Main Transmission Planning Criteria

Main Transmission System Planning

Guideline

February, 2005

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

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 Main Transmission Planning Criteria

1. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................. 1

2. RELIABILITY ...................................................................................................... 1
2.1 DEFINITION ........................................................................................................ 1
2.2 CRITERIA ........................................................................................................... 2
2.2.1 Single contingency criterion ...................................................................... 2
2.2.2 Maintenance outage................................... Error! Bookmark not defined.
An underlying assumption of the N-1 criteria is that maintenance is carried out
during times of light load. ....................................... Error! Bookmark not defined.
2.2.3 Multiple contingency.................................................................................. 3
2.2.4 Sub-station arrangement............................................................................ 3
2.3 RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT ................................................................................ 3
2.3.1 Load ........................................................................................................... 3
2.3.2 Dispatch ..................................................................................................... 3
3. STEADY STATE PERFORMANCE CRITERIA ............................................. 4
3.1 EQUIPMENT RATINGS ........................................................................................ 4
3.1.1 Grid owner equipment ............................................................................... 4
3.1.2 Generating Unit Rating.............................................................................. 4
3.2 VOLTAGE QUALITY ........................................................................................... 4
3.2.1 Normal Steady State Voltage ..................................................................... 5
3.2.2 Step Change in Voltage - Dynamic............................................................ 5
3.3 SHORT CIRCUIT LEVELS ..................................................................................... 6
4. STABILITY CRITERIA ...................................................................................... 6
4.1 TRANSIENT STABILITY....................................................................................... 6
4.1.1 Disturbances selected for testing............................................................... 7
4.1.2 Auto-reclose of Circuit Breakers ............................................................... 7
4.1.3 Fault Clearing Time................................................................................... 8
4.1.4 Transient Voltage Performance Criterion................................................. 8
4.1.5 Over-voltages due to Load Rejection......................................................... 8
4.2 DYNAMIC STABILITY ......................................................................................... 9
4.3 VOLTAGE STABILITY ......................................................................................... 9
4.4 FREQUENCY STABILITY ............................. ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED.
APPENDIX A: SECURITY CRITERIA ................................................................. 12

APPENDIX B: INFREQUENT SWITCHING CRITERIA .................................. 15

APPENDIX C: TRANSIENT STABILITY DISTURBANCES ............................ 16

APPENDIX D: DAMPING CRITERIA FOR DYNAMIC STABILITY ............. 18

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1. Introduction
The purpose of transmission system planning is to develop a reliable and efficient
transmission system for transferring power from areas of generation to areas of
demand (load) under varying system conditions, while operating equipment within
accepted ratings. The system conditions include - changing demand patterns,
generation changes and equipment outages (planned or unplanned).
The planning process involves applying a number of criteria: technical, economic,
environmental and safety to the current or future transmission system. This document
sets out the technical criteria to be applied in planning the main transmission network.
While this document is focused on technical criteria only, readers are reminded that
any proposed transmission development must also consider all other planning aspects
such as environmental, economic, etc.
The technical criteria used in transmission system planning can be divided into three
main categories, which are covered in this Guideline as per Table 1.1:

Table 1.1: Technical Criteria

Category Defined as Section
System reliability Is the system adequate and secure? 2
Steady state Is the normal operating state of the system 3
performance within prescribed limits?
Stability Does the system remain normal or return to 4
normal following a disturbance?

Additionally, for comparison purposes, the Appendices provide an international

context to the standards and criteria that Transpower applies in meeting each of these
activities.

2. System Reliability

2.1 Definition
The accepted definition of transmission system reliability incorporates assessment of
two basic aspects of the system - adequacy and security. The National Electricity
Reliability Council, USA (NERC)1 has defined these terms to mean:
Adequacy The ability of the electric systems to supply aggregate electrical
demand and energy requirements of their customers at all times, taking into
account scheduled and reasonably expected unscheduled outages of system
elements; and
Security The ability of the electric systems to withstand sudden disturbances such
as electric short circuits or unanticipated loss of system elements.

