Page |1

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT: THE CASE OF MOST AFFECTED BARANGAYS BY

SUPER TYPHOON LAWIN IN TUGUEGARAO CITY

by:
Abraham M. Maguigad, Jr.1, Reynald A. Cario1, Rizza P. Galera1, Catherine Simon1, Ruth A.
Peralta1, and Charissa Joy Q. Ferrer1and Joel Binasoy, MPA2

ABSTRACT
This study assessed the emergency management of ten barangays in Tuguegarao City that
had the most number of affected families by Super Typhoon Lawin. Specifically, this study assessed
the level of preparedness of barangays contingency plan and early warning system, evacuation
management, response/relief system, and responsiveness in the execution of calamity response and
after-calamity protocols for the said super typhoon. It likewise assessed the affected families level of
satisfaction in the implementation of emergency management focused on preparedness and response.
The emergency management initiatives that the barangays had, issues and problems encountered,
and recommendations for emergency management enhancement were also determined. Descriptive
design with the use of triangulation method of research was employed in the study. Interview, survey,
documentary analysis and on-site observation were used as data gathering techniques. Descriptive
statistics were used in treating the data.
Findings showed that the affected families were ambivalent as to the existence of
contingency plan for typhoon and/or flood and early warning system before the super typhoon. Also,
they do not know whether or not their barangays were prepared for evacuation management before
and during the super typhoon and possess response/relief system after. The affected families were
neither satisfied nor dissatisfied in the implementation of activities and services covered by
preparedness and response. Common emergency management initiatives among the barangays after
the super typhoon were relief distribution, clean-up drive and damage assessment. Generally, the
problems encountered by the BDRRMC and affected families were as follows: inadequate equipment
and facilities, insufficient funding for disaster preparedness, lack of seminars and trainings
pertaining to disaster risk reduction and management, lack of manpower and manpower
incompetency. Particularly, affected families encountered unfair and discriminatory distribution of
relief goods and other relief assistances.

Keywords: Emergency Management, Super Typhoon Lawin, Preparedness, Responsiveness,

Satisfaction, Emergency Management Initiatives, Issues and Problems, and Recommendations

1
BPA Students
2
Instructor I

INTRODUCTION
Since time immemorial, it was known in
human history that natural disasters had claimed
increasing death toll in the past, giving out an
indicator that natural forces are getting stronger.
The Philippines, as a country located in the
Pacific Rim, is vulnerable and experiences
dreadful disasters like typhoon and flood that
often cause high death rate and high economic
loss in the agricultural sector and other industry
in which Filipinos engaged. Livelihood and the
safety of communities, particularly in coastal
areas and major river basins, are at risk which
leaves discomfort and frustration.
The Philippine National Government
highly recognizes the adverse effects of natural
disasters made possible the enactment of
Republic Act No. 10121 or also known as the
Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and
Management Act of 2010 which provided the
legal basis for the creation of the National
Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan
(NDRRMP), the Local Disaster Risk Reduction
and Management Councils (LDRRMCs) and
Barangay Disaster Risk Reduction and
Management Committees (BDRRMCs) in the
multifarious Local Government Units (LGUs)
nationwide. The NDRRMP was established to
correspond to RA 10121 for the formulation of
policies, plans, and programs that concerns
disaster related phenomena. This plan revolves
around four thematic points or concerns,
namely: (1) Disaster Prevention and Mitigation;
(2) Disaster Preparedness; (3) Disaster
Response; and (4) Disaster Rehabilitation and
Recovery (NDRRMC, 2011). The establishment
of these thematic areas covered by NDRRMP
empowered LGUs nationwide in building
community resiliency and in the
institutionalization of measures in reducing
disaster risks.
Locally, LGUs in the Province of
Cagayan traversed by the Cagayan River and
other water tributaries, experience yearly the
ravaging effect of flood caused by massive
rainfall during wet seasons and typhoon
occurrences. In particular, the City of
Tuguegarao which grew on the banks of
Cagayan River in 2015 was considered as
Page |2
second among the top ten most disaster prone
cities in the world. The high danger posed by
the entrenching myriad of natural hazards that
the city is exposed to justify its rank among the
worlds most at risk cities.
In October 19, 2016, Tuguegarao City
was ravaged by another disaster named Super
Typhoon Lawin. The Super Typhoon had a
maximum wind of 225 km/h and gustiness of
315 km/h (CNN Philippines Staff, 2016). The
devastating strength of the Super Typhoon upon
its landfall ravaged intended shelters for
evacuees such as schools and gymnasiums
within the city. In the news article published by
Inquirer.net on October 23, 2016, this
monstrous calamity made a total of P581
million to P657 million damage against
infrastructure and P75.8 million against
agriculture across the four regions that were
affected. According to the Terminal Report
from the City Disaster Risk Reduction and
Management Council of Tuguegarao dated
November 11, 2016, there were 33, 244 families
being affected and P14, 754, 944 worth of
damage to agriculture and livestock were
recorded. In addition, the disaster incurred P1,
704, 600, 000 of damage to the infrastructure
sector of the city.
As a result of the adverse effects caused
by Super Typhoon Lawin, the capacity to cope
of the barangays within the City of Tuguegarao
in addressing problems with regards to
preparedness and response were challenged.
This research assessed the emergency
management of the ten barangays in Tuguegarao
City that had the most number of affected
families by Super Typhoon Lawin.
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
The study assessed the emergency
management of the ten (10) identified barangays
in the City of Tuguegarao that had the most
number of Super Typhoon Lawin affected
families.
Specifically, the study sought to answer
the following:
1. What is the level of preparedness of
the ten identified barangays in terms
of:

1.1.Contingency Plan for typhoon
and/or flood before the Super
Typhoon Lawin;
1.2.Early Warning System for
typhoon and/or flood before the
Super Typhoon Lawin;
1.3.Evacuation Management before
and during the Super Typhoon
Lawin; and
1.4.Response/Relief System during
and after the Super Typhoon
Lawin.
2. What is the level of responsiveness
of the ten identified barangays with
respect to the execution of:
2.1.Calamity response protocols
before and during the Super
Typhoon Lawin; and
2.2. After-calamity protocols after
the Super Typhoon Lawin.
3. What is the level of satisfaction of
the Super Typhoon Lawin affected
families in the ten respondent
barangays with respect to the
implementation of plans, activities
and services contained in the
following thematic areas of
emergency management:
3.1.Preparedness; and
3.2.Response.
4. What are the emergency
management initiatives that the
identified barangays had initiated
after the Super Typhoon Lawin?
5. What are the issues and problems
related to emergency management of
the ten respondent barangays that
were encountered by the BDRRMC
members and affected families
before, during, and after the Super
Typhoon Lawin?
6. What are the recommendations of
the affected family respondents and
BDRRMC member respondents that
may help the ten respondent
barangays in the enhancement of
their emergency management?
Page |3
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
The concepts that were used in the
formulation of this study were based on the
principles of Anticipatory Government by
Gaebler and Osborne, phases of Emergency
Management, UN Humanitarian Resolution
461182 of 1991, the Hyogo Framework for
Action, Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and
Management Act of 2010 (RA 10121), the
National Disaster Risk Reduction and
Management Framework of the Philippines, and
the National Disaster Risk Reduction and
Management Plan 2011 to 2018.
The principle of Anticipatory
Government by David Osborne and Ted Gaebler
(1992) postulates that the government should
engage in prevention rather than cure. This
principle implies that by governing with
foresight, government institutions can anticipate
problems in the future. Likewise, the concept of
Emergency Management involves preventive
measures and futuristic undertakings to at least
decrease the effect of disasters.
The UN Humanitarian Resolution
461182 of 1991 provided that each State has the
responsibility to first and foremost to take care
of the victims of natural disasters and other
emergencies occurring on its territory. Hence,
the affected State has the primary role in the
initiation, organization, coordination, and
implementation of humanitarian assistance
within its territory.
In the concept of governance, it is indeed
true that a governments primordial role is to
protect the welfare of its constituents through
initiatives, proper coordination and provision of
humanitarian assistance to the severely affected
citizens in times of emergency. In connection to
this, the concept of emergency management is
inherent to the function of the government as the
main instrumentality in delivering services for
the protection and advancement of humanitarian
welfare during emergencies. There are different
phases being attached to emergency
management which the government have to
fulfill and these are: mitigation, preparedness,
response/relief, and recovery (Baird, 2010). At
the outset, preparedness and response were dealt
with in this study.

