards are up for debate at the AIIB. (Indeed, the existing multilateral lenders are not necessarily the best poster children for good governance.) As did the late Lee Kuan
Yew during his iron-fisted rule in guiding Singapores success, China is now advancing an Asian way in this newest of multilateral lenders. For all the founding members of the AIIB, their challenge is now to move beyond the signing ceremony and ensure that the AIIB way is a balanced one: building
infrastructure and growing economies while also respecting the environment as well as individuals and their businesses and communities.

The AIIB proves China is attempting to tear down U.S. influence in Asia
Zachary Keck 10.10.14 Writer Why the US is trying to Squash Chinas new development bank Publisher: The Diplomat Date Accessed: 6.21.16 http://thediplomat.com/2014/10/why-the-us-
is-trying-to-squash-chinas-new-development-bank/ -AR
The U.S. has been working behind the scenes to kill a Chinese proposal for a regional infrastructure bank in Asia, according to the New York Times. As The Diplomat has reported in the past, Beijing is quietly lobbying Asian nations to sign onto its proposed new
regional development bank, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). China
views the AIIB as a way to diminish the regional influence of the World Bank and Asian Development Bank (ADB), where
countries like the United States and Japan hold[s] substantial sway. By offering to provide most of the $50 billion in start-up funding, Beijing is hoping to get smaller and medium-sized nations in Asia to sign onto a
bank where it [China] will call the shots. The New York Times reports, however, that the U.S. has also been lobbying the same Asian nations in an effort to persuade them not to sign onto the Chinese proposal. Citing senior U.S. officials and other
representatives from Asian governments, the report says, In quiet conversations with Chinas potential partners, American officials have lobbied against the development bank with unexpected determination and engaged in a vigorous campaign to persuade
important allies to shun the project. The report goes on to name South Korea and Australia as the two most important nations America and China are trying to woo. Beijing is hoping to get Canberra and Seoul to sign on as founding members of the AIIB in time
for Xi Jinping to announce it at the APEC summit in Beijing next month. U.S. officials are lobbying South Korea and Australia to ensure that doesnt happen. If Washington persuades South Korea and Australia to abstain, the report notes, it would all but ensure
membership in the bank would be limited to smaller countries, depriving it of the prestige and respectability the Chinese seek. The New York Times finds it ironic that America is trying to squash the Chinese bank. As the report notes, the U.S. has long been one of
the loudest voices in calling on China to take on a greater role in global affairs. But now that China is starting to act the part of a great power with initiatives like the AIIB, the U.S. is trying to undercut its efforts. This view, while not completely without merit, misses
some of the nuance of the U.S. position. It is certainly true that, throughout most of the post-Cold War era, there has been a widespread, bipartisan consensus in Washington that Chinas rise is a good thing for the U.S. because it would allow
Beijing to
relieve the U.S. of some of the burden of upholding the global order. It is also true that as China continued to rise, the U.S. grew increasingly vocal in calling on Beijing to do just that. All of this was premised, however, on the belief
that China would use its power to reinforce the existing global order, and not seek to create its own order. Indeed, Western analysts who dissented from the general consensus did so on the grounds that China, like
rising powers before it, would use its newfound power to reshape the global order not to reinforce the existing one. The pro-China camp in Washington responded to these criticisms by contending that China would
not challenge the existing order because it had served Beijing so well during its rise. Neither side, however, disputed that China attempting to reshape the global order would be a bad thing for the U.S. The only disagreement was over
whether China would use its power to support the existing system, as most in in the U.S. foreign policy community argued, or to overturn the existing order, as critics of the conventional wisdom maintained. In recent years, of course, the optimism
in Washington over Chinas rise has rapidly diminished. The reason for this is because Chinas actions particularly in the South and East China Sea, but also through initiatives like the AIIB
have made it increasingly difficult to argue that China will continue to support the existing order even as its power grows. After all, if China is already challenging the U.S.-led order in Asia, then why would China begin
supporting the status quo as it becomes even more powerful? Thus, seemingly overnight, the conventional wisdom in Washington changed from viewing Chinas rise as a boon to the U.S. to viewing it as a major threat to
America and the existing order. However, the key point is that the U.S. foreign policy community was always opposed to China or any other nation trying to upend the regional order in Asia, and there was never any reason to think the U.S. wouldnt be
opposed to initiatives that do just that, such as the AIIB. Its worth noting that none of this seems to have been lost on China. Indeed, despite frequent U.S. reassurances, China has been unwavering in its belief that the U.S. is seeking to
contain it. All signs suggest that this view isnt limited to some faceless hardliners in the PLA, but rather is a deeply held belief among the broader foreign policy community, and quite likely the society writ large. The reason why Beijing has
always been certain the U.S. wanted to contain it was because it viewed the U.S.-led regional order in Asia as unnatural, and (as it probably felt should be obvious to everyone), something that it would seek to change if
it became powerful enough to do. From watching the debate over its rise unfold in Washington, it was quite clear to Chinese leaders that the U.S. would try to prevent China from achieving its objectives. In this sense, Beijing was and is correct in saying that the
U.S. wants to contain it.

China made and is controlling the bank to fund its own foreign policy agenda
Geoff Raby 4.28.15 Chinas AIIB Bank: Part of a much bigger mater plan Date Accessed: 6.21.16 Publisher: The National Interest http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/chinas-aiib-bank-
part-much-bigger-master-plan-12748 -AR
The Banks founding coincides with an important change in Chinas foreign policy under Xi Jinping. Since the late 1970s, Chinas foreign policy has been governed by Deng Xiaopings maxim of hide your light, bide your time. Foreign policy had one principal
objective beyond Chinas security and that was to support Chinas economic development. Although China had begun to take a leadership role in international institution building and to adopt a more assertive policy under Xis predecessor, Hu Jintao, Xis
incumbency marks a break with Dengs approach and the adoption of a more muscular foreign policy. This can be seen in the South China Sea, in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute with Japan, and in a number of initiatives from institution
building to agreements with the US on greenhouse gas emissions controls. The AIIB also fits well with Xi Jinpings far-reaching, ambitious New Silk Road initiative. As is standard in China, the articulation of policy often follows what
has already been put in practice. In this case, Beijing has been building pipelines across Central Asia and Myanmar, train lines from Chongqing to Duisburg in Germany, and road links into Pakistan and a new port near Karachi for years. These massive
infrastructure projects all have at their heart a single geopolitical, strategic objective for Beijing. Throughout its entire history, China has been largely self-sufficient in natural resources and energy. But since its economy
began to grow rapidly in the mid-1990s, it has found itself increasingly dependent on international markets for the resources and energy it needs to sustain growth. And nearly all of these
imports must go through the Straits of Malacca. Chinas at least 20 to 30 years away from being capable of challenging the US militarily in the Straits. For strategic planners in Beijing this is a major
vulnerability. The New Silk Road is therefore intended to give Beijing strategic options, and the AIIB is a means to pay for it. China could have tried to achieve this solely through bilateral investments and loans.
Instead, it has decided to bind itself in part in the rules of an international organization. This is already contentious in China as some are arguing that it shouldnt constrain itself in this way, but should instead act unilaterally. Regardless, the leadership has
decided that a multilateral institution will give greater legitimacy to its strategic objectives. Inevitably the AsiaPacific is being reshaped by Chinas emergence as the dominant economic power. Over the past thirty years,
Australia has understood and responded creatively to changes in the region. APEC, for instance, was visionary in its anticipation of future regional developments. Its difficult then to understand the policy confusion in Canberra over the AIIB. In the end, Australia
has managed to achieve the worst of all possible results. We have lost early mover advantage to influence and shape the institution, especially its governance, and weve not supported an ally who lobbied against the AIIBs creation. We have joined the Bank not
at the outset as invited to do so but at the tail end of a 57-country body, somewhere between Luxembourg and Norway. Well need a big diplomatic effort to regain some of the lost influence. Those in the Obama administration who jumped on the phones to
pressure advisers to our ministers breached one of the cardinal rules of diplomacy: dont ask allies to make choices that may be against their interests. Interests will ultimately prevail over friendship. The arch realist Kissinger would have understood this.

Structural problems with current AIIB making it unfavorable for U.S. and allies
J. Berkshire Miller 10.08.15 Should Japan join a Chinese-led banking body Date Accessed: 6.21.16 Publisher: Al Jazeera America http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2015/10/should-
japan-join-a-chinese-led-banking-body.html -AR
Earlier this year China unveiled its Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), an international financial institution with goals to promote infrastructure development in the Asia-Pacific region. The initial capital for the AIIB, which will be based in Beijing, is expected
to be $50 billion, of which half will be provided by China. And the AIIB is one key element of the rapidly growing economic architecture in the region. The recently concluded negotiations for the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) a massive U.S.-led international
trade agreement that links 12 of the major economies in the Asia-Pacific would, if ratified, combine nearly 40 percent of the worlds GDP and bolster Washingtons role in guiding the economic trajectory of the Asia-Pacific. For now, the TPP is an exclusive club.
It does not include China, India or many other developing countries in Asia. It is a trade agreement, not an organization like the Chinese-led bank. By contrast, AAIB membership is open to countries all around the world, and key Western countries including the
U.K., France, Germany, Italy and Spain have overcome their initial skepticism about the transparency and management of the bank and joined. The bank has also attracted countries from most of the Asia-Pacific region, including such key U.S. allies as Australia
and South Korea. Even the Philippines, which is embroiled in a contentious territorial dispute with Beijing in the South China Sea, indicated its desire to join the AIIB. In fact, nearly every country in the Asia-Pacific has joined the bank, with the exception of Papua
New Guinea, Bhutan (which has no diplomatic relations with China) and North Korea. There are two other key outliers: the United States and Japan, the worlds largest and third-largest economies, respectively, and the two main power brokers in the International
Monetary Fund and World Bank.While they are not opposed to the AIIB in principle, these states say they are unwilling to join until its governance structure and recipient debt sustainability are more
clearly defined. But aside from these technical reservations, there is concern in Washington and Tokyo that the AIIB will elevate Chinese influence in the region and erode their [U.S. and allies] long-standing positions.
Should Japan sit this one out, it will be the only country in East Asia aside from North Korea to remain outside the AIIB. The U.S. expressed its disapproval with the AIIB, in its current standing, to its keys allies in Europe and Asia, noting that the bank still
lacks the proper governance structure. Up until this point, only Japan along with Canada and Mexico have agreed with the U.S. assessment and refrained from signing on. Tokyos other main reason for not joining the AIIB is Japans leadership
role in the more established Asian Development Bank (ADB), a bank based in Manila that focuses on sustainable investment in Asia. The ADB does a lot of work in China, whereas the AIIBs focus will be exclusively on projects
outside the country. Japan-China tensions have further magnified the persistent mistrust between Asias two largest economies. The U.S.- and Japanese-led ADB gets more than 30 percent of its capital flows from Tokyo and Washington; Beijing
contributes a mere 6 percent. Tokyo rightfully fears that the ADB will significantly lose influence if the AIIB takes hold in the region. And Japan is also [there is]concerned with the current makeup of the AIIB in terms of granting and
approving loans. The ADB screening process ensures that one state cannot drive the agenda; the AIIB setup is still developing, but it appears that China will have an outsize influence on determining the approval
of investments. Another point of contention between the U.S.-Japan bloc and China is the TPP, which Barack Obamas administration has framed as an alternative to Chinas rewriting the rules in Asia. The TPP agreement was struck earlier this week after
marathon negotiations in Atlanta among trade ministers of the 12 participating states. The next step involves ratification of the agreement by those nations legislatures. While the conclusion of the TPP talks is positive news for Obamas rebalance, the exclusion
of China, along with the pointed language on the AIIB, has widened the divide between Beijing and Tokyo. Of course, the broader strategic rivalry between the U.S. and China also feeds into the tension; Washingtons rebalance is largely seen by Beijing as a thinly
veiled containment strategy. Similarly, Japan-China tensions over history and their territorial dispute in the East China Sea have further magnified the persistent mistrust between Asias two largest economies. All these drivers have pushed Japan to opt out of the
AIIB for now. But there remain enticing reasons to join. Japan risks being left out a membership roster that includes nearly the entire Asia-Pacific region, not to mention most of Europe; while its concerns about the integrity of the AIIB are valid, they could be
addressed through the large influx of Western states as the groups founding members. Moreover, the U.S.- and Japan-led ADB will have to adapt to the creation of the AIIB, which would work better if Tokyo and Washington had clout in the newer banking body.
Finally, exclusion from the AIIB along with the TPP and enhanced security ties with the U.S. can be counterproductive because it reinforces the idea that Asias future will be defined by Chinas rivalries with the U.S. and Japan. Taking these considerations in
hand, Japan should continue discussions about joining the AIIB with China. It should also discuss with Western member states the banks evolution and organization. Japan will not sign on overnight nor should it. That said, its high time for Japan to adapt to the
realities of the bodys creation and its future role in the region.
 Corruption
Chinas extensive history of corruption will spill over into the AIIB
Taipei Times 4.01.15 Jumping on the AIIB bandwagon Date Accessed: 6.21.16 http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2015/04/01/2003614863 -AR
After his dreams of a meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping () came to naught, President Ma Ying-jeou () made a big deal about setting up a meeting between former vice president Vincent Siew () and Xi. However, little came of it. In their
brief encounter at the Boao Forum for Asia on Chinas Hainan Island last week, Siew told Xi about Taiwans willingness to participate in the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). The meeting between the two lasted a mere 45 seconds and Siew
was only rewarded with a nod from Xi accompanied by: OK, OK, OK. That is a cold, cold shoulder. The bank is part of Xis one belt, one road policy, referring to his Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road initiatives to connect China with
European and Asia-Pacific economies. The bank would help build domestic demand, while promot[e]ing Chinas diplomatic and economic agenda internationally. It is also a direct challenge to the World Bank and the Asian
Development Bank (ADB), which are dominated by the US, the EU and Japan. The AIIB is focused on infrastructure development, which is different from the aims of the ADB and the World Bank to reduce poverty.
The AIIBs investment capital of US$100 billion is not large and it will not necessarily be able to compete with the other two institutions. However, it is clear that Beijing has found a way to extend its growing economic clout into geopolitics to enable it to meet the
EU and the US on an equal footing. This is also why the US, Japan and many EU member states are largely adopting a wait-and-see attitude. The
AIIBs operations are to focus on Chinese banking circles. The problem is the Chinese
financial system is flawed, while corruption and other irregularities are rampant. For example, former Bank of China governors Zhou Xiaochuan () and Dai Xianglong () were charged
with corruption in 2012 and last year respectively. In January, Bank of Inner Mongolia vice governor Yan Chengshe () was implicated in a major corruption case, and last month, Dai was
investigated by the Chinese Communist Partys Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, and his son, Dai Chefeng (), is also suspected of serious economic crime. How could such a
country take on the major role of Asias financier? As for Taiwan, the AIIB might pose an investment opportunity, but the question of whether to participate is complex. It involves such issues as under what name Taiwan would participate and on what conditions.
In addition, it is only after Ma has expressed Taiwans willingness to participate that the Cabinet will start to invite ministerial representatives to discuss the issue. This is developing into a repeat of how the service trade agreement was handled. Ma is leaning
heavily toward China and he will never learn. Leaving aside the issue of whether he is a lame-duck president and if it is appropriate for him to make such a major decision, the least that can be demanded is that the ministries and government agencies engage in
comprehensive and cautious discussion, evaluation and planning, and consultations with the opposition to build a consensus and inform society at large in an open and transparent manner before making a decision. The president must not be allowed to continue
his closed-door dealings that preclude Cabinet, legislative, party and public oversight. If Ma continues to do as he pleases without informing anyone, the nation could well face another wave of anti-Ma protests.
 Financing is not the problem
The AIIB serves no purpose besides threatening to undermine stability
Richard Javad Heydarian 12.30.15 Academic, policy adviser, and author of Asias New Battlefield: US, China, and the Struggle for Western Pacific Publisher: The World Post Date Accessed:
6.21.16 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/richard-javad-heydarian/the-end-of-chinas-peacefu_b_8893222.html -AR

Many of the concerns the U.S. has with Chinas Asian-Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) are valid. The problem with developing much-needed infrastructure in Asia is not moneythe world is floating in money right
nowbut selecting and managing projects in way that will deliver the desired results. Given the track record of development lending by Chinas existing policy banks (the China Ex-Im Bank and China
Development Bank), at best the AIIB risks being merely a vehicle to buy business for Chinese companies and absorb China's huge overcapacity. At worst, it threatens to undermine the good
governance that is key to the regions genuine economic development. Many of the U.S. allies who broke ranks to join the bank appearlike the U.K., eager to win China's blessing as an offshore RMB trading
hubto have done so for deeply misguided and even delusional reasons. All that said, its hard to think of a more ham-fisted and ineffectual way to deal with these concerns than the U.S. employed. It was a classic case of you cant beat
something with nothing. The Chinese have accumulated a large pool of savings, and to pretend that Chinese capital wont play a role in the global economywith or without U.S. permissionis simply untenable. Issuing a blanket no to Chinese
capital, rather than offering constructive ideas or alternatives, was never going to fly. Strong-arming allies isnt going to work if it looks like China has a plan, and the U.S. is just a carping bystander. The AIIB potentially has flaws.
One of two things will happen: either those flaws will become evident, or China will find a way (perhaps working with other member countries) to overcome them. Either way, China has taken the lead and whining about it isnt a convincing argument. If the
U.S. wants to lead, then lead. Making progressand a real commitmentto the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) is one way to
do this. But the Obama Administration, despite pursuing these objectives, has yet to make them a real priority. President Clinton sent Vice President Gore out to debate NAFTA with Ross Perot on live TV. He spent real (and precious)
political capital to bat down opposition (much of it within his own party) and ensure congressional passage. By letting pending Free Trade Agreements with South Korea and Colombia twist in the wind for most of his first term, President Obama sent the signal, to
friends and foes alike, that his trade agenda wasnt very important, and certainly not worth fighting for. Into that leadership void has stepped China, with a different vision for the global economy. Can we really blame our friends for taking them more seriously, if
we fail to contest that vision in a more credible way?
 China = Threat is US Invests
China poses a potential threat to US
Revere 16 Revere, Evans. "U.S. Policy and East Asian Security: Challenge and Response." The Brookings Institution. N.p., 25 Jan. 2016. Web. 21 June 2016. EP
East Asia today faces a number of difficult challenges, beginning with that posed by a dynamic, militarily powerful China whose ambitions and intentions are far from clear. As U.S. policy makers deal with
this challenge, their main task will be to try to accommodate a more activist China while simultaneously reassuring allies and partners that Beijing will not be allowed to become the regional
hegemon or to supplant the United States as the regions preeminent actor. The challenge of China has major implications for the regions economic and trade institutions, as well as East
Asias military balance. The military dimension is particularly important, since Beijing has demonstrated that it is prepared to use military muscle to enforce its territorial claims. Chinas actions have serious implications for the United States, which is
committed to ensuring freedom of navigation and commerce in these vital waters and to supporting its regional allies and partners. Regional concerns about China are being exacerbated by Beijings ongoing crackdown on human rights and individual freedoms, as
well as its campaign to perpetuate the rule of an increasingly authoritarian Communist Party. For all these
reasons, U.S.-China relations are certain to remain highly complex, difficult, and sensitive for the foreseeable
future, even as U.S. policy makers seek a modus vivendi with China based on managing major differences and expanding areas of cooperation with Beijing.
 US Investment not needed
They dont need us
Esparza, 15. (Alfonso Esparza. "AIIB Says Japan and US Participation not Needed." MarketPulse. 10-23-2015 Web. Accessed: 6-20-2016. http://www.marketpulse.com/20151023/aiib-says-
japan-and-us-participation-not-needed/)
The China-backed Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) could lend out U.S. $2 billion in its first year of operation, AIIB president-designate Jin Liqun said during an interview with the Mainichi Shimbun
here. Jin, Chinas former vice finance minister, was appointed head of the nascent AIIB in August this year. The bank, which the United States and Japan have not joined, is scheduled to be established by the end of this year and start making loans in April 2016. During the interview, Jin
stressed that the AIIB will cooperate with the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and that the new institution can handle all of the challenges, even if the U.S. and Japan do
not join. The $2 billion in loans forecast by Jin for the AIIBs first year would be just one-tenth of the amount lent out by the ADB annually. But the enormous demand for infrastructure in Asia will quickly expand AIIB investments and, Jin
indicated, the AIIB will be able to respond to very large capital requirements in cooperation with the ADB and other international financial institutions. Jin also said, however, that the bank would carefully scrutinize all
enterprises seeking AIIB funds, and that making quality loans would be the banks first priority. Quality is more important than quantity, he said. Jin furthermore foresees more than 70 countries eventually joining the AIIB, as
we have the policy that AIIB, as a multilateral development institution, should be inclusive. Membership should be open to all of the countries in this world. He also reiterated that the AIIB would do just fine without Japan and the U.S., stating, We [it]
ha[s]ve almost all the major developed countries and emerging market economies. Were getting financially, economically more powerful. I think we can do a good job, given the existing
shareholders.

