AnalyzeBritainschangingattitudestowardsEuropeanintegrationbetween1948and

1973

Britains attitude towards postwar continental commitments remained ambivalent

and was mostly shaped by illusions and later, by Britains position as a world power
thatthreatenedBritisheconomicstability

I. BritishpolicyagainstEuropeanintegration

1) Joining EEC meant damaging commercial relations with the

Commonwealth
not envisageable because within the Commonwealth, Britain was free to
imposethetariffsdesireduponthecolonies,thusmakingalotofprofit
Atlee believed that closer integration with Australia or South Africa would
assure the sterling as a great trading currency : the sterling area
(Commonwealth+empire except for Canada) accounted for halfofthe world's
tradeintheearlypostwaryears
gradual recovery in British exports: by 1950, exports 75% higher than before
the war => made Atlee think the economy was going to thrive on the
longterm
=>AtleepicturedthattheBritisheconomycouldsuriveonitsown

2)Othereconomicreasons
special relation with the US: after the economic crisis of 1947, the US
supported Britain with over $1250 million in aid through the MarshallPlan=>
enoughmoneyforBritainseconomicreconstruction
also Britain (at USs demand) startedanuclearprogramm=>Britains
newallyofferedprotection,couldntgiveupontheUSfortheECSC
Crippss austeritymeasurespredictedlastingeconomicprosperityinEngland:
reducingimportssellingofnationalgoods+cuttinginflation
=> Britain was massively relying on US aid and Atlee didnt realize this economic
dependency

3)Geographicalisolationduringthewar
theexperienceofthewarwasdifferentfromtherestofEuropeancountries:
the Peoples War (ex: stading alone against the enemy during the
Blitz attack and numerous Nazi raids that bombed England) gave
Britain a feeling of unity, cohesion, deepening more than ever its
remoteness, isolation from the rest of Europe that was seen in a
chaoticstate,onthevergeofcollapsetocommunism(Italy,France)
=> Britain couldnt give up on her role as a leading power and submit to imposed
legislations

=> a series of illusions and shortsighted beliefs misled Britain into rejecting the
proposaloftheSchumanPlanin1951
=>whenshefinallywokeup,itwastoolate
 fear of loss of sovereignty because of supranational nature of ECSC (and lateron the EEC).
Which is whythey agreedto jointheCouncil of Europe(notsupranationalbody)butrefusedto
join ECSC and EECin1957. Until1961,noonefeltthatthesituationwasbadenoughthat they
wouldneedtoabandon some oftheir sovereignty(goodenough for the countries who hadnot
wonthewartheway Britaindid,butclearly too stiffapricefora countrythatstillsawitself asa
WorldPower).


II.BritainscaseforEuropeanintegration

1)Feelingabandoned(1961)
theSuezCrisis=>tenserelationswiththeUS
India, Ceylon, Burma gained independence and other colonies were on the
path of decolonization => Britain lost her influence and a part of the trade
profits
member of the EFTA (European Free Trade Association) =>disappointedby
the weakness of the agreement because the UK was the only powerful
nation, whereas in the EEC, Italy, France etc. witnessed spectacular
economicgrowth
=> Britain felt isolated, with no real ally, and hoped that continental association would help
her

2)Anticipatinganeconomiccollapse(1967)
failure to deal with the trade unions and seamens strike (1966) => industrial
relations became more precarious, showing Wilson that Britain was
dependent on the financial support of the trade unions, so by applying tothe
EEC,hedfindeconomicopportunitiesforhiscountry
devaluation of the pound in 1967 => another major economic crisis that
neededoutsideeconomicassistance
Wilson wanted to maintain the postwarconsensusstate,thereforeappliedto
the EEC (although he was a Labor leader and theoretically opposed the
EEC), but the Conservatives on board with the European integration, so he
could only hope that the British application to the EEC would be rejected
(which happened) in order to show that he supported some oftheprojectsof
theRightwing
=>WilsonwasmostlypushedintoapplyingtotheEECduetointernalconflicts