1
The National Electricity Reliability Council oversees and co-ordinates reliability and security for the
entire United States.

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2.2 Criteria
Transpower uses a deterministic approach to planning. This approach is consistently
applied in most transmission networks throughout the world.2
The deterministic planning criteria uses N, (N-k) terminologies to describe the
service level for which a system is planned, where k is the number of elements out
of service at any one time. These terms are defined as follows:
(N) criterion denotes that the system is planned such that with all transmission
facilities in service the system is in a satisfactory state and loads may have to be
shed to return to a satisfactory state for a credible contingency event. It could be
said that an N security policy results in a system that is not secure against
contingent events.
(N-k) criterion denotes that the system is planned such that with all transmission
facilities in service the system is in a secure state and for any k credible
contingency event(s) the system moves to a satisfactory state. If any further
contingency events were to occur loads may have to be shed to return to a
satisfactory state.

2.2.1 Single contingency criterion

The main interconnected transmission system shall be designed to maintain N-1
security criterion, meaning that the system is in a secure state with all transmission
facilities in service and in a satisfactory state under credible contingent events. N-1 is
a common security standard in many countries including Australia, Ireland, Denmark
and France3. The single contingencies to be considered under an N-1 criterion are:
loss of a single transmission circuit
loss of a single generator
loss of an HVDC pole
loss of a single bus section
loss of an interconnecting transformer
loss of a single shunt connected reactive component, e.g. capacitor bank, SVC

The loss of an element could be either planned (as part of scheduled maintenance) or
unplanned (as an unforeseen event) either by inadvertent disconnection or as a
consequence of a fault occurring in/on the affected element.

2.2.2 Maintenance outages

An underlying assumption of the N-1 criteria is that maintenance is carried out during
times of light load so that the risk and consequences of an interruption due to
unforseen events is minimised.

2
A 1992 survey by CIGRE confirmed that of 24 countries participating, all used the deterministic
criteria
3
Refer to Appendix A for further detail.

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2.2.3 Multiple contingency

The risk and consequences of less frequent but more extreme credible contingencies
must also be investigated to determine what emergency measures may be required to
minimise the consequences and provide for restoration of supply in the shortest
possible time.

2.2.4 Sub-station arrangement

The sub-station arrangements are chosen to satisfy all the reliability performance
criteria set out in this guideline while allowing for future extensions and maintenance.

2.3 Reliability Assessment

Reliability is assessed by simulating performance of the system with all transmission
facilities in service and then applying credible contingencies to the simulation, while
generation and load patterns are varied to determine whether a satisfactory state for
the system may be maintained for the various generation and load patterns.

2.3.1 Load
All simulation studies shall be performed for system peak load conditions for both
summer and winter periods. Studies may also be performed for light load conditions
where required. These latter studies may be necessary, for example, where
experience has identified that certain system issues arise only under light or trough
load conditions.
If a part of the system is radial, the studies for the radial part of the system must be
carried out for peak load conditions for that area.

2.3.2 Dispatch
Simulation studies shall be carried out for the worst case credible generation dispatch
scenarios. For hydro generation (New Zealands main source of electricity), these
include dry, average and wet hydrological scenarios.4 Studies shall also be carried out
for extreme dry scenarios to identify emergency measures that may have to be put in
place.

4
These have been developed within Transpower using information from a number of sources including
NIWA

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3. Steady State performance

The steady state criteria apply to normal operating conditions and to post-disturbance
conditions once the system settles to new operating conditions. The steady state
performance criteria for planning are:
Primary transmission equipment must operate within normal ratings when
all transmission facilities are in service.
Primary transmission equipment must operate within acceptable short term
ratings during contingencies.
There is no load curtailment required to maintain N-1 security level for
any operating condition.
Voltage quality is maintained as set out in section 3.2
Cascading outages do not occur.