U.S. involvement is unpopular and will not help solve the root issues
Economist 9.26.15 Publisher: Economist Reversion to the mean Date Accessed: 6.21.16 http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21667964-chinas-new-infrastructure-bank-has-gained-wide-
support-lending-will-be-tougher-reversion -AR
WITH his wavy silvery hair, relaxed demeanour, and fluent, colloquial English, Jin Liqun comes from a different mould from the one that churns out the standard senior Chinese official: raven-locked, stiff-necked, monoglot. That is perhaps one reason why China
chose him to lead the team setting up its new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Another is a career that seems to prepare him ideally for the roleas an official of the finance ministry, vice president of a multilateral development bank, boss of an
investment bank and chairman of a sovereign-wealth fund. His presence alone helps explain why China has been so successful in attracting other countries to back the AIIB. Mr Jin played a leading role in overcoming suspicions about the banksuch as that, by
offering less stringent lending conditions, it would threaten existing multilateral lenders, notably the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Indeed, Mr
Jins biggest difficulty may no longer be to establish the AIIBs credibility, but to
demonstrate why, if it hews so closely to principles followed by the existing banks, China felt the need to promote it at all. The saga of the AIIBs life so far, since its creation was announced by Chinas president, Xi
Jinping, on a visit to a regional forum in South-East Asia in 2013, has been of a victorious campaign against American-led scepticism that played on three fears about Chinese intentions. One was that the bank would be used to finance projects where the tendering
process would be skewed in favour of Chinese contractors. A second was that, in its eagerness to see results, the new bank would skimp on safeguardsrelating to the environment, for example, or the effects of construction on local residents. The other was that
the AIIB had a geopolitical aim: to help China achieve its goal of making itself the hub of Asias infrastructure links by boosting development along its traditional trading routes to Europea policy summed up by Chinese officials as One Belt, One Road. But
American attempts to persuade its friends to shun the AIIB seemed merely churlish, since Asias need for investment in infrastructure is so massive. Speaking in Singapore on September 19th, Mr Jin cited an estimate by the ADB itself: $730 billion a year until
2020, predominantly for electricity generation, roads and telecommunications. Indu Bhushan of the ADB says that, even after the AIIB is fully operational, the multilateral development banks may be able to finance 5% of that need, at most. Some of Americas
closest allies, including Australia, Britain and South Korea, ignored its warnings and signed up. Canada, Japan and America itself remain the biggest holdouts. In addition to the 57 prospective founding members which last month chose Mr Jin as the banks
president-designate, more than 20, he says, are on a waiting list. He says America, too, may join one day (tactfully ignoring the fact that Congress is more likely to approve reform of the IMF, or outlaw apple pie, than to
endorse the transfer of American taxpayers money to a Chinese-initiated bank). The AIIB is on track for a formal inauguration later this year; and to start considering its first batch of projects, says Mr Jin, in the second quarter of
2016. Meanwhile, the existing development banks are keen to emphasise how much they welcome its emergence. The talk is not of competition and rivalry but of collaboration and complementarity. This week the ADBs president, Takehiko
Nakao, met Mr Jin in Beijing. The two agreed to identify future ADB projects that the AIIB may be able to co-finance. Surely, though, it is not the AIIBs primary function to become another source of finance for projects
led by the ADB or World Bank? To demonstrate that it plugs a gap, it will also need to prove that it has at least some different project-selection criteria and operational practices. Mr Jin distinguishes the AIIBs approach in two ways: it will
work more with private-sector lenders; and, rather than pursue poverty reduction and economic growth directly, it will remain true to its infrastructure mandate. That will not be easy, however. The
biggest problem facing infrastructure finance in Asia is not, at present, a shortage of funds. According to professionals at the existing development banks, it is a shortage of projects. The need seems bottomless; the
demand is not, since relatively few proposed infrastructure projects have been through the painstaking process of detailed design, feasibility study and environmental- and social-impact
assessments. And of those that have, fewer still can demonstrate a reliable source of revenue out of which loans could be repaid: electricity-purchase agreements for a power station, say, or tolls for a road. Mr Jin
says that, on the contrary, there is a backlog of bankable projects that have been through most of the hoops, especially in low-income countries. But he also acknowledges that the AIIBs mandate requires it to spread its loan assets across the region. It cannot
lend only to its poorest countries. A second hurdle to turning grand infrastructure plans into actual building work is implementing them. Often, capacity is lacking or local regulationson land-acquisition, for exampleget in the way. Sounding for once like a
conventional Chinese official, Mr Jin argues against development banks meddling in countries internal affairs. But in many countries such as India, Indonesia and the Philippines it is those internal affairs that keep so many projects stuck on the drawing-board
for so many years. AIIB bulls recall the 1960s, when similar reservationsthen about perceived Japanese dominationclouded the ADBs launch. Yet the World Bank and the ADB have co-existed well enough. There is no reason why they should not make room
for the AIIB as well. So Asian infrastructure will have another welcome source of finance, and China a modest boost to its soft power. But if it wants a multilateral bank to pursue its own commercial or policy objectives, it may have to look
elsewhere
 Costly/Unpopular
AIIB is costly, unpopular in congress and exploits developing nations- empirics
Keatley- "China's AIIB Challenge: How Should America Respond?" The National Interest. N.p., 18 Apr. 2015. Web. 21 June 2016.NW
The well-worn advice that if you cant beat them, join them may be the right counsel as Washington ponders what to do next about the new China-backed investment bank intended to finance Asian infrastructure needs while also promoting Chinese influence. And as they think about it, U.S.
officials might also relax a bit. Doing so would be much wiser than the Obama Administrations first reactionattempting to block the banks creation, or failing that, prevent it from becoming an important financial agency with broad membership and significant influence. That effort failed miserably,
due either to bad judgment or inattention, so now, the new bank is off and running at high speed .Fifty-seven nations, including most of Americas closest friends and allies, have joined China as founding members of what is
officially the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), with even Taiwan trying to devise what Beijing would consider an appropriate name so it too can be a member. Of the worlds
major economies, only the United States and Japan remain outside (and Tokyo is considering a plan to join later with a $1.5 billion capital contribution). As a former American ambassador to China noted recently, American policy has proven to be a major
strategic blunder. The initial U.S. response had no possible upside but did promiseand delivereda great deal of downside. The new development bank, in fact, is still being developed and just how it will operate remains to be

determined. But the broad outlines are clear. First proposed by Chinese President Xi Jinping in late 2013, it is supposed to provide financing for seaports, airports, roads, railroads and other
infrastructure needs across Asia and thereby stimulate the regions economic growth. China has promised to provide up to $50 billion of its initial capital and hopes others will match that
total. The headquarters will be in Beijing and its first leader (already chosen) will be Chinese; to some degree, it will be a rival of the American-led World Bank in Washington and the Asian
Development Bank (ADB), a Japanese-led institution based in Manila. Though not openly stated, but obviously true, Chinas motives include using the bank to increase its political influence in neighboring nations, where Beijings sometimes aggressive diplomatic and military actions
have caused great worry. In any case, theres no doubt that the proposed AIIB will become reality, perhaps by the end of the year. Realizing that it chose a faulty course, the Obama Administration has already begun tacking in the new banks direction. After a recent Beijing visit, Treasury Secretary
But Lew repeated a
Jack Lew said the US stands ready to welcome new additions to the international development architecturea sharp contrast to late last year when senior White House officials were criticizing the AIIB as unsound and unneeded, and pressuring allies to stay away.

major American caveat: to be truly worthwhile, the AIIB must share the international communitys strong commitment to genuine multilateral decision-making and ever-improving lending
standards and safeguards. In other words, member states must not let the bank become an agency for advancing narrow Chinese economic interests in corrupt ways at the expense of local
citizens and the environment. These concerns show that the initial American reaction, however unwise, was not irrational. The Chinese record as a lender to developing nations is spotty at
best. Too often it has provided loans to kleptocratic regimes that finance Chinese companies using imported Chinese workers on projects that mainly ship energy and raw materials back to
Chinese industry; sometimes bribes grease the way, while the local environment and economy can suffer. Some experts say the Chinese record in Africa, for example, is no better than that of
19th century European colonialists. Other Chinese loans, such as $86 billion to Venezuela, were made primarily for political reasons and may never be repaid. A few countries, most recently
Sri Lanka and Myanmar, have canceled Chinese-funded projects on grounds that corruption paved their way and they serve no basic local purpose. During his successful campaign, Sri Lankas
new president, Maithripala Sirisena, described local Chinese projects as robbery taking place before everybody and in broad daylight.if this trend continues for another six years our country
would become a colony and we would become slaves. Since taking office, he has suspended work on a $1.5 billion Beijing-funded port project. But from the first, the AIIB was promised as something quite different, a bank that would follow international norms and be
devoted to economically sound projects of value to the borrowers. Jin Liqun, the Chinese official expected to become its first secretary general, has vowed that operations will be lean, clean and green, with at least half its staff recruited from overseas. Jin, a former Chinese deputy finance minister
and ADB vice president, also has said its operations will be both corruption-free and transparent, two traits seldom found in Chinese governance. Governing board members elected from other member states, such as Great Britain and Canada, are expected to ensure those guidelines are
followed. Washingtons next move is unclear. To join would require a capital commitment, something a Republican Congress is unlikely to provide even if President Obama asks. After all, the
AIIB was born partly because Congress consistently has refused to authorize a larger voice for Beijing in international agencies that the United States dominates, which would give China a role
reflecting its new economic strength. For example, for five years it has ignored legislation authorizing a cost-free (to U.S. taxpayers) revision of International Monetary Fund quotas despite administration urging. Even so, the administration should swallow its pride and explore the
possibility of getting inside the tent, perhaps with Japan, rather than remain a lonely outsider. On the positive side, Jim Yong Kim, the American who leads the World Bank, already plans talks about future cooperation with the AIIB. To date, the political payoff for Washington has been entirely
negative.
According to Singapore academic and former diplomat Kishore Mahbubani, a persistent America-basher, the AIIBs creation marks the end of the American century and the arrival of
the Asian century. The claim is nonsensethe bank is not that important, and the United States remains the worlds leading economy, most powerful military force, and a central figure in
the region; most Asian states want to keep close relations with America. But Washingtons efforts to stiff the new bank, and persuade friends to do the same, made it seem churlish, while Beijing appeared outgoing and generous. It also fed the political divide
between Japan and China, a major U.S. worry. Most countries ignored Washingtons advice and signed up for their own reasons; Britain perhaps to ensure that London (rather than Frankfurt) remains a center for trading the Chinese yuan, while others saw investment opportunities or a source of
needed finance. All this produced soft diplomacy gains for China at Americas expense, undermining the official U.S. policy of tilting Asias way .
Whatever American officials do about the bank eventually, they could well relax a bit. If it does
operate on promised terms, the AIIB should be a useful contributor to Asias economic development. But it cannot possibly dominate the Asian financial arena, nor replace other institutions.
According to the ADB, Asia needs $800 billion annually for a decade to meet its infrastructure needs, a vast sum far beyond the combined capabilities of all international agencies. (The ADB,
for example, has provided only $13 billion annually in recent times though it hopes to do more.) Huge amounts of national and private capital are also needed, and no single government or
institution can provide it alone. If the United States works to remain engaged in Asia, it will; even a successful AIIB will not let China displace it.
 Squo Solves
AIIB is currently cooperating with U.S. dominated World Bank and ADB. US is not key.
Wu 4-14(Wendy Wu, 4-14-2016, South China Morning Post, "AIIB and World Bank reach deal on joint projects, as China-led lender prepares to approve US$1.2 billion of funds this year,"
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/1935932/aiib-and-world-bank-reach-deal-joint-projects-china-led)//PH

The Beijing-led Asian -Infrastructure Investment Bank and the US-dominated World Bank originally seen as rivals have signed an agreement to -co-finance projects. As part of the deal
signed on Thursday which comes as the AIIB prepares to announce its first batch of loans the two banks are discussing nearly a dozen jointly financed projects in sectors including
transport, water and energy in Central Asia, South Asia, and East Asia. The AIIB is expected to begin lending from the second quarter of this year, after its high-profile inauguration in January.
Chinas Asian neighbours, such as Pakistan, are expected to benefit. The two banks said the AIIB expected to approve US$1.2 billion in funds for development projects this year, with a
sizeable share expected to go on joint projects with the World Bank. Jin Liqun ( ), president of the AIIB, said the bank was cooperating with both the World Bank and the Asian
Development Bank (ADB) in approving the first batch of co-financed projects in June. I would say a huge amount of chemistry has already been nurtured between the AIIB and the World
Bank, the AIIB and the ADB, Xinhua quoted him as saying at an event hosted by the Asia Society Policy Institute in Washington yesterday. The Beijing-led infrastructure bank has 57 members,
but some major developed nations, including the United States and Japan, have not joined. Its establishment was seen as an attempt by Beijing to rival the World Bank and the ADB, which is
presided over by Japan. Critics have expressed concerns over whether the operation of the AIIB is transparent and up to international standards. Jim Yong Kim, president of the World Bank,
said the joint agreement was an important first step towards working with a new partner to address the worlds huge infrastructure needs. The World Bank said it would prepare and
supervise the co-financed projects in accordance with its policies in areas such as procurement, environment and social safeguards. Chu Yin, an associate professor with the University of
International Relations in Beijing, said the banks cooperation was a move to dispel doubts over the AIIB. China has strong competence in infrastructure construction and is rich in capital, he
said. But it lacks the ability to manage the funds and is short of experience in communicating with -foreign governments to process the projects. Therefore, it needs to leverage others
strengths. Paul Haenle, director of the Carnegie-Tsinghua Centre for Global Policy, said the agreement showed that the AIIB wanted to be part of the global financing system, rather than
create a new one. What Jin wants to do is to make sure the AIIB becomes a part of the existing structure of multinational development banks, he said. But I think there is a financial aspect
too. [The two banks] cannot fund everything by themselves. They both need partners, [and are] looking to private partnerships and also other multinational banks, too. The AIIB plans to hold
a board meeting at the end of this month to discuss procedures for new members. Canadian officials have said they are looking closely at joining. Last month, asked about the possible entry
of the US and Japan, Jin said we are very patient and added that the bank was open and inclusive.

AIIB wont be any different than ADB

Jake Van Der Kamp 4.28.16 Writer about Asian relations Why AIIB is bigger but no better than ADB Publisher: South China Morning Post Date Accessed: 6.21.16
http://www.scmp.com/business/global-economy/article/1931311/why-aiib-bigger-no-better-adb -AR
I once went to an annual general meeting of the Asian Development Bank, and there received object lessons in the arts of how to waste money and how to abase myself in the presence of the lords of creation. These particular lords of creation were the deputy
finance ministers of various Asian countries, each of whom had installed himself in a suite at the Philippine Plaza hotel in Manila, where the event was being held. As No 3 on a three-man delegation from an American investment bank, I was there to make our
presence seem all the more a gesture of respect for the big man while our No 1 in roundabout ways asked him, please, Sir, may we handle your next big bond issue or any privatisation you care to arrange. The Big Man would then deign to bestow us with the
light of a smile from his countenance and tell us he would consider the matter. We would thereupon stay for another five minutes during which it was my task to laugh at his witticisms and nod solemnly at the profundity of his wisdom. Along the way I figured out
how the ADB worked. Japan ran it and the game was to lend yen on low Japanese interest rates to government-sponsored agricultural support projects for the purchase of Japanese pumps, ditch-diggers and other such equipment. The catch was that the
governments of the countries borrowing the money must guarantee the loans. The result was financial disaster. The yen went way up and there was no way that destitute Indonesian and Thai farmers could ever repay. Everyone at the hugely overstaffed ADB
palace in Manila then cried crocodile tears and the Indonesian and Thai fiscal deficits grew larger. In 1941 they called this sort of thing the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. The results were not much less devastating in its second appearance. Japan has
since withered in relative importance and another great power has risen to take its place in Asia. The authority structure of the ADB, however, has not been amended to reflect this change. How fitting then that China should set up its own and bigger version, the
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. How fitting in particular as the United States and Japan, annoyed with Chinas claims to rocks in the Sea of Vietnam, have teamed up to exclude China from their own trade and investment arrangements in Asia. Beijing has
done them one better. It has signed up half of Europe as starting partners of the AIIB. Take that, Obama. Suck it up, Abe. If
you [U.S. or Japan]want to join now, youre juniors or you dont get in. Thus when this new banks president, Jin
Liqun, according to our report dispelled rumours that the setting up of the AIIB reflected Beijings ambitions to challenge the present global financial governance regime, I begin to wonder about the many meanings of the
word dispel. Deny them, yes. Anyone can deny. But he cannot refute or dispel them. They are not rumours. They are fact. It is also fact that while government-sponsored development banks may have had some role to play in Asia in the 1950s, when other
financial arrangements were primitive, things are so no longer. Any
worthwhile infrastructure project will have commercial banks from around the world falling over each other to take part. There is no
shortage of money. There is only ever a shortage of good ideas for the use of it. This in turn means that the bad ideas in infrastructure will go the AIIB and the ADB, which do not really care as
they are driven by political jealousies rather than any real consideration for what is and what is not worthwhile in infrastructure. We have now been told that Hong Kong may be allowed to join the AIIB soon as a
sub-sovereign member. Let us all applaud fulsomely and tell the AIIB that we are happy to see it raise as much money as it can on our financial markets and we warmly welcome any conferences it may choose to host in Hong Kong. Please, sirs, set up a regional
office here. But keep your hands off our fiscal reserves.
Off Case
China Links
 AIIB Will Expand Influence
Chinas using the AIIB to expand its regional influence
The Economist, 14. (N.a. "Why China is creating a new "World Bank" for Asia." Economist. 11-11-2014 Web. Accessed: 6-21-2016. http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-
explains/2014/11/economist-explains-6)
. But the real, unstated tension stems from a deeper shift: China will use the new bank to expand its influence at the expense of America and Japan, Asia's established powers. Chinas decision
to fund a new multilateral bank rather than give more to existing ones reflects its exasperation with the glacial pace of global economic governance reform. The same motivation lies behind the New Development
Bank established by the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). Although China is the biggest economy in Asia, the ADB is dominated by Japan; Japans voting share is more than twice Chinas and the banks president has always been Japanese. Reforms to give China a little
more say at the International Monetary Fund have been delayed for years, and even if they go through America will still retain far more power. China is, understandably, impatient for change. It is therefore taking matters into its own hands.
Containment
 AIIB = Appeasement
Joining the AIIB is appeasement encourages and legitimizes China, while the pivot and the policy of containment has shown real progress.
Branigan, 15. (Tania Branigan. "China crisis: west riven by age-old question." Guardian. 3-19-2015 Web. Accessed: 6-21-2016. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/19/china-bind-
is-the-uk-accommodating-or-ceding-too-much-to-superpower)
You might call it one of the irregular verbs in international diplomacy: we engage, you accommodate, they appease. US irritation over Britains decision to sign up to a new Chinese development bank has laid bare the deep international divisions over how to deal with the worlds newest superpower.
For the Americans, as for human rights groups and Chinese dissidents, countries like Britain are too willing to cede power to China as it grows wealthier and more powerful. One White House official accused the UK last week of constant
accommodation of Beijing. The Foreign Office says its approach to China is consistent and it continues to raise sensitive issues, but analysts see a marked change since Beijing punished London over
David Camerons meeting with the Dalai Lama in 2012. They note a string of bilateral deals, regular visits by government ministers to China, emollient remarks on human rights and especially the
muted response to the Chinese governments tight restrictions on voting rights in Hong Kong, which has disappointed many in Britains former colony. All countries have of course become more accommodating
to China, says Katrin Kinzelbach of the Global Public Policy Institute, who has researched the EU-China human rights dialogue. Cameron met the Dalai Lama, experienced a backlash and no one stood with him It was the same when the Germans were in the same situation. The Dalai Lama.
Some say China's complaints about world leaders' meetings with the Dalai Lama are strategic attempts to exert power through a symbolic issue. Roderic Wye, associate fellow at Chatham House and previously a China and east Asia specialist at the Foreign Office, says Europe has signally
failed to produce any consistency in policy towards China. That in itself encourages China to press hard on issues they feel are important they think sooner or later there will be a crack.
Many suggest the same is true of Asian countries alarmed by Chinas growing military might and assertiveness, but attracted by trade with and investment from the worlds second largest
economy. Norway is a good example. When the countrys Nobel committee awarded Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo the peace prize in 2010, its salmon exports plummeted. Government
ministers took note. So when the Dalai Lama visited Oslo last year, no government representatives met him. Guy de Jonquires of the European Centre for International Political Economy suggests the costs are not terribly severe for a
reasonably sized and influential country, particularly as the Chinese economy slows and appears more precarious. China-UK trade increased by 11% in 2013, during the Dalai Lama row, and China continued to seek cooperation at non-ministerial levels. The Chinese are intensely pragmatic and have
an awful lot of stuff they want from us, he said. He suggests the chancellor has been too quick to offer Beijing advantages such as making it easier for Chinese banks to set up in London, loosening oversight. If all we want is to be a glorified Singapore, where making money and exports are all that
matters in foreign policy, thats fine but lets not kid ourselves if we want to be taken seriously by anyone else, he said. The more common accusation is that European
countries are not simply selling themselves too cheaply, but trading human rights concerns for
commercial interests. China assumes any accommodation from a foreign country comes from weakness and they do not respect weakness. They will bully those who let themselves be
bullied, says Jorge Guajardo, formerly the Mexican ambassador to Beijing and now senior director at McLarty Associates in Washington. You acquiesce on human rights and China assumes you do it for economic reasons; they make
more demands and you start acquiescing in other areas. India is probably one of the last countries to accommodate China on anything and at the end of the day, they work very well together. Some go further, suggesting complaints about meetings with the Dalai
Lama are strategic attempts to exert power through a symbolic issue in the first place. The German chancellor, Angela Merkel. Some say she has in some ways been firmer than her predecessors, but that is also possible because of the strength of the German economy. It is easier for some countries
to take a tough stance than others. While Angela Merkel has in some ways been firmer than her predecessors, that is also possible because of the strength of the German economy, Kinzelbach points out. If you accept only sticks and carrots work on human rights, what sticks and carrots can we use?
We dont have any left that are attractive or impressive enough for China any more, unfortunately, she said. She argues that the US itself has given ground on human rights issues, particularly at the beginning of the Obama administration. There was a real desire for partnership and China didnt
step up and deliver; it took advantage, said Bonnie Glaser, an expert on Sino-US relations at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, in a more generous assessment. It was the time of the financial crisis and China saw the US as weak. Then came the
pivot, now portrayed
as the strategic rebalance to Asia welcomed by US allies but viewed by Beijing as an attempt to contain it. While many China watchers in the US question whether the policy has been effective or even coherent, Glaser sees progress: in the joint
declaration of action on climate change and in better negotiations over issues such as North Korea and Iran. That reflected attempts to build cooperation where the countries have common
ground, while managing differences, she said. On cyber, South China Sea, trade policy we have been very clear to the Chinese where we see our interests in jeopardy, she added. The US is more able
than other countries to challenge China, but also keener to do so; Japan is in a similar, albeit weaker, position. The US consider they are the power in Asia-Pacific and, more than anyone in Europe, considers Chinas rise as a losing game for them, said Feng Zhongping, an expert on Sino-European
relations at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations. While European countries would protect their relationship with the US, they also wanted to benefit from the opportunities for growth and development offered by Chinas rise, he said. Shen Dingli, professor of international
relations at Fudan University, compared the US adjustment to Chinas peaceful rise to the UKs historical experience of facing a rising US. Britain constantly accommodates to its own interests, he said; France, Germany and Italys indications that they too will join the AIIB merely means that they
place their overall national interest, and the investment opportunity at this time, above the narrow interest of allying with America. Jean-Pierre Lehmann, professor of international political economy at the business school IMD, said: The UK is not constantly accommodating China; it recognises
that China has certain positions and grievances, some understandable. I dont particularly want to live in a world under Chinese power but we have to engage intelligently and strategically, without too much hypocrisy. An FCO spokeswoman said: Our approach to China is consistent. This is a
relationship that matters and that brings with it a wealth of opportunities for closer working on issues that are important worldwide. That does not mean to say we do not have areas on which we differ, but we handle these through an established process of regular dialogue. We do not see a choice
between securing growth and investment for the UK, and raising sensitive issues, including on Hong Kong and broader human rights. We raise them both and do so consistently thats what our policy of engagement is all about. We could not, and would not, do otherwise.
 Refund ADB/World Bank CP
Instead of panicking and joining AIIB, the U.S. should invest more in ADB and World Bank to combat Chinas growing influence
Scott Morris 3.20.15 No, the U.S. will not join the AIIB-But heres one thing it can do Writer, Publisher: Center for Global Development Date Accessed: 6.21.16
http://www.cgdev.org/blog/no-us-will-not-join-aiib-%E2%80%93-here%E2%80%99s-one-thing-it-can-do -AR
The backlash to the discordant US position on the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) this week was swift and seemingly universal. So much so that I cant find any voices defending the US view to link to here. Fair enough. As Ive already argued (here and
here), the criticism is deserved. But I part ways with one emerging narrative about how the US can get back on track. I dont agree that the
US should [not] join the very institution that it has so strongly called on others to avoid.
Even if the will were there from the Obama administration (and it is decidedly not), the path to membership would be nearly impossible. President Obama couldnt sign the United States up for AIIB membership for the same reason he cant
offer US approval for the IMF reform package (something he does want). Namely, the US Congress. Capitol Hill would need to authorize and pay for US participation in the new institution. That will not happen. Earlier this week
Treasury Secretary Jack Lew reiterated the Administrations urging for IMF reform in Congressional testimony (play video from 19.17 23.38). Yet a better and more feasible option is already at hand. Theres a higher likelihood that
the Obama administration could work with Congress on a set of measures to increase the attractiveness of the World Bank and Asian Development Bank in the eyes of the very countries that
are now looking fondly toward the AIIB. The US objective at this point will be to ensure that the AIIB does not grow quickly to eclipse the existing international financial institutions (IFIs), or that the AIIB does not otherwise become the launching
point for an alternative network of regional development banks, all of them excluding the United States. The best way to do that is to realize more of the pent up ambition for the new institutions through the existing
ones. That means one thing: money. The United States, and particularly the US Congress, cant expect to lead in institutions like the World Bank if it isnt willing to pony up more resources. This means
demonstrating a newfound ambition when it comes to more capital for the World Bank and the regional development banks in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Much of the US talk in these banks in recent
years is around doing more with less, leveraging more, and relying more on private money. In the meantime, many of the World Banks leading shareholders (China, the UK, France, Germany) are now demonstrating that they are perfectly willing to put more of
their public resources through multilateral channels. The United States can demonstrate renewed leadership by channeling some of this ambition from other countries into the existing IFIs. Why not announce
support for a doubling of World Bank capital? That may sound prohibitively expensive, but the budgetary implications are actually very modest, representing about one percent of the annual US foreign assistance budget. Is that too costly an investment to shore
up US strategic influence globally at a time when it appears to be in peril?
 Plan unpopular
There is no chance Congress will agree to join AIIB
Economist 9.26.15 Publisher: Economist Reversion to the mean Date Accessed: 6.21.16 http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21667964-chinas-new-infrastructure-bank-has-gained-wide-
support-lending-will-be-tougher-reversion -AR
WITH his wavy silvery hair, relaxed demeanour, and fluent, colloquial English, Jin Liqun comes from a different mould from the one that churns out the standard senior Chinese official: raven-locked, stiff-necked, monoglot. That is perhaps one reason why China
chose him to lead the team setting up its new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Another is a career that seems to prepare him ideally for the roleas an official of the finance ministry, vice president of a multilateral development bank, boss of an
investment bank and chairman of a sovereign-wealth fund. His presence alone helps explain why China has been so successful in attracting other countries to back the AIIB. Mr Jin played a leading role in overcoming suspicions about the banksuch as that, by
offering less stringent lending conditions, it would threaten existing multilateral lenders, notably the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Indeed, Mr
Jins biggest difficulty may no longer be to establish the AIIBs credibility, but to
demonstrate why, if it hews so closely to principles followed by the existing banks, China felt the need to promote it at all. The saga of the AIIBs life so far, since its creation was announced by Chinas president, Xi
Jinping, on a visit to a regional forum in South-East Asia in 2013, has been of a victorious campaign against American-led scepticism that played on three fears about Chinese intentions. One was that the bank would be used to finance projects where the tendering
process would be skewed in favour of Chinese contractors. A second was that, in its eagerness to see results, the new bank would skimp on safeguardsrelating to the environment, for example, or the effects of construction on local residents. The other was that
the AIIB had a geopolitical aim: to help China achieve its goal of making itself the hub of Asias infrastructure links by boosting development along its traditional trading routes to Europea policy summed up by Chinese officials as One Belt, One Road. But
American attempts to persuade its friends to shun the AIIB seemed merely churlish, since Asias need for investment in infrastructure is so massive. Speaking in Singapore on September 19th, Mr Jin cited an estimate by the ADB itself: $730 billion a year until
2020, predominantly for electricity generation, roads and telecommunications. Indu Bhushan of the ADB says that, even after the AIIB is fully operational, the multilateral development banks may be able to finance 5% of that need, at most. Some of Americas
closest allies, including Australia, Britain and South Korea, ignored its warnings and signed up. Canada, Japan and America itself remain the biggest holdouts. In addition to the 57 prospective founding members which last month chose Mr Jin as the banks
president-designate, more than 20, he says, are on a waiting list. He says America, too, may join one day (tactfully ignoring the fact that Congress is more likely to approve reform of the IMF, or outlaw apple pie, than to
endorse the transfer of American taxpayers money to a Chinese-initiated bank). The AIIB is on track for a formal inauguration later this year; and to start considering its first batch of projects, says Mr Jin, in the second quarter of
2016. Meanwhile, the existing development banks are keen to emphasise how much they welcome its emergence. The talk is not of competition and rivalry but of collaboration and complementarity. This week the ADBs president, Takehiko
Nakao, met Mr Jin in Beijing. The two agreed to identify future ADB projects that the AIIB may be able to co-finance. Surely, though, it is not the AIIBs primary function to become another source of finance for projects
led by the ADB or World Bank? To demonstrate that it plugs a gap, it will also need to prove that it has at least some different project-selection criteria and operational practices. Mr Jin distinguishes the AIIBs approach in two ways: it will
work more with private-sector lenders; and, rather than pursue poverty reduction and economic growth directly, it will remain true to its infrastructure mandate. That will not be easy, however. The
biggest problem facing infrastructure finance in Asia is not, at present, a shortage of funds. According to professionals at the existing development banks, it is a shortage of projects. The need seems bottomless; the
demand is not, since relatively few proposed infrastructure projects have been through the painstaking process of detailed design, feasibility study and environmental- and social-impact
assessments. And of those that have, fewer still can demonstrate a reliable source of revenue out of which loans could be repaid: electricity-purchase agreements for a power station, say, or tolls for a road. Mr Jin
says that, on the contrary, there is a backlog of bankable projects that have been through most of the hoops, especially in low-income countries. But he also acknowledges that the AIIBs mandate requires it to spread its loan assets across the region. It cannot
lend only to its poorest countries. A second hurdle to turning grand infrastructure plans into actual building work is implementing them. Often, capacity is lacking or local regulationson land-acquisition, for exampleget in the way. Sounding for once like a
conventional Chinese official, Mr Jin argues against development banks meddling in countries internal affairs. But in many countries such as India, Indonesia and the Philippines it is those internal affairs that keep so many projects stuck on the drawing-board
for so many years. AIIB bulls recall the 1960s, when similar reservationsthen about perceived Japanese dominationclouded the ADBs launch. Yet the World Bank and the ADB have co-existed well enough. There is no reason why they should not make room
for the AIIB as well. So Asian infrastructure will have another welcome source of finance, and China a modest boost to its soft power. But if it wants a multilateral bank to pursue its own commercial or policy objectives, it may have to look
elsewhere

