Professional Documents
Culture Documents
92299 April 19, 1991 most qualified since she was the only Certified Public Accountant Subsequently, public respondent CSC issued the questioned
among the contenders. resolutions which prompted the petitioner to submit before us
the following assignment of errors:
REYNALDO R. SAN JUAN, petitioner,
vs. On August 1, 1988, DBM Undersecretary Nazario S. Cabuquit, Jr.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND signed the appointment papers of the private respondent as PBO A. THE CSC ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE APPOINTMENT
MANAGEMENT and CECILIA ALMAJOSE,respondents. of Rizal upon the aforestated recommendation of Abella. BY DBM ASSISTANT SECRETARY CABUQUIT OF CECILIA
ALMAJOSE AS PBO OF RIZAL.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: In a letter dated August 3, 1988 addressed to Secretary Carague,
the petitioner reiterated his request for the appointment of B. THE CSC ERRED IN HOLDING THAT CECILIA ALMA
Dalisay Santos to the contested position unaware of the earlier JOSE POSSESSES ALL THE REQUIRED QUALIFICATIONS.
In this petition for certiorari pursuant to Section 7, Article IX (A) of
appointment made by Undersecretary Cabuquit.
the present Constitution, the petitioner Governor of the Province
of Rizal, prays for the nullification of Resolution No. 89-868 of the C. THE CSC ERRED IN DECLARING THAT PETITIONER'S
Civil Service Commission (CSC) dated November 21, 1989 and its On August 31, 1988, DBM Regional Director Agripino G. Galvez NOMINEES ARE NOT QUALIFIED TO THE SUBJECT
Resolution No. 90-150 dated February 9, 1990. wrote the petitioner that Dalisay Santos and his other POSITION.
recommendees did not meet the minimum requirements under
Local Budget Circular No. 31 for the position of a local budget
The dispositive portion of the questioned Resolution reads: D. THE CSC AND THE DBM GRAVELY ABUSED THEIR
officer. Director Galvez whether or not through oversight further
DISCRETION IN NOT ALLOWING PETITIONER TO
required the petitioner to submit at least three other qualified
SUBMIT NEW NOMINEES WHO COULD MEET THE
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the nominees who are qualified for the position of PBO of Rizal for
REQUIRED QUALIFICATION (Petition, pp. 7-8,Rollo, pp.
Commission resolved to dismiss, as it hereby dismisses evaluation and processing.
15-16)
the appeal of Governor Reynaldo San Juan of Rizal.
Accordingly, the approved appointment of Ms. Cecilia
On November 2, 1988, the petitioner after having been informed
Almajose as Provincial Budget Officer of Rizal, is All the assigned errors relate to the issue of whether or not the
of the private respondent's appointment wrote Secretary Carague
upheld. (Rollo, p. 32) private respondent is lawfully entitled to discharge the functions
protesting against the said appointment on the grounds that
of PBO of Rizal pursuant to the appointment made by public
Cabuquit as DBM Undersecretary is not legally authorized to
respondent DBM's Undersecretary upon the recommendation of
The subsequent Resolution No. 90-150 reiterates CSC's position appoint the PBO; that the private respondent lacks the required
then Director Abella of DBM Region IV.
upholding the private respondent's appointment by denying the three years work experience as provided in Local Budget Circular
petitioner's motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. No. 31; and that under Executive Order No. 112, it is the
Provincial Governor, not the Regional Director or a Congressman, The petitioner's arguments rest on his contention that he has the
who has the power to recommend nominees for the position of sole right and privilege to recommend the nominees to the
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
PBO. position of PBO and that the appointee should come only from his
nominees. In support thereof, he invokes Section 1 of Executive
On March 22, 1988, the position of Provincial Budget Officer Order No. 112 which provides that:
(PBO) for the province of Rizal was left vacant by its former On January 9, 1989 respondent DBM, through its Director of the
holder, a certain Henedima del Rosario. Bureau of Legal & Legislative Affairs (BLLA) Virgilio A. Afurung,
issued a Memorandum ruling that the petitioner's letter-protest is Sec. 1. All budget officers of provinces, cities and
not meritorious considering that public respondent DBM validly municipalities shall be appointed henceforth by the
In a letter dated April 18, 1988, the petitioner informed Director exercised its prerogative in filling-up the contested position since Minister of Budget and Management upon
Reynaldo Abella of the Department of Budget and Management none of the petitioner's nominees met the prescribed recommendation of the local chief executive
(DBM) Region IV that Ms. Dalisay Santos assumed office as Acting requirements. concerned, subject to civil service law, rules and
PBO since March 22, 1988 pursuant to a Memorandum issued by regulations, and they shall be placed under the
the petitioner who further requested Director Abella to endorse administrative control and technical supervision of the
the appointment of the said Ms. Dalisay Santos to the contested On January 27, 1989, the petitioner moved for a reconsideration
Ministry of Budget and Management.
position of PBO of Rizal. Ms. Dalisay Santos was then Municipal of the BLLA ruling.
Budget Officer of Taytay, Rizal before she discharged the
The petitioner maintains that the appointment of the private
functions of acting PBO. On February 28, 1989, the DBM Secretary denied the petitioner's
respondent to the contested position was made in derogation of
motion for reconsideration.
the provision so that both the public respondents committed
In a Memorandum dated July 26, 1988 addressed to the DBM grave abuse of discretion in upholding Almajose's appointment.
Secretary, then Director Abella of Region IV recommended the On March 27, 1989, the petitioner wrote public respondent CSC
appointment of the private respondent as PBO of Rizal on the protesting against the appointment of the private respondent and
There is no question that under Section 1 of Executive Order No.
basis of a comparative study of all Municipal Budget Officers of reiterating his position regarding the matter.
112 the petitioner's power to recommend is subject to the
the said province which included three nominees of the
qualifications prescribed by existing laws for the position of PBO.
petitioner. According to Abella, the private respondent was the
Consequently, in the event that the recommendations made by
the petitioner fall short of the required standards, the appointing of DBM of his appointing prerogative. To rule of the workings of native control show to be consistent with the
authority, the Minister (now Secretary) of public respondent DBM otherwise would in effect give the law or E.O. No. 112 maintenance of law, order and loyalty.
is expected to reject the same. a different interpretation or construction not intended
therein, taking into consideration that said officer has
In this initial organic act for the Philippines, the Commission which
been nationalized and is directly under the control and
In the event that the Governor recommends an unqualified combined both executive and legislative powers was directed to
supervision of the DBM Secretary or through his duly
person, is the Department Head free to appoint anyone he fancies give top priority to making local autonomy effective.
authorized representative. It cannot be gainsaid that
? This is the issue before us.
said national officer has a similar role in the local
government unit, only on another area or concern, to The 1935 Constitution had no specific article on local autonomy.
Before the promulgation of Executive Order No. 112 on December that of a Commission on Audit resident auditor. Hence, However, in distinguishing between presidential control and
24, 1986, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as the Local to preserve and maintain the independence of said supervision as follows:
Government Code vested upon the Governor, subject to civil officer from the local government unit, he must be
service rules and regulations, the power to appoint the PBO (Sec. primarily the choice of the national appointing official, The President shall have control of all the executive
216, subparagraph (1), BP 337). The Code further enumerated the and the exercise thereof must not be unduly hampered departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general
qualifications for the position of PBO. Thus, Section 216, or interfered with, provided the appointee finally supervision over all local governments as may be
subparagraph (2) of the same code states that: selected meets the requirements for the position in provided by law, and take care that the laws be
accordance with prescribed Civil Service Law, Rules faithfully executed. (Sec. 11, Article VII, 1935
(2) No person shall be appointed provincial budget and Regulations. In other words, the appointing official Constitution)
officer unless he is a citizen of the Philippines, of good is not restricted or circumscribed to the list submitted
moral character, a holder of a degree preferably in law, or recommended by the local chief executive in the
final selection of an appointee for the position. He may the Constitution clearly limited the executive power over local
commerce, public administration or any related course
consider other nominees for the position vis a vis the governments to "general supervision . . . as may be provided by
from a recognized college or university, a first grade
nominees of the local chief executive. (CSC Resolution law." The President controls the executive departments. He has
civil service eligibility or its equivalent, and has
No. 89-868, p. 2; Rollo, p. 31) no such power over local governments. He has only supervision
acquired at least five years experience in budgeting or
and that supervision is both general and circumscribed by statute.
in any related field.
The issue before the Court is not limited to the validity of the
appointment of one Provincial Budget Officer. The tug of war In Tecson v. Salas, 34 SCRA 275, 282 (1970), this Court stated:
The petitioner contends that since the appointing authority with
respect to the Provincial Budget Officer of Rizal was vested in him between the Secretary of Budget and Management and the
before, then, the real intent behind Executive Order No. 112 in Governor of the premier province of Rizal over a seemingly . . . Hebron v. Reyes, (104 Phil. 175 [1958]) with the
empowering him to recommend nominees to the position of innocuous position involves the application of a most important then Justice, now Chief Justice, Concepcion as
Provincial Budget Officer is to make his recommendation part and constitutional policy and principle, that of local autonomy. We theponente, clarified matters. As was pointed out, the
parcel of the appointment process. He states that the phrase have to obey the clear mandate on local autonomy. Where a law presidential competence is not even supervision in
"upon recommendation of the local chief executive concerned" is capable of two interpretations, one in favor of centralized general, but general supervision as may be provided by
must be given mandatory application in consonance with the power in Malacaang and the other beneficial to local autonomy, law. He could not thus go beyond the applicable
state policy of local autonomy as guaranteed by the 1987 the scales must be weighed in favor of autonomy. statutory provisions, which bind and fetter his
Constitution under Art. II, Sec. 25 and Art. X, Sec. 2 thereof. He discretion on the matter. Moreover, as had been
further argues that his power to recommend cannot validly be The exercise by local governments of meaningful power has been earlier ruled in an opinion penned by Justice Padilla in
defeated by a mere administrative issuance of public respondent a national goal since the turn of the century. And yet, inspite of Mondano V. Silvosa, (97 Phil. 143 [1955]) referred to
DBM reserving to itself the right to fill-up any existing vacancy in constitutional provisions and, as in this case, legislation by the present Chief Justice in his opinion in the
case the petitioner's nominees do not meet the qualification mandating greater autonomy for local officials, national officers Hebron case, supervision goes no further than
requirements as embodied in public respondent DBM's Local cannot seem to let go of centralized powers. They deny or water "overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to
Budget Circular No. 31 dated February 9, 1988. down what little grants of autonomy have so far been given to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If
municipal corporations. the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may
take such action or step as prescribed by law to make
The questioned ruling is justified by the public respondent CSC as
them perform their duties." (Ibid, pp. 147-148) Control,
follows: President McKinley's Instructions dated April 7, 1900 to the on the other hand, "means the power of an officer to
Second Philippine Commission ordered the new Government "to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a
As required by said E.O. No. 112, the DBM Secretary devote their attention in the first instance to the establishment of subordinate had done in the performance of their
may choose from among the recommendees of the municipal governments in which natives of the Islands, both in the duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for
Provincial Governor who are thus qualified and eligible cities and rural communities, shall be afforded the opportunity to that of the latter." It would follow then, according to
for appointment to the position of the PBO of Rizal. manage their own local officers to the fullest extent of which they the present Chief Justice, to go back to the Hebron
Notwithstanding, the recommendation of the local are capable and subject to the least degree of supervision and opinion, that the President had to abide by the then
chief executive is merely directory and not a control which a careful study of their capacities and observation provisions of the Revised Administrative Code on
conditionsine qua non to the exercise by the Secretary suspension and removal of municipal officials, there
being no power of control that he could rightfully accountable local government structure instituted Council. The President makes the appointments from the list of
exercise, the law clearly specifying the procedure by through a system of decentralization with effective nominees submitted to her by the Council. She cannot apply the
which such disciplinary action would be taken. mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, DBM procedure, reject all the Council nominees, and appoint
allocate among the different local government units another person whom she feels is better qualified. There can be
their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and no reservation of the right to fill up a position with a person of the
Pursuant to this principle under the 1935 Constitution, legislation
provide for the qualifications, election, appointment appointing power's personal choice.
implementing local autonomy was enacted. In 1959, Republic Act
and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and
No. 2264, "An Act Amending the Law Governing Local
duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to
Governments by Increasing Their Autonomy and Reorganizing The public respondent's grave abuse of discretion is aggravated by
the organization and operation of the local units.
Local Governments" was passed. It was followed in 1967 when the fact that Director Galvez required the Provincial Governor to
Republic Act No. 5185, the Decentralization Law was enacted, submit at least three other names of nominees better qualified
giving "further autonomous powers to local governments When the Civil Service Commission interpreted the than his earlier recommendation. It was a meaningless exercise.
governments." recommending power of the Provincial Governor as purely The appointment of the private respondent was formalized
directory, it went against the letter and spirit of the constitutional before the Governor was extended the courtesy of being
provisions on local autonomy. If the DBM Secretary jealously informed that his nominee had been rejected. The complete
The provisions of the 1973 Constitution moved the country
hoards the entirety of budgetary powers and ignores the right of disregard of the local government's prerogative and the smug
further, at least insofar as legal provisions are concerned, towards
local governments to develop self-reliance and resoluteness in the belief that the DBM has absolute wisdom, authority, and
greater autonomy. It provided under Article II as a basic principle
handling of their own funds, the goal of meaningful local discretion are manifest.
of government:
autonomy is frustrated and set back.
In his classic work "Philippine Political Law" Dean Vicente G. Sinco
Sec. 10. The State shall guarantee and promote the
The right given by Local Budget Circular No. 31 which states: stated that the value of local governments as institutions of
autonomy of local government units, especially the
democracy is measured by the degree of autonomy that they
barangay to ensure their fullest development as self-
enjoy. Citing Tocqueville, he stated that "local assemblies of
reliant communities. Sec. 6.0 The DBM reserves the right to fill up any
citizens constitute the strength of free nations. . . . A people may
existing vacancy where none of the nominees of the
establish a system of free government but without the spirit of
local chief executive meet the prescribed
An entire article on Local Government was incorporated into the municipal institutions, it cannot have the spirit of liberty." (Sinco,
requirements.
Constitution. It called for a local government code defining more Philippine Political Law, Eleventh Edition, pp. 705-706).
responsive and accountable local government structures. Any
creation, merger, abolition, or substantial boundary alteration is ultra vires and is, accordingly, set aside. The DBM may appoint
Our national officials should not only comply with the
cannot be done except in accordance with the local government only from the list of qualified recommendees nominated by the
constitutional provisions on local autonomy but should also
code and upon approval by a plebiscite. The power to create Governor. If none is qualified, he must return the list of nominees
appreciate the spirit of liberty upon which these provisions are
sources of revenue and to levy taxes was specifically settled upon to the Governor explaining why no one meets the legal
based.
local governments. requirements and ask for new recommendees who have the
necessary eligibilities and qualifications.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned
The exercise of greater local autonomy is even more marked in
resolutions of the Civil Service Commission are SET ASIDE. The
the present Constitution. The PBO is expected to synchronize his work with DBM. More
appointment of respondent Cecilia Almajose is nullified. The
important, however, is the proper administration of fiscal affairs
Department of Budget and Management is ordered to appoint the
at the local level. Provincial and municipal budgets are prepared
Article II, Section 25 on State Policies provides: Provincial Budget Officer of Rizal from among qualified nominees
at the local level and after completion are forwarded to the
submitted by the Provincial Governor.
national officials for review. They are prepared by the local
Sec. 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local officials who must work within the constraints of those budgets.
governments They are not formulated in the inner sanctums of an all-knowing SO ORDERED.
