American Intelligence in War-Time

AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE IN WAR-TIME
LONDON
The Story of the OSS

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AMERICAN
INTELLIGENCE IN WAR-
TIME LONDON
THE STORY OF THE OSS
Nelson MacPherson
FRANK CASS PUBLISHERS

LONDON PORTLAND, OR
First published in 2003 in Great Britain by
Crown House, 47 Chase Side, Southgate
London N14 5BP
This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005.
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Copyright 2003 Brian Nelson MacPherson
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
MacPherson, Nelson
American intelligence in War-time London: the Story of the OSS
1. United States. Office of Strategic ServicesHistory
2. World War, 19391945Secret serviceUnited States
3. World War, 19391945Secret serviceGreat Britain
4. Great BritainForeign relationsUnited States
5. United StatesForeign relationsGreat Britain
I. Title
940.5 48673
ISBN 0-203-49271-4 Master e-book ISBN
ISBN 0-203-58199-7 (Adobe eReader Format)

ISBN 0-7146-5419-1 (Print Edition) (cloth)
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

MacPherson, Nelson.
American intelligence in War-time London: the Story of the OSS/
Nelson MacPherson.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-7146-5419-1 (cloth)
1. World War, 19391945Military intelligenceUnited States.
2. World War, 19391945Military intelligenceGreat Britain.
3. United States. Office of Strategic ServicesHistory.
I. Title. II. Series.
D810.S7M253 2003
940.54/8673dc21 2002041472
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in or
introduced into a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means,
electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written
permission of the publisher of this book.
Contents
Acknowledgements viii
List of Abbreviations x
Introduction 1
Chapter 1: The British Intelligence Community: Setting the Tone for 16
OSS
Chapter 2: The Genesis of OSS/London, and the British Dimension 41
Chapter 3: Servants of OVERLORD: SO, SI, and the Invasion of 63
Europe
Chapter 4: Reductio Ad Absurdum: R&A/Londons Quest for 90
Relevance
Chapter 5: Falling Short of the Target: EOU, SIRA, and the Pitfalls 112
of R&A
Chapter 6: Inspired Improvisation: William Casey and the 143
Penetration of Germany
Chapter 7: Following the British Example: X-2 and Morale 169
Operations
Chapter 8: Full Circle: Anglo-American Intelligence and the 193
Transition to Cold War
Conclusion 233
Bibliography 243
Index 267
This book is dedicated to the memory of my mother, Mrs
Orma B.MacPherson, 14 October 19307 January 2001.
Everything I have accomplished in my life I owe to her.
I will always be her son.
Acknowledgements
This book owes much to a great deal of support and encouragement from a
variety of sources. I am grateful for the opportunity to acknowledge them here.
The research for this book was made possible by the generous financial
support of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, the
Alberta Heritage Scholarship Fund, and the NATO Research Fellowship
programme. The Centre for International Studies at the University of Toronto,
the Associates of the University of Toronto, the Royal Canadian Legion, and the
University of Salfords European Studies Research Institute also provided
funding.
For their help in my research, I would also like to thank: Mr John Taylor and
the staff of the Military Reference Branch, US National Archives and Records
Administration, Washington, DC; Dr Richard J. Somers, Dr David Keough, and
the staff of the US Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks; and
Professor John Kieger, European Studies Research Institute, University of
Salford. Appreciation is also due the staffs of the Public Record Office, Kew; the
Churchill College Archive Centre, University of Cambridge; the Robarts
Research Library, University of Toronto; the Metropolitan Toronto Research
Library; and the Mackimmie Library, University of Calgary. Material from the
Public Record Office is cited by permission of the Controller of Her Majestys
Stationary Office. Material from the McLachlan-Beesly Papers is cited courtesy
of the Churchill Archives Centre, Churchill College, Cambridge. The bulk of
Chapter 4 appears in the International Journal of Intelligence and Counter
Intelligence (Fall 2003), and its material is used here with permission of Editor-
in-Chief Richard Valcourt. An earlier version of Chapter 6 appeared as Inspired
Improvisation: William Casey and the Penetration of Germany, Intelligence and
National Security 9, 4 (October 1994), pp. 695722, and its material is used here
with permission of Frank Cass Publishers.
Every effort has been made in good faith to seek and obtain permission to
quote from known copyright materials. If, through oversight or ignorance, any
permission is outstanding, every effort will be made to rectify the situation upon
notification by the appropriate copyright holder(s).
I am indebted to Professor Martin S.Alexander, Department of International
Politics, University of Wales, Aberystwyth, for his considerable advice and
ix
encouragement in supporting the publication of this book. Professor David

J.Bercuson, Director of the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, University
of Calgary, generously made the Centres facilities available to me during the final
completion of the manuscript. His advice and encouragement while I was a
CMSS Research Associate has also been very important.
For other advice or comments on my work, I would like to thank: Professor
Christopher M.Andrew of Corpus Christi College, University of Cambridge;
Professor John R.Ferris of the Department of History, University of Calgary; and
Dr Richard J.Popplewell, late of the University of Salford. Ms Georgina Clark-
Mazo, Ms Sarah Clarke and Ms Sally Green of Frank Cass Publishers are also
thanked for their guidance. Any remaining errors of presentation, fact or
interpretation nevertheless remain my own.
Appreciation for their personal support is particularly due to: my father Neil
and brother Andrew; Mr Robert and Mrs Blanche LaVoie; Mr Robert
E.Lawrence, BMus, MA, Mr Norman and Mrs Brenda Lawrence; Mr Murdoch
and the late Mrs Dollie MacLeod; Mr Bruce G. Thompson, BA, LLB, MA; and
Mr Geoffrey and Mrs Tracy Phillips. Thanks are also due to Ms Shelley Wind
and my other colleagues at the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies,
University of Calgary, for their help and friendship during my tenure there as a
Research Associate.
Finally, I would like to express my thanks to Ms Ada K.Sun, BA. She has
been particularly supportive throughout the various stages of this project. Her
faith in my abilities has been very important and much appreciated.
Abbreviations
A-2 US Army Air Force Intelligence

Abwehr German espionage service; see GIS
ACoS Assistant Chief of Staff in US Army formations
Adm. Admiral
AEAF Allied Expeditionary Air Force
AFHQ Allied Forces Headquarters (Mediterranean)
AG Army Group
AI Royal Air Force Air Intelligence
Baker Street From the street address of SOE Headquarters, 64 Baker Street,
London; used as a short hand for the organization itself
BBC British Broadcasting Corporation
BCRA Bureau Central de Renseignements et dAction, Gaullist
espionage agency; see also DGER
BEW US Board of Economic Warfare
BI Bureau of Information, the Dutch espionage agency
BJSM British Joint Staff Mission, Washington, DC
Black Clandestine propaganda
Bletchley Park Buckinghamshire location of Britains GC&CS/GCHQ
SIGINT unit
Brig. Brigadier; a British Brigadier was equivalent to an American
Brigadier-General
BRISSEX Codename for British-controlled SUSSEX agents; BRItish
+suSSEX
Broadway From the street address of SIS Headquarters, Broadway
Buildings, London; used as shorthand for the organization
itself; see also MI6, Secret Service
BRUSA British/USA agreement of 1943
BSC British Security Coordination
xi
C Traditional appellation for the Chief of SIS; see also CSS

CALPO Moscow-controlled Comit de lAllemagne Libre pour
lOuest; French Office of Free Germany Committee
Capt. Captain
CAS British Chief of the Air Staff
CBO Combined Bomber Offensive
CCS Combined Chiefs of Staff
CD Codename for the Head of SOE
CD OSS Censorship and Documents branch
Cdr Naval rank of Commander
CE Counter-espionage
CES SO Central European Section
CG Commanding General
CHARLES SO communications station at Hurley, England
CI Counter-intelligence
CIA US Central Intelligence Agency
CICIP British Combined Intelligence Centre Iraq and Persia
CIG US Central Intelligence Group, immediate precursor to the CIA
CIGS British Chief of the Imperial General Staff
C-in-C Commander-in-Chief
CO Commanding Officer
COI Office of the Coordinator of Information; predecessor of OSS
Col Military rank of Colonel
COS British Chiefs of Staff Committee
COSSAC Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander
CROSS SOs 1945 proposed assassination project against Nazi/
Gestapo officials
CSS Chief of the Secret Service; see also C
CSTC Combined Strategic Targeting Committee; successor to JOTC
DCAS British Deputy Chief of the Air Staff
DCOS British Deputy Chiefs of Staff
DDI OSS Deputy-Director of Intelligence
DEG An item of CI interest derived from ULTRA
DGER Direction Generate des Etudes et Recherches, successor to
BCRA
DIP SI Division of Intelligence Procurement
DMI British Director of Military Intelligence
xii
DNI British Director of Naval Intelligence

DOUBLE British counter-espionage programme against German
CROSS intelligence in Britain
E Economic series of SIS intelligence reports
EAM Greek Communist movement
Englandspiel German counter-espionage control of SOE/Holland networks
in 1943
Enigma Brand-name commercial cipher machine adapted for use by the
German military
EOU Enemy Objectives Unit attached to the Economic Warfare
Division of the US Embassy in London
EPR European Political Report
ETO European Theater of Operations
ETOUSA European Theater of Operations, US Army
EWD Economic Warfare Division of the US Embassy in London
FBI US Federal Bureau of Investigation
FIS Foreign Information Service of COI; later absorbed by the
Office of War Information
FN Foreign Nationalities branch of OSS
FNCL French National Committee of Liberation
FO British Foreign Office
FORD Foreign Office Research Department; successor to FRPS and
PID
FRPS British Foreign Office Foreign Research and Press Service;
predecessor of FORD
G-2 US Military Intelligence Division Staff
G-3 US Military Operations Division Staff
G-5 US Military Civil Affairs Division Staff
GAP German Air Force
GC&CS British Government Code and Cipher School
GCHQ British Government Communications Headquarters Gen.
General
Gestapo Geheime Staats Polizei; Nazi Secret State Police
GHQ General Headquarters
GIS German Intelligence Service(s); Allied countries designation
for combined RSHA/Abwehr
H2S Designation for Allied air navigation radar system
HDE British Home Defence Executive
xiii
HM His/Her Majesty
HMSO His/Her Majestys Stationary Office
Hut 3 The element of GC&CS/GCHQ responsible for processing
German Army and Air Force decrypts at Bletchley Park
IAB US Intelligence Advisory Board
ISK Designation for counter-intelligence SIGINT derived from
ULTRA; the designation ISOS also covered this material
ISLD Inter-Services Liaison Department; MI6s overseas colonial
manifestation
ISOS Intelligence Service Oliver Strachey; see ISK
ISPB British Inter-Services Planning Board
ISTD British Admiralty Inter-Services Topographical Department
JCS US Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee
J/E JOAN ELEANOR; codename for OSS air-ground radio.
JEDBURGH Codename for SOE/SO sabotage project in support of
OVERLORD
JIB British Joint Intelligence Bureau
JIC US or British Joint Intelligence Committee
JIS US or British Joint Intelligence Staff
JOTC Allied Joint Oil Targeting Committee; predecessor of CSTC
JPS British Joint Planning Staff
KENT Unrealized 1944 joint SI/SIS espionage plan for penetrating
Germany
LAMDA SIS economic reports given to SSU
LPS British Lord Privy Seal
Lt Lieutenant; a navy Lt is equivalent to an army Captain; an
army Lieutenant is equivalent to a US Navy Ensign/ Royal
Navy Acting Sub-Lieutenant
Lt-Cdr Lieutenant-Commander
Lt-Col. Military rank of Lieutenant-Colonel
Lt(jg) US Navy rank of Lieutenant, junior grade; equivalent to a
Royal Navy Sub-Lieutenant
Maj. Military rank of Major
Maj.-Gen. Military rank of Major-General
MAN Military, Air, Naval series of SIS intelligence reports
Maquis French partisans, from the Corsican word for brushwood
MEDTO Mediterranean Theater of Operations
MEW British Ministry of Economic Warfare
xiv
MI1(b) First World War British Military Intelligence branch 1(b),

responsible for code and cipher breaking
MI1(c) First World War British Military Intelligence branch 1(c)
responsible for foreign intelligence gathering; see also Secret
Service
MI5 British Military Intelligence branch 5, cover for the
organization responsible for domestic counter espionage; see
also Security Service
MI6 British Military Intelligence branch 6, cover for the
organization responsible for foreign intelligence gathering and
overseas counter-espionage; see also Secret Service, and SIS
MI6(V) MI6 Section V, responsible for counter-intelligence; see
Section V
MI19(a) British Military Intelligence branch 19(a), responsible for
enemy Prisoner of War intelligence matters
MIR British Military Intelligence Research, cover for the British
Armys pre-SOE sabotage arm; later merged with Section D of
SIS to form SOE
MO OSS Morale Operations branch
MoD British Ministry of Defence
MOI/M of I British Ministry of Information
MSS Most Secret Sources; see ISK, ISOS, ULTRA
NARA US National Archives and Records Administration,
Washington, DC
NKVD Russian Peoples Commissariat for Internal Affairs (Soviet
Intelligence)
OG OSS Operational Group branch, equivalent of British SAS in
Normandy
OPSAF OSS/London Plans and Operations Staff
OSS Office of Strategic Services
OSSEX Codename for OSS-controlled SUSSEX agents; OSS+ sussEX
OVERLORD Codename for the overall invasion of Normandy; the actual
amphibious landings were codenamed NEPTUNE
OWI US Office of War Information
PAIR Designation for ULTRA-based CI intelligence
PID British Foreign Office Political Intelligence Department;
predecessor of FORD
PM Prime Minister
POINTBLANK Combined strategic bombing offensive against Germany.
xv
PR Photo Reconnaissance
PRO Public Record Office, Kew
PROUST Independent SI espionage project in Normandy; follow-up to
SUSSEX
PW Psychological Warfare; Prisoner(s) of War
P/W, Ps/W Prisoner(s) of War
PWD SHAEF Psychological Warfare Division
PWE British Political Warfare Executive
R&A OSS Research and Analysis branch
R&D OSS Research and Development branch
RAF Royal Air Force
RE8 British Ministry of Home Security Research and Experiments
Department 8
RSHA Reichssicherheitshauptamt; SS Reich security office; see also
GIS
RSS Radio Security Service
S&T OSS Schools and Training branch
SA Sturmabteilung; Nazi paramilitary organization
(Brownshirts); literally, Assault Detachment
SA/B OSS Special Activities/Bruce, predecessor of SI branch
SAFE HAVEN OSS/SSU intelligence on post-war Nazi capital
SA/G OSS Special Activities/Goodfellow, predecessor of SO branch
SA/H Redesignation of SA/G, predecessor of SO branch
SAS British Special Air Service
SASO (SB) RAF Senior Air Staff Officer (Strategic Bombing)
SCAEF Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force
SCI Detachment Special Counter-intelligence Detachment; X-2 teams attached
to the field armies
SCIU Special Counter-intelligence Units; alternative designation for
SCI Detachments
SD Sicherheitsdienst; Nazi Security Service
Section D SIS sabotage section, later merged with MIR to form SOE
Section V MI6 counter-intelligence section
Security Service British organization responsible for domestic counter
espionage; see MI5
Secret Service British organization responsible for foreign intelligence and
imperial counter-espionage; see Broadway, MI6, SIS
xvi
SF Deatachment Special Forces Detachment; SO teams attached to the field

armies
SFHQ Special Forces Headquarters; combined SOE/SO JED-BURGH
headquarters
SHAEF Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force
SI OSS Secret Intelligence branch
SI Detachment Secret Intelligence Detachment; SI teams attached to the field
armies
SIGINT Signals Intelligence
SIRA OSS combined SI and R&A intelligence processing
arrangement
SIS British Special or Secret Intelligence Service; see also
Broadway, MI6, Secret Service
SLU Special Liaison Unit
SO OSS Special Operations branch
SOE British Special Operations Executive
SOE/SO Combined SO-SOE headquarters, later redesignated SFHQ
SPARTAN Codename for the exercise which tested the JEDBURGH
concept in 1943
SS Schutzstaffel, Elite Guard; literally, Protection Squad
SSO Strategic Services Officer
SSU Strategic Services Unit; successor to OSS
SUSSEX Codename for the joint SI/SIS espionage programme in support
of OVERLORD; see also BRISSEX and OSSEX.
T Forces Intelligence units with OSS representatives tasked with
searching recently captured locations for material of
intelligence value
TC Theater Commander
TORCH Codename for the 1942 Allied invasion of North Africa.
Twenty Joint MI5-MI6 committee overseeing DOUBLE Committee
CROSS; see also DOUBLE CROSS, W Board, XX
ULTRA Eventual designation for SIGINT derived from intercepted
Enigma communications; see also MSS
USAAF US Army Air Force
USAMHI US Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks,
Carlisle, Pennsylvania
USGCC US Group, (Allied) Control Commission
USSBS US Strategic Bombing Survey
xvii
USSTAF US Strategic Air Forc

VENONA Intelligence on Russian espionage operations in
Allied countries
VICTOR SI communications station at Poundon, England
W Board MI5-MI6(V)-service intelligence oversight committee for
DOUBLE CROSS in 1940; direct control of DOUBLE CROSS
later passed to the Twenty Committee
WARWICK/ SIS intelligence reports given to SSU on Russia and Russian
COVENTRY activities
WD US War Department
White Overt propaganda
W/T Wireless/Telegraph (radio)
WO British War Office
X-2 OSS counter-intelligence branch
X-B Alternative designation for MI6(V)
XX British Twenty Committee, a sub-committee of the W Board
overseeing DOUBLE CROSS
Introduction
Thou art slave to fate, chance, kings, and desperate men.

John Donne, Holy Sonnets, No. 10.
Donnes fatalistic maxim succinctly defines the essential context that modern
intelligence services function within, and the variables determining their relative
fortunes. Their experiences suggest that they are very human institutions largely
shaped by the vagaries of circumstances beyond their control, not to mention
misfortune and luck. As refined information used by the state to further national
goals and policies, intelligence is directed, collected, analysed and disseminated
(the intelligence cycle) within the milieu of international politics. Intelligence
work must therefore function within the anarchical society of Great Powers.1
Equally significant is the extent to which intelligence functionaries serve at the
mercy of their policy masters. The intelligence officers themselves, in their
various professional incarnations, are the desperate men in this formulation,
striving as they do to carry out their risky and/or problematic duties in the face of
inertia and outright opposition on the part of rivals, enemies, and occasionally
their own countrymen. It is unlikely that any intelligence service in history has
ever completely escaped sub-jugation to such restrictive bondage.
These facts hold particularly true for the Office of Strategic Services mission in
London, Americas critical liaison and operational intelligence outpost during the
Second World War. Expanding to a peak of 2,800 personnel in 1944, OSS/
London was originally established in October 1941 with the arrival of a single
representative, followed by a staff nucleus the day after Americas entry into the
war. Eventually consisting of contingents from the four major OSS branches
Research and Analysis, Secret Intelligence, Special Operations, and X-2
(counter-intelligence)the mission served as a focal point for Anglo-American
intelligence relations in the decisive theatre in the war against Germany. The
London mission was at the heart of OSS relations with British intelligence, and
as such it personified the essence of that connection in the Allied war effort. The
Allied invasion of Europe ensured that OSS/London, more than any other OSS
outpost, would have the greatest opportunity to perform a decisive role in the
intelligence war. Other OSS missions would also make important contributions,
2 AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE IN WAR-TIME LONDON
notably in Cairo, Algiers and Italy; but these were ultimately secondary theatres,
while in the Pacific and Asia, OSS never acquired the sound relationship with the
military necessary for intelligence operations. London was at the heart of the
Allied war effort, and at the heart of the Anglo-American alliance itself. While
intelligence exchanges with the Soviet Union have been documented by Bradley
F.Smith, London was the big league in Allied intelligence during the war.2
Many significant matters were accordingly played-out there, offering detailed
examples of intelligence services in action. The experiences of OSS in London
therefore illuminate the process by which America was introduced to the various
components of intelligence and clandestine work, and how well American
intelligence performed in its own right. As the presumed precursor to the post-
war US Central Intelligence Agency, OSS further invites study in order to
understand the antecedents of Americas Cold War intelligence service. The
significant Anglo-American context of the evolution of modern American
intelligence moreover suggests that the Anglo-American Special Relationship
had an intelligence component that was manifested most strongly and clearly in
OSS/London.
The mission thus provides a case study of how US intelligence matured and
became institutionalized within the context of the larger Anglo-American
political-military alliance. This analysis accordingly examines an aspect of that
alliance, and of intelligence history in particular, that has not yet been explored
in any comprehensive detail. It is part of a current historiographical review of the
significance of intelligence services in military and international affairs. It
specifically examines OSS/London within the context of Anglo-American
relations, as well as the evolution of both modern American, and Allied,
intelligence during the Second World War.3
The general research approach blends what has been termed the American and
British schools of intelligence scholarship. The more historical nature of British
intelligence studies has been noted by Kenneth G.Robertson, while Roy
Godsons Intelligence: an American View, in Robertsons British and
American Approaches to Intelligence, distinguishes between this historical
methodology and the more conceptual or theoretical nature of American studies
(for example, Sherman Kents Strategic Intelligence for American World
Policy). British diplomatic historian D.C. Watt has therefore identified these
approaches as two distinct schools of intelligence study, though a recent
noteworthy British contribution to the theoretical school is Michael Hermans
Intelligence Power in Peace and War, which surveys the interrelationship
between post-war structures, tasks, and effectiveness.4 This study for its part
demonstrates the influences of both schools by linking theoretical concepts to the
role of intelligence ties within the larger wartime Anglo-American alliance.
The purposes of this study are threefold. The first and most general purpose is
to examine more closely the trend in western intelligence communities toward
slow and uneven professionalization noted by Christopher Andrew and David
Dilks in The Missing Dimension. In addition to underscoring the gradual and
INTRODUCTION 3
erratic professionalization of intelligence agencies, Andrew and Dilks also stress

the way in which governments and intelligence consumers have slowly learned
to use such agencies.5 By implication, intelligence as a vital component of
government policy has had to overcome the amateurishness of its practitioners
and consumers in equal measure. The history of OSS/London can accordingly
test whether this phenomenon manifested itself in the evolution of professional
American intelligence.
The second general purpose involves judging the relevance and
professionalization of the OSS intelligence effort within the Anglo-American
alliance. Much of the existing literature on OSS has been preoccupied with the
question of whether OSS had an impact on the war, of whether it accomplished
anything of consequence. This very concern dominated the first ever OSS
conference held at the US National Archives in July 1991.6 There have moreover
been a number of recent works beginning to examine the documentation on the
OSS operational record in various geographic areas, such as Romania and China.7
Richard Aldrich has gone a considerable way toward surveying OSS links and
rivalries with British intelligence in the Far East.8 Particularly noteworthy in
terms of this present study is Jay Jakubs recent Spies and Saboteurs, a survey of
Anglo-American collaboration and rivalry in espionage and special operations
in North Africa, Yugoslavia, Asia, and France. Jakub focuses on identifying
varying degrees of mutual dependence and independence in these specific
operational realms, and is a more substantially documented approach to the
operational evolution of OSS, including within OSS/London.9
Having said that, no existing work on OSS has really addressed the experience
of any OSS mission in terms of the trend identified by Andrew and Dilks, or
provided a comprehensive analysis of all the major OSS branches in their
activities. The question of overall OSS significance to the war effort also remains
largely unresolved historiographically. This present study therefore strives to
detail OSS/Londons evolution and activities comprehensively, and to establish
their larger significance to the institutionalization of American intelligence after
the war.
The third major research goal flows naturally from the second: to illuminate this
alliance intelligence relationship within the larger framework of Anglo-American
competitive cooperation. This phrase was coined by David Reynolds to
describe how Britain and America acted in concert as circumstances required,
while still manoeuvring for advantage and preeminence as powers.10 Linking this
phenomenon with the ambiguity, ambivalence, misuse and circumstance
inherent in intelligence operations as suggested by intelligence theory invites an
analysis of the intelligence relations between two major wartime powers, or more
bluntly, to place this intelligence study within the context of Great Power
politics.11
A number of key questions will be addressed while fulfilling these purposes.
How many of the theoretical problems of intelligence were faced by members of
OSS/London during the war? How did the outpost establish itself, and did it
mature? Was OSS/London persistently amateur, or did it make the most of its
opportunities and flourish as well as could be expected? Did OSS/London reflect
the popular portrait of Anglo-American intelligence relations (i.e., American
dependence), or of Anglo-American relations in general (i.e., British
dependence)? In other words, the popular portrait of Anglo-American relations
has as its theme Britains gradually increasing dependence on American power in
the first half of this century, especially from 1940 onwards. Conversely, the
popular portrait of Anglo-American intelligence relations during the war, with
the establishment of OSS, stresses the dependence of American intelligence
neophytes on the worldly-wise, yet perfidious, British. The issue at hand is thus
whether OSS/Londons evolution conformed to either, or both, of these
characterizations at various points in time. For example, did the evolution of
OSS/London change as US power made itself felt in the European Theatre from
1943 onwards? Did Britains growing subordination to US power develop in the
intelligence sphere as it did in diplomatic and military matters? Finally, how far
did mutual hidden agendas and priorities figure in the western intelligence
alliance during the Second World War? To what extent was OSS/London
trying to exploit its ties with British services for their own long-term bureaucratic
needs, and how extensively were the British intent on using organizational links,
including intelligence cooperation, to influence the application of American
power for British ends? These latter questions focus on the motivations and
agendas of the intelligence agencies themselves. As will be detailed in the
chapters that follow, the evidence indicates that OSS/London was not necessarily
slavishly subordinate or dependent on British intelligence. It in fact walked a fine
line between absorbing intelligence skills from the more experienced British
while trying to prove the organizations worth and independence in order to
secure its post-war status. The British, moreover, certainly extended their
tutelage in order to win the war efficiently, but with the transition to cold war,
Anglo-American intelligence ties were in turn exploited to mobilize American
power to suit British purposes, in part by influencing the character of American
intelligence so as to shape how America perceived evolving Great Power
issues.12
Answering these questions involves a unique application of intelligence theory
to a particular intelligence organization with a manageable historical lifespan.
Blending the British and American schools will also permit testing some
theoretical concepts, and provide for a better understanding of the intelligence
dimensionwhat Andrew and Dilks have called the missing dimensionof
Anglo-American political and strategic relations during the Second World War.
An essential preliminary step involves identifying the historiographic themes
of Anglo-American relations.13 Broadly speaking, they bring out the consistency
of competitive cooperation and manoeuvring for advantage. While Warren F.
Kimball refers to the most productive and cooperative coalition in modern
times, there remains the reality of increasing political, economic and strategic
rivalry, culminating with Britains sub-ordination to America.14 Robert
INTRODUCTION 5
Hathaway stresses that the Anglo-American relationship meant more to Britain

than it did to America as the war progressed. He also emphasizes how Britain
attempted to manipulate its ties with America in order to secure Britains post-
war position. Britain had to focus on the so-called special relationship, and
from 1944 onwards, increasingly sought to influence actively American decision-
making in the hope of using American power to protect British interests.15
However, with larger, home grown, objectives in mind for the world, America
exerted its will more forcefully. This was not done at the expense of the
fundamental objective of winning the war, of course, but it was not done with
any romantic attachment to a relationship which allowed American power to be
used for British ends either. Britain needed America more than America believed
that it needed Britain at the time. The ultimate price for Britains diplomatic
failure in 1939, then, was its increased dependence throughout the Second World
War on America for Britains power position.16 For its part, America became
increasingly convinced throughout the war that Russia was the true heir to
Britains waning status as number two in the world.17 These factors obviously
complicate the neat, tidy myth of the Special Relationship, and underscore the
role of national interest in the Anglo-American partnership.18
Intelligence historiography is more varied in its treatment of the intelligence
dimension of Anglo-American affairs. Before the establishment of OSS,
American intelligence had historically been dominated by the American military,
and this military orientation to American intelligence was notably perpetuated by
the critically important work against first Japanese, and then German, ciphers by
the US Army and Navy during the Second World War.19 One early assessment
of this work accordingly rated it far superior to the amateur, comic,
unproductive, and self-serving actions of OSS, a description illustrating the
intensity of anti-OSS partisans.20 This intensity is more than matched by pro-
OSS historians. Corey Fords Donovan of OSS is a classic example of the
glowingly uncritical vision of OSS founder William J.Donovan that credits him
with conceiving the idea of centralized intelligence, and who is implicitly lauded
for realizing an innovative American approach to intelligence by creating OSS in
his own image.21 Anthony Cave Browns The Last Hero: Wild Bill Donovan
largely concurs with this assessment based on Donovans papers, while Thomas
Troys Donovan and the CIA is devoted to demonstrating the direct lineage
between Donovans ideas and what eventually became the post-war Central
Intelligence Agency.22
More analytical surveys of OSS focus on its development and effectiveness.
R.Harris Smiths OSS: The Secret History of Americas First Central
Intelligence Agency was a notable first attempt at addressing the question of
overall OSS effectiveness and significance as gleaned almost entirely from
interviews. Harris Smith concluded that as Donovans child, OSS bore the stamp
of his personality, and that his spirit of adventurism was institutionally preserved
in the CIA. Smith therefore emphasizes the alleged legacy of OSS while
generally accepting the view that OSS competence followed initial growing
pains during the war.23 A more critical view is expressed in Bradley F.Smiths
The Shadow Warriors: OSS and the Origins of the CIA. Bradley Smith stresses
Donovans susceptibility to Britains experimentation with shadow warfare
(i.e., with the expedient of organized resistance and espionage as a centrepiece of
the Allied war effort) since this reduced OSS to being a handmaiden of tactical
military operations rather than a strategic intelligence arm. Donovans role in
establishing centralized intelligence is also overrated in Bradley Smiths view.
Bradley Smith instead stresses the concrete influence of the large body of OSS
veterans who provided the real nucleus of CIA. His work, based on examining
mostly Joint Chiefs of Staff and State Department records, thus finds the
presumed achievements of OSS wanting, although his analysis predated the
release of the full OSS archive. Irregular warfare, espionage, the parentage of
post-war US civilian intelligence, and the relevance of OSS strategic intelligence
are nevertheless all cast into doubt.24 More recent works have challenged these
conclusions. William Caseys memoir, The Secret War Against Hitler,
emphatically argues that the penetration of Germany in 194445 by OSS
espionage contributed to the services stature by wars end; Robin Winkss
Cloak and Gown defends the importance and relevance of OSS strategic
assessments produced by the Research and Analysis branch, although Winks
makes no definitive claims as to their true significance. Barry Katzs study of
R&A, Foreign Intelligence, also stresses the talent within the branch, but
concedes that it was overshadowed by OSSs clandestine activities.25
Concerning the question of Anglo-American intelligence relations, there is a
fairly superficial consensus. American inexperience and/or gullibility are the
major themes of the British Official Histories (Hinsley; Foot), and of the main
studies of OSS. Smoother relations over time are generally described as a
function of increased American experience in the official British view, while
British motives for helping OSS are suspect by OSS historians.26 This portrait
was presaged by events from the First World War, where the judicious use of
discretion and personal diplomacy enabled the British Secret Service
representative in Washington, William Wiseman, to solidify an Anglo-American
alliance of necessity.27 By smoothing ruffled feathers and allowing American
leaders to deal with one of their own kind, this covert diplomacy helped Britain
influence American government policy. Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones further suggests in
American Espionage that Wiseman was so adept at his role, he allowed Britain to
manipulate Americas own intelligence resources for British ends.28 Whether or
not this was the case before America entered the war, it certainly describes
Anglo-American cryptographic cooperation after 1917, where Britain preserved
its pre-eminence, and used its product to influence American policy-makers.29
Americas isolationism and demobilization of a cryptographic capability together
distanced it from Britain between the wars, and broke the existing Anglo-
American intelligence linkage.30
Alex Danchevs Establishing the Anglo-American Alliance: The Second World
War Diaries of Brigadier Vivian Dykes demonstrates how this all began to
INTRODUCTION 7
change after the fall of France in 1940, when Britain sought to impress American
representatives (including William Donovan), and to establish the basis for more
concrete ties upon Americas entry into the conflict in 1941.31 Anglo-American
ties in the realm of signals intelligence (SIGINT) were particularly strong with
the BRUSA (British/USA) agreement of 1943, which codified intelligence
pooling and the division of resources, and which possibly set the stage for post-
war American dominance in SIGINT with the alleged 1947 UK-USA pact.32
This all presumes a pre-ordained American intelligence ascendancy that smacks
of being wise after the fact, however, and contrasts with the widely conceded
portrait of American inexperience, and the assumption of allegedly perfidious
British intelligence dominance over OSS. For example, Kermit Roosevelts War
Report of the OSS, and Carlton S.Coons A North Africa Story, both accuse
British intelligence of obstructing and holding back independent long-range OSS
espionage.33 Nathan Millers Spying for America confirms the view of poor field
cooperation, while Harris Smith and Bradley Smith suggest that OSS gullibility
and Anglophilia allowed British intelligence to co-opt OSS to British methods,
and therefore establish de facto dependence on their British tutors.34
A more nuanced insight into the Anglo-OSS intelligence relationship is
provided by a British sabotage officer. Douglas Dodds-Parker notes in his
memoir how in Algiers, Donovan pressed for independent US projects that
would demonstrate the worth of an independent American intelligence service.
Donovan suggested to Dodds-Parker that if Franklin Roosevelt thought that OSS
only supported or reinforced British initiatives and projects, he would not be
likely to give full support to such an imperially-tainted organization after the war.
This created a conflict between Donovans long-term needs and plans (requiring
independent US operations), and the short-term aims of the Allied high
command (requiring the coordination of Allied intelligence, and so US
subordination).35 Dodds-Parker thus introduces a critical, if underrated, theme in
the history of Anglo-American intelligence relations during the Second World
War, and in the heritage of modern American intelligence: the agenda and
priorities of William Donovan relative to military imperatives, and to the
competitive cooperation between OSS and British intelligence. The need to
secure bureaucratic standing (as underscored by Rhodri Jeffreys-Joness The CIA
and American Democracy) is clearly identifiable in the experience of OSS/
London. It demonstrated throughout the war the necessity for an untried
intelligence organization to receive tutelage while trying to achieve
independence and long-term security, all within the context of a larger alliance
relationship.36
Intelligence theory suggests some concepts relevant to interpreting these
elements of OSS/Londons activities. Regarding the relationship between
intelligence producers and intelligence consumers, should intelligence be
expected to help guide policy directly?37 Alternatively, should intelligence
instead be detached from policy-making to avoid compromising the integrity of
its work?38 These questions relate to how well OSS/London served its military
and political masters, hence providing a framework for judging its relevance to
Americas war effort and post-war statecraft.39 More specifically, a persistent
theoretical issue involves the tension between supplying short-range current
estimates (or spot reports), and providing long-range estimates. This is directly
relevant to judging the significance of OSS/Londons revered R&A branch in
comparison with OSS/Londons operational intelligence work.40 Perhaps even
more significant to OSS/Londons history is the practicality of cooperation
between an intelligence services component branches, and the efficacy of
centralized organization.41 These points are relevant to the level of
organizational efficiency within OSS/London as compared to, and influenced by,
the structure of British intelligence. They moreover speak to the presumed OSS
legacy of centralization. Finally, is the vital essence of intelligence the
centralized production of analytical estimates, or is it intelligence as responsive
servant of immediate consumer needs?42 This relates to the question of whether
OSS/Londons intelligence operations were of greater significance than the work
of R&A, and to the relevance of OSS/London as a whole.
These themes of inquiry suggest the potential pitfalls and obstacles which
threaten to complicate, and even nullify, any intelligence organizations efforts,
much less those of a novice service. Ambiguity concerning function;
ambivalence from, and misuse by, superiors; and the simple circumstances
confronting a given organization are all the stock in trade of modern intelligence.
The manner in which OSS/London functioned internally, with the British, and
within the context of Anglo-American relations can thus be interpreted in light of
these theoretical questions. It is in this sense that OSS/London can serve as a
case study which tests theories about the ideal practice of the craft of
intelligence in relation to the realities of historical experience and power
politics.43
Undertaking such a case study is facilitated by the extensive availability of
OSS records, unprecedented for an intelligence agency. Held at the US National
Archives and Records Administration in Washington, DC, the 6,000-cubic-foot
OSS archive is deposited in Record Group 226, 3,000 cubic feet of which were
accessible when research was conducted between June 1992 and March 1993.
RG 226 is divided into over 110 Entries, the most significant of which regarding
OSS/London include: Entry 91 (OSS/London War Diary); Entry 92 (Central
Files); Entry 99 (records gathered by the OSS History Office); Entry 180
(Director OSS files); and Entries 115, 148, and 190 (Field Files). The superiority
of contemporaneous documentation over self-serving memoirs and decades-old
recollections is obvious. Extensive correspondence, memoranda, reports,
directives, and cables allow a detailed reconstruction of the key developments
within this crucial OSS outpost, and equally significant, an understanding of
developments and information relating to British intelligence. OSS/Londons
War Diary, while blatantly geared toward proselytizing for a post-war
intelligence agency, is nevertheless useful for contemporary analyses and
chronologies of events. RG 226 is also supplemented by Record Group 263,
INTRODUCTION 9
Records of the Central Intelligence Agency. This material includes the Thomas
Troy Papers, containing many records used in preparation of his in-house CIA
history Donovan and the CIA, and two other rival CIA histories by Arthur B.
Darling and Ludwell Montague. Also of some use were the William J. Donovan
Papers at the US Army Military History Institute in Carlisle, Pennsylvania.
Although this collection is badly organized and difficult to use, it offers some
important individual documents, especially concerning British intelligence.
Uncovering intelligence documents from British records at the Public Record
Office, Kew is a more problematic exercise in light of traditional British reluctance
to acknowledge, let alone document, the work of its secret services. Luck and
thoroughness are necessary to collect relevant records buried in the various
Cabinet, War Office, Air Ministry, and Foreign Office record classes.
Nevertheless, a considerable amount of material can still be discovered that
illustrates key aspects of the British intelligence community, and its relationship
with American intelligence. Despite the best efforts of departmental record
weeders, important facts can slip through. As one British officer attached to the
War Office Historical Section noted about some military records in 1959,
[t]he trouble is that they were never properly screened and one often finds
really hot documents tucked away in what would appear to be a completely
innocuous file. The best example of this was the finding of Sir Winston
Churchills personal opinion of the American Admiral [Ernest J.] King in a
very dull Q[uartermaster] file.44
Churchill was himself keen to ensure that British Secret Service records were
kept from premature release. After learning that a bomb hit on the Ministry of
Transports archives had scattered a vast mass of driving licences, he wrote the
Chief of the Secret Service to say that he had no doubt that all your papers are in
absolute bombproof security, but if not, they should be put there as soon as
possible.45 Finding intelligence documents in British archives is thus the
historical professions own version of the Great Game, but not one without its
rewards.
The fruits of this paperchase are organized as follows: Chapter 1 surveys the
British intelligence community with particular reference to how its fragmentation
and method of direction set the context for OSS/Londons own evolution, and
thereby shaped that portion of the Anglo-American intelligence relationship.
Chapter 2 illustrates how significant this phenomenon proved to be for the
London missions establishment under the aegis of the Coordinator of
Information before it gave way to OSS. This chapter also underscores the
missions bureaucratic insecurity, the power wielded by the American military
over its prospects, and the primacy of fragmentation over theoretical
centralization.
The remaining chapters survey the missions component branches and the
work done in connection with British services. Chapter 3 covers how OSS/
London evolved to participate in functionally integrated espionage and sabotage

operations with the British services leading up to the 1944 invasion of
Normandy. The importance of military imperatives and British support for OSS
efforts together counter the mythology of British manipulation of their American
colleagues, and demonstrate how military influence and British pragmatism
compensated for OSS/Londons minimal coordination. Chapter 4 examines OSS/
Londons R&A branch, long considered a jewel within a major innovation
credited to OSS, namely the marriage of scholarly analysis to intelligence
production. This chapter takes a sceptical view of the idea that this branch helped
validate a particular American style in intelligence that was duly perpetuated in
the CIA.46 Not only was R&A not particularly unique given British efforts in this
arena, but it was not very successful in carving a niche within the Anglo-
American intelligence community in support of military operations. R&As
targeting analysis for Allied strategic bombing in Europe has nonetheless been
presumed a major success in applying OSS resources to military operations.
Chapter 5 offers a critical case study of this R&A/London effort, and besides
demonstrating the flaws in its work and the myth of its empirical superiority, it
highlights the inherent dangers of intelligence manipulating policy decisions. It
also underscores the extent to which R&A work demonstrated egotism over
substance. This is reinforced by the chapters further analysis of how R&A
isolated itself from truly effective intelligence processing with its OSS
colleagues in contrast with proven British methods.
Chapter 6 returns to the realm of operational intelligence with an analysis of
the penetration of Germany by OSS espionage. This survey demonstrates the
only significant example of semi-centralized, coordinated intelligence work by
OSS/London, and concludes that this was a successful application of OSS assets
in support of military operations where British intelligence was unable to take
the lead. It also shows how this example of American operational independence
finally grew out of an exploitation of its inherent capabilities rather than any
manipulation by the British. Chapter 7 focuses on OSS work in the footsteps of
its British colleagues in counter-intelligence and propaganda. It contrasts the
relative effectiveness of these intelligence sub-disciplines, and shows how
virtual fusion with the British nullified the ostensible centralization of OSS/
London, albeit with different results.
Chapter 8 then surveys the fate of OSS/London in the post-war world. Despite
OSS giving way to the Strategic Services Unit, the London mission performed a
vital role in the Anglo-American relationship during the transition to cold war.
The chapter illuminates how British intelligence relied on its partnership with
OSS/Londons remnants as Britain found itself in dire strategic straits, and how
the preservation of this London rump formed a nucleus of Americas post-war
intelligence capability. It thus demonstrates how crucial the intelligence
dimension had become to the overall Anglo-American relationship, and to the
maturation of America as a world power.
INTRODUCTION 11
These chapters together show the stresses and strains of fate and chance on
OSS/London; the defining role of modern-day sovereigns on modern intelligence
bureaucracies; and the efforts of many British and American desperate men in a
necessary relationship. OSS/Londons experiences thus provide a foundation for
drawing lessons about intelligence work in general. They also contribute to the
scholarly understanding of a unique element within American statecraft, and its
role in one of the more critical alliances formed in modern international history.
NOTES
1. Alfred C.Maurer et al., General Introduction, p. 1, and Alfred C.Maurer et al.,

Conclusion, p. 354, both in Alfred C.Maurer et al. (eds), Intelligence: Policy and
Process (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985); see also Hedley Bull, The Anarchical
Society: A Study in World Politics (London: Macmillan, 1977), pp. 1067; Martin
Wight, Power Politics, Hedley Bull and Carston Holbraad (eds) (New York:
Holmes and Meier, 1978), pp. 29, 1004, 11617, 120; cf. Charles W.Yost, The
Conduct and Misconduct of Foreign Affairs (New York: Random House, 1972), pp.
194225, for an idealistic dissent from such conceptions.
2. On intelligence exchanges with the Russians, see Bradley F.Smith, Sharing Secrets
with Stalin: How the Allies Traded Intelligence, 19411945 (Lawrence: University
Press of Kansas, 1996).
3. Representative examples are Christopher Andrew, Secret Service: The Making of
the British Intelligence Community (London: Heinemann, 1985); Wesley K.Wark,
The Ultimate Enemy: British Intelligence and Nazi Germany, 19331939 (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1986); see also Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, American
Intelligence: A Spur to Historical Genius?, Intelligence and National Security 3, 2
(April 1988), pp. 3327.
4. Robertsons view discussed in Abram N.Shulsky, Silent Warfare: Understanding
the World of Intelligence (Washington: Brasseys, 1991), p. 181; Roy Godson,
Intelligence: an American View, in Kenneth G.Robertson (ed.), British and
American Approaches to Intelligence (London: Macmillan, 1987), pp. 336;
Sherman Kent, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1949, 1966); D.C.Watt, Intelligence Studies: The
Emergence of the British School, Intelligence and National Security 3, 2 (April
1988), pp. 3389; see also D.C.Watt, Intelligence and the Historian: A Comment
on John Gaddiss Intelligence, Espionage and Cold War Origins, Diplomatic
History 14, 2 (Spring 1990), pp. 199204; Michael Herman, Intelligence Power in
Peace and War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
5. Christopher Andrew and David Dilks, Introduction, in Christopher Andrew and
David Dilks (eds), The Missing Dimension: Governments and Intelligence
Communities in the Twentieth Century (London: Macmillan, 1984), p. 6.
6. For a description of this conference and its papers, see Nelson MacPherson,
Conference Report, Intelligence and National Security 7, 4 (October 1992), pp.
51315.
7. Eduard Mark, The OSS in Romania, 194445: An Intelligence Operation of the
Early Cold War, Intelligence and National Security 9, 2 (April 1994), pp. 32044;
Maochun Yu, OSS in China: Prelude to Cold War (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1996).
8. Richard J.Aldrich, Intelligence and the War Against Japan: Britain, America and
the Politics of Secret Service (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); see
also Richard J. Aldrich, American Intelligence and the British Raj: The OSS, the
SSU and India, 19421947, in Martin S.Alexander (ed.), Knowing Your Friends:
Intelligence Inside Alliances and Coalitions from 1914 to the Cold War (London:
Frank Cass, 1998), pp. 13264.
9. Jay Jakub, Spies and Saboteurs: Anglo-American Collaboration and Rivalry in
Human Intelligence Collection and Special Operations, 194045 (London:
Macmillan, 1999).
10. David Reynolds, The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance, 193741: A Study
in Competitive Co-operation (London: Europa, 1981); see also William Roger
Louis, Imperialism at Bay, 19411945: The United States and the Decolonization
of the British Empire (Oxford: Clarendon, 1977).
11. Shulsky, Silent, pp. 1779; see Bull, Anarchical, pp. 1856, 208, 219; see also
Michael I.Handel, The Politics of Intelligence, Intelligence and National Security
2, 4 (October 1987), p. 38.
12. See Jakub, Spies, pp. 18597, for his analysis of independence/dependence at the
level of OSS-British intelligence in various theatres.
13. Representative works on the subject include Reynolds, Creation; James R.Leutze,
Bargaining for Supremacy: Anglo-American Naval Collaboration, 19371941
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1977); Robert M.Hathaway,
Ambiguous Partnership: Britain and America, 19441947 (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1981); Christopher Thorne, Allies of a Kind: The United States,
Britain, and the War against Japan, 19411945 (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1978);
Keith Sainsbury, Turning Point: Roosevelt, Stalin, Churchill, and Chiang-Kai-
Shek, 1943: The Moscow, Cairo, and Teheran Conferences (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1985); more superficial treatments are John S.D.Eisenhower,
Allies: Pearl Harbor to D-Day (Garden City: Doubleday, 1982); Joseph P.Lash,
Roosevelt and Churchill, 19391941: The Partnership That Saved the West (New
York: W.W. Norton, 1976).
14. Warren F.Kimball, The Most Unsordid Act: Lend-lease, 19391941 (Baltimore:
The Johns Hopkins Press, 1977), p. 241.
15. Hathaway, Ambiguous, pp. 56, 1653, 308, 31617.
16. See C.A.MacDonald, The United States, Britain and Appeasement, 19361939
(London: Macmillan, 1980), pp. 1801; Alex Danchev, Very Special Relationship:
Field-Marshal Sir John Dill and the Anglo-American Alliance, 194144 (London:
Brasseys, 1986), pp. 14, 33, 412, 79.
17. A.C.Turner, The Unique Partnership: Britain and the United States (New York:
Pegasus, 1971), pp. 67, 869, 967; see also Robert Dallek, Franklin D.Roosevelt
and American Foreign Policy, 19321945 (New York: Oxford University Press,
1979); Herbert Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin: The War They Waged and the
Peace They Sought (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957); Charles L.Mee,
Meeting at Potsdam (New York: M.Evans, 1975).
18. See Max Beloff, The Special Relationship: an Anglo-American Myth, in Martin
Gilbert (ed.), A Century of Conflict, 18501950: Essays for A.J.P.Taylor (New
York: Atheneum, 1967), pp. 14871; D.Cameron Watt, Succeeding John Bull:
INTRODUCTION 13
America in Britains Place, 19001975 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

1984), pp. 905.
19. See Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, American Espionage: From Secret Service to CIA (New
York: The Free Press, 1977); David Kahn, The Codebreakers: The Story of Secret
Writing (New York: Macmillan, 1967); Ronald Clark, The Man Who Broke
Purple: The Life and Times of the Worlds Greatest Cryptologist, Colonel William
Friedman (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1977); Ronald Lewin, The Other
Ultra (London: Hutchinson, 1982); Thomas Parrish, The Ultra Americans: The US
Role in Breaking the Nazi Codes (New York: Stein and Day, 1986).
20. Stephen E.Ambrose, with Richard I.Immerman, Ikes Spies: Eisenhower and the
Espionage Establishment (Garden City: Doubleday, 1981).
21. Corey Ford, Donovan of OSS (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970).
22. Anthony Cave Brown, The Last Hero: Wild Bill Donovan (New York: Times
Books, 1982); Thomas Troy, Donovan and the CIA: A History of the Central
Intelligence Agency (Frederick: University Publications of America, 2nd printing,
1984).
23. R.Harris Smith, OSS: The Secret History of Americas First Central Intelligence
Agency (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972).
24. Bradley F.Smith, The Shadow Warriors: OSS and the Origins of the CIA (London:
Andre Deutsch, 1983).
25. William Casey, The Secret War Against Hitler (Washington: Regnery Gateway,
1988); Robin Winks, Cloak and Gown: Scholars in the Secret War, 19391961
(New York: William Morrow, 1987); Barry Katz, Foreign Intelligence: Research
and Analysis in the Office of Strategic Services, 19421945 (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1989).
26. F.H.Hinsley et al., British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on
Strategy and Operations, Vol. II (London: HMSO, 1991), pp. 524; M.R.D.Foot,
SOE in France (London: HMSO, 1966), pp. 312, 180349; B.F.Smith, Shadow,
pp. 16876, 1847; R.H.Smith, OSS, pp. 334.
27. W.B.Fowler, British-American Relations, 19171918: The Role of Sir William
Wiseman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969); Arthur Willert, The Road
to Safety: A Study in Anglo-American Relations (London: Derek Verschoyle, 1952).
28. Jeffreys-Jones, Espionage, pp. 45, 734.
29. Ibid., pp. 24950; Patrick Beesly, Room 40: British Naval Intelligence, 191418
(London: Hamish Hamilton, 1982); Herbert O.Yardley, The American Black
Chamber (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1931).
30. See Yardley, Black, passim, and Wayne S.Cole, Roosevelt and the Isolationists,
193245 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983), pp. 89, 163222.
31. Alex Danchev (ed.) Establishing the Anglo-American Alliance: The Second World
War Diaries of Brigadier Vivian Dykes (London: Brasseys, 1990).
32. See James Bamford, The Puzzle Palace: A Report on Americas Most Secret
Agency (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1982), and Jeffrey T.Richelson and Desmond
Ball, The Ties That Bind: Intelligence Cooperation between the UKUSA Countries
(Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1985); cf. Bradley F.Smith, The Ultra-Magic Deals and
the Most Secret Special Relationship, 19401946 (Novato: Presidio, 1993).
33. Kermit Roosevelt, The War Report of the OSS, Vol. II: The Overseas Targets (New
York: Walker, 1976); Carlton S.Coon, A North Africa Story: The Anthropologist as
OSS Agent, 19411943 (Ipswich: Gambit, 1980).
34. Nathan Miller, Spying for America: The Hidden History of US Intelligence (New
York: Paragon House, 1989); R.H.Smith, OSS, pp. 334; B.F.Smith, Shadow, pp.
16876, 1847.
35. Douglas Dodds-Parker, Setting Europe Ablaze: Some Account of Ungentlemanly
Warfare (Windlesham: Springwood Books, 1983), pp. 1245, 17980; see the
discussion of this point in the review by Nelson MacPherson of Max Corvo, The
OSS in Italy, 19421945: A Personal Memoir, in Intelligence and National
Security 6, 3 (July 1991), p. 646; a recent survey of presidential use of American
intelligence is Christopher Andrews For the Presidents Eyes Only: Secret
Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush (New York:
Harper Collins, 1995), with pp. 12348 detailing Roosevelts relationship with
intelligence.
36. Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, The CIA and American Democracy (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1989), pp. 248, 250; see Jakub, Spies, pp. 1967.
37. As suggested by H.H.Ransom, The Intelligence Establishment (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 57; Kenneth Strong, Men of Intelligence:
A Study of the Roles and Decisions of Chiefs of Intelligence from World War II to
the Present Day (London: Cassell, 1970), p. 131; Walter Laqueur, A World of
Secrets: The Uses and Limits of Intelligence (New York: Basic Books, 1985), pp.
1112, 232, 3406.
38. As suggested by Kent, Strategic, pp. 78103, 115, 1336, 1803, 195201; see also
Arthur S.Hulnick, The Intelligence Produce-Policy Consumer Linkage: A
Theoretical Approach, Intelligence and National Security 1, 2 (May 1986), pp.
21233, and Herman, Intelligence, pp. 1067, 1289, 1403, 2579.
39. Cf. Roger Hilsman, Strategic Intelligence and National Decisions (Glencoe: The
Free Press, 1956), pp. 37, 43, 84, 118, 182; and Bruce D.Berkowitz and Allan E.
Goodman, Strategic Intelligence for American National Security (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1989), pp. ixx, 227, 37, 109, 136, 1735, 1801,
183; these sources argue that intelligence cannot function properly if isolated from
policy-making, and must avoid being ignored as much as being intellectually
compromised; the relevance of intelligence thus stems from how effectively this
balance is struck.
40. See T.L.Hughes, The Fate of Facts in a World of Men: Foreign Policy and
Intelligence Making (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1976); Ralph
Bennett, Intelligence and Strategy in World War II, in Robertson (ed.), British,
pp. 1303; Herman, Intelligence, pp. 10012, 25779.
41. See Strong, Men, pp. 95, 168; Herman, Intelligence, pp. 1635.
42. See Strong, Men, p. 151; Shulsky, Silent, chs 3, 67; Andrew and Dilks, Missing,
p. 13.
43. See Allen Dulles, The Craft of Intelligence (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), pp.
4, 5564, 170.
44. Brigadier H.B.Latham, Historical Section, War Office to Sir Edward Hale,
Historical Branch, Cabinet Office, 19 August 1959, CAB 103/319, Public Record
Office, Kew [hereafter PRO].
45. Churchill to C, PMs Personal Minute, 10 July 1944, PREM 4/68/6A, PRO; pre-
war Secret Service records had at least been moved out of London to the British
cipher-breaking station at Bletchley Park, Buckinghamshire in 1939; see R.VJones,
INTRODUCTION 15
A Sidelight on Bletchley, 1942, Intelligence and National Security 9, 1 (January

1994), p. 1.
46. The American style idea was articulated by R&A veteran Professor Elspeth
Davies Rostow at the 1991 OSS conference in Washington, cited in MacPherson,
Conference Report, p. 515.
1
The British Intelligence Community: Setting
the Tone for OSS
Many OSS members believed unquestioningly in Britains intelligence pre-

eminence, and this article of faith has long permeated OSS historiography. The
Americans routinely attributed their successful indoctrination into the black arts
of intelligence to their special relationship with British spy masters whose
professional lineage stretched in an unbroken line from Elizabethan times.1 Their
British counterparts no doubt encouraged such a myth; but while British
experience indeed proved critical for the development of modern American
intelligence, its worth was all the more impressive given the British services
eccentric antecedents, their impoverishment, their uneven record, and their often
hard-pressed operational fortunes. The highly personalized and stubbornly
entrenched system of intelligence administration that emerged in wartime was
also significant, since this resolutely unchanging arrangement served to mould the
dominant structures and rivalries of the tightly knit Anglo-American intelligence
bureaucracies. The British example thereby ensured that OSS evolved even more
in the likeness of the British intelligence community than has been commonly
understood.
Although various court officials had performed intelligence functions for their
sovereigns throughout British history, the creation of a professional intelligence
establishment within the machinery of executive government was a strictly
modern phenomenon. Not until the post-Waterloo period were efforts made
within the War Office to formalize intelligence gathering in support of military
operations. The Royal Navy followed suit in the mid-1880s, while domestic
surveillance developed under the Special Branch during that same period.2 An
institutionalized Secret Service finally began to evolve in the late nineteenth
century through the collaboration of the Foreign Office and the War Office in
utilizing secret service funds to deploy a limited network of agents on the
continent and in imperial troublespots.3 The clandestine efforts of this ad hoc
system were, however, given an unexpected jolt by the efforts of pulp fiction
writers determined to dramatize Britains strategic vulnerability. Capitalizing on
the growing British fear of invasion by continental powers between 1900 and
1909, authors such as William Le Queux, E. Phillips Oppenheim, and Erskine
Childers popularized tales of German invasion plans, the vanguard of which
(according to Le Queux in particular) embodied hordes of Teutonic spies. These
THE BRITISH INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 17
villains were stymied in the books by a fictional British Secret Service wholly of
their authors imaginations.4 Harmless in themselves, these yarns began to take
hold in the minds of the public and establishment alike, and fanned by the press,
escalated into a wholesale spy mania. Where there are suspected spies, there is a
cry for counter-measures. Since the organs of the War Office and the Admiralty
were not up to the task, there was strong lobbying from within these departments
to create the means to verify and confound the knavish tricks of the continental
secret services. A sub-committee on foreign espionage of the Committee of
Imperial Defence, swayed as much by the fictional spy scenarios as anything
else, eventually concurred with that view in 1909. Their report led directly to the
establishment of Britains first Secret Service Bureau in that same year, modified
in 1910 to consist of a War Office home counter-espionage department, and a
foreign espionage department under control of the Admiralty.5 Upon the
outbreak of the First World War, the Home Section became an element of the
newly formed Directorate of Military Intelligence within the War Office in 1916,
and was styled as MI5. The Foreign Section also joined the War Office at that
time as MI1(c), but control and funding of the department passed to the Foreign
Office by the end of the conflict. The exclusive inter-service responsibility of the
Foreign Section for espionage, known by then as either the Secret Service, the
Special (or Secret) Intelligence Service (SIS), or by its nominal War Office
military intelligence cover title of MI6, was only formalized in 1921. The service
accordingly reported its information without interpretation to the Foreign Office,
was supervised by the Foreign Office, and its espionage system was not to
prejudice by association, or supplant, the FOs political reporting.6
The emphasis with the return to peace was obviously on bureaucratic control.
Less attention was paid to the actual execution of such control in terms of
establishing operational priorities, and in deploying the limited resources of SIS,
especially regarding direction from the armed services. This shortcoming would
only be exacerbated throughout the period preceding the Second World War. The
lack of funding was a prime reason for this, a problem shared with the defence
establishment in general. The SIS budget was reduced from 240,000 in 1919 to
90,000 in 1922, and SIS stressed in 1935 that the lack of finances had, for
example, forced the complete abandonment of operations in several countries
from which information could have been gathered on Italy relevant to the
Abyssinian crisis. This state of affairs persisted, with only a small temporary
budget increase in the spring of 1938, and led to the armed services complaining
about the poor, often non-existent, state of SIS information on German intentions
and rearmament.7 It is thus easy to understand why the Official Historians of
British intelligence entitled the section of their work dealing with the wartime
period from its out-break in September 1939 to the winter of 1941 In the Dark.
The British Secret Service was no all-seeing eye, no invincible collection of
cunning experts practicing their craft in the ruthless spirit of raison dtat. Two
decades of relative neglect and lack of direction were offset only by a late
realization of the need to mobilize intelligence for potential war in the manner of
the armed services. The same process of personnel expansion and enhanced
operational control in a transition from peacetime structures to those of war had
to be made by the SIS.8
One of the most pressing requirements with the onset of war was to develop an
effective means of executive control and direction over intelligence. Some
progress had been made on this front through the establishment within the Chiefs
of Staff organization of a Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee in 1936. It was
intended that the JIC would aid the service heads and assist the Joint (i.e., tri-
service) Planning Staff by acting as a channel for the dissemination of relevant
intelligence in support of higher planning. Actual practice was another matter
because the JIC consisted merely of service intelligence deputies who showed
little initiative in providing appreciations, and who were seldom consulted by the
JPS. There was, curiously, no SIS representation. It became clear by June 1939
that closer integration was required of the service intelligence departments, and
that Foreign Office political input would have to be incorporated into the JIC as
well. The Sub-Committee from then onwards consisted of the service
intelligence chiefs or their deputies, and a Counsellor from the FO who also
served in the capacity of unofficial chairman. Still without SIS participation, the
JIC was now formally expected to assess and co-ordinate intelligence for the
Chiefs of Staff in order to effect the most sound basis for Government policy,
and to contribute toward improving the efficient working of the intelligence
organization of the country as a whole.9 This essentially amounted to a mandate
to produce operational intelligence appreciations for the War Cabinet and COS,
and it was a nominal first for British intelligence. While the JIC was best suited
to compare and assess the widest range of information, it still must be noted that
the JIC only centralized strategic assessments, not the management of the
intelligence system as a whole. Even this innovation was problematic until the
creation of a Joint Intelligence Staff in May 1941 to ease the committees
debilitating workload by drafting basic appreciations for JIC consideration and
approval. By also serving as a corporate memory for the British intelligence
system, the JIS established a firm foundation for the systematic influence of
intelligence on British strategy. This in itself was a laudable accomplishment,
but it nevertheless failed to resolve the thorny issue of how best to coordinate the
component clandestine services within the intelligence system. It was as yet
unclear how the competing interests of the various departmentsForeign Office,
War Office, Admiraltycould be equably balanced, and it was assumed that
intelligence was best left in the hands of the various departmental masters.10
One consequence of the ongoing fractured direction of intelligence operations
was revealed through the convoluted, nearly arthritic, attempt to organize
clandestine sabotage before the German onslaught of May 1940. A French
General of the Secretariat General de la Dfense Nationale contacted the British
Military Secretary to the War Cabinet, Major-General Hastings Ismay, on 26
January 1940 with a proposal for a combined sabotage programme against
German railways and other lines of communication. Ismay in turn forwarded the
scheme to the Director of Military Intelligence, Major-General F.G.Beaumont-

Nesbitt, who in early February passed it on to Military Intelligence Research
(MIR), that element of the General Staff designated to plan such activities.11
Their conclusions, communicated to Ismay by Beaumont-Nesbitt on 3 March,
were that the French plan had merit if widely executed over some time with a
thorough organization. This would obviously require a degree of inter-service
and inter-Allied coordination that in the DMIs view still left something to be
desired. While MIR studied sabotage and guerrilla warfare, SIS was expected to
execute any specific projects. SIS tended to do this with no reference to the
military, which the DMI considered fundamentally wrong. The Foreign Office
and the three service intelligence chiefs had met in the preceding weeks to
fashion greater coordination, but more needed to be done. Beaumont-Nesbitt
suggested that all sabotage projects be submitted to a special all-service
committee under the control of, and answering to, the JIC. The JIC would then
decide on further action, including delegating responsibility for execution to the
military services or SIS. The DMI was convinced that even this ponderous set-up,
dictated by the circumstances of intelligence organization, would be an
improvement on our present haphazard methods. Coordination with the French
would see their utilization of a similar mechanism, and both would then report to
an inter-Allied JIC for the execution of a combined programme.12
Ismay replied two days later that while the DMIs proposals were thorough,
a less formal but equally effective alternative would be to make the War Office
responsible for all such projects, and that they could then devise the necessary
arrangements for the requisite harmonized effort. How exactly the War Office
was supposed to obtain the cooperation of the other competing bodies and
departments went unsaid. Subordinating such operations to the Army made
sense, but only if the DMI had sufficient authority, which he did not.13
The DMIs suggestion therefore found favour with the JIC, which agreed to
the formation of an Inter-Services Project Board. Both Ismay and Sir Edward
Bridges, the Secretary to the War Cabinet, emphasized JIC control of the
board.14 The First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, was not impressed
by this development. He commented that the ISPB would be only another piece
of clogging machinery set up in the path of action. Churchill understood that
these matters were primarily the care of Colonel Menzies who has
representatives of the three [service] Intelligence Departments either in, or in
close contact with his organization, that being SIS.15 As Deputy to the preceding
Chief of the Secret Service (CSS, or by traditional appellation, simply C),
Menzies had succeeded to the leadership of SIS in November 1939, and the First
Lord wanted the ISPB blueprint submitted by C and the JIC for Cabinet
approval.16 Churchill evidently soon relented, with the proviso that the suggested
board be under Lord Hankey [Minister without Portfolio], who with Colonel
Menzies ought to be the channel through which all such projects pass. To have it
as a separate piece of mechanism would be at once redundant and conflicting.17
Hankey himself had not been given time for a considered opinion on the matter,
although he was inclined to feel that the proposed board was on much too low a
level and that coordination in these matters ought to be carried out on a very high
level so that approval for projects could be given without the full War Cabinet
being consulted. He was nevertheless prepared to concur with Churchill.18
The JIC set out their formal proposition on the subject to the War Cabinet on
26 April. It emphasized the increasingly inter-departmental nature of sub rosa
operations, particularly of those irregular actions in support of the
Governments economic warfare strategy designed to blockade Germany into
capitulation. The ISPB was therefore intended as an advisory and consultative
body made up of comparatively junior officers (Lieutenant-Colonel grade)
from SIS and the service departments, and to be distinct from the JIC in order to
avoid the apparently disquieting spectre of unnecessary formalities.19 This
document was considered and accepted by the Deputy Chiefs of Staff on 29
April 1940, just in time to be rendered largely irrelevant by the decisive German
offensive that began on 10 May.20 The dispersion of intelligence functions and
bodies, the limitations of the JIC, and the Secret Services detachment therefrom
had obviously served as considerable stumbling blocks in the attempt to fashion
a timely and effective means of directing sabotage activities. British intelligence
direction on the eve of disaster was undeniably diffuse and impracticable.21
With a Shakespearean sense of timing, Churchill succeeded to the premiership
on the day of the German assault as a result of the fall of Neville Chamberlain
after the April debacle in Norway. Churchill came to the premiership with a long
history of dealings with intelligence throughout his Cabinet service. As Secretary
of War in 1920, he had even recommended that MI5 and SIS be combined as an
economy measure. This proposal was not accepted, and Churchill himself
reflected that the marriage of distinct and very secretive organizationscannot
be brought about in a hurry having regard to the peculiar nature of the matters
dealt with and the importance of not disturbing the relationships which exist.22
The Prime Minister did back a Chiefs of Staff review of the intelligence system
soon after taking power, and he pushed for the elementary measure of placing
SIS, MI5, and the Ministry of Economic Warfare in the JIC at the latters
arrangement on 24 May. (During a review of the secret services by Lord Hankey
the preceding March SIS had actually resisted joining the JIC in order to
preserve the historic aloofness of the SIS from the Whitehall committee
system, but Churchills decision now overrode such considerations.) Despite all
of this, he was nevertheless disinclined to pursue more radical measures.23
Churchills reticence was evidently married to an impatience with the Secret
Services performance to date. He minuted his obvious discontent to Ismay, for
Menzies, on 5 August as well:
I am not satisfied with the volume or quality of information received from

both the occupied and the unoccupied areas of France. We seem to be as
much cut off from these territories as from Germany. I do not wish such
reports as are received to be sift ed and digested by the various intelligence
authorities. For the present Major Morton will inspect them for me and
submit what he considers of major interest. He is to see everything and
submit authentic documents for me in their original form. Further I await
proposals from Colonel Menzies for improving and extending our
information about France and for keeping a continued flow of agents
moving to and fro. For this purpose Naval facilities can if necessary be
invoked. So far as the Vichy Government is concerned it is not creditable
that we have so little information. To what extent are Americans, Swiss
and Spanish agents being used [sic]. Colonel Menzies should submit a
report on what he has done and is proposing to do.24
That report must have made grim reading, as much for Churchill as for Menzies.
Since Churchill would make his famous tribute to the few of the Battle of
Britain on 20 August, it had to be just after that speech that a somewhat cruel
jest was made at the expense of [the] Intelligence Service. Paraphrasing
Churchills oratory, it was said of the Secret Intelligence Service that never in
the whole sum of human experience had so little been known by so many about
so much. This portrait, however,
was a half truth. The demand for intelligence was greater and covered a
wider field than ever in 1914/18. And the possibility of obtaining it was
much less. The occupation of so much of Europe by the Nazis and their
ruthless and terrorizing control had made the normal methods of obtaining
intelligence almost impractical. Agent after agent was liquidated or gave
up an impossibly difficult and dangerous task, and that great source of
informationthe neutral presshad almost disappeared. Restricted in
their usual sources of supply the Intelligence Branches of all three services
and other departments directly concerned with the war turned to long
distance high altitude photography as a ready solution to their troubles.25
Save for the joke, this assessment of SIS fortunes could have been that written by
Menzies for Churchill. It was certainly true that MI6 networks had been
completely destroyed in the wake of the German triumph in France and the Low
Countries, and that aerial photographic reconnaissance (PR) was of critical
importance in filling some of the intelligence void after Dunkirk. Photo
reconnaissance was, however, only part of the repertoire still available to C.
Another vital source controlled by SIS was understandably omitted from the
RAF narrativethat being signals intelligence.26
Britain achieved great success in the sphere of code- and cipherbreaking
during the First World War through the Royal Navys cryptanalysis unit, known
after its location within the Admiralty Building as Room 40. The War Office
equivalent was MI1(b), and both groups were amalgamated under Admiralty
authority in 1919 as the Government Code and Cipher School (GC&CS). Placed
under Foreign Office administration alongside SIS in 1922, it was subsequently
incorporated under Cs control (although separate from SIS) in 1923. The SIS
head from then onwards bore the official title of Chief of the Secret Service and
Director of GC&CS, and after 1925 both services were headquartered in
neighbouring offices within the building at 55 Broadway, London. The code and
cipher establishments specific operations were executed by its own
administrative Head while subordinated bureaucratically to C. SIS therefore
enjoyed effective responsibility for the material produced from such activities,
generically known as signals intelligence (SIGINT).27
This was of paramount importance by the time of Churchills accession. The
GC&CS experts at Bletchley Park, Buckinghamshire, were fortuitously able to
penetrate the various keys of Germanys main cipher system, which utilized the
Enigma machine. Enigma was first broken regularly by Polish cryptographers
in the years 193438 by means of a reconstructed device, and by an electro-
mechanical instrument designed to scan the multitudes of letter combinations
known as a cryptographic bombe. The Poles subsequently informed the French
and British cipher departments about the secret in July 1939 since they needed
help penetrating the more complex Enigma system adopted by the Germans at
the end of 1938. When the Poles fled to France after their countrys defeat, the
French took up the mantle. Upon the French defeat in 1940, GC&CS resources
and manpower came to the fore, and by 22 May of that year, one major German
Air Force key began to be read regularly with the British version of the bombe
technology. The German Naval key would follow in 1941, and the Armys in
1942.28
Known to a strictly controlled minority within Whitehall and the services, the
contents of these decrypted signals became the backbone of British intelligence
survival. After being unscrambled and translated by GC&CS (renamed by 1942
as the Government Communications Headquarters, or GCHQ), the resultant
verbatim data were fashioned into signals that accurately summarized the
information for use by British commanders. These signals were accorded the
highest degree of security, and thus eventually described as TOP SECRET
ULTRA, or often more succinctly as ULTRA material. Coming straight from the
proverbial horses mouth, these signals gave the British an unprecedented ability
to examine and use the most reliable (although not flawless) single source of
intelligence available on the enemy.29 Menziess August report to Churchill
could not bask in that success, however. It could not rely upon ULTRA to
obscure the lack of agents on the continent, nor the undeniable want of effective,
realistic operational plans ready for execution any time in the near future. About
all C could do at the Prime Ministers behest was offer up ULTRA signals,
often personally, for Churchills attention from at least September 1940
onwards. It is suggested in the Official History that this state of affairs was to
have one beneficial result. It produced a close relationship between C and the
Prime Minister, whose knowledge of the products of Cs organization,
particularly of GC and CS, proved valuable when strategic decisions and
intelligence priorities were being debated.30 A less contented conclusion can
nevertheless be drawn regarding Cs position, and Churchills knowledge of

SIS. In demanding receipt of regular ULTRA summaries, the PM was in fact
able to cut out his professional intelligence officials, and to manage the
intelligence war more and more through personal direction.31 C himself
admitted (to the Americans at least) that this particular direct relationship was
probably inadvisable. It is believed that intelligence, regardless of its source,
should be fully collated with all available information and processed through
regular military or political channels to Mr Churchill as Minister of Defence or
as Prime Minister.32 Since SIS had little to offer besides the fruits of what were
really the labours of GCHQ, the poverty of the Secret Services own
contributions to the war effort could hardly have escaped the Prime Ministers
notice, or enhanced his respect for the capabilities of SIS.33
The excision and independent reincarnation of the services sabotage arm in
July was itself an obvious vote of non-confidence in the ability of SIS (and the War
Office) to wage a secret campaign to Churchills satisfaction. The Prime
Minister rapidly abandoned his earlier insistence (as First Lord) that Menzies
control sabotage activities through Section D of SIS, perhaps because of his
direct knowledge of Section Ds lack-lustre performance in Norway. That section
was accordingly removed without the consultation of C and combined with the
War Offices MIR to establish the Special Operations Executive under the
Minister of Economic Warfare.34 The expulsion from France had not so much
increased Whitehalls interest in sabotage and subversion as rendered Britain
largely bereft of any other conceivable means of striking at Germany; Churchill
therefore readily embraced the prospect of SOE doing something to set Europe
ablaze.35 What SIS had failed to do with Section D it was hoped the new service
could accomplish as part of an optimistic strategy of wearing down Germany
through economic warfare, aerial bombing, and amphibious raiding, culminating
eventually with a thrust into Germany and a programme of SOE-orchestrated
insurrection in occupied Europe. This elevation of irregular warfare was patently
a classic case of making a virtue out of a necessity, and clearly at the expense of
SIS. The fortunes of SIS were thus at their lowest ebb by the time Churchill was
growling at Menzies for evidence of clandestine action in France. An entire
section of SIS had been unceremoniously ripped out and made a separate entity,
while the primary meaningful function left to SIS was the broad oversight of
signals intelligence. This by itself was unlikely to prove a strong enough
foundation for the Secret Services continued existence in its traditional form.36
Expressions of dissatisfaction with that form soon began to emanate from the
highest echelons of the War Cabinet. The Labour Party leader, Clement Attlee,
serving as Lord Privy Seal within the coalition government, minuted Churchill
on 4 November 1940 regarding the organization of intelligence and demanded to
know who is responsible and how long he has been in control. This was duly
forwarded to Ismay by Churchill the next day so that a report could be made.37
The Chiefs of Staff submitted their response on 14 November, addressing
Attlees points in sequence. An appendix outlined that the intelligence
establishment was not actually under a single fixed authority. The COS
concluded by saying that no one individual was at fault for the poor showing in
intelligence, and that so
far as the future is concerned, it may be urged that our whole intelligence
system should be reorganised Nevertheless, there are clearly many grave
disadvantages, not only in the proposition itself but alsomore particularly
in the idea of carrying it out at the present timeit seems to us very
undesirable that a drastic reorganisation of this magnitude should be
attempted at the moment when we are fighting for our lives.38
Attlee received his copy of the report on 24 November, and he found the logic of
the COS unconvincing.39 He made his reaction clear to Churchill on the 28th. If
no individual was at fault, then the very intelligence system was flawed. The
COS argument that change was currently inappropriate moreover amounted to
arguing that because [the British were] fighting for [their] lives [they] should
continue to use an inefficient instrument. It [was] precisely because [Britain was]
engaged in a critical war that [they] ought to do now, late though it is, what
should have been done years ago. Attlee therefore recommended appointing
one directing mind at the head of the Intelligence Service, and coordinating
military intelligence with SIS. Attlee further suggested that the Cabinet should
direct one individual to survey and report on the Intelligence Services. He should
be a person of analytic mind, detached from all the Serviceswithout parti pris,
such as the Solicitor General or some other lawyer of high standing.40
It so happened that the suggestion of a study of the feasibility of intelligence
centralization had already been put before Churchill prior to Attlees response. It
originated ironically enough from Churchills own Private Secretary brought to
Downing Street from the Admiralty, Eric Seal. He had minuted Churchill on 25
July to say that intelligence coordinating was inadequate, with the JIC recently
offering little more than a reprint of some of the Foreign Office telegrams, and
that [d]uring Mr Chamberlains Premiership Lord Hankey was appointed to
overhaul Secret Intelligence, but his reports were not very helpful, and in fact the
only recommendations he made were of a trifling character [see above, note
23]. Seal went on to suggest that Lord Lloyd be pressed into service as an
intelligence coordinator on Churchills behalf as Minister of Defence. Churchill
dismissed this proposal by scrawling below Seals signature a rather trivial
reason for not pursuing the matter: Lord Lloyd is already fully occupied. WSC
26.VII.41
Seal then used the COS response to Attlee as an opportunity to broach the
subject again on 22 November, when he reiterated his proposal for a Chief
Intelligence Officer under Churchill, this time suggesting David Margesson.42
Combined with Attlees interest, Seals persistence briefly paid off. When
A.W.R.Topham from Attlees office wrote Eric Seal on 7 January 1941 to
enquire as to follow up on Attlees 28 November minute, Seal replied the same day.
He said that Churchill had given thought to Attlees minute, dictating a long
note on the subject which he has now marked to be brought up on January 14.
Seal reminded Churchill of this note on 13 January, and informed him of Attlees
enquiry. An undated note with no author named is attached to Seals 13 January
reminder, and it covers intelligence coordination, Defence statistical organization
and missions to North America. A series of amendments to the intelligence
portion of the document, elaborating the duties and powers of the intelligence
coordinator along the lines suggested by Seal are also included, but that is where
the trail ends. There is no indication of official consideration. The individual
responsible for collating the file holding these documents was presumably the
author of the notation: Nothing further on thismatter fades away.43
Churchills civil/intelligence aide, Major Desmond Morton, soon delivered the
next overture for intelligence centralization. Mortons suggestions were no doubt
born of his own experience of the muddled handling of intelligence within
Whitehall. He wrote Ismay on 27 August 1940 to complain that he was not
receiving from the service intelligence directorates the material that he had been
authorized to obtain earlier that month (see above, p.23). He had received much
material from SIS, the FO, and MEW; as well as the Ministry of Information,
and the BBC, but nothing from the military services.44 Ismay responded two
days later, saying that there had been a misunderstanding which involved
confusion over Mortons receipt of Secret Service Reportsthe military
services main source was SIS, so they had not felt it necessary to pass
information to Morton.45 That point had, in fact, already been communicated to
the JIC by the Admiralty and War Office intelligence departments when
Churchills directive was first sent out, but no one had seen fit to inform either
Morton or Ismay, thus delaying matters for most of a month.46
Influenced by this episode, Morton minuted his own recipe for rational
intelligence management to Churchill on 20 January 1941, only one week after
Seals last abortive communication on the subject. Morton began by noting that
You have already mentioned in Cabinet your desire to improve our
Intelligence. He continued to point out that British intelligence was primarily
flawed by its failure to collate and appreciate the available information. This
Morton ascribed to the overemphasis on the responsibility of Directors of
Intelligence Departments for organisation and gathering information. A Director
of Intelligence should be responsible chiefly for appreciating information. He
[instead] must form and give opinions on matters of fact. Morton went on to
note the too-rigid separation of intelligence from planning, and recommended as
a remedy the establishment of an Intelligence Executive (not a Chiefs of Staff
Subcommittee like the JIC) composed of a Chairman and Vice-Chairman from
the Ministry of Defence, and representatives from the interested services, the
FO, MEW and the Colonial Office. The Executive would report to the Minister of
Defence (Churchill), and be responsible for appreciating information available
on overseas events. The members of the Executive would be in permanent
session, with no other duties, and the Chair and his Vice would have full access
to Cabinet and COS papers. Morton concluded by saying that such a body, if it
proves successful, could form the nucleus of the Central Government
Intelligence Organisation.47
Churchill did not feel moved to accept this suggestion either, since Mortons
proposals came to nothing. The same held true in October 1942, when Morton
again brought up the matter, and re-submitted his minute of January 1941.
Regarding Churchills non-receipt of an Air Ministry intelligence report, Morton
said that the incident serves to bring up again the question of whether the present
organisation of Intelligence in general cannot be improved. I am not talking about
C but about something of wider scope. He reminded Churchill of his previous
minute on the subject, and attached a copy.48 Churchill merely replied to the
question with some apparent disbelief about there being no arrangement by
which all Intelligence of the Department is brought together, and to order
Morton to weed out telegrams of special interest or importance so as not to
burden [the PM] with too much.49 General Ismay was then minuted to ensure
that Churchill got a better service in intelligence telegrams, with Morton seeing
them and feeding them to the PM. This procedure was marked as now working
on 23 November 1942. More tedious drone work was thus the sole result of
Mortons repeated supplications.50
The impetus to effect some sort of consolidated direction of intelligence next
surfaced seriously with regard to the issue of SIS-SOE coordination. The
Security Service (MI5) proffered in March 1943 that the two overseas
clandestine services be combined with itself through a committee mechanism as
a means of reducing damaging competitive friction between them, but Churchill
personally quashed that idea. He wrote that the illusions of permanence held by
wartime departments like SOE should not be encouraged, and that he felt that
it would be a mistake at the present time to stir up all these pools. I do not think
that the kind of Committee you propose would be fruitful; better that the heads
of MI5, SIS and SOE meet monthly with Major Morton so that cases of friction
could be smoothed out and common action promoted.51
These meetings were held only twice, and the limitation of this set-up was
soon made clear. In a meeting of the Defence Committee on 2 August, the Chief
of the Imperial General Staff, General Sir Alan Brooke, strongly pointed out in
the PMs presence that a closer relationship was required not only between SOE
and the Chiefs of Staff but also between SOE and SIS. Only recently the Chiefs
of Staff had received through SIS information relating to the penetration by the
enemy of certain Resistance Groups in France. Brooke went on to stress that it
was wrong that this important information should reach the Chiefs of Staff in
this way. They should have received it from SOE themselves. He endorsed the
suggestion of the Chief of the Air Staff that SOE be more closely integrated with
the Chiefs of Staff organisation. In response,
THE PRIME MINISTER emphasised the immense value to the war effort
of stimulating resistance amongst the people of Europe. He recognised that
acts of rebellion against the Germans frequently resulted in bloody