3)HeathcontinuingtheEuropeanintegrationhestartedin1961
new French president:Pompidou, so Britain hoped no rejection this
time
keen on monetary union: Macmillan told Pompidou in 1971 that the
British Government "did not regard sterling as an instrument of
prestigenordidtheyfeelsentimentalaboutit
Heath sought political union coz Britain could never have a
"satisfactory partnership" with America "even if Britain wanted it"
becauseofthedisparityofpowerbetweenthetransatlanticallies
successfulin1973
=> Heath very determined to join the EEC coz he was a member of theOneNation Torries
and believed in the modernization ofBritain,newtrendsgoingaroundandtheprosperitythe
EEC experienced covinced himthatBritaincouldplaya moreimportantroleintheEECthan
alone

All in all, the attitudes towards European integration between 1948 and 1973 had been
complex,oftencontrastingandallleadershaddifferentreasonstoapply
=> Even when Britain joined eventually in 1973, it was too late because the years of
economicprosperityhadbeenlonggone,soBritaincouldnolongerbenefitfromtrade


TowhatextentdidtheLabourgovernmentsof194551change
Britain?

I. TheStateofBritainin1945
Britisheconomyrunningat70milliondebtperday
theLendLeasearrangementsendedwhichleftBritaininastateofeconomicdecline
BritainstillaffectedbytheGreatDepression
alotofunrestinthecolonies=>movementsofindependencestartedinmostofthe
Britishcolonies
thelegacyofthePeoplesWarandthenumerouscasualtiesputpressureonthe
governmenttoadoptaNewJerusalem

II. ThechangesimposedbyLabour
thecreationofanationalsafetynet,theWelfareStatethatincludedtheNational
InsuranceAct,theNationalAssistanceAct,theNationalHealthServiceAct
Ittookcareofthe5giants:Squalor,Disease,Want,Idleness,Ignorance
AtleealsostartedtheprocessofdecolonizationgivingindependencetoIndiaand
Palestine
ItstartedthespecialrelationshipwiththeUSwhichmadeBritainturnitsbackat
Europe
Itbecameanuclearpower
Itstartedaprocessofnationalizationandcentralplanning:itmodernized20%ofthe
industry
Apolicyofconsensusthatlasteduntil1979

III. Theextentofthechanges
1. Whychange
TheWelfareStatewasbyfaroneofthemostfarreachingmeasureswhichany
governmenthadtakeninthefieldofsocialreformandinBritainithadalasting
impactbeforeWWII,onlytheupperclasshadaccesstoservices,buttheWelfare
Statemadesurethatregardlessofyourclass,youdstillhaveaccessto
unemploymentbenefitsorhealthcareservicesforinstance

TheresultsoftheWelfareStateweresignificantwithinashortperiodoftime:inYork,
in1950,primarypovertyhaddroppedto2%asopposedto36%in1936

Whenthegovernmentintroducedthe11+examinationasaselectionprocedurefor
thelimitednumberofplacesatseniorsecondaryorgrammarschools,itwasseenas
sociallydivisive,butonthelongtermitchangedBritainbecauseinthemid1960s,
Wilsoncamewithreformsthatallowedmorepplfromthemiddleclasstohave
accesstothesequalifications

Nationalizationhelpeddecreasetheunemploymentrate
 Asteadyeconomicgrowth(2.6%/year)thatlasteduntiltheendofthe1960s
Thepolicyofdecolonizationwasoneofthemostsignificantchangesbecausethe
followinggovernmentshadtoadoptit,acceleratingthecollapseoftheBritishEmpire

2. Limits
ItlookedmorelikeaprocessofcontinuitybecauseduringWWII,thecoalition
governmentinvestedintheindustryandmostofthesectorswereunderthecontrol
ofthestate
AlsoconsensusalreadyexistedduringWWII(thecoalitiongovernment),sobecause
ofthesharedexperiencethatmadeBritainthrive,thetwopartiesadoptedthesame
policies
TherapprochementwiththeUScausedalotofdamagetotheBritisheconomy
becausetheywereinvestingintoanunprofitableindustryyetLabourstillmanagedto
changeBritaininthesensethatitmadeitanuclearpower