DBM and unilaterally imposed on local governments whether or
The 14 sections in Article X on Local Government not only not they are relevant to local needs and resources. It is for this
reiterate earlier doctrines but give in greater detail the provisions reason that there should be a genuine interplay, a balancing of
making local autonomy more meaningful. Thus, Sections 2 and 3 viewpoints, and a harmonization of proposals from both the local
of Article X provide: and national officials. It is for this reason that the nomination and
appointment process involves a sharing of power between the
two levels of government.
Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall
enjoy local autonomy.
It may not be amiss to give by way of analogy the procedure
followed in the appointments of Justices and
Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government Judges.1wphi1 Under Article VIII of the Constitution,
code which shall provide for a more responsive and nominations for judicial positions are made by the Judicial and Bar
G.R. No. 104732 June 22, 1993 questioned proviso and not the President who appointed the to any public office or position during his
Mayor to the subject posts; 5 and, (c) Sec. 261, par. (g), of the tenure.
Omnibus Election Code, which says:
ROBERTO A. FLORES, DANIEL Y. FIGUEROA, ROGELIO T. PALO,
DOMINGO A. JADLOC, CARLITO T. CRUZ and MANUEL P. Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the
REYES, petitioner, Sec. 261. Prohibited Acts. The following shall be primary functions of his position, no
vs. guilty of an election offense: . . . (g) Appointment appointive official shall hold any other
HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, Executive Secretary, and RICHARD J. of new employees, creation of new position, office or employment in the Government or
GORDON, respondents. promotion, or giving salary increases. During any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
the period of forty-five days before a regular thereof, including government-owned or
election and thirty days before a special election, controlled corporations or their
BELLOSILLO, J.:
(1) any head, official or appointing officer of a subsidiaries.
government office, agency or instrumentality,
The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, 1 otherwise whether national or local, including government-
The section expresses the policy against the concentration of
known as the "Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992," owned or controlled corporations, who appoints or
several public positions in one person, so that a public officer or
under which respondent Mayor Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo hires any new employee, whether provisional,
employee may serve full-time with dedication and thus be
City was appointed Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the temporary or casual, or creates and fills any new
efficient in the delivery of public services. It is an affirmation that
Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), is challenged in this position, except upon prior authority of the
a public office is a full-time job. Hence, a public officer or
original petition with prayer for prohibition, preliminary injunction Commission. The Commission shall not grant the
employee, like the head of an executive department described
and temporary restraining order "to prevent useless and authority sought unless it is satisfied that the
in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 83896,
unnecessary expenditures of public funds by way of salaries and position to be filled is essential to the proper
and Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, Inc. v. Philip Ella C. Juico,
other operational expenses attached to the office . . . functioning of the office or agency concerned, and
as Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 83815, 6 ". . . . should
." 2 Paragraph (d) reads that the position shall not be filled in a manner
be allowed to attend to his duties and responsibilities without the
that may influence the election. As an exception to
distraction of other governmental duties or employment. He
(d) Chairman administrator The the foregoing provisions, a new employee may be
should be precluded from dissipating his efforts, attention and
President shall appoint a professional appointed in case of urgent
energy among too many positions of responsibility, which may
manager as administrator of the Subic need:Provided, however, That notice of the
result in haphazardness and inefficiency . . . ."
Authority with a compensation to be appointment shall be given to the Commission
determined by the Board subject to the within three days from the date of the
appointment. Any appointment or hiring in Particularly as regards the first paragraph of Sec. 7, "(t)he basic
approval of the Secretary of Budget, who
violation of this provision shall be null and void. (2) idea really is to prevent a situation where a local elective official
shall be the ex oficio chairman of the Board
Any government official who promotes, or gives will work for his appointment in an executive position in
and who shall serve as the chief executive
any increase of salary or remuneration or privilege government, and thus neglect his constituents . . . ." 7
officer of the Subic Authority: Provided,
however, That for the first year of its to any government official or employee, including
operations from the effectivity of this Act, those in government-owned or controlled In the case before us, the subject proviso directs the President to
the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be corporations . . . . appoint an elective official, i.e., the Mayor of Olongapo City, to
appointed as the chairman and chief other government posts (as Chairman of the Board and Chief
executive officer of the Subic for the reason that the appointment of respondent Gordon to the Executive Officer of SBMA). Since this is precisely what the
Authority (emphasis supplied). subject posts made by respondent Executive Secretary on 3 April constitutional proscription seeks to prevent, it needs no
1992 was within the prohibited 45-day period prior to the 11 May stretching of the imagination to conclude that
1992 Elections. the proviso contravenes Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the
Petitioners, who claim to be taxpayers, employees of the U.S.
Constitution. Here, the fact that the expertise of an elective
Facility at the Subic, Zambales, and officers and members of the
official may be most beneficial to the higher interest of the body
Filipino Civilian Employees Association in U.S. Facilities in the The principal question is whether the proviso in Sec. 13, par. (d),
politic is of no moment.
Philippines, maintain that theproviso in par. (d) of Sec. 13 herein- of R.A. 7227 which states, "Provided, however,That for the first
above quoted in italics infringes on the following constitutional year of its operations from the effectivity of this Act, the mayor of
and statutory provisions: (a) Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman and chief It is argued that Sec. 94 of the Local Government Code (LGC)
Constitution, which states that "[n]o elective official shall be executive officer of the Subic Authority," violates the permits the appointment of a local elective official to another
eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any constitutional proscription against appointment or designation of post if so allowed by law or by the primary functions of his
public officer or position during his tenure," 3 because the City elective officials to other government posts. office. 8 But, the contention is fallacious. Section 94 of the LGC is
Mayor of Olongapo City is an elective official and the subject posts not determinative of the constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of
are public offices; (b) Sec. 16, Art. VII, of the Constitution, which R.A. 7227, for no legislative act can prevail over the fundamental
In full, Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution provides:
provides that "[t]he President shall . . . . appoint all other officers law of the land. Moreover, since the constitutionality of Sec. 94 of
of the Government whose appointments are not LGC is not the issue here nor is that section sought to be declared
otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be No elective official shall be eligible for unconstitutional, we need not rule on its validity. Neither can we
authorized by law to appoint", 4 since it was Congress through the appointment or designation in any capacity
invoke a practice otherwise unconstitutional as authority for its provided by law, without receiving any additional compensation As may be defined, an "appointment" is "[t]he designation of a
validity. therefor. person, by the person or persons having authority therefor, to
discharge the duties of some office or trust," 17 or "[t]he selection
or designation of a person, by the person or persons having
In any case, the view that an elective official may be appointed to This argument is apparently based on a wrong premise. Congress
authority therefor, to fill an office or public function and discharge
another post if allowed by law or by the primary functions of his did not contemplate making the subject SBMA posts as ex
the duties of the same. 18 In his treatise, Philippine Political
office, ignores the clear-cut difference in the wording of the two officio or automatically attached to the Office of the Mayor of
Law, 19 Senior Associate Justice Isagani A. Cruz defines
(2) paragraphs of Sec. 7, Art. Olongapo City without need of appointment. The phrase "shall be
appointment as "the selection, by the authority vested with the
IX-B, of the Constitution. While the second paragraph authorizes appointed" unquestionably shows the intent to make the SBMA
power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given
holding of multiple offices by an appointiveofficial when allowed posts appointive and not merely adjunct to the post of Mayor of
office."
by law or by the primary functions of his position, the first Olongapo City. Had it been the legislative intent to make the
paragraph appears to be more stringent by not providing any subject positions ex officio, Congress would have, at least, avoided
exception to the rule against appointment or designation of the word "appointed" and, instead, "ex officio" would have been Considering that appointment calls for a selection, the appointing
an elective official to the government post, except as are used. 14 power necessarily exercises a discretion. According to Woodbury,
particularly recognized in the Constitution itself, e.g., the J., 20 "the choice of a person to fill an office constitutes the
President as head of the economic and planning agency; 9 the essence of his appointment," 21 and Mr. Justice Malcolm adds
Even in the Senate deliberations, the Senators were fully aware
Vice-President, who may be appointed Member of the that an "[a]ppointment to office is intrinsically an executive act
that subject proviso may contravene Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B,
Cabinet; 10 and, a member of Congress who may be involving the exercise of discretion." 22 In Pamantasan ng
but they nevertheless passed the bill and decided to have the
designated ex officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council. 11 Lungsod ng Maynila v. Intermediate Appellate Court 23 we held:
controversy resolved by the courts. Indeed, the Senators would
not have been concerned with the effects of Sec. 7, first par., had
The distinction between the first and second paragraphs of Sec. 7, they considered the SBMA posts as ex officio. The power to appoint is, in essence,
Art. IX-B, was not accidental when drawn, and not without discretionary. The appointing power has the
reason. It was purposely sought by the drafters of the right of choice which he may exercise freely
Cognizant of the complication that may arise from the way the
Constitution as shown in their deliberation, thus according to his judgment, deciding for
subject proviso was stated, Senator Rene Saguisag remarked that
himself who is best qualified among those
"if the Conference Committee just said "the Mayor shall be the
who have the necessary qualifications and
MR. MONSOD. In other words, what then Chairman" then that should foreclose the issue. It is a legislative
eligibilities. It is a prerogative of the
Commissioner is saying, Mr. Presiding choice." 15 The Senator took a view that the constitutional
appointing power . . . .
Officer, is that the prohibition is more strict proscription against appointment of elective officials may have
with respect to elective officials, because in been sidestepped if Congress attached the SBMA posts to the
the case of appointive officials, there may Mayor of Olongapo City instead of directing the President to Indeed, the power of choice is the heart of the power to appoint.
be a law that will allow them to hold other appoint him to the post. Without passing upon this view of Appointment involves an exercise of discretion of whom to
positions. Senator Saguisag, it suffices to state that Congress intended the appoint; it is not a ministerial act of issuing appointment papers
posts to be appointive, thus nibbling in the bud the argument that to the appointee. In other words, the choice of the appointee is a
they are ex officio. fundamental component of the appointing power.
MR. FOZ. Yes, I suggest we make that
difference, because in the case of
appointive officials, there will be certain The analogy with the position of Chairman of the Metro Manila Hence, when Congress clothes the President with the power to
situations where the law should allow them Authority made by respondents cannot be applied to uphold the appoint an officer, it (Congress) cannot at the same time limit the
to hold some other positions. 12 constitutionality of the challenged proviso since it is not put in choice of the President to only one candidate. Once the power of
issue in the present case. In the same vein, the argument that if appointment is conferred on the President, such conferment
no elective official may be appointed or designated to another necessarily carries the discretion of whom to appoint. Even on the
The distinction being clear, the exemption allowed to appointive
post then Sec. 8, Art. IX-B, of the Constitution allowing him to pretext of prescribing the qualifications of the officer, Congress
officials in the second paragraph cannot be extended to elective
receive double compensation 16 would be useless, is non may not abuse such power as to divest the appointing authority,
officials who are governed by the first paragraph.
sequitur since Sec. 8 does not affect the constitutionality of the directly or indirectly, of his discretion to pick his own choice.
subject proviso. In any case, the Vice-President for example, an Consequently, when the qualifications prescribed by Congress can
It is further argued that the SBMA posts are merely ex officio to elective official who may be appointed to a cabinet post under only be met by one individual, such enactment effectively
the position of Mayor of Olongapo City, hence, an excepted Sec. 3, Art. VII, may receive the compensation attached to the eliminates the discretion of the appointing power to choose and
circumstance, citing Civil Liberties Union v. Executive cabinet position if specifically authorized by law. constitutes an irregular restriction on the power of
Secretary, 13 where we stated that the prohibition against the appointment. 24
holding of any other office or employment by the President, Vice-
Petitioners also assail the legislative encroachment on the
President, Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or
appointing authority of the President. Section 13, par. (d), itself In the case at bar, while Congress willed that the subject posts be
assistants during their tenure, as provided in Sec. 13, Art. VII, of
vests in the President the power to appoint the Chairman of the filled with a presidential appointee for the first year of its
the Constitution, does not comprehend additional duties and
Board and the Chief Executive Officer of SBMA, although he really operations from the effectivity of R.A. 7227,
functions required by the primary functions of the officials
has no choice under the law but to appoint the Mayor of the proviso nevertheless limits the appointing authority to only
concerned, who are to perform them in an ex officio capacity as
Olongapo City. one eligible, i.e., the incumbent Mayor of Olongapo City. Since
only one can qualify for the posts in question, the President is Sec. 13, Art. VI, of the Constitution where "(n)o Senator or The illegality of his appointment to the SBMA posts being now
precluded from exercising his discretion to choose whom to Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other evident, other matters affecting the legality of the
appoint. Such supposed power of appointment, sans the essential office or employment in the Government . . . during his term questioned proviso as well as the appointment of said respondent
element of choice, is no power at all and goes against the very without forfeiting his seat . . . ." The difference between the two made pursuant thereto need no longer be discussed.
nature itself of appointment. provisions is significant in the sense that incumbent national
legislators lose their elective posts only after they have been
In thus concluding as we do, we can only share the lament of Sen.
appointed to another government office, while other incumbent
While it may be viewed that the proviso merely sets the Sotero Laurel which he expressed in the floor deliberations of S.B.
elective officials must first resign their posts before they can be
qualifications of the officer during the first year of operations of 1648, precursor of R.A. 7227, when he articulated
appointed, thus running the risk of losing the elective post as well
SBMA, i.e., he must be the Mayor of Olongapo City, it is manifestly
as not being appointed to the other post. It is therefore clear that
an abuse of congressional authority to prescribe qualifications
ineligibility is not directly related with forfeiture of office. ". . . . . . . . (much) as we would like to have the
where only one, and no other, can qualify. Accordingly, while the
The effect is quite different where it is expressly provided by law present Mayor of Olongapo City as the
conferment of the appointing power on the President is a
that a person holding one office shall be ineligible to another. Chief Executive of this Authority that we are
perfectly valid legislative act, the proviso limiting his choice to one
Such a provision is held to incapacitate the incumbent of an office creating; (much) as I, myself, would like to
is certainly an encroachment on his prerogative.
from accepting or holding a second office (State ex rel. Van because I know the capacity, integrity,
Antwerp v Hogan, 283 Ala. 445, 218 So 2d 258; McWilliams v industry and dedication of Mayor Gordon;
Since the ineligibility of an elective official for appointment Neal, 130 Ga 733, 61 SE 721) and to render his election or (much) as we would like to give him this
remains all throughout his tenure or during his incumbency, he appointment to the latter office void (State ex rel. Childs v Sutton, terrific, burdensome and heavy
may however resign first from his elective post to cast off the 63 Minn 147, 65 NW 262. Annotation: 40 ALR 945) or voidable responsibility, we cannot do it because of
constitutionally-attached disqualification before he may be (Baskin v State, 107 Okla 272, 232 p 388, 40 ALR 941)." 26 "Where the constitutional prohibition which is very
considered fit for appointment. The deliberation in the the constitution, or statutes declare that persons holding one clear. It says: "No elective official shall be
Constitutional Commission is enlightening: office shall be ineligible for election or appointment to another appointed or designated to another
office, either generally or of a certain kind, the prohibition has position in any capacity." 29
MR. DAVIDE. On Section 4, page 3, line 8, I propose the been held to incapacitate the incumbent of the first office to hold
substitution of the word "term" with TENURE. the second so that any attempt to hold the second is void (Ala. For, indeed, "a Constitution must be firm and immovable, like a
State ex rel. Van Antwerp v. Hogan, 218 So 2d 258, 283 Ala mountain amidst the strife of storms or a rock in the ocean amidst
445)." 27 the raging of the waves." 30 One of the characteristics of the
MR. FOZ. The effect of the proposed amendment is to
Constitution is permanence, i.e., "its capacity to resist capricious
make possible for one to resign from his position.
