Rational Action

Author(s): Carl G. Hempel

Source: Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, Vol. 35 (1961 -
1962), pp. 5-23
Published by: American Philosophical Association
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 RationalAction
CARL G. HEMPEL

1. Two aspectsof the conceptof rationalaction.

To say of an action that it is rational is to put forwardan
empiricalhypothesisand a criticalappraisal.The hypothesisis to the
effectthat the action was done for certainreasons,that it can be
explained as having been motivatedby them; these reasons will
includecertainends the agent soughtto attain,and his beliefsabout
available means of attainingthem.And the criticalappraisalimplied
by the attributionof rationalityis to the effectthat,judged in the
light of the agent's beliefs,his action constituteda reasonableor
appropriatechoice of means for the attainmentof his ends.
Both the criticaland the explanatoryaspectsof the conceptof
rationalactiongive rise to variousphilosophicalquestions.The con-
siderationsthatfollow are an attemptto delineateand exploresome
of themostimportant among these.
2. Rationality
ofactionas a criticalconcept.
2.1. Generalcharacterization.
Let us considerfirstthe basic problemof explicatingthe critical,
or normative, idea of rationalaction.This calls forthe elaborationof
precisecriteriaof rationalitywhichmightprovideus withstandardsfor
appraisingthe rationality of particularactions,and which mightthus
also affordguidance in making rationaldecisions.
Rationalityin the sensehere intendedis obviouslya relativecon-
cept. Whether a given action--or the decision to performit-is
rationalwill depend on the objectivesthat the action is meant to
achieveand on therelevantempiricalinformation availableat the time
of the decision.Broadlyspeaking,an actionwill qualifyas rationalif,
on the basis of the given information, it offersoptimalprospectsof
its
achieving objectives. I will now discussmorecloselythekeyconcepts
invokedin thischaracterization: the conceptsof the information basis
and of the objectivesof an action, and finallythat af rationality
relativeto a givenbasis and givenobjectives.

addressdeliveredbeforethe Fifty-Eighth
*Presidential Annual Meetingof the
EasternDivision of the AmericanPhilosophicalAssociationat AtlanticCity,
December27-29,1961.
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2.2. The information basisof rationaldecisionand action.

If we are to choosea rationalcourseof actionin pursuitof given
ends, we will have to take into account all available information
concerningsuch mattersas the particularcircumstances in which the
action is to be taken; the differentmeans by which, in these
circumstances, the given ends mightbe attained;and the side-effects
thatmaybe expectedto resultfromtheuse ofdifferent availablemeans.
The totalempiricalinformation that is available for a given de-
cisionmay be thoughtof as represented by a set of sentences,which
I will call theinformation basisof thedecisionor of thecorresponding
action. This construalof the empiricalbasis for a decision takes
accountof an obviousbut importantpoint: to judge the rationality of
a decision,we have to consider,not what empiricalfacts-particular
factsas well as generallaws-are actuallyrelevantto the successor
failureof the actiondecided upon, but what information concerning
such factsis available to the decision-maker. Indeed, a decisionmay
clearlyqualifyas rationaleven thoughit is based on incompleteor
on false empiricalassumptions.For example,the historian,precisely
in orderto presentan action by a historicalfigureas rational,will
oftenhave to assume-and may well be able to show on independent
grounds-thatthe agent was incompletelyinformed,or even enter-
tainedfalsebeliefs,concerningrelevantempiricalmatters.
But while the information basis of a rationalaction thus need
not be true,should therenot at least be good reasonsfor believing
it true? Should not the basis satisfya requirementof adequate evi-
dentialsupport?Some writersdo considerthis a necessarycondition
of rationalaction;and thisview is indeedquite plausible;forexample,
as one of itsrecentadvocates,QuentinGibson,pointsout,if "someone
were,carefullyand deliberately, to walk round a ladder because he
believed,withoutevidence,that walking under it would bring him
bad luck,we would not hesitateto say thathe acted irrationally."1
No doubtwe oftenunderstandrationality in thisrestricted sense.
But if we wish to constructa conceptof rationalaction that might
laterproveusefulin explainingcertaintypesof humanbehavior,then
it seems preferablenot to impose on it a requirementof evidential
support;for in order to explain an action in termsof the agent's
reason's,we need to know what theagentbelieved,but not necessarily
on what grounds.For example,an explanationof the behaviorof

1QuentinGibson,The Logic of Social Enquiry(London and New York,1960),

p. 43.
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 RATIONAL ACTION

Gibson's ladder-shunnerin termsof motivatingreasonswould have

to invoketheman'ssuperstitions
beliefs,butnotnecessarily
thegrounds
on which he holds them; and the man may well be said to be
givenhis beliefs.
actingquite reasonably,
23. The objectiveof rationaldecisionor action.
From the information basis of a decisionlet me now turnto its
objectives.In verysimplecases,an actionmightbe construedsimply
as intendedto bringabout a particularstateof affairs,which I will
call theend state.But even in suchsimplecases,some of thecoursesof
actionwhich,accordingto the information basis,are availableand are
likelyto achievethe end state,may nevertheless be ruledout because
theyviolatecertaingeneralconstrainingprinciples,such as moral or
legal norms,contractualcommitments, social conventions,the rulesof
the game being played,or the like. Accordingly,the contemplated
actionwill be aimed at achievingtheend statewithoutsuchviolation;
and what I will call its totalobjectivemay thenbe characterized by a
setE ofsentencesdescribing theintendedend-state, in conjunctionwith
anotherset,N, of constraining norms.
Again, as in thecase of the empiricalbasis,I will not imposethe
requirementthat there must be "good reasons" for adopting the
givenends and norms:rationality of an actionwill herebe understood
in a strictlyrelativesense,as its suitability,
judged in the lightof the
giveninformation, forachievingthespecifiedobjective.
2.4.Basic criteriaofrationality
of action.
How can suchsuitability be defined?For decisionsituationsof the
simple kind just contemplated,a characterizationcan readily be
given:Iftheinformation basiscontainsgenerallaws by virtueof which
certainof the available coursesof action would be bound to achieve
the totalobjective,then,clearly,any one of those actionswill count
as rationalin the given context.If the informationbasis does not
single out any available course of action as a sufficientmeans for
attainingthe objective,it may yet assign a numericalprobabilityof
successto each of the differentavailableactions,and in thiscase, any
one of thoseactionswill countas rationalwhose probability of success
is not exceededby thatof any availablealternative.

