Omnibus Cases - Civil Law

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J. Leonardo De Castro Cases
FAMILY RELATIONS
Jose Reynaldo B. Ochosa vs Bona J. Alano and Republic of the Philippines
G.R. No. 167459, January 26, 2011
Facts: Bonas illicit affairs with other men started at the onset of their marriage on October 27, 1973,
when Jose was assigned in various parts of the country as an officer in the AFP. She continued her
infidelity even when they lived together at Fort Bonifacio, Makati City sometime in 1985, whenever Jose
was out of their living quarters.
In 1987, Jose was incarcerated in Camp Crame for rebellion for the alleged participation of the failed
coup detat. He heard circulation of rumors of Bona getting caught having sex with his driver, Corporal
Gagarin.
He got a military pass from his jail warden and confronted Bona about the rumors, which she and Gagarin
admitted. Since then they were separated, and their foundling, Ramona Celeste, stayed with Bona in
Basilan until 1994 to live with Jose.
Jose Reynaldo B. Ochosa filed a Petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage between him and Bona
J. Alano, based on the ground of the latters psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential marital
obligations of marriage.
Elizabeth E. Rondain, a psychiatrist, one of the witnesses, testified and submitted a psychological
evaluation report on Bonas mental state. The interviews she had with Jose and two of his witnesses
brought her to the conclusion that respondent was suffering from histrionic personality disorder, and it
was traceable to her family history.
On January 11, 1999, the dispositive portion of the trial court declared the marriage of Jose and Bona
void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity of the respondent under Article 36 of the Family
Code. The Court finds that Bonas illness exhibited gravity, antecedence, and incurability.
OSG appealed the said ruling to the CA, and the CA subsequently granted the appeal and reversed the
ruling of the trial court decision.
Issue:Whether or not Bona should be deemed psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations.
Ruling: No. There is inadequate credible evidence that her defects were already present at the inception
of, or prior to, the marriage. Bonas alleged psychological incapacity did not satisfy the jurisprudential
requisite of juridical antecedence. Her persistent sexual infidelity and abandonment are not badges of
psychological incapacity nor cant it be traced to the inception of their marriage.
The psychiatrists conclusion about Bonas HPD which made her prone to promiscuity and sexual
infidelity existed before her marriage to Jose, cannot be taken as credible proof of antecedence since the
method by which such an inference was reached leaves much to be desired in terms of meeting the
standard of evidence required in determining psychological incapacity.
Dr. Rondains conclusion was based solely on the assumed truthful knowledge of Jose. No other witness
testified to Bonas family history or her behavior prior to or at the beginning of their marriage. The two
witnesses only started to live with them in 1980 and 1986, respectively.
CENTER FOR LEGAL EDUCATION AND RESEARCH P. 1

ARELLANO UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW
Verily, Dr. Rondain evaluated Bonas psychological condition directly from the information gathered solely
from Jose and his witnesses. These factual circumstances evoke the possibility that the information fed to
the psychiatrists is tainted with bias for Joses cause, in the absence of sufficient corroboration.
Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the
time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party
even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one
of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These
marital obligations are those provided under Article 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code.
Marietta C. Azcueta vs. Republic of the Philippines and the Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 180668, May 26, 2009
Facts: Petitioner Marieta C. Azcueta, 23 yrs old, and Rodolfo Azcueta, 28 yrs old, met in 1993 and was
married 2 months after, or on July 24, 1993 at Antipolo City. After 4 years of marriage without having any
children, they got separated. Marietta filed for the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity. She averred that Rodolfo failed to comply with the essential
obligation of marriage and is emotionally immature, irresponsible, and continuously failed to adopt in
married life. The same was testified by Florida de Ramos, Rodolfos first cousin, and Dr, Cecilia Villegas,
a psychiatrist.
RTC ruled that there was psychological incapacitation to perform essential duties of a husband thus
declaring the marriage void, and the same was reversed by the CA finding that the evidence is not
enough to prove psychological incapacity.
Issue: w/n the marriage of Marieta and Rodolfo should be declared void due to psychological incapacity?
Held: Yes. After a thorough review of the records, it was revealed that there is sufficient compliance of the
Molina case to warrant the annulment of marriage under Art. 36 of the Family Code:
(1) The burden to prove the psychological incapacity was duly proven. It is not a requirement for the
physician to personally examine the other party, what is required is for the totality of the evidence to
be adequate to support the findings of psychological incapacity.
(2) The root cause of Rodolfos psychological incapacity was medically and clinically proven by an expert
testimony. It was revealed that he suffered from Dependent Personality Disorder which makes him
psychological incapacitated.
(3) Rodolfos psychological incapacity was established to have been existing at the time and even before
the celebration of marriage and is proven to be permanent in character being deeply ingrained in his
system.
(4) The same has been shown to be sufficiently grave render him incapable to assume essential
obligation of marriage.
(5) It is evident that Rodolfo was unable to comply with the essential obligation of marriage as stated in
Articles 68-71 of the Family Code.
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PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS
HEIRS OF THE DECEASED CARMEN CRUZ-ZAMORA vs. MULTIWOOD INTERNATIONAL, INC.
G.R. No. 146428, January 19, 2009
FACTS: Carmen Cruz-Zamora filed a Complaint against Multiwood International alleging that Zamora
signed a Marketing Agreement to act as an agent of Multiwood. As agent, Zamora claimed that in
renumeration for her services, she was to be paid ten percent (10%) commission for the said projects.
Zamora claimed that Multiwood defaulted in the payment of her commission. She was compelled to file
an action for the collection of her commission when her repeated demands for payment remained
unheeded.
In its Answer with Counterclaim, Multiwood asserted that Zamora was not entitled to receive commissions
for the EdsaShangrila, Makati Shangrila and Diamond Hotel projects on the ground that those projects
were "construction contracts" while their Marketing Agreement spoke only of the sale of Multiwood
products. By way of counterclaim, Multiwood claimed, among others, that Zamora had unliquidated
advances in the amount of P37,397.71.
On April 15, 1996, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of Zamora. The trial court interpreted the
Marketing Agreement as to include construction contracts and allowed Zamora to claim the ten percent
(10%) commission granted in the said agreement.
Multiwood appealed to the CA which reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC ruling that Zamora
could not validly claim commissions from the EdsaShangrila, Makati Shangrila and Diamond Hotel
contracts on the basis of the Marketing Agreement because these contracts were limited only to the
solicitation of the products of prospective foreign or local buyers of Multiwood, excluding other services
offered by the latter such as construction services.
On October 3, 2002, Zamora was substituted by her heirs.Petitioners maintain that the interior
construction projects solicited by Zamora fell within the scope of the Marketing Agreement. The
identification, "solicitation, finding or introduction for negotiation of buyers, dealers and customers" for
Multiwoods product as stated in the agreement is an encompassing term as to include the solicitation of
interior construction projects.
ISSUE: Whether or not the interior construction projects fell within the scope of the Marketing Agreement.
HELD: When the terms of the agreement are clear and explicit, such that they do not justify an attempt to
read into them any alleged intention of the parties, the terms are to be understood literally just as they
appear on the face of the contract. Plainly, the trial court should not have read terms into the Marketing
Agreement that were not expressly in the agreement itself. The agreement is clear, plain and simple that
it leaves no room for interpretation. It explicitly provides that for the services of Zamora, as agent under
the agreement, Multiwood agreed to pay her in the amount equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the face
value of the invoice price, covering the letter of credit or such other instrument representing the actual
purchase price for the products sold or shipped by Multiwood. In other words, Zamoras commission
under the Marketing Agreement was to be paid only for products sold or supplied by Multiwood and not
for services rendered by the latter. .
Moreover, Section 9, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court is also in point:
SEC. 9. Evidence of written agreements. When the terms of an agreement have been reduced in
writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties

and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written
agreement.
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain, or add to the terms of the written agreement if
he puts in issue in his pleading:
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake, or imperfection in the written agreement;
(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto;
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in interest after the execution
of the written agreement.
An examination of even Exhibits B to H which were formally offered by Zamora do not substantiate her
assertion that Multiwood agreed to pay her a ten percent (10%) commission on construction contracts
whether under the Marketing Agreement or any other contract. It is a basic rule in civil cases that the
party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence, which simply
means evidence which is of greater weight, or more convincing than that which is offered in opposition to
it.
People vs. Sarcia

G.R. No. 169641, September 10, 2009
FACTS: Sometime in 1996, five year old AAA together with her cousin and two other playmates were
playing in the yard of SalingCrisologo near a mango tree. Appellant Richard Sarcia, 18 or 19years old at
the time appeared and invited AAA to go with him to the backyard of SalingCrisologos house, whereupon
appellant removed AAAs shorts and underwear, made her lie on her back and after removing his own
trousers and brief laid on top of AAA and made up-and-down movements which caused AAA to feel pain
in her genital area and in her stomach.
Unknown to appellant, AAAs cousin followed them and watched the whole incident from adistance.
AAAs cousin reported such AAAs mother but was rebuffed. AAAs father was working in Manila at the
time. On July 7, 2000, AAAs father filed a complaint for acts of lasciviousness which upon review of
evidence was upgraded to rape by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Ligao, Albay. Medico-legal
findings reported absence of introitalvulval laceration nor scars butwith perforated hymen.On January 17,
2003, the RTC Branch 13 of Ligao City found accused-appellant guilty of rapeand fined PHP 50,000 as
civil indemnity, PHP 50,000 as moral damages and cost of suit. The CA affirmed the RTCs decision but
modified the penalty to death and increased fines of civil indemnity to PHP 75,000, PHP 25,000 as
exemplary damages and PHP 50,000 as moral damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court imposed the proper penalty taking into consideration the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority.
RULING: The Court finds ground for modifying the penalty imposed by the CA. We cannot agree with the
CAs conclusion that the accused-appellant cannot be deemed a minor at the time of the commission of
the offense to entitle him to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority pursuant to Article 68(2) of
the Revised Penal Code.
Meanwhile, when accused-appellant was detained at the New Bilibid Prison pending the outcome of his
appeal before this Court, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9344, the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 took
effect on May 20, 2006. The RTC decision and CA decision were promulgated on January 17, 2003 and
July 14, 2005, respectively. The promulgation of the sentence of conviction of accused-appellant handed
down by the RTC was not suspended as he was about 25 years of age at that time, in accordance with
Article 192 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 603, The Child and Youth Welfare Code and Section 32 of
A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.

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R.A. No. 9344 provides for its retroactive application as follows:
Sec. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentence. Persons who have been
convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this Act, and who were below the age
of eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of the offense for which they were convicted and are
serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from the retroactive application of this Act. x xx
The aforequoted provision allows the retroactive application of the Act to those who have been convicted
and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this said Act, and who were below the age of 18
years at the time of the commission of the offense. With more reason, the Act should apply to this case
wherein the conviction by the lower court is still under review.
Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344 provides for the automatic suspension of sentence of a child in conflict with the
law, even if he/she is already 18 years of age or more at the time he/she is found guilty of the offense
charged.
To date, accused-appellant is about 31 years of age, and the judgment of the RTC had been
promulgated, even before the effectivity of R.A. No. 9344. Thus, the application of Secs. 38 and 40 to the
suspension of sentence is now moot and academic. However, accused-appellant shall be entitled to
appropriate disposition under Sec. 51 of R.A. No. 9344, which provides for the confinement of convicted
children.
GSIS vs COA
G.R. NO. 162372 SEPTEMBER 11, 2012
FACTS: Republic Act No. 8291, otherwise known as The Government Service Insurance System Act of
1997 (the GSIS Act), was enacted and approved, thereby expanding and increasing the coverage and
benefits of the GSIS and instituting reforms therein. The GSIS Board of Trustees approved Board
Resolution No. 326 by which they adopted the GSIS Employees Loyalty Incentive Plan which requires
employees to retire with 5 year lump sum under the GSIS Act or had previously retired under applicable
retirement laws. The corporate auditor of GSIS Ma Cristina Dimagiba opined that the provision
contravenes existing retirement laws like the Teves Retirement Law. In response to this opposition and to
conform strictly to existing retirement laws, the GSIS Board renamed the GSIS ELIP to GSIS
Retirement/Financial Plan. Dimagiba sought the assistance of the Commission on Audit to review the
provisions of the GSIS RFP. COA ruled that GSIS RFP is null and void because it is prohibited to
supplement existing retirement laws, and issued disallowances of retirement benefits under GSIS RFP
thereafter. GSIS filed a petition to review the decision of COA with the contention that GSIS RFP was a
supplementary retirement plan which impliedly repealed the existing retirement laws as a result of GSIS
power to adopt a retirement and/or financial assistance for its employees.
Issue: Whether or not GSIS RFP modified by implied repeal the existing retirement laws
Held: NO, the GSIS RFP did not modify by implied repeal the existing retirement laws because it failed
to identify or designate the statutes that are intended to be repealed. It is a well-settled rule that to bring
an implied repeal, the two laws must be absolutely incompatible and clearly repugnant that the later law
cannot exist without nullifying the prior law. The fact that GSIS changed the name from ELIP to RFP does
not change its essential nature. A perusal of plan shows that its purpose is not to encourage GSIS
employees to retire before their retirement age but to augment the retirement benefits they would receive
under our present laws. Without a doubt, the GSIS RFP is a supplementary retirement plan, which is
prohibited by the Teves Retirement Law.

Caridad Magkalas vs. National Housing Authority

G.R. No. 138823, September 17, 2008
Facts: Plaintiff and her predecessors-in-interest have been occupying a lot located at Bagong Barrio,
Caloocan City, for the past 39 years. P.D. No. 1315 was issued expropriating certain lots at Bagong
Barrio, Caloocan City. In the same Decree, the National Housing Authority (NHA) was named
Administrator of the Bagong Barrio Uban Bliss Project with the former to take possession, contol and
disposition of the expropriated properties with the power of demolition. After conducting studies, the NHA
determined that the area where plaintiffs structure is located should be classified as an area center (open
space). The Area Center was determined in compliance with the requirement to reserve 30% open space
in all types of residential development. Plaintiff, together with Spouses Valenton and Spouses Pangilinan,
filed an appeal from the decision to designate the area where the plaintiff and the two other spouses have
erected structures, as an Area Center, but was later denied. NHA, then, informed plaintiff that per
Development Program of Bagong Barrio, she was being assigned to Lot 77, Block 2, Barangay 132.
The Plaintiff filed a Complaint at for Damages with prayer for the issuance of a restraining order and writ
of Preliminary Injunction against the NHA with the RTC of Caloocan City. The case was dismissed with
the instruction that the parties exhaust the administrative remedies available to the plaintiff.The plaintiff
was told to remove the structure she erected on the area within 30 days and to transfer her residence
to Lot 77, Block 2.
Petitioner maintains that she had acquired a vested right over the property subject of this case on the
ground that she had been in possession of it for 40 years already. Thus, the relocation and the demolition
of her house will infringe the social justice clause guaranteed under the Constitution.
Issues:
1) Whether the demolition or relocation of the petitioners structure will violate the vested rights of the
petitioner over the acquired property under the social justice clause of the constitution.
2) Whether the R.A. 7279 impliedly repealed P.D. 1472 and P.D. 1315.
Held:
1. NO. The NHAs authority to order the relocation of petitioner and the demolition of her property is
mandated by P.D. No. 1315.The properties covered under P.D. No. 1315 included petitioners
property. The NHA, as the decrees designated administrator for the national government, was
empowered to take possession, control and disposition of the expropriated properties with the power of
demolition of their improvements.
Petitioner was informed by the NHA that she would be relocated another lot however, petitioner
adamantly refused to vacate the property claiming she had acquired a vested right over the same. Her
refusal to vacate and relocate to her assigned lot had hampered the development of the entire area. Only
petitioner had refused to comply with the NHA directive as the other occupants had already vacated the
premises. Her continued refusal to vacate has rendered illegal her occupancy and thus, petitioner could
lawfully be ejected even without a judicial order in accordance with P.D. No. 1472.
Neither can it be successfully argued that petitioner had already acquired a vested right over the subject
property when the NHA recognized her as the censused owner by assigning to her a tag number. The
assignment of a tag number was a mere expectant or contingent right and could not have ripened into a
vested right in favor of petitioner. Her possession and occupancy of the said property could not be
characterized as fixed and absolute. As such, petitioner cannot claim that she was deprived of her vested
right when the NHA ordered her relocation to another area.
2. NO. The Court held that R.A. No. 7279 does not necessarily repeal P.D. No. 1315 and P.D. No.
1472 as it does not contain any provision which categorically and expressly repeals the provisions of P.D.