As incumbent elective official, respondent Gordon is ineligible for or whimsical change dictated not by legitimate needs but only by
appointment to the position of Chairman of the Board and Chief passing fancies, temporary passions or occasional infatuations of
MR. DAVIDE. Yes, we should allow that prerogative. Executive of SBMA; hence, his appointment thereto pursuant to a the people with ideas or personalities . . . . Such a Constitution is
legislative act that contravenes the Constitution cannot be not likely to be easily tampered with to suit political expediency,
MR. FOZ. Resign from his position to accept an sustained. He however remains Mayor of Olongapo City, and his personal ambitions or ill-advised agitation for change." 31
executive position. acts as SBMA official are not necessarily null and void; he may be
considered a de facto officer, "one whose acts, though not those Ergo, under the Constitution, Mayor Gordon has a choice. We
of a lawful officer, the law, upon principles of policy and justice, have no choice.
MR. DAVIDE. Besides, it may turn out in a given case will hold valid so far as they involve the interest of the public and
that because of, say, incapacity, he may leave the third persons, where the duties of the office were exercised . . . .
service, but if he is prohibited from being appointed under color of a known election or appointment, void because the WHEREFORE, the proviso in par. (d), Sec. 13, of R.A. 7227, which
within the term for which he was elected, we may be officer was not eligible, or because there was a want of power in states: ". . . Provided, however, That for the first year of its
depriving the government of the needed expertise of an the electing or appointing body, or by reason of some defect or operations from the effectivity of this Act, the Mayor of the City of
individual. 25 irregularity in its exercise, such ineligibility, want of power or Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman and chief executive
defect being unknown to the public . . . . [or] under color of an officer of the Subic Authority," is declared unconstitutional;
Consequently, as long as he is an incumbent, an elective official election, or appointment, by or pursuant to a public consequently, the appointment pursuant thereto of the Mayor of
remains ineligible for appointment to another public office. unconstitutional law, before the same is adjudged to be Olongapo City, respondent Richard J. Gordon, is INVALID, hence
such (State vs. Carroll, 38 Conn., 499; Wilcox vs. Smith, 5 Wendell NULL and VOID.
[N.Y.], 231; 21 Am. Dec., 213; Sheehan's Case, 122 Mass, 445, 23
Where, as in the case of respondent Gordon, an incumbent
Am. Rep., 323)." 28 However, all per diems, allowances and other emoluments
elective official was, notwithstanding his ineligibility, appointed to
other government posts, he does not automatically forfeit his received by respondent Gordon, if any, as such Chairman and
elective office nor remove his ineligibility imposed by the Conformably with our ruling in Civil Liberties Union, any and Chief Executive Officer may be retained by him, and all acts
Constitution. On the contrary, since an incumbent elective official all per diems, allowances and other emoluments which may have otherwise legitimate done by him in the exercise of his authority
is not eligible to the appointive position, his appointment or been received by respondent Gordon pursuant to his as officer de facto of SBMA are hereby UPHELD.
designation thereto cannot be valid in view of his disqualification appointment may be retained by him.
or lack of eligibility. This provision should not be confused with SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 122197. June 26, 1998] Governor General or the officer having the power to fill-up a reason of services rendered in favor of the Province of
ZOSIMO M. DIMAANDAL, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON temporary absence or disability in the provincial office has the Batangas. He then posits the view that to disallow his
AUDIT, respondent. power to order or authorize payment of compensation to any compensation and in the process allow the Province of Batangas
DECISION government officer or employee designated or appointed to keep and enjoy the benefits derived from his services actually
MARTINEZ, J.: temporarily to fill the place; rendered would be tantamount to deprivation of property
without due process of law, and impairment of obligation of
contracts duly enshrined in the Constitution.
This petition for certiorari seeks the reversal of the decision 2. That the budget containing an appropriation for the position of
of the Commission on Audit dated September 7, 1995,[1] the Assistant Provincial Treasurer for Administration was already On the other hand, the respondent Commission, through
dispositive portion of which reads, to wit: approved by the Provincial Board; and the Office of the Solicitor General, maintains that the decisions
cited by petitioner do not find application in petitioners case. In
Foregoing premises considered, the instant appeal cannot be
3. That Mr. Dimaandal at the time of his designation as Acting the case of Menzon, what was extended was an appointment to
given due course. Accordingly, the disallowance in question in the
Provincial Treasurer for Administration was no longer performing the vacant position of Vice-Governor. Here, what was extended to
total amount of P52,908.00 is hereby affirmed. Considering that
the duties and functions of Supply Officer III." petitioner was not an appointment but a mere designation. Thus,
the claim for the RATA differential in the amount of P8,400.00 is
the nature of petitioners designation and in the absence of
devoid of any legal basis, the same is also disallowed. Hence,
authority of the Governor to authorize the payment of the
appellant Zosimo M. Dimaandal is hereby directed to refund the The Provincial Auditor, however, denied the request for
additional salary and RATA without the appropriate resolution
salary and RATA differential in the amount of P61,308.00 he had reconsideration. Appellant was required to refund the amount
from the Sangguniang Panlalawigan does not make the ruling on
received from the Provincial Government of Batangas.[2] of P52,908.00 which was disallowed.
de facto officers applicable in this case.
Petitioner appealed to the respondent Commission on
The undisputed facts: We find the petition to be without merit.
Audit which sustained the stand of the Provincial Auditor of
On November 23, 1992, petitioner Zosimo M. Dimaandal, Batangas as valid and proper. The respondent Commission was of We are not persuaded by petitioners insistence that he
then holding the position of Supply Officer III, was designated the view that the petitioner was merely designated as an could still claim the salary and RATA differential because he
Acting Assistant Provincial Treasurer for Administration by then Assistant Provincial Treasurer for Administration in addition to his actually performed the functions pertaining to the office of Acting
Governor Vicente A. Mayo of Batangas. Pursuant to the regular duties. As such, he is not entitled to receive an additional Assistant Provincial Treasurer and, therefore, entitled to the
designation, petitioner filed a claim for the difference in salary salary. The Commission further opined that petitioner was salary and benefits attached to it despite the fact that the
and Representation and Transportation Allowance (RATA) of likewise not entitled to receive the difference in RATA provided Governor of Batangas had no authority to designate him to the
Assistant Provincial Treasurer and Supply Officer III for the whole for under the Local Budget Circular issued by the Department of said position.
year of 1993 in the total amount of P61,308.00. Budget and Management considering that the party designating
him to such position is not the duly competent authority, The law applicable is Section 471(a) of RA 7160 otherwise
However, the Provincial Auditor disallowed in provided for under Section 471 of the Local Government Code. known as the Local Government Code which mandates that:
audit P52,908.00 of the claim. What was allowed was only the Notably, petitioner was appointed as Assistant Provincial
Treasurer for Administration by the Secretary of Finance only on Sec. 471. Assistant Treasurers. - (a) An assistant treasurer may be
amount of P8,400.00 which corresponds to the difference in the
July 8, 1994. appointed by the Secretary of Finance from a list of at least three
allowances attached to the designation and the position occupied
(3) ranking eligible recommendees of the governor or mayor,
by the appellant. The disallowance was premised on the following
Thus, the respondent Commission not only affirmed the subject to civil service law, rules and regulations.
reasons:
disallowance of the amount of P52,908.00 but likewise disallowed
1. The provisions of Section 2077 of the Revised Administrative the claim for the RATA differential in the amount ofP8,400.00, for xxxxxxxxx
Code is not applicable in the instant case as the power to fill the being devoid of any legal basis. Petitioner was, therefore, directed
position of Assistant Provincial Treasurer rests on the Secretary of to refund the salary and RATA differential in the amount In fact, the appointing officer is authorized by law to order
Finance. of P61,308.00. the payment of compensation to any government officer or
employee designated or appointed to fill such vacant position, as
Hence, this petition. provided under Section 2077 of the Revised Administrative Code
2. The designation is temporary in nature and does not amount to
The issue here is whether or not an employee who is which states that:
the issuance of an appointment as could entitle the designee to
receive the salary of the position to which he is designated designated in an acting capacity is entitled to the difference in "Section 2077. Compensation for person appointed to temporary
(Opinion of the Director, Office for Legal Affairs, Civil Service salary between his regular position and the higher position to service.
Commission dated January 25, 1994). which he is designated.
(b) In addition thereto, the city mayor may appoint a city Absent any contrary statutory provision, the power to
architect, a city information officer, a city agriculturist, a city appoint carries with it the power to remove or to
population officer, a city environment and natural resources discipline.[16] Since respondent was appointed by the regional
officer, and a city cooperatives officer. director of DECS, she may be disciplined or removed by the latter
pursuant to law.
x x x x x x x x x.[14] Finally, respondents primary duty is to conduct
investigations of cases involving teaching and nonteaching
Moreover, petitioners failed to show a specific provision in
personnel of the Division of City Schools of Manila. The report on
the LGC showing that the power to discipline officials in the
the results of her investigations is then submitted for final
Division of City Schools has been devolved from the regional
evaluation to the DECS regional director, who may approve,
director of the DECS to the city mayor. All that Section 17 (4) of
disapprove or allow respondent to modify it. This fact clearly
the Local Government Code states is that the city must provide
shows that supervision over respondent is lodged with the
support for education and other such services and facilities.
regional director, not the mayor.
Likewise, Section 455 (b-1-x) of the Local Government
All in all, petitioners have not convinced us that the Court
Code, which provides that the city mayor may cause to be
of Appeals committed any reversible error.
instituted administrative or judicial proceedings against any
official or employee of the city, is not necessarily incompatible WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED and the
with the provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987 assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
authorizing the regional director to discipline national education
employees. Nothing prohibits the mayor from filing complaints SO ORDERED.
against respondent before the DECS.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
GR 160791 rendered its Decision dismissing the petition, sustaining the CSCs
SALES, petitioner vs CARREON, respondent 2. Memorandum Orders Nos. 1 finding that the positions to which the petitioners were appointed
DECISION and 2, Series of 2001, issued were already reported and published even before they had been
by Mayor Rodolfo H. Carreon, declared vacant, in violation of Sections 2 and 3 of Republic Act
Jr., are hereby declared NULL (R.A.) No. 7041;[2] and that there was no first level representative
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: and VOID, and accordingly, to the Personnel Section Board who should have participated in
the screening of candidates for vacancy in the first level.
3. The LGU-Dapitan is hereby
For our resolution is the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari directed to pay the salaries Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but this was denied
assailing the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated September and other emoluments to by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated November 17,
16, 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 75515. which the 83 appointments 2003.
are entitled to pursuant to the
During the May 2001 elections, then Mayor Joseph Cedrick O. appointments issued to them. Hence, the instant petition.
Ruiz of Dapitan City, running for re-election, was defeated by
respondent Rodolfo H. Carreon, Jr. On appeal by respondent, the CSC En Banc, on June 17, 2002, This case is a typical example of the practice of outgoing local
issued Resolution No. 020828 reversing the assailed Omnibus chief executives to issue midnight appointments, especially after
On June 1, 18 and 27, 2001, his last month in office, then Dapitan Order of the CSC Regional Office No. IX, thus: their successors have been proclaimed. It does not only cause
City Mayor Ruiz issued 83 appointments, including those of herein animosities between the outgoing and the incoming officials, but
petitioners. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the also affects efficiency in local governance. Those appointed tend
Omnibus Order dated August 17, 2001of the to devote their time and energy in defending their appointments
On July 1, 2001, the newly elected Mayor, Rodolfo H. Carreon, Jr., Civil Service Commission Regional Office No. instead of attending to their functions. However, not
herein respondent, assumed office. IX is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The all midnight appointments are invalid.[3] Each appointment must
Commission hereby rules, as follows: be judged on the basis of the nature, character, and merits of the
On July 2, 2001, respondent issued Memorandum Orders Nos. 1 individual appointment and the circumstances surrounding the
and 2 revoking the 83 appointments signed by his predecessor on 1. The approval of all 83 same.[4] It is only when the appointments were made en
the ground that the latter violated Civil Service Commission (CSC) appointments issued by then masse by the outgoing administration and shown to have been
Resolution No. 01-988 in relation to CSC Memorandum Circular Mayor J. Cedrick O. Ruiz is made through hurried maneuvers and under circumstances
No. 7, Series of 2001, imposing a ban on issuing appointments in revoked for being violative of departing from good faith, morality, and propriety that this Court
the civil service during the election period. Thereupon, Republic Act No. 7041, CSC has struck down midnight appointments.[5]
respondent prohibited the release of the salaries and benefits of Memorandum Circular No. 18
the 83 appointees. s. 1988, as amended, CSC It is State policy that opportunities for government employment
Resolution No. 963332 on its shall be open to all qualified citizens and employees shall be
On July 10, 2001, Patricio Sales, one of herein petitioners, in his accreditation and CSC selected on the basis of fitness to perform the duties and assume
capacity as president of the Dapitan City Government Employees Resolution No. 01-0988. the responsibilities of the positions.[6] It was precisely in order to
Association, wrote the CSC Regional Office No. IX requesting its ensure transparency and equal opportunity in the recruitment
ruling on the matter. 2. All promoted employees are and hiring of government personnel, that Republic Act No. 7041
reverted to their previous was enacted. Section 2 provides:
On July 16 and August 3, 2001, respondent sent the said Office a position; and
position paper justifying his action, contending that the SEC. 2. Duty of Personnel Officers. It shall
questioned appointments were not only issued in bulk but that 3. Memorandum Order No. 1 and be the duty of all Chief Personnel or
there was no urgent need to fill those positions. Memorandum Order No. 2 Administrative Officers of all branches,
issued by incumbent Mayor subdivisions, instrumentalities and
On August 17, 2001, the CSC Regional Office No. IX issued an Rodolfo H. Carreon, Jr. are agencies of the Government, including
Omnibus Order, the dispositive portion of which reads: hereby declared null and void. government-owned or controlled
WHEREFORE, all premises considered: corporations with original charters, and
1. The eighty-three (83) The CSC En Banc held that the positions in question were local government units, to post in three
appointments issued by then published and declared vacant prior to the existence of any (3) conspicuous places of their offices for a
Mayor Joseph Cedrick O. Ruiz, vacancy. period ten (10) days a complete list of all
including those issued by the existing vacant positions in their
herein requesting parties, are, Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it respective offices which are authorized to
therefore not considered mass was denied in Resolution No. 030049 dated January 16, 2003 by be filled, and to transmit a copy of such
appointments, as defined the CSC En Banc. list and the corresponding qualification
under CSC Resolution No. 01- standards to the Civil Service Commission
0988 and are thus, VALID and On February 13, 2003, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals not later than the tenth day of every
EFFECTIVE. a petition for review. On September 16, 2003, the appellate court month. Vacant positions shall not be
filled until after publication: Provided, applicants to the 43 first-level positions. Petitioners contend,
however, that vacant and unfilled Here, the publication of vacancies was made even before the however, that although there was no such representative, the
positions that are: positions involved actually became vacant. Clearly, respondents action of the Board is still valid.
action violated Section 2 of R.A. No. 7041 cited earlier.
a) primarily confidential; Petitioners contention lacks merit.
b) policy-determining; Moreover, the CSC found that there was no first-level
c) highly technical; representative appointed to the Personnel Selection Board, which Section 20, Rule VI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing
d) co-terminous with that of the deliberated on the appointments to first-level positions. Book V-A of the Administrative Code of 1987 (also known as the
appointing authority; or Civil Service Law), provides:
e) limited to the duration of a CSC Memorandum Circular No. 18, series of 1988, as amended,
particular project, provides that the Personnel Selection Board shall be composed of SEC. 20. Notwithstanding the initial
the following: approval of an appointment, the same
shall be excluded from the list required by may be recalled on any of the following
law. a. Official of department/agency grounds:
directly responsible for
SEC. 3. Publication of Vacancies. The personnel management; a) non-compliance with the
Chairman and members of the Civil procedures/criteria provided in
Service Commission shall publish once b. Representative of the agencys Merit Promotion
every quarter a complete list of all the management; Plan;
existing vacant positions in the
Government throughout the country, c. Representative of b) failure to pass through the
including the qualification standards organizational unit which may agencys Selection/Promotion
required for each position and, thereafter, be an office, department, or Board;
certify under oath to the completion of division where the vacancy is;
publication. Copies of such publication c) violation of the existing
shall be sold at cost to the public and d. Representative of rank-and- collective bargaining
distributed free of charge to the various file employees, one (1) for the agreement between
personnel office of the government where first-level and one (1) for the management and employees
they shall be available for inspection by second-level, who shall both relative to promotion; or
the public:Provided, That said publication be chosen by duly
shall be posted by the Chief Personnel or registered/accredited d) violation of other existing civil
Administrative Officer of all local employees association in the service laws, rules and
government units in at least three (3) department or agency. The regulations.