Moreover, bases for assessment of
respondent barangays emergency management
can be traced out in the following international
protocols: the UN Humanitarian Charter and the
Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response
and the UN Hyogo Framework for Action
(HFA). The UN Humanitarian Charter and the
Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response
is a United Nation established project aimed at
upgrading the quality of disaster response in
terms of its effectiveness and accountability of
the humanitarian system to the people who are
strained by natural hazards (The Sphere Project,
2011). On the other hand, the UN Hyogo
Framework for Action (HFA) was formulated
and adopted because of the heavy losses and
damages to lives, properties, livelihood and
environment caused by natural calamities such
as typhoons, floods, and the like (UNISDR,
2005). Furthermore, this international
framework was adopted for the member states
to utilize a set of guidelines to reduce
vulnerabilities to natural hazards.
The National Disaster Risk Reduction
and Management Framework, in connection to
the provisions of RA 10121, was adopted and
envisioned to attain sustainable development
with safer, adaptive and disaster-resilient
Filipino Communities (National Disaster
Risk Reduction and Management Plan 2011-
2018, 2011). This movement is geared towards
paradigm shifting from a reactive to proactive
Disaster Risk Reduction and Management
(DRRM) to be fulfilled by citizens who have
increased awareness and understanding of
DRRM for amassing their resilience and
mitigating their vulnerabilities.
METHODOLOGY
Research Design
The researchers used triangulation in the
study since both qualitative and quantitative
methods were employed.
Locale of the Study
The study was conducted in the ten
barangays that had the most number of Super
Page |4
Typhoon Lawin affected families in Tuguegarao
City. The barangays were as follows: Ugac Sur,
Ugac Norte, Cataggaman Nuevo, Linao East,
Cataggaman Viejo, Caggay, Annafunan West,
Buntun, and Cataggaman Pardo and Tanza.
These barangays were ranked in accordance to
the Terminal Report of the CDRRMO of
Tuguegarao pertaining to the impact of Super
Typhoon Lawin dated November 11, 2016.
Respondents and Sampling Method
There were two groups of respondents in
this study: the BDRRMC members and the
affected families. Purposive sampling and
complete enumeration were used to determine
the number of BDRRMC members based on RA
10121.
In the case of affected family
respondents, Slovins formula was used to
determine the general sample size. The number
of affected family respondents was distributed
per respondent-barangay through stratified
sampling technique.
The affected family respondents were
identified by the City Social Welfare and
Development Office as referred by the City
Disaster Risk Reduction and Management
Office of Tuguegarao. There were 100
BDRRMC members but 95 were only
interviewed while all the 389 affected family
respondents were interviewed.
Research Instruments
Interview guides and survey
questionnaires were used in this study.
Data Gathering Procedures and Techniques
The researchers coordinated to the City
Mayors Office of Tuguegarao for the
endorsement of the conduct of survey and
interviews across the respondent barangays. The
immersion included the gathering of disaster
risk reduction and management documents and
reports of the barangays. Upon the endorsement
of the City Mayor, request letters were cascaded
to the Punong Barangays for the formal conduct