3.1 Equipment Ratings

3.1.1 Grid owner equipment

The grid owner equipment ratings used are drawn from Transpowers Asset
Capability Information (ACI) database. The ratings for equipment in this database are
in accordance with Transpower policy document TP.GG.01.10 on equipment ratings,
which take into account manufacturers recommendations, the age of equipment and
local environmental conditions. The database includes all transmission equipment:
lines, transformers, switchgear, protection and reactive equipment - synchronous
condensers, capacitors, reactors and SVCs.

3.1.2 Generating Unit Rating

The rating of all generating units connected to the grid shall be the ratings provided
by the Generators as part of their Asset Capability Statement provided to Transpower
( as the Grid Owner).

3.2 Voltage Quality

The criteria for voltage in steady state operation are defined by limits set for different
conditions:
Normal steady state voltage
Step change in voltage
Sustained steady state voltage (after tap changing, Reactive Power Controller
and other dynamic sources actions )

These are discussed in the following subsections.

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3.2.1 Normal Steady State Voltage

The normal steady state voltage at buses shall be as specified in Table 3.1 or as
stipulated in the contract agreement with the customer. Table 3.1 is consistent with
the steady state voltage limits as prescribed in Rule 3.1, Section III, Part C of the
Electricity Governance Rules and Regulations (EGRS).

Table: 3.1 Voltage Limits During Normal Conditions

Nominal Maximum Minimum
Voltage Voltage Voltage
(kV) (kV) (kV)
220 242 198
110 121 99
66 69.3 62.7
50 52.5 47.5

3.2.2 Step Change in Voltage - Dynamic

The voltage step change is the dynamic voltage change between the pre-switching
voltage and the prevailing voltage in the period immediately after transient decay and
AVR action but before any manual or slow control action e.g. manual tap changing,
automatic tap changing, manual switching of capacitor banks under normal operating
conditions. The allowable voltage deviation depends on the frequency of switching
infrequent or routine.

3.2.2.1 Routine Switching

The Australasian standard5 for acceptable voltage deviation during routine switching
is set out in Table 3.2:

Table 3.2 Allowable Dynamic Voltage Deviation

r Vdyn/Vn
no of events per hour (%)
MV HV
r1 4 3
1 < r 10 3 2.5
10< r 100 2 1.5
100 < r 1000 1.25 1
Note: MV refers to 1 kV < VN 35 kV
MV refers to 35 kV < VN 230 kV
Vdyn/Vn Maximum voltage change for normal operating conditions

The voltage change at buses for routine switching of equipment to control voltage
(e.g. switching of capacitor banks or circuits) must not exceed the value given in
Table 3.2. Currently Transpower plans on the basis of a 2% voltage dip for routine
switching - this is slightly more conservative than set out in the AS/NZS standard.

5
Australian/New Zealand Standard - AS/NZS 61000.3.7:2001,

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3.2.2.2 Infrequent switching

There are no standards specifying the allowable voltage deviation for infrequent
switching, but it would naturally be greater than for routine switching operations.
Transpower has designed the system based on a 5% variation. Worldwide, the
allowable voltage deviation is 5% to 6% depending on the utility.6

3.3 Short circuit levels

The default planned maximum short circuit levels are shown in Table 3.3. There are a
limited number of locations, such as Otahuhu 110 kV and Islington 66 kV buses,
where the maximum fault levels will exceed the default maximum short circuit levels
shown, and these are documented in other Grid Owner documents.

Table 3.3 - Maximum Short Circuit Power and Current Limits

Nominal Maximum short-circuit

Voltage Power and Current Limits
kV MVA kA
220 12,000 31.5
110 6,000 31.5
66 1,800 16
50 1,350 16
33 1,400 25
22 950 25
11 475 25

4. Stability Criteria
The stability of a power system is determined by its ability to remain stable when the
system is subjected to any disturbance. It can be further divided into four categories of
stability:
Transient Stability
Dynamic Stability
Voltage Stability
Frequency Stability.
These are discussed in the following subsections.

4.1 Transient Stability

Transient stability refers to the ability of the system to maintain synchronism when it
experiences large disturbances like a line fault or loss of a generator.