LendLeasearrangementsendedwhichleftBritaininastateofeconomicdecline

Iwouldn'tsaydeclinebecauseitimpliesthatasaresultofitthesituationwasgoingto
continuetogetworse.HereitjustputBritaininaverydifficulteconomicsituationbutthere
wasnoreasontothinkthatBritainwouldnotrecovereventually.Itwastemporary.Atleast
everyonethoughtthat.Anditprovedtobefairlyshortlived.By1950theeconomyhad
recovered.

Iwouldalsomentionthedestructionfromthewarandthecasualtiesplusthelegacyofthe
People'swarwhichputpressureonLabourtocreateanewBritain(theNewJerusalem).

Insecondpart,yousaythatAttleecreatedtheSpecialRelationship.Itwasthecontinuation
ofthecloserelationshipestablishedbyRooseveltandChurchill.Soitwasnewtoanextent
becausetheyhadneverhadthatinpeacetimebefore.Butitwasalsoabondthatthewar
hadalreadycreated.

Youalsosay:

itmodernized20%oftheindustry

Iwouldaddthatitdidwithvaryingdegreesofsuccess,especiallyinthelongterm.

Inlastpartyousay:

TherapprochementwiththeUScausedalotofdamagetotheBritisheconomybecause
theywereinvestingintoanunprofitableindustry



 Economicchangesince1946hasbeenthemainreasonfor
changesintheroleofthestateinFrance.Examinethevalidityof
thisview.


I. Economicchangedidimpacttheroleofthestate
nodoubtthattheeconomyshapedtheroleofthestateinFrancefrom1946

1) Aninadequatesystem:theIIIrdRepublic
immediatedevelopmentandmodernizationofthecountryneededbecausethe
industrialproductiondecreasedtooftheprewarlevel
thegovernmentsofthe1930sfailedtodealwiththeGreatDepressionwhichmade
Franceuncompetitiveandpoor
=>needtoregulateimbalances,eliminateinefficiencies,compensatefortheinjutices
ofthemarket,modernizeinfrastructureandindustrialplants

2) AnewstrategyconductedbytheIVthandVthRepublic
MarshallAidflowingin=>investmentsincentralplanningandnationalization
Planning(1946):stateestablishedtheCommisariatauPlan
a) thestatedefinedspecificgoalsinproduction=>morecompetitiveindustry
=>GDPx5between4677
thestateprovidedcapitalinvetsmenttomodernizeindustrieswhereprivate
investmentlacked
Nationalisation:transportation(AirFrance,Renault),energy(Coal,electrictiy)=>
economygrewonaverageatarateof4.6%/year
Nationalization+Centralplanningwerepartofthenumerous5yearsPlansthat
startedin1947andendedin1970 (goodtoknow:eachhaddifferentspecifictargets:
forinstance1stFiveYearPlanfocusedonindustrialproduction112%of1929
productiononlyin1952,whereas3rdFiveYearPlanfocusedoneducationand
health)

3) Significantchangesintheeconomy
theOPECcrisesof1973and1979,alongwiththeprosperityofmostFrench
industriesaftertheTrenteGlorieuses,madethestaterealizethatexcessivestate
interventionhadtobestopped
underMitterand,Chiracstartedimplementingsomereformsthatprivatizedlarge
sectorsoftheeconomy:SocitGnrale,Paribas,TF1thusdiminishingtheroleof
thestate(in1983,25%ofthenationalizedcompaniesweregiventoprivate
investors)
alsothegrowthofglobalizationchallengedstateintervention:therelocationof
MichelinTNCin1999leftthestatepowerlessinthefaceofincreasingunemployment