public and conspicuous places in their former shall sit during the
respective municipalities and screening of candidates for Verily, in deliberating and recommending to former Mayor Ruiz
provinces: Provided, further, That any vacancy in the first-level, the appointments of herein petitioners to the vacant
vacant position published therein shall be while the latter shall positions sans the required representation, the Board violated the
open to any qualified person who does participate in the screening of above CSC Rules. Hence, the appointments he issued are not
not necessarily belong to the same office candidates for vacancy in the valid. They may be recalled. In Mathay, Jr. v. Civil Service
with the vacancy or who occupies a second level. In case where Commission,[7] this Court upheld the authority of the CSC to take
position next-in-rank to the there is no employees appropriate action on all appointments, including its authority to
vacancy: Provided, finally, That the Civil association in the department recall appointments made in disregard of the applicable
Service Commission shall not act on any or agency, the representative provisions of Civil Service Law and regulations.
appointment to fill up a vacant position shall be chosen at large by the
unless the same has been reported to employees through a general In sum, for being in violation of Section 2, R.A. No. 7041, CSC
and published by the Commission. election to be called for the Memorandum Circular No. 18, as amended, and Section 20, Rule
purpose. VI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V-A of the
Administrative Code of 1987, the appointments of the above-
The foregoing provisions are clear and need no named petitioners are declared void.
interpretation. The CSC is required to publish the lists of vacant Petitioners admitted that after the retirement on April 22, 2000 of
positions and such publication shall be posted by the chief Beltran Faconete, the first-level representative to the Personnel WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the
personnel or administrative officer of all local government units in Selection Board, no other first-level representative to replace him assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
the designated places. The vacant positions may only be filled by was chosen by the Dapitan City Government Employees 755151.SO ORDERED.
the appointing authority after they have been reported to the CSC Association. Yet, the city government Personnel Selection Board ATTY. VICENTE E. SALUMBIDES, JR., and GLENDA ARAA,
as vacant and only after publication. proceeded to deliberate and recommend the appointments of Petitioners,- versus -
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, RICARDO AGON, RAMON Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and violation of the
VILLASANTA, ELMER DIZON,SALVADOR ADUL, and AGNES The mayor was to admit later his expectation or Commission on Audit (COA) Rules and the Local Government
FABIAN, assumption of risk on reimbursement: Code.
Respondents,
x x x It was my thinking that even By Order of June 14, 2002, the Office of the Ombudsman, denied
DECISION if a bidder emerges and gets these 2 projects the prayer to place petitioners et al. under preventive suspension
which were at the time on-going (although it pending investigation. By Order datedFebruary 1, 2005, approved
CARPIO MORALES, J.: was also my thinking then that no bidder on April 11, 2005, it denied the motion for reconsideration
would possibly bid for these 2 projects as but dropped the mayor and Coleta, both elective officials, as
Petitioners Vicente Salumbides, Jr. (Salumbides) and Glenda Araa these were cost-estimated very low- respondents in the administrative case, the 2004 elections having
(Glenda) challenge the October 11, 2007 Decision and the P150,000 for the 2-room school building mooted the case. The parties were thereupon directed to submit
December 13, 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals[1] in CA- P72,000 for the fencing) he (bidder) would their respective verified position papers to which petitioners,
G.R. SP No. 96889 affirming the Office of the Ombudsmans be reasonable enough to reimburse what I Jason and Aquino complied by submitting a consolidated position
decision finding them guilty of Simple Neglect of Duty. had so far spen[t] for the project. I said I paper on May 19, 2005.
because up to the time of the failed 2
Salumbides and Glenda were appointed in July 2001 as biddings I have shouldered the vale of the Meanwhile, in response to the subpoena duces tecum issued by
Municipal Legal Officer/Administrator and Municipal Budget laborers and I requisitioned some materials the Office of the Ombudsman on February 18, 2005 requiring the
Officer, respectively, of Tagkawayan, Quezon. on credit on my own personal account, and regional officer of the COA to submit the post-audit report on the
not a single centavo was at the time projects, Celerino Alviar, COA State Auditor II claimed by Affidavit
Towards the end of 2001, Mayor Vicente Salumbides III disbursed by our municipal treasury until all of May 23, 2005 that the required documents were among those
(the mayor) saw the urgent need to construct a two-classroom requirements for negotiated purchase of the razed by fire on April 14, 2004 that hit the Office of the Municipal
building with fence (the projects) for the Tagkawayan Municipal materials for the project had been Accountant where they were temporarily stored due to lack of
High School[2] (TMHS) since the public school in the poblacion accomplished. As a matter of fact, payments space at the Provincial Auditors Office.
area would no longer admit high school freshmen starting school for the expenses on these 2 projects have
year 2002-2003. On how to solve the classroom shortage, the been made only starting 19 March 2002. x x On October 17, 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman approved the
mayor consulted Salumbides who suggested that the construction x[4] (underscoring supplied) September 9, 2005 Memorandum absolving Jason and Aquino,
of the two-classroom building be charged to the account of the and finding petitioners guilty of Simple Neglect of Duty, for which
Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses/ Repair and The construction of the projects commenced without they were meted the penalty of suspension from office for a
Maintenance of Facilities (MOOE/RMF) and implemented by any approved appropriation and ahead of the public maximum period of six months with a stern warning against a
administration, as had been done in a previous classroom building bidding. Salumbides was of the opinion that the projects were similar repetition. It also approved on November 2,
project of the former mayor. regular and legal, based on an earlier project that was 2006 the March 27, 2006 Order[7] denying the motion for
implemented in the same manner, using the same source of fund reconsideration.
Upon consultation, Glenda advised Salumbides in and for the same reason of urgency which was allowed because
December 2001, that there were no more available funds that the building was considered merely temporary as the TMHS is set Their recourse to the appellate court having failed,
could be taken from the MOOE/RMF, but the savings of the to be transferred to an 8-hectare lot which the municipal petitioners come before this Court via Rule 45 of the Rules of
municipal government were adequate to fund the projects. She government is presently negotiating to buy.[5] Court.
added, however, that the approval by the Sangguniang Bayan of a For non-compliance with the rule on certification
proposed supplemental budget must be secured. Meanwhile, Aquino suggested to the Sangguniang against forum shopping, the petition merits outright
Bayan the adoption of model guidelines in the implementation of dismissal. The verification portion of the petition does not carry a
The members of the Sangguniang Bayan having infrastructure projects to be executed by administration, while certification against forum shopping.[8]
already gone on recess for the Christmas holidays, Glenda and Councilor Coleta Sandro (Coleta) sponsored a Resolution to ratify
Salumbides advised the mayor to source the funds from the projects and to authorize the mayor to enter into a negotiated The Court has distinguished the effects of non-compliance with
theP1,000,000 MOOE/RMF allocation in the approved Municipal procurement. Both actions did not merit the approval of the requirement of verification and that of certification against
Annual Budget for 2002.[3] the Sangguniang Bayan. forum shopping. A defective verification shall be treated as an
unsigned pleading and thus produces no legal effect, subject to
The mayor thus ordered on January 8, 2002 Municipal On May 13, 2002, herein respondents Ricardo Agon, the discretion of the court to allow the deficiency to be remedied,
Engineer Jose Aquino (Aquino) to proceed with the construction Ramon Villasanta, Elmer Dizon, Salvador Adul and Agnes while the failure to certify against forum shopping shall be cause
of the projects based on the program of work and bill of materials Fabian, all members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tagkawayan, for dismissal without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, and is
he (Aquino) prepared with a total cost estimate of P222,000. filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a complaint[6] against not curable by amendment of the initiatory pleading.[9]
Salumbides and Glenda (hereafter petitioners), the mayor, Coleta,
Upon advice of Municipal Planning and Development Jason and Aquino. Petitioners disregard of the rules was not the
Officer Hernan Jason (Jason), the mayor included the projects in first. Their motion for extension of time to file petition was
the list of local government projects scheduled for bidding The administrative aspect of the case, docketed as previously denied by Resolution of January 15, 2008[10] for non-
on January 25, 2002 which, together with the January 31, Case No. OMB-L-A-02-0276-E, charged petitioners et al. with compliance with the required showing of competent proof of
2002 public bidding, failed. Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Gross Neglect of Duty, Conduct identity in the Affidavit of Service. The Court, by Resolution
of March 4, 2008,[11] later granted their motion for moot, the therein petitioner having been duly reelected, is no university president.[31] (emphasis and
reconsideration with motion to admit appeal (Motion with longer amenable to administrative sanctions.[21] underscoring supplied)
Appeal) that was filed on February 18, 2008 or the last day of Contrary to petitioners asseveration, the non-application of the
filing within the extended period. Ingco v. Sanchez, et al.[22] clarified that the condonation doctrine to appointive officials does not violate the
condonation doctrine does not apply to right to equal protection of the law.
Moreover, in their Manifestation/Motion[12] filed a day later, a criminal case.[23] Luciano v. The Provincial Governor, et
petitioners prayed only for the admission of nine additional copies al.,[24] Olivarez v. Judge Villaluz,[25] and Aguinaldo v. In the recent case of Quinto v. Commission on Elections,[32] the
of the Motion with Appeal due to honest inadvertence in earlier Santos[26] echoed the qualified rule that reelection of a public Court applied the four-fold test in an equal protection
filing an insufficient number of copies. Petitioners were less than official does not bar prosecution for crimes committed by him challenge[33] against the resign-to-run provision, wherein it
candid when they surreptitiously submitted a Motion with Appeal prior thereto. discussed the material and substantive distinctions between
which is different from the first set they had submitted. The elective and appointive officials that could well apply to the
second set of Appeal includes specific Assignment of Consistently, the Court has reiterated the doctrine in a doctrine of condonation:
Errors[13] and already contains a certification against forum string of recent jurisprudence including two cases involving a
shopping[14] embedded in the Verification. The two different Senator and a Member of the House of Representatives.[27] The equal protection of the law clause is
Verifications were notarized by the same notary public and bear against undue favor and individual or class
the same date and document number.[15] The rectified Salalima v. Guingona, Jr.[28] and Mayor Garcia v. Hon. privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or
verification with certification, however, was filed beyond the Mojica[29] reinforced the doctrine. The condonation rule was the oppression of inequality. It is not
reglementary period. applied even if the administrative complaint was not filed before intended to prohibit legislation which is
the reelection of the public official, and even if the alleged limited either in the object to which it is
Its lapses aside, the petition just the same merits denial. misconduct occurred four days before the elections, directed or by territory within which it is to
respectively. Salalima did not distinguish as to the date of filing of operate. It does not demand absolute
Petitioners urge this Court to expand the settled doctrine of the administrative complaint, as long as the alleged misconduct equality among residents; it merely requires
condonation[16] to cover coterminous appointive officials who was committed during the prior term, the precise timing or period that all persons shall be treated alike, under
were administratively charged along with the reelected of which Garcia did not further distinguish, as long as the like circumstances and conditions both as to
official/appointing authority with infractions allegedly committed wrongdoing that gave rise to the public officials culpability was privileges conferred and liabilities
during their preceding term. committed prior to the date of reelection. enforced. The equal protection clause is not
infringed by legislation which applies only to
The Court rejects petitioners thesis. Petitioners theory is not novel. those persons falling within a specified class,
if it applies alike to all persons within such
More than 60 years ago, the Court in Pascual v. Hon. Provincial A parallel question was involved in Civil Service Commission v. class, and reasonable grounds exist for
Board of Nueva Ecija[17] issued the landmark ruling that prohibits Sojor[30] where the Court found no basis to broaden the scope of making a distinction between those who fall
the disciplining of an elective official for a wrongful act committed the doctrine of condonation: within such class and those who do not.
during his immediately preceding term of office. The Court
explained that [t]he underlying theory is that each term is Lastly, We do not agree with Substantial distinctions clearly exist
separate from other terms, and that the reelection to office respondents contention that his between elective officials and appointive
operates as a condonation of the officers previous misconduct to appointment to the position of president of officials. The former occupy their office by
the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor.[18] NORSU, despite the pending administrative virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They
cases against him, served as a condonation are elected to an office for a definite term
The Court should never remove a public by the BOR of the alleged acts imputed to and may be removed therefrom only upon
officer for acts done prior to his present term him. The doctrine this Court laid down stringent conditions. On the other
of office. To do otherwise would be to in Salalima v. Guingona, Jr. and Aguinaldo v. hand, appointive officials hold their office by
deprive the people of their right to elect Santos are inapplicable to the present virtue of their designation thereto by an
their officers. When the people elect[e]d a circumstances. Respondents in the appointing authority. Some appointive
man to office, it must be assumed that they mentioned cases are elective officials, unlike officials hold their office in a permanent
did this with knowledge of his life and respondent here who is an appointed capacity and are entitled to security of
character, and that they disregarded or official. Indeed, election expresses the tenure while others serve at the pleasure of
forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had sovereign will of the people. Under the the appointing authority.
been guilty of any. It is not for the court, by principle of vox populi est suprema lex, the
reason of such faults or misconduct[,] to re-election of a public official may, indeed, xxxx
practically overrule the will of the supersede a pending administrative An election is the embodiment of the
people.[19] (underscoring supplied) case. The same cannot be said of a re- popular will, perhaps the purest expression
appointment to a non-career of the sovereign power of the people. It
Lizares v. Hechanova, et al.[20] replicated the position. There is no sovereign will of the involves the choice or selection of candidates
doctrine. The Court dismissed the petition in that case for being people to speak of when the BOR re- to public office by popular vote. Considering
appointed respondent Sojor to the post of that elected officials are put in office by their
constituents for a definite term, x x x stamping their imprimatur and giving their advice to their Public service requires integrity and discipline. For this reason,
complete deference is accorded to the will of superior. public servants must exhibit at all times the highest sense of
the electorate that they be served by such honesty and dedication to duty. By the very nature of their duties
officials until the end of the term for which The appellate court correctly ruled that as municipal legal officer, and responsibilities, public officers and employees must faithfully
they were elected. In contrast, there is no petitioner Salumbides failed to uphold the law and provide a adhere to hold sacred and render inviolate the constitutional
such expectation insofar as appointed sound legal assistance and support to the mayor in carrying out principle that a public office is a public trust; and must at all times
officials are concerned. (emphasis and the delivery of basic services and provisions of adequate facilities be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
underscoring supplied) when he advised [the mayor] to proceed with the construction of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.[44]
the subject projects without prior competitive bidding.[38] As
pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, to absolve WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution of
The electorates condonation of the previous administrative Salumbides is tantamount to allowing with impunity the giving of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 96889
infractions of the reelected official cannot be extended to that of erroneous or illegal advice, when by law he is precisely tasked to are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, in that petitioners, Vicente
the reappointed coterminous employees, the underlying basis of advise the mayor on matters related to upholding the rule of Salumbides, Jr. and Glenda Araa, are suspended from office for
the rule being to uphold the will of the people expressed through law.[39] Indeed, a legal officer who renders a legal opinion on a three (3) months without pay.
the ballot. In other words, there is neither subversion of the course of action without any legal basis becomes no different
sovereign will nor disenfranchisement of the electorate to speak from a lay person who may approve the same because it appears SO ORDERED.
of, in the case of reappointed coterminous employees. justified.