6
Refer to Appendix B for further information

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4.1.1 Disturbances selected for testing

A key input into assessing transient stability is identification of the most severe
disturbance on the system. Transpower has identified 7 types of significant
disturbance, from which the most severe disturbance must be identified. The seven
disturbance types are:
(1) a 3-phase fault on a circuit close to a substation cleared in main protection
clearance time by opening the circuit breakers at each end of the circuit to
disconnect the circuit
(2) a 3-phase fault on a circuit close to a substation cleared in main protection
clearance time by opening the circuit breakers at each end of the circuit and
reclosing on fault with subsequent reopening of the circuit breakers at each end to
disconnect the circuit
(3) a 3-phase fault on a transformer followed by disconnection of the transformer
(4) a 3-phase fault on a bus section cleared by the bus zone protection operation of all
circuit breakers connected to the faulted bus section.
(5) a single-phase-to earth fault on a circuit cleared by the back-up protection
operation of the circuit breakers at each end of the circuit.
(6) a single-phase-to earth fault on any circuit cleared by circuit breaker failure
protection of the relevant back-up circuit breakers.
(7) a sudden disconnection of any plant including a generating unit
This list of disturbances is similar to those used by overseas utilities. Refer to
Appendix C for more detail.

4.1.2 Auto-reclose of Circuit Breakers

Automatic reclosing may be employed on all transmission lines to enhance security.
However, the system must be planned such that the system is stable without re-
closure.
The system must also be tested for stability with unsuccessful operation of the auto
re-closing facility. If the studies show that fast re-closure onto a fault makes the
system unstable, the dead time may be increased sufficiently to make the system
stable. Alternatively, auto-reclose may be enabled for a single-phase fault and
disabled for a 3-phase fault.
Autoreclosing at line terminals that are in electrical proximity to turbine-generators
may subject them to excessive shaft torque and winding stresses with resultant loss of
life. These effects should be evaluated before autoreclosing is applied.
Autoreclosing a region (with only one substation or group of substations) connected
to the main transmission grid through a single circuit with no generators or limited
generation in the region can cause voltage and/or frequency disturbances. There is a
possibility of sustained low voltage or even voltage collapse depending on the type of
load and the amount of load. These effects should be evaluated fully before applying
auto reclosures.

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4.1.3 Fault Clearing Time

Where the exact fault-clearing times are not known, the following fault clearing times
shall be used in simulation studies:

Main protection for 220 kV circuits: 120 msec.

Main protection for 110 kV circuits: 200 msec
Main protection for 66 kV circuits: 200 msec
CB failure time: 350 msec.

4.1.4 Transient Voltage Performance Criterion

The performance criteria for transient voltage performance for large disturbances are:

For single contingencies, the transient voltage dip after the fault is cleared should
not exceed 25% at load buses or 30% at non load buses. Furthermore, at load
buses, voltage dip should not exceed 20% for more than 20 cycles.
For multiple contingencies, the transient voltage dip after the fault is cleared
should not exceed 30% at load or non-load buses. Furthermore, at load buses,
voltage dip should not exceed 20% for more than 20 cycles.

This criteria has been adopted from the Western Electricity Co-ordinating Council
7
(WECC) planning standard, which is also applied in Western Australia.

4.1.5 Over-voltages due to Load Rejection

Power frequency over-voltages due to load rejection must be limited to values within
the over voltage envelope shown in Figure 4.1
Figure 4.1 Acceptable Overvoltage Envelope

1 .4
1 .3 p u
Ratio = --------------------------------------

1 .2
Post-Disturbance Voltage

Pre-Disturbance Voltage

1 .0 9 p u

1 .0

0 .8

0 .6

0 .4

0 .2

3 C yc le s 25
0 .0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
T im e (C y c le s )

7
Formerly the Western System Coordinating Council. Represents at least 40 electricity providers on
the Western seaboard of North America from Canada through to northern Mexico.