2.5.Broadenedconstrualof objectiveand of rationality.

However for many problemsof rationaldecision,the available
information,the objectives,and the criteriaof rationalitycannot be
construedin thissimplemanner.Our construalbecomesinapplicable,
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in particular,when the objectiveof a proposedactiondoes not consist

in attaininga specifiedend-state;and this is quite frequentlythe
case,as we will see.
To beginwith,even when a particularend-stateis to be attained,
the available informationwill oftenindicatethat there are several
alternativeways of definitely or probablyattainingit, and that these
alternativeswould be attendedby different incidentalconsequences,
such side-effects, after-effects,and the like. Some of these might
be regardedas moreor lessdesirable,othersas moreor less undesirable.
In a theoreticalmodelof suchsituationsthetotalgoal mustaccordingly
be indicated,not simplyby describingthe desiredend-state,but by
specifying the relativedesirabilityof the different totaloutcomesthat
may resultfrom the available courses of action.
In the mathematical theoryof decision-making, variousmodelsof
rationalchoicehave been constructed in whichthosedesirabilities are
assumedto be specifiablein numericalterms,as the so-calledutilities
of thedifferent totaloutcomes.
If the given information basis specifiesthe probabilitiesof the
different outcomes, we have a case of what is called decision-making
underrisk.For thiscase, one criterionof rationality has gained wide
acceptance,namely that of maximizingexpectedutility.The expected
utilitywhich, on the given information, is associatedwith a contem-
plated courseof action is determined by multiplying, foreach possible
outcome of the action,its probabilitywith its utility,and adding
the products.An action then qualifies as rational if its expected
utilityis maximalin the sense of not being exceededby the expected
utilityof any alternative action.
One more typeof decision-situation deservesbriefmentionhere
because of its interesting philosophicalimplications.This is the case
of decisionunderuncertainty. Here the formulation of the problemis
assumed to specifythe available coursesof action,and for each of
themits different possibleoutcomeswith theirutilities,but not their
probabilities.By way of illustration,suppose that you are offeredas
a presenta metalball thatyouwill obtainby one singledrawingmade,
at youroption,fromone of two urns.You are given the information
that the metal balls are of the same size, and that the firsturn
containsplatinumballs and lead balls in an unspecifiedproportion;
the second urn, gold and silverballs in an unspecifiedproportion.
Suppose that the utilitiesyou assign to platinum,gold, silver,and
lead are in the ratio of 1000: 100: 10: 1; from which urn is it
rational to draw? Interestingly, several quite differentcriteriaof
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 RATIONAL ACTION

rational choice under uncertaintyhave been set forth in recent

decision theory.Perhaps the best-knownof them is the maximin
rule; it directsus to maximizethe minimumutility,thatis to choose
an action whose worst possible outcome is at least as good as the
worstpossibleoutcomeof any alternative. In our example,thiscalls for
a drawingfromthe secondurn; forat worst,it will give you a silver
ball,whereastheworstoutcomeof a drawingfromthe firsturnwould
give you a lead ball. This rule clearlyrepresents a policyof extreme
the
caution,reflecting pessimistic maxim: act on the assumptionthat
the worstpossibleoutcomewill resultfromyour action.
By contrast,the so-called maximax rule reflectsan attitudeof
optimism;it directsus to act on the assumptionthatthe bestpossible
thingis going to happen,and hence to choose an action whose best
possibleoutcomeis at leastas good as thebestpossibleoutcomeof any
alternative.In our example,the properdecisionunderthisrule would
be to draw fromthe firsturn; forat bestthiswill give us a platinum
ball, whereas a drawing from the second urn can at best yield a
gold ball.
Apart fromthe two rules just considered,severalotherrules of
rationalchoice have been suggestedfor decision under uncertainty.
The standardsof rationality theyreflectall have a certainplausibility,
yet they conflictwith one another:for one and the same decision
situation,theywill normallysingleout different choicesas optimal.2
The mathematical modelsherebriefly characterizeddo notofferus
much help fora rationalsolutionof the grave and complexdecision
problemsthatconfront us in our dailyaffairs.
For in thesecases,we are
usuallyfar fromhaving the data requiredby our models: we often
have no clear idea of the available courses of action,nor can we
specifythe possibleoutcomes,let alone theirprobabilities and utilities.
In contexts,however,where such informationis available, mathe-
matical decision theoryhas been applied quite successfullyeven to
rathercomplexproblems,forexamplein industrialqualitycontroland
some phasesof strategic planning.
But whatevertheir practicalpromise,these models contribute,
I think,to the analyticclarification of the conceptof rationalaction.
In particular,they throw into reliefthe complex,multiplyrelative,
characterof thisconcept;and theyshow thatsome of the characteri-
zations of rational action which have been put forward in the