It is the will of the populace, not the whim of one person who As regards petitioner Glenda, the appellate court held that the
happens to be the appointing authority, that could extinguish an improper use of government funds upon the direction of the
administrative liability. Since petitioners hold appointive mayor and prior advice by the municipal legal officer did not
positions, they cannot claim the mandate of the electorate. The relieve her of liability for willingly cooperating rather than
people cannot be charged with the presumption of full knowledge registering her written objection[40] as municipal budget officer.
of the life and character of each and every probable appointee of
the elective official ahead of the latters actual reelection. Aside from the lack of competitive bidding, the appellate court,
pointing to the improper itemization of the expense, held that the
Moreover, the unwarranted expansion of the Pascual doctrine funding for the projects should have been taken from the capital
would set a dangerous precedent as it would, as respondents outlays that refer to the appropriations for the purchase of goods
posit, provide civil servants, particularly local government and services, the benefits of which extend beyond the fiscal year
employees, with blanket immunity from administrative liability and which add to the assets of the local government unit. It added
that would spawn and breed abuse in the bureaucracy. that current operating expenditures like MOOE/RMF refer to
appropriations for the purchase of goods and services for the
Asserting want of conspiracy, petitioners implore this Court to sift conduct of normal local government operations within the fiscal
through the evidence and re-assess the factual findings. This the year.[41]
Court cannot do, for being improper and immaterial.
In Office of the Ombudsman v. Tongson,[42] the Court reminded
Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be the therein respondents, who were guilty of simple neglect of
raised, since the Court is not a trier of facts.[34] As a rule, the duty, that government funds must be disbursed only upon
Court is not to review evidence on record and assess the compliance with the requirements provided by law and pertinent
probative weight thereof. In the present case, the appellate court rules.
affirmed the factual findings of the Office of the Ombudsman,
which rendered the factual questions beyond the province of the Simple neglect of duty is classified as a less grave offense
Court. punishable by suspension without pay for one month and one day
to six months. Finding no alleged or established circumstance to
Moreover, as correctly observed by respondents, the lack of warrant the imposition of the maximum penalty of six months,
conspiracy cannot be appreciated in favor of petitioners who the Court finds the imposition of suspension without pay for three
were found guilty of simple neglect of duty, for if they conspired months justified.
to act negligently, their infraction becomes intentional.[35] There
can hardly be conspiracy to commit negligence.[36] When a public officer takes an oath of office, he or she binds
Simple neglect of duty is defined as the failure to give proper himself or herself to faithfully perform the duties of the office and
attention to a task expected from an employee resulting from use reasonable skill and diligence, and to act primarily for the
either carelessness or indifference.[37] In the present case, benefit of the public. Thus, in the discharge of duties, a public
petitioners fell short of the reasonable diligence required of them, officer is to use that prudence, caution, and attention which
for failing to exercise due care and prudence in ascertaining the careful persons use in the management of their affairs.[43]
legal requirements and fiscal soundness of the projects before
G .R. No. 86564 August 1, 1989 Sec. 5. No petition for quo warranto shall be day after their publication in the Official
given due course without the payment of a Gazette or in at least (2) daily newspapers
filing fee in the amount of Three Hundred of general circulation in the Philippines.
RAMON L. LABO, JR., petitioner,
Pesos (P300.00) and the legal research fee
vs.
as required by law.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC) EN BANC AND LUIS The Court has considered the arguments of the parties and holds
L. LARDIZABAL, respondents that the petition for quo warranto was filed on time. We agree
and stresses that there is abundant jurisprudence holding that the with the respondents that the fee was paid during the ten-day
payment of the filing fee is essential to the timeliness of the filling period as extended by the pendency of the petition when it was
CRUZ, J.:
of the petition itself. He cites many rulings of the Court to this treated by the COMELEC as a pre-proclamation proceeding which
effect, specificallyManchester v. Court of Appeals. 1 did not require the payment of a filing fee. At that, we reach this
The petitioner asks this Court to restrain the Commission on conclusion only on the assumption that the requirement for the
Elections from looking into the question of his citizenship as a payment of the fees in quo warranto proceedings was already
For his part, the private respondent denies that the filing fee was
qualification for his office as Mayor of Baguio City. The allegation effective. There is no record that Res. No. 1450 was even
paid out of time. In fact he says, it was fliedahead of time. His
that he is a foreigner, he says, is not the issue. The issue is published; and as for Res. No. 1996, this took effect only on
point is that when he filed his "Petition for Quo Warranto with
whether or not the public respondent has jurisdiction to conduct March 3, 1988, seven days after its publication in the February 25,
Prayer for Immediate Annulment of Proclamation and Restraining
any inquiry into this matter, considering that the petition for quo 1988 issues of the Manila Chronicle and the Philippine Daily
Order or Injunction" on January 26, 1988, the COMELEC treated it
warranto against him was not filed on time. Inquirer, or after the petition was filed.
as a pre-proclamation controversy and docketed it as SPC Case
No. 88-288. No docket fee was collected although it was offered.
It is noteworthy that this argument is based on the alleged It was only on February 8, 1988, that the COMELEC decided to The petitioner forgets Ta;ada v. Tuvera 4 when he argues that
tardiness not of the petition itself but of the payment of the filing treat his petition as solely for quo warranto and re-docketed it as the resolutions became effective "immediately upon approval"
fee, which the petitioner contends was an indispensable EPC Case No. 88-19, serving him notice on February 10, 1988. He simply because it was so provided therein. We held in that case
requirement. The fee is, curiously enough, all of P300.00 only. This immediately paid the filing fee on that date. that publication was still necessary under the due process clause
brings to mind the popular verse that for want of a horse the despite such effectivity clause.
kingdom was lost. Still, if it is shown that the petition was indeed
The private respondent argues further that during the period
filed beyond the reglementary period, there is no question that
when the COMELEC regarded his petition as a pre-proclamation In any event, what is important is that the filing fee was paid, and
this petition must be granted and the challenge abated.
controversy, the time for filing an election protest or quo whatever delay there may have been is not imputable to the
warranto proceeding was deemed suspended under Section 248 private respondent's fault or neglect. It is true that in
The petitioner's position is simple. He was proclaimed mayor- of the Omnibus Election Code. 2 At any rate, he says, Rule 36, the Manchester Case, we required the timely payment of the
elect of Baguio City, on January 20, 1988. The petition for quo Section 5, of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure cited by the filing fee as a precondition for the timeliness of the filing of the
warranto was filed by the private respondent on January 26, petitioner, became effective only on November 15, 1988, seven case itself. In Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion, 5 however
1988, but no filing fee was paid on that date. This fee was finally days after publication of the said Rules in the Official Gazette this Court, taking into account the special circumstances of that
paid on February 10, 1988, or twenty-one days after his pursuant to Section 4, Rule 44 thereof. 3 These rules could not case, declared:
proclamation. As the petition by itself alone was ineffectual retroact to January 26,1988, when he filed his petition with the
without the filing fee, it should be deemed filed only when the fee COMELEC.
This Court reiterates the rule that the trial court
was paid. This was done beyond the reglementary period
acquires jurisdiction over a case only upon the
provided for under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code
In his Reply, the petitioner argues that even if the Omnibus payment of the prescribed filing fee. However, the
reading as follows:
Election Code did not require it, the payment of filing fees was still court may allow the payment of the said fee within a
necessary under Res. No. 1996 and, before that, Res. No. 1450 of reasonable time. In the event of non-compliance
SEC. 253. Petition for quo warranto. Any voter the respondent COMELEC, promulgated on January 12, 1988, and therewith, the case shall be dismissed.
contesting the election of a Member of the February 26, 1980, respectively. To this, the private respondent
Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial, or city counters that the latter resolution was intended for the local
The same idea is expressed in Rule 42, Section 18, of the
officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty elections held on January 30, 1980, and did not apply to the 1988
COMELEC Rules of Procedure adopted on June 20, 1988, thus:
to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn local elections, which were supposed to be governed by the first-
petition for quo warranto with the Commission mentioned resolution. However, Res. No. 1996 took effect only on
within ten days after the proclamation of the March 3, 1988, following the lapse of seven days after its Sec. 18. Non-payment of prescribed fees.
result of the election. publication as required by RA No. 6646, otherwise known as the If the fees above prescribed are not paid,
Electoral Reform Law of 1987, which became effective on January theCommission may refuse to take action
5, 1988. Its Section 30 provides in part: thereon until they are paid and may dismiss
The petitioner adds that the payment of the filing fee is required
the action or the proceeding. (Emphasis
under Rule 36, Section 5, of the Procedural Rules of the COMELEC
supplied.)
providing that Sec. 30. Effectivity of Regulations and
Orders of the Commission. The rules and
regulations promulgated by the The Court notes that while arguing the technical point that the
Commission shall take effect on the seventh petition for quo warranto should be dismissed for failure to pay
the filing fee on time, the petitioner would at the same time proper court which was the Court of the parties and the government, not to
minimize his alleged lack of citizenship as "a futile technicality," It Appeals for appropriate action. Considering, speak of delay in the disposal of the case
is regrettable, to say the least, that the requirement of citizenship however, the length of time that this case (cf. Fernandez v. Garcia, 92 Phil. 592, 597).
as a qualification for public office can be so demeaned. What is has been pending, we apply the rule in the A marked characteristic of our judicial set-
worse is that it is regarded as an even less important case of Del Castillo v. Jaymalin, (112 SCRA up is that where the dictates of justice so
consideration than the reglementary period the petitioner insists 629) and follow the principle enunciated in demand ... the Supreme Court should act,
upon. Alger Electric, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, (135 and act with finality.' (Li Siu Liat v. Republic,
SCRA 37) which states: 21 SCRA 1039, 1046, citing Samal v. CA, 99
Phil. 230 and U.S. v. Gimenez, 34 Phil. 74).
This matter should normally end here as the sole issue originally
In this case, the dictates of justice do
raised by the petitioner is the timeliness of thequo ... it is a cherished
demand that this Court act, and act with
warranto proceedings against him. However, as his citizenship is rule of procedure for
finality. 7
the subject of that proceeding, and considering the necessity for this Court to always
an early resolution of that more important question clearly and strive to settle the
urgently affecting the public interest, we shall directly address it entire controversy in xxx
now in this same action. a single proceeding
leaving no root or
Remand of the case to the lower court for
branch to bear the
The Court has similarly acted in a notable number of cases, thus: further reception of evidence is not
seeds of future
necessary where the court is in a position to
litigation. No useful
resolve the dispute based on the records
From the foregoing brief statement of the purpose will be
before it. On many occasions, the Court, in
nature of the instant case, it would appear served if this case is
the public interest and the expeditious
that our sole function in this proceeding remanded to the trial
administration of justice, has resolved
should be to resolve the single issue of court only to have its
actions on the merits instead of remanding
whether or not the Court of Appeals erred decision raised again
them to the trial court for further
in ruling that the motion for new trial of the to the Intermediate
proceedings, such as where the ends of
GSIS in question should indeed be Appellate Court and
justice would not be subserved by the
deemedpro forma. But going over the from there to this
remand of the case or when public interest
extended pleadings of both parties, the Court. (p. 43)
demands an early disposition of the case or
Court is immediately impressed that
where the trial court had already received
substantial justice may not be timely
Only recently in the case of Beautifont, Inc., all the evidence of the parties. 8
achieved, if we should decide this case
et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al. (G.R. No.
upon such a technical ground alone. We
50141, January 29, 1988), we stated that:
have carefully read all the allegations and This course of action becomes all the more justified in the present
arguments of the parties, very ably and case where, to repeat for stress, it is claimed that a foreigner is
comprehensively expounded by evidently ... But all those relevant facts are now holding a public office.
knowledgeable and unusually competent before this Court. And those facts dictate
counsel, and we feel we can better serve the rendition of a verdict in the petitioner's
We also note in his Reply, the petitioner says:
the interests of justice by broadening the favor. There is therefore no point in
scope of our inquiry, for as the record referring the case back to the Court of
before us stands, we see that there is Appeals. The facts and the legal In adopting private respondent's comment,
enough basis for us to end the basic propositions involved will not change, nor respondent COMELEC implicitly adopted as
controversy between the parties here and should the ultimate judgment. Considerable "its own" private respondent's repeated
now, dispensing, however, with procedural time has already elapsed and, to serve the assertion that petitioner is no longer a
steps which would not anyway affect ends of justice, it is time that the Filipino citizen. In so doing, has not
substantially the merits of their respective controversy is finally laid to rest. (See Sotto respondent COMELEC effectively
claims. 6 v. Samson, 5 SCRA 733; Republic v. Paredes, disqualified itself, by reason of
108 Phil. 57; Lianga Lumber Co. v. Lianga prejudgment, from resolving the petition
Timber Co., Inc., 76 SCRA 197; Erico v. Heirs for quo warranto filed by private
xxx
of Chigas, 98 SCRA 575; Francisco v. City of respondent still pending before it? 9
Davao, 12 SCRA 628; Valencia v.
While it is the fault of the petitioner for Mabilangan, 105 Phil. This is still another reason why the Court has seen fit to rule
appealing to the wrong court and thereby 162).lwph1.t Sound practice seeks to directly on the merits of this case.
allowing the period for appeal to lapse, the accommodate the theory which avoids
more correct procedure was for the waste of time, effort and expense, both to
respondent court to forward the case to the
Going over the record, we find that there are two administrative spouse of an Australian citizen, he was not AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY, MANILA, THIS 12th
decisions on the question of the petitioner's citizenship. The first required to meet normal requirements for DAY OF APRIL 1984. DONE AT MANILA IN
was rendered by the Commission on Elections on May 12, 1982, the grant of citizenship and was granted THE PHILIPPINES.
and found the petitioner to be a citizen of the Philippines. 10 The Australian citizenship by Sydney on 28 July
second was rendered by the Commission on Immigration and 1976.
(Signed) GRAHAM C. WEST Consul
Deportation on September 13, 1988, and held that the petitioner
was not a citizen of the Philippines. 11
B) Any person over the age of 16 years who
This was affirmed later by the letter of
is granted Australian citizenship must take
February 1, 1988, addressed to the private
The first decision was penned by then COMELEC Chigas, Vicente an oath of allegiance or make an
respondent by the Department of Foreign
Santiago, Jr., with Commissioners Pabalate Savellano and Opinion affirmation of allegiance. The wording of
Affairs reading as follows: 13
concurring in full and Commissioner Bacungan concurring in the the oath of affirmation is: "I ..., renouncing
dismissal of the petition "without prejudice to the issue of the all other allegiance ..." etc. This need not
respondent's citizenship being raised anew in a proper case." necessarily have any effect on his former Sir:
Commissioner Sagadraca reserved his vote, while Commissioner nationality as this would depend on the
Felipe was for deferring decision until representations shall have citizenship laws of his former country. With reference to your letter dated 1
been made with the Australian Embassy for official verification of February 1988, I wish to inform you that
the petitioner's alleged naturalization as an Australian. inquiry made with the Australian
C) The marriage was declared void in the
Australian Federal Court in Sydney on 27 Government through the Embassy of the
The second decision was unanimously rendered by Chairman June 1980 on the ground that the marriage Philippines in Canberra has elicited the
Miriam Defensor-Santiago and Commissioners Alano and had been bigamous. following information:
Geraldez of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation. It is
important to observe that in the proceeding before the COMELEC, 1) That Mr. Ramon L. Labo, Jr. acquired
D) According to our records LABO is still an
there was no direct proof that the herein petitioner had been Australian citizenship on 28 July 1976.
