The Fantasyin Cyberspace 103

Afternatively,the tamagochienablesyou to 'love your neighbour,with-

out a troublesome neighbourto love,conveniently reducinga canonized
virtueto a privatepathologicalneed.Thetamagochidoesnot dependon
any resemblance to produce its effect, but on its power to exchange
signalsand apparentlytake the initiative.However,all this activityon
the part of the subjectis an imaginarysymbolicstrategyto keep the
ls it Possible
to Traverse
the other's desireat bay, renderingit passivein order to posiponethe reali-
zation that jouissancecannot be obtainedin full. The structureis similar
Fantasyin Cyberspace? to that of an analysis:the drive is diverted into a surrogateactivityof
chatterthat keepsthe analystpassive - until, that is,the analysandcanat
lastassumethe activityof the drivewithout leaningon a paisivityin the
analyst.Meanwhile,the analysand babblesaway at the analyst,endea-
vouringto annul his desireand blot him out as a subjectoi lack,thus
'reducinghim
to a partialobjectwith which one can pliy games- tama-
gochi,the ultimateexemplificationof the Lacanianoolet a,. This is
only
one step away from looking for a final mysticalone with whom to
communeand whosecommandments we obey,God the Fatherhimself,
'the ultimate
tamagochi,.
In enteringcyberspace, are we in searchof an urtimatesymboric,oedi-
In this essay,publishedfor the first time, Zizekconsiders how an engage-
pally constructed, or are we going for the 'end of oedipus,?zizek lists
ment with cyberspace, through the distancingit offers,can allow parti- four modesof engagement:('r) forecrosingoedipus (psychoticimmer-
cular structuresof fantasy to surface. This distancing from actual sion);(2) accedingto oedipus (neuroticmediation);(3) pervertingoedi-
experiencemost commonlytakes the form of interpassivity,, pus (stagingthe perfectionof the Law);and (4) appropriating
because oedipus
the surferis activewith the intention of renderingthe 'anonymous,,big (playingout one'scapturein the symbolic). A first u"riion of-(1)claims
other"' passive, so that he or she can reachthe securityof a narcissistic that cyberspace involvesthe exclusionof a prohibiting agency,with a
identification,andtherebybe illusorilyinscribed resultingdissolutionin a pre-symbolic psychoticrealmin wtricrrth" .orn-
in the symbolic.ln order
to enhancethe definitionof interpassivity', Zizekinveststhe term ,inter-
puter incestuously absorbs the subject.Themorethat ,simulacra, (images
activity'with a contrarysense:the subjectis passive beyondwhichnothingrearcanbe found)are pursued, the more,appear-
while anotheractively
performsits task. ln fact, active and passiveare interdependent,since ance'(symbolic fictionsinvestedwith visionarypromise)is impaired.A
societyoften providesan activeform (suchas rituals of mourning)to secondversionperceives advantagesin this dissolutionof the patriarchal
give an inward passivefeeling an outward expression, orderand all that it implies,in that it visualizes an alternative to oedipus:
therebyopening
a gap betweeninner and outer, realityand appearance. The gap permits
cyberspace rescues subjectsfrom fixed symbolicidentities,,interpellation,
the bogusperformance of a ritual,and,conversely, into oppressiveregimes,allowing them to create themselvesfreely
the ritual canprovoke
genuinefeelingin someonegoingthroughthe motions,while,asa third beyondthe constraintsof binary oppositions.(2) counter to both these
,alternative,the gap for the obsessional neuroticstretchesbetweenthe versionsis the notion that cyberspace, far from looseningthe oedipal
ritualhe performsand the feelinghe avoids. structure,actuallystrengthensit, becausea real participationin a fictive
Thisgap betweenfeeling and expressionis exploitedin Zizek,sprime moderendersmoreobviousthe mediationby proxyof ordinarycommun-
exampleof interpassivity: the Japaneseelectronictoy, the tamagochi,a ication:the gap that existsbetweenthe Realof the subject(the ,subject
of
fake child/petthat needscare, captivatingits careis by its imperious enunciation') and its symbolicidentity(the 'subjectof the enunciated,)
demandsissuedthroughbeepsand flashinglightsfor 'food,,,drink,and alreadyrequiresthe adoptionof a persona. (3) Betweenthe psychosis of
'play',all supplied (1) and the neurosisof (2), betweenforeclosureof the Law
by buttons.lf it is not ,fed,,it ,dies,,which leavesopen ani its inte-
the possibilitythat it can be 'killed' by a murderouscyberwisechild. gration,isthe pervert'scomputerizedgame:ascyberspace triesto be free
 104 Culture
of the Real, paradoxicallyby installingwhatever laws it likes,so the
'proverbialmale
masochist'is preciselythe one who enjoyslayingdown
the law that forbidshis own enjoyment.(4) The final option that cyber-
spacecan provideis liberationfrom the enslavement of one's,fundamen-
tal fantasy'.HereZizekis alludingto the Freudo-Lacanian formulationof
fantasyas supportof the subjectin its alienation,coveringthe failure of
languageto acknowledgeits being:'to traversethe fantasy'is the Lacan-
ian versionof Freud's'working-through,- a breaking-upof the false
consistency of the subjectin all its morbid fixitiesby activatingthrough
the imaginationsomethinginvoluntarilycreated by the 'pre-synthetic
imagination'.cyberspaceoffers a realm of undisclosedpossibilitiesof
moving beyondoedipusand returning,allowingfor dramaticresponses
that preservea minimaldistanceelectronically
safeguarded.