 II. Politicalchanges
erosionofthecentralroleplayedbythestate

1) Decentralization
fractureintheadministrativeunityinfrastructureasthegovernmentdelegateddifficult
decisionstolowerechelonsofpublicadministration
Theresponsibilitiesoflocalandregionalauthoritieswereincreased,withthe
extensionoftheirinfluenceintonewpolicyareassuchassocialaffairs,economic
developmentandeducation
Examples:regionscouldhandletheconstructionofroutesandplanningofschools
whereasdpartementswereinchargeoftheconsumerprotectionlaw
alotoflegislativepowernowgiventoregions

2) Externalpoliticalorganizations
theFrenchgovernmenthastocomplywithsupranationallegislations
althoughduringDeGaullespresidency,theEECdidnothavealotofsupranational
sovereignty,afterhisresignationtheEuropeanCommunityacquiredmorepower
Example:theSocialChapterthatpromotedmoreequalitybetweenmenandwomen
atwork,butalsobetterworkconditions
Nowadays,24%oftheFrenchlawissubmittedtoEUcontrol
FrancemustalsoabidebyinternationalorganizationssuchasWTOthatfightsunfair
tradepolicies

III. Socialchanges
Thestateplayedamajorroleinthenumeroussocialchangesthattookplaceafter
theWW2
SettingupoftheWelfareStateaccordingtotheBeveridgeReport
CreatedtheGeneralSchemeasthemainproviderofsocialbenefits:pensionsfor
warwidows,studentsallowances
NumerousreformsunderGiscarddEstaing:legalisationofabortion(1975),majority
at18insteadof21andalsoanimportantchange:relaxedgovernmentoverthe
media
TheCrisisofMay1968alsogeneratedinthelongtermnewreforms:Mitterandinhis
firstgovernmentreducedtheretirementageto60,announced5weeksofpaid
holidaysinsteadof4whichhelpedtradeunionswiththeirrequests

underMitterand,Chiracstartedimplementingsomereformsthatprivatizedlargesectorsof
theeconomy:SocitGnrale,Paribas,TF1thusdiminishingtheroleofthestate(in1983,
25%ofthenationalizedcompaniesweregiventoprivateinvestors.

Twoissueshere.DifficulttosayUnderMitterand(leftwingpresident),whenChiracwasfrom
theotherside(theright).Sobettertosayinthe80s(youcanaddwhenMitterandwas
president,buthehadnothingtodowiththosedecisions).Alsoin1983,ChiracwasnotPM.
HebecamePrimeMinisterin1986.

Andinthe3rdpart,whereasthefirsttwoareaboutreasonsforchange,thisoneseemsto
beaboutsortsofchange(socialchanges).Soyouneedtofocusonthereasonswhythose
changestookplace,notwhatkindofchangestheywere.Anditcouldbearguedthatsome
ofthosesocialchangesweremotivated/causedbyeconomicchange.

 Examinetheroleofthemediaandpublicopinioninonepoliticalcrisisofyourchoice

Introduction: VietnamWarwasthefirsttelevisedwar,soanimportantchangeinthe
perceptionofthepopulation,plusnoAmericancensorship

I. Theroleofthemedia
with93%oftheAmericanpopulationhavingaccesstotelevisionin1966,media
increaseditsimpactovertheAmericans