2For a lucid statement

and comparativeanalysisof the criteriain question,see
R. D. Luce and H. Raiffa,Gamesand Decisions(New York, 1957),Chap. 13.
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philosophicalliterature are of a deceptiveneatnessand simplicity. For

example, Gibson, in his careful and illuminating study,remarks: "there
maybe variousalternative waysof achievingan end. To act rationally
. . . is to selectwhat on the evidenceis the bestway of achievingit;3
and he refersto "an elementarylogical point--namely,that,given
certainevidence,therecan onlybe one correctsolutionto the problem
as to thebestwayofachievinga givenend."4Gibsonoffers no criterion
forwhatconstitutes the bestsolution.But surely,what he assertshere
is not an elementary logicalpoint,and indeedit is not true.For, first,
even when the decisionsituationis of a kind forwhich one definite
criterion of rationalchoicemaybe assumedto be availableand agreed
upon-for example, the principleof maximizingexpectedutility-
then that criterionmay qualifyseveraldifferent coursesof action as
equally rational. Secondly, there are various kinds of decision-for
example, decisions under uncertainty-for which there is not even
agreement on a criterion of rationality,where maximin opposes
maximax,and bothare opposedby variousalternative rules.
It is importantto bear in mind that the different competing
criteriaof rationality of decisionor actiondo not reflectdifferences in
the evaluationof the variousends which,on the given information,
are attainable;all the competingrules here referredto presuppose
thattheutilitiesof thoseends have been antecedently fixed.Rather,the
different decision rules or criteriaof rationality reflectdifferentin-
ductiveattitudes;different degreesof optimismor pessimism concern-
ing what to expectof the world; and accordinglydifferent degreesof
venturesomeness or cautionin decidingupon a courseof action.
The considerations hereoutlinedconcerningthecriticalor norma-
tivenotionof rationality have importantimplicationsforthe explana-
toryuse of the idea of rationalaction.I now turnto thissecondtopic
of mypaper.

3. Rationalactionas an explanatory
concept.
Purposivehumanactionsare oftenexplainedin termsof motivat-
ing reasons.The precedingdiscussionsuggeststhat,if fullystated,
a specificationof such reasons will have to indicate the agent's
objectivesas well as his beliefsabout such mattersas the available
means and their likely consequences.This conception is clearly
forexample,in R. S. Peters'remarkthatin suchmotivational
reflected,

3Gibson,loc. cit.,p. 160 (italicsthe author's).

4Ibid.,p. 162.
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 RATIONALACTION

explanationswe "assume thatmen are rationalin thattheywill take

means which lead to ends if they have the informationand want
the ends.""5Here, then,we have the idea of an explanatoryuse of
the conceptof rationality.
Let us now examine the logic of explanationsby motivating
of rationality
reasons,and especiallythe r6le which the attribution to
the agent plays in thiscontext.

3.1. Dray's conceptor rationalexplanation.

As our pointof departure,let us chooseProfessorWilliam Dray's
stimulatingand lucid analysis of this kind of explanation: Dray
calls it rationalexplanationbecause,as he says,it "displaystherationale
of whatwas done" by offering "a reconstruction of the agent'scalcula-
tionof meansto be adoptedtowardhis chosenend in the lightof the
circumstances in which he found himself.To explain the action we
need to know what considerations convincedhim thathe should act
as he did."' But Dray attributesto rational explanationa further
characteristic,whichclearlyassignsan essentialr61le to theevaluativeor
criticalconceptof rationality.Accordingto him, the "goal of such
explanationis to show thatwhat was done was thethingto have done
forthereasonsgiven,ratherthanmerelythethingthatis done on such
occasions,perhapsin accordancewithcertainlaws."' Hence, "Reported
reasons,if they are to be explanatoryin the rationalway, must be
good reasonsat leastin the sense thatif the situationhad been as the
agent envisagedit . . . , then what was done would have been the
thingto have done."8To show that the agent had good reasonsfor
his action,a rationalexplanationmusttherefore invoke,not a general
empiricallaw, but a "principleof action,"whichexpresses"a judgment
of the form:'When in a situationof typeC1 ... C, the thingto do
is x'."' Thus, thereis "an elementof appraisalof what was done in
such explanations."'x And it is preciselyin thisrelianceon a principle
of actionexpressingan appraisalthatDray sees theessentialdifference
betweenrationalexplanationsand thoseexplanatory accounts,familiar

5R. S. Peters,The Conceptof Motivation(London and New York, 1958), p. 4

(Italicssupplied).
6WilliamDray,Laws and Explanationin History(Oxford,1957), pp. 124 and
122 (italicstheauthor's).
71bid.,p. 124.
81bid.,p. 126 (italicstheauthors).
9Ibid.,p. 132 (italicstheauthor's).
10lbid.,p. 124 (italicsthe author's).
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especiallyfromthe naturalsciences,whichexplaina phenomenonby