The four options do not, however,rule one another out, as if there
were a simplechoice;for cyberspace is subjectto linesof force vibrating
from symbolicnetworksof dominationand resistance.
I a person tells a tasteless
Recent theory of ideology and art has focused on the strange phenomenon of
inter?tassiuity,l a phenomenon that is the exact obverse of interactivity' in the
sense ofbeing active through another subject who does the job for me, like the
Hegelian Idea manipulating human passions to achieve its Goals (the ,cunning
of Reason' (List der wrnunft) ). Perhaps the first implicit formulation of inter-
passivity was given by Lacan in his commentary on the role of the chorus in
Greek tragedy:
And what is a chorus? You will be told that ir's you younelves. or perhapsit isn,t you.
But that's the point. Means are involved here, emotional means. In my view, the
Chorus is people who are moved.
[. . -] when you go to the theatre in the evening, you are preoccupied by the aflain
of the day, by the pen that you lost, by the check that you will have to sign next day.
You shouldn't give yourselves too much credit. your emotions are taken charge of by
the hedthy order displayed on the stage. The chorus takes care of them. The emo-
tional commentary is done for you. . . . It is just sufhciently silly; it is also not withour
6rmness;it is more or lesshuman.
Therefore, you don't have to worry; even if you don't feel anything, the chorus
'why
will feel in your stead. after all can one not imagine that the effect on you may
be achieved, at least a small dose of it, even if you didn't tremble that much?z
In order to avoid standard contemporary examples of interpassiviry like so-
called canned laughter (where laughter is included in the sound-track, so that
The Fantasyin Cyberspace 105
the TV set laughs for me - that is, it realizes,takes over, the spectator,svery
passiveexperienceof the show), let me evoke a different example,3that of
the
collector who merely accumulates paintings or video ."rr.tt., with films,
without ever having time (or true procliviry) to watch them. whar matters
to him is the fact that he possesses them, the awarenessthat they are there, all
the time at his disposal. Isn't there a paraller berween him and the famous
Pascalian,/Althusserianexample of a non-believer who just has to kneel
down
and blindly repeat the gesruresof ritual, and faith will come by itselfi The point
is to reinterpret the non-believer following the extemal ritual in the light
of the
logic of the collector: he doesnot wait for the magic moment of faith to
occur
- merely imitating the gesturesof faith,
laying the foundation for it, is enough
for him. crucial is this obsessionaleconomy of postponing the final
event -
that is, oflimiting oneself to merely laying the ground for it:1he truly
christian
statementis not 'I do not need to follow the extemal rituals, deep in
my heart
I believe and that's all that matters', but the opposite one, ,I follow the
rituals
of belief,but I can never be certainthat I believe...'.
Another exemplary caseof intelpassivity is the embarrassingscenein which
joke and then, when nobody around him laughs,
himself burstsout into a noisy laughter, repeating 'That was funnyl'
or some_
thing similar - that is to say, himself acting out the expected reaction
of the
audience.The situation here is in a way the exact oppositeof that of the
Greek
chorus: the chorus feelsfor us, bored and preoccupiedspectatorsunable
to let
ourselvesgo and experience the appropriate passiveemotions, while
here, it is
the agent (the narrator of the joke) himself who also assumesthe passive
role,
who laughs (at his own joke) instead of us, his public. The conirast
is even
stronger if we compare the situation with that of the cannedlaughter
on TV:
the agent who laughs instead of us (i.e., through whom we, tlie
bored and
embarrassed public, none rhe lesslaugh) is not the anonymous ,big other' of
the invisible artificial public, but the narrator of the joke himseH H-e
does it to
assurethe inscription of his act inro the 'big other' the symbolic order;
thar is,
his compulsivelaughter is not dissimilarto exclamationslike ,oopsl,
which we
feel obliged to utrer when we stumble or do somerhingstupid. Tie
mystery of
this last caseis that it is alsopossiblefor another person who merely
wrtnesses
our blooper to say 'oopsl'for us.So, in an theseexampres,I am active
in order
to assurethe passiviryof an other who standsfor my true place. Interpassiviry,
like interactiviry, thus subvertsthe standardopposition b.nu."r, activiry
and
passiviry:if in interactiviry (of the 'cunning of Reason'), I am passive
while
being activethrough another,in intcrpassiviry, I am activewhile b.i^g prsrru.
through another. More precisely,the term 'inreracriviry' is currenrly
used in
rvvo senses:(1') interacting with thc medium - thar is, not being just a passive
consumer; (2) actingthroughanother agent, so that my job is done,
wh-ile I sit
 106 Culture
'While
back and remain passive,just observing the game. the opposite of the
first mode of interactivity is also a kind of inteqpassivity',the mutual passivity
of two subjects, like two lovers passively observing each other and merely
enjoying the other's presence,the proper notion of inteqpassiviryaims at the
reversal of the second meaning of interactiviry: the distinguishing feature of
interpassivityis that, in it, the subjectis incessantly- frenetically even- actiue,
while displacingon to another the fundamentalpassivityof his or her being.
