Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Political Law
People v. Perfecto, 43 PHIL 887
Facts:
Mr. Gregorio Perfecto, editor of the newspaper La Nacion published an article stipulating
that the investigation of the Senate on oil companies is a mere comedy and that there was
official concealment; Senators benefited from electoral robbery.
An information was filed against Perfecto on the basis of article 256 of the Penal Code.
Perfecto said that the Philippine Libel Law, repealed the said provision (defendant not
liable under the new law) and such was abrogated completely by the change from
Spanish to American sovereignty over the Philippines
Issue: Whether article 256 is in the nature of a municipal law or political law?
Held:
Acquittal; It is a political law.
It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory, the previous
political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated. "Political" is here used to
denominate the laws regulating the relations sustained by the inhabitants to the sovereign.
Political law - That branch of public law which deals with the organization ,and
operations of the governmental organs of the State and defines the relations of the
State with the inhabitants of its territory
All laws, ordinances and regulations in conflict with the political character and
Constitution of the new government are at once displaced.
A. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
Constitution
Definition
Classification
Qualities of a Good Written Constitution
Phillipine Constitution
Essential Parts
Interpretation/Construction
Francisco v. House of Representatives GR No. 160261, Nov. 10, 2003
FACTS:
President Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint)
against Chief Davide and seven Associate Justices of this Court for "culpable violation of
the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes. [Committee on Justice
found it lacking in substance]
Representatives Teodoro, Jr. et. al filed a second impeachment complaint
Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, most of which
petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional
as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o
impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once
within a period of one year."
ISSUE:
Whether the impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice transgressed the
constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule
HELD:
YES. Well- settled principles of constitutional construction, namely: First, verba leais, i.
e., whenever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their
ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed.
Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio leqis et anima. The words of the Constitution
should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of the framers.
Third, ut maais valeat auam pereat. i.e., the Constitution has to be interpreted as a
whole.
IMPERTINENT RULING:
Political questions are those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided
by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government.
It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure.
The determination of a truly political question: whether there are constitutionally
imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then
our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the
government properly acted within such limits.
The Court held that it has no jurisdiction over the issue that goes into the merits of the
second impeachment complaint. Any discussion of this would require this Court to make
a determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a
purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the
legislation.
Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary GR No. 83896, Feb 22, 1991
FACTS:
- The Civil Liberties Union (CLU) and the Anti-Graft League of the Philippines (AGLP) assail the
constitutionality of EO No. 284 issued by President Aquino, which allows members of the
Cabinet, their undersecretaries and asst. secretaries, to hold other government positions in
addition to their primary positions
- According to CLU, this is violative of Sec 13 Art VII of the Constitution, which prohibits Cabinet
members, among other officials, from holding other public offices or employment during their
term
- The Executive Secretary, as respondent, counters that Sec 7 par. 2, Art IX-B of the Constitution
allows Cabinet members and their USecs and ASecs to hold other government offices if allowed
by law
- The AGLP argues that the Exec Secs position is invalid, as it incorrectly lumped together the
provisions of Sec 13 Art VII and Sec 7 par. 2, Art IX-B
ISSUE: How the said provisions should be constructed relative to each other
HELD:
The Court, in construing a Constitution, should bear in mind the object sought to be
accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A
doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history of the times, and the condition and
circumstances under which the Constitution was framed.
Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and interpreted together as to
effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat
another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand together.
Since the 1987 Constitution was made primarily to prevent the abuses under the Marcos regime
from happening again, the Court was mindful of the spirit of the prohibition in Sec 13 Art VII
that is, to prevent abuses by unscrupulous public officials who used their additional positions for
personal enrichment. The Court thus declared EO 284 as null and void.
Held: YES. There is no need for legislation to implement these self-executing provisions of the
Constitution. The rationale why these constitutional provisions are self-executing was explained
in Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, thus:
Constitutional History
Malolos Constitution
Treaty of Paris, December 10, 1898
McKinleys Instructions, April 7, 1900
Spooner Amendment, March 2, 1901
Philippine Bill, July 1, 1902
Philippine Autonomy Act, August 29, 1916
Philippine Independence Act (Tydings-McDuffie Act) March 24, 1934
1935 Constitution (Three Amendments)
Japanese Occupation
1973 Constitution
Provisional Freedom Constitution, Proclamation No. 3, March 25, 1986
1987 Constitution, Feb 2, 1987, De Leon v. Esguerra, Aug 31, 1987
Facts:
Petitioners were elected barangay officials in Taytay, Rizal. On February 8, 1987, then OIC
Governor Esguerra issued a Memoranda replacingpetitioners as barangay officials. Their
contention was that the designation was invalid on the ground that it violated the Barangay
Election Act.
The respondent invoke Section 2, Article III of the Provisional Constitution, because according
to them the appointment is with one year from Feb. 25, 1986.
All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution shall continue
in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the designation or
appointment and qualification of their successors, if such appointment is made within a period of
one year from February 25,1986.
Issue:
Whether the provisions of the Provisional Constitution will apply?
Ruling:
NO.The constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that date, the
Provisional Constitution have been superseded by the 1987 Constitution. As such,
respondent could no longer rely on Section 2 Article III of said Constitution. The Memoranda
was declared to be of no legal force and the writ of prohibition enjoining respondents from
proceeding with the take-over was granted.
Important Principles
Separation of Powers Principles
Principle of Checks and Balances
Principle of Comity
Hierarchy of Laws
Power of Judicial Review
Doctrine of Operative Fact
Political Questions Doctrine
Inherent Powers of Government
Immunity from Suit
Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency
Non-Delegation of Power
Power of Control and Supervision
Preamble
Re: Letter of Tony Q. Valenciano, re: Holding of Religious Rituals at the Halls of Justice
Building in Quezon City, AM No. 10-4-19-SC, March 7, 2017
(Include Dissenting Opinion of Justice Leonen)
RULING:
In accordance with Article 13 and 121 of the Convention, entitlements of a feature to generate
own maritime zones depend on:
1) Objective capacity of a feature in its natural condition;
2) Ability to sustain either a stable community of people or economic activity that is
not dependent on outside resources
Tribunal concludes that both Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal are located within 200
nautical miles of the Philippines coast on the island of Palawan and are located in an area
that is not overlapped by the entitlements generated by any maritime feature claimed by China.
It follows, therefore, that, as between the Philippines and China, Mischief Reef and Second
Thomas Shoal form part of the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf of the
Philippines.
The South China Sea Dispute: Philippine Sovereign Rights and Jurisdiction in the West
Philippine Sea (Justice Carpios Ebook)
PVTA (Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration) v. CIR, GR L-32052, July 25, 1975
Facts:
Private respondents filed a petition wherein they alleged their employment relationship,
the overtime services in excess of the regular 8 eight hours a day rendered by them, and
the failure to pay them overtime compensation in accordance with Commonwealth Act
No. 444.
Petitioner PVTA would predicate its plea for the reversal of the order complained of on
the basic proposition that it is beyond the jurisdiction of respondent Court as it is
exercising governmental functions and that it is exempt from the operation of
Commonwealth Act No. 444.
Issue: Whether PVTA is exercising governmental functions?
Ruling: NO. While, to repeat, its submission as to the governmental character of its operation is
to be given credence, it is not a necessary consequence that respondent Court is devoid of
jurisdiction. Nor could the challenged order be set aside on the additional argument that the
Eight-Hour Labor Law is not applicable to it.
ISSUE:WON petitioner's act of releasing and excluding the two Iranian nationals without
initiating any case for violation of immigration laws is valid.
RULING: NO. Petitioner had the duty under the law to oversee the filing of criminal actions and
deportation proceedings against the 2 and not merely excluding them. Every sovereign power has
the inherent power to deport aliens from its territory upon such grounds as it may deem proper
for its self-preservation or public interest. In the Philippines, aliens may be expelled or deported
from the Philippines on grounds and in the manner provided for by the Constitution, the PIA of
1940, as amended, and administrative issuances pursuant thereto.
Exclusion: when an alien is excluded he is immediately sent back to the country where he came
from on the same vessel which transported him
Deportation: is a police measure against undesirable aliens whose continued presence in the
country is found to be injurious to the public good and the domestic tranquility of the people.
The issue started when the Secretary of the Philippine Senate, Fernando Guerrero,
discovered that the documents regarding the testimony of the witnesses in an
investigation of oil companies had disappeared from his office.
Then, the day following the convening of Senate, the newspaper La Nacion edited by
herein respondent Gregorio Perfecto published an article against the Philippine Senate.
Here, Mr. Perfecto was alleged to have violated Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code
provision that punishes those who insults the Ministers of the Crown. Hence, the issue.
ISSUE: Whether or not Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code (SPC) is still in force and can be
applied in the case at bar?
RULING: The Supreme Court held that Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code was enacted by
the Government of Spain to protect Spanish officials who were representative of the King. With
the change of sovereignty, a new government, and a new theory of government, was set up in the
Philippines. It was no sense a continuation of the old laws. No longer is there a Minister of the
Crown or a person in authority of such exalted position that the citizen must speak of him only in
bated breath.
Prior to the incorporation of the City of Manila under the Republic Act No. 183,
petitioner Vilas is the creditor of the City.
After the incorporation, Vilas brought an action to recover the sum of money owed to
him by the city.
The City of Manila that incurred the debts has changed its sovereignty after the cession of
the Philippines to the US by the Treaty of Paris and its contention now is founded on the
theory that by virtue of the Act No. 183 its liability has been extinguished.
ISSUE: Whether or not the change of the sovereignty extinguishes the previous liability of the
City of Manila to its creditor?
RULING: No. The mere change of sovereignty of a country does not necessarily dissolve the
municipal corporation organized under the former sovereign. The new City of Manila is in a
legal sense the successor of the old city. Thus the new city is entitled to all property and property
rights of the predecessor corporation including its liabilities. The court held that only the
governmental functions that are not compatible with the present sovereignty are suspended.
Because the new City of Manila retains its character as the predecessor of the old city it is still
liable to the creditors of the old City of Manila.
Philip Morris v. CA, GR 91332, July 16, 1993*While international law is made part of the law of
the land, it does not imply primacy of international law over national law.
Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, established for the purpose of providing
aid to the victims of rape by Japanese military forces in the Philippines during the Second World
War.
Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive Department through the
DOJ, DFA, and OSG, requesting assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese officials and
military officers who ordered the establishment of the comfort women stations in the
Philippines. But officials of the Executive Department declined to assist the petitioners, and took
the position that the individual claims of the comfort women for compensation had already been
fully satisfied by Japans compliance with the Peace Treaty between the Philippines and Japan.
Hence, this petition where petitioners pray for this court to (a) declare that respondents
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of discretion in refusing to
espouse their claims for the crimes against humanity and war crimes committed against them;
and (b) compel the respondents to espouse their claims for official apology and other forms of
reparations against Japan before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and other international
tribunals.
ISSUE:
RULING:
NO, the Executive Department has the exclusive prerogative to determine whether to espouse
petitioners claims against Japan. The conduct of the foreign relations of our government is
committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislativethe politicaldepartments of the
government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not
subject to judicial inquiry or decision. are delicate, complex, and involve large elements of
prophecy.
But not all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions, and courts certainly
possess the authority to construe or invalidate treaties and executive agreements. However, the
question whether the Philippine government should espouse claims of its nationals against a
foreign government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is demonstrably
committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches. In this case, the
Executive Department has already decided that it is to the best interest of the country to waive all
claims of its nationals for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The wisdom
of such decision is not for the courts to question.
The President, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions which prevail
in foreign countries, and especially is this true in time of war. He has his confidential sources of
information. He has his agents in the form of diplomatic, consular and other officials.
In the international sphere, traditionally, the only means available for individuals to bring a claim
within the international legal system has been when the individual is able to persuade a
government to bring a claim on the individuals behalf. By taking up the case of one of its
subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on his behalf,
a State is in reality asserting its own right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the
rules of international law.
Within the limits prescribed by international law, a State may exercise diplomatic protection by
whatever means and to whatever extent it thinks fit, for it is its own right that the State is
asserting. Should the natural or legal person on whose behalf it is acting consider that their rights
are not adequately protected, they have no remedy in international law. All they can do is resort
to national law, if means are available, with a view to furthering their cause or obtaining redress.
All these questions remain within the province of municipal law and do not affect the position
internationally.
Even the invocation of jus cogens norms and ergaomnes obligations will not alter this analysis.
Petitioners have not shown that the crimes committed by the Japanese army violated jus cogens
prohibitions at the time the Treaty of Peace was signed, or that the duty to prosecute perpetrators
of international crimes is an ergaomnes obligation or has attained the status of jus cogens.
ISSUE 1: W/N the petitions as citizens suit satisfy the requirements of legal standing in
assailing the constitutionality of EDCA
No. Petitioners failed to make any specific assertion of a particular public right that
would be violated by the enforcement of EDCA. For their failure to do so, the present
petitions cannot be considered by the Court as citizens suits that would justify a
disregard of the aforementioned requirements.
NOTES:
Executive agreements cannot create new international obligations that are not expressly
allowed or reasonably implied in the law they purport to implement.
Treaties are considered superior to executive agreements. Treaties are products of the acts
of the Executive and the Senate unlike executive agreements, which are solely executive
actions. Because of legislative participation through the Senate, a treaty is regarded as
being on the same level as a statute. If there is an irreconcilable conflict, a later law or
treaty takes precedence over one that is prior.
An executive agreement is treated differently. Executive agreements that are inconsistent
with either a law or a treaty are considered ineffective. Both types of international
agreement are nevertheless subject to the supremacy of the Constitution.
ISSUE 1: W/N the petitions as citizens suit satisfy the requirements of legal standing in
assailing the constitutionality of EDCA
No. Petitioners failed to make any specific assertion of a particular public right that
would be violated by the enforcement of EDCA. For their failure to do so, the present
petitions cannot be considered by the Court as citizens suits that would justify a
disregard of the aforementioned requirements.
Issue: WON Commonwealth Act No. 01 aka. National Defense Law is unconstitutional.
Ruling:
No. The Constitutionality of the National Defense law is upheld.The National Defense Law, in so far as it
establishes compulsory military service, does not go against this constitutional provision but is, on the contrary, in
faithful compliance therewith. The duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be performed except through
an army. To leave the organization of an army to the will of the citizens would be to make this duty of the
Government excusable should there be no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist therein.
SEC. 2. The defense of the state is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfilment of this duty all
citizens may be required by law to render personal military or civil service.
Bradford United Church of Christ Inc. (BUCCI) disaffiliated itself from UCCP and filed its
Amended Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws before the SEC which provided for and
effected its disaffiliation from UCCP. SEC approved it on July 1993. UCCP filed a
complaint for rejection of decision, alleging that separate incorporation and registration
of BUCCI is not allowed under the UCCP Constitution and By-laws because only the
local church has the authority to do so. SEC en banc dismissed UCCP's petition and
defended the right of BUCCI to disassociate itself from UCCP in recognition of its
decision of SEC en banc. Before this court, UCCP maintains that it has the sole power
to decide whether BUCCI could disaffiliate from it as this involves a purely ecclesiastical
affair.
ISSUE:
ecclesiastical affair.
HELD:
No. The issue is not a purely ecclesiastical affair. An ecclesiastical affair is one that
concerns doctrine, creed or form of worship of the church, or the adoption and
enforcement within a religious association of needful laws and regulations for the
government of the membership, and the power of excluding from such associations
UCCP and BUCCI, being corporate entities and grantees of primary franchises,
are subject to the jurisdiction of the SEC. Section 3 of Presidential Decree No.
902-A provides that SEC shall have absolute jurisdiction, supervision and control
over all corporations. Even with their religious nature, SEC may exercise
BUCCI, as a juridical entity separate and distinct from UCCP, possesses the
The US Embassy and the DFA exchanged diplomatic notes confirmed all the necessary
requirements for the agreement to take force. The agreement was signed on April 2014. President
Benigno Noynoy Aquino III ratified the same in June 2014. It was not submitted to the
Congress. The Senate did not concur.
Petitions for certiorari were filed before the Supreme Court assailing the unconstitutionality of of
the executive agreement. Petitioners now contend that it should have concurred by the Senate as
it is not an executive agreement. The Senate issued Senate Resolution No. 105 expressing a
strong sense that in order EDCA to be valid and binding, it must be first be transmitted to the
Senate for deliberation and concurrence.
Issue:
WON EDCA is an executive agreement or a treaty?
Ruling:
EDCA is an executive agreement and does not need concurrence of 2/3 of all the members of the
Senate. EDCA is not constitutionally infirm. An executive agreement remains consistent with the
existing laws and treaties that it purports to implement. The President may enter into an
executive agreement on foreign military bases, troops, or facilities, if:
(a) it is not the instrument that allows the presence of the military bases, troops, facilities; or
(b) it merely aims to implement an existing law or treaty
ISSUE:
Whether the President may enter into an executive agreement on foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities/ Whether the provisions under EDCA are consistent with the Constitution, as well as with
existing laws and treaties
HELD: The President may generally enter into executive agreements subject to limitations
defined by the Constitution and may be in furtherance of a treaty already concurred in by the
Senate.