Australian citizen.
formally naturalized as a citizen of Australia. This conjecture,
which was eventually rejected, was merely inferred from the fact
that he had married an Australian citizen, obtained an Australian E) Should he return to Australia, LABO may 2) That prior to 17 July 1986, a candidate for
passport, and registered as an alien with the CID upon his return face court action in respect of Section 50 of Australian citizenship had to either swear an
to this country in 1980. Australian Citizenship Act 1948 which oath of allegiance or make an affirmation of
relates to the giving of false or misleading allegiance which carries a renunciation of
information of a material nature in respect "all other allegiance.
On the other hand, the decision of the CID took into account the
of an application for Australian citizenship.
official statement of the Australian Government dated August 12,
If such a prosecution was successful, he Very truly yours, For the Secretary of
1984, through its Consul in the Philippines, that the petitioner was
could be deprived of Australian citizenship Foreign Affairs: (SGD) RODOLFO SEVERINO,
still an Australian citizen as of that date by reason of his
under Section 21 of the Act. JR. Assistant Secretary
naturalization in 1976. That statement 12 is reproduced in full as
follows:
F) There are two further ways in which The decision also noted the oath of allegiance taken by every
LABO could divest himself of Australian naturalized Australian reading as follows:
I, GRAHAM COLIN WEST, Consul of Australia in the Philippines, by
citizenship:
virtue of a certificate of appointment signed and sealed by the
Australian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs on 19 October OATH OF ALLEGIANCE
1983, and recognized as such by Letter of Patent signed and (i) He could make a declaration of
sealed by the Philippines Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs on 23 Renunciation of Australian citizenship under
November 1983, do hereby provide the following statement in Section 18 of the Australian Citizenship Act, I, A.B., renouncing all other allegiance,
response to the subpoena Testificandum dated 9 April 1984 in or swear by Almighty God that I will be faithful
regard to the Petition for disqualification against RAMON LABO, and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty
JR. Y LOZANO (SPC No. 84-73), and do hereby certify that the Elizabeth the Second, Queen of Australia,
(ii) If he acquired another nationality, (for Her heirs and successors according to law,
statement is true and correct. example, Filipino) by a formal and voluntary and that I will faithfully observe the laws of
act other than marriage, then he would Australia and fulfill my duties as an
STATEMENT automatically lose as Australian citizenship Australian citizen. 14
under Section 17 of the Act.
A) RAMON LABO, JR. Y LOZANO, date of and the Affirmation of Allegiance, which declares:
birth 23 December 1934, was married in the IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I HAVE HEREUNTO
Philippines to an Australian citizen. As the SET MAY HAND AND SEAL OF THE
AFFIRMATION OF ALLEGIANCE
I, A.B., renouncing all other allegiance, Renouncing all other allegiance, he swore "to be faithful and bear That is why the Commission on Immigration and Deportation
solemnly and sincerely promise and declare true allegiance to Her Majesty Elizabeth the Second, Queen of rejected his application for the cancellation of his alien certificate
that I will be faithful and bear true Australia ..." and to fulfill his duties "as an Australian citizen." of registration. And that is also the reason we must deny his
allegiance to Her Majesty Elizabeth the present claim for recognition as a citizen of the Philippines.
Second, Queen of Australia, Her heirs and
The petitioner now claims that his naturalization in Australia
successors according to law, and that I will
made him at worst only a dual national and did not divest him of The petitioner is not now, nor was he on the day of the local
faithfully observe the Laws of Australia and
his Philippine citizenship. Such a specious argument cannot stand elections on January 18, 1988, a citizen of the Philippines. In fact,
fulfill my duties as an Australian citizen. 15
against the clear provisions of CA No. 63, which enumerates the he was not even a qualified voter under the Constitution itself
modes by which Philippine citizenship may be lost. Among these because of his alienage. 21 He was therefore ineligible as a
The petitioner does not question the authenticity of the above are: (1) naturalization in a foreign country; (2) express candidate for mayor of Baguio City, under Section 42 of the Local
evidence. Neither does he deny that he obtained Australian renunciation of citizenship; and (3) subscribing to an oath of Government Code providing in material part as follows:
Passport No. 754705, which he used in coming back to the allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign
Philippines in 1980, when he declared before the immigration country, all of which are applicable to the petitioner. It is also
Sec. 42. Qualifications. An elective local
authorities that he was an alien and registered as such under worth mentioning in this connection that under Article IV, Section
official must be a citizen of the Philippines,
Alien Certificate of Registration No. B-323985. 16 He later asked 5, of the present Constitution, "Dual allegiance of citizens is
at least twenty-three years of age on
for the change of his status from immigrant to a returning former inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."
election day, a qualified voter registered as
Philippine citizen and was granted Immigrant Certificate of
such in the barangay, municipality, city or
Residence No. 223809. 17 He also categorically declared that he
Even if it be assumed that, as the petitioner asserts, his province where he proposes to be elected,
was a citizen of Australia in a number of sworn statements
naturalization in Australia was annulled after it was found that his a resident therein for at least one year at
voluntarily made by him and. even sought to avoid the jurisdiction
marriage to the Australian citizen was bigamous, that the time of the filing of his certificate of
of the barangay court on the ground that he was a foreigner. 18
circumstance alone did not automatically restore his Philippine candidacy, and able to read and write
citizenship. His divestiture of Australian citizenship does not English, Filipino, or any other local language
The decision of the COMELEC in 1982 quaintly dismisses all these concern us here. That is a matter between him and his adopted or dialect.
acts as "mistakes" that did not divest the petitioner of his country. What we must consider is the fact that he voluntarily and
citizenship, although, as earlier noted, not all the members joined freely rejected Philippine citizenship and willingly and knowingly
The petitioner argues that his alleged lack of citizenship is a "futile
in this finding. We reject this ruling as totally baseless. The embraced the citizenship of a foreign country. The possibility that
technicality" that should not frustrate the will of the electorate of
petitioner is not an unlettered person who was not aware of the he may have been subsequently rejected by Australia, as he
Baguio City, who elected him by a "resonant and thunderous
consequences of his acts, let alone the fact that he was assisted claims, does not mean that he has been automatically reinstated
majority." To be accurate, it was not as loud as all that, for his
by counsel when he performed these acts. as a citizen of the Philippines.
lead over the second-placer was only about 2,100 votes. In any
event, the people of that locality could not have, even
The private respondent questions the motives of the COMELEC at Under CA No. 63 as amended by PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship unanimously, changed the requirements of the Local Government
that time and stresses Labo's political affiliation with the party in may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or Code and the Constitution. The electorate had no power to permit
power then, but we need not go into that now. by repatriation. It does not appear in the record, nor does the a foreigner owing his total allegiance to the Queen of Australia, or
petitioner claim, that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by at least a stateless individual owing no allegiance to the Republic
any of these methods. He does not point to any judicial decree of of the Philippines, to preside over them as mayor of their city.
There is also the claim that the decision can no longer be reversed
naturalization as to any statute directly conferring Philippine Only citizens of the Philippines have that privilege over their
because of the doctrine of res judicata, but this too must be
citizenship upon him. Neither has he shown that he has complied countrymen.
dismissed. This doctrine does not apply to questions of
with PD No. 725, providing that:
citizenship, as the Court has ruled in several cases. 19 Moreover,
it does not appear that it was properly and seasonably pleaded, in The probability that many of those who voted for the petitioner
a motion to dismiss or in the answer, having been invoked only ... (2) natural-born Filipinos who have lost may have done so in the belief that he was qualified only
when the petitioner filed his reply 20 to the private respondent's their Philippine citizenship may reacquire strengthens the conclusion that the results of the election cannot
comment. Besides, one of the requisites of res judicata, to wit, Philippine citizenship through repatriation nullify the qualifications for the office now held by him. These
identity of parties, is not present in this case. by applying with the Special Committee on qualifications are continuing requirements; once any of them is
Naturalization created by Letter of lost during incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed
Instruction No. 270, and, if their forfeited. In the case at bar, the citizenship and voting
The petitioner's contention that his marriage to an Australian
applications are approved, taking the requirements were not subsequently lost but were not possessed
national in 1976 did not automatically divest him of Philippine
necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic at all in the first place on the day of the election. The petitioner
citizenship is irrelevant. There is no claim or finding that he
of the Philippines, after which they shall be was disqualified from running as mayor and, although elected, is
automatically ceased to be a Filipino because of that marriage. He
deemed to have reacquired Philippine not now qualified to serve as such.
became a citizen of Australia because he was naturalized as such
citizenship. The Commission on Immigration
through a formal and positive process, simplified in his case
and Deportation shall thereupon cancel
because he was married to an Australian citizen. As a condition Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private
their certificate of registration. (Emphasis
for such naturalization, he formally took the Oath of Allegiance respondent, who filed the quo warranto petition, can replace the
supplied.)
and/or made the Affirmation of Allegiance, both quoted above. petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The simple reason is that as he
obtained only the second highest number of votes in the election, maintain him there. However, in the
he was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio city. absence of a statute which clearly asserts a
contrary political and legislative policy on
the matter, if the votes were cast in the
The latest ruling of the Court on this issue is Santos v. Commission
sincere belief that the candidate was alive,
on Elections 22 decided in 1985. In that case, the candidate who
qualified, or eligible, they should not be
placed second was proclaimed elected after the votes for his
treated as stray, void or meaningless.
winning rival, who was disqualified as a turncoat and considered a
non-candidate, were all disregarded as stray. In effect, the second
placer won by default. That decision was supported by eight It remains to stress that the citizen of the Philippines must take
members of the Court then 23 with three dissenting 24 and pride in his status as such and cherish this priceless gift that, out
another two reserving their vote.25 One was on official leave. 26 of more than a hundred other nationalities, God has seen fit to
grant him. Having been so endowed, he must not lightly yield this
precious advantage, rejecting it for another land that may offer
Re-examining that decision, the Court finds, and so holds, that it
him material and other attractions that he may not find in his own
should be reversed in favor of the earlier case ofGeronimo v.
country. To be sure, he has the right to renounce the Philippines if
Ramos, 27 Which represents the more logical and democratic
he sees fit and transfer his allegiance to a state with more
rule. That case, which reiterated the doctrine first announced in
allurements for him. 33 But having done so, he cannot expect to
1912 in Topacio vs. Paredes 28 was supported by ten members of
be welcomed back with open arms once his taste for his adopted
the Court 29 without any dissent, although one reserved his
country turns sour or he is himself disowned by it as an
vote, 30 another took no part 31 and two others were on
undesirable alien.
leave. 32 There the Court held:
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his
undertaking made under oath. Should he betray that trust, there
are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine
citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu
v. Defensor-Santiago, 19 we sustained the denial of entry into the
country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a
naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese
passport and declared in commercial documents executed abroad
that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken
against any one who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces
his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act
constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 137329 August 9, 2000 On June 14, 1997, while still the governor of Misamis Oriental, of March 13, 1995 in Precinct No. 12, Barangay Poblacion,
Emano executed a Voter Registration Record in Cagayan de Oro Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental bolster the petitioner's argument that
City (geographically located in the Province of Misamis Oriental), a the respondent is not a resident [or a] registered voter in Cagayan
ROGELIO M. TORAYNO SR., GENEROSO ELIGAN and JACQUELINE
highly urbanized city, in which he claimed 20 years of residence. de Oro City since registration in said Precinct No. 12 does not
M. SERIO, petitioners,
On March 25, 1998, he filed his Certificate of Candidacy for mayor preclude the respondent from registering anew in another place."
vs.
of the city, stating therein that his residence for the preceding
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and VICENTE Y.
two years and five months was at 1409 San Jose Street,
EMANO, respondents. Hence, this recourse5 before this Court.
Capistrano Subdivision, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City.
DECISION Issues
Among those who ran for the mayorship of the city in 1998, along
with Emano, was Erasmo B. Damasing, counsel of herein
PANGANIBAN, J.: petitioners. On May 15, 1998, Petitioners Rogelio M. Torayno Sr., In their Memorandum,6 petitioners submit that the main issue is
Generoso Q. Eligan and Jacqueline M. Serio, all residents of whether the "Comelec gravely abused its discretion amounting to
Cagayan de Oro City, filed a Petition before the Comelec, lack of jurisdiction in issuing the questioned Resolutions."
The Constitution and the law requires residence as a qualification
docketed as SPA No. 98-298, in which they sought the Allegedly, the resolution of this issue would depend on the
for seeking and holding elective public office, in order to give
disqualification of Emano as mayoral candidate, on the ground following:7
candidates the opportunity to be familiar with the needs,
difficulties, aspirations, potentials for growth and all matters vital that he had allegedly failed to meet the one-year residence
to the welfare of their constituencies; likewise, it enables the requirement. Prior to the resolution of their Petition, the Comelec "1. Whether or not private respondent Emano's
electorate to evaluate the office seekers' qualifications and fitness proclaimed private respondent as the duly elected city mayor.
for the job they aspire for. Inasmuch as Vicente Y. Emano has Thus, on May 29, 1998, petitioners filed another Petition before
the Comelec, this time for quo warranto,3 in which they sought (a) remaining as governor of Misamis
proven that he, together with his family, (1) had actually resided
(1) the annulment of the election of private respondent; and (2) Oriental until he filed his certificate of
in a house he bought in 1973 in Cagayan de Oro City; (2) had
the proclamation of Erasmo B. Damasing, who had garnered the candidacy for mayor of Cagayan de Oro City
actually held office there during his three terms as provincial
next highest number of votes, as the duly elected mayor of the on March 25, 1998 in the May 11, 1998
governor of Misamis Oriental, the provincial capitol being located
city. election;
therein; and (3) has registered as voter in the city during the
period required by law, he could not be deemed "a stranger or
newcomer" when he ran for and was overwhelmingly voted as In its Resolution dated July 14, 1998, the Comelec First Division (b) asserting under oath [that he was]
city mayor. Election laws must be liberally construed to give effect denied the Petition for Disqualification. Upon petitioners' Motion qualified to act as governor of said province
to the popular mandate. for Reconsideration and Motion for Consolidation, the two cases until said date; and
were consolidated.4
The Case (c) admitting, in sworn statements, [that he
Ruling of the Comelec was] a resident of Misamis Oriental,
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court seeking to set aside the January 18, 1999 Resolution1 of the As earlier stated, the Comelec en banc upheld the findings and precluded him from acquiring a bona fide domicile of
Commission on Elections (Comelec) en banc in SPA No. 98-298, conclusions of the First Division, holding that "[t]he records clearly choice for at least one (1) year in Cagayan de Oro City
which upheld the July 14, 1998 Resolution2 of the Comelec First show that the respondent is an actual resident of Cagayan de Oro prior to the May 11, 1998 elections, as to disqualify
Division. The assailed Resolutions ruled that Private Respondent City for such a period of time necessary to qualify him to run for him for being a candidate for city mayor of said City.