reprisals, but the blood of the martyrs was the seed of the church, and the
result of these incidents had been to make the Germans hated as no other
race had ever been hated. There nothing must be done which would result
in the falling off of this most valuable means of harassing the enemy. He
agreed, however, that some closer link should be created between SOE and
the organisation under the Minister of Defence.
It was therefore agreed that the COS should be kept continually informed of
SOE activities and intentions, and that SOE views should be expressed in person
to the COS when their activities were under discussion.52
The COS followed this apparent Prime Ministerial injunction to harmonize the
overseas secret services with a report on the SOE organization on 30 September.
They urged forthrightly that they wanted the higher control and direction of SOE
transferred to them, acting in consultation with the Foreign Office. This would
be in accordance with the normal procedure for the strategical conduct of the war
on the high level. It would not involve the creation of any new machinery. The
proposal evidently did not meet with the PMs substantive support, but its
timeliness was underscored within three months when a major disaster came to
light which dramatically focused attention on the question of effective
intelligence management.53
The COS directed the JIC on 1 December 1943 to investigate the SOE effort
in Hollandand throughout Europedue to the receipt by the Air Ministry of
original information from two Dutch escapees indicating that SOEs Holland
network had been penetrated by the Germans since late 1942. This was the first
evidence of the German Englandspiel, the playing of captured SOE agents in
Holland by German counter-intelligence, owing in great part to the failure of
established SOE security procedures.54 More information came to light later that
day. The COS noted that [i]t appeared that SIS had had doubts for some time as
to the situation in Holland, and had issued warnings to SOE on the subject. The
Minister of Economic Warfare, Lord Selborne, countered that such warnings had
been received only recently. He also noted that when heavy Dutch casualties
arose in June 1943, parallel SOE and SIS enquiries had both been negative. SOE
then attributed the casualties to increased German night fighter operations
intercepting British clandestine aircraft carrying agents for insertion.55
The JIC report on their enquiry into the fiasco was considered by the COS on
3 January 1944. CIGS Brooke stated outright that the situation was so serious
that he felt that the Chiefs of Staff should again state their opinion that from the
military point of view it was desirable that the SIS and SOE should be brought
under one ministerial head. The Ministry of Defence was suited for that role,
but if difficulties arose from removing SIS from Foreign Office control, Brooke
wanted SOE to join SIS under the FO. Sir Hastings Ismay replied that since
Churchill had always taken a keen personal interest in these questions, it was
best that the COS view should be given to the PM before their consideration by
the Defence Committee or the War Cabinet. Ismay was thus directed to inform
the PM and Deputy PM accordingly.56
Ismay clearly told Churchill that the COS believed that the time [had] come
to make a fresh start and to find a radical solution to this troublesome problem.
They feel strongly that SOE and SIS should be under the same ministerial
control.57 This issue was further addressed by the Foreign Secretary, Anthony
Eden, who indicated that the JIC report was certainly most disquieting, and that
the matter needed to be fully gone into by Ministers. He did not approve of
SOE coming under the FO, however, since it allegedly lacked the resources and
personnel to direct it. The Ministry of Defence was Edens preferred home for
SOE, with day to day control by the Chiefs of Staff in consultation with [Eden
himself] only in respect of policy. The Foreign Secretary conceded that SOE
SIS relations had never been easy, but he remained unconvinced that
amalgamation was the solution. The two services roles were distinct, while SIS
was a small, professional service of long standing and proven capacity; SOE
was conversely a large, loose organisation improvised to meet war needs (one
official, the future Lord Gladwyn, described the FO as quite unduly suspicious
of SOE despite its war-winning potentialities if it were intelligently used).
Anthony Eden thus supported coordination under the Ministry of Defence, but
not necessarily full amalgamation; his reservations regarding the creation of a
single intelligence service echoed Churchills comments as War Secretary in
1920 (noted above, p.22).58 Clement Attlee then wrote Churchill to say that he
agreed with Eden.59
The Defence Committee eventually considered the JIC report on 14 January
1944, prior to which, on 11 January, Lord Selborne had circulated his own paper
concerning that report. Selbornes paper held that the JIC report revealed certain
grave misapprehensions on matters of fact which is not altogether surprising in
that the JIC normally have no contact with SOE, and since SOE was not itself
contacted for evidence specifically connected with the wider issues[the JIC
had] raised. While the Joint Planners were familiar with the method of COS
direction of SOE operations, they were not consulted by the JIC, and worse still,
SOE was in fact practically excluded from contact with the JIC as all
intelligence received by SOE from its own sources is, by charter, passed direct to
SIS, whose representative [C] attends JIC meetings as required.60
Selborne further noted that the JIC raised the issues of coordination with SIS,
the necessity for unification of intelligence and subversive activities and the
institution of a single system of clandestine communications. He observed
Churchills ruling in COS (43) 618 (O) that the SOE organisation [would]
preserve its integrity under the Minister of Economic Warfare; that the COS
recommendations for closer control through the submission to them of SOE
reports had been accepted (in COS [43] 240th Meeting of 7 October); that the
COS had not subsequently complained about the matter; and that no SOE officer
was permitted to sit with the COS. On this point I can only repeat that I have
throughout been anxious that SOE should be subject to the control of the COS,
and should furnish them with all the information they desire. He also stated
that the functions of SIS and SOE, separated by War Cabinet decision in June
1940, should be kept that way. He then concluded that SOE should have the
same relationship with the COS as the Armys commandos. If SOEs current
separation from the Ministry of Defence precluded this arrangement, he fully
supported placing SOE under the MoD with or without the Minister of
Economic Warfare, who could either act as the Minister of Defences Under
Secretary or be eliminated.61
At the 14 January Defence Committee meeting itself, a good deal of
discussion revolved around the issue of the control of SOE by the COS, with
Selborne stating that SOE should join the COS Committee itself. General Ismay
said that the COS would discourage the suggestion that their Committee be
enlarged to include SOE given permanent representation as a fourth service.
Ismay went on to say that in his personal opinion, many difficulties would
diminish if special operations came under military control through theatre
Commanders-in-Chief. Selborne agreed, but pointed out that this had indeed
been the case for some time. The Foreign Secretary then commented, saying that
the JIC and Selborne reports indicated an unresolvable conflict of evidence. He
then reiterated his objections to the amalgamation of SIS and SOE, but
wondered, however, whether the COS would like to put forward a plan for the
future organisation of SOE and for the relationship which it should have with
SIS. It has been seen above that in COS (44) 1st Meeting of 3 January, the COS
did in fact have such a plan, which they had stated directly to Ismaymandate
control of both organizations through the Ministry of Defence. Eden, Attlee and
Selborne had accepted that as a solution, albeit with differing degrees of
enthusiasm. Ismay, however, was now evidently not about to forget where his
first loyalty lay, since he replied to Eden that he felt that the COS would take
the view that this was a matter for Ministers, the Prime Minister in particular,
presumably. Ismay then took the initiative to define the sense of the [Defence]
Committee as being that the control of special operations should be
decentralised [sic] to Commanders-in-Chief. This point was duly recorded in the
Committees conclusions as being desirable in principle, and Churchill so
informed on 29 January. Exit organizational reform.62
Churchill was not prepared to alter this situation as the war drew to a close.
Lord Selborne counselled in October 1944 that a nucleus of SOE should be
continued after the war. The Secretary to the Cabinet, Sir Edward Bridges, said
that this suggestion raised the same question as arises about many inter-Service
organisations, particularly in the intelligence field; namely To Whom should
these organisations be responsible?this had also been the case concerning the
issue of a possible SIS-MI5 merger in June 1944 which went nowhere, largely
because of the militarys concerns about SIS answering to both the Foreign and
Home Secretaries, and about checks on security authorities (cf. the significance
of MI5s lack of arrest powers in Chapter 7, p. 189). Bridges went on to submit
that SOEs future had to be resolved to prevent the secret services developing on
divergent lines. This subtle call for timely decision was followed with the
observation that such a question could not be answered until Britains post-war
defence organization was decided. Would there be a full-blooded Ministry of
Defence, or just a Minister of Defence like Churchill? If the latter, current
arrangements permitted making such organizations responsible to him; if the
former, then the necessary machinery had to be arranged. Regarding the control
of SOE military functions for the duration of the war, the likelihood that MEW
would be wound up in the near future suggested that such control should be
exercised by the COS in close collaboration with the Foreign Office. The
necessary machinery could then be worked out between the FO and COS.63 This
analysis was sent to Churchill; the PM noted the minute, but gave no further
indication of his views.64
The Foreign Secretary soon weighed in with his own thoughts on 23
November. MEWs impending disbandment raised the issue of responsibility
for SOE. The war with Japan continued, while in liberated territories and in
neutral countries there [might] beuseful scope for a covert organisation to
further the policy of HM Government. Eden would therefore regret abandoning
all special operations machinery even after the war. His preference was to put
SOE activities and SIS under the same controlling head since only chaos would
result through two independent secret organizations working in foreign countries
during peacetime. The Foreign Secretary was evidently trying to profit from the
experience of clandestine chaos in wartime. He went on to say that as Foreign
Secretary, he was responsible for SIS and the Political Warfare Executives
propaganda work; he was also in his personal capacity responsible for MI5 (see
below, Chapter 7, p. 189). Eden therefore proposed assuming Selbornes
responsibility for SOE, and responsibility for administration and policy
concerning special operations.65 So much for Edens January argument about the
FO lacking the machinery or personnel to control SOE.
The Chiefs of Staff were provided with a copy of this minute, and they
reviewed and accepted its proposals provided that the FOs control of SOE was
temporary and in no way prejudice[d] the future control of either SOE or SIS,
both of which the Chiefs of Staff would prefer to see under the Ministry of
Defence; that SOE would preserve its own Head without being placed under
C; and that SOEs Head dealt directly with the COS on all operational
matters.66 These provisos were communicated to Eden and Selborne, and were
evidently accepted.67 Upon receipt of a 14 August 1945 report by an ad hoc
committee under the Chairman of the JIC regarding the future of SOE, the COS
noted that for the present the organisation could continue under the Foreign
Office.68 That had only come about, of course, because MEW was disbanded,
and actual SOE activities were winding down. Further movement on the question
of intelligence centralization progressed only after Churchills departure from the
Premiership, and Clement Attlees succession. As the man who had himself
pushed more than once for greater intelligence coordination, Attlee rapidly (31
August) approved the ad hoc reports recommendation that SIS and SOE should,
for the present, be placed under a common executive head, and that
arrangements should be made to appoint an Executive Head of the Secret
Service having separate Special Operations and Secret Intelligence branches with
common services; after the Defence Committee [i]nvited C and CD to
effect such measures of coordination as were practicable, it was subsequently
agreed with C that the part of SOE which was required by the Secret Service
should be merged into SIS effective 30 June 1946.69
Attlee had thus initiated within a month of taking office a course of action
designed to integrate intelligence activities, all in response to a single ad hoc
report from the Chairman of the JIC, later supported by a report from a
committee established under Sir Findlater Stewart to study the entire intelligence
establishment. This was in direct contrast to the fate of such proposals under
Churchill. The open documentation shows in unambiguous detail a multitude of
instances where Churchill received overture after overture throughout the war,
from the highest echelons of the Cabinet, the special services, the military, and
the civil service concerning the need to improve the coordination and structure of
Britains intelligence system. On no fewer than eighteen different occasions
between 194044, these recommendations, plans, concurrences and/or reminders
of plans were communicated to Churchillfour times by the Chiefs of Staff
(August 1943; September 1943; January 1944; November 1944); thrice by Attlee,
the Deputy Prime Minister (two in November 1940; one in January 1944); thrice
by Eric Seal, the PMs own Private Secretary (July 1940; November 1940; January
1941); twice by Desmond Morton, the PMs own intelligence functionary
(January 1941; October 1942); twice by Anthony Eden, the Foreign Secretary
(January 1944; November 1944); once by Lord Selborne, the Minister of
Economic Warfare, who was prepared to give up his position to effect change
(January 1944); once by MI5 (March 1943); once by the JIC (January 1944); and
once by the Secretary to the Cabinet, Sir Edward Bridges (October 1944). None
of these was to any avail. The inclination of the Prime Minister in power was
obviously of paramount importance to the form and control of British
intelligence. As the primary consumer of intelligence, the PM had the power to
fashion the system to his liking, with consequent ramifications for the efficiency
and effectiveness of the component services. This judgement is certainly contrary
to the dubiously reasoned and thinly documented theses of works such as Nigel
Wests Secret War, and Robert Marshalls All the Kings Men, both of which
strive to attribute the problems between SIS and SOE in particular to gratuitous
inter-service rivalry, and in the case of Marshall, even dark conspiracy.70 As
demonstrated by the events surrounding the 1943 failure in Holland detailed
above, one need not look to conspiracy or thoughtless competition when the
outstanding issue of command and control of SOE, as well as the unresolved
question of how best to coordinate that service with SIS at the highest levels of
the intelligence system, can be so clearly documented.
These problems persisted throughout the war, with the JIC proving an
inadequate mechanism for their resolution. This survey of Churchills preferred
method of intelligence management and its implicit drawbacks is therefore more

ambivalent than the portrait in the Official History, or in Christopher Andrews
works on the subject, among others. Those works characterize Churchills
relationship with intelligence as being a fundamentally positive one in light of
the PMs personal interest in such matters. His keen understanding of the
ULTRA windfall; his continual personal contact with intelligence officials; his
focus on intelligence in the Anglo-American alliance; and his reliance on
deception and intelligence in formulating military operations and strategy are all
considered to outweigh the relatively minor sins of an exaggerated faith in the
efficacy of sabotage and subversion, and some impetuousness in using
intelligence. Churchill is also credited with being a great backer of the JIC system
of intelligence coordination. This propensity for immersing himself in the
modern Great Game is further attributed to his Victorian social and military
background (which stressed the role of gamesmanship and espionage in Great
Power politics), to his openness to new technological innovations (such as
signals intelligence), and to Churchills personal style of executive leadership,
with its relative flair for balancing the requirements of the people, the military,
and the government. The Prime Ministers affinity for intelligence management
was thus a major component of his overall superior capacity for waging Total
War.71
While such portraits give the PM his due, they overlook a key fault emanating
from his personal style of intelligence management. Churchills resistance to the
numerous requests to initiate improvements in the coordination of the major
intelligence services, while doubtless stemming from his personal inclination to
be his own intelligence officer, was nevertheless largely responsible for the
limitations of the disjointed SIS-SOE relationship documented above. The PM
ironically set the stage for the very complications and rivalries between the
intelligence and sabotage services that he himself deplored (as a lamentable, but
perhaps inevitable, feature of our affairs), and which others like Nigel West
simply attribute to the services themselves.72 He steadfastly refused to act on all
proposals brought to him for refining the coordination and structuring of the
clandestine services. The ostensible excuse that such changes would cause
gratuitous and unworkable disruption strikes an unconvincing note given the real
shortcomings inherent in the accepted set-up. The additional argument that the
JIC (as strengthened by Churchill in 194041, and in contrast with the original,
weak version of the committee) offered sufficient centralization, coordination,
and general direction may have been borne out with regard to the formulation
and use of strategic intelligence assessments derived largely from ULTRA, but it
certainly remained to be demonstrated in the operational management of the
intelligence services themselves. The Holland disaster detailed by Lord Selborne
in January 1944 particularly underscored the obvious disparity between the JICs
relative success as a strategic assessment body, and its inadequate capacity for
giving direction. This lack of real JIC coordinating authority over the various
clandestine organizations throughout the war reflected the unresolved question
of how best to direct the various intelligence functions. It specifically contributed

to COS demands for direct military control of SIS-SOE operations in late 1943,
and for Ministry of Defence or Foreign Office control through the COS after the
Englandspiel revelations demonstrated SOEs practical exclusion from the JIC.
It may be accepted from Edward Thomass analysis that the strategic assessment
function was the apotheosis of the JIC system, but the consequence of this reality
for the issue of intelligence direction must also be recognized.73 The JIC by itself
simply did not have the executive power to order closer coordination between the
intelligence services (regarding the Holland disaster, they could merely raise the
issue of closer coordination, which no one but the COS seriously considered
anyway). Only Churchill as Minister of Defence could sanction change, and this
he would not do. As noted acerbically by SIS veteran Malcom Muggeridge, it
thus remained that [t]hough SOE and MI6 were nominally on the same side in
the war, they were, generally speaking, more abhorrent to one another than the
Abwehr was to either of them.74 The argument advanced most notably by
Ronald Lewin that Churchill deliberately attempted to control his propensity for
foisting his own strategic and institutional initiatives onto the war effort may
seem to explain the PMs non-interventionist stance in the organization of British
intelligence, but it lacks credence given the consistency and intensity of the
requests made of him for action. Certainly the lack of basic interchanges between
SIS and SOE as evidenced by the Englandspiel fiasco in Holland mobilized the
COS, JIC, and Lord Selborne to confront the issue of necessary change; and
Attlee made the convincing point as early as 1940 (although perhaps on partisan
grounds given Labours distrust of British intelligence) that the very importance
of efficient intelligence organization, first to the very survival of Britain, and
then to the overall war effort, demanded action. It moreover cannot be logically
argued that any response by Churchill to the repeated pleas of his chief
subordinates could be misconstrued as undue or frivolous interference; such
action would simply conform to their stated wishes.75
So while Churchills relative effectiveness as an intelligence-orientated
warlord is obvious, the problems stemming from his highly personal oversight
must be squarely faced. By directly making demands on the intelligence and
sabotage services as he was wont to do, he made them focus on their institutional
survival, thus sowing the seeds for disharmony as SIS and SOE, in particular,
wanted to be seen to achieve success individually in their spheres of operation. By
resisting attempts to integrate further the higher direction of SIS and SOE, he
ensured that the British intelligence community would remain more fragmented
and disjointed in its collective efforts than need have been the case. Without greater
coordination or integration, vital information was compartmentalized among the
competing services, and limited personnel resources were dissipated. In contrast
to later American efforts in Germany (see Chapter 6), SOE and SIS resources were
not mobilized toward mutually supporting operations, and this also negated the
possibility of more coherent liaison with the military. Churchills reservations
about the differing characters of SOE and SIS activities notwithstanding, the
administrative centralization of the British secret services could have achieved

valuable dividends. Churchills direction of intelligence therefore had a
considerable effect on how the British intelligence bodies each waged their
particular brand of warfare with little regard for their ostensibly sister services,
and on the example provided for OSS/London to follow in the early days of the
Anglo-American intelligence partnership.
NOTES
1. Consider Stanley P.Lovell to Ned Buxton, December 1944, p. 3, Entry 180, Reel
118, R[ecord]G[roup] 226, US National Archives and Records Administration,
Washington, DC [hereafter NARA]: Since the days of Queen Elizabeth Great
Britain has maintained her Secret Intelligence Service. It was founded by a great
Englishman, greatly ignored by History, Sir Francis Walsingham. Sir Francis it was
who gave the masculine Elizabeth advance intelligencewhich greatly help to
explain the flowering of England under the Virgin Queen. As we looked over the
world scene we saw the British Secret Agent as a real power in the world. We
noted that to likely British youth a career in Secret Intelligence was as noble and
fine a future as a talented youngster could pick. Why was this so? The answer is
that in the generation between World Wars I and II the minds of Britons had been
dramatically touched. Touched by Somerset Maughan [sic] in his classic
Ashenden, the British Agent, by Lord Tweedsmuir (John Buchan) in The
Twenty-Nine Steps [sic] and scores of other storiesuntil the life-long or life-short
profession of British Agent appealed to Britons as the acme of patriotism,
adventure and reward; see also William J.Morgan, The OSS and I (New York:
W.W.Norton, 1957), p. 20; Thomas Powers, The Man who kept the Secrets:
Richard Helms and the CIA (New York: Alfred A.Knopf, 1979), p. 21; Patrick
Howarth, Intelligence Chief Extraordinary: The Life of the Ninth Duke of Portland
(London: The Bodley Head, 1986), pp. 111, 114.
2. Andrew, Secret Service, pp. 159.
3. See the PROs HD 3 Foreign Office: Permanent Under Secretarys Department:
Correspondence and Papers series of recordssee Louise Atherton, TOP SECRET:
An Interim Guide to Recent Releases of Intelligence Records at the Public Record
Office (London: PRO Publications, 1993), especially pp. 713, 1620, 301.
4. David French, Spy Fever in Britain, 19001915, Historical Journal 21, 2 (1978),
pp. 35570; David Trotter, The Politics of Adventure in the Early British Spy
Novel, Intelligence and National Security 5, 4 (October 1990), pp. 3254; Nicholas
P.Hiley, Decoding German Spies: British Spy Fiction 19081918, Intelligence
and National Security 5, 4 (October 1990), pp. 5577; on the impact of Erskine
Childerss The Riddle of the Sands, see Maldwin Drummond, The Riddle (London:
Nautical Books, 1985), pp. 153201.
5. French, Fever, pp. 35570; Nicholas P.Hiley, The Failure of British Counter-
Espionage Against Germany, 19071914, Historical Journal 28, 4 (1985), pp.
83562; F.H.Hinsley, et al., British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its
Influence on Strategy and Operations, Vol. I (London: HMSO, 2nd impression,
1986), p. 16; see also Nicholas P.Hiley, The Failure of British Espionage Against
Germany, 19071914, Historical Journal 26, 4 (1983), pp. 86789.
6. Hinsley, I, pp. 1618.
7. Ibid., pp. 4851, 556; see also Eunan OHalpin, Financing British Intelligence:
the Evidence up to 1945, in Robertson (ed.), Approaches, pp. 202, 21112; for a
portrait of inter-war British intelligence, see Andrew, Secret Service, especially pp.
33959, 376411, Wark, Ultimate, pp. 21, 47, 232.
8. Hinsley, I, p. 87; on the state of SIS, see Howarth, Chief, pp. 11114; M.R.D.Foot,
Resistance: An Analysis of European Resistance to Nazism, 19401945 (London:
Eyre Methuen, 1976), pp. 1345; for more caustic observations, Hugh Trevor-
Roper, The Philby Affair: Espionage, Treason, and Secret Services (London:
William Kimber, 1968), pp. 39, 42, 47, 69; see Andrew, Secret Service, pp. 44863
on intelligence mobilization in general; see also Christopher Andrew, The
Mobilization of British Intelligence for the Two World Wars, in N.F.Dreiszinger
(ed.), Mobilization for Total War (Waterloo: Wilfred Laurier University Press,
1981), pp. 107, 10910; see also Christopher Andrew, F.H.Hinsley and the
Cambridge moles: two patterns of intelligence recruitment, in Richard Langhorne
(ed.), Diplomacy and Intelligence during the Second World War: Essays in honour
of F.H.Hinsley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 313,
concerning the recruitment of university graduates; for German perceptions of SIS,
see Walter Schellenberg, Invasion 1940: The Nazi Invasion Plan for Britain
(London: St Ermins Press, 2000), pp. 12144.
9. Hinsley, I, pp. 3643; most of the pre-war minutes and memoranda of the JIC are
now available at the PRO in CAB 56; early wartime minutes and memoranda are in
CAB 81.
10. Edward Thomas, The Evolution of the JIC System Up to and During World War
II, in Christopher Andrew and Jeremy Noakes (eds), Intelligence and
International Relations, 19001945 (Exeter: Exeter University Publications, 1987),
pp. 22032.
11. Beaumont-Nesbitt to Ismay, 9 February 1940; Ismay to Colonel Petibon, 14
February 1940; both in CAB 21/1425, PRO; on MIR, see also Nigel West, MI6:
British Secret Intelligence Service Operations, 190945 (London: Panther, 1985),
pp. 11516.
12. Beaumont-Nesbitt to Ismay, 3 March 1940; on the Cadogan committee, see G.
Barnard to Ismay, 2 April 1940; both in CAB 21/1425, PRO; cf. Andrew, Secret
Service, pp. 4716.
13. Ismay to Beaumont-Nesbitt, 5 March 1940, CAB 21/1425, PRO.
14. Ismay to [Cabinet] Secretary, 8 March 1940; Bridges to Ismay, 12 March 1940;
Ismay to COS, 29 March 1940, which notes the JIC proposing the ISPB in the
paper COS (40) 271, both in CAB 21/1425, PRO.
15. Ismay to COS, 29 March 1940.
16. Ibid.; on Menzies (pronounced as Meng-eez), see Charles Whiting, The Battle for
Twelveland: An account of Anglo-American intelligence operations within Nazi
Germany, 19391945 (London: Transworld, 1975), p. 23, and Troy, Donovan, p.
32; West, MI6, pp. 1414; Andrew, Secret Service, pp. 3434, 439; the designation
C was derived from the name of the first CSS, Mansfield Gumming; see Andrew,
Secret Service, p. 73; Hinsley, I, p. xi.
17. Churchill minute, 2 April 1940, CAB 21/1425, PRO.
18. G.Barnard to Ismay, 2 April 1940, on Hankeys reaction, CAB 21/1425, PRO; see
Hinsley, I, pp. 934, on ISPB.
19. JIC (40) 36 (also as COS [40] 305 [JIC]), CAB 21/1425, PRO.
20. Registry form regarding the DCOS (40) 19th Mtg, 30 April 1940, CAB 21/1425,
PRO.
21. See also Hinsley, I, pp. 934, and Wesley K.Wark, Beyond Intelligence: The
Study of British Strategy and the Norway Campaign, 1940, in Michael Graham
Fry (ed.), Power, Personalities and Policies: Essays in Honour of Donald Cameron
Watt (London: Frank Cass, 1992), pp. 23840.
23. Christopher Andrew, Churchill and Intelligence, Intelligence and National
Security 3, 3 (July 1988), pp. 18193; Hinsley, I, p. 160; the role of SIS in the JIC
is also acknowledged in the American Liaison Sub-Committee of the War Cabinet,
AL (41) 1st Mtg, 29 May 1941 (noting the presence besides the service intelligence
departments of representatives of other Departments particularly concerned with
intelligence), in CAB 99/9, PRO; see also COS (40) 932 (Final) of 14 November
1940, PREM 4/97/11, PRO, which outlines the intelligence structure, including the
place of the officer in charge of the SIS within the JIC; on Hankeys review, see
Hinsley, I, pp. 912, and Wark, Beyond, in Fry (ed.), Power, p. 239.
24. Churchill to Ismay, for Menzies, 5 August 1940; Ismay passed on the verbatim
substance of Churchills pugnacious directive to Menzies that same day, adding a
PS that he believed that Morton has already told you the Prime Ministers wishes:
but thought it better to let you have his exact minute; on 21 August, someone
informed Colonel Jacob of the Secretariat that no reply from Menzies had been
received, although he may have rendered a report direct to Major Morton, and
enquiring whether to remind Menzies; when asked that same day whether he
wished any further action to be taken on the question, Ismay replied, No. This is
Mortons pigeon!; all in CAB 120/746, PRO; cf. Hinsley, I, p. 295, which quotes
only the first paragraph of the 5 August minute to Menzies (described as to
General Ismay alone) as an illustration of Churchills irritation with collective
wisdom.
25. Draft Paper on the History of the Photo Reconnaissance Unit, n.d., AIR 40/1816,
PRO.
26. See Hinsley, I, pp. 2630, 27482, 4969; Andrew, Mobilization, p. 106;
on destruction of SIS networks, see M.R.D.Foot, Was SOE Any Good?, Journal
of Contemporary History 16, 1 (January 1981), p. 172, and M.R.D.Foot, A
Comparison of SOE and OSS, in Robertson (ed.), p. 156.
27. Hinsley, I, p. 20; Peter Gudgin, Military Intelligence: The British Story (London:
Arms and Armour, 1989), p. 53; Andrew, Secret Service, pp. 25960.
28. Hinsley, I, pp. 54, 1089, 48895; Andrew, Secret Service, pp. 44951; Gordon
Welchman, The Hut Six Story: Breaking the Enigma Codes (New York: McGraw-
Hill, 1982), pp. 1115; Jean Stengers, Enigma, the French, the Poles and the
British, 19311940, in Andrew and Dilks (eds), Missing, pp. 10137; Hugh Sebag-
Montefiore, Enigma: The Battle for the Code (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson,
2000).
29. Andrew, Secret Service, pp. 4489, 486; Welchman, Six, pp. 92, 128, 160.
31. Howarth, Chief, p. 144, quotes Cavendish-Bentinck of the JIC as saying that
Churchill had a tendency to create his own intelligence; cf. Robert Cecil, Cs
War, Intelligence and National Security 1, 2 (May 1986), pp. 17980.
32. Cs view is recorded in the OSS/Washington report Coordination of Intelligence
Functions and the Organization of Secret Intelligence in the British Intelligence
System, July 1945, p. 39, held in the Sir William Stephenson File, Folder 78, Box
120B, William J.Donovan Papers, US Army Military History Institute (USAMHI),
Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, Pennsylvania; Arthur B.Darling MS, The Central
Intelligence Agency: An Instrument of Government, to 1950, Vol. I, DCI
Historical Series, December 1950, pp. 2930, and Ludwell Lee Montague Ms,
General Walter Bedell Smith as Director of Central Intelligence, October 1950
February 1953, Vol. I: The Essential Background, DCI Historical Series,
December 1971, p. 18, both in RG 263, NARA, each identify this report as being
written by the Deputy G-2 12th US Army Group, William Harding Jackson, after a
1945 trip to England to study the British intelligence system; Montague cites a
December 1969 letter he received from Jackson to note that Foreign Secretary
Anthony Eden was Jacksons main source of information; Eden was at that time the
minister responsible for SIS through the Foreign Office, and responsible in his
personal capacity for MI5 (see Chapter 7).
33. See also Malcom Muggeridge, Chronicles of Wasted Time, Vol. 2: The Infernal
Grove (London: Collins, 1973), p. 128, and Anthony Verrier, Through the Looking
Glass: British Foreign Policy in an Age of Illusions (New York: W.W. Norton,
1983), pp. 258, 40.
34. Hinsley, I, pp. 2778; see Wark, Beyond, in Fry (ed.), Power, pp. 2404.
35. Quotations from Andrew, Secret Service, pp. 4756.
36. See David Stafford, The Detonator Concept: British Strategy, SOE and European
Resistance After the Fall of France, Journal of Contemporary History 10, 2 (April
1975), pp. 185217; David Stafford, Britain and European Resistance, 19401945:
A Survey of the Special Operations Executive, with Documents (London:
Macmillan, 1980), pp. 2, 1049; J.R.M.Butler, Grand Strategy, Vol. II: September
1939June 1941 (London: HMSO, 1957), pp. 21217, 344, 40815; J.M.A.Gwyer,
Grand Strategy, Vol. III: June 1941August 1942, part i (London: HMSO, 1964),
pp. 2148; W.N.Medlicott, The Economic Blockade, Vol. I (London: HMSO and
Longmans, Green, 1952), pp. 259, 33, 43, 47, 4201; see also the Official History
by Foot, SOE; David Reynolds, Churchill and the British Decision to fight on in
1940: right policy, wrong reasons, in Langhorne (ed.), Diplomacy, pp. 1467,
David Stafford, Britain Looks at Europe, 1940: Some Origins of SOE, Canadian
Journal of History 10, 1 (April 1975), pp. 23948; David Stafford, Secret
Operations versus Secret Intelligence in World War II: The British Experience, in
Timothy Travers and Christon Archer (eds), Men at War: Politics, Technology and
Innovation in the Twentieth Century (Chicago: Precedent, 1982), pp. 120, 1289;
Brian Bond (ed.) Chief of Staff: The Diaries of Lieutenant-General Sir Henry
Pownall, Vol. II: 19401944 (London: Leo Cooper, 1974), pp. 237; Cecil, Cs,
p. 176.
37. Note by Lord Privy Seal, via PM for Ismay, 5 November 1940; L.C.Hollis to
A.M.R. Topham, 24 November 1940; both in PREM 4/97/11, PRO; cf. Hinsley, I,
pp. 2916, on the issue of intelligence centralization; Hinsley, I, p. 291 also
erroneously attributes the origin of the questions about the intelligence service, and
about who was responsible for it, to ChurchillCOS (40) 932 of 14 November is
cited, even though this document clearly states that the questions originated with
the Lord Privy Seal; Andrew, Secret Service, p. 485, repeats this; see also Thomas,
JIC, in Andrew and Noakes (eds), International, p. 233, regarding the presumed
dearth of alternatives to the JIC system of intelligence coordination.
38. COS (40) 932 (Final), 14 November 1940, PREM 4/97/11, PRO.
39. Hollis to Topham, 24 November 1940, PREM 4/97/11, PRO.
40. Attlee to PM, 28 November 1940, PREM 4/97/11, PRO.
41. Seal to PM, 25 July 1940, PREM 4/97/11, PRO.
42. Seal to PM, 22 November 1940, PREM 4/97/11, PRO.
43. Topham to Seal, 7 January 1941; Seal to Topham, 7 January 1941 (this is the
document with the Nothing further notation); Seal to PM, 13 January 1941,
with attachment and amendments, on 10 Downing Street letterhead; all in PREM 4/
97/11, PRO; see Andrew, Secret Service, p. 485, which mentions that Churchill
was at this time carefully considering Intelligence and Secret Service control.
44. Morton to Ismay, 27 August 1940, CAB 120/746, PRO.
45. Ismay to Morton, 29 August 1940, CAB 120/746, PRO.
46. Lt-Col Edwards to DNI, DMI and ACAS(I), 29 August 1940; P.R.Chambers to
Edwards, 5 August 1940; Maj.-Gen. Beaumont-Nesbitt to Edwards, 9 August
1940; all in CAB 120/746, PRO.
47. Morton to PM, 20 January 1941, PREM 4/97/11, PRO.
48. Morton to PM, 30 October 1942; Morton to PM, 3 November 1942; both in PREM
4/97/11, PRO.
49. Churchill to Morton, 1 November 1942, PREM 4/97/11, PRO.
50. Churchill to Ismay, 5 November 1942, with handwritten notation of 23 November,
PREM 4/97/11, PRO.
51. Hinsley, II, pp. 1417; F.H.Hinsley and C.A.G.Simkins, British Intelligence in the
Second World War, Vol. IV: Security and Counter-intelligence (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 1735; for a source of the friction, see also
COS (43) 142 (O), 20 March 1943, CAB 80/68, PRO (the SOE Directive for
1943), which states that the requirements of SIS should in general be accorded
priority over your own operations in western Europe; the July 1945 OSS report by
Jackson, Coordination of Intelligence Functions, Donovan Papers, USAMHI notes
that the lack of cooperation between SIS and SOE was a notable instance of failure
in the British system (p. 55), and that the coordination between the secret
intelligence agencies andthe Special Operations Executivehas been sporadic
and undirected (p. 65); see also Stafford, Secret, p. 133; WO 193/624, PRO
contains a series of OctoberNovember 1942 memoranda pertaining to the
appointment of Col E.H.L.Beddington from the MO Directorate as a link between
SIS and SOE and co-ordinate their work with general Staff policy; although his
charter has been weeded, it is shown that SIS and SOE would equally share the
cost of his salary.
52. Extract from DO (43) 7th Mtg, 2 August 1943; F.H.Hinsley, et al., British
Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations,
Vol. III, Part 1 (London: HMSO, 1984), p. 462, cites a copy of this document held
in CAB 69/5 without giving details of its contents.
53. COS (43) 594 (O), 30 September 1943, CAB 80/75; the background of this report
can be traced in COS (42) 150th Mtg, 14 May 1942, CAB 79/20, and in COS (42)
172nd Mtg, 8 June 1942, CAB 79/21; see also the extract of COS (43) 180th Mtg
(O), 4 August 1943, Minute 5, WO 193/624; all in PRO.
54. COS (43) 293rd Mtg, 1 December 1943, CAB 79/88, PRO; on the Englandspiel,
see H.J.Giskes, London Calling North Pole (London: William Kimber, 1953), pp.
39136, 2023; Lauren Paine, The Abwehr: German Military Intelligence in World
War II (London: Robert Hale, 1984), pp. 13949.
55. COS (43) 294th Mtg, 1 December 1943, both in CAB 79/88; see also E.I.C.Jacob
to Deputy Prime Minister, 1 December 1943, CAB 120/827; all in PRO.
56. COS (44) 1st Mtg, 3 January 1944 on JIC (43) 517 (O), SOE Operations in Europe,
CAB 79/89, PRO.
57. Ismay to PM, 5 January 1944, CAB 120/827, PRO.
58. Eden to PM, 5 January 1944, CAB 120/827, PRO; Gladwyn view from Lord
Gladwyn, The Memoirs of Lord Gladwyn (New York: Weybright and Talley,
1972), p. 103.
59. Ismay to Deputy Prime Minister, 3 January 1944; Attlee to PM, 6 January 1944, both
in CAB 120/827, PRO.
60. DO (44) 2, 11 January 1944, SOE Operations in EuropeNote by Minister of
Economic Warfare, CAB 69/6, PRO.
61. Ibid.; JIC chairman Cavendish-Bentinck reiterates the need for SIS-SOE
coordination in Howarth, Chief, pp. 1745; Foot, Resistance, p. 265, notes that SIS
handled SOE ciphers during the Dutch Englandspiel.
62. DO (44) 2nd Mtg, 14 January 1944, CAB 69/6; L.C.Hollis to PM, 29 January
1944, CAB 120/827; both in PRO.
63. Bridges to PM, 25 October 1944, CAB 120/827, PRO; June 1944 SIS-MI5 proposals,
Hinsley and Simkins, IV, pp. 1758.
64. G.B.Baker to Maj.-Gen. Jacob, 26 October 1944, CAB 120/827, PRO.
65. Eden to PM, 23 November 1944, Annex I to COS (44) 381st Mtg (O), CAB 79/83,
PRO.
66. COS (44) 381st Mtg (O), Minute 6, 27 November 1944, Confidential Annex, CAB
79/83, PRO.
67. L.C.Hollis to PM, 4 December 1944, CAB 120/827, PRO.
68. COS (45) 198th Mtg, 14 August 1945, CAB 79/37, PRO.
69. Ismay to PM (Attlee), 14 August 1945; Ismay to PM, 27 August 1944, suggesting
that the Defence Committee meet on the subject of SOEs future, marked
Approved CRA 27.8.45, both in CAB 120/827; DO (45) 4th Mtg, 31 August
1945, CAB 69/7; COS (45) 289th Mtg, 27 December 1945, CAB 79/42; COS (46)
58th Mtg, 11 April 1946, CAB 79/47; all in PRO; the ad hoc report was
memorandum COS (45) 504 (O), not currently available in the PRO.
70. Nigel West, Secret War: The Story of SOE, Britains Wartime Sabotage
Organisation (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1992), pp. 26, 24654; Robert
Marshall, All the Kings Men: The Truth Behind SOEs Greatest Wartime Disaster
(London: Collins, 1988), effectively discredited by Mark Seamans review in
Intelligence and National Security 4, 1 (January 1989), pp. 198201.
71. See Hinsley, I, p. 296; F.H.Hinsley, Churchill and Special Intelligence, in Robert
Blake and William Roger Louis (eds), Churchill (New York: W.W.Norton, 1993),
pp. 40812, Andrew, Secret Service, pp. 4856; Andrew, Churchill and
Intelligence, pp. 18193; see also Thomas, JIC, in Andrew and Noakes (eds),
International, p. 233, and Stafford, Secret, pp. 1313; on the Great Game and
Total War, see David Jablonsky, Churchill, The Great Game and Total War
(London: Frank Cass, 1991), pp. 1223, 2943, 5665, 736, 84189.
72. See Churchill to Ismay, 10 February 1944, CAB 120/827, PRO, where he describes
the warfare between SOE and SIS as lamentable; see also Stafford, Secret, p.
133; Stafford, Resistance, pp. 86, 204; cf. West, Secret War, pp. 24654.
73. Cf. Thomas, JIC, pp. 2323.
74. Muggeridge, Chronicles, p. 174; the Abwehr was the German Intelligence Service.
75. Cf. Hinsley, Churchill, in Blake and Louis (eds), Churchill, pp. 40812, on the
issue of general direction; see also Ronald Lewin, Churchill as Warlord (London:
B.T. Batsford, 1973), pp. 3, 434, 567, 735, 1323, 2656, and John Charmley,
Churchill: The End of Glory: A Political Biography (Toronto: Macfarlane, Walter
and Ross, 1993), p. 505.
2
The Genesis of OSS/London, and the British
Dimension
MI6s Malcom Muggeridge recalled Americans in wartime espionage as being

like innocent girls from a finishing-school anxious to learn the seasoned demi-
mondaine ways of the old practitionersin this case the legendary British Secret
Service Alas, as Muggeridge would have it, the period of tutelage lasted all
too short a time before the first feeling of awe and respect soon evaporated,
and the students learned all there was to know about the espionage game.1
Matters were not quite so simple in reality, however, at least during the war.
William Donovans organization was in fact firmly pinned between two
symbiotic priorities throughout 194143: the need to establish itself in the eyes
of American authorities, and the requirement to attract support from British
services which themselves sought assurances of OSS permanence and viability.
The British intelligence system outlined in Chapter 1 played a defining role in
the resolution of this dilemma. Since OSS was hampered less by its relative
inexperience than it was stymied by the US militarys luke-warm support in
Europe, the confused jostling for bureaucratic survival made OSS that much
more dependent on British support. This in turn made OSS particularly subject to
the British systems fragmentation as each OSS component seized upon a
relationship with its opposite number. The American militarys power over OSS
thus did more to fuse OSS with its British cousins than all the club lunches
between Anglo-American intelligence patricians ever did. OSS bureaucratic
insecurity accordingly proved more significant than its operational inexperience
in defining the character of wartime Anglo-American intelligence relations.2
Surveying the origins of Wild Bill Donovans intelligence organization
invariably leads to his early counterpart, William Little Bill Stephenson,
especially as their characters and past experiences were quite similar. Each had a
good war during 191418, Stephenson as a highly decorated Canadian fighter
ace, Donovan as a highly decorated infantry officer whose aggression won him his
colourful nickname. Each achieved post-war wealth, Stephenson as a financier
and businessman, Donovan as a Wall Street lawyer. Significantly, each moved in
the tightly-knit circles of money and power which constituted the American and
British political establishments, making them ideal servants for their
governments.3
Stephenson was duly appointed to the SIS post of Chief, British Security
Coordination (BSC) in the United States in June 1940, in part to smooth the way
for British security and intelligence activities in North America through personal
liaison. Claims advancing a more glamorous and seminal role for Stephenson in
the Anglo-American partnership, and the origins of US intelligence, have little
substantive evidence to support them. They originated for the most part in
Stephensons impaired post-war memory, and in the tales of hagiographers.4
What is certain, however, is that Stephensons service as an observer in the
British effort to woo the Americans was paralleled by the manner in which
Donovan was also used by President Franklin Roosevelt to assess Britains
chances against Germany, in part through the use of links with British
intelligence officials. After journeying to London in July 1940, and meeting
leading figures in SIS and SOE, Donovan returned to communicate to Roosevelt
and the American public that Britain could, and would, fight on. Donovans
conclusions, emanating from a Republican, were no doubt expected by the
Democratic president, and designed merely to provide an ostensibly objective
and non-partisan source of public support for the Presidents overly cautious
efforts to help Britain as a neutral; but they also opened up possibilities for the
British. Donovan was now on the British bandwagon, weaned on contacts with
the legendary masters of British intelligence. He was thus a natural target for
suggestions that America cultivate its own intelligence sources in order to further
its national interests. By so doing he would confirm the British assessments of
the Nazi threat to civilization, and therefore to Britain and America in equal
measure.5
The only scholarly debate concerns the source of these suggestions, and their
role in the genesis of Donovans organization. Stephenson partisans credit Little
Bill for nurturing his new relationship with his soul-mate, Donovan, throughout
the autumn of 1940. Stephenson was particularly instrumental in arranging a
December trip by Donovan throughout the Middle East and the Balkans for a
tutorial on British strategy (that of closing a ring around the periphery of Europe,
bomb ing, and subversive warfare). The ensuing report by Donovan, his
concomitant enthusiasm for Britains intelligence and war efforts, and his
appointment as a Coordinator of Information (COI) in July 1940, are thus
presumed to have enjoyed an exclusive causal relationship, thanks largely to
Stephenson. Another view is that the good offices of British Naval Intelligence
officials were as equally, and perhaps more importantly, involved in the origins
of American intelligence as were Stephenson and SIS.6
The documentation in fact clearly supports a combination of these views:
British Naval Intelligence played the most important role of the two in originally
articulating the actual form of a US intelligence service; Stephenson and BSC
apparently helped to cultivate Donovans interest in intelligence, and provided
assistance during the subsequent early days of COI/OSS. In direct response to a
personal request from Donovan, Commander Ian Fleming communicated some
suggestions concerned with the obtaining of intelligence through United States
THE GENESIS OF OSS/LONDON 43
sources and the cooperation of US Intelligence Services with our own on 9 June
1941 in his capacity as assistant to the Director of British Naval Intelligence (DNI),
Rear-Admiral John Godfrey. Although they were submitted privately, they
were first vetted by Godfrey, with an information copy to Stephenson. While
naturally stressing that none of the suggestions concerning SIS could be acted
upon without prior consultation with Mr Stephenson, or without the full
concurrence of his chief [Menzies], Fleming was their sole originator. He
particularly mooted the possibility that a suitable representative of the US SIS
should be sent to London forthwith for discussions with CSS London, and it will
probably be necessary to form a small US SIS mission in London.7 Stephenson
denied in 1969 that Fleming had had anything to do with the idea of an American
intelligence organization, calling the portrait in Donald McLachlans Room 398
(which reproduces portions of the Fleming memo without archival source) a
pack of nonsense. He further claimed that Dick Ellis of BSC could confirm that
Godfrey would have been horrified at the thought of Fleming being so
engaged, and that Ellis himself was a key source on the establishing of US
intelligence.9 Elliss citation for the US Legion of Merit, however, clearly states
that it was only during the period from 1 January 1942 to early 1943 that Ellis
served as BSC-COI liaison, assisting in the firm establishment and growth of
the Coordinator of Information, and in laying the foundation for an American
counterpart of SIS.10
In a report on his observations of American intelligence efforts at that time,
Godfrey offered more detail on the specifics of British influence in the creation of
COI:
In cooperation with Mr StephensonColonel Donovan was persuaded to

increase his personal interest in Intelligence, and details of how US
Intelligence could be improved in the common cause were worked out in
collaboration with him and certain other senior officials of the
government. The question was also discussed with the President direct, and
Colonel Donovans qualifications as Coordinator of Intelligence were
advocated to Mr Roosevelt.
Finally, a memorandum conceiving a very large scale, and in many
respects novel Intelligence Organisation was prepared by Colonel Donovan
for the Foreign Secretary [sic; Godfrey is referring to the Secretary of
State], the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War This was
approved by them, and subsequently Colonel Donovan was offered by the
President, and accepted, the post of Coordinator of Intelligence [sic;
Godfrey means of Information]. It is too early to say how closely Colonel
Donovans duties will follow those proposed in his memorandum, but it is
understood that they will cover a very wide field, that his finances will be
met from a secret vote, and that he will be responsible to the President
direct.
Colonel Donovan has been supplied with memoranda on a great variety

of aspects of intelligence and he has been offered any degree of
collaboration he may require with British Intelligence Organisations. Mr
Stephenson will continue to work in the closest cooperation with him11
The overall agenda and intent of British officialdom is clear: cultivate Donovan,
and get the Americans to establish some sort of intelligence organ as a first step
toward a complete mobilization of American resources in the common cause.
Stephenson was just one of a number of British contacts designed to point
Donovan in the right direction. British Naval Intelligence was certainly another
key player, being particularly instrumental in helping to define the necessities of
an American intelligence service with the vital attribute of working in
partnership with its British counterpart through a mission in London. Once COI
was formed on 11 July 1941, Stephenson and BSC then played a substantive role
in developing the specific contacts required by the Americans for creating their
unit from scratch.12
Donovans 10 June 1941 Memorandum of Establishment of Service of
Strategic Information indirectly referred to by Godfrey thus bears the hallmarks
of British guidance flavoured with Donovans own proposals born of enthusiastic
brainstorming rather than experience. The memo lectures the reader at the
beginning that [s]trategy, without information upon which it can rely, is
helpless. Likewise, information is useless unless it is intelligently directed to the
strategic purpose. It goes on to state that the US lacked a service for collecting
and analysing strategic information. With much relevant data scattered
throughout the government, Donovan argued that it was imperative that some
organization be formed to collect (at home and abroad), collate, analyse
expertly, and disseminate such information. He also stressed the idea of the
proposed organization participating in psychological warfare in close
connection with intelligence. This body would be directed by a Coordinator of
Information answering directly to the President as Commander-in-Chief to aid
him in his military and operational decisions.13
The memo explicitly stressed the need for an information conduit direct to the
President embodying the means for gathering the requisite data overseas, and
directing its efforts to the obvious hostile target, all under the supervision of
Britains star pupil in these matters. It was nevertheless long on what was needed,
and a little vague on how exactly the mechanics of such an organization could be
mobilized and made to function. COI was intended chiefly as a rough
counterpart to the BSC in that it was orientated toward both secret intelligence
and coordination. The organization would accordingly grow along the
following haphazard lines during 194143: COIs initial priorities upon its
establishment on 11 July 1941 involved nailing down spheres of operation and
securing sufficient budgetary funding. Donovan hoped to match a strong research
and analytical component with branches devoted to procuring intelligence (SA/B),
and executing subversive activities (SA/G, later SA/H). Establishing these
embryonic branches in Washington dominated the first six months of COIs

existence, during which time Donovan pressed for definite areas of the war effort
in which COI might operate. Donovan originally hoped to be involved in
activities beyond the scope of subversion and psychological warfare, but such
proposals were so general and open-ended that COI immediately encountered
resistance and hostility from other government departments who felt encroached
upon. This hostility, combined with internal conflict over controlling propaganda
activities, prompted Roosevelt to split off COIs White propaganda arm as the
Office of War Information, to remove Donovan from serving the President
directly, and to rename Donovans unit the Office of Strategic Services under
authority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 13 June 1942. This direct subordination
to the military did not stop the US Army and Navy from seeking to edge out
Donovan from what they considered their exclusive preserve to wage war for the
United States. OSS involvement in active intelligence collection was particularly
downplayed, leaving the organization mainly to oversee the as yet unfulfilled
promise of guerrilla warfare and subversion.14
Serving the military became the prime objective of OSS in its desire to
establish itself more firmly in the US military hierarchy, and the November 1942
invasion of North Africa (TORCH) particularly highlighted the potential of OSS
to serve theatre commanders. The growth of OSS therefore proceeded at a
gradual pace which essentially mirrored that of US military operations. As the
American military presence solidified in the Mediterranean and elsewhere, OSS
sought to establish its own in-theatre missions, and to be more fully incorporated
into the local military structure. The creation of OSS missions in London, Cairo,
and Algiers therefore reflected the military context of OSS evolution through
194243, with the invasion of Italy giving further opportunity for OSS to follow
the expanding American military presence in Europe. Such missions were
obviously the means by which OSS hoped to secure a place in decisive military
operations as American participation in the war gathered momentum. The
ultimate decision to settle on a fixed date for launching the invasion of western
Europe from England in 1944 further underscored the importance of the OSS/
London mission. This was particularly fitting given Londons early emergence as
the outstation which capitalized upon Donovans contacts with the British, and
which eventually did much to secure for Donovan a degree of security with the
American military establishment.15
COI had rapidly appointed a representative to the British capital in October
1941.16 Since Roosevelt had assigned to Donovans organization the
responsibility for the collection, analysis, correlation and dissemination of
information relevant to national security, the President notified Winston
Churchill that [i]n order to facilitate the carrying out of the work of the
Coordinator with respect to Europe and the occupied countries, he had
authorized Colonel Donovan to send a small staff to London.17 The head of this
London mission was former Rhodes Scholar and New York-London corporate
lawyer William D. Whitney, who on arrival informed Major-General Ismay that
his task was to transmit a balanced picture of the British viewpoint.18 At this
stage Whitney and his propaganda colleague, Robert Sherwood, inspected all
relevant British installations (SOE, SIS, political warfare, MOI, and MEW). In
doing so they were acting in the capacity of general observers and had no
particular liaison purpose in mind. Their intent was to gain some idea of how the
British were fighting the irregular conflict of psychological warfare, secret
intelligence, and sabotage.19 These British organizations also served as direct
sources of information. Liaison contracts were then established with the
individual British agencies for the exchange of information after the timely
arrival of a staff for Whitney the day following the Japanese attack on Pearl
Harbor.20
This was obviously precisely what the British had in mind for COI.
Particularly noteworthy is COI/Londons role at this time as the foremost contact
point with the British regarding propaganda, psychological war-fare,
intelligence, and sabotage. COI/London was the most critical pathway for
creating formal links through which hard information from British intelligence
services was passed. One specific example of intelligence passed to COI/London
involves the JIC decision to pass on to Donovans representative in London
certain JIC papers concurrently circulated to the American military (see also the
recollections of W.H. Shepardson in Chapter 3, p. 75). BSC, on the other hand,
served mostly as a courier service passing reports which had already been
selected and cleared by SIS in London.21 An 18 November 1941 memo from Ismay
to Churchill specifically stated that it was hoped that the London Representative
might particularly reflect and emphasize the British viewpoint.22 Among the
various British agencies, the Political Warfare Executive proved most helpful
and prodigious in supplying information to Whitney and his associates, and SOE
enthusiastically sought out COI/London as an ally.23 The major complication
involved the precise status of Whitney and COI regarding intelligence work and
relations with SIS. Whitney discussed this matter with Churchill on 25
November, stressing that his function was one of coordinating information, not
executing intelligence operations. Churchill replied that he agreed with COI/
Londons view that there was a gap here which could usefully be filled between
high official channelsconducted by himself and the many lower channels
conducted by the collaborating agencies. Whitney was then advised by the PM
to deal through his assistants, Ismay for the military, and Desmond Morton on
civil matters.24 A major snag in this arrangement involved the dearth of a
suitable COI official to nurture links with SIS. The man originally selected for
the job was R.M.J.Fellner. While he was successful in correctly identifying the
willingness of Menzies and SIS to create an arrangement with COI/London,
Fellner blundered by misunderstanding, or perhaps misrepresenting, SIS views
on the geographical scope of US intelligence operations in Europe. He further
presented a laughable impression to the British due to his being frightened and
jittery for fear that he would be shot or kidnapped by the Germans between the
airport and the American Legation while visiting neutral Lisbon. An unamused
Whitney went on to note that Fellner eventually succeeded in obtaining a

revolver from Scotland Yard, of which he is very proud. I am sure you will agree
that this is no spirit for a man to head up this kind of work I really think he is
pretty much of an amateur storybook sleuth.25 Another problem was Menziess
mistrust of Whitneys assistant, William Phillips, who the British believed had
earlier run a spy system on them, and who the erratic Fellner had described to
Menzies as being anti-British (Phillips was apparently oblivious to the depth of
this feeling; while he denied the transgression attributed to him, his post-war
recollection was that he found nothing but the most welcome response.
Immediately, I was invited [by the British organizations] to luncheons and
dinners to meet the members of their various staffs. These were always pleasant
occasions and helped to bring OSS into personal touch with the British
services).26
This confusion came to a head with Americas entry into the war. Whitney left
for Washington soon after the 8 December arrival of his staff to confer with
Donovan as to the impact of formal American participation in the war on the role
of COI. Whitney had written Donovan twice on 2 December to indicate that his
mission had to contend with the doubts about Phillips, the failure of Fellner,
and the quite justified pounding from the British which arises from their
disappointment that we have not done for them the one thing that they most ask
us to do, i.e., the embarrassing fact that all favours requested by us appear to
have been met promptly but that we have not accomplished any of their
requests, leaving the British puzzled and hurt. More important was the fact
that with the advent of war, COI was assailed by all manner of bureaucratic
rivals in Washington, which together with the earlier developments quickly
eroded British confidence in COI.27
An early sign of British caution toward COI emerged on 2 January 1942.
Desmond Morton raised Whitneys ire by seeking a clear declaration from
Donovan personally accepting full responsibility for assurances that all
political radio re-broadcasting by COI was conducted with the approval of both
the President and the State Department. This did not sit well with Whitney, who
saw it as meddling in the relations between US departments, and contrary to
COIs status as answering only to the President.28 Mortons suggestion
nonetheless reflected a desire to know exactly the permanence and authority of
COI in the Roosevelt administrations new wartime footing. Whitney
subsequently conceded as much to the British in an 8 January memo to Donovan
concerning The Crisis in COI. Whitney noted that a large American
government department tried to raid COI on a daily basis. The State
Department would approach the British directly about broadcasting on one day,
while on another, the FBI and its allies wanted to remove intelligence from
COIs jurisdiction. The Bureau of the Budget would then propose transferring
COIs Research and Analysis branch to the Economic Warfare Board as the Army
and Navy sought another branch.29
These developments underscored COIs lack of any formal mandate to work in

these fields. Equally troublesome was the reality that COIs secret intelligence
and secret operations branches remained virtually uncreated. For these units to be
of substance, and not look ridiculously inept and inefficient beside their British
counterparts, they would require support from the State Department, the Army,
and the Navy on the platform that they are going to get the benefits of this
work. Whitney therefore recommended COIs concentration on securing a
mandate for either coordinating information dissemination, for acting as a
foreign information service, or for being the secret intelligence and secret
operations service, not all three.30
Thus emerged the parameters of the Donovan organizations protracted
struggle for bureaucratic survival, complete with the spectre of a campaign on two
fronts: one involving wave after wave of bureaucratic assaults at home; the
second entailing attempts to convince the British that Donovans unit was in fact
the bona fide intelligence service it purported to be, worthy of full confidence
and candor. The classic Catch-22 was, of course, that Donovan needed
substantive accomplishments to secure the ramparts at home, while the prospects
of engineering such accomplishments rested in large part on convincing the
British (SIS in particular) that Donovans service was a going concern with the
American powers that be. A delicate balancing act was obviously required to
resolve this dilemma.
Donovans own actions did not help achieve that balance at a time when he
needed to inspire all the faith he could. Within less than a month after Whitneys
Crisis memo, he penned a bizarre appeal from a soldier to his Commander-in-
Chief on 21 February. Donovan wrote Roosevelt to plead for the execution of a
sound but daring military plan to save the doomed Philippines garrison
involving troop reinforcements; basing heavy bombers in India with a mission
to strike at the sea lanes of communication in the China Sea, and to give aid in
whatever way to MacArthur; and most fantastic of all, sending a naval task
force with a carrier or carriers whose planes would attack targets in Japanvital
to her war effort. Donovan argued further that [m]any objections [could] be
made to such a proposal, but military history shows that military effort is not a
matter of arithmetic or bookkeepingthe imponderables [could not] be
discounted. He concluded by saying that America had nothing with which to
operate on a big scale, but that it should do as would a small but determined
nation. He was convinced that the logistics would show its feasibility, and he
requested that he himself be permitted to serve with this force in any combat
capacity.31
Gone was the notion that strategy, without information upon which it can rely,
is helpless. Likewise, information is useless unless it is intelligently directed to
the strategic purpose. Donovans proposal bore no relation to the resources at
hand, or to the practicalities of executing the operations he had dreamed up. It
was as if Donovan had learned nothing about modern warfare during his trips
abroad, or about assessing the information available to him. What is most
extraordinary is Donovans apparent willingness to abandon leadership of COI,

and to forsake its methodsthe imponderables now took precedence over
empirical mathematics and bookkeeping. It is quite plausible that Donovan was
losing heart in the face of his organizations difficulties with official Washington,
and that such a desperate mission involving the squandering of the limited forces
then available to the US would allow him to bask in a blaze of glory reminiscent
of his experiences in the First World War, where he won a Medal of Honor.
However understandable the proclivities of his temperament, it is undeniable that
such a memo, given directly to the President (and to the Secretaries of War and
the Navy as well), could not possibly have inspired much confidence among the
highest echelons of the US war leadership in Donovans stability, or in his
commitment to organizing an intelligence arm, or in his ability to offer sound
strategic appreciations. Roosevelt accordingly seems to have humoured Donovan.
He replied on 25 February that I would want to do the same thing if I were in
your place. Talk with General Marshall [the US Army Chief of Staff] about it.
Plans are under way. Marshall then replied on 27 February that we all share
your feelings on the situation in the Far East, and that some action was being
taken. Your request for service in a combat capacity is typical of you. I will
watch for a suitable assignment in that area and will call on you as soon as it
develops. This, of course, never came.32
Such erratic behaviour was grist for the mill as far as Donovans opponents
were concerned. It bore out the assessment of Donovan by MI6s Dick Ellis:
Intense personal ambitionbad strategist: crystallizes opposition and underrates
political enemies. Indiscreet. Inclination to flashy work.33 Combined with an
internal struggle over control of White propaganda with his deputy, Robert
Sherwood, the over-extension and bureaucratic assaults highlighted by Whitney,
and a growing desire to forsake psychological warfare for raiding and sabotage
by Donovan, Donovans Wild Bill reputation gave his Washington rivals
sufficient ammunition in their efforts to cut Donovan down to size throughout
the spring of 1942. Donovan was therefore most open to the prospect of
accepting a secure slot within the new Joint Chiefs of Staff organization which
had been created the preceding January. As the American counterpart to the
British Chiefs of Staff, the JCS had been considering through early 1942 the
employment of COI within Americas war-fighting resources. Donovan soon
accepted this arrangement after some wrangling over exact duties at the expense
of the renamed Office of Strategic Services being distanced from the President.34
Branch activities in London during 1942 reflected the inertia caused by the
uncertainties plaguing the organization. As will be detailed in subsequent
chapters, OSS consisted of component branches each focusing on one aspect of
clandestine or intelligence work. The Special Operations branch (SO, formerly
SA/G-SA/H) reached an agreement with SOE for operational collaboration in the
realm of sabotage and sub-version, but this was offset by SOs lack of personnel
and resources with-in the theatre. In 1942, only six SO officers had reached
London to establish a presence and to initiate links with SOE. As more SO staff
personnel slowly arrived throughout 194243, increasingly formal linkages with

SOE could be established, which itself begged the outstanding question of just
how closely integrated SO/London was authorized to be with SOE. Further
progress would have to wait until 1943 when SOE plans for Europe were more
concrete, and after an influx of 50 trained military SO clandestine operatives and
their supporting elements arrived after January 1944. The Secret Intelligence
branch (SI, formerly SA/B) sought the opportunity to move beyond liaison staff
work through its original five-man team to collaborate in espionage with SIS and
Free French intelligence during autumn 1942. SIs operational freedom of action
was restricted by the US military until 1943, however (see Chapter 3, pp. 757),
after which it managed to grow in proportion to its role in the Normandy
invasion with the addition of more staff. The Research and Analysis branch
(R&A) was responsible for establishing a unique contribution to the use of
intelligence data with its initial complement of three analysts in 1942 growing
throughout 1943 as a permanent analysis staff of about 50 men, but its 1942
efforts were largely confined to minor propaganda work before the creation of
OWI. After that development, the branch fended for itself by contacting the
many British agencies engaged in research and analysis as a preliminary step to
direct information exchanges (see Chapter 4, pp. 1056). Independent
R&A work on bomb targeting for the American Army Air Force was in its infant
stages during autumn 1942 (see Chapter 5).35
In sum, OSS/Londons personnel were about evenly dispersed throughout its
branches and headquarters components as they gingerly tried to expand on their
toe-hold within the theatre. Each element gradually grew from a small nucleus of
military and civilian members throughout 194243. By the end of 1943, a major
surge of military personnel allowed SI and SO to expand rapidly for French
operations, although R&A more gradually acquired staff for its intelligence
processing and office work. The branches thus for the most part grew in size
separately but equally in response to their evolving tasks, with clear roles and
personnel requirements largely worked out by mid-1944 for what by then was a
2,800 man mission.36
All of this growth depended on Donovan following up his services 1942
revamping by trying to codify the specific duties of the revised, if stagnating,
unit. This would finally go some way at least toward opening up opportunities
for OSS branches in London. OSS duties were thus eventually defined in January
1943 with JCS 155/4/D, and OSS General Order Number 9.37 While OSS in-
house histories describe this process as making OSS more homogeneous and
more purposeful, the fact remained that OSS was overall responsible in the first
instance to the JCS. It was the JCS who defined the functions of OSS in direct
support of actual or planned military operations. As these operations were
within the purview of theatre commanders, it therefore followed that when in a
theatre of operations, OSS was subject to the Theater Commanders. Of
paramount importance, however, is the fact that the JCS would not order theatre
commanders to use OSSthose commanders had themselves to favour utilizing
the service. This nicety would remain an essential stumbling block in the OSS
drive to establish itself.38
The experience throughout 1943 of what was now OSS/London, with Whitney
replaced by William Phillips in July, bore this out. As corroborated in the
Directors Office War Diary, these directives concerning operations in the
European Theater of Operations (ETO) were valid for OSS/London only in that
they described the Washington, or main, section of the Office of Strategic
Services. Their relevance to the overseas missions was not explicitly apparent,
since they were not directly subordinate to the JCS. They were instead
answerable to a two-fold intermediary authority, the Director OSS on one hand,
and the Theater Commander on the other. This undeniably complicated OSS/
Londons duties (now defined primarily as gathering strategic intelligence for the
JCS) since the Theater Command in London had its own ideas about the scope of
OSS activities. The Theater Commander believed that OSS/London should be
limited to acting as a section of US Army intelligence (G-2) in London. This held
true for both General Frank M. Andrews, killed in a May 1943 plane crash, and
his replacement as Commanding General, US Army European Theater of
Operations (CG, ETOUSA), General J.L.Devers.39
General Devers in particular showed a distinct inclination to accept the myth of
British intelligence invincibility to the point of supporting the British
organizations over OSS. OSS/Londons new mission head, David Bruce,
indicated in his correspondence that Devers was impressed with British
intelligence, and consequently somewhat apprehensive of the development of
OSS intelligence lest it should jeopardize the British system. This in turn
reflected how often Americans new to London easily presumed the adequacy
and competence of things British.40 The American generals attitude soon
complicated OSS-SIS negotiations for joint operations, code-named SUSSEX
(see Chapter 3). When the American Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 in London
indicated that OSS should expedite its detailed arrangements with SIS, he was
told on 2 August that OSS had been informed by the British that they would
prefer to suspend further discussions until the Office of Strategic Services shall
have been given official authorization by the Theater Commander to execute the
project with British SIS.41
The very day that this memorandum was being written, the OSS Director met
with Menzies to obtain the good word of SIS in his battle to convince the
American Theater Commander of the utility of OSS secret intelligence. Donovan
detailed a meeting held with Devers the preceding day in which Devers had
stated that SIS had complained about the slick and underhanded methods of
OSS, and about their breaking of agreements. Donovan earnestly denied these
charges to Menzies, and said that it is inconceivable that anyone from your
organization could have undertaken to speak for you in this manner. If anyone
has done so we can only look to you as the responsible head to deal with it.
Donovans memorandum to this effect had been drafted without address or
signature so that Sir Stewart could discuss it with Sir Claude Dansey,
presumably the suspected culprit. Menzies then agreed to go and clear the
matter with General Devers.42 Whether by coincidence or by way of
punishment, Dansey was in fact relieved as Chief Deputy Director of SIS soon
after this meeting, and replaced by General James Marshall-Cornwall. SI/London
later described Dansey as a man of vast experience in secret intelligence work, a
stalwart defender of the British imperial interest, a sharp and skillful negotiator,
and, in his fashion, a genial friend of SI officers who had nevertheless been an
obstructionist in a number of matters which [SI had] sought to achieve.43
Menziess support was critical in light of the American Joint Chiefs of Staff
enquiry to Devers on 14 July as to the utility of OSS in the theatre, and since the
JCS ordered Devers to solicit the views of the British Chiefs of Staff on the
matter. The COS replied, after consultation with C, that they supported a role
for OSS in secret intelligence provided that it was fully coordinated with the
British and French services (i.e., according to the terms of SUSSEX); and that
counter-intelligence operations be coordinated in London by SIS, all without
precluding the theatre commander from tasking OSS as desired, aircraft
availability permitting.44 With this qualified British support of OSS, Devers
reported to the JCS that [i]t [was] most desirable that OSS be developed to its
fullest capacity. This [could not] be done, however, without the complete
integration of all OSS activities with similar activities of the British SIS and SOE,
and for this purpose OSS [London] should have direct contact with those
agencies for operational planning.45 This development saved OSS/London from
being gutted by its own high command, but it moved David Bruce to compose a
rather bitter letter to Washington on 18 September:
You will, before this, have read a copy of the reply of the British Chiefs of
Staff to the JCS letter of July 14th to General Devers. To those in OSS,
Washington, who seem to have a feeling that the OSS Mission in London
is somewhat prone to allow its independence to be fettered by SIS and
SOE, this communication from the British Chiefs of Staff should afford
interesting food for reflection. After having our operations here submitted
to the closest scrutiny by the American Theater Commander who sought the
opinion of some of our British colleagues concerning them, it became
necessary as a result of the request by the American Joint Chiefs of Staff to
the British Chiefs of Staff for the opinion of the latter upon our functions,
for us to go hat-in-hand to Broadway and Baker Street [the SIS and SOE
HQs] and ask them to be as kind as possible to us in whatever answer they
made to the questions addressed to them by the British Chiefs of Staff. On
top of a performance such as this it seems to me sometimes remarkable
that we enjoy any independence whatever; in fact to date we have obtained
our strongest support, not from any American authority, but from our
English competitors, which is a sad and undeniable fact.46
This incident is significant since only at this point (autumn 1943) could OSS/
London be said to have acquired the authority to function as the primary US
intelligence service in the ETO, with the correlative bureaucratic security to
convince the British that OSS was in the intelligence field for the duration.
Equally noteworthy is that if SIS had been motivated simply by a petty desire to
cripple OSS, they had ample opportunity to do so during summer 1943. That
they did not so ruin the Americans is a testament to their willingness to forge a
partnership, provided OSS had the backing of the American authoritiesto
cooperate without such assurances risked a colossal waste of time and precious
effort by SIS. The various organs of British intelligence had accordingly been
sufficiently impressed with the potential and capacity for effectiveness
demonstrated by the various branches of OSS (albeit often for their own reasons)
to marshal this necessary recognition and acceptance of OSS by the American
military.47
With the recognition and support of the Anglo-American military leadership,
and an understanding with its own theatre command, OSS/London could then fit
itself into the strategic and operational agendas of the Allies. The Anglo-
American intelligence relationship was thus, by the autumn of 1943, finally
progressing beyond the initial stages of cultivation and subtle exploitation in the
name of British survival to the point of establishing a truly functioning
partnership. OSS as a whole benefited from this recognition since it reflected a
real accomplishment and contribution to the US war effort, and a demonstration
of confidence in the potential of the Donovan organization to function as
advertised.
It remained to be proved, though, just how effective the theory of a single all-
encompassing clandestine service could be in practice. OSS/London certainly
owed its survival to the good offices of its British colleagues; but the fragmented
structure of British intelligence was another consequence of the British link that
had already made itself felt. The form and preoccupations of the British
intelligence services effectively moulded OSS in their own collective image. The
head of American Military Intelligence, Major-General George Strong, once
stated to an OSS representative that he did not understand the reason for the
wide divorcement between SO and SI. It was pointed out to him that the
apparent [sic] impression that there was a divorcement was based on the
relationship, or lack of relationship, between the British organizations, SOE and
SIS.48
This insight obviously applies in equal measure to British intelligence since it
served as the blueprint for the reality of OSS. Whatever the mythical ideal of
OSS as the origin of centralized intelligence, it was undoubtedly the British
intelligence apparatus which determined the operating method of OSS/London.
The R&A branch War Diary reveals the precise method by which the Americans
had to establish links with the British. While ostensibly an organization
combining all intelligence functionsSI, SO, R&Athe reality was that the
most unfortunate feature of this early period in the history of the London office
is the fact that these branches [SI and SO], certainly in relation to R&A, were
wholly unintegrated. The R&A/London Branch Head, Allan Evans, had not
even been briefed on the existence of SO before arriving in London. The overall
effect was to ensure that the conditions within the London office were
essentially those of a free-for-all pioneering and expansion.
[D]efinite rules of the game existed, and in the course of time careful
account had to be taken of them. The situation which confronted the British
was difficult, for strange American agencies were pouring into London and
setting up offices, and all trying to spread their contacts as wide as
possible. In short, the same free-for-all existed outside the limits of OSS as
existed within it.
Amidst this chaotic situation every British office of importance made an
effort to distinguish the one American agency which most closely
corresponded to its own function, and to establish more or less exclusive
relations with that agency.49
This situation ensured that however centralized OSS was supposed to be in

theory, OSS/London could in no way function under any one controlling
authority. The necessity of dealing with separate British entities, each determined
to work with the American structure most closely resembling itself, compounded
the phenomenon. The original vision of OSS as a super all-in-one intelligence
entity was thus at the mercy of the nature of British intelligence, at least in
London.
An even blunter appraisal of the branch-balkanization within OSS/London
was written in September 1945 by a member of the OSS/London Secretariat,
Walter Lord:
The exaggerated delineation between Branches in the conduct of OSS

activities was always apparent throughout the time I worked in ETO [T]
his endless stress on the Branch as the be-all and end-all of OSS operations
tended to becloud the contributions of the organization as a whole. So
strong and independent was the position of the Branches that it was
literally impossible to give the organization the close, direct, centralized
executive control necessary for a maximum integrated contribution.
Instead, the breakdown of the organization into innumerable semi-
autonomous principalities made for jealousies, reduced efficiency, wasted
resources, confusion in the eyes of Allied and other US agencies, the loss of
services which one Branch could have offered another, and the absence of
benefits which would otherwise have resulted from combining talents and
facilities[A]lways in the background was the fundamental concept of
Branch dominance. The apparent acceptance by Washington of this
philosophy defeated the best efforts of [the OSS/London] executive staff to
produce a truly integrated effort. It was in fact a basic philosophy which no
human being could beat, embodying as it did the strangely contradictory

thesis that the parts of an organization are greater than the whole.50
Since there was no single official coordinating British intelligence authority for
OSS/London to deal with, this branch independence manifested itself in the
distinct relationships arranged by the OSS components with the disparate organs
of British intelligence. The SO branch was thus moved to establish its own
direct, formal agreement with SOE in June 1942 outlining the extent of
American and British spheres of responsibility for sabotage and resistance (or
executive) operations (see Chapter 3).51 The R&A War Diary commented that
SO/Londons preoccupation with the British was especially intenseindeed
that branch in London operated so closely with the highly elaborate British SOE
organization as hardly to need any further auxiliary services on its own
accountt.52
The SI branchs situation paralleled that of SO in this respect. It eventually
forged a relationship with its opposite number, SIS, which for all practical
purposes was stronger than any bond it had with the rest of OSS/London for
most of the war (see Chapter 3). This partnership was summarized in a memo
outlining the basis for recommending Menzies for a US decoration:
When OSSstarted functioning in London in early 1942, the task was, in

so far as SI was concerned, to procure secret intelligence for the [US] Joint
Chiefs of Staff, and later for the Theater Commander and other agencies in
the Theater. One of the first and most important sources to which SI turned
was Broadway [SIS]. This organization provided SI with a great deal of
intelligence material although in the beginning SI had little to offer in
return. Eventually the relationship became less one-sided, and cooperation
became increasingly close as time went on The largest single joint
undertaking by SI and SIS was probably the Sussex operationSI and SIS
worked together very closely throughout53
SI was not wholly content, however. The branch long harboured the belief that
SIS was seeking to frustrate the development of an independent American secret
service in Europe. During an April 1943 meeting in London to discuss the
creation of an SI operational base, it was argued that
SO was shortly going to have men in the field working with SOE but SI
was in a different position than SIS, as SIS was a career organization and
would not or could not afford to permit SI to develop lines that might
jeopardise their ownSIS was jealous of its training program, considered
it one of its greatest secrets and SI could not hope to have their cooperation.54
Whatever the Americans perceptions, the reality was more subtle and complex
than they realized. SIS was itself in the position of fighting for its bureaucratic
lifeof trying to survive the war as an intact entity. It was not in any shape to
reveal cavalierly its methods and assets to just any group of possibly transient
Americans. As suggested earlier, before SIS was going to bare itself to any part
of OSS, it needed some proof that OSS was there to stay, and that the effort and
cost of forging a working relationship with SI would be justified in terms of
successful secret intelligence operations which would reflect well on SIS. Any
reticence on the part of SIS was therefore not due merely to pique or jealousy,
however frustrating the SIS attitude may have seemed to outside observers (a
further consideration was the distinction between the attitude of particular SIS
officers, as opposed to the service itself, see Chapter 3).
The finer points of the SIS attitude are born out in the documentation. Some
time in the early days of OSS/London, an OSS staff member was visited by Sir
William Wiseman, the former SIS liaison officer to the United States during the
First World War.
During the course of the conversation he hinted that there was still a good
deal of uncertainty in official circles here with regard to the Donovan
organization, and in particular with reference to its permanency during the
duration. I said I was very much interested in this impression, and asked
him whether he was referring to the attitude of C. He said yes, he knew
for a fact that C had in his own mind considerable doubts, and he
mentioned also Duff Cooper [overseeing SOE] who was of a similar mind.
He went on to say that Cs attitude was partly caused by his
dissatisfaction with the set up of the British agencies having to deal with
intelligence, that he was not in sympathy with the rapid creation of these
agencies, some of which intruded upon the activities of his own
organization. Moreover, he felt that with each new alphabetical creation
the security of the Secret Service was seriously affected. Sir William
thought that gradually the standing of OSS would be clarified and that
everything was going satisfactorily in that direction. He thought that
anything I could say to C, indicating the Presidents backing of OSS,
would be of great value at this time.55
Combined with the role of SIS in the Devers-JCS episode, this insight into the
British reaction to OSS shows how the British Secret Service was fundamentally
supportive of its American counterpart, although the functioning of British, and
therefore Allied, intelligence necessarily entrenched the reality of fragmentation
and often debilitating institutional isolation.
All of the attempts at fashioning some sort of centralized approach to
intelligence management which emanated from the British, and the centralization
hopefully embodied in the organizational flow-charts of OSS, were thus no
match for the simple reality of fragmented allied intelligence coordination.
Neither the old hands in the British services, nor the new boys in OSS, could be
immune to that defining factor in the Allied intelligence alliance during the
Second World War. While it might conceivably be argued that modern American
intelligence services have uniformly and typically tended toward fragmentation
of their own accord during the twentieth century, it cannot be seriously posited
that OSS/London might well have evolved as it actually did regardless of the
British dimension to its experience. OSS was by definition established as a
unique entity, deliberately embodying the principle of centralization in direct
contrast to both British and past American experience. The establishment of
component branches as part of a single intelligence agency rather than of fully
independent services was the defining, if theoretical, characteristic of COI and
OSS.56 It could also be argued on the basis of Graham Allisons analysis of
government organizations during the Cuban Missile Crisis that government is a
conglomeration of semi-feudal, loosely allied organizations, each with a
substantial life of its own. These fiefdoms accordingly eschew homogenous aims,
reflecting instead an inherent drive toward competitive bureaucratic politics
dominated by parochial priorities and perceptions, rival goals and interests, and
clashing stakes and stands.57 This model is not particularly applicable to OSS/
London, though. The very homogeneity and centralized authority within COI/
OSS was, in the first place, explicitly expected to avoid just that problem as
compared with the rest of the US government. The role of extra-governmental
influences must also be accounted for. The simple reality of OSS/Londons
position relative to the US military, and to the firmly entrenched British system,
combined to break down the structural innovation of OSS in the European
theatre. All of the ensuing developments and experiences of OSS/London in
relation to its British counterparts were destined to bear the imprint of this reality,
and its component branches would accordingly be required to carve their own
separate niches within the context of the Allied war effort in Europe.
NOTES
1. Muggeridge, Chronicles, p. 173.

2. Cf. Nelson D.Lankford (ed.) OSS against the Reich: The World War II Diaries of
Colonel David K.E.Bruce (Kent, OH: The Kent State University Press, 1991), and
the review of this volume by Nelson MacPherson in Intelligence and National
Security 7, 3 (July 1992), pp. 3667.
3. The standard works on Donovan and Stephenson are Cave Brown, Last Hero,
Richard Dunlop, Donovan: Americas Master Spy (Chicago: Rand McNally,
1982); Ford, Donovan of OSS; H.Montgomery Hyde, The Quiet Canadian: The
Secret Service Story of Sir William Stephenson (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1962);
Bill Macdonald, The True Intrepid: Sir William Stephenson and the Unknown Agents
(Surrey, BC: Timberholme Books, 1998); British Security Coordination: The Secret
History of British Intelligence in the Americas, 19401945 (New York: Fromm
International, 1999), pp. 146; Troy, Donovan; Thomas F.Troy, Wild Bill and
Intrepid: Donovan, Stephenson, and the Origins of CIA (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1996); since Stephenson was of modest physical stature, his usual
nom de guerre was Little Bill to Donovans Big Billhe was never a man
called INTREPID- see Hyde, Quiet, p. 5; see also David Stafford, Camp X
(Toronto: General Paperbacks, 1987), pp. 15, 257, 279, and the final two
unnumbered pages of the Postscript.
4. See B.F.Smith, Shadow, pp. 213; Andrew, Churchill, pp. 1912; Troy,
Donovan, p. 34; Troy, Bill, passim; Dunlop, Donovan, p. 203; Whiting, Battle, pp.
11112; Patrick Beesly, Very Special Admiral: The Life of Admiral J.H.Godfrey,
CB (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1980), pp. 17685; Donald McLachlan, Room 39:
Naval Intelligence in Action, 193945 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968),
pp. 224, 228; Mark M. Lowenthal, INTREPID and the History of World War II,
Military Affairs 41, 2 (April 1977), pp. 889; David Stafford, Intrepid: Myth and
Reality, Journal of Contemporary History 22, 2 (April 1987), pp. 306, 315;
Stafford, X, pp. 1517, and Postscript; Timothy J.Naftali, Intrepids Last
Deception: Documenting the Career of Sir William Stephenson, Intelligence and
National Security 8, 3 (July 1993), especially pp. 756, 79, 82, 87; John Bryden,
Best Kept Secret: Canadian Secret Intelligence in the Second World War (Toronto:
Lester Publishing, 1993), pp. 567, 679, 81, 845, 1078, 113, 116, 2712, 335;
cf. Hyde, Quiet, pp. 1516, Dunlop, Donovan, pp. 213, 2801, and Whiting, Battle,
pp. 11112; cf. also the interview with Stephenson conducted by Thomas F.Troy in
1969, Troy to Director of Training, CIA, 13 March 1969, Folder 66, Box 8, and
Donovans comments on Conyers Read to Donovan, 12 February 1944, Attached
British Manuscript, Folder 4, Box 1, both in the Thomas Troy Papers, RG 263,
NARA.
5. Cf. J.H.Godfrey, The Naval Memoirs of Admiral J.H.Godfrey, Vol. V, 19391942,
Part I: Naval Intelligence Division, Chapter XX, McLachlan-Beesly Papers,
Churchill Archives Centre (CAC), Churchill College, Cambridge; Hyde, Quiet, pp.
368, and Paul Kramer, Nelson Rockefeller and British Security Coordination,
Journal of Contemporary History 16, 1 (January 1981), pp. 75, 78; see B.F.Smith,
Shadow, pp. 558, 623; James Leutze (ed.) The London Journal of General
Raymond E. Lee, 19401941 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), p. 21; David
E.Koskoff, Joseph P. Kennedy: A Life and Times (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall,
1974), p. 255, n. 123; regarding the influences on Roosevelt concerning Britain, see
David G.Haglund, George C.Marshall and the Question of Military aid to
England, MayJune 1940, in Walter Laqueur (ed.), The Second World War:
Essays in Military and Political History (London: SAGE Publications, 1982), pp.
1434, 1545, and Mark M. Lowenthal, Roosevelt and the Coming of the War:
The Search for United States Policy, 193742, in Laqueur (ed.), Second World War,
pp. 60, 66, 6971; Mark L. Chadwin, The Hawks of World War II (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1968), pp. 923, 1256; Lewin, Warlord, p.
50n; see also Halifax to Eden, c. 5 December 1940, A4925/4925/45 (1); Archibald
Sinclair to Halifax, 7 December 1940, A5059/4925/45 (2), both in FO 371/24263;
Minute by Sir D.Scott, 27 February 1941; and Alexander Cadogan to PM, 1 March
1941, both in A1 154/183/45, FO 371/26194, Cadogan noting that although we
have every reason to think that he enjoys the latters [i.e., FDRs] confidence, he is
not one of his intimate associates; all in PRO; cf. M.R.D.Foot, SOE: An outline
history of the Special Operations Executive, 194046 (London: BBC, 1984), p. 150;
see also Danchev (ed.), Diaries of Vivian Dykes, pp. 214.
6. See Read to Donovan, Attached British Manuscript, and Troy to Director of

Training; cf. Dunlop, Donovan, pp. 21213, 2801, 318 and Hyde, Quiet, pp. 151
6 with McLachlan, 39, pp. 22439, and Beesly, Admiral, pp. 17384; see also
History of the OSS, Vol. I: The COI, Part One: Establishment of the COI, pp. 23,
10, 96, Folder 5, Box 70, Entry 99, RG 226, NARA; Leutze (ed.), Journal of
Raymond E. Lee, p. 334; Naftali, Deception, p. 87; Jakub, Spies, pp. 121; and
Danchev (ed.), Diaries of Vivian Dykes, pp. 234.
7. Fleming to Donovan, 9 June 1941, Folder 32, Box 1, Entry 92, RG 226, NARA;
this is the Ian Fleming of James Bond fame; see also Stafford, X, p. 279, and
Troy, Donovan, p. 81, where both refer to a later, less-detailed, memo dated 27
June; Troy further refers to an earlier (at that time undiscovered) memo,
presumably that of 9 June cited here; see also Troy, Bill, p. 127, Jakub, Spies, p.
29; Andrew Lycett, Ian Fleming: The Man Behind James Bond (Atlanta: Turner
Publishing, 1995), pp. 12930.
8. McLachlan, 39, pp. 2314.
9. See Troy interview with Stephenson, Troy to Director of Training, Troy Papers, RG
263, NARA.
10. See frames 12412, Reel 21, Entry 162, RG 226, NARA; cf. Thomas Troys
comments favouring the Ellis link over that of Fleming, but without any reference
to chronology, in Troy to Director of Training, 11 October 1974, Folder 49, Box 7,
Troy Papers, RG 263, NARA; Donovan to Frank Knox, 26 April 1941, in British
Intelligence Systems, Vol. 29, Book No. 5, Box 80A, Donovan Papers, USAMHI,
simply outlines the organization of SIS, conceivably as gleaned from sources like
Ellis or Menzies, but there is no mention of how an American service might be
established to work with the British; a minute purporting to be from Stephenson for
Donovan pre-COI, n.d., in the Stephenson File, Folder 78, Box 120B, Donovan
Papers, USAMHI, simply outlines basic espionage tradecraft with regard to British
Recruitment and Handling of Agents.
11. Intelligence in the United States, by J.H.Godfrey, DNI, Washington, 7 July 1941,
CAB 122/1021; this was in due course circulated to the COS on 30 July as JIC (41)
300 of 28 July; see COS (41) 267th Mtg, 30 July 1941, Minute 8, CAB 79/13; all in
PRO; Godfrey, Memoirs, I, Chapter XX, McLachlan, 39, pp. 22931, and
Beesly, Admiral, pp. 1823, detail Godfreys discussions with Roosevelt
Donovan was recommended as COI by the US Ambassador to London, John
Winant; on Godfreys report, see also Bradley F.Smith, Admiral Godfreys
Mission to America, June/July 1941, Intelligence and National Security 1, 3
(September 1986), pp. 44150.
12. See Stephensons citation for the US Medal for Merit, 17 May 1945, Frames 1238
40, Reel 21, Entry 162, RG 226, NARA, which stresses Stephensons role in this
capacity after the formation of COI; see War Diary, SO Branch, OSS/London,
Vol. 12, Basic Documents, p. 1, in OSS/London: Special Operations Branch and
Secret Intelligence Branch War Diaries (Frederick, MD: University Publications of
America, 1985), Reel 6, for the order establishing COI.
13. As the Book of Genesis for OSS, copies of this memo are found throughout the
OSS archive in RG 226, NARA; eg., Folder 8, Box 70, Entry 99; Folder 489, Box
48, Entry 110, etc.
14. Troy, Donovan, pp. 65153 (open-ended, p. 110); History of the OSS, Vol. IF, 2
October 1944, p. 3, Folder 17, Box 73, Entry 99; Conyers Read History, pp. 4950,
Folder 16, Box 73, Entry 99; SA stood for Special Activities, B and G for the
branch heads, Bruce and Goodfellow (H is unknown); see Bruce to Donovan, 16
March 1942 on SA/B designation, Folder 44, Box 8, Entry 92; all in RG 226,
NARA; see also Jakub, Spies, pp. 2247.
15. B.F.Smith, Shadow, pp. 140254; Max Corvo, The OSS in Italy, 19421945: A
Personal Memoir (New York: Praeger, 1990), pp. 32272; Jakub, Spies, pp. 48
109.
16. Robert A.Solborg to Donovan, 6 October 1941, Folder 38, Box 1, Entry 92, RG
226, NARA.
17. Roosevelt to Churchill, 24 October 1941, Folder 489, Box 48, Entry 110, RG 226,
NARA; see also Warren F.Kimball (ed.), Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete
Correspondence, Vol. I: Alliance Emerging, October 1933November 1942
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 263.
18. Whitney to Donovan, 19 November 1941, with enclosure Ismay to PM, 18
November 1941, Folder 8, Box 70, Entry 99, RG 226; Donovan to JCS 5 August
1942, Folder 15, Box 73, Entry 99 also mentions the London missions liaison
function; despite what he put on paper, Ismay had, in reality, been evidently
perplexed as regards the true object of Whitneys visitsee the cable, no author,
no recipient, 23 November 1941, Folder 20, Box 2, Troy Papers, RG 263; all in
NARA.
19. Interview with Mr William Dwight Whitney, London, 6 June 1945, Folder 31, Box
2, Entry 147, RG 226, NARA.
20. Ibid.; see also Conyers Read History, Part II, The Office of the Coordinator
of Information, pp. 556, Folder 7, Box 70, Entry 99, RG 226, NARA.
21. See the Whitney interview; JIC decision in JIC (41) 35th Mtg, 2 December 1941,
Minute No. 6, CAB 81/88, PRO; War Diary, SI Branch, OSS/London, Vol. 1,
Introductory Survey, pp. 24, 6, in Bradley F.Smith (ed.) Covert Warfare, Vol. 2:
The Spy Factory and Secret Intelligence (New York: Garland, 1989), also
demonstrates the intelligence-conduit role of SI, then named SA/B branch; see also
H.Montgomery Hyde, Secret Intelligence Agent (London: Constable, 1982), p.
255.
22. Ismay to Churchill, 18 November 1941, Folder 8, Box 70, Entry 99, RG 226; see
also Donovan to Churchill, 27 October 1941, Folder 20, Box 2, Troy Papers, RG
263; both in NARA.
23. E.L.Taylor to William Whitney, 12 November 1941, Folder 20, Box 2, Troy
Papers, RG 263, NARA.
24. Whitney to Donovan, 25 November 1941Ismay and Morton were to show
Whitney papers in their discretion; in Folder 20, Box 2, Troy Papers, RG 263,
NARA.
25. Whitney to Donovan, 2 December 1941, Folder 20, Box 2, Troy Papers, RG 263;
re: Fellners early work, Fellner to Donovan, 2 November 1941 and Fellner to
Donovan, 5 November 1941, both in Folder 8, Box 70, Entry 99, RG 226; all in
NARA.
26. Whitney to Donovan, 21 November 1941 (with Phillipss denial), Folder 20, Box
2, Troy Papers, RG 263, NARA; Phillipss recollection in Dunlop, Donovan, p.
357.
27. Letter, Whitney to Donovan, 2 December 1941; typescript (of a cable?), Whitney to
Donovan, 2 December 1941, both in Folder 20, Box 2, Troy Papers, RG 263; see
also Whitney interview, Folder 31, Box 2, Entry 147, RG 226; all in NARA.
28. On Morton enquiry, see the cable, for Taylor from Winner, 2 January 1942; on
Whitneys reaction, Whitney to Donovan, 5 January 1942; Whitney to Donovan, 6
January 1942, Folder 20, Box 2, Troy Papers, RG 263, NARA.
29. Whitney to Donovan, 8 January 1942, Folder 20, Box 2, Troy Papers, RG 263,
NARA.
30. Whitney to Donovan, 8 January 1942; see Whitneys further memos exploring the
possibility of arranging an alliance with the State Department in the handwritten
Whitney to Donovan, 15 January 1942; Whitney to Donovan, Position of British
Foreign Office Illustrating Our Relations with State Dept., 15 January 1942;
Whitney to Donovan, State Department/Joint Intelligence, 17 January 1942; all in
Folder 20, Box 2, Troy Papers, RG 263, NARA.
31. Donovan for the President, 21 February 1942, frames 57882, Reel 22, Entry 162,
RG 226, NARA.
32. For Roosevelts response, see ibid., frame 578; for Marshalls response, see Folder
21, Box 2, Troy Papers, RG 263; the Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, called the
proposal mostly wildsee B.F.Smith, Shadow, p. 126; see also Kenneth Young
(ed.) The Diaries of Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart, Vol. II: 19391965 (London:
Macmillan, 1980), p. 175, with Lockharts 17 July 1942 entry: according to
Desmond Morton, who quotes [Ambassador Drexel] Biddle as his authority, the
President likes Colonel Donovan, says he must be helped down, but that he is no
organiser and is a child in political matters.
33. Notes by Dick Ellis, McLachlan-Beesly Papers, 6/5, CAC.
34. See History of OSS, Vol. II, pp. 3, 223, Entry 99, RG 226, NARA; Troy,
Donovan, pp. 12953.
35. See R.H.Smith, OSS, pp. 163203; B.F.Smith, Shadow, pp. 1756, 1847, 20211,
248, 2523; on SI/SO activities, see Jakub, Spies, pp. 5366.
36. R.H.Smith, OSS, pp. 163203; B.F.Smith, Shadow, pp. 1756, 1847, 20211,
2523.
37. General Order No. 9 is found throughout the OSS archive, e.g., Folder 489, Box
48, Entry 110, RG 226, NARA.
38. History of OSS, IF, pp. 3, 223, Entry 99, RG 226, NARA; Vivian Dykes of the
British Staff Mission in Washington noted on 4 July 1942, that Donovans ideas
were a bit too big to suit his new [JCS] mastersDanchev (ed.), Diary of Vivian
Dykes, p. 165.
39. War Diary, Directors Office, OSS/London, Preamble to January 1944, Part IF,
pp. 1819, Folder 38, Box 3, Entry 147; Office of Strategic ServicesLondon
(mission statement), 24 June 1942, Folder 8, Box 73, Entry 92; Robert Cresswell to
Whitney, 2 June 1943, Folder 22, Box 325, Entry 92, all in RG 226, NARA.
40. These observations with reference to Bruces correspondence are from Hugh R.
Wilson to Donovan, 19 June 1943, Folder 24, Box 334, Entry 92, RG 226, NARA.
41. David Bruce to Brig.-Gen. J.C.Crockett, 2 August 1943, Folder 535, Box 238,
Entry 190; see also Bruce to G.Edward Buxton, 19 June 1943, Folder 39, Box 24,
Entry 92; both in RG 226, NARA; see also Stewart Alsop and Thomas Braden, Sub
Rosa: The OSS and American Espionage (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World,
1964), pp. 312.
42. Memorandum of Meeting, 2 August 1943, with letter, Donovan to Menzies, 31 July
1943, in Folder 33, Box 4, Troy Papers, RG 263, NARA.
43. SI Branch Semi-Monthly Report #15, W.P.Maddox to Bruce, 15 September 1943,
in Folder 1, Box 1, Entry 99, RG 226, NARA; see also Cecil, Cs, p. 180.
44. Proposed Operations by OSS in the European Theater: Memorandum by the
Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff, n.d. (c. July 1943), Folder 376, Box
227; see also CCS 449, 28 December 1943, frame 1129, and CCS 449/1, 5 April
1944, frame 1130, Reel 4, Entry 190; both in RG 226, NARA.
45. Devers to JCS, 6 August 1943, Folder 406, Box 229, Entry 190, RG 226, NARA.
46. Bruce to G.Edward Buxton, 18 September 1943, Folder 39, Box 24, Entry 92, RG
226, NARA; see also Young (ed.), Diaries of Robert Bruce Lockhart, p. 238, with
Robert Bruce Lockharts prescient 31 May 1943 diary entry stating that OSS is
making headway all the timeand is backed by the army chiefs.
47. Cf. Jakub, Spies, pp. 1067
48. C.S.Vanderblue to Bruce, 14 August 1943, Folder 429, Box 231, Entry 190, RG
226, NARA.
49. War Diary, R&A Branch, OSS/London, Vol. 1, Early History, pp. 10, 12, 16, 87,
Reel 3, Entry 91, both in RG 226, NARA; West, Secret War, p. 218, understands
the phenomenon, if not its cause; cf. W.T.M.Beale to Bruce and Wilson, 9
September 1942 on the need for greater cooperation between SA/B (later SI) and
SA/H (formerly SA/G, later SO) in Folder 18, Box 129, Entry 92, RG 226, NARA.
50. Lord to Director, OSS, with Hold this for me written on it in Donovans hand, 13
September 1945, Folder 46b (#1), Box 11, Entry 99, RG 226, NARA.
51. Sir Charles Hambro (CD) to Donovan, 9 September 1942, Folder 196, Box 344,
Entry 190, RG 226, NARA.
52. War Diary, R&A, 1, p. 87.
53. Ernest Brooks, Jr to Mr Nichols, 18 April 1945, Folder 88, Box 300, Entry 190, RG
226, NARA.
54. Meeting of London Branch SI to consider operational base in London, 23 April
1943, Folder 424, Box 319, Entry 190, RG 226, NARA.
55. Minute, n.d., n.a., presumably by William Phillips, c. early to mid-1943, Folder
538, Box 238, Entry 190, RG 226, NARA; see also Young (ed.), Diary of Robert
Bruce Lockhart, p. 191, with Robert Bruce Lockharts report of William
Wisemans views on the permanency of OSS propaganda efforts, 27 August 1942;
cf. Robin W.Winks, Getting the Right Stuff: FDR, Donovan, and the Quest for
Professional Intelligence, in George C.Chalou (ed.) The Secrets War: The Office
of Strategic Services in World War II, (Washington, DC: National Archives and
Records Administration, 1992), pp. 267; see also Kermit Roosevelt, War Report of
the OSS (New York: Walker and Company, 1976), pp. 2567.
56. See Troy, Donovan, pp. 321, on pre-OSS American intelligence.
57. Graham T.Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis
(Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1971), pp. 67, 144, 146, 1667.
3
Servants of OVERLORD: SO, SI, and the
Invasion of Europe
Some of the most significant tests of Anglo-American intelligence relations

involved OSS/Londons Special Operations and Secret Intelligence branches.
Long before OSS-controlled intelligence and sabotage operatives parachuted into
France in 1944 with their Anglo-French compatriots, the major element of
Anglo-American cooperation had manifested itself already in the very fact that
OSS was ever involved in formulating these schemes. OSS/Londons inclusion
during operational planning, and the services success in arranging
communications with its agents, were the truly noteworthy developments in the
SO-SOE and SI-SIS partnerships. While the operatives in the field were
primarily concerned with surviving long enough to aid local Allied tactical units,
both branches depended on establishing close headquarters relations with their
British counterparts to the point where each was more fully integrated with its
opposite British service than it was with the rest of OSS. SIS and SOE obviously
gave strong support to American involvement in the European clandestine war,
albeit partly out of self-interest. The British services were clearly loyal, if
prudently cautious, allies and partners once they were assured of OSS/Londons
sound bureaucratic footing. Equally significant was how much OSS/Londons
leadership depended on establishing such close operational alliances. These
developments in turn unfolded within the clear context of military primacy, and
the creation of meaningful OSS operations for OVERLORD undeniably proved
significant to the military campaign in France. The Anglo-American clandestine
partnership was geared primarily toward aiding the Allied armies return to the
continent, with SI, SO, and the British services together hoping to excel at that
mission. These operations therefore underscored how Anglo-American
intelligence relations were indi visible from the larger military alliance.
Whatever the overblown, pervasive American mythology about British
intelligence manipulating the Americans in this sphere, OSS was mindful of the
requirement to exploit their colleagues operationally-orientated corporate spirit,
and so impress their own Army high command. The subordination of clandestine
action to military utility was accordingly the most critical factor in the Anglo-
American intelligence relationship leading up to OVERLORD, the June 1944
invasion of Normandy.
64 SERVANTS OF OVERLORD
A notable development in OSS/Londons operational evolution was David