The President's duty to execute the laws and protect the Philippines is inextricably
interwoven with his foreign affairs powers, such that he must resolve issues imbued with
both concerns to the full extent of his powers, subject only to the limits supplied by law.
We have in laid down the power of presidential initiatives in respect of foreign affairs(Vinuya v.
Romulo)
In fine, the presidential role in foreign affairs is dominant and the President is traditionally
accorded a wider degree of discretion in the conduct of foreign affairs. The regularity, nay,
validity of his actions are adjudged under less stringent standards, lest their judicial
repudiation lead to breach of an international obligation, rupture of state relations,
forfeiture of confidence, national embarrassment and a plethora of other problems with
equally undesirable consequences(Bavan v. Executive Secretary) and (Pimentel v. Executive
Secretary)
The President, however, may enter into an executive agreement on foreign military bases, troops,
or facilities, if (a) it is not the instrument that allows the presence of foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities; or (b) it merely aims to implement an existing law or treaty.
Note that the provision "shall not be allowed" is a negative injunction. This wording signifies
that the President is not authorized by law to allow foreign military bases, troops, or facilities to
enter the Philippines, except under a treaty concurred in by the Senate. Hence, the
constitutionally restricted authority pertains to the entry of the bases, troops, or facilities, and
not to the activities to be done after entry.
It is evident that the constitutional restriction refers solely to the initial entry of the foreign
military bases, troops, or facilities. Once entry is authorized, the subsequent acts are
thereafter subject only to the limitations provided by the rest of the Constitution and
Philippine law, and not to the Section 25 requirement of validity througha treaty.
- Imbong, along with a slew of pro-life and religious groups, assail the constitutionality of RA
10354 the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act, known colloquially as the RH
Law on the premise that the RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. According to the
petitioners, notwithstanding its declared policy against abortion, the implementation of the RH
Law would authorize the purchase of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices and
injectables which are abortives, in violation of Section 12, Article II of the Constitution which
guarantees protection of both the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.
- They also assail the RH Law on the following points:
o It violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products they
posit that the RH Law provides universal access to contraceptives which are hazardous to
one's health, as it causes cancer and other health problems
o It violates the right to religious freedom it is contended that the RH Law violates the
constitutional guarantee respecting religion as it authorizes the use of public funds for the
procurement of contraceptives. For the petitioners, the use of public funds for purposes
that are believed to be contrary to their beliefs is included in the constitutional mandate
ensuring religious freedom
ISSUES: 1. W/N the RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn (PERTINENT)
2. W/N the RH Law violates the right to religious freedom (IMPERTINENT)
HELD:
1. NO. The RH Law effectively draws a line between contraceptives and abortifacients. The framers
of the Constitution intended conception to refer to fertilization.Protection is thus given upon
fertilization. The difference between allowable contraceptives and abortifacients is that
allowable contraceptives merely prevent the meeting of the sperm and the egg. Abortifacients, on
the other hand, destroy the fertilized ovum, or prevent a fertilized ovum from being implanted
into the uterine wall. The RH Law does not allow the use of abortifacients, only allowable
contraceptives that prevent implantation. This is consistent with the intent of the framers of the
Constitution, which was to prevent Congress from passing a law that would legalize abortion.
a. However, the redefinition of contraceptives provided for in Sec 3.01(a) of the IRR of the
RH Law was deemed unconstitutional, as it defines abortifacients as drugs, devices, or
products that PRIMARILY induce abortion. The insertion of the qualifier "primarily" will
pave the way for the approval of contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of
the unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of Sec 12 Art II of the Constitution.
Such definition appears to insinuate that a contraceptive will only be considered as an
"abortifacient" if its sole known effect is abortion orthe prevention of the implantation
of the fertilized ovum. For the same reason, this definition of "contraceptive" would
permit the approval of contraceptives which are actually abortifacients because of their
fail-safe mechanism.
b. Likewise, the provision in Sec 7 of the RH Law, where minor who already have had (a)
child(ren) or a miscarriage do not have to secure parental consent before undergoing a
reproductive health procedure was deemed unconstitutional in that it was anti-family,
thus against the provisions regarding the family and the right of parents to exercise
parental control over their minor children enshrined in Sec 12 Art II of the Constitution
2. YES, but only when the healthcare provider is a conscientious objector to his/her obligations
under the RH Law. Thus, a healthcare provider who cites religious freedom and objects to
his/her obligations under the RH Law may not be compelled to give a patient information
relating to modern reproductive health products, methods, services, and procedures. The Court
cited the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality espoused in the case of Estrada v. Escritor, where a
court interpreter was adjudged to not have been engaged in immoral conduct when she
cohabited with a man not her husband, due to her religious beliefs.
- Atty. Reynante B. Orceo assails the validity of Comelec Resolution No. 8714, which includes
airsoft guns and their replicas/imitations in the coverage of the Gun Ban implemented during the
election period in 2010
- Orceo claims to be a real party-in-interest, because he had been playing airsoft since 2000 (Kits
note: SERIOUSLY?! @_@)
- Orceo claims, among others, that such ban on airsoft guns runs contrary to Sec 12 Art II of the
1987 Constitution, which recognizes the sanctity of family life and protects and strengthens the
family as a basic autonomous social institution (Kits note: THIS IS SERIOUSLY NOT A
JOKE. @_@)
- Orceo asserts the following:
o asserts that playing airsoft provides bonding moments among family members
o families are entitled to protection by the society and the State under the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights
o they are free to choose and enjoy their recreational activities
o these liberties cannot be abridged by the COMELEC
- Comelec argues that constitutional freedoms are not absolute, and they may be abridged to some
extent to serve appropriate and important interests
ISSUE: W/N the Comelec ban against airsoft guns during election season infringes upon the State policy
of protecting and promoting family interests
HELD: NO. The abovementioned State Policies do not directly uphold a licensees absolute right to
possess or carry an airsoft gun under any circumstance. The inclusion of airsoft guns in the gun ban does
not reflect capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment on the part of Comelec. On the contrary, the
Court recognizes that some freedoms and rights given by the Constitution and by law may be abridged to
serve overarching public interest.
- Atty. Humberto Basco et al seek the annulment of the charter of Philippine Amusement
and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), contained in PD 1869
- According to Basco et al, the creation of PAGCOR is contrary to morals and the equal
protection clause in the Constitution, because it allows the conduction of state-sanctioned
gambling, while most other forms of gambling are not allowed, along with other innately
immoral acts such as prostitution and drug-trafficking
- Further, Basco et al posit that the gambling objective of PD 1869 runs contrary to Sec
13 Art II of the Constitution, which calls for the promotion of the moral well-being of the
youth
ISSUE: W/N the establishment of PAGCOR runs afoul of the State policy of promoting the
moral well-being of the youth
HELD: THE COURT DID NOT RULE DIRECTLY ON THIS ISSUE. The Court merely said
that Sec 13 Art II of the Constitution is not a self-executing provision, being a mere statement of
State policy. Being non-self-executing, a law should be passed by Congress to clearly define and
effectuate said policy. WHAT DOES THIS MEAN?As to whether PD 1869 is a wise legislation
considering the issues of morality, youth, and educational valuesis for Congress to determine.
It also said that every law carries with it a presumption of constitutionality. Absent a showing of
clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, the assailed law remains valid. Basco et al
failed to overcome this presumption in the instant case.
Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. COA, GR 177131, June 7, 2011
Facts:
COA issued a resolution, stating that BSP is a public corporation created by Commonwealth Act
No. 111. Hence, it is a GOCC subject to COAs jurisdiction for audit. This is also based on the
ruling in BSP v. NLRC. BSP argued that the ruling in BSP v. NLRC is for the determination of
NLRCs jurisdiction and not the COA and that the governance of BSP is private.
Issue:
Is BSP a public corporation?
Ruling:
YES. The purpose of the creation of BSP is to implement a State Policy declared in Article II,
Section 13. Evidently, the BSP, which was created by a special law to serve a public purpose in
pursuit of a constitutional mandate, comes within the class of public corporations.
Section 17. Education, Science and Technology, Arts, Culture and Sports
Guingona v. Carague
Facts:
The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billion
for debt service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated under RA 6831, otherwise known as the
General Approriations Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion, while the appropriations for the
DECS amount to P27,017,813,000.00.
The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by PD No. 18, entitled
Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred
Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act), by PD No. 1177, entitled Revising
the Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New
Society, and by PD No.1967, entitled An Act Strengthening the Guarantee and
Payment Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on its Contingent Liabilities Arising
out of Relent and Guaranteed Loans by Appropriating Funds For The Purpose.
The petitioners were questioning the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for
debt service, it being higher than the budget for education, the Constitution mandates to
assign the highest budgetary priority to education.
Issue: Whether it is violative of the constitution?
Ruling: No. While it is true that the Congress is mandated to assign the highest budgetary
priority to education, it does not thereby follow that the hands of Congress are so hamstrung as
to deprive it the power to respond to the imperatives of the national interest and for the
attainment of other state policies or objectives.
Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by its good judgment, to provide an
appropriation, that can reasonably service our enormous debt. It is not only a matter of honor and
to protect the credit standing of the country. More especially, the very survival of our economy is
at stake. Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated an amount for debt service bigger than the
share allocated to education, the Court finds and so holds that said appropriation cannot be
thereby assailed as unconstitutional.
Philconsa v. Enriquez: S5, Art14 which provides for the highest budgetary priority to education
is merely directory.
This is a consolidation of cases which sought to question the veto authority of the
president involving the General Appropriations Act of 1994.
The pertinent part of the GAA is the appropriation of P86,323,438,000.00for debt
service, while it appropriated only P37,780,450,000.00 for the Department of Education
Culture and Sports.
Petitioners urged that Congress cannot give debt service the highest priority in the GAA
of 1994 (Rollo, pp. 93-94) because under the Constitution it should be education that is
entitled to the highest funding. They invoke Section 5(5), Article XIV thereof, which
provides:
(5) The State shall assign the highest budgetary priority to education and ensure
that teaching will attract and retain its rightful share of the best available talents
through adequate remuneration and other means of job satisfaction and
fulfillment.
ISSUE: WON the appropriation of the budget for education should be given higher importance.
RULING: Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution, is merely directory. As aptly observed
by respondents, since 1985, the budget for education has tripled to upgrade and improve the
facility of the public school system. The compensation of teachers has been doubled. The amount
of P29,740,611,000.00 set aside for the Department of Education, Culture and Sports under the
General Appropriations Act (R.A. No. 6381), is the highest budgetary allocation among all
department budgets. This is a clear compliance with the aforesaid constitutional mandate
according highest priority to education.
In the fulfilment of the cited provision, it cannot deprive the Congress the power to respond to
the imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment of other state policies or objectives.
1. Section 18. Labor Protection
JMM Promotion v. CA, GR 120095, Aug 5, 1996
ISSUE: WON an Artist Record Book is a valid requirement for overseas employment.
RULING: The regulation is a valid exercise of police power. Police power concerns government
enactments which precisely interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the
general welfare or the common good. As the assailed Department Order enjoys a presumed
validity, it follows that the burden rests upon petitioners to demonstrate that the said order,
particularly, its ARB requirement, does not enhance the public welfare or was exercised
arbitrarily or unreasonably. The welfare of Filipino performing artists, particularly the women
was paramount in the issuance of Department Order No. 3.
PASE v. Drilon
RULING:
Respondent Province of Aklan must secure approvals from local government units and hold
proper consultations with non-governmental organizations and other stakeholders and sectors
concerned as required by Local Government Code.
The parties are evidently in accord in seeking to uphold the mandate found in Article
II, Declaration of Principles and State Policies, of the 1987 Constitution: SECTION 20. The State
recognizes the indispensable role of the private sector, encourages private enterprise, and
provides incentives to needed investments.
To achieve the policy of the state to achieve a balance between socio-economic development
and environmental protection, which are the twin goals of sustainable development, we must
adopt a comprehensive and integrated environmental protection program where all the
sectors of the community are involved, i.e., the government and the private sectors.
Navarro et al, as taxpayers, filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court to declare as
unconstitutional Republic Act 9355, which created the Province of Dinagat Islands. According to them,
the province did not meet the requirements of the Local Government Code, Republic Act 7160 in terms
of population and territory. Whereas RA 7610 mandates that a province to be created should have a
population of at least 250,000, the Province of Dinagat, as of the 2000 NSO Census only had 106,591;
whereas the law requires a new province to have at least 2,000 square kilometres of contiguous area,
the new province will only have a land area of 802.12 square kilometres. Further, the act of creating the
province was allegedly an act of gerrymandering.
In their defense, the respondents posited that the law is constitutional. Dinagat as a new province
complied with the requirements of Republic Act 7160 in terms of population and land area. Most
notably, it is supposedly exempt from the land area requirement because it is composed of several
islands, which exception is provided for under the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act
7160.
ISSUE: W/N the creation of the Province of Dinagat Islands complied with the requisites of the law
HELD: YES. The IRR of the LGC provides that component cities and municipalities which consist of
islands are exempt from the land area requirement for the creation of a new province. This is consistent
with Sec 25 Art II of the Constitution, which ensures the autonomy of local governments. The liberal
construction of the land area requirement for the creation of a new province allows island-municipalities
to become more self-reliant, progressive, and grant access to basic services to its constituents. To treat
them the same way as provinces with a contiguous land mass would be unfair, as island-municipalities are
separated by bodies of water, thus making the provision of services to political constituents difficult and
burdensome. This unfair treatment defeats the purpose of local autonomy and decentralization espoused
in the Constitution.
Belgica v. ES, 2013 *With PDAF, a Congressman can simply bypass the local development
council and initiate project on his own. Thus, insofar as individual legislators are authorized to
intervene in purely local matters and thereby subvert genuine local autonomy, the 2013 PDAF
Article and similar forms are deemed unconstitutional.
Facts:
The concept of Pork Barrel is commonly known as the lump-sum, discretionary funds of the
members of the Congress. It underwent several legal designations from Congressional Pork
Barrel to the latest Priority Development Assistance Fund or PDAF. The allocation for the
pork barrel is integrated in the annual General Appropriations Act (GAA).
Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in allocatinginfrastructure projects like
roads, buildings, schools, etc. and scholarship grants, medical assistance, livelihood programs,
IT development for the members of the legislative.
The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of funds whereby certain cabinet
members may request for the realignment of funds into their department provided that the
request for realignment is approved or concurred by the legislator concerned.
Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others, filed various petitions before the
Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of the pork barrel system, as it makes equal
the unequal
Issue:
Whether or not the 2013 PDAF and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws
similar thereto are unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of
constitutional provisions on local autonomy.
Ruling:
The 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other similar forms of Congressional Pork
Barrel is deemed unconstitutional.
As a rule, the local governments have the power to manage their local affairs.
Through their Local Development Councils (LDCs), the LGUs can develop their own
programs and policies concerning their localities. But with the PDAF, particularly
on the part of the members of the house of representatives, whats happening is that
a congressman can either bypass or duplicate a project by the LDC and later on
claim it as his own.
This is an instance where the national government (note, a congressman is a
national officer) meddles with the affairs of the local government and this is
contrary to the State policy embodied in the Constitution on local autonomy. Its
good if thats all that is happening under the pork barrel system but worse, the
PDAF becomes more of a personal fund on the part of legislators.
The concept of Pork Barrel is commonly known as the lump-sum, discretionary funds of the
members of the Congress. It underwent several legal designations from Congressional Pork
Barrel to the latest Priority Development Assistance Fund or PDAF. The allocation for the
pork barrel is integrated in the annual General Appropriations Act (GAA).
Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in allocatinginfrastructure projects like
roads, buildings, schools, etc. and scholarship grants, medical assistance, livelihood programs,
IT development for the members of the legislative.
The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of funds whereby certain cabinet
members may request for the realignment of funds into their department provided that the
request for realignment is approved or concurred by the legislator concerned.
Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others, filed various petitions before the
Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of the pork barrel system, as it makes equal
the unequal
Issue:
Whether or not the 2013 PDAF and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws
similar thereto are unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of
constitutional provisions on local autonomy.
Ruling:
The 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other similar forms of Congressional Pork
Barrel is deemed unconstitutional.
As a rule, the local governments have the power to manage their local affairs.
Through their Local Development Councils (LDCs), the LGUs can develop their own
programs and policies concerning their localities. But with the PDAF, particularly
on the part of the members of the house of representatives, whats happening is that
a congressman can either bypass or duplicate a project by the LDC and later on
claim it as his own.
This is an instance where the national government (note, a congressman is a
national officer) meddles with the affairs of the local government and this is
contrary to the State policy embodied in the Constitution on local autonomy. Its
good if thats all that is happening under the pork barrel system but worse, the
PDAF becomes more of a personal fund on the part of legislators.
Facts:
DOTC entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment ZTE for
the supply and sevices for the National Broadband Network Project in the amount of 16
Billion Pesos to be funded by Peoples Republic of China. The Senate passed various
resolutions relative to the National Broadband Network Project.
