INDUS TREATY: A DIFFERENT VIEW

Ramaswamy R. Iyer

Abstract
This paper presents to the readers an understanding of the Indus Waters Treaty
1960 that is somewhat different from the generally prevalent view, and to show that
differences such as those relating to the Baglihar and other projects are the inevitable
outcome of, and are almost built into, the Treaty. The density of technical detail in the
Treaty provides ample opportunities for differences among engineers. Further, though the
Treaty did resolve the water-sharing issue, it created a potentially adversarial situation in
relation to the Indian use of the western rivers. The location of projects in J & K adds a
further political dimension to the differences. However, a re-negotiation of the Treaty is
fraught with serious difficulties. It might be better to leave things as they are, and hope
that with improving political relations a more reasonable and constructive spirit will
prevail in the future than in the past. That applies to both sides.

I. Introductory

Preliminary
The purpose of this paper is to present to the readers an
understanding of the Indus Waters Treaty 1960 that is somewhat
different from the generally prevalent views, Indian, Pakistani and
international; and to show that differences such as those relating to the
Baglihar and other projects are the inevitable outcome of, and are almost
built into, the Treaty. It is written in the first person because it
represents a change or evolution in my personal understanding of the
subject. It is offered in a tentative non-dogmatic spirit for comment and
correction. The discussion will be in general terms; specific issues
relating to particular projects such as Baglihar or Kishenganga will not
be referred to.

Historical Background
First, however, the background must be briefly outlined. What
follows is a very broad picture. In 1947 the line of Partition of the Indian

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sub-continent cut across the Indus river system, leading to the
disruption of well-established irrigation systems. The newly created
Pakistan felt that it was vulnerably dependent on Indian goodwill, and in
fact there was a disruption of flows in April 1948 through an act of the
provincial Punjab government, though Nehru intervened and rectified
this. Negotiations began soon thereafter, and were tortuous and difficult.
Prolonged talks between the two Governments, assisted by the good
offices of the World Bank, led to the signing of the Indus Treaty in 1960.
The water-sharing under the Treaty (ignoring the details given in the
Annexes and Appendices) was quite simple: the three western rivers (the
Jhelum, the Chenab and the Indus itself) were allocated to Pakistan, and
the three eastern rivers (the Ravi, the Beas and the Sutlej) were allocated
to India. India was not allowed to build storages on the rivers allocated to
Pakistan, except to a very limited extent. Restrictions were also imposed
on the extension of irrigation development in India. There were also
provisions regarding the exchange of data on project operation, extent of
irrigated agriculture, and so on. The Treaty further mandated certain
institutional arrangements: there was to be a permanent Indus
Commission consisting of a Commissioner each for India and for
Pakistan, and there were to be periodical meetings and exchanges of
visits. Provisions were included for the resolution of the differences that
might arise. (Questions, if any arose, were to be resolved within the
Commission; if agreement could not be reached at the Commission level,
the matter was to be referred to the two Governments; if they too failed to
reach agreement, the `question would become a `difference to be
referred to a Neutral Expert. The Neutral Experts findings on the
differences referred to him would be final and binding. If the NE decided
that the matter was in fact a `dispute, it would have to go to a Court of
Arbitration.) The Treaty also included the provision of international
financial assistance to Pakistan for the development of irrigation works

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for utilizing the waters allocated to it, and India too paid a sum of
62.06 million as laid down in the Treaty.

II. Prevailing Views of the Treaty

International View
Let us now take note of the prevailing views on the Treaty (without
comment or discussion at this stage). Internationally, the Indus Waters
Treaty 1960 is regarded as a successful instance of conflictresolution
between two countries that have otherwise been locked in conflict. It is
customary to draw attention to the fact that the Treaty has remained in
place despite three wars between India and Pakistan. It even survived the
serious deterioration in the relations between the two countries following
Kargil. It was also the practice until recently to express satisfaction at
the fact that the arbitration provisions of the Treaty had not so far been
invoked, but that record is changing now.