subsumingit under coveringgeneral laws that describebut do not
appraise.
It appears then that accordingto Dray's conceptiona rational
explanationanswersthe question 'Why did agent A do x?' by a
statementof the form: 'A was in a situation of type C1 ... and in
Cn;
a situationof thattype,the thingto do is x'; or briefly:'A was in a
situationof type C (whose descriptionwould presumablyinclude a
specificationof A's objectivesand relevantbeliefs), and in such a
situation, rationalthingto do is x'.
the
Now, this construalof rationalexplanationclearlypresupposes
that thereis a criterionof rationalitywhich,for the given kind of
decisionsituation,uniquelysinglescut one particularcourseof action
as "thethingto do." However,thisassumptionseemsto be untenable,
forreasonsindicatedearlier.
But, more importantly,even if such a criterionwere granted,an
of
account the form Dray attributesto a rationalexplanationcannot,
it seemsto me,do thejob ofexplainingwhyA did x. For anyadequate
answerto thequestionwhya certaineventoccurredwill surelyhave to
provideus with information which,if acceptedas true,would afford
good groundsfor believingthat that event did indeed occur-even
if therewere no otherevidenceforits occurrence.This seemsclearly
a necessaryconditionfor an adequate explanation-thoughof course
by no means a sufficient one: producingevidencefor the occurrence
of an eventis not the same thingas explainingit. Now, information
to the effect that agent A was in a situation of kind C,
and that in such a situationthe rationalthing to do is x, affords
groundsforbelievingthatit would have been rationalforA to do x;
but not forbelievingthat A did in fact do x. To justifythis latter
belief,we clearlyneed a furtherexplanatoryassumption, namelythat-
at leastat the timein question-A was a Irationalagent and thus was
disposedto do whateverwas rationalunderthe circumstances.
But when this assumptionis added, the answer to the question
'Why did A do x?' takeson thefollowingform:
A was in a situationof typeC
(SchemaR) A was a rationalagent
agentwilldo x
of typeC anyrational
In a situation
A did x.
Therefore
This construal differs
of rationalexplanation fromDray's in two
First,theassumption
respects: agentis explicitly
thatA was a rational
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 RATIONAL ACTION

added; and secondly,the evaluativeor appraisingprincipleof action,

which tells us what is the thingto do in situationC, is replacedby
a descriptivegeneralizationtellingus how a rationalagentwill act in
situationsof thatkind: but thisrestoresthe covering-law formto the
explanation.
In thus disagreeingwith Dray's analysisof rationalexplanation,
I do not wish to deny that an explanatoryaccount in terms of
motivating reasonsmaywell haveevaluativeovertones:whatI maintain
is only that whethera criticalappraisalis includedin, or suggested
by, a given account,is irrevelantto its explanatoryforce: and that
an appraisalalone,by meansof what Dray calls a principleof action,
does not explainat all why A did in factdo x.

3.2. Explanationby reasonsas broadlydispositional.

The alternativeconstrualwhich I have so far sketchedonly in
outlinenow requiresa somewhatfullerstatement.
The notionof rationalagent invoked in Schema R above must
of coursebe conceivedas a descriptive-psychological conceptgoverned
by objectivecriteriaof application;any normativeor evaluativecon-
notationsit may carrywithit are inessentialforthe explanatory force
of the argument.To be sure,normativepreconceptions as to how a
trulyrationalpersonought to behave may well influencethe choice
of descriptive criteriafora rationalagent--justas the construction of
testsprovidingobjectivecriteriaof intelligence, verbalaptitude,mathe-
matical aptitude,and the like will be influencedby pre-systematic
conceptionsand norms.But the descriptive-psychological use of the
term'rationalagent' (just like thatof the terms'IQ,' 'verbalaptitude,'
'mathematicalaptitude,'et cetera) must then be governed by the
objectiveempiricalrulesof applicationthathave beenadopted,irrespec-
tive of whetherthisor thatperson (for example,the proponentof a
rationalexplanationor the personto whom it is addressed) happens
to find those objective rules in accord with his own normative
standardsof rationality.
By whateverspecificempiricalcriteriait may be characterized,
rationality in the descriptive-psychologicalsense is what I will call a
broadlydispositional trait:to sayof someonethathe is a rationalagent
is to attributeto him,by implication, a complexbundleof dispositions,
each of them a tendencyto behave in characteristic ways in certain
kinds of situation(whose full specificationwould have to include
information abouttheagent'sobjectivesand beliefs,aboutotheraspects
of his psychologicaland biological state, about his environment,
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et cetera).To explaina givenactionby reference to theagent'sreasons

and his rationality is thus to presentit as conforming to, as being an
instanceof,one of thosegeneraltendencies.Roughlyspeaking,there-
fore, explanationsby motivatingreasons have the characterof
dispositionalexplanationsin the sense examined by Ryle in The
Conceptof Mind." However,this rough characterization now must
be elaborateda littleand mustalso be qualifiedin certainrespects.
To begin with, the dispositionsimplied by the psychological
conceptof rationalagent are not simplydispositionsto respondby
certaincharacteristic overtbehaviorto specificexternalstimuli.They
differin thisrespectfromat leastsomeofthedispositions impliedwhen
we say of a personthat he is allergicto ragweedpollen; for to say
thisis to imply,amongotherthings,thathe will exhibitthe symptoms
of a head cold when exposedto the pollen. When we call someone
a rationalagent, we assert by implicationthat he will behave in
characteristicwaysif he findshimselfin certainkindsof situation;but
-and this is a firstpointto note-those situationscannotbe described
simply in terms of certain environmenttl conditionsand external
stimuli;for characteristically they include the agent's having certain
objectivesand entertaining certain revelant beliefs. To mark this
difference, we mightsay that the dispositionsimpliedby attributing
rationalityto a personare higher-order dispositions;for the beliefs
and ends-in-view in responseto which, it were,arationalagentacts
as
in a characteristic way are not manifestexternalstimulibut rather,
in turn,broadlydispositional featuresof theagent.Indeed,to attribute
to someonea particularbeliefor end-in-view is to implythatin certain
circumstanceshe will tend to behave in certain ways which are
indicativeor symptomaticof his belief or his end-in-view.When
I saythatbelief-attributions or end-attributions "imply"certaindisposi-
tional statements, the implyingin question will usually have to be
conceivedas being probabilisticin character;but in order not to
cimplicatethe discussionof our centralproblems,I will make no
furtherexplicitreferenceto this qualification.
There is yetanotherpointI wish to indicateby sayingthat the
ascriptionof a belief,of a goal, or of rationality to a personis only
broadlydispositional in character;namely,thata statement expressing
such an ascriptionmayimply,but is not tantamountto, a set of other
statements whichattribute to thepersoncertainclustersof dispositions.
These dispositionsconstitutesymptomsor indices of the person's