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No. 1315 and P.D. No. 1472. Neither could there be an implied repeal. There was no irreconcilable
conflict or repugnancy between Section 28 of R.A. No. 7279 and P.D. No. 1315 and No. 1472, rather,
they can be read together and harmonized to give effect to their provisions. It should be stressed that
Section 28 of R.A. No. 7279 does not totally and absolutely prohibit eviction and demolition without a
judicial order as in fact it provides for exceptions. Pursuant to established doctrine, the 3 statutes should
be construed in light of the objective to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed by the said
laws, and they should be given such construction as will advance the object, suppress the mischief, and
secure the benefits intended. It is worthy to note that the three laws (P.D. No. 1315, P.D. No. 1472 and
R.A. No. 7279) have a common objective to address the housing problems of the country by
establishing a comprehensive urban development and housing program for the homeless. For this
reason, the need to harmonize these laws all the more becomes imperative. Hence, in construing the
three laws together, the Court arrived at a conclusion that demolition and eviction may be validly carried
out even without a judicial order in certain instances, (1) when the property involved is an expropriated
property in Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City pursuant to Section 1 of P.D. No. 1315, (2) when there are
squatters on government resettlement projects and illegal occupants in any homelot, apartment or
dwelling unit owned or administered by the NHA pursuant to Section 2 of P.D. No. 1472, (3) when
persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks,
shorelines, waterways and other public places such as sidewalks, roads, parks and playgrounds,
pursuant to Section 28(a) of R.A. No. 7279; (4) when government infrastructure projects with available
funding are about to be implemented pursuant to Section 28(b) of R.A. No. 7279.
It readily appears that R.A. No. 7279 does not foreclose the NHAs authority to dismantle the house of
petitioner. Besides, under Section 28(b) of R.A. No. 7279, demolition may be carried out when
government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be implemented. Under P.D. No.
1315, the government has set aside the amount of P40 million for the establishment and upgrading of
housing facilities and services in Bagong Barrio. Thus, on the ground of a much-delayed government
infrastructure project about to be implemented, the NHA has the authority to carry out the summary
eviction and demolition of petitioners structure on the subject lot.
THE LAW FIRM OF RAYMUNDO A. ARMOVIT, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and BENGSON
COMMERCIAL BUILDING, INC.
G.R. No. 154559 , October 5, 2011
Facts: Bengson Commercial Building, Inc. (BCBI) obtained loans from the GSIS in the total amount
of P4,250,000.00, secured by real estate and chattel mortgages. When BCBI defaulted in the payment of
the amortizations, GSIS extrajudiciallyforeclosed the mortgaged properties.
With the Armovit Law Firm as its counsel, BCBI filed an action to annul the extrajudicial foreclosure on
June 23, 1977. Regional Trial Court, rendered a decision in favor of BCBI. GSIS appealed to the Court of
Appeals. It appears that the Armovit Law Firm ceased to be the counsel of BCBI sometime before the
appeal of GSIS. The Decision of the Court of Appeals became final and executory on February 10, 1988
and the records were remanded to the court a quo on March 14, 1988.
When this case was called for hearing on the petition to record attorney's charging lien, Attys. Armovit
and Aglipay appeared for the petitioners.
Atty. Armovit informed the Court that they are withdrawing the petition considering that they are in the
process of amicably settling their differences with the plaintiff, which manifestation was confirmed by Atty.
Yadao.
However, upon the turnover of the money to the private respondent, Mrs. Bengson delivered to Atty.
Armovit the sum of P300,000.00 only. Atty. Armovit protested and demanded the amount of P552,000.00.

On November 4, 1988, however, Atty. Armovit received an order emanating from the trial court in the
tenor as follows:
In compliance with the Order of this Court, the plaintiff submitted a pleading denominated as compliance
alleging that petitioner (Atty. Armovit) has already received from the plaintiff the sum of P300,000.00,
Philippine Currency, as and by way of attorneys fees. With the receipt by the petitioner from the plaintiff
of this amount, the latter has faithfully complied with its obligation.
WHEREFORE, the Order of this Court dated October 11, 1988 approving the withdrawal of the petition to
record attorneys charging lien, on motion of the petitioner, is now final.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Armovit is entitled to the sum of P252,000.00 more, in addition to the sum of
P300,000.00 already paid him by the private respondent.
HELD: The present action is devoid of merit. The Armovit Law Firm, in insisting on its claim, pins its entire
case on the statement in the body of the Decision that "we do not find Atty. Armovits claim for twenty
percent of all recoveries to be unreasonable." In this regard, our ruling in Grageda v. Gomez is
enlightening:
It is basic that when there is a conflict between the dispositive portion or fallo of a Decision and the
opinion of the court contained in the text or body of the judgment, the former prevails over the latter. An
order of execution is based on the disposition, not on the body, of the Decision.This rule rests on the
theory that the fallo is the final order while the opinion in the body is merely a statement ordering nothing.
Indeed, the foregoing rule is not without an exception. We have held that where the inevitable conclusion
from the body of the decision is so clear as to show that there was a mistake in the dispositive portion, the
body of the decision will prevail. x xx.
Applying this ruling to the case at bar, it is clear that the statement in the body of our 1991 Decision (that
"we do not find Atty. Armovits claim for twenty percent of all recoveries to be unreasonable"30) is not an
order which can be the subject of execution. Neither can we ascertain from the body of the Decision an
inevitable conclusion clearly showing a mistake in the dispositive portion. On the contrary, the context in
which the statement was used shows that it is premised on the interpretation that Atty. Armovits valid
claim is only for an additional P252,000.00 in attorneys fees.
MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, Petitioner,

vs.
DING VELAYO SPORTS CENTER, INC., Respondent.
First Division, G.R. No. 161718, December 14, 2011
FACTS: Petitioner MIAA, then called Civil Aeronautics Administration or CAA Salem Investment
Corporation (Salem) entered into a Contract of Lease whereby petitioner leased in favor of Salem the
subject parcel of land in Pasay City. In a Transfer of Lease Rights and Existing Improvements dated
September 30, 1974, Salem conveyed in favor of Ding Velayo Export Corporation (Velayo Export).
Velayo Export executed a Transfer of Lease Rights dated April 27, 1976 by which it conveyed to
respondent Ding Velayo Sports Center (DVSC). DVSC then constructed a multi-million plaza with a three-
storey building on said property and leased the spaces to various business proprietors. MIAA eventually
issued Administrative Order (AO) No. 4, series of 1982, and AO No. 1, series of 1984, fixing various rates
for the lease rentals of its properties, effecting an increase in the lease rental. More than 60 days prior to
the expiration of the lease contract, DVSC expressed its intent to renew the same, to which MIAA
disagreed, ordering DVSC to vacate the subject premises. DVSC then filed before the RTC a Complaint
for Injunction, Consignation, and Damages with a Prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order against MIAA
praying for the renewal of the Contract of Lease between the parties for another 25-year term. The RTC
issued a TRO and, subsequently, a Writ of Preliminary Injunction against MIAA. The RTC then ruled in

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favor of DVSC. The RTC likewise found that the administrative issuances of MIAA increasing the rentals
were not published in full thus cannot bind DVSC. MIAA then elevated the case to the Supreme Court via
Rule 45 contending that the renewal of the Contract of Lease cannot be made to depend on the sole will
ofDVSC
ISSUE # 1: Whether the validity of an administrative order may be collaterally attacked.
HELD # 1: YES.
We have previously declared that a party may raise the unconstitutionality or invalidity of an
administrative regulation on every occasion that said regulation is being enforced. Since it is petitioner
which first invoked its administrative orders to justify the increase in lease rentals of respondent, then
respondent may raise before the court the invalidity of said administrative orders on the ground of non-
publication thereof.
We [have held] that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published
as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different
effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive
orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly
delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and
regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also
to a valid delegation.
ISSUE # 2: Whether petitioner MIAA is already estopped from opposing the renewal of the subject
contract of lease.
HELD # 2: YES.
An essential element of estoppel is that the person invoking it has been influenced and has relied on the
representations or conduct of the person sought to be estopped, and this element is wanting in the instant
case. In Cristobal vs. Gomez, this Court held that no estoppel based on a document can be invoked by
one who has not been misled by the false statements contained therein. And in Republic of the
Philippines vs. Garcia, et al., this Court ruled that there is no estoppel when the statement or action
invoked as its basis did not mislead the adverse party. Estoppel has been characterized as harsh or
odious, and not favored in law. When misapplied, estoppel becomes a most effective weapon to
accomplish an injustice, inasmuch as it shuts a man's mouth from speaking the truth and debars the truth
in a particular case. Estoppel cannot be sustained by mere argument or doubtful inference; it must be
clearly proved in all its essential elements by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence. No party should
be precluded from making out his case according to its truth unless by force of some positive principle of
law, and, consequently, estoppel in pais must be applied strictly and should not be enforced unless
substantiated in every particular.
The essential elements of estoppel in pais may be considered in relation to the party sought to be
estopped, and in relation to the party invoking the estoppel in his favor. As related to the party to be
estopped, the essential elements are: (1) conduct amounting to false representation or concealment of
material facts; or at least calculated to convey the impression that the facts are otherwise than, and
inconsistent with, those which the party subsequently attempts to assert; (2) intent, or at least expectation
that his conduct shall be acted upon by, or at least influence, the other party; and (3) knowledge, actual or
constructive, of the real facts. As related to the party claiming the estoppel, the essential elements are (1)
lack of knowledge and of the means of knowledge of the truth as the facts in questions; (2) reliance, in
good faith, upon the conduct or statements of the party to be estopped; (3) action or inaction based
thereon of such character as to change the position or status of the party claiming the estoppel, to his
injury, detriment or prejudice.

CONTRACTS
MCA-MBF COUNTDOWN CARDS PHILIPPINES INC. v. MBF CARD INTERNATIONAL LIMTED
G.R. No. 173586, March 14, 2012
FACTS: Respondents alleged that before they could agree with petitioner regarding the drafts of the Joint
Venture and Licensing Agreement, and pending negotiations, petitioner Aguiluz V wrote respondent MBf
Card that he already incorporated a company which would later be converted into the proposed JVC upon
the execution and approval of the pertinent Agreements. Acceding to a request in the same letter,
respondent MBf Card remitted an amount to which belongs to petitioner MCA-MBF. The understanding
was that such amount was to be applied as MBf Cards payment of its 40% shareholding in the JVC upon
the execution and approval of the Joint Venture and Licensing Agreements.However, without the prior
authority of the respondents, and while the parties were still discussing and negotiating on the terms and
conditions of the Joint Venture and Licensing Agreements, petitioners, through the intended JVC
(petitioner MCA-MBF), began to promote, market and sell the Countdown Discount Cards to the public,
using the "Countdown" name, logo and trademark despite respondents advice to petitioner not to do so.
What is worse is that Aguiluz V misrepresented to the public that he, "representing the MCA Holdings had
actually signed a joint venture agreement with Mr. Gordon Yuen, Chairman, of the Malaysia Borneo
Finance." Petitioner MCA-MBF claims that the contract between the parties had already been perfected.
The parties allegedly agreed that (1) they jointly undertook the task of marketing the MBf Discount Card in
the Philippines; (2) MBf Card was solely responsible for securing the necessary selling paraphernalia
from the main Licensor, Countdown of London, England; and (3) Gordon Yuen and T.K. Wong were
elected as members of the Board of Directors of the Joint Venture Corporation. Petitioner MCA-MBF
asserted that MBf Card did not suffer any damage from the introduction and marketing of the MBf
Countdown Discount Card in the Philippines since all acts pertaining to the business were jointly
undertaken by the parties.
ISSUE: Whether or not the joint venture agreement between the parties had been perfected on the
ground that it was an oral agreement which is perfected by mere consent.
HELD: There was no perfected contract between the parties. Art 1315 of the Civil Code provides that
contracts are perfected by mere, consent and Art 1356 states that contracts shall be obligatory in
whatever form they may have been entered into, provided all essential requisites for their validity are
presented. However, the factual findings of the RTC found no perfected oral joint venture agreement: that
Tan Sri had no authority to bind the respondents; that Aguiluz V neither knew nor inquired whether Tan
Sri was an officer of the plaintiff corporations; that the remittance and conveyance of trade secrets cannot
be considered as partial execution of the JVA as the testimonies of the witnesses told the RTC that the
same will only be applied to the proposed shareholding UPON EXECUTION of the JVA; that the advice
from respondents regarding the marketing of discount cards are merely preparatory acts; that
Pangulayans letter admitted that the signing of the JVA is required to finalize the formation of the JVC
and a Licensing Agreement still needs to be executed between the JVC and the respondents.
The lack of a written contract constitutes convincing circumstantial proof that the parties were only in the
process of negotiating contracts terms. When there is no meeting of minds as to the subject matter or the
cause or consideration of the contract, the same cannot be considered perfected.
Barceliza P. Capistrano vs. Darryl Limcuando and Fe S. Sumiran

G.R. No. 152413, February 13, 2009
Facts: Petitioner Capistrano owned a parcel of land in Barangay Talaga, Rizal, covered by OCT No. P-
10302 pursuant to free patent issued on August 23, 1977. She then sold the said lot to spouses Felimon
Zuasola and Anita Subida on December 31, 1985 with right to repurchase. He again sold half of the said

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lot to respondents Limcuando and Sumiran via Deed of Absolute Sale for the amount of P75,000.00 with
P10,000.00 partial payment. However, respondents defaulted payment.
Upon knowledge of the double sale, respondents filed a case for estafa and consequently, petitioner was
convicted. Petitioner repurchased the lot to spouses Zuasola and Subida and tried to repurchase the lot
to respondents but the latter refused. This prompted the filing of the case for annulment of deed of
absolute sake alleging that the sale is void from the beginning. RTC ruled for the validity of the deed of
absolute sale and was affirmed by the CA contending that petitioner is in bad faith through her act of
double sale.
Issue: Whether or not the deed of absolute sale is void?
Ruling: Yes. Petitioners action for annulment of the subject deed should be dismissed based on Art. 397
of the CC which provides that the person who employed fraud cannot base his action for the annulment of
contracts upon such flaws of the contract. She is precluded from seeking the annulment of the said
contract based on the fraud which she herself has caused.
As to the contention that the civil action for annulment of deed of sale is impliedly instituted in the criminal
action of estafa is bereft of merit since it is not among the civil actions which are impliedly instituted in a
criminal action, to wit: recovery of indemnity and damages under Arts. 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the CC.
Also that the contention that he should be allowed to repurchase the same has no merit, although a free
patent should not be disposed within 5 years from the date of conveyance in order to preserve and keep
in the family of the homesteader that portion of public land and which the State had gratuitously given to
him, this will not be applicable in the case at bar since such repurchase would reward rather than
sanction an act of injustice committed by her in her fraudulent dealings with land that she acquired from
the government under the Public Land Act. It is evident that the motive of petitioner is for profit-making
because she only made an effort to repurchase during the pendency of the criminal case.
Fontana Resort and Country Club, Inc. And RN Development Corp., vs. Spouse Tan
G.R. No. 154670, January 30, 2012
Facts: Sometime in March 1997, Respondent spouses Tan bought from petitioner RN Development
Corporation RNDC two class D shares of stock in petitioner Fontana Resort and Country Club, Inc.
(FRCCI), worth P387,300.00, enticed by the promises of petitioners sales agents that petitioner FRCCI
would construct a park with first-class leisure facilities in Clark Field, Pampanga, to be called Fontana
Leisure Park. Two years later, respondents filed before the SEC a Complaint for refund of
the P387,300.00 they spent to purchase FRCCI shares of stock from petitioners. Respondents alleged
that they had been deceived into buying FRCCI shares because of petitioners fraudulent
misrepresentations. Construction of FLP turned out to be still unfinished and the policies, rules, and
regulations of the country club were obscure
SEC-SICD Hearing Officer Bacalla conducted preliminary hearings and trial proper in the case. When
petitioners twice defaulted, without any valid excuse, to present evidence on the scheduled hearing dates,
hence, it was deemed that petitioners have waived their right to present evidence and considered the
case submitted for resolution. Consequently, SEC rendered a decision directing to jointly and severally
pay herein respondents the amount of P387,000.00 plus interest at the rate of 21% per annum computed
from when demand was first made, until such time as payment is actually made.
Issues:

1. Whether the contract of sale should be subject to rescission or annulment of the contract of sale
between RNDC and respondents?
2. Whether the petitioners committed fraud or defaulted on their promises as would justify the annulment
or rescission of their contract of sale
Held:
1. NO. No evidence on record that petitioners defaulted on any of their obligations that would have
called for the rescission of the sale of the FRCCI shares to respondents. The right to rescind a
contract arises once the other party defaults in the performance of his obligation. Rescission of a
contract will not be permitted for a slight or casual breach, but only such substantial and fundamental
breach as would defeat the very object of the parties in making the agreement. In the same case as
fraud, the burden of establishing the default of petitioners lies upon respondents, but respondents
once more failed to discharge the same.
2. NO. In this case, respondents have miserably failed to prove how petitioners employed fraud to
induce respondents to buy FRCCI shares. It can only be expected that petitioners presented the FLP
and the country club in the most positive light in order to attract investor-members. There is no
showing that in their sales talk to respondents, petitioners actually used insidious words or
machinations, without which, respondents would not have bought the FRCCI shares. Respondents
appear to be literate and of above-average means, who may not be so easily deceived into parting
with a substantial amount of money. What is apparent to us is that respondents knowingly and
willingly consented to buying FRCCI shares, but were later on disappointed with the actual FLP
facilities and club membership benefits.
PHILNICO INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION vs. PRIVATIZATION AND MANAGEMENT OFFICE

G.R. No. 199420, August 27, 2014
Facts: The Development Bank of the Philippines and Philippine National Bank, by virtue of foreclosure
proceedings, became the holders of all the shares of stock in PPC (then still the Nonoc Mining and
Industrial Corporation). The banks eventually transferred their PPC shares of stock to PMO (then still the
APT) in 1987.
On May 10, 1996, PMO, PIC (then still the Philnico Mining and Industrial Corporation), and PPC executed
a contract, denominated as the Amended and Restated Definitive Agreement (ARDA). Under the ARDA,
PIC agreed to pay PMO the peso equivalent of US$333,762,000.00 as purchase price, payable in
installments and in accordance with the schedule also set out in the ARDA, which states that If an event
of default shall have occurred the PMO is hereby authorized to sell in one or more sales, either public or
private, at any time the whole or any part of the Pledged Shares in such order and number as the [PMO]
may elect.
Three years later, PMO notified PIC that the latter had defaulted in the payment of its obligations and
demanded that PIC settle its unpaid amortizations or else the PMO would enforce the automatic reversion
of the PPC shares of stock under Section 8.02 of the ARDA.
A day before the deadline for payment set by PMO in its letters, PIC filed before the RTC a Complaint for
Prohibition against Reversion of Shares stating that while the failure of [PIC] to meet its amortization with
respect to the smaller portion of the purchase price cannot be denied, said default cannot automatically
result in the reversion of the shares of stocks to PMO. The provision in the ARDA providing for ipso facto
reversion of the shares of stock is null and void for being a pactum commissorium. The RTC granted the
writ.