Sometime in Septemeber 2007, Jose De Venecia III testified that several high executive
officials and power brokers were using their influence to push through the NBN project
by NEDA.
Neri is the head of NEDA. He was inveted to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He
appeared in one hearing and he was interrogated by the Senate Blue Ribbon. He admitted
that COMELEC Abalos bribe him with P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN
deal. He further narrated that he informed President Gloria Arroyo about the bribe and he
was instructed by the President not to accept the bribe.
Neri was then asked further on what they have discussed about the NBN project, Neri-
petitioner refused to answer the following questions:
a. WON President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project;
b. WON she directed him to prioritize it;
c. WON she directed him to approve;
Neri invoked executive privilege and later on refused to attend the other hearings. He
was cited in contempt of the respondent Senate Committee and an order of his arrest and
detention until such time that he would appear and give his testimony.
Issue:
a. Will the claim on executive privilege in this case violate the Section 28, Article 2 of the
1987 Constitution?
b. Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by executive
privilege?
Ruling:
a. No.
In the Nixon and post-Watergate cases established the broad contours of the presidential
communications privilege.28 In United States v. Nixon,29 the U.S. Court recognized a great
public interest in preserving "the confidentiality of conversations that take place in the
President's performance of his official duties." It thus considered presidential communications
as "presumptively privileged." Apparently, the presumption is founded on the "President's
generalized interest in confidentiality." The privilege is said to be necessary to guarantee the
candor of presidential advisors and to provide "the President and those who assist him with
freedom to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and
to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express except privately."
In In Re: Sealed Case,30 the U.S. Court of Appeals delved deeper. It ruled that there are two (2)
kinds of executive privilege; one is the presidential communications privilege and, the other
is the deliberative process privilege. The former pertains to "communications, documents or
other materials that reflect presidential decision-making and deliberations and that the
President believes should remain confidential." The latter includes 'advisory opinions,
recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental
decisions and policies are formulated."
The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry
relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of
military and foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the President is the repository of the
commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and diplomatic powers. Consistent with the doctrine
of separation of powers, the information relating to these powers may enjoy greater
confidentiality than others.
Several jurisprudence cited provide the elements of presidential communications privilege:
1) The protected communication must relate to a quintessential and non-delegable presidential
power.
2) The communication must be authored or solicited and received by a close advisor of the
President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in operational
proximity with the President.
In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on the
ground that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions fall under conversation and
correspondence between the President and public officials necessary in her executive and
policy decision-making process and, that the information sought to be disclosed might impair
our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the Peoples Republic of China. Simply put,
the bases are presidential communications privilege and executive privilege on matters relating
to diplomacy or foreign relations.
Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited by the
three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the
communications relate to a quintessential and non-delegable power of the President, i.e. the
power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President
to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally
been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the communications are received by a
close advisor of the President. Under the operational proximity test, petitioner can be
considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyos cabinet. And third, there is no
adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of
the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioners claim of executive
privilege violates the constitutional provisions on the right of the people to information on
matters of public concern.50 We might have agreed with such contention if petitioner did not
appear before them at all. But petitioner made himself available to them during the September 26
hearing, where he was questioned for eleven (11) hours. Not only that, he expressly manifested
his willingness to answer more questions from the Senators, with the exception only of those
covered by his claim of executive privilege.
The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation. Section 7 of Article
III provides:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access
to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
Garcia v. Teves
Petitioner is a former supervising personnel specialist of the CSC Regional Office No. IV
and also the Officer-in-charge of the Public Assistance and Liaison Division (PALD)
under the MamamayanMuna Hindi Mamaya Na program of the CSC.
On January 3, 2007, an unsigned letter-complaint addressed to respondent CSC
Chairperson Karina Constantino-David stating that petitioner has been lawyering and
extending help to many who has pending cases in the CSC.
Chairperson David immediately formed a team of four personnel with background on IT
and issued a memo directing them to conduct an investigation and specifically to back
up all the files in the computers found in the (PALD) and Legal Divisions.
The next day, all the computers in the PALD were sealed and secured for the purpose of
preserving all the files stored therein and were turned over to Chairperson David.
The contents of the diskettes were examined by the CSCs office for Legal Affairs. It was
found that most of the files in the 17 diskettes contained filed copied from petitioners
computer, were draft pleadings or letter in connection with administrative cases in the
CSC and other tribunals.
Chairperson issued the Show-Cause Order requiring petitioner to submit his explanation
or counter-affidavit within five (5) days from notice. Petitioner denied the allegations.
Petitioner Accused CSC officials for they unlawfully copied and printed his personal files
in his computer without his consent which violated his right to privacy.
Ruling:
No. Under Section 28, Article 2 Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State
adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public
interest. The CSC had implemented a policy that put its employees on notice that they have no
expectation of privacy in anything they create, store, send or receive on the office computers, and
that the CSC may monitor the use of the computer, and the CSC may monitor the use of the
computer resources using both automated or human means.
Philippine Savings Bank and Pascual Garcia III v. Senate Impeachment Court, Feb 9, 2012
FACTS:
Philippine Savings Bank (PS Bank) and its President, Pascual M. Garcia III, filed before
the Supreme Court an original civil action for certiorari and prohibition with application
for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. The TRO was
sought to stop the Senate, sitting as impeachment court, from further implementing
the Subpoena Ad TestificandumetDucesTecum, dated February 6, 2012, that it issued
against the Branch Manager of PS Bank, Katipunan Branch. The subpoena assailed by
petitioners covers the foreign currency denominated accounts allegedly owned by the
impeached Chief Justice Renato Corona of the Philippine Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Should the TRO be issued to the impeachment court to enjoin it from further implementing
the subpoena with respect to the alleged foreign currency denominated accounts of CJ Corona?
HELD: YES, a TRO should be issued against the impeachment court to enjoin it from further
implementing the subpoena with respect to the alleged foreign currency denominated
accounts of CJ Corona.
There are two requisite conditions for the issuance of a preliminary injunction:
A clear right to maintain the confidentiality of the foreign currency deposits of the Chief
Justice is provided under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, otherwise known as the Foreign
Currency Deposit Act of the Philippines (RA 6426). This law establishes the absolute confidentiality
of foreign currency deposits:
Under R.A. No. 6426 there is only a single exception to the secrecy of foreign currency
deposits, that is, disclosure is allowed only upon the written permission of the depositor. In Intengan
v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that where the accounts in question are U.S. dollar deposits, the
applicable law is not Republic Act No. 1405 but RA 6426. Similarly, in the recent case
of Government Service Insurance System v. 15thDivision of the Court of Appeals, the Court also held
that RA 6426 is the applicable law for foreign currency deposits and not Republic Act No. 1405. xxx.
Facts:
During the impeachment proceedings against Chief Justice Corona, the prosecution Panel
manifested in a COMPLIANCE that it would present about 100 witnesses which included
Justices of the Supreme Court, and Court officials and employees who will testify on matters
internal to the Court and almost a thousand documents
Letters were sent to the SC asking for the examination of records, and the issuance of
certified true copies of the rollosand the Agenda and Minutes of the Deliberationsof various
cases decided by the SC for purposes of the Impeachment Complaint. Subpoena Ad
TestificandumetDucesTecumAnd Subpoena Ad Testificandum were also issued against Clerks of
Court of the SC.
Held:
The Internal Rules of the Supreme Court (IRSC) prohibits the disclosure of
(1) the result of the raffle of cases,
(2) the actions taken by the Court on each case included in the agenda of the Courts session,
(3) the deliberations of the Members in court sessions on cases and matters pending before
it.
Under the law, therefore, the Members of the Court may not be compelled to testify in the
impeachment proceedings against the Chief Justice or other Members of the Court about
information they acquired in the performance of their official function of adjudication,
such as information on how deliberations were conducted or the material inputs that the
justices used in decision-making, because the end-result would be the disclosure of
confidential information that could subject them to criminal prosecution.Such act violates
judicial privilege (or the equivalent of executive privilege) as it pertains to the exercise of the
constitutional mandate of adjudication.
Party List
Ang Bagong Bayani v. COMELEC, 359 SCRA 698 (2001)
VC Cadangen, et al v. COMELEC, GR No. 177179, June 5, 2009
Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC, 342 SCRA 244 (2000)
Partido v. COMELEC, GR No. 164702, March 15, 2006
Lokin, Jr. v. COMELEC, GR Nos. 179431-32, June 22, 2010
AtongPaglaum, Inc. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013
PGBI v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190529, April 29, 2010
Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190582, April 8,2010
ANAD v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206987, September 10, 2013
Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens v. COMELEC, G.R. 206844-45, July 23, 2013
Bello v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 191998, December 7,2010
ABC v. COMELEC, GR. No. 193256, March 22, 2011
AbangLingkod Party-List v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206952, October 22, 2013
Cocofed-Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207026,
August 6, 2013
Milagros Amores v. HRET, G.R. No. 189600, June 29, 2010
Section 19. Constitutions of the Electoral Tribunal and the Commission on Appointments
ISSUE: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may
prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
RULING: The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in
determining that the return of the Former Pres. Marcos and his family poses a serious threat to national
interest and welfare. President Aquino has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of
the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years after the Marcos regime.
Estrada v. Desierto, 353 SCRA 452, 2001; MR, 356 SCRA 108, 2001
FACTS: It began in October 2000 when allegations of wrong doings involving bribe-taking,
illegal gambling, and other forms of corruption were made against Estrada before the Senate
Blue Ribbon Committee. On November 13, 2000, Estrada was impeached by the Hor and, on
December 7, impeachment proceedings were begun in the Senate during which more serious
allegations of graft and corruption against Estrada were made. Subsequently, SC declared that
the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada constructively resigned his post.
Erap, after his fall, filed petition for prohibition with prayer for WPI. It sought to enjoin the
respondent Ombudsman from conducting any further proceedings in cases filed against him not
until his term as president ends.
ISSUE: WoN the former President enjoys immunity from suit.
RULING: The cases filed against Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder,
bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially
plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-
sitting president. He cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to commit
criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. The rule is that
unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not
acting as such but stands in the same footing as any trespasser.
Rodriguez was abducted by military men and was tortured repeatedly when he refused to
confess to his membership in the NPA. When released, he filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo and
and Petition for the Writ of Habeas Data with Prayers for Protection Orders, Inspection of Place, and
Production of Documents and Personal Properties. The petition was filed against former Pres. Arroyo, et
al. The writs were granted but the CA dropped Pres Arroyo as party-respondent, as she may not be sued
in any case during her tenure of office or actual incumbency.
Issue:
1. Whether former Pres GMA should be dropped as respondent on the basis of presidential
immunity from suit
2. Whether the doctrine of command responsibility can be used in amparo and habeas data cases.
3. Whether the president, as commander-in-chief of the military, can be held responsible or
accountable for extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.
4. Whether Rodriguez has proven through substantial evidence that former President Arroyo is
responsible or accountable for his abduction.
Held:
1. No. It bears stressing that since there is no determination of administrative, civil or criminal
liability in amparo and habeas data proceedings, courts can only go as far as ascertaining
responsibility or accountability for the enforced disappearance or extrajudicial killing.
As was held in the case of Estrada v Desierto, a non-sitting President does not enjoy immunity
from suit, even for acts committed during the latters tenure; that courts should look with disfavor
upon the presidential privilege of immunity, especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs
the vindication of a right. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission also reveal that the intent
of the framers is clear that presidential immunity from suit is concurrent only with his tenure and not his
term. (The term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and
fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another. The tenure represents
the term during which the incumbent actually holds office. The tenure may be shorter than the term for
reasons within or beyond the power of the incumbent.) Therefore, former Pres. GMA cannot use such
immunity to shield herself from judicial scrutiny that would assess whether, within the context
of amparo proceedings, she was responsible or accountable for the abduction of Rodriguez.
Precisely in the case at bar, the doctrine of command responsibility may be used to determine
whether respondents are accountable for and have the duty to address the abduction of Rodriguez in
order to enable the courts to devise remedial measures to protect his rights. Clearly, nothing precludes
this Court from applying the doctrine of command responsibility in amparo proceedings to ascertain
responsibility and accountability in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.
In other words, command responsibility may be loosely applied in amparo cases in order to identify
those accountable individuals that have the power to effectively implement whatever processes an
amparo court would issue. In such application, the amparo court does not impute criminal responsibility
but merely pinpoint the superiors it considers to be in the best position to protect the rights of the
aggrieved party. Such identification of the responsible and accountable superiors may well be a
preliminary determination of criminal liability which, of course, is still subject to further investigation by
the appropriate government agency.
Thus, although there is no determination of criminal, civil or administrative liabilities, the doctrine of
command responsibility may nevertheless be applied to ascertain responsibility and accountability
within these foregoing definitions.
3. Yes.
To hold someone liable under the doctrine of command responsibility, the following elements must
obtain:
a. the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the accused as superior and the
perpetrator of the crime as his subordinate;
b. the superior knew or had reason to know that the crime was about to be or had been
committed; and
c. the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the criminal
acts or punish the perpetrators thereof.84
The president, being the commander-in-chief of all armed forces, necessarily possesses control over the
military that qualifies him as a superior within the purview of the command responsibility doctrine.
4. No. Rodriguez anchors his argument on a general allegation that on the basis of the "Melo
Commission" and the "Alston Report," respondents in G.R. No. 191805 already had knowledge
of and information on, and should have known that a climate of enforced disappearances had
been perpetrated on members of the NPA. Without even attaching, or at the very least, quoting
these reports, Rodriguez contends that the Melo Report points to rogue military men as the
perpetrators. While the Alston Report states that there is a policy allowing enforced
disappearances and pins the blame on the President, we do not automatically impute
responsibility to former President Arroyo for each and every count of forcible disappearance.
Aside from Rodriguezs general averments, there is no piece of evidence that could establish her
responsibility or accountability for his abduction. Neither was there even a clear attempt to
show that she should have known about the violation of his right to life, liberty or security, or
that she had failed to investigate, punish or prevent it.
Beltran is among the petitioners in this case. He together with others was charged for libel by the
president. Cory herself filed a complaint-affidavit against him and others.
Makasiar averred that Cory cannot file a complaint affidavit because this would defeat her
immunity from suit. He grounded his contention on the principle that a president cannot be sued.
However, if a president would sue then the president would allow herself to be placed under the
courts jurisdiction and conversely she would be consenting to be sued back. Also, considering
the functions of a president, the president may not be able to appear in court to be a witness for
herself thus she may be liable for contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not the President, under the Constitution, may initiate criminal proceedings against
the petitioners through the filing of a complaint-affidavit?
HELD: The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the
exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that
being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office-holders
time, also demands undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be
invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the Presidents behalf. Thus, an
accused like Beltran et al, in a criminal case in which the President is complainant cannot raise the
presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. Thus,
if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the courts
jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the Presidents
prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person.
ISSUE: Whether respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in implementing E.O. 464
RULING: Yes. Since the Congress has authority to inquire into the operations of the executive
branch, it would be inconsistent to hold that the power of inquiry does not extend to executive
officials who are the most familiar with and informed on the executive operations, although there
are exemptions to the power of inquiry which fall under the rubric of executive privilege. The
executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or the public, is recognized
only in relation to certain types of information of a sensitive character. Executive privilege per
se is not meant to cover up embarrassing information. It is a relative concept, the validity of its
assertion to a great extent depends upon the political situation of the country.
HELD: YES.
Whether a claim of executive privilege is valid depends on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in
which it is made.
In the present case, the ground for respondents claim of privilege is set forth in their Comment, viz:
x x x The categories of information that may be considered privileged includes matters of diplomatic character
and under negotiation and review. In this case, the privileged character of the diplomatic negotiations has been
categorically invoked and clearly explained by respondents particularly respondent DTI Senior
Undersecretary.
The documents on the proposed JPEPA as well as the text which is subject to negotiations and legal review by
the parties fall under the exceptions to the right of access to information on matters of public concern and
policy of public disclosure. They come within the coverage of executive privilege.At the timewhen the
Committee was requesting for copies of such documents, the negotiations were ongoing as they are still now
and the text of the proposed JPEPA is still uncertain and subject to change. Considering the status and
nature of such documents then and now, these are evidently covered by executive privilege consistent with
existing legal provisions and settled jurisprudence.
In executive privilege controversies, the requirement that parties present a sufficient showing of
need only means, in substance, that they should show a public interest in favor of disclosure
sufficient in degree to overcome the claim of privilege. Verily, the Court in such cases engages
in a balancing of interests. Such a balancing of interests is certainly not new in constitutional
adjudication involving fundamental
Thus, we hold that the balance in this case tilts in favor of executive privilege.
The privileged character of diplomatic negotiations has been recognized in this jurisdiction. In
discussing valid limitations on the right to information, the Court in Chavez v. PCGG held that
information on inter-government exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive
agreements may be subject to reasonable safeguards for the sake of national interest.