Dissatisfaction in India and Pakistan

That favourable view of the Treaty as a successful instance of
conflict-resolution is prevalent to a large extent in India and Pakistan as
well, but there is also a measure of dissatisfaction with the Treaty in
both countries. There is a body of opinion that the division of waters
under the Treaty was unfair, but the unfairness alleged in one country is
the exact opposite of that alleged in the other country. There is extensive
writing on the subject in India. The Pakistani dissatisfactions with the
Treaty have also found expression in articles in the media, including one
in the issue of Economic and Political Weekly, Mumbai, dated 26
February 2005.
Quite apart from the question of the sharing of the waters in terms
of percentages, the real difficulty from the Indian point of view is that
certain projects that India has planned on the western rivers are stalled

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because of Pakistans objections. One such project, the Salal
Hydroelectric Project on the Chenab, was under prolonged discussion at
the Commission level and later between the two Governments, and was
eventually accepted by Pakistan (with some agreed changes) in the
1970s. However, differences over other projects Tulbul or Wullar,
Baglihar and Kishenganga are unresolved. Work on Tulbul was stopped
15 years ago, and has not been resumed. On Baglihar, Pakistan has
invoked the arbitration clause of the Treaty for the first time. A Neutral
Expert has been appointed and he has begun his work. The final
outcome of that process has to be awaited. The process might end with
the Neutral Experts findings (which will be final and binding) on the
points of difference, or if he finds that there is a `dispute, it might go to a
Court of Arbitration. Tulbul and Kishenganga have been under
discussion, but the impasse continues.

Unhappiness in J & K
All those projects are in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. There is
much unhappiness in that State at the fact that the restrictions placed
on India in relation to the western rivers make it virtually impossible for
that State to derive any benefits by way of irrigation, hydroelectric power,
navigation, or other, from the waters of the Jhelum and Chenab rivers
that flow through the State. Successive J & K Governments and
Legislatures have complained that the Treaty did not take care of the
interests of the State. That feeling is shared by the people, media,
academics, and others in the State. From time to time there have even
been calls for a scrapping of the Treaty.

Post-Kargil Calls for Abrogation

The dissatisfaction in some quarters in India with the water-
sharing proportions, and the sense of frustration at the stalling of
projects, were aggravated in 2002 by anger at the harm that Pakistan

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was perceived to be inflicting on this country through what came to be
known as `cross-border terrorism. This resulted in the advocacy by some
commentators of the abrogation or re-negotiation of the Treaty. One does
not know whether any such proposal was ever considered at the
governmental level or not, but no such move was actually made. The
relations between the two countries have since shown signs of
improvement.

III. Some Questions

From that brief account of the Treaty and the prevailing views
about it, let us proceed now to a consideration of some of the questions
that arise.

Successful Conflict Resolution?

First, is the Treaty really a successful example of conflict-
resolution? The answer has to be `Yes and No. One must give due credit
to the fact that the Treaty has managed to survive three wars, that the
Indus Commission has continued to meet even when the political
relationship between the two countries was extremely bad, and that at
the working level the relationship between the officials of the two
countries has been marked by cordiality. However, the water-sharing
under the Treaty was (as mentioned earlier) a simple division of the
rivers, with no continuous water-sharing on the same river. The Treaty
itself was doubtless the resolution of a conflict, but once the Treaty was
signed, there was nothing much thereafter to `operate. The high praise of
the Indus Treaty as a successful instance of conflict-resolution seems
somewhat exaggerated. Echoing E. M. Forster on democracy, one might
say that two cheers are quite enough for the Indus Treaty, and that three
cheers are not called for.

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Surgery on the River System
Secondly, what the Treaty did was to carry out a surgery on the
river-system, dividing it into two segments, one for Pakistan and one for
India. The `surgery on the river-systems (Indus in the west, Ganga
Brahmaputra Meghna in the east) was of course a part of the surgery
on the subcontinent. That surgery is now a fact of history. However,
without entering into a discussion of that division, it must be noted that
in deciding whether the sub-continent should be divided, little if any
attention was paid to the fact that major river-systems were going to be
cut across. That did not figure as a factor in the decision-making but was
only considered later as a consequence of a decision taken on other
grounds.
It can be and has been argued that dividing the river-system into
two segments was not the best thing to do, and that the better course
would have been for the two countries jointly to manage the entire
system in an integrated and holistic manner. However, given the
circumstances of Partition and the difficult relationship between the two
newly formed countries, it would have been nave to expect that such a
joint integrated cooperative approach would work. Even now, with the
improvement in the political climate and the resumption of talks, one is
not sure that the vision of more enlightened cooperation on the river
system will be easy to realize.

Why Not River-wise Sharing?