Kirkpatrick Este Bruces appointment as head of the mission (with the eventual
title of Strategic Services Officer) at the end of 1942. William Whitney had
departed from his post with the transition of COI to OSS, to be replaced by
William Phillips on 19 July 1942. Phillipss tenure until 23 December was
notable more for its caretaking of OSS-British relations than it was for any
innovations in establishing actual operations.1 Suspected by the British of having
operated agents for the US Navy in a manner hostile to British interests (see
Chapter 2, p. 52), Phillips was later described by Bruce as being stubborn,
opinionated a loner, not the best traits for fashioning harmonious partnerships.
Upon taking over from Phillips, Bruce moreover found that his predecessor had
been running only two (useless) agents, and that both were already known to the
incoming Bruce through his British contacts. Phillips was just an amateur who
knew nothing, in Bruces blunt appraisal.2 The critical task of furthering liaison
contracts between the various branches of OSS and their opposite numbers in
the British services was in fact executed almost exclusively by the branches
themselves. Phillipss role accordingly involved little liaison contact work. He
instead focused on deciding between competing OSS/London claims that
occasionally arose for exclusive contact with a single British service.3
Bruces December appointment as OSS/Londons head thus marked a turning
point. Born to Virginian wealth and privilege, Bruce had served as an enlisted
man during the First World War, married into the Mellon family, been elected a
State legislator in both Maryland and Virginia, practised law, been Vice-Consul
in Rome, and worked with the Red Cross in Britain before the US entered the
Second World War.4 His patrician background was obviously suited to easing
relations with the British intelligence establishment (SOE/Washingtons Bickham
Sweet-Escott described him as one of the ablest Americans he had ever met),
but Bruce served with OSS for a year before being selected to work in London.5
His first post within OSS was that of overall SA/B branch chief from December
1941, in which capacity he was instructed in espionage tradecraft by MI6s Dick
Ellis. Bruce asked Ellis what to do, and Ellis accordingly instructed him. Bruce
later said that SI could not have begun without Ellis, and that Ellis had been
instructed to tell all about the British organization.6 This first-hand tutorial on
espionage was probably as professional a background as any available for an
OSS officer designated to oversee actual clandestine activities. Despite this, OSS/
Londons initial operational headway would be made with SO, not SI.
SO/London pursued negotiations with SOE during the Whitney-Phillips period
concerning SOs involvement in sabotage and subversion. These substantive
talks were among the earliest attempts by OSS to forge an Anglo-American
working relationship. Discussions were held on 17, 19, 22, and 23 June 1942 to
establish SO-SOE collaboration, and to define their respective global spheres of
responsibility. The OSS/ London area of principal concern was western Europe,
including France, Germany, the Low Countries, Norway, Switzerland, Poland,
and Czechoslovakia. Collaboration recognized two stagesestablishing a
AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE IN WAR-TIME LONDON 65
London SO presence to prepare for future operations with the US military, and
sending embryonic forces to potential invasion targets. It was accordingly
agreed that since SOE was already so engaged, it was reasonable in the spirit of
avoiding duplication and misunderstandings that any SO activity controlled from
London (not Washington) would for the time being fall under SOE direction and
supervision. Regional arrangements defining exclusive or joint SO or SOE work
would cover those countries and areas not falling within the invasion sphere,
and thus not within any operational military command. Both Donovan and
SOEs Head (CD), Sir Charles Hambro, initialled the agreements, and the
American JCS, British COS, and Foreign Office all approved them by the end of
August 1942.7
SO and SOE ostensibly carved up their own operational niches with this
spheres agreement, but in practice it gave approval for SO/ Londons full
collaboration with SOE concerning the exchange of information, intelligence,
and training methods, thereby conferring considerable legitimacy to SOs
potential. It also placed operational execution firmly within the military
leaderships purview, as SO would join SOE to serve military plans and
priorities. Phillips actually emphasized this aspect of SOEs relationship to the
British High Command. He noted the implicit suggestion that OSS develop a
similar relationship, thereby putting SO on a more equal footing with SOE, and
permitting SO-SOE collaboration on any future large-scale operations.8
David Bruce found upon relieving Phillips and arriving in London in February
1943 that actually creating such a viable SO operational capa bility necessitated
considerably more effort than merely signing agreements. Bruce began sending
Donovan a series of weekly letters in February describing OSS/London
developments, and his letter of 20 March stressed that the [m]ost important
current objective involved joining SOE on the ground floor with their
JEDBURGH plan, which SOE considered their most useful potential operation.
Complicating this, however, was the fact that SO was handicapped by
inadequate supplies, an as yet unfulfilled need for quality recruits, and
insufficient SO officers, those already in London being described as hard
working but not competent to deal as equals with their opposite numbers
higher leaders in SOE.9 He wrote further on 10 April that SOs basic policy
question centred on whether it should integrate in effect with SOE, and so be
subordinated to SOE in Europe. Bruce assumed British control over future
military invasion operations, and noted the tendencynot only in the military
but in the civil sphere, (as represented by the Ambassador), to allow the British
to play a predominant part. It was perhaps largely because of this phenomenon
that Bruce considered the SO-SOE partnership to have its attractions. SOs
integration with them and the advantage of their experience would enable
faster development than otherwise possible without SOE. Equally sobering was
that when OSS asked for such facilities as airplanes, we can only describe
hopes; the British can point to visible results, plans in being, and personnel in
great forces.10
Bruce felt moved on 17 April to clarify and amplify his previous suggestion
about a complete integration of SO with SOE after Donovan responded on 13
April to demand a defence of SOs independent status as a junior partner with the
British service.11 Bruce in fact believed that accepting British command
authority would enable SO to infiltrate [its] people actually into the various
sections of the SOE organization. He went on to note that this would give
[SOE] only ultimate authority for leadership; our men would perform certain
duties under British command, but at the same time maintain their own offices
for purposes of administration and carrying out their other activities. A further
development concerned revising the SO-SOE agreement. Bruce was about to
receive a memo from the British on a new and shorter form of the June 1942
Donovan-CD spheres agreement since the original had become so overlaid by
various notations and subsequent conversations that it is almost impossible to
decide from the written record where the two organizations stand. A clearer
understanding with SOE was desired given the prospective creation of a joint
Anglo-American invasion staff with a British head (Major-General Frederick
Morgan) and an American deputy (Brigadier-General Barker). Bruce had already
informed Barker of the SO-SOE arrangement, discovering that Barker knew well
SOEs Major-General Colin Gubbins (responsible for liaison with SO). Barker
agreed that this was desirable, and felt that SO should concede leadership to
SOE with the understanding that this authority would be revoked if and when
supreme command of an invasion were transferred to American forces. Barker
further suggested that SO should request permission simultaneously from the
new joint staff for the Jedburgh plan.12
Notwithstanding the acceptance of SO by the high-ranking officers of what
would become the Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (COSSAC),
Bruces reliance on SO-SOE integration must also have been affected by the
aforementioned tendency for American officials to defer to British capabilities. It
has been seen earlier how General Devers, commanding US Army forces within
the theatre, was notorious for this propensity. Bruce informed Donovan on 29
May that Devers worried about OSS/London operations tangling with British
arrangements. Bruce detailed Deverss intention to adhere strictly to the
Eisenhower policy [as Commanding General, ETOUSA in 1942] of not
conflicting with anything the British do, but to cooperate and use British
facilities. Bruce understandably found this attitude somewhat disturbing.13 It
was nevertheless a reality which could not be ignored, particularly as OSS was
designated a fully military detachment subject to military control on 4 June
1943.14
The ensuing drama of OSS/London securing British backing to convince the
JCS and Devers of OSS/Londons utility has already been detailed (see
Chapter 2, pp. 579), and the impact of this development on SOs fortunes was
soon clear. Bruce informed Donovan on 23 August that the Theater Commander
would back up [OSS] on [its] joint operations (Jeds, etc.), but perversely
complained that the trouble is that both the theater and the British expect us to
produce 100 French speaking American Army officers out of a hat like so many
rabbits.15 By 4 September, Bruce was less irked. MIRABILE DICTU! There
seems to have been during the last fortnight a complete change of atmosphere in
our relations with the Theater Commander. We only have to ask for something;
it is granted[Everything has been approved, everything is smooth.16
The American militarys support enhanced SOs ability to function
meaningfully with SOE, particularly as Major-General Gubbins replaced
Hambro within a week of Bruces ecstatic letter to Donovan. This shift from a
civilian to a military CD was taken by Bruce to be consistent with SOEs
increasing militarization.17 The most obvious operational rationale for this was
the formulation of the JEDBURGH plan, alluded to above. Named after an abbey
town in the Scottish Borders, this plan was designed to utilize French Resistance
forces to assist in the invasion of Normandy.18 SOE tested the concept of direct
British aid to resistance in March 1943 during exercise SPARTAN in western
England. This scenario demonstrated the potential of employing Allied teams to
organize resistance behind the lines as coordinated with Army plans by staff
detachments. The exercises lessons were discussed over the following two
weeks in meetings between SOE and SO representatives at Norgeby House (across
from SOEs 64 Baker Street headquarters in London). Their conclusions were
then submitted in a draft memorandum dated 18 March detailing how SOE
cooperation with conventional military forces could complement the invasion of
Europe, which would in turn serve as the basis for subsequent SO-SOE
operational planning. In securing personnel for JEDBURGH, SO/London drafted
another paper stressing the opportunity for a definite American contribution to
OVERLORDs resistance programme. This was submitted to the CG, ETOUSA
on 23 April, with his approval following on 29 August.19
The dual requirements of reaching agreement with SOE on incorporating SO
within its militarized OVERLORD plans, and securing the American Theater
Commanders support of OSS/London in general, thus converged by autumn
1943. This situation was, as might be expected, paralleled in SI. That branch first
discussed the prospect of collaborating with SIS and Free French intelligence in
autumn 1942, but progress on that front had been precluded by the restrictions
placed on OSS/Londons freedom to engage in espionage by the US military.20 SIS
was not prepared to interfere in what it considered a purely American
jurisdictional dispute.21 SI/London was therefore restricted to performing its
original COI function of collection of intelligence through liaison with the
British and other allied services, with a complement of two SI officers, Whitney
Shepardson and William Maddox. Shepardson in fact met the British JICs
chairman, Victor Cavendish-Bentinck in summer 1942, whereupon Cavendish-
Bentinck in most generous fashionput before [Shepardson] examples of many
kinds of British SIS intelligence intake and told [Shepardson] that he might
regularly receive any or all of these categories of intelligence.22
In light of the uncertainty about its own status with the American military,
however, and its own paucity of resources, OSS/London harboured doubts about
MI6s receptivity to a more active operational role for SI. It has been shown
earlier how SIS in fact desired guarantees as to the permanency of OSS before
agreeing to completely joint operations (Chapter 2). SI/Londons head actually
knew in 1942 that the US militarys restrictions on OSS were a mistaken
consideration on their part, inasmuch as British SIS was itself prepared to regard
[SI] as its opposite number.23 Such matters were further exacerbated by US
military intelligence interference in OSS relationships with exile intelligence
services, and with SIs receipt of SIS material.24 These facts combined with the
restrictions placed on SI espionage by US military intelligence to make the US
Army G-2 contingent in London potentially responsible for both American
espionage and for working with SIS. The question of OSS status therefore
developed in tandem with the formulation of plans for joint clandestine
operations. By 10 April, Bruce notified Donovan of an SI/London plan
developed by Stacey Lloyd for the infiltration of uni-formed two-man teams to
transmit military intelligence.25 The requirements for staff, training, potential
agents, and more SI personnel to liaise with foreign services were communicated
to Donovan two weeks later, and Bruce assured Donovan on 24 May that the SI-
SIS relationship continued satisfactorily despite OSS/Londons uncertain
position. He further told one OSS/Washington officer that SI/London was in the
best possible standing, thanks to Whitney [Shepardson, presumably] and the
continuation of his work and contacts.26 The Devers episode then intervened,
with Bruce informing Donovan on 29 May about the Theater Commanders
deference to British intelligence. This was all the more disheartening as Bruce
outlined in the same letter the encouragement he had received directly from C
to arrange the assignment of SI officers for staff intelligence and secret
intelligence duties to be trained before invasion, with SIS providing assistance
to SI groups at Army HQs as long as their presence was desirable. There was
also a tentative suggestion by C that French operations be conducted jointly
by SIS and OSS along with the French. Bruce understandably noted his
unhappiness with the idea of being denied the Theater Commanders permission
to move along such lines, especially since SIS made it clear that no further
consideration could be given to joint operations until OSS/London in fact
obtained the Theater Commanders official authorization to proceed. This was
all particularly galling since Bruce was mindful of the need to change over OSS/
Londons functions from liaison to operations, and because effective Broadway-
Si planning for an SIS operation similar to the Lloyd proposal, code-named
SUSSEX, was proceeding smoothly.27 With the successful resolution of OSS/
Londons standing, Bruce was able to inform Donovan on 28 August that the
Theatre Commanders intelligence staff was disposed to cooperate fully in the
activation of approved SIplans, thereby permitting SI to exploit its budding
operational links with SIS.28 A tripartite SUSSEX committee was soon formed
on 4 January 1944 to oversee planning, training, etc., consisting of MI6s
Commander Kenneth Cohen as chairman, with SIs Lieutenant-Colonel Francis
P.Miller and a Lieutenant-Colonel from French intelligence.29
Broadways support did not mean that SI was beyond attributing

obstructionist tendencies to SIS as a whole.30 One faction within SI/ London
insisted on blaming some SIS officials for trying to curb SIs activities, which
does not entirely square with the record of SIS support offered by C for OSS
over Devers, and for an SI role in OVERLORD in conjunction with SIS itself.31
One SI analysis subsequently noted that [w]hile some [MI6] officers were
apparently motivated only by a reasonable desire that there should be no crossing
of wires caused by American activities in territory already entered by the
British, other unnamed Britishers evidently were anxious to maintain complete
control of all intelligence activities in Western Europe.32 This must be
contrasted with Bruces March 1943 report to Donovan that no recommendation
from Major-General George Strong (of US Army G-2) would likely have any
influence with C, and the fact that C later rebuffed Strongs attempt to
involve G-2 in counter-intelligence work in favour of OSS/London (see
Chapter 7).33 One important detail may have been noted by SIs Whitney
Shepardson: the intense mutual hostility between French and British intelligence.
Because SI had excellent relations with both British and French services, SIs
position between the two may have complicated matters.34 David Schoenbruns
Soldiers of the Night quotes Bruces observation that Menzies was favourably
disposed toward OSS, but his deputy, Claude Dansey, a crusty old curmudgeon
whodid everything he couldand it was quite a bitto sabotage [OSS/
Londons] relationship [with the French] and [OSS/Londons] plans to set up
American teams for France.35 Menziess personal assistant also suggests that
Dansey was overtly hostile toward SOE, OSS, and the French intelligence
service, BCRA.36 SIs conflict with Dansey personally over French overtures to SI
would thus seem to be the source of any SI-SIS friction, rather than some
institutional desire by SIS to thwart or control OSS (see Chapter 2 for more on
Dansey, pp. 578).
In any event, SOE-SO joint subversive operations within the JEDBURGH
scheme, and SIS-SI joint intelligence operations within the SUSSEX formula,
were worked out from the end of August 1943 onwards. The defining elements
of these partnerships were from the beginning the essentially smooth integration
of the American intelligence and sabotage branches with their British opposite
numbers, and the often intense SO-SI rivalry within OSS that mirrored the ill-
feeling between SOE and SIS. The nature of this situation may be gleaned from
the diary of George E.Brewer, Jr, alternately SO/Londons Acting Chief,
Executive Officer, and officer in charge of country house installations. Brewer
himself betrayed one source of the rivalry:
Think [SIs William P.] Maddox has a tendency to be touchy on matters of

SI prestige vs. SOrivalry must not develop between branches but it is a
slight danger. I will ask all our Branch to be both tactful and cooperative with
SI. There is one point, however, that should be recognized by M[addox]
and D[avid] B[ruce]: SI exists as a service branch (tho by no means
exclusively for SO). SO is not; it is an operative branch. The sanctity of

our respective files and the degree of freedom with which we exchange
information is governed by different necessities.
Such an artificial distinction could hardly grease the wheels for interbranch
collaboration regarding planning, coordinating field operations, joint liaison with
the military, information exchanges, intelligence sharing, and the economical use
of personnel and resources. The entire prospect of SI/London engaging in
SUSSEX particularly vexed Brewer, who described SIs intentions as a
thoroughly crack pot action program that could interfere with the JEDBURGH
plan, particularly with regard to recruiting wireless operators. Brewer informed
Bruce on 26 April 1943 of his certainty that confusion, wastage of common
resources, etc. would result if SI carried on. While Bruce apparently saw
Brewers point, he remained fundamentally unsympathetic to Brewers desire
to curtail the activities of SI which appear[ed] to [Brewer] to be operational
rather than concerned with Intelligence. Even after meeting with SI officers on
30 April to clarify their operation, Brewer and other SO men still concluded that
SI had completely overstepped themselves and the only excuse for their pursuing
their plan at all was one of politics, namely that by performing this particular
service for the Army, the Army might be more inclined to grant us favors in the
future.37
This friction contrasted strongly with the apparently warm SO-SOE
relationship as personified by SOEs liaison officer, who Brewer described as
a most likable and frank personalways willing to acknowledge the

justice of events and facts[with] no sense of false pride whatever either
in his organization or in a British point of view. I think we understand each
other perfectly and as long as he is in the picture in his present capacity there
should never be a serious misunderstanding with Baker Street and
ourselves on any subject.
Brewer further described his SOE counterparts as men who all impressed [him]
as being the highest type of honorable and loyal officers who are playing
absolutely square with [SO] in every particular, whereas when SO officers were
briefed on North African operations by SOEs Douglas Dodds-Parker, he
referred to one OSS officer in that theatre as being more an SI than an SO man,
thus confirming Brewers suspicions that he had never really been sold on the
SO gang.38
Brewers observations clearly indicate that SOE-SIS fragmentation affected
the separate planning within OSS for JEDBURGH and SUSSEX. The sabotage
people spoke one anothers language, and saw things in similar terms; likewise
for the intelligence services and their operations. The two groups could only
speak past one another, and this obviated developing a distinctive, unified
American intelligence-sabotage campaign in Europe. Brewer evidently could not
comprehend the operational dimension of intelligence collection. While having

only the highest praise for the judicious and logical temperaments of his SOE
counterparts, the SI types were simply not part of the gang. The dominance of
Britains fragmented intelligence system therefore helps explain why Bruce
found himself balanced on a bureaucratic tightrope between SIS and SOE in
his attempts to get an OSS operational capability off the ground.39 A touch of
Anglophilia might also account for the willing American acceptance of British
methods as each OSS branch sought to ensure its own standing within the
London mission. Brewer was certainly motivated by a natural ambition to
achieve operational successes, and jealously guarded his branchs interests. This
in itself merely demonstrates, however, the extent to which OSS/Londons
theoretical unity gave way to the force of circumstance, and OSS/Londons weak
capacity for centralized direction in the face of outside influences. It also confirms
the observation of SOEs Bickham Sweet-Escott that Anglo-American liaison
functioned most effectively in the field, not in Washington. SOE alienated SO/
Washington by withholding information, while SO/Washington refused to learn
from SOEs experience, and generally tried to function without seemingly
selling-out to the perfidious British, all with little to show for it (OSS/
Washingtons James Grafton Rogers described resenting SOEs cagey,
patronizing interference in November 1943). SO/London conversely embraced
the chance to work with SOE.40
A critical prerequisite for this separate but equal evolution of joint SO-SOE
and SI-SIS plans for OVERLORD concerned communications arrangements
previously worked out with the British services. Efficient radio communication
with the JEDBURGH teams was obviously essential to the plans successful
execution, centring as it did on the coordination of Resistance forces with the
invasion armies. The SUSSEX plan also required secure, reliable
communications links, without which the entire attempt to provide timely
intelligence from behind German lines would prove impossible. OSS had
initially been keen to establish an independent OSS signals set-up in England
exclusively for their operations, but by November 1942 they openly conceded
that the crowded condition of those parts of the [radio] spectrum reserved for
secret communication between England and agents on the continent made
perfect coordination between stations in England mandatory. Without it the
entire secret communications network would be jeopardized. SOE had in fact
opposed the establishment of an independent American network to
communicate with SO agents for precisely such technical reasons that were
undeniably valid. SIS for its part apparently assumed that OSS would insist
upon having [its] own communications system for SI agents on the continent and
elsewhere, which led OSS to believe in November 1942 that SIS would
probably make no serious objection should [OSS] seek to establish a small
transmitting station for this work in the British Isles. OSS/London therefore
took its SI communications arrangement as a given, while specifically proposing
that it should build, equip, staff, and operate the third SOE communications
station scheduled for inclusion in the British communications system, thereby

enabling SO to use the entire SOE network for all SO traffic and any other
messages [SO] might wish to clear through it in [their] own cipher.41 MI6s
Controller (of) Special Communications, Colonel R.Gambier-Parry, concurred
with this intention and sanctioned allocating unlisted SIS frequencies for
exclusive OSS use, provided that OSS agreed to coordinate technical issues with
him (such as mast locations and heights, frequencies, contact times and operating
procedures) so as to avoid serious disaster, and undesirable investigation from
the Radio Security Service. This was promptly accepted by OSS in January 1943,
and it ensured the utmost freedom and independence of action that OSS/
London desired. OSS communications for OVERLORD duly proceeded from
two stations in England: Station CHARLES (SO) at Hurley, and Station
VICTOR (SI) at Poundon.42 (It should be noted, too, that the British intelligence
Official History states that OSS refused to accept joint codes and a single
communications system with SIS in January 1943 as this would have permitted
SIS knowledge of SI operations without reciprocity, and that SIS lacked
confidence in OSS signals security; this assertion is undocumented, but it is
presumably drawn from Kermit Roosevelts War Report of the OSS, Vol. II).43
Equally crucial for the JEDBURGH/SUSSEX schemes was the creation of SI
and SO detachments designed to coordinate the clandestine operations with the
armies actions in the field. SO concluded early in its JEDBURGH planning that
assuring its best assistance for the invasion forces required attaching officers to
field army staffs for close work with the staffs operational and intelligence
divisions. This would facilitate liaison between armies and resistance groups
through SOE/SO Headquarters in London. The SO detachments would move
with the advancing armies, and attempt to inform commanders of resistance
group capabilities according to the militarys own operational plans. SO staff
members could quickly contact resistance members overrun by the military
forces, and funnel information from resistance members or agents, as well as
from JEDBURGH teams via SOE/SO HQ, to the armies field headquarters. This
idea was formalized throughout the spring and summer of 1943, building on a
similar proposal from SOE for COSSAC, and approved by the British Chiefs of
Staff in July. SI Field Detachments were also planned in conjunction with
SUSSEX as linkage between SI/London and the American forces in the field.
Planning commenced in summer 1943 with Broadway and G-2. SI units were
tasked with channelling secret information from SUSSEX, transmitting
information requests from the military to field agents, and processing remaining
agents in the SUSSEX pool. They would also recruit agents in the field, and this
organization was deliberately modelled on the British SIS team raised to serve
the British-Canadian 21st Army Group. The SI Detachment plan was expanded
in November 1943 to provide a staff at the American Army Group level as well,
and to include the recovery of overrun agents.44
The orientation of both JEDBURGH and SUSSEX planning clearly reflected
the primary objective of these projects: to contribute as fully as possible to
OVERLORDs successful execution. This objective was the driving force behind
the support given to these plans by General Dwight Eisenhower, appointed in
January 1944 as Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force. One factor
contributing to Eisenhower getting SOE/SO HQ under his wing through its
subordination to the G-3 (Operations) staff of the Supreme Headquarters, Allied
Expeditionary Force (SHAEF, successor to COSSAC), was the question of
Americas relationship with the Free French. Prime Minister Churchill had
proven a strong backer of the French National Committee of Liberation (FNCL),
which Washington officials interpreted as Churchills attempt to woo the French
for the post-war political end of securing British influence in non-communist
Europe. When Eisenhower informed the JCS at the end of January 1944 that he
and SHAEF were dependent on SOE for their Resistance policy, he was naturally
moved to see the integrated SO-SOE effort (formalized on 24 January) as a
means of injecting an American component to Resistance support. By 19 April, a
JCS cable informed Eisenhower that an equalization of effort in arming the
French was required. SOs potential to help realize that goal was again
obvious.45 This clearly helped to counter a January 1944 JCS demand that SO/
London work independently of SOE (the British observed in March that the
close coordination between SO-SOE did not compromise OSS
independence).46
Another reason for Eisenhower to embrace the joint Anglo-American
intelligence/sabotage plans stemmed from their potential utility to the
conventional invasion forces. More bluntly, Eisenhowers concern for
OVERLORDs success understandably encouraged a maximum effort of
wholesale rail-cuts beyond the original phased programme of JED-BURGH pre-
invasion sabotage.47 Eisenhowers recognition that the military would need very
badly the support of the Resistance Groups in France also helped to overcome
his reluctance to mix with the FNCLhe would, in fact, deal with any French
body that seem[ed] capable of assisting the invasion.48 The work of SO-SOE
through JEDBURGH thus fitted precisely into Eisenhowers calculations of the
correlation of forces for OVERLORD, grasping as he was for any possible
battlefield advantage available in order to secure his bridgehead. The SUSSEX
plan was also geared toward providing timely tactical intelligence for the armies
which would be at a premium in the effort to survive the inevitable German
counter-attack, let alone to launch an eventual break-out.49
As an integral part of that risky enterprise, the joint SOE/SO Headquarters was
renamed Special Forces Headquarters (SFHQ) on 1 May 1944, with training and
material preparation proceeding at a rapid pace for executing what was originally
conceived as a two-phase plan of sabotage. The first phase would cover the pre-
invasion (or pre-D-Day) period, as three-man teams consisting of two officers
and a signaller drawn from American, British, and French personnel commenced
dropping by parachute immediately before the scheduled invasion date, and
continuing thereafter. These JEDBURGH teams would organize French
Resistance forces in a general sabotage programme against German military
installations. The second (or post-D-Day) phase would begin with the invasion
itself, when JEDBURGH teams would coordinate the Resistance forces with
allied bombing, attacks against German reserves, and general guerrilla warfare.
As noted above, however, the original phased plan was intensified to concentrate
on attacks against German communications, particularly rail lines, in order to
impede the immediate German reaction to the landings. Throughout these
operations, the JEDBURGH teams would be directed from, and report to, SFHQ,
which was in turn directly controlled under the aegis of SHAEFs G-3
(Operations) staff, although the French Resistance forces themselves were placed
under the command of the French General Marie-Pierre Koenig by SHAEF on 6
June without consulting SFHQ.50
The first JEDBURGH team dropped into France on the night of 5/6 June, with
a total of six teams in the field by the end of the month. Four of these teams
(FREDERICK, GEORGE, HAMISH and IAN) contained SO personnel.
FREDERICK conducted attacks against enemy communications; HAMISH
interfered with troop movements, and arranged reception of supplies; IAN
likewise interfered with troop movements, but was effectively uncontrolled due
to wireless difficulties; GEORGE was largely thwarted by enemy action, and
compromised by an enemy agent among its Resistance colleagues. From July
through August, these teams primarily engaged in coordinating general Maquis
guerrilla warfare while monitored by Station CHARLES. During the July
September period, they were joined by additional teams, of which GAVIN,
HORACE, HILARY, GERALD, RONALD, DOUGLAS II, IVOR, ALEC, LEE,
JAMES, ALEXANDER, ANTHONY, and BRUCE contained SO personnel.
These new teams further contributed to the guerrilla campaign by organizing the
Maquis as reconnaissance, holding, and general nuisance forces despite strained
relations with the more action-orientated Special Air Service (SAS) troops, who
also fell into organizing Resistance forces (the SAS were primarily designed as
raiding forces, whose independent OSS counterparts were the OGs, or
Operational Groups). These teams profited from the work of the SO units
attached to the field armies, now renamed SF Detachments. The detachments
engaged in a considerable amount of personal liaison with Resistance groups
encountered by the armies when direction from London proved impracticable.
This, in turn, contributed greatly to the further tactical employment of the
Maquis in support of immediate military operations, and to their provision of
tactical intelligence in the course of their activities. Such support by the SF
Detachments proved so popular with the armies that the OSS officers involved
could not keep up with the demand.51 The JEDBURGH operations thus helped
complicate German attempts to establish set defences against the conventional
military forces in what amounted to a tactical, rather than strategic role. The
entire Resistance effort in turn tended to exhibit potential beyond that expected
before the invasion.
The SUSSEX teams experiences also evolved beyond original expectations.
With three-quarters of the SI/London staff concentrating on SUSSEX, this
scheme offered OSS its first real chance at contributing substantively to the
European intelligence war. SUSSEX in its final form envisaged tripartite
cooperation among SIS, SI and BCRA in providing both strategic and tactical
intelligence to the Allied armies for OVER-LORD. This intelligence would be
collected by 96 agents recruited from a common pool of potential agents drawn
from the Free French Army, and dropped into France in two-man teams over the
period 9 April1 September 1944. Half of these observer-signaller teams would
be dispatched to locations in the US Armys area of operations, and controlled by
SI through Station VICTOR. These teams would be collectively known as
OSSEX. The remaining teams, code-named BRISSEX, would function in the
British-Canadian 21st Army Group sector, and be controlled by SIS from its own
radio facility in England. SI and SIS would then communicate to SHAEF and the
invasion armies the intelligence messages they received from the field. A
Pathfinder mission was sent to France in February to make advance security
arrangements for the SUSSEX teams in the form of safe landing fields, safe
houses and reception committees. By D-Day, there were seven each of the
BRISSEX and OSSEX teams in the field providing messages on German
military installations and movements. All of their messages were received by the
respective SIS and SI radio stations, passed to the respective SIS or SI
Operations Rooms, translated and processed (in SI, by their Reports Division),
and disseminated to SHAEF and the SI Field Detachments in the American sector.
The messages were then passed on to the relevant field army intelligence staffs;
copies of each message were subsequently sent by the receiving service (SI or
SIS) to its Anglo-French or Franco-American colleagues.52
The OSSEX teams most notable coup immediately before and after D-Day
involved tracking the Panzer Lehr Divisions movements. By the end of June, 87
reports had been received from the 12 OSSEX teams in contact with Station
VICTOR or with monitoring aircraft; 22 messages were disseminated by
BRISSEX teams. Eight further OSSEX teams were dropped during July,
resulting in 219 messages containing intelligence.53 SI/London disseminations of
intelligence to SHAEF graded for reliability indicate a one or two day delay in
getting OSSEX material to SHAEF throughout JuneAugust 1944, with most
OSSEX messages graded B-2, as compared to B-3 for material of SFHQ
origin.54 This intelligence effort was well regarded in the field by the 1st US
Army, and received an equally positive reception from SHAEF.55 Major-General
K.W.D.Strong stated after the war that as SHAEF G-2, secret agents were one of
his main sources as his staff made the transition from focusing on strategic
intelligence to procuring tactical intelligence. His best sources of tactical
intelligence were air reconnaissance supplemented through tie-ins with OSS,
SIS, [and] SOE, with OSS in particular doing a good job.56 The 21st Army
Groups Brigadier General Staff (Intelligence), E.T.Williams, also valued OSS
intelligence on the movement of German armour, whereas British agents were
too thin in the south to get this dope. The [b]ulk of the sources [were]
established by the British, but Williams believed that after OVERLORD,
British sources from [the] agents point of view ceased. American sources came
alive tactically, while the British remained the best strategically[as they were
more directly] linked back to London.57 Williams further wanted an SI
Detachment to work with the 21st Army Group because its product was so
highly regarded, compared to the intelligence from the 2nd British Army, which
had been unsatisfactory.58
The SI Field Detachments were critical to the militarys increasingly positive
reception toward OSS intelligence work in Normandy (General Sibert, 12th US
Army Group G-2, several times expressed satisfaction with work done by [the]
12th Army Group [SI] Detachment).59 The strategic and operational picture
available to the army staffs obviously centered on ULTRA material gleaned from
cryptanalysis, and passed to the armies by Special Liaison Units attached to the
army field headquarters.60 ULTRA was also useful as a means of selecting
correct information from the mass of available material.61 A 1st US Army SLU
officer believed that G-2 had to use PW interrogations, P/R and Tac[tical]/R
[econnaissance], Signal Intelligence, Agents and Documents, as well as Ultra.
No single one is a touchstone and dire results will follow from the notion that
Ultra is the only agency which need be studied and believed.62 One officer
attached to SHAEF Air Intelligence stated outright that ULTRA gives merely
proper direction and the rest is a matter of applying sound Intelligence
procedure to the other sources, rather than simply providing conversational
titbits for generals.63 The main relevance of OSSEX-generated information was
therefore at the immediate tactical level as another valued source of combat
intelligence. The SI Field Detachments fulfilled much the same role as an SLU
by being a link between SUSSEX intelligence and the field armies, but they were
also more closely involved in directing and controlling their own particular
assets. The SI Detachments recruited local people as agents without special
training for use in shallow infiltration missions to obtain short range tactical
intelligence.64 SIS encountered the same phenomenon, and credited it both to a
gap in the British and American armies long-range intelligence capabilities, and
to their immediate, pressing demands for tactical intelligence.65 This must have
contributed to Broadways 11 June decision to sanction sending SI-controlled
agents to the American zone without formal SIS clearance.66
The commander of the 1st US Armys SI Detachment ironically took
exception to this whole trend, as a dissipation of SI resources at the expense of
its proper espionage role, although this attitude may have stemmed from the 1st
US Army G-2s personal antipathy toward OSS, which contributed to this
detachment eventually moving to the 12th US Army Group HQ.67 The SI
Detachment commanders superiors in London did not concur with his view,
however. OSS/Londons Theater Report for 115 June 1944 emphasized that:
Attention has been directed to possibilities of expanding the number of

intelligence producing sources which SI detachments in the field could
offer to G-2 in the field. OSS has its greatest opportunity for intelligence
service when G-2 makes up a list of intelligence requirements in

connection with any operation; when the G-2 Operations Section checks
over these intelligence requirements, determines those which can be met
with air reconnaissance, combat patrols, etc., and finds that some of these
requirements cannot be met by any orthodox method. It is on these that
OSS should train its intelligence resources.68
This hard reality was brought home even more by David Bruce himself two
weeks later:
During the past week, Colonel Bruce visited the lodgment area and
returned with several distinctive impressions which may be summarized as
follows:
Regardless of the value of the contribution that OSS has made in the
past, or will continue to make in the field of Strategic or long-range
intelligence and operations, from now on OSS [sic] reputation and
prestige will be considerably affected by the success obtained by its field
units in achieving the tactical desires of army commanders. This is in large
part due to the fact that those field commanders whose word will mean
much concerning the value of any given components of the military
organization will have small appreciation of long-range activities of OSS,
but they are likely to have definite opinions concerning the operations of
our field units. OSS is therefore in a position where it must give full
support to its field units, even though they may have been considered as
subsidiary and incidental to the long-range activities of the organization.69
(Bradley Smith credits Donovan for pushing this agenda throughout 1944, but
the documents obviously show how this was only realized after D-Day, and by
Bruce and other officers.)70 For their part, the American military concluded that
agents reports were of particular use, fourth in priority to the more immediate
means of PW interrogation, PR, and SIGINT. The 3rd US Army G-2 believed
that
[t]he OSS Detachment was an agency of wide versatility and great value.
Under aggressive and cooperative leadership, and functioning in close
coordination and confidence, it executed a wide range of important
missions, from procuring of information of enemy forces, defenses and
movements behind his lines, to preparing economic and political surveys
of areas under enemy control It contributed vitally to effective combat
intelligence and in a number of cases was the sole source of information
upon which tactical decisions could be based. From the Army point of
view, under proper leadership, it was indispensable.
American military intelligence further conceded that there was universal

agreement on the need of personnel trained in espionage to work with the field
armies, and OSS received nothing but praise for its work in establishing the
network of agents which furnished considerable valuable intelligence before
OVERLORD.71
The SI Detachments position, like that of OSS as a whole concerning
OVERLORD, bore out the advice tendered by a former SHAEF liaison officer to
his replacement. My main hint is not to be a Fuller Brush man. Bother people as
little as possible and ONLY when you have something that will help them. Be on
top, but never underfoot. Then, when you do need them, your credit will be
good.72 By so acting, OSS came into its own as a result of JEDBURGH and
SUSSEX, and their utility to SHAEF and the American armies. OSS intelligence
efforts soon came to outstrip MI6s capabilities as SI built on the particular
success of its OSSEX programme. It has been noted above how SIS-controlled
agents dried up after D-Day, and SIS apparently found itself unable to cope
with the requirements of documenting their existing agents due for insertion. The
OSS/London Research and Development Branch War Diary details how between
115 August, their SIS counterparts could not keep up the flow, apparently due
to their shockingly meagre budgets and apparatus compared with [R&Ds], and
requested that R&D come to their rescue.73 SI, in contrast, was able to follow up
on SUSSEX with a wholly independent OSS project run along SUSSEX lines,
code-named PROUST. Donovan had suggested the preceding February that SI
create a reserve agent pool in preparation for any eventualities which might arise
after D-Day. A total of 43 French agents were dispatched throughout July to mid-
September grouped into seven missions which continued providing tactical
intelligence with mixed success due to bad luck, and to the teams being
overtaken by rapidly advancing military forces. SOE and SO for their part wound
down their JEDBURGH operation together on 13 October after their own
subordination to the main military effort.74
The Normandy campaigns conclusion at the end of August 1944 marked the
terminal point to an experience that saw SI and SO finally act on the months of
dealing and planning for a US role in the intelligence and sabotage war. Those
experiences highlighted just how much the intelligence war had evolved into an
auxiliary of the main effort, rather than as a fourth arm. This held true as much
for the other components of the Allied intelligence arsenal as for OSS. ULTRA
could not itself stand as the sole basis of Allied intelligence in Normandy, in
spite of Hut 3 [at GCHQ] mak[ing] a fetish of not considering any other
source.75 Nor could the military HQs jeopardize the successful execution of
OVERLORD by ignoring the secret services contribution. The military bore the
responsibility for the main effort, and everything was subordinated to supporting
it. Independent agents waging their own strictly cloak-and-dagger war were
irrelevant to that reality. The intelligence war now mattered only insofar as it
furthered the supreme operation of 1944. SHAEF embraced the potential of the
clandestine intelligence and sabotage services precisely in those terms, and the
armies in the field quickly came to rely on them to fill a real gap in their
intelligence capabilities, and to augment the conventional forces with the
widespread harassment factor embodied in the Resistance.76
The relevance of the Anglo-American secret services was therefore directly
proportionate to their ability to serve SHAEF and the armies. SIS and SOE were
as heavily invested in the successful execution of that mission as were SI and SO.
SOE was driven to validate the entire concept of sabotage and resistance as a
fourth arm, while SIS had with SUSSEX its only real prospect of redeeming
itself for past operational shortcomings with some tangible successes in the field.
That SI outstripped its British counterpart, and SO kept pace with the
numerically superior SOE, were achievements made possible by the British
services obvious support of OSS. Both SIS and SOE gave their support to their
American colleagues as OSS secured the authority to act from its own theatre
command, and as certain unavoidable technical prerequisites, such as
communications and personnel, were met. That the British did so testifies to their
whole approach toward working with OSS. Each British service paired off with
the OSS branch most similar to itself, and supported what would presumably be
a junior partner that would probably enhance the viability of JEDBURGH or
SUSSEX with its modest contribution. It may also have been considered politic
to involve OSS fully with British plans in keeping with the corporatism of the
entire OVERLORD enterprise. As events unfolded, however, SI and SO
surpassed all expectations, and delivered what the military desired. Both
branches proved better able to adapt and respond to evolving circumstances, and
their focus on doing so was not an indication of a minimalized anti-climactic
role, but a recognition of what was required from intelligence as supporting
players.77
These two branches successes were simultaneously facilitated, and
complicated, by their relationship with the British services. The support of SIS
and SOE was of paramount importance to the survival and evolving credibility
of OSS in the face of persistent scepticism from the American military. At no
time did SIS or SOE seek to curtail the growth of OSS, whatever the suspicions
of some within SI, or whatever inevitable personality clashes occurred. The
British in fact fostered OSS. SI and SO moreover owed their involvement in
OVERLORD to their being permitted to fuse with their counterparts in what
were really the only viable clandestine programmes that OSS could have hoped
to participate in, much less develop on its own, whatever premature pretensions
Donovan in particular harboured about independent SI espionage launched
from Britain. What must also be conceded, though, is the fact that OSS did not
participate in OVERLORD as a coherent entity. It was as fragmented as the
British intelligence community, and in fact suffered from the same rivalries and
infighting as the British. George Brewers diary particularly illuminates the
institutional parochialism involved, while Bruces correspondence further
underscores the reality that the branches had to forge their own relationships with
the individual British services to make any headway. The evolution of SUSSEX
and JED-BURGH therefore had to overcome the competition tolerated within the
British system, thus nullifying the presumed advantage of a unified intelligence
service supposedly embodied by OSS. The classic manifestation of this was SIs
opposition to SO disseminating intelligence obtained from the Resistance; SIS
continues to disseminate its own reports and interpretations of Resistance
independent of SOE. Since SIS preserves its freedom as an intelligence agency,
SI must retain a similar right on the American side.78 It is moreover clear in
retrospect that this fragmentation prevented the clandestine services from making
an even greater contribution to OVERLORD than was in fact the case. It
obviously precluded contemplating, much less developing, a unified secret
service HQ that could oversee both SUSSEX and JEDBURGH; it ruled out the
possibility of having a joint SI/SF Detachment with each army HQ; and it certainly
prevented a unity of effort in the field between the SFHQ-controlled Resistance,
and the SUSSEX intelligence gatherers. It is not unreasonable to hold that a truly
coordinated clandestine programme could have provided even better support for
the military. It is undeniable, though, that cooperation between functionally
identical servicesSI with SIS, SO with SOEwas as far as unity of effort
could go. Functional loyalties thus took precedence over national ones. SI and
SIS could fuse more effectively than either could with their own national
sabotage service (William Phillips characterized this phenomenon as SO and
SOE working jointly, while SI and SIS worked on parallel lines).79
The popular mythology about British intelligence colouring most
interpretations of OSS/Londons evolution are accordingly rooted in some
fundamental misconceptions about the outstations imperatives. The patrician
background of OSS/Londons hierarchy, particularly as embodied by David
Bruce, is granted pride of place in explaining Anglo-American intelligence
harmony. Bruces ability to mix in the British establishments Savoy/Whites
milieu is often presumed to have been a prerequisite for creating a sound, even
like-minded, relationship with British services keen to see OSS evolve under
their thumbs. By projecting the correct image, the Americans were able to secure
British tutelage and subsequently bloom to assume the British espionage mantle.
The quality of life that Bruce and his British counterparts enjoyed is certainly
spelled out in Bruces wartime diary, with constant references to his fine dining
experiences.80 Bruce further wrote Donovan in March 1943 to request
(unsuccessfully, it seems) getting on the US Embassys Diplomatic List in order
to obtain liquor necessary for the arduous, continuous entertaining that the
men in [Bruces] office [were] obliged to do to maintain and open up
relationshipsprofitable to [OSS/Londons] work.81 Reality was nevertheless
quite different. Clubability and establishment credentials counted for very little
as long as the US military remained wary of OSS abilities. The British
were moreover guided primarily in their approach to OSS wartime operations by
their own strained resources, not by a cunning desire to control American
intelligence. The British supported SI and SO because of what the Americans
could offer to the success of JEDBURGH and SUSSEX, not because the
Americans presented an acceptable establishment face. While OSS alumnus

Donald Downes later castigated the British for the sins of cynicism and perfidious
manipulation at the expense of OSS innocence and incompetence in the Great
Game, his disillusioned portrait is unconvincing. Downes had no conception of
the importance of the military context to Anglo-American clandestine
operations, particularly as related to the pressing need for OSS to win favour
with its high command (if anything, his portrait of 1943 OSS relations with SOE
in the Mediterranean underscores the British wariness about OSS involvement
when OSS lacked the backing of its high command, in that instance
Eisenhower). Where Downes saw conflicting Anglo-American politics being
played out in the intelligence arena, there was really confusion about
capabilities, aims, authority, and military utility. Such confusion developed in
London, but the primacy of OVERLORD and SHAEF made the British support
full OSS participation in clandestine operations. The influence of British
fragmentation may have prevented OSS from demonstrating centralization, but it
certainly never prevented OSS from making the most of its opportunities,
opportunities largely based on the pragmatism of the British connection.82
SI and SO accordingly forged a much-desired OSS operational spearhead
through their participation in OVERLORD where their operations made a useful
contribution to the Normandy campaign after winning the US militarys support.
This required functionally integrating US activities with those of their British
counterparts, and so demonstrated a positive result from the Anglo-American
intelligence relationship. It may still be seen, though, that this was at the expense
of realizing the OSS potential for a coordinated effort that may, in turn, have
realized the presumed advantage inherent in the ostensibly unified American
service. As events unfolded, such a realization only developed in the closing
months of the war.
Besides centralization, another supposed OSS innovation involved more
cerebral weapons, subsequently described as the intellectual equivalent of the
Manhattan Project. While this component of OSS/London ambitiously sought to
bring its particular capacity for using the fruits of intelligence to bear on the war
effort with as much enthusiasm as the most daring JEDBURGH operative, the
extent to which it merits such a historical reputation is another matter.83
NOTES
1. War Diary, Directors Office, OSS/London, Preamble to 1 January 1944, pp. 4,

2. Thomas Troy interview with Bruce, 30 December 1972, Folder 56, Box 7, Troy
Papers, RG 263, NARA.
3. War Diary, Directors Office, Preamble, pp. 289.
4. See Lankford (ed.), Diaries of David K.E.Bruce, pp. 115, and n.d., n.a.,
biographical details in Folder 147, Box 97, Entry 99, RG 226, NARA; note also
that SA/B was later renamed SI.
5. Bickham Sweet-Escott, Baker Street Irregular (London: Methuen, 1965), p. 133.

6. Troy interview with Bruce; see also Bruces report, The Functions and Requirements
of SAB London, 12 August 1942, Reel 88, Entry 180, RG 226, NARA.
7. This paragraph is drawn from the narrative of War Diary, Directors Office,
Preamble, pp. 246.
8. Ibid., p. 26; for the text of the SOE/SO agreement, see War Diary, SO Branch,
Vol. 12, pp. 1631, in OSS/London, Reel 6.
9. Bruce to Donovan, 20 March 1943, frame 98, Reel 39, Entry 95; summarized in
Notes on Colonel Bruces Correspondence with General Donovan, February 13
December 17 1943, in Folder 376, Box 227, Entry 190; both in RG 226, NARA.
10. Bruce to Donovan, 10 April 1943, frames 11112, Reel 39, Entry 95, summarized
in Notes on Bruces Correspondence, in Folder 376, Box 227, Entry 190; see also
George S. Brewer, Jr, Diary, 7 April 1943, Folder 4, Box 178, Entry 92; all in RG
226, NARA; SO participation in SOE sabotage circuits began in July 1942, but
only on a small scalesee War Diary, SO Branch, OSS/London, Vol. 3, Western
Europe, pp. 1213, in Bradley F.Smith (ed.), Covert Warfare, Vol. 5: Other OSS
Teams (New York: Garland, 1989).
11. Draft of War Diary, Strategic Services Officer, OSS/London, Relations with the
British, pp. 1112, Folder 38, Box 3, Entry 147, RG 226, NARA; Donovan later
stated explicitly to SOE on 26 July 1943 that he supported an integrated SOE-OSS
team in Francesee M.R.D.Foot, The OSS and SOE: An Equal Partnership?, in
Chalou (ed.), Secrets, p. 298; Bruce to Donovan, 17 April 1943, Notes; and
frames 11517, Reel 39, Entry 95, RG 226, NARA.
12. Bruce to Donovan, 17 April 1943Bruce to Donovan, 13 February 1943, frame
76, Reel 39, shows that Barker had been keen on SO operations on a scale that they
simply could not yet meet; see also Brewer Diary, 3, 9, 12, 15 and 27 April 1943;
all in RG 226, NARA.
13. Bruce to Donovan, 29 May 1943, Notes; and frames 1445, Reel 39, Entry 95;
see also Brewer Diary, 26 March 1943; draft of War Diary, Directors Office,
OSS/London, Preamble to 1 January 1944, p. 12, Folder 248, Box 220, Entry 190,
14. Military Control of the Office of Strategic Services, 3 June 1943, in War Diary,
SO, Vol. 12, p. 51.
15. Bruce to Donovan, 23 August 1943, Notes; and frame 178, Reel 39, Entry 95, RG
226, NARA.
16. Bruce to Donovan, 4 September 1943, Notes; and frame 185, Reel 39, Entry 95;
this change included approval for obtaining sufficient personnel for the projected
operationssee draft of War Diary, Directors Office, pp. 657, Folder 39, Box
3, Entry 147; all in RG 226, NARA.
17. Bruce to Buxton, 13 September 1943, Folder 39, Box 24, Entry 92, RG 226,
NARA.
18. Jedburgh is properly pronounced to rhyme with Edinburgh, rather than with ice-
berg; Bruce first referred to Jedburgh teams being tested during an exercise held
in the first week of March, presumably SPARTANsee Bruce to Donovan, 8
March 1943, Notes, and frame 92, Reel 39, Entry 95, RG 226, NARA.
19. See War Diary, SO Branch, OSS/London, Vol. 2, Planning, pp. xxxxvii, in OSS/
London, Reel 1; see also Brewer Diary, Notes on Meeting of SO officers, 22 March
1943; on SPARTAN and after, see War Diary, SO Branch, OSS/London, Vol. 4,
Books 1 and 2, Jedburgh Teams, pp. xxvi, in Bradley F.Smith (ed.), Covert
Warfare, Vol. 3: OSS Jedburgh Teams I (New York: Garland, 1989); the Minutes
for COSSAC Staff Conference, 2 July 1943, WO 219/588, PRO note that the
possibilities of SOE action should be constantly borne in mind during planning;
see J.R.M. Butler, Grand Strategy, Vol. III, June 1941August 1942, part ii
(London: HMSO, 1964), pp. 51718, on how the entry of the US into the war
changed SOEs role.
20. See OSS London, June 1942December 1942, Notes by Whitney S.Shepardson,
September 1959, Folder 48, Box 119B, Donovan Papers, USAMHI.
21. Bruce to Donovan, 8 March 1943, frame 92, Reel 39, Entry 95, RG 226, NARA.
22. See Shepardson notes, September 1959, Folder 48, Box 119B, Donovan Papers;
Bruce report on SAB London, 12 August 1942, names the two SA/B-SI officers,
and emphasizes Londons limited liaison role to date; Bruce to Donovan, 27
February 1943, frame 87, Reel 39, Entry 95, RG 226, NARA, states that Cavendish-
Bentinck was satisfied in every respect with the relationships that he has had with
OSS.
23. Shepardson notes.
24. Ibid.
25. Bruce to Donovan, 10 April 1943, frames 11112, Reel 39, Entry 95, RG 226,
NARA.
26. Bruce to Donovan, 24 April and 24 May 1943, frames 1203, 13942, Reel 39,
Entry 95; Bruce to Francis P.Miller, 29 April 1943, Folder 39, Box 24, Entry 92;
both in RG 226, NARA.
27. Bruce to Donovan, 29 May 1943, frames 1445; on smooth SUSSEX planning,
Bruce to Donovan, 3 July 1943, frames 1658; 14 August 1943, frames 1734; 23
August 1943, frame 178; and 28 August 1943, frame 182; all in Reel 39, Entry 95;
tentative suggestion and US military intelligence obstruction of SI in SUSSEX:
Developments as shown in Progress Reports, 16 October 1944, Folder 556, Box
240, Entry 190; all in RG 226, NARA.
28. Bruce to Donovan, 28 August 1943.
29. See Millers note to Cohen thanking him for his season ticket to Broadway (i.e., his
pass), 18 January 1944, Folder 242, Box 308, and Miller to Maddox, report on
SUSSEX management, 14 April 1944, Folder 475, Box 234, both in Entry 190, RG
226, NARA.
30. See the draft War Diary, Strategic Services Officer, Relations with the British, p.
24; War Diary, SI Branch, Vol. 1, pp. 1516, 235 (which alternately suggests
SIS was reluctant to help SI, and that SI had nothing to offer SIS in exchange for
the British help).
31. See War Diary, SI Branch, Vol. 3, pp. 35, 257.
32. SUSSEX: Developments as shown in Progress Reports; see also SI Branch
SemiMonthly Report #11, 15 July 1943, Folder 1, Box 1, Entry 99, RG 226,
NARA.
33. Bruce to Donovan, 8 March 1943; and Bruce to Donovan, 14 August 1943.
34. Shepardson notes; Shepardsons recollection is confirmed by The Relations of
OSS to the Free French BCRA, and to British Broadway, 26 August 1942, Folder
451, Box 320, Entry 190, and Bruce to Donovan, 27 March 1943, frame 102, Reel
39, Entry 95, which remark on the mutual suspicion between SIS and the French,
both in RG 226, NARA.
35. David Schoenbrun, Soldiers of the Night: The Story of the French Resistance (New
York: E.P.Dutton, 1980), p. 295; see also pp. 296, 330.
36. Cecil, Cs, pp. 172, 180; R.H. Smith, OSS, p. 172 presumes, rather than proves,
Danseys culpability.
37. Brewer Diary, 27 March; 24, 26, 30 April 1943some notes on Brewers journal are
in Folder 343, Box 224, Entry 190; a number of memoranda concerning SOs
hostility to the Lloyd plan are to be found in Folder 3, Box 347, Entry 92 (for
Lloyds plan, and the covering letter, J.M.Scribner to Donovan, 17 March 1944,
outlining the objections of SO officers), and in Folder 188, Box 343, Entry 190 for
comments and counter-comments by Lloyd and Brewer, all in RG 226, NARA.
38. Brewer Diary, 9, 10 April; 3 May 1943; Dodds-Parker further stated on 3 May that
the combination of SO/SOE seemed to be headed for a joint operation in North
Africa in exactly the same way as being planned in London.
39. Tightrope from William R.Corson, The Armies of Ignorance: The Rise of the
American Intelligence Empire (New York: The Dial Press/James Wade, 1977), p.
195.
40. Sweet-Escott, Baker, pp. 138, 1456, 153; Thomas F.Troy (ed.), Wartime
Washington: The Secret OSS Journal of James Grafton Rogers, 19421943
(Frederick: University Publications of America, 1987), entry for 18 November
1943, p. 175.
41. Confidential Memorandum For Colonel Donovan regarding Communication by
radio from England with secret agents in Europe, attached to memos, Donovan to
Col Gambier-Parry, to Sir Charles Hambro, to Capt. Louis Huot, and to Lt-Gen.
D.D. Eisenhower, CG, ETOUSA, all 25 November 1942, all in War Diary,
Communications Branch, OSS/London, Vol. 7, Basic Documents, Reel 1, Entry
91, RG 226, NARA.
42. Col R.Gambier-Parry to Capt. L.Huot, 6 January 1943; Huot to Gambier-Parry, 9
January 1943, both in War Diary, Communications Branch, 7; Gambier-Perrys
cooperation and unlisted SIS frequencies for OSS from draft narrative
Headquarters Communications Branch London, pp. 27, Folder 97, Box 4, Entry
103; see also note on 12 October 1942 meeting with Gambier-Parry, and letters,
Huot to Maj. L.W Lowman, 1 and 7 January, and 5 March 1943, Lowman to Huot,
21 January 1943, all in Folder 12, Box 201, Entry 190; for Stations CHARLES and
VICTOR and their technical cipher/communications methods, see War Diary,
Communications Branch, OSS/London, Vol. 5, Technical Volume, frames 492
584, Reel 1, Entry 91; for a schematic of the CHARLES and VICTOR nets with
the armies in the field, see frame 1092, Reel 129, Entry 116; see the Minutes of the
SI/London meeting concerning the establishment of an operating base, 23 April
1943, Folder 424, Box 319, Entry 190 which concedes that as [the US] had never
permitted the British to set up an independent communication system in America,
there was justification in their not wishing us to set one up here; all in RG 226,
NARA; for the importance of radio for clandestine programmes, see Resistance
Movements in the War, Lecture by Maj.-Gen. Sir Colin Gubbins, 28 January
1948, pp. 1924, Document No. 937, Folder 2, Box 5, Donovan Papers, USAMHI;
Jrgen Haestrup, European Resistance Movements, 19391945: A Complete
History (Westport: Meckler, 1981), pp. 3845.
43. Hinsley, II, p. 53; Kermit Roosevelts War Report of the OSS, Vol. II, is previously
cited on that page.
44. War Diary, SO Branch, OSS/London, Vol. 5, Army Staffs, pp. iviii, in OSS/
London, Reel 5; War Diary, SI Branch, OSS/London, Vol. 5, Field Detachments,
pp. 14, in OSS/London, Reel 7; see also material from 29 May 1944, pertaining to
the allocation of personnel for SO and SI Detachments, frames 84570, Reel 18,
Entry 162; and the excellent survey (n.d., but presumably pre-OVERLORD) of the
purpose, planning, structure, standard procedures, and operational methods of SI
Field Detachments contained in Folder 3255, Box 230, Entry 146; see also
Standing Operating Procedures of SO and SI Detachments in Folder 432, Box 231,
Entry 190; all in RG 226, NARA.
45. Arthur L.Funk, Churchill, Eisenhower, and the French Resistance, Military
Affairs 45, 1 (February 1981), pp. 2932; War Diary, SO, Vol. 1, Office of Chief,
pp. 12, 23; see also Fabrizio Calvi, The OSS in France, in Chalou (ed.), Secrets,
pp. 2478; on British motives in France, see Keith Sainsbury, The Second
Wartime Alliance, in Neville Waites (ed.), Troubled Neighbours: Franco-British
Relations in the Twentieth Century (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971), pp.
2512, and Milton Viorst, Hostile Allies: FDR and Charles de Gaulle (New York:
Macmillan, 1965), p. 223; for Roosevelts hostility toward the FNCL, see Warren
F.Kimball (ed.), Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence, Vol. II:
Alliance Forged, November 1942February 1944 (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1984), p. 255; see Roosevelts 12 May 1944 message to Churchill
concerning Eisenhowers authority to deal with the FNCL in Warren F.Kimball (ed.),
Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence, Vol. III: Alliance
Declining, February 1944April 1945 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984),
p. 130; see also the SIS-SOE view in the extract from the 20th Meeting of the FO
[SIS]-SOE Committee, 1 September 1943, Z9717/519/G17, FO 371/36059B, PRO;
SHAEF Operational Directive to SOE/SO, 23 March 1943, in War Diary, SO,
Vol. 12, pp. 7583.
46. JCS demand in JSM Washington-WCO London, JSM 1396, 7 January 1944, WO
193/624; British response in Air Ministry to Britman Washington, COS (W) 1246,
30 March 1944, WO 106/4321; both in PRO.
47. See Kenneth Macksey, The Partisans of Europe in World War II (London: Hart-
Davis, MacGibbon, 1975), pp. 1867.
48. See Eisenhowers Secret Memorandum for the Record, 22 March 1944, in Alfred
D. Chandler, Jr, et al. (eds) The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: The War
Years, Vol. III (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), pp. 17834see also
Viorst, Hostile, pp. 192, 1967; Robert H.Ferrell (ed.), The Eisenhower Diaries
(New York: W.W. Norton, 1981), p. 113; Mark Wheeler, The SOE Phenomenon,
Journal of Contemporary History 16, 3 (July 1981), pp. 51718; Stephen
E.Ambrose, Eisenhower and the Intelligence Community in World War II,
Journal of Contemporary History 16, 1 (January 1981), p. 154; Stephen
E.Ambrose, Eisenhower, the Intelligence Community, and the D-Day Invasion,
Wisconsin Magazine of History 64, 4 (Summer 1981), pp. 2612.
49. See War Diary, SI, Vol. 3, pp. 1921 on the utility of SUSSEX; for the fixation
on securing the bridgehead, see Russell F.Weigley, Eisenhowers Lieutenants: The
Campaign in France and Germany, 19441945 (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1981), pp. 4953, 701.
50. War Diary, SO Branch, Vol. 2, pp. 714; War Diary, Directors Office, OSS/
London, Vol. 1, AprilJune 1944, pp. 35, Folder 145, Box 211, Entry 190, RG
226, NARA; see also the chart of OSS Branch relationships with SHAEF, Folder
121, Box 93, Entry 99, RG 226, NARA; Macksey, Partisans, pp. 1867; War
Diary, SO Branch, Vol. 1, pp. 2640; for the Basic JEDBURGH Directive of
December 1943, see War Diary, SO, Vol. 12, pp. 3647; for redesignation as
SFHQ, p. 85; on training for JEDBURGH, see War Diary, SO Branch, OSS/
London, Vol. 9, Training, pp. ixiv, 133; on supply, see War Diary, SO Branch,
OSS/London, Vol. 10, Supply, pp. ix, 112, Pierre Lorain, Clandestine
Operations: The Arms and Techniques of the Resistance, 19411944, adapted by
David Kahn (New York: Macmillan, 1983), and James D. Ladd, Keith Melton, and
Peter Mason, Clandestine Warfare: Weapons and Equipment of the SOE and OSS
(London: Blandford Press, 1988); on French Resistance, see War Diary, SO
Branch, OSS/London, Vol. 13, Miscellaneous, pp. 905, all in OSS/London, Reel
6; see also Forrest C.Pogue, The Supreme Command (Washington, DC: Office of
the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1954), pp. 1536, and
Gordon A.Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief
of Military History, Department of the Army, 1951), pp. 198207.
51. See: Foot, SOE, pp. 304, 4002; War Diary, SO, Vol. 3, pp. 6, 1757 (a list of
pre-and post-D-Day sabotage is found on pp. 26879), in B.F.Smith (ed.), Covert
Warfare, 5; War Diary, SO Branch, OSS/London, Vol. 4, Books 1 and 2, Jedburgh
Teams, pp. 17322, in B.F.Smith (ed.), Covert Warfare, 3 ; War Diary, SO
Branch, OSS/London, Vol. 4, Books 3 and 4, Jedburgh Teams, pp. 519861on
relations with SAS, see pp. 502, 567, 574, 5789; on SAS operations, see Paul
McCue, SAS Operation Bulbasket: Behind the Lines in Occupied France, 1944
(London: Leo Cooper, 1996); on tactical versus strategic, see pp. 623, 682, 740,
747, 859; on the air operations for the SO drops, see War Diary, SO Branch, OSS/
London, Vol. 6, Air Operations, in OSS/London, Reel 5, as well as Ben Parnell,
Carpetbaggers: Americas Secret War in Europe: A Story of the World War II
Carpetbaggers 801st/492nd Bombardment Group (H) US Army Eighth Air Force
(Austin: Eakin Press, 1987); for Operational Group commando-style, rather than
clandestine, activities, see War Diary, SO Branch, OSS/London, Vol. 4-A,
Operational Groups, pp. 24, 22144, in Bradley F. Smith (ed.), Covert Warfare,
Vol. 4: OSS Jedburgh Teams II (New York: Garland, 1989); War Diary, SO, Vol.
5, pp. 736; see also Overseas Report of Captain Reeve Schley, 27 June 1945,
Folder 46b#3, Box 11a, Entry 99, RG 226, NARA, for the observations of an SO
officer of the utility of the Maquis to the military, and Phantom Operations in the
US Sector, Operation Overlord; for general reports on the 1st US Army SF
Detachment, see William C.Jackson to Col Haskell, 3 July 1944, Folder 304, and
24 July, with Standing Operating Procedures for the Detachment, Folder 302, both
in Box 352, Entry 190; see also Alfred D.Chandler, Jr, et al., The Papers of Dwight
David Eisenhower: The War Years, Vol. IV (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press,
1970), p. 2101; Fabrizio Calvi, with Olivier Schmidt, OSSLa Guerre Secrte en
France: Les Services Speciaux Americains, La Resistance et la Gestapo, 1942
1945 (Paris: Hachette, 1990); Ambrose, D-Day, pp. 2712.
52. War Diary, SI, Vol. 1, pp. 256; War Diary, SI, Vol. 3, pp. 12, 611; War
Diary, Strategic Services Officer, Relations with the British, p. 27; on signal-
processing/sharing procedure, see also Miller to Horton, 19 May 1944, and to
ACoS, G-2 SHAEF, 30 May 1944, Folder 476, Box 234; Memo, Maj. L.Dups to Maj.
Harrison, with attachments, 3 August 1944, Folder 1318, Box 292; and diagrams,
Folder 1171, Box 280, all in Entry 190, RG 226, NARA; G-2 Washington had
originally insisted that SI be denied authority to collect tactical intelligence, which
affected the deployment of SUSSEX agents deep behind enemy linessee
Minutes, SI Executive Committee, 27 April 1944, Folder 236, Box 18, Entry 168,
RG 226, NARA; Elaboration of the Sussex Plan of the Office of Strategic
Services, 2 November 1943, in War Diary, SI Branch, OSS/London, Vol. 11,
Basic Documents, in OSS/London, Reel 8.
53. War Diary, SI, Vol. 3, pp. 1214; for the origins of aircraft radio monitoring
(code-named ASCENSION), see OSS Activities, January 1944, regarding
SUSSEX in the ETO, Folder 111, Box 91, Entry 99, RG 226, NARA.
54. Folders 102730, Box 104, Entry 136; SI Field Detachment messages concerning
the employment of agents for the armies are in Folder 1222, Box 110, Entry 136; a
series of SHAEF information requests for SI dated 28 July, 9 and 15 August are in
Folder 325, Box 314, Entry 190; all in RG 226, NARA.
55. War Diary, SI, Vol. 3, pp. 1214.
56. Forrest C.Pogue interview with K.W.D.Strong, 12 December 1946, in materials
used for The Supreme Command, USAMHI.
57. Forrest C.Pogue interview with Brig. E.T.Williams, 3031 May 1947, USAMHI.
58. Minutes of Intelligence Committee Meeting, 29 June 1944, Folder 356, Box 226,
59. SI London Monthly Progress Report, 31 August 1944, Folder 97, Box 87, Entry
99, RG 226, NARA.
60. On the development of SLUs and the militarys use of ULTRA, see Synthesis of
Experiences in the Use of Ultra Intelligence by US Army Field Commands in the
European Theatre of Operations, especially pp. 613, 249, SRH-006, RG 457,
NARA.
61. Ibid., p. 20.
62. Memorandum on Ultra Intelligence by Lt-Col A.G.Rosengarten, 1st US Army, 21
May 1945 in PRO 31/20/3, PRO.
63. Memorandum by Lt-Col E.K.Thompson, SHAEF Air Intelligence, 12 May 1945 in
PRO 31/20/12, PRO; see also F.W.Winterbotham, The Ultra Secret (New York:
Dell, 1974), pp. 424, 114, 1323, 182, 18990, 2056; Ralph Bennett, Ultra and
Mediterranean Strategy (New York: William Morrow, 1989), pp. 1519, and
passim; Ralph Bennett, Ultra in the West: The Normandy Campaign of 194445
(New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1979), pp. 125, 29, 58, and passim; Parrish,
Ultra Americans, pp. 20732; Hinsley, I, p. 572; F.H.Hinsley, et al., British
Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations,
Vol. III, Part 2 (London: HMSO, 1988), pp. 3277; cf. Ambrose, Ikes, pp. 67, 71
2; on ULTRA over-reliance, cf. David Fraser, Alanbrooke (London: Collins,
1982), p. 341.
64. On Recruitment in the Bridgehead Area, see the Memo from Maj. A.M.Scaife
through Chief, SO and Chief, SI, 27 June 1944, Folder 355, Box 315, Entry 190,
RG 226, NARA.
65. OSS/London War Diary, SI, 5, pp. 436.
66. See the entry from Bruces diary in Lankford (ed.), Diaries of David K.E.Bruce, p.
71.
67. War Diary, SI, Vol. 5, pp. 203; the peculiar attitude of the 1st Army G-2 is
evident in the Forrest C.Pogue interview with Col B.A.Dickson, 1st US Army G-2,
6 February 1952, who states that after banishing OSS from his staff, he got OSS
stuff anyway from Koch (3rd Army G-2)he sent out the stuff by the pound.
68. ETO Theatre Report, 15 June 1944, Folder 3, Box 2, Entry 99, RG 226, NARA.
69. ETO Theatre Report, 1 July 1944, both in Folder 3, Box 2, Entry 99, RG 226,
NARA (see also Scaife to Shepardson, 7 July 1944, and ETO Officers Pouch
Report, 14 July 1944, both in Folder 39, Box 9, Entry 99, RG 226, NARA).
70. B.F.Smith, Shadow, pp. 2923.
71. A Study of Operations of G-2 (Intelligence Branch) in the 12th Army Group For
the Period from 1 August 1944 to 9 May 1945, pp. 367, Folder 83, Box 300,
Entry 190; see Field Report of Maj. Trafford P.Klots, of the SI Detachment, 1st US
Army, Folder 46a#4, and of Maj. E.P.Gaskell, SI Detachment, 3rd US Army,
Folder 46a#3, both in Box 11, Entry 99; all RG 226, NARA; see Bruce diary, 10
June, in Lankford (ed.), Diaries of David K.E.Bruce, pp. 701, 117, and n. 1, p.
220.
72. Handwritten response by Maj. Ides Van Der Gracht, on Memo, Lt (jg) H.H.Proctor
to Van Der Gracht, 2 November 1944, Folder 363, Box 316, Entry 190, RG 226,
NARA.
73. War Diary, R&D Branch, OSS/London, Vol. 1, Organization, pp. 423, frames
3489, Reel 4, Entry 91; shockingly, Lt E.C.Crocker to S.P.Lovell, 10 May 1944,
Folder 1232, Box 84, Entry 148, both in RG 226, NARA.
74. War Diary, SI Branch, OSS/London, Vol. 4, Proust, pp. 13, 3841, in B.F.Smith
(ed.), Covert Warfare, 2; see also Waller B.Booth, Mission Marcel Proust: The
Story of an Unusual OSS Undertaking (Philadelphia: Dorrance and Company,
1972) for a narrative of the PROUST teams.
75. Thompson memo, PRO 31/20/12, PRO.
76. See The Value of SOE Operations in the Supreme Commanders Sphere, n.d, c.
July 1945, WO 219/40B, PRO; cf. B.F.Smith, Shadow, p. 418.
77. See B.F.Smith, Shadow, pp. 2923, 305, 307, and Jakub, Spies, pp. 14684; on the
militarization of OSS, see Robert H.Alcorn, No Bugles for Spies: Tales of the
OSS (London: Jarrolds, 1963), pp. 1878; on SOE aims, see Wheeler, pp. 51718;
see M.R.D.Foot, What Good Did Resistance Do?, in Stephan Hawes and Ralph
White (eds), Resistance in Europe, 19391945 (London: Allen Lane, 1975), pp.
2101; see also Historical Survey, Report #1, German Intelligence Services M.I.
4, September 1947, WO 208/4358, PRO regarding Referat IV A2 of the Gestapo,
which states that the resistance movements in Western Europe did not become
fully developed until 19434, and that German counter-resistance efforts were
focused on the East until that period; FO 371/419058, PRO holds excerpts from
fortnightly SIS-SOE meetings (FO-SOE Committee), with those of 12 April, 9
May, and 11 July 1944, survey the increased German counter-measures
encountered by Resistance groups over this period; George Brewer specifically
described the SO-SOE operational relationship as that of a junior partner working
under the direction of a senior partner in draft of War Diary, Strategic Services
Officer, Relations with the British, p. 18.
78. Col John Haskell to Col Bruce, 3 June 1944, Folder 780, Box 255, Entry 190, RG
226, NARAcorroborated by Bruce Diary for 22 June 1944, in Lankford (ed.) p.
83, which states that the touchy relationship between SIS and SOE complicated
plans for SF Detachments to make intelligence reports; Maj. R.G.DOench to Lt
Col W.P. Maddox, 19 June 1944, Folder 465, Box 34, Entry 115, RG 226, NARA
shows that SHAEF ordered all SFHQ intelligence reports to be disseminated to G-2
SHAEF by SI; see also Foot, Partnership, in Chalou (ed.), Secrets, pp. 295300; a
Minute by V Cavendish-Bentinck, 25 October 1944, Z6774/82/G14, FO 371/41907,
PRO refers to the French knowing perfectly well that SIS and SOE are not only
separate organizations, but are at daggers drawn.
79. William Phillips, Ventures in Diplomacy (London: John Murray, 1955), p. 211; cf.
Miller, Spying, pp. 2825; Roosevelt, II, p. viii, argues that such coordination
amounted to direct British control; see Donovans reaction to the September 1943
British COS opinion on the worth of OSS, followed by the JCS authority for SI to
act independently should the opportunity arise in War Diary, Strategic Services
Officer, Relations with the British, pp. 5863; Donovans full memo, 18 October
1943, is in Folder 1, Box 89, Entry 92, RG 226, NARA; COS (43), 240th Mtg (O),
7 October 1943, Minute 6, WO 193/624, PRO clearly indicates that the British
were primarily concerned with once and for allclarify [ing] the principles
underwhich SOE and OSS should operate incombined theatres and US or British
theatres without restricting the freedom of SI; cf. J.G.Beevor, SOE: Recollections
and Reflections, 19401945 (London: The Bodley Head, 1981), p. 83, on the
British emphasis on procedures for the control of operations, and not spheres of
influence, and SI/London Minutes, 23 April 1943, which reluctantly concedes that
SIS could not be expected to jeopardize its own operations for American ones of
dubious potential; see also Jakub, Spies, pp. 14684.
80. Lankford (ed.), Diaries of David K.E.Bruce, pp. 1234.
81. Bruce to Donovan, 4 March 1943; continuous, Hugh R.Wilson to G.Howland
Shaw; this request was vetoed by Donovan since Bruce would have been listed as
an Assistant to the Military Attache, and this would have implied subordination to
G-2/Londonsee Donovan to Bruce, 12 April 1943; all in Folder 39, Box 24,
Entry 92, RG 226, NARA..
82. Cf. with Christopher Hitchens, Blood, Class and Nostalgia: Anglo-American
Ironies. (London: Chatto and Windus, 1990), pp. 3309; Winks, Cloak, pp. 152
230, especially p. 179, and pp. 1902 on the Mediterranean; Donald Downes, The
Scarlet Thread: Adventures in Wartime Espionage (New York: The British Book
Centre, 1953), especially p. 86, where Downes opines that spying is essentially
unmilitary; and Corvo, Italy, passim; see also the negative view of SIS in Coon,
Story, pp. 1313.
83. For the Manhattan Project analogy, see Barry M.Katz, The OSS and the
Development of the Research and Analysis Branch, in Chalou (ed.), Secrets, p. 47.
4
Reductio Ad Absurdum: R&A/Londons Quest
for Relevance
OSS/Londons Research and Analysis branch (R&A) spent its existence in a