Applying the principles adopted in PMPF v. Manglapus, it is clear that while the final text of the
JPEPA may not be kept perpetually confidential since there should be ample opportunity for
discussion before [a treaty] is approved the offers exchanged by the parties during the
negotiations continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA is published. It is reasonable to
conclude that the Japanese representatives submitted their offers with the understanding that
historic confidentiality would govern the same. Disclosing these offers could impair the ability
of the Philippines to deal not only with Japan but with other foreign governments in future
negotiations.
A ruling that Philippine offers in treaty negotiations should not be open to public scrutiny would
discourage future Philippine representatives from frankly expressing their views during
negotiations. While, on first impression, it appears wise to deter Philippine representatives from
entering into compromises, it bears noting that treaty negotiations, or any negotiation for that
matter, normally involve a process of quid pro quo, and oftentimes negotiators have to be willing
to grant concessions in an area of lesser importance in order to obtain more favorable terms in an
area of greater national interest.
Diplomatic negotiations, therefore, are recognized as privileged in this jurisdiction, the JPEPA
negotiations constituting no exception. It bears emphasis, however, that such privilege is only
presumptive. For as Senate v. Ermita holds, recognizing a type of information as privileged does
not mean that it will be considered privileged in all instances. Only after a consideration of the
context in which the claim is made may it be determined if there is a public interest that calls for
the disclosure of the desired information, strong enough to overcome its traditionally privileged
status.
To recapitulate, petitioners demand to be furnished with a copy of the full text of the JPEPA has
become moot and academic, it having been made accessible to the public since September 11,
2006. As for their demand for copies of the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the
JPEPA negotiations, the same must be denied, respondents claim of executive privilege being
valid.
Neri v. Senate, G.R. 180643, March 25, 2008; MR, Sept. 4, 2008
FACTS: This is in relation to the NBN-ZTE scandal that erupted during the time of Pres. Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo. On September 26, 2007, petitioner appeared before three Senate committees
and testified for about eleven (11) hours on matters concerning the National Broadband Project
(NBN) a project awarded by the Department of Transportation and Communications to Zhong
Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE). Neri disclosed that then Comelec Chairman
Benjamin Abalos offered him P200 Million in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He
further narrated that he informed President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo of the bribery attempt and
that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on President
Arroyo and Neris discussions relating to the NBN Project, he refused to answer, invoking
"executive privilege." Neri refused to answer questions on: (a) whether or not President Arroyo
followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether
or not she directed him to approve it.
Neri was once again invited by the Senate to testify, but Exec. Sec. Ermita asked the Senate to
dispense with Neris testimony on the ground of executive privilege. The Senate refused. Neri,
failing to appear before the Senate in subsequent hearings,was then cited in contempt.
Issue: W/N the contempt citing against Neri was proper considering his invocation of executive
privilege
Held: NO. The type of executive privilege exercised here was presidential communication
privilege. Presidential communication is presumptively privileged, but subject to rebuttal. In
other words, whoever seeks to challenge this privilege must show valid reasons related to public
good. In this case, the Supreme Court came to the decision that the Senate failed to show a valid
reason to controvert the privilege.
Province of North Cotabato v. Government, G.R. No. 183591, Oct. 14, 2008
Facts: On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement of the Ancestral Domain
Aspect of the GRP - MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The
authority of the GRP Negotiating Panel is defined by Executive Order No. 3 (E.O. No. 3), issued
on February 28, 2001.
Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, the petitioners seek to compel respondents
to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MA-AD and to prohibit the slated
signing of the MOA-AD and the holding of public consultation thereon. They also pray that the MOA-
AD be declared unconstitutional. The Court issued a TRO enjoining the GRP from signing the same.
Issue: May executive privilege be invoked by the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process Hermogenes
Esperon to withhold information on the MOA-AD from the public?
Held: NO. The invocation of the doctrine of executive privilege it is not tenable under the premises. The
argument defies sound reason when contrasted with E.O. No. 3s explicit provisions on continuing
consultation and dialogue on both national and local levels. The executive order even recognizes the
exercise of the publics right even before the GRP makes its official recommendations or before the
government proffers its definite propositions. It bear emphasis that E.O. No. 3 seeks to elicit relevant
advice, information, comments and recommendations from the people through dialogue.
In any case, respondents effectively waived the defense of executive privilege in view of their unqualified
disclosure of the official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD.
FACTS:
President Ramos vetoed some of the provisions in RA 7663 (the General Appropriations Act of
1994), of which issues of constitutionality were raised before the Supreme Court.
PhilConsA prayed for a writ of prohibition to declare unconstitutional and void a.) Art 16 on the
Countrywide Development Fund and b.) The veto of the President of the Special provision of Art
XLVIII of the GAA of 1994.
16 members of the Senate sought the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
against the Exec. Secretary, the Sec of Dept of Budget and Management and the National Treasurer
and questions: 1.) Constitutionality of the conditions imposed by the President in the items of the
GAA of 1994 and 2.) the constitutionality of the veto of the special provision in the appropriation for
debt services.
Senators Tanada and Romulo sought the issuance of the writs of prohibition and mandamus against
the same respondents. Petitioners contest the constitutionality of: 1.) veto on four special provisions
added to items in the GAA of 1994 for the AFP and DPWH; and 2.) the conditions imposed by the
President in the implementation of certain appropriations for the CAFGUs, DPWH, and Natl
Highway Authority.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the veto of the president on four special provisions is constitutional and valid?
HELD:
1. Special Provision on Debt Ceiling Congress provided for a debt-ceiling. Vetoed by the Pres. w/o
vetoing the entire appropriation for debt service. The said provisions are germane to & have direct
relation w/ debt service. They are appropriate provisions & cannot be vetoed w/o vetoing the entire
item/appropriation. VETO VOID.
2. Special Provision on Revolving Funds for SCUs said provision allows for the use of income &
creation of revolving fund for SCUs. Provision for Western Visayas State Univ. & Leyte State
Colleges vetoed by Pres. Other SCUs enjoying the privilege do so by existing law. Pres. merely
acted in pursuance to existing law. VETO VALID.
3. Special Provision on Road Maintenance Congress specified 30% ratio fo works for maintenance
of roads be contracted according to guidelines set forth by DPWH. Vetoed by the Pres. w/o vetoing
the entire appropriation. It is not an inappropriate provision; it is not alien to the subj. of road
maintenance & cannot be veoted w/o vetoing the entire appropriation. VETO VOID.
4. Special Provision on Purchase of Military Equip. AFP modernization, prior approval of Congress
required before release of modernization funds. It is the so-called legislative veto. Any prov. blocking
an admin.action in implementing a law or requiring legislative approval must be subj. of a separate
law. VETO VALID.
5. Special Provision on Use of Savings for AFP Pensions allows Chief of Staff to augment pension
funds through the use of savings. According to the Consttution, only the Pres. may exercise such
power pursuant to a specific law. Properly vetoed.VETO VALID.
6. Special Provision on Conditions for de-activation of CAFGUs use of special fund for the
compensation of the said CAFGUs. Vetoed, Pres. requires his prior approval. It is also an
amendment to existing law (PD No. 1597 & RA No. 6758). A provision in an appropriation act cannot
be used to repeal/amend existing laws. VETO VALID.
Section 2. Qualifications
Tecson v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 161434, March 3, 2004
FACTS:
The issue of citizenship is brought up to challenge the qualifications of a presidential
candidate to hold the highest office of the land.
On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe,
Jr. (hereinafter FPJ), filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of
the Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP);
In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines, stated his name to be Fernando Jr., or Ronald Allan Poe, his date of
birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila;
Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner, filed a case to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or
to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born
Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his
mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a
Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject;
Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not
have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of
an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of respondent on
two assertionsfirst, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita
Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such prior marriage
had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of
respondent.
Documents presented by petitioner:
1. certificate of birth of FPJ
2. certified photocopy of an affidavit executed in Spanish by Paulita Poe y
Gomez attesting to her having filed a case for bigamy and concubinage
against the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, after discovering his
bigamous relationship with Bessie Kelley
3. English translation of the affidavit aforesaid
4. a certification issued by the Director of the Records Management and
Archives Office, attesting to the fact that there was no record in the
National Archives that a Lorenzo Poe or Lorenzo Pou resided or entered
the Philippines before 1907, among others.
Documents presented by FPJ:
1. a copy of the purported marriage contract between Fernando Pou and
Bessie Kelley,
2. a certification issued by the City Civil Registrar of San Carlos City,
Pangasinan, stating that the records of birth in the said office during the
period of from 1900 until May 1946 were totally destroyed during World
War II.
ISSUE: Is Fernando Poe, Jr., the hero of silver screen, and now one of the main contenders for
the presidency, a natural-born Filipino or is he not?
HELD:
The term natural-born citizens, is defined to include those who are citizens of the Philippines
from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine
citizenship.
The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939 during the regime of
the 1935 Constitution.
Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines.
Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of Customs29 (1912), did not last long. With the adoption of the
1935 Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor30 (1947),
jus sanguinis or blood relationship would now become the primary basis of
citizenship by birth.
Documentary evidence adduced by petitioner would tend to indicate that the earliest established
direct ascendant of FPJ was his paternal grandfather Lorenzo Pou, married to Marta Reyes, the
father of Allan F. Poe.
While the record of birth of Lorenzo Pou had not been presented in evidence, his death
certificate, however, identified him to be a Filipino (grandfather), a resident of San Carlos,
Pangasinan, and 84 years old at the time of his death on 11 September 1954.
The certificate of birth of the father of FPJ, Allan F. Poe, showed that he was born on 17 May
1915 to an Espaol father, Lorenzo Pou, and a mestizo Espaol mother, Marta Reyes.
Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some of the entries on the birth
certificate of respondent and the marriage certificate of his parents, the only conclusions that could
be drawn with some degree of certainty from the documents would be that
3. Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16 September, 1940;
The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ, and the
death certificate of Lorenzo Pou are documents of public record in the custody of a public
officer.
Section 3, Rule 130, Rules of Court states that (BEST EVIDENCE RULE)
Original document must be produced; exceptions.When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the
following cases:
xxx x xx x xx
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public office or is recorded in a public
office.
Being public documents, the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou, the marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe
and Bessie Kelly, and the birth certificate of FPJ, constitute prima facie proof of their contents
Petitioner, however, likewise failed to show that Lorenzo Pou was at any other place during the
same period. In his death certificate, the residence of Lorenzo Pou was stated to be San Carlos,
Pangasinan. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it should be sound to conclude,
or at least to presume, that the place of residence of a person at the time of his death was
also his residence before death. It would be extremely doubtful if the Records Management and
Archives Office would have had complete records of all residents of the Philippines from 1898 to
1902.
Petitioner submits, in any case, that in establishing filiation (relationship or civil status of the
child to the father [or mother]) or paternity (relationship or civil status of the father to the
child) of an illegitimate child, FPJ evidently being an illegitimate son according to petitioner,
the mandatory rules under civil law must be used.
Under the Civil Code of Spain, acknowledgment was required to establish filiation or paternity.
Acknowledgment was either judicial (compulsory) or voluntary. Judicial or compulsory
acknowledgment was possible only if done during the lifetime of the putative parent; voluntary
acknowledgment could only be had in a record of birth, a will, or a public document
The Civil Code or Family Code provisions on proof of filiation or paternity, although good law, do not
have preclusive effects on matters alien to personal and family relations.
The ordinary rules on evidence could well and should govern.
In order that the birth certificate could then be utilized to prove voluntary acknowledgment of
filiation or paternity, the certificate was required to be signed or sworn to by the father
In the birth certificate of respondent FPJ, presented by both parties, nowhere in the document
was the signature of Allan F. Poe found
What is the relevance of legitimacy or illegitimacy to elective public service? What possible state
interest can there be for disqualifying an illegitimate child from becoming a public officer. It was
not the fault of the child that his parents had illicit liaison. Why deprive the child of the fullness
of political rights for no fault of his own? To disqualify an illegitimate child from holding an
important public office is to punish him for the indiscretion of his parents. There is neither
justice nor rationality in that. And if there is neither justice nor rationality in the distinction, then
the distinction transgresses the equal protection clause and must be reprobated.
But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor
enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in
his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus
Election Code. Petitioner has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the Court,
notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to present their position and
evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been material misrepresentation, which, as
so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, must not only be material, but also
deliberate and willful.
On certiorari, the SC reversed the ruling and held (9-6 votes) that Poe is qualified as a candidate
for Presidency. Three justices, however, abstained to vote on the natural-born citizenship issue.
Issue 1: WON the COMELEC has jurisdiction to rule on the issue of qualifications of
candidates?
Held:
No. Article IX-C, Sec 2 of the Constitution provides for the powers and functions of the
COMELEC, and deciding on the qualifications or lack thereof of a candidate is not one among
them.
In contrast, the Constitution provides that only the SET and HRET tribunals have sole
jurisdiction over the election contests, returns, and qualifications of their respective members,
whereas over the President and Vice President, only the SC en banc has sole jurisdiction. As for
the qualifications of candidates for such positions, the Constitution is silent. There is simply no
authorized proceeding in determining the ineligibility of candidates before elections. Such lack
of provision cannot be supplied by a mere rule, and for the COMELEC to assimilate grounds for
ineligibility into grounds for disqualification in Rule 25 in its rules of procedures would be
contrary to the intent of the Constitution.
Hence, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it decided on the qualification
issue of Grace as a candidate in the same case for cancellation of her COC.
Held:Yes, Grace Poe might be and is considerably a natural-born Filipino. For that, she satisfies
one of the constitutional requirements that only natural-born Filipinos may run for presidency.
First, there is a high probability that Grace Poes parents are Filipinos. Her physical features
are typical of Filipinos. The fact that she was abandoned as an infant in a municipality where the
population of the Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would be more than
99% chance that a child born in such province is a Filipino is also a circumstantial evidence of
her parents nationality. That probability and the evidence on which it is based are admissible
under Rule 128, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. To assume otherwise is to accept
the absurd, if not the virtually impossible, as the norm.
Second, by votes of 7-5, the SC pronounced that foundlings are as a class, natural-born
citizens. This is based on the finding that the deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional
Convention show that the framers intended foundlings to be covered by the enumeration.
While the 1935 Constitutions enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive
language which would definitely exclude foundlings either. Because of silence and
ambiguity in the enumeration with respect to foundlings, the SC felt the need to examine
the intent of the framers.
Third, that foundlings are automatically conferred with natural-born citizenship is supported by
treaties and the general principles of international law. Although the Philippines is not a
signatory to some of these treaties, it adheres to the customary rule to presume foundlings as
having born of the country in which the foundling is found.
Grace Poes domicile had been timely changed as of May 24, 2005, and not on July 18, 2006
when her application under RA 9225 was approved by the BI. COMELECs reliance on cases
which decree that an aliens stay in the country cannot be counted unless she acquires a
permanent resident visa or reacquires her Filipino citizenship is without merit. Such cases are
different from the circumstances in this case, in which Grace Poe presented an overwhelming
evidence of her actual stay and intent to abandon permanently her domicile in the US. Coupled
with her eventual application to reacquire Philippine citizenship and her familys actual
continuous stay in the Philippines over the years, it is clear that when Grace Poe returned on May
24, 2005, it was for good.
Issue 4: W/N the Grace Poes candidacy should be denied or cancelled for committing material
misrepresentations in her COC
Held:
No. The COMELEC cannot cancel her COC on the ground that she misrepresented facts as to
her citizenship and residency because such facts refer to grounds for ineligibility in which the
COMELEC has no jurisdiction to decide upon. Only when there is a prior authority finding that
a candidate is suffering from a disqualification provided by law or the Constitution that the
COMELEC may deny due course or cancel her candidacy on ground of false representations
regarding her qualifications.
In this case, by authority of the Supreme Court Grace Poe is now pronounced qualified as a
candidate for the presidency. Hence, there cannot be any false representations in her COC
regarding her citizenship and residency
ISSUE: Does Section 18.5 of the same law empowering the COMELEC to proclaim the winning
candidates for national offices and party list representatives including the President and the Vice-
President violate the constitutional mandate under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution that
the winning candidates for President and the Vice-President shall be proclaimed as winners by
Congress?
HELD: It violates.
Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 appears to be repugnant to Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution only insofar as said Section totally disregarded the authority given to
Congress by the Constitution to proclaim the winning candidates for the positions of
president and vice-president.
Congress could not have allowed the COMELEC to usurp a power that constitutionally
belongs to it or, as aptly stated by petitioner, to encroach on the power of Congress to
canvass the votes for president and vice-president and the power to proclaim the winners
for the said positions.
The provisions of the Constitution as the fundamental law of the land should be read as
part of The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 and hence, the canvassing of the votes
and the proclamation of the winning candidates for president and vice-president for the
entire nation must remain in the hands of Congress.
Section 4 of R.A. No. 9189 provides that the overseas absentee voter may vote for president,
vice-president, senators and party-list representatives.