If the ideal solution - joint integrated management of the system
as a whole - was unavailable, then the choice had necessarily to fall on
the second-best solution. However, one would have expected that
second-best solution to take the form of a water-sharing on each of the
six rivers constituting the system. That would surely have been
technically feasible. It would no doubt have been difficult to operate.
Continuous sharing on each river with joint monitoring arrangements

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and so on might have proved cumbersome, difficult and productive of
endless disputes. However, would that process have been more
contentious than the present situation? Why then was a division of the
system into two agreed upon? We shall return to this.

Fair Sharing of Waters?

Thirdly, was the sharing of waters fair? Many in India feel that the
allocation of 80% of the waters to Pakistan and 20 % to India was an
unfair settlement foolishly accepted by the Indian negotiators; and many
in Pakistan argue that the territories that went to India under Partition
were historically using less than10 % of the Indus waters, and that the
Treaty was generous to India in giving it 20% of the waters. Both are
fallacious arguments. A share of 20% is not ipso facto low; on the other
hand, the level of historic use (10% or whatever) does not necessarily
determine a countrys future needs or entitlements. A multiplicity of
factors and criteria have to be applied, having regard to all the relevant
circumstances; no a priori view on what is fair is possible. All that one
can say is that when prolonged inter-country negotiations by teams
acting under governmental briefings leads to a Treaty, and the Treaty is
approved and signed at the highest levels, it must be presumed that it
was the best outcome that could have been negotiated under the given
circumstances; either side is then precluded from saying that it was
unfair, unequal, poorly negotiated, etc. If a degree of dissatisfaction with
the Treaty arises in the course of operation of the Treaty, that would be a
matter for inter-country discussions within the ambit of the Treaty, or a
re-negotiation of the Treaty. (We shall return to that question also.)

Arbitration Regrettable?
Is the invocation of the arbitration provisions a matter for regret?
My answer would be `No. The Treaty provides for arbitration. That would
also be action under the Treaty, and not a breakdown of the Treaty. If

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India is convinced that its position is correct, it should be able to present
its case strongly to the Neutral Expert, and eventually to the Court of
Arbitration if that contingency arises. The outcome of these processes
will have to be accepted by both sides, even if one side has (or both sides
have) reservations on the result. (Presumably the two sides are not
precluded from continuing their discussions, arriving at an agreement
and reporting it to the NE or the Court of Arbitration, as the case may
be.)

IV. Differences over Projects

How do the Differences Arise?

We now come to the crucial question: Why are certain differences
(Tulbul, Baglihar, etc) proving intractable? Broadly speaking, the
Pakistani position is that these projects constitute violations of the
Treaty by India; India denies this. Which party is right?
That question cannot be easily answered because we (the general
public) are generally not in possession of all the technical details of the
projects and are not privy to the discussions that take place between the
two Governments. Even if we were, our view of which side is right will be
only one more opinion, without any authority. It is really for the two
Governments to reach an agreed position, or to seek arbitration.
However, we can try and understand how the differences over
these projects arise. To put it very briefly, they arise from different
approaches to, and interpretations of, various provisions of the main text
of the Treaty, but even more, of the detailed provisions and specifications
contained in the numerous Annexures and Appendices to the Treaty.
Ignoring the complexities involved and simplifying matters, one may say
that Article III (4) of the Treaty basically precludes the building of any
storages by India on the western rivers, except to a limited extent

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carefully laid down in Annexures D and E, which also specify technical
conditions relating to engineering structures and features, such as limits
on raising artificially the water level in the operating pool, pondage levels,
crest level of the gates (where a gated spillway is considered necessary),
location of intakes for the turbines, and so on.
One can immediately see how differences arise. One party can
claim to be in full conformity with the criteria laid down in the Treaty,
and the other party can say that this is not the case. That is exactly what
has been happening. The technical divergences between the two sides
were doubtless rendered more intractable by the bad political
relationship between the two countries over a long period, but it is my
view that the likelihood of differences was inherent in the nature of the
Treaty. There are two reasons for that statement, which I proceed to
explain.

Two Basic Factors:

(a) A Highly Technical Treaty
The first reason is the density of technical detail in the Treaty,
which provides ample opportunities for differences among engineers. It is
interesting to compare this Treaty with the Mahakali Treaty between
India and Nepal, or the Ganges Treaty between India and Bangladesh.
The latter two are relatively non-technical documents that are easy to
understand, even for non-engineers. On the other hand, while the main
part of the Indus Treaty is fairly slim and not too dense, the devil is in
the detail: the Treaty is accompanied by several Annexures and
Appendices of a highly technical and opaque nature. It is these
Annexures and Appendices that determine the overall character of the
Treaty. The engineers on the two sides can have a field day disagreeing
on the meaning and precise application of the various technical features
and criteria that the Annexures and Appendices contain. The Treaty
provides a happy hunting ground for technical disagreements.