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Issue: Whether or not Section 8.02 of the ARDA on ipso facto or automatic reversion of the PPC shares
of stock to PMO in case of default by PIC constitutes pactum commissorium.
Held: Yes. Section 8.02 of the ARDA constitutes pactum commissorium and, thus, null and void for being
contrary to Article 2088 of the Civil Code.
Pactum commissoriumis among the contractual stipulations that are deemed contrary to law. It is defined
as "a stipulation empowering the creditor to appropriate the thing given as guaranty for the fulfillment of
the obligation in the event the obligor fails to live up to his undertakings, without further formality, such as
foreclosure proceedings, and a public sale."It is explicitly prohibited under Article 2088 of the Civil Code
which provides:
ART. 2088. The creditor cannot appropriate the things given by way of pledge or mortgage, or dispose of
them. Any stipulation to the contrary is null and void.
There are two elements for pactum commissoriumto exist: (1) that there should be a pledge or mortgage
wherein a property is pledged or mortgaged by way of security for the payment of the principal obligation;
and (2) that there should be a stipulation for an automatic appropriation by the creditor of the thing
pledged or mortgaged in the event of nonpayment of the principal obligation within the stipulated period.
Both elements of pactum commissoriumare present in the instant case: (1) By virtue of the Pledge
Agreement dated May 2,1997, PIC pledged its PPC shares of stock in favor of PMO as security for the
fulfillment of the formers obligations under the ARDA dated May 10, 1996 and the Pledge Agreement
itself; and (2) There is automatic appropriation as under Section 8.02 of the ARDA, in the event of default
by PIC, title to the PPC shares of stock shall ipso factorevert from PIC to PMO without need of demand.

PRESCRIPTION
SPOUSES CARPO vs. AYALA LAND, INCORPORATED
G.R. No. 166577, February 3, 2010
FACTS: Spouses Morris and Socorro Carpo (Carpos) filed a Complaint for Quieting of Title against
Ayala Land, Incorporated (ALI) claiming that they are the owners of a parcel of land covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 296463 issued in their names. They further alleged that ALI was
claiming to have titles (specifically, TCT Nos. 125945, T-4366, T-4367 and T-4368) over the property
covered by the Carpos TCT No. 296463.
In its Answer, ALI pointed out that the areas covered by TCT Nos. T-4366, T-4367, and T-4368 do not
overlap with the Carpos claimed property and the dispute pertained only to the land covered by the
Carpos TCT No. 296463 and TCT No. T-5333 in the name of Las Pias Ventures, Inc. (LPVI) which was
derived from TCT No. 125945 in the name of Ayala Corporation. It appeared that Ayala
Corporation contributed the property to LPVI and LPVI had, in turn, also merged with ALI. Further, ALI
alleged that it is the true owner of the property covered by TCT No. T-5333 as it traces back its title to
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 242 issued in 1950 while the Carpos title was derived from OCT
No. 8575 issued only in 1970. ALI also claimed the Carpos complaint was barred by res judicata in view
of the 1941 decision of this Court in Guico v. San Pedro which upheld the ownership of a certain Eduardo
Guico over the subject property as Lot 3, of Psu-80886 over the claim of a certain FlorentinoBaltazar who
was asserting ownership of the same under his plan, Psu-56007.
The RTC ruled that the Carpos title is superior to that of ALI. The CA reversed RTCs decision.The
Carpos filed their motion for reconsideration but the same was denied by the CA. Hence, this petition.
The Carpos contend that it is error on the part of the CA to rule that their cause of action has been barred
by prescription and laches. According to them, since the OCT from which ALI derived its title is void for
want of a duly approved survey plan, their cause of action did not prescribe.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Carpos cause of action has been barred by prescription and laches.
HELD: YES. OCT No. 242 of ALIs predecessor-in-interest was issued on May 7, 1950, or forty-five (45)
years before the Car[pos filed their complaint on March 10, 1995. As such, it is the Courts firmly held
view that the Carpos claim is barred not only by prescription, but also by laches.
Aside from the fact that OCT No. 242 had become incontrovertible after the lapse of one (1) year from the
time a decree of registration was issued, any action for reconveyance that the Carpos could have availed
of is also barred. Although the Carpos complaint was for quieting of title, it is in essence an action for
reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust, considering that the Carpos were alleging in
said complaint that there was a serious mistake, if not fraud, in the issuance of OCT No. 242 in favor of
ALIs predecessor-in-interest. It is now well-settled that an action for reconveyance, which is a legal
remedy granted to a landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in
anothers name, must be filed within ten years from the issuance of the title, since such issuance
operates as a constructive notice. Since ALIs title is traced to an OCT issued in 1950, the ten-year
prescriptive period expired in 1960.
By laches is meant the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. It does not
involve mere lapse or passage of time, but is principally an impediment to the assertion or enforcement of
a right, which has become under the circumstances inequitable or unfair to permit. In the instant case, the
Carpos, as well as their predecessor-in-interest, have not shown that they have taken judicial steps to
nullify OCT No. 242, from which ALIs title was derived, for forty-five (45) years. To allow them to do so

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now, and if successful, would be clearly unjust and inequitable to those who relied on the validity of said
OCT, the innocent purchasers for value, who are protected by P.D. 1529.
HEIRS OF DOMINGO HERNANDEZ SR. V MINGOA

G.R. NO. 146548 DECEMBER 18, 2009
FACTS: Domingo Hernandez Sr. and his spouse Sergia V. Hernandez were awarded a piece of real
property by the Philippine Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC) by way of salary deduction. PHHC
executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Hernandez Sr upon his full payment hence the issuance of
TCT No. 107534. When Hernandez Sr died intestate, his heirs discovered that TCT No. 107534 was
already cancelled a year before and TCT No. 290121 was issued to a Plaridel Mingoa in lieu thereof.
Melanie Mingoa, daughter of Plaridel who purchased the property from him, was found to be in
possession of the property and all official receipts indicating payment of the realty taxes in the name of
Hernandez Sr. Melanie averred that it was Dolores Camisura who sold the property to Plaridel after
Hernandez Sr sold his rights to Camisura and executed an Irrevocable Special Power of Attorney
appointing her as attorney-in-fact. Sergia contended that she did not sign the deed of sale in favor of
Camisura and asserted that the sale is therefore void since the subject lot is a conjugal property.
The heirs filed a complaint claiming rights over the property with prayer to annul TCT No. 290121
including all its derivative titles and the Special Power of Attorney executed in favor of Camisura. Mingoa
et al filed a Motion to Dismiss the case on the ground that the heirs right to recover the property has been
barred by laches since the prescriptive period of 10 years has passed.
From 1966 (the time when Mingoa were able to possess the property) to 1983 (the time when the heirs
had knowledge that the TCT in the name of Hernandez Sr had already been cancelled by the Registry of
Deeds of Quezon City) covers almost a span of 17 years; and from 1983 to 1995 (the time when the
Heirs filed the original action) is a period of another 12 years.
ISSUE: Whether or not the action impugning the validity of the alienation of property has prescribed?
HELD: Yes, the action has prescribed on the ground that no action was made by the heirs to recover the
property during the prescriptive period of 10 years. Laches means the failure or neglect for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which, by observance of due diligence, could or
should have been done earlier. The time-honored rule anchored on public policy is that relief will be
denied to a litigant whose claim or demand has become stale, or who has acquiesced for an
unreasonable length of time, or who has not been vigilant or who has slept on his rights either by
negligence, folly or inattention.
Since the sale of the conjugal property by Hernandez Sr. was without the consent of his wife Sergia, the
same is voidable; thus, binding unless annulled. Considering that Sergia failed to exercise her right to ask
for the annulment of the sale within the prescribed period, she is now barred from questioning the validity
thereof. More so, she is precluded from assailing the validity of the subsequent transfers from Camisura
to Plaridel Mingoa and from the latter to Melanie Mingoa. Therefore, title to the subject property cannot
anymore be reconveyed to the petitioners by reason of prescription and laches.

PARTNERSHIP
SPS. RENATO AND FLORINDA DELA CRUZ V SPS GIL AND LEONILA SEGOVIA
G. R. NO. 149801 JUNE 26, 2008
FACTS: Florinda dela Cruz and her sister Leonila Segovia purchased two parcels of land which were sold
together at P180,000 of which Florinda contributed P144,000 and Leonila added P36,000 in 1985. The
properties were consequently registered in the name of Renato dela Cruz, spouse of Florinda. In 1990,
the sisters reduced their agreement into a Note of Agreement.
In 1991, Florinda and Leonilas sister Linda Duval prepared a formal contract between them which they
both signed. The new Agreement stated that it shall supersede all previous agreements on the properties
and that the Lender (Florinda) will take ownership of the property if payment was not made after ten (10)
years. Leonila continued paying Florinda between 1990 and 1991. Finally, in 1995, Leonila attempted to
pay the remaining balance but Florinda refused to accept the same on the ground that the ten-year period
for the payment of the balance reckoned from the year they bought the house and entered into a verbal
agreement which was 1985. Thereafter, Florinda demanded that Leonila and her family vacate the house
at Lot 505.
Leonila consigned her final payment to the court and asserted that the payment scheme commenced in
1991 as the contract prepared by Linda superseded previous agreements. The Regional Trial Court ruled
in favor of Leonila, holding that the ten-year payment period commenced when the sisters signed the new
contract in 1991.
ISSUE: Whether or not the subject lots are conjugal properties of Florinda and Renato Dela Cruz
HELD: NO, the subject lots are not conjugal properties because the lots were merely registered in the
name of Renato and Florinda to secure Leonilas full payment of the property they paid for in advance.
The Family Code requires the written consent of the other spouse, or authority of the court for the
disposition or encumbrance of conjugal partnership property without which, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. The foregoing provision finds no application in this case because the
transaction between Florinda and Leonila in reality did not involve any disposition of property belonging to
any of the sisters conjugal assets. With money pooled together, the sisters agreed that Lot 503 be valued
at P80,000.00 and Lot 505 valued at P100,000.00. The P36,000.00 contribution of Leonila shall be
applied to the 503 property which upon full payment of the remaining balance of P44,000.00 advanced by
Florinda shall belong to Leonila. To secure payment of the loan, Lot 503 was provisionally registered in
the name of Florinda and Renato. Hence Lot 503 was at the outset not intended to be part of the conjugal
asset of the petitioners but only as a security for the payment of the P44,000.00 due from respondents.

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CREDIT TRANSACTIONS
Philippine Trust Company vs. Hon. Court of Appeals and Forfom Development Corporation
G.R. No. 150318, November 22, 2010
Facts: Forfom Development Corporation is the registered owner of two (2) parcels of land subject of the
present controversy under Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 10896 and 64884. Sometime in 1989, Forfom
discovered that the subject properties had already been transferred in the names of said Ma. Teresa
Limcauco and EllenoraLimcauco. Subsequently, Forfom caused the annotation of its adverse claim on
TCT No. 75533.
On December 26, 1989, plaintiff instituted the present action against the defendants alleging
conspiratorial acts committed by said defendants who succeeded in causing the fraudulent transfer of
registration of the properties. In its Answer, defendant Philippine Trust Company denied the allegations of
the Complaint as to the irregularities in the granting of the P8 million loan to defendant-spouses Raul and
Elea Claveria. According to said defendant, the Claveria spouses have been their clients since 1986 and
on October 2, 1987, all their outstanding obligations in the amount of P7,300,000.00 were consolidated
into one (1) account on clean basis.
The RTC rendered a decision in favor of Forfom. On appeal, the CA expressed that Philtrust was
negligent in its credit investigation procedures and its standards for granting of loans, as shown by (a) its
previously extending unsecured and uncollateralized loans to the spouses Raul and Elea Claveria, and
(b) its failure to discover the latters statement of a fictitious address in the mortgage contract and being
the subject of estafa cases. The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial courts finding that Philtrust acted in
haste in the execution of the mortgage and loan contracts, as the property, assessed only at more
than P2 million and allegedly purchased at more than P5 million, was made to secure the principal loan
obligation of P8 million.
Indeed, the presence of anything which excites or arouses suspicion should prompt the vendee or
mortgagee to look beyond the certificate and investigate the title of the vendor appearing on the face of
said certificate. If the vendee or mortgagee failed to do so before the execution of the contract, the
vendee or mortgagee is deemed to be in bad faith and therefore cannot acquire any title under the forged
instrument.
ISSUE: Whether Philtrust is a mortgagee in good or bad faith.
HELD: It is settled that banks, their business being impressed with public interest, are expected to
exercise more care and prudence than private individuals in their dealings, even those involving
registered land. The rule that persons dealing with registered lands can rely solely on the certificate of
title does not apply to banks.Consequently, Philtrust should prove that it exercised extraordinary
diligence required of it in approving the mortgage contract in favor of the spouses Claveria.
Philtrust, therefore, presented no evidence rebutting the following badges of bad faith shown in the
records of the case. Even though circumstantial, the following adequately prove by preponderance of
evidence that Philtrust was aware of the fraudulent scheme perpetrated upon Forfom:
1. Within a period of less than one year, Philtrust extended unsecured loans amounting
to P7,300,000.00 to the spouses Claveria.
The RTC and the Court of Appeals considered these circumstances as circumstantial evidence of
Philtrustsawareness of the fraudulent scheme against Forfom.Nevertheless, Philtrust up to this date
persists with suppressing these details:

Petitioner humbly believes and strongly maintains its position that the presentation of all documents
pertaining to the loan transactions of Spouses Claveria is unnecessary, irrelevant, and immaterial in its
defense of good faith before the court a quo. Nevertheless, as discussed above, Petitioner had
sufficiently proved through its Answer to Interrogatories and loan documents extant in the records of the
case that it prudently complied with the standard practice of banks in accepting mortgage.
All the foregoing considered, we find that the Court of Appeals did not even err in finding that Philtrust
was in bad faith in the execution of the mortgage contract with the spouses Claveria. Consequently,
Philtrust miserably failed to prove that the Court.
CENTURY SAVINGS BANKv.SPS. SAMONTE

G.R. No. 176212,October 20, 2010
FACTS: Petitioner extended two loans to respondents secured by a promissory note and deed of real
estate mortgage. When respondents defaulted in the payment, petitioner initiated before the notary public
extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings over the mortgaged properties, pursuant to Act No. 3135, also
known as "An Act to Regulate the Sale of Property under Special Powers Inserted in or Annexed to Real
Estate Mortgages," as amended.
Section 3 of Act No. 3135 provides for the following pre-requisites for an extrajudicial sale:
Notice shall be given by posting notices of the sale for not less than twenty days in at least three public
places of the municipality or city where the property is situated, and if such property is worth more than
four hundred pesos, such notice shall also be published once a week for at least three consecutive weeks
in a newspaper of general circulation in the municipality or city.
Hence, petitioner caused the publication of a Notice of Sale in a weekly newspaper of general circulation.
The Notary Public also attested in a Certificate of Posting.
Later on, the parties executed a Contract of Lease whereby petitioner leased one of the foreclosed
properties to respondents. A few months later, respondents filed a Complaint seeking the annulment of
the extrajudicial foreclosure sale of their real properties. The RTC dismissed the case and found that the
Notice of Sale appears to have been duly posted as stated in the Notary Publics Certificate of Posting;
and that even if the posting requirement was not complied with, the publication of the Notice of Sale in a
newspaper of general circulation already satisfied the notice requirement under Act No. 3135, as
amended. The trial court added that under the equitable principle of estoppel, respondents were
precluded from impugning the validity of the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings as they already
acknowledged the same in theirContract of Lease with petitioner. However, CA reversed the said RTCs
decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the extrajudicial foreclosure sale of the mortgaged properties was valid on the
ground of non-compliance with the legal requirements on the posting of the notices of sale.
Whether or not respondents are estopped from challenging the validity of the foreclosure sale on the
ground of entering with a subsequent Contract of Lease
HELD: The extrajudicial foreclosure sale of the properties is valid. A Certificate of Posting is actually
evidence presented by the petitioner to establish that copies of the Notice of Sale were indeed posted as
required by Act No. 3135, as amended. In addition, despite any defect in the posting of the Notice of Sale,
previous jurisprudence tells us that the publication of the same notice in a newspaper of general
circulation is already sufficient compliance with the requirement of the law: the purpose of a notice of sale
is to inform the public of the nature and condition of the property to be sold, and of the time, place and
terms of the sale. Notices are given for the purpose of securing bidders and to prevent a sacrifice of the

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property. If these objects are attained, immaterial errors and mistakes will not affect the sufficiency of the
notice; but if mistakes or omissions occur in the notices of sale, which are calculated to deter or mislead
bidders, to depreciate the value of the property, or to prevent it from bringing a fair price, such mistakes or
omissions will be fatal to the validity of the notice, and also to the sale made pursuant thereto; and, if such
purpose could be attained by publication alone, then the absence of actual posting should not nullify the
sale. Newspaper publications have more far-reaching effects than posting on bulletin boards in public
places. There is a greater probability that an announcement or notice published in a newspaper of
general circulation, which is distributed nationwide, shall have a readership of more people than that
posted in a public bulletin board, no matter how strategic its location may be, which caters only to a
limited few. Hence, the publication of the notice of sale in the newspaper of general circulation alone is
more than sufficient compliance with the notice-posting requirement of the law. By such publication, a
reasonably wide publicity had been effected such that those interested might attend the public sale, and
the purpose of the law had been thereby subserved.
Finally, the respondents are already estopped from challenging the validity of the foreclosure sale, after
entering into a Contract of Lease with petitioner over one of the foreclosed properties. The title of the
landlord is a conclusive presumption as against the tenant or lessee. According to Section 2(b), Rule 131
of the Rules of Court, "[t]he tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of the
commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between them." The juridical relationship between
petitioner as lessor and respondents as lessees carries with it recognition of the lessors title. As lessees,
then respondents are estopped to deny their landlord's title, or to assert a better title not only in
themselves, but also in some third person while they remain in possession of the leased premises and
until they surrender possession to the landlord. This estoppel applies even though the lessor had no title
at the time the relation of lessor and lessee was created, and may be asserted not only by the original
lessor, but also by those who succeed to his title.
VIOLA CAHILIG and ANTONIO G. SIEL, JR. vs. HON. EUSTAQUIO G. TERENCIO
G.R. No. 164470, November 28, 2011
Facts: Soterania G. Siel executed deeds of real estate mortgage covering a portion of Lot 402, in favor
of Moneytrend Lending Corporation, as security for two promissory notes. Moneytrend Lending
Corporation assigned the promissory notes and deeds of real estate mortgage to private respondent
Mercantile Credit Resources Corporation.
In view of the non-payment of the loans, private respondent caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the
mortgages. It SoteraniaSiel failed to redeem the property within the prescribed period and a final deed of
sale was issued by the Sheriff on March 19, 2001 in favor of private respondent.
On May 2, 2001, private respondent filed with the RTC an ex-parte motion for the issuance of a writ of
possession over the subject property. On March 11, 2002, the Sheriff received a third party claimants
affidavit executed by petitioner Antonio Siel, Jr., who claimed that he and his siblings bought the
property from their mother, SoteraniaSiel, on March 2, 1993, attaching thereto copies of the deeds of
sale in their favor.
On November 25, 2002, private respondent filed a motion for the issuance of an alias writ of possession.
Said motion was opposed by petitioners Viola Cahilig and Antonio G. Siel, Jr. alleging that they and their
siblings have been the owners of the property since 1993, that is, before the mortgage was constituted.
In its July 23, 2003 Decision, the Court of Appeals pointed out that the principal issue to be resolved in
the case being appealed by the petitioners is whether or not petitioners are third parties holding the
subject property adversely to the judgment debtor which was the late SoteraniaSiel. The Court of
Appeals ruled in the negative and dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of merit.