18. 5 The canvass of votes shall not cause the delay of the proclamation of
a winning candidate if the outcome of the election will not be affected by the results
thereof. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Commission is empowered to order the
proclamation of winning candidates despite the fact that the scheduled election has not
taken place in a particular country or countries, xxxxx
Petitioner claims that the provision of Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 empowering the
COMELEC to order the proclamation of winning candidates insofar as it affects the canvass of
votes and proclamation of winning candidates for president and vice-president, is
unconstitutional because it violates the following provisions of paragraph 4, Section 4 of
Article VII of the Constitution:
SEC. 4: The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly
certified by the board of canvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted to the
Congress, directed to the President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of
canvass, the President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the
election, open all the certificates in the presence of the Senate and the House of
Representatives in joint public session, and the Congress, upon determination of the
authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass the
votes.
The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but in case two
or more shall have an equal and highest number of votes, one of them shall forthwith be
chosen by the vote of a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting
separately.
The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates which
gives to Congress the duty to canvass the votes and proclaim the winning candidates
for president and vice-president.
- Rep. Ruy Elias Lopez filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus seeking to nullify
Sec VIII, Rule 13 of the Rules of the Joint Session of Congress
- Said rule created a Joint Committee that would be in charge of preliminary canvass of
votes for the President and Vice-Presidential elections in 2004
- Accdg to Lopez, the creation of the Joint Canvassing Committee constitutes grave abuse
and deprives him and other member of Congress of their Congressional prerogatives
ISSUE: W/N the creation of the Joint Canvassing Committee constitutes grave abuse on the part
of both houses of Congress
HELD: NO. Sec 4 Art VII of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides that Congress has the
power to promulgate its rules for the canvassing of certificates. Thus, the creation of the Joint
Canvassing Committee is well within the powers granted to Congress by the Constitution with
regard to canvassing. Further, the judiciary has no power to review the internal proceedings of
Congress absent a clear violation of the Constitution, which has not been shown in this case.
- Senator Aquilino Pimentel Jr., assails the validity of the existence of the Joint Congressional
Committee, which sought to determine the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of
canvass and preliminary canvass of the votes cast for President and Vice-President during the
2004 National Elections
- Accdg to Pimentel, Congress had already adjourned sine die on June 11, 2004, and since the Joint
Canvassing Committee was constituted after this date, its acts were without any effect, as starting
June 11, 2004 the Twelfth Congress had already passed out of legal existence
- Pimentel uses as basis for his position Sec 15 Art 6 of the 1987 Constitution, which states that
Congress shall convene once every year on the fourth Monday of July for its regular session,
unless a different date is fixed by law, and shall continue to be in session for such number of days
as it may determine
Issue: W/N the Joint Canvassing Committees existence is null and void
Held: NO. Section 15, Article VI of the Constitution cited by petitioner does not pertain to the term of
Congress, but to its regular annual legislative sessions and the mandatory 30-day recess before the
opening of its next regular session.
The joint public session of both Houses of Congress convened by express directive of Section 4, Article
VII of the Constitution to canvass the votes for and to proclaim the newly elected President and Vice-
President cannot adjourn sine die until it has accomplished its constitutionally mandated tasks. For
only when a board of canvassers has completed its functions is it rendered functus officio. Its membership
may change, but it retains its authority as a board until it has accomplished its purposes.
Macalintal argues that Presidential Electoral Tribunal is unconstitutional on the ground that Sec 4, Art VII
of the Constitution does not provide for the creation of the PET.
The Solicitor General maintains that the constitution of the PET is on firm footing on the basis of the
grant of authority to the Supreme Court to be the sole judge of all election contests for the President or
Vice-President under par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not PET is constitutional.
Held: YES. The explicit reference of the Members of the Constitutional Commission to a Presidential
Electoral Tribunal, with Fr. Joaquin Bernas categorically declaring that in crafting the last paragraph of
Sec. 4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution, they constitutionalized what was statutory. Judicial power
granted to the Supreme Court by the same Constitution is plenary. And under the doctrine of necessary
implication, the additional jurisdiction bestowed by the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution to decide presidential and vice-presidential elections contests includes the means necessary
to carry it into effect.
Although the method by which the Supreme Court exercises this authority is not specified in the
provision, the grant of power does not contain any limitation on the Supreme Courts exercise thereof.
The Supreme Courts method of deciding presidential and vice-presidential election contests, through the
PET, is actually a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional
provision.
Fernando Poe, Jr. v. Arroyo, PET Case No. 002, March 29, 2005
- Ronald Allan Poe, aka Fernando Poe, Jr., filed a protest with the PET, alleging that he
was cheated in the Presidential Election of 2004, where he lost to Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo
- During the pendency of the protest, FPJ died of cardio-pulmonary arrest
- His widow, Jesusa Sonora Poe (Susan Roces) filed a Petition/Motion to Intervene as a
Substitute for Deceased Protestant
- Accdg to Roces, the death of the protestant does not constitute a ground for the dismissal
of the protestor or oust the tribunal of its jurisdiction
- Roces acknowledged that she cannot succeed FPJ as President should he be declared the
true winner of the elections, but stressed that she wanted to intervene to find out the true
will of the electorate, as a service to the Filipino people
- Arroyo countered that the PET rules provided that only the second or third-placed
candidate in the Presidential election may file a protest
ISSUE: W/N Roces may be allowed to substitute for her late husband as protestant
HELD: NO. The PET has no rules regarding intervention or substitution, but it allows for the
analogous and suppletory application of the Rules of Court and decisions of the Supreme Court
and the Electoral Tribunals, pursuant to its rule-making power under Sec 4 Art VII of the 1987
Constitution:
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its
rules for the purpose.
In this vein, the PET adopted Rule 3 Sec 16 of the Rules of Court, where substitution by a legal
representative is allowed, but only when the legal representative is a real party-in-interest.
Applying said rule to an election contest, the PET said that a public office is personal to the
public officer and not a property transmissible to the heirs upon death.
Roces petition for intervention was thus denied. The protest was also dismissed for failure of a
real party-in-interest to sustain the protest within the allowed time.
Legarda v. De Castro, PET Case No. 003, March 31, 2005
- Loren Legarda filed an election protest, alleging that the results of the Vice-Presidential election
in 2004 did not accurately reflect the will of the electorate, and that her opponent, Noli de Castro,
had been holding the position of Vice-President without basis
- The Supreme Court, sitting as the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, confirmed its jurisdiction over
the protest and ordered concerned officials to undertake measures for the protection and
preservation of the ballots and election documents
- De Castro assailed the authority of the PET to re-canvass the election returns and to correct
manifest errors in the election returns and certificates of canvass, arguing that these were
ministerial functions which ought to be performed by a canvassing body
ISSUE: W/N the PET may re-canvass election returns and correct manifest errors in election returns
HELD: YES. The constitutional function as well as the power and the duty to be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualification of the President and Vice-President is expressly
vested in the PET, in Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution. Included therein is the duty to correct
manifest errors in the Statements of Votes and Certificates of Canvass. Likewise, although Rule 61 of the
PET Rules only pertains to revision of ballots, nothing therein prevents the Tribunal from allowing or
including the correction of manifest errors, pursuant to the Tribunals rule-making power under Section 4,
Article VII of the Constitution.
FACTS:
o Protestant Miriam Defensor-Santiago (Miriam) ran for President in the 1992 elections
and lost against Fidel V. Ramos (Ramos).
o Miriam prayed that the revision of ballots1 in the remaining precincts of the pilot areas be
dispensed with and the revision process in the pilot areas be deemed completed.
o The Supreme Court deferred its action on that motion and required Miriam and Ramos
(protestee) to submit their respective memoranda on the issue of whether or not the
case has been rendered moot and academic by the election of Miriam as a Senator
in the May 1995 election and her assumption of office on June 30, 1995.
o Miriam's side: NO. They should decide on the election contest because:
Election contest confirms the true choice of the electorate.
The case at hand is imbued with public interest.
It is only moot if the term of office has expired.
Her election as Senator and assumption of office does not mean she abandoned
the protest.
The Court has abandoned the view that just because a case has been declared
moot, it should be dismissed.
1Basically means that in an electoral protest, the protestant is entitled for a "review" of ballots to determine whether or not s/he has
a chance of winning based on 20% of the findings of said revision. It also means that they will be segregated into contested and
uncontested ballots.
Miriam referred to 3 cases to bolster her arguments:
1. Sibulo vda. de De Mesa vs. Mencias - the death of the protestee did not
stop the proceedings in the protest filed against him. A protest survives
the death of the protestee, and must be prosecuted to final judgment.
2. Lomugdang vs. Javier- If the protest succeeds and the protestee is
unseated = NOT a ground for dismissal of the protest.
3. De Castro vs. Ginete- Just because a losing candidate concedes to the
winner, it doesn't mean that the losing candidate is barred from
questioning the validity of the election of the winner.
4. (Cited by the SC in line with Miriam's cases) Moraleja vs. Relova- The acceptance
by the protestee of an appointment to another position is NOT a ground
for dismissal of the protest.
o SC's rebuttal to Miriam:
The cases she cited does not concur with the case at hand. These are the
differences:
1. Sibulo vda. de De Mesa vs. Mencias - the protestee had been proclaimed
as the winner and assumed office, and then DIED when the election
protest was ongoing.
2. Lomugdang vs. Javier- the protestant DIED during the ongoing protest.
3. De Castro vs. Ginete- the protestant congratulated the protestee after the
protestee won.
4. Moraleja vs. Relova-the election protest survived the protestant's
acceptance of TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT during the ongoing election
protest.
o Ramos' side: NO. There is strong legal basis for the PET to rule that Miriam is deemed
to have abandoned the protest because of the ruling in Dimaporo vs. Mitra. They
should decide on the election contest because:
Public interest requires that the protest must be resolved because a) it involves a
matter of paramount and grave public interest, and b) the protest was filed in bad
faith.
A resolution of the case would confirm his victory in the 1992 Presidential
elections and prove that Miriam's protest is unfounded.
Resolving the case would establish guiding and controlling principles or doctrines
with respect to presidential election protest cases, thereby educating the bench
and the bar and prevent the indiscriminate filing of baseless protest cases.
o SC's rebuttal to Ramos:
SC doesn't accept his view that just because Miriam filed her certificate of
candidacy, Miriam forfeited her claim to the office of the President.
Dimaporo case does not apply to Miriam.
There is no logic to Ramos' reasoning that the case should be resolved becaue
of bad faith. Also, there is no reason to proceed with the case just to establish
guidelines regarding election protests involving the office of the President or the
Vice-President.
1) WON this case has been rendered moot by the election of Miriam as a Senator in the
May 1995 election and her assumption of office on June 30, 1995?
YES.
Miriam ran for Senator in the 1995 elections without any qualification, condition
or reservation. This means that her running was not conditional based on any
circumstances (e.g. her pending presidential election protest) and that she was
fully prepared to enter into a political contract with the electorate to serve as a
Senator.
SC cited the case of Moraleja (see case 4 in the cases cited above), saying she
abandoned her "determination to protect and pursue the public interest involved
in the matter of who is the real choice of the electorate". In short, in assuming the
office of Senator, Miriam abandoned and withdrew her protest.
The Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal cite 5 instances in dismissing an
electoral protest. The SC reasoned that if you can dismiss a protest on
TECHNICAL grounds (like the Rules), it can also be dismissed for a stronger
reason (Miriam running and winning as Senator) if it became moot due to Miriam
abandoning the protest (which the SC implies she did when she ran for Senator).
ALSO, the SC says that since Miriam decided to waive her revision of the
remaining ballots from over 4,000 precincts in pilot areas, the SC resolved to: A)
Order the revision of the remaining ballot boxes
B) Require Miriam to inform the Tribunal within 10 days if, in the completion of
the revision of the ballots from her pilot areas, she would present evidence
regarding the revision.
Regarding B, Miriam has not informed the PET about presenting evidence. The
SC took it as an indication that she no longer intended to do so.
SC also said that revision of ballots is NOT a resolution of the said protest.
Hence, a dismissal of the protest is inevitable.
RULING: The Presidential Electoral Tribunal (a.k.a. the SC) resolved to:
DISMISS the election protest because it has been rendered MOOT and ACADEMIC by
the abandonment/withdrawal of Miriam as a consequence of her election and
assumption of office as Senator;
DISMISS, as a consequence, Ramos' counter-protest;
GRANT Miriam's Motion to dispense with the revision of ballots and other election
documents in the remaining precincts of the pilot areas.
Section 5. Oath
In GR No. 146528, the Petition asks the Court to enjoin Joseph Ejercito Estrada "from exercising
the powers and authority of the President under the Constitution" and "to yield the Presidency to
his constitutional successor, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo."
In GR No. 146549, petitioner prays that the Court declare that "the occupation of the Office of
[the President] of the Philippines by Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo is constitutional
and legal with the full support of the Filipino people and other foreign countries.
In GR No. 146579, the Petition asks the Court to issue a "definitive ruling on whether or not
Joseph Estrada is still the President" and, hence. "exempt from all criminal suits."
In GR No. 146631, the Petition prays "that the proclamation and oath-taking of Madame Arroyo
. . . be declared null and void . . ." or that she be "declared acting President and President Joseph
Ejercito Estrada, President-on-leave . . ."
Although the Petition in GR No.146528 labels itself as a "Petition for Prohibition and
Mandamus," it fails to allege, much less show, lack or excess of jurisdiction, or grave abuse of
jurisdiction on the part of "any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person whether exercising
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions," which Rule 65 of the Rules of Court requires to
be alleged and proven before the extra-ordinary writ of prohibition may be issued. Neither have
petitioners sufficiently alleged, much less shown, that respondent or anyone else "unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty," to entitle them
to the writ of mandamus. In any case, petitioners themselves admit that their plea is really one
for declaratory relief, (par. 6.1. of Petition) and that they "fully understand the well-settled
doctrine that this Honorable Court is bereft of jurisdiction to entertain cases for declaratory
relief."
Second, petitioners have no legal standing to file the suits. They have now shown any direct and
personal injury as a result of President Arroyos oath-taking. Specifically, Petitioner Lozanos
alleged interest as a taxpayer is far too detached from the ultimate objective of his Petition:
nullify the oath-taking of Arroyo and declare Estrada as "President-on-leave." The other
petitioners have not even alleged, not to say shown, any prima facie legal interest to qualify them
as proper parties. Kibitzers, however well-meaning, have no locus standi.
Clearly, the herein Petitions have miserably failed to present justiciable controversies brought by
the proper parties to deserve further considerations by this Court.
Section 10. Vacancies in Both the Presidency and the Vice Presidency
Facts: Estrada was inaugurated as president of the Republic of the Philippines on June 30, 1998
with Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as his Vice President.
In October 2000, Ilocos Sur governor Luis Chavit Singson, a close friend of the President,
alleged that he had personally given Estrada money as payoff from jueteng hidden in a bank
account known as Jose Velarde a grassroots-based numbers game. Singsons allegation also
caused controversy across the nation, which culminated in the House of Representatives filing
of an impeachment case against Estrada on November 13, 2000. House Speaker Manny
Villar fast-tracked the impeachment complaint. The impeachment suit was brought to the Senate
and an impeachment court was formed, with Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. as presiding
officer. Estrada, pleaded not guilty.
The expos immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January 18, a crowd continued to grow at
EDSA, bolstered by students from private schools and left-wing organizations. Activists from the
group Bayan and Akbayan as well as lawyers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and other
bar associations joined in the thousands of protesters.
oath of office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA, becoming the 14th president of the
Philippines.
Estrada released a letter saying he had strong and serious doubts about the legality and
constitutionality of her proclamation as president, but saying he would give up his office to
avoid being an obstacle to healing the nation. Estrada and his family later left Malacaang
Palace.
Issue: Whether or not the case at bar a political or justiciable issue. If justiciable, whether or not
petitioner Estrada was a president-on-leave or did he truly resign.
Ruling: The Court made a distinction between the Aquino presidency and the Arroyo
presidency. The Court said that while the Aquino government was a government spawned
by the direct demand of the people in defiance to the 1973 Constitution, overthrowing the
old government entirely, the Arroyo government on the other hand was a government
exercising under the 1987 constitution, wherein only the office of the president was
affected. In the former, it The question of whether the previous president (president
Estrada) truly resigned subjects it to judicial review. The Court held that the issue is legal
and not political.
Issue: Whether or not the act of Doromal would constitute a violation of the Constitution.
Ruling: YES. The presence of a signed document bearing the signature of Doromal as part of the
application to bid shows that he can rightfully be charged with having participated in a business
which act is absolutely prohibited by Section 13 of Article VII of the Constitution" because "the
DITC remained a family corporation in which Doromal has at least an indirect interest."
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "the President, Vice-President, the
members of the Cabinet and their deputies or assistants shall not... during (their) tenure,
...directly or indirectly... participate in any business.
Espiritu v. Del Rosario, GR. No. 204964, 738 SCRA 464, 2014
FACTS:
Del Rosario filed an application for exemption with the Department of Agrarian Reform,
seeking to exempt his lots from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP)
Del Rosario argue that the decision of.then Deputy Executive Secretary Gaite was void
since he had been appointed to the Securities and Exchange Commission two months
prior to the rendering of the decision. Thus, he has already lost his authority as Deputy
Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs when he rendered the said decision since he is
constitutionally prohibited from holding two offices during his tenure.