of interviews, surveys, and acquiring of
documents.
List of identified affected families were
acquired through the City Social Welfare and
Development Office and became the basis in the
determination of affected family respondents.
The data gathering techniques that were
employed in this study were interviews, survey,
documentary analysis, and on-site observation.
Statistical Tool and Treatment
Descriptive statistics such as frequency,
mean and percentage were used in the treatment
of the data on the level of preparedness and
level of responsiveness of the barangays, and
level of satisfaction of affected family
respondents. Moreover, in measuring the level
of preparedness, response, and satisfaction,
Likert scale was used with the following
arbitrary scale and descriptive value; 4.21
5.00: Very Much Prepared/Very
Responsive/Very Satisfied, 3.41 4.20:
Prepared/Responsive/Satisfied, 2.61 3.40,
Ambivalent/Moderately Responsive/Neither
Satisfied nor Dissatisfied, 1.81
2.60:Unprepared/Unresponsive/Dissatisfied, and
1.0 1.8:Very Much Unprepared/Very
Unresponsive/Very Dissatisfied.
Moreover, frequency counts and ranking
were used in treating the data on the problems
encountered by the different groups of
respondents and their recommendations that
may help their barangays emergency
management.
FINDINGS
Level of Preparedness
A. Contingency Plan before the Super
Typhoon Lawin
The respondent barangays were
generally perceived as ambivalent with respect
to their contingency plan before the Super
Typhoon Lawin with a mean of 2.77. This
shows that the preparedness of the contingency
plan of the respondent barangays were
uncertain.
Page |5
Further probing showed that seven (7)
barangays had their respective contingency plan
for typhoon and/or flood, but were not posted in
conspicuous places, before the Super Typhoon
Lawin. Moreover, five (5) barangays had an
available local disaster risk map, yet only two
(2) barangays posted it in their respective
barangay halls.
Analysis of records in all barangays
showed that only Cataggaman Viejo had a drill
for the testing of their contingency plan before
the super typhoon. Disaster related signages
before the super typhoon in Buntun,
Cataggaman Pardo, Cataggaman Viejo, Ugac
Sur, and Cataggaman Nuevo were posted but
destroyed during the super typhoon.
B. Early Warning System before Super
Typhoon Lawin
Generally, the ten respondent barangays
early warning system before the onslaught of
Super Typhoon Lawin was perceived as
ambivalent with a mean of 3.07. This indicates
that there was an uncertainty on the barangays
preparedness.
On the other hand, records analysis
showed that only three (3) barangays had their
early warning system prior to the onslaught of
the super typhoon. However, all the respondent-
barangays dont have an installed early warning
system. Instead, their early warning systems
revolved in the use of whistles, megaphones,
and sirens. This indicates that the barangays
were still using the old and practical way of
providing early warning.
C. Evacuation Management System
before and during the Super Typhoon
Lawin
Generally, the barangays were
ambivalent in terms of evacuation management
system before and during the Super Typhoon
Lawin with a mean of 3.00. It can be inferred in
general that the respondent barangays
preparedness was uncertain.
Individually, all barangays designated
their evacuation centers before and during the
super typhoon. It was revealed that the most

common evacuation centers were Barangay
Hall, Covered Court/Gymnasium,
Church/Chapel, and Multipurpose Hall.
Interviews with the BDRRMC members
in Cataggaman Pardo revealed that they did not
housed the evacuees in the covered
court/gymnasium because of its vulnerability to
the strength of the super typhoon. Specifically,
it was revealed that only three (3) barangays had
an available evacuation map/route and
evacuation management plan.
Food pack with potable water was the
most common basic necessity in the evacuation
center while sleeping mats were the least.
BDRRMC members from barangays Ugac
Norte and Tanza disclosed they did not provided
sleeping mats, blankets and pillows in the
evacuation centers because evacuees brought
their own sleeping paraphernalia. Power supply
and health facilities were the most common
basic facilities while priority areas for pregnant
women, elderly and persons with disabilities
was the least basic facility. It can be deduced
that the establishment of priority areas for
pregnant women, elderly and persons with
disabilities have to be strengthened since these
are the vulnerable sectors.
All barangays had their own power
supply and mobile communication system.
Their communication before, during and after
the super typhoon relied on cellular phones and
handheld radio. For instance in Caggay,
BDRRMC members used cellular phone and
handheld radio in transmitting information and
calling. Moreover, all barangays were able to
deploy their barangay tanods to secure the
evacuation centers.
D. Response/Relief System during and
after the Super Typhoon Lawin
Generally, survey showed that all
barangays were ambivalent in terms of
response/relief system during and after the super
typhoon with a mean of 3.33. This shows that
there was an uncertainty in the preparedness of
the barangays in terms of response/relief system
during and after the calamity.
Interviews and on-site observation
showed that all barangays designated their
Page |6
barangay halls as the sole barangay operation
center after the super typhoon. Members of the
BDRRMC also said that their respective Punong
Barangays acted as the persons-in-charge. In
addition, all barangays were able to deploy
personnel for search and rescue after but were
not during the super typhoon. Relief distribution
was tackled in the barangays but only two (2)
barangays documented it.
Level of Responsiveness
A. Execution of Calamity Response
Protocols before and during the Super
Typhoon Lawin
Generally, survey shows that the barangays
were moderately responsive in terms of calamity
response protocols execution with a mean of
3.04. This indicates that their responsiveness
was average.
Majority of the BDRRMC members
affirmed in the execution of the calamity
response protocols before the super typhoon.
However, records analysis revealed that only
two (2) barangays were able to make
announcement or issuance of advisories, alerts
and warnings before the super typhoon. It was
found out that there were series of
announcements done by the BDRRMC
members upon the transmission of information
from the city government.
In terms of evacuation and search
equipment, search light was the most common
while extrication kit was the least. Other
evacuation and rescue equipment such as
chainsaw, and rope were also present.
Cataggaman Nuevo and Cataggaman Pardo
have their own boats.
Probing into the mobilization of
BDRRMC members revealed that they were not
fully mobilized before the super typhoon
because they secured first their own families
and properties. Some of the CSO representatives
were not informed and mobilized. It was also
found out that BHWs, BNS, and other barangay
officials were referred to as the trained
personnel who were deployed before the super
typhoon for food handling, orderly distribution
of relief goods, provision of medical, counseling