"Gilbert Ryle,The Conceptof Mind (London, 1949).

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 RATIONALACTION

or rationality;
beliefs,objectives, but theydo not sufficefullyto specify
the latter.
Let me tryto supportthis view firstby means of a parallel.To
say of a physicalbody that it is electricallycharged,or that it is
magnetic,is to attribute to it,byimplication, bundlesof dispositions
to
respond in characteristic, or symptomatic, ways to various testing
procedures.But thisdoes not exhaustwhat is being asserted;for the
conceptsof electriccharge,magnetization,and so on are governed
by a networkof theoretical principlesinterconnectinga large number
of physicalconcepts.Conjointly,thesetheoretical principlesdetermine
an infiniteset of empiricalconsequences,among them various dis-
positionalstatements which provideoperationalcriteriafor ascertain-
ing whethera given body is electrically chargedor magneticor the
like. Thus, the underlyingtheoreticalassumptionscontributeessen-
tiallyto what is being assertedby the attribution of those physical
properties.Indeed,it is onlyin conjunctionwithsuch theoretical back-
ground assumptionsthat a statementattributingan electriccharge
to a givenbody impliesa set of dispositionalstatements;whereasthe
whole set of dispositionalstatementsdoes not imply the statement
about the charge, let alone the theoreticalbackgroundprinciples.
Now, to be sure,thepsychological conceptsthatserveto indicatea
person's beliefs,objectives, moral standards,rationality,et cetera,
do not functionin a theoreticalnetworkcomparablein scope or
explicitnessto that of electromagnetic theory.Nevertheless,we use
those psychologicalconceptsin a manner that clearly presupposes
certainsimilarconnections-wemightcall themquasi-theoretical con-
nections.For example,we assumethatthe overtbehaviorshown by a
personpursuinga certainobjectivewill depend on his beliefs;and
conversely.Thus, the attribution, to Henry, of the belief that the
streetsare slushywill be takento implythathe will put on galoshes
only on suitablefurtherassumptionsabout his objectivesand indeed
about his furtherbeliefs;such as that he wants to go out, wants to
keep his feet dry,believesthat his galoshes will serve the purpose,
does not feel in too much of a hurryto put themon, et cetera: and
thisplainlyreflectstheassumptionof manycomplexinterdependencies
betweenthe psychologicalconceptsin question. It is these assump-
tionswhichdetermine our expectations as to whatbehavioralmanifesta-
tions, including overt action, a psychologicaltrait will have in a
particularcase.
To reject the construalof those traits as simply bundles of
dispositionsis not to conjure up again the ghost in the machine,so
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deftlyand subtlyexorcisedby Ryle and earlier-more summarily,

but on basically similar grounds-by the logical behaviorismof
Carnap. The point is ratherthat to characterizethe psychological
featuresin question,we have to considernot only theirdispositional
implications, whichprovideoperationalcriteriaforattributing certain
beliefsand objectivesto a person: we must also take account of
the quasi-theoretical assumptionsconnectingthem; for these, too,
govern the use of those concepts,and they cannot be regardedas
logical consequences of the associated
sets of dispositionalstatements
with them.

and goal attribu-

of beliefattributions
3.3. Epistemicinterdependence
tions.
The quasi-theoretical connectionsjust referredto give rise to a
problem that requires at leastbriefconsideration. For our purposesit
will sufficeto examine one form of it which is of fundamentalim-
portanceto the idea of rational explanation.
What sortsof dispositions do we attributeto a personby implica-
tion when we assertthathe has such and such objectivesor beliefs?
To begin with objectivesor ends-in-view: The statement thatHenry
wants a drink of water implies,among atherthings, that Henry is
disposedto drinka liquid offeredhim-providedthatbe believes it to
be potable water (and providedhe has no overriding reasons for
refusingto accept it, et cetera). Thus, ascriptionof an objective
here has implicationsconcerningcharacteristic overt behavioronly
when taken in conjunctionwith ascriptionsof appropriatebeliefs.
Similarly,in our earlierexample,the hypothesisthat Henry believes
the streetsto be slushyimpliesthe occurrenceof characteristics overt
behavioronly when taken in conjunctionwith suitablehypotheses
about Henry'sobjectives.
And indeed it seems that generally a hypothesisabout an
agent'sobjectivescan be takento implytheoccurrence of specificovert
action only when conjoined with appropriatehypothesesabout his
beliefs;and vice versa. Hence, strictlyspeaking,an examinationof
an agent'sbehaviorcannotserveto testassumptionsabout his beliefs
or abouthis objectivesseparately, but onlyin suitablepairs,as it were;
or briefly,belief attributions and goal attributions are epistemically
interdependent.
This fact does not create insuperabledifficulties in ascertaining
a person'sbeliefsor his objectives.For oftenwe have good antecedent
informationabout one of the interdependentitems and then a
hypothesisabout the other may be testedby ascertaininghow the
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 RATIONAL ACTION