RULING:
Deputy Executive Secretary Gaite's
decision is presumed valid, effective,
and binding
. . . . (Emphasis supplied)
It is alleged that Gaite was appointed Commissioner to the Securities and Exchange Commission
on March 16, 2009.[40] This, however, is not conclusive since no evidence was presented as to
when he accepted the appointment, took his oath of office, or assumed the position.
Assuming that Gaite's appointment became effective on March 16, 2009, he can be considered
a de facto officer at the time he rendered the decision
A de facto officer is one who derives his appointment from one having colorable authority to
appoint, if the office is an appointive office, and whose appointment is valid on its face.
Assuming that Gaite was a de facto officer of the Office of the President after his appointment to
the Securities and Exchange Commission, any decision he renders during this time is presumed
to be valid, binding, and effective.
With Gaite being a public officer, his acts also enjoy the presumption of regularity, thus: The
presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity
or failure to perform a duty.
Respondent has not presented evidence showing that the decision was rendered ultra vires,
other than her allegation that Gaite had already been appointed to another office.
The Court's view is that during the period stated in Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution the
President is neither required to make appointments to the courts nor allowed to do so; and that
Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII simply mean that the President is required to fill vacancies in
the courts within the time frames provided therein unless prohibited by Section 15 of Article VII.
The appointments of Messrs. Valenzuela and Vallarta on March 30, were unquestionably made
during the period of the ban. While the filling of vacancies in the judiciary is undoubtedly in the
public interest, there is no showing in this case of any compelling reason to justify the making of
the appointments during the period of the ban. On the other hand, as already discussed, there is
a strong public policy for the prohibition against appointments made within the period of the ban.
In view of the foregoing considerations, the Court Resolved to DECLARE VOID the
appointments signed by His Excellency the President under date of March 30, 1998
FACTS: De Rama, mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon, assails 14 appointments made by his predecessor
Abeja. Initially, he cited the appointments as midnight appointments and violative of the
constitutional prohibition on such matters. His assailment was denied by the CSC and was lifted
to the Court of Appeals where it was similarly dismissed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appointments made by the previous mayor are violative on the
prohibition of midnight appointments
HELD: No, the appointments made by then-mayor Abeja are NOT violative on prohibition of
midnight appointments.
De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, GR No. 191002, April 20, 2010 and May 1, 2010
FACTS:
Seven days After 2010 Presidential Election, Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno had his compulsory
Retirement by May 17, 2010. Even before the event actually happens, it is giving rise to many
legal dilemmas. May the incumbent President appoint his successor, considering that Section 15,
Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits the President or Acting
President from making appointments within two months immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive positions
when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. But
under Section 4 (1), Article III judicial Department of the Constitution, which provides that any
vacancy in the Supreme Court shall be filled within 90 days from the occurrence thereof, from a
"list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy." This
provision sin in contrast with the provision mentioned above.
The question now arises whether the incumbent president has the right to appoint the next chief
Justice upon the retirement of Chief Justice Puno. The JBC has unanimously agreed in their
meeting on January 18, 2011, to start the process of the filling the Vacant position of the Retired
Chief Justice. Judicial Bar Council has published the said announcement in the Daily inquirer
and Philippine Star news papers on January 20, 2010. Despite of the issues JBC has decided to
proceed to the next step of the process by announcing the names of the following Associate
Justices: Associate Justice Carpio, Associate Justice Corona, Associate Justice Carpio Morales,
Associate Justice Leonardo-De Castro, Associate Justice Brion, and Associate Justice Sandoval
and inviting the public to file their sworn complaint, written report, or opposition, if any, not
later than February 22, 2010, to the Following Candidates. The announcement was printed at
Daily Inquirer and Philippine Star on February 13, 2010.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 15, Article VII apply to appointments in the Supreme Court or to the
Judiciary.
RULING:
No. Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a
vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary the Constitutional
Commission confined the prohibition to appointments made in the Executive Department.
However, Section 4(1) and Section 9, Article VIII, mandate the President to fill the vacancy in
the Supreme Court within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy, and within 90 days from
the submission of the list, in the case of the lower courts. The 90-day period is directed at the
President, not at the JBC. Thus, the JBC should start the process of selecting the candidates to fill
the vacancy in the Supreme Court before the occurrence of the vacancy. The JBC has no
discretion to submit the list to the President after the vacancy occurs, because that shortens the
90-day period allowed by the Constitution for the President to make the appointment. For the
JBC to do so will be unconscionable on its part, considering that it will thereby effectively and
illegally deprive the President of the ample time granted under the Constitution to reflect on the
qualifications of the nominees named in the list of the JBC before making the appointment. The
duty of the JBC to submit a list of nominees before the start of the President's mandatory 90-day
period to appoint is ministerial, but its selection of the candidates whose names will be in the list
to be submitted to the President lies within the discretion of the JBC. The object of the petitions
for mandamus herein should only refer to the duty to submit to the President the list of nominees
for every vacancy in the Judiciary, because in order to constitute unlawful neglect of duty, there
must be an unjustified delay in performing that duty. The distinction between a ministerial and
discretionary act is well delineated. A purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or
tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of
a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or
impropriety of the act done.
Velicaria-Garafil v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 20337, June 16, 2015
The court ruled that Executive Order No. 2 in its entirety is constitutional, especially as to its
definition of midnight appointments and its recall, revocation and withdrawal of midnight
appointments.
It said the appointment to a government post is a process that takes several steps to complete and
any valid appointment, including one made under the exception in Article VII, section 15 of the
1987 Constitution, must consist of the president signing an appointee's appointment paper to a
vacant office and its official issuance and acceptance by the appointee evidenced by his or her
oath of office or assumption of duties.
"[F]or purposes of the 2010 elections, 10 March 2010 was the cut-off date for valid appointments
and the next day, 11 March 2010, was the reference date for midnight appointments," the SC
said.
Exceptions to the ban on midnight appointments only refer to "temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger
public safety," but the high court said "[n]one of the petitioners claim that their appointments fall
under this exception."
While the appointment letters of petitioners were able to beat the March 10, 2010 cut-off date,
they took their oaths of office and assumed their post beyond March 10.
Section 16. Power to Appoint; Commission on Appointments
Government v. Springer 50 PHILS 259, 1927
FACTS:
Sometime in the 1900s, the National Coal Company (NCC) was created by the Philippine
Congress. The law created it (Act No. 2822) provides that: The voting power shall be vested
exclusively in a committee consisting of the Governor-General, the President of the Senate, and
the Speaker of the House of Representatives.
In November 1926, the Governor-General (Leonard Wood) issued E.O. No. 37 which divested
the voting rights of the Senate President and House Speaker in the NCC. The EO emphasized
that the voting right should be solely lodged in the Governor-General who is the head of the
government (President at that time was considered the head of state but does not manage
government affairs). A copy of the said EO was furnished to the Senate President and the House
Speaker.
However, in December 1926, NCC held its elections and the Senate President as well as the
House Speaker, notwithstanding EO No. 37 and the objection of the Governor-General, still
elected Milton Springer and four others as Board of Directors of NCC. Thereafter, a quo
warranto proceeding in behalf of the government was filed against Springer et al questioning the
validity of their election into the Board of NCC.
Issue:
Whether or not the Senate President as well as the House Speaker can validly elect the
Board Members of NCC.
Held:
E.O. No 37 is valid. It is in accordance with the doctrine of separation of powers. The Supreme
Court emphasized that the legislature creates the public office but it has nothing to do with
designating the persons to fill the office. Appointing persons to a public office is essentially
executive. The NCC is a government owned and controlled corporation. It was created by
Congress. To extend the power of Congress into allowing it, through the Senate President and
the House Speaker, to appoint members of the NCC is already an invasion of executive powers.
The Supreme Court however notes that indeed there are exceptions to this rule where the
legislature may appoint persons to fill public office. Such exception can be found in the
appointment by the legislature of persons to fill offices within the legislative branch this
exception is allowable because it does not weaken the executive branch.
Bautista v. Salonga, 172 SCRA 1260, 1989 (Mary Concepcion Bautista v. Jovito Salonga (GR
86439, April 13 1989)
FACTS:
This case is an offshoot of Sarmiento v. Mison although different in the position subject
of dispute
o In here, petitioner Bautista was appointed as Chairman of the CHR by then-
President Aquino
o As such, she accepted the post, took her oath before Justice Fernan and performed
the functions of her office
Later, she was asked to submit herself to confirmation proceedings before the CA which
she refused to acknowledged causing the disapproval of her ad interim appointment
o In fact, an Acting Chairman was appointed by Aquino in her place which was
submitted to CA for confirmation
ISSUE:
Whether the CHR Chairmanship post requires CA confirmation
RULING:
NO, the CHR Chairmanship post is not among the appointees requiring CA confirmation
The subsequent act of appointing an Acting Chairman and submitting such appointment
for CA confirmation is deemed unconstitutional
o When the appointment is one that the Constitution mandates is for the President to
make without the participation of the CA, the executive's voluntary act of
submitting such appointment to the CA and the latter's act of confirming or
rejecting the same, are done without or in excess of jurisdiction
Sarmiento v. Mison, 156 SCRA 549, 1987 (Ulpiano Sarmiento, Juanito Arcilla v. Salvador
Mison (Customs Commissioner), Guillermo Carague (DBM Secretary) (GR 79974,
December 17, 1987)
FACTS:
Petitioners (as taxpayers, lawyers & Constitutional law professors) question the
appointment of Mison as Customs Commissioner and seek to prevent DBM Secretary
Carague to release Misons salary
o They argue that Misons appointment to his post was without confirmation from
the Commission on Appointments (CA)
ISSUE:
Whether the post of Customs Commissioner require CA confirmation
RULING:
NO, the position is one which belongs to the 2nd class of presidential appointees, that is,
appointed by the President but does not require CA confirmation
This method was adopted as a middle ground between the 1935 and 1973 Constitution
where presidential appointees were all subject to CA confirmation (1935) or none at all
(1973), respectively
o As a result of this innovation in the 1987 Constitution, there are officers whose
appointments require no confirmation of the Commission on Appointments, even
if such officers may be higher in rank, compared to some officers whose
appointments have to be confirmed by the CA (e.g. BSP Governor)
ISSUE: WON Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the CoA of appointments
extended by the President to government officers additional to those expressly mentioned in the
first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. 7 of the Constitution whose appointments require confirmation by
the CoA.
HELD: The SC agreed with the Sol-Gen, confirmation by the CoA is required exclusively for
the heads of executive departments, ambassadors, public ministers, consuls, officers of the armed
forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are
vested in the President by the Constitution, such as the members of the various Constitutional
Commissions. With respect to the other officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided
for by the law and to those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint, no
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is required.
Jurisprudence established the following in interpreting Sec 16, Art 7 of the Constitution:
2. Confirmation is not required when the President appoints other government officers whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law or those officers whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint (like the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human
Rights).
This case questions the constitutionality and legality of the permanent appointments
issued by former President Corazon C. Aquino to the respondent senior officers of the
Philippine National Police who were promoted to the ranks of Chief Superintendent and
Director without their appointments submitted to the Commission on Appointments for
confirmation under Section16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution and Republic Act
6975 otherwise known as the Local Government Act of 1990.
Section 26 of Republic Act 6975, creating the Department of Interior and Local Government
states that:
The Chief of the PNP shall be appointed by the President from among the senior officers down
to the rank of the chief superintendent, subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointmentsxxxxx
Director General - Appointed by the President from among the senior officers down to the rank of
chief superintendent in the service, subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointmentsxxx
Petitioner, Jesulito Sistoza question the constitutionality and legality of the appointments
issued by former Pres. Corazon Aquino to the respondent senior officers of the PNP who
were promoted to the rank of Chief Superintendent and Director without their
appointments submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation.
The said police officers took their Oath of Offices and assumed their respective positions.
Thereafter, the Department of Budget and Management, under the then Secretary
Salvador Enriquez III, authorized disbursements for their salaries and other emoluments.
The petitioner brought before this petition for prohibition, as a tax payer suit to the SC to
assail the legality of subject appointment and disbursement thereof.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment of the senior officers of the PNP is valid even without
the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.
HELD: The SC held that the appointments are valid. The court has the inherent authority to
determine whether a statute enacted by the legislature transcends the limit alienated by the
fundamental law. When it does the courts will not hesitate to strike down such
unconstitutionality.
It is well-settled that only presidential appointments belonging to the first group require the
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
(the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution)
The appointments of respondent officers, who are not within the first category, need not be
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. As held in the case of Tarrosa vs. Singson,
Congress cannot by law expand the power of confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments and require confirmation of appointments of other government officials not
mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
It is petitioners submission that the Philippine National Police is akin to the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and therefore, the appointments of police officers whose rank is equal to that of
colonel or naval captain require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
This contention is equally untenable. The Philippine National Police is separate and distinct
from the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
To so distinguish the police force from the armed forces, Congress enacted Republic Act6975
which states in part:
No element of the police force shall be military nor shall any position thereof be occupied by
active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Thereunder, the police force is
different from and independent of the armed forces and the ranks in the military are not
similar to those in the Philippine National Police. Thus, directors and chief superintendents
of the PNP, such as the herein respondent police officers, do not fall under the first
category of presidential appointees requiring the confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments.
Matibag v. Benipayo, GR No. 149036, April 2, 2002
Facts:
Petitioner Angelina G. Matibag was appointed as Acting Director of COMELECs Educational
and Information Department (EID) by COMELEC en banc, Chairperson Demetriou, and
Commissioner Javier.
On March 22, 2001, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed, ad interim, Alfredo L.
Benipayo as Chairman of the Commission on Elections; and Resurreccion Z. Borra and
Florentino A. Tuason, Jr. as COMELEC Commissioners, each for a term of seven years and all
expiring on February 8, 2008.
On June 1, 2001, President Arroyo renewed the ad interim appointments expiring on February 2,
2008 Respondents took their oaths of office for a second time. The Office of the President
transmitted on June 5, 2001 their appointments to the Commission on Appointments for
confirmation. Congress adjourned before the Commission on Appointments could act on their
appointments. Thus, on June 8, 2001, President Arroyo renewed again the ad
interim appointments of Benipayo, et al. to the same positions. The Office of the President
submitted their appointments for confirmation to the Commission on Appointments. They took
their oaths of office anew.
Petitioner was later reappointed to the Law Department by the Chairman Benipayo. Petitioner
requested Benipayo to reconsider her relief as Director IV of the EID and her reassignment to the
Law Department but was denied. Hence, she appealed the denial of her request for
reconsideration to the COMELEC en banc and filed an administrative case on Benipayo.
During the pendency of the case, petitioner filed the instant petition questioning the
reappointment and the right to remain in office of respondents as ad interim appointees is
unconstitutional because the respondent contends, the subsequent requirement which was the
approval of the Commission on Appointments of their reappointment by the president is lacking.
Issue: Whether the ad interim appointments issued by the President violates Section 16, Article VII.
Ruling: An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and
can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it
is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent
character. The Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by making it
effective until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of
Congress.
In the instant case, the President did in fact appoint permanent Commissioners to fill the vacancies in the
COMELEC, subject only to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Benipayo, Borra and
Tuason were extended permanent appointments during the recess of Congress. They were not appointed
or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. The ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and
Tuason are expressly allowed by the Constitution which authorizes the President, during the recess
of Congress, to make appointments that take effect immediately.
ISSUE:
Whether or not PD 15, Section 6 allowing appointments made by trustees of their fellow
members is constitutional
HELD:
No, PD 15, Section 6 allowing appointments of members by the trustees themselves is
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Appointing authority may be given to other officials than the President provided the
appointment is in a rank lower than the appointing official.
While it is stated that appointing powers may be delegated by the President, such power
is limited in scope to include only ranks lower than the appointing authority.
In the case, an appointment of a member made by a fellow member transgresses Article
7, Section 16 (1) since both positions are equal in nature. CCP cannot invoke autonomy
prescribed in its charter as an exemption from the limitation of delegative appointing power
because such invocation puts CCP outside the control of the President.
Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, GR No. 196271, October 18, 2011
Facts:
Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) were
enacted by Congress.
Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 is the organic act that established the ARMM and
scheduled the first regular elections for the ARMM regional officials.
o RA No. 9054 amended the ARMM Charter and reset the regular elections for the
ARMM regional officials to the second Monday of September 2001.
o RA No. 9140 further reset the first regular elections to November 26, 2001.
o RA No. 9333 reset for the third time the ARMM regional elections to the
2nd Monday of August 2005 and on the same date every 3 years thereafter.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held
on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections and had
accepted certificates of candidacies for the various regional offices to be elected.