desperate, if largely futile, struggle to secure a meaningful role. It was hampered
in this attempt by two mutually exacerbating factors: the expectations of its
branch superiors in Washington, and the practical realities of forging links with
the British intelligence establishment. Further complications involved R&As
tenuous affiliation with the other OSS branches in London, and its fifth wheel
relationship with SHAEF.
This portrait contradicts R&As post-war reputation as a unique collection of
scholarly operatives mobilized by an ingenious William Donovan who more than
anyone else appreciated the potential contribution of such a group.1 Some
unconvincing tributes to R&A have described its achievements as being
enormous, if ambiguous, describing the branch as being the most powerful and
important weapon within OSS, despite there being no smoking gun to prove
effectiveness.2 R&A partisans are thus inclined to conclude with a straight face
that the vital importance of R and As legacy stemmed from the fact that for the
first time, it collected, synthesized, and analyzed the entire range of
intelligence, even though it often remained unused.3 The scholarly literature on
OSS has largely taken R&As unique success at providing accurate, objective
studies as a given, although R&As overall significance to the war effort is less
easily demonstrated. R.Harris Smith incorrectly characterizes R&A as the first
concerted effort to apply the talents of its academic community to official
analysis of foreign affairs, as the British experience will indicate.4 Robin Winks
sees research and analysis at the core of intelligence, with R&A controlling
the most powerful weapon in the OSS arsenal: the three-by-five index card.
The branch nevertheless could not easily prove the relevance of its work; it could
not always answer the so what? question posed by decision-makers. Winks
stresses the potential of applying scholarly talents to intelligence evaluations, but
in an important sense, he sees that potential constrained by R&As awkward fit
in the intelligence system. He nevertheless assumes without any smoking gun to
prove effectiveness that R&A was the most important unit in the OSS.5
Thomas Troy concludes like R.H. Smith that Donovancarved out a brand new
province in government with R&A, but he does little to substantiate this.6 Such
a view is particularly debatable in light of British experience. It has moreover
been suggested by Bradley F.Smith that with OSS restructured and distanced
from Roosevelt, the branch essentially became orientated as a data-feeding
organization that developed information and then tried to find customers who
would use it. Smith does, however, mirror Winkss view of research and
analysis being the core of intelligence agencies, and of R&A demonstrating the
potential application of academic study to a centralized service that continued
after the war.7 Barry Katz particularly embraces this positive view of academias
contribution to intelligence, and of intelligence-experienced scholars to
academia, through R&A.8
This latter inclination is understandable in terms of intellectual history, but it
still leaves the specific issue of R&As contribution to intelligence unresolved. It
is not enough to presume R&As effectiveness in the face of the continuing
scholarly ambiguity regarding R&As actual work. R&A/Londons experiences
in fact demonstrate quite clearly that it was not very unique in its achievements;
that it was more often superfluous to collection-synthesis-analysis than an
embodiment of it; and that in many situations, there was a discrepancy between
what social scientists thought they could do and what policy-makers were
prepared to let them do, although R&As work did often remain unused.9
Britain began mobilizing scholars and professionals to provide expert
analytical support for the government well before Donovans creation of an OSS
academic branch. This infusion of new men and new methods into wartime
Whitehall is termed Hitlers reforms by one historian of the British Civil
Service. The reoccupation of the Rhineland on 7 March 1936 prompted Lord
Hankey to begin focusing government attention on the steps necessary for
mobilizing new ministries in the event of war with Germany. Profiting from First
World War experience, it was quickly realized that talent originating outside the
Civil Service would have to be identified and earmarked for official use. A
report on the Employment in war of University men delivered by the Manpower
Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence in August 1938
recommended that undergraduates and graduates wishing to enlist should be
treated primarily as a field for the selection of officers or for employment on
special duties and therefore dealt with under special recruiting arrangements. A
Central Register for gathering particulars on suitably qualified individuals was
subsequently established within the Ministry of Labour. While GC&CS had
already begun recruiting probably the greatest collection of first-class British
grey matter ever assembled in one place the preceding June, other government
departments began identifying people with presumed technical and
administrative expertise. The Central Register was sidestepped to an extent by
SIS who had rather special requirements for men who were not specifically
covered by the Registers mandate, but the outbreak of hostilities in September
1939 soon had academics placed throughout the war ministries. Almost 1,000
each month found themselves assigned duties within the first 6 months of war.
Statisticians were like gold dust, while many economists found their way
logically enough into the Economic Section of the War Cabinet. Since Churchill
92 R&A/LONDONS QUEST FOR RELEVANCE
largely delegated oversight of the Home Front to the Lord President of the
Council, the Home Front effectively became an adventure playground for
conscripted social scientists.10
The influx of scholars into wartime policy direction commenced with alacrity
thanks to an admirable amount of foresight and pre-planning. Many men rapidly
found themselves directly involved in the formulation and execution of
government policy, achieving far greater effect than could any repository of
academics writing reports willy-nilly without reference to the issues of
immediate concern to government departments. These professorial types were
also absorbed into intelligence-orientated work beyond that of GC&CS,
including analytical tasks for various research bodies within the government.
One intelligence-veteran turned spy-novelist recalls his first exposure to this sort
of recruit upon reporting to the British Armys Intelligence Corps depot in
Winchester, where he
hobnobbed with professors of French and German who could write theses
on Trade Unions in the Middle Ages but couldnt ask a girl out for coffee.
On our second day, a Sunday[following] the Saturday night dance, the
professors and I were detailed to clean up the abandoned prophylactic
devices as our introduction to security work. This led to much quoting of
Rabelais and Juvenal.11
While those possessing appropriate linguistic faculties plied their trade with the
agents, others found employment among the array of British analytical bodies.
SIS itself maintained no research and analysis unit. The service was instead
divided into Production Sections, having no concern with [the] evaluation of
incoming intelligence beyond indicating agent reliability, and Circulating
Sections, that evaluated, screened, and disseminated intelligence for whatever
consumer they dealt with directly. In other words, the Circulating Sections were
largely the responsibility of the intelligence consumer, such as War Office or
Admiralty, which placed them [the Circulating Sections] in SIS. These sections
were essentially concerned with processing data collected by SIS without
reference to other sources, and with funnelling the largely raw product to those
who would decide for themselves how best to use it.12
Other branches of government conducted more specialized analyses. The
Ministry of Economic Warfares Enemy Branch contained a Damage Assessment
Unit studying the economic impact of Allied strategic bombing based on
collecting and collating relevant intelligence, and advising on further targeting.
The Research and Experiments Department 8 (RE8) of the Ministry of Home
Security was a close partner through its examination of German bombing effects
in Britain. MEW also employed Enemy Resources Departments to study and
produce expert commodities reports relative to the enemy. An Inter-Services
Topographical Department (ISTD) was established in Oxford under Admiralty
administration to process topographical intelligence on a tri-service basis for
producing detailed surveys by country or district, its chief editor being a classics
don. The Foreign Office for its part employed a Foreign Research and Press
Service (FRPS) that evolved into the Foreign Office Research Department, and a
Political Intelligence Department (PID) that provided a cover for the Political
Warfare Executive (PWE). FRPS originally conducted foreign press surveys,
while PID published a weekly secret Political Intelligence Summary with
supplements drawn from research on special topics. FRPS and PID were later
merged to create FORD, which continued its predecessors activities, including
issuing special reports at various agencies requests. The almost entirely
academic staff included Professor Arnold Toynbee, and its special reports and
research were closely linked to the FOs post-hostilities planning by wars end.13
British research and analysis relative to intelligence obviously stressed serving
specific customers through the performing of a particular function. The cohorts of
mobilized analysts were employed to serve clearly defined existing needs, and to
provide special research in response to developing demands. The relevance and
influence of their work stemmed directly from their applying skilled research to
meet the pressing requirements of the various wartime ministries and services.
No research department or group tried to be all things to all people, or to beaver
on in splendid isolation from the real requirements of their customers. The
customers were largely able to tailor research staffs themselves without having to
establish ties with an autonomous group of academics pursuing their own
institutional agenda.
While this system could reasonably be expected to have stood as an example
to be emulated by Donovans OSS, such was not the case. Part of the problem
lay with the relative vacuum in US pre-war planning. There was no American
equivalent of the British Central Register, and therefore no concerted pre-war
effort to mobilize Americas rich academic resources. Donovan eagerly
presumed to fill this void with his conception of what would become the
Research and Analysis branch of COI-OSS. The Colonel planned for a
concentrated unit of academics serving under him. Scholars were from the
beginning deemed necessary to give intelligence greater substance while
focusing on key strategic and policy questions.14 The original plan for COIs
analysts envisaged executing functional research through a unit in the Library of
Congress, filtering its product through a supreme Board of Analysts, and thence
to Donovan for the President. This soon proved impractical, due largely to
Donovans decision to court an ambivalent Roosevelt instead of serving specific
government departments.15 With OSSs evolution under the JCS, the original
R&A branch was left to carry the burden of Donovans conception by
establishing a reputation for accurate and objective studies. A close examination
of R&As evolution in London with specific reference to intelligence reveals the
practical success of this innovation.
Those making up R&A have been termed the bad eyes brigade in deference
to their bespectacled contribution to the war effort, and the personalities involved
certainly distinguished the branch from the rest of OSS.16 Ivy League academics
provided many of the earliest recruits, setting a suitably elitist tone for the
branch. This did not impress all observers, however. One R&A underling later
wrote that vanity seemed to rule the whole setup. The pecking order was
brutal. It was almost an insult to address any one as professor. To a man all those
eligible insisted on being called doctor, which saw the more irreverent within
OSS referring to R&A/Washingtons building as the medical school.17
However much they were disdained, these status-conscious analysts were
nevertheless expected to establish R&As presence overseas. It was precisely the
elite branch format, however, that would be a source of future complications
since R&A by definition maintained a virtual monopoly of the scholars working
in American intelligence, whereas it has already been detailed how this was not
the case in the British system, where academics were spread throughout a
number of secret services. The first R&A representatives in London were thus
confronted with the fundamental task of establishing contacts with such a diffuse
collection of potential British colleagues.18
R&A interests in London were represented until 15 May 1942 by three
members of the Foreign Information Service (FIS), a propaganda section
subsequently hived-off to the Office of War Information (OWI). They were
primarily occupied with establishing cordial relations with Britains Ministry of
Information and PID through the flow of information digests, and with the
Political Warfare Executive in obtaining foreign newspapers. Permanent R&A
staff arrived in mid-May, but functioning without a designated branch head made
it harder to approach the British. R&A/London was essentially not integrated
with the other OSS branches, and the absence of an R&A chief obstructed efforts
to measure the branchs standing within the London mission. This amounted to a
debilitating degree of functional isolation in the branch War Diarys phrase,
which meant that R&A/London was left mostly to its own devices in establishing
firmer links with British agencies, links that varied considerably with the
organization concerned. As each British agency sought out that portion of OSS
which most closely corresponded to its own function, and to establish more or
less exclusive relations with that [branch], the fact that R&A did not fit neatly
into any single existing category of British intelligence work made for slow
progress. This was particularly so since R&A was not the only American body
doing, for example, economic or propaganda research. The only recourse for
R&A was thus the flexible policy of allocating and lending personnel at
strategic points. In the early period, though, R&A/London could only establish
channels and gain access to British agencies through recognized American
opposite numbers. This was only realistic, and attained the immediate objective
of document procurement rather than any close constant liaison. The British
were for their part quite willing to gamble on the future with respect of quid pro
quo, which explained how, with nothing to give, the branch was able to collect
so much material for Washington.19
The process of securing introductions with representatives of British agencies
as a foundation for subsequent direct requests for information and materials
continued until the end of 1942. Profitable links were initiated with FRPS, MEW,
the JIC (with R&A participating in meetings between the JIC and other
American agencies in London), ISTD, and PWE. Relations with ISTD and PWE
particularly held the possibility of mutually beneficial projects. This situation
contrasted with the tenuous relations between R&A and the other OSS branches
during 1942. This problem was not confined to London, and stemmed from each
branchs attempt to catch up with its British opposite numbers, thus focusing
efforts outside, not inside, OSS. SI was particularly prone to cultivating its
independence, and to pursuing its rivalry with R&A concerning information
collection and processing.20
The R&A-PWE relationship was itself complicated by PWEs 31 July 1942
recognition of OWI as the normal channel for PWE material (with OWI
communicating it to OSS), and by PWEs reluctance to formalize ties with OSS/
London before PWE understood its own position in the US with OSS/
Washington. There was also some uncertainty within PWE as to what actually
Whitney Phillipss function was.21 R&A/London was in due course successful in
acquiring texts and information from PWE since these gifts did not involve R&A
in actual propaganda operations. Limited progress was also made with other
British organizations. Geographical handbooks and topographical proofs were
exchanged with the Admiralty, while books were borrowed from the Foreign
Office.22 Contact was made with PID on 30 October, which made R&A/
Londons Allan Evans believe that he might obtain access to PIDs valuable
background sources of information, including pamphlets and books on
Germany and its economy.23 Evanss enthusiasm was not blunted by the
requirement to sign the most alarming engagements, oaths and promises,
although he stressed the secrecy of the information so obtained since he preferred
to see the inside of the Tower only as a visitor. The FO had also opened the
mysteries of FRPS to the Americans by that date, giving R&A/London the
right to receive the same diet of reports as other outsiders, all of which made
Evans feel that the branch had done rather well with the Foreign Office.24
R&A thus engaged in some rather prosaic activities centred on reaching out to
British departments for information. Far from disappointing R&As Washington
superiors, this was in fact completely in line with their expectations. Harvard
historian William Langer assumed overall leadership of R&A in October 1942,
and while he differed from his predecessor (James Baxter) on how best to structure
the branch, he shared Baxters view that the purpose of the outposts was to
make [R&A] studies available in the field, [and] to collect and transmit to
Washington intelligence of all kinds that might be valuable, with some attention
to giving all possible aid to the other parts of the agency and to perform such
functions as might be required by the theater commander.25 Langers focus was
on what outposts like R&A/London could do for R&A/Washington, with only
passing thought given to serving key consumers in the theatres. Langers attitude
toward the necessity of establishing close working ties with the British was
equally ambivalent. His views concerning the FRPS material enthused upon by
Evans were communicated to London in December 1942: Langer did not think
that the FRPS data warranted [R&A] dignifying them to the extent of making a
formal request for them; but if London found them of real importance, and of
bureaucratic political utility, Langer said he might reverse the decision.26 It was
further believed in Washington that R&A/London should function as an
intelligence source on the British while working as their partner.27 Allan Evans
agreed perfectly with the view that work done in London [was] supplemental
to the work done in Washington.28 Such was the preferred R&A method; the
incoming material was systematically handled, the outposts were kept informed
of home needs, and at least a modicum of direction was supplied, although in
Langers view, much more could and should have been done to provide
guidance and direction.29
Despite his belief in the need for even stronger direction of London activities
from Washington, Langer was nevertheless astounded to find how little account
was taken of the Branch and its work and how little its chiefs were included in
the inner councils of the organization during a trip to London in September
1942.30 He was evidently unable to grasp then (or after the war) the relationship
between the primacy he placed on acquiring data for R&A/Washington, and
R&A/Londons apparent irrelevance to the activities and needs of the other OSS
branches. In light of the aforementioned functional isolation of R&A in
London, and Langers lukewarm appreciation of R&A/Londons need to
ingratiate itself with similar British organizations as a means of commencing
relevant field work, it is hardly surprising that R&A/London was forever on the
outside looking in. R&A/Londons eternal dilemma was therefore defined early
on as the necessity of satisfying Washingtons demands while trying to work
with disparate British organizations as a means of demonstrating R&A/Londons
bona fides in order to accomplish something concrete in its own right. This
problem also reflected Langers belief that if [R&A] could effectively fill a need
[for research and analysis] which certainly existed, customers would eventually
beat a pathway to [its] doors.31 This helps explain why Langer saw R&As first
requirement as being the creation of a super-repository of global intelligence
housed in Washington serviced by outposts whose main duty was to fulfill what
amounted to a post-office role. The London group was accordingly obliged to
function as a conduit for the flow of information, with all other activities
ancillary to that essential task. The branch outposts were not expected to
concentrate on acting as local performers of the R&A mission since head-office
requirements outweighed independent theatre work. The material collected in
London could in theory have served as a data-base from which R&A/London
analysts fashioned reports concerning myriad political, economic, and
geographical subjects. Such reports could then have been used by both ETO
customers and the Washington HQ. Langer, however, did not see it that way.
Collecting and exchanging research materials on behalf of the home office
remained the paramount mission for his London subordinates.
R&A/London was therefore pulled in two directions, with the inherent tension
only increasing with time. Shepard Morgan was appointed London branch head
in January 1943 while R&A as a whole underwent structural reorganization away
from academic disciplines (Economic, Political, Psychological, etc.) toward
geographical areas of collective analysis. It was thus an ideal time for R&A/
London to appraise its situation for the benefit of its new mission chief.32
Chandler Morse of the Enemy Objectives Unit (see Chapter 5) observed in a
meeting between R&A staffers on 14 January that since R&A/Londons sources
were British, and its work with British agencies was available for R&A
dissemination, the branchs best course of action would be to supplement
deficient British manpower in existing British intelligence agencies. A
memorandum was accordingly drawn up by Crane Brinton for Morgan on 16
January suggesting future plans. Brinton recommended that
R&A infiltrate into British agencies much as it was doing in ISTD. He

considered that only so would R&A gain access to British files which must
be its only source of information. The assignments would, however, be
qualified so that, at any time when work for an independent R&A staff
appeared, the members could be recalled and reintegrated. He indicated
that MEW might be the easiest agency to infiltrate, but that PWE and
FRPS were the most desirable in view of the nature of the R&A staff.33
Not everyone agreed with this policy. Allan Evans wrote an addendum to
Brintons report questioning that R&A men be put into British agencies simply
to get them to work. Evans argued instead for opening and cultivating contacts
on the basis of inventing research projects in London. A policy of distributing
R&A personnel throughout British units was only justified if R&A work with
British agencies paralleled projects actually under way in R&A/Washington.34
This basic policy conflict would never be resolved. The R&A War Diary puts the
best face on the situation by describing how
both policies were followed simultaneously for the next two years. At no
time did the nucleus of R&A[Londons]headquarters wholly dissolve
[T]here was no time when R&A did not have members more or less
completely assigned to work in British agencies. In generalthe two
policies were complementary and mutually indispensable. Without a
central working headquarters the infiltrated men would have been of small
direct benefit to the R&A Branch [in Washington], but it was largely
through these same men that the central office gained access to the most
important sources of information.35
The War Diary nicely encapsulates the nature and permanence of the branchs
predicament. Given OWIs first claim on PWE, R&A could only collaborate on
producing Civil Affairs Handbooks designed to provide information to the
armies on occupied Europe, and exchange information pertaining to German

public opinion and morale. Exchanges of map and general information
dominated the R&A-ISTD relationship, while guide books and reference books
were obtained from MEW for economic studies.36 As these activities filled
R&As working hours throughout 1943, Washington still expected the branch to
act as their London information service. Morgan was reminded on 21 January to
keep Washington informed as to what research work PWE is doing on other
areas, and informed on 17 July that Langer had been disappointed with the
results of adding R&A people to ISTD since they were entirely out of touch
and [had] done nothing to make available to [Washington] special material which
may be in the ISTD files.37 Langer wrote Morgan on 22 October to say that he
was very glad that R&As men in PWE had proven effective, but suggested
that once handbook work closed, Morgan ought to very seriously consider
whether these men should be continued with the British agencies. Langer had
very grave doubts about the wisdom of supplying R&A staff to British
agencies since this scattered R&As own limited staff. He mentioned the point
particularly in connection with the Civil Affairs work, and felt that it was
highly desirable [that] a few menshould actually be on the planning group for
Civil Affairs work but for the rest [he was] convinced that in London, as [in
Washington], [R&A could] operate more effectively as a well integrated
servicing unit.38
While Langer continued to ignore how R&A/London had more to do than
harvest information out of British files on behalf of the home office, the branchs
relationship with the rest of OSS/London continued to rest on the weak
foundation laid in 1942. Langer ironically delighted in quoting David Bruces
praise of R&A/London as a quality organization whose infiltration of various
individuals into different British departments and agencies [had] provedto
have been timely and wise, despite Langers own obvious antipathy toward that
particular achievement.39 More telling was the observation of John Wilson, who
wrote in May of mutual mistrust between R&A and the other branches
throughout OSS, and not simply in London:
The cloak and dagger boys felt that the long-haired researchists were
owlishly impractical with regard to existing situations and were
insufficiently schooled on security. On the other hand, the researchists felt
that the operations people were rashly eager to get something done right
away, disregarded the necessity for basic knowledge as controlling action,
and therefore made disastrous mistakes. From the first there was no useful
contact between the two points of view.
The operations people did see some need for basic information.
However, they distrusted the regional specialists of R&A and therefore
tried to build up their own information resources. They were blessed with
greater financial flexibility and were thus able to add their own
researchists, who duplicated much of the work done in R&A. This
tendency has been visible in SI, SO, [and] FN [Foreign Nationalities

branch].40
R&A was thus so functionally isolated from the rest of OSS that its very job
was being usurped by other branches. Far from standing as the apotheosis of
intelligence analysis within OSS, R&A was evidently unable to meet the
operational branches requirements, leading those branches to do the job
themselves. Langer moreover could not see how his own branchs fixation with
shuffling data to Washington was executed at the expense of serving customers
within OSS/London. All of David Bruces references to R&A in his
correspondence with Donovan during this period make no mention of how R&A
could be integrated with the rest of OSS, although he again speaks approvingly
of R&As infiltration of British agencies.41 R&A was thus still confined to a
frustrating bridesmaid role throughout 1943.
Events became even more confused in 1944. R&A/London under-went a
significant personnel expansion prior to OVERLORD as part of Washingtons
new recognition of Londons potential during January February 1944. This
itself created strains between Washington and London which were only resolved
when a new theatre branch chief was appointed. R&A/London had reconciled
itself to fulfilling Washingtons limited expectations, particularly since a more
involved role was precluded by the existence of extremely able people from
OWI, the American Embassy, and the US Army whose talents would have to be
used in the Strategic Intelligence Branch of G-2, ETOUSA. Since Morgan had
returned to the US because of ill health the preceding September, R&A/London
Acting Chief Crane Brinton believed that his colleagues had to avoid aiming too
high, instead serving military plans by continuing to be in large part a sort of
information bureauan exalted information bureau maybe, but still an
information bureau. This suggestion was in keeping with R&A/Londons
structure and experience up to that point, but Langer soon threw a wrench into
this conception. Washington decided without consulting London directly that the
main branch Headquarters of R&A should be moved to London to exploit
opportunities arising from the prospective Normandy invasion, an idea which
merely demonstrated the gulf between the two.42 David Bruce received a letter
from Langer on 3 February explaining that R&A/ London had to undergo a shift
in emphasis from military planning studies toward post-hostilities work, chiefly
military government and civil affairs. All new staff reinforcements were to avoid
dispersal, and act as integrated units on a few major objectives.43
Such grandiose plans excited hopes among London analysts for increased
action in their theatre, but they were soon tainted by the discovery of an
intemperate letter sent to Washington on 4 January by Carl Schorske outlining
his views on R&A/Londons track-record. Schorske alleged that R&A/London
had been established with no clear function or direction from Washington in
mere imitation of other branches who were creating London outposts. Without
any clear objective, R&A/London then allowed itself to be exploited by various
persuasive British agencies for personnel before finally acting as a more useful
service unit for varied American customers. London was nevertheless still
engaged in piddling and insignificant commitments in early 1944.
Schorske went on to blame Londons inadequate leadership, and the outposts
chaotic history, for involving R&A/London in many commitments which
prevented the branch from welding its activities into a unified program. He was
obviously unaware of the necessity of working with the British as a means of
satisfying Washingtons information demands, and therefore oblivious both to
the dilemma facing his London superiors, and to the dual policy response
formulated by Brinton for Morgan. Schorskes description of the pedestrian and
often irrelevant nature of most R&A/London activities was at least accurate, but
he failed to identify the true cause, that being Washingtons vision of London as
a data-collecting outpost, which handicapped Londons ability to provide
meaningful direct service to anyone in the ETO. Schorske also failed to
recognize the reality that R&A-British links were necessary for performing
either role. Brinton had himself detected behind [Langers reorganization]
memorandum a feeling that R&A/L should be in contact with higher echelons
and exert an influence upon policy planning. Brinton and Allan Evans agreed
that expectations of this sort rested upon a misunderstanding of conditions in the
theatre, and both subsequently replied to Schorskes memorandum in that
vein.44 Brinton particularly detailed Londons two-policy approach, and
informed Langer directly that [n]o one fromSchorskes positioncould
possibly be aware of the difficulties and delicacies of our work here.45 Evans
detailed errors of fact in Schorskes memo, and later pointedly replied to
Schorske with a personal letter suggesting a subtitle for his piece: Jaundice in an
Ivory Tower.46 Langer eventually proffered an apology of sorts to Brinton on 7
February, but the basic misunderstandings remained unresolved.47
The arrival of Harold Deutsch (the addressee of Schorskes memo) from
Washington in February was intended to effect that resolution through various
administrative conferences, and by rationalizing R&A/Londons personnel
assignments and structure consistent with the geographic reorganization of R&A
as a whole. This programme still required maintaining links with the British, but
precluded dispersing R&A/London staff to other agencies working for the
military in the field, and necessarily isolated R&A from the militarys
increasingly defining influence with the rest of OSS. Deutsch also negotiated a
freer exchange of intelligence with SI (see Chapter 5, p. 145), but he could not
overcome R&A/Londons exclusion from OSS/Londons operational planning
for OVERLORD.48 Hard on the heels of these developments was Chandler
Morses appointment as R&A/Londons permanent chief in place of Brinton,
ostensibly because Langer did not have confidence in Brintons administrative
abilities.49
R&A/Londons actual work programme now focused on serving the
information demands of SHAEFs Civil Affairss numerous sections by
answering their various factual questions. It also concentrated personnel in the
British PID (tasked with weekly political intelligence reports; see above), but
PID subsequently played a disappointingly small role relative to SHAEF after D-
Day. New work was also done appraising and interpreting European economic
and political trends with a mind to civil affairs and post-hostilities applications.
The resulting European Political Reports (EPR) were deemed particularly
significant within R&A/London since they utilized all branch divisions in an
integrated application of analytical talent, and they were apparently well received
by the embryonic military government formed for the occupation of Germany
(see below pp. 11415).50 A particularly anti-climactic contribution to
OVERLORD concerned R&As formal tasking as OSS/Londons post-invasion
channel for relations with G-5 [Civil Affairs] SHAEF; but despite R&A/
Londons previous March 1944 realization that their people had to work closely
with PWE in real joint teams so that evaluations of liberated populations for
SHAEF would not be made exclusively by PWE, it was clear by July that R&A
could not produce the requisite personnel for such work.51 Deutsch told Langer
as much on 3 July, stressing the consequent failure to secure an intimate
relationship with SHAEFs Political Warfare Division.52 This did not stop R&A/
London from subsequently making the odd claim that
[o]utlets for the work of the Research and Analysis Branch in ETO
continued to develop rapidly during July. In order not to dissipate the
Branch energies in too many directions, a work program [was] designed
toward a maximum contribution of R&A intelligence to bodies responsible
for formulating military and political policy within ETO. Complete and
satisfactory arrangements with the more important of these policy bodies
so that they look upon R&A as one of their principal research staffs had
not been made at months end. However, steady progress toward this goal
was realized [sic].53
As for R&As relationship with the rest of OSS, some changes developed in the
OVERLORD period. The prospect of close ties to the Morale Operations branch
in its propaganda work fizzled out due to MOs failure to make significant
headway (see Chapter 7, pp. 2059), but an SI-R&A curb service was
established in July. This gave R&A access to SI intelligence, while R&A agreed
to create an efficient routine for handling requests from SI field detachments
which R&A [was] especially qualified to fill. This latter development heralded a
degree of SI-R&A cooperation that would culminate in a joint intelligence
processing unit late in the war (see Chapter 5, pp. 1458).54
The post-OVERLORD period gave R&A/London one more opportunity to
carve a niche in ETO after its relationship with SHAEF G-5 failed to take off.
Langer had identified continental and post-hostilities work as definite planning
objectives in February 1944, and the post-invasion period was considered
especially ideal for dispatching R&A teams to report on local populations.55
R&A particularly desired representation in the OSS ETO Forward Headquarters
in Paris because of the competition R&A encountered from other agencies.

These included G-2 SHAEF, which outstripped R&As capability for enemy
Document Procurement in Civil Affairs work.56 As Morse himself conceded,
another determining consideration was his coming to recognize, perhaps too
tardily, that R&As actual and potential theatre clients were not particularly
high-grade customers. The German Country Units staff was trying to plan
without any knowledge of military post-hostilities policy; their influence on
policy [would] be accidental, the result of defaulted obligations at higher levels,
not intentional. Morse did not envisage any significant power being delegated to
SHAEF, although his opinion stemmed from his view of R&As weak prospects
in that arena. He accordingly concluded that R&A/London should concentrate
on quality output and try to anticipate new needs[and] maintain contact with
[its] present clientsbutavoid entangling commitments until a clearer view of
the future [was] possible, and concentrateon (1) helping R&A/W to serve its
policy making clients in Washington and (2) defining a solid function for [R&A/
London] in the future that will make intensive use of the resources and special
facilities that [it had] to offer. This recognition that R&A/London was still
trying to accomplish something of consequence beyond carrying out [its]
primary objective of serving [R&A/Washington] well revealed much about the
relevance of its work to date.57
Little changed after Morse made his views known. R&A/Londons main
activities involved planning to support the Allied Control Council in occupied
Germany with a higher level of interpretation and analysis rather than day-to-
day intelligence work, and with providing economic, cartographic, and
biographical information in support of Military Government.58 It had been
pointed out in August that the main possibility for R&A/London post-hostilities
work resided in the Control Council.59 While some R&A work was eventually
done in agent briefing, the branch accordingly orientated itself toward aiding the
US Group, Control Council for the rest of 194445.60 As noted above, R&As
European Political Report made an impression on American military government
officials. G-5 ETOUSA were particularly impressed with R&As support of their
planning for Germany, stating that their plans were impossible without the
contribution of R&A research.61 True to form, however, such effective winning-
over of potentially influential customers within the theatre remained secondary to
the prime mission of securing strategic intelligence for the central agency in
Washington.62
This last episode bears out the fact that as R&A passed through various phases
during its tenure in London, its experience was marked by a number of
undeniable constants.63 From the gradual growth of initial contacts with British
opposites, to attempting to build on those contacts throughout 1943, to
scrambling to provide a meaningful service in the OVERLORD period, up until
the last attempt at securing a raison dtre in post-hostilities work, R&A/
Londons experience was repeatedly marked by certain factors that prevented the
full exploitation of the branchs potential. Especially significant was the fact that
the branchs effort at both strategic and tactical levels [was]dissipated due to
the necessity for finding markets rather than meeting an existing demand.64
Langer himself conceded that R&A studies often failed to reach those they
should have, and that he himself should have done more to solicit customers;
but since it was not in his nature to do so, he patiently waited for customers to
beat a pathway to [R&As] doors.65 Achieving this objective was itself
problematic in light of the branchs eccentricities when viewed from outside. A
member of the US Joint Intelligence Staff once bluntly pointed out that
there [were] many PhDswho [were] living emotionally in some other

period of history and submitting to the [US JIC] Summary articles which
appear to have no relation to the present. Not only the subject matter but
the tone of the articles are open to criticism. Some of them seem to have
the moral-dream-world quality induced by reading the more wistful pieces
in the New Republic. Actually, the papers published in a first class learned
journal embody the objectivity and poise I would like to see
The writer went on to note that provided R&A got rid of such people, their work
would fulfil a useful role.66
This emphasizes the critical importance of identifying just who R&A could
serveboth in London and in Washingtonand how best it could serve them,
but in a letter to the chief OSS historian, R&A/Londons Crane Brinton specified
many of the complications experienced in attempting to do this. The first of these
was poor liaison with Washington. Londons feeling that it was misunderstood
by Washington, and Washingtons view that the outpost was wayward and
indifferent to home needs, were natural but too prevalent. There were also
problems centering around the difficulties of a brand-new agency, with a job not
quite like any previous American agency, in getting the materials it was set up to
get. The cost of fulfilling that task was a certain abandonment of R&A
independence since it had to infiltrate men into PWE, et al. A related problem
Brinton found hardest to solve, and which [he] solved in a way not altogether
pleasing to Donovan and Langer, concerned that of concentration versus
dispersal of personnel. R&A/London was forced by circumstance to be nearer
the pole of dispersion than the pole of independence; [i]n fact, though this was
one of [Londons] big misunderstandings with Washington, London felt it could
only operate in the ETO if it gave a quid pro quo for materialsfor
intelligencein actual manpower. R&A-PWE relations depended entirely on
R&A giving manpower. R&A/Londons biggest problem, however, involved
whether it should try to horn in as much as possible on the dignified work of
planning, or whether it should be content with doing the less spectacular
work of grinding out the often petty details of research. Brinton described his
experience this way:
[A]cademic social scientists in government jobs, certainly if they have

attained middle age, seem to feel that anything less than high level
planning is beneath their dignity. They want to tell somebody important
how to treat the Germans under the occupation, how to handle De Gaulle,
how to treat the Communistsor at any rate, they want to write essays on
such subjects, and hold meetings to discuss them. Now in ETO at least, R
and A never...quite attained that high level. We were not invited to sit in at
the big policy meetings, we were not offered the post of minence grise to
any big shot. What the operational people wanted of us was not our
opinions, not our advice, but the facts. The facts they wanted were often
darned hard to get Now frankly I early became in London an advocate
for our being modest, for our setting ourselves up as just about the best
information bureau we could be, and trying to answer well the incredible
number of specific questions shot at us by the Army. I was not even much
worried about the problem of deciding whether the questions were
important enough for us to give them the benefit of our skill in research.
But most of my colleagues took the view that our skills were too great for
this information service, and that we ought to set ourselves up primarily as
a planning organization. Therefore it seems to me we spent too much
time trying to horn in where we werent wanted, spent too much time just
talking and planning, taking in one anothers intel lectual washing. I think
it is obvious that if we did a really good job giving the operators the facts
we would in reality very considerably influence policy But I know this
problem will always be with us. The intellectual, especially the academic
intellectual, seems to get obsessed with the importance of thinking and
planning when he goes out into the world, and to lose some of the patient
virtues at research he had acquired professionally.67
Brintons recipe for R&A success was clear: establish a convincing track-record
by giving available consumers the material they wanted, thereby proving R&As
value, and building from there. The links established with the British were by
implication ideal, and indeed necessary, prerequisites for accomplishing this.
Such links opened up sources of information to be analysed, and they gave R&A
a foundation of work to build on. Brintons strategy was also for the most part a
mirror image of the British research and analysis model discussed earlier, which
itself involved serving specific customers to the customers satisfaction, rather
than pursuing self-aggrandizement. R&A/London, however, often ended up
producing material in isolation from existing theatre requirements which it
believed consumers would flock to (e.g., political and economic trends reports).
That tendency proved most unrealistic in light of the gulf between what the
social scientists thought they could do and what policy-makers were prepared to
let them do;68 Brinton noted that R&A was even at bestsomewhat of a
parvenu in its relations with the US Embassy, G-2 ETOUSA, and G-2 SHAEF.
69 R&A thus failed to reconcile its pretensions with the reality of military
primacy in the ETO (which made the sword mightier than the pen), and to
content itself with the more humble lot of working with British agencies in
support of predominantly military requirements (Katz conversely attributes R&A/
Londons difficulties to a dearth of the administrative ruthlessness necessary
for functioning in Londons proverbial intelligence brothel).70
However telling his observations, though, Brinton only hints at the larger
reason for R&A/Londons failure to fulfil its potential. The essential conflict
between Washingtons view of R&A/Londons fundamental purpose, and the
circumstances and opportunities facing the London analysts, effectively pre-
empted any chance of their functioning according to Brintons philosophy. R&A/
London was time and again expected to subordinate the execution of a distinct
service role within the theatre to the post-office duty Washington desired. The
London unit was therefore obliged to miss the opportunity to entrench itself in its
own right. Given this isolation from the other branches of OSS/London, and from
closer links with potential customers, the bulk of R&A/London was effectively
rendered irrelevant to any serious intelligence function in the ETO. It was more a
sidelight to meaningful intelligence processing than the shining embodiment of
it, as indicated by its estrangement from both G-2 SHAEF and from the
intelligence work of OSS itself.
The Assistant Chief of R&A/Londons Map Division articulated the problem
best in November 1944. Lieutenant (jg) Robert M.Coffin argued that virtually
all the detailed difficultiesfaced at the outpost could have been traced to one
basic point, namely that there seem[ed] to be a lack of a real intelligence
philosophy in OSS, resulting in no established concept of intelligence work.
This meant that a
[coordination of outpost aims and purposes between R&A, London and

R&A, Washington was never really accomplished Having practically no
well-established intelligence concept a great deal of time was spent trying
to set up aims, goals and customers [T]hese aims and goals were never
quite accomplished andthe resulting continental operations [could] not
be satisfactory.
Most culpable in Coffins view was the fact that since no clear idea existed as to
R&As precise intelligence function, there was no clear idea as to the type of
work which needed doing by R&A when it arrived on the continental scene. It
was confused as to the big concept of a well-rounded intelligence program, and
how it could be pushed forward after OVERLORD. Continental Operations
finally took on the appearance of an Oklahoma homesteading rush withpeople
poised on the line waiting for the gun in order to get into France to stake out
their claims.71
The lack of a clear intelligence concept essentially explains it all, and this
crippling confusion emanated from the top down. Donovan could only articulate
the general idea that R&A scholars were to revolutionize intelligence processing,
while leaving the specifics of how exactly they were to accomplish that goal to
William Langer. It has been shown that Langer was consistently obtuse in his
grasp of the circumstances and opportunities confronting the London outpost,
primarily because there was no appreciation of how R&A could function best
in effect, no intelligence philosophy. Langer was a scholar after all, not a
professional intelligence officer. Langer saw R&As birthright as one of
collecting data, writing it up, and basking in the reputation automatically secured
by the self-evident brilliance of the analysis. He did not fully grasp that R&A had
to earn its place in the intelligence sun, and that doing so would require knowing
precisely what its primarily military consumers wanted, and delivering it. This
shortcoming was the main obstacle for R&A/London since R&A/Washingtons
conception of London as little more than a conduit providing information for the
home-office analysts impinged irrevocably on the chances of Langers London
subordinates making the most of their situation. R&A/London was thus largely
reduced to an absurd shadow of what it could have been.
R&A/Washingtons fate was little better, since Langers own memoir notes
that he did not do enough to solicit customers, and was generally too passive to
realize R&As potential.72 There was, moreover, never any indication to London
concerning what specific needs were being met by its information gathering, no
statement of direction concerning specific consumer needs that had to be met by
R&A/Washington for the JCS, or the President, or the State Department. It was all
simply about gathering information. If Langer subsequently encountered greater
success as an intelligence chief in the post-war Central Intelligence Agency, it
owed much to some obvious distinctions between CIA and OSS. Unlike the
situation he faced in the Donovan organization, Langers experience of the CIA
was shaped by the fact that the CIA answered directly to the President; that it
enjoyed a monopoly on high level analysis and assessments; that no parallel
analytical function was haphazardly set up in CIA outposts; and that CIA
analysts were not dependent on forging links with US military commanders, nor
on the necessity of accommodating an allys fragmented analysis system. In
short, the CIA had a more sophisticated intelligence concept than OSS and R&A
ever did, and its responsibilities and chain of command were much clearer and
more rationalized than those of OSS. Langer was evidently better equipped to
manage the postwar American system than he was the OSS version. The thesis
of R&A relevance and uniqueness thus stands unproved. The conception of
academics as natural intelligence analysts failed to develop in OSS/London given
the lack of a working intelligence concept. If anything, this view of academics is
more descriptive of the British experience.73
Notwithstanding the generally unproved assumptions about R&A/London, two
of its offshoots have the reputation of being particularly effective. In cooperation
with entities outside R&A, these units engaged in work that shows research and
analysis applied directly to intelligence tasks, and presumably vindicated the
RScA experiment. The extent to which these applications of R&A talent
validated the concept of scholars as intelligence officers thus invites detailed
exploration, first concerning economic analysis in directing strategic bombing,

and secondly in joint intelligence processing with the branchs arch rival, SI.
NOTES
1. See the transcript of Anthony Cave Browns interview with O.C. Doering, Jr, n.d.,
Tape #7, pp. 10910, and transcript of A.C.Brown interview with William Colby,
17 August 1980, pp. 1112, both in the Donovan Papers, USAMHI; R.H.Smith,
OSS, p. 13.
2. Enormous remark made by Barry Katz at the 1112 July 1991 US National
Archives conference, The Secrets War: The OSS in World War II, cited in
MacPherson, Conference Report, p. 514; powerful, effective, smoking gun, from
Winks, Cloak, pp. 623, 112, 114see also Winks, Stuff, p. 28.
3. Bernard David Rifkind, OSS and Franco-American Relations: 19421945, PhD
dissertation, George Washington University, 1983, p. 302.
4. R.H.Smith, OSS, p. 13.
5. Quotes from Winks, Cloak, pp. 624, 712, 7782, 11115.
6. Troy, Donovan, pp. 845, 100.
7. B.F.Smith, Shadow, pp. 77, 3601.
8. Katz, Foreign, passim.
9. Leonard W.Doob, The Utilization of Social Scientists in the Overseas Branch of
the Office of War Information, The American Political Science Review 41, 4
(August 1947), p. 649.
10. This paragraph is drawn from Peter Hennessy, Whitehall (London: Fontana, 1990),
pp. 8892, 945, 97, 1003, 111; on GC&CS recruitment, see also Andrew,
Hinsley, in Langhorne (ed.), Diplomacy, pp. 323.
11. Ted Allbeury, Memoirs of an Ex-Spy, in Dilys Winn (ed.), Murder Ink: The
Mystery Readers Companion (New York: Workman Publishing, 1977), p. 165.
12. Jackson report on The British Intelligence System, pp. 22, 247, 33, USAMHI.
13. Ibid., pp. 66, 6976; for detail on RE8, see the correspondence of Seymour Janow
in Folder Seymour Janow, Box 2, Entry 77, and C.P.Kindleberger to Col
R.Hughes, 5 April 1943, Folder 94, Box 8, Entry 145; both in RG 226, NARA.
14. Katz, Foreign, pp. xiii, 58, 1721; Katz, Development, in Chalou (ed.), Secrets,
pp. 434.
15. B.F.Smith, Shadow, pp. 737, 36080.
16. Winks, Stuff, in Chalou (ed.), Secrets, p. 20.
17. Alcorn, Bugles, p. 75cf. Winks, Cloak, pp. 778.
18. B.F.Smith, Shadow, pp. 3612.
19. This paragraph is drawn from War Diary, R&A, Vol. 1, pp. 13, 58, 1012, 16
18, frames 2702, 2747, 27981, 2857; see also the memo by JDW (John
D.Wilson), 19 June 1942, frames 8436, Reel 102, and the memo by Allan Evans,
The Work of R&A in London, 22 June 1942, frames 8379, Reel 102, all in Entry
95; see also Whitney to James P.Baxter, 9 February 1942; Fisher Howe to Baxter
and Langer, 15 April 1942; Howe to Baxter, 16 June 1942; memo and letter Wilson
to Baxter, 18 June 1942; all in Folder 1824, Box 128, Entry 146; John D.Wilson
memo, 19 June 1942, Folder 94, Box 8, Entry 145, and Wilson to Emile Despres,
21 July 1942, Folder 1302, Box 8, Entry 146; all in RG 226, NARA.
20. War Diary, R&A, Vol. 1, pp. 1921, 3945, 546, 7791, frames 28890, 308
14, 3246, 35468; J.D.Wilson, Future Liaison of COI With English
Organizations Engaged in Economic Intelligence, 11 May 1942, and Wilson to
Baxter, 20 June 1942, both in Folder 1824, Box 128, Entry 146; for a proposal on
working with FRPS, see Allan Evans to Phillips, 26 October 1942, and for an
example of informa tion obtained by the JIC and passed to Washington, see Evans
to Wilson, Note by Air Pouch, n.d. (c. January 1943), both in Folder 94, Box 8,
Entry 145; on early exchanges with SI, see Report of Joint R&A/SA/B Committee
on R&A, dated simply October 1942, Folder 1838, Box 129, Entry 146; see also
Interview with Mr Allan Evans, R&A, 6 February 1945, Folder 342, Box 224,
21. Minutes of PWE-OWI Meetings, 31 July and 6 August 1942, FO 898/104see
also PWE Meeting of the Propaganda Policy Committee, 4 August 1942, FO 898/
13; all in PRO.
22. War Diary, SSO, Relations with British, p. 38.
23. Evans to William Langer, 30 October 1942, Folder 94, Box 8, Entry 145; see also
Allan Evans, OSS R&A/London, 16 November 1942, Folder 1302, Box 8, Entry
146; both in RG 226, NARA.
24. Evans to Langer, 25 November 1942 (the reference must be to the Official Secrets
Act), with attached Report on PID, Folder 94, Box 8, Entry 145; see also Evans to
Phillips, 3 September 1942, in War Diary, OSS/London, R&A Branch, Vol. 12,
Basic Documents, pp. 913, frames 404, Reel 4, Entry 95; both in RG 226,
NARA.
25. Langers comments in The Research and Analysis Branch, 1 March 1947, pp. 21
2, attached to Langer to Kermit Roosevelt, 5 March 1947, Folder 666, Box 48,
26. John D.Wilson, European Theatre Reports Officer, R&A/Washington to Allan
Evans, 10 December 1942, Folder 94, Box 8, Entry 145, RG 226, NARA.
27. John D.Wilson, European Theatre Reports Officer, R&A/Washington to Allan
Evans, 24 December 1942, Folder 94, Box 8, Entry 145, RG 226, NARA.
28. Evans to Wilson, 17 November 1942, Folder 1302, Box 8, Entry 146, RG 226,
NARA.
29. Langer, Research, pp. 212; see also the report by William Applebaum on his trip
to London over December 1942January 1943 in War Diary, R&A, Vol. 12, pp.
1599, frames 146245, RG 226, NARA; see also B.F.Smith, Shadow, pp. 3678.
30. Langer, Research, p. 13.
31. William L.Langer, In and Out of the Ivory Tower (New York: Neale Watson,
1977), p. 188.
32. Langer, Research, pp. 718; Interviews with Drs Langer, McKay and Brinton,
15 November 1946, pp. 12, Folder 666, Box 48, Entry 146; War Diary, OSS/
London, R&A Branch, Vol. 2, Early Period of Independent Operations, pp. 12,
frames 3845, Reel 3, Entry 95; both in RG 226, NARA.
33. War Diary, R&A, Vol. 2, pp. 68, frames 38991.
34. Evans addendum to Brinton memo, Folder Basic Documents, Box 1, Entry 75,
RG 226, NARA.
35. War Diary, R&A, 2, p. 8; see also Morse to William Hall, 27 January 1943,
Folder Washington Letters, Box 2, Entry 77; for a list of R&A/London personnel
at this time, see Robert H.Alcorn to Donovan, 6 January 1943, Folder 2299, Box
152, Entry 146; both in RG 226, NARA; see also Katz, Foreign, pp. 223.
36. War Diary, R&A, 2, pp. 213, 34, frames 4046, 417; Brinton to Langer, 26
March 1943, and Conyers Read to Langer, 22 February 1943, both in Folder 1302,
Box 87, Entry 146; Morgan to Langer, 11 and 18 August 1943, Folder 94, Box 8,
37. Wilson to Morgan, 21 January 1943, Folder 94, Box 8, Entry 145; cable, Langer to
Morgan, 17 July 1943, Folder 2306, Box 153, Entry 146; for an interesting
descrip tion of work with ISTD, see J.A.Barnes to Langer, 29 March 1943, Folder
1302, Box 87, Entry 146see also Shepard Morgan to Langer, 16 July 1943,
38. Langer to Morgan, 22 October 1943; see also Langer to Shepard Morgan, 31 July
1943, both in Folder 94, Box 8, Entry 145; for detail on Civil Affairs, see War
Diary, R&A, Vol. 2, pp. 4952, frames 4325, and frames 689767, Reel 102,
Entry 95; see also R&A Branch Operations Report, London, 1 March 1943, Folder
1, Box 1, Entry 99, R&A Operations Report No. 2, 15 March 1943, Folder 1302,
Box 8, Entry 146, and Progress Reports dated 15 April, 1 and 15 December 1943, all
in Folder 94, Box 8, Entry 145; see Langers memo to James Grafton Rogers, 5
May 1943, Folder 35, Box 3, Entry 145, which highlights Londons collection of
data for Washington as a model illustration of what R&A is capable of doing in a
Theatre; cf. William Koren to Langer, 10 December 1943, Folder Koren, Lt
William, Box 2, Entry 74; all in RG 226, NARA.
39. Langer to R&A Division and Section Chiefs, 17 July 1943, citing a passage from
Bruces letter to Col G.Edward Buxton, 19 June 1943, (itself in Folder 39, Box 24,
Entry 92), Folder 33, Box 3, Entry 145, RG 226, NARA.
40. John A.Wilson, The Regional Specialist in OSS, p. 2, attached to Wilson to
Langer, 17 May 1943, Folder 33, Box 3, Entry 145, RG 226, NARA.
41. Bruce first referred to the successful efforts to infiltrate R&A men into various
British organizations in a letter to Donovan, 20 March 1943, frame 99, and did so
again in another letter to Buxton, 18 September 1943, frame 188, both in Reel 39
his other references to R&A in this correspondence are in frames 76, 81, 87, 104,
110, 118, and 1278 for the period FebruaryMay 1943, all in Reel 39; all in Entry
190, RG 226, NARA; on Bruces attitude to R&A, see also Arthur Schlesinger, Jr,
The London Operation: Recollections of a Historian, in Chalou (ed.), Secrets, p.
65.
42. The foregoing is drawn from War Diary, OSS/London, R&A Branch, Vol. 3,
January 1944September 1944, pp. 1, 58, frames 448, 4536, Reel 3, Entry 95,
RG 226, NARA.
43. Langers memo to Bruce, 20 January 1944, Folder London 1944, Box 17, Entry 1;
see also Langer to Bruce, 18 January 1944, Folder 1219, Box 84, Entry 146,
decrying the lack of political reporting from London; both RG 226, NARA.
44. The foregoing is from War Diary, R&A, Vol. 3, pp. 1115, frames 45963; the
Schorske memo to Harold Deutsch, 4 January 1944, Outpost-Home Office
Relations, and Notes by Allan Evans on the memorandum concerning R&A,
London Outpost, written by C.E.Schorske on 4 January 1944, for H.C.Deutsch, 22
January 1944, are both in Folder London 1944, Box 17, Entry 1, RG 226, NARA.
45. Brinton to Langer, 22 January 1944, Folder London 1944, Box 17, Entry 1, RG
226, NARA.
46. Evanss reply to Schorske, 21 January 1944, Folder Schorske, Carl, Box 4, Entry
75, RG 226, NARA.
47. Langer to Brinton, 7 February 1944, Folder 2317, Box 155, Entry 146; see also
Europe-Africa Division Outpost Letter No. 4, 3 March 1944, Folder
Communications to Outposts, Box 1, Entry 39, and J.E.Sawyer to Morse, 22 July
1944, concerning support for the idea of centralizing research in Washington, and
being served by the outposts, Folder London letters out, 1/6/445/8/44, Box 4,
Entry 52; all in RG 226, NARA; see also B.F.Smith, Shadow, p. 368cf. Katz,
Foreign, pp. 1712.
48. See Deutsch to Langer, 23 March 1944, Folder 1173, Box 82, Entry 146, RG 226,
NARA; War Diary, R&A, Vol. 3, pp. 1626, frames 46475.
49. Langer to Bruce, and Langer to Brinton, both 26 February 1944, both in Folder
1219, Box 84, Entry 146, RG 226, NARA; cf. Schlesinger, Historian, in Chalou
(ed.), Secrets, p. 63.
50. War Diary, R&A, Vol. 3, pp. 3044, frames 48093; ETO Officers Pouch
Report, 14 February 1944, quoting cable No. 21641 of 8 February, Langer to R&A/
London, which states that the branch should serve Civil Affairs and SHAEFs
Psychological Warfare Bureau as a unified research staff, in Folder 35, Box 8,
51. G-5 channel from ETO Officers Pouch Report, 29 June 1944, Folder 38, Box 9; on
still-born joint work for SHAEF and July developments, see: Brinton to Bruce,
R&A Branch Progress Report, 1 March 1944, Folder 2, Box 1; ETO Officers
Pouch Report, 3 July 1944, Folder 39, Box 9; all in Entry 99, RG 226, NARA.
52. Deutsch to Langer, 3 July 1944, Folder 39, Box 9, Entry 99, RG 226, NARA.
53. OSS Activities Report for July 1944, Folder 117, Box 93, Entry 99, RG 226,
NARA.
54. On MO, see Deutsch to Langer, 27 May and 13 June 1944, both in Folder 667, Box
48, Entry 146; on SI, see Morse to Bruce, R&A Progress Report, 7 July 1944,
55. For R&A teams, see Morses proposal to Colonel J.R. Forgan, 4 May 1944, and on
post-war plans, Objectives of long-range intelligence organization, 29 May 1944,
both in Folder 1235, Box 84; for Langers early thoughts on planning for work in
post-war Germany, see Langer to Donovan, 15 March 1944, Folder 2318, Box 155;
all in Entry 146, RG 226, NARA.
56. Morse to Langer, 7 July 1944, Folder 1235, Box 84, Entry 146; see also Field
Programme of the Intelligence Services Staff, R&A/ETO (Forward), 21 February
1945, Folder 1032, Box 273, Entry 190; both in RG 226, NARA.
57. Morse to Langer, 17 July 1944, Folder 1235, Box 84, Entry 146; see also Langer to
Bruce, 9 October 1944, Folder 1219, Box 84, Entry 146; cf. The Work Program of
R&A/L, 3 August 1944, in War Diary, R&A, Vol. 12, pp. 1508, frames 27786;
see also War Diary, OSS/London, R&A Branch, Vol. 3, (ii), General
Development and Planning, Oct.Dec. 1944, pp. 189203, frames 64256, Reel 3,
Entry 95; all in RG 226, NARA; see B.F.Smith, Shadow, pp. 3745, on R&A
relevance; cf. Katz, Foreign, pp. 824, and Schlesinger, Historian, in Chalou
(ed.), Secrets, pp. 645.
58. Achievements of the R&A Branch During the Past Year, 23 April 1945, Folder
Achievements of R&A, Box 12, Entry 1, RG 226, NARA.
59. ETO Officers Pouch Report, 14 August 1944, quoting Depres to Morse for Starr, 7
August, Folder 39, Box 9, Entry 99, RG 226, NARA.
60. Wilson to Langer, 27 February 1945, Folder ETO, Box 1, Entry 39, which also
contains memoranda on R&A work during the post-hostilities period for the
Control Council, as does Folder Germany, Box 16, Entry 1; both RG 226,
NARA.
61. Norman Pearson, Acting Chief, X-2/ETO to Morse, 13 January 1945, Folder 1165,
Box 280, Entry 190, RG 226, NARA.
62. Langer Directive on R&A objectives and Organization in Europe (Revised), 29
January 1945, Folder ETO Activities of R&APlans and Suggestions, Box 1,
Entry 39; for a list of R&A/London members in December 1944, see War Diary,
OSS/London, R&A Branch, Vol. 11, Personnel Roster, pp. 135, frames 84119,
Reel 4, Entry 95; both in RG 226, NARA; see also Katz, Foreign, pp. 7880.
63. See the outline of the history of R&A/London, n.d., Folder 1235, Box 84, Entry
146, RG 226, NARA.
64. ETO Officers Pouch Report, 26 July 1944, quoting Robinson to Morse, 17
July, Folder 39, Box 9, Entry 99, RG 226, NARA.
65. Langer, Tower, pp. 1878; see also Winks, Cloak, pp. 756.
66. Lt-Cdr Gilbert P.Simons to S.E.Gleason, 28 August 1943, Folder 961, Box 69,
67. Brinton to Conyers Read, 19 December 1944, Folder 61c #1, Box 15, Entry 99, RG
226, NARA.
68. Doob, Utilization, p. 649.
69. Brinton to Read, 19 December 1944.
70. Katz, Foreign, p. 172.
71. Coffin Field Report, 2 November 1944, Folder 46c, Box 12, Entry 99, RG 226,
NARA.
72. Langer, Tower, p. 188.
73. Cf. B.F.Smith, Shadow, pp. 3701, 3768, for a less critical assessment of Langer;
cf. Winks, Cloak, p. 61 on CIA, p. 64 on R&A arrogance.
5
Falling Short of the Target: EOU, SIRA, and
the Pitfalls of R&A
The Enemy Objectives Unit and the joint SI-R&A intelligence-processing

partnership each had the opportunity to shake free of the confusion that crippled
R&As potential, and to validate R&As theoretical advantages. They were
notable efforts in OSSs attempt to secure maximum influence, and to establish a
distinctive American approach to intelligence in accordance with Donovans
original conception. They were R&A/Londons most potentially suitable
weapons, with EOU being particularly well regarded inside OSS; but their
experiences actually illuminated two unforeseen dangers inherent in the whole
R&A experiment with crafting intelligence analysis. Despite demonstrating
R&As possible reach when appropriately tasked, EOU permitted analysts to be
policy advocates rather than strictly objective specialized data-processors. The
joint SI-R&A entity, known by the combined acronym SIRA, hoped in late 1944
to achieve a measure of direct R&A input into OSS intelligence processing
usually absent in the ETO. SIRA instead demonstrated R&As marginalization in
connection with intelligence handling, and the usurpation of R&As status as the
chief conduit for reporting. While EOU was especially culpable for abandoning
objectivity in favour of its own agenda to the point of openly defying the high
command, both units fell disappointingly short of the target Donovan had set for
R&A.
EOU eventually found itself one of the more influential groups involved in
executing an Allied strategic bombing effort that grew out of Britains tenuous
position in autumn 1940. The Chiefs of Staff September 1940 appreciation
outlining Britains desperate reliance on SOE-directed subversion also stated that
aerial bombing by the Royal Air Force offered the only meansof striking
immediately at objectives within enemy territory, complementing the optimistic
economic blockade that was expected to cripple Nazi industry.1 Thus originated
the strategic air offensive, intended as a method of direct attack on the enemy
state that deprived it of the means or the will to continue the war.2 This
strategy unfolded largely in accordance with the inter-war concepts of the Italian
air power theorist Giulio Douhet, who wrote in 1921 that in the era of total war,
achieving command of the air through mass deployments of bombers against
the enemys homeland could inflict the most rapid, efficient, and crippling
amount of damage possible.3
EOU, SIRA, AND THE PITFALLS OF R&A 113
One of Douhets most prescient observations concerned the selection of

targets, which had obvious ramifications for the application of intelligence
resources to the bombing campaign:
The choice of enemy targetsis the most delicate operation of aerial

warfare. In such a case the final decision depends upon the disequilibrium
between the damage suffered by the enemy and his powers of
recuperating. The truth of the matter is that no hard and fast rules can be
laid down on this aspect of aerial warfare. It is impossible even to outline
general standards because the choice of enemy targets will depend on a
number of circumstances, material, moral, and psychological, the
importance of which, though real, is not easily estimated. It is just here, in
grasping these imponderables, in choosing enemy targets, that future
commanders of Air Forces will show their ability.
Once the choice of enemy objectives and the order of their destruction
have been determined, the task of the Air Force becomes very simpleto
get on with their destruction in the briefest possible time, with no other
preoccupation.4
The British were indeed confronted with the target selection problem in 1939. A
targeting organization was immediately required to analyse the German
economy, search for the most vulnerable target systems and targets within
those systems, and so help employ the RAFs limited striking power.5
The organization responsible for this task in the first instance was the Ministry
of Economic Warfare. The role of MEWs Enemy Branch in regard to
bombing was defined for the new Commander-in-Chief RAF Bomber
Command in 1942 as providing target information, as assessing the vulnerability
of different targets to attack, and as determining the effect of those attacks on the
German war effort.6 The high degree of uncertainty about Germanys real
economic position at wars outbreak coloured the Enemy Branchs analyses and
recommendations, however. MEW found it difficult to reconcile the puzzling,
but often very explicit, evidence of German deficiencies and improvisations with
theoverwhelming success of German military operations in 1939 and 1940,
which MEW credited to thorough and ruthless planning for a war economy
presumably running at fever pitch. This was an erroneous conception of an
enemy economy far from complete mobilization, but it led MEW to conclude in
1939 that commodity control through blockade would cause Germanys
economic breakdown by starving the admittedly adequate industrial base of its
assumed peak consumption of raw materials.7 The stunning events of May
June 1940 forced MEW to abandon hopes of victory by simple blockade
(particularly as Germanys recent territorial acquisitions and pact with Russia
largely ameliorated the strength of economic warfare), and to focus on
destroying supplies of key commodities, most notably oil.8 Oil was accordingly
regarded as a prime target for RAF Bomber Commands attacks in 1940, but two
shortcomings combined to frustrate this first concentrated air offensive. Precise

knowledge was lacking about Germanys oil position, which involved both
domestically produced synthetic fuels and conquered natural supplies.
Germanys ability to cut civilian oil consumption, and to increase synthetic
production, could not be predicted accurately before the war, while the amounts
of Polish and Romanian oil obtained were even more difficult to ascertain.
Equally debilitating was Bomber Commands frank technical inability to realize
oil bombings potential in 19401. Forces and bomb-loads were insufficient, as
were the operational techniques necessary to ensure hitting the targets.9
This failure of RAF oil bombing as directed by MEW assessments had two
major consequences. First and foremost, Bomber Command developed a
jaundiced opinion of targeting by economic analysts. During the great targeting
debates of 1944, the Bomber Command C-in-C, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur
Harris, took pains to describe very forcibly [his] experience with the Ministry of
Economic Warfare in the past and expressed [his] view that if this was anything
to go by [the air forces] should certainly be basing [their] plans on incomplete
information. Harris grew to have little confidence in MEWs recommendations
to bomb targets which were supposed by the economic experts to be such a vital
bottleneck in the German war industry that when they were destroyed the enemy
would have to pack up. Only at the very end of the war did the arguments of
the economic experts [not] invariably [prove] fallacious. Harriss experience
with MEW as a group commander concerning oil, and then regarding
molybdenum, Ruhr dams, ball-bearings and German morale as C-in-C Bomber
Command, hardened his views considerably given MEWs repeated failure to
detect the results expected from bombing their selected target.10
MEWs consistently high expectations about the effects of precise economic
attacks were due largely to its inability to appreciate fully the limitations and
considerations of transcontinental bombing as demonstrated in 19401.11 These
inescapable technical factors contributed to the second major consequence of the
oil bombing failure. The inability of daylight selective attack to achieve
success inexorably led to the acceptance of night area targeting as the only viable
application of the RAF bomber force. The casualties inflicted on aircraft by day
and the lack of long-range fighter escort necessitated night operations, which itself
rendered navigation and target acquisition considerably more difficult (the
August 1941 Butt Report demonstrated that only one in five night bombers
overall bombed within five milesi.e., within 78.5 square milesof their
target).12 The addition of Americas bomber force to the air war in 1942
subsequently reintroduced the concept of daylight attacks against precise targets
along the lines previously attempted by the RAF, which the Eighth US Army Air
Force (USAAF) hoped would demonstrate its own worth as a weapon
embodying economy of force through attacking specific industries.13 It was this
distinction between a strategy of area targeting and one of precision targeting
that set the two forces apart. The USAAF hoped to succeed where the RAF had
already failed by attacking presumably vital industrial concerns, after which the
enemy would have to pack up. The RAFs earlier experience engendered little
faith in the idea of defeating Germany through destroying allegedly key
industries, which then turned it to night bombing against industrial centres
themselves (i.e., cities). Britain thus felt forced by over-whelming circumstances
to adopt night bombing, which itself imposed the necessity of area targeting as
the most suitable means of disrupting Germanys economy.14 As one American
analyst put it,
[a]rea bombing has not sprung full blown from the mind of a military
theorist; it is a technique evolved from experience and determined in part
by the machines, instruments, and weapons available for air attack
It is a mistake to suppose that the entire evolution of the British air arm
has been directed toward increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of area
bombing. The more correct view is probably that, given the stage of
aircraft development, the British believe that they can affect the German
war machine more by directing their attack by night against the whole of a
built-up area than they could achieve on German war potential by directing
their air force against particular industrial objectives [T]his calculus has
as its basis the evaluation of damage done against losses suffered
It is not true that area bombing was probably important because of the
general job it does upon civilian morale and attitudes. In the British
concept it is important because it forces a redistribution and re-
arrangement of materials and labour force which detracts from the volume
of war production.15
The Americans for their part still held to the belief that destroying key industries
could prove decisive once those industries were identified. Thanks to the
deliberate development of both the B-17 Flying Fortress and special defensive
formation tactics, the USAAF felt able to pursue the luxury of daylight bombing,
which then theoretically facilitated targeting individual installations. So while
Britains decision to target the most obvious manifestation of Germanys
strategic economic capacityits industrial citiesevolved from the requirement
to attack at night and from a declining faith in the existence of conveniently
vulnerable bottleneck industries, the American faith in the existence of
convenient bottlenecks, combined with a belief that technology could
overcome adverse circumstances, led to the decision to try targeting only certain
industrial installations of presumed strategic import by day.16
The difference between the British and American air-attack strategies
therefore rested more on the degree of faith held in the efficacy of targeting
either key industries or industrial centres than it did on the commonly (if
incorrectly) understood distinction between the tactic of aiming at an area as
opposed to a precision target. One former USAAF navigators experience
indicates that this was a distinction without a difference, since only the lead
navigator of the squadron of planes focused its bombsight on the target. We who
followed simply dropped our bombs when we saw the lead planes bombs
falling, with the result that our bombs just fell into the center of cities.17 Also
significant was the USAAFs combat box formation, which produced a pattern
correspond[ing] to a bomb ground pattern larger than the usual industrial
target.18 The difference between precision and area aiming thus bore less
relation to how exclusively the target was defined than to how close the aircraft
were to a somewhat arbitrary point when the bombs were released. The accuracy
of all bombing was accordingly determined by this physical reality. The
destruction of a given industrial installation could be desired, but to ensure
hitting the area that included the installation, and not a point exclusive to the
industrial site, both British and American bombs would either way have to fall in
a dispersed pattern.
A further consideration of particular relevance to RAF strategy concerned the
munitions used, which stemmed from the disparity between the effectiveness of
high explosives (HE) as compared with incendiaries. Incendiaries were judged
on the basis of British experience under German attack to cause five times as
much damage as an equal weight of high explosives. The central city and built-
up compact residential areas of German cities were especially vulnerable to fire
given their material construction and lay-out, and the fact that this 8 per cent of
the average city area contained the densest concentration of dwellings (50 per
cent). With 2530 per cent of the force bomb-load containing HE to destroy
essential fire defence means (roads, water mains, etc.), and to complicate civil
defence measures, incendiaries offered the best hope of achieving the total
destruction of the industrial and social activity of an industrial centre (i.e., of
making it incapable of functioning as an industrial city). By 1942, the simple
reality was that for the RAF to have a reasonable chance of destroying German
industrial capacity, incendiaries had to be used, which were by definition area,
rather than precision, weapons.19 The effect of incendiary-bombing cities was
also assumed from the start to have the potential to precipitate a crisis in German
morale. This in fact reflected the RAFs desire to equate area targeting with a
possibly decisive result achieved in relatively short order; it originated in
February 1942 when the very continued existence of Bomber Command was in
doubt due to its operational shortcomings.20 It was incidental to the inability to
hit precise targets (the essential reason for turning to area targeting in the first
instance), and essentially an effort to make a virtue out of a necessity.21
The choice of day or night navigation, the definition of what constituted a viable
target, and the relative efficiency of available munitions accordingly combined to
shape the Anglo-American air attacks against German industry. Early 1940s
bombing was by definition an inexact science, and the respective methods of the
RAF and USAAF owed much to their conceptions of what was technically
possible with regard to industrial targeting. Such were the Allied bombing
offensives established parameters when R&A men entered the fray to fill a clear
gap in the organization of the American Air Staff in Europe.22 John D.Wilson
and Russell Dorr initially established contacts with MEWs Enemy Branch
between April and June 1942.23 When Colonel Richard Hughes arrived in
England as Eighth Air Force target intelligence officer, he was approached by
Dorr regarding the possibility of R&A contributing to his work since MEWs
Enemy Branch considered R&A to be its opposite number. Following a series of
meetings between R&A and Eighth Air Force representatives, it was agreed that
R&A economic analysts would establish an Enemy Objectives Unit as part of an
overall Economic Warfare Division (EWD) of the US Embassy in London
staffed by the American Board of Economic Warfare. The three-man nucleus of
EOU (Dorr, Chandler Morse, and Captain Walt W. Rostow) was formally
established on 12 September 1942, and was soon joined by other analysts who
were tasked by the Eighth Air Force to start aiming point reports on 24
September.24
EOU set about independently developing its own theoretical doctrine for
target selection at a time when the USAAF wanted key target systems identified
for methodical attack. This made for a certain confluence of aims as the
USAAFs doctrine of precision bombing committed it to destroying industrial
targets and to industrial analysis in equal measure. Since the USAAF, unlike
RAF Bomber Command, stressed selecting targets scientifically, its targeting
intelligence personnel soon commenced formulating Aiming Point reports on
individual industrial sites, where-upon EOU laid the groundwork for its
analytical methodology.25 Using data gleaned from ground reports, prisoner
interrogations, visits to similar British factories, and photo reconnaissance, EOU
provided analyses of individual target viability for the Eighth Air Force. EOU
then moved on to special studies of German industry that were completed by
March 1943. It must be stressed that due to dissatisfaction with the methods and
performance of MEWs Enemy Branch, EOU worked independently from its
British opposite beyond accepting MEW intelligence for EOU analysis. This
analysis work involved producing Target Potentiality Reports designed to show
how bombing might be best directed against specific possible target systems. In
so doing, EOU focused on ranking possible target systems according to their
military utility. This involved answering three fundamental questions, expressed
quantitatively as follows in a memo by William Salant, quoted in the EOU War
Diary:
1. How great is the impairment of the enemys efforts per unit of physical
destruction?
2. How many units of physical destruction will be achieved per ton of
bombs dropped on the target?
3. How many tons of bombs can be dropped per unit of air effort, or per
unit of cost? (Including losses and wastage of planes and crew, expenditure
of bombs and gasoline, etc.). Analytically, it seems best to assume that
virtually any objective can be achieved if sufficient effort is expended.
Greater effortin terms of sorties will mean higher costhowever
measured. Therefore cost in some sense seems to be the relevant concept

[emphasis added].
Known as the Party Line, these concepts were expressed as a simple ratio of
impairment to enemy/cost to us, and their development corresponded with the
deliberate execution of a Combined Bomber Offensive (CBO) by the RAF and
USAAF beginning in June.26 EOUs conclusions favouring an attack against the
production of German fighter aircraft engines contributed to the effort
throughout the summer and autumn of 1943 to wear down the German Air
Forces front-line fighter strength (code-named POINTBLANK). POINTBLANK
did not succeed, however, given the failure to appreciate the need to repeat strikes
against aircraft industry targets in order to overcome German recuperative
powers. A revamped effort during February and March 1944 met with greater
(but not lasting) success, although the effective defeat of the German fighter
force was achieved with the introduction of US longrange fighter escorts.27
The advantages of a precision targeting strategy over RAF methods remained
unproved despite EOUs conclusion based on its impairment/cost equation that
precision targeting was more effective, and Bomber Command was actually
encouraged in this period to concentrate its attacks against cities vital to German
aircraft production.28 Neither method was in fact yet capable of delivering a
crippling or decisive blow, however, especially since the Germans responded to
the CBO with greater economic mobilization and improvisation.29 The weight of
air attack therefore needed more time to overcome the German economy, but
that time would be denied both air forces since they were expected from 1 April
1944 to support OVERLORDs requirements as coordinated by SHAEFs Allied
Expeditionary Air Force.30 This development led to one of the most heated
controversies of the air war, and it would persist in modified form until Germanys
defeat, with EOU playing a central role in applying its Party Line as a doctrine
of warfare.31
The controversy started from considerations regarding how best to employ the
bomber forces in support of OVERLORD, and there were two leading
alternatives. The first alternative originated in the experience of the Deputy
Supreme Allied Commander, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder, with the
bombing of rail communications in the Mediterranean. He was supported in this
conception by the analysis of his former targeting aide, anthropologist professor
Solly Zuckerman, who believed that such bombing would complicate moving
German troops and supplies by rail while also paralysing industry.32
The second alternative was a bombing campaign against German oil facilities,
emanating from EOU. This plan was backed by the newly appointed chief of
Eighth Bomber Command, Lieutenant-General Carl Spaatz. Despite its own
early interest in the potential of rail bombing as demonstrated in Italy, EOU
became convinced of the German oil industrys vulnerability based on its target
potentiality studies. Its view particularly stressed the deficiency of German oil
stocks in relation to German oil capacity.33 EOUs faith in the prospects of
bombing oil put it in direct conflict with Zuckermans rail proposal, with the
main source of friction being the competing agendas involved. EOU staff
member Charles Kindleberger outlines the friction in his memoir, although he
defers to Walt Rostows published version of events, and Barry Katzs Foreign
Intelligence.34 These sources all suggest the role of competing egos and agendas,
but they do not reveal their full influence on events. Zuckermans status stemmed
from his personal relationship with Tedder born of their experiences in the
Mediterranean. In arguing for the rail plan, both Tedder and Zuckerman placed
their respective military and analytical reputations on the line. EOU for its part was
eager to have a direct impact on operations and to exploit the USAAFs
predisposition in order to have their new plan for victory executed, especially since
the American Eighth Bomber Command was frankly casting about for the golden
opportunity to enable the Eighth Air Force to prove the validity of precision
targeting doctrine. The USAAFs search was clearly reflected in the alternating
American enthusiasm for attacking first ball-bearings, and then the German
fighter industry.35 It was also a pronounced tendency in the newly designated
ETO American bomber commander, Carl Spaatz, who as Eisenhowers former
Mediterranean air chief was fascinated with the prospect of buggering up
transportation in depth. Spaatz had a pre-occupation with attacking
communications in Italy that gave him a bias on the subject before his arrival
in England. EOUs Charles Kindleberger was advised by a Mediterranean
counterpart that although Spaatz might be sold the right line immediately by
EOU, it would be better to convince him through his own staff officers. EOU
could educate Spaatz on the attractions of a narrow list of vitally strategic
targets, which would obviously steer him toward EOUs resurrection of oil as the
primary bombing target by appealing to his desire to discover some means of
validating American bombing methods. EOU was thus engaged by February
1944 in a two-front campaign designed to woo Spaatz and to discredit
Zuckermans rail plan in order to secure the oil plans adoption. EOU would not
so much serve its chief consumer as manipulate him.36
EOU accomplished its first objective with relative ease on 5 March when, as
predicted, Spaatz rapidly accepted an EOU draft plan presented to him by
Colonel Hughes of his target selection staff in accordance with the advice
Kindleberger received about approaching Spaatz. This plan implicitly focused on
using American strategic air power against oil (Kindlebergers memoir
confusingly claims that a meeting of minds between Hughes and EOU occurred
[i]n the winter of 19 [4]34 concerning bridge bombing, not oil bombing, that
bridges versus rail marshalling yards was the basic controversy between EOU
and Zuckerman, and that this became partly entangled in the strategic issue of
bombing oil plants).37 Achieving the second goal proved harder, not only
because of Tedders involvement, but because the issue was not as clear-cut as
EOU defined it. One member of Britains Railway Research Service responded
to the criticisms of the rail plan made by EOU and other British agencies
(including MEW, the War Office and Air Intelligence) by observing that the
critics had grossly underestimated German rail requirements in a battle situation,

had blatantly overestimated German locomotive availability, and had wrongly
regarded all train engine types as interchangeable.38
As indicated above, reservations with the rail plan did not develop along strict
British and American lines. Air Chief Marshal Harris opposed an exclusive
commitment to any plan that would not by itself ensure the complete application
of his specialized force. Harris explicitly said
that he was not disputing the choice of targets, and agreed that if this number
of rail centres could be successfully attacked the railway system would be
dislocated and chaos would result. What he did question was the degree of
effectiveness of night bombing upon which the calculations in the paper
had been based. [Harris went on to point out that the accuracy of the OBOE
and OBOE II navigational aids were unlikely to prove as great as projected.
He also stated]when operations were carried out to a fixed target
programme it was inevitable that repeated opportunities for other profitable
attacks would be missed. He said the night bomber force must be free to
strike whenever and wherever the opportunity occurs [in supporting
OVERLORD].39
The C-in-Cs doubts as to Bomber Commands suitability for such work were
reasonable, although inconclusive, but his misgivings about the wisdom of a
fixed programme were supported by Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal, Chief
of the Air Staff. The debate over rail versus oil in support of OVERLORD had
nevertheless gone on long enough. Its resolution finally emerged in a meeting
between Eisenhower and the interested air commanders on 25 March where the
Supreme Commander came down in favour of the rail plan. The issue was de
facto decided by Eisenhower based on which choice implied the most reliable
contribution to the execution of OVERLORD. EOUs Kindleberger had
fashioned a tactical plan incorporating bridge and supply dump bombing in
explicit opposition to the AEAF rail proposal, but Spaatz had decided only to
offer oil bombing for consideration. Eisenhower then decided that bombing rail
facilities and marshalling yards would do more to hinder German military
operations near the bridgehead in the period immediately after OVERLORD,
whereas oil bombing would offer greater potential for strategically damaging
Germanys war effort over time. It should be noted that EOU and Spaatz
believed that oil bombing would have an impact at the tactical level as well, but
this was dependent on its execution in conjunction with bridge bombing, which
itself was not presented to Eisenhower (Kindlebergers memoir confuses the
matter by not clearly articulating the relationship between bridge and oil
bombing). The concerns of OVERLORD thus necessitated the prudent selection
of Zuckermans proposal from the options presented.40
This was not the end of the matter, however. Within a week of his oil
proposals defeat, Spaatz minuted Eisenhower with a request for the Fifteenth
Air Force in Italy to bomb Romanian rail yards conveniently adjacent to oil
refineries, and for the Eighth Air Force to bomb selected oil plants in Germany,
as means of further reducing German Air Force (GAP) fighter power to achieve
pre-OVERLORD air supremacy.41 Spaatz succeeded in this oblique
circumvention of Eisenhowers 25 March decision in part by an alleged threat to
resign his command if he was not permitted to attack oil in fulfilment of his
directive to attrit the GAF.42 Given the ease with which Spaatz secured
Eisenhowers accession to oil attacks before the invasion, and the prompt
unleashing of those attacks after D-Day, it seems likely that Spaatz reconciled
himself to the rail plans inevitability as necessitated by OVERLORDs short-
term requirements. By acquiescing to marshalling yard attacks, he then secured a
trade-off for that which he valued mostthe opportunity to demonstrate oil
bombings strategically significant potential so that the Eighth Air Force would
be released to assault oil plants wholesale after the invasion. Bridge bombing
was further infiltrated into the pre-invasion bombing programme by the first
week of May as tactical bombers were employed to cut these arteries, thus
invalidating Zuckermans conclusion on the basis of Sicilian bombing that
bridges were not profitable targets.43 Rail bombing eventually proved to have the
desired effect, partly due to the unexpectedly impressive results achieved by
RAF Bomber Command with newly operational navigational devices, but mostly
because of bridge bombing in the unique geographical context of Normandys
dense and contained rail network. EOU was instrumental in pushing for bridge
bombing as the results of the May experiments became known.44
EOUs input regarding bridges played a useful role in supplementing, and
even fine-tuning, the original rail plan, and it laid the foundation upon which
Spaatz was able to insinuate oil bombing into Allied strategy on the back of
OVERLORDs requirements; but while oil bombings subsequent contribution to
the end of the war has been largely taken as a given by EOU partisans, the
accompanying in-fighting has been glossed over. Most notable is the view of
EOU alumnus Walt Rostow: Postwar analysts and historians arevirtually
unanimous in their verdict that the attack on oil represented the most effective
use of strategic air power in the European theater (he particularly decries the
delay in oil bombing caused by the 25 March OVERLORD decision).45
Whatever the notoriety of the controversy surrounding pre-invasion bombing, an
even more intense struggle ensued as the war drew to a close, one that has not
been fully appreciated before, and which reveals EOU in a most unflattering
light.
Since nearly three-quarters of all Allied bombs dropped on Europe were
delivered after 1 July 1944, the post-invasion period was the strategic air
offensives truly decisive hour.46 Oil was increasingly presumed to be
Germanys Achilles heel by the higher Allied authorities, but their reasoning was
more nuanced than EOUs. It was particularly stressed by the British War
Cabinets Sub-Committee on Axis Oil that losing Romanian and East Polish oil
sources would put an immense burden on Germanys domestic synthetic
hydrogenation plants. Germany would therefore be particularly vulnerable as the

synthetic plants (50 per cent of its remaining oil sources) were attacked once the
external sources were overrun by the Soviets. This would further impose
considerable re-organisation and alterations to the Axis oil transportation
programme. Germany would be 60 per cent dependent on its synthetic supplies
if Hungary and Estonia were also lost.47 This obviously gave added impetus for
pursuing EOUs preferred strategy, but it also provided considerations in favour
of heightening attacks against Germanys rail system during the advance beyond
Normandy, thus making the two campaigns complementary. Tedder particularly
backed transportation attacks because of their con crete effects against troop and
supply movement in battle areas, which would prove important as the Allies
closed in on Germany.48 Zuckerman also argued that transportation was the
German economys greatest common denominator, and therefore the highest
priority target.49 RAF Bomber Commands Arthur Harris was wary of both plans
despite the accuracy his men displayed during pre-invasion bombing. He was
particularly concerned about the poor weather likely to be encountered in the
winter months that would conspire to complicate and potentially nullify any
precision targeting strategy if area targeting were relegated to an afterthought.
It would be especially risky to bet everything on an oil bombing strategy that had
yet to prove itself conclusively.50
The July 1944April 1945 period thus witnessed an ongoing struggle between
competing visions of how best to employ the Allied strategic air forces during
the wars climax. EOU was an interested party throughout, with its analysts in a
distinct position to influence how the question was handled. A Joint Oil
Targeting Committee (JOTC) was established on 6 July to monitor bombing
effects and to recommend specific targets on the strength of demonstrated
performance. Representatives were drawn from all interested agencies and
forces, including EOU (and eventually EOUs Nat Pincus), with JOTC renamed
the Combined Strategic Targets Committee (CSTC) in October. Its
responsibilities were then extended to include recommending target system
priorities as well.51 JOTC also issued weekly bulletins summarizing oil campaign
developments based on running assessments of each individual oil plant. CSTC
continued this procedure until wars end. These bulletins indicated some vital
considerations in judging the oil campaigns effectiveness. While German fuel
output fell to 60 per cent of April pre-bombing levels by 30 June, to 50 per cent
of pre-bombing levels by 31 July, to the 39 per cent level by 31 August, and
eventually to a low of about 23 per cent by 30 September, the Germans
continued to fight. Much of the September figure resulted from Russian troops
over-running all Romanian and most Polish facilities (Romania alone accounted
for 50 per cent of German crude); but equally significant was the fact that
Germany increasingly responded in accordance with the dictum that if something
is worth bombing, it is worth defending.52 Extreme measures were taken to
repair damaged plants, and oil refining was dispersed to new underground
facilities. It was even feared in October that future German synthetic output
might reach the levels sustained in August (when Germany still controlled
Romanian and Polish sources).53 A slow recovery in fact started during October
(to 30 per cent output), a level Germany managed to sustain until Russias
January 1945 advance into Silesia captured more plants, leaving only Germanys
central and western facilities.54 The British advance into the Ruhr then captured
Germanys heavily damaged western plants, thus leaving the air forces by April
to maintain their existing stranglehold on the enemys oil supplies until such time
as the ground armies place [d] the issue beyond doubt by capture of the main
sources of production.55
Whatever EOUs position, then, the precision targeting of oil alone never
managed to knock out Germany, or even drive its oil output below 30 per cent of
its April 1944 level for very long. The most significant influence on German oil
was the Soviet and Allied land armies advance (itself owing something to the
application of strategic airpower to ground support in the west), since the actual
capture of plants is what decisively affected the issue. Oil bombing was moreover
complicated by the inability of photo reconnaissancethe main source of
intelligence on bombing effectsto keep pace with the scale of refinery attacks.
There were often seven- to ten-day delays in PR coverage, during which time the
Germans could make repairs and so frustrate JOTC/CSTC damage assessments.
Even when available, PR had its limitations: one Romanian plant was judged as
operating at high capacity when in reality it was producing half the estimated
amount given that the plants primary distillation unit was out of service for ten
weeks, a result undetectable from the air; another plants damaged boiler houses
led to the conclusion that production was seriously affected when actually the
boilers themselves were undamaged and the output higher than assessed on the
basis of PR.56
Weather was the factor common to the obstinacy of German production in the
face of bombing, and to the lag in PR confirmation, particularly between October
and December 1944. CSTC itself noted that during this period, the weather lived
up to the worst expectations and visual opportunities of attack were rare, while
weather also made PR damage assessments of specific plants much more
difficult; as a result, [i]n most branches of the enemys oil production[,] repairs
began to make progress in [the] face of new damage.57 Radar-guided bombing
was too inaccurate to offset the weather problem. Ten centimetre wavelength
H2S radar could only provide an average accuracy of 50% of bombs dropped
blindlyto fall on [a] built-up area, with identification of specific aiming
points within the built-up areasnot usually possible. For 3cm wavelength radar,
operational performance was expected to be considerably worse than the
theoretical accuracy of mile, thus giving slightly higher accuracy than 10cm
wavelength radar.58 A report on Bombing Accuracy, USAAF Heavy and
Medium Bombers in the ETO furthermore stated that the two most difficult
target complexes to bomb accurately were synthetic oil plants and oil refineries,
with accuracy defined as 50 per cent of the bombload landing within 1,000 feet of
the aim point.59 Even before the winters bad weather, it was conceded by the
USAAF that the difficulties involved[had] made it impossible to achieve

anything like [its] usual bombing accuracy, with all visual B-17 attacks through
mid-July to mid-September achieving only 41 per cent of bombs within 1,000
feet of the aim point, and with an average aiming point error of 950 feet. It was
thus clear that the number of bombs which must be dispatched to get the same
density of bombs on a synthetic oil target is three or four times as large as it is
on [other] targets in general [emphasis added].60 This obviously nullified oil
bombings presumed advantage as defined by the terms of EOUs own Party
Line, already cited aboveit seems best to assume that virtually any objective
can be achieved if sufficient effort is expended. Greater effortin terms of sorties
will mean higher costhowever measured. Therefore cost in some sense
seems to be the relevant concept [emphasis added].61 EOUs preferred strategy
was thus a failure by its own methodology. Given weather, German counter-
measures, and bombing technologys practical limitations, a fundamentally
necessary condition for a knock-out oil bombing campaign (hitting the targets
with sufficient cost-effectiveness) was not being met. The result achieved against
oil also owed more to the advancing armies than it did to bombing.
Harriss worst expectations were therefore vindicated by events, justifying
his coolness toward abandoning city attacks for a precision campaign that could
be so easily frustrated by the elements. He rightly characterized the Allies task
as a race between the destruction [they] could do and the building of new small
plants and the repair of large old ones, and Bomber Commands tactical
methods in fact proved particularly effective in this regard.62 Bomber Command
actually dropped only slightly less tonnage on oil targets than did the Eighth Air
Force, but with such effectiveness that unlike the USAAF, the RAF rarely had to
repeat its work. The RAFs destruction of ten Ruhr oil centres proved more
effective than the American attacks against central and eastern German plants,
and rapidly brought their output to a decisive low level that could not be
countered by rebuilding as rapidly as other sites given the attacks devastation.63
These facts failed to impress Harriss superiors and rivals, though, who believed
that he was gratuitously obstructing Bomber Commands application against
oil.64 The CAS in particular engaged in a lengthy correspondence with Harris
notable for its trivialization of Bomber Commands position.65 Harris in reality
had oil plants as the primary targets for attack, weather and circumstances
permitting. Portal specified a lack of enthusiasm for oil as compared with area
attacks in his letter to Harris of 20 January 1945, but Harris had already told him
on 6 November 1944 that the Bomber Command Operations Room had asquash
ladder of Ruhr oil targets requiring further attention.66 During a 1 March 1945 Air
Commanders Conference held at SHAEF, Harris also stressed most forcibly
that he considered when the weather was fine that the heavies must continue to
concentrate on the oil targets[T]he whole effect would be lost unless every
effort was taken to keep output at its current low level.67 Bomber Command had
also stated at the conference of 4 January (over two weeks before Portals
enthusiasm letter) that oil should be a priority, especially as the month of
January usually offered good weather, thereby enabling deep penetration into
Germany to attack oil targets.68 The commander of Bomber Commands
Pathfinder Group noted in his memoirs Harriss March 1945 enthusiasm for oil
despite earlier objections that the plants were too hard to hit (before the new H2S
Mk. III radar proved itself).69 Despite all of this, EOU also considered Harris an
actual foe of oil bombing per se, and this demonstrates the extent to which EOU
analysts could not grasp that oil plants were not being hit effectively, that the
land armies advances were decisive, and that EOUs Party Line was vastly
inferior to Harriss judgement.70
EOUs obstinacy flared up dramatically toward wars end. Throughout the oil
campaign, a competing communications campaign was also waged with the
noted backing of Tedder. Attacks against rail facilities were constantly weighed
in the judgements of SHAEF and the JIC, with communications routinely
assigned second or third priority as precision targets by CSTC in conjunction
with direct support of the land campaign.71 EOUs CSTC representative
nevertheless became so caught up in the oil-rail competition that he and like-
minded colleagues formed a distinct faction within the committee which actually
defied the high commands wishes by shunting communications targets to the
lowest possible priority in the wars closing weeks despite oil bombing having
achieved as much as it could. The EOU War Diary baldly states that a running
guerrilla battle was fought to the end of the war on the proportion of effort which
should be allocated to the oil system. While Captain Harold Barnett lobbied for
Army support through G-2 SHAEF, Nat Pincus and other CSTC Members
fought to make the job thorough.72 In point of fact, much of CSTC was not
necessarily on EOUs side, and the thoroughness issue was hardly so simple. The
CSTC minutes of the meetings surrounding this episode clearly illustrate that
poor weather required repeated oil attacks in November in order to prevent an
even greater German resurgence, with the Eighth Air Force representative
(Colonel Hughes) particularly keen on having oil remain the priority target
system.73 Tedder, though, made it known to CSTC on 22 November that he
particularly wanted a bombing programme that would aid the land battle
directly.74 Supported by MEW representative Oliver Lawrence, Nat Pincus
reiterated EOUs opposition to such a transportation programme the following
week, although he was reminded on 6 December that rail bombings objective
was to create dislocation and complement the oil campaign.75 This was SHAEFs
view, repeated to CSTC on 27 December, but the committee continued to
recommend oils precedence over communications until the end of March
1945.76
Matters then came to a head during the 4 April CSTC meeting. The committee
chair made it clear that in order to contribute directly to facilitating the advance
of the land Armies, a plan for attacking selected central and southern German
communications targets had been agreed to by the Commanding General, US
Strategic Air Forces (USSTAF, the new designation for the echelon above
Eighth Air Force), the RAF Deputy Chief of the Air Staff (DCAS, Bomber
Commands immediate superior), and SHAEF. Pincus immediately declared that