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 (One such debate could be over the difference between `run-of-the-
river projects and `storages. What does `run-of-the-river mean? It
means the absence of storage: that is almost a definitional point. When
we describe a project as `run-of-the-river we are implicitly denying the
existence of any storage. The Treaty prohibits storages by India on the
western rivers except to a limited extent, but permits run-of-the-river
schemes subject to certain conditions. However, to describe a scheme as
`run-of-the-river and then to conclude that there is no storage is a
circular argument because the conclusion is implicit in the premise. The
conventional engineering view is that a diversion barrage or a run-of-the-
river hydroelectric project, unlike a dam and a reservoir, does not create
any storage. However, even run-of-the-river projects involve structures,
and any structure on a river does raise the water-level and create a
minimal storage. The question then becomes one of the level and
acceptability of that storage, and a difference of opinion on this is
possible, and has in fact occurred. Even a run-of-the-river project can
be a big project involving a big dam. What India regards as `run-of-the-
river could be in Pakistans view a `storage project. I am not concerned
here with the question of which view is correct, but merely illustrating
the possibility of technical differences between the two sides.)

(b) Nature of Division under Treaty

The second reason is the nature of the division of waters under the
Treaty. Having allocated the western rivers to Pakistan, the Treaty aims
at restraining and not facilitating Indian projects on those rivers. It is
essentially negative towards Indian projects - particularly big projects -
on the western rivers, with some limited permissive provisions. India
wants to use those permissive provisions to the full. It is aware of the
dissatisfaction in the State of J & K, and would like to remove that
grievance. It therefore formulates projects such as Salal, Tulbul,
Baglihar, Kishenganga, and so on. However, the Treaty requires India to

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send all the technical details of such projects to Pakistan in advance,
and that is when the trouble starts.
Pakistan regards the western rivers as its rivers under the Treaty,
and tends to look with jaundiced eyes at any attempts by India to build
structures on those rivers. Structures give control, and Pakistan is
reluctant to agree to India acquiring a measure of control over rivers that
stand allocated to Pakistan. The Treaty gives Pakistan virtually a veto
power over Indian projects on the western rivers, which Pakistan tends to
exercise in a stringent rather than accommodating manner.

Adversarial Situation created by Treaty

Pakistan is apprehensive of the structures in question enabling
India either to reduce water-flows to Pakistan or to release stored waters
and cause floods. The Pakistani objections are thus partly water-related
and partly security-related. The Indian position is that the security fears
are misconceived as India cannot flood Pakistan without flooding itself
first and that its capacity to reduce flows to Pakistan is very limited. The
argument goes on. Thus, though the Treaty did resolve the water-sharing
issue, it created a potentially adversarial situation in relation to the
Indian use of the western rivers.

Divergent Approaches
The Indian and Pakistani approaches to Indian projects on the
western rivers are bound to be fundamentally different. The Indian
engineers would tend to plan and design projects on the western rivers
exactly as they would anywhere else, but try to make them conform to
the criteria laid down in the Treaty and Annexures D and E. As
professionals, their orientation would be to plan and design techno-
economically sound projects that would yield the best benefits in the
given physical circumstances. In doing so, they would doubtless keep in
mind the limitations imposed by the Treaty, but that would be a

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secondary consideration: techno-economic considerations would come
first. (It must be mentioned that the need for techno-economic
soundness is recognized in the Treaty.)
On the other hand, in their examination of the Indian plans and
designs, the Pakistani engineers would be primarily concerned with
protecting Pakistans interests under the Treaty and not with the
necessity for or viability of the Indian projects. They would tend to start
from the Treaty provisions and limitations as the governing and
paramount considerations, and treat techno-economic considerations as
secondary. It is the Indian view that Pakistan is negatively inclined and
tries to find grounds for rejecting all Indian proposals. Even if that is not
true, Pakistani officials may apply the Treaty criteria far more stringently
than their Indian counterparts, and suggest changes, modifications or
alternatives that may appear techno-economically less sound or less
attractive to the latter.
The upshot is that Pakistan tends to accuse India of planning
works that are violative of the Treaty, withholding information, and not
cooperating in a resolution of the difference, and India complains about
what it perceives as Pakistans negativism and deliberate obstruction of
any effort by India to utilize even the limited rights given to it on the
western rivers.
There is a further political dimension to these differences that
must be kept in mind. One can speculate - and this is no more than
speculation - that Pakistan is perhaps not keen on letting these projects
go forward because (a) they are in what it regards as disputed territory,
and (b) the benefits of the projects would go to J & K under Indian
auspices. Hence (presumably) the stalemate. Tulbul, Baglihar, etc, might
not have proved so difficult to resolve if they had been located not in J &
K but elsewhere. However, Pakistan did at one stage let Salal proceed
under certain conditions; that has not happened in the case of Baglihar
or Kishenganga, for whatever reason.