services and law enforcement, and in settling
interpersonal conflicts.
Enforcement of pre-emptive and forced
evacuation became a bottleneck before the super
typhoon due to community resistance. People in
the community chose to stay in their house
rather than to take shelter in the evacuation
centers. The deployment of search and rescue
and Barangay Emergency Response Teams
were not done during the super typhoon because
unpassable roads caused by fallen trees and
debris from houses and buildings.
B. Execution of After-Calamity Protocols
after the Super Typhoon Lawin
Generally, survey in the barangays
revealed that they were moderately responsive
in the execution of after calamity protocols after
the super typhoon with a mean of 3.20. This
shows that their responsiveness was average.
Interviews revealed that majority of the
BDRRMC members affirmed on the inspection
of affected areas in their barangays before
evacuees returned. Likewise, it was revealed
that there was a provision of relief assistance,
including medical and psycho-social services.
There were barangay clean-ups done within 24
hours after the calamity.
In the contrary, records showed that not
all barangays had executed the after-calamity
protocols. It revealed that there were five (5)
barangays who had the inspection of affected
areas and damage assessments. Moreover, only
two (2) barangays had documentations during
the clean-up activity.
Level of Satisfaction
A. Affected families satisfaction on the
implementation of plans, activities and
services on the thematic area of
preparedness.
Generally, the affected family
respondents were neither satisfied nor
dissatisfied in the preparedness of the barangays
with a mean of 2.82. This means that there is a
need for the barangays to enhance the
implementation of activities and services
Page |7
encompassed by preparedness to uplift peoples
satisfaction.
B. Affected families satisfaction on the
implementation of barangay-based
plans, activities and services on the
thematic area of response
The affected family respondents, in general,
were neither satisfied nor dissatisfied in the
execution of the various activities and services
covered by response with a mean of 3.18. These
findings show that there is also a need for the
improvement in the implementation of activities
and services encompassed by response to gain
higher satisfaction.
Emergency Management Initiatives that the
Barangays had after the Super Typhoon
Lawin
Activities such as damage assessments,
relief distribution, clean-up drive, rehabilitation
of streetlights and after-calamity monitoring are
the common activities that the affected families
and BDRRMC members regard as emergency
management initiatives.
Issues and Problems encountered by the
BDRRMC Members and Affected Family
Respondents before, during, and after the
Super Typhoon Lawin
The most common issues and problems
encountered by the two groups of respondents
before, during and after the super typhoon were
inadequate equipment and facilities, inadequate
budget for disaster preparedness, lack of
seminars and training pertaining to disaster risk
reduction and management, lack of manpower,
and lack of manpower competency.
Particularly, the affected family
respondents encountered unfair and politicized
distribution of relief assistances while the
BDRRMC members experienced challenges on
the distribution of relief assistances due to
peoples confusions and misconceptions.