CSTC had already decided that communications targets were less promising than
attacks against munitions depots, and therefore deserved lower priority. Group
Captain Merely of SHAEF/Air challenged Pincus on this, but [a]fter further
discussion, the chairman held a vote on whether communications should be
second after oil and ahead of depots (the plan desired by the high command), or
whether oil should be ranked first, depots second, and communications third. The
second proposal, backed by EOU and its confederates, amazingly prevailed
despite the obvious wishes of the air commanders and SHAEF, read Tedder.77
It was a short-lived victory. Tedder immediately contacted DCAS Norman
Bottomly and Spaatz on 10 April strongly underscoring the importance of
communications attacks, and concluding: I notice that opposition to the present
priorities has been expressed in the Strategic Targets Committee. I suggest that
the function of this Committee is to choose targets and not to settle policy. I
request that the Committee be invited forthwith to prepare an additional list of
communications targets.78 Tedders invitation was not one to be refused, and
CSTC miraculously decided on a further study of the depot and communications
question the following day.79 A blunter appraisal of the episode, and EOUs part
in it, was delivered to EOUs Harold Barnett by Lieutenant-Colonel Henry
Bailey-King of SHAEF (Forward) G-2 on 20 April: I am afraid that the CSTC
meeting of 4th April 45 was most unfortunate. Whatever the facts of the case it
was taken as an indication that Nat [Pincus], George JONES [of Eighth Air
Force] and others outside the Committee had deliberately decided to veto the Air
Commanders [sic] decision; make as much trouble as they could, and what is
more aid and abet the 8th [Air Force] to shift cards under the table. I dont need
to recapitulate all the hard words that were spoken, suffice it that I tell you that I
know that a lot of knuckles were rappedhigh ranking ones tooand that
whatever may have happened on a low level in the way of telling chaps to do
what they were told and stop arguing is mild compared with some of the signals
passed at high levels. Some quite high chaps found themselves on the mat. All
because, as far as anyone can see, EOU (and Oliver LAWRENCE [of MEW]
perhaps!?) decided to test the strength of the Committee; anyhow you all know
how weak it is. I mean it just cant try conclusions with the commanders! I must
say quite openly thatthe apparent decision of various people to agitate against
the Air Commanders [sic] decision was just the worst possible policy
imaginable. I just cannot conceive anything more calculated to set the house
alight. Whatever good I may have done in getting depots attached at all was
nullified forever in a flash. In rage, I suspect if nothing else, the Commanders
decided to erase all mention of depots from the priority list I described the
LONDON agitation to Charlie [Kindleberger] as pulling a hair out of the arse of
the almightythe result a clout over the ear I dont know who prompted who
to fiddle with the lay ons but it was clear for about a week that somebody was not
playing the game by the rules, however repugnant those rules may have been; so
it was brought to various peoples attention. Naturally when about the same time
various people read the minutes of the CSTC meeting the balloon went upand
how. Let it be realised though that those chaps concernedprepared their own
nooses; unwittingly maybe! Their intentions may be good, but as you must
know Nats blind apparent hatred for all forms of transportation attacks makes
many people suspicious of his actions and motivesYou may say that to cut off
all depots from the list in rage so as to ensure that there is no fiddling with
priorities, is quite unjust; maybe it is; but that is the way things happen in the
Army when chaps stick pins in the Generals arse
You have seen enough of how a military machine works to know how things are
done. I wish to God you could get across to others
this simple fact. When orders have been given it is better to obey them than
stick pins in the generals arse. If you want to complain, by all means do so
through the right channels. EOU is perfectly at liberty to argue with
USSTAF or the 8th but dont be caught shuffling the cards under the
table; and remember that in the Army, Airforces etc. nothing is really run
by a committee
May I ask one last question: at this stage of the war was it all worth it?80
EOU clearly worked with the Eighth Air Force to obstruct the transportation
programme in order to prevent any reduction in oil attacks through the pretext of
the depot issue (the EOU War Diary, written by Walt Rostow, refrains from
going into real detail about the episode, merely characterizing it as another noble
effort to maximize oil bombing against the odds that was settled by a decision
of the air commanders, at which point EOU and the dissident members of the
CSTC, of course, retired from the fray).81 It is also known that CSTCs oil
partisans (particularly Lawrence of MEW) even went so far as to suppress
analyses of ULTRA material regarding transportation and the German economy
that showed the significant effects of air attacks.82 EOU was thus party to a
concerted attempt to manipulate analyses and procedures in support of its like-
minded USAAF consumers. EOU had obviously gone from simply advancing
targeting proposals toward involving itself in shaping policies that would enable
the USAAF to validate precision targeting. The confluence of aims noted earlier
made for a partnership between analyst and consumer that went beyond the
intimate support of operations (a theoretical ideal) to active participation in
policy debates to the point of collusion designed to frustrate the high
command.83 EOU was committed to proving the validity of precision targeting,
and to abiding by the Party Lines dictum of realizing greater impairment to the
enemy compared with the cost born by the USAAF, by definition in their view
through oil bombing. Despite clear evidence that the impairment of the enemy/
cost ratio in oil bombing was not nearly as efficient as EOU claimed, it
nevertheless clung to a fixed view dominated more by an emotional investment
in an abstract doctrine than by any operational reality or objective intelligence
analysis, a stance that obviously influenced EOUs entire approach to analysing

target intelligence.
The oil campaigns objective merits in comparison with communications
attacks, and with the targeting of industrial centres, indicates that the oil bombing
reduced Germanys oil output to a definite ceiling; it did not, and could not, end
Germanys capacity to resist. The transportation alternative never really had a
fair chance to prove itself despite Tedders patronage, but as a precision target
system it would likely have been bedevilled by weather and PR difficulties as
much as oil. It is therefore clear that within the constraints of weather and
operational technique, RAF Bomber Command was consistently the most
effective in destroying communications, oil targets, and industrial centres as
navigational technology and crew capabilities reached their peak efficiency. The
strategic bombing forces contribution to victory, with Bomber Command in the
vanguard, was thus a cumulative one: overall industrial destruction,
communications dislocation, and firm pressure on oil combined with the advance
of the land armies (itself facilitated by strategic air support) to defeat Germany.84
EOU would never concede this since it was obsessed with the Party Line, and
wedded to proving the validity of precision targeting strategy. The only way
bombing could have accomplished more would have been for Harris to think
sooner in terms of target systems for prioritized destruction by area targeting as
opposed to his conventional geographical conception of targets for much of the
war (i.e., his targeting of Berlin and the Ruhr).85 The preferred approach
eventually manifested itself after OVERLORD as key systems were then
realistically identifiable and vulnerable.86 The only other possible option was to
bomb Germanys hydroelectric facilities, but this alternative required electricity
to be correctly identified as the Reichs most vulnerable target system.87 MEW
never detected this vulnerability during the war, however (neither did EOU), and
conceded as much when captured documents disclosed it.88 MEW Intelligence
Weekly Report No. 169 of 3 May 1945 quoted a captured Bulletin of the
German Ministry of Armament and War Production dated 10 February 1945: it
has not been possible since 1941 to meet fully the demands for power which come
in the peak period of winter despite a 1.3 per cent increase in output in 1943,
and a further 2.4 per cent increase in 1944. MEW commented that this
insufficiency indicated a more serious shortage of generating capacity than it
had believed; and that the developments and extensions of war industry
apparently soon outstripped it and much of the new plant installed was
earmarked forsynthetic oil and aluminium plants and did not therefore ease the
burden on the supply system as a whole.89 An interrogation of Albert Speer on
18 July 1945 further identified power stations as the most efficient means of
crippling industry, although Speer variously described oil, ball-bearings, and city-
busting as potentially decisive, depending on what he was asked in his cell.90 The
failure of British targeting intelligence bodies to win Bomber Commands
confidence, and to detect the most opportune target system, thus combined with
EOUs partisanship to prevent the strategic air offensive from fulfilling its
maximum potential.91
If EOU displayed the dangers of R&A men getting ideas above their station,
the SIRA experience demonstrated their branchs eclipse in one of its original
preservesintelligence reporting.92 R&A/London was always sensitive to SIs
attitude toward intelligence handling, and it was a small victory near the end of
1942 to arrange for SI to put R&A in touch with exile government intelligence
sections in order to acquire political information while preserving SIs role in
processing military intelligence.93 Suspicions nevertheless existed within R&A
that SI was not passing on all the intelligence it possessed.94 These doubts were
confirmed in 1943 after G-2 ETOUSA requested some OSS analyses, whereupon
SI was granted sole responsibility for formulating its own contributions, so
complicated and esoteric were alleged to be the processes of evaluating and
exploiting the original raw intelligence. Even when R&A later secured
permission to screen incoming SI Reports Division material for inclusion in
R&A/Londons political reports to G-2, R&A believed that SI intelligence
hardly justified the fuss, while SI held that the uses of R&A scarcely warranted
the intrusion upon tradition and security. SI thus closely guarded the material
received from SIS and others just as R&A simultaneously sought a more direct
role in the intelligence cycle with its political reports.95 Harold Deutsch managed
to convince SI in May 1944 to circulate material that would not normally be
passed outside SI, and to allow R&A to criticize and appraise SI reports. An
R&A Evaluations Procedures Officer was duly appointed to co-ordinate this
agreement with SIs Reports Division.96 A curb service was then established on
15 June which permitted R&A to examine intelligence of psychological warfare
interest. This had developed after SI more and more [found] that its political or
psychological warfare intelligence, for which adequate staff provision had not
been made, attracted attention and customers.97 In an ironic sense, R&A was
one of those customers since it received particularly useful data for its French
political studies. It was this trend toward a combined effort in political
intelligence that set the precedent for the even closer SIRA arrangement.98
Although R&A credited SI stinginess in sharing intelligence for SIs growing
relevance to OSS/Londons intelligence analysis, there were in reality two main
reasons for SIRAs development: first, consumers found SI material more
interesting than R&A reports, and second, SI was more attuned to the importance
of intelligence dissemination than was R&A. The mechanism for SI
dissemination was the aforementioned Reports Division. SI rapidly appreciated
that the value of intelligence depended in large part on the accuracy, clarity, and
speed of its transmission to those who could use it fully. This concern with
properly disposing of SI/Londons intelligence is notable for the implication that
consumers, not R&A, would analyse intelligence in keeping with SIS practice
outlined in Chapter 4. It was an important matter since the volume of intelligence
obtained by SI was so great that the branch eventually had to be split into
accumulation and disposition sub-units once sufficient personnel were available
in London for this division of labour. A distinct Reports Division function

subsequently evolved throughout the summer and autumn of 1943, focusing on
assessing the credibility and significance of sources and data, and on transmitting
the material to Washington. SI/London soon realized that such intelligence,
including that passed to London from other outposts, should also be disseminated
within the ETO. SI was thus able to exploit the Reports Division as an in-house
unit for screening and selecting incoming information to meet particular
requests, or probable needs as revealed by ongoing liaison, and for delivering the
requisite goods to those concerned (particularly G-2 ETOUSA after March
1943). SI not only mirrored British methods of intelligence processing, but it was
also successful in obtaining undigested SIS material for its own use in the form of
the Military, Air, Naval (MAN) and Economic (E) series of Broadway reports.
SIS also performed the valuable function of disseminating SI reports, in
accordance with standard SIS practice, to specific government offices such as the
Admiralty, Air Ministry, FO, MEW, and War Office. These consumers evaluated
the material, and SIS followed up by passing these evaluations back to the
Reports Division. The Reports Division therefore enjoyed a clear advantage over
R&A given that SIs attention to the dissemination function at least equalled that
given to collection and analysis. As it began processing the material passing
through its hands, the Reports Division increasingly became OSS/Londons
central intelligence handling centre. The division also became more involved
with providing political intelligence to the point where its hostility toward
R&As practice of disseminating political intelligence contributed to an
agreement allowing R&A comment on SI reports before dissemination.
When the Reports Division began depositing political material with R&A in
February 1944 it found that political warfare consumers resented the practice
because they preferred to receive such intelligence from SI directly. Along with
R&As own desire for the curb service, this led to SI developing a Political
Section during JuneAugust 1944, by which point both branches saw merit in a
joint arrangement for processing politically-orientated intelligence.100
Negotiations were conducted in a number of meetings between branch
representatives that culminated in a letter from the SI-R&A branch heads to their
Washington superiors on 12 September detailing the combined SIRA
arrangement. SI initiated the talks by approaching R&As Chandler Morse with
the fundamental objective of combining resources for establishing joint reporting
boards in London, Paris, and eventually Berlin.101 The London boards
ostensible rationale involved SIs expectation of moving from military
intelligence processing to political and economic material, and R&As decreased
production of reference compendia as it moved toward more current political
reporting. SI would then be able to exploit R&A research methods and data,
while R&A could profit from SIs processing and dissemination capabilities.
Centralization would also avoid duplication and overlapping effort. A more honest
set of reasons included R&As desire to obtain access to all SI data, and its wish
to preserve R&As monopoly on the interpretive function that SIs Reports
Division had encroached upon. Achieving these goals while streamlining

political reporting necessitated dividing SIRA administrative positions between
the two branches and subordinating the hybrid entity to both branch heads. This
was acceptable to SI, which was more concerned with alleviating the personnel
shortage that endangered the Reports Divisions ability to maintain its output
(i.e., its disseminations). It was hoped that a joint communiqu sent to
Washington on 12 September (with the tentative approval of Donovan, who was
in London as it was drafted) would overcome the anticipated reluctance of the SI-
R&A Washington hierarchies to grant approval for this scheme. SIRAs Political
and Economic sections would be drawn primarily from R&A, and its Military
and Technical sections from SI.102
R&As Arthur Schlesinger was especially keen to embrace SIRA as the wave
of the future that might do much to preserve OSS after the war. Since SI would
inevitably be involved in more political and economic work in the post-hostilities
period, SIRA offered R&As best hope of maintaining control over reporting in
these fields for the good of OSS as a whole.103 SIRAs successful execution in
London was greatly hampered, however, by the prosaic problem of insufficient
separate office space for its personnel, the SI Registry, and the R&A Reference
Library. This space was deemed necessary both for efficiency, and for avoiding
any suggestion that R&A members of the unit were being subsumed by SI.104
This difficulty thus required R&As personnel to divide their time between the
facilities allotted in SIs home building and the R&A HQ. This arrangement
unfortunately led to considerable confusion. SIRAs chief, Phil Horton of SI,
expected the R&A men to work full time for SIRA, while R&As Allan Evans
expected them only to do SIRA work half time so that they could still work for
R&A. Further confusion arose when SIRA was directed by the OSS/London
command on 28 October that there should be a SIRA/ETO chief to whom the
London, Paris and Berlin SIRA boards could all answer. It was then proposed by
the interested branches that a four man SIRA board made up of two men from
each branch be created to perform a coordinating liaison function between SIs
Reports Division and R&As analysts, and each branchs document-processing
sections, as well as a recommendation function in directing SI-R&A resources.
When OSS/Washingtons negative ruling on the original SIRA conception
arrived on 5 December, London responded that the original plan was now so
modified as to preclude objections raised by Washington and Donovan that SIRA
muddled the branches distinct missions. London pointed out that the newly
evolved SIRA conception now embodied the closer document-processing feature
originally encouraged by Donovan.105
SIRAs potential was thus nullified to a great extent by its failure to obtain
separate facilities, which made R&A face the possibility of physically losing its
designated personnel to SI instead of merely having them devote their efforts to
R&A sections. R&A men were also disappointed with the drudgery associated
with SI Reports Divisions processing work, with the small amount of low-grade
political and economic intelligence emanating from Germany in the closing
months of 1944, and with SIs desire to issue reports containing minimal analysis
and comment in the best SIS tradition. All of R&As active personnel assigned to
SIRA duly exited the Reports Division by the end of December, leaving SI with
its monopoly on effective dissemination procedures. R&A subsequently argued
that the SIRA scheme had too grandiose aims and insufficient development time
to realize the coordination of resources implicit in the OSS concept. Such pathos
merely masked the real issue, namely, R&As unwillingness to lower itself to
perform the processing drudgery that was the key to whatever influence SI
enjoyed. R&A was insufficiently practical to focus on the process of intelligence
reporting. R&A was neither willing to establish its own version of SIs Reports
Division, nor to pitch in while riding SIs coat-tails. R&A thus succeeded in once
again short-changing its own effort, not through any evidence that SI reporting was
inconsequential or too imitative of SIS methods, but through administrative
confusion and analytical arrogance. As indicated in Chapter 4, R&A had no clear
intelligence concept with which to fit itself into the intelligence cycle. The
potential was there, but R&A basically did not know how to adapt its particular
strengths and shortcomings to the reality of ETO intelligence demands.106
EOU and SIRA accordingly realized the R&A experiments inherent
shortcomings. EOU eschewed objectivity in exchange for a rigid doctrinaire
approach that became an end in itself, while SIRA underscored R&As self-
defeating abhorrence of drudgery and its failure to execute dissemination as well
as it did collection and analysis. SI was then permitted, largely by default, to fill
the gap left by its more exalted colleagues. As the theoretical embodiment of a
potentially distinctive American approach to intelligence analysis, R&A thus lost
out to another branchs adoption of proven SIS methods for processing intelligence
and to its own egotism toward those consumers it sought to manipulate, or to
defy. These R&A off-shoots accordingly fell far short of realizing Donovans
goal of a higher form of intelligence analysis. Processing, dissemination, and
operational relevance evidently counted for more than unbending commitments
to elitist analysis, or doctrinal obsession.
It would ultimately be SI, not R&A, that did the most to validate Donovans
concept by surpassing expectations in 1945. Its espionage assault on Germany
achieved some measure of OSS/Londons theoretical centralization. SI did so
with its most ambitious independent operation of the war, one that made the
most of OSS/Londons capacity for a coordinated, unified intelligence campaign,
and one that owed more to the drive of a junior officer with a flair for planning
and administration than it did to Donovans direction.
NOTES
1. COS (40) 683, Future Strategy, 4 September 1940, WO 193/147, PRO.

2. Sir Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive Against
Germany, 19391945, Vol. I: Preparation (London: HMSO, 1961), p. 6.
3. Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air, trans. Dino Ferrari (New York: Coward-
McCann, 1942, originally published 1921, rev. edn 1927), pp. 510, 248, 49, 51.
4. Ibid., pp. 5960; W.F.Craven, and J.L.Gate, et al., The Army Air Forces in World
War II, Vol. II: Europe: Torch to Pointblank, August 1942December 1943
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949), p. 348.
5. Webster and Frankland, I, pp. 257; Anthony Verrier, The Bomber Offensive
(London: B.T.Batsford, 1968), p. 208.
6. Lord Selborne to Air Marshal Arthur Harris, 13 May 1942, AIR 14/3510, PRO; on
Enemy Branch, see also Wark, Ultimate, pp. 15587 for its antecedents; W.N.
Medlicott, The Economic Blockade, Vol. II (London: HMSO, and Longmans,
Green, 1959), pp. 392, 67488; and Hinsley, I, pp. 1001, 28991.
7. W.N.Medlicott, The Economic Blockade, Vol. 1 (London: HMSO and Longmans,
Green, 1952) pp. 1, 256 (for puzzling/ruthless quotes), 29, 33 (for
extent quote), 43, 46, 62, 41721; see also Hinsley, I, pp. 22348, and see also
the assessment by the Commodities Priorities Committee Sub-Committee on
Petroleum, 193940, FO 837/111, PRO; Ben Pimlott, Hugh Dalton (London:
Jonathan Cape, 1985), pp. 2912, 315.
8. On Germanys war economy and total war, see Berenice A. Carroll, Design for
Total War: Arms and Economics in the Third Reich (The Hague: Mouton, 1968),
pp. 93, 18990, R.J.Overy, Goering: The Iron Man (London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul, 1984), pp. 369, 4875, 78, 828, 95102, 14852, R.J.Overy, War
and Economy in the Third Reich (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), Alan
S.Milward, The German Economy at War (London: The Athlone Press, 1965), pp.
27, 53, and Alan S.Milward, War, Economy and Society, 19391945 (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1977), pp. 7582, 13549, 31213.
9. See Webster and Frankland, I, pp. 1635, 2804, 2901, 2967, 299306, 31836;
and Marshal of the RAF Sir Arthur Harris, Bomber Offensive (London: Collins,
1947), pp. 456, 77; see also Sir Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, The
Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany, Vol. IV: Annexes and Appendices
(London: HMSO, 1961), pp. 18893, for the 7 January 1941 Report on Air
Bombardment Policy regarding oil; see also Ben Pimlott (ed.), The Second World
War Diary of Hugh Dalton, 19401945 (London: Jonathan Cape/London School of
Economics and Political Science, 1986), pp. 23, 31, 37.
10. Harris, Bomber, pp. 220, 229; see also Charles Messenger, Bomber Harris and
the Strategic Bombing Offensive, 19391945 (London: Arms and Armour Press,
1984), pp. 33, 1034, 148; Henry Probert, Bomber Harris: His Life and Times: The
Biography of Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Arthur Harris, Wartime Chief of
Bomber Command (Toronto: Stoddart, 2001), pp. 12633; David MacIsaac (ed.),
The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Vol. I (New York: Garland, 1976), pp.
2, 209; Hinsley, II, pp. 12959; cf. Stephen Roskill, Hankey: Man of Secrets, Vol.
III, 19311963 (London: Collins, 1974), pp. 4945, 5201, 530.
11. Medlicott, II, pp. 18, 6345.
12. Dudley Saward, Bomber Harris (London: Sphere, 1985), pp. 1445; see also Robin
Neillands, The Bomber War: The Allied Air Offensive Against Nazi Germany
(Woodstock: The Overlook Press, 2001), pp. 3461.
13. Webster and Frankland, I, pp. 16788, 45872; Craven and Gate, II, p. 349; W.F.
Craven and J.L.Gate, et al., The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. I: Plans
and Early Operations, January 1939August 1942 (Chicago: University of

Chicago Press, 1948), p. 597.
14. Saward, Harris, pp. 1445.
15. Seymour Janow to Chandler Morse, 25 February 1943see also Janow to Fowler
Hamilton (BEW), 24 February both in Folder Seymour Janow, Box 2, Entry 77,
RG 226, NARA.
16. Medlicott, II, p. 660; R.J.Overy, The Air War, 19391945 (London: Europa, 1980),
pp. 10412, 1989; Williamson Murray, Luftwaffe (Baltimore: The Nautical and
Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1985), pp. 298316.
17. Letter by Edward Field, New York Review of Books 37, 11 (28 June 1990), p. 61.
18. Marc Peter to P.H.Coombs, 5 February 1944, Folder MAAF, Box 2, Entry 77; see
also War Diary, OSS/London, R&A Branch, Vol. 5, Economic Outpost with
Economic Warfare Division, p. 30, frame 766, Reel 3, Entry 95; both in RG 226,
NARA; see also W.W.Rostow, The London Operation: Recollections of an
Economist, in Chalou (ed.), Secrets, p. 52, which details how a USAAF raid
on Ploesti in April 1944, while targeted on rail marshaling yards located near oil
plants, actually permitted bombing nearby oil refineries, and J.L.Ethell, and Alfred
Price, Target Berlin: Mission 250:6 March 1944 (London: Arms and Armour,
1989), pp. 1415, 945, 1423, which details the poor results achieved well into
the war by a USAAF daylight precision raid.
19. See the excellent British Air Ministry report Incendiary Attack of German Cities,
January 1943, Folder Incendiary, Box 5, Entry 77, RG 226, NARAphotographs
highlight the repairable damage of even large HE bombs as compared with the
irreparable damage caused by even a few incendiaries; see also Air Attack by
Fire, by AI 3c (Air Liaison), 18 October 1941, AIR 40/1351, PRO; Albert Speer
noted in an interrogation of 18 July 1945 that fire caused the most damage in RAF
raids see Webster and Frankland, IV, p. 393; see also Overy, Air War, pp. 11415.
20. Cf. Martin Middlebrook and Chris Everitt, The Bomber Command War Diaries: An
Operational Reference Book, 19391945 (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990), pp.
23940 (which cites directives from the CAS in both Webster and Frankland, I, p.
324, and Webster and Frankland, IV, p. 144), with Hinsley, II, pp. 1534, 2645,
which points out that the intended effects on civilians were to degrade the living
conditions of industrial workers in order to erode their performancesee the Janow
passage above; killing civilians was therefore an unavoidable side-effect of area
targeting cities, not its primary aimthe aim was to stop an industrial city from
functioning as such, and an extant population would actually serve as a greater
burden in a city with interrupted power and water, wrecked transportation
facilities, damaged residential areas, and disrupted industrial works which
themselves would be a priority for repair.
21. See Sir Charles Webster, and Noble Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive Against
Germany, 19391945, Vol. II: Endeavour (London: HMSO, 1961), p. 5; Medlicott,
II, p. 387; Hinsley, II, pp. 23573.
22. War Diary, R&A, 5, pp. 1, 1116, frames 737, 74752, RG 226, NARA; see also
W.W.Rostow, Pre-Invasion Bombing Strategy: General Eisenhowers Decision of
March 25 1944 (Aldershot: Gower, 1981), pp. 1619; see also Medlicott, II, p. 62.
23. For detail on early negotiations regarding R&A economic intelligence work, see
John D.Wilson, Future Liaison of COI with English Organizations Engaged in
Economic Intelligence, 11 May 1942, Folder 1824, Box 128, Entry 146, RG 226,
NARA.
24. Wilson to Donovan, 23 June 1942, Conference with Colonel Hughes, Folder 21,
Box 84, Entry 92; Wilson to Russell H.Dorr, 29 August 1942, Folder 1301, Box
87, Entry 146; Notes on Talk with Chandler Morse, 20 November 1942, Folder
94, Box 8, Entry 145; Possible Work for Eighth Air Force by Office of Strategic
Services, attached to Dorr to Col Robert L.Bacon, G-2 Eighth Air Force, 18
August 1942, Folder 1824, Box 128, Entry 146; War Diary, R&A, 5, pp. 1, 1116
(citing 12 September for EOUs inception), frames 737, 74752, RG 226, NARA;
see also Rostow, Strategy, pp. 1619 (which cites 13 September as EOUs
inception date).
25. See W.W.Rostow, Notes on Strategic Bombing-1944, Folder Target Potentiality
Reports, Box 1, Entry 77, RG 226, NARA; Craven and Gate, II, pp. 3057, 349
69, 66881, 7079; W.F.Craven, and J.L.Gate, et al., The Army Air Forces in
World War II, Vol. III: Argument to V-E Day, January 1944May 1945 (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1951), pp. 269, 308, 578, 656.
26. On EOU targeting methodology, see War Diary, R&A, 5, pp. 2168, frames 757
804; see also Katz, Foreign, pp. 11518; the US Chief of the Air Staff, Lt-
Gen. Hap Arnold, actually publicly revealed the four major target systems
considered by the Eighth Air Force in January 1943, and his remarks were
published in newspaper reportssee Morse to Kindleberger, 20 January 1943,
Folder 1235, Box 84, Entry 146; on EOU work, see Depres to Mark Turner of
MEW, 15 February 1943, Folder Washington Letters, Box 2, Entry 77, and
Depres to Morse for Donovan, and The Development and Work of the Enemy
Objectives Unit London, 4 May 1943, Folder 94, Box 8, Entry 145; Col
H.A.Berliner to Donovan, 10 May 1943, Folder 2315, Box 155, Entry 146;
C.P.Kindleberger to Hughes, 15 March 1943, Folder Aiming Points, Box 6, Entry
77; see also History of OSS/R&A, Folder 16, Box 73, Entry 99, which notes that
A-2 (USAAF intelligence) was the only consistently friendly organization to the
OSS; all in RG 226, NARA; see also The Defeat of the German Air Force, in
David MacIsaac (ed.), The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Vol. III (New
York: Garland, 1976); W.W.Haines, Ultra and the History of the United States
Strategic Air Force in Europe vs. the German Air Force (Frederick: University
Publications of America, 1980, 2nd printing, 1986), pp. xvi; and Hinsley, III, (1),
pp. 291322.
27. Webster and Frankland, II, pp. 56; Webster and Frankland, IV, pp. 15365.
28. EOU comparison of area and precision methods in War Diary, R&A, 5, pp. 447,
frames 7803.
29. The Effects of Strategic Bombing on the German War Economy, pp. 68, in
MacIsaac, I: Speers work was more the result of brilliant improvisations than a
single well thought-out plan, notable for the piecemeal, not widespread,
exploitation of mass production techniques.
30. Webster and Frankland, II, pp. 24568; Sir Charles Webster and Noble Frankland,
The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany, Vol. III: Victory (London: HMSO,
1961), pp. 1013.
31. Doctrine of warfare quote, War Diary, R&A, 5, p. 50, frame 786; see Murray,
Luftwaffe, pp. 1619.
32. Marshal of the RAF Lord Tedder, With Prejudice (London: Cassell, 1966), pp.
489, 5034; Professor Zuckermans Report on Air Attacks on Road and Rail
Communications in Sicily and Southern Italy, 28 December 1943, AIR 37/749,
PRO; see the following in Folder H.N.Barnett, Transportation, Box 1, Entry 77,
RG 226, NARA: Operation Overlord, Delay and Disorganization of Enemy
Movement by Rail, n.d.; Draft Minutes of 6th Mtg of the Allied Air Force
Bombing Committee, 24 January 1944; Kindleberger to Hughes, 8 February 1944;
Program of Attacks Against Enemy Military Transport and Supplies in Support of
Ground Forces in the Western Front, n.d.; Extract from Mediterranean Allied Air
Force Weekly Intelligence Summary, 7 January 1944; see also the correspondence
in Folder MAAF, Box 2, Entry 77; see also Solly Zuckerman, From Apes to
Warlords, 190446: An Autobiography (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1978), pp. 221,
2313; Lord Zuckerman, The Doctrine of Destruction, New York Review of Books
37, 5 (29 March 1990), p. 3.
33. On early interest in rail, see Dorr to Morse, 14 November 1942, Folder 1301, and
Dorr to Kindleberger, 12 June 1943, Folder 1304, both in Box 87, Entry 146, RG
226, NARA; on EOU oil analysis, see Rostow, Strategy, pp. 334, 523, and Oil
Refineries and Synthetic Oil Plants, 1 January 1944, Petroleum: Summary and
Conclusions, 10 January 1944, both in Folder Target Potentiality Reports, Box
34. On EOU vs. Zuckerman, see Critical Analysis of Delay and Disorganization
of Enemy Movement by Rail, 7 February 1944, Folder H.N.Barnett,
Transportation, Box 1, both in Entry 77, RG 226, NARA; see also Zuckerman,
Apes, p. 226; on personalities, see Rostow, Economist, in Chalou (ed.), Secrets,
pp. 512; on Kindleberger, Charles P.Kindleberger, The Life of an Economist: An
Autobiography (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1991), pp. 849.
35. On the futility of ball-bearings, see Medlicott, II, pp. 409, 41516.
36. Spaatzs enthusiasm for rail bombing, and the advice on managing him, is in Coombs
to Kindleberger, 2 January 1944, Folder MAAF, Box 2, Entry 77, RG 226,
NARA.
37. On convincing Spaatz through Hughes, see Rostow, Strategy, pp. 323, and War
Diary, R&A, 5, pp. 801, frames 81617; on Kindleberger and bridges, see
Kindleberger, Life, pp. 838.
38. On rail counter-arguments, see Technical Comments by the Railway Research
Service, 15 March 1944, AIR 37/514, PRO; cf. Kindleberger, Life, 856.
39. Harris view in Minutes of 11th Meeting of Allied Forces Bombing Commanders,
15 February 1944, AIR 40/732, PRO; see also Murray, pp. 24962; on his
commitment to supporting OVERLORD, see Harris, Bomber, p. 192; Probert,
Harris, pp. 28997; cf. Zuckerman, Apes, pp. 2225, and Zuckerman, Doctrine,
p. 3.
40. War Diary, R&A, 5, pp. 6882, frames 80418; Rostow, Strategy, pp. 314, 36
51; Kindleberger, Life, pp. 857; see also Zuckerman, Apes, pp. 2436, and p. 257,
which notes that EOU did not stress the bridge alternative in its original criticisms
of the rail plan; Craven and Gate, III, pp. 729.
41. Rostow, Strategy, pp. 11315 for the 31 March 1944 Spaatz-Eisenhower memo;
for Fifteenth Air Force, see also MAAF Air Attack on the Axis Oil Supply, 27
March 1944, Folder MAAF Reports, Oil, Box 2, Entry 77, RG 226, NARA.
42. See ibid., pp. 526, and n. 28, which detail the alleged threat of resignation.
43. Ibid., pp. 5665; see also Tedder, Prejudice, p. 537, and Sir John Slessor, The
Central Blue: Recollections and Reflections (London: Cassell, 1956), pp. 5678; on
bridges, see Draft Plan for Air Attack Against Enemy Rail Communications, 5
May 1944, The Effort Against Seven Seine Rail Bridges, n.d., both in Folder
H.N.Barnett, Transportation, Box 1, Entry 77, RG 226, NARA.
44. Bombing Attacks on French Railways, Jan.Aug. 1944, AIR 40/371, PRO, and
Rostow, Economist, in Chalou (ed.), Secrets, pp. 534 for EOUs role; on the rail
programmes effects, see Bombing Analysis Unit Report No. 1, 4 November 1944,
AIR 40/669, PRO; cable, SI Staff London to SI Staff SHAEF, 24 June 1944, Folder
1029, Box 104, Entry 136; see also H.W.Liebert to E.S.Mason, 20 July 1944, The
Role of R&A/Algiers and R&A/London in Recent Target Activities, Folder
Economic Subdivision, Box 3, Entry 37; both in RG 226, NARA; War Diary,
R&A, 5, pp. 82103, frames 81940; cf. the French intelligence reports submitted
by EOU on 8 August 1944, in Folder H.N.Barnett, Transportation, and
Zuckermans rebuttal, 21 August 1944, to Air C-in-C, AIR 37/719, PRO; on RAF,
see Harris, Bomber, pp. 195209; see also Craven and Gate, III, pp. 1569;
Hinsley, III, (2), pp. 10623, 497505; Bomber Commands sorties are detailed in
Middlebrook and Everitt, Diaries, pp. 52163; USAAF sorties in R.A.Freeman,
with A.Crouchman and V Maslin, Mighty Eighth War Diary (London: Janes, 1981),
pp. 234336.
45. See Rostow, Strategy, pp. 79, 824, 11921; see also Rostow, Economist, in
Chalou (ed.), Secrets, pp. 525.
46. On 3/4 figure for bombs dropped on Europe, MacIsaac, I, p. xviii.
47. War Cabinet Technical Sub-Committee on Axis Oil, AO (44) 31, 3 April 1944;
AO (44) 32 (Final) (also JIC (44) 153), 14 April 1944; and AO (44) 34 (Final) (also
JIC (44) 168), 23 April 1944, all in CAB 77/24; see also JIC (44) 218 (O) (Final),
27 May 1944, PREM 3/332/1 (all in PRO); and JIC (44) 301 (O) (Final), 20 July
1944, Reel 29, frames 105970, 10749, which stress the combined effects of
bombing oil and transportation; see also S. Alexander to Kindleberger, 30 March
1944, Folder London Letters Out, 27/7/4331/5/44, Box 4, Entry 52, RG 226,
NARA, which stresses the vulnerability of German synthetic stocks once Ploesti
was overrun; for optimism over oil results, see JIC (44) 320 (O) (Final), 24 July
1944, frames 10919; and JIC (44) 344 (O) (Final), 7 August 1944, frames 1110
14; both in Reel 29, Entry 190, RG 226, NARA; for a lucid discussion of the
technical details pertaining to synthetic oil plants and oil refineries, see the British
Ministry of Home Security report in Folder OilMiscellaneous, Box 1, Entry 77,
RG 226, NARA.
48. Tedder, Prejudice, pp. 60912.
49. Zuckerman, Apes, pp. 337, 3434.
50. See Saward, Harris, pp. 3434 (for afterthought); Harris, Bomber, pp. 2208.
51. On JOTC/CSTC organization, see CSTC Working Committee (Oil) Bulletin No.
194519, AIR 40/1262, PRO.
52. JOTC Working Committee (Oil) Bulletins (output percentages observed in each
report): 9 (29 August 1944) details the Romanian surrender, and Polish situation;
SHAEF Weekly Report No. 6, 2 September 1944, Folder Oil Memoranda, Box 2,
RG 226, NARA, gives the 50 per cent crude figure; JOTC Bulletin data are also
found in the cables in Folders JuneJuly 1944 and AugustSeptember 1944,
Box 3, Entry 6, RG 226, NARA; see Harris, Bomber, p. 228, and Saward, Harris, p.
412, on loss of Romania and Poland.
53. JOTC Working Committee (Oil) Bulletins in Box 1, Entry 79, RG 226, NARA:
Bulletins Nos. 4 (25 July 1944), 5 (1 August 1944), and 6 (8 August 1944) detail
German repair work; 8 (22 August 1944) details the need to re-bomb repaired
plants; CSTC Working Committee (Oil) Bulletins in Box 6, Entry 77, RG 226,
NARA: 19 (7 November 1944), and 19454 (23 January 1945), detail underground
plants; 22 (28 November 1944) details extensive repair efforts of the enemy; cf.
W.J. Gold to Philip Horton, 13 November 1944, Folder 364, Box 316, Entry 190,
RG 226, NARA, quoting EOUs Nat Pincus regarding the failure to date to destroy
completely any plants, on how all plants were as yet significant producers or
potential producers, and on using labour for repairs; Harris, Bomber, p. 229 on
German repair corps and underground plants; Webster and Frankland, IV, pp. 347
8, details German reconstruction efforts in Speer to Bormann, 16 September 1945.
54. CSTC Working Committee (Oil) Bulletins: 19454 also details the imminent
capture of Silesia; 19455 (30 January 1945) covers the effects of the capture of
Silesia; 21 (21 November 1944) details the inactivity of plants in western
Germany, and the substantial production (66 per cent level) of central and eastern
plants.
55. CSTC Working Committee (Oil) Bulletins: 194514 (3 April 1945) for advance to
the Ruhr, and stranglehold quote; see AO (46) 1, 8 March 1946, Oil as a Factor
in the German War Effort, 19331945, AIR 8/1019, PRO; and see also War
Diary, R&A, 5, pp. 10413, frames 8409; R.C.Cooke and R.C.Nesbit, Target:
Hitlers Oil: Allied Attacks on German Oil Supplies, 19391945 (London: William
Kimber, 1985), pp. 10873; Craven and Gate, III, pp. 1728, 2807, 6406; and
Webster and Frankland, III, pp. 47, 22543.
56. JOTC (Oil) Bulletins Nos. 12 (19 September 1944), 13 (26 September 1944), 14
(26 September 1944), 15 (10 October 1944) detail the lack of PR (JOTC No. 15
details problems encountered in interpreting Romanian plants); CSTC Bulletins
Nos. 16 (17 October 1944), 17 (24 October 1944), 20 (14 November 1944), 24 (12
December 1944) detail the lack of PR coverage; 21, 26 (26 December 1944) detail
working off PR deficits; the minutes of CSTC 8th Mtg, 6 December 1944, AIR 40/
1269, PRO note the technical problems encountered in winter PR over Germany;
see Ursula Powys-Lybbe, The Eye of Intelligence (London: William Kimber,
1983), pp. 3445, 15267, on photo interpretation in bomb damage assessments;
War Diary, R&A, 5, pp. 11417, frames 8514, also covers assessment; see also
Webster and Frankland, III, pp. 21011; the USSBS reports on oil bombing are in
David MacIsaac (ed.), The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Vol. V (New
York: Garland, 1976).
57. CSTC 194519; see also CSTC Bulletins Nos: 19, on blind bombing done in the
first week of November due to bad weather; 25 (19 December 1944), on how raids
of 30 November produced minor or negligible damage; 19454 on the German
exploitation of bad weather for repairs; see also David MacIsaac (ed.), Strategic
Bombing in World War Two: The Story of the United States Strategic Bombing
Survey (New York: Garland, 1976), p. 159, and US Strategic Bombing Survey
(USSBS), Overall Report (European War) (US Government Printing Office,
1945), pp. 29, 108, on repetition of attacks; on weather considerations, see
Frequency of Weather Conditions Suitable for Bombing Northwestern Germany,
7 November 1942 Folder 21, Box 4, Entry 77, RG 226, NARA (half of the days
and nights in winter were considered good enough for bombing, with large-scale
operations less possible in winter).
58. Use of 3cm H2S for Locating Specific Objectives, 19 January 1944, Folder 20,
59. The report on Bombing Accuracy, USAAF Heavy and Medium Bombers in the
ETO, is in MacIsaac (ed.), III.
60. Eighth Air Force Memorandum on the Selection of MPI and Bombs and Fuzes for
Attacks Against Synthetic Oil Plants, 7 November 1944, Folder Oil Memoranda,
61. War Diary, R&A, 5, pp. 2168.
62. Harris, Bomber, p. 229; see also pp. 2245 on weather.
63. Ibid., pp. 2302; CSTC 4th Mtg, covers Bomber Commands effectiveness against
Ruhr oil; see chart, SASO (SB) Bomber Command in AIR 14/906, PRO for
comparative tonnage dropped on oil targets; see also Probert, Harris, pp. 3057.
64. Hinsley, III, (2), pp. 50532, accuses Harris of deliberately flouting his superiors to
the detriment of the oil offensive without considering the implications of weather
and aiming factors to its execution; cf. Middlebrook and Everitt, Diaries, pp. 582,
5912, 599, 614, 61721, 628, 644, 646, 6525, 65862, 664, 66685, 689, 6912,
698 for the realities of Bomber Command attacks on oil between September 1944
April 1945; on the shortcomings of the Hinsley interpretation, see Alfred C.
Mierzejewski, Intelligence and the Strategic Bombing of Germany: The Combined
Strategic Targets Committee, International Journal of Intelligence and
Counterintelligence 3, 1 (Spring 1989), p. 83.
65. Portal-Harris correspondence in AIR 8/1020, and 8/1745, PRO; see Messenger,
Harris, pp. 178, and 17484 on the whole oil issue; cf. Saward, Harris, pp. 3434,
35264, and Cooke and Nesbit, Target, p. 187.
66. Portal to Harris, 20 January 1945, AIR 8/1020; Harris to Portal, 6 November 1944,
AIR 8/1745; both in PRO.
67. 2 March 1945 memo on the Air Commanders Conference held at SHAEF on
1 March, AIR 14/913, PRO.
68. Minutes of conference of 4 January 1944, AIR 14/913, PRO.
69. D.C.T.Bennett, Pathfinder (London: Goodall, 1988), p. 211.
70. For EOUs view of Harris as relatively unenthusiastic about oil, see Rostow,
Economist, in Chalou (ed.), Secrets, p. 55; cf. Neillands, Bomber, pp. 33850.
71. On communications ranking, see the various CSTC minutes in AIR 40/1269, PRO;
for CSTC mandate, see 1st Mtg, 18 October 1944.
72. War Diary, R&A, 5, p. 84, frame 820; note that this volume of the War Diary was
written by W.W.Rostow (see Katz, Foreign, p. 223, n. 29); see also Mierzejewski,
Intelligence, pp. 8998.
73. Weather problems and Hughess view, CSTC 2nd Mtg, 25 October 1944; lack of
PR in CSTC 3rd Mtg, 1 November 1944, and CSTC 5th Mtg, 15 November 1944;
all in AIR 40/1269, PRO.
74. CSTC 6th Mtg, 22 November 1944, AIR 40/1269, PRO.
75. Pincus/Lawrence opinions in CSTC 7th Mtg, 29 November 1944; reminder in
CSTC 8th Mtg, 6 December 1944; both in AIR 40/1269, PRO.
76. CSTC 11th Mtg, 27 December 1944; recommendations on oil over

communications especially in CSTC 13th, 14th, 16th, and 24th Mtgs (10 and 17
January, 2 February, 28 March 1945); all in AIR 40/1269, PRO.
77. CSTC 25th Mtg, 4 April 1945, AIR 40/1269; see also EOUs The Attack upon
German TransportA Dissenting Opinion, 22 December 1944, in AIR 20/4819;
both in PRO; for Pincuss attitude, see Pincus to Bill, 13 January 1945, Box 5, Entry
77, RG 226, NARA; on rail bombing, see Craven and Gate, III, pp. 650, 6557,
733, and Webster and Frankland, III, pp. 24461; the USSBS reports on
transportation bombing are in David MacIsaac (ed.), The United States Strategic
Bombing Survey, Vol. VI (New York: Garland, 1976); cf. Hinsley, III, (2), pp. 520
3, 5268.
78. Tedder signed Eisenhower to Air Ministry Whitehall for DCAS, HQ USSTAF, CG
SHAEF (Forward), 10 April 1945, AIR 40/1265, PRO.
79. CSTC 26th Mtg, 11 April 1945, AIR 40/1269, PRO.
80. Bailey-King to Barnett, 20 April 1945, Folder CorrespondenceMediterranean,
81. War Diary, R&A, 5, p. 84, frame 820.
82. On ULTRA and CSTC, see Mierzejewski, Intelligence, pp. 84, 956, and
Zuckerman, Doctrine, p. 35, citing Alfred C.Mierzejewski, The Collapse of the
German Economy, 19441945: Allied Air Power and the German National
Railway (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990); cf. the suggestive
note from B. Ops. 1 to D.B. Ops., 23 April 1945, AIR 20/4819, PRO: Intelligence
sources indicate the effectiveness of transportation bombing, but it is impossible
to make a convincing case for this view without reference to these Intelligence
sources; MI 14/21/7/45 of 24 March 1945, AIR 40/1187, PRO shows ULTRA
being used to track the activity of various depots.
83. See Mierzejewski, Intelligence, pp. 978; on analyst-consumer, see Laqueur,
Secrets, pp. 21, 338, 3434.
84. For differing views on bombing, cf: Bomb Targets in Germany and German
Occupied Countries, c. February 1945, Folder London Joint Target Group
Correspondence, Box 1, Entry 78, RG 226, NARA; Zuckerman, Apes, p. 3378;
Verrier, Bomber, pp. 31723; Max Hastings, Bomber Command (New York: The
Dial Press, 1979), pp. 2778, 326, 330, 350; Foot, Good, p. 210; USSBS,
Overall, pp. 3945, 5964; Russell F.Weigley, The American Way of War: A
History of United States Military Strategy and Policy (New York: Macmillan,
1973), pp. 3579; Area Studies Division Report, p. 23, in David MacIsaac (ed.)
The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Vol. II (New York: Garland, 1976);
Milward, German, pp. 118, 163; and Saward, Harris, pp. 3612, 41112.
85. On the Ruhr as a geographic objective, see The Ruhr, n.d., n.a., Folder 20a, Box
4, Entry 77, RG 226, NARA; see also Freeman, Mighty Eighth, pp. 234500.
86. See Middlebrook and Everitt, Diaries, pp. 497, 5001, 6078, 612, 6256, 646, 676
for examples of area targeting methods against industry, and pp. 581, 5956, 620,
635, 640, 649, 6634, 676, 6868, 6938 for efforts against rail; see also Overy,
Air War, pp. 11926, 20511.
87. See Richard Ruggles to Sidney Alexander regarding an interview with Professor
Rudenberg, 8 January 1943, Folder Industrial Reports, Box 3, Entry 34 (which
states that electricity was very vulnerable); Target Potentiality Report IIIA, 5
January 1943, and Electric Power as a Military Objective, both in Folder Target
Potentiality Reports, Box 1, Entry 77; all in RG 226, NARA.
88. MEWs assessment of Germanys electrical supply of August 1943, FO 837/446,
was distributed to EWD, and despite noting that 87 per cent of all electricity was
used by industry, and that German industry [was] almost wholly dependent on
electricity for motive power (80 per cent of all motors were electric), MEW
concluded that German excess capacity made the electrical system resistant to
attack; MEWs assessment was the same in late 1944see the FO and MEW
Enemy Branch report of November 1944, FO 837/448; both in PRO; cf.
Kindleberger, Life, p. 75.
89. MEW Intelligence Weekly Report No. 169, 3 May 1945, citing the captured
Bulletin of the German Ministry of Armament and War Production, 10 February
1945, AIR 8/602, PRO.
90. Webster and Frankland, IV, pp. 384, 391; see also Albert Speer, Inside the Third
Reich, trans. Richard and Clara Winston (New York: Macmillan, 1970), pp. 2789,
2846, 3467, and the record of his interrogations contained in Webster and
Frankland, IV, pp. pp. 37595, and German Electric Utilities Industry Report, in
MacIsaac (ed.), VI, which states that bombing electricity would have had a
catastrophic effect on Germanys war production; see also The German Electric
Power Complex as a Target System, in Haywood S.Hansell, Jr, The Air Plan That
Defeated Hitler (New York: Arno Press, 1980), pp. 801, 161, 2602, 28697,
which stresses the viability of bombing electric power while still accounting for
weather and repair factors; Craven and Gate, III, pp. 78992, note the failure to see
the inter-connectedness of economic systems, while pp. 794802 note the success
of oil, and p. 801 discusses electricity; Kindleberger, Life, p. 75, disputes
electricitys vulnerability.
91. See Webster and Frankland, III, pp. 2423, on the decisiveness of oil, and pp. 302
4, on MEW and Bomber Commands lack of confidence.
92. This paragraphs quotes and narrative are from War Diary, R&A, 3, (i), pp. 179
87, frames 6308.
93. On political documents from exile governments, see J.D. Wilson to Brinton, 26
April 1943, Folder 94, Box 8, Entry 145, RG 226, NARA.
94. For R&A frustration with its access to SI intelligence and SI reporting work, see
SI and R&A Relations, n.a., 26 May 1943 (and SIs response, n.a., c. June 1943),
Folder 40, Box 103, Entry 92; Brinton to Langer, 4 May 1943, Folder 1296, Box
86, Entry 146; and Sherman Kent to Applebaum, 13 March 1944, Folder
Executive Officer, Box 3, Entry 37; all in RG 226, NARA.
95. On SI disseminations compared with R&As, see Minutes of Intelligence
Committee, 1 March 1944, Folder 66-A, Box 00005, Entry 115, RG 226, NARA.
96. See Gen. Magruder to Langer, 13 March 1944, Folder 685-A, Box 50, and Morse
and Haskell to Forgan, 26 May 1944, Folder 1235, Box 84, both in Entry 146, RG
226, NARA.
97. For detail on SI-R&A document sharing, see Alan Scaife to W.H. Shepardson, 13
January 1943, Folder 47, Box 27; Scaife to Shepardson, 4 February 1943, Folder 9,
Box 238; both in Entry 92, both on handling Broadway Most Secret documents,
and T.W.Reese and P.Horton to Forgan, 17 May 1944, Folder 1235, Box 84, Entry
146; on curb service, see Morse to Bruce, R&A Progress Report, 7 July 1944,
98. For a comparison of SI-R&A developments in Washington, see J.R.Forgan to

Shepardson and Langer, 10 November 1943, Folder 23, Box 2, Entry 145,
Evaluation of Intelligence Material, 28 December 1943, and J.A.Montgomery to
Magruder, 19 February 1944, both in Folder 865, Box 64, Entry 146, and S.A.
Callisen to Magruder, 22 March 1944, Folder 103, Box 14, Entry 137; cf. Langer,
Branch, pp. 24 (on Magruders work), and 27 (Langers opinion that R&A must
have all incoming intelligence, and that R&A should even be in a position to
direct the intelligence-collecting activities of other parts of the organization); all in
RG 226, NARA; cf. Charles D.Ameringer, US Foreign Intelligence: The Secret
Side of American History (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1988), pp. 1634.
99. Narrative from War Diary, OSS/London, SI Branch, Vol. 8, Reports Division, pp.
19, 30a-58, 1013, 11933, and see also pp. 1021, 10318, 13363, 23352,
26975, for sources and consumers, pp. 2230, 5975, 89101, 163202, 25268,
on methods of processing and assessing reports (including SUSSEX material), in
OSS/London, Reel 8; see also Summary Report of Overseas Duty of Maj. Harold J.
Coolidge, n.d., Folder 46a #2, Box 11, and ETO Officers Pouch Report, 14
September 1944, citing S-038906 of 15 August, Folder 39, Box 9, both in Entry
99, RG 226, NARA; see also William Colby and Peter Forbath, Honorable Men: My
Life in the CIA (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978), pp. 556.
100. R&A Progress Report, 1 September 1944, Folder 4, Box 2, Entry 99, RG 226,
NARA.
101. Haskell and Morse to Chiefs SI and R&A, Washington, 12 September 1944; see
also the objections to the proposal in J.E.OGara to W.H.Shepardson, 27
September 1944, and response to Comments on the OGara Memo of 27
September, n.d., n.a., all in Folder 61, Box 220, Entry 92, RG 226, NARA.
102. This paragraph is based on War Diary, SI, 8, pp. 20213, 22224, 27587; War
Diary, R&A, 3 (i), p. 187, frame 638; War Diary, R&A, 3, (ii), pp. 24350,
frames 696703.
103. Schlesinger to Morse, 13 October 1944, Folder 337, Box 314, Entry 190, RG 226,
NARA.
104. On space problems, R&A Branch Progress Report, 16 November 1944, Folder 7,
105. This paragraph is based on War Diary, SI, 8, pp. 283, 3249; War Diary, R&A,
3, (ii), pp. 25160, frames 70413; see also R&A Branch Progress Report, 30
November 1944, Folder 7, Box 3, Entry 99; Donovan to Bruce, 6 December 1944,
Folder SI-R&A Relations, Box 5, Entry 37; Evans to Schlesinger, 18 October
1944, Folder 337, Box 314, Entry 190; cf. Philip Horton to W.J.Gold,
10 November 1944, Folder 254, Box 310, Entry 190; cf. Field Report of B.Homer
Hall, 20 October 1944, Folder 46a #1, Box 11, Entry 99; all in RG 226, NARA; see
also Schlesinger, Historian, in Chalou (ed.), Secrets, p. 67.
106. This paragraph is based on War Diary, R&A, 3, (ii), pp. 2604, frames 71317;
for SI vs. R&A comments on reports prior to dissemination, see S.A.Callisen to
Chief, SI, 29 November 1944, Folder 103, Box 14, Entry 137, RG 226, NARA; cf.
Cave Brown interview with William Colby, 17 August, 1980, Donovan Papers,
USAMHI, where Colby credits Donovan with forming an organizational pattern
for American intelligence by having the intellectuals and the operators in the
same club.
6
Inspired Improvisation: William Casey and the
Penetration of Germany
SIs penetration of Germany in 194445 after the French campaign has been
characterized as an effort that collected minutiae at great risk with insufficient
depth to benefit the Allied armies.1 British intelligence was allegedly lukewarm
to the whole plan given Nazi Germanys intense counter-espionage climate, the
lack of a supporting German resistance movement, the American use of leftist
agents, and the presumed pointlessness of risking agents when the profitable
exploitation of ULTRA SIGINT offered so much operational material.2 The
reality of the matter was quite different. OSS/Londons experience in these
German operations actually demonstrated its largely untapped potential for
coordinating individual branch resources toward a common goal. The
intelligence produced by OSS agents was in fact prized by the military, which
fully supported its collection in Germany. While OSS/London did indeed press
on regardless of the British clandestine services lack of enthusiasm, the British
reticence owed little to the supposed operational difficulties, the efficacy of
ULTRA, or the presumed dangers of using leftists. The British were instead
mindful that any American success where SIS and SOE feared to tread
underscored Britains inability to execute operations of consequence during the
European wars closing phase. The functional fragmentation problem still
complicated SIs coordination of operations with SFHQ, but the fact that OSS
contributed what it did owed much to the drive and skill of a single officer who
rose from the position of staff functionary to that of SI branch chief in the ETO.
The penetration of Germany demonstrated William J.Caseys singular adeptness
at harnessing OSS/Londons disparate assets into a more cohesive force as SI led
the London mission toward a unique degree of operational independence. Casey
thus combined the experience previously gained along side the British with his
own brand of inspired improvisation to achieve a measure of operational
relevance which surpassed most expectations.3
SI presciently envisaged in April 1943 that Germany [was] a free territory for
intelligence and all planning should look towards an invasion of the continent
when SI would be asked to secure American intelligence from France andbe
able to move forward with the army and drop agents ahead of the army right up
to the frontier and into Germany itself.4 SI also anticipated the likelihood that
there was a real source for agents from Prisoners of]/W[ar] since many of them
144 WILLIAM CASEY AND THE PENETRATION OF GERMANY
in France were not Germans at heart, and hated Nazism. Once identified and
trained, they could be sent at once back into German lines to secure operational
intelligence.5
The need to solidify its status in the ETO and to plan for collecting
intelligence with SIS in support of the Normandy invasion (the SUSSEX plan)
obviously intervened, but subsequent events undeniably bore out SIs foresight.
Even before OVERLORD, an OSS/London Intelligence Planning Committee
was established in an attempt to formulate and coordinate plans of the several
branches in respect to the development of work on the continent.6 The successful
execution of OVERLORD, and with it SUSSEX, eventually provided a real
impetus for German operations based on SHAEFs goodwill and enthusiasm for
continued OSS espionage. The OSS ETO Report revealed as early as 24 June
1944 SHAEFs willingness to support SI in any work directed against
Germany, particularly since SHAEF had no plans of its own.7 The SHAEF G-2
Operational Intelligence chief, Colonel Foord, subsequently admitted to one OSS
officer in August that SHAEF had no specific intelligence objectives in mind
beyond the general fact that little was known of operational matters within
Germany, and that any information regarding location, strength, and movement
of troops and supplies, together with the state of morale, was of interest; another
SHAEF officer admitted that they simply had not done any planning for tactical
intelligence about Germany.8 SI consequently appointed a Chief, Continental
Division on 29 June to formulate continental espionage plans, but it soon
transpired that its proposed joint SI/SIS project for the penetration of Germany
had to be dropped. Although it was intended as a German Sussex Plan,
Broadway rejected it without providing any specific reason.9 The Acting Chief
of SI Continental Divisions German Section, Major Aubrey H.Harwood,
recalled that he was instructed to contact Major Gallenne, Chief of the German
Section, SIS, with a view to developing such a plan in mid-July. After several
meetings with Major Gallenne and his staff (including Major Day and
Lieutenant-Colonels Gardner and Brook), it was recognized that the problem
was entirely different from the one which the Sussex plan was developed to
meet, as in that case the personnel [were] recruited by the French authorities to
operate in friendly territory with Reception Committees and safe addresses
established in advance. Gallenne and Brook both mooted the possibility of
securing the necessary personnelamong the German prisoners of war, or
alternatively from German refugees and Dutch, Belgian, and French contacts.
After several meetings and considerable discussionand learning that it was the
consensus of opinion that prisoners of war were not desirable, a plan was finally
drawn up to be known as the Kent plan. This envisaged SI and SIS together
recruiting 10 teams each consisting of an observer and W/T operator from the
Allied agencies, German refugees, and as a last resort, German prisoners. With
the 20 July attempt on Hitlers life and other complications and considerations,
Broadways Commander Kenneth Cohen then advised OSS/London chief David
Bruce that SIS had decided not to go ahead with KENT.10
SI/London was thus blessed with the opportunity to realize its long-term
espionage aims under the auspices of SHAEF, but cursed with the fact that its
proposals were deflected by the British. However frustrating Broadways attitude
may have appeared, SIS coolness toward OSS plans stemmed from a real
inability to participate as a full partner in any German scheme. Its most obvious
shortcoming concerned agent recruitment. While SI had confidently considered
using enemy prisoners as agents in 1943, SIS, SOE, and the Political Warfare
Executive had met on 10 February of that year to discuss ways and means of
recruiting from among enemy Ps/W, personnel who might be of use. It was
nevertheless agreed that in view of the difficulties to be surmounted, SIS and
SOE would be best served by recruiting prisoners for SIS/SOE in the forward
areas by their representatives on the spot.11 Not even this expedient was deemed
worth pursuing by the following August. It was finally decided that the
difficulties in the way of using Ps/W for MI6 purposes, other than within the UK
were too great to make this practicable (SI ironically enough set about
establishing liaison with the British office responsible for P/W intelligence
mattersMI 19(a)just as MI6 turned its back on the whole matter).12 SIS thus
forfeited a viable agent source in 1943 that would have been a critical asset in
1944. Broadway also suggested to Harwood that their section heads were
opposed to requesting personnel from the Allied agencies (French, Dutch,
Belgian) because personnel previously made available had suffered very high
casualties, thereby making them unsympathetic to further recruitment. SIS
also doubted the prospects of physically getting agents into Germany, and
thought that counterfeiting German documents was a tremendously difficult
undertaking, if not in some cases a practical impossibility (as seen in
Chapter 3, Broadway encountered enough problems meeting its documentation
requirements in France despite enjoying years of preparation). The prospect of
revolution in Germany and the difficulties of rapidly formulating a training
course further mitigated against mobilizing limited resources for penetrating
Germany. Another unspoken factor may have been Broadways fear of SIs
ability to build on the SUSSEX effort when Broadway could not: Harwood was
told by Gallenne that SIS interpreted the rules under which SI operated as
requiring British approval and active collaboration in any intelligence work.
Harwood also found a certain reluctance to putting the cards on the table with
[SIs] British counterparts, and a general feeling which seemed to be one of
suspicion towards [SIs] dealings with the other Allied agencies in general.
Given SIs subsequent independent development of PROUST in France,
Broadways tight-lipped lack of enthusiasm for KENT evidently betrayed a
sensitivity to the paucity of SIS resources, and doubts about its ability to
participate as first among equals in such a plan. SIS was hardly going to
advertise these delicate considerations to OSS.13
If OSS/London still hoped to penetrate Germany after the Normandy
campaign, it had to rely on its own devices; but it was still an open question
which OSS branch was best suited for the task. While SHAEF admittedly backed
SI, it also supported possible SO efforts into the Reich. The close relationship
between SO and SHAEF staff officers was expected to facilitate SOs August
plans for controlling and coordinating all OSS efforts for penetrating Germany.14
William Donovan stressed as much in a 2 September memo on future central
European OSS operations: SHAEF had accepted the principle we urged of
unblocking the joint control of [OSS/SOE] in such operations, recognizing that
to carry on aggressive subversion behind enemy lines we must vest authority in
our forward echelons; OSS thus had to do with its own force what previously
[it] had done largely through resistance groups [it had] organized and trained.15
This purposeful air doubtless contributed to SHAEFs anticipation in mid-
September that SO would play a significant role both before and after the
German surrender, and to SHAEFs approval for SO and SOE to work
independently (but under SHAEF control) in Germany.16 SOs Central European
Section (CES) was particularly enthusiastic about SHAEF plans for using special
raiding groups against personnel, documents and military objectives behind
enemy lines immediately preceding advancing allied forces. CESs appreciation
still sounded a cautionary note: The fact remains, as before, that we have only a
few agents, and our plans must be made accordingly, as there is no prospect of
obtaining others.17 This 13 September caveat was subsequently borne out in a
matter of days. The 18 September SO Progress Report declared that time
constraints and a lack of suitable personnel were handicapping plans for
Germany.18 An October report also noted that since SHAEFs German policy
remained undefined, future OSS planning had been held up, although a draft SO/
SOE Policy Directive for Germany had been submitted to SHAEF at the end of
September.19 The difficulties facing such activities were reflected in a 24
September report to the British-Canadian 21st Army Groups Planning Staff from
SOEs Lieutenant-Colonel M.A.W.Rowlandson. The British perspective did not
hold out much hope for spectacular SOE-SO operations within the Reich since
there was no contact with any organized German resistance groups. This
naturally reduced the prospect of obtaining tactical military intelligence on the
scale enjoyed in France and Belgium. Rowlandson still suggested considering
groups and individuals who [could] be contacted and to assess their possible
value to our operations. These included foreign workers inside Germany (who
might possibly be loosely coordinated for random sabotage), individual Germans
thought from pre-war information to be anti-Nazi (but more pro-German than
pro-Allies), and a few coup de main] currently earmarked for retrieving
German documents from newly captured installations. The question of effective
communications, however, made these possibilities problematic. Couriers were
very slow, and two-way W/T was considered NOT to be hopeful.20
Rowlandsons tentative analysis underscored the difficulties obstructing the
formulation of German plans. It also betrayed the sabotage services lack of
planning for German operations, as SOE was evidently grasping at any
potentially expeditious means of serving the military through penetrating
Germany. This desperation also influenced the possibilities for SO activity. One
SO officer recalls how in late 1944 the branch had not yet received any material
from its German desk for planning a German mission. There was no information
at all on dissident groups with guerrilla potential. He was also told that internal
security was as tight as a drum in Germany, and that Germans historically
deferred to authority.21 SO was thus sufficiently hard up to entertain
a visit from a US pilot who believed that he could have himself shot down
over Germany and, in the process of interrogation, work his way into the
confidence of responsible German officers to such an extent that they
recognizing the inevitability of defeat and the possibility of saving their
own skinsmight be willing to surrender in the entirety. This proposal
was not accepted.22
More seriously, it transpired toward the end of October that the British sector of
operations obviated SOE infiltration and exfiltration between Germany and the
British-Canadian 21st Army Group given the short direct front with Germany
and the difficult terrain. SHAEF therefore desired SOE to operate out of 12th US
Army Groups sector, which had a sizable contiguous front with Germany, and
very suitable terrain in Luxembourg.23 This was potentially ideal for SO since it
established a good foundation for American domination, but that was not to be.
While the 1st US Army approved SOE activities in its sector, SO was largely
superfluous to these efforts. SI attributed this to the unspoken politics of the
situation surrounding G-2 1st US Armys overt hostility toward OSS, while the
Chief of SO/London went so far as to suggest that OSS lacked real
representation in, for example, the Lowlands Mission [including Luxembourg],
that it was run by the British who would like to have it appear joint.24 In
actuality, SOs problems stemmed less from SOE deviousness than from a lack of
SO resources. SO admitted to suffering from a deficit in German speakers for
these operations, while also lacking personnel to serve in a liaison capacity
between SO and SOE. At this problems root was the branchs failure to plan
for German operations before the end of September given its active concern with
French operations.25 The best that SO could manage by mid-January 1945 was
the conclusion that foreign workers presented a mounting obstacle in Germany,
and a plaintive request for a firm directive from SHAEF, stating whether or not
plans should be laid for future delivery, [and] whether OSS (SO) [was] to work as
an independent agency.26
This directive, broadly authorizing SO to conduct activities to hasten the
surrender or disintegration of the German armed forces by subversive activities
in Germany, directed towards bringing about the downfall of Germany from
within, proved forthcoming on 29 January, but SO still could not get anything
off the ground.27 As SHAEF concluded about SOEs German activities after the
war, they cannot be said to have hastened the end of, or affected the course of
the war beyond creating anxiety over internal security and straining German
administration. There was evidently little accomplished by clandestine sabotage

in Germany beyond providing a latent threat that was never realized.28
Since neither SOE nor SO could exploit indigenous resources within Germany,
they apparently turned to assassination as a means of accomplishing something
constructive. The SO Monthly Report for March 1945 noted that in Norway, a
well known quisling and a dangerous informer [had] both been liquidated. It has
also been learned that the Chief of Police in Oslo was executed on orders issued
from SFHQ. It was further noted that in Denmark, [liquidation of informers
continued at a high rate and during a recent week as many as 10 were put away.
During 1944 a total of 143 informers were destroyed.29 SO/London was
sufficiently inspired by this precedent to formulate a plan for direct action
against Nazi officialdom within the Reich. Designated project CROSS, it was
specifically developed by the end of March 1945 in response to SHAEFs 29
January directive. SO drew up aprogram of special sabotage operations against
Nazi and Gestapo personnel, characterizing it as the most effective means at
this stage of the war to realize the SHAEF directive. SOs stated objective
involved concentrating its primary efforts on the single mission of assassination
of high-ranking members of the Nazi Party and Gestapo, using approximately
100 German nationals, recruited from the CALPO organization (the Comit de
lAllemagne Libre pour lOuest, or the French Office of Free Germany
Committee, an organization taking the same political line in Western Europe as
did Moscows Free Germany Committee).30 Possessed of sufficient
commitment-cum-fanaticism to volunteer for work inside Nazi Germany, these
communists were to serve under American commanders with the requisite
communications equipment. The plan called for dispatching agents to known
concentrations of Gestapo and Nazi Party officials at the rank of Major and
above. Preference was for SS and SA within the Party, and for SD, Gestapo, or
Kriminal Polizei within the police apparatus. The organised killings of Nazi
and Gestapo officials were expected to demonstrate the vulnerability of the
dictatorship, force the targets to protect themselves and so reduce their
effectiveness, and encourage similar acts among German anti-Nazis.31
It was stressed on 5 April that while personnel targets should be top priority,
straight liquidation would be wasteful[and] every effort should be made by
the CROSS men to question the victims first to extract from them as much
information as possible prior to the final coup de grace. To help facilitate the
accurate application of torture, a certain Mr Stefan Rundt was made available to
help the CROSS men identify the various types of officers, and to brief them on
the type of information to be extracted from the victims.32 Two days later, it was
revealed that the proposed tactics would involve surveilling specific Nazi
headquarters, identifying the Nazi officials, and then taking the necessary action.
It was further stressed that it made no difference who they were so long as they
were officials of some importance. As a final note, it was observed that so
called small-fry as secretaries, cable-boys, telegraph operators, and the like
may prove to be a highly important source of information, and consequently
should not be overlooked. This was because such individuals were deemed more
approachable than the big shots, and perhaps more knowledgeable than their
superiors.33 All of this relentlessly ruthless planning ultimately came to naught,
however. When briefed on 11 April by Colonel J.R.Forgan, OSS/Londons new
chief, the Director of OSS vetoed the project. Donovan feared too many
repercussions would be entailed from the employment of CALPO agents on such
a project, and that the plan would invite only trouble for OSS. While agreeing
that the idea of kidnapping Gestapo personnel or Nazi leaders was legitimate,
Donovan said that a plan entailing wholesale assassination was not to be
considered, and ordered it withdrawn.34
Since SOs efforts were repeatedly confounded after the French campaign, the
prospects for meaningful OSS operations against Germany thus rested squarely
with SI, even though its summer 1944 KENT plan for SI/SIS espionage in
Germany was aborted by Broadways inability to participate. The renaissance of
SIs German prospects ultimately centred around the development of OSS/
Londons planning bureaucracy, and with it the innovations of a minor staff
member. The London mission utilized a Staff Operational Committee before
OVERLORD to formalize policy developments within its branches, and one
junior officer participating in the committee as a free-lance minute-keeper and
secretary was former business lawyer William J.Casey.35 As head of American
intelligence some forty years later, Casey attracted considerable opprobrium for
his alleged role in politically controversial activities. Observers duly
characterized him as a largely guileful and devious political operative with a
typically American can-do approach fostered during his experiences of covert
intelligence and money-making, with the mystique of his OSS background
adding to his reputation as a veteran spook.36 Caseys role in penetrating
Germany suggests a more measured assessment, however. His memoirs clearly
illustrate a strong sense of personal allegiance to William Donovan while
downplaying his own leading role in events, a circumspect loyalty replicated for
his president as Director of Central Intelligence.37 Caseys can-do mentality
may also be more subtly described on the basis of his wartime work as a goal-
orientated tenacity of purpose married to a keen grasp of how to satisfy his
superiors vaguely defined needs. This attunement to his leaders wishes and
problems, the ability to construct workable solutions, and the competence to
make the most of available resources in executing them were the hallmarks of
Casey as inspired improviser. All of this accounts for how Casey became the
major force behind SI/Londons effective mobilization of OSS assets at a time
when there seemed to be little hope of accomplishing anything of consequence in
Germany.
By 6 June 1944 Casey was formally designated the OSS/London Secretariat,
tasked with overseeing the running of David Bruces office, and with embodying
a staff-capacity for the OSS/London leadership by bringing policy matters to
their attention.38 Casey soon realized, however, that SIs long range plans were
largely non-existent or still-born. This was particularly obvious after Casey
returned from an August Mediterranean trip where he observed the use of Ps/W
as agents for the potential penetration of Austria and southern Germany.39 The
experience contributed to Caseys own thinking on the matter, whereupon he
penned a lengthy memo to David Bruce on 11 September outlining his views on
Urgently needed discussions. Casey submitted that there was an immediate
need for basic top policy decisions concerning geographic and functional
organization for controlling the penetration of Germany, and regarding agent
recruitment. Casey also stressed the need for clear decisions on who [would be]
responsible for what in the next phase. Casey went on to detail some obvious
innovations for which OSS was uniquely suited:
Geographic unification
Within the next few weeks there will be a single targetGermany

and limited resources for the job. This seems to call for some degree
of central direction of and pooling of resources for the attack on the
target. We are short on agent material, German speaking officers,
safe houses, reception possibilities, operational intelligence etc. Full
and continuous exchange of information on operational plans, safe
houses, reception facilities, radio sets, etc., is a minimum requirement
when operations are conducted from MED[iterranean]T[heater of]O
[perations] and ETO against the same target. However, it is
submitted that even the closest liaison will not yield maximum
effectiveness in the penetration of Germany. What is needed is a
single direction and control. Some one person on the spot in Europe
should be able to decide where the limited number of agents
available should be used
Functional unification
It is equally vital that limited German resources be stretched to cover

the German job without regard to Branch lines. This is one time
when we must make the most out of the advantage which OSS has
over [its] British counterparts by having SO, SI and M[orale]O
[perations] in one organization. We do not have enough potential
agents to adequately cover Germany. We just cannot afford to try to
develop a network for SI, another for SO and another for MO. The
situation calls for us to throw everything we have into penetrating
Germany and covering it adequately. When that is done the network
can be used for SI, SO and MO purposes as and when appropriate.
SI, SO and MO each have German speaking bodies and staff
officers but none of them have enough to cover the German job
[individually]. Potential German agents are too scarce for them to
compete in recruiting, which they are now doing. They must make
common use of safe houses, radio and reception facilities. They must
not be allowed to build up three networks in one area and leave other
important areas uncovered. Right now SI has aplan worked out
with SHAEF which will provide lift into Germany for SI German
speaking bodies in the event of a collapse. Because SI worked this
plan out there has been no provision for SO and MO German
speaking bodies who might be useful in the event of a German
surrender.
The Italian experience establishes the feasibility of multiple
purpose agents. There all agents, whether SO or SI in origin, procure
intelligence, support resistance and sabotage and aid in the
distribution of black propaganda
Moreover, at certain times intelligence procurement is the most
valuable thing agents can do, at other times [its] operations and at
still other times propaganda distribution will be the most valuable
use of agents. In preparation for an action intelligence may rate top
priority, during an action sabotage may be most useful and after an
action has succeeded propaganda to exploit the setback to the enemy
may be most effective
Organizationally the basic alternatives seem to be as follows:
(a) A separate task force is set up for the penetration with a director, staff
and all available agents. SI, SO and MO perform their supplementary
functions and use the network developed as previously indicated.
(b) SI is assigned to carry out the penetration and takes over MO and SO
agent resources. This on the theory that SI now has the great bulk of agent
resources and plans for penetration of Germany and that the intelligence
job is basic and preliminary to satisfactory MO and SO work.
(c) The branches continue to function independently under the loose
coordination which a committee or staff can achieve.
Casey went on to recommend appointing a single geographic authority for the

penetration of Germany; establishing a separate penetration task force using all
branch resources; SO having its activities and personnel adjusted accordingly;
and for someone [to] be designated to organize and run an all out recruiting
drive for agent material suitable for Germany.40
Caseys recommendations immediately bore fruit. Since Donovan was then
present in theatre, he sanctioned OSS/Londons creation of an ETO Planning
Board on 13 September 1944, ultimately formalized on 4 October 1944. With
representatives from each branch under the chairmanship of SI Chief Whitney
Shepardson, its primary task involved the integration of all new Office of
Strategic Services operations.41 This was to be accomplished by mobilizing
ETO resources for the penetration of Germany, and by Caseys initiation of

geographic functionalism through consolidating efforts among OSSs
Mediterranean, ETO, Swedish, Iberian, and Swiss outposts.42 Since Shepardson
particularly stressed the imperative of mobilizing the resources of the various
Branches against the common target, Casey was also assigned on 16 September
the responsibility for summarizing how these various branch assets might be
combined so that an inventory of Branch resources and plans could be studied
by the Planning Board as a whole.43
Casey presented his paper on 12 October. It emphasized that while the
functions necessary for penetrating Germany involved several branches, they
were closely connected with each other, and could not be handled in water-tight
compartments. Caseys analysis therefore gave form to this [integrationist]
tendency in planning by proposing the creation of a staff along functional lines
to cover efforts involving foreign workers, agent penetration, and counter-
measures.44 These recommendations were soon acted upon with Donovans
enthusiastic approval.45 A Plans and Operations Staff (OPSAF) accordingly
replaced the Planning Board on 27 October, being responsible to David Bruce
for executing the Planning Boards previous mandate for German operations. All
plans would be submitted to OPSAF for approval and recommendation, while
Casey was left responsible for geographic consolidation and the foreign workers
problem.46 Although Casey could help mobilize OSS resources, OPSAFs
contribution floundered since the branches resisted OPSAFs authority to direct
all of their operations geared toward the penetration of Germany.47 With OSS/
Londons fragmented branch organization stymieing OPSAFs ability to realize
the functional and geographic integration so clearly necessary for the penetration
of Germany, Caseys personal influence would become even more necessary to
maintain momentum for the operations successful execution.
SIs relatively sluggish performance before Caseys critical promotion at the
beginning of December bears out the importance of his influence. In many ways,
SI started out duplicating the British services unpromising achievements. The
OSS Planning Board heard on 19 September a degree of pessimism about the
feasibility of placing intelligence teams inside Germany. It was British policy
to send intelligence teams into Germany only if they had a safe house where the
agent could hide and be fed and German contacts which he could use to get
information which would be radioed from the hiding place. The British
apparently enjoyed minimal success to that point since they had only one
working radio inside Germany.48 The Board later attributed this difficulty
primarily to the strictness of German controls, suggesting that the opportunity
for satisfactory penetration of Germany [was] exceedingly slim.49 Existing SIS
and SOE efforts now focused primarily on handling French, Belgian and Dutch
agents for clandestine operations, their earlier doubts about these sources having
been overcome.50 OSS freely agreed to provide its clearances for British
operations in the American sector in keeping with SHAEFs directive
concerning British work in the more geographically convenient American
frontage with Germany. This process was defined by mid-October as occurring

either through OPSAF in the case of all SOE work and those MI6 operations
originating in Britain, or through SOs Colonel Canfield and Commander
Cassidy for MI6 continental operations. The British services would then arrange
their own infiltrations through the OSS Field Detachments in the appropriate
sectors; the British reciprocated to OSS in the British-Canadian sector.51 This
willing cooperation notwithstanding, the fact remained that the French, Belgian,
and Dutch agencies only provided a limited number of suitable personnel to the
British services.52 It is clear, then, that whatever their protestations about the
prohibitive difficulty of direct penetration without the assistance of resistance
groups and friendly local populations, the truly debilitating factor was the lack of
agents available to the British given their eschewal of Ps/W in 1943. SIS and
SOE were as a result only able to insert a combined total of just over 30 agent
teams into Germany before wars end.53
SIs pessimistic view in the second half of September was obviously
understandable given the presumed link between the efficiency of German
controls and the poor British showing. Together with OPSAFs inertia, it
accounts for SIs tentative start in agent insertion. A September inventory of
OSS/Londons combined branch resources revealed that there were ten SO
agents and 81 SI agents capable of living under cover in Germany. Twenty
additional SI assets could function if Germanys controls collapsed. The
consistent fear of German controls combined with the USAAFs unwillingness
to fly into the German interior, however, created a feeling by December that
Germany was too tough a nut to crack.54 SI thus expected in September that
only four American-controlled agents would be inside Germany by 30
November.55 This indeed transpired, but since the agents lacked communications,
they did not produce current intelligence.56 Momentum fortunately began to
gather at this point, as David Bruce decided before departing for the US in mid-
December that all OSS/London assets should be pooled into one operating
machinery for the penetration of Germany, that the SI assets would form the
nucleus of this machinery, and that the task of getting agents into Germany
would be an SI responsibility, with SO and MO turning their personnel over to
SI. Bruce was essentially enforcing acceptance of Caseys ideas. SO did not
fully embrace this decision, and resisted making some of its personnel available
to SI until Colonel J.R. Forgan, Bruces replacement as OSS/London chief, flatly
overrode SOs objections.57
The implementation of Caseys ideas was facilitated by SIs restructuring in
November 1944 immediately before Whitney Shepardsons departure, and
Caseys fortuitous appointment as SI/London chief effective 1 December. This
promotion placed the truly dynamic force within OSS/London in the strongest
possible position to realize his ideas. Organizationally, SI intelligence objectives
were now defined by a new Division of Intelligence Direction, while a Division
of Intelligence Procurement (DIP) was set up to coordinate all SI resources, and
to direct and control all penetration operations.58 DIPs immediate priority was
agent recruitment and training, the great crippler of SO and British schemes. The
largest source of potential agents within SI was the branchs Labor Division
(thanks to its contacts with European labour groups), but this element was geared
primarily toward short-range tactical missions. Deep penetration missions
conversely took between four to six weeks of preparing an agent with
supplementary training and the necessary documents. This time was necessary for
getting to know the agent, mission formulation, acquiring briefing directives,
obtaining clothing, security vetting, and receiving formal mission approval from
OPSAF.59 That September, a forward base had been established in Luxembourg
for radio training and agent recruitment, but the rapid pace of military operations
was too great for it to conduct long-range planning (now concentrated in
London), confining it instead to medium/short-range infiltration teams.60
Codenamed MILWAUKEE FORWARD, its profile may have been too high to
be completely successful anyway. One OSS officer recounted to a colleague in
December that a man turned up at Milwaukee Forwardand said that he
wanted a job as a secret agent for the US Government. Of course, they clapped
him in the clink but discovered later that he had been referred to OSS by the
local G-5 [Civil Affairs Staff Officer], Hows your cover?61 The bulk of DIPs
agents accordingly had to be collected from a variety of sources, subject to
British clearance procedures (the SI War Diary specifically notes that the
Britishnever took advantage of their security powers to prevent OSS from
using certain types of agents).62 Ps/W were still excluded, but members of
resistance movements in recently liberated countries with contacts among
German dissident or worker organizations were of particular interest for DIP
canvassing efforts. Church dissidents, veterans of the Spanish Civil War, and
communists (including several CALPO members) were all sources of agent
trainees.63 The French, Polish, Belgian, and Dutch intelligence services were also
pressured by OSS liaison teams and the respective SI country desks to provide
any suitable bodies for insertion in the guise of conscripted foreign workers (the
most significant OSS liaison missions were Paris; ESPINETTE in Brussels,
Belgium; and MELANIE in Eindhoven, Holland).64
Agent training by the Poles, Belgians, etc., was done locally, while for
London-controlled missions, it was conducted mainly in England: parachuting at
Ringway, basic SI training lectures at Area F at Ruislip.65 Training facilities had
not been set up before 14 October because previous instruction of OSS agents
had largely been done jointly with SIS or SOE. Personnel training for DIPs
German work, however, was now the sole responsibility of OSS/London (by the
end of December, the Schools and Training branch noted that its teaching
material included a dozen [unnamed] books of the most technically interesting
spy stories. More [were] being procured).66 The Censorship and Documents
branch produced fake documents, although the BACH section of SIs Labour
Division was subsequently transferred to DIP in January 1945 to aid in cover and
briefing; the Research and Development branch handled agent equipment. The
success of these supporting elements placed OSS in a position where the British
came to OSS for help on German cover stories and documents more often than
the reverse.67 A singularly critical development concerned communications.
This involved an invention of a radio set by Dewitt Goddard of the RCA
corporation which enabled air-to-ground communication. Using an extremely
high frequency, the sets were hand held and transmitted a directional cone-
shaped beam. The frequency and directional features made it resistant to
anything but the most elaborate enemy direction-finding equipment, and the
aircraft with which the agents communicated could fly at high altitude without
betraying the agents location. The system, codenamed JOAN ELEANOR or J/E
for short, was also secure enough to permit plain voice transmissions; this was an
improvement over the KLAXON system employed by SUSSEX teams in
Normandy.68 The problem of deep agent air dispatch (as opposed to overland
from Holland and Belgium) was addressed by the US Army Air Forces
provision of A-26 medium aircraft for parachute delivery. This method would
begin operating on 1 March 1945, thereby supplementing the expedient use of
B-24s.69
As DIPs necessary mobilization of OSS resources gained momentum, the
issue of employing the agents to support the military was also resolved. The
December 1944 German Ardennes offensive had naturally resulted in an acute
awareness that Allied forces were going into Germany blind and in a genuine
appreciation of the intelligence that had been extracted from France both before
and after the invasion.70 The Ardennes offensive had in fact caused an
immediate demand for tactical intelligence as the battle developed, making for
an intensification of short-range infiltration under the direction of the various
field detachments attached to the armies (note that the separate SI, SF, and SCI
detachments were merged into unified OSS detachments with each HQ in
October 1944); results were apparent in increased short-range tactical
penetrations of the German lines and in the joint effort of the Brussels
[ESPINETTE] mission and SIS to build up a network of stay-behind teams in
German-overrun areas (in part by using German Ps/W) provided [SHAEF]
G-2s permission were secured and the prisoners were not registered by the Red
Cross.71 This experience obviously accounted for the US Armys renewed
appreciation for OSS intelligence, which manifested itself in early January 1945
when Casey, Forgan, and Gamble met with the G-2s of the 6th and 12th US Army
Groups, and of the 3rd and 7th US Armies (1st US Army G-2 B.A.Dickson had
already made it clear on 20 December that he did not desire tactical assistance
from OSS except under 12th AG).
All of these men were very strong in their view that it was of much greater
importance to have agents placed the other side of the Rhine in key transport
centers than to have agents move a few miles across the line and return. They
were acutely interested in what OSS could produce in the way of that kind
of intelligence during the first half of 1945. They were planning on the
necessity of fighting through to the fall of 1945, and they had been shaken
into an acute awareness of the dearth of intelligence by the Runstedt [sic]

offensive. General Sibert [G-2 12th AG] said they were going blind into
Germany and that they did not want to overlook any bet which might yield
intelligence of a strategic nature. General Harrison [G-2 6th AG]
protested against an excessive caution, pointing out that we should not
hesitate to take risks with our agents while a thousand men a day were
being killed along the front. Colonel Forgan was able to assure him that we
had already decided to abandon any caution which might have
characterized previous [OSS] efforts to penetrate Germany. At that time
we were able to report plans of putting nine and ten teams in the southern
sector, but we had almost nothing of interest to promise the 12th Army
Group[given] the unwillingness of the Air Force to fly north of
Stuttgart.72
This was gratifying support for OSS/Londons programme, but it created a

conflict between the agent requirements of the tactically-orientated Field
Detachments, and the strategically-focused DIP effort. Casey [strove] to strike
the best balance possible, but the necessity to develop a program of strategic
intelligence in Germany was his chief priority for resources.73
MELANIEs impressive coverage of military activities in northwest Germany
(through the facilities of Dutch BI [Bureau of Information]) largely resolved this
conflict.74 In SIRAs opinion, the Eindhoven OSS liaison team accounted for
half of all OSS/ETO intelligence over the last quarter of 1944, and more than 80
per cent of OSS material quoted by SHAEFs daily intelligence digest.75 While
this performance was deemed astounding, it was accomplished despite the
sloppiness of Dutch intelligence in Eindhoven, whose handling of agent
operations appalled Dutch resistance leaders inside occupied Holland. This
actually played into MELANIEs hands by giving the Dutch resistance
confidence in OSS. Moreover, while MELANIE organized local agent missions,
it gave the impression that they were nominally handled by the Dutch. Since
MELANIE was operating in Holland in the British Armys zone of operations, it
felt driven to wangle it allwithout making BI feel it [was] a long way off the
ball.76 This was necessary to get the job done, and Dutch intelligence did not
seem to mindBI [leant] itself contentedly to so effort saving an
arrangement.77 OSS even went so far as to label its Holland reports as Dutch
Intelligence Reports since the facade of BI competence was necessary to
preserve the reality of the American Intelligence producing and handling
machinery in Holland (SIS did likewise concerning its reports from Holland).78
MELANIE thus effectively carried the burden of tactical intelligence in northern
Germany with great success, and all under the constant and hawklike
watchfulness of [its] local Cousins, who would pounce on the first serious slip
MELANIE made and use it to their advantage (SIS sensitivity may have stemmed
from the willingness of 21st Army Groups Brigadier General Staff
[Intelligence] to allow OSS work in his sector provided there was a full exchange
of intelligence; this despite SIS complaints about OSS duplication and general
confusion).79
With OSS in a position to cover north German tactical intelligence, and to
launch a serious deep penetration effort across the Rhine, Caseys project was
finally able to act on the months of planning and improvisation. Up to mid-
February, a total of 12 OSS teams were dispatched to Germany, and one to
occupied Holland; there were eight from the Labor Desk and one former MO
team sent under SI/Londons auspices, one each from MELANIE and the 9th US
Army OSS Detachment, and three from the 7th US Army OSS Detachment. The
first three Labor Desk missions used the slow courier method of communication,
including the initial agent codenamed DOWNEND, who parachuted without
reception on 1 September to gather intelligence for OSS and organize resistance
for SOE. DOWNENDs experience represented this methods weakness: only two
pouches of intelligence materials were exfiltrated, while SOE and the agent
could not agree on the location or safety of proposed drop zones for arms and
supplies. Once overrun on 9 April, he was able to provide tactical intelligence
and names of further pro-Allied contacts in the Ruhr (the other two missions,
RUPPERT and RAGWEED, were infiltrated overland to Berlin and the Ruhr in
November). Two of SI/Londons agents were tourists, dropped 50 to 100 miles
behind enemy lines (ECLIPSE to Dusseldorf in December, and HOFER to
Austria in January) and ordered to follow a prescribed route and to check
specific points on the way back to the American lines. Two teams using
conventional W/T equipment (RUBENS and STUDENT) were inserted in
January and February; one using the J/E system (TYL) went in on 10 November.
REUBENS and TYL were, however, soon captured.80
The FebruaryMarch moon period then proved detrimental to oper ations, with
seven straight days of bad weather scrubbing all operations toward the end of
February. London managed to dispatch only five of 12 operations in this period,
the rest being nullified by weather, poor coordination with the Air Force, or poor
conditions at the second-rate Lyons airfield relied upon because of the weather.
Of the 7th US Army operations, three tourist teams returned with reports (MIMI,
COCO, LULU), but W/T team PITT established only brief contact before
capture, another (DUBUQE) was killed, while J/E team TROY disappeared after
initial contact.81
It was the climactic Allied offensive of the Rhine crossing that allowed OSS
teams to mount a truly large-scale penetration of enemy territory.82 The
massive airborne operations connected with the Rhine crossing coincided with
the greater availability of aircraft and radio equipment for air-dropping agents.83
In anticipating the Rhine offensive, 12th US Army Group G-2 Brigadier General
Sibert requested coverage of Frankfurt, Giessen, Arfurt, Fulda and Kassel, all of
which were laid on in a few days, including London missions OLD
FASHIONED (Geissen, W/T), PINK LADY (Erfurt, W/T), and HIGHBALL
(Kassel, W/T).84 Three particularly successful missions were HAMMER (J/E)
dropped near Berlin on 2 March; CHAUFFEUR to Regensberg on 31 March (W/
T-J/E); and DOCTOR (W/T) in Austria on 23 March.85 A further 20 teams were

air-dropped, and eight infiltrated overland, during the 618 April dark moon
period. With Allied armies driving deep into Germany, they were appealing for
intelligence on the Reduit, Berlin, and Leipzig areas.86 Sibert and Casey decided
that it would be best to concentrate missions along the Elbe because the concern
at that time was whether or not and how soon the Germans would divert
divisions from the Eastern to the Western front. Teams were accordingly placed
in Chemnitz (MANHATTAN, W/T), Leipzig (BUZZSAW, J/E), Magdeburg
(ORANGE BLOSSOM, W/T), Wittenberg (TOM COLLINS, W/T), and Plauen
(FARO, J/E). Although there was considerable coverage of strategic areas, the W/
T equipped teams usually failed to make contact, while the J/E teams got
through.87 As for the Reduit (or Redoubt), this was the rumoured area for a last-
ditch stand in the Bavarian, Austrian and Italian Alps.88 These areas of
Germany, along with Berlin, were therefore all that remained for the OSS teams
by the next moon period (19 April to the 7 May German surrender). A final 18
missions were launched: six each from 7th US Army and London, and two each
from the French intelligence service (DGER) and 9th US Army. The London
teams included VIRGINIA and GEORGIA (both on 24 April with reception by
DOCTOR) in Austria with W/T. The most successful German missions inserted
during the month of April were those equipped with J/E: PICKAXE (Landshut,
near Munich, 4 April), and LUXE I (Wilheim, Southern Bavaria, 4 April).89
The effectiveness of the missions was influenced by a number of variables.
Two constraints which OSS could do little to control were weather and the pace
of military operations. The penetration missions could not go into full swing
until 1 March because problematic weather conditions complicated the air drops.
The interruptions delayed the deployment of many teams, thus reducing their
effectiveness. The DOCTOR team delivered near Munich particularly suffered
from a loss of [a] months working time in the field, which undoubtedly
reduced [its] value considerably (this by implication delayed inserting
VIRGINIA and GEORGIA).90 Equally significant was the fact that while the
military had specific applications for the missions, the advance of the Allied
forces after the Rhine crossing [was] so swift that operations were continually
being scrubbed and shifted to new targets. This steady state of being off balance
was best expressed when the chief of SIs Belgian desk moaned, General Patton
is screwing up all my operations.91 OSS often felt pressure to concentrate their
energies to directly support the Army Groups in covering priority targets,
defined before the Rhine crossing as key rail junctions, choke points, marshalling
yards, and Rhine rail bridges.92 The armies afterward tended to want teams
placed at a point of immediate Army interest in itself rather than as a transport
center, after which the team would be overrun before it could get started.
Casey subsequently noted that the most successful missions were spotted near
the Elbe and down toward the southern reduit. Here the teams had time to get
settled and produce, and there is no getting away from the fact that it takes
anywhere from 3 weeks to 3 months for a clandestine team to become really

productive.93
The most significant variable affecting the teams in the field was the reliability
of available communications methods. Here, J/E teams clearly outperformed
those equipped with conventional W/T. W/T was potentially the most reliable
and satisfactory method, but only if the teams using it were given time to get
settled. DOCTOR and CHAUFFEUR fortuitously fell in with the Austrian
resistance and with French-Belgian deportees respectively who could offer them
a safe location with sufficient power to run their radios. DOCTOR then received
VIRGINIA and GEORGIA, and J/E team LUXE received a W/T for its later
work. Most of the other WT [sic] teams encountered great difficulty in
securing power and a safe location and just didnt have time to get their WT
working before they were overrun. The teams using the smaller, simpler, more
secure J/E system in contrast got started much more quickly and it was possible
to plan on a contact shortly after [a successful] drop.94 Out of 85 attempted
contacts with 14 J/E teams, 38 were successful (44.75 per cent); 40 were
unsuccessful with no response from the ground (47 per cent); and seven were
failures due to mechanical problems with the J/E set or with the aircraft (8.25 per
cent). This compares well with the 29 out of 41 W/T missions who made no
contact at all before being over-run, an almost 71 per cent rate of communications
ineffectiveness (DIP tried to compensate for the W/T delays by relaying any
agent W/T messages directly to SI Reports Division and any relevant military
detachments without translation for their immediate handling).95 The combined
OSS effort under DIP coordination thus accounted for a total of 102 missions
through London, the Army detachments, and through the liaison missions (86 by
air). Fifty-seven of the 102 were judged successful, 26 as failures, and ten as
unknown.96 Of the 46 teams directly sent from London, 15 were judged fully
successful; seven partially successful; and 24 were classed as failures although
they contacted advanced American infantry units and gave reports of some
tactical value. Of the London W/T teams, only five of 27 made successful
contact. Reasons for these failures included four W/T sets being lost or damaged
in parachuting, five sets failing to function outright, six teams being dropped too
far from their targets before being overrun, two teams being injured in dropping,
two more being overrun almost immediately after landing, and two teams
documents leading to their arrest [these were the only two document failures by
OSS branches Censorship and Documents (CD) and Research and Development
(R&D)]; one other team went missing. As for the nine London J/E teams, five
were successful, while one team was lost with its aircraft, one other lost its
equipment, and the other two never made contact. Losses had been anticipated to
run as high as 50 per cent, but the 46 London teams actually suffered three
known dead, three captured, and one missing.97
The intelligence gleaned from the missions was relatively small in quantity
but of high quality Coverage was good in areas like Munich, the Redoubt and
Berlin where the teams had considerable time to work, and poor in Western
Germany where they were rapidly overrun by the advancing armies.98 Casey
noted that [virtually all of the teams were able to supply valuable tactical
intelligence to the troop elements which overran them. In efforts that could have
proven useful to SOs CROSS project, three teams penetrated the
Sicherheitsdienst and Gestapo (including one each in Berlin and Munich), and
others identified many local Nazis.99 SIRA/Paris circulated only one report from
SI/ETO assets in February 1945, but five J/E and W/T teams produced
intelligence during March; three of these became unproductive by the end of the
month through overruns, etc. Of the March production, there were a single
report from a source in Oberhausen providing some purely tactical information
[,]seven excellent tactical reports from Dinslaken, and identification of elements
of the 116th Panzer Division and 84th Infantry Division which were of strategic
interest. A single report was also received concerning a resistance group near
Munich, while a Berlin report contained miscellaneous local industrial and
communications data of obvious relevance to targeting air bombardment. A
further two reports contained several useful troop identifications from a source in
Mannheim which was thereafter overrun.100
SI/Londons German operations thus provided the military with precisely the
kind of information it wanted at a time when the exploitation of ULTRA
material declined given the German Armys increased use of land-line
communications as it retreated into the Reich. Since reduced radio usage ensured
that German troop movements and locations were betrayed less often, the utility
of agent reports relative to ULTRA grew accordingly.101 The militarys repeated
demands for agents on shallow missions to report tactical intelligence, and their
support of missions to the Elbe and the supposed Redoubt area, both indicate
their need for intelligence on the state of German installations, defences, and
troop movements as they drove deeper into the Reich. A post-war assessment by
G-2 12th AG specifically noted that OSS agents helped provide the balance of
information regarding routes of enemy withdrawal and strong defensive
positions supplemented by prisoners and air-photo coverage.102 The fluid
advance into Germany combined with the disintegrating German defence to
obscure the military picture, and the high-quality intelligence of OSS agents gave
American G-2s timely insights into enemy defences and the dubious prospects for
a last-stand bastion in the Alps. No other source of intelligence was as useful in
reliably discerning such details in the closing months of the war, and it must be
stressed that these evaluations of the penetrations significance did not originate
from within SI alone, but from knowledgeable consumers like G-2 and SIRA.103
The British effort in Germany appears paltry in comparison with OSS/
Londons. Whatever minimizing has been done of SIs penetration programme,
its 102 missions far outstripped the 30-plus British missions. The delay in
initiating planning, the weather, the pace of the Allied ground advance, and the
communications difficulties may have complicated SIs work, but Caseys
programme far exceeded that managed by the established British services; his
British colleagues were amazed at the volume [of operations] finally
attained.104 SIS and SOE admittedly overestimated the potential problems in

penetrating Germany (difficulties which declined as the Reichs internal chaos
helped loosen its controls), but their efforts were most significantly crippled by
an inability to shift from French to German operations.105 They lacked agents,
equipment, and communications, the proffered reservations about Ps/W and
French, Dutch, or Belgian personnel notwithstanding. Most of all, they were split
into two distinct services. While OSS/London long reflected this fragmentation,
it managed to overcome the branch primacy inherited from its previous joint
operations with the British. It did so because Casey recognized the futility of a
nominally centralized organization scattering its efforts to the point where they
individually accomplished nothing. The innovations he pushedparticularly
geographic and functional integrationallowed OSS to capitalize on its inherent
advantage over the British services through SI. It was thus William Casey, not
William Donovan, who made SI an independent realization of American
espionage.106 There would never have been 102 OSS missions if the cumulative
assets of SI/London, the Field Detachments, and the liaison missions had not
been coordinated by Caseys DIP, and none of these integrationist ideas
originated with Donovan. The British services obviously never achieved this
measure of combined operations, and OSS suspicions that MI6 held back its
German intelligence were groundlessBroadway had painfully little to hold
back (SI Reports Division actually attributed camouflaged ULTRA intelligence
from the SHAEF Daily Digest to fixed W/T SIS agents in Germany. Indeed,
the division believed that all but a few [pieces of data] were received by w/t [sic]
from the source; truer than they realized since OSS was not generally a recipient
of ULTRA).107
William J.Casey therefore enabled OSS/London to transcend its debilitating
fragmentation, and to realize a unique accomplishment in the intelligence war.
Whatever his future experiences as DCI, it must be conceded that the penetration
of Germany owed much to Caseys abilities. Casey showed what OSS as a whole
could do when it acted less like a collection of independent branches and more
like a coherent, unified service. By effectively directing OSS/London toward an
audacious intelligence objective, he orchestrated one of the missions most
noteworthy achievements of the Second World War. By building on the
espionage successes in France, SI again impressed the military, among them the
future governors of post-hostilities Germany. OSS/Londons success in building
on its British links in counter-espionage would likewise be fruitful, although its
forays into propaganda would prove much less impressive.
NOTES
1. Minutiae description: Miller, Spying, p. 297; lack of benefit to armies: B.F.Smith,