Plan unpopular investments

Scott Morris 3.20.15 No, the U.S. will not join the AIIB-But heres one thing it can do Writer, Publisher: Center for Global Development Date Accessed: 6.21.16
http://www.cgdev.org/blog/no-us-will-not-join-aiib-%E2%80%93-here%E2%80%99s-one-thing-it-can-do -AR
The backlash to the discordant US position on the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) this week was swift and seemingly universal. So much so that I cant find any voices defending the US view to link to here. Fair enough. As Ive already argued (here and
here), the criticism is deserved. But I part ways with one emerging narrative about how the US can get back on track. I dont agree that theUS should [not] join the very institution that it has so strongly called on others to avoid.
Even if the will were there from the Obama administration (and it is decidedly not), the path to membership would be nearly impossible. President Obama couldnt sign the United States up for AIIB membership for the same reason he cant
offer US approval for the IMF reform package (something he does want). Namely, the US Congress. Capitol Hill would need to authorize and pay for US participation in the new institution. That will not happen. Earlier this week
Treasury Secretary Jack Lew reiterated the Administrations urging for IMF reform in Congressional testimony (play video from 19.17 23.38). Yet a better and more feasible option is already at hand. Theres a higher likelihood that
the Obama administration could work with Congress on a set of measures to increase the attractiveness of the World Bank and Asian Development Bank in the eyes of the very countries that
are now looking fondly toward the AIIB. The US objective at this point will be to ensure that the AIIB does not grow quickly to eclipse the existing international financial institutions (IFIs), or that the AIIB does not otherwise become the launching
point for an alternative network of regional development banks, all of them excluding the United States. The best way to do that is to realize more of the pent up ambition for the new institutions through the existing
ones. That means one thing: money. The United States, and particularly the US Congress, cant expect to lead in institutions like the World Bank if it isnt willing to pony up more resources. This means demonstrating a newfound ambition when it comes to
more capital for the World Bank and the regional development banks in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Much of the US talk in these banks in recent years is around doing more with less, leveraging more, and relying more on private money. In the meantime,
many of the World Banks leading shareholders (China, the UK, France, Germany) are now demonstrating that they are perfectly willing to put more of their public resources through multilateral channels. The
United States can demonstrate
renewed leadership by channeling some of this ambition from other countries into the existing IFIs. Why not announce support for a doubling of World Bank capital? That may sound prohibitively expensive, but the budgetary
implications are actually very modest, representing about one percent of the annual US foreign assistance budget. Is that too costly an investment to shore up US strategic influence globally at a time when it appears to be in peril?

Over half of Americans see Chinas rise as a major threat

Ben Westcott 5.06.16 Publisher: South China Morning Post Half of Americans still see Chinas rise as threat, survey suggests http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-
defence/article/1941667/half-americans-still-see-chinas-rise-threat-survey -AR

Half of Americans still believe Chinas emergence as a world power is a major threat to the United States, according to a new survey released by the Pew Research Centre on Friday. But Islamic State, refugees fleeing from
Iraq and Syria and climate change were all ranked as more worrying in the survey, which polled more than 4,000 United States citizens. Insecurities and bluster: the roots of distrust between China and the US In the latest of a series of
surveys published by Pew, attitudes towards China remain negative but stable as tensions in the South China Sea continue to pit the two superpowers against each other. Youre talking about people
in a country thats used to being number one, that like to be number one and Chinas clearly challenging that number one position, said David Zweig, an expert on China and international relations at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. About
55 per cent of United States citizens interviewed in the survey said they wanted the United States to remain the sole military superpower in the world, including 67 per cent of Republican voters. In addition,
almost a quarter of interviewees said they saw China as an adversary to the United States, the same number as Russia. Both numbers havent changed much in recent years, according to Pew. Zweig said a quarter of Americans seeing China as an
adversary wasnt unsurprising, but it could be a problem in the future. Its a problem when people tend not to trust each other, when they see negatives even when there arent necessarily
negatives, he said. I think that Chinese clearly believe America wants to contain Chinas rise ... and if you ask a lot of Americans they see China as a bully, as a threat. Xi and Obama find common ground
on nuclear security, climate change Zweig said that according to previous Pew surveys, attitudes to China in the United States had started to sour in 2012 following territorial tensions in the South China Sea and President Xi Jinping taking office. The Pew survey
was conducted between April 4 and 19 this year. Fifty
per cent of respondents said Chinas emergence as a world power was a major threat, 80 per cent cited Islamic State as a major fear and 55 per cent
said they were threatened by the number of refugees leaving Syria and Iraq.
 IMF/World Bank Loss Influence DA
Continued IMF and World Bank targeted fight against poverty, global poverty is at an all time low
Reuters 10.4.15 World Bank: extreme poverty to fall below 10% of world population for the first time Date Accessed: 6.22.16 Publisher: the Guardian
https://www.theguardian.com/society/2015/oct/05/world-bank-extreme-poverty-to-fall-below-10-of-world-population-for-first-time -AR

The number of people living in extreme poverty is likely to fall for the first time below 10% of the worlds population in 2015, the World Bank said on Sunday as it revised its benchmark for measuring the problem. UN:
15-year push ends extreme poverty for a billion people Read more This is the best story in the world today, said World Bank president Jim Yong Kim. These projections show us that we are the first generation in human history that can end extreme poverty.
Extreme poverty has long been defined as living on or below $1.25 a day, but the World Banks adjustment now sets the poverty line at $1.90 a day. The Bank said the change reflects new data on differences in the cost of living across countries, while preserving
the real purchasing power of the previous yardstick. Using the new benchmark, the World Bank projects 702 million people or 9.6% of the worlds population will be living in extreme poverty in 2015, down from
902 million people or 12.8% of the global population in 2012. The global development lender attributed the continued fall in poverty to strong economic growth rates in emerging markets, particularly India, and investments in education,
health, and social safety nets. However, Kim warned slower global growth, volatile financial markets, conflicts, high youth unemployment and the impact of climate change were obstacles to meeting a UN target to end poverty by 2030, part of a new set of
development goals adopted by 193 countries at the United Nations last month. World Bank welcomes China's new bank as means to fight poverty But it remains within our grasp, as long as our high aspirations are matched by country-led plans that help the still
millions of people living in extreme poverty, Kim added. According to the bank, around half of those living in extreme poverty by 2020 will hail from hard-to-reach fragile and conflict-affected states. Sub-Saharan Africa accounts for half of the global poor. He said
the prospect of emerging economies losing steam could challenge promises to eradicate extreme poverty. Advertisement If economic growth of the developing world over the last 15 years was an anomaly, was a blip, then were in trouble, said Laurence
Chandy, a fellow at the Brookings Institution whose research focuses on global poverty. If instead its a kind new normal then weve got a good chance of getting close to this goal, he said. The World Bank first introduced a global poverty line in 1990, setting it at
$1 a day. It was adjusted last in 2008, when the group raised it to $1.25 a day. Across the
planet, the number of people living in extreme poverty has dropped by more than half since 1990, when 1.9 billion people
lived on under $1.25 a day, compared to 836 million in 2015, according to the UN. This follows the adoption in 2001 of the millennium development goals, which included the eradication of extreme poverty. Replacing the MDGs are the
Sustainable Development Goals, a set of 17 goals to combat poverty, inequality and climate change by 2030 with ending extreme poverty for all people everywhere, a key target. This article was amended on 5 October 2015. The article originally stated that the
millennium development goals were adopted in 2000.

Increased AIIB support kills IMF and the World Bank support, where U.S. has biggest influence and even voting power
Michael Hudson 12.20.15 The IMF changes its rules to isolate china and russia Date Accessed: 6.22.16 Michael Hudson (Writer about Finance and Powers of Neoliberalism) http://michael-
hudson.com/2015/12/the-imf-changes-its-rules-to-isolate-china-and-russia/ -AR

A nightmare scenario of U.S. geopolitical strategists is coming true: foreign independence from U.S.-centered financial and diplomatic control. China and Russia are investing in neighboring economies on terms
that cement Eurasian integration on the basis of financing in their own currencies and favoring their own exports. They also have created the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as an alternative military alliance to NATO.[1] And the Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) threatens to replace the IMF and World Bank tandem in which the United States holds unique veto power. More than just a disparity of voting rights in
the IMF and World Bank is at stake. At issue is a philosophy of development. U.S. and other foreign investment in infrastructure (or buyouts and takeovers on credit) adds interest rates and other financial charges to the cost structure, while charging
prices as high as the market can bear (think of Carlos Slims telephone monopoly in Mexico, or the high costs of Americas health care system), and making their profits and monopoly rents tax-exempt by paying them out as interest. By contrast, government-
owned infrastructure provides basic services at low cost, on a subsidized basis, or freely. That is what has made the United States, Germany and other industrial lead nations so competitive over the past few centuries. But this positive role of government is no
longer possible under World Bank/IMF policy. The U.S. promotion of neoliberalism and austerity is a major reason propelling China, Russia and other nations out of the U.S. diplomatic and banking orbit. On December 3, 2015, Prime Minister Putin proposed that
Russia and other Eurasian Economic Union countries should kick-off consultations with members of the SCO and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) on a possible economic partnership.[2] Russia also is seeking to build pipelines to Europe
through friendly secular countries instead of Sunni jihadist U.S.-backed countries locked into Americas increasingly confrontational orbit. Russian finance minister Anton Siluanov points out that when Russias 2013 loan to Ukraine was made, at the request of
Ukraines elected government, Ukraines international reserves were barely enough to cover three months imports, and no other creditor was prepared to lend on terms acceptable to Kiev. Yet Russia provided $3 billion of much-needed funding at a 5 per cent
interest rate, when Ukraines bonds were yielding nearly 12 per cent.[3] What especially annoys U.S. financial strategists is that this loan by Russias National Wealth Fund was protected by IMF lending practice, which at that time ensured collectability by
withholding credit from countries in default of foreign official debts, or at least not bargaining in good faith to pay. To cap matters, the bonds are registered under Londons creditor-oriented rules and courts. Most worrisome to U.S. strategists is that China and
Russia are denominating their trade and investment in their own currencies instead of dollars. After U.S. officials threatened to derange Russias banking linkages by cutting it off from the SWIFT interbank clearing system, China accelerated its creation of the
alternative China International Payments System (CIPS), and its own credit card system to protect Eurasian economies from the threats made by U.S. unilateralists. Russia and China are simply doing what the United States has long done: using trade and credit
linkages to cement their diplomacy. This tectonic geopolitical shift is a Copernican threat to New Cold War ideology: Instead of the world economy revolving around the United States (the Ptolemaic idea of America as the indispensible nation), it may revolve
around Eurasia. As long as global financial control remains grounded in Washington at the offices of the IMF and World Bank, such a shift in the center of gravity will be fought with all the power of an American Century (and would-be American Millennium)
inquisition. Any inquisition needs a court system and enforcement vehicles. So does resistance to such a system. That is what todays global financial, legal and trade maneuvering is all about. And that is why todays world system is in the process of breaking
apart. Differences in economic philosophy call for different institutions. To
U.S. neocons the specter of AIIB government-to-government investment creates fear of nations minting their own money and holding
each others debt in their international reserves instead of borrowing dollars, paying interest in dollars and subordinating their financial planning to the U.S. Treasury and IMF. Foreign governments
would have less need to finance their budget deficits by selling off key infrastructure. And instead of dismantling public spending, a broad Eurasian economic union would do what the United States itself practices, and seek self-sufficiency in banking and monetary
policy. Imagine the following scenario five years from now. China will have spent half a decade building high-speed railroads, ports, power systems and other construction for Asian and African countries, enabling them to grow and export more. These exports will
be coming online to repay the infrastructure loans. Also, suppose that Russia has been supplying the oil and gas energy for these projects on credit. To avert this prospect, suppose an American diplomat makes the following proposal to the leaders of countries in
debt to China, Russia and the AIIB: Now that youve got your increased production in place, why repay? Well make you rich if you stiff our adversaries and turn back to the West. We and our European allies will support your assigning your nations public
infrastructure to yourselves and your supporters at insider prices, and then give these assets market value by selling shares in New York and London. Then, you can keep the money and spend it in the West. How can China or Russia collect in such a situation?
They can sue. But what court in the West will accept their jurisdiction? That is the kind of scenario U.S. State Department and Treasury officials have been discussing for more than a year. Implementing it became more pressing in light of Ukraines $3 billion debt
to Russia falling due by December 20, 2015. Ukraines U.S.-backed regime has announced its intention to default. To support their position, the IMF has just changed its rules to remove a critical lever on which Russia and other governments have long relied to
ensure payment of their loans. The IMFs role as enforcer of inter-government debts When it comes to enforcing nations to pay inter-government debts, the IMF is able to withhold not only its own credit but also that of governments and global bank consortia
participating when debtor countries need stabilization loans (the neoliberal euphemism for imposing austerity and destabilizing debtor economies, as in Greece this year). Countries that do not privatize their infrastructure and sell it to Western buyers are
threatened with sanctions, backed by U.S.-sponsored regime change and democracy promotion Maidan-style. The Funds creditor leverage has been that if a nation is in financial arrears to any government, it cannot qualify for an IMF loan and hence, for
packages involving other governments. That is how the dollarized global financial system has worked for half a century. But until now, the beneficiaries have been U.S. and NATO lenders, not been China or Russia. The focus on a mixed public/private economy sets
the AIIB at odds with the Trans-Pacific Partnerships aim of relinquishing government planning power to the financial and corporate sector, and the neoliberal aim of blocking governments from creating their own money and implementing their own financial,
economic and environmental regulation. Chief Nomura economist Richard Koo, explained the
logic of viewing the AIIB as a threat to the U.S.-controlled IMF: If the IMFs rival is heavily under Chinas influence,
countries receiving its support will rebuild their economies under what is effectively Chinese guidance, increasing the likelihood they will fall directly or indirectly under that countrys
influence.[4]