ISSUE: whether or not the issuance of the writ of possession over the property subject of the foreclosure
of the real estate mortgage is proper.
HELD: The petition is without merit. The SC previously held in Villanueva v. Cherdan Lending Investors
Corporation that:
A writ of possession is an order of the court commanding the sheriff to place a person in possession of a
real or personal property. It may be issued in an extrajudicial foreclosure of a real estate mortgage under
Section 7 of Act 3135, as amended by Act 4118, either 1) within the one-year redemption period, upon
the filing of a bond, or 2) after the lapse of the redemption period, without need of a bond or of a separate
and independent action.
In a number of cases, we have held that the obligation of the court to issue an ex parte writ of possession
in favor of the purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale ceases to be ministerial once it appears that
there is a third party in possession of the property who is claiming a right adverse to that of the
debtor/mortgagor.
However, unlike in those cases, the third-party claim in the instant case was not presented at the onset of
litigation. It must be stressed that petitioners raised for the first time their theory that they are third parties
(vendees) holding the property adversely to the mortgagor only in their Opposition to the Motion for
Issuance of Alias Writ of Possession, after the trial court had already issued the first order granting a writ
of possession to private respondent.
In light of this written admission in their pleading, petitioners cannot be allowed to subsequently claim in
the same proceedings that they oppose the issuance of the writ of possession because they already
owned the subject property prior to the constitution of the mortgage without first showing that the
contradictory admission was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. This
petitioners failed to do and, worse, they offer no explanation as to why they failed to adduce evidence of
the purported sale of the property in their favor at the earliest opportunity. As a consequence thereof, they
must be bound by their original admission that they are merely successors in interest of the mortgagor,
rather than adverse claimants.
All in all, we find that the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error when it affirmed the trial courts
issuance of a writ of possession in the present case and in light of petitioners own failure to prove (a)
their status as third parties to the mortgage, and (b) notice to the mortgagee of the supposed sale of the
subject property in their favor.
TORBELA V ROSARIO
G.R. NO. 140528 DECEMBER 7, 2011
FACTS: A certain Valeriano Semilla owned a parcel of land in Urdaneta City, Pangasinan with Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 16676. Under unexplained circumstances, Semilla gave Lot No. 356-A to his
sister Marta Semilla who is married to Eugenio Torbela. Upon the deaths of the spouses Torbela, Lot No.
356-A was adjudicated in equal shares among their children, the Torbela siblings.
The Torbela siblings executed a Deed of Absolute Quitclaim over Lot No. 356-A in favor of Dr. Andres
Rosario but Dr. Rosario executed a Quitclaim acknowledging that he only borrowed Lot No. 356-A from
the Torbela siblings and would return the same. Dr. Rosario later obtained loans from the Development
Bank of the Philippines (DBP) and Philippine National Bank (PNB) by constituting mortgages on Lot No.
356-A as security. Cornelio Tosino executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim on behalf of the Torbela
siblings claiming that Dr. Rosario filed a Quitclaim over the property earlier. The Adverse Claim and the
Quitclaim were later annotated as liens in the title.

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Dr. Rosario and his spouse attempted to cancel the previous liens only on the basis of the Cancellation
and Discharge of Mortgage from the loans they successfully paid. The spouses then acquired a third loan
from Banco Filipino which they secured by constituting mortgages on Lot No. 356-A as well as other
properties they bought from previous loans which are Lot No. 4489 and Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A.
When the spouses Rosario failed to pay their third loan, Banco Filipino extrajudicially foreclosed the
mortgages on the said properties. Banco Filipino was the lone bidder for the three foreclosed properties.
The Torbela siblings filed a motion to cancel the Certificate of Final Sale of Lot No. 356-A to Banco
Filipino, contending that Banco Filipino is not a mortgagee and buyer in good faith because it knew of the
Adverse Claim and Quitclaim annotated in the title. Banco Filipino averred that it was not aware that the
Adverse Claim on Lot No. 356-A still subsisted despite Dr. Rosarios attempt to cancel it.
ISSUE: Whether or not Banco Filipino is a mortgagee and buyer in good faith
HELD: No, Banco Filipino is not a mortgagee and buyer in good faith because it foreclosed and
reconveyed the lots when all liens in the title have not been properly cancelled. Under Article 2085 of the
Civil Code, one of the essential requisites of the contract of mortgage is that the mortgagor should be the
absolute owner of the property to be mortgaged; otherwise, the mortgage is considered null and void.
However, an exception to this rule is the doctrine of mortgagee in good faith. Under this doctrine, even if
the mortgagor is not the owner of the mortgaged property, the mortgage contract and any foreclosure
sale arising therefrom are given effect by reason of public policy.
No petition for cancellation has been filed and no hearing has been conducted herein to determine the
validity or merit of the adverse claim of the Torbela siblings. The previous liens were improperly cancelled
as they were only based on a mere Cancellation and Discharge of Mortgage. While the defective
cancellation of the lien entries might not be evident to a private individual, the same should have been
apparent to Banco Filipino. Banco Filipino is not an ordinary mortgagee, but is a mortgagee-bank, whose
business is impressed with public interest.
ISSUE: Whether there was an express trust between the Torbela siblings and Dr. Rosario?
Ruling: YES. When Dr. Rosario was able to register Lot No. 356-A in his name under TCT No. 52751, an
implied trust was initially established between him and the Torbela siblings under Art. 1451 of the Civil
Code Dr. Rosarios execution of the Deed of Absolute Quitclaim containing his express admission that he
only borrowed Lot No. 356-A from the Torbela siblings, eventually transformed the nature of the trust to
an express one. The express trust continued despite Dr. Rosario stating in his Deed of Absolute
Quitclaim that he was already returning Lot No. 356-A to the Torbela siblings as Lot No. 356-A remained
registered in Dr. Rosarios name under TCT No. 52751 and Dr. Rosario kept possession of said property,
together with the improvements thereon.
Union Bank of the Philippines vs. Spouses Rodolfo T. Tiu and Victoria N. Tiu
G.R. Nos. 173090-91, September 7, 2011
Facts: Petitioner Union Bank and respondent Spouses Tiu entered into a Credit Line Agreement whereby
Union Bank agreed to make available to the spouses Tiu credit facilities in such amounts as may be
approved. From September 1997 to March 1998, the spouses Tiu took out various loans pursuant to this
CLA in the total amount of US$3,632,000.00 as evidenced by promissory notes.
The spouses Tiu wrote to Union Bank authorizing the latter to redenominate the loans at the rate of
US$1=P41.40 with interest of 19% for 1 year. Union Bank and the spouses Tiu entered into a
Restructuring Agreement. It contained a clause wherein the spouses Tiu confirmed their debt and waived
any action on account thereof.

The said Agreement, provides that the spouses Tiu executed a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of Union
Bank over their residential property inclusive of lot and improvements located at P. Burgos St., Mandaue
City, covered by TCT No. T-11951 with an area of 3,096 square meters. The spouses Tiu failed to comply
with the payment schemes and the Union Bank initiated extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the
residential property of the spouses Tiu, covered by TCT No. T-11951. The property was to be sold at
public auction.
The RTC held that the spouses Tiu failed to present any evidence to prove either fraud or intimidation or
any other act vitiating their consent to the same. The exact obligation of the spouses Tiu to Union Bank is
therefore P104,668,741.00, as agreed upon by the parties in the Restructuring Agreement. The CA held
that the Restructuring Agreement is void on account of its being a failed novation of the original loan
agreements. Since there was no stipulation that the loans will be paid in dollars, and since no dollars ever
exchanged hands, the original loan transactions were in pesos. Proceeding from this premise, that the
Restructuring Agreement, which was meant to convert the loans into pesos, was unwarranted.
Issues: Whether Restructuring Agreement is valid?
Held: YES. No valid novation of the original obligation took place. Even if there was a novation, the
sudden change in the original amount of the loan to the new amount declared in the Restructuring
Agreement is not supported by any cause or consideration. Under Art.1352 of the Civil Code, contracts
without cause, or with unlawful cause, produce no effect whatever. A contract whose cause did not exist
at the time of the transaction is void. Accordingly, Art. 1297 of the NCC mandates that, if the new
obligation is void, the original one shall subsist, unless the parties intended that the former relation should
be extinguished at any event. Since the Restructuring Agreement is void and since there was no intention
to extinguish the original loan, the original loan shall subsist.
The Court agreed with Union Bank. Although indeed, the spouses Tiu received peso equivalents of the
borrowed amounts, the loan documents and the promissory notes, expressed the amount of the loans in
US dollars and not in any other currency. This clearly indicates that the spouses Tiu were bound to pay
Union Bank in dollars, the amount stipulated in said loan documents. Thus, before the Restructuring
Agreement, the spouses Tiu were bound to pay Union Bank the amount of US$3,632,000.00 plus the
interest stipulated in the promissory notes, without converting the same to pesos.
Such stipulation of payment in dollars is not prohibited by any prevailing law or jurisprudence at the time
the loans were taken. In this regard, Art. 1249 of the Civil Code provides: The payment of debts in
money shall be made in the currency stipulated, and if it is not possible to deliver such currency, then in
the currency which is legal tender in the Philippines.
Country Bankers Insurance Corporation vs. Keppel Cebu Shipyard, Unimarine Shipping Lines,
Inc., Paul Rodriguez, Peter Rodriguez, Albert Hontanosas, and Bethoven Quinain
G.R. No. 166044, June 18, 2012
Facts: Unimarine Shipping Lines, Inc., a corporation engaged in the shipping industry, contracted the
service of Keppel Cebu Shipyard for dry docking and ship repair works on its vessel, the MV Pacific
Fortune. A surety bond was issued by BethovenQuinainn in favor of Unimarine. When due, Unimarine
failed to pay the amount due that cause the filing of the complaint against Unimarine and its sureties.
RTC rendered a Decision in favor of Cebu Shipyard ordering defendants Unimarine, Country Bankers
Insurance Corp., and Plaridel Surety to pay the former jointly and severally the smount of P4,629,000.00
equivalent to the value of the surety bond and for Unimarine to pay the amount of P259,458 to complete
its obligation. the same was affirmed by the CA.

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Issue: Whether or not CBIC is liable to the surety bond issued by Quinain to Unimarine?
Held: No. It is evident in the SPA that Quinains authority is limited to the issuance of surety bond in favor
of DPWH, NAPOCOR and other government agencies, it is evident that when Quinain issued a surety
bond in favor of Unimarine, it exceeded its authority, thereby the same does not bind its principal, CBIC.
Unimarine should have inquired on Quinains authority before it agreed to the terms of the surety bond.
There being no ratification, implied or express, by CBIC, therefore, Quinains act will not bind CBIC.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. MERELO B. AZNAR; MATIAS B. AZNAR III; JOSE L. AZNAR
(deceased), represented by his heirs; RAMON A. BARCENILLA; ROSARIO T. BARCENILLA; JOSE
B. ENAD (deceased), represented by his heirs; and RICARDO GABUYA (deceased), represented
by his heirs.
G.R. No. 171805, May 30, 2011
Facts: In 1958, RISCO ceased operation due to business reverses. In plaintiffs desire to rehabilitate
RISCO, they contributed a total amount of P212,720.00 which was used in the purchase of the three (3)
parcels of land.After the purchase of the above lots, titles were issued in the name of RISCO. The amount
contributed by plaintiffs constituted as liens and encumbrances on the aforementioned properties as
annotated in the titles of said lots.A Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of Philippine National Bank,
being the lone and highest bidder of the three (3) parcels of land.
This prompted plaintiffs-appellees to file the instant complaint seeking the quieting of their supposed title
to the subject properties, declaratory relief, cancellation of TCT and reconveyance with temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction.They argued that the Final Deed of Sale and TCT No. 119848
are null and void as these were issued only after 28 years and that any right which PNB may have over
the properties had long become stale.Defendant PNB on the other hand countered that plaintiffs have no
right of action for quieting of title since the order of the court directing the issuance of titles to PNB had
already become final and executory and their validity cannot be attacked except in a direct proceeding for
their annulment.
Issue: Whether or not the disputed land constitutes a lien.
Held: No. The term lien as used in the Minutes is defined as "a discharge on property usually for the
payment of some debt or obligation. A lien is a qualified right or a proprietary interest which may be
exercised over the property of another. It is a right which the law gives to have a debt satisfied out of a
particular thing. It signifies a legal claim or charge on property; whether real or personal, as a collateral or
security for the payment of some debt or obligation." Hence, from the use of the word "lien" in the
Minutes, We find that the money contributed by plaintiffs-appellees was in the nature of a loan, secured
by their liens and interests duly annotated on the titles.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EMILIANO R. SANTIAGO, JR.

G.R. No. 182209, October 3, 2012
Facts: Respondent Emiliano R. Santiago, Jr. is one of the heirs of Emiliano F. Santiago, the registered
owner of an 18.5615-hectare parcel of land (subject property) in Laur, Nueva Ecija.
In determining the just compensation payable to Santiago, the LBP and the DAR used the following
formula under Presidential Decree No. 27:
The average gross production per hectare shall be multiplied by two and a half (2.5), the product of which
shall be multiplied by P 35.00, the government support price for one cavan of 50 kilos of palay on October
21, 1972, or P 31.00.

As Santiago had died earlier on November 1, 1987, the LBP, in 1992, reserved in trust for his heirs the
amount of P 135,482.12, as just compensation computed by LBP and DAR and the amount was released
to Santiagos heirs. Also, the heirs were paid the sum of P353,122.62, representing the incremental
interest of 6%.Discontented with the ruling, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the SACs
decision on February 16, 2000, arguing that the GSP per cavan of palay should be computed at P 400.00
instead of P 300.00. The SAC Branch 29 also lowered the legal interest from 12% to 6% on the ground
that respondents claim cannot be considered as a forbearance of money. LBP filed a Petition for
Review before the Court of Appeals which favored the respondent, hence this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the grant by the court a quo of 6% interest
to the respondent.
Held: No. The Court, in Republic, recognized that "the just compensation due to the landowners for their
expropriated property amounted to an effective forbearance on the part of the State." In fixing the interest
rate at 12%, it followed the guidelines on the award of interest that we enumerated in Eastern Shipping
Lines, In c. v. Court of Appeals, to wit:
When an obligation, regardless of its source, i.e., law, contracts, quasi-contracts, delicts or quasi-delicts is
breached, the contravenor can be held liable for damages. The provisions under Title XVIII on "Damages"
of the Civil Code govern in determining the measure of recoverable damages.
This Court therefore deems it proper to impose a 12% legal interest per annum, computed from the date
of the "taking" of the subject property on the just compensation to be determined by the SAC, due to
respondent, less whatever he and his co-owners had already received.