Shadow, pp. 2967.
2. British lukewarm and ULTRA: West, Secret War, pp. 2423, and West, MI6, p. 379
on ULTRA, see also Joseph E.Persico, Piercing the Reich: The Penetration of
Nazi Germany by American Secret Agents during World War II (New York:
Viking, 1979), p. 14; Ambrose, Ikes, p. 143 claims that OSS had only four men in
Germany who produced no intelligence.
3. Inspired remark on OSS in general by Gordon Craig in 1991, cited in
MacPherson, Conference Report, p. 513.
4. The 1943 plans are in Meeting of London Branch SI to consider operational base
in London, 23 April 1943, Folder 424, Box 319, Entry 190; the remarks on
Germany are by OSS/London head David Bruce; see also SI Branch Report,
European Theater Report, August 1943, Folder 1a, Box 1, Entry 99; both in RG
226, NARA.
5. The P/W point was made by SIs Stacey Lloyd in the Meeting, 23 April 1943.
6. ETO Officers Pouch Report, 12 June 1944see also ETO Officers Pouch Report,
2 June 1944, citing memo Maddox to Haskell of 22 May; both in Folder 38, Box 9,
Entry 99, RG 226, NARA..
7. European Theater Office Report, 24 June 1944, Folder 35, Box 8, Entry 99, RG
226, NARA; ETO Officers Pouch Report, 12 June 1944.
8. SHAEF admissions: Maj. Ides van der Gracht to Robert MacLeod and George
Pratt, 21 August 1944, Folder 325, Box 314, Entry 190see also van der Grachtts
SI Liaison Officer Progress Report for 15 August11 September 1944, Folder 5,
Box 2, Entry 99; ETO Officers Pouch Report, 10 July, 1944, Folder 39, Box 9,
9. OSS Activities, July 1944, Folder 117, Box 93, Entry 99, RG 226, NARA.
10. Report by Maj. Aubrey H. Harwood on OSS, SI Activities, 4 November 1944,
Folder 46a#3, Box 11, Entry 99; see also cable #61884, Bruce to Donovan, 20 July
1944 seeking guidance on future SI plans and German planning, Reel 77, Entry
11. On 10 February 1943 meeting, see MI 19(a) War Diary, Summary of Events,
February 1943, WO 165/41, PRO.
12. The finally decided quote is from MI19(a) War Diary, Summary of Events,
August 1943, WO 165/41, PRO; the War Diary also cites 15 August 1944, rather
than 1943, as the date of liaison establishment with OSS, but this appears to be a
typo-graphical error as 1943 makes more sense from the documents context.
13. Harwood report; see also Persico, Piercing, p. 14.
14. European Theater Office Report, 10 August 1944, Folder 36, Box 8, Entry 99, RG
226, NARA.
15. Donovan quote is from Future Office of Strategic Services Operations in Central
Europe, 2 September 1944, Folder 61, Box 220, Entry 92, RG 226, NARA; see
also Peter Wilkinson and Joan Bright Astley, Gubbins and SOE (London: Leo
Cooper, 1997), pp. 21113.
16. European Theater Office Report, 12 September 1944, Folder 36, Box 8, Entry 99,
RG 226, NARA.
17. Stewart Herman, to Col Haskell, 13 September 1944, Folder 5, Box 2, Entry 99,
RG 226, NARA.
18. SO Semi-monthly Section Progress Reports, 115 September 1944, dated 18
September 1944, Folder 5, Box 2, Entry 99, RG 226, NARA.
19. SO Progress Report, 28 September-13 October 1944, dated 13 October 1944,

Folder 6, Box 3, Entry 99, RG 226, NARA.
20. Lt-Col M.A.W.Rowlandson to Brigadier General Staff (Plans), Possible SF
Assistance to 21 Army Group Operations in Germany, 24 September 1944, WO
205/208, PRO; Stafford, Resistance, p. 187, states that Germany became the first
priority target for SOE activities in August 1944, and that this was too late to
accomplish much; on German resistance in general, see Hans Rothfels, The
German Opposition to Hitler: An Appraisal, trans. Lawrence Wilson (Chicago:
Henry Regnery, 1962), especially p. 153 (opposition could never be a mass
movement); Anthony Williams, Resistance and Opposition amongst Germans, in
Hawes and White (eds), Resistance, pp. 13569; Mary A.Gallin, German
Resistance to Hitler: Ethical and Religous Factors (Washington, DC: Catholic
University of America Press, 1961); Allen Dulles, Germanys Underground (New
York: Macmillan, 1947); Allan Merson, Communist Resistance in Nazi Germany
(London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1985), especially pp. 234, 276, 288303; James
Donohoe, Hitlers Conservative Opponents in Bavaria, 19301945: A Study of
Catholic, monarchist and separatist anti-Nazi activities (Leiden: E.J.Brill, 1961),
p. 22 and passim; Peter Hoffmann, The History of German Resistance, 19331945,
trans. Richard Barry (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1977); John L.Snell, Wartime
Origins of the East-West Dilemma Over Germany (New Orleans: Phauser Press,
1959), p. 129; Michael Balfour, Withstanding Hitler in Germany, 193345
(London: Routledge, 1988) (which examines reasons for the inadequate scope and
effectiveness of German resistance); Klemens von Klemperer, German Resistance
Against Hitler: The Search for Allies Abroad, 19381945 (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1992), pp. 57, 31568, 437; see also Jrgen Heideking and Christof Mauch
(eds), American Intelligence and the German Resistance to Hitler (Boulder:
Westview Press, 1996) and Neal H.Petersen (ed.), From Hitlers Doorstep: The
Wartime Intelligence Reports of Allen Dulles, 19421945 (University Park: The
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996).
21. Aaron Bank, From OSS to Green Berets: The Birth of Special Forces (Novato:
Presidio, 1986), p. 69see also pp. 701.
22. The pilot quote is from S.W.Herman to Gerald Miller, n.d., Folder 6, Box 3, Entry
99, RG 226, NARA.
23. SOE and 21st/12th Army Groups, SHAEF Main, Signed Eisenhower to 12th Army
Group for Sibert, 25 October 1944, and 12 Army Group Tactical HQ Sibert Signed
Bradley to SHAEF Main, Attention SHGCT, 4 November 1944, both in WO 219/
612, PRO.
24. William J.Casey to Col W.C.Jackson and Gerald Miller, 22 November 1944,
25. Charles E.Brebner, SO Executive Officer Report for 1530 November 1944 SO
Progress Report, 1 December 1944, Folder 7, Box 3, Entry 99, RG 226, NARA.
26. OSS(SO), SO Planning Section Progress Report for 115 January 1945, dated 11
January 1945, Folder 9, Box 4, Entry 99, RG 226, NARA.
27. SHAEF/17240/13/Ops (C) of 29 January 1945 noted in Col J.R.Forgan, SO
Branch Use of GERMAN Nationals, Recruited through CALPO, as Agent
Saboteurs on Special Operations into GERMANY, February 1945, Folder 1025,
Box 272, Entry 190, and in Col E.W.Gamble, Jr, to SHAEF through G-3 Ops (C),
SHAEF, Special Sabotage Operations Against Nazi and Gestapo Personnel, 31

March 1945, Folder 2113, Box 122, Entry 148, RG 226, NARA.
28. The Value of SOE Operations in the Supreme Commanders Sphere, c. July
1945, WO 219/40B, PRO; cf. Roosevelt, II, p. 305.
29. SO Branch Monthly Report for March 1945, Folder 104, Box 90, Entry 99, RG
226, NARA.
30. CROSS: Gamble to SHAEF through G-3 Ops (C), Special Sabotage, 31 March
1945, Folder 2113, Box 122, Entry 148, RG 226, NARA; political line: from
Casey, Secret, p. 189note that Casey makes no mention of the CROSS project;
see also Merson, Communist, p. 272, on CALPO.
31. Gamble to SHAEF through G-3 Ops (C), Special Sabotage, 31 March 1945,
32. Maj. C.G.Hirsch, Acting Chief, CES-SO to Lt-Col Powell and Mr Manning, SO
Branch, OSS/Paris, 5 April 1945, Folder 57, Box 332, Entry 190, RG 226, NARA.
33. Hirsch to Manning and Lt Henry Weldon, 7 April 1945, Folder 57, Box 332, Entry
190, RG 226, NARA.
34. Minutes of Meeting with the Director Reference SO Branch Activities into
Germany, 11 April 1945, Folder 223, Box 346, Entry 190, RG 226, NARA; on
Donovan and communists, see Casey, Secret, p. 189, and Persico, Piercing, p. 167;
cf. B.F.Smith, Shadow, pp. 3559.
35. For Operations Committee, see minutes with Caseys status in Folder 357, Box 315,
Entry 190, RG 226, NARA; cf. the thin account in Persico, Piercing, pp. 1718.
36. See Joseph E.Persico, Casey: From OSS to the CIA (New York: Viking: 1990), pp.
ixxii, 8799, 20729, 394416, 55077; Bob Woodward, Veil: The Secret Wars
of the CIA, 19811987 (New York: Pocket Books, 1988), especially pp. 257, 30,
356, 393, 53888; John Ranelagh, The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA
(New York: Touchstone, 1987), pp. 6745; see also Robert A.Strong, October
Surprises, Intelligence and National Security 8, 2 (April 1993), pp. 22735.
37. Casey, Secret, pp. 216, 222; see also Woodward, Veil, pp. 356.
38. Casey to Col O.C.Doering, 9 June 1944; William Casey and Charles Bane to Col
Giblin, 5 June 1944; see also the memo on Establishment of Secretariat, 6 June
1944; all in Folder 439, Box 232, Entry 190, RG 226, NARA.
39. MEDTO observations in Casey to Bruce and Forgan, 21 August 1944, Folder 16a,
Box 33, Entry 99, RG 226, NARA, reproduced in Casey, Secret, pp. 23949.
40. Casey to Bruce, 11 September 1944, Folder 61, Box 220, Entry 92, RG 226,
NARA.
41. See W.H.Shepardson to Donovan, 23 October 1944, outlining the genesis of the
Planning Board, with integration quote, Folder 61, Box 220, Entry 92, RG 226,
NARA.
42. First Progress Report, Planning and Operations Board, ETO, 26 September 1944,
43. Minutes, Planning Board, 16 September 1944, Folder 61, Box 220, Entry 92, RG
226, NARA.
44. Shepardson to Donovan, 23 October 1944, Folder 61, Box 220, Entry 92, RG 226,
NARA.
45. Cable No. 78474, Donovan (109) to Bruce (105) et al., 30 October 1944, Reel
82, Entry 180, RG 226, NARA.
46. General Order No. 12, 27 October 1944, Folder 61, Box 220, Entry 92; see also
OPSAF Standard Operating Procedures, 2 November 1944; for continued Casey
assignments, see Jackson to Forgan, 23 October 1944; both in Folder 1, Box 51, Entry
115; all in RG 226, NARA.
47. Jackson to Bruce and Armour, 30 November 1944, Folder 152, Box 212, Entry 190,
RG 226, NARA.
48. Minutes of Planning Board meeting, 19 September 1944, Folder 61, Box 220,
49. Planning and Operations Board Report, 26 September 1944, Folder 61, Box 220,
50. Minutes of Meeting Held at SOE HQ, 13 January 1945, Folder 1265, Box 285,
51. Jackson to Canfield, 23 December 1944, Folder 1265, Box 285, Entry 190; MI6/
OSS mutual clearance agreement signed by Col R.E.Brook and Col E.W Gamble,
31 January 1945, Folder 2002, Box 117, Entry 148; see also Coster to Haskell on 5
October Meeting with Brig. Williams, 21st Army Group [BGS (I)], 7 October 1944,
52. Minutes of Meeting Held at SOE HQ, 13 January 1945, Folder 1265, Box 285,
53. Prohibitive quote and 30 SIS/SOE teams from Chief, SI (William Casey) to CO,
OSS, Final Report on SI Operations into Germany, 24 July 1945, Folder 518, Box
325, Entry 190, RG 226, NARA; this clearly numbers OSS missions into Germany
as eventually totalling 102, and states that these were three times those of SIS and
SOE in number, hence just over 30 British missions; Roosevelt, II, pp. 3056,
defines OSS missions as those dropped by air directly from London, a total of 34,
thus misstating the basis of the one-third British ratio; West, Secret, pp. 2412,
relies on Roosevelt while badly garbling and confusing the narrative of SOE and
OSS penetration; Stafford, Resistance, p. 188 states that SOE/SIS sent 19 agents to
Germany, mostly for denazification efforts.
54. Planning Board Report, 26 September 1944; fear of controls also in Planning Board
Minutes, 19 September 1944; both in Folder 61, Box 220, Entry 92, RG 226,
NARA.
55. Planning Board Minutes, 19 September 1944.
56. Casey to Ernest Brooks and John Greedy, 12 July 1945, Folder 94, Box 300, Entry
190, RG 226, NARA.
57. Ibid.
58. War Diary, OSS/London, SI Branch, Vol. 12, German Operations, 1945, pp. 45,
1011, in Bradley F. Smith (ed.), Covert Warfare, Vol. II: The Spy Factory and
Secret Intelligence (New York: Garland, 1989); SI reorganization detail is in
Organization of SI/ETO, 31 March 1945, Folder 1911, Box 111, Entry 148, RG
226, NARA.
59. Labor Division and requirements for deep penetration missions: A.E.Jolis, Labour
Division, to Plans and Operations, 20 November 1944, Folder 254, Box 310, Entry
190; on agent sources, see also War Diary, SI, 12, pp. 267, and Stacy B.Lloyd to
Donovan, 5 February 1945, Reel 125, Entry 180; all in RG 226, NARA; see also
War Diary, OSS/London, SI Branch, Vol. 6, Labor Division, in OSS/London, Reel
7.
60. ETO Officers Pouch Report, 5 October 1944, Folder 40, Box 9, and OSS Activities
Report, September 1944, Folder 119, Box 93, both in Entry 99, RG 226, NARA.
61. Unknown author to Charles Bane, 16 December 1944, Folder 984, Box 269, Entry
190, RG 226, NARA.
62. War Diary, SI, 12, pp. 349.
63. Agent recruitment: Casey to Brooks and Greedy; P/W exclusion: Harwood report;
doubts about the reliability of German prisoners: Report of E.M.Carroll, 12 June
1945, Folder 46a#2, Box 11, Entry 99; British and SI attitudes to German prisoners
and CALPO: Report of Donald K.Adams, Folder 680, Box 49, Entry 146; all in RG
226, NARA; on agent recruitment, see also Casey, Secret, pp. 18990.
64. OSS liaison missions: War Diary, SI, 12, pp. 901; Country Desks: War Diary,
SI, 12, 136402; on MELANIE and ESPINETTE, see War Diary, OSS/London,
SI Branch, Vol. 7, Miscellaneous Operations with Allied Services, pp. 933, in
OSS/London, Reel 8.
65. War Diary, SI, 12, pp. 378.
66. British opposites: OSS Activities Report, October 1944, Folder 120, Box 93; spy
stories: Progress Report on Instruction, S&T Branch, 30 December 1944, Folder
8, Box 4; both in Entry 99, RG 226, NARA.
67. Final Report on SI Operations; see also Adams report; BACH in War Diary, SI,
6, pp. 13775.
68. Communications and J/E in War Diary, SI, 12, pp. 923; J/E also in Casey,
Secret, pp. 1867.
69. Final Report on SI Operations.
70. Ibid.
71. Ardennes detail: OSS Activities Report, December 1944, Folder 122, Box 94,
Entry 99; merging of detachments: Bruce to All Detachments and Missions, 30
October 1944, Folder 166, Box 214, Entry 190; both in RG 226, NARA.
72. 1st US Army G-2 attitude from Lt-Col John H.Colby memo OSS Operations in
Zone of First US Army, 20 December 1944, Folder 365, Box 316, Entry 190, RG
226, NARA; Casey-Forgan-Gamble meeting with G-2s, including the extended
quote: Casey to Brooks and Creedysee also War Diary, SI, 12, pp. 212.
73. Best balance: Casey to Shepardson, S-009107, in European-Mediterranean
Pouch Review, 18 January 1945, Folder 37, Box 9; priority for resources: Forgan,
Gamble and Casey to 154, 22 January 1945, in European-Mediterranean Cable
Digest, 24 January 1945, Folder 41, Box 10; both in Entry 99; see also James
R.Forgan to CG 12th Army Group on Plans for OSS Activities in 12th Army
Group Sector, 27 January 1945, and Forgan to Donovan, 13 February 1945, both
in Reel 125, Entry 180; all in RG 226, NARA.
74. OSS Activities Report for January 1945, Folder 123, Box 94, Entry 99; BI defined
in Capt. G.E.Borst to G.S.Platt, Monthly Progress Report, 6 December 1943,
75. Low Countries Desk SI Report for February 1945, Folder 3, Box 80, Entry 92, RG
226, NARA.
76. Operational Report for period ending 17 March 1945 from OSS Mission to the
Netherlands, 18 March 1945, Folder 11, Box 5, Entry 99, RG 226, NARA.
77. Intelligence Report for week ending 31 March from Mission Melanie, 2 April 1945,
78. LaVerge to Casey, 25 December 1944 and Casey to Philip Horton, 26 December
1944, Folder 2/12, Box 2, Entry 115, RG 226, NARA.
79. Cousins: LaVerge to SI Staff, London, Attention: Dr MacLeod, 30 November
1944, Folder 2/12, Box 2, Entry 115, RG 226, NARA; 21st Army Group BGS (I)
views: Coster to Haskell memo concerning the meeting with Brig. Williams, 7
October 1944, cited above; SIS complaints: War Diary, SI, 7, pp. 1314.
80. War Diary, SI, 12, p. 130, and Sheet Number 1 (SI Intelligence Teams
Dispatched to Germany, September 1944May 1945); see also Roosevelt, II, pp.
3089; tourists methodology and quote in Final Report on SI Operations; SOE
connection to DOWNEND in West, Secret War, p. 242.
81. War Diary, SI, 12, pp. 1312, and Sheet Number 1; SI Operations Status attached
to Organization of SI/ETO; see also the Field Report of Air Dispatch Officer
Maj. Jacques H.Beau, 20 September 1945, Folder 46a#l, Box 11, Entry 99, RG 226,
NARA.
82. OSS Activities Report for March 1945, Folder 125, Box 94, Entry 99, RG 226,
NARA.
83. War Diary, SI, 12, p. 132, and Field Report of Stephen Vinciguerra, 23 June 1945,
Folder 46b#4, Box 11a, Entry 99, RG 226, NARA.
84. Casey to Brooks and Greedy; see also 12th US AG Operational report for 1824
March, dated 28 March 1945 regarding a 23 March meeting between Sibert and
Maj.-Gen. Kenneth Strong, G-2 SHAEF with Col Colby, 12th Army Group OSS
Detachment commander, Folder 12, Box 5, Entry 99, RG 226, NARA; see also
War Diary, SI, 12, Sheet Number 1.
85. War Diary, SI, 12, p. 133, and Sheet Number 1; Roosevelt, II, pp. 30911.
86. War Diary, SI, 12, pp. 1323.
87. Casey to Brooks and Greedy, and 12th Army Group OSS Detachment Weekly
Report, 10 April 1945, Folder 12, Box 5, Entry 99, RG 226, NARA; War Diary,
SI, 12, Sheet Number 1.
88. See The IORS/DID project on the Alpine Redoubt (January to May 1945), Folder
Redoubt Project, Box 4, Entry 75, RG 226, NARA, and Rodney G.Minott, The
Fortress that Never Was: The Myth of Hitlers Bavarian Stronghold (New York:
Holt, Rinehart, Winston, 1964); see also Petersen, (ed.), Doorstep, pp. 42930, 447
9, 4501, 4612, 4723, 4845, 4923, 5045, 513.
89. War Diary, SI, 12, pp. 1323 and Sheet Number 1; Roosevelt, II, pp. 31011.
90. War Diary, SI, 12, p. 131.
92. Minutes of Meeting of Field Detachment Commanding Officers, 12th AG, 23
February 1945, dated 28 February 1945, Folder 10, Box 4, Entry 99; see also G-2
Study of Operations for the period 1 August 1944 to 9 May 1945, pp. 18, 36,
Folder 83, Box 300, Entry 190; both in RG 226, NARA.
94. Ibid.
95. J/E contact statistics from Individual Contacts invoice and Comparative Figures
attached to DIP Contact Office Final Report, 26 May 1945 (which also covers
contact procedures), Folder 495, Box 49, Entry 110; W/T contact percentage from
War Diary, SI, 12, Sheet Number 1; W/T relay procedure in two Casey memos to
George Pratt, both dated 13 March 1945, Folder 1078, Box 276, Entry 190; see also
Report of Douglas W Alden, 20 August 1945, Folder 46a#l, Box 11, Entry 99; all
in RG 226, NARA.
97. War Diary, SI, 12, pp. 289, 134, and Sheet Number 1.
98. War Diary, SI, 12, p. 29see also p. 135.
99. Final Report on SI Operationssee also Casey, Secret, pp. 21113.
100. War Diary, OSS/London, Secret Intelligence Branch, Vol. 8, Reports Division,
pp. 3589, Reel 5, Entry 91, RG 226, NARA.
101. On ULTRA and land-lines, see Bennett, Ultra in the West, pp. 221, 2478, who
naturally focuses on the information still gleaned from SIGINT; for ULTRA and
the general tactical picture after the Ardennes offensive, see Hinsley, III, (2), pp.
66390, 71146.
102. G-2 Study of Operations for the period 1 August 1944 to 9 May 1945, p. 52.
103. On assessing the Redoubt, see Casey, Secret, pp. 2058, Bennett, Ultra in the
West, pp. 25762, and Weigley, Lieutenants, pp. 7003; cf. Persico, Piercing, pp.
3335.
105. Overestimation of difficulties: War Diary, SI, 12, pp. 34; see also Col. V Lada-
Mocarski to Donovan through Chief SI, 27 January 1945, Folder 46b#l, Box 11,
106. Cf. Persico, Piercing, pp. 1518, and Persico, Casey, pp. 648, 83; Casey
admittedly downplayed his role to Persico; he certainly neglected to mention his
geographic/functional integration proposals in his own memoirs.
107. SI and MI6/ULTRA: Rositzke to Horton, 16 February 1945, Horton to Casey, 17
February 1945, and Horton to Gamble, 18 February 1945, Folder 1998, Box 117,
Entry 148, RG 226, NARAthe material attached by Rositzke is clearly derived
from ULTRA given its breadth, specificity, and general content; B.F.Smith,
Shadow, p. 172, notes the general exclusion of OSS from signals intelligence.
7
Following the British Example: X-2 and
Morale Operations
OSS/Londons X-2 and Morale Operations branches clearly demonstrated how

the British connection to OSS defined two of the intelligence wars sub-
disciplines. While the Americans deliberately tried to profit from British path-
breaking in counter-intelligence and political warfare, that very linkage basically
foreordained the outcome of equivalent OSS efforts in Europe. These Anglo-
American connections in turn demonstrated the utility of empirical intelligence
on the one hand, and the weakness of clandestine propaganda on the other, in
support of military operations. It was indeed this relative utility to military
operations which accordingly defined the relevance of these activities for OSS/
London.
Counter-intelligence was one of Britains particular wartime triumphs despite
the ad hoc system overseeing its execution. Involving all efforts to defend
against enemy intelligence collection (and including counter-espionage, or CE,
defending against enemy agents), British CI was split between the Security
Service (MI5) and MI6s Section V (five). Whereas Anthony Eden oversaw
MI6s intelligence work as Foreign Secretary, MI5 answered to him in his
personal capacity for security intelligence and investigations. There were six
principal MI5 divisions for this work: A (administration and registry), C
(security vetting of government employees), D (travel control/port and factory
security), E (alien control), and F (domestic subversive activities by Communists,
Fascists, and Pacifists). Counter-espionage involving the detection, interrogation,
and controlling of foreign agents was B divisions preserve. The Security Service
was deliberately confined to investigation and intelligence without police or
executive authority as a constitutional safeguard. Its vague ministerial control
further meant that no one individual or government office could master MI5.1
The agency responsible for CI work outside Britain itself was MI6s Section V
This element evolved from a Circulating Section (numbering three officers at
home and two abroad) that gathered information on enemy intelligence services.
It developed over time into an outright operating section tasked with receiving,
evaluating, and disseminating information on rival intelligence services; with
running overseas double agents for CE purposes; with maintaining liaison with
its allied counterparts; with giving CE advice to the armies in the field; and with
advising on the security of SIS operations. To execute these responsibilities, MI6
(V) was organized into regional sections sub-divided by country desks. At its
1944 peak, MI6(V) numbered about 60 officers at home and another 60 abroad.2
The major operation involving this two-service set-up was the DOUBLE
CROSS system. This was the most significant counter-espionage programme
operated within Britain against the German Intelligence Service, or Abwehr. It
involved countering German espionage through using controlled enemy agents,
and originated in a 1936 approach to SIS by an electrical engineer working in
Germany. The engineer, codenamed SNOW, agreed to serve as a British agent
and deliver intelligence information, but the Abwehr subsequently recruited him
to operate against the British. After SIS intercepted letters to his German
controller, he was forced to continue operating as a straight German agent while
misleading the Abwehr with the impression that he was running a string of sub-
agents inside Britain, agents that were strictly notional. SNOW eventually lost
contact with Germany in August 1939. Upon the outbreak of war, he was
incarcerated by the British and made to re-establish contact with Germany using
an Abwehr transmitter he had received in January 1939but this time, under
British direction. Once this transpired, it permitted MI6 to expose Germanys
espionage organization, codes, and ciphers, thereby allowing SIS to read other
German messages and to master the entire German espionage system. These
messages were intercepted by the Radio Security Service (RSS) and codenamed
ISOS (Intelligence Service Oliver Strachey). Misleading information provided to
Germany by SNOW concerning the forgery of British identity documents then
allowed the Security Service to identify and capture a string of parachute agents
who landed in England during summer 1940, including future double-agents
SUMMER and TATE. Two businessmen with foreign contacts, TRICYCLE and
DRAGONFLY, also began working for Britain in 1940 after the Abwehr
attempted their recruitment. Thus by the end of 1940, Germany had made an
effort to create a spy organization in Britain, while MI5 and MI6(V) had the luxury
of bringing that organization under British control by turning the Abwehrs
network into a double-cross system. This active running and controlling of
German espionage within Britain developed seven objectives, the creed of
double-cross: controlling the enemy system, catching fresh spies, gaining
knowledge of Abwehr personnel and tactics, gaining knowledge about the
Abwehrs codes and ciphers, obtaining evidence on German plans, influencing
enemy plans through providing deceptive information, and masking Allied plans
and intentions.3
The successive capture of German agents, and the choice they faced between
summary execution and accepting British control, gave British counter-
intelligence an unparalleled advantage over Germany throughout the war,
especially with ULTRA intelligence allowing Britain to monitor German
reactions to the fake information and deception material supplied by DOUBLE
CROSS agents. The mechanisms controlling the agents, however, reflected the
major shortcoming of Britains intelligence system as a whole, outlined in
Chapter 1. An agent captured beyond the three-mile limit automatically passed
X-2 AND MORALE OPERATIONS 171
under MI6 control; another caught within that limit came under MI5s direction.
Within Britain, however, DOUBLE CROSSS growing complexity initiated
changes to the existing improvised coordination practices. The double-agents
dissemination of false information was delegated to a W Board in September
1940. It consisted of the service intelligence chiefs, C, and the head of MI5s B
division (and later the head of the Home Defence Executive [HDE]), but this
proved too high a level for the systems day-to-day control. A W Board sub-
committee was accordingly established in January 1941 known as the Twenty
Committee (DOUBLE CROSS = XX=Twenty). Representatives were drawn
from service intelligence, HDE, GHQ Home Forces, and MI6; MI5 provided the
committees chair and secretary (a SHAEF staff officer was duly added in 1944).
The Twenty Committee met 226 times between 2 January 1941 and 10 May
1945 to coordinate the content of, and manner in which, selected accurate facts
and misinformation were passed to the enemy. Throughout this period, the
committee enjoyed no charter or precise delineation of authority, with the
assumption eventually accepted that MI5 and MI6 together would use the
DOUBLE CROSS machine to perform the actual running of the double agents.4
Conflicts nevertheless arose concerning control of GARBO and TRICYCLE, and
MI5 pressed for a more offensive use of DOUBLE CROSS throughout the
second half of 1942. Other conflicts arose outside the Twenty Committee,
notably after MI6 assumed responsibility for RSS in May 1941, and with it the
control, analysis, and dissemination of ISOS. MI5 came to believe that SIS
con trol over RSS, ISOS, and after December 1941, Enigma-based German
espionage traffic (codenamed ISK) precluded sufficiently close working
relations between MI5 and GCHQ, thus preventing MI5 from seeing all
necessary information relative to Britains domestic security.5 MI5 subsequently
conceded the importance of MI6(V)s overseas counter-espionage in 1942, but it
still felt that Section V lacked enough staff to deal with it. MI5s
recommendation that it absorb Section V was rejected that year, although MI6
(V)s concurrent move to London helped facilitate closer liaison between the two.6
While MI5 and MI6 experienced minimal friction within the Twenty
Committee during the rest of the war (doubtless because the stakes involved
concentrated the minds of all concerned), espionage and CI nevertheless
continued to deal with two sides of the same coin. This reality led to the
conclusion that MI5 and MI6(V) should combine as far as possible, or at least
agree to complete record-sharing.7 MI6(V) and MI5 duplicated much work since
MI5 received all relevant information on enemy intelligence services operating
against Britain, with each services records covering much of the same ground.
Indeed, while they each maintained entirely separate registries, the services both
maintained files on the same subjects, with largely the same information. In light
of this duplication and the difficulties connected with distinguishing between the
problems of domestic and external security intelligence, proposals were
submitted in June 1944 regarding an MI5-MI6(V) combination with a single
central security registry, but to no avail.8 British security intelligence thus
manifested a familiar degree of fragmentation which undermined, through

duplication and rivalry, an efficient, coordinated use of security intelligence
throughout the war. ISOS control was obviously a contentious point once
DOUBLE CROSS got on its feet. MI5 aggressively attempted to capitalize on its
DOUBLE CROSS success at Broadways expense, but ISOS remained MI6(V)s
steadfast preserve, courtesy of Cs position as GCHQs superior, and Broadway
control of RSS.9 MI6(V)s responsibility for ISOS/ISK, its distribution, and its
access, would accordingly determine how OSS/Londons own counter-
intelligence branch evolved.
The British Official History briefly states that a December 1942 agreement was
concluded between SIS and OSS/London for full cooperation on counter-
espionage between Section V andX-2 [branch], in London and at overseas
stations. Representatives of X-2 joined Section V in March 1943 and a mutually
profitable liaison developed.10 There was actually more to X-2s creation than
this passage indicates. Broadway recognized the lack of an American CI service
in the course of its liaison with OSS, and through BSC, it proposed in August
1942 that OSS establish a counter-espionage section that would cooperate
closely with its British counterpart.11 Having revealed to OSS the existence of
intercepts of German espionage traffic as early as 24 March 1942, Broadway now
insisted that a single American entity be designated to receive ISOS/ISK
exclusively, known also as Most Secret Sources (MSS).12 Section Vs control of
RSS, and therefore of ISOS, obviously gave MI6 authority to control the links
for sharing MSS, and thus responsibility for maintaining direct liaison with
allied counter espionage services.13 Given its fundamental concern about
securely handling ISOS/ISK, MI6(V)s wish for an entirely new American CI
arm exclusively receiving MSS was understandable. OSS/Washington
accordingly sent George Bowden to London in December 1942 to bring about CI
liaison with the British, while David Bruce and SI/Londons William Maddox
followed up with their own discussions on laying the groundwork for formal
liaison the following February.14 Maddox apparently believed that Washington
would send a complete CI staff to London, but Bowdens original plan envisaged
this CI section as a division of SI.15 SIs counterintelligence division was thus
formally established on 1 March 1943 under James Murphy, and Captain John
McDonough appointed its London liaison by the end of that month.16 Section V
arranged for suitable accommodation at their Glenalmond facility in central
Scotland for the permanent American CI staff scheduled to arrive, but a major
complication arose concerning an attempt by US military intelligence to usurp
the CI function from OSS. SIS, however, was not receptive to this, and told
Bruce as much, although C stressed that the arrival of permanent OSS CI
personnel was a prerequisite to firming up the MI6(V)-OSS relationship in these
matters. When OSS/London suggested assigning temporary staff with MI6(V)
until the permanent CI staff arrived, the British rejected such an arrangement.
They felt that it was waste of time to indoctrinate anyone unless they continued
in CI indefinitely.17 As noted in Chapter 2, SIS stressed secure, permanent
relationships, and the unspoken necessity to vet and indoctrinate the Americans
on ISOS/ISK must also have been a factor. In any event, the status of OSS CI
was soon resolved as James Murphy (a former legal colleague of William
Donovan) arrived in April, closely followed by Dana Durand, Robert Blum,
Hubert Will, and future X-2/London chief Norman Pearson.18 G-2/ETO settled
for liaison with MI6(V), although G-2 Washington made a second assault on CI
in August, at which point Bruce informed Donovan of how C had staved off
another attempt by our friend Uncle George [Strong] to insinuate his people
further into CE work (see Chapter 3, p. 77).19
It soon became apparent to OSS/Londons CI staff that because of concerns
about ISOS/ISK security, MI6(V) was not yet prepared to transmit MSS material
to Washington, while the OSS/London CI staff would require direct tutelage on
how to handle the material. Combined with Broadways fears that SI/London
might expose MSS sources through an insufficient appreciation for their
sensitivity, these considerations led to the creation of a separate independent CI
branch in London numbering 25 members effective 15 June 1943.20 Designated
X-2, either in deference to DOUBLE CROSS or Section Vs alternative label of
X-B, it was also decided to locate its operational headquarters in London rather
than Washington.21 X-2s transfer from Glenalmond was accomplished on 18
July, coinciding with MI6(V)s own move to 14 Ryder Street, London. During
JanuaryFebruary 1944, X-2 took over the adjacent building with a passage
between them. Besides sharing its location with MI6(V), X-2 moreover adopted
Section Vs exact geographical desk structure for efficient coordination (i.e.,
both units used the desk system whereby each desk was tasked with carding,
collating and interpreting all CI material concerning a specific geographical
area).22
X-2 was now clearly tied to MI6(V) owing to Broadways extensive liaison
with OSS/London, its exclusive control of ISOS/ISK, and its control over sharing
MSS. Whatever MI5s leading role in DOUBLE CROSS, Section V linked
outsiders with that operations product, including arranging Norman Pearsons
liaison with the Twenty Committee.23 MI6(V) had a combination of motives for
such largess. Foremost was the fact that it was in Britains interest to ensure the
security of OSS intelligence operations, particularly if any SI-SIS partnership was
expected to develop. Counter-intelligence was necessary to nullify Abwehr
operations while revealing information that could facilitate Allied espionage. It
was also common sense that a US link be established for CIs deception element
since the entire deception scheme could be undermined without American
awareness of its existence and goals, although it must be stressed that deception
control was exercised by MI5 and MI6(V) in the Twenty Committee without
X-2s direct involvement in decision-making. MI6(V) in fact recognized that in
CI, the Americans could contribute only to the degree they had full access to
British expertise and information; [a]nd the overriding British policy was to try
to augment their own effectiveness with US personnel and equipment resources
(as noted above, MI6(V) had only 60 personnel in London by 1944).24 Closer to
home, Section Vs head, Major Felix Cowgill (pre-sumably sanctioned by C),

wished to minimize the London liaison between MI5 and the FBI. Cowgill
sought to achieve this end by giving X-2 free access to Section Vs files,
including MSS material. By so bolstering X-2, Cowgill hoped to minimize
encroachments by MI5 and the FBI. X-2 thus greatly benefited from Cowgills
maneuver.25
So while SIS admittedly took an overwhelming security risk by revealing its
CI life-blood and the accompanying insights into ULTRA, it did so for a mixture
of motives. The fragmentation inherent in Britains clandestine services again
contributed to the close relationship enjoyed between an OSS/London branch
and a single designated British counter-part. SIS pragmatically fostered links
with OSS/London, partly out of operational necessity, partly to secure its own
position relative to its domestic rivals. Had it not done so, an independent OSS CI
effort would have been as wishful as independent SO/SI work before
OVERLORD.26
With Section V controlling intercept material about enemy espionage
personnel and activities on OSS/Londons behalf, a mutually beneficial
partnership was free to develop.27 X-2 was accordingly given the task of with
vetting and approving all X-2 agents, clearing and directing all X-2 operational
projects, and receiving and processing all field reports with reference to British
reports. X-2 very frankly sought Section Vs direction in these endeavours. The
Italian desks James Angleton was especially explicit and completely frank in
expressing his desire to learn from British example, and naturally enough
Section Vs Italian desk was very responsive to Angleton, and cooperated in
every possible way.28 Branch chief James Murphy also suggested to SI that X-2
adopt Section Vs method of controlling sub-agents and informers: as soon as
any SIS officer engaged a sub-agent or sub-source, he immediately forwarded a
complete statement to headquarters. This information was then checked through
MI6(V), or sometimes with MI5. Employment of enemy agents, sources,
suspects and non-sympathizers was thus avoided. Once Home Office approval
was secured, sub-sources would be assigned and a proper evaluation given to any
reports. The British also maintained a report card on each agent, sub-agent, or
source detailing report dates, their distribution, and their evaluation. SIS found this
system secure, believing that it provided central control and excellent protection
for the organization. It generally protected SIS from external penetration,
although it did not stop penetration originating within MI6(V) given Kim
Philbys success on Russias behalf.29 When SI finally launched SUSSEX, these
procedures were formalized within OSS/London on 1 May 1944.30
X-2 also learned about Germanys continental intelligence channels. In
planning its post-invasion intelligence network, OSS/London wanted to exploit
these channels once they came into Allied hands. The most promising ones
involved banking, insurance, and industry. X-2 had an insurance unit investigate
Germanys development and usage of an espionage network based on insurance
organizations under the control of German reinsurance firms. X-2 and Section V
also compiled personality data on Europeans who were bad actors, although
there were occasions where one of these files pronounced an individual
violently anti-Nazi and the other declared the same person to be a German
spy.31
The major application of X-2 resources, however, involved planning and
preparation for CI support of the field armies after the Normandy invasion. The
concept of security and counter-intelligence detachments (Ib units) was first
developed for the 1942 TORCH landings in North Africa. The Special
Intelligence (b) Units were to communicate ISOS material to the Ib (i.e., security)
staffs of Allied Forces Headquarters and the British 1st Army. Since they
operated overseas, they were Section Vs responsibility, with no MI5
participation. As events unfolded, neither Tunisian or Sicilian operations gave
much scope for these units to test their effectiveness since there were no German
stay-behind networks. When the American COSSAC contingent proved
unfamiliar with this work, MI5 insinuated itself into the formulation of a
February 1944 SHAEF directive on CI. This directive specified the duties of the
redesignated Special Counter-intelligence Units (SCIUs, or SCI Units) as
performing CI work against German intelligence networks or personnel
encountered in the field during OVERLORD.32
X-2 was particularly keen to seize this opportunity to bring American CE
service in combat zones up to par with that of both [its] allies and enemy, and in
fact submitted its own SCIU plan to SHAEF in November 1943.33 OSS/London
envisaged SCIU duties as involving interrogating resistance leaders and
JEDBURGH members for information relevant to CI; for vetting alleged
resistance leaders as they were picked up by the armies; for vetting all OSS
agents going into the field (Section V did precisely this for Broadways
BRISSEX agents); and for checking the names of agents picked up against their
CI field files or by W/T against SHAEF files in London.34 X-2 SCIUs were
thus attached to the headquarters of the 1st and 3rd US Armies.
X-2/MI6(V) relations were as usual highly satisfactory in the SCIU realm
through the attachment of X-2 officers to the British-Canadian 21st Army Group
for liaison, while SHAEFs own SCIU (tasked with helping implement cover and
deception plans, and with coordinating such activities at the Army Group level
through the SCIUs attached to those AGs) consisted of 15 officers and 20 other
ranks drawn from MI6 and OSS/London.35 Section V and X-2 facilitated these
units activities by agreeing to pass information [especially that based on MSS]
relating to hostile secret intelligence services direct to SCI Units attached to the
Army Groups in the field through their own special communications (it was
strict policy that Special Source material [could] never travel in clear text
outside the UK. It [was] for this reason that Londonnever produced summaries
of [such material] for the field. Camouflaged MSS information could be
transmitted, but the Abwehr Index itselfthe compendium of information on
the German espionage systemcould not be summarized since practically all
the material included in [it was] based on Special Sources[and] distribution
of Special Source material [could] be done only by British telegram).36 This

material revealed by June 1944 the general locations, names and cover-names of
over 100 stay-behind agents, now controlled by the SS RSHA after it absorbed
the Abwehr (German intelligence was henceforth referred to by the Allies as the
German Intelligence Service, or GIS).37 David Bruce thus inflated X-2s
contribution somewhat when he informed SHAEF G-2 that OSS alone [had]
produced the names and other pertinent information on over 35,000 individuals,
over 6,000 of whom are known or suspect enemy agents, members of enemy
espionage organizations or active enemy sympathizers.38
In the course of OVERLORD, about a dozen of these GIS agents and line-
crossers, almost all French, were sent to England for interrogation during June
and July, with a further 20 processed in August. As the armies advanced into the
Low Countries, the speed of operations stretched the SCIUs ability to identify
enemy operators, particularly given the need to investigate the large number of
arrested collaborators. ISOS still managed to reveal in September that about 20
stay-behind agents were operating in western France, and most were rounded up
in October. ISOS was temporarily lost between October and mid-December as
GIS changed its ciphers, but defectors and captured collaborators made up the
difference until a double-agent helped decrypt the new key (the capture of X-2s
ISOS-indoctrinated Major Maxwell Paupurt on 26 September by the Germans
evidently did not figure in this cipher change).39 SHAEF thus concluded in April
1945 that GIS spies and saboteurs had little success.40 One X-2 SCI
commander further believed that X-2s intimate knowledge of the structure of
the German Intelligence Services and its [sic] method of operationsproved to
be of the greatest value on innumerable occasions. Army level G-2s repeatedly
expressed their high regard for the SCI function.41 Another SCI officer reported
that while much work was of purely local interest, it contributed to the overall
job of nullifying the effect of the enemy intelligence services The work
covered enemy saboteurs, wireless operators, intelligence agents, their
paymasters, couriers and informers, whether they were line-crossers,
parachutists, or stay-behind agents.42 It must nevertheless be noted that as France
was liberated, X-2 SCIUs ended up attached to the Communications Zone (i.e.,
the chain of command covering the rear areas behind Allied lines), whereas MI6
(V) functioned directly under SHAEF British SCIUs in the 21st AG had more field
and ordinary case work than desired, but they were all subsequently concentrated
in Brussels along with a unit of MI5-trained officers for handling Special Agent
cases.43 These cases involved double-agents in the field in support of deception
overseen by a 212 Committee at SHAEF (212 represented the 21st and 12th
AGs), although this activity was largely pre-empted by the speedy Allied
advance.44 By the beginning of 1945, X-2/SCI operations were nevertheless
largely based on interrogation reports concerning captured GIS personnel in the
Low Countries, with X-2 maintaining a liaison officer with the British SCIU in
Brussels. This individual enjoyed the distinction of being the only such officer
permitted to see all of the counter-espionage material that originated from that
area, presumably including that derived from ISOS.45 By March, X-2

successfully used captured German agents to attempt penetration of GIS. It
appeared that the enemys clandestine services had been somewhat surprised by
the rapidity of the Allied advance, and their efforts seemed to be shifted from
short-range to long-term tasks, presumably of a partisan nature in anticipation of
Germanys defeat (see Chapter 8, pp. 2213).46
A significant adjunct to this field work was embodied by the development of a
CI War Room. This evolved out of a joint MI6(V)/X-2 section for handling
counter-intelligence information stemming from military operations, which was
then passed through the SCIUs onto a French Desk situated in London. The
subsequent French War Room was thus the original French Desk geared to
exploiting intelligence opportunities that originated in areas behind the Allied
armies, and to serving other intelligence agencies through the SCIUs. This War
Room prepared cards on all known GIS personnel, and made them available to
other field agencies through discreet distribution by SIS or X-2 officers. It also
prepared lists of known stay-behind W/T agents, handled information services
for the field, and vetted OSS agents. A small, and relatively inexperienced, X-2
War Room complement of about ten officers with no secretary received an
intensive indoctrination between July and November, but they believed that they
learned quickly. The British representatives usually numbered about 12 case
officers, each aided by a secretary. A trio of brilliant, highly intelligent, well
trained, experienced officers was at the core of the British War Room
contingent, while the remaining MI6 officers and secretaries profited from
having been at their tasks long enough to provide efficient assistance. The X-2
component, in contrast, endured disruption when many of them were ill-
advisedly transferred to the independent CI set-up in OSS/Paris; British officers
in Paris conversely remained under MI6(V)s London direction. The Americans
SIS colleagues were nevertheless patient and helpful, and X-2s people managed
to hold their own over time. They made no major mistakeswhen [they] might
in the course of any one of those days have made manyand [they] earned the
respect and the solid friendship of [their] colleagues by [their] work.47
It was still believed by British officers, however, that the War Rooms main
failure concerned the advice and direction given to personnel in the field, thanks
in part to the schism between X-2/Paris and X-2/London when compared to
Section Vs consistent control over British contingents. London was the Head
Office for British CI operations, and it kept firm control over its field units. X-2
personnel, on the other hand, were inclined to act and then tell X-2/London
afterwards. The relative experience levels also played a role, since the British
system was based on the mass of detailed [MSS] intelligence that could not be
made available to officers in the field as exploited by a pool of MI6, and
especially MI5, intelligence officers possessing considerable field intelligence
experience. In contrast, experienced X-2 officers were shipped off to Paris, and
their novice replacements advice was often ignored by Americans in the field.
Having said that, the War Room systems relative effectiveness increasingly
reflected the ubiquitous problem of British fragmentation:
It is known in Washington, of course, that the criticisms of the French War

Room are, in no small part, the result of the long feud between MI5 and
MI6.
The French War Room was organized under the auspices of MI6
which iscustodian of Circle information [ISOS]. On the other hand, the
MI5 Registry is the richest and most useful in England and very many of
the MI6 officers[were] trained by MI5. It is true that much of the
advisory material sent to the field [was] prepared by MI5, as are all the
020 Reports [London agent interrogations were conducted at Camp 020].
MI5therefore [began] moving to take a greater share in the German
operations, because they believe that since they [had] been contributing so
heavily in what [was]done, they ought to have a proper share of
representation and control in the New War Room [see below].
It was thus clear by the end of 1944 that strong as X-2s loyalties were to MI6
(V), X-2 would doubtless find an adjustment to new relations between
something like a joint MI5-MI6 [cooperative]in the German War Roomnot
only possible but advantageous. This was particularly attractive since MI5s war
record was brilliant, since some X-2 men had trained under MI5, and because
MI5 had thus liked [X-2s] people, although this may have owed more to
Section Vs eroding influence over X-2 than to the great generosity and honesty
of dealing attributed to them by the OSS men.48
This all points to some intriguing issues concerning the evolution of the CI
War Room concept, but the British Official History merely notes that by June
1944, a joint SIS/OSS War Room had been established to service the SCIUs
with MI5 and French security representation, and that [i]n light of experience in
the summer and autumn of 1944, changes in arrangements for providing expert
back-up for the counter-intelligence organisation in the field were discussed in
November with specific reference to the need for more staff, and the fact that
the SCIUs had spent more time distributing ISOS than running double-agents.49
More detail can be gleaned from the OSS records, though. OSS/London
indicated to OSS/Washington in September that X-2/London and MI6(V) were
engaging in a cooperative German desk operating under an arrangement similar
to that established for operations concerning France and the Lowlands.50 The
French War Room in a sense served as a laboratory for those planning the German
War Room.51 SHAEF, however, soon expressed its wish to supersede the
French/Lowlands and German War Rooms with a CI War Room enlarged in
scope and supported by the special registry and staff of MI5s B Division
entirely under SHAEFs control, and including French security representatives.
This new entity could then circulate its intelligence directly to the CI field staffs
rather than through the SCIUs.
The Official History notes that when C opposed SHAEF taking over control
of the War Room from the CI services for reasons of ISOS security, on this point
SHAEF had its way.52 The matter is worth detailing since it again underscores
SHAEFs primacy in Allied intelligence planning. The issue was discussed in a
letter from the SHAEF G-2, Major-General K.W.D.Strong, to Stewart Menzies.
After noting Cs choice of War Room Director, MI5s Lieutenant-Colonel T.A.
Robertson, Strong went on to address
those outstanding points where you say decisions have still been reserved.
The first of these is the question of control. I still feel that my original
proposition that [SHAEF] should be given the direction of an organization
which, whatever else it may be, is primarily of interest to the Armies in the
field, is the right one. I gather from your letter and from what [Colonel
Dick] White has told me of conversations he has had with you that, despite
a feeling on your side that this may not be the most convenient way to
settle the matter, you are prepared to agree if we here feel sufficiently
strongly on the point. To this I feel I must answer that we do feel that the
point is an important one and as you have left the matter in my hands, I
propose with [Director General of MI5] Sir David Petries agreement to
take over Lt. Col. Robertson on to [SHAEF] strength and to charge him
with the direction of the War Room. I shall also take up with OSS the
question of Mr [Robert] Blums position as Deputy Director, which I think
should also belong to [SHAEF], thus giving expression to the concept of
full Anglo-American integration which, as you know, is the basis of this
Headquarters I note from Mr James Murphys letterthat nothing I
have said above is at variance with the point of view taken by OSS
I should like to give you one final word of assurance that, in maintaining
my proposition that the Director of the War Room should be responsible to
[SHAEF], I naturally make no claim to invade any prerogatives of the
heads of the Special Agencies over their own personnel, sources of
intelligence or special intelligence facilities. I feel sure the smooth running
of the organization can be achieved if the procedure outlined in para 2 of Mr
Murphys letter is adhered to, for I have no doubt from Whites account of
his meetings in London that the requisite good will exists on all sides.
I should be grateful if you could show this letter to Mr James Murphy
and Sir David Petrie.53
Murphys suggested procedure was discussed on 15 and 27 January with MI6s

Dick White, Robertson, and other security representatives. The War Room would
have an Administrative Section for communications, personnel, transportation,
reproducing documents and SHAEF personality cards, and processing papers
(designated Section A under MI5s John Marriett). Section B would handle
receiving, distributing, and reproducing reports, while about thirty staff members
would be assigned to a Case Section that would handle tracing captured persons,
preparing questionnaires, and addressing field requests about cases (later termed
the Assessment Section, or Section C, under MI5s Roland Bird, with X-2s Joe
Roland as Deputy). This section would also handle double- agent matters, with
Robertson insisting that he, or someone designated by him and [X-2s Robert]
Blum, should definitely know [the] identities and details of all Double Agents
for the protection of [the] Double Agent and Col. Robertson himself. A
Documents Section would immediately process captured records, and make
prcis of them before routing them to their proper destinations (Section E under
X-2s Sam Bossard), while a Research Section (later Publications, or Section G)
would prepare studies on GIS and other topics. Colonel Robertson warned that
with respect to a head for this section, C would offer him Hugh Trevor-Roper
who is not easy to get along with; X-2s Reginald Phelps was proposed as
Trevor-Ropers luckless assistant. A Registry Section (Section F under a certain
Horrocks of MI5) was patterned after the existing MI5, MI6, and X-2 Registries;
this section would also maintain a SHAEF personality card sub-section on
suspected Nazis. An obviously critical component of the War Room was Section
D (under MI6[V]s Colin Roberts, with X-2s Grace Dolowitz) responsible for
handling Abwehr and SD signal traffic for the field, codenamed PAIR in this
instance.54 Robertson and MI6(V)s new head, Lieutenant-Colonel Milne, met
with a G-2 SIGINT representative in January 1945 to satisfy G-2 that no further
ULTRA representative would be required in the War Room. It was agreed,
however, to introduce a new method of CI ULTRA dissemination to the field.
Throughout the war, a Section V representative at GCHQ had scanned
operational ULTRA signals for items of CI relevance, known as DEGS. One
member from each Section V geographic desk received these, after which they
were filed in a special card file (not available to the OSS personnel working in the
building). No one from Section V was permitted to take any action on these
DEGS without previously referring it to Menzies. By January 1945, this was
deemed inadequate for continental CI, so Robertson and Major Mason, head of
Section Vs German Desk, proposed creating a special ULTRA room next to the
German Desk at Ryder Street, which finally became operational about 1 April.
After the daily GCHQ intake was received, Colin Roberts of the SHAEF CI War
Rooms PAIR section examined the material that had been DEGGED, and
decided what material should be communicated to the field as PAIR messages.
Trevor-Roper of the Research Section also examined this material for his GIS
reports.55
Throughout these developments, X-2 felt that Section V appeared
cooperative, and the physical presence of a PAIR section in the War Room was
considered a signal victory.56 The War Room accordingly began operating on
28 February with 175 officers and civilians.57 Though providing only 20
personnel, X-2 had secured the Deputy Directorship, and it was also noted during
the planning stage that MI5 seemed to be getting their people into the key slots;
but when the issue of providing qualified personnel for these positions came up,
it was agreed that Section V was not prepared to release them for service in the
War Room.58 MI6(V) was thus being eclipsed, in keeping with the expectations
expressed above based on the French War Room. This coincided with the April
revelation through IS OS that GIS was abandoning any serious attempt at
establishing a stay-behind network in western Germany.59 The special ULTRA
room used for PAIR also existed little more than a month before the operational
Ultra began to dry up, although it was deemed a superior system for screening
GCHQ material for CI information.60 As Germanys collapse continued, the War
Room became involved in using MI5 and MI6(V) files for processing known
GIS personnel from those captured or automatically arrested.61 By the end of
April, X-2 emphasized the need for OSS SCIUs to expedite transferring
prisoners to London for interrogation by SHAEFs CI War Room, for OSS/
London to provide aircraft for that task, and for transporting relevant captured
enemy documents.62 Such efforts would ensure that X-2 fully met its War Room
and SCI commitments. These commitments were soon matters of concern given
that the first month after the collapse of GIS produced, on the one hand, a vastly
accelerated program of activity in the War Room, and on the other, a period of
confusion and redirection in the field. In fact, the extent of the collapse [was]
almost more than the relatively small CI staffs [could] cope with (the 12th AG
OSS Detachment contributed to this work-load by sending two German doctors
to Paris for interrogation They claimed to be death ray experts).63
In light of this range of activity, it is evident that X-2/London enjoyed a strong
presence in Allied CI, from ISOS indoctrination, to the SCIUs, to the War
Rooms, and that this success was largely due to the branchs utility with respect
to British CI plans. The British need to maintain a specialized ISOS connection
with the Americans was the fundamental raison d tre for X-2, and its initial
close relationship with Section V further emphasized that fact within the context
of MI5-MI6 counter-intelligence fragmentation. This reality also enabled OSS/
London to withstand the attempt by US military intelligence to obtain the CI role,
and this in turn gave X-2 obvious scope in both the SCIUs and the War Room
concept. The X-2/London War Diary explicitly states that X-2s role in SHAEF
planning, and its position as the official US CI agency in Europe, could not have
been achieved without the resources and backing of MI6.64 In the final months
of war, X-2 was able to profit from its ISOS link, and to secure the Deputy
Directorship of the SHAEF War Room despite Section Vs waning, and MI5s
influx into SHAEF CI. While such developments testified to X-2s competence
and usefulness, it also reflected the significance of Anglo-American functional
integration to the relative cohesion of OSS. The ISOS/ISK connection was X-2/
Londons birthright, but it required the branch to work hand-inglove with its
British opposites at the expense of close ties with the other OSS branches. The
sensitivity of this crucial source could not permit any other alternative. X-2 was
therefore inevitably more a part of an essentially British-dominated Allied CI
system than it was a part of any independent American intelligence system, and
many within OSS/London resented this fact. One OSS/London reports officer
felt that during his tenure with the mission, the operations of X-2 remained a
mystery to me as well as to a great many other people in the organization. He

mentioned this because he believed that X-2 could have assisted in many ways
if the Branch had been more closely integrated with the rest of the mission.65
Walter Lord of OSS/Londons Secretariat argued that X-2 played a role which
combined the more exasperating aspects of a prima donna and a pampered
child X-2 lived a life of its own. While Lord appreciated the excellent job
X-2/ETO did, and conceded the need for extra security precautions on certain
aspects of X-2 work, he believed that this need was often abused and made a
convenient vehicle for getting away with all sorts of favors. Aloof and apart from
the rest of the organization, X-2 went its own mysterious way. In Lords
opinion, this eroded morale in the other branches given X-2s perceived lack of
cooperation in sharing with SI/London any positive intelligence obtained from
its counter-espionage sources; its lack of cooperation with R&A in developing
the latters biographical file on European personalities; and its non-cooperation
with SO to formulate a joint counter-sabotage unit.66 All of these criticisms made
sense for people unfamiliar with the role of ISOS/ISK in supporting the field
armies and SHAEF, or for those unaware of MI6(V)s understandable fetish for
ISOS security. Such considerations ruled out the kind of overt sharing of CI
information which might have rapidly compromised the source. The dilemma
was encapsulated by Osgood Nichols of the Morale Operations branch:
X-2 generated the suspicion that the smoke-screen of security under which
its plans, operations, communications and personnel were protected from
the rest of the organization hid many potentialities for working
constructively with the other branches. As long as X-2 [was] allowed to be
the exception to so many rules, it [was]dif ficult to persuade the other
branches to shed their own sovereignty in favour of better teamwork.67
As detailed in earlier chapters, branch primacy and functional integration with

the British in fact nullified the centralization supposedly inherent to the OSS
concept. In X-2s case, it would seem to have been a sine qua non of its duties,
and the reality of OSS/Londons need to define itself in relation to the realities of
British intelligence ensured that X-2 would achieve successes it could not have
imagined on its own while distancing itself from the rest of the London mission.
OSS/Londons Morale Operations branch mirrored this reliance on a British
opposite number in the arena of political warfare, but with much less to show for
it. MO/Londons development was particularly defined by Britains Political
Warfare Executive, formed in September 1941. Most, but not all, responsibility
for foreign propaganda was at that time removed from SOE and set up under Sir
Robert Bruce Lockharts Director-Generalship. SOE nevertheless continued
fighting for a propaganda role as part of its subversion efforts. PWE policy was
determined by the Foreign Office under the auspices of the Political Intelligence
Division (see Chapter 4), while the coordination and execution of such policy
was overseen by the Ministry of Information. PWE received intelligence from
SIS, service intelligence, and public sources to formulate and distribute overt
(White) and clandestine (Black) propaganda. PWE also prepared under the
JICs general direction political and social studies for the secret and military
services. Whereas the Ministry of Information [aimed] to tell the truth, PWE
[was] frankly an agency of propaganda, be it White, and thus clearly of Allied
origin, or Black, purporting to originate within enemy territory. PWE chiefly
used open radio, Black radio (passed off as transmitting in occupied France, for
example), air-dropped leaflets, leaflets brought behind enemy lines, and false
rumours deliberately planted. Agents trained by SOE were used for propaganda
dissemination.68
William Donovan was long a keen enthusiast of psychological warfare,
believing in the efficacy of fifth column techniques for defeating Germany.69
PWE activities were thus investigated by COIs London nucleus in 1941. A 12
November 1941 report by E.L.Taylor waxed optimistic about the possibilities for
COI joining with the British in political warfare, especially through providing
intelligence on foreign radio broadcasting, morale, and political psychology (this
was because PWE placed great emphasis on acquiring all intelligence necessary
for operations).70 As noted in Chapter 4, R&A made overtures to
PWE concerning information exchanges, but refrained from actual propaganda
work. This potential linkage was nullified, however, when COI was split into
OSS and OWI in June 1942. The latter organization was made responsible for
White propaganda, while OSS kept authority for Black work. PWE was then
faced with deciding with which unit it should establish its main working
relationship since the British service did both White and Black; it eventually
decided on OWI as its main link with US propaganda in July 1942 (see
Chapter 4, p. 106).71 PWE soon followed this up by wrestling total control of
propaganda directed at enemy-occupied countries from SOE, although the latter
maintained a joint school with PWE for training propaganda agents.72
R&A sought to re-establish ties with PWE in February 1943 by coordinating
their work on Military Government Handbooks, political reporting, and
psychological warfare information. It soon became evident to OSS, however,
that a distinct branch of OSS/London would have to be formed for propaganda
liaison with PWE and SOE.73 Morale Operations/London was thus established in
June 1943, with Rae Smith appointed branch head and initial lone member.
David Bruce could not help noticing that a one man branch [was] not a source
of prestige for OSS/London, but reinforcements arrived in due course.74 For its
part, PWE was reluctant to enter into any direct partnership for fear that their
position would be weakened if MO produced more personnel to challenge
PWEs propaganda operations. MO was still able to secure PWEs agreement in
July 1943 for MO work on rumours planning since PWE hoped to compensate
for its lack of manpower through the arrival of more MO staff. MO was for its
part trying to secure representation on any joint effort while foregoing
independent operations in preparation for future eventualities.75
By December 1943, MO found itself having to choose between consolidating

with other similar agencies such as PWE and OWI under COSSACs proposed
Psychological Warfare Division (PWD), and trying to operate on its own without
Army support. Since OSS could hardly afford to alienate the US military, the
decision was self-evident. David Bruce concluded that it would be better policy
for MO to become integrated with the other agencies [PWE, OWI] in the army
design, now that PWD responsibilities were divided among specific sections,
including planning, intelligence, leaflets, press, news, and publications.76 PWD
nonetheless suffered from a late start and from insufficient trained personnel. MO
moreover lost its identity as an OSS branch when it was fully integrated with
what became SHAEFs psychological and political warfare set-up. Matters were
so muddled, however, that neither OSS/Londons separate branches, nor
SHAEFs PWD, realized MOs potential contributions.77 MO effected no
headway with SO for joint Black propaganda work, particularly since SO did not
know, and did not care to know, anything about such work given its JEDBURGH
activities. This prevented MO/London from duplicating the SOE-PWE set-up
whereby PWEs propaganda-disseminating agents were controlled by SOE in the
field, and thus ruled out MO joining in such work. MO was so desperate
immediately after the OVERLORD landings that it seized on the chance to
report news and gossip from within Europe for use in Black radio broadcasts,
publications, and leaflets.78
What this really meant was that MO/London was essentially irrelevant to the
Normandy landings. There was some prospect for change on 13 July 1944 when
SHAEF gave MO an explicit operational directive authorizing the Americans to
exploit allegedly poor German morale by disseminating propaganda about the
rot setting in at home, the break-down of controls within Germany, and how
the individual German soldier could help things along by surrendering or
working to rule at the front.79 While MO was willing to launch immediately
into producing leaflets and assorted publications, it was stymied by paper and
equipment shortages. MO then became reliant on help from PWE, PID, and
OWI.80 By January 1945, the only significant result of such pathetic efforts was
the New York Herald Tribune and Readers Digest publication as fact of
accounts based on an MO Black leaflet. This faked document purported to be a
German High Command directive to the German officer corps to protect itself
at all cost when the Nazis went underground after the war. This coup was seen
as a great success by MO/London.81 By February, MO was making some of its
resources available for the espionage penetration of Germany (see Chapter 6), but
by March, it was Lester Armours considered opinion that MO field operations
[were] really, in laymans language, just a lot of bunk. MO could lend its
people to PWD and print Black propaganda leaflets, but in Armours view, OSS/
London should not waste much time over them.82 Armour was not alone. When
an inquiry into the effect of British political warfare against Germany was
suggested after the war, the JICs Chairman, Victor Cavendish-Bentinck, said
that he was rather doubtful as to whether it had shortened the (recent) war by
one hour.83
MOs largely non-existent contribution to the war thus reflected the poor
results of political warfare. Like political warfare in general, MOs reports were
always concerned with what was going to happen and not always had much
bearing on what had been [actually] accomplished.84 The British particularly
held too much faith in propaganda, especially in its efficacy against Nazi
Germany.85 It was moreover inconsistent with the overriding primacy of
unconditional surrender.86 Potential German rebels were concerned with
Germanys post-war survival as a nation, whereas unconditional surrender
implied the overthrow of Nazis and militarists; unfortunately, only the militarists
could overthrow the Nazis inside Germany.87 This was not likely to happen when
the attitude of German soldiers in Normandy was one of Lets enjoy the war
because the peace will be terrible.88 Germanys two-front war in fact gave Nazi
leaders a simple slogan for the military: Sieg oder Siberia, Victory or Siberia.
Leaflets and radio broadcasts were not going to counter this stark set of options.
All political warfare could reasonably accomplish was to harp on a simple set of
coherent themes along the lines that Germany was outnumbered and outgunned,
its defeat was inevitable, and the best thing for Germany was to end the war as
soon as possible, preferably by removing the Nazis. Despite the reliance on
Black work in Allied political warfare strategy, this was essentially a task for
White propaganda.
MO/Londons inherent shortcomings exacerbated these obstacles. MO was
undeniably frustrated by the fact that it was held back literally for months
through the inability of PWD and various other military agencies to determine
exactly what it was to be permitted to do, but a major problem concerned how
its leadership followed British methods and experience.89 Rae Smith was deemed
by one MO/London member as unaggressive and too deferential to British
precedent in political warfare, with MO accordingly playing second and third
fiddle to the British; it was even allegedly said in response to proposals within
MO: We have done it this way for four years, why should we change now?90
Equally significant were the observations of Walter Lord:
No branch made greater use of expensive, specialized personnel and

facilities than MO, and I believe for the amount put into it the results
achieved [during 19441945]were not justified. There is, furthermore, as
far as I know, no real indication that the few black radio and newspaper
projects which were developed ever had any noticeable effect on the
German people. Yet MO used not only money but monopolized various
expert German-speaking personnel who were desperately needed when SI
was putting on its great German penetration drive early in 1945 The
contribution that this [sic] personnel wouldhave made if assigned to the
development of secret intelligence plans and projects would have
outweighed by far their usefulness in conjuring up subtle radio programs
which few Germans listened to and caused no appreciable effect even

when heard.91
MO/London thus attempted to parrot British methods and policies which were
themselves doomed to failure, and MO was thereby prevented from making a
distinct contribution to the rest of OSS/London. As indicated elsewhere, this went
with the territory. The British intelligence systems entrenched fragmentation
nullified OSSs potential for centralization, and individual branches were
essentially left to make their own way within this defining context. When
attempted by X-2, it could result in success; when tried by MO, it largely came to
naught. Joint work with the British either created a strong potential for continued
branch work by wars end, or else it underscored the futility of carrying on. In
either case, the relative significance of the clandestine activity in question was
the determining factor.
This reality would prove significant in OSS/Londons post-hostilities work.
Independent OSS intelligence and CI operations in Germany seemed to be the
pending focal point of American intelligence in Europe, but events well outside
that theatre soon made their presence felt for OSS/London and its successor.
NOTES
1. Jackson report on the British Intelligence System, Donovan Papers, USAMHI, pp.
41, 43, 478; see also Hinsley and Simkins, IV, pp. 810, 2964, 6870, 178; note
that the functions of E and F divisions originally resided within B division at wars
outbreak, but were then removed and assigned to the two new divisions in April
1941; the British tended to use the term counter-espionage to mean all CI duties,
but the distinction above is used hereon this difference between CI and CE see
Winks, Cloak, p. 422.
2. Quotes from Jackson, British Intelligence System, pp. 302; see also Hinsley and
Simkins, IV, pp. 810, 180 (for staff numbers); see Chapter 4 above on SIS
Circulating Sections.
3. Narrative from J.C.Masterman, The Double Cross System in the War of 1939 to
1945 (London: Sphere, 1973), pp. 3, 3642, 4958; see Hinsley and Simkins, IV,
pp. 87130, 21744, and Appendices 1, 3, 6, 9, 11; on German intelligence, see
also David Kahn, Hitlers Spies: German Military Intelligence in World War II
(New York: Macmillan, 1978), pp. 236, 5258, 5346; on deception, Masterman,
Double Cross, pp. 10411, 1301, 14563; Michael Howard, British Intelligence in
the Second World War, Vol. V: Strategic Deception (London: HMSO, 1990), pp. 3
30, 4552, 10333, 167200; Jock Haswell, The Tangled Web: The Art of Tactical
and Strategic Deception (Wendover: John Goodchild, 1985); Ralph Bennett,
Fortitude, Ultra and the Need to Know, Intelligence and National Security 4, 3
(July 1989), pp. 482502, and Ralph Bennett, A Footnote to Fortitude,
Intelligence and National Security 6, 1 (January 1991), pp. 2401; cf. Charles
Cruickshank, Deception in World War II (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981);
David Mure, Master of Deception: Tangled Webs in London and the Middle East
(London: Kimber, 1980), pp. 16, 198, 273; T.L.Cubbage II, The German
Misapprehensions Regarding Overlord: Understanding Failure in the Estimative
Process, Intelligence and National Security 2, 3 (July 1987), pp. 11474; Klaus-
Jrgen Mller, A German Perspective on Allied Deception Operations in the
Second World War, Intelligence and National Security 2, 3 (July 1987), pp. 301
26; David Hunt, Remarks on A German Perspective on Allied Deception
Operations, Intelligence and National Security 3, 1 (January 1988), pp. 1904;
Michael I.Handel, Methodological Mischief: A Reply to Professor Mller,
Intelligence and National Security 4, 1 (January 1989), pp. 1614; John Ferris,
The Intelligence-Deception Complex: An Anatomy, Intelligence and National
Security 4, 4 (October 1989), pp. 71934; see also Winks, Cloak, pp. 28997, on the
publication of Mastermans book.
4. Masterman, Double Cross, pp. 606; Hinsley and Simkins, IV, pp. 98102, 21744.
5. MI5s position is disputed by Robert Cecil, Five of Six at War: Section V of MI6,
Intelligence and National Security 9, 2 (April 1994), p. 347.
6. Hinsley and Simkins, IV, pp. 723 (on RSS), 11314, 12437 (on MI5-MI6
conflicts)cf. with Masterman, Double Cross, pp. 606, who says there were no
unresolved disputes concerning MI5 primacy over MI6(V) on the Twenty
Committee; note also that Masterman was the MI5 Chairman of the Twenty
Committee (Hinsley and Simkins, p. 98).
7. Masterman, Double Cross, pp. 656; 189; cf, Cecil, Five, p. 347.
8. British Intelligence System, pp. 32, 489; see also Hinsley and Simkins, IV, pp.
1758.
9. See Cecil, Five, pp. 3467; Cecil states (p. 347) that amalgamating MI5 and MI6
in the middle of the war would have been the height of folly.
10. Hinsley and Simkins, IV, p. 187.
11. August 1942 date, MemorandumRe X-2 Beginning, n.d, n.a., Folder 14a, Box
74, Entry 92, RG 226, NARA; BSC proposal from manuscript excerpt, London
Station History, Chapter I, The OSS Prelude, written by William L.Billick, in
Folder 19, Box 2, Troy Papers, RG 263, NARA.
12. Intercepts, Minutes of discussion in David Bruces office, 24 March 1942, Folder
1647, Box 152, Entry 136, RG 226, NARA; Most Secret Sources, Billick MS,
OSS Prelude.
13. Jackson, British Intelligence System, p. 31.
14. Billick MS, OSS Prelude.
15. Bruce to Donovan, 13 February 1943, frame 78, Reel 39, Entry 95, RG 226, NARA.
16. Billick MS, OSS Prelude; see also Cecil, Five, pp. 3501.
17. Accommodation, Bruce to Donovan, 27 February 1943, frames 867;
complication, Cs view, and MI6(V) vs. temporary staff, Bruce to Donovan, 8
March 1943, frames 923; both in Reel 39, Entry 95, RG 226, NARA; cf. John
Costello, Mask of Treachery (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1988),
pp. 422, 431.
18. April 1943 arrival, Billick MS, OSS Prelude; resolved status of OSS CI, Bruce to
Donovan, 12 March 1943, frames 956, Reel 39, Entry 95, RG 226, NARA; on
Murphy, Bowden, McDonough, Pearson, Blum, Will, G-2 hostility, see also Winks,
Cloak, pp. 2603.
19. G-2 liaison, Bruce to Donovan, 12 March 1943, frames 956; staved, Bruce to
Donovan, 14 August 1943, frame 173; both in Reel 39, Entry 95, RG 226, NARA.
20. Billick MS, OSS Prelude; X-2 establishment in General Order Number 13,
Revised, 19 June 1943, effective 15 June 1943, Folder 109, Box 15, Entry 119, RG
226, NARA; 25 members, Winks, Cloak, p. 264.
21. Billick MS, OSS Prelude; X-2 designation, Winks, Cloak, p. 263.
22. Billick MS, OSS Prelude; see also War Diary, OSS/London, X-2 Branch, Vol. 1,
Early History, Chronological Summary, and pp. ivv, frames 1149, 11545, Reel
10, Entry 91, RG 226, NARAnote that pp. vixliv and the remainder of Vol. 1
are closed, although certain details were inadvertently left by the weeders in the
Chronological Summary and Index.
23. Winks, Cloak, pp. 2805.
24. Billick MS, OSS Prelude; the War Diary, OSS/London, X-2 Branch, Vol. 2,
London Headquarters, Reel 10, Entry 91, p. 20, notes that in pre-OVERLORD CI
information processing, the British obviously were able to furnish most of the
information required. The thing that X-2 could furnish was the man and woman-
power to do the necessary carding and filing; see also Memorandum for Director
OSS on Survey of Manpower UtilizationX-2 Branch, 31 March 1944, frames
000211, Reel 72, Entry 190; both in RG 226, NARA.
25. Billick MS OSS Prelude; see also War Diary, X-2, 2, Chronological Summary,
and pp. 17, 20, 26, frames 11618, 1181, 1187British motives are apparently
discussed on p. viii of Vol. 1, but this is closed; see also British views on the need
to ensure central coordination of OSS CI through SIS in London where OSS are
represented, in Air Ministry to Britman, Washington, COS (W) 852, 3 October
1943, Reference: JSM 1200, CAB 119/47, PRO; Winks, Cloak, pp. 2879, notes
Pearsons closeness with Cowgill, Cowgills denial of ISOS to the FBI, and
dismisses as nonsense the idea that Cowgill stymied the FBI in order to minimize
MI5 encroachments against himself personally, this dismissal is fair and
understandable since Winks is referring to the claims of the traitor Kim Philby in this
regard, but the quotes cited above from Billick MS, OSS Prelude, originate within
OSS, not from Kim Philby, and they concern MI6 vs. MI5 as part of their ongoing
rivalry, not Cowgill vs. MI5 out of personal self-interest; see also Winks, Cloak, p.
534, note 81, and Cecil, Five, pp. 3512; cf. Desmond Bristow, with Bill
Bristow, A Game of Moles: The Deceptions of an MI6 Officer (London: Little,
Brown and Company, 1993), pp. 334.
26. Overwhelming, Roosevelt, II, p. 150; see also Winks, Cloak, p. 534, note 81, on
the role of British self-interest.
27. For British control on X-2s behalf, see Jackson British Intelligence System, p.
31.
28. X-2 duties/Angleton, War Diary, X-2, 2, pp. 4, 37, frames 1165, 1197note that
the Angleton reference is bracketed with the word cut handwritten beside it;
Angleton was the future CIAs noted CI guru before his enforced retirement in
1974; see Winks, Cloak, pp. 372435.
29. Murphy to Shepardson, 10 July 1943, Folder 24, Box 347, Entry 92, RG 226, NARA
see also War Diary, X-2, 2, pp. 1011, frames 11712; see also Costello,
Mask, p. 427.
30. Branch Order No. 10 by Acting Chief Hubert L.Will, 1 May 1944, Folder 50, Box
31. William Casey to Giblin and Armour, 29 January 1944; see also Minutes of the
Staff Operational committee, 27 January 1944; both in Folder 357, Box 315, Entry
190see also the work of R&As Biographical Records in 1944 regarding

information on Europeans in general in Folder 449, Box 232, Entry 190; note that all
references to X-2s Insurance unit in Vol. 2 of the X-2 War Diary have been excised
see the index regarding pp. 417, 958, 133, and frames 1201, 1247, 1282; all in
RG 226, NARA; see Winks, Cloak, pp. 2668, on early training of X-2 men and
the presumed receptivity of the British to Yale men and/or Rhodes Scholars, and
pp. 322438, on Angleton.
32. Hinsley and Simkins, IV, pp. 2613see also pp. 34972; see also War Diary,
Directors Office, 1, para. 47, Folder 144, Box 211, Entry 190, RG 226, NARA.
33. Up to par, Notes on X-2, n.d., n.a., Folder 14a, Box 74, Entry 92, RG 226,
NARA; November SCI proposal, War Diary, Directors Office, 1, paras 46, 77
80.
34. X-2 duties, William Casey to Armour, et al., 9 March 1944, Folder 325, Box 223;
field and W/T vetting, Minutes of Staff Operational Committee, 24 February 1944;
Folder 357, Box 315; both in Entry 190, RG 226, NARA.
35. OSS Activities Report, May 1944, Folder 115, Box 92, Entry 99; X-2/21st AG
liaison proposed in Minutes of Staff Operational Committee, 9 March 1944, Folder
357, Box 315, Entry 190; X-2 at 21st AG, War Diary, Directors Office, 1, paras
46, 7780; all in RG 226, NARA; see Special Counter-intelligence Units at HQ 21
Army Group, 21 April 1944, WO 208/2091, PRO.
36. Pass information, SHAEF Intelligence Directive No. 7, Section XI, WO 219/179,
PRO; Special Sources/Abwehr Index in SAINT London to SAINT Paris, c.
February 1945, Folder 408, Box 367; on the impact of ISOS security on X-2s
communications system, see Lowman to Armour, 15 February 1945, Folder 983,
Box 268; both in Entry 190, RG 226, NARA.
37. Hinsley and Simkins, IV, pp. 2634.
38. Bruce to SCAEF via ACoS G-2, 26 May 1944, WO 219/5278, PRO.
39. Hinsley and Simkins, IV, pp. 2657; on Paupurt capture, see Winks, Cloak, pp.
2789.
40. SHAEF view in JIC SHAEF (45) 14 (Final), 12 April 1945, WO 219/182, PRO
see also JIC SHAEF (45) 5 (Final), 7 March 1945, frames 57781, Reel 15; for
information on SHAEFFs JIC, see the Revised Directive to Joint Intelligence
Committee (SHAEF), Folder 1206, Box 282; both in Entry 190, RG 226, NARA.
41. Report on Activities by Maj. Walter Hochschild, 9 January 1945, Folder 46a#4,
Box 11, Entry 99; see also Roger A. Piaff to Donovan, 31 July 1944, on X-2 SCIU
activities in Normandy, frames 7568, Reel 80, Entry 95; both in RG 226, NARA.
42. Report of Maj. Thomas B. Lee, 10 May 1945, Folder 46b#l, Box 11, Entry 99, RG
226, NARA.
43. Field Report of John Waldron, 12 January 1945, Folder 46b#4, Box 11a, Entry 99,
RG 226, NARA; see also Bristow, Moles, pp. 16970.
44. Hinsley and Simkins, IV, p. 273; see also Masterman, Double Cross, p. 167.
45. Lowlands interrogation/liaison, X-2 Progress Report for 115 January 1945, dated
15 January 1945, Folder 9, Box 4, Entry 99, RG 226, NARA.
46. OSS Activities Report for March 1945, Folder 125, Box 94, Entry 99, RG 226,
NARA.
47. Quotes and narrative from Waldron Field Report; see also War Diary, X-2, 2, pp.
701, 10817, frames 12245, 125766.
48. Ibid.; on Camp 020, see Hinsley and Simkins, IV, Appendix 10.
49. Hinsley and Simkins, IV, pp. 264, 267.