IMF and the World Bank has the best empirical method for international cooperation to help fight poverty
Rawle Lucas 7.5.15 Publisher: Stabroek News Date Accessed: 6.21.16 The changed relationship between the IMF and developing
countrieshttp://www.stabroeknews.com/2015/features/07/05/the-changed-relationship-between-the-imf-and-developing-countries-2/ -AR
Member countries of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are required to avoid the use of restrictive practices that interfere with or undermine international trade. The particular focus is on the exchange rate arrangements that member countries put in place
to meet international financial commitments. In cases where member countries make changes to their exchange rate regime, they must report it to the IMF so that it could evaluate if the change could injure other trading countries. This obligation applies to every
member of the organization, even though smaller member-countries feel that they are at a disadvantage. Notwithstanding the concerns, there seems to be less tension between developing countries and the IMF. business pageOne of the most important changes
has been the end of the Cold War which also saw the end of competition between the capitalist and the communist economic systems. These two systems represented two methods of allocating and distributing resources. One favoured free enterprise and the
market as a means of allocating resources while the other favoured state control and distribution of the resources. The IMF itself was a creation of the countries that followed the capitalist system and therefore had a natural affinity towards market-oriented
economic systems. Developing countries which pursued socialist or communist policies were often pressured to change their economic systems before they could receive special assistance from the IMF. The demand that governments give up resources to the
private sector was therefore part of an ideological struggle which ignored the social goals of the supplicant country. Even countries which pursued economic nationalism to reflect their independent political status were victims of the hard and fast market
prescriptions of the IMF. Once the ideological war that gave rise to the two competing economic systems ended, developing countries were left with no other option but to deal with the IMF. Despite the demise of the communist economic system and the shift
towards free market systems, many countries still had difficulties treating with the IMF. The social impact of adjustment programmes continued to be ignored by the IMF for many years. It was not until the
IMF began to see and understand some
of the social problems that developing countries faced as a result of poverty that things began to change. An early attempt to recognize that its traditional lending programmes could not help developing countries led to the
establishment of the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) in 1987. Guyana was among the first set of countries to benefit from this facility. The ESAF provided low-interest loans to countries that had suffered economic setbacks. They represented a 3-
year programme of financial support to member countries. It therefore recognized that poor countries could not achieve rapid macroeconomic changes in a short period and therefore could not necessarily see the positive impact over short periods of time. LUCAS
STOCK INDEX The Lucas Stock Index (LSI) declined 0.38 per cent in trading during the fifth period of June 2015. The stocks of four companies were traded with 320,198 shares changing hands. There were no Climbers but there was one Tumbler. The stocks of
Republic Bank Limited (RBL) fell 1.64 per cent on the sale of 1,000 shares. In the meanwhile, the stocks of Banks DIH (DIH), Demerara Bank Limited (DBL) and Demerara Tobacco Company (DTC) remained unchanged on the sale of 80,877; 238,246 and 75 shares
respectively. The Lucas Stock Index (LSI) declined 0.38 per cent in trading during the fifth period of June 2015. The stocks of four companies were traded with 320,198 shares changing hands. There were no Climbers but there was one Tumbler. The stocks of
Republic Bank Limited (RBL) fell 1.64 per cent on the sale of 1,000 shares. In the meanwhile, the stocks of Banks DIH (DIH), Demerara Bank Limited (DBL) and Demerara Tobacco Company (DTC) remained unchanged on the sale of 80,877; 238,246 and 75 shares
respectively. The IMF continued to tinker with its lending programmes and by 2000 had made an all-out effort to tackle poverty head on. This shift in position, undoubtedly, was influenced by the
moves which had begun towards a global commitment to reduce poverty levels across the world that culminated in the formulation of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Anticipating
the global push to eradicate poverty, a first attempt to assist developing countries to achieve the millennium goals was the establishment of the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF). This initiative
made poverty reduction integral to the work of the IMF. The initiative recognized that the balance-of-payment problems of poor countries could not be solved at the same speed and under the same conditions as countries with structurally
stronger and more diversified economies. The distributional effects of its policies were therefore still discriminated against the poor. The PRGF was a particularly innovative technique by the IMF. Public participation and country ownership were distinguishing
features of the programme. Lending under the PRGF was based on the demands made by beneficiary countries on the basis of country-specific poverty reduction strategies. The IMF therefore had moved
further away from the one-size fit all strategy that was the source of much tension between it and developing countries in the past to a more flexible lending arrangement that took account of the individual circumstances of needy member countries. In addition,
the IMF had become more accommodating of a balanced approach to investment in poor developing countries. Whereas in the past the IMF insisted on an almost exclusive production role of the private sector, it came
around to the view under the PRGF that public investment had equally positive benefits as private investments. It was therefore willing to tolerate higher levels of public investment as long as that investment did not disturb the macroeconomic stability of the
borrowing country. By participating in the global poverty reduction efforts, the IMF actually submitted itself to an evaluation of its performance that was no longer influenced solely by the narrow dictates of its more powerful members and its governing board.
For the first time, it was no longer the final arbiter of the effectiveness of its work. It was now subject to the eyes of the world and if poor countries could not make progress in reducing hunger and poverty, then the entire world could express no confidence in its
policies. Developing countries could now use the voting strength of global public opinion to condemn the policies of the IMF. Conscious of this threat to its reputation and even survival, the
IMF recognized that flexibility in its lending was
critical to its success in the fight against poverty. With some of the initiatives that it took, one could say that the sensitivity of the IMF has risen. As a reflection of this attitudinal shift, the IMF established in 2010 the Poverty
Reduction and Growth Trust. This facility has three lending windows. These are the Extended Credit Facility, the Standby Credit Facility and the Rapid Credit Facility. They provide financing that is suitable to the diverse needs of individual developing
countries. In between, there were other special facilities like the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC), the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI), the Policy Support Instrument (PSI), and the Exogenous Shocks Facility (ESF). This latter facility came
with a rapid access and a high access component. The creation of these various initiatives pointed to a recognition that there was need for Fund programmes to be relevant and better focused. They have become better focused. The IMF has also devised a
communications strategy that has aided in the promotion of a better understanding of Fund work and policy advice. Using a combination of traditional and new media, and seeking input from a broader group of stakeholders, communications efforts have
supported the spectrum of work undertaken by the world body. In particular, there has been a strong focus on, and coordination of, the Funds major surveillance products (World Economic Outlook (WEO), Global Financial Stability Report (GFSR), and the Fiscal
Monitor (FM)). At the same time, the IMF implemented an outreach programme that included closer collaboration with local media and beneficiary communities and organizations. Despite the changes made by the IMF in the way it conducts business, pressure is
on it to continue adjusting its way of doing business with developing countries. The pressure is coming from one of its founder members, China, which perhaps is the best example of how private and public investment could lead to economic improvements in a
country. China has emerged as an important lender to many developing countries. While at this moment, its aid does not focus on balance-of-payments support, access to its loans acts as a release valve against IMF pressure. China has cultivated its relationship
with developing countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America over the years and feels that it understands how to work with them. Having acquired the capacity to lend, China now provides preferential loans to many developing countries without demanding the
conditions associated with structural adjustment programmes. Among the countries that benefit from these loans are ones that appear to have been forgotten by the IMF as it began to direct greater amounts of financial resources towards poor countries.
Evidence of this focus could be gleaned from the size of aid flows to developing countries by China. One report indicates that from 2005 to 2014, China lent about US$119 billion to 15 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, including Guyana. These loans
went to 76 projects in 15 countries. Last year, China indicated that it would create four regional lending arrangements that could see as much as US$35 billion coming to the region. Earlier in 2013, China offered US$3 billion in loans to nine countries in the
Caribbean. China has also made countries in Africa a focus of its lending programme. Additional pressure was likely to be felt by the IMF in light of the rival contingency fund set up by the BRICS to meet their short-
term balance-of-payments needs. This US$100 billion Fund, led by Chinas contribution of US$41 billion, will come into effect in less than 30 days. This financial arrangement among the BRICS represents a major shake-up in
global financial relations. It is clear that these countries will no longer have to rely on the dictates of the IMF and other developed countries for balance-of-payments support. Given the independence that it offers member countries to manage their
macroeconomic policies as they see fit, it would come as no surprise to anyone to see other developing countries seeking access to this facility through membership. As such one could envision also a weakening of the control that the IMF has over global financial
matters and as a consequence over developing countries.

Poverty has major health and economic consequences for everyone

Lawrence Lanahan Fall/Winter 2014 Publisher: John Hopkins Health Review Why Poverty is bad for all of us http://www.johnshopkinshealthreview.com/issues/fall-winter-
2014/articles/why-poverty-is-bad-for-all-of-us -AR

Income inequality is harmful to your healthwhether youre rich, poor, or part of the ever-shrinking population living between those two extremes. Im glad Im living in the land of the free Where the rich
just get richer And the poor you dont ever have to see. Randy Newman, The World Isnt Fair The afterschool art program was done for the day, and the children filed into the van. I went along for the ride as we took them back to their homes in West
Baltimore, past blocks of boarded-up row houses. As we pulled to the curb to drop off one little girl, I saw a man in dirty clothes stumbling down the sidewalk. The girl stepped out of the van right in front of him. He continued his awkward ambling just steps
behind her. The longer the man followed the girl, the more I tensed up. She walked in a door. He walked in behind her. He lives with her, I realized. The door closed. I lived less than two miles away, but the distance felt much greater. Life expectancy in the little
girls neighborhood is 68 years. Its 75 years in the neighborhood of well-kept brownstones I went home to later that day. Just a few miles up the road, among the Victorian homes with wide wraparound porches, its 83 years. Look closely at those life expectancy
patterns and youll see them track with race and class. In America, the numbers will tell you: Whiteness and wealth mean better outcomes on many indicators of health. But being well-off doesnt necessarily make you well. Income inequality may be driving
Americans further and further apart economically, but their lives continue to intersect through policy and in our communities. The consequences of growing poverty and inequality create tension that can be felt physically by
the rich and poor alike. With every effort made to reinforce the social and geographical distance between more well-off Americans and the problems they see in poorer communities, that tension grows. And its making us all less well. Being well-off
doesnt necessarily make you well. The consequences of growing poverty and inequality create tension that can be felt physically by the rich and poor alike. Theres no question that poverty is bad for poor people, particularly where
their health is concerned. There is a growing body of research into the so-called social determinants of healthincome, access to health care, food security, public school conditions, racial discrimination, and any other social condition, policy, or
distribution of economic resources that can affect a persons health. Theyre a priority for the World Health Organization, which recently created a global plan of action to address them, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, which has several
initiatives, including the Racial and Ethnic Health Disparities Action Institute. One report cited by the CDC claims that social determinants actually have a greater effect on health than do genes, medical care, and health behavior combined. Poor people are more
likely to have low birth weight at the beginning of life, the end of life is likely to come earlier, and they have more asthma, heart disease, and diabetes in between. Researchers, however, have been investigating not just the effect of poverty on the health of
individual poor people, but what happens to the health of entire societies when the rich get richer and the poor get poorer. British epidemiologist Richard Wilkinson has spent three decades studying the effects of income inequality on population health. As
income inequality increases in rich nations, he argues, so do other health and social problems, among them infant mortality, low life expectancy, incarceration rates, and social mistrust. And thats not just among the poorthats everybody. America is one of the
most unequal countries in the developed world, he says. And it does worst in terms of almost all the health and social problems. In The Spirit Level: Why Greater Equality Makes Societies Stronger, published in 2009, Wilkinson and co-author Kate Pickett
compare Swedish health to that of England and Wales, the former having a more equal distribution of income than the latter two. He found that lower-class Swedes had lower death rates than those in the upper classes of England and Wales. He also found infant
mortality to be lower in Sweden than in England and Wales at all levels. One theory about the consequences of inequality on population health posits that if youre at the bottom of the economic ladder with no hope of climbing up, anxiety and resentment can
create a lifetime of debilitating stress and lead to coping mechanisms like smoking or drug abuse. Wilkinson cites a 2004 study that found the release of cortisol, a hormone associated with stress, elevated for tasks related to social evaluative threatthe feeling
of being rejected or judged by others. Wilkinson sees this effect not just on the poor, thoughhe says its on all rungs of the economic ladder. In a more unequal society, he says, where some people seem so important and other people seem almost worthless,
I think we judge each other more by social status. I think we all get more worried about how were seen and judged, and there are lots of signs of that. Money becomes even more important, so people work longer hours and get into debt more and save less,
because money becomes more important as a way of showing what youre worth. America is one of the most unequal countries in the developed world. And it does worst in terms of almost all the health and social problems. Earlier this year, a Baltimore
resident and blogger named Tracey Halvorsen, who lives in one of the citys recently gentrified neighborhoods by Patterson Park, wrote a post called Baltimore City, Youre Breaking My Heart. In response to several brutal crimes in her neighborhoodincluding
a mugger knocking a mans teeth out with a brick and burglars stabbing a woman to death in her park-front homeHalvorsen wrote that she is now scared to visit the park even during the day. She wanted to stay in the city, she said, and she made a long list of
things she loves about living there. But the blogs subhead made clear what was at stake: This is why people leave. The post went viral in Baltimore. Halvorsen advocated for police to start arresting people in her neighborhood for minor offenses like littering,
arguing that the offenders would eventually take their problems elsewhere. Some Baltimoreans criticized her us versus them mentalityincluding me. I pointed out that police had already tried zero tolerance quality-of-life policing, which they dropped after a
lawsuit pointed out that in one year, they had made 100,000 arrests in a city of less than 650,000 residents. An us versus them mentality, I thought, undermined the fact that even people in Baltimores poorest neighborhoods care about quality of life and home
values. Yet an us versus them mentality prevails, not just in Baltimore, and the problem goes beyond urban environments. Across the country, middle-class neighborhoodswhere Americans of a wide range of economic backgrounds go to the same schools,
attend the same churches, and socialize in the same civic and fraternal organizationsare disappearing. According to US2010, a peer-reviewed research project on how America is changing in the 21st century, in the 1970s, two-thirds of American families lived in
middle-income neighborhoods. Now less than half do. Its hard to argue that a healthy community is one in which the most comfortable residents are actually so uncomfortable that they are retreating to exclusive neighborhoods or, like Halvorsen, are at least
hatching escape plans. Those with the greatest means are increasingly retreating behind locked gates. The number of American housing units in gated communities rose by 4 million between 2001 and 2009. It used to be that only in the poorest of countries
people lived in locked and gated communities, says Robert Blum, director of the Johns Hopkins Urban Health Institute. But increasingly, because of the recent economic disparity and the consequent sense of vulnerability, we have a proliferation of locked and
gated communities to try to give those of us of higher income the illusionor delusionof safety. Those with the greatest means are increasingly retreating behind locked gates. Social epidemiologist Ichiro Kawachi, chair of the Department of Social and
Behavioral Sciences at the Harvard School of Public Health, has found that ruptures in the social fabricmemberships in social organizations, a sense that neighbors look out for one another and can be trustedare correlated with mortality, and that mistrust is
higher where income inequality is greater. Amid this social disorganization, his theory goes, mistrust fills the growing chasm between the haves and the have-nots. As middle-class neighborhoods disappear, so does the common ground upon which social
bonds can grow between those on all rungs of the economic ladder. The idea that social bonds make us healthierand that a lack of them makes us less healthyis not necessarily new. A 1999 study published in Sociological Forum by sociologist David Williams
and Chiquita Collins, currently associate dean for diversity and cultural competence at the Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, found that in cities where blacks and whites had little contact, both groups mortality rates were higher. Citing a collection
of 10 studies, a 2001 Russell Sage Foundation review that looked at the way social capital (the benefits of strong social relationships within a community), poverty, and community health all worked together showed that an equitable distribution of resources
translates into a lower burden of mortality for all members of the community. The review also noted that the positive contribution to health made by social integration and social support are said to rival in strength the detrimental contributions of several well-
established biomedical risk factors like smoking, obesity, and elevated blood pressure. In the 1990s, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development used a lottery to offer poor families in several cities housing vouchers to move out to mixed-income
areas. A 2012 study of the Moving to Opportunity program found that even though such moves didnt improve a familys economic well-being, the program had a positive impact on peoples physical and mental health, including obesity, diabetes, and self-
reports of subjective well-being. Thomas LaVeist will tell you that [and]
poverty has real economic costs. A Johns Hopkins health policy professor and director of the universitys Center for Health Disparities Solutions, LaVeist co-authored a 2009
report for the Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies called The Economic Burden of Health Inequalities in the United States. He and two other researchers calculated that American
health inequalities had a direct medical cost of
over $230 billion between 2003 and 2006, plus $1.24 trillion in indirect costs from lower productivity and premature death. The result, LaVeist says, is a workforce that is less healthy than it
should be and an economy that is less productive than it should be, leaving us with what he calls opportunity costs affecting everyone. Resources that are used to try to address inequalities are not available to
use for other things, LaVeist says. If youve got people showing up in the emergency departments with illnesses that shouldnt necessarily need emergency care, that affects the ability to bring through the system people who really do need emergency care.
Arguments for addressing those inequalities have, for the most part, been focused on social justice, LaVeist says. Its the right thing to do; its a shame; we shouldnt do that. What we wanted to do was to create another strain of argument for why we should
devote resources and to move beyond simply tugging at peoples heartstrings to say, No, the cold, hard reality is that it is taking resources out of the economy, and its expensive to maintain disparities, and everyones affected by them. But the economy is not
the only thing at stake. In his book One Nation, Underprivileged: Why American Poverty Affects Us All, Mark Rank acknowledges the inefficiency of money spent on the back end of the problem rather than on the front end. But he also believes growing
poverty and inequality are incompatible with fundamental American values. The words liberty and justice for all take on a hollow meaning when a significant percentage of the population is
economically and politically disenfranchised, he writes. This undermines every citizen, for it suggests that the American ideals in which we profess to believe apply to some more than others. This contradicts the very core of the American
promise, diminishing us all. If youve got people showing up in the emergency departments with illnesses that shouldnt necessarily need emergency care, that affects the ability to bring through the system people who really do need emergency care. At the
end of the Economic Burden of Health Inequalities report, LaVeist and the other authors acknowledge that their analysis shows social justice can be cost-effective. But, they write, sometimes the tremendous human suffering of health inequalities can be
obscured by analysis such as was conducted for this report. It is not our intent that the utilitarian argument replace moral deliberation or the application of social justice, they continue. We should address health disparities because such inequities are
inconsistent with the values of our society. Addressing them is the right thing to do.
 Ext.
Chinas AIIB threatens US led IMF influence in China
Daniel Weiser 4.9.15 Does the US fear the Asian Infrastructure Bank? Date Accessed: 6.22.16 http://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/040915/does-us-fear-asian-infrastructure-
investment-bank.asp -AR

In private, the U.S. reaction to the AIIB reflects less concern about banking standards and more concern about Chinese influence in world affairs. As China continues to grow as a world power, the U.S. is working to
maintain its role in Asian development and keep the dollar as the main global currency. The AIIB is a threat to both of these aims. Through the IMF, the World Bank and the ADP, the U.S. is able to exert its influence over Asian
development as a leader in global lending. The U.S. uses majority voting powers or alignment with western nations to select specific projects for development in Asia. A concern for the U.S. with the
AIIB is that China will now be able to use its influence to determine what does and doesnt get developed in Asia. Instead of looking to the U.S. as a dominant power, developing Asian countries will look to China for their
leadership, a trend the U.S. doesnt want to see occur. In addition to a growing concern over Chinese leadership in Asia, U.S. AIIB hesitation includes the growing threat of the Chinese yuan as a global currency. Since the end of World War II,
the U.S. dollar has consistently maintained its status as the worlds reserve currency. As China continues to grow economically, the yuan gains strength against the dollar, and the AIIB could continue this trend. The U.S. is apprehensive towards the AIIB because
the dollar naturally maintains value over time due to its status as the worlds reserve currency. Demand for the dollar as a reserve currency allows the U.S. to avoid depreciation in its currency.

The AIIB is a mechanism to uproot the IMF and U.S. influence

Trevor Gerszt 5.25.16 Chinas AIIB Quietly Declares war on IMF Date Accessed: 6.22.16 Writer for GoldCo Date Accessed: 6.22.16 https://goldcopreciousmetals.com/goldco-precious-metals-
blog/chinas-aiib-quietly-declares-war-imf -AR
Suppose you have a neighbor who lives across the street. His house isnt quite as big as yours and hes constantly building and adding on to it. You and he get along for the most part, but you know theres always a bit of resentment smoldering that your home is
bigger and you have more influence in the neighborhood. Now suppose one day your neighbor rolls up in a tank, and parks it in his driveway. Even though hes careful not to point the gun at your house, its hard not to see this new development as a threat. Your
neighbor insists its a flower planter. Thats how the U.S. sees Chinas new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, or AIIB. The
Chinese insist the AIIB is nothing more than a vehicle for bringing energy, transportation and
telecommunications projects to remote regions in Asiaeven though Asia already had a development bank called the Asian Development Bank (ADB). But China didnt like the ADB because
its mostly run by Japan, an ally of the U.S. in the region. China also doesnt like what it sees as the ADBs political interference in places like Azerbaijan. So next month the AIIB will officially be open for business, as the organization kicks off its
first annual meeting in Beijing. Troubled History with the IMF The AIIB is also an outgrowth of Chinas long and troubled history with the IMF. The real dustup came when China wanted its currency,
the yuan, included as one of the worlds reserve currencies. At first the IMF said no and China reacted strongly. Since conflict really isnt the IMFs thing, eventually China won out. The IMF is also a frequent critic of Chinese economic policy
and its probably frustrating to China to not be able to silence dissent on the global stage like it does at home. China Wants More Say Weary of what they saw as interference by the U.S., Japan and the IMF, the Chinese decided they would start their own
investment bank, the AIIB. Predictably the U.S. pushed back against other nations joining the AIIB, including allies like Australia, South Korea and the United Kingdomall of which was wasted effort. U.S. allies or no, those nations wanted a piece of the developing
nation pie that the AIIB represents, thus we discovered our partners economic allegiance to the U.S. was fairly flimsy. Australia, South Korea and the U.K. all applied to join the AIIB; even Canada quietly filled out an application. In truth the exodus to the AIIB was
also likely due to an undercurrent of resentment that the IMF and ADB were pushing more and more regulations and funding projects that had nothing to do with infrastructure development. Like any big institution, over the years the IMF experienced mission
creep and did in some ways become a tool of U.S. foreign policy. As good an argument as any to throw in with the Chinese The AIIB is simply the next move for China in extending its global economic power. Interestingly, the first
steps China took towards that goal involved escalating its influence over the worldwide gold market. First it dove for a chair in the newly-revamped London gold fix. At the same time it was setting up its new Shanghai Gold Exchange. This April, the Chinese began
publishing a benchmark gold price denominated in the yuan. After gaining greater influence over the price of gold, Chinas next move was to provide an alternative to the heavy-handed IMF.
Its interesting that currently China appears to be
more concerned with extending its reach among Asian nations, rather than trying to influence western nationsand its working. Russia, which has a history of conflict with China, was one of
the first nations in line for AIIB cash. You have to give the Chinese credit for being smart about playing the long game for economic influence
 Japan
Plan is unpopular with Japan
Martin 15,-. "Japan Says Won't Decide on AIIB until Corruption Addressed." Reuters UK. 2015. Web. 21 June 2016.NW
Leaders of the Group of Seven industrial nations discussed a new Chinese-led Asian investment bank at a summit on Sunday, with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe underlining the need to
address issues like corruption, his spokesman said. While 57 countries, including G7 members Britain, Germany and France, have joined the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) as
founding members, Japan and the United States have stayed out of a venture seen as a rival to the U.S.-dominated World Bank and Japan-led Asian Development Bank (ADB). Tokyo is, however,
keeping its options open. Abe's spokesman, Yasuhisa Kawamura, told reporters at the G7 summit in the Bavarian Alps that Japan would not say whether or not it would join the bank until China had
tackled concerns about human rights, debt sustainability, environmental protection and governance. "Whether the AIIB would clear those elements is quite important for us. So unless those questions (are) cleared, Japan
wouldn't position (itself on) whether to join or not," he said. "(Abe) took note of the importance of the corruptions to be addressed." Tokyo has asked the Chinese authorities to clarify those issues but Beijing has not yet straightened
them out, he said, adding that Japan would continue to talk to China about this. Kawamura said the Japanese finance minister had mentioned recently that cooperation between the ADB and the AIIB might be possible in future if Beijing tackled Tokyo's concerns.
He also said that German Chancellor Angela Merkel had said that next year, when Japan has the presidency of the G7, the issue needed to be discussed continually.
Heg DA
 UQ
UK joining the AIIB is a sign of US heg decline.
Mahbubani, 15. (Kishore Mahbubani. Kishore Mahbubani is Dean of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore and the author of The Great
Convergence: Asia, the West and the Logic of One World. Mahbubani is a member of the World Economic Forums Global Agenda Council on China. "Why Britain Joining China-Led Bank Is a
Sign of American Decline." Huffington Post. 3-16-2015 Web. Accessed: 6-21-2016. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/kishore-mahbubani/britain-china-bank-america-decline_b_6877942.html)
PN
SINGAPORE Some events are epochal. The decision by Great Britain to join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank was one such event. It may have heralded the end of the American century and the arrival of the Asian
century. A clue to the epochal significance of this event came from a senior U.S. government official interviewed by the Financial Times. His sharp words were very telling: We are wary about a trend toward constant accommodation of
China, which is not the best way to engage a rising power. No ally has been as faithful to the U.S. as the British. Only they would follow the United States into the Iraqi quagmire and that was only 12 years ago. Today, that same ally has decided that history has turned a corner. The U.S.
can no longer dominate world history. A new power has also arrived. The British, like most other middle powers, have decided to hedge their bets and work with China as well as the U.S. But this is also a
matter of survival. If London does not serve the financial and economic interests of a rising China, it could become sidelined in the 21st century. Hence, the British have no choice but to work with China. The petulant White House reaction was predictable. Sadly, it was also unwise. Any objective and
calm assessment of the Chinese decision to launch the AIIB would show that this is a bank whose time has come. The Asian Development Bank has estimated that Asia needs to spend at least $8 trillion in infrastructure investment. The American-dominated World Bank and related institutions cannot
possibly fulfill this demand. Chinas decision to use its reserves to boost Asian infrastructure investment was clearly welcomed in Asia. Given its spectacular success with developing world-class infrastructure in record time, China has a lot of expertise in this area. Asia needs this. Until the British joined
the AIIB, America had been publicly denying that it was discouraging countries from joining the new bank, even though it was well known that America was doing so. Australia and South Korea held back from joining the AIIB because of direct calls from Washington. Now that the British have joined,
there is no reason for them to hold back any longer. America should wisely accept their decision. Publicly, America said that it could not support the AIIB because it could only support an institution with high standards of governance. If America truly wants these high standards of governance, it
should welcome the British decision to join. The British can and should lobby for the position of vice president of corporate governance at AIIB. If high British standards of the rule of law and corporate governance are embedded in the AIIB, the bank could provide a role model of a new kind of
international institution. Sadly, the American-dominated World Bank cannot serve as a model for the AIIB. It is now well known that the World Bank has served as an instrument of American foreign policy. Joe Stiglitz has documented how the World Bank punished Ethiopia at the request of private
American banks, which had lost revenue on loans to Ethiopia. If the U.S. wants high standards of governance in the AIIB, it should serve as a role model and agree to relinquish control of the World Bank. It should also allow true meritocratic governance, instead of insisting that only an American can
run the World Bank. At the end of the day, this new competition between America and China to produce better multilateral institutions will be good for the world. This will be a race to the top in corporate governance,
and not a race to the bottom. It does not matter whether America wins or China wins. Either way, we will see an improvement in the standards of managing institutions of global governance. In the process, the Asian people will be better off. And the Asian century will arrive faster.