But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the next ARMM regular
elections to May 2013 to coincide with the regular national and local elections of the
country. The law as well granted the President the power to appoint officers-in-charge
(OICs) for the Office of the Regional Governor, the Regional Vice-Governor, and the
Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly, who shall perform the functions
pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections
shall have qualified and assumed office.
In these consolidated petitions filed directly with the Supreme Court, the petitioners
assailed the constitutionality of RA No. 10153.
Issue:
Whether the choice of the Presidents power to appoint for a fixed and specific period as an
interim measure unconstitutional
Ruling:
o First, the heads of the executive departments; ambassadors; other public ministers
and consuls; officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, from the rank of
colonel or naval captain; and other officers whose appointments are vested in the
President in this Constitution;
o Second, all other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law;
o Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and
o Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest
in the President alone
What RA No. 10153 in fact only does is to appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the
Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative
Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials
duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office. This
power is far different from appointing elective ARMM officials for the abbreviated term
ending on the assumption to office of the officials elected in the May 2013 elections.
Besides, RA No. 10153 provides only for synchronization of elections
ISSUE: Whether the Executive Secretary, acting by authority of the President, reverse a decision
of the Director of Lands?
RULING:
No, Acts of Executive Secretary acting by authority of the President are those of
President himself
The Office of the Executive Secretary is an auxiliary unit which assists the President.
The Executive Secretary who acts for and in behalf and by authority of the President has
an undisputed jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or even reverse any order that the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources, including the Director of Lands, may issue.
Where the Executive Secretary acts by authority of the President, his decision is that of
the President. Such decision is to be given full faith and credit by our courts.
Only the President may rightfully say that the Executive Secretary is not authorized to do
so. Therefore, unless the action taken is disapproved or reprobated by the Chief
Executive, that remains the act of the Chief Executive, and cannot be successfully
assailed.
Issue:
Whether or not the Asst. Exec. Sec. acted on grave abuse of discretion.
Ruling:
No. The Assistant Executive Secretary only acted on the Presidents behalf. In a ruling by
Justice Laurel in the aforecited Villena decision, it states that:
The Pepsi-Cola Co. requested for the withdrawal of Pepsi-Cola concentrates which were
not covered by any Central Bank release certificate. It counsels approached Collector of Customs
Ang-Angco to secure the immediate release of the concentrates, but advised the counsel to
secure the release certificate from the No-Dollar Import Office.
The Non-Dollar Import Office wrote a letter to Ang-Angco which stated that his office
had no objection to the release of the concentrates but could not take action on the request as it
was not in their jurisdiction. Ang-Angco telephoned the Secretary of Finance who expressed his
approval of the release on the basis of said certificate.
Collector Ang-Angco finally released the concentrates. When Commissioner of Customs
learned of the release he filed an administrative complaint against Collector of Customs Ang-
Angco. For three years Ang-Angco had been discharging the duties of his office.
Then, Executive Secretary Castillo, by the authority of the President, rendered his
judgment against the petitioner.
Ang-Angco wrote a letter to President Carlos P. Garcia calling attention the action taken
by Secretary Castillo in removing him from office had the effect of depriving him of his right to
have his case originally decided by the Commissioner of Civil Service
Secretary Castillo, also by authority of the President, denied the request for
reconsideration. Not satisfied with this resolution, Collector Ang-Angco sent a memorandum to
President Garcia reiterating once more the same grounds on which he predicated his request for
reconsideration. Again Secretary Castillo, also by authority of the President, denied the appeal,
asserting that the President virtue of his power of control over all executive departments can take
direct action and dispose of the administrative case in question
ISSUE:
Whether Exec. Sec. Castillo in acting by authority of the President, violated the guaranty in
which the Commissioner of Civil Service the original and exclusive jurisdiction to decide
administrative cases against officers and employees in the classified service, deprived him of his
right of appeal
RULING:
The action taken by respondent Executive Secretary, even with the authority of the
President, in taking direct action on the administrative case of petitioner, without submitting the
same to the Commissioner of Civil Service, is contrary to law and should be set aside.
Under Section 16(1) of the Civil Service Act of 1959 it is the Commissioner of Civil
Service who has original and exclusive jurisdiction to decide administrative cases of all officers
and employees in the classified service. The only limitation to this power is that the decision of
the Commissioner may be appealed to the Civil Service Board of Appeals, whose decision in
such cases shall be final.
Moreover, Civil Service Law of 1959 does not provide for any appeal to the President,
nor is he given the power to review the decision in administrative cases motu proprio
ISSUE: Does Section 187 of the LGC give the Secretary of Justice the power of control?
RULING: No. The Supreme Court said that the provision only gave the Secretary of Justice the
power to supervise, not control, in that the Secretary of Justice could only determine the
constitutionality or legality of the local tax ordinance and revoke them on such grounds. The
provision did not empower the Secretary to substitute his own judgment for the judgment of the
LGU. The Secretary was not authorized by Section 187 to determine whether the law was wise
or reasonable or otherwise a generally bad law.
FACTS: This is a case that involves the validity of the suspension of Eduardo Joson, Governor
of the province of Nueva Ecija under. On September 12, 1996, petitioner is said to belligerently
barged into the session hall of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan with armed men and uttered
threatening words to the members of the Sangguniang Panglunsod members. Respondents
alleged that the Governor was concern about a legislative measure regarding the loan of P150M
from PNB. Thus, private respondents send a letter to the President regarding the incident and
requesting for the suspension of the Governor for threathening their lives and safety. President
assigned Sec. Barbers to settle the controversy. In the process, for failure of the Governor to
submit an answer to the complaint, he was in default and with the Resolution dated January 8,
1998, petitioner was suspended for six (6)months. Petitioner now questions as to the validity of
the resolution praying that as an elective official and not appointed, he cannot be covered by
such resolution or the control power of the president.
ISSUE: Was the resolution valid? Is this covered by the Presidents Power of Control?
RULING: The SC held that the resolution was null and void. The petitioner is an elected official
and not appointed by the Executive Department and therefore not covered by the Presidents
power of control to deal with the case at bar. The law provides that for disciplinary actions
involving elected official should be covered by the Local Government code and the code
provides that such case should be investigated and decided by the Civil Service Law and results
to be provided to the Civil Service Commission for the proper sanctions after due investigation.
Issue: Whether or not Local Budget Circular 55 of the DBM is void for going beyond the
supervisory powers of the President?
Ruling: We rule in favor of the petitioner judges. By constitutional fiat, local government units
are subject to the Presidents supervision only, not control, so long as their acts are exercised
within the sphere of their legitimate powers. By the same token, the President may not withhold
or alter any authority or power given them by the Constitution and the law. Clearly then, the
President can only interfere in the affairs and activities of a local government unit if he or she
finds that the latter has acted contrary to law. This is the scope of the Presidents supervisory
powers over local government units. Hence, the President or any of his or her alter egos cannot
interfere in local affairs as long as the concerned local government unit acts within the
parameters of the law and the Constitution. Any directive therefore by the President or any of
his or her alter egos seeking to alter the wisdom of a law-conforming judgment on local affairs of
a local government unit is a patent nullity because it violates the principle of local autonomy and
separation of powers of the executive and legislative departments in governing municipal
corporations.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the transfer of the Regional Office ordered by the Secretary of DENR has
legal basis and within his authority
HELD:
Yes, the transfer ordered by the DENR Secretary has legal basis and within his authority.
With regards to legal basis, the Admin Order issued for the transfer has its basis in EO
192 which effectively reorganized DENR. Admin Order 99-14 was executed within the limits of
said Executive Order and thus granting the transfer sufficient legal basis
In addition, the Court invoked the doctrine of qualified political agency to justify that the
transfer ordered by the DENR Secretary is within his authority. The Secretary, as appointed
executive department head, is an alter-ego and political agent of the President.
The doctrine purports that with a single executive branch, all executive and
administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department. Moreover, the heads of
executive departments are assistants and agents of the President and the actions of these
secretaries are deemed to be the acts of the President unless disapproved or reprobated by the
President.
Ruben Villaluz was appointed as the Administrator of the Motor Vehicles Office in 1958.
In 1960, Congressman Joaquin Roces alleged that Villaluz was an ineffective leader and
had caused losses to the government. He indorsed the removal of Villaluz.
Consequently, Executive Secretary Calixto Zaldivar suspended Villaluz and ordered a
committee to investigate the matter.
After investigation, it was recommended that Villaluz be removed. The president then
issued an Administrative Order removing Villaluz from his post. Villaluz averred that the
president has no jurisdiction to remove him.
ISSUE: Whether or not Villaluz is under the jurisdiction of the President to be removed
considering that he is an appointee of the president.
HELD: Yes. The president has jurisdiction and not the Civil Service. The President of the
Philippines has jurisdiction to investigate and remove him since he is a presidential appointee
who belongs to the non-competitive or unclassified service under Sec 5 of Republic Act No.
2260; being a presidential appointee, Villaluz belongs to the non-competitive or unclassified
service of the government and as such he can only be investigated and removed from office after
due hearing by the President of the Philippines under the principle that the power to remove is
inherent in the power to appoint .
There is some point in the argument that the power of control of the President may extend to the
power to investigate, suspend or remove officers and employees who belong to the executive
department if they are presidential appointees or do not belong to the classified service for such
can be justified under the principle that the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint
but not with regard to those officers or employees who belong to the classified service for as to
them that inherent power cannot be exercised. This is in line with the provision of our
Constitution which says that the Congress may by law vest the appointment of the inferior
officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in heads of department.
Tondo Medical Center Employees v. CA, GR No. 167324, July 17, 2007
FACTS:
Petitioners contended that a law, such as Executive Order No. 102, which effects the
reorganization of the DOH, should be enacted by Congress in the exercise of its
legislative function. They argued that Executive Order No. 102 is void, having been
issued in excess of the Presidents authority;
[Executive Order No. 102 entitled Redirecting the Functions and Operations of the
Department of Health]: which provided for the changes in the roles, functions, and
organizational processes of the DOH. Under the assailed executive order, the DOH
refocused its mandate from being the sole provider of health services to being a provider
of specific health services and technical assistance, as a result of the devolution of basic
services to local government units;
Executive Order No. 102 was enacted pursuant to Section 17 of the Local Government
Code (Republic Act No. 7160), which provided for the devolution to the local
government units of basic services and facilities, as well as specific health-related
functions and responsibilities;
The Court of Appeals decreed that the President was empowered to issue Executive
Order No. 102, in accordance with Section 17 Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
HELD: No.
This Court has already ruled in a number of cases that the President may, by executive
or administrative order, direct the reorganization of government entities under the
Executive Department. This is also sanctioned under the Constitution, as well as other
statutes.
Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, clearly states: [T]he president shall have
control of all executive departments, bureaus and offices. Section 31, Book III, Chapter
10 of Executive Order No. 292, also known as the Administrative Code of 1987 reads:
SEC. 31. Continuing Authority of the President to Reorganize his Office - The
President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity,
economy and efficiency, shall have continuing authority to reorganize the administrative
structure of the Office of the President. For this purpose, he may take any of the
following actions:
(1) Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper,
including the immediate offices, the Presidential Special Assistants/Advisers System and
the Common Staff Support System, by abolishing consolidating or merging units thereof
or transferring functions from one unit to another;
(2) Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other
Department or Agency as well as transfer functions to the Office of the President from
other Departments or Agencies; and
(3) Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other
department or agency as well as transfer agencies to the Office of the President from
other Departments or agencies.
In Domingo v. Zamora,2 this Court explained the rationale behind the Presidents
continuing authority under the Administrative Code to reorganize the
administrative structure of the Office of the President. The law grants the
President the power to reorganize the Office of the President in recognition of the
recurring need of every President to reorganize his or her office to achieve
simplicity, economy and efficiency. To remain effective and efficient, it must be
capable of being shaped and reshaped by the President in the manner the Chief
Executive deems fit to carry out presidential directives and policies.
The Administrative Code provides that the Office of the President consists of the Office
of the President Proper and the agencies under it. The agencies under the Office of the
President are identified in Section 23, Chapter 8, Title II of the Administrative Code:
Sec. 23. The Agencies under the Office of the President.The agencies under the
Office of the President refer to those offices placed under the chairmanship of the
President, those under the supervision and control of the President, those under the
administrative supervision of the Office of the President, those attached to it for policy
and program coordination, and those that are not placed by law or order creating them
under any specific department. (Emphasis provided.)
Section 2(4) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code defines the term
agency of the government as follows:
Agency of the Government refers to any of the various units of the Government,
including a department, bureau, office, instrumentality, or government-owned or
controlled corporation, or a local government or a distinct unit therein.
Furthermore, the DOH is among the cabinet-level departments enumerated under Book
IV of the Administrative Code, mainly tasked with the functional distribution of the work
of the President.3 Indubitably, the DOH is an agency which is under the supervision and
control of the President and, thus, part of the Office of the President. Consequently,
Section 31, Book III, Chapter 10 of the Administrative Code, granting the President the
continued authority to reorganize the Office of the President, extends to the DOH.
Again, in the year when Executive Order No. 102 was issued, The General
Appropriations Act of Fiscal Year 1999 (Republic Act No. 8745) conceded to the
President the power to make any changes in any of the key positions and organizational
units in the executive department thus:
Clearly, Executive Order No. 102 is well within the constitutional power of the President
to issue. The President did not usurp any legislative prerogative in issuing Executive
Order No. 102. It is an exercise of the Presidents constitutional power of control over the
executive department, supported by the provisions of the Administrative Code,
recognized by other statutes, and consistently affirmed by this Court.
ISSUES:
Whether Sections 78 and 80 of the General Provision of Republic Act No. 8522, otherwise
known as the General Appropriation[s] Act of 1998[,] empower former President Joseph E.
Estrada to reorganize structurally and functionally the Department of Health.
Whether the President has authority under Section 17, Article VIII of the Constitution to effect a
reorganization of a department under the executive branch.
HELD:
The President has the authority to carry out a reorganization of the Department of Health
under the Constitution and statutory laws. This authority is an adjunct of his power of control
under Article VII, Sections 1 and 17 of the 1987 Constitution, viz.:
Section 1. The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.
Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices.
He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
The general rule has always been that the power to abolish a public office is lodged with the
legislature. This proceeds from the legal precept that the power to create includes the power to
destroy. A public office is either created by the Constitution, by statute, or by authority of law. Thus,
except where the office was created by the Constitution itself, it may be abolished by the same
legislature that brought it into existence.
The exception, however, is that as far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive department
are concerned, the President's power of control may justify him to inactivate the functions of a
particular office, or certain laws may grant him the broad authority to carry out reorganization
measures.
The President's power to reorganize the executive branch is also an exercise of his residual powers
under Section 20, Title I, Book III of E.O. No. 292 which grants the President broad organization
powers to implement reorganization measures, viz.:
SEC. 20. Residual Powers. - Unless Congress provides otherwise, the President shall exercise
such other powers and functions vested in the President which are provided for under the
laws and which are not specifically enumerated above, or which are not delegated by the President
in accordance with law
It is Presidential Decree No. 1772 which amended Presidential Decree No. 1416. These
decrees expressly grant the President of the Philippines the continuing authority to
reorganize the national government, which includes the power to group, consolidate bureaus
and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify functions,
services and activities and to standardize salaries and materials. The validity of these two
decrees [is] unquestionable. The 1987 Constitution clearly provides that "all laws, decrees, executive
orders, proclamations, letters of instructions and other executive issuances not inconsistent with this
Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked." So far, there is yet no law
amending or repealing said decrees.
The pertinent provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1416, as amended by Presidential Decree No.
1772, clearly support the President's continuing power to reorganize the executive branch
ISSUE: whether or not a petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
is a proper mode of appeal from a resolution of the Secretary of Justice directing the prosecutor
to withdraw an information in a criminal case.
HELD: Petitioner's above posture, while valid to a point, will not carry the day for him.
It is petitioner's thesis that Rule 43 was intended to apply to all quasi-judicial agencies exercising
quasi-judicial functions. Upon this premise, petitioner submits that resolutions of the DOJ in the
exercise of its quasi-judicial functions are properly appealable to the CA via a petition for review
under Rule 43, adding that the quasi-judicial bodies enumerated under said Rule are not
exclusive.
There is compelling reason to believe, however, that the exclusion of the DOJ from the list is
deliberate, being in consonance with the constitutional power of control lodged in the President
over executive departments, bureaus and offices. This power of control, which even Congress
cannot limit, let alone withdraw, means the power of the Chief Executive to review, alter,
modify, nullify, or set aside what a subordinate, e.g., members of the Cabinet and heads of line
agencies, had done in the performance of their duties and to substitute the judgment of the
former for that of the latter.
Being thus under the control of the President, the Secretary of Justice, or, to be precise, his
decision is subject to review of the former. In fine, recourse from the decision of the Secretary
of Justice should be to the President, instead of the CA, under the established principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies. The thrust of the rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies is that if an appeal or remedy obtains or is available within the administrative
machinery, this should be resorted to before resort can be made to the courts.
Immediate recourse to the court would be premature and precipitate; subject to defined
exception, a case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of action should a party fail to
exhaust administrative remedies.