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4.2 Dynamic Stability

Dynamic stability refers to the ability of a power system to withstand small changes in
loads, switching of lines and also to return to a satisfactory state following large
disturbances like a line fault. The main problem in dynamic stability is with
electromechanical oscillations of increasing amplitude between generators, causing
generators to lose synchronism unless there is positive damping of these oscillations.
The damping criterion set by Transpower is that the oscillations must decay within 12
seconds (settling time). If oscillations do not settle within the time specified,
appropriate measures must be taken to damp the oscillations. The 12 second decay
time is similar to that used by most other utilities. Refer to Appendix D for more
information.

4.3 Voltage Stability

Voltage stability refers to the ability of the system to maintain voltage at all buses
under steady state conditions, for any disturbance, such as a variation in load or an
outage of circuit(s). During periods of voltage instability, voltage drops progressively,
leading to low voltage throughout the system/region. When voltage throughout the
system/region reaches and stays at low values, the system is considered to have
reached voltage collapse. How near the system is to voltage instability can be
assessed on the basis of real and reactive power margins for the system or particular
region concerned. Note that the voltage stability margin may not always be a reliable
indicator. For example in a heavily reactive power compensated system, instability
can occur even at high voltages.
There are no international standards on acceptable real or reactive power margins, as
this depends very much on the system. The criteria adopted by Transpower are drawn
from the Western Electric Co-ordinating Council (US)8report and are based on Q-V
and P-V analyses. They are:
i) For the outage of a single element, (a generator, circuit, transformer or any
reactive source), the real power (MW) margin must be 5% as measured from
the nose point of the P-V curve.
ii) The reactive power (Mvar) margin at the most reactive-deficient bus must
have an adequate reactive power margin for the worst single contingency, to
satisfy either a 5% increase beyond maximum forecast loads or a loss of
reactive support close to the bus that is considered most susceptible to voltage
collapse and for which the Q-V plots are derived. The worst single
contingency is the one causing the largest decrease in the reactive power
margin.
iii) For outage of a bus section or for a double contingency, the MW margin must
be 2.5% as measured from the nose point of the P-V curve.
iv) The reactive power (Mvar) margin at the most reactive-deficient bus must
have an adequate reactive power margin for the loss of a bus section or a
double contingency at 50% of that required for the worst single contingency.

8
Formerly the Western System Co-ordinating Council

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v) Adequate dynamic reserve should be provided to ensure that voltage during

the transient period does not result in a sustained voltage collapse.
The static analysis must be supplemented by a limited number of dynamic studies to
establish that the static approach is satisfactory. In the dynamic analysis, the effect
of generator over-excitation limiters, transformer taps, induction motors, etc should be
represented in detail.

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Appendices

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Appendix A: Security Criteria

Introduction
The security criteria adopted by international utilities have been identified by
reviewing published papers and by direct correspondence. Generally utilities adopt
N-1 or N-2 security criteria for the main transmission grid. Many of the utilities use
N-1 security criterion for the main grid and N-2 security criterion for critical loads.
The degree to which the transmission networks are meshed and the availability of
generation within regions of the transmission network are important factors in
determining the appropriate security criteria for a region. Table A.1 gives a
comparison of security criteria used by some of the major utilities in the world. More
detail can be found in the following country sections.

Table A.1 Comparison of Security Standard

Utility Security Remarks
Criterion
Transpower N-1 Maintenance to be carried out at appropriate time without
violating N-1 security criteria
NECA, Australia N-1
Western N-2 When circuit is out on maintenance, the system is planned to meet
Australia only 80% of the demand
WECC, USA N-2 No loss of demand. Allows for simultaneous outage of two
elements with planned outage of an element but with some load
shedding
NGC, UK N-2 N-2 For the main transmission system
N-1, N-2 A mix of N-1 and N-2 for specific regions, depending on demand
Ireland, Belgium, N-1 CIGRE 1992 Survey
Denmark, (meshed system with interconnection to neighbouring countries)
Finland, France
Brazil N-1
Italy N-2 CIGRE 1992 Survey
ESB, Ireland N-2 Loss of load is allowed for maintenance events

Australia
All the Australian utilities, except Western Australia follow the National Electricity
Code (NEC) which specifies that the network must be planned, operated and
maintained so that it is capable of withstanding any single credible contingency
event. The code allows for higher standards to be adopted where appropriate due, for
example, to the size and importance of the customer groups.
Western Power, Western Australia, specifies N-1 security criterion to meet peak
load and (N-2) security criteria to meet 80% of load.