person acts in certainsituations.For example, we may have good

groundsforthe assumptionthatour man is subjectively honest;then
his answersto our questionsmay afforda reliableindicationof his
beliefs.Conversely,we are oftenable to test a hypothesisabout a
person'sobjectivesby examininghis behaviorin certaincriticalsitua-
tions because we have good reasons to assume that he has certain
relevantbeliefs.
But the epistemicinterdependence of beliefattributions and goal
attributions does raisethequestionwhetheran explanationby motivat-
ing reasonsever requiresthe explanatoryassumptionthat the acting
personwas, at least,at the time in question,a rationalagent. How
this question arises can be seen by a closer look at the criteriafor
belief-and goal attributions.
Supposewe know an agent'sbeliefsand wishto testthehypothesis
thathe wantsto attaingoal G. Justwhat sortof actionis impliedby
this hypothesis?It seems clear that the criterionused in such cases
is roughlythis: If A actuallywantsto attainG thenhe will followa
courseof actionwhich,in the lightof his beliefs,offershim the best
chanceof success.In the parlanceof our earlierdiscussion,therefore,
the testand the justification of our goal attributionappears to pre-
suppose the assumption that A will choose an action that is rational
relativeto his objectivesand beliefs.This would mean that the way
in whichwe use a person'sactionsas evidencein ascertaining his goals
has the presupposition of rationalitybuilt into it. An analogouscom-
mentappliesto the way in whichthe actionsof a personwhoseobjec-
tiveswe know are normallyused as evidencein ascertaining his beliefs.
But this seems to discreditthe construalof rationalexplanationas
involving,in the manner suggestedin Schema R, an explanatory
hypothesisto the effectthat the person in question was a rational
agent.For theconsiderations just outlinedsuggestthatthishypothesis
is alwaysmade trueby a tacitconventiongoverningour attribution of
motivatingreasons-that is, objectivesand beliefs-to the agent. If
thisis generallythe case, thenthe assumptionof rationality could not
possiblybe violated;any apparentviolationwould be taken to show
only that our conjecturesabout the agent's beliefs,or those about
his objectives,or both,were in error.And undeniably,such will in
factoftenbe our verdict.
But will it always be so? I thinkthereare variouskinds of cir-
cumstancesin which we might well leave our belief- and goal
attributions unchangedand abandoninsteadthe assumptionof ration-
ality. First of all, in deciding upon his action, a person may well
overlookcertainrelevantitemsof information whichhe clearlyknows
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 AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

or at least believes to be true and which, if properlytaken into

account,wouldhavecalledfora different courseof action.Secondly,the
agentmay overlook certain itemsin the totalgoal he is clearlyseeking
to attain,and may thus decide upon an actionthatis not rationalas
judged by his objectivesand beliefs.Thirdly,even if the agent were
to take into account all aspectsof his total goal as well as all the
relevantinformation at his disposal,and evenifhe shouldgo througha
deliberate"calculationof meansto be adoptedtowardhis chosenend"
(to repeatan earlierquotationfromDray), the resultmay still fail
to be a rationaldecisionbecauseof somelogicalflawin his calculation.
It is quite clear that therecould be strongevidence,in certaincases,
that an agent had actuallyfallen shortof rationalityin one of the
waysheresuggested;and indeed,if his decisionhad been made under
pressureof timeor underemotionalstrain,fatigue,or otherdisturbing
influences,suchdeviationsfromrationality would be regardedas quite
likely.(This reflectsanother one of the quasi-theoreticalconnections
among the various psychological concepts that a
play rale in explana-
tions by reasons or by motives.)
In sum then, rationalityof human actions is not universally
guaranteedby conventionsgoverningthe attributionof goals and
beliefsin humanagents;theremaybe verygood groundsforascribing
to an agentcertaingoals and beliefsand yet acknowledgingthathis
actionwas not rationalas judged by thosegoals and beliefs.

3.4. Rationalactionas an explanatorymodel concept.

So farI have arguedthreemain pointsconcerningtheexplanatory
use of the conceptof rationalaction,namely(i) thatexplanationsby
motivatingreasons are broadlydispositionalin character;(ii) that
therefore theyconformto the generalconceptionof an explanation
as subsumingits explanandumundercoveringlaws (the laws may be
of strictlyuniversalor of statisticalform,and the subsumptionwill
accordinglybe deductiveor inductive-probabilistic in character12);
and (iii) thatin explanationsby motivatingbeliefsand ends-in-view,
the assumptionthat the acting individual was a rational agent
is not,as it may appearto be, alwaysmade trueby a tacitconvention
governingthe attribution of beliefsand ends-in-view.