A China led AIIB will destroy US heg in Asia

Javad, 15. (Richard Javad. Richard Javad Heydarian is a lecturer in international affairs and political science at Ateneo De Manila University, and a policy advisor at the Philippine House of
Representatives. As a specialist on Asian geopolitics and economic affairs, he has written for or interviewed by Al Jazeera, Asia Times, BBC, Bloomberg, The New York Times, The Huffington
Post, The Diplomat, The National Interest, and USA TODAY, among other leading international publications. He is the author of How Capitalism Failed the Arab World: The Economic Roots and
Precarious Future of the Middle East Uprisings (Zed, London), and the forthcoming book The Philippines: The US, China, and the Struggle for Asias Pivot State. "China's Plan to Obliterate
American Supremacy." National Interest. 4-8-2015 Web. Accessed: 6-21-2016. http://nationalinterest.org/feature/chinas-plan-obliterate-american-supremacy-12577?page=show) PN
Americas strategic primacy in Asia is at stake. Chinas astute economic diplomacyaimed at challenging the Bretton Woods system (BWS) of global governanceand accelerated construction activities in the South China Sea, an artery of global trade, are
chipping away at the very foundations of the decades-long U.S.-led order in Asia. And a whole range of U.S. partners, from the Philippines to Vietnam to Japan, are anxiously watching Chinas ever-expanding shadow across the Asia-Pacific theater. On
the economic front, the United Kingdoms early-March decision to join the China-led Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) has irreversibly cracked the U.S.-led siege against the proposed financial body. The participation of the
United States closest (European) ally as a founding member of the AIIB has paved the way for long-standing European partners, from Germany to Italy to France, and leading Asia allies, particularly Australia and South Korea, to jump on the China economic bandwagon. Even Japan, which sees the AIIB
as nothing less than a direct challenge to the Asian Development Bank (ADB), is considering its options. Prior to Londons strategic mutiny, Washington delicately managed to successfully stage a collective boycott against the AIIB,
leaving the China-backed bank stacked with mostly developing countries with limited capital to spare. At some point, Chinese officials began wondering whether the AIIB would make any commercial sense at all, shifting their attention to more
financially viable options, such as the proposed Maritime Silk Road initiative. Formally, Washington has raised concerns over the AIIBs compliance with existing good governance, transparency and environmental-sustainability standards embodied by the World Bank, the ADB and the IMF. In
reality, however, the key concern is whether China will use the AIIB as a Trojan horse for its broader strategic interests in Asia, utilizing the prowess of its financial resource to buy the loyalty of its
neighbors. After all, if China was really interested in bridging the infrastructure spending gap in Asia, it could have simply increased its contribution to the (Japan-dominated) ADB. As prominent Chinese scholar Yan
Xuetong, bluntly puts it: The policy now is to allow these smaller [neighboring] countries to benefit economically from their relationships with China. For China, we need good relationships more urgently than we need economic development. We let them benefit economically, and in return we get
good political relationships. We should purchase the relationships. What we are witnessing today is President Xi Jinpings Peripheral Diplomacy initiative in action, a strategy that gained pace after the Chinese Communist Partys Foreign Affairs Leading Group meeting in late-2014, the first in eight
years. The key challenge, however, is with respect to Chinas unabated effort at consolidating its strategic depth in adjacent waters, particularly in the South China Sea, where it is clearly winning the scramble for bitterly contested islands and marine resources. American Isolation In
light of the
AIIB fiasco, which clearly marks a major symbolic victory for Chinese soft power, the United States has responded with sound and fury. Senior American officials have bluntly expressed their outrage over the UK's decision, stating how Washington is "wary about a
trend toward constant accommodation of China, which is not the best way to engage a rising power. A statement by the National Security Council expressed Washington's "concerns about whether the AIIB will meet these high standards, particularly related to governance, and environmental and
social safeguards, encouraging China to ensure the AIIB will "complement the existing architecture, and to work effectively alongside the World Bank and Asian Development Bank. With
the World Bank, IMF and ADB also expressing their support for the AIIB,
Washington has had no choice but to soften its criticism of the China-led body. Recovering from a major strategic setback, top American officials, such as Treasury Secretary Jack Lew, have stated that the United States welcome[s] China having a
significant role in the global economic and financial architecture, provided, of course, it will complement existing international financial institutions . . . and share the international communitys strong commitment to genuine multilateral decision making and ever-improving lending standards and
safeguards. Asian triumphalists, such as Kishore Mahbubani, author of The Great Convergence: Asia, the West, and the Logic of One World, have happily embraced the AIIBand Chinas rising economic profile on the global stage. For Mahbubani, this new competition between America and China
to produce better multilateral institutions will be good for the world. The former Singaporean diplomat adds, [i]t does not matter whether America wins or China wins. Either way, we will see an improvement in the standards of managing institutions of global governance. The intensifying Sino-
American rivalry ultimately means, Mahbubani argues, the Asian people will be better off. And the Asian century will arrive faster. In fairness, Chinas decision to challenge the BWS by establishing new initiatives, such as the AIIB, the New Development Bank and the New Silk Road initiative, is partly
driven by emerging powers deepening frustration with the lack of much-needed reforms in the World Bank and the IMF, largely thanks to the unwillingness of the U.S. Congress to ratify proposed reforms in 2010. With $4 trillion dollars in its coffers, Chinathe worlds biggest economy in purchasing
power parity termsis in a strong position to bridge the $8 trillion infrastructure spending deficit in Asia. Given the inherent volatilities of currency markets, China is interested in redirecting its financial reserves towards tangible, commercially viable investment opportunities. Time for a Robust
Response The problem with Mahbubanis argument, however, is that it treats Sino-American rivalry in Asia like a free-market competition between corporate giants, paving the way for global multipolarity. But what we are facing is not a microeconomic case of efficient, profit-driven firms competing
for market shares. As
China grows richer, becoming moderately prosperous, it is more concerned with prestige, influence and the pursuit of the China Dreamrecreating the Sino-centric order in Asia. Peripheral diplomacy
is primarily about challenging American primacy and deepening Chinas strategic depth in its backyard. Chinas economic charm-offensive has gone hand in hand with gobbling up contested islands and marine resources in the South China
Sea, anchored by accelerated construction activities, which dont only violate the spirit of international law, particularly the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, but also pave the way for the establishment of a Chinese Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ)or a similar form of military
domainin one of the worlds most important Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC). If the fundamental motivation for the Pivot to Asia (P2A) policy is to reassert American position as an anchor of stability and prosperity in the region, then Washington has to decisively respond to Chinas economic
and maritime blitzkrieg in Asia. Obviously, sustained economic recovery will be crucial to Americas ability to maintain a semblance of economic relevance in Asia. The successful conclusion of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) free trade agreement will have to be complemented by sustained direct
investments in and diplomatic engagement with the region. On the security front, Washington has to urgently respond to Beijings turbo-charged salami-slicing strategy in the South China Sea. American partners, particularly the Philippines and Vietnam, may have the political will to confront China,
but they the lack sufficient capability to do so. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), meanwhile, has oscillated between neutrality and centrality vis--vis the ongoing disputes, prompting veteran regional experts, such as Barry Desker, a Singaporean diplomat and the former head of
the prestigious Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), to lament The ability of external parties to shape the positions of ASEAN members on regional issues such as the competing maritime claims in the South China Sea. The ASEANs relevance is under question. Joint Patrols Yet, any
American response to Chinese maritime assertiveness should neither be unilateral, nor primarily military in nature. By utilizing its unique convening power, Washington can assemble a coalition of forces to ensure maritime stability in the South China Sea. One of the most interesting proposals on
the table is the recent suggestion by Vice Admiral Robert Thomas, commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, to establish a multilateral maritime patrol coalition to act as a peacekeeping force in the contested areas. To encourage his ASEAN partners, Thomas stated If ASEAN members were to take the
lead in organizing something along those lines, trust me, the U.S. 7th Fleet would be ready to support. Shortly after, Malaysia, the current chairman of the ASEAN, endorsed Thomas proposal. Malaysian defense minister Hishammuddin Hussein didnt hesitate to underscore the urgency of addressing
Chinas maritime assertiveness, stating: If we continue to look only at dotted lines [Chinas claim to practically the entire South China Sea] and competing claims, the future looks very bleak. There is already precedence for this in Southeast Asia. In the Strait of Malacca, Thailand, Singapore,
Indonesia and Malaysia have, since 2004, participated in joint patrols against nontraditional security threats, such as maritime piracy. The United States has also asked the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Forces to contribute to such efforts. The Japanese Defense Ministry seems to be receptive to
such a proposal, especially in light of the Abe administrations concerted effort at carving out a new security role for Japan in the region. The United States has also proposed the establishment of a South China Sea International Operations Center in Jakarta, Indonesiathe ASEANs informal leader,
which has been increasingly critical of Chinas territorial posturing. Recently, Indonesian president Jokowi Widodo once again volunteered his country as a potential mediator in the South China Sea disputes. The International Operations Center could provide critical logistical support for joint
maritime patrols by the United States and its regional allies in the Western Pacific and Indian Oceans. The exact mandate and composition of any multilateral peacekeeping force in the South China Sea will certainly inspire a contentious debate. For sure, China will exert tremendous pressure on its
regional allies, particularly Cambodia and Laos, to block any such effort. But with key ASEAN countries, such as Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam and the Philippines, consistently expressing their concerns with Chinas territorial assertiveness, there is enough reason to seriously consider such
option. In light of the ASEANs inability to even negotiate a Code of Conduct (CoC) in the South China Sea, joint patrols could serve as an important mechanism to manage the ongoing disputes. Americas political and logistical support will be crucial. Any joint patrols in the South China Sea should be
ostensibly led by Indigenous powers, but Washington could play a key role by leading from behind. Overall, it is clear that China is determined to challenge American primacy in Asia. The United States can respond by leveraging its broad network of allies in
the region, which mostly share Washingtons anxieties about Chinese territorial designs in the Western Pacificand its potentially negative ramifications for freedom of navigation in and flight over international waters.

AIIB eroding US heg

Rasmus, 14. (Jack Rasmus. Jack Rasmus is the author of the forthcoming book, Systemic Fragility in the Global Economy, by Clarity Press, 2015, and the prior books, Epic Recession: Prelude
to Global Depression, 2012, and Obamas Economy: Recovery for the Few, 2012. He has been a local union president, negotiator and representative for several American unions. "Chinas
Bank & Waning USA Hegemony." TeleSur. 10-24-2014 Web. Accessed: 6-21-2016. http://www.telesurtv.net/english/opinion/Chinas-Bank--Waning-USA-Hegemony-20150328-0013.html) PN
Two events occurred last week that mark a further phase in the waning of US global economic hegemony: China introduced its own Economic Development Bank, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB); the IMF
simultaneously announced it will decide in May to include the Chinese currency as a global reserve-trading currency alongside the dollar, pound, and euroan almost certainly done deal as well. The dual moves caught the
US off guard, especially as the USAs erstwhile main economic ally, Britain, was the first to announce it would join Chinas AIIB as a founding member. That announcement set off a quick succession of further announcements by major western economies that they too were now joining the
AIIBby Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and Switzerlandas major European capitalist economies scurried to ensure a piece of the Asian economic action and to tap Chinas huge foreign currency reserves for investment in their own economies. Singapore and Australia followed within days.
South Korea and Canada are now reconsidering joining, as are other once solid USA economic allies. The initial USA response to Britain was to accuse it of constant accommodation of China. US Treasury Secretary, Jack Lew, even made telephone calls to British finance minister, George Osborne,
requesting that he hold off after Britains initial announcement, according to reports in the international business press. That effort was apparently to no avail, however, as British politicians, including prime minister, David Cameron, facing re-election within weeks, chose to leverage the decision for
political purposes as well as economic. Reportedly the US also attempted to strong-arm Singapore into not joining, but failed there as well. The entire affair caught USA political bureaucrats by surprise. The matter of joining the AIIB was thought to have been raised in European centers at low levels,
but not at senior financial minister or ambassador levels. No decisions appeared imminent. Events in recent weeks show the Europeans successfully kept USA out of the loop concerning their real intentions, as Britain last week jumped the gun, as they say, with British government officials giving the
reason for their decision to join the AIIB as We want to be a Chinese partner of choice in international finance(read: we want a slice of the economic pie before someone else gets to eat it). The China-UK Connection In making their announcement, British officials vowed that they
want the UK to become the main destination for Chinese investments. In 2013-14, when the British and Euro economies were in particularly bad shape, major trade delegations from China repeatedly visited both Britain and Germany on numerous occasions.
Much of Britains recent tentative economic recovery the past two years has been driven by infrastructure and property deals that have been heavily financed by massive China private capital
inflows into London real estate, infrastructure projects, and south England investments. Deals to revitalize investment in Britains nuclear power sector are also being financed by China investment. Without China investments in the UK in recent years, and other capital inflows from emerging
markets, British economic recovery would have remained British stagnation at best. USA vs. China policies toward British banks offer another example of a growing divergence of interests between the USA and Britain with regard to China. USA bank regulators have been targeting and fining London
banks for their repeated scandals, money laundering, global interest rate (Libor) manipulations, and speculative excesses. London in recent years has become a veritable wild west of international banking. The US levying of fines on UK banks has been justified. But banking is one of the few industries
that keep Britain from becoming a third tier economy. British Prime Minister Cameron therefore has doneand will dowhatever it takes to protect and advance the economic interests of his so-called City of London (UK banking sector). He is even prepared to leave the European Union, if
necessary, to prevent re-regulation of the British banking sector. So it should not have been a surprise to the USA when Cameron and other conservative British politicians turned to China and quickly joined Chinas AIIB. All the signals were there already. British finance capital had already last year, in
2014, announced an agreement with China that London would become the global trading center for Chinas currency, the Yuan. And Britain has become increasingly dependent on China money capital inflows in recent years, as noted. So the recent AIIB decision is just a logical consequence of
deepening British-China economic relations that have been already underway now for some time, even though the USA didnt totally see it coming. Deepening China-Europe economic relations extend to the Eurozone and eastern Europe economies as well, not just to Britain. Trade
integration between China and Germany has been growing sharply. China is Germanys fourth largest trading partner. China has been setting up investment funds in eastern European economies from the Baltics to the Balkans; China
has an offer on the table to buy Greeces main port at Pireaus; and in recent years has been repeatedly purchasing Italian and other southern European countries sovereign bonds to help those economies weather their recent debt crisis. Origins of the AIIB The origins of the AIIB announcement trace
back at least to 2010, when the USA quietly agreed to allow China to increase its influence in the USA-dominated international economic institution, the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Since then, however, the USA has reneged on that agreement, in order to ensure that Chinas influence in the
IMF would remain minimal. So China went off last October 2014 and formed its own AIIB, in what amounts in effect to a fundamental challenge to the IMFs parallel USA-dominated institution, the World Bank. With 27 nations
having already signed on, including Britain and other Europeans, Australia, Singapore, and others, the AIIB represents a major challenge to the USA-dominated development banks, the World Bank, as well as to the Asian Development Bank (USA and
Japan dominated ADB) located in Manila, Philippines. Initially the AIIB is to be funded with $50 billion to invest in Asian infrastructure. That compares with $160 billion in the Asian Development Bank (ADB). However, the near term AIIB target is to provide $100 billion in funding. And by 2020,
potentially up to $730 billion. Thats a lot of projects and potential profits for European and British businesses. Britain and the other European economies were quick to join Chinas AIIB because it allows their own companies almost guaranteed participation in the AIIBs lending projectsthus giving
them a leg up, as they say, in their competition with USA and Japanese companies involving development and infrastructure investment projects in the EMEs. It also gives them, the British and the Europeans, the opportunity to redirect some of that investment capital to companies inside their own
economies, where their own companies get to provide semi-finished goods and services to the infrastructure projects in Asia that the AIIB will approve with its initial (and no doubt soon to expand) $50 billion fund. Indeed, Europeans have become increasingly frustrated
with USA dominated World Bank and IMF, in which the USA typically vetoes decisions of those institutions that it dislikes with as little as 20% of the voting rights in those bodies. At the same time, conservatives in the US Congress
continue to refuse to provide the USs share of the operating funds for those institutions. Chinas AIIB enters the global infrastructure investment field with a promise by China not to veto and to hold no more than 49% of
voting rights in the AIIB. It is an attractive alternative to the USAs World Bank and IMF dominated bodies. Not surprising, Europe and other major economies are therefore seriously interested in participating in the AIIB. However,
to the extent they do, it represents a waning of USA economic influence over its once, almost completely economically subservient allies. The Old Order of US Economic Hegemony The USAs dominance of the IMF and
World Bank since 1945 has provided Washington with great leverage in influencing both political events and economic directions in emerging market economies (EMEs). Often multi-billion dollar lending projects are dangled before an EME, or threatened with suspension, if the EME in question fails
to do the bidding of Washington involving a political decision Washington wants, or an investment concession Washington wants from the EME for a US bank or company. A good example of the kind of economic arm-twisting by the USA still going on today is the pressure exerted by USA
government and courts to force Argentina to agree to terms demanded by USA shadow banksters with regard to the repayment of loans; or the moves underway by USA government and banksters to drain Venezuelas currency reserves to effect a collapse of its currency, the Bolivar, to set off import
inflation to set the stage for another coup and political intervention. Those are extreme, but not untypical, examples; countless lesser forms of pressure on EMEs occur frequently by the USA through its control of decisions by the IMF and World Bank. Ukraine is another, perhaps more traditional
example, where the USA has influenced the IMF to install US citizen, shadow bankers, like private equity CEO, Natalia Jaresko, to run the Ukraines economy as finance minister as a condition for the Ukraine receiving IMF loans. But by
providing an alternative source of
infrastructure project funding, the China AIIB reduces potential USA economic and political influence over EMEs. From 1944 to 1973 the U.S. maintained more or less total economic
hegemony in the global economy. The U.S. dollar was the prime currency for trading and reserve purposes. This dominance was challenged in the post-1973 period briefly, however, as the U.S. economy experienced an economic crisis at
that time. The institutional arrangements by which the U.S. retained dominance from 1944 to 1973 were restructured and rearranged. The U.S. economy and its world dominance was restored in a new set of arrangements and relationships
with other states and economies starting in the 1980s, which is sometimes referred to as Neoliberalism. The symbol of that economic dominance, the U.S. dollar, after having seriously weakened in the 1970s was restored again to unchallenged status as the global
currency in the 1980s and after. But the restructuring of the global economy in the 1980s, led by the United States (and a junior partner the UK) has now run its course for a second time. Once the unchallenged global currency, the U.S.
dollar is once again facing challenge as the dominant global currency. US dominated global institutions like the World Bank and IMF are being challenged by alternative institutions, like the AIIB. The
focal point of that challenge, today and in the years ahead, is China. The Yuan will not overturn or replace the US dollar tomorrow, or even in the near term. The World Bank and Asian Development Bank wont be displaced by the AIIB. But in the longer term it is inevitable, should
China continue to grow at its recent rates and the USA continue to lag with its recent below historic average growth rates. Recent events surrounding the AIIB, and the IMF adding the Yuan to its currency mix, are just a subset of the broader and even more strategically significant rise of the Yuan as a
global trading and reserve currency and of alternative institutions developed that break the hegemonic control of global economic institutions by the USA. A Global Economic Grand Game? As China continues to successfully target Europe for economic integration, the USA has been clumsily
targeting Russia for European de-integration. Whats ironic is that the USA today is directing its most aggressive efforts against Russia, in an attempt to prevent Europe from deepening its economic relationships with that country and to roll back those relationships by means of economic sanctions.
Since at least 2010, Europes growing resource and trade integration with Russia since has made the USA increasingly nervous. Much of the USAs policies toward Ukraine (especially the USA initiated coup there in 2014), and subsequent efforts to get Europe to impose severe sanctions on Russia,
should be viewed in this light. The USA wants to sever the growing Europe (especially German)-Russian trade connections and, in particular, Europes recent growing dependence on Russian energy. It is at least arguable that the USA initiated and supported the coup in the Ukraine with that in mind:
i.e. to provoke a Russian military response, in order to force Europe to impose severe sanctions leading to a roll back economic relations with Russia. The USA sees its economic influence in Europe as strategic. Severing Russia economically from Europe ensures that. It would ensure Europes
continuing dependence on the USA, economically, and therefore politically and militarily. The Ukraine-Russia conflict should thus be viewed in the context of a much bigger competition between Russia and the USA over economic influence in Europe. But while the USA focuses on undermining
economic relations between Europe and Russia, China continues to slip in the back door and deepen its economic relationships with Europe. Today its the AIIB. Tomorrow the Yuan as an officially accepted trading currency. Thereafter the Yuan as the dominant trading and reserve currency, and an
even deeper European dependence on China money capital flows. China
thus represents by far a much greater challenge to US economic hegemony in Europe, and indeed globally as well. But the USA blindly
continues to engage in economic adventurism in Europe to contain a Russian threat that there that doesnt exist.

AIIB causes US heg to fail.