50. OSS Activities Report, September 1944, Folder 119, Box 93, Entry 99, RG 226,
NARA.
51. Waldron Field Report.
53. Robertson in MI5 from X-2 Progress Report for 115 January 1945; text of
letter, Maj.-Gen. K.W.D. Strong to Maj.-Gen. Sir Stewart Menzies, Room 900,
War Office, 30 January 1945, Folder 170, Box 23, Entry 119; see also Lt Jerome
W.Shay Returnee Report, 17 May 1945, passim, Folder 46b#3, Box 11 a, Entry 99;
54. 15 January 1945 meeting referred to in Covering Report for OSS ETO, 115
January 1945, dated 18 January 1945, Folder 9, Box 4, Entry 99; 30 staff for Case
Section, double-agent identities quote, Trevor-Roper, PAIR all in Minutes of
Meeting of Saturday, 27 January, dated 29 January 1945, Folder 170, Box 23,
Entry 119, RG 226, NARA; the assessment of Trevor-Roper reflects difficulties
encountered when he defied injunctions concerning ISOS/ISK distribution, at
which point Felix Cowgill had recommended Trevor-Ropers dismissalsee
Cecil, Five, p. 346; cf. how Trevor-Roper (now Lord Dacre) got his own back in
Hugh Trevor-Roper, The Philby Affair: Espionage, Treason, and Secret Services
(London: William Kimber, 1968), pp. ix, 39, 42, 47, 6975; War Room section
quotes in X-2 Progress Report for 1531 January 1945, dated 31 January 1945, by
Norman Holmes Pearson, Folder 9, Box 4, Entry 99, RG 226, NARA; Section
Heads/deputies and Section letters from outgoing cable 8394, HAWK to
AGNOSTIC, 6 February 1945; see also Memorandum on 5 February 1945 Meeting,
dated 6 February 1945; Memorandum on Meeting of 7 February 1945 (this also
names many of the proposed Assessment Section case officers); see Memorandum
on Meeting of 30 January 1945, dated 1 February 1945, on the War Rooms
telecryption facilities; both in Folder 170, Box 23, Entry 119, RG 226, NARA.
55. MIS, War Department, Liaison Activities in the UK, 19431945, I: History of
Special Counter-intelligence War Room, SRH-153, RG 457, NARA.
56. Minutes of 27 January 1945 meeting.
57. Personnel numbers from OSS Activities report for February 1945, Folder 124, Box
94; for numbers, February start, and overview of activities, see X-2 Progress
Report for 1528 February 1945, dated 28 February 1945, Folder 10, Box 4; both
in Entry 99; see also SHAEF G-2 Memo on Central Counter Intelligence War
Room (WR), n.d., Folder 170, Box 23, Entry 119; all in RG 226, NARA; the 28
February date is from the Shay Returnee Report.
58. Memorandum on Meeting of 7 February 1945.
59. Hinsley and Simkins, IV, p. 268, gives 1 March as the War Rooms start date, and
details April ISOS.
60. SRH-153, RG 457, NARA.
62. Norman Holmes Pearson to Col Forgan, 30 April 1945, Folder 998, Box 270, Entry
190, RG 226, NARA.
63. First month after collapse, X-2 Branch Monthly Report of Activities for June 1945,
Folder 107, Box 91; death ray, OSS Detachment 12 AG Operational Report, 21
May 1945, Folder 13, Box 6; both in Entry 99, RG 226, NARA.
64. War Diary, X-2, 2, p. 17, frame 1178on relations with other branches, cf. pp.
1078, frames 12567.
65. Howard S.Cady Field Report, 22 May 1945, Folder 46a#2, Box 11, Entry 99; on
X-2/R&A and X-2/SI information exchanges, see draft agreements from February
March 1945, frames 76090, Reel 57, Entry 95; both in RG 226, NARA.
66. Lord Field Report, Folder 46b#l, Box 11, Entry 99, RG 226, NARA; on SO and
countersabotage, see Chapter 8.
67. Osgood Nichols Field Report, 4 June 1945, Folder 46b#2; Box 11, Entry 99,
RG 226, NARA.
68. Narrative and quotes from British Intelligence System, pp. 559; see also
B.F.Smith, Shadow, p. 81; Gladwyn, Memoirs, pp. 1012; Hugh Dalton, The
Fateful Years: Memoirs, 19311945 (London: Frederick Muller, 1957), p. 377; see
also Edmond Taylor, Awakening from History (Boston: Gambit, 1969).
69. Lawrence C.Soley, Radio Warfare: OSS and CIA Subversive Propaganda (New
York: Praeger, 1989), p. 12; see also the influential Edmond Taylor, The Strategy of
Terror: Europes Inner Front (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1940).
70. E.L.Taylor to W.D.Whitney, 12 November 1941, Folder 8, Box 70, Entry 99, RG
226, NARA; PWE intelligence emphasis from M.G.Balfour to GSO London, 27
November 1942, FO 898/17, PRO.
71. See Allan M.Winkler, The Politics of Propaganda: The Office of War Information,
19421945 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), pp. 267, 31, and Young
(ed.), Diaries of Robert Bruce Lockhart, 27 August 1942, p. 191.
72. B.F.Smith, Shadow, pp. 1578; SSO War Diary: Relations with the British, paras
73. Shepard Morgan to Lockhart, 5 February 1943, Folder PWD and PWE, Box 4,
74. Bruce to Buxton, 18 September 1943, Reel 39, Entry 95, RG 226, NARA.
75. SSO: Relations, paras 1025; draft War Diary, Directors Office, Preamble to 1
January 1944, pp. 12, 14, Folder 248, Box 220, Entry 190; War Diary, OSS/
London, MO Branch, Vol. 1, Administration, p. 1, frame 318, Reel 2, Entry 91; both
in RG 226, NARA; Fred Oechsner to Donovan, 12 June 1943, Folder 97, Box 12,
Troy Papers, RG 263, NARA; see also R.H.Bruce Lockhart, Comes the Reckoning
(London: Putnam, 1947), pp. 1812; see Young (ed.), Diaries of Robert Bruce
Lockhart, 31 May 1943, pp. 2389.
76. Bruce to J.M.Scribner, 17 December 1943, Folder 39, Box 24, Entry 92, RG 226,
NARA.
77. Draft War Diary, Directors Office, OSS/London, Preamble to January 1944, Part
II, pp. 201, Folder 39, Box 3, Entry 147; draft War Diary, Directors Office, OSS/
London, Vol. 1, JanuaryMarch 1944, paras 503, 73, Folder 144, Box 211, Entry
190; both in RG 226, NARA; see also War Diary, MO, 1, pp. 214; see also
Winkler, Politics, pp. 1226, and Lockhart, Reckoning, p. 196.
78. On SO-MO, see Rae Smith and David Winston to Bruce, 23 February 1944, Paul Van
Der Stricht to Joseph Haskell, 25 March 1944, and Lester Armour to Donovan, 26
May 1944, all in Folder 190, Box 343, Entry 190; on gossip reporting, see Rae
Smith to Williamson, 17 June 1944, quoted in the ETO Officers Pouch of 27 June
1944, Folder 38, Box 9, Entry 99; all in RG 226, NARA; see also Winkler,
Politics, pp. 1226, and Lockhart, Reckoning, p. 196.
79. SHAEF Directive in War Diary, OSS/London, MO Branch, Vol. 7, Basic

Documents, frames 2213, Reel 3, Entry 91, RG 226, NARA.
80. War Diary, OSS/London, MO Branch, Vol. 2, Publication, pp. 19, frames 345
54, Reel 2, Entry 91, RG 226, NARA.
81. MO Branch Progress Report for 1531 January 1945, dated 31 January 1945,
82. Penetration of Germany, OSS Activities Report for February 1945, Folder 124,
Box 94, Entry 99; Armour quotes, Armour to Forgan, 16 March 1945, Folder 994,
Box 270, Entry 190; both in RG 226, NARA.
83. Cavendish-Bentinck quote in Suggested Inquiry into the Effect of British
Political Warfare against Germany, 12 July 1945, FO 898/420, PRO.
84. Cady Final Report.
85. Charles Cruickshank, The Fourth Arm: Psychological Warfare, 19381945
(London: Davis-Poynter, 1977), pp. 1857.
86. Cf. Alexander DeConde, A History of American Foreign Policy, Vol. II Global
Power (1900 to the Present), (New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 3rd edn, 1978),
p. 180.
87. Michael Balfour, Propaganda in War, 19391945: Organisations, Policies and
Publics in Britain and Germany (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979), pp.
31720; see also Lockhart, Reckoning, p. 229; Howarth, Chief, p. 182; Anne
Armstrong, Unconditional Surrender: The Impact of the Casablanca Policy upon
World War II (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1974), pp. 167224, 249, 2545; Heinz
Hhne, Canaris, trans. J.Maxwell Brownjohn (London: Seeker and Warburg,
1979), p. 482; cf. A.E.Campbell, Franklin Roosevelt and Unconditional
Surrender, in Langhorne (ed.), Diplomacy, pp. 232, 240.
88. Max Hastings, Overlord: D-Day and the Battle for Normandy (London: Michael
Joseph, 1984), p. 172.
89. Final Report of John P.Harris, 15 November 1944, Folder 46a#l, Box 11, Entry 99,
RG 226, NARA.
90. Field Report of Christ Brix, n.d., Folder 46a#l, Box 11, Entry 99, RG 226, NARA.
91. Lord Report.
8
Full Circle: Anglo-American Intelligence and
the Transition to Cold War
Wars end did not immediately bring about any great innovations in British and
American intelligence. Britains intelligence system remained largely
decentralized, and William Donovans attempt to perpetuate his organization as a
strongly centralized American post-war intelligence service came to nought.
Ironically, OSS faded from the scene just as Russia began emerging as a real
threat to the post-war world. American intelligence bodies largely failed to
anticipate this development in keeping with the assumptions of Americas
preferred post-war foreign policy, while OSS was itself primarily geared toward
denazifying occupied Germany. Thanks to information obtained from British
intelligence, however, the London mission finally began appreciating matters
just before OSS was disbanded. A successor organization was then left to
manage an evolving intelligence situation that its political superiors only dimly
recognized, and that it was hardly equipped to deal with alone. The ongoing
relationship with British intelligence thus acquired great significance throughout
early 1946. British policy-makers were only too aware of Russian hostility
toward traditional British interests, and of Britains inability to confront this
threat alone. They naturally considered it imperative to inform American leaders
about this situation, and the Anglo-American intelligence relationship proved
critical to achieving this end. This link not only contributed in due course to
Americas reassessment of Soviet intentions, but it also indirectly helped prove
the continued relevance of a fully mobilized American peacetime intelligence
capability, thereby succeeding where Donovan himself failed. The Anglo-
American intelligence connection in the face of a mutual threat thus recalls the
context of OSS/Londons genesis. It also illustrates the consistent importance of
Britains pragmatic self-interest, and down-plays the significance usually
ascribed to Donovan personally. The Anglo-American intelligence relationship
accordingly entered the Cold War as it did the Second World Wargrounded in
necessity, not in sentiment or superficial personality. By mid-1946, the
intelligence dimension of Anglo-American affairs had indeed turned full circle.
As detailed in Chapter 1, Broadways absorption of SOE was sanctioned in
August 1945 as a means of reconciling the ad hoc sabotage arm with the
permanent Secret Service.1 The JIC also proposed on 1 June 1945 establishing a
Joint Intelligence Bureau under its control for centralizing existing and future
194 THE TRANSITION TO COLD WAR
joint service intelligence units, such as scientific and topographical intelligence.

As indicated by its take-over of SOEs function and the decision not to merge
MI6(V) with MI5 (see Chapter 7), SIS managed to withstand the persistent
threats to its traditional primacy, although GCHQs reflected glory was credited
for this in OSS.2 Wartime Secret Service expenditures (covering the work of
SIS, GCHQ, MI5, SOE, and PWE) had understandably dwarfed those of prewar
years (see Chapter 1, p. 19), rising to 5,622,334 during 194041, 7,535,897 in
194142, 11,919,551 through 194243, to a peak of 15,021,643 in 194344,
provisionally declining for 1944March 1945 to 12,637,000 (when approached
about releasing these numbers to Parliament in June 1945, Churchill responded:
It is much too soon to publish these figures. I do not think they ought to be
disclosed till the end of the Japanese war; but anyhow not in the middle of an
Election).3 While wars end might justify reducing intelligence expenses, there
was no impetus to make drastic changes concerning the overall intelligence
system beyond those minor developments noted above.4 The experience of
working with OSS/London did not make any meaningful impression on the
British in this regard. The JICs existing centralization and coordination of
strategic assessment was deemed sufficient, and preferable to using any
permanently assigned staff of a separate central agency.5 The service
intelligence chiefs continued, for example, to assume responsibility for
overseeing joint strategic estimates. SIS discussed its intelligence objectives with
the other JIC members, but it was not given intelligence directives per se by the
JIC. Secret intelligence collection was still responsive to the needs of MI6s
Circulating Sections, which themselves represented the JICs component
services and ministries. These services and ministries then individually collated
the material so gathered, and if relevant to joint strategic appreciations, passed it
to the JIC. The operational management of British intelligence nonetheless
remained outside the JICs purview.6
There was obviously no desire to experiment with the OSS system
of theoretical centralization. Although consistently honoured in the breach, the
concept of mating intelligence collection, executive operations, and intelligence
assessment under one authority was supposedly the legacy of American
methods. The British remained unconvinced. As late as 8 November 1947, a
report on intelligence organization by Sir Douglas Evill indicated that a system
of more closely centralized intelligence departments under a single authority, on
the American model, offer[ed] important advantages to coordination, but it
would presumably complicate the work of the military staffs. Evill added that the
JIB centralised very satisfactorily certain processes of intelligence, and that he
did not see much opportunity for profitably carrying this centralisation much
further. It was afterwards suggested in 1950 that intelligence centralization
could not outpace defence centralization as a whole, and that there was no reason
to disagree with Evills report.7
As the war wound down, American strategic intelligence in fact grew to
resemble, at least temporarily, the British system more than it did OSS, despite
William Donovans hopes to the contrary. Donovan approached President

Roosevelt about organizing Americas post-war intelligence on 23 February
1945 with an 18 November 1944 memorandum detailing a plan for an unnamed
service acting as a central intelligence authority reporting directly to the President
rather than to the JCS. The plan envisaged giving this service responsibility for
framing intelligence objectives while collecting and coordinating whatever
material the President required to formulate and execute national policy and
strategy.8 Donovans scheme was nonetheless under fire before Roosevelt even
received it. A copy of the plan circulated to the Joint Chiefs (as JCS 1181) was
leaked to various newspapers hostile to the Roosevelt administration. An article
published by journalist Walter Trohan on 9 February characterized the suggested
service as a potential Gestapo. Further articles quoting reaction from the JCSs
own JIC were published on 11 February concerning the militarys preference for
control over post-war intelligence, and for avoiding direct reporting by any
intelligence supremo to the President (these views were formally set out in JCS
239/5).9 Donovan naturally suspected the JCS at first, but he eventually came to
finger FBI Director J.Edgar Hoover for this act of pre-emptive sabotage.10
Roosevelt for his part contented himself with directing Donovan on 5 April to
canvass the heads of interested departments and existing intelligence agencies
so that a consensus of opinion [could] be secured.11 This attitude did not reflect
any great presidential interest in Donovans proposal, so there was no guarantee
that it would have been deemed acceptable even had Roosevelt not died a week
later on 12 April. The question of post-war intelligence was at any rate now in
President Harry S.Trumans hands.
Donovans own reputation complicated matters, especially concerning his
proven shortcomings as an intelligence director. Whatever his organizations
claim to being a centralized, coordinated service, it has been amply demonstrated
in earlier chapters how this phenomenon failed to manifest itself in actuality.12
Furthermore, despite receiving suggestions for realizing true OSS centralization,
Donovan persistently supported branch fragmentation given the belief that his
nominal overall control equalled centralization. This was clearly shown after
Donovan appointed Brigadier-General James Magruder as OSS Deputy-Director
of Intelligence, responsible for coordinating the intelligence branches (SI, X-2,
R&A) in 1943. Magruder wrote a report on 1 October 1943 recommending
greater intra-branch coordination since OSS seemed more of a holding
company whose various independent concerns only shared the same director.
Since there was too much emphasis on paramilitary activities (ostensibly
coordinated by a Deputy-Director of Operations) to the detriment of real
intelligence work, Magruder believed that OSS would function best if it was
confined primarily to intelligence activities of direct use for the military
program, with branch chiefs answering to their respective deputy directors. This
would compensate for the debilitating lack of clearcut lines of authority and
responsibility (Magruder told OSS/Washingtons James Grafton Rogers two
months after drafting these comments that OSS [was] small, the war immense,
that [OSS] scattered] too much, that [it had] many talents, some results).13
Magruders suggestions made Donovan livid, and were interpreted as an attempt
to usurp Donovans authority. Donovan dismissed Magruders logical
innovations as objectionable hierarchy and bureaucracy, and repeated his
preference for the chain of command as from [each] Branch Head to the
Director.14 In other words, Donovan wanted nominal control of everything, but
real control frankly proved beyond his grasp. He never really directed his
organization in any meaningful way, either through the branches or through the
overseas missions, where developments unfolded more often in response to local
circumstances than to Donovans direction. Donovan was in fact widely
recognized as a poor administrator, with Washingtons James Rogers attesting to
the endless administrative crises, and Londons David Bruce believing that one
should [n]ever ask [Donovan] what to do. Do it and show him what you have
done.15 Donovans shortcomings were compounded by his erratic behavior (see
Chapter 2), and all of these factors contributed by 1945 to a widespread antipathy
for Donovan personally which gravely undermined his attempts at securing OSS
in the post-war intelligence bureaucracy.16
This context was most significant when Donovans plans ran up against the
militarys ideas for post-war intelligence. Bradley Smith has suggestedon the
strength of a 12 September 1945 Truman memo to the Secretaries of State, War,
and Navy sanctioning their request for continued peacetime signals intelligence
collaboration with the Britishthat Truman consciously opted for SIGINT as the
foundation of post-war American intelligence as opposed to continuing with the
dubious and unorthodox OSS.17 More convincing is the likelihood that
Donovans reputation for erratic behavior, arrogant stubbornness, and blatant
ambition determined OSSs fate by alienating the military, who had their own
views about post-war intelligence. The senior US Army officer of the American
Joint Intelligence Staff, Colonel Ludwell Montague, participated in the US JICs
fierce debate over Donovans proposal, and personally drafted JIC 239/5 (noted
above). His recollections of events reveal that only passing attention was paid to
the issue of post-war intelligence organization until Donovans plan of 18
November 1944 was circulated to the JIC. Donovans proposed monopoly on
clandestine intelligence work, strategic intelligence, and national intelligence
policy threatened to give him effective control over all other American
intelligence agencies. This would obviously remove OSS and therefore Donovan
from under the JCS and eclipse the JIC.18 The JCS instructed Montague to
prepare a JIC service members paper on the issue (JIC 239/1), arguing that no
one operating agency (such as OSS) should be given the power to coordinate the
others as this would violate the principle of chain of command.19 Although the
JICs civilian members favoured Donovans plan, a compromise position was
eventually worked out by Montague as JIC 239/5, dated 1 January 1945. This
proposed a National Intelligence Authority (made up of the Secretaries of State,
War, and Navy) coordinating the activities of a director of central intelligence,
who would also receive assessments and planning advice from a JIC-like
Intelligence Advisory Board.20
Secretary of War Henry Stimson favoured the JCS compromise, but suggested
that the matter be set aside until wars end.21 DDI General Magruder counselled
Donovan to accept the JCS compromise as this would disarm the opposition
and secure OSS as the nucleus of post-war American intelligence. Donovan
ignored this advice. His authoritarian attitude and zealous inability to consider
any other point of view than his own thus left OSS grievously exposed upon
Roosevelts death when, unaware of the JCS 239/5 plan, Truman preferred to let
the Bureau of the Budget carry on with its recommendations for demobilizing
various wartime agencies.22 The proposed demobilizations soon included OSS.
Despite Donovans plaintive requests to all and sundry for OSSs survival and its
centralized format (which Donovan disingenuously claimed was being copied
by the British), Truman unceremoniously approved terminating OSS on 13
September 1945, effective 1 October.23 Without any obvious reason to put up
with Donovan and his ambitions for intelligence supremacy, the existing JCS-JIC
capacity for coordinated strategic assessment enabled Truman to jettison the
troublesome OSS Director. The attraction of the JIC moreover depended not so
much on SIGINT (which incidentally remained firmly split between the military
services until the formation of the National Security Agency in 1952)24 as on its
existing capacity for producing joint strategic intelligence assessments, all of
which obviously resembled Britains JIC system more than OSS. Equally
important was the fact that Trumans decision disposed of Donovan while
preserving the OSS operational intelligence branches, albeit in a different guise.
This crucial detail is routinely overlooked by historians who imply that the
various branches completely expired upon Trumans termination order.25 With a
JIC responsible for strategic assessments, the American intelligence community
from 1 October 1945 also included a scaled-down operational intelligence
service when SI and X-2 together formed the Strategic Services Unit within the
War Department (R&A managed to find a home in the State Departments
Interim Research and Intelligence Service upon OSSs dissolution, while SO was
closed down altogether before Trumans order).26 The preservation of such
assets would prove most significant in the coming months.
While these ultimately critical organizational developments unfolded in
Washington, the London mission focused on supporting post-hostilities work in
occupied Germany. OSS/London postulated in August 1944 that OSS would play
a role through R&A monitoring German political, economic, social, and military
developments; SI obtaining information on those very aspects of German life;
and X-2 exploiting its information about German espionage and sabotage
organizations to advise the Allied Control Commission. X-2 rated the probability
of continued German secret intelligence or espionage work a high one since
plans for such underground intelligence activities had already come to their
attention. As well, the potential for an underground Nazi party was considered
broader and larger than work against the Nazi espionage system, which had
enjoyed the DOUBLE CROSS advantage.27 By February 1945, OSS/London

envisaged SI and X-2 developing secret intelligence from Germany, R&A
providing services for US and Allied agencies within Germany, and MO
undermining German resistance to the occupation forces.28 This programme was
accepted in its essentials and communicated to the JCS on 14 August 1945,
excluding the MO component.29
OSS plans complemented SHAEFs own concerns about the Allies security
problems in Germany, especially regarding sabotage and assassinating Allied
personnel.30 Although SO proposed serving as a countersabotage unit and
opposed jeopardizing OSS contacts with SOE, it served no meaningful role in post-
hostilities Germany, and was disbanded by mid-September 1945 (X-2 opposed
SO involvement in counter-sabotage since that was essentially an X-2 matter).31
R&A confined itself to compiling lists of Germans suitable for senior
administrative posts, and reporting on German politics, economics, etc. in
support of the Allied Control Commissions Civil Affairs work (potential
friendly Germans had to be carefully scrutinized to determine if they were
proAllied and not simply anti-Nazi).32 OSS/Germanys major contribution
centred around X-2 countering residual Nazism while continuing] its close
liaison with British secret intelligence organizations.33 Twelfth US Army Group
G-2 Brigadier-General Sibert had stressed the importance of post-hostilities
counter-intelligence work in April, and X-2 was accordingly the only OSS
branch which anticipated continuing at its wartime strength as it worked toward
exterminating the German Intelligence System.34 X-2 in fact achieved early
success when it detected a stay-behind network of agents in southern Germany
and Austria.35 X-2 penetration agents were employed to reveal evidence of Nazi
sub-version, but this was complicated when German intelligence officers in
Cologne apparently began organizing [Nazi] resistance groups under
Communist cover. X-2 also received a surprisingly large number of offers
from GIS officials to work for the Allieseither for selfish reasons or to
embroil [X-2] with the Russians.36 It soon transpired, however, that despite
X-2s cooperation with Soviet counter-intelligence in July against a formerly
German-controlled W/T agent network directed against the Russians in Hungary
and Rumania, no GIS efforts were needed to foster such embroilment.37 By
August 1945, Russian attempts to penetrate[OSS] were revealed when an
agent gave himself up immediately after dispatch by the NKVD [i.e., the
Peoples Commissariat for Internal Affairs, the Soviet intelligence service]. X-2
naturally considered this a most fundamentally significant development, and
immediately began running the individual as a double agent. Since X-2 also
suspected Russian agent activity in P/W camps in Kassel, the local SCI unit
began investigating whether penetration, control, or neutralization should be
recommended.38 Russian intelligence operations against American forces,
especially in Berlin, continued throughout September.39 As OSS gave way to
SSU, X-2 was naturally orientated more toward a shift in emphasis to long-
range targets. Primary importance [was] now attached to activities and
personalities of all intelligence services rather than the German and Japanese,
although X-2s counter-measures were doubtless compromised by Broadways
new Russian Desk chief and Soviet-controlled double-agent, Kim Philby.40
While the original emphasis on containing post-war German resistance
admittedly began undergoing a sea-change as OSS faded away, X-2s experience
merely underscored the extent to which OSS was completely unprepared for
work against Russia after Germanys defeat. This fact obviously erodes the
assumption that OSS did anything of prophetic consequence against Russia as
the European war ended. Indeed, the obliviousness to the Soviet threat was long
evident in repeated OSS assessments of Britains and Russias relative status that
mirrored the prevailing view among American authorities, and which
cumulatively contributed to Britains subsequent desperate position. Most
American officials were loath to be seen as overreacting to Russias nascent
power. One unnamed State Department officer in Berne opined in 1943 that the
Bolshevism bogy [was] being used as so often before to conjure up the specter
of Red Terror and Atheism, without any attempt to discuss Marxism or
Stalinism. He also stated that Stalins repeated disclaimers of any desires to
Bolshevize Europeincluding thedeclaration of the Soviet Presidium
declaring that they [would] not impose their form of government in Europe
should be useful to us.41 Such sentiments were duplicated within R&A. R&A/
Londons Post War Problems Committee under Paul Sweezy responded to the
question of Big Three cooperation in Germany by arguing in September 1944
that Russia would be motivated primarily by self-interest, which in turn dictated
close harmonious ties to the western powers. There was no question of Russian
occupation of territory beyond its 1940 borders (excepting Germany), and no
reason to suppose that Russia [had] any intention or desire to occupy such
territory some time in the future The USSR [had] vast undeveloped resources
and an economic system which [would] permit their unlimited exploitation for
purposes of internal development. The fact that Russia [had] no aggressive
designs [was] confirmed by everything thathappened since the beginning of
the war with Germany. Official Russian pronouncements and acts [had] shown a
meticulous regard for the independence of neighboring states. No European
country would have any incentive to attack Britain since[it did] not constitute
a mil itary menace and possesse[d] no resources indispensable to Europe.
Britains congenital conservatism and Russian security concerns nevertheless
suggested the probability of a clash between British and Russian European
policies after the war, in which case Americas best course of action would be
to refuse support to British policy and to seek to work out a common policy with
Russia towards the countries of Europe. This seemed logical since a successful
British imperialist policy would jeopardize the European peace, while probable
Russian objectives [were] compatible with the maintenance of peace in the
calculable future. If Russia and the United States[could] pursue common
policies towards the nations of Europe, Britain [would] have no alternative to
joining them.42 These basic characterizations of British and Russian motivations
reflected widespread assumptions within R&tA/London, although Carl Schorske

believed that while it was illegitimate to use the Bolshevik bogy in order to win
sentiment for a given policy, he was unable to swallow the London
memorandum laying down a line for American policy in post-war Europe, where
it was suggested that [the US] should follow blindly not Britain, but Russia.43
Despite these disclaimers, it was still generally accepted within R&A that while
Russias policy was frequently gauche from the standpoint of the salons and
occasionally outrageous from our own viewpoint, it appeared to be dictated
entirely from a desire to assure her security. Traditional, provocative balance of
power politics obligating US support of Britain were therefore obsolete.44
It must be stressed that R&tA/Londons views are noteworthy not for their
influence over American policy, but for the extent to which they reflected the
underlying assumptions of American policy existing upon Germanys defeat.
These assumptions, moreover, were precisely what Britain needed to overturn in
light of Russias emerging hostility toward British interests. Britains nurturing of
Anglo-American intelligence links would accordingly prove vital to the eventual
harmonization of British and American policies, particularly given their
originally divergent approaches to post-war Russia. In Americas case, the
Rooseveltian foreign policy ultimately inherited by Truman was intent upon
realizing the ideals enshrined in the Atlantic Charter.45 Roosevelt furthermore
crafted these policy objectives without any meaningful input from Secretary of
State Cordell Hull beyond Hulls emphasis on global free trade as a foundation
for the new post-war world order.46 Roosevelt was more inclined to make
American democracy safe from another war than he was intent on making the
world safe for democracy, hence his basic premise of reaching an accord with
Russia in light of Britains decline as a Great Power.47 Without much confidence
in Americas willingness to accept further open-ended involvement in post-war
world affairs, Roosevelt relied on a conciliatory approach to Josef Stalins Russia
in an effort to achieve a workable mutual understanding.48 This was particularly
evident during the Big Three Conference at Tehran in 1943, where Roosevelt
isolated Churchill and made common cause with Stalin regarding OVERLORDs
timing and definitiveness as a basis for cultivating Stalins goodwill over post-
war cooperation.49 As such manoeuvres were geared toward effecting
Roosevelts smooth handling of Stalin, they obviously necessitated approaching
Russia with overt goodwill rather than open suspicion, and contributed to the
predominant notion, displayed above, that America could afford to conceive of
the Russians as simply democrats in furry hats.50 On a more practical note,
Americans tended to believe that Russia was the rising power of the future, while
Britain was obsolete and decliningSHAEF Chief of Staff Walter Bedell Smith
said as much to SHAEF G-2 Kenneth Strong in 1945.51
While the logic of these goals and assumptions is understandable, it must
nevertheless be conceded that it exhibited a singularly glaring weakness, namely,
that American policy toward Russia was predicated on an overwhelming hostage
to fortune in the form of Stalins cooperation. There was little that America could
do to affect that desired end beyond courting the Soviet dictator; whether or not
he played along depended entirely on Stalin. The viability of American post-war
policy rested on Stalins cooperation in respecting independent states, his
concern merely for Soviet security, his intention to focus on domestic
reconstruction, etc.; all America could do to further those goals was mollify
Stalin through recognition of Russias power, avoid provoking defensive
hostility, and ostentatiously distance itself from perfidious Albions traditional
Great Power politicking against imagined Bolshevik bogies.
This approach was on one level a realistic acceptance of the reality of Soviet
power, and the limits on Americas options, but it nevertheless reflected
Roosevelts own navet enshrined as policy. According to William Emerson, the
soundness and realism of his political motives were particularly questionable.
Roosevelt apparently doubted the American peoples ability and willingness to
shoulder new, weighty, and, as the event has shown, unavoidable
responsibilities, but a fundamental flaw of his policy stemmed from his hope,
in the changed world of 1945, to pursue a course of action which would
preserve the benefits while avoiding the disadvantages of isolation.52 Central to
this intent was the underlying assumption that the Second World War would be
the last war, thus minimizing the importance of developing a concrete basis for
post-war security against RussiaRussia, after all, was expected to be
conveniently compliant and moderate.53 The reality of Soviet power, however,
ensured that America could not be the controlling element in Europe.54
Roosevelt therefore had to rely on his ability to manage Stalinon his ability to
stroke a tiger into a kitten- and it is here that US policy manifested a willing
belief in Russias reasonableness in a new world which would supplant Britains
cynical methods.55 Roosevelt actually articulated the reasoning behind this belief
to Churchill (concerning the prospect of Chinese designs on Indochina) when he
stated that Britain had 400 years of acquisitive instinct in [its] blood and you
just dont understand how a country might not want to acquire land somewhere
if they can get it. A new period has opened up in the worlds history, and you
will have to adjust to it.56
The worth of Roosevelts policy thus depended entirely on his reading of
Stalins motives and attitudes, and their susceptibility to Roosevelts influence.
Stalin had his own ideas, particularly under the rubric of Soviet security.
Roosevelt in particular misunderstood Stalins participation in the optimistically
named Grand Alliance for the defeat of Russias arch-enemy as a commitment to
a post-war New Order.57 Once the common enemy was defeated, there was no
common objective between America and Russia, and Stalin began to assert what
he felt were his security requirements.58 These amounted to an unreasonable
hegemony in eastern Europe, which America was slow to appreciate thanks to its
leaders misplaced, if somewhat desperate, optimism in an Uncle Joe who never
was.59 Allied to this aggressive security stance was Stalins eagerness to exploit
Russias new ability to project power into areas previously beyond its reach.
Because western leaders failed to impress Stalin with the limits of their
tolerance, his precipitate overreaching more than anything recklessly brought

Russia into conflict with its erstwhile allies.60
This was the context in which British officials tried to convince Roosevelts
successor and heir to his foreign policy of Russias emerging challenge to the
post-war order. Eraser Harbutt characterizes this transition period as a first Cold
War, during which Stalin deliberately targeted British interests for exploitation
under the presumption that America had granted him a free hand by virtue of its
rejection of a standing Anglo-American alliance in Europe. Confident of
Britains isolation and Americas detachment, Stalin launched a comprehensive
political campaign against various British interests vital to its status as a Great
Power.61
Optimism about Soviet objectives originally minimized this threat in British
eyes. Like the Americans, a British War Cabinet Sub-Committee on Post-
Hostilities Planning thought in early 1944 that Russia was more likely to expend
her energy and resources upon achievinga higher standard of comfort, liberty,
culture and contentment of her people than to follow a policy of external
aggrandizement at the expense of other states which might embroil her in
another war with all the consequences that this might entail for her peaceful
economic development. Realism would off-set Russias traditional opportunism
and self-interest, and make it unwilling for up to thirty years to invite another
foreign war before its domestic aims [had] been mainly achieved, although
many changes [might] take place before then. Having said that, Persia and Iraq
stood as possible areas of impact between British and Russian interests given
Britains reliance on Near Eastern oilto be cut off from these supplies would
make Britains position in war precarious. Russias partial absorption of
Turkey was also considered a possible threat as it would facilitate attack upon
the Middle East oil supplies, and [Britains] Mediterranean communications.
If it became obvious that Russia intended aggression against these interests
[Britain] should have to prepare for war with her. It was assumed, however, that
conciliation toward Russia would obviate this threat. Britains best policy would
be not to stand in Russias way unless [Britains] vital interests [were] actually
threatened. Britain should support Russian demands in areas which she considers
essential to her security in exchange for her support of [British] claims in areas
vital to [it]. Failing that, it was believed that given local American interests, Soviet
aggression would automatically involve America in any Russian interference
in the Near/Middle East, a fact that might act as a deterrent to Russia. The
report still realized that these appreciations, based largely on assumptions,
[would] require continued modification as Russias real policy unfold[ed].62
Britains JIC largely supported these initial assumptions in a December 1944
report which concluded that Russia would be motivated primarily by the
imperatives of security and domestic reconstruction. Security would be served by
strategic dominance over eastern Europe and the de-fanging of Germany and
Japan, so the JIC could not see what else Russia could under such conditions
hope to gain from a policy of aggression. Russia would at least experiment with
Big Three cooperation, and only in light of British or American insincerity would
Russia try by political intrigue to stir up trouble in Greece, the whole of the
Middle East and India, and exploit her influence over the Communist parties in
the countries concerned to stimulate opposition to an anti-Russian policy.
Allowing for Russian tactlessness in the handling of international affairs,
Russias dealings with America and Britain would depend very largely on the
ability of either side to convince the other of the sincerity of its desire for
collaboration.63 These views were accepted by Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden,
and their similarity with contemporary American assumptions can be
appreciated.64 There was also a significant differencethe realization that
concessions to Russia had to be founded on a hard and fast mutual recognition of
interest, and a reliance on assertiveness (or ultimately a form of containment) in
the event of Soviet non-cooperation. Britains weakness put it at a definite
disadvantage compared to Russia, but British policy was not so simplistic and
crude as to rely exclusively on Stalins presumed goodwill and reasonableness.
The British seemed to be more overtly putting their stock in establishing an
understanding based on certain power realities.65
This cautious optimism was nevertheless forced to undergo substantial
revision as Anglo-Russian relations passed from the Grand Alliance stage to one
of active Soviet hostility toward British interests born of Stalins assumption of
American detachment. This, according to Harbutt, set the framework for a third
stage whereby a Soviet-instigated crisis in Anglo-Russian relations throughout
1946 finally saw America brought into confrontation with Soviet aggression.
There were three main areas of Soviet pressure throughout these stages
Turkey, Greece, and Iran, just as anticipated. Bruce R.Kuniholm further
underscores that the Near East traditionally stood as a buffer zone between
Britain and Russia, and its role in the post-war Anglo-Soviet rivalry was such
that it revolutionized American foreign policy toward an eventual commitment to
confronting Russia.66 Harry Trumans ascendancy to the White House did not
alter the fact that America was in 1945 committed to a detached, cooperative
policy concerning Russia, and Trumans neophyte status in fact made it that
much more problematic as to whether the US would adopt an overtly challenging
attitude toward Russian aims with sufficient alacrity.67
Turkish and Greek affairs were particularly entwined for the British in the
wars closing months. The threat to Greece centred around the Communist EAM
movement in the country seeking to overthrow the Greek monarchy, while overt
Russian hostility to Turkey was connected with Soviet territorial ambitions in the
region. Blatant Russian coldness toward Turkey manifested itself as early as
September 1944 when Russias Ambassador failed to call on Turkeys new
Foreign Minister, thus underscoring that greater efforts [had] been made on the
Turkish side than on the Soviet side to improve relations.68 Soviet hostility
increased as Anglo-Turkish relations improved after spring 1944; by March
1945, Radio Moscow barraged Turkey daily with criticism and abuse, which the
Foreign Office interpreted as a run-up to Soviet demands regarding the
Bosphorus and Dardenelles (the Straits question).69 Russia duly followed with
a June 1945 demand for bases in the Straits, and the FO concluded by July that
Russia was preparing to challenge [Britains] policy of building up a strong and
independent Greece and Turkey friendly to Great Britain, and at the same time
strengthen the position of their own client in Bulgaria. Britain assumed that this
was primarily intended to preclude Bulgarias isolation, and that a successful
countering by Britain would stop Russian plans. Soviet successes in Greece,
however, would enable them to overthrow the Greek Government and revive
EAM and also to reduce Turkey by a war of nerves to a state where she would be
prepared to give the Soviet Government the bases on the Straits which she has
demanded, and generally to force her into the Russian orbit.70 The JIC still
assumed that Russia would prefer exhausting all peaceful means of realizing its
Turkish ambitions before initiating overt military aggression against Greece from
Bulgaria, but the COS took a more urgent view of Britains predicament: while
the FO assumed that the British Army could commit itself to a defence of the
Greek frontiers, Field-Marshal Sir Alan Brooke stressed that such a change in
policy from strictly internal security duties in Greece would require Cabinet
approval. Britain would moreover have to increase its forces in Greece
considerably. Few of the necessary British Army formations were currently
available in Britain or the Middle East, and the RAF component could only be
secured barring any other Mediterranean threat. Brooke particularly stressed that
Britain might well be seriously embarrassed militarily if [its] bluff were called;
and besides, the risk of conflict with Russian forces would have to be taken
seriously into account in assessing[the] overall military situation.71
As the COS stressed Britains desperate military position, the British Embassy
in Washington found the new Secretary of State, James Byrnes, very much out
of his depth in these South Eastern European problems toward the end of August,
and reluctant to issue simultaneous pronouncements on such matters as this would
merely give [the] Russians needless cause to complain that [America and
Britain] were ganging up on them. The Joint Staff Planners underscored the
danger of American reticence given British military weakness in a September
appreciation requested by the FO which focused on how Russian demands
concerning the Straits permitted further expansion into the eastern Mediterranean
and Middle East, a direct blow against British interests. Russian bases in the
Straits were deemed unacceptable, requiring Britain to prevent such extension
and preserve the status quo. If Britain had American support this threat would be
greatly offset, but the JPS went on to note that [a]t present the attitude the
Americans are likely to take in opposing Russian demands [was] uncertain.72
This doubt was reinforced in a matter of days when the British Embassy in
Washington reiterated that while American rhetoric concerning Russian policy in
Rumania and Bulgaria seemed tougher,
the Administration [was] still most anxious to avoid any semblance of

giving needless offence to the Russians and of thus reviving the accusation
of liberal and left-wing commentariesthat the United States Government

[was] allowing itself to be dragged along in an anti-Soviet policy at the tail
of the British kite. The sensitiveness of the State Department to possible
clamours of nervous camp followers in their rear necessarily complicates
the task of coordinating American policy with our own and lends them at
times to pursue tactics which bear an unfortunate resemblance to the
gallant Duke of York.73
Combined with Americas unreliability was Britains failure to secure Russian

cooperation. This was especially obvious when the Soviets rebuffed Foreign
Secretary Ernest Bevins direct request for mutual frankness in realizing each
countrys aims.74 Such Russian frankness was not forthcoming then or later, and
British concerns about Russian activities grew accordingly.75 A JIC assessment
of the Russian threat to Turkey on 6 October 1945 surveyed Turkish reports of
increased Russian military activity near Turkeys frontiers with Bulgaria and
Russia. As Turkey rejected Russias June demands for bases in the Straits, the
Russians made further territorial claims concerning Anatolia, thus providing two
pre-texts for aggression. The JIC noted that Russia was proceeding as if it were
the sole arbiter of the destiny of south-east European countries, and that Russia
could re-deploy troops from Rumania and Hungary within a matter of weeks for
a direct attack against Turkey. Such an attack was nevertheless considered
unlikely at that time, and the JIC believed that Russian activities were part of its
war of nerves against the Turks as a means of securing their desired concessions
(significantly, this report was circulated to the American JIC on 31 October as
Memorandum for Information 189).76
The FO still noted that such activities rattled the Turks.77 As for the Greek
problem, the COS frankly stated their preferred solution to Britains dilemma on
31 December. The JPS had prepared a paper on 17 December stating the
desirability of American participation in Greece, and the unlikelihood of such
assistance given Americas attitude that Greece was Britains responsibility, and
Americas rapid military demobilization. The JPS therefore did not believe that
there [was] any possibility at present of obtaining American military
participation, but did consider American political and financial help to be
possible.78 The COS seized on this to press the JPS to strengthen the economic
line of argument, apparently in an effort to underscore that Britain had to get
America on its side given Britains inability to shoulder this economic burden
alone (CIGS Lord Alanbrooke explicitly stated the attractiveness of getting
America to realise that their interests were also involved and thereby get them to
share the cost).79
The growing threat to Greece and Turkey was paralleled in another area of
Soviet ambition, namely Persia (later Iran). Persia was a focal point for Anglo-
Russian imperial rivalry dating back to the late-1820s. Russian attempts to
penetrate established British spheresmost notably Indiawere traditionally
based on the idea that shifts in the Near Eastern balance of power would
influence the basic European balance of power. This made Persia a major area of
competition in addition to Central Asia and the Indian frontier itself, and the
ensuing Great Game encompassed the evolution of British intelligence activity
in the region, with a system of consular watching posts coordinated from
Meshed, Persia operating by 1886.80 Anglo-Russian intrigue within Persia would
be the staple in 1945, as it had been in the 1800s, as the Russians again sought to
influence the larger European balance of power in the Near East. Persias
obvious oil potential added to its strategic significance, and this was not lost on
the Russians.81 By October 1944, Persia was resisting Russias demands for oil
concessions to explore and exploit the northern oil-bearing regions, which
naturally introduced considerable tension between the two.82 This led to the
usual Russian methods of intimidation and hostility, summarized by the British
Combined Intelligence Centre Iraq and Persia (CICIP) as follows:
During1945 Russian influence in Persia rapidly achieved a position of

aggressive dominance. This seems to have been accomplished by three
methods. Firstly, by diplomatic manoeuvring, with browbeating of
individuals where necessary. Secondly, by interference in Persian politics
through revolutionary parties, and minority movements, as well as through
a group of Majlis [i.e., parliament] deputies hoping to gain by Russian
success, or collaborating under pressure. Thirdly by armed intervention in
favour of rebels and by military pressure to back diplomacy. By December
[1945] Persias balance of power no longer existed, her internal affairs
were in confusion and her richest province was detached.
Soviet anger over the refusal of oil concessions triggered ultimately unsuccessful
efforts to dominate Southern Persia by controlling its largest industrial centre
through the TUDEH Party. Despite 1942 treaty obligations to remove British
and Russian troops within six months after the end of hostilities, many Red
Army troops were left behind as ostensible civilians. When a tribal revolt broke
out in Azerbaijan on 16 November, the rebels were assisted by Persian ex-
residents of the USSR and by Russian troops in plain clothes. Russian forces
even went so far as to stop the Persian government from sending its own military
to suppress the revolt, thus bluntly ending Persian authority in that province.83
Throughout this campaign, Russia assailed Persia with print and radio assaults
against Britain in an effort to capitalize on British weakness and undermine
British influence.84 These attacks were often imaginative. CICIP noted in August
1945 that the Iran-i-Ma newspaper argued that there would be no change in
British policy as a result of the [July] Labour victory, for as everyone well knew,
the British Empire was ruled by the British Secret Service, and a change of
Government would certainly make for no change in the policy of that sinister
body (CICIP noted that the articles writer had fell foul of the British Security
authorities in 1943 and was subsequently interned).85 Two weeks later it was
revealed that the Freedom Front newspaper conceived the British Conservative
Party as being at the centre of a monstrous spiders-web of intrigue with world-

wide ramifications, the power behind the British Secret Service and the agency
responsible for the training of such fiendish spies as T.E. LAWRENCE; the
recent change of government was merely another plot to lull the Workers of the
World into a false sense of security, and then, from ambush, to strike and destroy
their power forever.86 More serious was the constant Soviet press criticism of
British international policy, domestic social conditions, and the governments
general attitude, including post-election disappointment with the Labour Party
and its dependence on America.87 The implied American support of Britain was
certainly exaggerated concerning Persia as these events were unfolding, since the
British Ambassador to Tehran described his American counterpart, Wallace
Murray, as being ignorant of British policy and actions in the country as late as
November 1945.88 The FO hoped in December that the departing British
Ambassador, Sir Reader Bullard, would make a final attempt to remove some of
Mr Murrays misconceptions about British policy, although it was conceded
that Murray was one of those Americans whose pre-conceived ideas it [would]
be most difficult to shift as Britain tried to communicate its concerns over
Russian actions.89
The August-December 1945 period thus saw British officialdom confront the
reality of Soviet designs on British interests, and the concomitant realization that
Britain could not on its own mollify or contain this aggression without American
help. Britains wartime experience had firmly imprinted in British decision-
makers the judgement that the American connection was Britains most vital last-
ditch strategic asset.90 Britain was essentially in the same position it was in
during 1917 and 1941isolated against a powerful adversary, and looking to
America for deliverance. Britain again had to convince America of its interest in
thwarting Britains rivals.91 With Britains power stretched to the limit, it now
had to overcome Americas naive policy premises, the assumptions of British
deviousness, and the reality of the Soviet threat to fashion another marriage of
necessity.92
That would not be easy in light of prevailing American attitudes about
Britains status as a Great Power and the exercise of American leadership. A
dispatch on American attitudes by Mr John Balfour of Britains Washington
Embassy to Foreign Secretary Bevin on 9 August 1945 stressed how Americans
thought in terms of the Big Two, namely America and Russia. The new reality
of American dominance made it partial to a faith in the magic of large words; an
enthusiastic belief that the mere enunciation of an abstract principle is equivalent
to its concrete fulfillment; a tendency to overlook the practical difficulties that
obstruct the easy solution of current problems; and a constant disposition to
prefer the emotional to the rational approach, all of which would provoke
impatience with the more stolid, disillusioned and pragmatic British, and to give
rise to current misunderstandings between [the] two Governments. America still
held Britain in considerable esteem, but this tended to assume the apparently
ineradicable idea that nature has endowed the British with a well-nigh
inexhaustible store of superior cunning, of which they are only too prone to make
the fullest possible use in international affairs. Americans thus tended to
criticize British policy by way of a number of ugly catch-wordse.g. balance
of power, Spheres of Influence, reactionary imperialist trends, colonial
aggression, old-world guile, diplomatic double-talk, Uncle Sam [the] Santa
Claus and sucker, and the like. Britain could counter this tendency provided it
referred to a typically American yard-stick such as moral responsibility,
idealism, or leadership. For the time-being, Americans were still likely to rate
Russia as more important than Britain, and trust in the ability of Truman and
Byrnes to succeed in resolving Soviet and American differences on a basis of
honorable compromise to secure a world that rotates in two orbits of power.
Americans expected that British foreign policy in Europe or the Middle East
would likely embark on ill-advised courses which in the last analysis might
constitute a threat to US security, so America would enforce Britains junior
status. The British government thus had to be careful to formulate requests for
their support in such a manner as to avoid teaching the Americans where their
best interests lie. As men who themselves preferred] the simple forthright
approach, the Americans appreciate[d] plain speaking in others, and were best
approached not so much on the grounds of sentiment as upon lucidly argued
appeals to reason and the logic of hard fact. Success in this method would then
enable Britain once again to save Europe by [its] example.93
This survey succinctly stated the ideal methodology for Britains appeal to
America regarding the Soviet threat during the first cold warthe reliance on
hard fact to make Americans see the light. Some FO officials still assumed that
Britain could simply make shrewd use of Americas dependence on the British
Commonwealths geographical dominance in Americas own security zone to
turn their immensely superior power to [Britains] benefit as well as to that of the
world as a whole; but the FOs North American Department heartily share [d]
Balfours advice, and successfully recommended its circulation to King George
VI and the Cabinet.94 Americans appreciate realism in others even if they do not
always display it themselves, and this realism was implicit in Britains
associating America with its Middle Eastern interests, instead of trying to
preserve an exclusive position which would threaten to bring [Britain] into
conflict with their interests. The Americans would also be impressed by
evidence of [Britains] old ability to judge important issues with the experience
and objectivity which they have learnt to expectand to give wise council when
the atmosphere is over-charged with emotional tension.95
Intelligence could play a central role in realizing these objectivesshared as
they were by the highest echelons of the military and the Foreign Officeto
convince Americas government of the reality of Soviet aggression against
British, and ultimately American, interests. The circulation of British intelligence
to Americas JIC, JCS, and State Department throughout 194546 demonstrates
the heretofore unacknowledged intelligence dimension of the process by which
America came to ally herself with Britain and confront Russia. Although it has
only been assumed in some quarters that the system of Anglo-American

intelligence pooling established during the Second World War
remained unchanging and constant, it can in fact be clearly demonstrated that
Britain worked hard to foster the intelligence link during the first cold war as a
means of getting British information and viewpoints injected into the American
strategic concept.96
This is particularly reflected in the evolution of the US JICs various
assessments of Anglo-Soviet relations throughout this period.97 The US Joint
Intelligence Staff assessed post-war Soviet capabilities and intentions in January
1945 as being essentially benign by force of circumstance. The devastating
personnel and economic losses sustained in the war with Germany (estimated as
involving a ten million drop in population and a 25 per cent destruction of all
major branches of the Russian economy) were understandably expected to curb
any expansionist desires until at least 1952. Economic reconstruction to raise
Russias standard of living was considered Stalins top priority. This would
necessarily reduce Russian military expenditures, while the 1945 pool of
military-age males was slightly less than in 1941. There would be no stomach for
international adventurism or further war, only for domestic needs and
achievements.98 An addendum on Soviet foreign policy by regions predicted that
it was unlikely for Russia to try to extend its influence in Greece; that it would
not demand control of the Straits since it would not risk war with Britain; and
that there was little chance of Anglo-Russian conflict in Persia since British
interests were concentrated in the south, with Russian interests in the north.99
The JIC accepted this analysis for general concurrence as JIC 250/1, and
explicitly concluded in their own JIC 250/2 that [i]n order to accomplish
maximum economic recovery, the Soviet Union must avoid conflict with Great
Britain and the United States, or even such tension as would lead to an
armaments race, at least until after 1952. The JIC believed that Russia would in
fact follow such a policy unless it conceived its vital interests relating to national
security to be threatened.100 The US Joint Intelligence Staff then assessed
British capabilities and intentions on 10 May 1945 as being shaped by an envy
and resentment of America and Russia, and by an inferiority complex regarding
Britains relative weakness. British foreign policy would be determined more by
US or Soviet actions than British preferences. Although Britain might be tempted
to play off America against Russia, Anglo-American friendship would be its
paramount goal in conjunction with its traditional reliance on balance of power
and spheres of influenceeven though they have proved disastrous in the past
to offset Russias domination of Europe. Britains irrational fear of the
Bolshevik menace could lead to conflict with Russia, assuming American military
support for Britain; but as matters stood, the Soviets were not a threat in Greece,
British weakness would make Britain probably acquiesce in modifications to the
Montreux Convention governing the Straits question, while Britain would likely
be reduced to preserving its declining fortunes in Persia by holding on to the
south.101 Americas JIC/JIS thus largely subscribed to the view of a peaceful
Russia and a fading, yet Machiavellian, Britain as the European war ended. The
underlying assumptions of American policy were clearly manifest in Americas
main strategic assessment mechanism. Weak British conservatism and a powerful,
but inward-looking USSR could be managed by America. There was little
potential for serious trouble in the Near East.
The US JIC found cause to reassess matters throughout 1945, however. The
JIS transmitted an analysis of Soviet capabilities to the JCS on behalf of the JIC
on 29 November 1945 that considered Soviet political aims and capabilities for
expanding the Soviet sphere of influence by means short of war through 1
January 1948, and Russias ability to support a major war. The JIS concluded
that Russias economy was likely to remain incapable of supporting a war over
the coming five years, thus making Russia likely to avoid the risks of such a war
during that period. Russia would nevertheless pursue the aim of establishing
Soviet hegemony in peripheral areas. Russia maintained an as yet unrealized
ability to foment civil strife in Greece, and its goals in Turkey were confined to
revising the Straits question and neutralizing Turkey as a base for hostile action
against Russia. Russia was unlikely to expand its influence in Persia as this
would risk an open break with Britain.102 This assessment of Soviet activities
emphasized the idea that Russia was only seeking to consolidate its recent
peripheral acquisitions. A 31 January 1946 analysis assumed that Russia was not
prepared to risk deliberately a major conflict with the other Great Powers;
however, a conflict could result from Soviet miscalculation as to the point
beyond which she [could not] aggressively pursue these aims without directly
provoking Anglo-American military reaction, or from an incident, involving a
minor power such as Turkey, which might produce indirectly a British, and
subsequently a US military reaction. It was nevertheless still a substantial
revision of the US JICs earlier assumptions about Russias potential aggression,
and is noteworthy given the circulation of the British JICs October report on the
looming threat to Turkey discussed above, and the recent Soviet annexation of
Azerbaijan.103 The British dimension of the strategic equation was explicitly
covered within a week after this report when the US JIC surveyed British
capabilities under the assumptions that Russia would attempt to extend her
present boundaries or spheres of influence by military action, and that Britain
would resist these efforts either with direct US military assistance, or with lend-
lease or similar support short of war. In this detailed analysis, Britain was
specifically judged incapable of unilaterally stopping a Soviet seizure of Greece,
Turkey or Persia through to 1948, and could not by herself protect the Suez Canal
against Russian attack after 1952. The report specifically noted that Russian
interest in the eastern Mediterranean/Near East focused on these areas, Vitally
important and absolutely necessary to Britain.104
The JIC was now a good deal less smug about the prospects of Russian
cooperativeness, or Britains irrational exaggeration of the Bolshevik menace.
The increased receipt of British assessments from the British Joint Staff Mission
(BJSM) in Washington seems to have been significant to this change in
perceptions. The BJSM forwarded to the US JIC a report on 15 May 1946

concerning Russian Troop Movements in South-East Europe and Persia (with a
request that the British JIC origin of the enclosure be not disclosed in any
subsequent use made of the report or the material therein).105 This was followed
by a detailed British report on Russias strategic interests and intentions in the
Middle East in June (which stressed Russias overt aim to weaken Britain
specifically); an updated analysis of the same topic in July; and a British report
on the situation in Persia on 5 August.106 These reports clearly had an impact. By
25 September, the Director of US Naval Intelligence noted the receipt of these
reports, and the fact that the US JIC had never reciprocated. If the US JIC wished
to continue receiving Britains JIC estimates, it had to be on an exchange basis,
lest the source dry up. There were many places, particularly parts of Europe, the
Near East, and the Middle East, where Britains information sources were
superior to Americas, and given the [existing] world situation, it was
obviously desirable that the US JIC continue to receive such estimates.107
Britains concerted effort at making American strategic assessors aware of
British conclusions, and their empirical basis, is clear. The passage of British JIC
reports to their US counterpart was obviously in keeping with the
aforementioned dictum that the Americans appreciated plain-speaking grounded
in fact, and the change in US JIC analyses, coupled with the real desire to maintain
that flow of British intelligence, demonstrates its effectiveness.
Such efforts were not confined to strategic assessments, however. OSS and
SSU were also privy to critical British intelligence sources on specific details of
Russian activities inimical to British interests, and these were in turn circulated
throughout American military and diplomatic channels in Europe during 1945
46. Despite R&As negative views of Britain relative to Russia (and its July 1944
dismissal of the Communist threat in Greece as greatly exaggerated), OSS
itself provided the means of overcoming the obviously widespread US scepticism
about the Soviet-British equation evidenced at wars end in Europe.108
Immediately upon Germanys defeat, OSS assets in the ETO were concentrated
in the German outpost while London remained the chief liaison conduit. This
was of particular importance to SI/London, which was primarily engaged in
maintaining its link with SIS. SI/Londons Reports and Registry section
strengthened the efficiency of liaison and intelligence exchanges with
Broadways Special Liaison Control Section at the end of 1944, thus improving
the flow of mutual queries and comments.109 It was explicitly noted by mid-
January 1945 that Broadways policy in giving [SI] political intelligence appear
[ed] liberal. Maintaining this exchange was one of OSS/Londons vital tasks,
especially since SIS was one of the few good sources of German political
material.110 The intelligence exchange stayed greatly to [SIs] advantage
throughout the rest of January, with [m]ore frequent meetings between
Broadway and OSS planned by the end of February.111 Fourteen Broadway
reports were received on Russian Air Force matters during both February and
March, although military and economic reports dropped.112 SI suspected that SIS
was holding out on its military (not political) reporting from Germany during the
MarchApril period, but as indicated in Chapter 7, this was due to the paucity of
Broadways sources in Germany, not non-cooperation.113 What Broadway did
circulate was still instructive: 23 Balkan political reports, with 19 Greek items
being of particular interest.114
With wars end, SIs customer list was cut drastically, but still included the
various American embassies in Europe.115 By June 1945, SI/London was
primarily involved in establishing an Economic Intelligence Desk tasked with
producing and developing clandestine methods of intelligence on all matters
dealing with the concealment and flight of enemy held capital for post-
hostilities Nazi activities, code-named SAFE HAVEN; SAFE HAVEN counter-
intelligence matters were X-2s preserve.116 As OSS commenced liquidation
throughout Europe, SIS was still keen to maintain the flow of information with
SI/London: Broadway especially requested assurance that OSS would continue
as an intelligence agency; SIS moreover evidenced particular interest in
intelligence reports on Russia, for reasons that are by now self-evident.117 SI/
Londons Reports and Registry Section was accordingly orientated toward being
chiefly an intelligence relay center, with its original report processing
minimalized. Such an internal set-up was considered as good an arrangement as
[could] presently be worked out to meet the attitude of Broadway.118 This was a
significant factor given OSS/Londons view that its Broadway connection was
important as a contact between the American and British Governments on a
plane not duplicated by any other American agency.119
After the London mission was renamed OSS/Great Britain on 12 July 1945,
the flow of Broadway intelligence increased as SI was better able to develop the
proceduresto give these materials the special handling required for their
dissemination outside SI.120 By months end, SI had received 62 reports from SIS
(18 more than during June), half of which concerned Greece and Yugoslavia. For
its part, Broadways interest in OSS reports continue[d] to center in Russian
activities in the Balkans and Near East.121 British goals were thus obvious: to
receive, and draw attention to, as much information as possible concerning those
areas of evolving strategic import to Britain relative to Russia. By August, SIs
liaison with SIS enabled it to [d]isseminate the information received from the
above source to the Commanding General, US F[orces]E[uropean] T[heater], the
US Embassy [London], the [rest of] OSS, and other authorized US Government
departments and agencies. It was stressed that a close relationship [had] been
established withSIS, which [had] been and [would] continue to be productive
of valuable results.122 Notably, the Broadway political reports [were] now
being gotten up by the London office in disseminations for top American
customers in Europe, including the US Embassy in London and other OSS
missions in Europe. Such reports had not until then been available for such reuse
by SI, and their content indicates the reason for the change of policy: out of 76
Broadway reports, 34 were on Russia, and 15 on the Balkans, with report S-716
revealing the Turkish Presidents reaction to Russian demands (London found
out in September that OSS/Cairo and OSS/Athens were also receiving British
reports on the Near East and Greece).123 OSS was in fact the only American
channel for receipt of general SIS political reports and LAMDA (apparently
economic) material concerning Europe, and considered Broadways Most Secret
Political series as being
reports of recognized high calibre, valuable both for substantive

information and as disclosing intelligence supplied by British Service to
FO and Service Departments, and thus providing base for deductions as to
British FO intentions. Arrangements now work out to make these available
to top US officials London[,] Washington and other posts.124
This increase in the type and quantity of Broadway reports constituted SIs
chief activity in combination with an effort to establish closer relations with the
[US] Ambassador in London. OSS/Great Britains chief, Colonel John A.
Bross, accordingly took a selective group of Broadway political reports to the
Ambassador personally with a view to familiarizing him as much as possible
with the important material available to the mission.125 The establishment of
closer working relations with the Embassy [was] achieved as SIs circulation of
SIS political reports began in earnest, just as OSS faced disbandment.126 During
September, SI submitted daily reports to the American Delegation to the Council
of Foreign Ministers as Broadways reports had increased in importance, variety,
and volume. This intelligence was ascribed a high value as it emanated, in most
cases, directly from the countries concerned rather than from emigre circles in
the United Kingdom. All told, SI servicing of the Embassy was maintained in
the customary way with material of special interest being routed directly to the
Ambassador.127 X-2 was similarly tasked in relation to counter-intelligence
matters, the significance of which is obvious given the emerging evidence of
Russian espionage noted earlier:
X-2 London serves as American counterpart to counter-intelligence section

MI-6. Sole channel obtain British CI material relative outside Western
Hemisphere for use American armies, State Department and authorized
American agencies. By British rule certain categories info obtainable only
by maintenance liaison at British HQ London. [X-2] also operates and
controls CI War Room, formerly SHAEF [see Chapter 7], with British
special services for benefit [military CI] staffs Germany and Austria[A]
ssurance complete acquisition for American use of all CI records in British
and French zones of occupation. Serves American Embassy and Attaches
on special request.128
X-2s reciprocal exchange with MI6(V) was itself a function of the British
assumption that they were dealing with a permanent opposite number parallel in
character to themselves.129 The September 1945 defection of Igor Gouzenko in
Ottawa, his information on Soviet intelligence ciphers, and their role in revealing
further intelligence on Russian espionage (codenamed VENONA) would later
provide a significant amount of CI material for exchange by this reliable route.130
The end of OSS did not signal any change in these developments. The final
report from OSS/Great Britain explicitly noted that
[d]espite the uncertainty as to the immediate future of OSS and the form of
any successor organization, representatives of this Mission, in their
dealings with SIS, have continued to express their confidence that a
successor organization was in process of formation which would take over
the functions and probably some of the existing personnel of OSS as it is
presently constituted. The situation was explainedto Commander Arnold
Foster, in an off-the-record conversation[,] and C was informed of the
content of Mr Chestons cable explaining the incorporation of OSS into the
War Department as an agency directly responsible to the assistant
Secretary of War.131
Enter the Strategic Services Unit. Under the direction of Brigadier-General John
Magruder (formerly OSS Deputy-Director of Intelligence), and without definite
guarantees concerning its future, SSU preserved those parts of OSS with
potential utility for a future permanent intelligence service, notably SI and
X-2.132 Continuing the SIS intelligence exchanges was therefore a top priority of
SSU/Great Britains small SI and X-2 staff. With the transition from OSS to SSU,
there was a well-established procedure in place for disseminating Broadway
political reports to the American Embassy in London, and to the SSU missions in
Paris, Germany, Salzburg, Rome, and Cairo for further distribution to their
military and diplomatic customers, all under the cryptonym WARWICK/
COVENTRY. WARWICK/COVENTRY reports were given modified
introductions to avoid disclosing SIS as the source, and to remove SSU one step
from Broadways informants. Distribution was strictly limited: five to seven
copies went to London consumers, including the Ambassador and Embassy
Counsellor, both of whom were personally briefed on the meaning of the
WARWICK/COVENTRY cryptonym; ten copies went to the American Zone in
Germany, including General Lucius Clay (the Commanding General), his chief of
intelligence, the G-2 and G-3 of American forces in Europe, and the American
Ambassador (all but the G-3 were briefed on the cryptonym); and six copies went
to Paris for the French, Dutch, and Belgian US Embassies.133 This procedure was
then disrupted throughout October-December 1945. SSU continued to receive
high-quality Broadway reportsespecially LAMDA economic reports, as well
as November material on Russia and its activities in the Near East (the latter
were courtesy of Broadways regional Inter-Services Liaison Department
[ISLD]), and increasing December coverage of Turkey and Soviet-Turkish
relationsby a source whose judgement and information [was] regarded by
Broadway as very reliablebut SI could not give them external dissemination
except in very special instances.134 This restriction evidently reflected

Broadways concern for SSUs continued existence, but by December, SIS said
they would assume SSUs continuation.135 X-2 for its part was still disseminating
CI reports to the State Department concerning Soviet activity in Greece, while
Russian activities in Iran continue[d] to occupy [X-2s] attention, despite X-2
lacking a representative in Persia itself.136
The significance of the WARWICK/COVENTRY material may be gauged by
Brigadier-General Magruders dissemination of some May October 1945
reports to the US service intelligence chiefs in December.137 When G-2 insisted
on receiving these reports without restriction, Magruder promptly replied with
details of their sensitivity.138 Magruder indicated the importance of these reports
to SSU when he stated that this information was obtained under very particular
conditions, not of [SSUs] making, which severely restricted] dissemination to
specified recipients at a very high level. In order to maintain available this
source [G-2] should appreciate the importance of handling this material with the
degree of caution consistent with our obligations to [the] source. Their
comprehensive significance was further revealed by the headings under which
they were listed: NavalRussian Fleets, Order of Battle, Naval Training
Establishments; Shipping and WaterwaysRoutes, Waterways, Ports,
Shipbuilding, Merchant Shipping; MilitaryKey Personnel of First Battle Front,
Troop Movements; EconomicPower Stations, Engineering Works; Aviation
Production; MiscellaneousPolitical-Economic.139
G-2 was eventually satisfied, and Naval Intelligence expressed its particular
appreciation for the data.140 SSU followed this up in January 1946 with order of
battle information on Russian armoured units from the secret intelligence
agency of a foreign countryin a peculiarly favourable situation for obtaining
such information, and a report on Russia and the Baltic from a source rated
high because of the critical evaluation applied by this [foreign, i.e. British]
agency to its own reports.141 The military import of this selection disseminated
to Washington was significant at a time when the US JIC was seeking to ensure
its receipt of such data (noted earlier). The US Armys G-2 confirmed this when
he expressed how he greatly appreciated the information on Russian armoured
units, and stressed his desire to receive any similar intelligence SSU could
obtain.142
A further factor concerning the attractiveness of British reports involved the
superior reach of British intelligence at a time when SSU was unable to conduct
intelligence collection operations on Broadways scale. OSS had particularly
noted the effective functioning of British intelligence in Persia as early as June
1945. ISLD apparently used numerous friends and sympathizers among the land
owning and merchant class as well as a large body of pensioners, hangers-on and
poorer people who [had] received benefits from them. Moslem hostility to
Russian anti-religious attitudes may also have been a factor in fostering
sufficient cooperation with ISLD.143 Even more important was British SIGINTs
potential: at a GHQ Middle East conference held on 11 June 1946, the Brigadier
General Staff (Intelligence) noted that Arabic ciphers [could] be broken locally;
Russian ciphers [were] dealt with in London, the new home for GCHQ. This
source would have revealed much of the information SSU received from
Broadway, especially on order of battle, troop movements, logistics, and
depending on the ciphers broken, political-diplomatic material as well.144
With such sources available to SIS, it was fortuitous that SSU/Great Britains
ability to circulate Broadway reports among its American customers resumed in
January 1946. SSU disseminated Broadway reports on Turkey to the US
Embassy in London, stating explicitly that they came from an experienced
observer, [and would] merit [the Embassys] special attention.145 For its part,
SSU told the American Ambassador to Britain that it did not regard it as a mere
accident that such political information had reached them with a remarkable
degree of consistency. It [was], after all, presumed by [their] British opposite
number [i.e., SIS] that this information [would] ultimately reach the proper
quarters in the American Government.146
Broadway reports on Russian interest in Greek affairs, conditions in
Lithuania, and Turko-Russian relations then followed.147 By February, the
prospect of exchanging SAFE HAVEN material with SIS was explored as past
experience indicated that the FOs Economic Division was very keen on this
type of information, and SSU hoped that this would secure even more Broadway
material.148 SSU-SIS relations on the working level continue[d] on the best of
terms throughout March, and Broadways allowance for a fairly liberal
exchange of questions as to given subjects and areas was particularly
appreciated. It was further hoped that an increase in American intelligence to
Britain would allow SSU to press for even more British reports.149 There was
evidently no lack of American enthusiasm for Broadways product, and the
quality and quantity of reports exchanged with SIS during April improved. X-2
was increasing its CI disseminations at this time by about 10 per cent over
February (X-2 also operated by early March 1946 its own clandestine link into
Russia through a White Russian group which worked for the Germans).150
SSU further noted in May that Americas delegation to the April Paris
Conference of Foreign Ministers had been entirely dependent on SSU for the
type of information procured by clandestine means which [it] had been able to
provide.151 The level of exchanges with SIS continued at a similar pace
throughout the summer. SSUs June collection of Broadway reports totalled 145,
while those for July numbered 279.152 By September, SSU conceded its
complete reliance on a dozen ISLD reports for intelligence on Persia given the
lack of SSU sources there, and noted that only one SSU man remained in Turkey.153
The cumulative effects of these intelligence acquisitions were very real. For
one thing, British reports helped erode the American reticence to address
intelligence on Russia. One frustrated SSU officer noted in March 1946 that the
fear to deal openly with the Russian question [had] permeated down to all levels
of the government to a degree that it [was] considered poor taste and an
infraction of some ephemeral rule to speak out specifically or concretely on
matters dealing with Russia. Despite the desperation of American consumers

for information, any information, concerning Russian activities, they [had] at
the same time clothed their requests for this information in the garb of unofficial
or personal queries.154 These attitudes changed as events unfolded over spring
1946 given Americas growing realization of Russias challenge to the status quo
post bellumespecially in Persiaculminating with a hardening American
attitude toward Russia in February, and Winston Churchills freelance call for
Anglo-American unity of interest against Russias unfolding Iron Curtain at
Fulton, Missouri on 5 March.155 Fraser Harbutt credits Trumans interactions
with Churchill in early February as the pivot of Americas reorientation before
the overt diplomatic confrontation over Russias grasping for Persia at the end of
March. He gives particular emphasis to the effect of Churchills Fulton oratory
on American public opinion and Josef Stalin in equal measure.156 These events
were doubtless explicit realizations of Americas entry into the cold war as
Russia backed down and evacuated Persia, but it must be conceded that the
empirical basis for the change in US policy was clearly influenced by the months
of hard British intelligence on Russian activities in the main Near Eastern areas
of concern obtained through the US JIC in Washington, and OSS/SSU in
London. Truman entered the Oval Office relying more on the State Department
than his predecessor, and what Bruce Kuniholm terms the inadvertent education
of the State Department by British influence thus had a crucial intelligence
component as detailed above.157 Indeed, it has already been seen how SSU
explicitly noted the State Departments reliance on its intelligence of British
origin during the April 1946 Paris Council of Foreign Ministers, during which
America diplomatically held firm against Russia over Persia.158 By May, the
Foreign Office was also able to note with pardonable satisfaction that Mr
Byrnes has sounder views on Turkey than he had some months ago, and that the
Americans were now fully alive to [the] importance of Turkeys position and
their interest in Turkey was real and would be maintained; combined with his
new grasp of Communism in Greece, one FO official concluded that Byrnes was
looking up all round.159
It is therefore plainly evident that the British had, within the space of a year,
helped convince America of the reality of Soviet adventurism, and the unity of
interest between the two western powers. The FOs faith in the logic of hard
fact, continuously provided in the form of SIS intelligence reports, had been
borne out. This interpretation directly contradicts that popularized by Daniel
Yergin concerning the basis of Americas reaction to Soviet post-war foreign
policy. Yergin envisages American perceptions dominated by a set of Riga
axioms erroneously characterizing the USSR as an expansionist hostile power.
Combined with an inflexible doctrine of national security, the institutions of a
National Security State then emerged to elevate military confrontation over
diplomacy.160 The reality of Britains first cold war, and the evolution of
Americas response in the face of objective fact, clearly offers a sounder
conceptualization of both the genesis of Americas confrontation with Stalin, and
the origins of post-war US intelligence. This reality moreover complements