Vicente Y. Emano possessed the minimum period of residence to mayor therein. This fact is clearly established by the respondent
be eligible to vote in Cagayan de Oro City, as well as be voted having a house in the city which has been existing therein since 2. Differently stated, whether or not Emano's securing
mayor thereof. 1973 and where his family has been living since then." a residence certificate in Cagayan de Oro City, holding
offices as governor of Misamis Oriental in the Capitol
The Facts Additionally, it ruled: Building located in Cagayan de Oro City and having a
house therein where [he had] stay[ed] during his
tenure as governor, and registering as a voter in said
The pertinent facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as "There is nothing in the law which bars an elected provincial City in June 1997, would be legally sufficient, as against
follows. official from residing and/or registering as a voter in a highly the undisputed facts above enumerated, to constitute
urbanized city whose residents are not given the right to vote for a change of his domicile of birth in Tagoloan, Misamis
During the 1995 elections, Vicente Y. Emano ran for, was elected, and be elected to a position in the province embracing such highly Oriental in favor of a new domicile of choice in
and proclaimed provincial governor of Misamis Oriental. It was his urbanized city as long as he has complied with the requirements Cagayan de Oro City for at least one (1) year for
third consecutive term as governor of the province. In his prescribed by law in the case of a qualified voter. purposes of qualifying him to run for city mayor in the
Certificate of Candidacy dated March 12, 1995, his residence was May 11, 1998 elections.
declared to be in Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental. "Neither can the list of voters submitted as evidence for the
petitioners showing that the respondent was a registered voter as
3. Whether or not Erasmo Damasing, the candidate for Main Issue: Residence Qualification for Candidacy of the required qualifications for election merely renders the
mayor of Cagayan de Oro City in the May 11, 1998 official's title or right to office open to challenge. In Emano's case,
elections, who received the second highest number of no one challenged his right to the Office of Provincial Governor
Petitioners argue that private respondent maintains his domicile
votes, can be declared winner, considering that when he transferred his residence to Cagayan de Oro City.
in Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental, not in Cagayan de Oro City, as
respondent Emano was disqualified to run for and hold Naturally, he continued to discharge his functions as such, until he
allegedly shown by the following facts: (1) he had run and won as
said office and considering that his disqualification or filed his candidacy for mayor in March 1998.
governor of the province of Misamis Oriental for three
ineligibility had been extensively brought to the
consecutive terms immediately preceding the 1998 elections; (2)
attention and consciousness of the voters prior to the
in the pleadings he filed in connection with an election protest Lastly, Emano urges that the sanctity of the people's will, as
May 11, 1998 election as to attain notoriety,
against him relating to the 1995 election, he had stated that he expressed in the election result, must be respected. He is not,
notwithstanding which they still voted for him."
was a resident of Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental; (3) he had fully after all, a stranger to the city, much less to its voters. During his
exercised the powers and prerogatives of governor until he filed three terms as governor of Misamis Oriental, his life and
Petitioners are seeking the resolution of essentially two his Certificate of Candidacy for mayor on March 25, 1998. actuations have been closely interwoven with the pulse and beat
questions: (1) whether private respondent had duly established of Cagayan de Oro City.
his residence in Cagayan de Oro City at least one year prior to the
Petitioners claim that in discharging his duties as provincial
May 11, 1998 elections to qualify him to run for the mayorship
governor, private respondent remained a resident of the Public Respondent Comelec relies essentially on Romualdez-
thereof; and (2) if not, whether Erasmo Damasing, the candidate
province. They aver that residence is a continuing qualification Marcos v. Comelec15 in its Memorandum16 which supports the
who had received the second highest number of votes, should be
that an elective official must possess throughout his term. Thus, assailed Resolutions, and which has been filed in view of the
proclaimed mayor of the city.
private respondent could not have changed his residence to solicitor general's Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of
Cagayan de Oro City while he was still governor of Misamis Comment.17 Thus, the poll body argues that "x x x the fact of
The Courts Ruling Oriental. residence x x x ought to be decisive in determining whether or not
an individual has satisfied the Constitution's residency
qualification requirement."
The Petition has no merit. Petitioners further contend that the following were not sufficient
to constitute a change of domicile: having a house in Cagayan de
Oro City, residing therein while exercising one's office as governor Law on Qualifications of Local Elective Officials
Preliminary Matter: Locus Standi of Petitioners
(the city being the seat of government of the province), securing a
residence certificate and registering as voter therein.
The pertinent provision sought to be enforced is Section 39 of the
Although not raised by the parties, the legal standing of the
Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991,18which provides for the
petitioners was deliberated upon by the Court. We note that
Private respondent, on the other hand, alleges that he actually qualifications of local elective officials, as follows:
petitioners pray, among others, for judgment "declaring Atty.
and physically resided in Cagayan de Oro City while serving as
Erasmo B. Damasing as entitled to be proclaimed winner as mayor
provincial governor for three consecutive terms, since the seat of
in the May 11, 1998 elections in Cagayan de Oro City."8 And yet, "SEC. 39. Qualifications. - (a) An elective local official must be a
the provincial government was located at the heart of that
Damasing is not a party to the instant "Petition citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay,
city.13 He also avers that one's choice of domicile is a matter of
for Certiorari pursuant to Rule[s] 64 and 65" brought before us. municipality, city, or province x x x where he intends to be
intention, and it is the person concerned who would be in the
elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately
best position to make a choice. In this case, Emano decided to
preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write
Under the Rules of Court, a quo warranto may be brought only by adopt Cagayan de Oro City as his place of residence after the May
Filipino or any other local language or dialect."
(1) the solicitor general or (2) a public prosecutor or (3) a person 1995 elections. In fact, in January 1997, he secured his
claiming to be entitled to the public office or position usurped or Community Tax Certificate at the City Treasurer's Office, stating
unlawfully held or exercised by another.9 A reading of the Rules therein that he was a resident of 1409 San Jose Street, Capistrano Generally, in requiring candidates to have a minimum period of
shows that petitioners, none of whom qualify under any of the Subdivision, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. During the general residence in the area in which they seek to be elected, the
above three categories, are without legal standing to bring this registration of voters in June 1997, he registered in one of the Constitution or the law intends to prevent the possibility of a
suit. precincts of Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. This meant that, at the "stranger or newcomer unacquainted with the conditions and
time, Emano had been a voter of the city for the minimum period needs of a community and not identified with the latter from
required by law. No one has ever challenged this fact before any [seeking] an elective office to serve that community."19 Such
However, the present Petition finds its root in two separate cases
tribunal. provision is aimed at excluding outsiders "from taking advantage
filed before the Comelec: (1) SPC 98-298 for disqualification and
of favorable circumstances existing in that community for
(2) EPC 98-62 for quo warranto. Under our election laws and the
electoral gain."20 Establishing residence in a community merely
Comelec Rules of Procedure, any voter may file a petition to Private respondent contends further that his transfer of legal
to meet an election law requirement defeats the purpose of
disqualify a candidate on grounds provided by law,10 or to residence did not ipso facto divest him of his position as provincial
representation: to elect through the assent of voters those most
contest the election of a city officer on the ground of ineligibility governor. First, there is no law that prevents an elected official
cognizant and sensitive to the needs of the community. This
or disloyalty to the Republic.11 The petitioners herein, being from transferring residence while in office. Second, an elective
purpose is "best met by individuals who have either had actual
"duly-registered voters" of Cagayan de Oro City, therefore satisfy official's transfer of residence does not prevent the performance
residence in the area for a given period or who have been
the requirement of said laws and rules.12 of that official's duties, especially in private respondent's case in
domiciled in the same area either by origin or by choice."21
which the seat of government became his adopted place of
residence.Third, as ruled in Frivaldo v. Comelec,14 the loss of any
Facts Showing Change of Residence governor of Misamis Oriental for three terms and consequently enough to show his intention to fulfill the duties of mayor and for
residing in Cagayan de Oro City within that period, could not be the voters to evaluate his qualifications for the mayorship.
said to be a stranger or newcomer to the city in the last year of his Petitioners' very legalistic, academic and technical approach to
In the recent en banc case Mamba-Perez v. Comelec,22 this Court
third term, when he decided to adopt it as his permanent place of the residence requirement does not satisfy this simple, practical
ruled that private respondent therein, now Representative
residence. and common-sense rationale for the residence requirement.
Rodolfo E. Aguinaldo of the Third District of Cagayan, had duly
proven his change of residence from Gattaran, Cagayan (part of
the First District) to Tuguegarao, Cagayan (part of the Third Significantly, the Court also declared in Mamba-Perez that Interpretation to Favor Popular Mandate
District in which he sought election as congressman). He proved it "although private respondent declared in his certificates of
with the following facts: (1) in July 1990, he leased and lived in a candidacy prior to the May 11, 1998 elections that he was a
There is no question that private respondent was the
residential apartment in Magallanes Street, Tuguegarao, Cagayan; resident of Gattaran, Cagayan, the fact is that he was actually a
overwhelming choice of the people of Cagayan de Oro
(2) in July 1995, he leased another residential apartment in resident of the Third District not just for one (1) year prior to the
City.1wphi1 He won by a margin of about 30,000 votes.24 Thus,
Kamias Street, Tanza, Tuguegarao, Cagayan; (3) the January 18, May 11, 1998 elections but for more than seven (7) years since
we find it apt to reiterate the principle that the manifest will of
1998 Certificate of Marriage between Aguinaldo and his second July 1990. His claim that he ha[s] been a resident of Tuguegarao
the people as expressed through the ballot must be given fullest
wife, Lerma Dumaguit; (4) the Certificate of Live Birth of his since July 1990 is credible considering that he was governor from
effect. In case of doubt, political laws must be interpreted to give
second daughter; and (5) various letters addressed to him and his 1988 to 1998 and, therefore, it would be convenient for him to
life and spirit to the popular mandate.25 Verily, in Frivaldo v.
family showed that he had been a resident of Tuguegarao for at maintain his residence in Tuguegarao, which is the capital of the
Comelec,26 the Court held:
least one year immediately preceding the May 1998 elections. province of Cagayan."
The Court also stated that it was not "of much importance that in
his [Aguinaldo's] certificates of candidacy for provincial governor "x x x [T]his Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of
Similarly in the instant case, private respondent was actually and
in the elections of 1988, 1992, and 1995, private respondent giving effect to the sovereign will in order to ensure the survival of
physically residing in Cagayan de Oro City while discharging his
stated that he was a resident of Gattaran."23 our democracy. In any action involving the possibility of a reversal
duties as governor of Misamis Oriental. He owned a house in the
of the popular electoral choice, this Court must exert utmost
city and resided there together with his family. He even paid his
effort to resolve the issues in a manner that would give effect to
In the case at bar, the Comelec found that private respondent and 1998 community tax and registered as a voter therein. To all
the will of the majority, for it is merely sound public policy to
his family had actually been residing in Capistrano Subdivision, intents and purposes of the Constitution and the law, he is a
cause elective offices to be filled by those who are the choice of
Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, in a house he had bought in 1973. resident of Cagayan de Oro City and eligible to run for mayor
the majority. To successfully challenge a winning candidate's
Furthermore, during the three terms (1988-1998) that he was thereof.
qualifications, the petitioner must clearly demonstrate that the
governor of Misamis Oriental, he physically lived in that city,
ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional and legal
where the seat of the provincial government was located. In June
To petitioners' argument that Emano could not have continued to principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving
1997, he also registered as voter of the same city. Based on our
qualify as provincial governor if he was indeed a resident of effect to the apparent will of the people would ultimately create
ruling in Mamba-Perez, these facts indubitably prove that Vicente
Cagayan de Oro City, we respond that the issue before this Court greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic
Y. Emano was a resident of Cagayan de Oro City for a period of
is whether Emano's residence in the city qualifies him to run for traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and
time sufficient to qualify him to run for public office therein.
and be elected as mayor, not whether he could have continued promote."
Moreover, the Comelec did not find any bad faith on the part of
sitting as governor of the province. There was no challenge to his
Emano in his choice of residence.
eligibility to continue running the province; hence, this Court
In the same vein, we stated in Alberto v. Comelec27 that "election
cannot make any pronouncement on such issue. Considerations of
cases involve public interest; thus, laws governing election
Petitioners put much emphasis on the fact that Cagayan de Oro due process prevent us from adjudging matters not properly
contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the
City is a highly urbanized city whose voters cannot participate in brought to us. On the basis, however, of the facts proven before
people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by
the provincial elections. Such political subdivisions and voting the Comelec, we hold that he has satisfied the residence
mere technical objections."
restrictions, however, are simply for the purpose of parity in qualification required by law for the mayorship of the city.
representation. The classification of an area as a highly urbanized
or independent component city, for that matter, does not Indeed, "it would be far better to err in favor of popular
We stress that the residence requirement is rooted in the desire
completely isolate its residents, politics, commerce and other sovereignty than to be right in complex but little understood
that officials of districts or localities be acquainted not only with
businesses from the entire province -- and vice versa -- especially legalisms."28
the metes and bounds of their constituencies but, more
when the city is located at the very heart of the province itself, as
important, with the constituents themselves -- their needs,
in this case. In sum, we hold that Respondent Comelec cannot be faulted with
difficulties, aspirations, potentials for growth and development,
and all matters vital to their common welfare. The requisite abuse, much less grave abuse, of discretion in upholding private
Undeniably, Cagayan de Oro City was once an integral part of period would give candidates the opportunity to be familiar with respondent's election.
Misamis Oriental and remains a geographical part of the province. their desired constituencies, and likewise for the electorate to
Not only is it at the center of the province; more important, it is evaluate the former's qualifications and fitness for the offices they Corollary Issue: Effect of Disqualification of Winner on Second
itself the seat of the provincial government. As a consequence, seek. Placer
the provincial officials who carry out their functions in the city
cannot avoid residing therein; much less, getting acquainted with
In other words, the actual, physical and personal presence of
its concerns and interests. Vicente Y. Emano, having been the
herein private respondent in Cagayan de Oro City is substantial
With the resolution of the first issue in the positive, it is obvious
that the second one posited by petitioners has become academic
and need not be ruled upon.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 207900 April 22, 2014 Supervening Event on March 26, 2013. The petition was docketed "Ergo, since respondent Lonzanida was never a candidate for the
as SPA No. 13-249(DC)(F).9 Hayudini appealed the March 8, 2013 position of mayor [of] San Antonio, Zambales, the votes cast for
RTC decision to the Court of Appeals (CA), but on April 17, 2013, him should be considered stray votes. Consequently, Intervenor
MAYOR GAMAL S. HAYUDINI, Petitioner,
in CA-G.R. SP No. 05426,10 the same was denied. Antipolo, who remains as the sole candidate for the mayoralty
vs.
post and obtained the highest number of votes, should now be
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MUSTAPHA J.
proclaimed as the duly-elected Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales.
OMAR, Respondents. On May 13, 2013, Hayudini won the mayoralty race in South
Ubian, Tawi-Tawi. He was proclaimed and, consequently, took his
oath of office. Lonzanida's certificate of candidacy was cancelled, because he
DECISION
was ineligible or not qualified to run for Mayor. Whether his
certificate of candidacy is cancelled before or after elections is
On June 20, 2013, the COMELEC Second Division issued a
PERALTA, J.: immaterial because the cancellation on such ground means he
Resolution11 granting Omars second petition to cancel
was never a candidate from the very beginning, his certificate of
Hayudinis CoC. The dispositive portion of the COMELEC
For the Court's resolution is a Petition for Certiorari and candidacy being void ab initio. There was only one qualified
Resolution reads:
Prohibition1 under Rule 65, which petitioner Gamal S. Hayudini candidate for Mayor in the May 2010 elections - Antipolo, who
(Hayudini) filed to set aside and annul the assailed Resolutions of therefore received the highest number of votes."
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), dated June 20,
GRANTED. Accordingly, the Certificate of Candidacy filed by Gamal
20132 and July 10, 2013,3 which cancelled his Certificate of The Office of the Deputy Executive Director for Operations is
S. Hayudini as Mayor of South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, in the 13 May
Candidacy for the mayoralty seat in the 2013 local elections in hereby directed to constitute a Special Board of Canvassers for
2013 elections, is hereby CANCELLED.
South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, for having been issued with grave abuse the purpose of proclaiming SALMA OMAR as the winning
of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. candidate for mayoralty position in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi during
The Office of the Deputy Executive Director for Operations is the May 13, 2013 elections.
hereby directed to constitute a Special Board of Canvassers for
The antecedent facts are:
the purpose of proclaiming the lawful winner for mayoralty
SO ORDERED.14
position in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi during the 13 May 2013
On October 5, 2012, Hayudini filed his Certificate of elections.
Candidacy4 (CoC) for the position of Municipal Mayor of South Thus, Hayudini filed the instant petition for certiorari and
Ubian, Tawi-Tawi in the May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections prohibition.