Notably, Section 1, supra, of Rule 43 includes the Office of the President in the agencies named
therein, thereby accentuating the fact that appeals from rulings of department heads must first be
taken to and resolved by that office before any appellate recourse may be resorted to.
ISSUE: WON the executive power of control over the acts of department secretaries must not be
rendered illusory by rules of procedure?
HELD: Petitioner should have immediately elevated to the Court of Appeals the denial by
respondent BOI of its application for an ITH; Petitioner appealed to the Office of the President, a
recourse that is not sanctioned by either the Rules of Civil Procedure or by the Omnibus
Investments Code of 1987.
Petitioner cannot invoke Article 36 of E.O. No. 226 to justify its appeal to the Office of the
President. Article 36, along with Article 7, which allows recourse to the Office of the President,
applies to specific instances, namely, controversies between a registered enterprise and a
government agency and decisions concerning the registration of an enterprise, respectively.
Expresio unius est exclusio alterius. This enumeration is exclusive so that other controversies
outside of its purview, including petitioners entitlement to an ITH, can invoke only the appellate
judicial relief provided under Article 82. In the instant case, the denial of petitioners application
for an ITH is not within the cases where the law expressly provides for appellate recourse to the
Office of the President. That being the case, petitioner should have elevated its appeal to the
Court of Appeals under Rule 43.
Petitioner further contends that from the decision of respondent BOI, appeal to the Office of the
President should be allowed; otherwise, the constitutional power of the President to review acts
of department secretaries will be rendered illusory by mere rules of procedure.
The executive power of control over the acts of department secretaries is laid down in Section
17, Article VIIof the 1987 Constitution. The power of control has been defined as the "power of
an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter."
Such "executive control" is not absolute. The definition of the structure of the executive branch
of government, and the corresponding degrees of administrative control and supervision is not
the exclusive preserve of the executive. It may be effectively limited by the Constitution, by law,
or by judicial decisions.33 All the more in the matter of appellate procedure as in the instant case.
Appeals are remedial in nature; hence, constitutionally subject to this Courts rule-making
power.
- Louis Biraogo seeks to invalidate Executive Order No. 1 promulgated by President Benigno
Aquino III and signed by Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa
- EO No. 1 created the Philippine Truth Commission, which sought to investigate reports of graft
and corruption committed by public officers and employees during the administration of former
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
- Biraogo, and a number of Congressmen in a separate petition, assailed the constitutionality of EO
No. 1 in that it was, according to them, beyond the powers of the President to create the
Philippine Truth Commission, because it usurped the power of Congress to create public offices,
and supplanted the power of the Ombudsman and the DOJ
- Accdg to Biraogo, the PTC was a public office and not merely an adjunct of the Office of the
President, and its creation is therefore violative of the Doctrine of Separation of Powers
- Biraogo et al also assailed the constitutionality of the PTC in that it allegedly violated the Equal
Protection clause by targeting only officials of the Arroyo administration
ISSUE: Does the President have the power to create ad hoc offices such as the PTC?
HELD: YES. The creation of the PTC through EO No. 1 was completely within the power of control
granted to the President by Sec 17 Art VII of the 1987 Constitution. Thus, the President is necessarily
vested with the power to conduct fact-finding investigations, pursuant to his duty to ensure that all laws
are enforced by public officials and employees of his department and in the exercise of his authority to
assume directly the functions of the executive department or interfere with the discretion of his officials.
The power of the President to investigate is not limited to the exercise of his power of control over his
subordinates in the executive branch, but extends further in the exercise of his other powers, such as his
power to discipline subordinates, his power for rule making, adjudication and licensing purposes and in
order to be informed on matters which he is entitled to know.
However, the Supreme Court ruled that the creation of the PTC was unconstitutional for violating the
Equal Protection Clause of the 1987 Constitution, as it targeted only officials of the Arroyo
administration, to the exclusion of others.
Banda v. Executive Secretary Ermita, G.R. No. 166620, April 20, 2010
- President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued EO No. 378, which removed the exclusive jurisdiction
of the National Printing Office (NPO) over the printing service requirements of government
offices and instrumentalities
- Pursuant to EO 378, government offices are allowed to source their printing service requirements
from private service providers through competitive bidding
- Banda et al, who were employees of the NPO, assailed the constitutionality of EO 378,
contending that since the NPO was created through EO 285, which was issued by President
Corazon Aquino when she still exercised legislative powers, it is beyond the executive powers of
President Arroyo to amend EO 285 through executive issuance
ISSUE: W/N President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo may validly amend the jurisdiction of the NPO through
an Executive Order
HELD: YES. The President has the power of control, granted by Sec 17 Art VII of the 1987 Constitution.
The power of control necessarily includes the power of the President to reorganize the offices and
agencies in the executive department in line with her constitutionally-granted power of control and by
virtue of a valid delegation of the legislative power to reorganize executive offices under existing statutes.
Prospero Pichay v. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs, G.R. No. 196425,
July 24, 2012
- In 2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III issued EO No. 13, which abolished the
Presidential Anti-Graft Commission and transferred its powers to the Investigative and
Adjudicatory Division of the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs
(IAD-ODESLA)
- In 2011, then-Finance Secretary Cesar Purisima filed with the IAD-ODESLA a complaint
affidavit against Prospero Pichay, Jr., Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Local
Water Utilities Administration, and other members of the LWUA Board of Trustees, for
the purchase of the LWUA of 445,377 shares of stock of Express Savings Bank, Inc.
- Pichay then received an Order signed by Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa requiring
him and his co-respondents to submit their written explanations under oath
- Pichay filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Supreme Court against the
IAD-ODESLA, on the ground that EO 13 is unconstitutional for usurping the power of
Congress to create a public office
HELD: NO. The President's authority to issue E.O. 13 and constitute the IAD-ODESLA as his fact-
finding investigator cannot be doubted. After all, as Chief Executive, he is granted full control over
the Executive Department to ensure the enforcement of the laws by Section 17, Article VII of the
Constitution.
The IAD-ODESLA is not a quasi-judicial body, but merely a fact-finding body. Thus, its creation is
not a usurpation of judicial power nor the power to create to create a public office, which is reserved
to the legislature.
- Rep. Risa Hontiveros assails the Amendment to the Supplemental Toll Operation
Agreement (ASTOA) signed by DOTC Secretary Leandro Mendoza, which allowed
Skyway O & M Corporation (SOMCO) to take over the Philippine National Construction
Corporation (PNCC) in performing the operations and maintenance of Stage 1 of the
South Metro Manila Skyway
- According to Hontiveros, PD 1113 and PD 1894, which granted to PNCC the right to
construct, maintain, and operate the Metro Manila Skyways, contained a provision which
required presidential approval for any transfer of rights under the franchise granted to the
PNCC
- Therefore, the ASTOA was without legal effect, as it was DOTC Secretary Mendoza and
not then-President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo who signed the agreement, in violation of
the presidential approval requirement in PD 1113 and PD 1894
ISSUE: W/N the ASTOA was valid considering it was signed by Sec Mendoza and not by the
President
HELD: YES. The acts of the DOTC Secretary in the ordinary course of the performance of his
duties are the acts of the President. Thus, the power of control exercised by the President
pursuant to Sec 17 Art VII of the 1987 Constitution may be exercised by his alter-egos.
- On Nov 24 2009, the day after the gruesome Maguindanao Massacre, during which 57
men and women, including journalists, were killed, then-President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1946, which place the provinces of Maguindanao and
Sultan Kudarat and Cotabato City under a State of Emergency
- Three days later, President Arroyo issued Administrative Order 273, delegating
supervision of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao from the Office of the
President to the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG)
- Datu Zaldy Uy Ampatuan and several ARMM officials filed a petition for prohibition
under Rule 65, claiming that the Presidents issuances encroached upon the autonomy of
the ARMM
- Ampatuan et al also argued that the President gave the DILG Secretary the power to
exercise not merely administrative supervision but control over the ARMM since the
DILG Sec had the power to suspend ARMM officials and replace them
ISSUE: Did the President invalidly give control powers to the DILG Secretary pursuant to
Proclamation No. 1946?
HELD: NO. The DILG did not take over the operations of the ARMM and assume direct
governmental powers over the region. The President merely delegated through AO 273 her
supervisory powers over the ARMM. This was valid because the DILG Secretary was her alter-
ego, and this is consistent with the Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency. Likewise, the
delegation was consistent with Sec 17 Art VII of the 1987 Constitution, where the President is
authorized to ensured that the laws be faithfully executed.
NOTE: The question became moot and academic since the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus had later been lifted by President Aquino.
These 7 consolidated petitions question the validity of PP 1017 (declaring a state of national emergency)
and General Order No. 5 issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. While the cases are pending,
President Arroyo issued PP 1021, declaring that the state of national emergency has ceased to exist,
thereby, in effect, lifting PP 1017.
ISSUE:
* Whether or not PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 arrogated upon the President the power to enact laws and
decrees
* If so, whether or not PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional
HELD:
Take-Care Power
This refers to the power of the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed, based on Sec. 17,
Art. VII: The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall
ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
As the Executive in whom the executive power is vested, the primary function of the President is to
enforce the laws as well as to formulate policies to be embodied in existing laws. He sees to it that all
laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department. Before assuming office, he is
required to take an oath or affirmation to the effect that as President of the Philippines, he will, among
others, execute its laws. In the exercise of such function, the President, if needed, may employ the
powers attached to his office as the Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the country, including
the Philippine National Police under the Department of Interior and Local Government.
The specific portion of PP 1017 questioned is the enabling clause: to enforce obedience to all the laws
and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.
The President is granted an Ordinance Power under Chap. 2, Book III of E.O. 292. President Arroyos
ordinance power is limited to those issuances mentioned in the foregoing provision. She cannot issue
decrees similar to those issued by Former President Marcos under PP 1081. Presidential Decrees are
laws which are of the same category and binding force as statutes because they were issued by the
President in the exercise of his legislative power during the period of Martial Law under the 1973
Constitution.
This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the
authority to promulgate decrees. Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature.
Sec. 1, Art. VI categorically states that the legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives. To be sure, neither Martial
Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President Arroyos exercise of legislative
power by issuing decrees.
But can President Arroyo enforce obedience to all decrees and laws through the military?
As this Court stated earlier, President Arroyo has no authority to enact decrees. It follows that these
decrees are void and, therefore, cannot be enforced. With respect to laws, she cannot call the military to
enforce or implement certain laws, such as customs laws, laws governing family and property relations,
laws on obligations and contracts and the like. She can only order the military, under PP 1017, to enforce
laws pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless violence.
Judicial Review
Lina v. Purisma, 82 SCRA 344 (1978)
Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 PHIL 139 (1936)
Macasiano v. NHA, 224 SCRA 236 (1993)
Tan v. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 678 (1972)
PACU v. Secretary of Education, 97 PHIL 806 (1955)
Gonzales v. Marcos, 65 SCRA 624 (1975)
Oposa v. Factoran, 224 SCRA 792 (1993)
Joya v. PCGG, 225 SCRA 568 (1993)
Kilosbayan v. Morato, 246 SCRA (1995)
Anti Graft League of the Philippines, 260 SCRA 250 (1996)
Telecom v. COMELEC, 289 SCRA 337 (1998)
Bayan v. Executive Secretary, GR No. 138570, October 10, 2000
Automotive Industry Workers v. Executive Secretary, GR No. 157509, January 18, 2005
White Light Corp v. City of Manila, GR No. 122846, January 20, 2009
Gonzales v. Narvasa, GR No. 140835, August 14, 2000
Sandoval v. PAGCOR, GR No. 138982, November 29, 2000
Chavez v. PCGG, 299 SCRA 744 (1998)
IBP v. Zamora, 342 SCRA 449 (2000)
Francisco v. House of Representatives, 415 SCRA 44
De Agbayani v. PNB, 38 SCRA 429 (1971)
David v. Arroyo, 489 SCRA 162
People v. Mateo, 433 SCRA 540
Mariano Jr. v. COMELEC, GR No. 118577, March 7, 1995
Dumlao v. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 392
Solicitor General v. Metropolitan Manila Authority, GR No. 102782, December 11, 1991
Kalipunan ng DamayangMahihirap v. Jessie Robredo, GR No. 200903, 730 SCRA 322, July 22,
2014
Gov. Villafuerte, Jr. v. Hon. Robredo GR No. 195390, December 10, 2014
UDK-15143, January 21, 2015
Republic of the Philippines v. Transunion Corporation, G.R. No. 191590, 2014,
Section 9. Appointments of Members of the Supreme Court and Judges of Lower Courts
Section 14. Contents of Decision; Petition for Review; Motion for Reconsideration
People v. Escober, 157 SCRA 541 (1988)
Air France v. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155 (1966)
People v. Bravo, 227 SCRA 285 (1993)
Hernandez v. CA, 208 SCRA 429 (1993)
Nicos v. CA, 206 SCRA 127 (1992)
Borromeo v. CA, 186 SCRA 1 (1990)
Francisco v. Pernskul, 173 SCRA 324 (1989)
Velarde v. Social Justice Society, GR 159357, April 28, 2004
A. Common Provisions
Section 3. Salary
Section 2. Scope
Paragraph 1
EIIB v. CA, GR No. 129133, Nov. 25, 1998
NASECO v. NLRC, GR No. 100947, May 31, 1993
MWSS v. Hernandez, 143 SCRA 602
Philippine Fisheries Development Authority v. NLRC and Odin Security Agency, GR No.
94825, September 4, 1992
PAGCOR v. CA, GR No. 93396, September 30, 1991
Agyao v. CSC, 639 SCRA 781
Funa v. Duque III, G.R. No. 191672, November 25, 2014
Barcelona v. LIM, G.R. No. 189171, June 3, 2014
Paragraph 2
De los Santos v. Mallare, 87 PHIL 289
Santiago Jr. v. CSC, GR No. 81467, October 27, 1989
Central Bank v. CSC, GR No. 80455-56, April 10, 1989
CSC v. Salas, 274 SCRA 414
CSC v. Javier, 546 SCRA 485
Grino v. CSC, 194 SCRA 458
Paragraph 3
Briones v. Osmena, 104 PHIL 588
Abakada Group Party List v. Purisima, 562 SCRA 251
CSC v. Sojor, 554 SCRA 160
PCSO Board of Directors v. Lapid, 648 SCRA 546
Right to Organize
Social Security System v. CA, GR No. 85279, July 28, 1989
Manila Public School Teachers Association v. Secretary of Education, GR No. 95445, August 6,
1991
C. Commission on Elections
Section 3. Decisions
Sarmiento v. COMELEC, 212 SCRA 307
Salazar Jr. v. COMELEC, 184 SCRA 433 (1990)
Baytan v. COMELEC, GR No. 153954 , Feb. 4, 2003
Balindong v. COMELEC, GR Nos. 153991-2, Oct. 16, 2003
Liberal Party v. COMELEC, GR No. 191771, May 6, 2010
Alvarez v. COMELEC, GR No. 142527, March 1, 2001
Villarosa v. COMELEC GR No. 212953, August 05, 2014
Section 7. No Block-Voting
D. Commission of Audit
Section 1. Qualifications; Term
Mison v. COA, 187 SCRA 445
Section 4. Sandiganbayan
Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, 128 SCRA 324 (1984)
Defensor-Santiago, 356 SCRA 636 (2001)
Balmadrid v. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 58327, March 22, 1991
Azarcon v. Sandiganbanyan, GR No. 116033, February 26, 1997
Section 5. Ombudsman
Carandang v. Desierto, 639 SCRA 293
Lacson v. ES, 649 SCRA 142
People v. Morales, 649 SCRA 182
Quarto v. Marcelo, 658 SCRA 580
Office of the Ombudsman v. Quimbo, G.R. No. 173277, February 25, 2015
Office of the Ombudsman v. CA and Binay, G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015
Section 6. Appointments
Ombudsman v. CSC, GR No. 162215, July 20, 2007
Laud v. People, et al., G.R. No. 199032,November 19, 2014
Sabijon v. De Juan, A.M. No. P-14-3281, 2015
Casimiro v. Rigor, G.R. No. 206661, 2014
Airlift Asia Customs Brokerage, Inc. v. Court Of Appeals, G.R. No. 183664, 2014
Buena, Jr v. Benito, G.R. No. 181760, October 14, 2014
Section 8. Qualifications
Argel v. Gov. Singson, G.R. No. 202970, 2015
Section 9. Appointments
Section 4. AFP
Section 2. Initiative
RA No. 6735, An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum
Defensor-Santiago v. COMELEC, 270 SCRA 106 (1997); MR (1997)
Lambino v. COMELEC, 505 SCRA 160 (2006) *SC declared RA 6735 as sufficient and
adequate for a peoples initiative, effectively abandoning the ruling in Defensor-Santiago v.
COMELEC.
Section 4. Ratification
Gonzales v. COMELEC, 21 SCRA 774 (1967)
Tolentino v. COMELEC, 41 SCRA 702 (1971)
Javellana v. ES, GR L-36142, March 31, 1973