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DAMAGES
People of the Philippines vs. Roger Tejero
G.R. No. 187744, June 20, 2012
FACTS: Tejero, herein appellant, was charged and, later, found guilty of three counts of rape, and was
ordered to pay the private complainant AAA the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) in moral
damages. When Tejero appealed, the appellate court affirmed judgment of conviction and modified the
said judgment by adding an additional amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity. In
view of the penalty imposed, the case was elevated to the Supreme Court for review.
ISSUE: Whether or not the awards of civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages are
appropriate in this case.
HELD: The award of civil indemnity to the rape victim is mandatory upon the finding that rape took place.
Moral damages, on the other hand, are awarded to rape victims without need of proof other than the fact
of rape under the assumption that the victim suffered moral injuries from the experience she underwent.
Based on prevailing jurisprudence, the award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and another P50,000.00 as
moral damages for each count of simple rape are proper.
Conformably with the ruling in People v. Esperanza, when either one of the qualifying circumstances of
relationship or minority (for qualified rape under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code) is omitted or
lacking, that which is pleaded in the Information and proved by the evidence may be considered as an
aggravating circumstance. As such, AAAs minority may be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
When a crime is committed with an aggravating circumstance either as qualifying or generic, an award of
exemplary damages is justified under Article 2230 of the New Civil Code. Consequently, AAA is entitled
to the additional award of exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00 for each count of simple rape.
Hence, the Supreme Court ordered the appellant to pay the victim AAA the amounts of P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages for every
countwith interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of the judgment until fully
paid.
Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Traverse Development Corporation and Central Surety
and Insurance Company, G.R. No. 169293, October 5, 2011
FACTS: Respondent Traverse Devt. Corp. (respondent Traverse) acquired a 1-year fire insurance for the
building of the former from FGU as compliance of a condition in the real estate mortgage entered with the
petitioner Devt Bank of the Phils. (petitioner). On its second year, FGU automatically renewed the
insurance for another year. However, petitioner returned the FGU insurance for the second year to
respondent Traverse for petitioner had already transferred the buildings insurance to Central Surety &
Insurance Company (respondent Central), for the same terms.
A complaint for payment of its claim and damages was filed by the respondent Traverse against the
petitioner and respondent Central, in which the lower court rendered its decision, among others, ordering
the petitioner to extinguish the loan of the respondent Traverse, which was later deleted after partially
granting the motion for reconsideration of the petitioner,and that it is solidarily liable with respondent
Central in the payment of attorneys fees and cost of litigation. The petitioner and respondent Central
appealed but was dismissed. Respondent Centrals motion for reconsideration was denied but petitioners

was partially granted in the rectification of the decision but not the setting aside of the decision on the
solidarity of attorneys fees and litigation cost. Hence, this petition for review.
ISSUE: Whether or not DBP can be held solidarily liable with Central for the payment of attorneys fees
and cost of litigation
HELD: In the absence of stipulation, attorneys fees may be recovered as actual or compensatory
damages under any of the circumstances provided for in Article 2208 of the Civil Code, provided that said
fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable. Also, the Supreme Court held in ABS-CBN
Broadcasting Corporation vs. Court of Appeals that the power of the court to award attorneys fees under
Article 2208 demands factual, legal, and equitable justification. Even when a claimant is compelled to
litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his rights, still attorneys fees may not be
awarded where no sufficient showing of bad faith could be reflected in a partys persistence in a case
other than an erroneous conviction of the righteousness of his cause.
In this case, the Supreme Court failed to find anyfactual, legal, and equitable justification for petitioner to
be solidarily liable for said fees and cost under the circumstance that the petitioner's act or omission has
compelled the respondent Traverse to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his
interest.
The reason for respondent Traverse to compel itself to litigate its claims is due to the fact that respondent
Central persistently refused to pay such claims and not because of the transfer of insurance policy from
FGU to respondent Central. Thus, only respondent Central should be held liable for the payment of
attorneys fees and costs of suit.
Hence, petition was granted and the Court modified the decision of the Court of Appeals holding the
petitioner not liable for the payment of the attorneys fees and cost of suit.
People of the Philippines vs. Gary Alinao,

G.R. No. 191256, September 18, 2013
FACTS: Gary Alinao, herein accused-appellant, was charged and found guilty for the crime of murder
with evident premeditation as the qualifying circumstance, sentencing him with the appropriate
punishment and ordered to pay the aggrieved party P50,000.00 for civil indemnity, P120,000.00 for moral
damages, P75,000.00 for actual damage and P30,000.00 for exemplary damage. On appeal, the
appellate court affirmed the conviction of the accused-appellant but modified the award for damages
previously ruled, P75,000.00 for civil indemnity, P50,000.00 for moral damages, and P25,000.00 for
temperate damages, and deleted the award for exemplary damages. The accused-appellant appealed in
the Supreme Court, which the court had the opportunity to review the deletion of the exemplary damage.
ISSUE: Whether or not the award of exemplary damages is applicable in this case.
HELD: The Supreme Court has ruled in People vs. Paling that an award of exemplary damages is
justified if an aggravating circumstance, either qualifying or generic, accompanies the crime.In the case at
bar, the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation was duly alleged in the Information and proved
during the trial. Therefore, in line with current jurisprudence,the Supreme Court reinstate the trial court's
award of the amount of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages to heirs of the victim
Soledad Leonor Pea Suatengco and Antonio Esteban Suatengco vs. Carmencita O. Reyes, G.R.
No. 162729, December 17, 2008

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CIVIL LAW
FACTS: Congressman Reyes, herein respondent, lends petitioners estimately P1.3 Million. In the loan
contract, it is stipulated that in the event of default, Suatengco must pay the balance plus 12% interest per
annum plus 5% attorneys fees for the total award. Atty. Edmundo Reyes, son of the respondent,
appeared as the attorney-in-fact of the respondent, and files a case for collection of sum of money, the
12% interest and 20% attorneys fees. The lower and appellate courts award the same. The petitioners
countered alleging that the stipulated attorneys fees is only 5%.
ISSUE: Whether or not 20% of the outstanding balance prevails over the 5% stipulated in the promissory
note as basis for the attorneys fees.
HELD: The attorneys fees herein litigated are in the nature of liquidated damages and not the attorneys
fees recoverable as between attorney and client enunciated and regulated by the Rules of Court.
Liquidated damages are those agreed upon by the parties to a contract to be paid in case of breach
thereof.The stipulation on attorneys fees contained in the said Promissory Note constitutes what is
known as a penal clause. A penalty clause, expressly recognized by law, is an accessory undertaking to
assume greater liability on the part of the obligor in case of breach of an obligation. The obligor would
then be bound to pay the stipulated indemnity without the necessity of proof on the existence and on the
measure of damages caused by the breach. It is well-settled that so long as such stipulation does not
contravene law, morals, or public order, it is strictly binding upon the obligor. The attorneys fees so
provided are awarded in favor of the litigant, not his counsel. It is improper for both the RTC and the CA
to increase the award of attorneys fees despite the express stipulation contained in the said Promissory
Note since it is not intended to be the compensation for the respondents counsel but was rather in the
nature of a penalty or liquidated damages.
Thus, the Supreme Court modified the award for the attorneys fees from 20% to 5% of the total balance
of the outstanding indebtedness but affirmed the decision of the appellate court in all other respects.
Bank Of The Philippine Islands, as Successor-In-Interest of Far East Bank & Trust Company vs.
Cynthia L. Reyes
G.R. No. 182769, February 1, 2012
Facts: Respondent Reyes borrowed, renewed and received from Far East Bank the principal amount of
P20,950,000.00 and in support thereof, 4 PN was issued and was presented during the trail. As security
of the obligation, a real estate mortgage was executed by respondent involving 22 parcel of lands. Due to
failure to pay the obligation when due, the real estate mortgage was foreclosed and was sold to BPI as
the highest bidder in the amount of P19,700,000.00 with unsatisfied interest and penalty of
P24,545,094.67. thus the RTC ruled in favor of BPI and ordered respondent to pay the former the amount
of P22,083,700 representing the outstanding obligation with 12% interest per annum and P200,000.00 as
attorneys fees, the CA reversed the finding of the RTC.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to recover the unpaid balance or deficiency from respondent
despite the fact that respondents property, which were appraised by petitioners predecessor-in-interest
at P47,536,000.00, was sold and later bought by petitioner in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale for only
P9,032,960.00?
Held: Yes. In the recent case of BPI Family Savings Bank vs. Avenido, we reiterated the well-entrenched
rule that a creditor is not precluded from recovering any unpaid balance on the principal obligation if the
extrajudicial foreclosure sale of the property subject of the real estate mortgage results in a deficiency.
Anent the issue of the nullity of the foreclosure sale due to the alleged unconscionable and inadequate
purchase price, the Court held that throughout a long line of jurisprudence, we have declared that unlike
in an ordinary sale, inadequacy of the price at a forced sale is immaterial and does not nullify a sale

since, in a forced sale, a low price is more beneficial to the mortgage debtor in order to redeem the
property.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROGER TEJERO

G.R. No. 187744, June 20, 2012
FACTS: AAA, who was then 14 years old, was raped by Roger Tejero, her step father, three times. AAAs
mother only discovered that accused raped AAA when, on July 2004, AAA was confined for
appendectomy and the doctor revealed that she is 5 months pregnant and had a lacerated and healed
hymen. Accused was convicted in the RTC and CA.
ISSUE: Whether or not the award of moral and exemplary damages, as well as civil indemnity, were
proper?
HELD: Yes. The Court upheld the conviction of the accused for the crime of rape and awarded the
following amounts to AAA: (a) 50,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) 50,000.00 as moral damages; and (c)
30,000.00 as exemplary damages. The award of civil indemnity to the rape is mandatory upon the finding
that rape took place. Moral damages is awarded o rape victims without need of proof other than the fact
of rape under the assumption that the victim suffered moral injures from the experience she underwent.
When an aggravating circumstance of minority and relationship is omitted or lacking, based on the fact
that the same is not alleged in the information. An award of exemplary damages is awarded when a crime
is committed with an aggravating circumstance, either aggravating or generic, under Art 2230 of the Civil
Code.

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CIVIL LAW
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
Republic of the Philippines vs. Concepcion Lorenzo, et al.,
G.R. No. 172338, December 10, 2012
FACTS: The heirs of Pedro Fontanilla, herein respondents, filed a petition for reconstitution of lost or
destroyed Torrens certificate of title. According to the respondents, the owners duplicate copy was eaten
by white ants and the copy of Register of Deeds Isabela is no longer available as the same was
included burned and lost beyond recovery when office was razed by fire sometime in 1976. Also, for
taxation purposes, land covered by the same OCT no. is still under the name of the respondents
grandmother. In addition, land was free from lien and encumbrance.
To support said petition, the respondents submitted the plan of the property, certified technical description
and certification from LRA as to the non-availability of a copy of DECREE NO. 650254, and one of the
respondents, Fontanilla-Gozum, testified that land was acquired by her father Pedro Fontanilla and her
mother, respondent Lorenzo, during their marriage, from their grandmother as evidenced by a deed of
sale.
Lower court granted petition. The petitioner appealed arguing, among others, that the alleged loss or
destruction of the owners duplicate copy of OCT has no evidentiary basis and that there is no sufficient
basis for the reconstitution of said OCT. The appellate court dismissed appeal. Hence, this petition for
review.
ISSUE: Whether or not the reconstitution of OCT No. 3980 was in accordance with the pertinent law and
jurisprudence on the matter.
HELD: The relevant law that governs the reconstitution of a lost or destroyed Torrens certificate of title is
Republic Act No. 26. Section 2 enumerates the valid sources for judicial reconstitution of title. Paragraph
(f) of the said section refers to any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and
proper basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of title. The phrase any other document,
according to Republic vs. Holazo, refers to reliable documents of the kind described in the preceding
enumerations and that the documents referred to in Section 2(f) may be resorted to only in the absence of
the preceding documents in the list. Also, the party praying for the reconstitution of a title must show that
he had, in fact, sought to secure such documents and failed to find them before presentation of "other
documents" as evidence in substitution is allowed.
In this case, the respondents were unable to discharge the burden of proof prescribed by law and
jurisprudence for the reconstitution of lost or destroyed Torrens certificate of title.
1) The respondents failed to prove that the owners duplicate copy of OCT was indeed eaten by termites
while in the custody of respondent Lorenzo and her late husband Pedro Fontanilla who did not
execute an affidavit of loss as required by PD No. 1529;
2) The certification issued by the Register of Deeds Isabela did not categorically state that the subject
OCT was among those destroyed by the fire that gutted the premises of said office.
3) A comparison between the aforementioned certification and the technical description and sketch plan
will reveal that there was a discrepancy in the land area of the lot allegedly covered by OCT No.
3980.

In addition, the deed of sale purportedly between Antonia Pascua, as seller, and Pedro Fontanilla, as
buyer, which involves OCT No. 3980 cannot be relied upon as basis for reconstitution of Torrens
certificate of title. According to Tahanan Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals, the absence of any
document, private or official, mentioning the number of the certificate of title and the date when the
certificate of title was issued, does not warrant the granting of a petition for reconstitution. In this case, the
deed of sale, though the OCT number is stated, does not contain the date of issuance of certificate,
resulting for its failure to support the judicial reconstitution of the OCT.
Therefore, the decisions of the lower and appellate courts were reversed and set aside, denying the
petition for reconstitution.
RODOLFO MORLA, vs. CORAZON NISPEROS BELMONTE

G.R. No. 171146, December 7, 2011
Facts: On June 8, 1988, the Nisperos spouses executed a Partial Deed of Absolute Sale, wherein they
sold a portion of Lot No. 4353 with an area of 50,000 square meters (subject land) to the Morla brothers
for the sum of P 250,000.00. The Morla brothers acknowledged that they had bought from the Nisperos
spouses the subject land, and that they had agreed to give the Nisperos spouses a period of ten (10)
years within which to repurchase the subject land for the price of P 275,000.00.
On June 27, 1994, the Nisperos spouses filed a Complaint for Repurchase and/or Recovery of Ownership
against the Morla brothers. In response, the Morla brothers claimed that the Nisperos spouses had no
cause of action, as the repurchase of the subject land was improper for being outside the five-year period
provided under Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141.
At the pre-trial conference, the parties settled that the only issue to be resolved by the RTC was whether
the 1988 contract executed by the parties, wherein it was stipulated that the Nisperos spouses may
repurchase the land sold to the Morla brothers within a period of ten (10) years, was valid or not.
The RTC rendered a decision in favor of plaintiffs.The RTC held that it was clear from the 1988 contract,
which the Morla brothers executed, that they had bound themselves to its terms and conditions. The RTC
further proclaimed that what was prohibited was the shortening of the five-year redemption period under
Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, and not its prolongation.
Issue: May parties to a deed of sale of a land covered by a homestead patent extend or prolong the 5-
year period of repurchase under Section 119 of Act 141, under a private writing subsequently executed
by them.
HELD: Yes. Since the subject land was acquired by the Nisperos spouses pursuant to a homestead
patent, the applicable law is Commonwealth Act No. 141, or the Public Land Act. 44 Section 119 thereof
specifically speaks about repurchases of a homestead or free patent land:
Sec. 119. Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions, when
proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs, within a period of five
years from the date of the conveyance.
The Supreme Court is in full accord with the clear findings and apt ruling of the lower courts. Nowhere in
Commonwealth Act No. 141 does it say that the right to repurchase under Section 119 thereof could not
be extended by mutual agreement of the parties involved. Neither would extending the period in Section
119 be against public policy as "the evident purpose of the Public Land Act, especially the provisions
thereof in relation to homesteads, is to conserve ownership of lands acquired as homesteads in the
homesteader or his heirs."50 "What cannot be bartered away is the homesteaders right to repurchase the
homestead within five years from its conveyance, as this is what public policy by law seeks to preserve."

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Petitioner does not dispute that the 1988 contract was executed freely and willingly between him and his
late brother, and the Nisperos spouses. "The freedom of contract is both a constitutional and statutory
right," and "the contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they
may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or
public policy." The 1988 contract neither shortens the period provided under Section 119 nor does away
with it. Instead, it gives the Nisperos spouses more time to reacquire the land that the State gratuitously
gave them.
JOSE FERNANDO, JR. vs. LEON ACUNA

G.R. No. 161030, September 14, 2011
Facts: A parcel of land was registered in the names of Jose A. Fernando, married to Lucila Tinio, and
Antonia A. Fernando, married to Felipe Galvez, and located in San Jose, Baliuag, Bulacan.The heirs
failed to agree on the division of the subject property amongst themselves, even after compulsory
conciliation before the Barangay Lupon. In his Complaint in Intervention filed on January 12, 1998,
respondent Leon Acuna (Acuna) averred that the portion of the property identified was already
adjudicated.
Issue: Whether or not a title registered under the Torrens system, as the subject original certificate of title
is the best evidence of ownership of land and is a notice against the world.
Held: No. Section 47 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree, states that "[n]o title to registered land in derogation of the title of the registered owner shall be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession." Thus, the Court has held that the right to recover
possession of registered land is imprescriptible because possession is a mere consequence of
ownership. However, in Heirs of Anacleto B. Nieto v. Municipality of Meycauayan, Bulacan,the Court had
recognized the jurisprudential thread regarding the exception to the foregoing doctrine that while it is true
that a Torrens title is indefeasible and imprescriptible, the registered landowner may lose his right to
recover possession of his registered property by reason of laches.
Laches means the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which,
by observance of due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. It is negligence or omission to
assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the party entitled to assert his
right either has abandoned or declined to assert it. Laches thus operates as a bar in equity.The essential
elements of laches are: (a) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving
rise to the situation complained of; (b) delay in asserting complainants rights after he had knowledge of
defendants acts and after he has had the opportunity to sue; (c) lack of knowledge or notice by defendant
that the complainant will assert the right on which he bases his suit; and (d) injury or prejudice to the
defendant in the event the relief is accorded to the complainant.
The right of the registered owners as well as their successors-in-interest to recover possession of the
property is already a stale demand and, thus, is barred by laches.
Republic of the Philippines vs. Hon. Mamindiara P. Mangotara, et al.,

G.R. No. 170375, July 7, 2010
FACTS: These are cases consolidated into one; respectively, actions for quieting of title, expropriation,
ejectment, and reversion, which all involve the same parcels of land.The consolidatedcases have for their
common genesis: the 1914 case of Cacho v. Government of the United States (1914 Cacho case); and
the 1997 Cacho Case.