Clark, 15. (Gregory Clark. Gregory Clark is an economic historian at the University of California, Davis. "AIIB dissent may mark shift away from compliance with US hegemony." Global Times.
4-7-2015 Web. Accessed: 6-21-2016. http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/915638.shtml) PN
US failure to prevent much of the global financial community from joining the China-proposed Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) marks not just a setback for US efforts to dominate global financial affairs. It also provides the precedent
whereby would-be US allies can begin to dissent from US hegemonistic demands. From the beginning the rationale for Washington to oppose the Chinese move was weak. A China excluded from the G7 grouping of major
industrial powers, despite China's industrial sector far exceeding that of most G7 members, was bound to want to assert itself globally. Did Washington really think that a China, that was denied any real role in the US-dominated
World Bank, the European-dominated IMF and Japan-dominated Asian Development Bank, would want meekly to submit for ever to this global triumvirate despite having reserves of around $4 trillion and already having a superior record in providing infrastructure aid to developing
nations around the globe? It was inevitable that Beijing would want to go off and create its own alternative axis of global financial affairs. Much of the world seems to have appreciated the move. In the campaign to discredit the AIIB
proposal, Washington and some of its friends have spoken loudly about the need for good governance, for transparency and fairness in any new global financial institution. But the rival Western institutions hardly provide models in
this respect. The World Bank has often provided generous funds to weak economies with attractive resources and corrupt pro-Western governments. Then when the inevitable occurs and the funds are wasted and repayment is impossible, the IMF moves in with its demands that they impose
austerity and sell off government assets, often to Western-controlled enterprises. An AIIB which avoids this kind of legalized two-tag banditry would be welcome. True, the enthusiasm of many Western nations, led by the UK, to join the AIIB is not entirely altruistic. They would hope to qualify for the
consultancies and large capital equipment contracts that go with large infrastructure projects. They would also wish to continue to receive the Chinese money that helps sustain their weakened economies. There was also the band-wagon effect as we saw with APEC, which was originally a Japan-
Australian attempt to encourage the Asian economies to look eastward and away from China, but which has since been forced by its large membership to include China. Governments are always afraid of missing the bus when new institutions are created. Even so, the de facto admission by almost 50
nations that the existing global financial system needs to be improved is significant. So too are the political repercussions. Canberra with its lock-step pro-US foreign policies was originally expected to succumb to strong US pressure and reject any invitation to join. But with the example of the UK
before it, and under counter-pressure from many business and other groups that realize China's importance for Australia's economy, it was forced to reverse course. South Korea's willingness to run counter to US wishes was also significant. Will Japan also
eventually do the same? Currently the nationalistic, anti-China biases of the Shinzo Abe-centered leadership make it unlikely it will want to do anything that adds of China's global prestige and creates a rival to the Asian Development Bank it helped create. It is also doing all it can to lock the US into its
East Asian military strategies and is in no mood to say no to the US on any issue. Even so, some business groups have voiced concern. And some remember how in the wake of the 1997 Asian financial crisis a hegemonistic US crudely intervened to prevent Tokyo from setting up an Asian Monetary
Fund to prevent a recurrence. They ask whether Japan needs constantly to bow to US demands.

The AIIB challenges regional US heg.

Chen, 15. (Dingding Chen. Dingding Chen is an assistant professor of Government and Public Administration at the University of Macau, Non-Resident Fellow at the Global Public Policy
Institute (GPPi) Berlin, Germany. He is also the Founding Director of Intellisia Institute, a newly established independent think tank focusing on international affairs in
China. His research interests include: Chinese foreign policy, Asian security, Chinese politics, and human rights."AIIB: Not a US Loss, Not a Chinese Win." Diplomat. 3-22-2015 Web. Accessed:
6-21-2016. http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/aiib-not-a-us-loss-not-a-chinese-win/)
Needless to say, the China-led AIIB poses some challenges to U.S. influence in Asia. It is imperative for leaders from both China and the United States to avoid falling into a confrontational trap.
Healthy competition between different global financial institutions is
good for Asia and the world as a whole. To that end, analysts should stop the China vs. the U.S. hype and pay more attention to how the quality of the AIIB as an institution can be improved.

China will use the AIIB to power project over regional powers.
Heydarian, 15. (Richard Javad Heydarian. Richard Javad Heydarian is a specialist in Asian geopolitical/economic affairs and author of "How Capitalism Failed the Arab World: The Economic
Roots and Precarious Future of the Middle East Uprisings.". "China's economic hegemony inspires fears." Al Jazeera. 7-10-2015 Web. Accessed: 6-21-2016.
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2015/07/china-economic-hegemony-inspires-fears-150708145825840.html) PN
Earlier this year, China was painfully isolated during the Shangri-La Dialogue (Asia's premiere security forum), with Beijing's massive reclamation activities in the South China Sea coming under criticism from almost all quarters. The United States' newly-installed Secretary of Defense, Ashton Carter,
triumphantly declared Washington's efforts to secure freedom of navigation in international waters by challenging China's growing grip on contested features and waters in the South China Sea. But recent weeks have been good to China, allowing the Asian powerhouse to project economic
leadership across Asia and beyond. China officially launched the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), a key component of the Xi Jinping administration's plan to turn China into a pillar of the Asian order. China's National People's Congress also just
approved the New Development Bank, a key economic initiative of emerging powers of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. Blessed with up to $4 trillion in currency reserves, Beijing is expected to splurge even more funds on its ultimate pet project, the modern revival of the Silk Road under
the "One Road, One Belt" initiative, which will transform Beijing into a core element of infrastructure development and transregional connectivity across Eurasian landmass as well as the Pacific to the Mediterranean waters. All these initiatives are
part of the so-called "peripheral
diplomacy", which Xi announced in 2013 and is carefully designed to win the favour of estranged neighbours and consolidate Beijing's influence over longtime partners. But not all of China's neighbours are impressed, with the
Philippines and Japan openly expressing their continued reservations over Beijing's growing economic clout in Asia. On a practical level, the AIIB is a mechanism for China to invest its massive financial resource in more tangible assets such as infrastructure. Volatilities in global currency markets have
repeatedly threatened the value of China's multi-trillion-dollar reserves. Not all neighbouring countries were enthusiastic to sign up for China's new bank. Channelling its resources through multilateral institutions will also allow China to gain a strategic foothold in the important sectors of economies
across the region. Given Asia's estimated $8 trillion infrastructure spending gap, China's financial resources are a dire necessity to revamp the regional economic landscape. Recently, 50 countries hailing from across five continents, signed Articles of Agreement of China's new lending agency, laying
the foundations of the AIIB's governance structure and determining the individual shares, contributions, and obligations of member states. Much of the world, including the Western-dominated World Bank and Japanese-dominated Asian Development Bank, has welcomed the AIIB as a
complementary mechanism to address the $8 trillion infrastructure spending gap in Asia alone. Australia reportedly led the signing ceremony at the Beijing's Great Hall of the People, followed by forty-nine other nations. Symbolic value Having a major US ally leading the event carried a huge symbolic
value for Beijing, which skilfully managed to break the months-long Washington-led siege on the newly established lending agency. The AIIB, in an official statement, claims that its "foundation will be built on international best practices and the lessons and experiences of existing multilateral
development banks and the private sector", while Beijing has tried to appease its critics by claiming it has forsworn any veto power within the newly established lending agency. Yet, not all neighbouring countries were enthusiastic to sign up for China's new bank. The Philippines, which has been
locked in bitter territorial disputes with China, has deferred membership - along with Thailand, Malaysia, and four other prospective members - to later this year. It is carefully assessing the strategic implications of joining the AIIB. The neighbour's Finance Secretary Cesar Purisima openly admitted
how his country is still suspicious of China's intentions, stating the Southeast Asian country is "taking the time given to prudently consider its membership" in the China-led bank. Earlier, the Philippines expressed its concerns over the necessity to "make sure [the AIIB] is inclusive" and "complements
rather than competes" with existing international financial institutions such as the World Bank. The Philippines has questioned whether the new lending agency is "truly multilateral in nature", with Filipino President Beningo Aquino openly declaring his concern that "the economic help that is
supposed to be afforded [by AIIB loans] will not be subjected to vagaries of [geo]politics". There are grounds for scepticism. Corruption scandals China's past infrastructure investments in the Philippines were mired in corruption scandals. Despite suggestion for the AIIB to be based in another Asian
country, particularly in Indonesia, China pushed ahead with establishing the headquarters in Beijing. China will still be the largest contributor to the lending agency's capitalisation, enjoying a whopping 26 percent voting shares for contributing as much as 30 percent of total funds (twice higher than
the United States' shares in the World Bank). There are serious concerns that the lending agency will be mostly packed by Chinese bureaucrats and placed under the careful gaze of Beijing's leadership. Refusing to join the AIIB, the United States has raised concerns over the governance structure and
transparency of the its lending practices. Similarly, Japan, amid its ferocious territorial spats with China in the East China Sea, has also decided not to join the China-led agency altogether. Japan's Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga stated Tokyo will "watch [the AIIB] closely, including its actual
operations." To counter China's growing economic influence, Japan has pledged up to $110bn for infrastructural development across Asia. Overall, it
is clear that at least some neighbouring countries continue to view China's growing economic clout with considerable suspicions,
fearing Beijing will use its financial prowess to gain geopolitical subservience from its increasingly dependent neighbours.

AIIB is used to block the pivot to asia

University of Pennsylvania, 15. (N.a. "China's AIIB Recasts Regional Lending." Knowledge@Wharton, University of Pennsylvania. 4-16-2015 Web. Accessed: 6-22-2016.
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/chinas-aiib-recasts-regional-development-finance-and-u-s-global-influence/)
In opting to back the AIIB, Britain and other major Western nations were not joining a gold rush but were acting on the premise that the American approach was mistaken, Bottelier adds.
Europeans want to do more business with China and they do not have security concerns about China, says Allen. I think that they realized that China is not a threat to them at all, so they are better off to join. In fact, they would like to balance the Russians with the
Chinese, so they are quite willing to do this. Another of Xis aims is to undermine President Barack Obamas pivot to Asia and the push for the dozen-nation TPP, an Asia-Pacific rim trade zone that so far excludes China. Awkwardly for the
U.S., almost all of the countries participating in the TPP talks plan to join the AIIB, which is lacking the high hurdles laid out by the U.S. as a condition for joining the pan-Pacific trade bloc.
 Link
US engaging AIIB increases US Hegemony
Desai and Vreeland, 15. (Raj M. Desai and James Raymond Vreeland. Raj M. Desai&nbsp;is associate professor of&nbsp;international development at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign
Service and in the Department of Government at Georgetown University, and a&nbsp;non-resident senior fellow&nbsp;at the&nbsp;Brookings Institution.&nbsp;James Vreeland&nbsp;is
associate professor of international development at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and in the Department of Government at Georgetown University., . "How to stop worrying
and love the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank." Washington Post. 4-6-2015 Web. Accessed: 6-21-2016. https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/04/06/how-to-
stop-worrying-and-love-the-asian-infrastructure-investment-bank/) PN
China launched the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in October of 2014 and has met with nothing but opposition from the United States. Officially, the objection cited by the United States is a lack of clarity about AIIBs governance, as well as
concerns about whether the AIIB will adhere to strict environmental and labor standards in its operations. It is clear, however, that U.S. opposition also derives from fears that the AIIB spearheaded by China and part of Chinas New Silk Road strategy will
diminish U.S. leadership in the region. But if the AIIB jeopardizes U.S. leadership in Asia, it will be a result of the manner in which American authorities have responded to the organization.
Through its intransigence, the United States continues to push Asian countries including certain key allies away. By refusing to participate in this new institution, the United States gives up a vital
role in shaping the Asian regional development agenda. And by goading other bilateral and multilateral donors to resist the AIIB, the U.S. government may end up cutting American investors off
from the potential benefits of private investment in Asian infrastructure. Despite its efforts, the United States has been unable to keep its allies from joining the AIIB. Earlier this year, Saudi Arabia applied for membership. Last week, the United Kingdom
announced that it would join as a founding member a move that received a rare, public rebuke from the White House. Now a trio of European powers France, Germany and Italy have also applied for membership. Ironically, the founding of the AIIB is partly a result of the United States
unwillingness to reform the Bretton Woods institutions. Since 2010, the U.S. Senate has refused to ratify an agreement on governance reform that would have doubled resources available to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) by increasing capital contributions from emerging market countries,
which would proportionately expand their voting power on the IMF Executive Board where current quotas treat France as though it were more economically dominant than China, and Belgium more dominant than Brazil. Nevertheless, the United States has used its blocking vote at the IMF to keep
countries such as China, India and Brazil underrepresented. Late last year, IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde warned that governments would be forced to look for alternative options by which development financing could be provided. Not surprisingly, the New Development Bank the so-
called BRICS Bank was launched by Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa to fund development projects in member countries outside of the traditional multilateral channels. As we have pointed out, the BRICS bank will be managed by governments with little in common beyond their
dissatisfaction with the Bretton-Woods institutions. The AIIB is yet another creation whose aim is to challenge the hegemony of institutions dominated by the United States, Western Europe and Japan. Unlike the
BRICS Bank, whose main shareholders may face coordination problems due to the equal distribution of voting shares, the AIIB faces no such difficulty since China will provide the largest share of resources. It also, of course, has a far more focused mission than the BRICS Bank. In fact, the
developmental logic behind the AIIB is paramount. Asia faces a massive infrastructure gap. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) estimates that Asia will need $8 trillion over the next decade for energy, transportation, telecommunication and water/sanitation. Private investment in infrastructure,
according to the ADB, hovers at $13 billion a year, the majority of which is concentrated in low-risk projects. Official development assistance adds another $11 billion a year in financing. If true, this means that the shortfall exceeds $700 billion a year. The United States, as a result, places itself in
opposition to regional investments that can expand trade, support financial market development and macroeconomic stability, and improve environmental, health and social conditions. Were the current group of international financial institutions capable of plugging the gap, it is unlikely that the
AIIB would gather worldwide support. But existing institutions cannot hope to fill this hole. The ADB and the World Bank have a combined capital base of less than $400 billion, which must support a wide variety of lending programs beyond infrastructure. Moreover, there is little chance that bilateral
donors including the biggest bilateral donor, the U.S. government will increase its funding for foreign aid in the current political climate. The AIIB has an initial capital base of $50 billion, with authorized capital up to $100 billion. According to one estimate, using similar loans-to-equity ratios of
the World Bank and ADB, the AIIB could commit some $30 billion in loans devoted exclusively to infrastructure (the World Banks own infrastructure financing was $24 billion in 2014). In effect, the United States is informing fast-growing Asian nations: We are not going to increase official funding for
your important needs anytime soon; we are also going to prevent the institutions we control from increasing their funding for those needs; and lastly, we are going to admonish others from devising other ways of funding you. No wonder that Asian governments have jumped on the AIIB bandwagon.
Australia, Indonesia and South Korea were conspicuously absent from inauguration ceremonies last year when they shared U.S. concerns. But now they have all warmed to the idea of joining the AIIB (Indonesia became a founding member, while Australia and South Korea have applied for
membership). Moreover, ADB and World Bank officials have extended a cautious welcome to the new China-led bank, saying they see room for collaboration. But the clearest signal of the AIIBs appeal has come from officials in Taipei, who have announced that Taiwan, too, will join the organization
as Taipei, China. If Japan also joins as is now expected it will leave the United States isolated among major donor nations. Not
only does the United States endanger its own regional influence through its refusal to participate, it also
threatens private American investment. Unlike most types of private investment, infrastructure projects tend to have extremely high up-front costs and longer maturities. This leaves infrastructure investors much more
vulnerable to sovereign risk, regulatory instability, shifting political winds, and the threat of expropriation. For this reason, multilateral development banks play a critical role in attracting private infrastructure investment to
developing countries through additionality, that is, by contributing their own funding, bringing financing partners into specific deals (through syndications or co-financing), and by using risk guarantees and
other tools. Importantly, multilateral development banks cannot offer support to investors from non-member countries. Should the AIIB develop its own system of risk insurance and partial guarantees, they will not be available to American investors. Asia, the United States and
for that matter, the whole world would be better off if the United States were to participate in the AIIB. What better way to encourage the Chinese to implement a transparent regime that
adopts global best practices in financing infrastructure than to be a voting member? If anything, Chinas move towards multilateralism should be welcomed. Rather than rebuke others for joining, the U.S. should
consider doing the same.

Joining the AIIB gives the US an opportunity to shape regional politics

Moore, 15. (Greg Moore. Greg Moore is an Associate Professor of International Relations at the School of Public Affairs at Zhejiang University (Hangzhou, China), and a member of the
National Committee on US-China Relations. "No Escape: America Should Join China's New Bank." National Interest. 3-31-2015 Web. Accessed: 6-21-2016.
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/no-escape-america-should-join-chinas-new-bank-12508?page=show)
Chinas Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) got several major boosts this past week, when the UK, Germany, France, Italy, Turkey and South Korea all announced plans to join, in addition to India and others already on board.
This wave of U.S. allies flocking to join the China-led financial institution demonstrates the limits of Washingtons influence over its allies, at least in financial matters, for U.S. diplomats have been working overtime in recent months to discourage its allies from joining the AIIB. The United
States concerns about the new bank are legitimate. This is not just a U.S. power play to keep Chinas influence down. U.S. Treasury Secretary Jack Lew and others have warned that at present the bank appears to be well below
international standards in governance, transparency, environmental/labor safeguards and other global lending norms. Chinese state-run corporations and institutions have not scored high historically on issues of transparency, insulation from partisan Chinese governmental political machinations or
adherence to objective rules-based governance, among other things, and so concerns about the potential for problems regarding the AIIB are not unfounded. However, the
question raised here is whether or not the United States extant strategy of trying to
isolate the new institution is really the best strategy for addressing these concerns. My conclusion is that it is clear (especially now) that it is not, and the United States should simply sign on to the AIIB prior to the March 31
deadline for founding members for the following reasons. First and foremost, doing so would allow it to work with its allies and other like-minded partners to help shape the new institution and hold the banks
leadership accountable to global standards. Second, the Wall Street Journal reported that China has relinquished its veto at the AIIB as a condition to the accession of a number of Western European partners, and this should allay some concerns the United States has had that
Beijing would be able to use the bank to forward its (sometimes alternative) political agenda via AIIB lending, for example. Relinquishing the veto is a major concession, and appears to be a sign of Beijings willingness to be accountable to the international community to some degree. Third, the United
States has argued for some time that it desires to see China become a responsible stakeholder in the international system. This is a reasonable and rational request, and one that the Chinese themselves have found agreeable and have generally embraced (perhaps its maritime policies and things
like its support for the Pyongyang regime following the sinking of South Koreas Cheonan aside). Chinas establishment of the AIIB could be a significant way for China to demonstrate it is indeed serious about becoming a responsible stakeholder, for surely there is a need for more loans in the region
of the sort the bank could conceivably offer. Fourth, it is clear the U.S. policy of attempting to isolate the Chinese in their establishment of the bank, and to encourage U.S. allies not to join, has failed, and it appears certain that the
bank will move forward with or without
the United States blessing. The United States must now move on, in search of a what next strategy. Joining the bank is the most reasonable choice at this point, particularly since the United
States could have significant help from its allies in working inside the new bank to make sure it maintains high standards. Fifth, and related, now that the bank appears poised to move forward with a
successful launch, the United States would truly look like a stick in the mud by staying out, and doing so might cost the United States more in damaged relations with Beijing in the long run than whatever the United States
might hope to gain (if anything at this point) by staying out. Last, by joining the AIIB as a founding member, the United States could reserve the right to withdraw from membership in protest down the road if U.S. (and general
Western) concerns are not adequately addressed. The United States would have greater leverage in this sense by being in the bank than by remaining outside it. American policy makers should have more confidence in their liberal policy proclivities
than their current policy demonstrates. The rest of the world knows that global standards for such institutions are everyones best practices currently, and these standards reflect cherished liberal (and humanitarian) values. If China chooses to flout these values and practices, and instead chooses to
use the AIIB for partisan political gain, it will be painfully obvious to everyone, and the other members would likely criticize Beijing for this. Given its level of interdependence with the rest of the world, China is highly accountable and vulnerable to international pressure if it misbehaves. Let us give
China the benefit of the doubt for now, and lets allow them the chance to prove they are responsible stakeholders (or not). As Daniel Drezner, Jack Lew himself and others have pointed out, the United States should have supported reforms of the Bretton Woods institutions earlier. If it had, perhaps
there would have been no market for the AIIB, or at least less support for its establishment. As things currently stand, however, a continued U.S. policy of trying to isolate Beijing over the AIIB only serves to isolate Washington, and does less to address Washingtons legitimate concerns about the bank
than becoming a member likely would.

Failure to support international institutions is undermining US relevance.

Liqun et. al., 15. (Uzan, Marc, Christine Lagarde, Thomas Jordan, and Jin Liqun. Jin Liqun, Secretary General, International Interim Secretariat for Establishing the Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank"China as a Shaper of the New Bretton Woods System." Bretton Woods: The next 70 Years. 2015. 203. Web. http://eml.berkeley.edu/~eichengr/Bretton-Woods-next-70.pdf)
PN
The current financial and debt crisis has heightened the urgency of the reform of the existing world economic order. While the financial crisis has a lot to do with the domestic macroeconomic mismanagement of the countries in distress, few people would question the rationale for making a change
to the international monetary system, the evolvement of which over the past seventy years has not yet arrived at its desired destination. So
far as the Bretton Woods institutions performance is concerned, there is much room for
improvement. And in the run up to the next global financial or debt crisis, the Bretton Woods institutions should be able to respond most decisively and effectively, or had better nip it in the bud. The resolution on the reform of shareholder structure and
quota increases made in 2010 is still waiting for the nod of the US Congress for implementation. This is very unfortunate, particularly at a time when the financial capacity of IMF is so crucial to the
global financial and economic stability. The US risks forfeiting its international relevance while stuck in its domestic political quagmire. Even purely from the perspective of the US, this should be done without further delay.
Multilateralism is what the major economy proposed during the Bretton Woods conference; and this has served every member well over the last seven decades, for all the troubles experienced. The multilateral feature of the Bretton Woods institutions is well worth the effort to pursue by all,
particularly the major economies.
 Impact
The drive for US hegemony makes war against Russia and China inevitable that goes nuclear
Roberts 5-26 Paul Craig Roberts has had careers in scholarship and academia, journalism, public service, and business. He is chairman of The Institute for Political Economy.
Dr. Roberts has held academic appointments at Virginia Tech, Tulane University, University of New Mexico, Stanford University where he was Senior Research Fellow in the
Hoover Institution, George Mason University where he had a joint appointment as professor of economics and professor of business administration, and Georgetown
University where he held the William E. Simon Chair in Political Economy in the Center for Strategic and International Studies. (Paul Craig, US hegemonic drive makes war with
Russia/China inevitable PressTV, http://jhaines6.wordpress.com/2014/05/27/presstv-us-hegemonic-drive-makes-war-with-russiachina-inevitable-by-paul-craig-roberts/#)