Supply to CBD
Sydney CBD is supplied by TransGrid over the 330 kV and by Energy Australia over
a large 132 kV cable network. The security standard adopted for supply to the CBD
allows for the simultaneous outage of a TransGrid 330 kV cable into Sydney and any
132 kV cable or 330/132 kV transformer within the Energy Australia Network. It

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also allows for outage of any section of a 132 kV busbar. It does not allow for the
outage of two 330 kV cables, as this is considered too costly.
Supply to the Melbourne and Adelaide CBDs are designed to meet N-2 criteria.
The 110 kV supply to the Brisbane CBD is being planned so that full supply is
maintained with two 110 kV cables out of service.

United States - Western Electric Co-ordinating Council (WECC),

WECC also uses (N-2) criterion for planning the transmission grid. However, there
are some differences in defining contingencies:
WECC considers bus section outage as a double contingency not a single
contingency.
WECC allows for unplanned outage of two elements with planned load
curtailment or shedding but does not specify the percentage of load that is met
under such conditions.

United Kingdom - National Grid Company (NGC)

The security standard adopted by NGC for the main interconnected transmission
system is (N-2). However, there are significant differences between the NGC system
and the New Zealand system; the NGC system is heavily meshed with generation in
diverse areas, whereas the New Zealand system is comprised of a weak, longitudinal
transmission with significant generation located in a few areas, remote from the
demand. In addition, the NGC demand is around 10 times that of NZ and due to its
density, there are generally alternative supply options to any grid off-take, via the
distribution networks, which means the restoration times can be reduced.

Table A.2 Security Level for Group Demand

Group Initial System Condition
Demand Intact System With Single Arranged Outage
Over 1500 MW In accordance with main interconnected transmission system planning criteria

Over 300 MW Immediately Immediately

To 1500 MW No loss of supply Maintenance Period Demand

Note 1 Within time to restore arranged outage

Group Demand

Over 60 MW Immediately Within 3 hrs

To 300 MW Group Demand minus 20 MW Smaller of (Group Demand minus
100 MW) and 1/3 Group Demand.
Note 2

Within 3 hrs Within time to restore arranged outage

No loss of supply Group Demand

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Up to 60 MW Within 15 min
Smaller of (Group Demand minus
12 MW) and 2/3 Group Demand Nil

Within 3 hrs
No loss of supply

Note 1 The maintenance period demand is 67% of the group demand.

Note 2 The group demand are the forecast maximum demand.

The NGC also defines separate planning criteria for areas of grouped demand. The
security standards for these areas is such that, for an outage of any of the following:
a) A single transmission circuit; or
b) A single transmission circuit with a single arranged outage of another
transmission circuit, generating unit or any reactive supporting equipment, any
loss of supply shall be in accordance with Table A.2.

Ireland - ESB National Grid

ESB National grid plans their system for N-2 security criteria. However, they allow
for some loss of load for an unplanned outage when another transmission element is
on planned outage.

International Surveys
CIGRE published a report in 1992 on a survey carried out on standard used in
transmission planning. Twenty four countries participated in this survey. The
findings from the survey are:
All countries use deterministic technique for planning. In addition about half
use or have probabilistic techniques available.
The number of countries that use (N-2) criterion just exceeds the number that
use only an (N-1) criterion. However, the definition of (N-2) criteria and its
application varies. Some countries consider the outage of double circuits only
(not any two circuits); some do not apply the criteria at peak load conditions;
and some apply it only for critical loads.
Those countries that use N-2' criterion do not also consider the outage of a
busbar.
10 of the 24 countries (Brazil, Canada, UK, USA, South Africa, etc) use
additional transfer requirements for zones or groups of circuits.