In the 1914 Case, the late Doa Demetria Cacho applied for the registration of two parcels of land. After
the determinations, the court finds that the applicant Doa Demetria Cacho is owner of the portion of land
occupied in the southern part of the large parcel object only; and her application as to all the rest of the
land solicited in said case is denied. And it is ordered that a new survey of the land be made and a
corrected plan be presented, excluding all the land not occupied; it is further ordered that final decision in
these cases is reserved until the presentation of the said deed and the new plan.
Eighty-three years later, in 1997, the Court was again called upon to settle a matter concerning the
registration of Lots 1 and where Teofilo Cacho, claiming to be the late Doa Demetrias son and sole heir,
filed before the RTC a petition for reconstitution of two original certificates of title (OCTs). After trial, the
RTC rendered its Decision granting Teofilos petition and ordering the reconstitution and re-issuance of
the decrees involving the parcels of land in the 1914 Cacho Case. Another four cases involving the same
parcels of land were instituted before the trial courts during and after the pendency of the 1997 Cacho
case. These cases are: (1) the Expropriation Case; (2) the Quieting of Title Case; (3) the Ejectment or
Unlawful Detainer Case; and (4) the Cancellation of Titles and Reversion Case.
In the Quieting of Title Case,Demetria Vidal and its successor-in-interest, AZIMUTH, filed a Quieting of
Title petition against Teofilo, Atty. Cabildo and the Registry of Deeds of Iligan City. She averred that she
is the sole surviving heir of Doa Demetria and not Teofilo. That she is the daughter of Francisco Cacho
Vidal who was the only child of Don Dionisio and Doa Demetria.
In the Cancellation of Titles and Reversion Case, Republic filed a complaint for the cancellation of the
two reconstituted original certificates of title (OCT) bearing the same parcels of land in dispute which
reconstitution dates back from the 1997 Cacho Case; also it sought the reversion of the parcels of land
covered thereby to the Government because the OCT bearing the larger land parcel cover property larger
in area than that granted by the land registration court in its corresponding decision.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Vidal has a cause of action or an equitable title or interest in the parcels of land; and, is
the rightful owner of the parcels of land on the ground that (1) the evidence she presented is sufficient to
establish her status and filiation with Doa Demetria, and that (2) her rights to claim ownership have not
yet prescribed;
2. Whether or not the original certificates of title cannot be cancelled and the parcels of land in dispute
cannot be reversed on the grounds that (1) the Republic has no cause of action and (2) that, even if there
is, it failed to state such cause (3) and the same is already barred by prescription.
HELD:
Quieting of Title Case (1) Demetria Vidal has a cause of action because she has an equitable title or
interest. Art 476 of the Civil Code lays down the circumstances when a person may institute an action for
quieting of title:
Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any
instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth
and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action
may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property or
any interest therein.
Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud or doubt or uncertainty with respect
to title of a real property which originates in equity jurisprudence. Its purpose is to secure and adjudication

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that a claim of title to or an interest in property, adverse to that of the complainant, is invalid, so that the
complainant and those claiming under him may be forever afterward free from any danger of hostile
claim.
Generally, the registered owner of a property is the proper party to bring an action to quiet title. However,
it has been held that this remedy may also be availed of by a person other than the registered owner
because, in the Article reproduced above, "title" does not necessarily refer to the original or transfer
certificate of title. Thus, lack of an actual certificate of title to a property does not necessarily bar an action
to quiet title.
In an action for quieting of title, the subject matter is the title sought to have quieted. "Title" is not limited
to the certificate of registration under the Torrens System. Pursuant to Article 477 of the Civil Code, the
plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in, the real property subject of the action for
quieting of title. The plaintiff need not even be in possession of the property. If she is indeed Doa
Demetrias sole heir, Vidal already has equitable title to or interest in the two parcels of land by right of
succession, even though she has not yet secured certificates of title to the said properties in her name.
(2) Demetria Vidal is the rightful owner of the parcels of land because the evidence she presented is
sufficient to establish her status and filiation with Doa Demetria, and that her rights to claim ownership
have not yet prescribed.
According to the factual findings of RTC-Branch 3 and the Court of Appeals, Vidal testified in open court
the existence of the following: Birth Certificate and Baptismal Certificate of Vidal and her drivers license,
the Cacho Family Tree, and the Death Certificate of Demetri Cacho.
Alternative means of proving an individuals filiation is recognized by the Philippine Courts. Under Art 172
of the Family Code: the filiation of legitimate children shall be proved by any other means allowed by the
Rules of Court and special laws, in the absence of a record of birth or a parents admission of such
legitimate filiation in a public or private document duly signed by the parent. Such other proof of ones
filiation may be a baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name has been
entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses
and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
By analogy, this method of proving filiation may also be utilized in the instant case.Vidals baptismal
certificate is not totally bereft of any probative value. It may be appreciated, together with all the other
documentary and testimonial evidence submitted on Vidals filiation. From the evidence adduced, both
testimonial and documentary, the court is convinced that petitioner Vidal is the granddaughter of Demetria
Cacho Vidal, the registered owner of the subject property. Such being the case, she is an heir of
Demetria Cacho Vidal.
It is only right that petitioner Vidal should seek protection of her ownership from acts tending to cast doubt
on her title. Among the legal remedies she could pursue, is this petition for Quieting of Title under Chapter
3, Title I, Book II of the Civil Code, Articles 476 to 481 inclusive.
Regarding the issue of prescription, Article 1141 of the Civil Code plainly provides that real actions over
immovables prescribe after thirty years. The Court further notes that Article 1411 of the Civil Code also
clearly states that the 30-year prescriptive period for real actions over immovables is without prejudice to
what is established for the acquisition of ownership and other real rights by prescription. Thus, the Court
must also look into the acquisitive prescription periods of ownership and other real rights.
Acquisitive prescription of dominion and real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary.

Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in good faith and with just title for the time
fixed by law.In the case of ownership and other real rights over immovable property, they are acquired by
ordinary prescription through possession of 10 years.
Since the ordinary acquisitive prescription period of 10 years does not apply to LANDTRADE, then the
Court turns its attention to the extraordinary acquisitive prescription period of 30 years set by Article 1137
of the Civil Code, which reads:
Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse
possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith.
Cancellation of Titles and Reversion Case The OCTs and the parcels of land may be cancelled and
be subject to reversion, respectively, because the Republic of the Philippines (1) has a cause of action
under the concept of Regalian Doctrine. Rule 2, Sec.2 of the Rules of Court defines a cause of action as
"the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another." Its essential elements are the following:
(1) a right in favor of the plaintiff; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to
violate such right; and (3) such defendants act or omission that is violative of the right of the plaintiff or
constituting a breach of the obligation of the former to the latter.
The first element is constituted by the right of the Republic to seek relief in an action of Reversion to
revert the subject lands back to the government under the Regalian doctrine. The lands originated from a
grant by the government and its cancellation is a matter between the grantor and the grantee.
Reversion was defined as an action which seeks to restore public land fraudulently awarded and
disposed of to private individuals or corporations to the mass of public domain.Under the Regalian
doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and that the State is the source of any
asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. This same
doctrine also states that all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State.It is incorporated in the 1987 Philippine Constitution under Article XII,
Section 2 which declares "all lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other
natural resources are owned by the State." No public land can be acquired by private persons without any
grant, express or implied, from the government; it is indispensable that there be a showing of the title from
the State.
The second element rests generally on the dispute over the main argument that the reconstituted OCTs
included parcels of lands which were not adjudicated by the Court in the 1914 Cacho case. If, indeed, the
parcels of land covered by said OCTs were not those granted to Doa Demetria in the 1914 Cacho case,
then it can be presumed, under the Regalian doctrine, that said properties still form part of the public
domain belonging to the State.
The third element is constituted by the issuance of the certificate of title. In Francisco v Rodriguez, Sec.
101 of the Public Land Act"may be invoked only when title has already vested in the individual, e.g., when
a patent or a certificate of title has already been issued" for the basic premise in an action for reversion is
that the certificate of title fraudulently or unlawfully included land of the public domain, hence, calling for
the cancellation of said certificate.
(2)There was also a statement of the cause of action even though the complaint did not allege that fraud
was committed in the registration or that the Director of Lands requested the reversion.
Other than the well-settled rule that the existence of a cause of action is determined by allegations in the
complaint and, that a motion to dismiss generally partakes the nature of a demurrer which hypothetically
admits the truth of the factual allegations; the complaint that there was no allegation that it has been filed
by the OSGdoes not call for its dismissal on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. Section 101
of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, as amended, simply requires

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that:All actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of the public domain or improvements
thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in
the name of the Republic of the Philippines.
The authority to institute an action for reversion, on behalf of the Republic, is primarily conferred upon the
OSG. While the OSG, for most of the time, will file an action for reversion upon the request or
recommendation of the Director of Lands, there is no basis for saying that the former is absolutely bound
or dependent on the latter.
(3) Lastly, the right of the Republic to file a reversion case is imprescriptible. Elementary is the rule that
prescription does not run against the State and its subdivisions. When the government is the real party in
interest, and it is proceeding mainly to assert its own right to recover its own property, there can as a rule
be no defense grounded on laches or prescription. Public land fraudulently included in patents or
certificates of title may be recovered or reverted to the State in accordance with Section 101 of the Public
Land Act. The right of reversion or reconveyance to the State is not barred by prescription.
National Housing Authority vs. Augusto Basa, Jr., Luz Basa and Eduardo S. Basa
G.R. No. 149121, April 20, 2010
Facts: Spouses Basa loaned from NHA the amount of P556,827.10 secured by a real estate mortgage
over their properties covered by TCTs Nos. 287008 and 285413, located at Quezon City. Spouses Basa
did not pay the loan despite repeated demands. To collect its credit, the NHA, filed a verified petition for
extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage before the Sheriffs Office in Quezon City. After notice and
publication, the properties were sold at public auction where NHA emerged as the highest bidder. The
sheriffs certificate of sale was registered and annotated only on the owners duplicate copies of the titles
in the hands of the respondents, since the titles in the custody of the RD were among those burned down
when a fire gutted the City Hall of QC. After which, the redemption period expired, without respondents
having redeemed the properties. Shortly thereafter, NHA executed an Affidavit of Consolidation of
Ownership over the foreclosed properties, and the same was inscribed by the RD on the certificates of
title in the hand of NHA. NHA filed a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Possession. The said petition
was granted by the RTC ordering spouses Augusto and Luz Basa to vacate the subject lots. The writ,
however, remained unserved. This compelled NHA to move for the issuance of an alias writ of
possession.
Before the RTC could resolve the motion for the issuance of an alias writ of possession, respondents
spouses Basa and Eduardo Basa, filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and Petition in Intervention (with
Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction). Respondents anchored
said petition for intervention on Sec. 8 of Act No. 3135, as amended, which gives the debtor/mortgagor
the remedy to petition that the sale be set aside and the writ of possession be cancelled. Respondents
averred that the extrajudicial foreclosure of the subject properties was a nullity since notices were not
posted and published, written notices of foreclosure were not given to them, and notices of sale were not
tendered to the occupants of the sold properties, thereby denying them the opportunity to ventilate their
rights.
The CA declared that the period of redemption had not expired as the certificate of sale had not been
registered or annotated in the original copies of the titles supposedly kept with the Register of Deeds
since said titles were earlier razed by fireThus, entry made on the owners duplicate of the titles cannot be
considered notice that would bind the whole world. Having been deprived of their right of redemption, the
CA deemed it proper to allow respondents to intervene. Undaunted, NHA appealed to the CA. The CA
ruled in favor of the NHA.

NHA stresses that the annotation and entry in the owners duplicate certificate of titles of the sheriffs
certificate of sale are sufficient compliance with the requirement of law on registration. The CA defended
its affirmation of the RTCs grant of the alias writ of possession in NHAs favor by saying that it was a
necessary consequence after the earlier writ was left unserved to the party.
Issue: Whether the annotation of the sheriffs certificate of sale on the owners duplicate certificate of
titles is sufficient registration considering that the inscription on the original certificates could not be made
as the same got burned?
Held: Yes. The prevailing rule is that there is effective registration once the registrant has fulfilled all that
is needed of him for purposes of entry and annotation, so that what is left to be accomplished lies solely
on the register of deeds. Thus, entry alone produces the effect of registration, whether the transaction
entered is a voluntary or an involuntary one, so long as the registrant has complied with all that is
required of him for purposes of entry and annotation, and nothing more remains to be done but a duty
incumbent solely on the register of deeds.
In this case, NHA presented the sheriffs certificate of sale to the Register of Deeds and the same was
entered as Entry No. 2873 and said entry was further annotated in the owners transfer certificate of title.
It was not NHAs fault that the certificate of sale was not annotated on the transfer certificates of title
which were supposed to be in the custody of the Registrar, since the same were burned. Neither could
NHA be blamed for the fact that there were no reconstituted titles available during the time of inscription
as it had taken the necessary steps in having the same reconstituted as early as July 15, 1988. NHA did
everything within its power to assert its right.
Since entry of the certificate of sale was validly registered, the redemption period accruing to respondents
commenced therefrom, since the one-year period of redemption is reckoned from the date of registration
of the certificate of sale. It must be noted that the sheriffs certificate of sale was registered and annotated
only on the owners duplicate copies of the titles and on April 1992, the redemption period expired,
without respondents having redeemed the properties. In fact, NHA executed an Affidavit of Consolidation
of Ownership. Clearly, respondents have lost their opportunity to redeem the properties in question.
CLT Realty Development Corporation vs. Phil-Ville Development and Housing Corporation,
Republic Of The Philippines (through the OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL), and the
Register of Deeds of Metro Manila District III, Caloocan
G .R. No. 160728, March 11, 2015
Facts: Respondent Phil-ville, the registered owner and actual possessor of a sixteen (16)-parcel of land
located at Baesa, Caloocan City claimed that it had been in actual, open, notorious, public, physical and
continuous possession of the subject land and avtually fenced the same in 1980 and 1981.
Phil-ville alleged that petitioner CLT Realty Devt Corps TCT No. T-177013 overlapped its title, and
although apparently valid of effective, is in truth and in fact, invalid and ineffective. On the other hand,
petitioner CLT alleged that its title is derived from an award of the court thereby awarding 25% attorneys
fees from the estate of Maria Dela Concepcion Vidal in favor of Atty. Jose Dimsom, which is known as Lot
26 of the Maysilo Estate. It was later on sold to Estelita Hipolito.
RTC and CA ruled in favor of respondent finding that the said lot was first transferred to Ruiz and Leuterio
leaving no more lot to be transferred to Atty. Dismson through the Court Order. Thereby, such transfer of
title should be declared invalid.
Issue: Whether or not Phil-ville had validly acquired title to the subject land?

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Held: Yes. In the case entitled Manotok Realty, Inc, v. CLT Realty Devt. Corp , it pronounced that CLTs
title was null and void. CLTs title bearing a spurious date of April 19, 1917 when the true date of the title
was May 3, 1917, thereby arriving at the conclusion that said title id invalid as well as all other claims
deriving from such invalidated title. It further ruled that since Atty. Dimsom did not offer any explanation
as to the spurious date in the OCT No. 994, therefore the Court rightfully declared his title as void.
Thus, both requisites in order for an action for quieting of tile to prosper have been met, to wuts: (a) Phil-
ville had established its equitable title or interest in the said lot; and (b) TCT No T-177013 was previously
declared void.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GLORIA JARALVE substituted by ALAN JESS JARALVE
DOCUMENTO, JR., EDGARDO JARALVE, SERAFIN UY, JR., SHELLA UY, NIMFA LAGNADA,
PANTALEON SAY A-ANG, STARG LAD INTERNATIONAL AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
ANNIE TAN, TEOTIMO CABARRUBIAS, JESSICA DACLAN, MA. EMMA RAMAS, DANILO DEEN,
and ERIC ANTHONY DEEN
G.R. No. 175177, October 24, 2012
Facts: Gloria Jaralve et. al. filed an Application RTC of Cebu City, for the registration in their names of Lot
Sgs-07-000307 (subject property), under Presidential Decree No. 1529.
In their original and amended applications, respondents declared that they were the co-owners in fee
simple of the subject property. Respondents application was opposed by the different parties, including
the Director of Lands, who argued that: a) neither the respondents nor their predecessors-in-interest had
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject property
since June 12, 1945, and the Regional Executive Director of the DENR, who averred that the subject
property fell within Timberland Block 3-C and was within the Cebu City Reforestation project, formerly
known as the Osmea Reforestation Project.
During the pendency of the case, CENRO officers issued certificate that the said land is alienable and
disposable. RTC ruled in favor of respondents. Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC in its Decision.
Issue: Whether the grant of respondents application for registration of title to the subject property was
proper under the law and jurisprudence.
Held: No.This Court finds the petition to be meritorious land classification or reclassification cannot be
assumed. It must be proved. To prove that the subject property is alienable and disposable land of the
public domain, respondents presented the CENRO Certificate dated March 20, 1996 signed by CENR
Officer Iluminado C. Lucas and PENR Officer Isabelo R. Montejo, and verified by Forester Anastacio C.
Cabalejo.
However, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable.
The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land
classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable. Unfortunately,
respondents were not able to discharge the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land they
sought to be registered forms part of the public domain.