Memorial Day is when we commemorate our war dead. Like the Fourth of July, Memorial Day is being turned into a celebration of war. Those who lose family members and dear friends to war dont want the deaths to have been in vain. Consequently, wars
become glorious deeds performed by noble soldiers fighting for truth, justice, and the American way. Patriotic speeches tell us how much we owe to those who gave their lives so that America could remain free. The speeches are well-intentioned, but the
speeches create a false reality that supports ever more wars. None of Americas wars had anything to do with keeping America free. To the contrary, the wars swept away our civil liberties, making us unfree. President Lincoln issued an executive order for the
arrest and imprisonment of northern newspaper reporters and editors. He shut down 300 northern newspapers and held 14,000 political prisoners. Lincoln arrested war critic US Representative Clement Vallandigham from Ohio and exiled him to the Confederacy.
President Woodrow Wilson used WWI to suppress free speech, and President Franklin D. Roosevelt used WWII to intern 120,000 US citizens of Japanese descent on the grounds that race made them suspect. Professor Samuel Walker concluded that President
George W. Bush used the war on terror for an across the board assault on US civil liberty, making the Bush regime the greatest danger American liberty has ever faced. Lincoln forever destroyed states rights, but the suspension of habeas corpus and free speech
that went hand in hand with Americas three largest wars was lifted at wars end. However, President George W. Bushs repeal of the Constitution has been expanded by President Obama and codified by Congress and executive orders into law. Far from
defending our liberties, our soldiers who died in the war on terror died so that the president can indefinitely detain US citizens without due process of law and murder US citizens on suspicion alone without any accountability to law or the Constitution. The
conclusion is unavoidable that Americas wars have not protected our liberty but, instead, destroyed liberty. As Alexander Solzhenitsyn said, A state of war only serves as an excuse for domestic tyranny. Southern secession did pose a threat to Washingtons
empire, but not to the American people. Neither the Germans of WWI vintage nor the Germans and Japanese of WWII vintage posed any threat to the US. As historians have made completely clear, Germany did not start WWI and did not go to war for the
purpose of territorial expansion. Japans ambitions were in Asia. Hitler did not want war with England and France. Hitlers territorial ambitions were mainly to restore German provinces stripped from Germany as WWI booty in violation of President Wilsons
guarantees. Any other German ambitions were to the East. Neither country had any plans to invade the US. Japan attacked the US fleet at Pearl Harbor hoping to remove an obstacle to its activities in Asia, not as a precursor to an invasion of America. Certainly the
countries ravaged by Bush and Obama in the 21st centuryIraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Somalia, Syria, Pakistan, and Yemen posed no military threat to the US. Indeed, these were wars used by a tyrannical executive branch to establish the basis of the Stasi State that
now exists in the US. The truth is hard to bear, but the facts are clear. Americas wars have been fought in order to advance Washingtons power, the profits of bankers and armaments industries, and the fortunes of US companies. Marine General Smedley Butler
said, I served in all commissioned ranks from a second Lieutenant to a Major General. And during that time, I spent most of my time being a high-class muscle man for Big Business, for Wall Street, and for the bankers. In short, I was a racketeer for capitalism. It
is more or less impossible to commemorate the war dead without glorifying them, and it is impossible to glorify them without glorifying their wars. For the entirety of the 21st century the US has been at war, not war against massed armies or threats to American
freedom, but wars against civilians, against women, children, and village elders, and wars against our own liberty. Elites with a vested interest in these wars tell us that the wars will have to go on for another 20 to 30 years before we defeat the terrorist threat.
This, of course, is nonsense. There was no terrorist threat until Washington began trying to create terrorists by military attacks, justified by lies, on Muslim populations. Washington succeeded with its war lies to the point that Washingtons audacity and hubris
have outgrown Washingtons judgment. By overthrowing the democratically elected government in Ukraine, Washington has brought the United States into confrontation with Russia. This is a confrontation
that could end badly, perhaps for Washington and perhaps for the entire world. If Gaddafi and Assad would not roll over for Washington, why does Washington think Russia will? The Bush and Obama regimes have destroyed
Americas reputation with their incessant lies and violence against other peoples. The world sees Washington as the prime threat. Worldwide polls consistently show that people around the world regard the US
and Israel as posing the greatest threat to peace. (see here and here) The countries that Washingtons propaganda declares to be rogue states and the axis of evil, such as Iran and North Korea, are far down the list when the peoples in the
world are consulted. It could not be more clear that the world does not believe Washingtons self-serving propaganda. The world sees the US and Israel as the rogue elements. The US and Israel are the only two in the world that are in the grip of ideologies. The
US is in the grip of the Neoconservative ideology which has declared the US to be the exceptional, indispensable country chosen by history to exercise hegemony over all others. This ideology is buttressed by the Brzezinski and Wolfowitz doctrines that are the
basis of US foreign policy. The Israeli government is in the grip of the Zionist ideology that declares a greater Israel from the Nile to the Euphrates. Many Israelis themselves do not accept this ideology, but it is the ideology of the settlers and those who control
the Israeli government. Ideologies are important causes of war. Just as the Hitlerian ideology of German superiority is mirrored in the Neoconservative ideology of US superiority, the Communist ideology that the working class is superior to the capitalist class is
mirrored in the Zionist ideology that Israelis are superior to Palestinians. Zionists have never heard of squatters rights and claim that recent Jewish immigrants into Palestine invaders really have the right to land occupied by others for millennia.
Washingtons and Israels doctrines of superiority over others do not sit very well with the others. When Obama declared in a speech that Americans are the exceptional people, Russias President Putin responded, God created
us all equal. To the detriment of its population, the Israeli government has made endless enemies. Israel has effectively isolated itself in the world. Israels continued existence depends entirely on the willingness and
ability of Washington to protect Israel. This means that Israels power is derivative of Washingtons power. Washingtons power is a different story. As the only economy standing after WWII, the US dollar became the world
money. This role for the dollar has given Washington financial hegemony over the world, the main source of Washingtons power. As other countries rise, Washingtons hegemony is imperiled. To prevent other countries from rising,
Washington invokes the Brzezinski and Wolfowitz doctrines. To be brief, the Brzezinski doctrine says that in order to remain the only superpower, Washington must control the Eurasian land mass. Brzezinski is willing for this to occur peacefully
by suborning the Russian government into Washingtons empire. A loosely confederated Russia . . . a decentralized Russia would be less susceptible to imperial mobilization. In other words, break up Russia into associations of semi-autonomous states whose
politicians can be suborned by Washingtons money. Brzezinski propounded a geo-strategy for Eurasia. In
Brzezinskis strategy, China and a confederated Russia are part of a transcontinental security framework,
managed by Washington in order to perpetuate the role of the US as the worlds only superpower. I once asked my colleague, Brzezinski, that if everyone was allied with us, who were we organized against? My question
surprised him, because I think that Brzezinski remains caught up in Cold War strategy even after the demise of the Soviet Union. In Cold War thinking it was important to have the upper hand or else be at risk of being eliminated as a player. The importance of
prevailing became all consuming, and this consuming drive survived the Soviet collapse. Prevailing over others is the only foreign policy that Washington knows. The mindset that America must prevail set the stage for the Neoconservatives and
their 21st century wars, which, with Washingtons overthrow of the democratically elected government of Ukraine, has resulted in a crisis that has brought Washington into direct conflict with Russia. I know the strategic institutes that serve
Washington. I was the occupant of the William E.Simon Chair in Political Economy, Center for Strategic and International Studies, for a dozen years. The idea is prevalent that Washington must prevail over Russia in Ukraine or Washington will lose prestige and its
superpower status. The idea of prevailing always leads to war once one power thinks it has prevailed. The path to war is reinforced by the Wolfowitz Doctrine. Paul Wolfowitz, the neoconservative intellectual who formulated US
military and foreign policy doctrine, wrote among many similar passages: Our first objective is to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival, either on the territory of the former Soviet Union or elsewhere [China] that poses
a threat on the order of that posed formerly by the Soviet Union. This is a dominant consideration underlying the new regional defense strategy and requires that we endeavor to prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would,
under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power. In the Wolfowitz Doctrine, any other strong country is defined as a threat and a power hostile to the US regardless of how willing that country
is to get along with the US for mutual benefit. The difference between Brzezinski and the Neoconservatives is that Brzezinski wants to suborn Russia and China by including them in the empire as important elements whose voices would be heard,
If only for diplomatic reasons, whereas the Neoconservatives are prepared to rely on military force combined with internal subversion orchestrated with US financed NGOs and even terrorist organizations. Neither the US nor Israel is embarrassed
by their worldwide reputations as posing the greatest threat. In fact, both are proud to be recognized as the greatest threats. The foreign policy of both is devoid of any diplomacy. US and Israeli foreign policy rests on violence alone.
Washington tells countries to do as Washington says or be bombed into the stone age. Israel declares all Palestinians, even women and children, to be terrorists, and proceeds to shoot them down in the streets, claiming that
Israel is merely protecting itself against terrorists. Israel, which does not recognize the existence of Palestine as a country, covers up its crimes with the claim that Palestinians do not accept the existence of Israel. We dont need no stinking diplomacy. We got
power. This is the attitude that guarantees war, and that is where the US is taking the world. The prime minister of Britain, the chancellor of Germany, and the president of France are Washingtons enablers. They provide the cover for
Washington. Instead of war crimes, Washington has coalitions of the willing and military invasions that bring democracy and womens rights to non-compliant countries. China gets much the same
treatment. A country with four times the US population but a smaller prison population, China is constantly criticized by Washington as an authoritarian state. China is accused of human rights abuses while US police brutalize the US
population. The problem for humanity is that Russia and China are not Libya and Iraq. These two countries possess strategic nuclear weapons. Their land mass greatly exceeds that of the US. The US, which was unable to
successfully occupy Baghdad or Afghanistan, has no prospect of prevailing against Russia and China in conventional warfare. Washington will push the nuclear button. What else can we expect from a
government devoid of morality? The world has never experienced rogue elements comparable to Washington and Israel. Both governments are prepared to murder anyone and everyone. Look at the crisis that Washington has created in
Ukraine and the dangers thereof. On May 23, 2014, Russias President Putin spoke to the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, a three-day gathering of delegations from 62 countries and CEOs from 146 of the largest Western corporations. Putin did not
speak of the billions of dollars in trade deals that were being formalized. Instead Putin
spoke of the crisis that Washington had brought to Russia, and he criticized Europe for being Washingtons vassals for supporting
Washingtons propaganda against Russia and Washingtons interference in vital Russian interests. Putin was diplomatic in his language, but the
message that powerful economic interests from the US and Europe received is that it will lead to
trouble if Washington and European governments continue to ignore Russias concerns and continue to act as if they can interfere in Russias vital interests as if Russia did not exist. The heads of these large
corporations will carry this message back to Washington and European capitals. Putin made it clear that the lack of dialogue with Russia could lead to the West making the mistake of putting Ukraine in NATO and establishing missile bases on Russias border with
Ukraine. Putin has learned that Russia cannot rely on good will from the West, and Putin made it clear, short of issuing a threat, that Western military bases in Ukraine are unacceptable. Washington will continue to ignore Russia. However, European capitals will
have to decide whether Washington is pushing them into conflict with Russia that is against European interests. Thus, Putin is testing European politicians to determine if there is sufficient intelligence and independence in Europe for a rapprochement. If
Washington in its overbearing arrogance and hubris forces Putin to write off the West, the Russian/Chinese strategic alliance, which is forming to counteract Washingtons hostile policy of surrounding both countries with military bases, will harden into
preparation for the inevitable war. The survivors, if any, can thank the Neoconservatives, the Wolfowitz doctrine, and the Brzezinski strategy for the destruction of life on earth. The American public contains a large number of misinformed people who think they
know everything. These people have been programmed by US and Israeli propaganda. They are led to believe that Islam, a religion, is a militarist doctrine that calls for the overthrow of Western civilization, as if anything remains of Western civilization. Many
believe this propaganda. The US has departed Iraq, but the carnage today is as high as or higher than during the US invasion and occupation. The daily death tolls from the conflict are extraordinary. The West has overthrown itself. In the US the Constitution has
been murdered by the Bush and Obama regimes. Nothing remains. As the US is the Constitution, what was once the United States no longer exists. A different entity has taken its place. Europe died with the European Union, which requires the termination of
sovereignty of all member countries. A few unaccountable bureaucrats in Brussels have become superior to the wills of the French, German, British, Italian, Dutch, Spanish, Greek, and Portuguese peoples. Western civilization is a skeleton. It still stands, barely, but
there is no life in it. The blood of liberty has departed. Western peoples look at their governments and see nothing but enemies. Why else has Washington militarized local police forces, equipping them as if they were occupying armies? Why else has Homeland
Security, the Department of Agriculture, and even the Postal Service and Social Security Administration ordered billions of rounds of ammunition and even submachine guns? What is this taxpayer-paid-for arsenal for if not to suppress US citizens? As the
prominent trends forecaster Gerald Celente spells out in the current Trends Journal, uprisings span four corners of the globe. Throughout Europe angry, desperate and outraged peoples march against EU financial policies that are driving the peoples into the
ground. Despite all of Washingtons efforts with its well funded fifth columns known as NGOs to destabilize Russia and China, both the Russian and Chinese governments have far more support from their people than do the US and Europe. In the 20th century
Russia and China learned what tyranny is, and they have rejected it. In the US tyranny has entered under the guise of the war on terror, a hoax used to scare the sheeple into abandoning their civil liberties, thus freeing Washington from accountability to law and
permitting Washington to erect a militarist police state. Ever since WWII, Washington has used its financial hegemony and the Soviet threat, now converted into the Russian threat, to absorb Europe into Washingtons empire. Putin is hoping that the interests
of European countries will prevail over subservience to Washington. This is Putins current bet. This is the reason Putin remains unprovoked by Washingtons provocations in Ukraine. If Europe fails Russia, Putin and China will prepare for the war
that Washingtons drive for hegemony makes inevitable.
 Containment Good
Containing China is in the USs interest.
Tiezzi, 15. (Shannon Tiezzi. Her main focus is on China, and she writes on Chinas foreign relations, domestic politics, and economy. Shannon previously served as a research associate at the
U.S.-China Policy Foundation, where she hosted the weekly television show China Forum. She received her A.M. from Harvard University and her B.A. from The College of William and Mary.
Shannon has also studied at Tsinghua University in Beijing. "Yes, the US Does Want to Contain China (Sort Of)." Diplomat. 8-8-2015 Web. Accessed: 6-21-2016.
http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/yes-the-us-does-want-to-contain-china-sort-of/)
Yesterday I had the pleasure of speaking at a panel discussing tensions in the South China Sea, hosted by the Project for the Study of the 21st Century. At the very end of the event, one audience member raised a question that is central to the U.S.-China relationship today: China believes the U.S. is
seeking to contain its rise. Is Beijing right? To listen to U.S. policymakers, the answer is unequivocally no. On his first visit to China, in November 2009, Obama explicitly addressed the issue: [W]e do not seek to contain Chinas rise. On the contrary, we welcome China as a strong and prosperous and
successful member of the community of nations. The rhetoric has been consistent throughout Obamas administration. In July 2014, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry reassured his Chinese hosts that the U.S. is not, as we have said many times, in a rivalry competition with China in terms of trying
to contain it or otherwise. In November 2014, during Obamas second visit to China, he sought to debunk the notion that our pivot to Asia is about containing China. On one level, this is absolutely true. But at the same time, its false. It all depends on how we define the term containment and
what that actually implies about the United States goals vis--vis China. Let me explain. First, the word containment is problematic. It specifically refers to a previous U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union, which involved using military, political, and economic policies to halt Soviet expansion and
influence. To this end, as critics have rightly pointed out, its ridiculous to charge the U.S. with adopting a containment policy toward China when the U.S.-China relationship today is in no way comparable to the morbid state of U.S.-USSR ties during the Cold War. Washington and Beijing have scores
of annual high-level bilateral and multilateral dialogues and do nearly $600 billion in bilateral trade each year (by comparison, U.S.-USSR trade totaled only $24 billion for the entire period from 1985-1992). Containment as its classically envisioned is not what
were seeing today. However, the sentiment behind the containment policy of the Cold War is at play in todays U.S.-China relationship. A 1950 National Security Council memo to then-U.S. President Harry Truman laid out
the framework of the U.S. response to the Soviet Union. The end goal: achieving the process of Soviet accommodation to the new political, psychological, and economic conditions in the world with those new conditions of 1950 being the post-war international order that serves as todays
status quo. In this sense, the U.S. goal toward China seeking to shape its growth so that Beijing will be a responsible stakeholder in the U.S.-led world order is the same goal Washington had for its relationship with Moscow. So the word containment is not quite right. Saying the
U.S.
wants to check or (to use an even more anodyne word) channel Chinas rise might be a more accurate phrasing. In other words, the U.S. does not want to prevent China from growing powerful, per se, but does want to prevent the
use of that power in ways unacceptable to the United States. This is what Obama meant when he said in January 2011, [W]e welcome Chinas rise. We just want to make sure that that rise occurs in a way that reinforces international norms and international
rules, and enhances security and peace, as opposed to it being a source of conflict either in the region or around the world. This contradiction between containment and checking is summarized by Joseph Bosco in a June piece for The Diplomat: American policy from Richard Nixons opening
to the present has been designed to help China shake off historic shackles, lift its people out of poverty, and bring it into what Richard Nixon called the family of nations. The policy succeeded beyond Nixons dreams, but Xi Jinpings China Dream has become a potential nightmare for the West. This
hits the salient points. The U.S. does have a real and demonstrated interest in seeing China both stable and prosperous; at the same time, Washington is increasingly wary of how China seeks to use
the strength that comes with its prosperity. On the one hand, the United States does not want to contain China (in the Cold War sense); on the other hand, no U.S. policymaker is eager to see the China dream as envisioned by Xi Jinping
become a reality. As Ashely Tellis and Robert Blackwill put it in their recent assessment of U.S.-China relations, Because of profound differences in history, ideology, strategic culture, and domestic politics, the United States and China have diametrically
opposed and mutually incompatible perceptions regarding the future balance of power in Asia. And given those diametrically opposed views on a future Asian order, its ludicrous to suggest that the United States
has no interest in checking Chinas ambitions. That, essentially, is what Chinese policymakers mean when they complain that the U.S. rebalance to Asia is meant to contain China. And in that sense, theyre absolutely right. China envisions a new security
order for the Asia-Pacific, one where Asian countries completely abandon the old order (predicated on the U.S. alliance system). Chinas Belt and Road project seeks to reshape Asia (and even Europe) economically, making China the center of the
regions financial and trade initiatives. And ideologically, China opposes U.S. interpretations of a number of existing global standards and rules, from the legality of military surveillance within another states exclusive economic zone to the way
the Internet is conceived of and governed. In each of these cases, its in the U.S. interest to block, check, or redirect these ambitions leaving China howling, not unjustifiably, that its being contained. As my outline of the two
sides differing visions above demonstrates, China is also guilty of using misleading diplospeak. Chinas repeated claim that it has no intention to shut the U.S. out of Asia (most recently reiterated by Foreign Minister Wang Yi on August 5) is also both true and disingenuous. China does not benefit
from an Asia where the U.S. is entirely absent, economically or even militarily (U.S. forces play a useful role, for example, in keeping North Korea from making a dangerous mistake). But Beijing does want to diminish the U.S. role in Asia, making China at least an accepted equal in setting the agenda
for the region. That is what China truly means when it talks of mutual respect and having the U.S. accept its core interests a new model of relationship whereby the United States accepts parity with China, which by necessity would entail reduced influence for Washington in Asia. These
contradictions are getting worse, not better, as time progresses and the chances of China turning its dream into reality rise. Part of the problem is that both sides continue to hide the true issues at stake with comforting slogans the U.S. doesnt want to contain China; China doesnt want to kick the
U.S. out of Asia. Technically true on both counts but deliberately misleading and thus a major source of distrust on both sides. At this point, the rhetoric is largely meaningless just diplomatic white noise and both sides should think about abandoning it in favor of more realistic frame for their
relationship.

We should move past our history of engagement and towards containment

Mann, 15. (James Mann. James Mann is a fellow at the Johns Hopkins School of International Studies and the author of three books about America and China, including About Face: A
History of Americas Curious Relationship With China., . "Americas painfully outdated approach to China." Washington Post. 9-17-2015 Web. Accessed: 6-22-2016.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/changing-the-rules-of-engagement/2015/09/17/d96c955a-5bd2-11e5-b38e-06883aacba64_story.html)
This summer, President Obama offered a pithy description of the way that inertia sometimes prevents the United States from discarding old ideas that no longer fit current circumstances. Sometimes we allow ourselves to be trapped by a certain way of doing things, he said. We dont have to be
imprisoned by the past. When something isnt working, we can and will change. The president was talking about Cuba. But he should also apply these words with equal force to U.S. policy toward China. As Washington prepares for a visit from Chinese President Xi Jinping next week,
American thinking about China seems stuck on concepts developed in the 1970s, 80s and 90s. Since that time, however, China has evolved in ways that few, if any, in Washington saw coming. It has become more
assertive overseas, more repressive at home and more mercantilist in its trade practices than was anticipated two decades ago. Back then, American leaders regularly predicted that trade and prosperity would produce a more open China, one that would ease into the
existing international system created under U.S. leadership. Yet even as China moves in new directions, we use the mindset of the past when we talk about it. We continue to draw on ideas dating to Richard Nixons opening even though it seems likely that Nixon himself, were he alive today, would
take a much tougher stance toward China than he did in 1972. Several
intellectual traps stand in the way of developing new approaches. The first is the notion of engagement. This concept dates to the period after the 1989
Tiananmen Square massacre, when President George H.W. Bush resisted proposals to cut off all contact with Chinese leaders. Instead, he laid
down a policy of engagement meaning that his administration would meet with Chinese leaders in hopes of changing them.
President Bill Clinton perpetuated the use of engagement, and it has become a catchphrase for conciliatory, non-punitive approaches to our differences. But it was never really clear what
engagement sought, other than meetings and talk. And now, a quarter century after Tiananmen, when no one suggests cutting off contact, engagement has lost whatever slight meaning it once held. Likewise,
those who resist any policy change frequently argue that, beginning with Nixon, eight presidents in a row have come around to roughly the same China policies and that therefore these policies should not be altered. This idea also has a history. Since the Nixon era, several presidents most
notably Ronald Reagan and Clinton have campaigned promising to change U.S. policy toward China, only to do an about-face in office. Yet the history isnt so simple. Obama, for example, actually did a reverse about-face: He set out to avoid conflict, then toughened his approach after his first year
in office. More fundamentally, as Obamas words on Cuba recognize, what a series of predecessors have done does not answer what the United States should do when circumstances change. Nixon himself inherited a China policy carried out by his four immediate predecessors, but rightly reversed
the policy. Then there are the recurrent calls for a G-2. It is sometimes proposed that China and the United States should reach a broad strategic accommodation allowing them, together, to guide
the affairs of the world. This idea gained strength during the financial crisis, when China appeared to be the economically strongest partner for the United States. More recently, Xis repeated proposal for a new type of major-power relationship seems a variant of the old calls for a
Group of 2. But such formulations overlook larger realities. They implicitly downgrade the interests of U.S. allies and friends (Japan, India, South Korea and the European Union, for starters) who would naturally feel threatened
by the notion of the United States and China teaming up without them. They also ignore fundamental differences in values and political systems. Do advocates expect the United States to stay silent on issues such as Chinas severe repression of dissent? The
underlying reality is that the congruence of strategic interests that held the United States and China together in the late Cold War no longer exists. And the desire of the U.S. business community for trade and investment in China,
which drove U.S. policy in the 1990s, has also been transformed: These days, U.S. businesses tend to come to the White House not to get help in expanding trade but looking for a tougher line on issues such as intellectual property and cybertheft. In this climate, efforts to perpetuate the old U.S.-
China relationship seem increasingly out of touch. The truth is, the United States China policy is already changing at the working levels of government and at the grass-roots level, but our overriding ideas about this relationship have not kept pace. Over
the next few years, a new
U.S. policy toward China is sure to emerge, but it may do so gradually, from the bottom up. As it does, some simple concepts could be brought back into play. One is the idea that China should
be treated by the same rules as other countries. Another is the notion of reciprocity: When China penalizes U.S. businesses or media, the United States should respond with similar limits on
Chinese entities. We should develop a more businesslike approach, forsaking the dream that some personalized diplomacy or dramatic communiqu can bring back the special relationship of
the past. The United States and China are in a new era. Its time to develop policies and ideas that dont try fruitlessly to replicate the past.