1) SupporttheGovernmentsdecisions
atthebeginning,themediareflectedwhattheAmericansweremostlypreoccupied
with:theriseofcommunisminSouthVietnamandtheneedtofightback
apolicyofconsensusamongthejournalistsatfirst(19601964):
theBattleofApBac(January63)showedthefirmstanceofthereportersin
Vietnam:verycriticalofDiemsmilitarytacticsandprinciples,sobest
solutions:getridofDiemorhavetheUnitedStatescontrolthewar
situationexacerbatedwiththeBuddhistCrisiswhenBuddhistswhoset
themselvesonfireshowedhowdictatorialDiemsregimewas
=>itaddedmorepressuretotheAmericandecisiontoremoveDiemfrom
power,theyfinallydiditwithacoupin1964
from19651967theUSMissionandMilitaryAssistanceCommandVietnamassisted
thecorrespondentsinpresentingnonerroneousstories,butmostimportantly,
formulatedinaveryfavorablefashionfortheUSpolicies,thusexposingthewarasa
fightbetweencapitalistfreedomandcommunistopression
=>theuncensoredimagestriggeredinsomeareasaveryviolentresponsefromthe
AmericanpeoplewhodemonstratedinNewYorkandSanFrancisco(intotalmorearound
180,000people),butthepresswasverydismissiveanddepictedthemasmarginalgroups
whodidnotrepresenttherealAmericansocietyMaoistProgressiveLaborParty,
anarchistsunderblackflags
=>themajorityofAmericanpeoplesupportedthewarandwasinfavoroftheUS
escalation

2) Raiseawarenessagainstthebrutalityofthewar
thecoverageofthemediabackfiredinJanuary1968asaresultoftheTetOfensive:
althoughadefeatforNorthVietnam,itwaspresentedasamajormilitarysuccessfor
thecommunisttroopsbecausethe recordfootageofthebombingofcitiesandthe
executionofprisonersofwar emphasizedthecrueltyofwar,aswellasthelackof
securityforAmericansinVietnamaftertheattackontheAmericanembassy
ThearticlesabouttheMyLaiMassacrealsoinfluencedthepublicopinionasthe
antiwarmovementhadmoreandmoresupporters
=>themediaproduceda turningpointinbothU.S.troopmoraleandinpublictrustof
thegovernment'sreportsontheprogressofthewar
=>themainroleofthemediaduringtheVietnamWarwastoshapethepublic
responsetothewar:atfirstsupportive,laterdismissive

 II. Theroleofthepublicopinion

1) 19641967
Aperiodwhenavastmajorityofthecountrysupportedthewarandbelievedinthe
justfightofcapitalismagainstthethreatofcommunism
OftentheUSlabeledthewaropponentsasradical,stereotypedstudentsthatdidnot
representtheinterestsoftheAmericansociety
Infact,in1965over70%ofthoseagedunder30supportedthewar,whereas
lessthan50%ofthoseagedover49supportedthewar,thusshowingthat
themajorityofsupportersdidnotbelongtotheyoungpopulationhowever
studentsweremorevocal,whereastheoldergenerationdidnotcriticizethe
conductofthewarpubliclywhichledtothissuperficiallabel

2) 19671973
theMyLaimassacreandtheTetOffensiveproducedamassivedivisionamongstthe
Americanpopulation:somebelievedthewarshouldstop,otherssupportedits
continuation
TheleakofthePentagonPapersbytheNewYorkTimesincreasedthedistrustof
thepopulationtowardsthegovernment
onNovember15,1969,asmanyashalfofmillionpeoplegatheredacrosstheWhite
HouseinamassivedemonstrationcalledthePeaceMoratorium
6970:8peoplediedprotesting+over1800demonstrations
By1973,lessthanoftheAmericanpeoplesupportedthewar
=>thepublicopinion(theantiwarmovement)contributedonlybyaddingmore
pressuretothehesitancyofthegovernmenttocommitmoretroops(allAmerican
administrationshadbeenhesitant,startingwithEisenhowerwhoonlysentadvisers
uptoKennedywhowasstillunsurewhethertointerveneornotandcontinuedwith
Johnsonandhisgradualescalation),butitdidnotstopthewardirectly

Conclusion
WhydidtheUSwithdraw?Nixonunderstoodthewarcouldnotbewonbecauseofa
combinationofrecurrentmistakes:
apolicyofgradualescalationthatpoorlyallocatedfundsandsentinsufficient
manpower
amilitaryfailurethatcamefromaninappropriatewarfare,immoralSearch
andDestroyMissions
obliviousnesstowardsthepowerfulholdofVietnamesenationalism:aCivil
War,notaSovietintenttotakeovertheworld