Gregorio Araneta University Foundation vs. The Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City
G.R. No. 139672, March 4, 2009
Facts: The case stemmed from the Joint Order dated August 29, 1986 and Order dated December 23,
1988 by the CFI of Rizal in Civil Case No. 131 thereby declaring the compromise agreement between the
52 tenants and Araneta Institute of Agriculture as null and void, thus, the title issued in favor of Araneta,
arising from such compromise, was decreed to be cancelled. The same was affiremed by the CA, and
thereafter, a writ of execution by the lower court.
Issue: w/n the joint order dated August 29, 1986 and the order dated December 23, 2988 is null for lack of
jurisdiction?
Held: No. The cancellation of TCT No. 24153 in favor of Araneta is not a collateral attack since the rule
that a title issued under the Torrens system is presumed valid and hence, is the best proof of ownership
does not applu where the very certificate itself is faulty as to its purported origin, as in this case.
An action or proceeding is deemed an attack on a title when the object of the action is to nullify the title,
and this challenges the judgment pursuant to which the title was decreed. The attack is direct when the
object of the action is to annul or set aside such judgment, or enjoins its enforcement; on the other hand,
it is indirect or collateral when, in an action or proceeding to obtain a different relief, an attack on the
judgment is nevertheless made as an incident thereof.
Well-settled is the rule that the indefeasibility of a title does not attach to titles secured by fraud and
misrepresentation. In view of the circumstances, it was as if no title was ever issued in this case to the
petitioner.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES BUREAU OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT v. VICENTE ROXAS

G.R. No. 157988, December 11, 2013
FACTS: Through Proclamation No. 678, the 928 hectares land located at San Teodoro, Orinetal Mindoro,
described as the Matchwood Forest Reserve, was placed under the control of the Bureau of Forestry.
However, petitioner Vicente Roxas applied for and was granted with a homestead patent covering the
same lot, as the same was declared by the Bureau as an alienable and disposable land. Republic,
representing the Bureau, filed a complaint for cancellation of Certificate of Title and its reversion to the
State.
The Republic averred that the subject lot is a forest reserve and the issuance of a patent and COT in
favour of Roxas is null and void. Roxas, on the other hand, alleged that the said lot was not part of the
forest reserve since the OCT was validly issued to him, and he thus complied with the requirements. He
also said that he was in open, continuous possession of the same since 1959.
The RTC and CA ruled in favour of petitioner stating that since the same was certified by the Bureau as
an alienable and disposable, then the same is not anymore within the jurisdiction of the latter. Since the
patent was granted and after a year, a COT was subsequently been issued in favour of petitioner, the title
became indefeasible.
ISSUE: Whether or not the subject lot was under the forest reserve?
HELD: Yes. The lot was under the forest reserve as proven by the relocation survey submitted by the
committee created by the RTC for such purpose and evidenced by their testimony in the trial, the subject
lot was well within the forest reserve and is therefore, inalienable land. Roxas could not obtain an

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indefeasible title thereto since there is no title that can be validly issued in his favour considering that the
land is incapable of ownership and possession. It must be emphasized that the indefeasibility of the
patent after a year of its issuance applies only to disposable land, which is not obtained in this case. Also,
property of the public domain is incapable of registration and its inclusion in a title nullified that title. It is
settled that the statute of limitation and estoppel does not run against the state for the acts of its agents.
By virtue of PD 705, the President delegated to the DENR Secretary the power to determine which of the
unclassified lands of the public domain are (1) needed for forest purposes and declare them as
permanent forest to form part of the forest purposes and reserves; (2) not needed for forest purposes and
declare them as alienable and disposable.Per public land act, alienable and disposable land of the public
domain can be disposed by homestead settlement, sale, lease, and by confirmation of an imperfect title.
REPUBLIC vs. CONCEPCION LORENZO

G.R. No. 172338; December 10, 2012
FACTS: During the lifetime of Spouses Pedro Fontanilla and Concepcion Lorenzo, they acquired a parcel
of residential land which is identical to the lot covered by and embraced under ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE
OF TITLE of the Land Records of Isabela, in the name of Antonia Pascua as her paraphernal property.
Upon the death of Pedro Fontanilla, the lot as was settled and adjudicated among Lorenzo, et.al.
However, the owners duplicate of the said Torrens certificate of title was later discovered to have been
eaten by termites and that the original copy of the said Torrens certificate of title on file with the Register
of Deeds of Isabela was certified to be burned and lost beyond recovery when the office was razed by fire
of unknown origin
The trial court then directed the Regional Director of Isabela to reconstitute OCT in the name of Antonia
Pascua on the basis of the deed of sale, the technical description and the sketch plans, and to issue
another owners duplicate copy of the said Torrens certificate of title. Petitioner Republic of the
Philippines, through the OSG, appealed the ruling to the CA arguing that the trial court erred in granting
respondents petition for reconstitution of Torrens title since they failed to present substantial proof that
the purported original certificate of title was valid and existing at the time of its alleged loss or destruction.
CA dismissed, hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the reconstitution of OCT was in accordance with the pertinent law and
jurisprudence?
HELD: No. The relevant law that governs the reconstitution of a lost or destroyed Torrens certificate of
title is Republic Act No. 26. Section 2 of said statute enumerates the following as valid sources for judicial
reconstitution of title:
SECTION 2. Original certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the sources hereunder
enumerated as may be available, in the following order:
(a) The owners duplicate of the certificate of title;
(b) The co-owners, mortgagees, or lessees duplicate of the certificate of title;
(c) A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the register of deeds or by a
legal custodian thereof;
(d) An authenticated copy of the decree of registration or patent, as the case may be, pursuant to
which the original certificate of title was issued;

(e) A document, on file in the Registry of Deeds, by which the property, the description of which is
given in said document, is mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or an authenticated copy of said
document showing that its original had been registered; and
(f) Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper basis for
reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of title.
In the case at bar, the respondents were unable to discharge the burden of proof prescribed by law and
jurisprudence for the reconstitution of lost or destroyed Torrens certificate of title. First, respondents failed
to prove that the owners duplicate copy of OCT was indeed eaten by termites while in the custody of
Concepcion Lorenzo who, inexplicably, did not execute an affidavit of loss as required by Section 109 of
PD 1529. Second, The Certification issued by the RD of Ilagan, Isabela did not categorically state that the
original copy of OCT, which respondents alleged to be on file with said office, was among those
destroyed by the fire that gutted the premises. Likewise, the deed of sale purportedly between Antonia
Pascua, as seller, and Pedro Fontanilla, as buyer, which involves OCT No. 3980 cannot be relied upon as
basis for reconstitution of Torrens certificate of title.
De Guzman vs. Tabangao Realty Inc.

G.R. No. 154262, February 11, 2015
Facts: Serafin De Guzman and Josefina De Guzman applied for and granted authority to distribute oil
and lubricating products manufactured and marketed by Filipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation, however,
they eventually pay the credit purchase. A complaint for sum of money was filed by FSPC, and the same
was ruled in its favour. Thereafter, A writ of execution was issued causing a parcel of land located in
Malabon to be levied and after five (5) years, be sold through an auction sale.
De Guzman filed for a case of Quieting of Title claiming that they are the heirs of Serafin and Amelia De
Guzman, and that the auction sale was not actually conducted. Granting the arguendo that the auction
sale is valid, it is barred by laches being beyond ten (10) years from the finality of the trial courts
judgment.
On the other hand. Tabangao Realty claimed that all petitioner failed to sign the Certification against
Forum Shopping that is a mandatory requirement under the Rules of Court. Also, when they failed to
repurchase the same within the redemption period, they lost their right over the subject land making the
sale valid.
RTC ruled that the petition was valid. The case was directly appealed with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Who is the rightful owner of the subject lot?
Held: it was Tabangao Realty Inc. who is proven to be the valid owner of the subject lot considering that
petitioner failed to redeem the subject property within the period of redemption, therefore all the rights,
title, interest, and claim of the judgment of obligor to the property as of the time of the levy is transferred
to the former. Petitioner has no right over the subject property.
DURAWOOD CONSTRUCTION AND LUMBER SUPPLY INC. vs. CANDICE S. BONA

G.R. No. 179884, January 25, 2012
FACTS: Petitioner Durawood Construction and Lumber Supply, Inc. filed an action for sum of money
against LBB Construction and Development Cororation. Thereafter, an order of attachment dated June
17, 2004 was issued by the RTC thereby attaching LBBs property located at Richdale Subdivision,
Antipolo City. Respondent Candice S. Bona filed a motion to intervene, alleging that she owned the

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attached property as the same was sold to her by LBB and was registered in the primary entry book on
June 16, 2004 prior to the writ of attachment.
RTC ruled in favor of Durawood stating that the date of registration of deeds as signed by Atty. Rutaquio
was disputable since on said date, the acting Register of Deeds of Antipolo City was Atty. Edgar D.
Santos, but the title was signed by Atty. Randy A. Rutaquio. The CA, however, reversed the ruling of the
RTC stating the date of registration of the deed of sale is the date it was entered in the primary entry book
and the same was signed by Atty. Rutaquio because on June 16, 2004, Bona was not able to pay the
fees required thereby the registration was suspended. She was able to comply on the requirement for
registration subsequently, and Atty. Rotaquio then was the Register of Deeds.
ISSUE: Whether or not the registration of the deed of sale was perfected on June 16, 2004 though Bona
belatedly complied with the requirements of paying of the required fees?
HELD: The registration is already perfected on June 16, 2004. In voluntary registration, such as sale,
mortgage or lease, if the owners duplicate is not surrender or if there is non-payment of the registration
fees within 15 days, it does not operate to convey of operate the land sold. In the case at bar, it is
undisputed that Bona belatedly paid the required fees. The belated payment of the required fees is a
substantial compliance with the law and the entry of the instrument the day before, should not be
invalidated.
However, since on June 25, 2004, there is still no compliance of the required fees and the notice of
attachment was issued on June 17, 2005. Then, the court ruled that the attachment preceded the
registration of the deed of sale thereby the notice of attachment was properly annotated to the title.
SPS. AMBROSIO DECALENG vs. BISHOP OF THE MISSIONARY DISTRICT OF THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS OF PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL CHURCH IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
otherwise known as THE PHILIPPINE EPISCOPAL CHURCH
G.R. No. 171209, June 27, 2012
Facts: Petitioner Philippine Episcopal Church (PEC) is a religious corporation duly organized and
registered under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines. On February 18, 1992, PEC-EDNP filed
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bontoc, Mountain Province, Branch 36, a Complaint for Accion
Reinvindicatoria and Accion Publiciana against Decalengs.
Petitioner alleged that it is the owner of two parcels of land in the Municipality of Sagada, located in areas
commonly known as Ken-geka and Ken-gedeng.
Petitioner contended that Ambrosio Decaleng and Lopez refused to vacate the portions of Ken-geka and
Ken-gedeng properties that they are occupying. Ambrosio Decaleng and Lopez claimed to be the owners
of said portions, but PEC-EDNP maintained that such claim is illegal and baseless in fact and in law.
RTC rendered its Decision finding that the plaintiff Church is determined not the owner of those three (3)
parcels of land situated at Sitio Ken-geka and Sitio Ken-gedeng. The Court of Appeals rendered its
Decision on August 26, 2005, overturning the appealed RTC Decision because it was based on
misplaced premises and contrary to law and jurisprudence. The Court of Appeals declared PEC-EDNP
the true and real owner of the Ken-geka and Ken-gedeng properties.
Issue: Whether or not the claim of the PEC has greater bearing.
Held: Yes. The Court finds that PEC-EDNP was able to successfully prove both requisites by
preponderance of evidence, both documentary and testimonial.

The plaintiff established its ownership and possession of the contested lots through the various
documents under and in the name of its predecessor-in-interest, the [U.S. Episcopal Church], specifically:
deed of donation; approved plat of sales survey; and the approved survey plan and owners copies of Tax
Declaration Nos. 6307, 14326, A-11179, 14325 and 6306. In contrast, the defendants mainly relied on the
supposed non-existence of OCT No. 1 that rested solely on the certification of Atty. Dulay-Papa of the
Registry of Deeds-Mountain Province.
The applicant failed to show that he has title to the lot that may be confirmed under the Land Registration
Act.1 He failed to show that he or any of his predecessors in interest had acquired the lot from the
Government, either by purchase or by grant, under the laws, orders and decrees promulgated by the
Spanish Government in the Philippines, or by possessory information under the Mortgage Law (section
19, Act 496). All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant,
belong to the public domain.

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LEASE
MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY vs. DING VELAYO SPORTS CENTER INC.
G.R. No. 161718, December 14, 2011
FACTS: MIAA and Salem Investment Corporation entered into a lease agreement over a parcel of land
with an area of 76,328 sq. m., located in front of the MIA in Pasay City. Subsequently in a transfer of
lease rights and existing improvement, Salem conveyed to Velayo Export Corp. the right over the 15,534
sq. m. leased lot. Velayo Export then conveyed to respondent Ding Velayo Sports Center, Inc. (DVSCI)
the 8,481 sq. m area in the leased lot that cause the execution of the lease contract between petitioner
and respondent on May 14, 1976. DVSCI paid the monthly rental of P2,205.25 and built on the lot a multi-
million plaza. In response to the request of MIAA to submit the gross income of the establishment, DVSCI
informed the former that its gross income is P1,972,968.11. Subsequently, MIAA increased the rental of
DVSCI to P42,405.00 (P5/sq.m.) which was opposed by the latter. Because of this, the current lease fees
were maintained until the expiration of the contract.
DVSCI communicated its intention to renew the contract, but was, however, been denied by MIAA and
demanded to pay arrears in the lease rentals as of January 1992 in the sum of P15,671,173.75. Velayo,
then President of DVSCI, sent a letter to MIAA denying the liability to the leased rentals above-stated and
that it be given time in order to turn over the property. At the course of the turning over, Samuel Alomesen
became the new president of DVSCI and he revoked the letter sent by Velayo and sent another letter
informing MIAA of its intention to renew the contract and giving a managers check worth P8,821.00.
MIAA then denied the letter request and demanded them to turn over the property. DVSCi filed a case
before the RTC for renewal of the lease contract with consignation. RTC ruled in favor of respondent and
grant the renewal of the lease contract which was affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE: Whether or notthe RTC and CA erred in renewing the lease contract?
HELD: No. The court a quo correctly ruled on the extension of the lease contract for another 25 years
since it is the one stated in the lease contract entered by MIAA and Salem that was later on transferred to
Velayo and then to respondent. Thereby, included in the rights transferred is the right to renew the
contract at the option of the lessee. The said provision in the contract is not violative of the mutuality of
contract since the option to give the same is based on the free will of the lessor. And while the lessee had
the option to renew or not to renew the contract, the lessor will accept it, both of them will then be bound
with a new lease agreement having the same terms and conditions as the first lease contract. To prove
otherwise will defeat the purpose of renewing the contract since the MIAA will give unreasonable and
onerous condition so that the lessor will be forced not to renew the contract. Also, the fact that DVSCI
invested a multi-million building in the subject lot appeared that it is interested in renewing the contract.
CEBU BIONIC BUILDERS SUPPLY, INC. vs. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 154366; November 17, 2010
FACTS: Spouses Rudy and Elizabeth Robles entered into a mortgage contract with DBP in order to
secure a loan from the said bank. The property mortgaged was a parcel of land in Tabunoc, Talisay,
Cebu, which was then covered by TCT of the RD of Cebu, together with all the existing improvements,
and the commercial building to be constructed thereon. Thereafter, Rudy Robles executed a contract of
lease in favor of Cebu Bionic. However, such contract was not registered by the parties in the RD of
Cebu. Subsequently, the spouses Robles failed to settle their loan obligation with DBP. The latter was,
thus, prompted to effect extrajudicial foreclosure on the subject property. During the foreclosure sale,

DBP was the lone bidder and thereby acquired ownership of the mortgaged property, and thus, a final
decree of sale was issued in their favor.
Meanwhile, DBP sent a letter to Bonifacio Sia, the husband of Lydia Sia, President of Cebu Bionic,
notifying the latter of DBPs acquisition of the State Theatre Building and if Cebu Bionic wishes to
continue on leasing the property, they are requested to come to the Bank for the execution of a Contract
of Lease. In their reply, the counsel of Sia is asking some cahnges as to the contract, also an extension
for the 30 day notice in case of eviction, they then issued a Certificate of Time Deposit to be remitted to
DBP as an advance rental, however, no written contract of lease was executed between them. When
Cebu Bionic through their representative, Judy Garces, offered to purchase the subject property, such
offer was not accepted by DBP, as the corresponding deposit therefor was allegedly insufficient.
The petitioners filed against respondents DBP, To Chip, Yap and Balila a complaint for specific
performance and cancellation of deed of sale with damages in the RTC of Cebu, which decided in favor
of the petitioners. The CA affirmed the RTC's decision in toto, but, thereafter reversed such on the finding
that DBP had terminated the Robles lease contract upon the notification it earlier gave Cebu Bionic.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a contract of lease between petitioners and DBP
RULING: No
Article 1676 of the Civil Code provides that [t]he purchaser of a piece of land which is under a lease that
is not recorded in the Registry of Property may terminate the lease, save when there is a stipulation to the
contrary in the contract of sale, or when the purchaser knows of the existence of the lease. In short, the
buyer at the foreclosure sale, as a rule, may terminate an unregistered lease except when it knows of the
existence of lease.
In the instant case, the lease contract between petitioners and Rudy Robles was not registered. The
parties, failed to execute a written contract of lease. Petitioners put the blame on DBP, asserting that no
contract was signed because DBP did not prepare it for them. DBP, on the other hand, counters that it
was petitioners who did not positively act on the conditions for the execution of the lease contract. In view
of the counter-offer of petitioners, DBP and respondents To Chip, Yap and Balila argue that there was no
meeting of minds between DBP and petitioners, which would have given rise to a new contract of lease.
Further, it was held that the purchaser of a piece of land which is under a lease that is not recorded in the
Registry of Property may terminate the lease, save when there is a stipulation to the contrary in the
contract of sale, or when the purchaser knows of the existence of the lease
LEONARDO TARONA v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 170182, June 18, 2009
Facts: The parcel of land subject of this case is located in Mauban, now Nagbalayong, Morong, Bataan,
with an area of 10.4758 hectares, more or less and registered in the name of Antonia T. Leao married to
Federico Leao.
The instant case stemmed from a complaint for recovery of possession of the subject landholding filed on
May 22, 1998, with the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board in Dinalupihan, Bataan, by herein
private respondents Gay T. Leao.
Private respondents claimed that the petitioners, then defendants and intervenors, are not lawful and
bona fide tenants of the subject landholding because they have no legal or valid document evidencing
tenancy or any proof of rental payments. Original defendants, denied the material allegations. Insisting