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Appendix B: Infrequent Switching Criteria

Australia
Western Australia uses +/-6% voltage change for infrequent switching whereas the
regulator overseer - NEC does not make any specific distinction between routine and
infrequent switching. Specifically, the NEC code specifies in Clause S5.3.7 that
voltage should not exceed the following limit:
Where only one Distribution Network Service Provider or Customer has a
connection point associated with the point of supply, the limit is 80% of the
threshold of perceptibility set out in Figure 1 of AS2279 Part 4; or
Where two or more Distribution Network Service Providers or Customers causing
voltage fluctuations have a connection point associated with the point of supply,
the threshold of perceptibility limit is to be shared in a manner to be agreed
between the Distribution Network Service Provider and the Code Participant in
accordance with good electricity industry practice.

Ireland
ESB National Grid (Ireland) allows step voltage changes of 3% for capacitor bank
switchings with all transmission facilities in service. It does not specify any step
voltage change for infrequent switchings.

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Appendix C: Transient Stability Disturbances

Australia
All Australian utilities except Western Power (WA), follow the National Electricity
Code in planning their system. The NECA specifies the following disturbances for
planning the system:
Disconnection of any single generating unit with or without application of a fault
Disconnection of any transmission line, with or without the application of a single
circuit two-phase-to-ground solid fault on lines operating at or above 220 kV, and
a single circuit three-phase solid fault on lines operating below 220 kV.

Western Power specifies the following disturbances for planning the system:
A three-phase-to-ground fault cleared by main protection
A single phase fault cleared by backup protection
Single phase auto-reclosing of lines
Tripping of lines or transformer without a fault

United States
The Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC)9, USA specifies the following
disturbances for planning the system:
a) Single line to ground fault (SLG) or three-phase fault on generator, transformer,
or generator cleared by main protection
b) Loss of a transmission component - transmission line, transformer, generator
without a fault
c) SLG fault on bus section or breaker with normal clearing
d) SLG fault with delayed clearing on generator, transformer, transmission circuit or
bus section.

For a) and b) above, no loss of demand is allowed. For other events, depending on
system design and expected system, the controlled load shedding and planned
removal of some generators is allowed. Additionally, cascading outages are not
allowed for any of the above events.

United Kingdom
The NGC specifies the following disturbances for planning the system:
A three-phase-to-ground fault cleared by main protection
A single phase fault cleared by backup protection
Single phase auto-reclosing of lines
Tripping of lines or transformer without a fault

9
Formerly the Western System Coordinating Council. Represents at least 40 electricity providers on
the Western seaboard of North America from Canada to northern Mexico.

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 Main Transmission Planning Criteria

CIGRE
CIGRE published a report in 1992 on a survey carried out on standards used in
transmission planning. Of the 24 countries participating, 20 (83%) confirmed use of
3-phase faults to test stability. Other findings included:
Australia, Brazil and CIS (formerly part of USSR) countries do not plan for 3-
phase faults. Australia and CIS use two-phase-to-ground faults and Brazil uses
single phase faults.
Some countries consider two-phase faults and single phase faults to assess the
effect of torsional interaction and voltage transients to generators and industrial
users.

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 Main Transmission Planning Criteria

Appendix D: Damping Criteria for Dynamic Stability

The following table compares the criteria across a number of electricity utilities:

Utility Damping Criteria

Transgrid, VENCorp, Halving time of the least damped oscillations must
Electranet, Western Power not be more than 5 seconds.
(Australia)
Powerlink Damping ratio of at least 0.05
Elsam (Denmark) Oscillations to be damped within 10-20 seconds
Statnet (Norway) Oscillations to be damped within 10-20 seconds
ESB (Ireland) Damping coefficient of not less than 0.05
UK Power frequency oscillations time constant should
be less than 12 seconds
WECC, (USA) Do not include specific requirement. It is updated
from time to time.

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