12Thesetwo typesof explanationby coveringlaws are discussedmorefullyin

my essay "Deductive-Nomologicalvs. StatisticalExplanation"in H. Feigl and
G. Maxwell (eds.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. III
1962).
(Minneapolis,
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 RATIONALACTION
For furtherclarificationof the r le that the assumptionof
rationalityplays in explanationsby motivatingreasons,it may be
illuminatingto ask whetherthe conceptof rationalagent mightnot
be viewed as an idealized explanatorymodel comparable to the
explanatoryconceptof an ideal gas, thatis, a gas conforming exactly
to Boyle's and Charles's laws. No actual gas strictlysatisfiesthose
laws; but thereis a wide range of conditionswithin which many
gases conformat least very closelyto the account the model gives
of theinterrelations betweentemperature, pressure,and volume.More-
over, there are more general,but less simple laws, such as van der
Waals', Clausius', and others,which explain to a large extentthe
deviationsfromthe ideal model that are exhibitedby actual gases
undercertainconditions.
Perhapsthe conceptof a rationalagentcan similarlybe regarded
as an explanatorymodel characterized by an "ideal law" to the effect
that the agent's actions are strictlyrational (in the sense of sonme
specificcriterion)relativeto his objectivesand beliefs.How could
thisprogrammatic conceptionbe implemented?How could an explan-
atory model of rationalactionbe preciselycharacterized,and how could
it be applied and tested?
As noted earlier,the conceptof rationalityis by no means as
clear and unequivocal as is sometimesimplied in the literatureon
rationalexplanation.But let us assume thatthe proposedexplanatory
use of the conceptof rationalaction is limited,to begin with, to
cases of a relativelysimple typefor which some precisecriterionof
rationality can be formulated and incorporated intoour model.
Then thereis still the question of how to apply the model to
particularinstances,how to testwhethera given action does in fact
conformto the criterionof rationalitythe model incorporates. And
thisraisesa perplexingproblem.The problemis not just the practical
one of how to ascertainan agent's beliefsand actions in a given
case,but theconceptualone of what is to be understoodby the beliefs
and objectivesof an agent at a given time,and what kind of logical
device mightserveto characterizethem.Let me amplifythis briefly.
First,a personmust surelybe taken to hold many beliefswhich
he is not consciouslyentertaining at the time, but which could be
elicitedby variousmeans. Indeed, a personmay be held to believe
many thingshe has neverthoughtof at all and perhapsnever will
think of as long as he lives. For example,if he believes that five
and seven are twelve,we would surelytake him to believealso that
five speckled hens and seven more speckled hens make twelve
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 AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

speckled hens-although he might never consciouslyentertainthis

particularbelief.Generally,a man will be taken to believe certain
thingsthat are consequencesof otherthingshe believes: but surely
not all those consequences,since-to mentionbut one reason-his
logical perspicacityis limited.
Hence, while in a theoreticalmodel of the normativeor critical
concept of rational decision the information basis may be construed
a
as set of statements that is closed under an appropriaterelationof
logicalderivability,thisassumptiondefinitely cannot be transferredto
an explanatory a
model of rationaldecision.In particular, personmay
well give his believingassentto one of a pair of logicallyequivalent
statements but withholdit fromthe other-although,accordingto a
familiarparlance,both expressthe same proposition.It seems clear,
therefore, that the objectsof a person'sbeliefscannot be construed
to be propositions each of whichmay be represented by any one of an
infiniteset of equivalentstatements;in specifyingan agent'sbeliefs,
the mode of its formulationis essential. (This pecularityseems
closely akin to what Quine has called the referentialopacity of
beliefsentences.13)
Presumably,then,in an explanatorymodel conceptof rational
action,the agent'sbeliefswould have to be represented by some set
of sentencesthatis not closedunderlogicalderivability. But what set?
For example: should the belief-set for an agent at a given time be
takento includeall sentencesassentto which could be elicitedfrom
him by pertinent questionsand arguments, no matterhow numerous
or complex?Clearlysuchconstrualis unwarranted if we are interested
in specifyinga set of beliefswhich can be regardedas motivating
factorsin explainingan actiondone by theagent.Wheretheboundary
line of the beliefset is to be drawn-conceptually, not just practically
-is a puzzling and obscurequestion.
Quite similar observationsapply to the problem of how to
characterize an agent'stotalobjectivesin a givendecisionsituation.
Consequently,though in a normative-critical model of rational
decisionrationality is always judged by referenceto the total infor-
mationbasisand thetotalobjectivespecified, it would be self-defeating
to incorporateinto an explanatorymodel of rational action the

13See,forexample,W. V. Quine, Wordand Object(New York,1960), sec. 30.

This sectionand the subsequentones throughsec. 45 containincisiveanalyses
of the basic logicalproblemsraisedby beliefattributionsand goal attributions
and an illuminating discussionof recentphilosophical on thissubject.
literature
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 RATIONALACTION

principlethat a rationalagent acts optimally,as judged by specified

criteria,on the basis of his total set of objectivesand beliefs: this
latternotionis simplytoo obscure.

3.5. The modelof a consciouslyrationalagent.

A way out seems to be suggestedby the observationthat many
rationalexplanationspresentan action as rationallydeterminedby
considerationswhich presumablythe agent took consciouslyinto
accountin makinghisdecision.Let us saythata personis a consciously
rationalagent (at a certaintime) if (at that time) his actions are
rationalrelativeto those of his objectivesand beliefswhich he con-
sciouslytakesintoaccountin arrivingat his decision.
This "ideal model" of a consciouslyrationalagent seems to yield
approximateexplanatoryand predictiveaccounts of at least some
typesof decisionor action.
Consider,forexample,a competent engineerwho seeksan optimal
solutionto a problemof design or of industrialquality controlfor
which the range of permissiblesolutionsis clearly delimited,the
and utilitiesare preciselyspecified,
relevantprobabilities and even the
criterionof rationalityto be employed (for example,maximization
of expected utilities) has been explicitlystated. In this case, the
objectivesand beliefswhichdeterminethe engineer'sdecisionmay be
takento be fullyindicatedby the specificationof the problem;and by
applying to the engineer the explanatorymodel of a consciously
rationalagent (whose standardof rationalityis that specifiedin the
given problem),we can explain--orpredict-thathe will come up
with that solution,or set of solutions,which is the theoretically
correctone.
The idea of a consciouslyrationalagent, with its very limited
scope of application,does not, however,representthe only way in
whicha modelconceptof rationaldecisionmightbe put to explanatory
and predictiveuse. One interestingalternativehas been suggested
in a studyby Davidson, Suppes, and Siegel.14These investigators
presentan empiricaltheoryof human choicewhichis modeledon the
mathematicalmodel of decision under risk and incorporatesthe
hypothesis thatthechoicesmade by humansubjectswill be rationalin
theprecisesenseof maximizingexpectedutilities.
As mightbe expected,the rigorously quantitativecharacterof the