Melvyn Lefflers conception of a Truman presidency independently motivated
by fears and uncertainty concerning American security and relative power to
confront Russia. Leffler credits Truman and his high policy advisers with a prompt
and distinctly American reaction to the emerging global Russian threat.161
Lefflers portrait of realistic, prudent men shedding Rooseveltian optimism while
responding to an imminent challenge to American power is convincing, but it
defines this response as being largely intuitive. It is in fact more likely that such
men were particularly open to hard proof of Russias challenge to the postwar
order, with British intelligence ultimately confirming the Truman
administrations budding unease with Russia, and defining the ensuing rivalry
with Stalin in terms that reflected both British and American concerns, not
Americas alone.
Anglo-American intelligence relations had thus turned full circle back to the
point where the American mission in London was primarily involved with
obtaining British reports on matters of mutual strategic import which SI could not
as yet covermirroring the early days of OSS/London (see Chapters 23). This
was significant as Americaas intelligence capacity evolved into the Central
Intelligence Agency in preparation for waging the cold war. After Truman
dissolved OSS, the War Department pursued the question of establishing a
permanent modern US intelligence system. This would encompass the JICs
strategic assessment function, and SSUs intelligence collection role. After some
study, it endorsed the basic JCS proposal for a National Intelligence Authority
overseeing a Central Intelligence Agency, with SSU transferred to that agency as
the repository of Americas existing capacity for intelligence collection and
counter-intelligence.162 The Bureau of the Budget drafted an elaborate rival plan
under the uncertain auspices of the State Department in November, but by
December, Truman lost his patience with the whole matter.163 Truman then
personally reviewed the competing State-JCS plans on 27 December, decided
emphatically in favour of the JCS plan, and ordered its execution.164 A National
Intelligence Authority was then established and directed by Truman to create an
inter-departmental Central Intelligence Group consisting of various State, War,
and Navy components under a Director of Central Intelligence pending the
necessary legislation to create a Central Intelligence Agency.165 SSUs
intelligence/counter-intelligence functions were then transferred to CIG on 2
April, which broadly ran SSU through the War Department while SSU/Great
Britain continued to receive Broadway reports for dissemination to American
consumers as indicated above.166 The US JIC also formed an Intelligence
Advisory Board (IAB) for overseeing the processes of intelligence estimates and
intelligence direction, but IAB and CIG eventually gave way to a Central
Intelligence Agency finally combining the elements of strategic assessment,
intelligence collection, and overseas counter-intelligence on 26 July 1947.167
This particularly American conception of intelligence had ultimately grown
out of the largely accidental situation whereby the US JIC exercised an interim
strategic assessment function, and SSU preserved an intelligence gathering

capacity that had shown its worth by liaising with SIS. The value of SSUs
intelligence acquisitions spoke volumes about the relevance of such sources to
Americas post-war statecraft, and this more than William Donovans aggressive
lobbying helped secure a place for professional intelligence-gathering in the eyes
of the US government and military. Moreover, as America joined Britain in the
cold war, American intelligence was firmly bound to its British counterpart in
what would be a central component of the North Atlantic alliance over the next
five decades, continuing a partnership conceived in London during 1941. In a
world where Great Power confrontation had potentially
catastrophic consequences, the cold wars intelligence dimension gave Britain a
strong role in confronting Russia, and a secure place in the western alliance that
belied its otherwise weak resources. The Anglo-American intelligence
relationship had thus played some part in preparing America to be a superpower,
and in cushioning the effects of Britains decline.
NOTES
1. See Eden to Churchill, 23 November 1944, CAB 79/83; COS (45), 190th Mtg,
Minute 2, 2 August 1945, CAB 79/37; JP (45) 235 (S) (T of R), 2 September 1945,
CAB 84/75; COS (45) 263rd Mtg, Minute 3, regarding COS (45) 638 (O), 31
October 1945, CAB 79/41; JP (45) 304 (S) (T of R), 5 December 1945, CAB 84/77;
all in PRO.
2. Jackson report, British Intelligence System, Donovan Papers, USAMHI, pp. 11 n.
4, 1819, 40 (on GCHQ successes credited to SIS), 49, (on JIB).
3. Draft Question and Answer, attached to Chancellor of the Exchequer to Prime
Minister, 8 June 1945, and Churchills reply in Churchill to Chancellor of the
Exchequer, 11 June 1945, all in PREM 4/1619, PRO.
4. See JIC (45) 293 (Final), Manpower Requirements for Post-War Intelligence
Organisations, 13 October 1945, CAB 79/40, PRO.
5. Jackson, British Intelligence System, pp. 624.
6. Ibid.
7. Evill Report, COS (47) 231 (O), 8 November 1947, quoted and commented on in
Intelligence Organisation, 5 July 1950, prepared on instructions of the Ministry of
Defence to the COS, DEFE 11/349, PRO.
8. Donovan to President, 18 November 1944, covering letter dated 23 February 1945,
9. Suspicions of JCS in Donovan to President, 23 February 1945, frames 4056, Reel
1, Entry 190, RG 226, NARA; see the Memorandum for the Record by Thomas
Troy on his telephone conversation with former high-ranking FBI official William
C. Sullivan, 23 December 1974 (misdated 1954), Folder 56, Box 7, Troy Papers,
RG 263, NARASullivan states that the FBI leaked the Donovan memo, and that
Trohan pliantly published it according to FBI wishes given compromising
information about his son in the FBIs possession.
10. Donovan to JCS, 15 February 1945, frames 40913, and Donovan to JCS, 22
February 1945, frames 4078, Reel 1, Entry 190, RG 226, NARA.
11. Donovan to Truman, 13 September 1945, frame 455, Reel 1, Entry 190, RG 226,
NARA.
12. See also Leonard Mosley, Dulles: A Biography of Eleanor, Allen, and John Foster
Dulles and Their Family Network (New York: The Dial Press, 1978), p. 295.
13. Magruder to Donovan, 1 October 1943, Folder 35, Box 5, Troy Papers, RG 263,
NARA; Magruder comment to Rogers dated 30 November 1943, in Troy (ed.),
Wartime Washington, p. 184; (cf. Col E.F.Connoly to Donovan, 23 November
1944, frames 12713, Reel 77, Entry 190, RG 226, NARA, suggesting placing the
various branches under staff officers (D-1 to D-5) responsible for personnel,
intelligence, operations, services, and communications.
14. Donovan to Magruder, 3 April 1944, Folder 35, Box 5, Troy Papers, RG 263,
NARA.
15. Rogers diary entry for 8 June 1943, Troy (ed.), Wartime Washington, p. 107; Bruce
comment from Stanley P.Lovell, Of Spies and Stratagems (Englewood Cliffs:
Prentice-Hall, 1963), p. 19see also p. 177.
16. Antipathy, Cave Brown, Last Hero, pp. 7913; bureaucratic standing, Rhodri
Jeffreys-Jones, CIA, p. 250; see also Danny D.Jansen and Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones,
The Missouri Gang and the CIA, in Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones and Andrew Lownie
(eds), North American Spies: New Revisionist Essays (Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press, 1991), pp. 124, 1279.
17. Bradley F.Smith, A Note on the OSS, Ultra, and World War IIs Intelligence
Legacy for America, Defense Analysis 3, 2 (June 1987), pp. 1868, citing Truman
to the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy held in the Harry S.Truman Presidential
Library; see also Bradley F.Smith, The OSS and Record Group 226: Some
Perspectives and Prospects, in Chalou (ed.), Secrets, pp. 3646, and B.F.Smith,
Ultra-Magic, pp. 21114, where Smith stresses the cost-effectiveness of SIGINT
while ignoring the question of coordinated strategic assessments, which lay at the
heart of the post-war intelligence debate; see also Christopher Andrew, The
Growth of the Australian Intelligence Community and the Anglo-American
Connection, Intelligence and National Security 4, 2 (April 1989), p. 223.
18. Ludwell Lee Montague MS, General Walter Bedell Smith as Director of Central
Intelligence, I, pp. iv, 3642, RG 263, NARA; on the US JIC, see also JIC 76/4,
Revision of the JIC Charter, 23 February 1944, frames 75876, Reel 12, Entry
95; JCS 85/1/D, JIS Charter, 26 May 1944, frames 2224, Reel 5, Entry 190; both
in RG 226, NARA.
19. Ludwell Montague, Memorandum for the Record, 1 December 1969, on
Intelligence Service, 19401950, with attached appendix of recollections, pp. 19
27, Folder HS/HC 401, Box 2, History Source Collection of the CIA Historical
Staff, RG 263, NARA.
20. Ibid., and Montague MS, Smith.
21. Montague MS, Smith, p. 41; see also Henry L.Stimson, and McGeorge Bundy,
On Active Service in Peace and War (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948), p.
455.
22. Montague MS, Smith, pp. 1, 41.
23. Donovan to Truman, 13 September 1945, frame 455, and Donovan to JCS, 13
September 1945, frame 456; Donovan to Harold D.Smith, Director, Bureau of the
Budget, 13 September 1945, frames 4589 (including the claim of British imitation
of OSS); all in Reel 1, Entry 190, RG 226, NARA; see also William H.Jackson to
James Forrestal, 14 November 1945, Folder HS/HC 400, Box 2, History Source
Collection of the CIA History Staff, RG 263, NARA.
24. Bamford, Palace, pp. 6881.
25. See for example B.F.Smith, Ultra-Magic, pp. 219, 225, 227; Andrew, Secret
Service, p. 492.
26. IRIS, Troy, Donovan, pp. 302, 337; R&A Monthly Report to the Outposts 130
September 1945, 5 September [read October] 1945, Folder Miscellaneous
Outpost Stuff, Box 2, Entry 39, RG 226, NARA; see below, n. 31, on SO.
27. OSS Functions in Germany, attached to Col Forgan to Brig.-Gen. Cornelius
Wickersham, 11 August 1944, Folder 347, Box 225, Entry 190, RG 226, NARA;
see also Maj.-Gen. J.F.M.Whiteley, ACoS G-2 SHAEF, to Maj.-Gen. J.A.Sinclair,
DMI, WO 219/1667, PRO concerning proposals for security in Germany, and
including the views of C and MI5s Director-General, Sir David Petrie.
28. JCS 1035, 6 September 1944, frames 3213, Reel 5; Overall and Special Programs
for Strategic Services Activities in the European Theater of Operations Post-
Hostilities Period, 26 February 1945, Folder 153, Box 212see also Tab A, JPS
610 D, frames 387402, Reel 5, and MO to SI, The Importance of Counter-
measures against German Black during the Period of Occupation, Folder 253,
Box 221; all in Entry 190, RG 226, NARA.
29. Over-All and Special Programs for Strategic Services Activities in Germany
during the Occupation Period, 14 August 1945, frames 34856see also
organization of OSS/Germany c. June 1945, frame 443; both in Reel 132, Entry
116; Proposal for OSS Unit in Germany, 1 May 1945, Folder 2077, Box 120,
30. See the SHAEF JIC reports over April-May 1945 in frames 61729, 64857, Reel
15, Entry 190, RG 226, NARA; see also James Lucas, Kommando: German
Special Forces of World War Two (London: Grafton, 1986), pp. 284312.
31. Special Operations Program for Germany, 10 December 1944, Folder 61, Box
220, Entry 92; SO Branch Progress Report for 130 June 1945, dated 26 June
1945, Folder 14, Box 6, and SO Branch Progress Report for 131 August 1945,
dated 1 September 1945, Folder 28, Box 7, both in Entry 99; X-2 vs. SO plan in
N.H. Pearson to F.O.Canfield, 30 October 1944, Folder 1, Box 50, Entry 115; all in
RG 226, NARA.
32. R&A/Germany Progress Report, 131 August 1945, dated 1 September 1945,
Folder Germany, Box 16, Entry 1, RG 226, NARA; scrutinized, Counter-
Intelligence Directive, Pre-Surrender Period, Germany, 16 September 1944, WO
208/4421, PRO; see also the disjointed memoir of an OSS member detailed to
collecting such White-listed Germans in Edward L.Field, Retreat to Victory: A
Previously Untold OSS Operation (Surfside Beach, SC: EDMA Historical
Publishers, 1991), and the negative review by Nelson MacPherson in Intelligence
and National Security 7, 4 (October 1992), pp. 5002.
33. OSS Planning Group: Over-all and Special Programs for Strategic Services in the
European Theater, Post-Hostilities, 12 October 1944, Folder 2, Box 86, Entry 92,
RG 226, NARA.
34. Sibert, OSS Detachment to 12th AG Weekly Report, 10 April 1945, Folder 12, Box
5; war-time strength, OSS/ETO Covering Report, 5 June 1945, Folder 13, Box 6;
exterminating, OSS Activities Report for May 1945, Folder 127a, Box 95; all in
35. OSS Activities Report for May 1945.
36. X-2 Branch Monthly Report for July 1945, Folder 108, Box 91; see also OSS
Activities Report for June 1945, Folder 128, Box 95, which is unsure whether these
organizations were GIS under Communist cover or vice versa; both in Entry 99, RG
226, NARA.
37. Cooperation with the Russians from OSS Activities Report for July 1945, Folder
129, Box 95, Entry 99, RG 226, NARA.
38. OSS Mission for Germany Progress Report for August 1945, Folder 17, Box 6; also
in the OSS Activities Report for August 1945, Folder 130, Box 95; both in Entry
99, RG 226, NARA.
39. OSS Mission for Germany Progress Report for September, Folder 17, Box 6; see
also OSS Activities Report for September 1945, Folder 131, Box 95; both in Entry
99, RG 226, NARA.
40. X-2 Branch Monthly Report for August 1945, Folder 109, Box 91, Entry 99, RG
226, NARA; on Philby, see Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, KGB: The
Inside Story (New York: Harper Perennial, 1991), pp. 2956; and Cecil, Five, pp.
3512.
41. Digest of State Department Cables, 15 March 1943, Folder 26, Box 2, Entry 145,
RG 226, NARA.
42. R&A/London comments on Three Power cooperation and the Occupation of
Germany, c. September 1944see also comments by Franz L.Neumann to
Chandler Morse for Sweezy, 21 September 1944, Emile Depres to Morse for
Sweezy, 22 September 1944, the more negative comments of J.A.Morrison to
William Langer, 18 September 1944; all in Folder London II, Box 18, Entry 1,
RG 226, NARA; for some FO reaction to an OSS/Washington report on post-war
Russian capabilities and intentions; one official said that In general, the paper is
written with an air of authority which may be very misleading I cannot believe
that all the positive statements madecould be proved. I think they are good
guesses; but I doubt they are much more than that; another wrote that It is too
optimistic and too doctrinaire, but none the less a very good piece of work. From p.
56 onwards it is pure speculation and at times unduly verbose[;] economics section
is worth reading; see the minutes dated 15, 16, and 25 June 1945 in FO 371/
47883, N8125/165/G, PRO.
43. Schorske to Morse for Arthur Schlesinger, 21 September 1944, Folder London
Letters Out, 1/8/4430/9/44, Box 4, Entry 52, RG 226, NARA.
44. Quinn Shaughnessy to Donovan through Bruce, 8 September 1944, Folder 783,
Box 255, Entry 190, RG 226, NARA; see also Katz, Foreign, pp. 1248, 14964.
45. Robert Beitzell, The Uneasy Alliance: America, Britain, and Russia, 19411943
(New York: Alfred A.Knopf, 1972), p. 384; see also Norman A.Graebner, America
as a World Power: A Realist Appraisal from Wilson to Reagan (Wilmington:
Scholarly Resources Inc., 1984), pp. 878.
46. Cordell Hull, Memoirs, Vol. II (New York: Macmillan, 1948), pp. 110910; see
also Julius W.Pratt, The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy, Vol.
XIII: Cordell Hull, 193344 (New York: Cooper Square, 1964), pp. 5323; on free
trade influences on modern American policy, see David P. Calleo and Benjamin
M. Rowland, America and the World Political Economy: Atlantic Dreams and
National Realities (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973), pp. 3, 17, 357;
see also Gier Lundestad, Moralism, Presentism, Exceptionalism, Provincialism,
and Other Extravagancies in American Writings on the Early Cold War Years,
Diplomatic History 13, 4 (Fall 1989), pp. 52745; cf. Gabriel Kolko, The Politics
of War: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 19431945 (New York:
Random House, 1968), passim, part of the revisionist school of Cold War
historiography with its portrait of predatory American capitalism as the driving
force behind US diplomacy in the closing phase of the war; see also the more recent
work of Randall Bennett Woods, A Changing of the Guard: Anglo-American
Relations, 19411946 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1990),
especially pp. 132, 244300, 397407.
48. See William R.Emerson, FDR (19411945), in Ernest R.May (ed.), The Ultimate
Decision: The President as Commander in Chief (New York: George Braziller,
1960), pp. 1701, 176; see also Richard Leopold, The Growth of American Foreign
Policy: A History (New York: Alfred A.Knopf, 1967), p. 608.
49. Sainsbury, Turning, pp. 1, 20, 21718, 22833, 2389, 245, 257, 299, 307; see
also Gaddis Smith, American Diplomacy during the Second World War, 1941
1945 (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966), p. 71; for a narrative of the various
wartime conferences and Big Three diplomacy, see Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt,
Stalin, passim-, see also D.C.Watt, Britain and the Historiography of the Yalta
Conference and the Cold War, Diplomatic History 13, 1 (Winter 1989), pp. 67
98.
50. Turner, Unique, pp. 968; see also Robert Garson, The Atlantic Alliance, Eastern
Europe and the Origins of the Cold War: From Pearl Harbor to Yalta, in H.C.Allen
and Roger Thompson (eds), Contrast and Connection: Bicentennial Essays in
Anglo-American History (London: G.Bell and Sons, 1976), pp. 2989.
51. Kenneth Strong, Intelligence at the Top: The Recollections of an Intelligence
Officer (London: Cassell, 1968), p. 218; see also Leopold, Growth, p. 607, and
Hathaway, Ambiguous, pp. 46.
52. Emerson, FDR, pp. 1767; see also Beitzell, Uneasy, p. 384; Ernest R.May, An
American Tradition in Foreign Policy: The Role of Public Opinion, in William H.
Nelson, with Francis L.Lowenheim (eds), Theory and Practice in American
Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), p. 122; Richard W.Steele,
The Pulse of the People. Franklin D.Roosevelt and the Gauging of American Public
Opinion, Journal of Contemporary History 9, 4 (October 1974), p. 195; Gordon
A.Craig, The Political Leader as Strategist, in Peter Paret (ed.), Makers of Modern
Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1986), pp. 5078; George F.Kennan, Memoirs, 19251950 (Boston: Little,
Brown and Co., 1967), pp. 21415, also characterizes Roosevelts policy
concerning eastern Europe toward the end of the war as having basic elements of
unrealism.
53. See Samuel P.Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of
Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press, 1959), p. 344; cf. Warren F.Kimball, The Juggler: Franklin
Roosevelt as Wartime Statesman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), p.
17.
54. Graebner, America, p. 105.
55. Quotation from Frederick W.Marks III, Wind Over Sand: The Diplomacy of
Franklin Roosevelt (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1988), p. 169; see
also W.Averell Harriman and Elie Abel, Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin,
19411946 (New York: Random House, 1975), pp. 170, 216; cf. with Kimball,
Juggler, pp. 1001; for a positive appraisal of Roosevelts idealistic, rather than
naive, approach see Willard Range, Franklin D.Roosevelts World Order (Athens:
University of Georgia Press, 1959), pp. xii, 18, 278, 31, 76, 10219, 192, 195,
1978; cf. Gaddis Smith, American, pp. 1778.
56. This episode is recorded in both Thomas M.Campbell and George C.Herring (eds),
The Diaries of Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., 19431946 (New York: New Viewpoints,
1975), p. 40, and David Dilks (ed.), The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, OM,
19381945 (New York: G.P.Putnams Sons, 1972), p. 578; see also Kimball,
Juggler, pp. 12757; Watt, Bull, pp. 801; Elisabeth Barker, Churchill and Eden at
War (London: Macmillan, 1978), pp. 11, 125, 129, 205; Earl Avon, The Eden
Memoirs: The Reckoning (London: Cassell, 1965), p. 513.
57. See Isaac Deutscher, Stalin: A Political Biography (Harmondsworth: Penguin, rev.
edn 1966), p. 494; Vojtech Mastney, Russias Road to the Cold War: Diplomacy,
Warfare, and the Politics of Communism, 19411945 (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1979), pp. 1245; see also John Lewis Gaddis, The Emerging Post-
Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War, Diplomatic History 7, 3
(Summer 1983), pp. 17190 (pp. 1756 on Mastney); see also Craig, Strategist,
in Paret, Makers, pp. 504, 5089.
58. Beitzell, Uneasy, pp. 366, 378.
59. Ibid., p. 384; Mastney, Road, pp. 283, 306; see also William Taubman, Stalins
American Policy: From Entente to Dtente to Cold War (New York: W.W.Norton,
1982), pp. 9, 226; see also John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins
of the Cold War, 19411947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), pp. 63
4; cf. Thomas G. Paterson, On Every Front: The Making of the Cold War (New
York: W.W.Norton, 1979), pp. 168; Martin McCauley, The Origins of the Cold War
(London: Longman, 1983), pp. 4951; Kimball, Juggler, pp. 83105.
60. Mastney, Road, pp. 308, 312; see also R.C.Raack, Stalins Drive to the West, 1938
1945: The Origins of the Cold War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995),
pp. 13668; Garson, Alliance, pp. 296300; J.F.C.Fuller, The Conduct of War,
17891961: A Study of the Impact of the French, Industrial, and Russian
Revolutions on War and its Conduct (London: Methuen, 1972), p. 304;
J.F.C.Fuller, The Decisive Battles of the Western World, and their Influence upon
History, Volume Two, 17921944, John Terraine (ed.) (London: Grenada, 1982),
pp. 531, 5349, 586; Halford J.Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality,
Anthony J.Pearce (ed.) (New York: W.W.Norton, 1962), pp. 62, 75, 789, 150;
Nicholas J.Spykman, The Geography of the Peace (New York: Harcourt, Brace and
Co., 1944), pp. 38, 41, 43; Jonathan Haslam, Stalins Fears of a Separate Peace,
1942, Intelligence and National Security 8, 4 (October 1993), p. 99, suggests that
the interpretation and quality of intelligence emanating from the Cambridge Five
spy ring was insufficient to influence Stalins perceptions and policy choices; cf.
Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlins Cold War: From
Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), pp. 36
53, 914, 1213, 1268.
61. Fraser J.Harbutt, The Iron Curtain: Churchill, America, and the Origins of the Cold
War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. xiv, 266, 2805; see also
Avon, Memoirs, p. 513, and Michael F.Hopkins, A British Cold War?,
Intelligence and National Security 7, 4 (October 1992), pp. 47982; see also Terry
H.Anderson, The United States, Great Britain, and the Cold War, 19441947
(Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1981); Hugh Thomas, Armed Truce: The
Beginnings of the Cold War, 194546 (New York: Atheneum, 1987), and the
review essay by Fraser J.Harbutt, Cold War Origins: An Anglo-European
Perspective, Diplomatic History 13, 1 (Winter 1989), pp. 12333; on Harts book,
see the review essay by J.Samuel Walker, The Beginnings of the Cold War: Prize-
Winning Perspectives, Diplomatic History 12, 1 (Winter 1988), pp. 95101; see
also Curtis Keeble, Britain, the Soviet Union and Russia (London: Macmillan,
2000), pp. 20615.
62. PHP (43) 1 (O) (Preliminary Draft), Effect of Russian Policy on British Interests,
17 February 1944, FO 371/43384, N1 120/1120/38, PRO.
63. JIC (44) 467 (O) (Final), Russias Strategic Interests and Intentions from the Point
of View of her Security, 18 December 1944, FO 371/47860/N678/20/G38, PRO.
64. O.S. Sargent to L.C.Hollis, 22 January 1945, FO 371/47860/N678/20/G, PRO; see
also Barker, Churchill, pp. 125, 138.
65. See Barker, Churchill, p. 128.
66. Harbutt, Iron, pp. xiv, 11822; Bruce R.Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in
the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), pp. xvxxi, 35, 6872, 1259, 203
8, 298431; cf. Melvyn P.Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security,
the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1992), pp. xxi; see also Henry B.Ryan, The Vision of Anglo-America: The
US-UK Alliance and the Emerging Cold War, 19431946 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1987); Ritchie Ovendale, The English-Speaking Alliance:
Britain, the United States, the Dominions and the Cold War, 19451951 (London:
George Allen and Unwin, 1985), pp. 358; John Kent, British Imperial Strategy
and the Origins of the Cold War, 194449 (Leicester: Leicester University Press,
1993), pp. 1115; Peter J. Taylor, Britain and the Cold War: 1945 as Geopolitical
Transition (London: Pinter, 1990), pp. 330, 55100, 12133; cf. Daniel Yergin,
Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977), pp. 1112, 17105, 13862, 193220, 34365.
67. Cf. Leffler, Power, pp. 4967.
68. Minute by G.L.McDermott, 26 September 1944, FO 371/44176, R15242/6206/44,
PRO.
69. Telegram by Sir M.Peterson (Angora) to FO, 13 March 1945, No. 340, FO 371/
48773, R4972/4476/44; Telegram by Sir M.Peterson (Angora) to FO, 22 March
1945, No. 377, FO 371/48773, R5 579/447 6/44; both in PRO.
70. On the June 1945 demands on Turkey, JIC (45) 289 (O) (Final), 6 October 1945,
FO 371/48775/R18280/4476/G44; on FO assessments of Russian motives,
Telegram, FO to TERMINAL for Sir A.Cadogan, 27 July 1945, ONWARD No.
242, CAB 119/86; both in PRO.
71. JIC (45) 237 (O) (Final), 31 July 1945, Developments in South East Europe; COS
(45) 191st Mtg, 3 August 1945; see also COS (45) 186th Mtg, 30 July 1945; all in
CAB 119/8 6; both in PRO.
72. JPS (45) 233 (Final), 4 September 1945, CAB 84/75, PRO.
73. Washington (Mr Balfour) to FO, No. 6047, 6 September 1945, WO 106/3222, PRO.
74. See CP (45) 218, 11 October 1945, Record of Conversation Between the Secretary
of State and M. Molotov on the 23rd September, 1945, CAB 129/3, PRO.
75. See Elisabeth Barker, The British Between the Superpowers, 194550 (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1983), pp. 317; see also Frank K.Roberts, Ernest
Bevin as Foreign Secretary, in Ritchie Ovendale (ed.), The Foreign Policy of the
British Labour Governments, 19451951 (Leicester: Leicester University Press,
1984), pp. 334; Alan Bullock, Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary, 19451951
(London: Heinemann, 1983), pp. 12939, 1569, 20639 (which does not really
subscribe to the First Cold War idea); see also Graham Ross, Foreign Office
Attitudes to the Soviet Union, 194145, Journal of Contemporary History 16, 3
(July 1981), pp. 522, 533, 538.
76. JIC (45) 289 (O) (Final); JIC Memorandum for Information 189, Discussion of the
Reported Threat to Turkey, 31 October 1945, frames 4603, Reel 8, Entry 190, RG
226, NARA; see also the remarks by Maj.-Gen. Francis de Guingand in the Extract
from COS (45) 244th Mtg, 9 October 1945, FO 371/48775/R18280/4476/G44,
PRO.
77. See the FO Minutes of 30 and 31 October in FO 371/48775/R18280/44768/G44,
PRO.
78. JPS (45) 292 (Revised Final), 17 December 1945, Long Term Policy in Greece;
on prospects for US economic aid, see also telegrams Athens to FO, No. 2268, 12
November 1945, and Washington to FO, No. 7535, 10 November 1945; all in CAB
119/87, PRO.
79. Extract of COS (45) 291st Mtg, 31 December 1945, CAB 119/87, PRO.
80. See Edward Ingram, The Beginning of the Great Game in Asia, 18281834
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1979), pp. ixx, 45, 1218, 34, 512, 1267, 180, 182, 221
2, 32839; V.G.Kiernan, European Empires from Conquest to Collapse, 1815
1960 (Bath: Leicester University Press, 1982), pp. 57, 63; on intelligence, see
Atherton, Guide, pp. 8, 1617, as well as HD 2/1, The Great GameMeshedd, MS
by Col. C.S.Maclean, HD 3/70, and HD 3/118, all in PRO.
81. Or on the Americanssee the assessment of Persian oil potential by American
officers in Tehran cable No. 36646, 31 July 1944, Folder Most Secret Cables (Not
shipping) #9, Box 3, Entry 5, RG 226, NARA: The foregoing information should
be conveyed at once to the two US companies that are interested, although the
British were not informed of this [reconnaissance] trip and [had] not consented to
it. The foregoing should not be allowed to reach their ears.
82. Cipher Telegram GO 40943, 28 October 1944, WO 106/3093, PRO.
83. Combined Intelligence Centre Iraq and Persia Tribal and Political Review for the
Year 1945, 8 April 1946, WO 208/1571, PRO; on the treaty obligations for troop
withdrawals, see also Harbutt, Iron, pp. 1423.
84. See CICIP Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 232 for the week ending 26 July
1945, WO 208/1569, PRO.
85. CICIP Tribal and Political Intelligence Weekly Summary for the week ending 2
August 1945, WO 208/1570, PRO.
86. CICIP Tribal and Political Intelligence Weekly Summary No. 235 for the week
ending 16 August 1945, WO 208/1570, PRO.
87. Telegram No. 5067 from Sir A.Clark Kerr, 23 November 1945, FO 371/47858,
Nl6109/18/38, PRO.
88. Sir R. Bullard to C.W.Baxter, 26 November 1945, FO 371/45487, G.328/43/45,
PRO.
89. Minute by L.Pyram (?), 23 December 1945, and Minute by B.Gage, 3 January
1946, both in FO 371/45487, G.328/43/45; note that Murray was confirmed as US
Ambassador to Persia on 19 February 1945see Halifax to London, telegram No.
384, 2 March 1945, FO 371/45487, E1409/530/34; all in PRO; see also Harbutt,
Iron, pp. 1424.
90. Coral Bell, The Special Relationship, in Michael Leifer (ed.), Constraints and
Adjustments in British Foreign Policy (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1972),
p. 105; see also Watt, Bull, p. 89; R.B.Manderson-Jones, The Special Relationship:
Anglo-American Relations and Western European Unity, 194756 (London:
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1972), pp. 1301, 134; Hathaway, Ambiguous, p. 308;
Barker, Between, pp. 217, 3089; Correlli Barnett, The Collapse of British Power
(London: Alan Sutton, 1984), p. 582.
91. Harbutt, Iron, p. xiv; see also David Reynolds, Roosevelt, Churchill, and the
Wartime Anglo-American Alliance, 19391945: Towards a New Synthesis, in
William Roger Louis and Hedley Bull (eds), The Special Relationship: Anglo-
American Relations Since 1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 19
21, 3841.
92. On marriage of necessity, see Reynolds, Synthesis, p. 38; see also David
Reynolds, Rethinking Anglo-American relations, International Affairs 65, 1
(Winter 1988 1989), pp. 94, 97, 98; on the emerging British dimension of Cold
War history, see D.C.Watt, Rethinking the Cold War: A Letter to a British
Historian, Political Quarterly 49, 4 (OctoberDecember 1978), pp. 4466.
93. This dispatch is to be found as J.Balfour for the Ambassador to Bevin, No. 1038, 9
August 1945, CAB 122/1036, and as Halifax to Bevin, No. 16898, 23 August
1945, FO 371/44557, AN 2560/22/45, PRO; see also Victor Rothwell, Britain and
the Cold War, 19411947 (London: Jonathan Cape, 1982), p. 148.
94. Shrewd/superior power quotes from Minute by J.C.Donnelly, 5 September 1945,
FO 371/44557, AN 2560/22/45, PROon such British attitudes, see also Leon D.
Epstein, BritainUneasy Ally (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), pp. 9,
215, 34, and Danchev, Very, pp. 412; heartily and recommendation for
circulation, Minute by P.Mason, 25 January 1946, and approval by Sir Orme
Sargent, 30 January 1946, both in FO 371/51627, AN 205/5/45, PRO.
95. Mason Minute.
96. Assumption from Bell, Special, p. 112; see also John Lewis Gaddis, Intelligence,
Espionage, and Cold War Origins, Diplomatic History 13, 2 (Spring 1989), pp.
191212, expressing uncertainty as to when a scholarly treatment of post-war
intelligence will be possible; D.C.Watt, Intelligence and the Historian: A Comment
on John Gaddiss Intelligence, Espionage, and Cold War Origins, Diplomatic
History 14, 2 (Spring 1990), pp. 199204, suggests using policy records for
determining the impact of intelligence.
97. On the US JIC, see Larry A.Valero, An Impressive Record: The American Joint
Intelligence Committee and Estimates of the Soviet Union, 19451947, Studies in
Intelligence 9 (Summer 2000), pp. 6580.
98. JIS 80/2, Capabilities and Intentions of the USSR in the Postwar Period, 6
January 1945, frames 4198, Reel 13, Entry 95, RG 226, NARA.
99. Addendum to JIS 80/2, USSR Postwar Foreign Policy by Regions, 10 January
1945, frames 14465, Reel 13, Entry 95, RG 226, NARA.
100. JIC 250/1, USSR Postwar Capabilities and Policies, 31 January 1945, frames 4
96; JIC 250/2, 2 February 1945, frames 12731; both in Reel 14, Entry 95, RG
226, NARA.
101. JIS 161, British Capabilities and Intentions, 10 May 1945, frames 145479, Reel
102. JIC 250/6, Soviet Capabilities, 29 November 1945, frames 73969, Reel 2, Entry
190, RG 226, NARA.
103. JIC 341, Aims and Sequence of Soviet Political and Military Moves, 31 January
1946, frames 73969, Reel 2, Entry 190, RG 226, NARA.
104. JIC 342, British Capabilities Versus the USSR, 6 February 1946, frames 84199,
Reel 2, Entry 190; cf. the dismissive R&A/Washington analysis of the JIS study
upon which this report is based in Joseph Sweeny, Acting Chief, British Unit to
Langer, 7 January 1946, Folder British Empire Division, Box 12, Entry 1; both in
RG 226, NARA.
105. JIC Memorandum for Information No. 217, Russian Troop Movements in South-
East Europe and Persia, 15 May 1946, frames 98895, Reel 2, Entry 190, RG 226,
NARA; see also MM (S) (45) 88 (Final), British Postwar Service Representation
in the United States, Report by the Joint Staff Mission, Washington, Paragraph 10,
Intelligence Representation, CAB 122/1385, PRO.
106. JIC Memorandum for Information No. 223, Russias Strategic Interests and
Intentions in the Middle East, 28 June 1946 (British date 14 June 1946), frames
42245; JIC Memorandum for Information No. 224, Russias Strategic Interests
and Intentions in the Middle East, 12 July 1946 (British date 6 July 1946), frames
44852; JIC Memorandum for Information No. 229, Situation in South Persia, 5
August 1946, formerly British JIC (46) 55 (O) (Final) of 7 June 1946, frames 179
85; all in Reel 7, Entry 190, RG 226, NARA.
107. JIC 370, Exchange of Intelligence Estimates and Evaluations thereof Between the
United States and the British Joint Intelligence Committees, 25 September 1946,
frames 53840, Reel 7, Entry 190, RG 226, NARA; see also Ranelagh, Agency, pp.
64950, n, detailing the American reliance on British intelligence reports
regarding Iran during 197980.
108. R&A on Greece in Langer to Donovan, 11 July 1944, Folder 2322, Box 155, Entry
146, RG 226, NARA.
109. SI Branch Progress Report for 131 December 1944, 31 December 1944, Folder 8,
110. ETO-METO Cable Digest, 16 January 1945, citing cable #3054 London, Casey and
Gold to Maddox, 13 January 1945, Folder 41, Box 10, Entry 99, RG 226, NARA.
111. SI Branch Progress Report, for 129 January 1945, dated 29 January 1945, Folder
9; SI Branch Progress Report, Liaison, for 1528 February 1945, dated 1 March
1945, Folder 10; both in Box 4, Entry 99, RG 226, NARA.
112. SI Branch Progress Report for 115 March 1945, dated 15 March 1945, Folder 11,
113. Ibid.; SI Branch Progress Report for 131 March 1945, dated 2 April 1945, Folder
11; SI Branch Progress Report for 115 April 1945, dated 14 April 1945, Folder 12;
both in Box 5, Entry 99, RG 226, NARA.
114. SI Progress Report for 115 April 1945.
115. SI Branch Progress Report for 131 May 1945, dated 31 May 1945, Folder 13, Box
116. General Order 55, 2 June 1945, Folder 46, Box 3, Entry 147; Thomas V.Dunn to
Alfred McCormick, Outline of American Counter-intelligence, Counter-Espionage
and Security Activities World War II, n.d., frame 803, Reel 58, Entry 190; both in
RG 226, NARA.
117. OSS Activities Report for June 1945, Folder 128, Box 95, Entry 99, RG 226,
NARA.
118. SI Branch Progress Report for 130 June 1945, dated 30 June 1945, Folder 14, Box
119. W.J.Gold to John A.Bross, 16 July 1945, Folder 995, Box 270, Entry 190, RG 226,
NARA.
120. OSS/Washington General Order 86, 12 July 1945, Folder 76, Box 17; SI Branch
Progress Report for 130 July 1945, Folder 27, Box 7; both in Entry 99, RG 226,
NARA.
121. SI Branch Progress Report for 131 July 1945, dated 31 July 1945, Folder 27, Box
122. Over-all and Special Programs for Strategic Services Activities Based on Great
Britain (Post-Hostilities), 13 August 1945, Document 419.22, Folder 22, Box 69C,
Donovan Papers, USAMHI.
123. SI Branch Progress Report for 131 August 1945, Folder 28; Cairo/Athens,
European Reports Branch Progress Report for September 1945, dated 25
September 1945, Folder 29; both in Box 7, Entry 99, RG 226, NARA.
124. Cable In 22072, London to Director OSS, 20 August 1945, Folder London Paris
August 131 December 1945, Box 12, Entry 6, RG 226, NARA.
125. Covering Report, OSS/Great Britain for 131 August 1945, dated 4 September
126. OSS Activities Report for August 1945, Folder 130, Box 95, Entry 99, RG 226,
NARA.
127. OSS Activities Report for September 1945, Folder 131, Box 95; see also
OSS Mission to Great Britain Progress Report, dated 4 October 1945, Folder 29,
Box 7; both in Entry 99, RG 226, NARA.
128. Cable In 22072, London to Director OSS, 20 August 1945; see also Overall and
Special Programs for Strategic Services Activities Based on Great Britain (Post-
Hostilities), 13 August 1945.
129. Magruder to Donovan, 5 September 1945, Folder 829, Box 60, Entry 146, RG 226,
NARA.
130. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 3705; Andrew, Australian, p. 227; Bryden,
Secret, pp. 26777; such intelligence might account for the very detailed
information contained in the Preliminary Outline of the Russian Intelligence
Service, dated 18 April 1946 in frames 71630, Reel 57, Entry 95, RG 226,
NARA; see also John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr, VENONA: Decoding Soviet
Espionage in America (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000).
131. OSS Mission to Great Britain Covering Report for 130 September 1945, dated 3
October 1945, Folder 29, Box 7, Entry 99, RG 226, NARA.
132. Cable Washington 15287, Magruder to 110 and Shuling, 4 October 1945, Folder
Amzon September 1 194520 February 1946, Box 6, Entry 6; see also Report of
Brigadier-General John Magruder, Director SSU, WD, to Assistant Secretary
Lovett on Intelligence Matters, 26 October 1945, frames 91651, Reel 1; SSU
General Order No. 2, 12 October 1945, frames 107176, Reel 27; both in Entry
190; all in RG 226, NARA.
133. Edgar M.Valk to W.J.Gold, 17 October 1945, Folder 1356, Box 293; see also Valk
to Chief, SI/Turkey, and Chief, SI/Greece, 2 May 1946, Folder 551, Box 327; both
in Entry 190, RG 226, NARA.
134. European Reports Progress Report for October 1945, Folder 2812, Box 200, Entry
146; Summary of SSU Activities for November 1945 and SI Monthly Progress
Report for the Near-Middle East, November 1945, both in Folder 2813, Box 201,
Entry 146; Soviet-Turkish relations source from SSU Summary for December
1945, Folder 2814, Box 201, Entry 146; ETO SI Report for October 1945; ETO SI
Report for November 1945; ETO SI Report for December 1945; all in Folder 13,
Box 81, Entry 92; all in RG 226, NARA.
135. SSU/Great Britain Report for December 1945, Folder 2814, Box 201, Entry 146,
RG 226, NARA.
136. X-2 Branch Progress Report for 131 October 1945; Report of Activities,
Headquarters, X-2 Branch October 1945; both in Folder 2812, Box 200, Entry 146,
RG 226, NARA.
137. See Magruder letters to G-2, A-2, and Naval Intelligence, 7 December 1945, and the
various responses, frames 11227, and Maj.-Gen. Clayton Bissell to Magruder, 20
December 1945, frame 1136, all in Reel 29, Entry 190, RG 226, NARA.
138. Bissell to Magruder, 18 December 1945, with Secretary of War to Magruder, 18
December 1945, frames 11278, Reel 29, Entry 190, RG 226, NARA.
139. Magruder to Bissell, 19 December 1945, frames 112930, Reel 29, Entry 190, RG
226, NARA.
140. See Magruder to Bissell, 29 December 1945, and Rear-Adm. T.B.Inglis to
Magruder, 2 January 1946, frames 1140, 1145, Reel 29, Entry 190, RG 226, NARA.
141. Magruder to Bissell, 9 January 1946, frame 705, and Magruder to ACoS G-2, 12
January 1946, frame 706, both in Reel 57, Entry 95, RG 226, NARA.
142. Bissell to Magruder, 24 January 1946, frame 709, Reel 57, Entry 95, RG 226,
NARA.
143. British Personnel in Meshed and Notes on British Intelligence, 7 June 1945,
frames 00000001, Reel 1, Entry 153A, RG 226, NARA.
144. Conference at GHQ Middle East, 11 June 1946, Annex to talk by BGS(I) on The
Intelligence Problem in the Middle East, WO 193/998; see also COS (45) 200th Mtg,
17 August 1945, Minute 7, Organisation of Post War Signal Intelligence, CAB
79/37; both in PRO; Alan Stripp, Breaking Japanese Codes, Intelligence and
National Security 2, 4 (October 1987), pp. 1412, and Alan Stripp, Codebreaker in
the Far East (London: Frank Cass, 1989), pp. 506 on post-war work against low-
grade Persian diplomatic ciphers; see also Andy Thomas, British Signals
Intelligence After the Second World War, Intelligence and National Security 3, 4
(October 1988), pp. 10310; on later GCHQ work on Russia, see Richard Aldrich
and Michael Coleman, The Cold War, the JIC and British Signals Intelligence,
1948, Intelligence and National Security 4, 3 (July 1989), pp. 53549; see
B.F.Smith, Stalin, p. 254.
145. Edgar M.Valk to Philip Mosely, 8 January 1946, Folder 553, Box 327, Entry 190,
RG 226, NARA.
146. James S.Kaylor to Ambassador Winant, 7 January 1946, Folder 553, Box 327,
Entry 190; for numerous examples of such reports on Turkey, Greece, and Persia
forwarded by SSU from British sources, see frames 4534, 475, Reel 1; frames
33454, 4089, 535, Reel 2; frames 257, 4615, 6212, Reel 3; all in Entry 153A;
147. Edgar M.Valk to Cabot Coville, 11 January 1946; James S.Kaylor to Ambassador
Winant, 12 January 1946; Folder 553, Box 327, Entry 190, RG 226, NARA.
148. Edgar M.Valk to Lester C.Houck, 8 February 1946, Folder 553, Box 327, Entry
190, RG 226, NARA.
149. SSU ETO Report for March 1946, Folder 2817, Box 201, Entry 146; liberal quote
from Edgar M.Valk to Chief, SI/Berne, 14 March 1946, Folder 552, Box 327, Entry
150. Secretariat to Director, 29 April 1946, Folder 2817, Box 201, Entry 146, RG 226,
NARA; on X-2s link in Russia, this was stated by X-2s Mr Blum before the SSU
Fact Finding Board on 20 February 1946; see the Minutes of the Board, frame
1037, Reel 1, Entry 190, RG 226, NARA; Blum also stated that X-2 had not run
any agents in Russia during the war itself.
151. SSU ETO Progress Report for May 1946, Folder 13, Box 81, Entry 92, RG 226,
NARA.
152. Foreign Reports London Desk Report for July 1946, Folder 6, Box 80, Entry 92,
RG 226, NARA.
153. Donald M.Greer to Lester C.Houck, Monthly Evaluation Report, 12 September
1946; on Persia and Turkey, Middle East Station Report for August 1946, dated 4
September 1946; both in Folder 4, Box 80, Entry 92, RG 226, NARA.
154. Open Memorandum by Beurt SerVaas [sic], 18 March 1946, frames 71215, Reel
155. Harbutt, Iron, pp. 151208; see also Richard Pfau, Containment in Iran, 1946: The
Shift to an Active Policy, Diplomatic History 1, 4 (Fall 1977), pp. 35972;
Stephen L. McFarland, A Peripheral View of the Origins of the Cold War: The
Crisis in Iran, 194147, Diplomatic History 4, 4 (Fall 1980), pp. 33351.
156. Harbutt, Iron, pp. 164, 169, 17282, 20966; cf. Walker, Beginnings, pp. 95
101; D.Cameron Watt, Britain, the United States, and the Opening of the Cold
War, in Ovendale (ed.), Labour, pp. 4360.
157. Kuniholm, Near, pp. xvxxi; see Richard J.Aldrich (ed.) British Intelligence,
Strategy and the Cold War 194551 (London: Routledge, 1992), and the review by
David Stafford, Intelligence and National Security 9, 1 (January 1994), pp. 1645;
see also B.F.Smith, Ultra-Magic, pp. 2217 on SIGINT ties in the 194546 period,
and for the suggestion that general Anglo-American intelligence exchanges dated
from after August 1946 between the British Joint Intelligence Board and the US
Central Intelligence Group (see below on CIG).
158. Harbutt, Iron, pp. 26871.
159. Sounder, Minute by Williams, 16 May 1946; fully alive, telegram by Mr Helm,
16 May 1946; looking up, Minute by illegible, 16 May 1946; all in FO 371/59312,
R7311/7311/44, PRO; not that American economic aid for Britain was particularly
forthcomingsee Woods, Changing, pp. 397407.
160. Yergin, Shattered, pp. 1741, 13862, 2001, 219, 2701; see also Howard Jones
and Randall B.Woods, Origins of the Cold War in Europe and the Near East:
Recent Historiography and the National Security Imperative, Diplomatic History
17, 2 (Spring 1993), pp. 2576; cf. Bradley F.Smith, An Idiosyncratic View of
Where we Stand on the History of American Intelligence in the Early post-1945
Era, Intelligence and National Security 3, 4 (October 1988), pp. 11123; see also
Robert L.Messer, Paths Not Taken: The United States Department of State and
Alternatives to Containment, 19451946, Diplomatic History 1, 4 (Fall 1977), pp.
297319; Burton Hersh, The Old Boys: The American Elite and the Origins of the
CIA (New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1992), pp. 176, 454, and the review by
Nelson MacPherson in Intelligence and National Security 8, 2 (April 1993), pp.
2724.
161. See Leffler, Power, pp. 3140, 497, 499, 502.
162. Memorandum to the Secretary of War, Preliminary Report of Committee
Appointed to Study War Department Intelligence Activities, 3 November 1945,
163. On the Bureau of the Budget/State Department plan, see Troy, Donovan, pp. 3259.
164. Ibid., pp. 33940; quote from Montague MS, Smith, p. 50.
165. Troy, Donovan, pp. 3409; Montague MS, Smith, pp. 502.
166. Troy, Donovan, p. 358; cf. B.F.Smith, Ultra-Magic, pp. 225, 227 on CIG and
intelligence exchanges with the British JIB.
167. Troy, Donovan, pp. 359410; see also Jansen and Jeffreys-Jones, Gang, pp. 130
42; cf. David F.Rudgers, Creating the Secret State: The Origins of the Central
Intelligence Agency, 19431947 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000).
Conclusion
R&A alumnus Gordon Craig noted in 1991 that during his entire time in OSS, he
never knew what was going on within the organization.1 This observation
unwittingly substantiated William Caseys experience of being told in September
1943 that OSS was a mess in London. Good people, but no one knows what
anybody else is doing.2 Given the wide variety of OSS/London activities
surveyed in the preceding chapters, it is easy to understand how individual OSS
members knew little beyond their immediate surroundings. The wide-ranging
scope of OSS/Londons war made the workings of other branches a mystery, and
the complete story of the mission beyond any one mans comprehension.
Whatever its claims to centralization and coordination, no one individual ever
really appreciated the full measure of OSS/Londons activities, nor the complete
significance of its relationship with British intelligence. This study, with the
benefit of agency-wide archival sources, therefore offers an unprecedented
examination of developments within OSS/London, and insights into the worth of
modern intelligence work. OSS/Londons development, and its partnership with
British intelligence, moreover reveal an inner mechanism of the larger Anglo-
American relationship, itself based on necessity, and firmly grounded in
pragmatism. This evolving primacy of professionalism was perhaps the most
important legacy of wartime Anglo-American intelligence for the post-war world.
The fruits of intelligence collaboration thus gave the post-1945 North Atlantic
alliance a foundation based on recognizing intelligence as a proverbial sine qua
non of power politics. It did not lead to a US National Security State, nor to
America imposing ties that bind on its much weaker intelligence colleagues.3 It
instead helped America accept the anarchical societys dictates, and gave Britain
more status in the alliance than otherwise likely.4
OSS/London was first and foremost shaped by the British intelligence
establishment. Britain admittedly exploited intelligence links through William
Stephensons BSC to influence American perceptions of how America might aid
Britain short of war. With William Donovan as their mark, the British
Admiraltys Naval Intelligence Division combined with BSC to help mobilize a
formal, distinct American intelligence service with the Coordinator of
Information. From then on, however, the development of American intelligence
in London was subject less to the machinations of British officials than to the
234 CONCLUSION
intelligence wars exigencies. While functioning usefully as a conduit for SIS

intelligence, COI/London rested on shaky ground in light of the American
militarys hostility toward Donovans service in Washington. This bureaucratic
insecurity was itself a defining element in the Anglo-American intelligence
relationship. On one level, it required the Americans to win the confidence of
Britains intelligence services in order to gain an entre into operational
intelligence work. On another level, it complicated that very process since the
British invariably wanted assurance of COIs viability before fully opening up to
the Americans. COIs metamorphosis into OSS did little to overcome the
uncertainty and inertia plaguing the London mission given the US Armys
reliance on British intelligence (as witnessed by William Wisemans enquiries on
behalf of C regarding the permanence of OSS). Only the support of SIS and
SOE themselves during summer 1943 finally permitted OSS/London to secure
its place within the military hierarchy. This substantively reflected the primary
British motivation at that point: identifying an American counterpart, and getting
on with formulating plans for operations in Europe. To this end, both SIS and
SOE obviously saw OSS/London as the most logical partner for their European
work. While this was a vital development for OSS/Londons viability, it
entrenched another defining aspect of the wartime intelligence relationship: the
extent to which Churchills fragmented and disharmonious intelligence system
directly determined the development of OSS/Londons branches. The
centralization supposedly inherent in OSS was thus negated by the decisions of
Winston Churchill and the American military, and the support of British services
desperate to achieve operational successes. OSS/London accordingly mirrored the
factionalized British intelligence system throughout the war.
OSS/Londons main operational branches therefore worked more closely in
full partnerships with their British colleagues through SUSSEX and JEDBURGH
than either did with each other or the rest of OSS. The British and OSS/London
moreover understood how these operations reflected the primacy of military
requirements in the intelligence war.5 Indeed, OSS/London clearly recognized its
need for full and complete operational partnerships with British intelligence in
order to achieve something of consequence, and to win the American militarys
confidence. Rather than being naive victims of British manipulation, SI and SO
both thrived as a result of their piggy-backing onto British intelligence.
R&As fate underscores this conclusion. Without a clear opposite number for
forging a partnership, the bulk of R&A/London was left to work in isolation from
the rest of OSS and the intelligence war in Europe. Intended as a unique
American innovation in modern intelligence work, R&A was instead crippled by
the lack of a clear intelligence concept. Reduced to serving as a glorified post-
office, R&A/London developed into a highly skilled irrelevancy born of an
unwillingness to accept that R&As best chance to thrive lay in working with the
many opposite British agencies to serve basic military information needs. As a
collection of academics rather than intelligence officers, R&A failed to grasp the
essential requirement of serving the needs of intelligence consumers, and the
importance of fitting within the context of military primacy. When given the
opportunity to do just that, R&A simply allowed its intellectual pretensions to
get in the way. This was clearly demonstrated by EOU when it tried to
manipulate the military leaders it was supposed to serve, all in pursuit of a
military objective steeped more in intellectual arrogance than in empirical fact.
Its rigid adherence to a Party Line that wilfully ignored certain disappointing
operational realities nullified the application of scholarly analysis to operational
policy since the facts were defined by the desired end, not the other way around.
R&As unwillingness to lower itself to perform mundane intelligence processing
likewise subordinated empiricism to dilettantism in SIRA, and so rendered R&A
superfluous to OSS/Londons increasingly professional intelligence work.6
Professionalism also marked SIs German penetration, and X-2s partnership
with MI6(V) in counter-intelligence. William Casey successfully mobilized OSS/
Londons assets over a surprisingly brief period to achieve an independent
espionage effort against Germany in support of the military. The militarys
enthusiasm for this operation, and their reliance on the intelligence produced,
both testify to OSS/Londons coming of age in the operational realm and the
extent to which OSS/London had matured from its early days as an intelligence
conduit. X-2 also demonstrated its capacity for rapidly developing a strong CI
capability in tandem with the British culminating with a central role in SHAEFs
CI War Room. While distanced from the rest of OSS/London by the usual, but in
this case more understandable, functional fragmentation typifying the Anglo-
American intelligence community, X-2s experiences nevertheless showed its
evolution from the status of neophyte to full partner. The close ties between OSS/
Londons Morale Operations and British psychological warfare conversely made
MO vulnerable to the inherent weaknesses and poor potential of propaganda
during the war.
With wars end, OSS/London was reduced to an intelligence-CI rump as SSU/
Great Britain. The experienced, professional service that had grown over the
previous four years was demobilized with unseemly haste. This professionalism
was not matched by the US governments appreciation for its relevance to
American foreign policy, however, and the link with British intelligence at this
juncture again proved critical. By virtue of the Anglo-American intelligence
relationship which had evolved throughout the war, SSUs SI and X-2 branches
provided an ideal channel for British intelligence reports on the growing Soviet
threat to the post-war order. The necessity of American help for Britain took
precedence over any sentimentality in the transition to Cold War, and the ensuing
North Atlantic alliance was conceived at least in part through the hard
intelligence facts given to SSU by SIS. The intelligence dimension of the Anglo-
American partnership that started with COI/London in 1941, and which had
flourished in wartime, was preserved to fight another day in the period leading
up to the CIAs creation, and Americas dominant role in cold war intelligence.
The British connections significance to American intelligence is clear. US
intelligence was not shaped by any Machiavellian manipulation by SIS and SOE,
236 CONCLUSION
or by the prophetic genius of William Donovan. It was instead moulded through

the forging of an Anglo-American intelligence partnership that paved the way
for realizing a concrete capacity for professional American intelligence. The
British intelligence establishment did not tutor OSS/London per se. The various
OSS branches were instead accepted by their British counterparts as partners in
joint endeavours, in the course of which OSS/London achieved an accelerated
capability which matched, and in some cases surpassed, that of the British
services. X-2 and SO certainly produced efforts equivalent to those of MI6(V)
and SOE in northwest Europe. SI not only kept pace with Broadways
operational record in France, but it went on to out-perform MI6 in penetrating
Germany. Even when largely run down as SSU, the SI and X-2 components
maintained a critical nucleus for Americas future intelligence capability. MOs
efforts were limited by the problematic nature of its work, whereas R&A served
mainly as an underachieving disappointment that hinted at the possibilities of
applying scholarly methods to intelligence analysis without matching those
already attained by Britain. This potential would remain unrealized in America
until the CIAs formation.7
The preceding chapters accordingly provide an empirical basis for assessing
the relative fortunes of these London branches, ordained as they were in large
part by the British connection. SI, SO, and X-2 flourished because of that
linkage, while MO achieved little as a result of its counterparts own weak hand.
R&A achieved minimal results because the branchs Washington leadership
largely eschewed a realistic agenda based on exploiting partnerships with British
agencies. SI managed in a few short months between January 1944 and the
invasion of Europe to piece together an effective espionage capacity for the
SUSSEX programme. OSSEX intelligence was of great tactical significance in
Normandy since it supplemented that gained through ULTRA and PR. Not only
could SI build on SUSSEX with its own PROUST agent scheme in France, but it
went on to direct the penetration of Germany where SIS could not hope to
operate. SI in effect capitalized on its partnership with SIS in serving SHAEF
during OVERLORD by going on alone to meet the militarys tactical
intelligence needs in Germany.8 SOs peak performance came in France with the
JEDBURGH project, where the Americans operated on a par with their more
numerous SOE partners to make the hazardous clandestine sabotage and guerrilla
warfare campaign a success. X-2 quickly achieved high standing in the arcane
world of counter-intelligence thanks largely to the British willingness to share
ISOS as a means of formulating a truly effective Allied CI capacity. The military
again benefited greatly from the Anglo-American CI work that neutralized
German espionage during and after OVERLORD. Taken fully into MI6(V)s
confidence, X-2 helped form an integrated CI arm ready to counter residual
Nazism before the NKVDs efforts manifested themselves. In contrast to these
achievements, R&A failed to live up to its overrated reputation. The most
overrated R&A element of all, EOU, illustrates a perversion of the intelligence
cycle. EOU demonstrated its subordination of disinterested analysis and
dissemination to the biased needs of its bloated collective ego. It clearly

developed an unseemly propensity for manipulating consumers into providing
the direction that EOU itself desired. That was not the way it was done in
Broadways Circulating Sections, FRPS, or PID, much less SIs Reports
Division. Research and analysis in those units were confined to applying skills to
meet the needs of various consumers, and did not extend toward controlling
those consumers with fallacious Party Lines.
The relative merits of OSS/Londons branches moreover rest firmly within the
context of the Anglo-American relationship, and reveal one of that partnerships
key dimensions. The foremost aspect to be considered is that of British
pragmatism in its approach to America. Britain was inclined more to trust in the
self-evident wisdom of its example than it was to outright manipulation of its
ally. Its desperate position in 194041 obviously contributed to a rather overt
attempt to influence US envoys and representatives, but that was a far cry from
pulling Americas strings. The habitual American assumption that nature had
endowed the British with a well-nigh inexhaustible store of superior cunning
may explain the inferiority complex which sometimes marked perceptions within
OSS (especially inside SI), but Britain was clearly and essentially motivated by
necessity in its intelligence relationship with the US.9 In the spirit of
competitive cooperation, Britain still hoped to preserve its interests in the face
of its inexorable eclipse by the Big Two, and to avoid being trampled by
Roosevelts headlong rush to a new world order created in his own image, but its
intelligence community still extended tutelage and cooperation toward the OSS
to expedite winning the intelligence war as each British service conceived it. SIS
and SOE naturally had their own individual survival to consider as they
desperately pursued operational successes in the intelligence war. Once assured
of OSS/Londons permanence, they cooperated to the best of their abilities (SIS
opted out of penetrating Germany to mask its own inadequacies, not to curtail
SI; its responsibility for vetting SIs German agents could have neatly put paid to
SIs plans had Broadway been so motivated). Particularly noteworthy is the
manner in which MI6(V) made its IS OS intelligence fully available to X-2. This
was presumably done out of a need to ensure cohesive Allied CI, not sentiment;
but it clearly demonstrated that once British intelligence decided to cooperate
with the Americans to the extent of forging a partnership, it did so completely.
With the onset of the first cold war, British policy-makers were sufficiently
motivated by their discomfort in the face of Russian hostility to direct a
considerable amount of relevant intelligence to both the US JIC and SSU/Great
Britain in an attempt to win America over to Britains strategic conception.
Pragmatism once again made SIS forthcoming, and once again Broadway
expressed concern about the permanence of some sort of American intelligence
capacity. This last point also underscores the fact that the Anglo-American
intelligence relationship through OSS/London depended not on smooth
Anglophile officers who melded with the British Establishment, but on
necessity.10 Long after David Bruce left London, SIS was keen to preserve its
238 CONCLUSION
links with SSU. What counted most here was the fact that Britain needed
America as an ally for Britains self-preservation, and this held equally true in
the intelligence realm. Competitive cooperation was mitigated by common
sense.
OSS/Londons experience thus bears out the dictum by Andrew and Dilks
concerning the gradual professionalization of intelligence services, and the
gradual way in which policy-makers and leaders have learned to use them. OSS/
Londons evolution toward professionalism, and the experience of Americas
military and political leaders in learning to appreciate the capabilities of OSS/
SSU, are both evident.11 So is the extent to which both of these phenomena were
influenced by the intelligence relationship with Britain. British intelligence did
not tutor American neophytes. Intelligence was instead treated as yet another
element of an Anglo-American necessary relationship, a factor in modern
warfare and statecraft that could not be ignored or trifled with. Once reconciled
to this reality, the British sought to realize a functioning partnership. Britain thus
invited the creation of a viable, modern US intelligence capacity, just as it invited
Americas participation in the Second World War, and just as it invited
American leadership of the post-war North Atlantic alliance. Pretensions to
independent British actions simply could not stand up to harsh realities after
Dunkirk, periodic spasms of resentment notwithstanding. OSS/London therefore
did not simply learn intelligence tradecraft from its British colleagues. More
importantly, and perhaps subliminally, it learned about the role of the Great Game
in the world of Great Power politics, and about the realities incumbent to
America being a Great Power. As America in fact vaulted to the status of
superpower, Britain was in a very real sense able to preserve a degree of
importance in the emerging North Atlantic alliance that belied its comparatively
pathetic resources. The renowned German historian Leopold von Ranke placed
considerable emphasis on power relationships between nation-states, and defined
the essence of diplomacy as divining the nature of the international balance of
power, and through that judgement safeguard the national interest.12 In what
Martin Wight has called a shadow diplomacy, intelligence is essential to such
judgements, with raison dtat justifying its actions in defence of the public
interest.13 The existence of a strong, tested Anglo-American intelligence
relationship thus did not impose British subordination on America (that was
already a given). It instead provided Britain with a basis from which it could
exercise a degree of influence its material resources could not possibly ensure.14
The manner in which Britain exploited its intelligence relationship with America
during 194546 certainly confirms this.
As a case-study of the evolution toward professional intelligence, OSS/
London also reveals some aspects significant to intelligence theory.15 In terms of
the relationship with policy makers, the relative success of SI and SO in
comparison with R&A suggests that intelligence entities are best employed by
serving the basic information needs of their consumers. As suggested by R&As
own Crane Brinton, by so providing the basics of shadow diplomacy, or shadow
military strategy, intelligence services can truly influence policy with reliable
information. Supplying short-range estimates or tactical intelligence thereby
establishes the essential utility of intelligence in response to immediate consumer
needs through delivering the significant hard facts needed to formulate and
execute policy.16 Neither SHAEF nor the American armies in Europe quarrelled
with the content of SI intelligence, or denigrated the utility of SOs coordination
of resistance forces with military operations, or resisted taking heed of X-2s CI
information. Intelligence is more likely to become compromised when, as in the
case of EOU, supplying information is subordinated to the intelligence services
own agenda. OSS/Londons experiences overall suggest that intelligence is a
demandside activity, not a supply-side one. In other words, intelligence
services only flourish when they can meet specific, existing needs. Any attempt
to rely on the usefulness of the intelligence product to be self-evident, and to be
automatically recognized as such by decision-makers, is futile.17
As for the question of coordinating intelligence services, and the efficacy of
centralization, OSS/London provides some interesting evidence. The ostensible
centralization of OSS, long considered its main innovation, was a myth. OSS/
Londons branches never demonstrated any of the supposed advantages of its
organization before William Caseys penetration of Germany. Until that
operation, each branch had established a closer relationship with its functionally
similar British counterpart than with other OSS branches. The closest OSS/
London came to realizing its innovation was after Casey prodded it to mobilize
its assets to penetrate Germany. That was the only significant instance where
OSS/London realized the ideal of combining various branches and resources to a
common goal. As such, that operation accomplished much more than its
fragmented British counterparts could with their system of separate services.
Combined with the lack of substantive direction from William Donovan, the
reality of separate, rival British services shaped how OSS/Londons own
branches developed. Facing the pressure to get operational, most of OSS/Londons
branches threw themselves into establishing partnerships with the British
services, and thereby replicated their fragmentation. This was inevitable, and
ultimately for the best if the resulting professionalization is balanced against the
probability that a steadfastly centralized, but isolated, OSS/London would have
accom plished very little of consequence to justify an administrative innovation.
Indeed, the various Anglo-American partnerships between like services (SI-SIS;
SO-SOE; X-2-MI6[V]) each demonstrated a strong degree of functional,
horizontal integration within an alliance that far outweighed manipulation or
dominance by a single nation, thereby laying a more convincing foundation for
any post-war ties that bind.18 It was also the main reason why Donovans
centralization was more ambitious than practical at this stage of development.
Functionalism thus outweighed centralization in the Anglo-American
intelligence partnership in London, and it is difficult to conceive of how it might
have been different.
240 CONCLUSION
OSS/Londons experiences further suggest that overseas OSS missions tended

to evolve outside OSS/Washingtons narrow administrative context, and that
theatre missions deserve further study as to their relationships with local military
and allied intelligence services. OSS/Londons place within the larger history of
US intelligence also confirms Rhodri Jeffreys-Joness point about the importance
of American intelligence services securing bureaucratic standing, while
underscoring how America accepted intelligence as a necessity.19 Both
considerations thereby define the wartime experience as a turning point in US
intelligence history. Since Americas acceptance of intelligence was so marked
by the Anglo-American alliance, OSS/Londons story provides additional
insights into the Special Relationship itself. The alliance was, on the working
level at least, more markedly based on mutually enlightened self-interest than on
sentiment. It may be described more accurately as a Necessary Relationship,
which itself suggests a less romantic approach to studying Anglo-American
relations based on distinguishing between the rhetoric of national leaders, and the
concrete efforts established by each nations institutions. At the same time, it
indicates a modification of the notably unromantic portrait painted by David
Reynoldss conception of competitive cooperation. As shown by the wartime
Anglo-American intelligence relationship, any competitiveness was quickly
subordinated to the reality that Britain increasingly depended on its alliance with
America. With war, Britain essentially compromised on its Great Power status to
accept a junior partnership in a more permanent, reliable North Atlantic alliance
of Anglo-Saxon nations that preserved the last vestiges of British influence,
among which were intelligence. Competitiveness had to give way as Britain
retired from the front rank of Great Powers.20
Studying OSS/London also suggests some methodological points. The opening
of intelligence archives is perhaps the single most important development
represented by this present study. The archival trend begun in America, now
spreading to Russia (and less extensively to Britain), provides a new opportunity
to place intelligence studies more concretely within the context of military and
diplomatic studies. It allows a testing of outdated myths, and of intelligence
theory; it allows intelligence studies to come of age, and so acquire scholarly
legitimacy by revealing insights that have previously eluded scholars of military
and diplomatic history, or of political science.21 New paths have thus been
opened for intelligence study, particularly for future students of OSS. Feasible
projects include detailed, impartial treatments of individual OSS branches, or of
OSS missions in Algiers, Cairo, and Italy, that focus on how intelligence was
collected and practically used, on how OSS was variously obstructed or
supported, on how local OSS members adapted to local conditions and to the
congenital chaos within OSS itself, and on how OSS members exploited their
opportunities. Additional work on the origins of the Cold War is also possible
given the increasing availability of intelligence records pertaining to many
relevant episodes after 1941 and beyond.
OSS/London thus illustrates that US intelligence matured and became

institutionalized within the larger Anglo-American relationship. As a case-study
of an intelligence service in action, the preceding chapters document the critical
role intelligence played in one of the Second World Wars most significant
military and diplomatic theatres. They also illuminate the strengths and
weaknesses of OSS relative to its British partners, while revealing many
previously undocumented aspects of those partners. Most importantly, they place
OSS/Londons evolution within the context of modern statecraft. The
institutionalization of American intelligence owes much to its role in supporting
military operations as part of a realistic Anglo-American partnership, since it
was in this intense environment that America learnedquicker than many
realizedwhat being a Great Power involved.22 OSS/London was thus a focal
point that brought together some hard-won lessons with a transition to alliance
leadership in the space of five years. If war realized a modern, professional,
tested American intelligence capability, post-war developments confirmed its
critical timing. Atomic physics and a firmly bipolar world combined to confront
America with an unprecedented international system defined by starkly
unforgiving consequences in the event of its breakdown. By 1946, professional
intelligence and American power were mated in a kind of world that few could
have anticipated in 1941, one where desperate men waging clandestine shadow
diplomacy strove to usurp war as ultima ratio regum, the final argument of
kings.
NOTES
1. Cited in MacPherson, Conference Report, p. 513.

2. Persico, Casey, p. 55.
3. See Yergin, Shattered, and Richelson and Ball, Ties.
4. See Verrier, Looking Glass.
5. See Strong, Men, p. 120, on how Eisenhower wanted intelligence to have a position
of professional military authority within staff and organizational structures.
6. On R&A in general, cf. Hilsman, Strategic, pp. 223, 33, 82; Ransom, Intelligence,
p. 66.
7. See Colby and Forbath, Honorable, p. 55.
8. For SHAEFs view of OSS, see cable, SHAEF Forward to AGWAR for JCS, No.
Fwd-22386, 26 May 1945, WO 219/5277, PRO.
9. Balfour dispatch, 9 August 1945; cf. Downes, Thread, passim.
10. See the MacPherson review of Lankford (ed.), pp. 3667.
11. See the MacPherson review of Hersh, p. 273.
12. David Trask, Writings on American Foreign Relations: 1957 to the Present, in
John Braeman, Robert H.Bremner, and David Brody (eds), Twentieth-Century
American Foreign Policy (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1971), p. 59.
13. Wight, Power, pp. 29, 11617; cf. Yergin, Shattered, passim.
242 CONCLUSION
14. Verrier, Looking Glass; see Richelson and Ball, Ties; on the Cold War in general,
see John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold
War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987).
15. See Chapter 1 above, p.9.
16. See also Handel, Politics, p. 9.
17. See Berkowitz and Goodman, Strategic, pp. 109, 136, 1737; Strong, Men, p. 168.
18. See Richelson and Ball, Ties.
19. Jeffreys-Jones, CIA, pp. 248, 250.
20. This is broadly recognized in Reynolds, Synthesis, pp. 3841; see also Reynolds,
Rethinking, pp. 94, 978; Hathaway, Ambiguous, p. 308.
21. See MacPherson, Conference, p. 515; cf. Gaddis, Intelligence, pp. 191212.
22. On the context of the international system and state requirements for intelligence,
see Roger Hilsman, International Environment, the State, and Intelligence, in
Maurer, Tunstall, and Keagle (eds), Intelligence, pp. 1927; cf. B.F.Smith,
Idiosyncratic, pp. 1212, and Jeffreys-Jones, Espionage, pp. 1727.
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AIR 20, Unregistered Papers.
AIR 37, Allied Expeditionary Air Force and 2nd Tactical Air Force.
AIR 40, Directorate of Intelligence and Other Intelligence Papers.
CAB, Records of the Cabinet Office and Related Bodies:
CAB 21, Cabinet Office: Registered Files.
CAB 56, Cabinet Office, Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee, Minutes and Memoranda,
193639.
CAB 69, War Cabinet, Defence Committee (Operations).
CAB 77, War Cabinet, Committees on Oil Policy.
CAB 79, War Cabinet, Chiefs of Staff Committee, Minutes of Meetings.
CAB 80, War Cabinet, Chiefs of Staff Committee, Memoranda.
CAB 81, War Cabinet, Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee, Minutes and Memoranda, 1939
41.
CAB 84, War Cabinet, Joint Planning Committee.
CAB 99, War Cabinet: Commonwealth and International Conferences.
CAB 103, Cabinet Office: Historical Section: Registered Files.
CAB 119, Joint Planning Staff: Files.
CAB 120, Minister of Defence: Secretariat Files.
CAB 122, British Joint Staff Mission: Washington Office Files.
CAB 129, Cabinet Memoranda from 1945.
DEFE, Records Created or Inherited by the Ministry of Defence, Chiefs of Staff
Committee, or Related Bodies:
DEFE 11, Chiefs of Staff Committee: Registered Files.

FO, Records of the Foreign Office and Related Bodies:
FO 371, Foreign Office General Correspondence: Political.
FO 837, Ministry of Economic Warfare.
FO 898, Political Warfare Executive.
HD, Foreign Office Intelligence Records:
HD 2, Foreign Office: Consulate-General, Meshed: Monthly Accounts of Secret Service
Payment.
HD 3, Foreign Office: Permanent Under Secretarys Department: Correspondence and
Papers.
PREM, Records of the Prime Ministers Office:
PREM 3, Operations Papers.
PREM 4, Confidential Papers.
PRO, Records Acquired by Gift or Deposit:
PRO 31/20, ULTRA: Representatives with US Army Groups: Reports.
WO, Records of the War Office, Armed Forces and Related Bodies:
WO 106, Directorate of Military Operations and Intelligence.
WO 165, War Diaries, War Office Directorates, 193947.
WO 193, Directorate of Military Operations: Collation Files, 194546.
WO 205, 21st Army Group in Northern Europe, 194345.
WO 208, Directorate of Military Intelligence. WO 219, Supreme Headquarters, Allied
Expeditionary Force.
b.
Churchill Archives Centre, Churchill College, Cambridge
McLachlan-Beesly Papers.
2.
United States
a.
National Archives and Records Administration, Washington,
DC
Record Group 226, OSS Archives of the Central Intelligence Agency:

Entry 1, Research and Analysis Branch: Security-Classified General Correspondence,
194246.
Entry 5, Research and Analysis Branch: Most Secret Cablegrams Received from OSS
Outposts, 194244.
Entry 6, Research and Analysis Branch: Security-Classified Cablegrams Sent to and
Received from OSS Outposts, 194446.
Entry 34, Research and Analysis Branch, Economics Division: Security-Classified
Reports on Industrial Resources of Axis Powers, 194243.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 245
Entry 37, Research and Analysis Branch, Europe-Africa Division: Security-Classified

Correspondence of the Division Chief, 194245.
Correspondence Relating to Outposts, 194245.
Records Relating to the London Outpost, 194145.
Entry 74, Research and Analysis Branch, European Theater of Operations: Security-
Classified Correspondence of Branch Chiefs Chandler Morse and William Langer,
194345.
Classified Correspondence of Deputy Chief Allan Evans.
Classified General Correspondence of the Enemy Objectives Unit of the Economic
Warfare Division, 194345.
Classified Correspondence of the London Joint Target Group, 1944.
Entry 79, Research and Analysis Branch, European Theater of Operations: Top Secret
Reports of the Working Committee of the London Joint Oil Target Committee, July-
October 1944.
Entry 91, History of OSS in London.
Entry 92, COI/OSS Central Files.
Entry 95, Combined Intelligence Committee.
Entry 99, OSS History Office.
Entry 103, Special Forces and Jedburgh Mission Reports.
Entry 110, Field Intelligence Reports, Theater Officer Correspondence, Draft Histories.
Entry 115, London Field Files.
Entry 116, Office of the Director, OSS.
Entry 119, London X-2 Files.
Entry 136, Field Files.
Entry 137, Washington Secretariat and Secret Intelligence Records.
Entry 145, Research and Analysis Branch Chief Files.
Entry 146, Washington: History Project, Intelligence Service, Research and Analysis,
Research and Development, Secretariat, Security, Secret Intelligence, Secret
Operations, Strategic Services Officer.
Entry 147, New York and London Records.
Entry 153A, SSU Intelligence Reports, 1946.
Entry 162, OSS Directors Office Correspondence.
Entry 180, Director OSS Official Files, Sanitized Text.
Entry 190, Field Files, Resistance History, and Washington Directors Office Files.
Record Group 263, Records of the Central Intelligence Agency:
DCI Historical Series.
History Source Collection of the CIA History Staff.
Thomas Troy Papers.
Record Group 457, Records of the National Security Agency:
SRH-006.
SRH-153.
b.
US Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks,
Carlisle, Pennsylvania
Interview collection of Forrest C.Pogue for The Supreme Command, 194652.

William J.Donovan Papers.
B.
Published Documents
British Security Coordination: The Secret History of British Intelligence in the Americas,
194045. (New York: Fromm International, 1999).
Haines, W.W. Ultra and the History of the United States Strategic Air Force in Europe
vs. the German Air Force (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America,
1980, 2nd printing, 1986).
Heideking, Jrgen and Mauch, Christof. American Intelligence and the German
Resistance to Hitler. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996).
MacIsaac, David. Strategic Bombing in World War Two: The Story of the United States
Strategic Bombing Survey (New York: Garland, 1976).
(ed.) The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Vol. I (New York: Garland,
1976).
(ed.) The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Vol. II (New York: Garland,
1976).
(ed.) The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Vol. III (New York: Garland,
1976).
(ed.) The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Vol. V (New York: Garland,
1976).
(ed.) The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Vol. VI (New York: Garland,
1976).
Masterman, J.C. The Double Cross System in the War of 1939 to 1945 (London: Sphere,
1973).
OSS/London: Special Operations Branch and Secret Intelligence Branch War Diaries
(Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1985). Microfilm, 8 reels.
Schellenberg, Walter. Invasion 1940: The Nazi Invasion Plan for Britain (London: St
Ermins Press, 2000).
Smith, Bradley F. (ed.) Covert Warfare, Vol. 2: The Spy Factory and Secret Intelligence
(New York: Garland, 1989).
(ed.) Covert Warfare, Vol. 3: OSS Jedburgh Teams I (New York: Garland, 1989).
(ed.) Covert Warfare, Vol. 4: OSS Jedburgh Teams II (New York: Garland, 1989).
(ed.) Covert Warfare, Vol. 5: Other OSS Teams (New York: Garland, 1989).
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Office, 1945.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 247
C.
Published Diaries, Letters, and Papers
Bond, Brian (ed.) Chief of Staff: The Diaries of Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Pownall,
Vol. II: 19401944 (London: Leo Cooper, 1974).
Campbell, Thomas M. and Herring, George C. (eds) The Diaries of Edward R.Stettinius,
Jr, 19431946 (New York: New Viewpoints, 1975).
Chandler, Alfred D., Jr, et al. (eds) The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: The War
Years, Vol. III (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970).
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Johns Hopkins Press, 1970).
Danchev, Alex (ed.) Establishing the Anglo-American Alliance: The Second World War
Diaries of Brigadier Vivian Dykes (London: Brasseys, 1990).
Dilks, David (ed.) The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, OM, 19381945 (New York:
G.P.Putnams Sons, 1972).
Ferrell, Robert H. (ed.) The Eisenhower Diaries (New York: W.W Norton, 1981).
Kimball, Warren F. (ed.) Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence, Vol. I:
Alliance Emerging, October 1933-November 1942 (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1984).
(ed.) Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence, Vol. II: Alliance
Forged, November 1942February 1944 (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1984).
(ed.) Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence, Vol. III: Alliance
Declining, February 1944April 1945 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).
Lankford, Nelson D. (ed.) OSS against the Reich: The World War II Diaries of Colonel
David K.E.Bruce (Kent, Ohio: The Kent State University Press, 1991).
Leutze, James (ed.) The London Journal of General Raymond E.Lee, 19401941 (Boston:
Little, Brown, 1971).
Petersen, Neal H. (ed.) From Hitlers Doorstep: The Wartime Intelligence Reports of
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1996).
Pimlott, Ben (ed.) The Second World War Diary of Hugh Dalton, 19401945 (London:
Jonathan Cape/London School of Economics and Political Science, 1986).
Troy, Thomas (ed.) Wartime Washington: The Secret OSS Journal of James Grafton
Rogers, 19421943 (Frederick: University Publications of America, 1987).
Young, Kenneth (ed.) The Diaries of Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart, Vol. II: 19391965
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D.
Memoirs, Reminiscences, and Personal Narratives
Alcorn, Robert H. No Bugles for Spies: Tales of the OSS (London: Jarrolds, 1963).
Avon, Earl. The Eden Memoirs: The Reckoning (London: Cassell, 1965).
Bank, Aaron. From OSS to Green Berets: The Birth of Special Forces (Novato: Presidio,
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Colby, William and Forbath, Peter. Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA (New York:
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Coon, Carlton S. A North Africa Story: The Anthropologist as OSS Agent, 19411943
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Corvo, Max. The OSS in Italy, 19421945: A Personal Memoir (New York: Praeger,
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Index
Abwehr see GIS BJSM (British Joint Staff Mission) 237

Alanbrooke, Field Marshal Viscount 29, Blum, Robert 193, 2012
31, 231 Bottomly, Norman 141
Andrews, General Frank 57 Bowden, George 193
Angleton, James 195 Brewer, George 78
Anglo-American relations 26, 36, 2245, Bridges, Sir Edward 21
2334, 266, 268; Brinton, Crane 108, 11112, 11517, 267
Intelligence dimension 45, 701, 88 BRISSEX 84, 196
91, 21617, 224, 2345, 237, 2457, British Intelligence 1738, 21718;
2606 budgets 19, 217;
armies: effectiveness 160, 171, 1801;
1st British 196; fragmentation 358, 45, 5961, 63, 79,
1st US 856, 165, 174; 89, 169, 192, 195, 199, 2035, 209,
3rd US 87, 174; 21618, 261, 2668;
7th US 174, 1767; pre-1939 history 1719, 190
9th US 1767; Bruce, Colonel David 578, 714, 769,
see also army groups 867, 90, 11011, 162, 168, 170, 172,
Armour, Lester 207 193, 206, 219, 265
army groups: BSC (British Security Coordination) 469,
6th US 1745; 51, 193, 261
12th US 86, 165, 1745, 177, 180, 198, Byrnes, James 229, 245
203, 222;
21st British-Canadian 81, 845, 1645, C (Chief of the Secret Service) 215, 29,
176, 196, 198; 32, 345, 47, 51, 578, 61, 63, 767,
see also armies 1912, 194, 200, 202, 241, 261
Attlee, Clement 267, 315 C&D (Censorship and Documents) 179
CALPO 1667, 173
Bailey-King, Colonel Henry 141 Camp 020 199
Balfour, John 233 Casey, William 160, 16772, 174, 17881,
Barnett, Harold 1401 260, 267
Baxter, James 106 Cavendish-Bentinck, Victor 75, 207
BCRA (Free French Intelligence) 77, 84 CHARLES 80
Beaumont-Nesbitt, Major-General F.B. 20 Churchill, Sir Winston 1011, 213, 2538,
Bevin, Ernest 230, 233 51, 81, 102, 217, 2256, 244, 261
BI (Bureau of Information) 1756
267
CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) 2, 119, FIS (Foreign Information Service) 105
246, 2624 Fleming, Commander Ian 47
CIG (Central Intelligence Group) 246 FN (Foreign Nationalities) 110
Clay, General Lucius 241 FNCL (French Committee of National
Coffin, Robert 118 Liberation) 812
Cohen, Commander Kenneth 162 Foord, Colonel 161
COI (Coordinator of Information) 4755, FORD (Foreign Office Research
104, 205, 261, 263 Department) 103
Cold War: Forgan, Colonel J.R. 167, 172, 1745
origins 226, 228, 233, 2445; FRPS (Foreign Research Press Service)
perceptions 22338, 2447, 265 103, 105, 1078, 264
Cowgill, Felix 194
Craig, Gordon 260 Gallene, Major 1613
CROSS 1667, 179 Gambier-Perry, Colonel R. 80
GC&CS (Government Code and Cipher
Dansey, Claude 57, 77 School) 245, 102
death ray experts 203 GCHQ (Government Communications
Deutsch, Harold 11213, 145 Headquarters) 24, 88, 192, 202, 217, 243
Devers, General J.L. 578, 63, 74, 77 German Army:
DIP (Division of Intelligence Procurement) 84th Infantry Division 180;
1725, 179, 181 116th Panzer Division 180;
Dodds-Parker, Douglas 8 Panzer Lehr Division 84
Donovan, Major General William 4550, GIS (German Intelligence Services) 1901,
527, 59, 62, 737, 104, 116, 118, 147 194, 1978, 2023, 222
9, 163, 167, 170, 193, 21621, 246, 261, Goddard, Dewitt 174
263, 2678 Godfrey, Rear-Admiral John 478
Dorr, Russell 1301 Gubbins, Major-General Colin 74
DOUBLE CROSS 1902, 194, 221
Hambro, Sir Charles 72, 74
Eden, Anthony 31, 335 Hankey, Lord 21, 101
Eisenhower, General Dwight 74, 812, Harris, Marshal of the RAF Sir Arthur 127,
133, 135 134, 137, 13940, 144
Ellis, Dick 47, 54, 72 Harwood, Major Aubrey 161, 163
Englandspiel 30, 37 Hoover, J.Edgar 218
EOU (Enemy Objectives Unit) 108, 125, Horton, Phil 148
13145, 149, 262, 264, 267; Hughes, Colonel Richard 130, 134, 141
Party Line 1312, 13940, 1434, Hull, Cordell 224
262, 264
Evans, Allan 60, 1068, 112, 148 Intelligence:
Evill, Sir Douglas 218 historiography 69;
EWD (Economic Warfare Division) 131 professionalism 3, 260, 262, 266;
schools of scholarship 23, 5;
FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation) 53, theory 23, 9, 267
194, 218 Ismay, Major-General Sir Hastings 202,
Fellner, R.J. 512 289, 31, 501
Field Detachments 81, 837, 171, 175, ISOS (Intelligence Service Oliver
181, 197, 203, 222 Strachey) see MSS
INDEX 269
ISTD (Inter-Services Topographical Montague, Ludwell Lee 220

Department) 103, 105, 109 Morgan, Major-General Frederick 73
Morgan, Shepard 1089, 112
J/E (JOAN/ELEANOR) 174, 17680 Morse, Chandler 108, 112, 114, 131, 147
JEDBURGH 735, 77, 803, 8791, 196, Morton, Desmond 23, 289, 35, 512
206, 261, 264 MSS (Most Secret Sources) 190200, 202
JIC (British Joint Intelligence Sub- 3, 2645
Committee) 1922, 278, 304, 367, Muggeridge, Malcom 37, 45
51, 105, 140, 205, 207, 217, 221, 227, Murphy, James 193, 195, 201
22930, 2367;
see also US JIC Nichols, Osgood 204
Jones, George 142 NKVD (Peoples Commissariat for
Internal Affairs) 222, 264
KENT 1623, 167
Kindleberger, Charles 1335, 142 OG (Operational Groups) 83
King, Fleet Admiral Ernest J. 10 OPSAF (Plans and Operations Staff) 1703
KLAXON 174 OSS (Office of Strategic Services):
Koenig, General Marie-Pierre 83 archive 910;
effectiveness 45, 889, 1001, 115
LAMDA 239, 241 19, 160, 16870, 17981, 208, 264;
Langer, William 10616, 11819 establishment 4950;
Lawrence, Oliver 1413 fragmentation 5961, 634, 79, 8990,
Lloyd, Stacey 76 110, 16870, 172, 181, 2045, 217,
Lockhart, Robert Bruce 205 219, 263, 2678;
Lord, Walter 60, 204, 208 London mission in general 12, 45,
56, 160, 1678, 263, 269;
Maddox, William 75, 78, 193 significance 45, 2669
Magruder, Brigadier General John 21920, OSSEX 84 264
2412 OVERLORD 701, 757, 7985, 87, 89
Marshall, General George C. 54 91, 110, 11213, 115, 118, 132, 1345,
Marshall-Cornwall, General James 57 144, 161, 167, 1957, 207, 264
McDonough, Captain John 193 OWI (Office of War Information) 49, 55,
Menzies, Sir Stewart see C (Chief of the 105, 109, 111, 2067
Secret Service)
MEW (Ministry of Economic Warfare) 22, PAIR 2023
28, 34, 50, 103, 105, 1089, 1268, 130 Patton, General George 178
1, 134, 1414, 146 Paupert, Major Maxwell 197
MI5 see Security Service Pearson, Norman 1934
MI6 see SIS (Secret Intelligence Service) Petrie, Sir David 201
MI6(V) see SIS (Secret Intelligence Philby, Kim 195, 223
Service), Section V Phillips, William 52, 56, 71, 90, 106
MI19(a) 162 PID (Political Intelligence Division) 103,
MILWAUKEE FORWARD 173 106, 112, 205, 264
MIR (Military Intelligence Research) 20, Pincus, Nat 1412
25 Portal, Marshal of the RAF Viscount 135,
MO (Morale Operations) 113, 16970, 176, 13940
189, 2049, 222, 2634
PR (Photo Reconnaissance) 23, 138, 144, Sherwood, Robert 50, 54

264 SI (Secret Intelligence) 55, 602, 70, 75
propaganda 2058 81, 8491, 106, 110, 125, 1459, 1603,
PROUST 88, 163, 264 16781, 1935, 208, 219, 221, 23841,
PWD (Psychological Warfare Division) 245, 2625, 2678
2068 SIGINT (Signals Intelligence) 8, 245, 85,
PWE (Political Warfare Executive) 501, 88, 160, 1801, 190200, 2024, 2201,
103, 1056, 108, 113, 116, 162, 2057, 243;
217 see also MSS;
PAIR;
R&A (Research and Analysis) 55, 60, 100 SLU;
1, 10419, 125, 1301, 1459, 2056, ULTRA;
219, 2214, 237, 2624, 267 VENONA
R&D (Research and Development) 88, 173, SIRA 113, 125, 1459, 175, 17980, 262
179 SIS (Secret Intelligence Service) 1829,
Robertson, Lieutenant-Colonel T.A. 2002 318, 457, 51, 53, 55, 579, 612, 70,
Rogers, James Grafton 79, 219 7580, 8491, 103, 146, 1603, 167,
Roosevelt, Franklin 46, 4850, 524, 104, 1714, 176, 1801, 192, 1945, 205,
218, 2246 217, 23844, 246, 2615, 268;
Rostow, Walt 131, 133, 136, 143 ISLD (Inter-Services Liaison
Rowlandson, Lieutenant-Colonel M.A.W Department) 241, 2434;
164 Section V 18990, 1926, 198200,
RSHA see GIS 2024, 217, 240, 2624, 268
RSS (Radio Security Service) 80, 1902 SLU (Special Liaison Unit) 85
Rundt, Stefan 166 Smith, Rae 206, 208
Smith, Walter Bedell 225
SA/B 49, 55, 71 SO (Special Operations) 55, 602, 70, 72
SA/G 49, 55 5, 7783, 110, 1637, 169, 1712, 179,
SA/H 49, 55 195, 207, 2212, 2624, 2678
SAFE HAVEN 238, 243 SOE (Special Operations Executive) 25,
Salant, William 131 2934, 368, 46, 55, 589, 612, 705,
SAS (Special Air Service) 83 7782, 85, 8891, 1635, 171, 173, 176,
Schlesinger, Arthur Jr 147 1801, 2056, 217, 222, 261, 2635, 268
Schorske, Carl 11112 Spaatz, Lieutenant-General Carl 1336,
SD see GIS 141
Seal, Eric 278, 35 SPARTAN 75
Security Service 18, 29, 335, 18992, Speer, Albert 144
1946, 199204, 217 Spheres Agreement 723
Selbourne, Lord 313, 35 SSU (Strategic Services Unit) 221, 223,
SFHQ (Special Forces Headquarters) 81 237, 2414, 246, 263, 2656
4, 90, 160, 166 Stalin, Josef 2256, 244
SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters Allied Stephenson, William 458, 260
Expeditionary Force) 813, 100, 112 Stimson, Henry 220
13, 140, 1616, 1745, 181, 191, 1968, strategic bombing 1256, 12931, 1435;
2003, 2067, 222, 225, 240, 262, 264, bridges 1346;
267 British 12530, 132, 136, 13840, 144;
Shepardson, Whitney 51, 757, 170, 172 electricity 144;
oil 1278, 13344;
INDEX 271
transportation 1336, 1401;

US 12832, 1389
Strong, Major-General George 59, 77, 193
Strong, Major-General Sir Kenneth 85,
200, 225
SUSSEX 578, 62, 769, 81, 8491, 161
2, 174, 195, 261, 264
Sweet-Escott, Bickham 71, 79
Tedder, Marshal of the RAF Lord Arthur

1326, 1401
TORCH 196
Toynbee, Arnold 103
Trevor-Roper, Hugh 202
Trohan, Walter 218
Truman, Harry 21921, 2234, 228, 2446
Twenty Committee 1912, 194
ULTRA 25, 36, 85, 88, 143, 160, 1801,

191, 195, 202, 264;
DECS 202;
ISK see MSS
US JIC (US military Joint Intelligence
Committee) 218, 2201, 230, 2347,
242, 244, 246;
see also JIC (British Joint Intelligence
Sub-Committee)
VENONA 240
VICTOR 80, 84
W Board 191
WARWICK/COVENTRY 2412
White, Colonel Dick 201
Whitney, William 502
Williams, Brigadier E.T. 85, 176
Wilson, John 110, 130
Wiseman, William 623, 261
X-B see SIS (Secret Intelligence Service),

Section V
X-2 189, 192205, 209, 219, 2213, 238,
2403, 262, 2645, 2678;
War Rooms 198203, 240, 2623, 267
Zuckerman, Solly 1327

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AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE IN WAR-TIME

The Story of the OSS

FRANK CASS PUBLISHERS

ISBN 0-203-49271-4 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0-203-58199-7 (Adobe eReader Format)

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

encouragement in supporting the publication of this book. Professor David

A-2 US Army Air Force Intelligence

C Traditional appellation for the Chief of SIS; see also CSS

DNI British Director of Naval Intelligence

MI1(b) First World War British Military Intelligence branch 1(b),

SF Deatachment Special Forces Detachment; SO teams attached to the field

USSTAF US Strategic Air Forc

Thou art slave to fate, chance, kings, and desperate men.

erratic professionalization of intelligence agencies, Andrew and Dilks also stress

Hathaway stresses that the Anglo-American relationship meant more to Britain

London evolved to participate in functionally integrated espionage and sabotage

1. Alfred C.Maurer et al., General Introduction, p. 1, and Alfred C.Maurer et al.,

America in Britains Place, 19001975 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

A Sidelight on Bletchley, 1942, Intelligence and National Security 9, 1 (January

Many OSS members believed unquestioningly in Britains intelligence pre-

scheme to the Director of Military Intelligence, Major-General F.G.Beaumont-

I am not satisfied with the volume or quality of information received from

nevertheless be drawn regarding Cs position, and Churchills knowledge of

acts of rebellion against the Germans frequently resulted in bloody

method of intelligence management and its implicit drawbacks is therefore more

of how best to direct the various intelligence functions. It specifically contributed

administrative centralization of the British secret services could have achieved

MI6s Malcom Muggeridge recalled Americans in wartime espionage as being

In cooperation with Mr StephensonColonel Donovan was persuaded to

Colonel Donovan has been supplied with memoranda on a great variety

embryonic branches in Washington dominated the first six months of COIs

Whitney went on to note that Fellner eventually succeeded in obtaining a

These developments underscored COIs lack of any formal mandate to work in

extraordinary is Donovans apparent willingness to abandon leadership of COI,

personnel slowly arrived throughout 194243, increasingly formal linkages with

This situation ensured that however centralized OSS was supposed to be in

The exaggerated delineation between Branches in the conduct of OSS

human being could beat, embodying as it did the strangely contradictory

When OSSstarted functioning in London in early 1942, the task was, in

1. Muggeridge, Chronicles, p. 173.

6. See Read to Donovan, Attached British Manuscript, and Troy to Director of

Some of the most significant tests of Anglo-American intelligence relations

A notable development in OSS/Londons operational evolution was David

Broadways support did not mean that SI was beyond attributing

Think [SIs William P.] Maddox has a tendency to be touchy on matters of

exclusively for SO). SO is not; it is an operative branch. The sanctity of

a most likable and frank personalways willing to acknowledge the

comprehend the operational dimension of intelligence collection. While having

station scheduled for inclusion in the British communications system, thereby

Attention has been directed to possibilities of expanding the number of

service when G-2 makes up a list of intelligence requirements in

American military intelligence further conceded that there was universal

Americans presented an acceptable establishment face. While OSS alumnus

1. War Diary, Directors Office, OSS/London, Preamble to 1 January 1944, pp. 4,

5. Bickham Sweet-Escott, Baker Street Irregular (London: Methuen, 1965), p. 133.

OSS/Londons Research and Analysis branch (R&A) spent its existence in a

R&A infiltrate into British agencies much as it was doing in ISTD. He

armies on occupied Europe, and exchange information pertaining to German

tendency has been visible in SI, SO, [and] FN [Foreign Nationalities

in Paris because of the competition R&A encountered from other agencies.

there [were] many PhDswho [were] living emotionally in some other

[A]cademic social scientists in government jobs, certainly if they have