Recommendations of the BDRRMC
Members and Affected Family Respondents
The two groups of respondents commonly
recommended the provision of additional
funding, facilities and materials for disaster
preparedness, search and rescue and
response/relief; enhancement of early warning
system and provision of trainings and seminars
for disaster preparedness; encouragement of
more barangay residents to participate during
barangay assemblies and other activities; and
procurement of upgraded equipment for search
and rescue, and strengthening of the
dissemination of disaster advisories, alerts and
warnings.
CONCLUSION
Based on the findings, it was concluded that
1. The respondent-barangays were
perceived as ambivalent in terms of
contingency plan for typhoon and/or
flood and early warning system before
the super typhoon. They were also
perceived as ambivalent in terms of
evacuation management before and
during the super typhoon and ambivalent
with respect to response/relief system
after.
However, interviews and documentary
analysis showed that seven (7)
barangays were prepared in terms of
contingency plan while three (3)
barangays were prepared in terms of
early warning system before the super
typhoon. Only two (2) barangays were
prepared in terms of evacuation
management before and during the super
typhoon while all of them were prepared
in terms of response/relief system during
and after.
2. The respondent-barangays, in general,
were moderately responsive in terms of
calamity response protocol execution.
They were also moderately responsive in
the after-calamity response protocol
execution. On the other hand, interviews
Page |8
and documentary analysis showed that
only two (2) barangays were able to
execute the calamity response protocols
while two (2) barangays were able to
execute the after-calamity protocols.
Respondent barangays were not able to
execute the calamity response protocols
during the super typhoon due to strong
winds and unpassable roads.
3. The affected family respondents, in
general, were neither satisfied nor
dissatisfied in terms of the
implementation of activities and services
encompassed by the thematic area of
preparedness. They were also neither
satisfied nor dissatisfied in terms of the
implementation of activities and services
covered by the thematic area of
response.
4. The most common emergency
management initiatives that the
respondent-barangays had were relief
distribution, clean-up drive and damage
assessment. The respondent barangays
also had after-calamity monitoring.
5. The affected families and BDRRMC
members both encountered inadequate
equipment and facilities, inadequate
budget for disaster preparedness, lack of
seminars and training pertaining to
disaster risk reduction and management,
lack of manpower, and lack of
manpower competency.
In particular, the affected families
experienced issues and problems in the
distribution of relief assistances due to
unfair, discriminate, and politicized
distribution. Likewise, the BDRRMC
members experienced issues and
problems in relief distribution due to
peoples confusions and misconceptions.
6. The affected families and BDRRMC
members commonly recommended the
provision of additional funding, more
facilities and materials, more trainings
and seminars for disaster preparedness,
search and rescue and response/relief;
enhancement of early warning system;
encouragement of more barangay
residents to participate during barangay

assemblies and other activities,
procurement of upgraded equipment for
search and rescue; and strengthening of
the dissemination of disaster advisories,
alerts and warnings.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the conclusions, the following
recommendations are formulated:
1. Establish a barangay based DRRM
program reinforced with the conduct of
series of capability building seminars
and trainings that will enhance the
preparedness and responsiveness of
barangays before, during and after a
disaster.
2. Establish a strong barangay-based
contingency planning harmonized with
the DRRM Plan of the City DRRMC for
disaster preparedness and adopt a
standard barangay based system for
early warning, evacuation management,
and response/relief operations.
3. Intensify barangay based information-
dissemination, the timely sending of
advisories, disaster related alerts and
warnings, and strengthen the
participation and level of awareness of
the community in pre-emptive and
forced evacuation, relief distribution
system, rescue operations and household
disaster preparations. To realize this,
there must be a provision of an increase
of DRRM fund from 5% to 10%
mandatory budget allocation for disaster
preparedness or provision for
exemptions in the procurement process
and request for authority to purchase;
enactment of ordinance on pre-emptive
and force evacuation; and procurement
of upgraded evacuation and rescue
equipment.
4. Strengthen capacities of the BDRRMC
and the community in the formulation of
BDRRM plans, contingency plan,
evacuation map and routes through
massive distribution of pamphlets and
posting of information materials in
Page |9
conspicuous places aside from barangay
halls and schools.
5. Provide trainings and seminars to create
social awareness, and encourage citizen
participation and skills development of
frontline respondents.
6. Capacitate BDRRMCs on community
based Disaster Risk Reduction
Assessment for inputs on DRRM
management.
7. Forward the results of this study to the
city government as a basis for policy-
making towards Disaster Risk and
Reduction Management.
REFERENCES
Araja, R. N., & Solmerin, F. S. (2016, October
20). Manila Standard. Retrieved
October 31, 2016, from Manila
Standard:
http://manilastandard.net/news/-main-
stories/top-stories/219285/storm-signal-
number-5-up-for-first-time-amid-lawin-
.html
Balana, C. D. (2016, October 23). Inquirer.net.
Retrieved October 30, 2016, from
Inquirer.net:
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/830036/typh
oon-lawin-damage-p657m
City Disaster Risk Reduction and Management
Office (2016). Super Typhoon Lawin
Terminal Report. Tuguegarao City.
CNN Philippines Staff. (2016, Ocotober 19).
CNN Philippines. Retrieved November
5, 2016, from CNN Philippines:
http://cnnphilippines.com/news/2016/10/
19/Super-typhoon-Lawin-PAGASA-
October-19.html
DILG. (2010, August 24). DILG. Retrieved
January 27, 2017, from DILG :
http://www.dilg.gov.ph
DILG Memorandum Circular No. 2010 - 143.
(2010, December 9). DILG. Retrieved
December 27, 2016, from DILG:
http://downloads.caraga.dilg.gov.ph/Dis
aster%20Preparedness/DILG%20Issuanc
es%20on%20DRRM%20and%20CCA/
DILG-Memo_Circular-2010-143.pdf