14DonaldDavidson,PatrickSuppes,and SidneySiegel,Decision Making: An

Experimental
Approach
(Stanford,
1957).
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theoryhas to be purchasedat the price of limitingits applicability

to decisionsof a rathersimple type which permitof strictexperi-
mental control.In the experimentdesigned by the authorsto test
thetheory, thesubjectshad to make a seriesof decisionseach of which
called for a choice between two options.Each option offeredthe
prospectof eithergaining a specifiedsmall amount of money or
losingsome otherspecifiedsmall amount,dependingon the outcome
of a certainrandomexperiment, such as rollinga regulardie with
peculiar markings on its faces. The random experiments,their
possibleoutcomes, and the corresponding gainsor losseswerecarefully
describedto the subjects,who then made their choices.
The resultsof the experimentconformedquite well to the
hypothesisthat subjectswould choose the option with the greater
expectedutility,wherethe expectedutilityof an optionis computed,
in the standardmanner,on the basis of theoretically postulatedsub-
jectiveprobabilities and utilitieswhich the differentoutcomeshave
forthe choosingsubject.The theoryproposedby the authorsprovides
an objective,if indirect,method forthe simultaneousand independent
measurement of such subjectiveprobabilities and utilitiesfor a given
agent. Experimentalstudy shows that the subjective probability
which a specifiedoutcomeof a given random experimentpossesses
fora givensubjectis not,in general,equal to its objectiveprobability,
even thoughthe subjectmay know the latter;nor are the subjective
utilitiesproportionalto the corresponding monetarygains or losses.
Indeed a personwill normallybe entirelyunaware of the subjective
probabilitiesand utilitieswhich,on the theoryunder consideration,
the possibleoutcomespossessforhim.
Thus, insofaras the theoryis correct,it gives a quite peculiar
twistto the idea of rationalaction.Though the subjectsmake their
choicesin clearlystructured decisionsituations,with full opportunity
for antecedentdeliberationand even calculation,they act rationally
(in a preciselyrefinedquantitativesense) relativeto subjectiveproba-
bilitiesand utilitieswhich theydo not know, and which,therefore,
theycannottake intoaccountin theirdeliberations; theyact rationally
in the sense of actingas if theywere tryingto maximize expected
utilities.We seem to have here a typeof consciouschoice which is
non-consciously rationalwithquantitative What mightFreud
precision.
have thoughtof this?

3.6. Concluding
remarks.
Obviously,themorefamiliarinstancesofexplanationbymotivating
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 RATIONALACTION
reasonsdo not conformto this special theoreticalmodel. By intent,
at least, they come closer to invokingthe model of a consciously
rationalagent.In particular, manyof the rationalexplanationsoffered
in historicalwritingsseem to imply that the given action was the
outcomeof rationaldeliberation based on specificbeliefsand objectives
which the historian,oftenon verygood evidence,attributesto the
agent.But sinceit is impossibleforthe historian,even underthe best
of conditions, to ascertainall the considerationsthatmay have entered
intotheagent'sdeliberation and maythushave influenced his decision,
themostfavorableconstrualthatcan be givento theexplanatory import
of suchargumentsappearsto be thiseffect:The explanansincludesthe
information thatthe agenthad such and such goals and beliefs;and
sincehe actedin a mannerto be expectedof a rationalagentin these
circumstances, it is plausible to suppose that whateverother con-
siderationsmay have figuredin his deliberationhad no decisive
influence on itsoutcome:in thissense,theagent'sdecisionis accounted
forby thespecifiedbeliefsand goals.
In explanationsof this kind, the relevantsense of rationalityis
not explicitlydefined;rather,it is left to our judgmentto put an
appropriateconstrualon the explanatoryhypothesisof rationality
and to recognizethat what was done was rational relativeto the
adduced reasons.
Practically,thisis no doubt oftenthe best we can do by way of
explainingan action.But I wouldnot agreewiththeview thatexplana-
tionsof thiskind are perfectly adequateforthepurposesof historyand
thatnothingfurther needbe attempted. For since,in theirexplanations,
historiansmake objectiveclaims,theywill have to take into account
whateverrelevantinsightsmay be providedby the scientificstudy
of motivationand action.And I thinkit likelythat as a resultthe
vague generalprocedureof explanationby reasonswill graduallybe
replaced,at leastin some areas,by the use of morespecificexplanatory
hypotheses, in which our standardnotionsof rationalitymay play
a less importantr6le. The influencewhich some recentpsychological
theories,including the ideas of psychoanalysis, have had on the
explanationof human actionseemsto me indicativeof thistrend.
If suchtheoretical developments shouldshow thatthe explanatory
power of the concept of rational action is in fact ratherlimited,
we willhaveto acceptthisphilosophically: afterall, in themethodology
of explanationwe can ill affordto give a generaladvanceendorsement
to the saying:"Man is a rationalbeingindeed: he can give reasonsfor
anythinghe does."
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