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 V. Allocation: Why did India Agree?

Essentially then, the intractable differences arise from the fact that
under the Treaty India has limited rights on the western rivers and
cannot undertake projects on those rivers without providing all the
details to Pakistan and dealing with Pakistans objections. Why did India
put itself in that position? The answer is that if Pakistan got the near-
exclusive allocation of the three western rivers, India for its part got the
eastern rivers. This was important from the point of view of the Indian
negotiators, because the water needs of Punjab and Rajasthan weighed
heavily with them in seeking an adequate allocation of Indus waters for
India. As early as in 1953, many years before the Treaty, thinking had
begun on the transfer of waters from the eastern rivers to Rajasthan
through a canal. In the 1950s again, Bhakra Nangal was already under
construction. If the Ravi, Beas and Sutlej had not been allocated to India,
Pakistan would have had the usual lower-riparian rights over these
rivers, and would have had to be consulted about these projects and
would surely have raised objections. The projects might not have come
up at all, or might have had to be substantially smaller. In a sense, one
might say that the allocation of the eastern rivers to India under the
Indus Treaty removed Pakistan from the picture in relation to these
rivers, and retrospectively legitimized the Bhakra-Nangal and Rajasthan
Canal Projects. The price paid for this was the sacrifice of rights over the
western rivers. The difficulties that this would lead to in due course, and
the discontent that this would cause in J & K, were perhaps not
anticipated. Having signed away the western rivers to Pakistan, India has
since been trying to remedy the situation to the extent possible within
the four corners of the Treaty, and coming up against the contours of the
Treaty as well as resistance by Pakistan.

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 VI. Where Do We Go From Here?

If the fact that India has limited rights on the western rivers makes
it very difficult for it to build projects on those rivers, what should it do?
It could decide to abide very strictly by the restraints placed on it by the
Treaty, and stop trying to undertake big projects on the western rivers. If
that is not considered possible or desirable, it could continue to try to
persuade Pakistan that the projects are in compliance with the Treaty, or
get a favourable finding from the Neutral Expert or the Court of
Arbitration. Alternatively, it could try and seek a revision of the Treaty.
Abrogation of the Treaty is out of the question, but re-negotiation
is a theoretical possibility. To revert to a point made earlier, India could
seek a water-sharing on the western rivers. That would give India a
position vis vis the western rivers which it does not have at present.
However, there are two difficulties here. First, Pakistan may not agree to
a re-negotiation, or if it does, it may (understandably) want to improve its
position on the western rivers. (Incidentally, some Pakistani writers have
raised questions about Indias right to talk about the rivers that flow
through J & K, though the Indus Treaty implicitly recognizes this; that
question too may get raised in the new negotiations.) Secondly, India
cannot expect to restrict the re-negotiation to the western rivers; the
eastern rivers will also be part of the agenda. If India wants to seek more
rights on the western rivers, it may have to give Pakistan some rights on
the eastern rivers. Is that feasible at this stage? Would that not open a
Pandoras Box? I refrain from spelling out the issues that might arise if
the eastern rivers are opened to re-negotiation.
(Parenthetically, even an abrogation of the Treaty apart from the
wrongness of such a course is not necessarily an advantageous step for
India to take: it may extinguish Pakistans special rights on the western
rivers, but that country would continue to have normal lower-riparian
rights under international law on those rivers; and its lower-riparian

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rights on the eastern rivers, now over-ridden by the Treaty, would stand
revived.)
Having regard to all those complications, perhaps it would be
better to leave things as they are, and hope that with improving political
relations a more reasonable and constructive spirit will prevail in the
future than in the past. That applies to both sides. India may legitimately
expect Pakistan to be more positive and reasonable in its examination of
Indian proposals relating to the western rivers, but equally, India will
have to be scrupulously mindful of the limitations and criteria laid down
in the Treaty, and not chafe at them as being unduly restrictive. That
may not appear to be a wonderful or innovative solution to the difficulties
that have been discussed, but given the complexities involved, nothing
better seems available.

