You are on page 1of 4

Mere denial and alibi are weak defenses

Posted on March 12, 2016 by Lawyers in the Philippines

Someone accused of a crime before the Court should base her defense on more than merely denying the
charges or claiming to be somewhere else when the crime occurred. These are often not strong enough
to be reliable legal defenses.

The Supreme Court has many, many decisions ruling that mere denial and alibi are weak defenses that
cannot prevail over the positive and categorical testimony of a prosecution witness. Mere denial, if
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is a self-serving assertion that deserves no weight in
law. And the defense of alibi is also a flimsy shield against conviction.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. DONATO BULASAG Y ARELLANO ALIAS DONG,
APPELLANT.

[G.R. No. 172869, July 28, 2008]

Nothing is more settled in criminal law jurisprudence than that denial and alibi cannot prevail over the
positive and categorical testimony of the witness. Denial is an intrinsically weak defense which must be
buttressed with strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility. Alibi is an inherently weak
defense, which is viewed with suspicion and received with caution because it can easily be fabricated.
For alibi to prosper, appellant must prove not only that he was at some other place when the crime was
committed but that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis at the time of its
commission. Appellants own evidence shows that he was in the immediate environs when the incident
occurred. For he stated that he was just in his own house, barely three meters away from the house of
the victim, Estelita.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GONZALO PENASO @ LULU, accusedappellant.

[G.R. No. 121980. February 23, 2000]

We find complainants testimony credible, while appellants defenses of alibi and denial are lacking in
truth and candor. Nothing is more settled in criminal law jurisprudence than that alibi and denial cannot
prevail over the positive and categorical testimony of the complainant.Alibi is an inherently weak
defense, which is viewed with suspicion and received with caution because it can easily be
fabricated. Denial is an intrinsically weak defense which must be buttressed with strong evidence of non-
culpability to merit credibility. We find that despite his stance that several persons watched him
demonstrate how to cook banana chips in Ubay, Bohol in the morning of November 16, 1989, appellant
failed to present any disinterested witness to support his claim. For alibi to prosper, it is not enough that
accused show he was elsewhere at the time the crime was committed, but there must also be clear and
convincing proof that it was impossible for him to be at the locus criminis at the time of its commission.

With respect to the appellants claim that the victim was attending her classes at the time she was
raped, we note that complainants explanation that it was their vacant period, was not rebutted by the
defense. All told, we see no reason to depart from the rule that positive identification of the malefactor
prevails over the defenses of alibi and denial.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. BOBBY AGUNOS, accused-appellants.

[G.R. No. 130961. October 13, 1999]

The shopworn rule is that for alibi to prosper, it is not enough that accused was at some place else at the
time of the commission of the crime, it must also be proved by clear and convincing evidence that it was
physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission and
commit the crime. His aunts testimony that he was seen sleeping outside the polling place from 1:00
oclock to 3:00 oclock in the early morning of May 9, 1995 must be taken with a grain of salt inasmuch as
accused-appellant failed to present other disinterested witnesses aside from a close relation to
corroborate his claim that he was nowhere near complainants home at the time of the commission of
the crime.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOVITO BARONA, FELIPE FERRARIZ, ELPIDIO SARA,
JR., @ Matias Sara and ROBERTO BARONA, @ Pewe Barona, accused-appellants.

[G.R. No. 119595. January 25, 2000]

The bare denials and alibi interposed by accused-appellants when juxtaposed with the positive
declarations of the prosecution witnesses is not worthy of credence. Recognized as inherently weak
defenses, which is the usual refuge of scoundrels, alibi and denial must be buttressed by other
convincing evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility. It all the more fails where the assailants were
positively identified by credible witness, against whom no ulterior motive can be attributed, as in this
case. Records, show that the place where accused-appellants claimed they were at the time of the
incident ranges from a distance of thirty (30) meters to about a kilometer away from the place of the
crime. Other than these unsubstantiated, self-serving and negative statements of their alleged respective
locations, no other evidence was presented to show that it was impossible for them to physically
traverse the two places within a short span of time as to preclude their presence in the locus criminis.
Such self-serving statements deserve no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary value
over the testimony of witnesses who testified on positive points. A distance of about five kilometers
between the scene of the crime and the whereabouts of the accused has been considered as not so far
as to negate physical presence at the scene of the crime. With more reason then, the fact that a mere
neighbor whose house is about fifty (50) meters from the locus criminis which obviously can be
negotiated by mere walking negates the posture of alibi. As consistently held by the court, for alibi to
prosper, there must be potent proof that the accused could not have been physically present at the place
of the crime or its vicinity at the time of its commission. As mentioned earlier, no such, convincing proof
was presented to substantiate their proffered defenses.

Atty. Francesco C. Britanico

Denial as a defense; G.R. No. 187246

G.R. No. 187246

Excerpts:

"The defense of denial

The petitioner denied that his car had bumped the victim, and insists that he just saw the victims body
sprawled on the road after his car had already ramped on the island divider.

The petitioners defense of denial must crumble in light of Victors positive and specific testimony. We
reiterate that the petitioner, aside from merely alleging the inconsistency between Victors affidavit and
court testimony, did not impute any ill motive on Victors part to falsely testify against him. The
petitioner, in fact, admitted that he and Victor did not know each other prior to the incident. We have
consistently held that positive identification of the accused, when categorical and consistent, and
without anyshowing of ill-motive on the part of the testifying eyewitness, should prevail over the denial
of the accused whose testimony is not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. [48] A denial is
negative evidence. To be believed, it must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability;
otherwise, the denial is purely self-serving and has no evidentiary value. [49]

We significantly note that the petitioner claimed for the first time in his present petition that he saw a
rug-like thing[50] being thrown out of a passing car as he was about to alight from his car after turning
off its engine; he later discovered that the thing thrown was a persons body. He reiterated this claim in
his motion for reconsideration before this Court. This assertion was a clear rip-off from his co-accused
Mendez version who likewise claimed to have seen the same thing. To our mind, the modification of the
petitioners story was a belated attempt to cover up his failure to convincingly explain the presence of
the victims slumped body on the road near his car and a last-ditch effort to exculpate himself. Nowhere
in his affidavit or earlier court testimonies, or even in his previous pleadings with the lower courts, did he
ever state that a passing car had thrown a rug-like thing [51] on the street. The petitioners sudden
change of story at this stage of the proceedings casts doubt on the veracity of his claim.
In addition, we are baffled by the petitioners act of frequenting the hospital after the incident. Amanda
Ycong, the victims aunt, testified that she saw the petitioner several times at the hospital when the
victim was confined there; but would immediately leave whenever he saw members of the victims
family. We find it highly unusual for a person who allegedly had no participation in the incident to be
overly concerned with the victims well-being. What puzzles us even more is why the petitioner would
evade members of the victims family whenever he was seen by them at the hospital.

All told, we see no reason to overturn the lower courts findings of fact and conclusions of law finding
the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged."

You might also like