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that the subject land was part of the late spouses Federico and Antonia Leaos conjugal property and
not that of Antonias alone, the defendants and the intervenors asserted that the uninterrupted and
physical possession by them of said land for many years has estopped the private respondents from
questioning the validity of the leasehold agreement. The defendants and intervenors lastly asserted that
the subject landholding is within the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP)
and should be distributed to them.
Adjudicator (PARAD), found that a tenancy relationship existed. On appeal, the DARAB affirmed the
findings of the PARAD.
Issue: Whether or not a tenancy relationship existed between the respondent and petitioner?
Held: No. In order to establish a tenancy relationship, the following essential requisites must concur: (1)
the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) the subject matter of the
relationship is an agricultural land; (3) there is consent between the parties to the relationship; (4) the
purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation on the
part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) the harvest is shared between the landowner and the
tenant or agricultural lessee.
Clearly, private respondents evidence, which significantly the petitioners failed to refute, more than
substantially proved the impossibility of personal cultivation. Petitioners (intervenors) have already left the
place where the subject land lies in Morong, Bataan, and now live in another locality which is in Caloocan
City. Since Bataan is of a considerable distance from Caloocan City, it would undeniably be physically
impossible for the petitioners to personally cultivate the landholding
In the absence of the requisite of personal cultivation as it is defined by law, we cannot but rule that all the
petitioners herein are not tenants of the private respondents. It has been held that personal cultivation is
an important factor in determining the existence of an agricultural lease relationship such that in its
absence, an occupant of a tract of land, or a cultivator thereof, or planter thereon, cannot qualify as a de
jure lessee

SALES
SPS. JESUS CHING AND LEE POE TIN vs. SPS. ADOLFO AND ARSENIA ENRILE
GR 156076; SEPTEMBER 17, 2008
FACTS: The petitioners purchased from Raymunda La Fuente a 370-sqm. lot located. La Fuente
delivered to petitioners a duly notarized Deed of Absolute Sale with the Owners Duplicate Certificate of
Title and thereafter, the petitioners took physical possession of the subject property. However, the
conveyance was not registered in the RD. Instead, they executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim which
was recorded and annotated at the back of TCT.
Three years later, the petitioners received a Notice of Levy on Attachment and Writ of Execution issued
by the RTC of Pasig in favor of respondents. Thus, the petitioners filed a Petition to Remove Cloud on or
Quiet Title to Real Property asserting ownership of the disputed property.The RTC rendered judgment in
favor of petitioners upholding the latters superior right over the disputed property in view of the
registration of the Affidavit of Adverse Claim prior to the Certificate of Sale annotated in favor of
respondents. On Appeal, the CA reversed the RTC. Citing a myriad of jurisprudence, the CA declared
that respondents, as attaching creditors who registered the order of attachment and the sale of the
property to them as the highest bidders, acquired a valid title to the disputed property as against
petitioners who had previously bought the same property from the registered owner but failed to register
their deed of sale.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents were purchasers in good faith when they acquired the disputed
lot despite the annotated adverse claim on their title
RULING: No. The Court has invariably ruled that in case of conflict between a vendee and an attaching
creditor, an attaching creditor who registers the order of attachment and the sale of the property to him as
the highest bidder acquires a valid title to the property as against a vendee who had previously bought
the same property from the same owner but who failed to register his deed of sale. This is because
registration is the operative act that binds or affects the land insofar as third persons are concerned. It is
upon registration that there is notice to the whole world. But where a party has knowledge of a prior
existing interest, as here, which is unregistered at the time he acquired a right to the same land, his
knowledge of that prior unregistered interest has the effect of registration as to him. Knowledge of an
unregistered sale is equivalent to registration.
The general rule is that a person dealing with registered land is not required to go behind the register to
determine the condition of the property. In that case, such person is charged with notice of the burden on
the property which is noted on the face of the register or certificate of title.
Good faith, or the want of it, is capable of being ascertained only from the acts of one claiming its
presence, for it is a condition of the mind which can only be judged by actual or fancied token or signs. It
is beyond dispute that the property in question had already been sold by La Fuente to petitioners.
Petitioners immediately took possession thereof.
The law does not require a person dealing with the owner of registered land to go beyond the certificate
of title as he may rely on the notices of the encumbrances on the property annotated on the certificate of
title or absence of any annotation. Here, petitioners adverse claim is annotated at the back of the title
coupled with the fact that they are in possession of the disputed property. To us, these circumstances
should have put respondents on guard and required them to ascertain the property being offered to them
has already been sold to another to prevent injury to prior innocent buyers. A person who deliberately
ignores a significant fact which would create suspicion in an otherwise reasonable man is not an innocent
purchaser for value. It is a well-settled rule that a purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should

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put a reasonable man upon his guard, and then claim that he acted in good faith under the belief that
there was no defect in the title of the vendor.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESv. MARAWI-MARANTAO GENERAL HOSPITAL

G.R. No. 158920,November 28, 2012
FACTS: Respondent obtained a loan from SSS secured by a real mortgage. Due to failure of payment,
the SSS extrajudicially foreclosed on the mortgage and the property was sold to SSS in a public auction.
Atty. Mangondato, chairman of respondent-hospital board, asked for an additional 6-months redemption
period; he tendered a partial payment while the SSS approved the proposal and issued a Resolution
stating that partial payment has been paid. A deed of conditional sale was executed between the parties
with Atty. Sison as the Senior Deputy Administrator of SSS. Among others, the Deed provides in its
Paragraph 10 that title to the property xxx remains with the vendor and shall pass to xxx vendee only
upon execution of Final Deed of Sale, while Paragraph 12 says that upon full payment by vendee of
purchase price xxx vendor agrees to execute xxxx such Deed of Absolute Sale xxx. Atty. Mangondato
issued a check in favor of SSS representing the full payment so he asked the latter for the transfer of
ownership. However, SSS issued a resolution informing the attorney the nullity of the conditional sale and
the return of the purchase price on the grounds, among others, that a public bidding is required in the sale
of an SSS-acquired asset and, that Atty. Sison solely had no authority to represent SSS and cannot
solely signify in the contract. Respondent filed a case for specific performance which the trial court
approved directing SSS to execute an Absolute Deed of Sale. SSS appealed but failed. When it reached
the Supreme Court, as represented by the Republic, they argue further that the redemption period had
already expired.
ISSUE: Whether or not the conditional sale should be annulled on the grounds that the period of
redemptions has expired; a sale of SSS-acquired asset requires a public bidding; lastly, Atty. Sison has
no authority. If redemption is valid, what is now the obligation of SSS under the deed of conditional sale?
HELD: The conditional sale remains valid even if the period for redemption has already expired.
Jurisprudence tells us that statutory period of redemption can be extended by agreement and acceptance
of redemption price after expiration of statutory period is considered a waiver. In this case, when SSS
issued its resolution on and approved the proposal of Atty. Mangondato to redeem/repurchase the
property, it is deemed the original limited period of redemption have been waived or even
extended.Likewise, the requirement for the conduct of public bidding in the sale of an SSS-acquired asset
is only a standard operating procedure and is not a condition for redemption. There is no law that has
been violated by the resale to the previous owner of a property acquired by foreclosure.
The true nature of the contract between herein parties is a contract to sell. Where the seller promises to
execute a deed of absolute sale upon completion by the buyer of the payment of the price, the contract is
only a contract to sell even if it is denominated as a Deed of Conditional Sale.
A contract to sell is a bilateral contract whereby the prospective seller, while expressly reserving the
ownership of the property despite delivery thereof to the prospective buyer, binds himself to sell the
property exclusively to the buyer upon fulfillment of the condition agreed the full payment of the
purchase price. The seller explicitly reserves the transfer of title to the buyer, meaning he does not yet
agree to transfer ownership until the happening of an event which is the full payment of the purchase
price; thus, what the seller obliges him-self to do is to fulfill his promise to sell when entire payment is
delivered to him.

GARCIA VS. VILLAR

G.R. No. 158891 June 27, 2012
Facts: Lourdes V. Galas was the original owner of the subject propertywith her daughter, Ophelia G.
Pingolas co-maker, mortgaged the subject property to Yolanda Valdez Villar as security for a loan.Galas,
again with Pingol as her comaker, mortgaged the same subject property to Pablo P. Garcia to secure
her loan. Galas sold the subject property to Villar and declared in the Deed of Sale that such property was
free and clear of all liens and encumbrances of any kind whatsoever.
Garcia filed a Petition for Mandamus with Damages against Villar and subsequently amended his petition
to a complaint for Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage with Damages alleging that when Villar purchased
the subject property, she acted in bad faith and with malice as she knowingly and willfully disregarded the
provisions on laws on judicial and extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgaged property. Garcia further claimed
that when Villar purchased the subject property, Galas was relieved of her contractual obligation and the
characters of creditor and debtor were merged in the person of Villar. Therefore, Garcia argued, he, as
the second mortgagee, was subrogated to Villars original status as first mortgagee, which is the creditor
with the right to foreclose. Garcia further asserted that he had demanded payment from Villar, whose
refusal compelled him to incur expenses in filing an action in court.
Villar, in her Answer claimed that the complaint stated no cause of action and that the second mortgage
was done in bad faith as it was without her consent and knowledge.
Villar alleged that she only discovered the second mortgage when she had the Deed of Sale registered.
Villar blamed Garcia for the controversy as he accepted the second mortgage without prior consent from
her. She averred that there could be no subrogation as the assignment of credit was done with neither
her knowledge nor prior consent. Villar added that Garcia should seek recourse against Galas and Pingol,
with whom he had privity insofar as the second mortgage of property is concerned.
The RTC ruled in favor of Garcia. Villar appealed to the court of appeals which reversed the ruling of the
regional trial court.
Issue: Whether or not the sale of the subject property to Villar was in violation of the prohibition on
pactum commissorium
Ruling: No.The following are the elements of pactum commissorium:
(1) There should be a property mortgaged by way of security for the payment of the principal obligation;
and
(2) There should be a stipulation for automatic appropriation by the creditor of the thing mortgaged in
case of non-payment of the principal obligation within the stipulated period.39 Villars purchase of the
subject property did not violate the prohibition on pactum commissorium.
The power of attorney provision above did not provide that the ownership over the subject property would
automatically pass to Villar upon Galass failure to pay the loan on time. What it granted was the mere
appointment of Villar as attorney-in-fact, with authority to sell or otherwise dispose of the subject property,
and to apply the proceeds to the payment of the loan.40 This provision is customary in mortgage
contracts, and is in conformity with Article 2087 of the Civil Code, which reads: Art. 2087. It is also of the
essence of these contracts that when the principal obligation becomes due, the things in which the pledge
or mortgage consists may be alienated for the payment to the creditor.
Galass decision to eventually sell the subject property to Villar for an additional P1,500,000.00 was well
within the scope of her rights as the owner of the subject property. The subject property was transferred
to Villar by virtue of another and separate contract, which is the Deed of Sale. Garcia never alleged that

COMMISSION
CIVIL LAW
the transfer of the subject property to Villar was automatic upon Galass failure to discharge her debt, or
that the sale was simulated to cover up such automatic transfer.
ROLANDO T. CATUNGAL, JOSE T. CATUNGAL, JR., CAROLYN T. CATUNGAL and ERLINDA

CATUNGAL-WESSEL vs. ANGEL S. RODRIGUEZ,
G.R. No. 146839, March 23, 2011
Facts: Agapita T. Catungal , with the consent of his husband, sold a parcel of land with an area of 65.246
sq. m. covered by OCT No. 105 located at Cebu City to respondent Rodriguez via contract to sell that
was later on upgraded to conditional deed of sale. However, on August 31, 1990,Sps, Catungal
requested for an advance payment of P5 Million since they will be using it for business venture. When
respondent refused, the subject lot was offered to other buyers. Thereafter, petitioners counsel informed
the respondent that it should make up her mind if it will still buy the said lot since other buyer is willing to
buy the same. Rodriguez was able to convert the said lot from agricultural to residential which increases
the value of the property and negotiated the road right of way as stipulated in the contract.
Sps. Catungal then unilaterally rescind the contract, thus prompting the respondent to file a complaint
against the former. Atty. Catungal refused to appear thereby the defendant was declared in default and
thereafter, a Decision was ruled in favorof respondent. The CA affirmed the RTC Decision.
Issue: Whether or not the conditional deed of sale is a perfected contract of sale?
Held: Yes. In the case of Romero vs. CA, it is ruled that such condition in a conditional sale did not affect
the perfection of the contract of but only impose a condition on the fulfilment of the obligation to paythe
balance of the purchase price. Also, Rodriguez made an earnest effort to negotiate and was able to
negotiate the road right of way thus, said condition is fulfilled. What Catungal should have done was to
first file an action in Court to fix the period on which to comply with the condition and not to demand an
additional P5 Million payment. Thus, the declaration of the contract as void by petitioner is premature. It is
stated that the option to rescind is not potestative and is not dependent only in the option of Rodriguez
because it is conditioned on the negotiation of the right of way. The same is true with regards to the
payment of the purchase price.
ADORACION ROSALES RUFLOE vs LEONARDA BURGOS

G.R. No. 143573, January 30, 2009
FACTS: Spouses Adoracion and Angel Rufloe was the registered owner of a parcel of land located in
Bagbagan, Muntinlupa City as evidenced by the TCT No. 406851. Allegedly, a certain Elvira Delos Reyes
forged their signature so as to appear that the land was sold to the latter, and thereafter, succeeded in the
transfer of the said lot to her name. Spouses Rufloe filed a complaint of forgery against Delos Reyes and
prayed for the cancellation of the deed of sale and the declaration of nullity of Delos Reyes COT Pending
resolution of the complaint, the COT was able to be transferred to Delos Reyes children and thereafter to
their aunt, Leonarda Burgos. They claimed to be purchasers in good faith.
The RTC, in its Decision, declared that the signature in the deed of sale is a forgery and the title acquired
thereto is of nullity. However, the CA reversed the RTCs Ruling declaring that Delos Reyes and Burgos
was a purchaser in good faith and had acquired a valid title thereto.
ISSUE: Whether or not the signature in the deed of sale is a forgery so as to nullify the subsequent
transfer of the said title?

HELD: Yes. The issue on the validity of the signature was already resolved with finality in Civil Case No.
M-7690 when it was declared that Rufloes signature is a forgery. Thereby, Delos Reyes could not pass a
valid title since it is a settled doctrine that one cannot give what he does not have (nemo dat quod non
habet). All the transaction subsequent to the forged deed of sale is likewise void.
The Delos Reyes siblings and Burgos could not be considered a purchaser in good faith since the
presumption that the buyer can rely on the face of the COT does not apply when there is a reasonable
ground to arouse suspicion, however, the buyer failed to inquire on the validity of the title especially in the
instance in the case at bar, since Delos Reyes was not in the possession of the subject lot since it
remained with Rufloes. Also, Leonarda never exercised ownership over the subject lot since he did not
pay its taxes and she allowed the siblings to be the owner of the subject lot under the COT.

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CIVIL LAW
OBLIGATION
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. THI THU THUY T. DE GUZMAN
G.R. No. 175021, June 15, 2011
Facts: Respondent is the proprietress of Montaguz General Merchandise (MGM), a contractor accredited
by the PNP for the supply of office and construction materials and equipment, and for the delivery of
various services such as printing and rental, repair of various equipment, and renovation of buildings,
facilities, vehicles, tires, and spare parts.
PNP Engineering Services (PNPES), released a Requisition and Issue Voucher for the acquisition of
various building materials for the construction of a four-storey condominium building with roof deck at
Camp Crame.The respondent, through counsel, sent a letter to the PNP, demanding the
paymentof P2,288,562.60 for the construction materials MGM procured.
PNP, through its Officer-in-Charge, replied, informing her of the payment made to MGM via Land Bank of
the Philippines (LBP).Respondent reiterated her demand, denying having ever received the LBP check,
personally or through an authorized person. Respondent filed a collection case on RTC.
RTC rendered its decision favoring the respondent and the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with
modification the RTCs ruling.
Issue: Whether or not the release of the check constitutes payment and fulfilment of obligation.
Held: No. The RTC and the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the petitioners obligation has not been
extinguished. The petitioners obligation consists of payment of a sum of money. In order for petitioners
payment to be effective in extinguishing its obligation, it must be made to the proper person. Article 1240
of the Civil Code states:
Art. 1240. Payment shall be made to the person in whose favor the obligation has been constituted, or his
successor in interest, or any person authorized to receive it.
Payment made by the debtor to the person of the creditor or to one authorized by him or by the law to
receive it extinguishes the obligation.
A payment in order to be effective to discharge an obligation, must be made to the proper person. Thus,
payment must be made to the obligee himself or to an agent having authority, express or implied, to
receive the particular payment.
The respondent was able to establish that the LBP check was not received by her or by her authorized
personnel. The PNPs own records show that it was claimed and signed for by Cruz, who is openly known
as being connected to Highland Enterprises, another contractor. Hence, absent any showing that the
respondent agreed to the payment of the contract price to another person, or that she authorized Cruz to
claim the check on her behalf, the payment, to be effective must be made to her.

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Acquisitive prescription of dominion and real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary.

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(a) The owners duplicate of the certificate of title;

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