VII. `Indus II?

At this stage, we must take note of a vision of possibilities of

constructive India-Pakistan cooperation over the Indus going beyond the
existing Indus Treaty, that Mr. B. G. Verghese has been putting forward
under the title of `Indus II (The Tribune, 25 26 May 2005). No one
would wish to deprecate such a vision. However, there is a basic difficulty
here. If the Indus Treaty 1960 had been a constructive, cooperative
water-sharing treaty, it could have been built upon and taken further;
but it is a negative, partitioning treaty, a coda to the partitioning of the
land. How can we build cooperation on that basis? How can there be any
joint projects under the Treaty as it stands? Mr. Verghese cites Art. XII
which talks about modifications to the Treaty, but that article has no
great significance: it merely says that the Treaty can be modified by
another Treaty. Essentially what this means is that if you want to bring
about a change you have to negotiate a new Treaty. Even without Article
XII, that could have been done. My point is that a new Treaty of

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cooperation would have to be fundamentally different from the existing
Treaty of division and cannot be built on it. Mr. Verghese refers to Article
VII about `Future Cooperation, but what kind of cooperation does the
article envisage? It begins by referring to common interest in the
optimum development of the rivers and of cooperation towards that end,
but proceeds to such instances of cooperation as the establishment of
hydrological and meteorological stations and sharing of costs on drainage
works. That is a very limited understanding of cooperation. Clause 1 (c)
does talk about cooperation in engineering works, but clause 2 reverts to
the general adversarial relationship embodied in the Treaty (the supply of
advance information about engineering works to the other party, etc).
The point is that Article VII, and in particular Clause 1 (c), is at odds
with the rest of the Treaty. How can cooperation in the optimum
development of the rivers and the joint undertaking of engineering
works on the rivers be reconciled with a division of the river system into
two segments, one for Pakistan and one for India? Hypothetically
speaking, if the two countries were to agree to undertake a certain
project (say Tulbul or Baglihar) jointly, does that mean that the restraint
imposed by Article III (4) of the Treaty on the building of storages by
India on the western rivers, and the detailed provisions of Annexures D
and E stipulating conditions about pondage, placement of spillway gates,
and so on, will not apply to such projects? In other words, does Article
VII over-ride the provisions of Article III and Annexures D and E? Where
in the Treaty is there any basis for such an understanding? There are no
detailed provisions applicable to joint projects in the Treaty. The Treaty is
basically about a division, restricting Indias rights on the western rivers
and Pakistans on the eastern rivers; two isolated sentences about
`cooperation and about `undertaking engineering works cannot change
the entire nature of the Treaty. In my view, the existing Indus Treaty
offers no scope for the kind of `Indus II that Mr. Verghese has in mind. If
we want a new relationship between the two countries on the Indus (and

16
I am at one with Mr. Verghese on this) a totally new treaty will have to be
negotiated; it cannot grow out of the existing Treaty; and questions will
immediately arise about the co-existence of two divergent Treaties.
Even if we ignore that aspect, any negotiations on an `Indus II will
provide an opportunity for a re-opening of all the old settled issues, and
the various difficulties mentioned earlier will arise. Perhaps when the
Kashmir issue has become a thing of the past, and the relations between
India and Pakistan have ceased to be adversarial, we can think of a
better Treaty on the Indus in replacement of the existing one; for the time
being, it might be wiser to leave the existing Treaty as it is, and try to
bring about a more constructive and cooperative approach to its working.

VII. A Final Caveat

The discussion in this paper has been with reference to the

provisions of the Treaty, the perspectives of the two Governments, and
the issues that tend to figure in the talks between them. It does not go
into the question of proper water-management in the Indus Basin. The
waters of the Indus are being badly mismanaged on both sides of the
border, as evidenced (for instance) by the serious incidence of water-
logging and salinity and the intensity of internal water-related conflicts
(inter-State/ inter-provincial) in both countries. With better and saner
water-resource management, the situation in both countries may be very
different, and conflicts may diminish or disappear. That, however, would
call for a separate paper.

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