American containment is central to maintaining American primacy and freedom in the region
Browne, 15. (Andrew Browne. "Can China Be Contained?." WSJ. 6-12-2015 Web. Accessed: 6-22-2016. http://www.wsj.com/articles/can-china-be-contained-1434118534)
The mood shift in Washington may end up being every bit as consequential as the one that came over the U.S. immediately
after World War II, when it dawned on America that the Soviet Union wasnt going to continue to be an ally. That is when the legendary U.S.
diplomat and policy thinker George F. Kennan formulated his plan for containment. In a 1947 article in Foreign Affairs, he wrote that the U.S. has it in its power to increase enormously the strains under which
Soviet policy must operate, to force upon the Kremlin a far greater degree of moderation and circumspection than it has had to observe in recent years, and in this way to promote tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in either the breakup or the gradual mellowing of
Soviet power. Kennans strategyto bleed the Soviet Union through nonprovocative resistanceoffered comfort to Europeans who feared that they faced a stark choice between war and capitulation. A similar anxiety about Chinas actions and intentions has
now taken hold among many Asians. U.S. friends and allies in the region are flocking to Americas side to seek protection as Mr. Xis China builds up its navy, pushes its fleets farther into the blue ocean and
presses its territorial claims. In what is just the latest assertive move to alarm the region, China is now dredging tiny coral reefs in the South China Sea to create runways, apparently for military jets. The U.S. is resisting. President Obamas signature pivot to
Asiadesigned both to calm anxious U.S. friends and to recognize the regions vast strategic importance in the 21st centuryis bringing advanced American combat ships to Singapore, Marines to Australia and military advisers to the Philippines.
Japan, Americas key ally in Asia, is rearming and has adjusted its pacifist postwar constitution to allow its forces to play a wider role in the region. The purpose of much of this activity is to preserve the independence of smaller Asian nations who fear they might otherwise have no choice but
to fall into Chinas orbit and yield to its territorial ambitionsin other words, to capitulate. For its part, China is utterly convinced that the U.S. is pursuing a policy of containment. Kevin Rudd, the former Australian prime minister (and himself a China
expert), summarized Beijings perception of U.S. goals in five bullet points in a recent Harvard study: to isolate China, contain it, diminish it, internally divide it and sabotage its political leadership. To be sure, the new tension in U.S.-China relations is not anything like the Cold War stare-down that
preoccupied Europe for decades, when NATO and Warsaw Pact tanks faced each other across lines that neither side dared to cross. But in one important respect, history
is repeating itself: Both China and the U.S. have started to view each other not
as partners, competitors or rivals but as adversaries. Chinas missile and naval buildup, as well as its development of new cyber- and space-warfare capabilities, are aimed squarely at deterring the U.S. military from intervening
in any conflict in Asia. Meanwhile, many of the Pentagons pet projectsStar Wars technologies such as lasers and advanced weapons systems such as a long-range bomberare being developed with China in mind. So what, specifically, should America do? In one of the most hawkish of
the recent think-tank reports, Robert D. Blackwill, a former U.S. deputy national security adviser and ambassador to India under President George W. Bush, and Ashley J. Tellis, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace who also served on the National Security Council staff
under President Bush, write that engagement
with China has served to strengthen a competitor. It is time, they declare, for a new grand strategy: less engagement and more balancing to ensure the central
objective of continued U.S. global primacy. Among other things, America should beef up its military in Asia, choke off Chinas access to military technology, accelerate missile-defense deployments and increase U.S. offensive cyber capabilities. For
Michael D. Swaine, also of the Carnegie Endowment, this is a certain recipe for another Cold War, or worse. He outlines a sweeping settlement under which America would concede its primacy in East Asia, turning much of the region into a buffer zone policed by a balance of forces, including those
from a strengthened Japan. All foreign forces would withdraw from Korea. And China would offer assurances that it wouldnt launch hostilities against Taiwan, which it regards as a renegade province. Such arrangements, even if possible, would take decades to sort out. Meanwhile, warns David M.
Lampton, a professor at the Johns Hopkins Universitys School of Advanced International Studies, U.S.-China ties have reached a tipping point. Our respective fears are nearer to outweighing our hopes than at any time since normalization, he said in a recent speech. The West has been in this
position before. Optimism about the prospects of transforming an ancient civilization through engagement, followed by deep disillusion, has been the pattern ever since early Jesuit missionaries sought to convert the Chinese to Christianity. Those envoys adopted the gowns of the Mandarin class,
The
grew long beards and even couched their gospel message in Confucian terms to make it more palatable. The 17th-century German priest Adam Schall got as far as becoming the chief astronomer of the Qing dynasty. But he fell from favor, and the Jesuits were later expelled.
disappointment in the U.S. today is heightened by the fact that engagement with China has promised so much and progressed so far. Trade and technology have transformed China beyond anything that Nixon could have
imaged, and the two countries are each others second-largest trading partners. China is Americas biggest creditor. More than a quarter million Chinese students study at U.S. universities. But the ideological gap hasnt narrowed at alland now Mr. Xi has taken a sharp anti-Western turn. Mao
Zedong made the bold decision to cut a deal with Nixon, confident enough to embrace American capitalists even while pressing the radical agenda of his Cultural Revolution. Later, Deng Xiaoping struck a pragmatic balance between the opportunities of economic engagement with the West and the
dangers posed by an influx of Western ideas. When you open the window, flies and mosquitoes come in, he shrugged. Today, Mr. Xi is furiously zapping the bugs. A newly proposed law would put the entire
foreign nonprofit sector under police administration, effectively treating such groups as potential enemies of the state. State newspapers rail against hostile foreign forces and their local sympathizers. The Chinese Communist Partys Document No. 9 prohibits discussion of Western democracy on
college campuses. And as Mr. Xi champions traditional Chinese culture, authorities in Wenzhou, a heavily Christian coastal city dubbed Chinas New Jerusalem, tear down crosses atop churches as unwanted symbols of Western influence. The backlash against the West extends well beyond Chinas
borders. For decades, China accepted Americas role as a regional policeman to maintain the peace and keep sea lanes open. But in Shanghai last year, Mr. Xi declared that it is for the people of Asia to run the affairs of Asia, solve the problems of Asia and uphold the security of Asia. Washington
feels a certain sense of betrayal. Americas open markets, after all, smoothed Chinas export-led rise to become the worlds second-largest economy, and the two economies are now thoroughly enmeshed. Still, it would be a mistake to assume that mutual dependence will necessarily prevent
conflict. Pre-World War I Europe was also closely entwined through trade and investment. Even the U.S. business community, once Beijings staunchest advocate in Washington, has lost some of its enthusiasm for engagement. James McGregor, a former chairman of the American Chamber of
Commerce in China and now the China chairman of APCO Worldwide, a business consultancy, recalls helping to persuade U.S. trade associations to lobby for Chinas admission to the World Trade Organization, which happened in 2001. That unity of purpose, he says has been splintering ever since.
Today, they all believe that China is out to screw them. Chinas fears notwithstanding, the Obama administration remains very much in favor of engagement. Last years high-profile deal on climate change showed that cooperation is still possible. Ahead of a planned summit in the U.S. in
In an increasingly awkward dance, however, the
September, the two countries are hammering out an ambitious bilateral trade agreement. And it is often pointed out that not a single problem in the world, from piracy to pollution, can be solved without their joint efforts.
Obama administration is trying to sustain this policy of engagement while also ramping up its military options in Asia. China is playing a similar game. And it is not clear how long both sides will be able to continue
before there is a clash, by accident or design. Mr. Obama himself sometimes strikes adversarial postures on China. In trying to push a massive Asia-Pacific free-trade zone through a resistant Congress, he has been invoking a China threat. If we dont write the rules, China will write the rules out in
that region, he told The Wall Street Journal in April. He also has pursued a campaignultimately futileto prevent allies such as Britain and Australia from signing on to a Chinese regional development bank. Although the bank will help deliver much-needed infrastructure, the White House
interpreted it as part of a bid to undermine Americas leadership in global finance. For its part, China believes that the U.S. will never accept the legitimacy of a communist government. Mr. Xi has proposed a new model of great-power relations, designed to break a pattern of wars through the ages
that occur when a rising power challenges the incumbent one. But America has turned him down, unwilling to accept a formula that not only assumes that the two countries are peers but seems to place them on the same moral plane. Appropriately, perhaps, tensions are coming to a head in the
Spratly Islands, an archipelago of reefs and sandbars in the South China Sea so hazardous that old British Admiralty sailing charts marked the entire area as Dangerous Ground. In this mariners graveyard, China has massively expanded several reefs through dredging; one boasts a runway long
enough to land Chinas largest military planes. Chinas neighbors regard them as outposts for an eventual Chinese takeover of the whole South China Sea. The Pentagon presents them as a threat to the U.S. Navys unchallenged right to sail the oceans. U.S. Defense Secretary Ash
Carter is considering a show of forceand is under political pressure to do so. Last month, Sen. Bob Corker, the Republican chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, complained that the U.S. response to the island-building has been too
passive. I see no price whatsoever that China is paying for their activities in the South and East China Seas, Mr. Corker said. None. In fact, I see us paying a price. Neither side wants a war. Mr. Xi is not anti-West in the manner of Russian President Vladimir Putin, and so far, he has not
acted rashly, as Mr. Putin has by grabbing territory in Ukraine. China still needs U.S. markets and know-how to rise. A war against America would be an economic catastrophe for China. The U.S.-China relationship has weathered storms before. Recall the days following the Chinese armys 1989
assault on pro-democracy students in Tiananmen Square, when cooperation between the countries went into a deep freeze. But President George H.W. Bush calculated that the U.S.-China relationship was too important to sacrifice, and he quickly sent emissaries to Beijing to ensure that it remained
intact. Today, surely, that calculation carries no less weight. Moreover, trying to contain China would be immensely costly: Neither country can succeed economically without the other. Kennans containment strategy worked against the Soviet Union because it was economically weak, with almost no
Set against these realities, however, is the fact that the U.S.-China relationship has lost
commercial ties to America. But todays China is an economic powerhouse, and its double-digit military budgets are supported by a deep and diversified industrial base.
its strategic raison dtre: the Soviet Union, the common threat that brought the two countries together. Opposition to Moscow was the logic that drove Nixons opening to China. But even Nixon, a tough-minded realist who was
focused on the balance of power, wasnt sure how his opening to China would ultimately play out. As he told the late New York Times columnist William Safire not long before Nixons death in 1994, We may have created a Frankenstein.
 Advantage CP
Text: The United States federal government should invest in the research, development, and implementation of offshore wind power.
Wind energy on track to stop climate change.
AWEA, 14. (N.a. "Wind energy ready as a solution to climate challenge." American Wind Energy Association. May 2014. Web. Accessed: 6-22-2016.
http://www.awea.org/Advocacy/Content.aspx?ItemNumber=5552.)
President Obama gave a speech in June 2013 in which he outlined his agenda to tackle climate change. As detailed in this AWEA white paper, wind
energy is well positioned to be a leading solution to the climate challenge outlined by the President. In
nearly every state in the country, wind energy is already playing a significant role in reducing carbon emissions, as well as emissions of other air pollutants. Further, wind energy is doing so affordably and reliably for
consumers. Among the key findings in the AWEA white paper titled The Clean Air Benefits of Wind Energy are: The 167.7 million megawatt-hours (MWh) of wind energy produced in the U.S. in 2013 reduced CO2 emissions by 126.8 million tons, the equivalent of reducing power sector
emissions by more than 5 percent, or taking 20 million cars off the road. The top 10 states by volume of carbon reductions from wind energy are: Texas, Illinois, California, Colorado, Iowa, Missouri, Oklahoma, Wisconsin, Minnesota and Wyoming. States achieving a reduction in carbon emissions of 10
percent or more from wind energy alone include California, Colorado, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, South Dakota, Vermont, and Washington State, with Oklahoma, Wisconsin and Wyoming coming in just under 10%. Wind energy also currently reduces
sulfur dioxide (SO2)emissions by nearly 347 million pounds per year and nitrous oxide (NOx) emissions by 214 million pounds per year. These pollutants acidify lakes and streams, contribute to smog, and negatively impact public health. Wind energy saved 36.5 billion
gallons of water in 2013 that would have been consumed at conventional power plants, the equivalent of roughly 116 gallons per person in the U.S., or 276 billion bottles of water, providing critical relief in drought-stricken areas. While other generation may need to ramp up or down to
accommodate the variability of wind energy (and other far larger sources of variability on the power system like electricity demand and the sudden failure of large conventional generators), two recent studies from different regions in the U.S. document that such cycling has virtually no net effect on
the emissions reductions from wind energy, with wind producing 99.8 percent of the carbon emissions savings expected of a zero emissions resource. Wind
energy can play an even greater role in reducing emissions reductions going forward. More
than a dozen utility and independent grid operator studies have found wind can reliably provide an even larger share of our electricity needs, which will, in turn, produce even larger emissions reductions. For example, an
NREL study for the Eastern U.S. found that obtaining 20 percent of electricity from wind energy cut power sector carbon emissions by 25 percent, and 30 percent wind cut carbon emissions by 37 percent, relative to the baseline generation mix. Engaging on EPA regulations impacting the power sector
AWEA and the wind energy industry are closely following the Environmental Protection Agencys (EPA) efforts to draft regulations to limit emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) and other pollutants, particularly emissions from the electric generation sector. AWEA will be working to
ensure that any regulations adequately recognize the contribution that wind energy can make in solving the climate challenge.
 OSW Solvency
Offshore wind solves warming
Biello 12 Associate editor @ Scientific American
(David, The Sky Is the Limit for Wind Power, http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=no-limit-for-wind-power)
Wind turbines on land and offshore could readily provide more than four times the power that the world as a whole currently uses. Throw in kites or robot aircraft generating electricity from
sky-high winds and the world could physically extract roughly 100 times more power than presently employedand the climatic consequences remain minimal. Two new computer-model
analyses suggest there are few limits to the wind's potential. Although "there are physical limits to the amount of power that can be harvested from winds, these limits are well above total
global energy demand," explains climate-modeler Kate Marvel of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, who led the analysis published September 9 in Nature Climate Change. (Scientific
American is part of Nature Publishing Group.) Current global demand is roughly 18 terawatts. (A terawatt is one trillion watts.)

OSW solves warming

Schroeder 10 - J.D. from University of California, Berkeley, School of Law
(Erica, 2010. And Masters in Environmental Management from Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, Turning Offshore Wind On, California Law Review)
Many of the most compelling benefits of offshore wind are similar to those of onshore wind, though offshore wind has its own unique set of benefits. To start, wind power generation can help meet the growing energy
demand in the United States. The U.S. Energy Information Administration predicts that the demand for electricity in the United States will grow to 5.8 billion MWh in 2030, a 39 percent increase from 2005.58 The more that wind power can help to meet this
demand, the more diversified the United States energy portfolio will be, and the less susceptible the nation will be to dependency on foreign fuel sources and to price fluctuations in traditional fuels.59 In addition, wind power benefits the United States by
creating a substantial number of jobs for building and operating the domestic wind energy facilities.60 In an April 2009 speech at the Trinity Structural Towers Manufacturing Plant in Iowa, President Obama predicted that if the United States fully pursues our
potential for wind energy on land and offshore, wind power could create 250,000 jobs by 2030.61 Once a wind project is built, it involves only minimal environmental impacts compared to traditional electricity
generation. Wind power emits negligible amounts of traditional air pollutants, such as sulfur dioxide and particulate matter, as well as carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases.62 Lower emissions of traditional air
pollutants means fewer air quality-related illnesses locally and regionally.63 Lower greenhouse gas emissions will help to combat climate change, effects of which will be felt locally and around
the world.64 According to the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the effects of climate change will include melting snow, ice, and permafrost; significant effects on terrestrial, marine, and freshwater plant and animal species; forced changes to
agricultural and forestry management; and adverse human health impacts, including increased heat-related mortality and infectious diseases.65 The U.S. Energy Information Administration estimates that the United States emits 6 billion metric tons of
greenhouse gases annually, and it expects emissions to increase to 7.9 billion metric tons by 2030, with 40 percent of emissions coming from the electric power sector.66 Thus, if
the United States can get more of its electricity from wind
power, it will contribute less to climate change, and help to mitigate its negative impacts. Furthermore, wind power does not involve any of the additional environmental costs associated with
nuclear power or fuel extraction for traditional electricity generation, such as coal mining and natural gas extraction.67 Wind power generation also does not require the water necessary to cool traditional coal, gas, and
nuclear generation units.68Moreover, offshore wind power has certain attributes that give it added benefits compared to onshore wind. Wind tends to be stronger and more consistent offshoreboth
benefits when it comes to wind power generation.69 This is largely due to reduced wind shear and roughness on the open ocean.70 Wind shear and roughness refer to effects of the landscape surrounding turbines on the quality of wind and thus the amount of
electricity produced.71 While long grass, trees, and buildings will slow wind down significantly, water is generally very smooth and has
much less of an effect on wind speeds.72 In addition, because offshore wind projects face fewer
barriersboth natural and manmadeto their expansion, offshore developers can take advantage of economies of scale and build larger wind farms that generate more electricity.73Importantly, offshore wind also
could overcome the problems that onshore wind faces regarding the distance between wind power generation and electricity demand. That is, although the United States has considerable onshore wind resources in certain areas, mostly in the middle of the
country, they are frequently distant from areas with high electricity demand, mostly on the coasts, resulting in transmission problems.74 By contrast, offshore
resources are near coastal electricity demand centers.75 In fact, twenty-
eight of the contiguous forty-eight states have coastal boundaries, and these same states use 78 percent of the United States electricity.76 Thus, offshore wind power generation can effectively
serve major U.S. demand centers and avoid many of the transmission costs faced by remote onshore generation.77 If shallow water offshore potential (less than about 100 feet in depth) is met on the nations coasts,
twenty-six of the twenty-eight coastal states would have sufficient wind resources to meet at least 20 percent of their electricity needs, and many states would have enough to meet their total electricity demand.78

Wind energy solves coupled with grid reductions helps solve.

Abraham, 15. (John Abraham. "Wind energy is a key climate change solution." Guardian. 12-10-2015 Web. Accessed: 6-22-2016. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/climate-
consensus-97-per-cent/2015/dec/10/wind-energy-is-a-key-climate-change-solution)
When we think about climate change, its easy to focus on reducing emissions in order to maintain a healthy global temperature. But any real progress has to be complemented by a significant increase in clean and renewable energy. Fortunately, businesses have plans to build on
recent successes and supply the world with the energy we need to grow economies. A great example is Vestas, a major renewable energy company. I had the pleasure of communicating with the Vestas CEO Mr. Anders Runevad. He has served as CEO
since 2013 and prior to that he worked at Ericsson and Sony Mobile. Mr. Runevad combines a technical background and education with business training to chart out pathways for companies to build capacity in the rapidly evolving energy market. Vestas is a company very familiar to people like me
who work in the wind power industry. They are the largest manufacturer of wind turbines in the world. Just this year, they have reached 7 GW of announced orders; their turbines can supply energy to supply the needs of 75 million Europeans. But providing energy to the developing world is only part
of the energy solution. Solving the climate change problem means we also need to revolutionize the power grids in the developing world . Companies like Vestas are working on that problem too. Mr. Runevad recently met with Indias
Prime Minister Modi and presented a plan to build blades at a new factory in India. They also have plans to increase the renewable energy supply in that country. As of now, Vestas has installed nearly 5,000 turbines in India and employs approximately 900 people there. Vestas has also committed to
investments in Kenya by participating in the development of a wind park. The goal is to supply 15% of the electrical needs of Kenya, a country that is plagued by expensive and unreliable energy sources. I asked Mr. Runevad a few questions related to recent wind power developments and to the
future outlook on the industry. I asked him what has happened to costs of wind power around the world and in the USA in particular. He told me that in
the past 20 years, the cost of wind is down approximately 80%. In the past 5 years, the cost is down 15%. In
the USA, the cost has decreased more than 50% since 2009. So, the
cost decrease is significant and sustained. One concern people have about wind power is that they perceive it isnt reliable. When the wind does not blow, power is not produced. But Mr. Runevad told me
that the newer wind turbines are better at creating wind power in variable wind speeds. They have bigger rotors, higher towers, and lighter blades. The resulting grid is more stable. Importantly, there is better
interconnection with neighboring countries and linking with storage or hydropower sources, which also increases reliability and efficiency. I asked how effectively wind can compete with fossil fuel sources, and learned
that wind has become extremely cost effective. In areas where energy consumption is increasing so that new power sources have to be built, there is a basic parity and in many cases, wind wins on cost alone. In mature markets where existing coal,
nuclear, or gas power generation infrastructure is already built (often with years of subsidies), it is more challenging to build wind because new infrastructure would have to be created. There, new-build wind has to compete with the costs of maintenance of the existing energy source. However, even
then, wind is an attractive option, aside from the fact it creates energy without greenhouse gas emissions. With renewable energy technology changing so rapidly, I wanted to know what was in store in the near-term future. He told me that the cost reductions will continue into the future. There are
three reasons for the cost reductions. First, turbines are becoming larger, with taller towers, and lighter construction. Second, increased efficiency in the supply chain and manufacturing systems are lowering cost. Finally, as
the scale of wind installations increase, there
are cost savings from the economies of scale that are realized. Companies like Vestas want to not only create products that can be profitable, but they are motivated by making a positive difference in the world. That is one of the reasons why they are interested in
climate change and the impacts it can have on people and systems around the globe. I asked Mr. Runevad what he hoped to see out of the Paris climate conference. He told me that he hopes the talks result in increased funding for green development with a mechanism to review and revise emissions
targets and renewable energy targets. These two mechanisms (reducing emissions and increasing renewable energy) are the tools we will have to employ simultaneously to lower our risk of climate change. As we get close to the end of the hottest year on record, it is encouraging that companies
have clearly articulated plans to help us collectively emerge into the new energy economy. Its apparent that smart planning now will not only help us solve the global warming problem, but will also create jobs and diversify our energy supply.

Solves multiple warming causes

Rosenberg 8 Professor of Law, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, and Director, American Legal Systems (LLM) Graduate Program, William and Mary Law School
(Ronald, Article: Making Renewable Energy a Reality--Finding Ways to Site Wind Power Facilities, 32 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol'y Rev. 635)
3.Total Elimination of Air Pollutants and Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Probably the strongest advantage of wind power is the absence of air pollution and greenhouse gas emissions. Thermoelectric fossil-fuel-fired plants generate the largest percentage of American electricity. 121 They are also
the largest single CO2 contributor, even exceeding contributions from all forms of transportation. 122 Wind power, by definition, does [661] not burn any fuel so it does not emit any air pollutants or greenhouse gases. This
lack of air emissions is a permanent feature of a wind power facility. Conventional fossil fuel combustion also results in sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, carbon monoxide, particulate matter,
hydrocarbons, mercury and other emissions which are considered to be air pollutants of concern to the public's health and safety and regulated under clean air laws. 123 Additionally, the absence
of carbon dioxide resulting from wind power contributes to the reduction of global warming gases. With the increased emphasis on the elimination of greenhouse gases, 124 the substitution of fossil-fuel-
generated electricity with non-combustion-produced electricity will reduce the rate of growth of greenhouse gas emissions from America's electrical energy sector. As American climate change policy
begins to embrace more rigorous greenhouse gas reduction goals, wind power could be viewed as a viable energy alternative to electricity generated from coal and natural gas.