Dullana, R. (2015, October 24). Rappler.
Retrieved September 18, 2016, from
Rappler:
http://www.rappler.com/nation/110178-
typhoon-lando-tuguegarao-floods
GMA News. (2015, October 19). GMA News
Online. Retrieved September 18, 2016,
from GMA News Online:
http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story
/541237/news/regions/massive-flooding-
hits-cagayan-province
National Disaster Risk Reduction and
Management Framework. (2011, June
16). ADRC. Retrieved September 18,
2016, from ADRC:
http://www.adrc.asia/documents/dm_inf
ormation/Philippines_NDRRM_Framew
ork.pdf
National Disaster Risk Reduction and
Management Plan 2011-2018. (2011).
NDRRMC. Retrieved September 18,
2016, from NDRRMC:
http://www.ndrrmc.gov.ph/attachments/a
rticle/41/NDRRM_Plan_2011-2028.pdf
NDRRMC. (2011). NDRRMC. Retrieved
September 18, 2016, from NDRRMC
Web Site:
http://www.ndrrmc.gov.ph/attachments/a
rticle/41/NDRRM_Plan_2011-2028.pdf
Osborne, D., & Gaebler, T. (2003, September
23). Angelfire. Retrieved September 30,
2016, from Angelfire:
http://www.angelfire.com/folk/classproje
ct0/SHU-G-SF-ASK-CP20030923.htm
PAGASA. (2015). PAGASA. Retrieved
February 6, 2017, from PAGASA:
http://www.pagasa.dost.gov.ph/index.ph
p/learning-tools/94-weather/478-
philippine-public-storm-warning-signal
RA 10121. (2010, May 27). NDRRMC.
Retrieved September 18, 2016, from
NDRRMC:
http://www.ndrrmc.gov.ph/attachments/a
rticle/45/Republic_Act_10121.pdf
UNISDR. (2005). Hyogo Framework for Action
2005-2015: Building the Resilience of
Nations and Communities to Disasters.
World Conference on Disaster
Reduction. Kobe: UNISDR.
P a g e | 10
United Nations. (1991, December 19). UN.
Retrieved September 18, 2016, from
UN:
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/46/
a46r182.htm
United Nations. (2015). Sendai Framework for
Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030.
Third UN World Conference , (p. 5).
Sendai.
Verisk Maplecroft. (2015, March 4).
Maplecroft. Retrieved September 19,
2016, from Verisk Maplecroft:
https://maplecroft.com/portfolio/new-
analysis/2015/03/04/56-100-cities-most-
exposed-natural-hazards-found-key-
economies-philippines-japan-china-
bangladesh-verisk-maplecroft/
Wa State EM Council. (2008). Guide to
Emergency Management and Related
Terms, Definitions, Concepts,
Acronyms, Organizations, Programs,
Gudance, Executive Orders &
Legislation. In B. Blanchard, Guide to
Emergency Management and Related
Terms, Definitions, Concepts, Acronyms,
Organizations, Programs, Gudance,
Executive Orders & Legislation (p. 12).
Waugh, W. J. (2010). Public Administration,
Emergency Management, and Disaster
Policy. FEMA.