SO ORDERED.12
held in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. Ten days
after, or on October 15, 2012, Mustapha J. Omar (Omar) filed a
Hayudini mainly advances the following arguments:
Petition to Deny Due Course or Cancel Hayudinis CoC, entitled Hayudini, thus, filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the
Mustapha J. Omar v. Gamal S. Hayudini, docketed as SPA No. 13- COMELEC En Banc, arguing that its Second Division committed
106(DC)(F).5 Omar basically asserted that Hayudini should be grave error when it gave due course to a belatedly filed petition A.
disqualified for making false representation regarding his and treated the March 8, 2013 RTC Decision as a supervening
residence. He claimed that Hayudini declared in his CoC that he is event.
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
a resident of the Municipality of South Ubian when, in fact, he
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF
resides in Zamboanga City.
On July 10, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc denied Hayudinis Motion JURISDICTION WHEN IT FAILED TO OUTRIGHTLY DISMISS THE
for Reconsideration for lack of merit. The decretal portion of the INSTANT PETITION TO CANCEL CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY DUE
Thereafter, on November 30, 2012, Hayudini filed a Petition for En Bancs assailed Resolution states: TO SUPERVENING EVENT (SPA. NO. 13-249(DC)(F), DESPITE THE
Inclusion in the Permanent List of Voters in Barangay Bintawlan, FAILURE OF RESPONDENT OMAR TO COMPLY WITH THE
South Ubian before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC). MANDATORY REQUIREMENTS OF SECTIONS 2 AND 4 OF THE
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as
Despite the opposition of Ignacio Aguilar Baki, the MCTC granted COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 9532.
it hereby RESOLVES to DENY this Motion for Reconsideration for
Hayudinis petition on January 31, 2013.6 On that same day, the
LACK OF MERIT. Consequently, the June 20, 2013 Resolution of
COMELECs First Division dismissed7 Omars earlier petition to
the Commission (Second Division) is hereby affirmed. xxxx
cancel Hayudinis CoC in SPA No. 13-106(DC)(F) for lack of
substantial evidence that Hayudini committed false
representation as to his residency. Corollary thereto, the proclamation of respondent GAMAL S. C.
HAYUDINI is hereby declared null and void and without any legal
force and effect. SALMA A. OMAR is hereby proclaimed as the
Oppositor Baki, subsequently, elevated the case to the Bongao THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
duly-elected Mayor for South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, being the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 5. The RTC, on March 8, 2013, DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF
qualified candidate obtaining the highest number of votes,
Reversed8 the MCTC ruling and ordered the deletion of Hayudinis JURISDICTION WHEN IT REVISITED AND MODIFIED THE FINAL AND
considering the doctrine laid down by the case Aratea v.
name in Barangay Bintawlans permanent list of voters. In view of EXECUTORY RESOLUTION ISSUED BY THE FIRST DIVISION IN THE
Comelec13 that a cancelled CoC cannot give rise to a valid
said decision, Omar filed before the COMELEC a Petition to Cancel SPA NO. 13-106(DC)(F).
candidacy, and much less, to a valid vote, to wit:
the Certificate of Candidacy of Gamal S. Hayudini by Virtue of a
III. Section 4. Procedure to be observed. Both parties shall observe every action and proceeding brought before the COMELEC. Unlike
the following procedure: an ordinary civil action, an election contest is imbued with public
interest. It involves not only the adjudication of private and
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
pecuniary interests of rival candidates, but also the paramount
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF 1. The petitioner shall, before filing of the Petition, furnish a copy
need of dispelling the uncertainty which beclouds the real choice
JURISDICTION WHEN IT RESOLVED TO CANCEL PETITIONER of the Petition, through personal service to the respondent. In
of the electorate. And the tribunal has the corresponding duty to
HAYUDINIS CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY AND DECLARE HIS cases where personal service is not feasible, or the respondent
ascertain, by all means within its command, whom the people
PROCLAMATION AS NULL AND VOID. refuses to receive the Petition, or the respondents whereabouts
truly chose as their rightful leader.21
cannot be ascertained, the petitioner shall execute an affidavit
stating the reason or circumstances therefor and resort to
xxxx
registered mail as a mode of service. The proof of service or the Indeed, Omar had previously filed a Petition to Deny Due Course
affidavit shall be attached to the Petition to be filed;17 or Cancel Hayudinis CoC on October 15, 2012, docketed as SPA
L. No. 13-106(DC)(F). This was dismissed on January 31, 2013, or the
same day the MCTC granted Hayudinis petition to be included in
Here, Hayudini filed his CoC on October 5, 2012, which was also
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF the list of voters. However, on March 8, 2013, the RTC reversed
the last day of filing of CoC for the May 13, 2013 elections. Omar,
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF the MCTC ruling and, consequently, ordered the deletion of
on the other hand, filed the subject petition only on March 26,
JURISDICTION WHEN IT DECREED THE PROCLAMATION OF SALMA Hayudinis name in Barangay Bintawlans permanent list of voters.
2013. Under the COMELEC Rules, a Petition to Deny Due Course
A. OMAR AS THE DULY-ELECTED MAYOR FOR SOUTH UBIAN, Said deletion was already final and executory under the
or Cancel CoC must be filed within five days from the last day for
TAWI-TAWI.15 law.22 Hayudini, however, still appealed the case to the CA, which
filing a certificate of candidacy, but not later than twenty-five
was subsequently denied. Notably, thereafter, he went to the CA
days from the time of filing of the CoC subject of the petition.
again, this time to file a petition for certiorari, docketed as CA-
The Court finds the petition to be without merit. Clearly, Omars petition was filed way beyond the prescribed
G.R. SP No. 05499.23 In a Resolution dated July 9, 2013, the CA
period. Likewise, he failed to provide sufficient explanation as to
also denied said petition primarily because of Hayudinis act of
why his petition was not served personally to Hayudini.
A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is an independent engaging in the pernicious practice of forum shopping by filing
action based on thespecific grounds and available only if there is two modes of appeal before said court.24 Hence, by virtue of the
no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the Notwithstanding the aforementioned procedural missteps, the finality of said RTC decision deleting his name from the voters list,
ordinary course of law. It will only prosper if grave abuse of Court sustains the COMELECs liberal treatment of Omars Hayudini, who had been previously qualified under the law25 to
discretion is alleged and is actually proved to exist. Grave abuse of petition. run for an elective position, was then rendered ineligible.
discretion has been defined as the arbitrary exercise of power due
to passion, prejudice or personal hostility; or the whimsical, As a general rule, statutes providing for election contests are to Given the finality of the RTC decision, the same should be
arbitrary, or capricious exercise of power that amounts to an be liberally construed in order that the will of the people in the considered a valid supervening event. A supervening event refers
evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or to choice of public officers may not be defeated by mere technical to facts and events transpiring after the judgment or order had
act at all in contemplation of law. For an act to be condemned as objections. Moreover, it is neither fair nor just to keep in office, become executory. These circumstances affect or change the
having been done with grave abuse of discretion, such an abuse for an indefinite period, one whose right to it is uncertain and substance of the judgment and render its execution
must be patent and gross.16 Here, Hayudini miserably failed to under suspicion. It is imperative that his claim be immediately inequitable.26 Here, the RTCs March 8, 2013 decision, ordering
prove that the COMELEC rendered its assailed Resolutions with cleared, not only for the benefit of the winner but for the sake of the deletion of Hayudinis name in the list of voters, which came
grave abuse of discretion. public interest, which can only be achieved by brushing aside after the dismissal of Omars first petition, is indubitably a
technicalities of procedure that protract and delay the trial of an supervening event which would render the execution of the ruling
Hayudini contends that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of ordinary action. This principle was reiterated in the cases of in SPA No. 13-106(DC)(F) iniquitous and unjust. As the COMELEC
discretion when it admitted, and later granted, Omars petition Tolentino v. Commission on Elections18 and De Castro v. aptly ruled, the decision to exclude Hayudini was still non-existent
despite failure to comply with Sections 2 and 4 of Rule 23 of the Commission on Elections,19 where the Court held that "in when the COMELEC first promulgated the Resolution in SPA No.
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended by Resolution No. exercising its powers and jurisdiction, as defined by its mandate to 13-106(DC)(F) on January 31, 2013, or when the issues involved
9523. The subject sections read: protect the integrity of elections, the COMELEC must not be therein were passed upon.27 The First Division even expressed
straitjacketed by procedural rules in resolving election that although the Election Registration Board (ERB) denied
disputes."20 Hayudinis application for registration, it could not adopt the
Section 2. Period to File Petition. The Petition must be filed same because it was not yet final as Hayudini was still to file a
within five (5) days from the last day for filing of certificate of Petition for Inclusion before the MCTC.28 Thus, it is not far-
candidacy; but not later than twenty five (25) days from the time Settled is the rule that the COMELEC Rules of Procedure are
subject to liberal construction.1wphi1 The COMELEC has the fetched to say that had this final RTC finding been existent before,
of filing of the certificate of candidacy subject of the Petition. In the COMELEC First Division could have taken judicial notice of it
case of a substitute candidate, the Petition must be filed within power to liberally interpret or even suspend its rules of procedure
in the interest of justice, including obtaining a speedy disposition and issued a substantially different ruling in SPA No. 13-
five (5) days from the time the substitute candidate filed his 106(DC)(F).29
certificate of candidacy. of all matters pending before it. This liberality is for the purpose
of promoting the effective and efficient implementation of its
objectives ensuring the holding of free, orderly, honest, The same ruling adequately equipped Omar with the necessary
xxxx peaceful, and credible elections, as well as achieving just, ground to successfully have Hayudinis CoC struck down. Under
expeditious, and inexpensive determination and disposition of
the rules, a statement in a certificate of candidacy claiming that a Aside from the requirement of materiality, a false representation candidates have been proclaimed, taken the proper oath, and also
candidate is eligible to run for public office when in truth he is under Section 78 must consist of a "deliberate attempt to assumed office.38
not, is a false material representation, a ground for a petition mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a
under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. candidate ineligible." Simply put, it must be made with a malicious
It bears stressing that one of the requirements for a mayoralty
intent to deceive the electorate as to the potential candidate's
candidate is that he must be a resident of the city or municipality
qualifications for public office.32
Sections 74 and 78 read: where he intends to be elected. Thus, under Section 74 of the
Omnibus Election Code, it is required that a candidate must
Section 74 requires the candidate to state under oath in his CoC certify under oath that he is eligible for the public office he seeks
Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. The certificate of
"that he is eligible for said office." A candidate is eligible if he has election. In this case, when petitioner stated in his CoC that he is a
candidacy shall state that the person filing it is announcing his
a right to run for the public office. If a candidate is not actually resident of Barangay Bintawlan, South Ubian, Tawi Tawi and
candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for
eligible because he is not a registered voter in the municipality eligible for a public office, but it turned out that he was declared
said office; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the
where he intends to be elected, but still he states under oath in to be a non-resident thereof in a petition for his inclusion in the
province, including its component cities, highly urbanized city or
his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to run for public list of registered voters, he therefore committed a false
district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party
office, then the candidate clearly makes a false material representation in his CoC which pertained to a material fact which
to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his
representation, a ground to support a petition under Section is a ground for the cancellation of his CoC under Section 78 of the
post office address for all election purposes; his profession or
78.33 It is interesting to note that Hayudini was, in fact, initially Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner's ineligibility for not being a
occupation; that he will support and defend the Constitution of
excluded by the ERB as a voter. On November 30, 2012, the ERB resident of the place he sought election is not a ground for a
the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto;
issued a certificate confirming the disapproval of Hayudinis petition for disqualification, since the grounds enumerated under
that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated
petition for registration.34 This is precisely the reason why he Section 6839 of the Omnibus Election Code specifically refer to
by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent
needed to file a Petition for Inclusion in the Permanent List of the commission of prohibited acts, and possession of a permanent
resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation
Voters in Barangay Bintawlan before the MCTC. Thus, when he resident status in a foreign country.
imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental
stated in his CoC that "he is eligible for said office," Hayudini
reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the
made a clear and material misrepresentation as to his eligibility,
certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge. As held in Aratea v. COMELEC,40 which is a case for cancellation
because he was not, in fact, registered as a voter in Barangay
of CoC under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, a
Bintawlan.
cancelled certificate of candidacy void ab initio cannot give rise to
xxxx
a valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes. Whether a
Had the COMELEC not given due course to Omars petition solely certificate of candidacy is cancelled before or after the elections is
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of based on procedural deficiencies, South Ubian would have a immaterial, because the cancellation on such ground means he
candidacy. A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to mayor who is not even a registered voter in the locality he is was never a candidate from the very beginning, his certificate of
cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person supposed to govern, thereby creating a ridiculously absurd and candidacy being void ab initio. We then found that since the
exclusively on the ground that any material representation outrageous situation. Hence, the COMELEC was accurate in winning mayoralty candidate's certificate of candidacy was void
contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. cancelling Hayudinis certificate of candidacy. Hayudini likewise ab initio, he was never a candidate at all and all his votes were
The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five protests that it was a grave error on the part of the COMELEC to considered stray votes, and thus, proclaimed the second placer,
days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and have declared his proclamation null and void when no petition for the only qualified candidate, who actually garnered the highest
shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than annulment of his proclamation was ever filed. What petitioner number of votes, for the position of Mayor.
fifteen days before the election. seems to miss, however, is that the nullification of his
proclamation as a winning candidate is also a legitimate outcome
We find the factual mileu of the Aratea case applicable in the
The false representation mentioned in these provisions must a necessary legal consequence of the cancellation of his CoC
instant case, since this is also a case for a petition to deny due
pertain to a material fact, not to a mere innocuous mistake. A pursuant to Section 78. A CoC cancellation proceeding essentially
course or cancel a certificate of candidacy. Since Hayudini was
candidate who falsifies a material fact cannot run; if he runs and is partakes of the nature of a disqualification case.35 The
never a valid candidate for the position of the Municipal Mayor of
elected, cannot serve; in both cases, he or she can be prosecuted cancellation of a CoC essentially renders the votes cast for the
South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, the votes cast for him should be
for violation of the election laws. These facts pertain to a candidate whose certificate of candidacy has been cancelled as
considered stray votes, Consequently, the COMELEC properly
candidate's qualification for elective office, such as his or her stray votes.36 If the disqualification or CoC cancellation or denial
proclaimed Salma Omar, who garnered the highest number of
citizenship and residence. Similarly, the candidate's status as a case is not resolved before the election day, the proceedings shall
votes in the remaining qualified candidates for the mayoralty
registered voter falls under this classification as it is a legal continue even after the election and the proclamation of the
post, as the duly-elected Mayor of South Ubian, Tawi Tawi.
requirement which must be reflected in the CoC. The reason for winner. Meanwhile, the candidate may be voted for and even be
this is obvious: the candidate, if he or she wins, will work for and proclaimed as the winner, but the COMELEC's jurisdiction to deny
due course and cancel his or her CoC continues. This rule likewise Codilla v. De Venecia case has no application in this case, since it
represent the local government under which he or she is
applies even if the candidate facing disqualification has already dealt with a petition for disqualification under Section 68 of the
running.30 Even the will of the people, as expressed through the
taken his oath of office.37 The only exception to this rule is in the Omnibus Election Code and not a petition to deny due course or
ballot, cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they
case of congressional and senatorial candidates where the cancel certificate of candidacy under Section 78 which is the case
mistakenly believed, as in the instant case, that the candidate was
COMELEC ipso jure loses jurisdiction in favor of either the Senate at bar.
qualified.31
or the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal after the
Finally, contrary to Hayudini's belief, the will of the electorate is
still actually respected even when the votes for the ineligible
candidate are disregarded. The votes cast in favor of the ineligible
candidate are not considered at all in determining the winner of
an election for these do not constitute the sole and total
expression of the sovereign voice. On the other hand, those votes
for the eligible and legitimate candidates form an integral part of
said voice, which must equally be given due respect , if not
more.41
SO ORDERED.