Of course, being active and being passiveare inextricably linked, since a
passivefeeling, authentic asit is, in a way acquiresactualityonly in so far asit is
'expressed'
properly extemalized, in an activity that is already socially codified
(the most obvious example: in Japan, laughter signalsour host's respectful
embarrassment,while for us, if someone answersour query with a laugh, it
rather signalsaggressive disrespect.. . ). This minimal gap opensup the way not
ri only to faking authentic feelings, but also to inducing them by means of
f externally submitting to their ritualized expression (in this way, one can
'make
l. oneselfcry', etc.), so that, although it startedasa fake, we end up 'really
'tfeeling
it'. It is this minimal gap that is mobilized in the obsessionaleconomy:
'the obsessional ritual is preciselya kind of 'empty'ritual, a ritual in which we,
say, go through gesturesof mourning precisely in order not to expeience the
true sorrow over the death of our fellow whose losswe are mouming. Doesn't
tamagochi, the newJapanesetoy extremely popular among children, rely on this
same gap? Tamagochi is a virtual pet, a small round object with a screenthat
behaveslike a child (or a dog, or a bird, or some other pet animal that needs
care), rrlahJngnoisesand - the key feature - posing demands on the child who
owns it. When it beeps, one has to look on the screen,where the object's
demand can be read - for food, drink, or whatever - and push the proper
buttons beneath the screen to satisfy these demands. The object can also
demand that we play with it; if it is too wild, the proper thing to do is to
punish it by, again, pressing the proper buttons. Various signals ftke the
number of small hearts on display) even tell us the level of the object's
happiness.If one fails too many times to meet these demands, the object
'dies'; it possesses
only one more life, and when we fail yet another time, the
object dies definitively - that is, stopsfunctioning - so that, of course,we have
to buy a new one . . . (And, incidentally, one of the common ways in which
wicked children heckle their peers innocently imrnersed in their care for
tamagochi is to meddle with the toy when it is briefly left unattended,provoking
catastrophicconsequences- for example, feeding it too much so that the
virtual animal behind the screen chokes to death. Tamagochiis thus also
breeding a number of virtual murderers among children, giving rise to the
cyberspacecounterpart of the sadisticchild torturing a cat or a butterfly to
'death'
death.') Since this ultimate has causednumerous neryous breakdowns
The Fantasyin Cyberspace 107
and deep traumas in the children who owned them, recent versions of tama-
gochi contain endlesspossibilities of resuscitation - that is, after the pet-object
dies,the gameis simply over, and one can startit again.This, of course,already
obfuscateswhat was so provocative and traumatic about the original tamagochi:
namely,the very fact that its (secondor third) deathwasfna/, irrevocabl..uTh.
interesting thing here is that we are dealing with a toy, a mechanicalobject,
that provides satisfactionprecisely by behaving like a difficult child bombarding
us with demands.The satisfactionis provided by our being compelled to care
for the object any time it wants - that is, by fulfilling its demands. Don't we
find here the ultimate exemplificationof the obsessional's object, in so far asthe
gb:"'S's.*3lb-".*biS:l#;{:.:i:.-il*tli.-e*g*S5;*3g?-g{i=
Tamagochi
enablesus to
possessan other who satisfidd<jur desirein so far as it is reduced to a seriesof
pure demands.
The other is th,Lrspurely virtual: no longer a true, living, intersubjective
other, but an inanimate screen, a stand-in for the non-existent pet animal,
which just signalsthe animal'sdemands.In other words, whar we find here is a
strangerealizationof the scenedescribedbyJohn Searlein his famous chinese
room mental experiment designedto prove that machines cannot think: we
know that there is no 'real' partner of communication, nobody who really
'understands'
the emitted demands,just a meaninglessdigital circuit. The
uncanny enigma, of course,residesin the fact that we feel fully the appropriare
emotions, although we are well aware that there is nothing beyond the screen
- that is, that we are playing with signalswith no referenr:
the garne is reduced
to the symbolic order, to the exchangeof signals,with no referenr beyond it.
'we
can thus well imagine alsoa sex-tamagochi: a tamagochibombarding us with
demandslike 'Kiss me! Lick me down there! Penetrate me!', to which we
respondby simply pressingthe appropriatebuttons, and thus fulfilling our dury
to enjoy, while in 'real life' we can rest calmly and have a nice lone drink. No
wonder some conservativetheologians in Europe have already proclaimed
tamagochi to be the latest incamation of Satan,in so far as, in ethical terms,
'Satan'
is also a name for the solipsistic self-imrnersion and utter ignorance of
Ioving compassionfor my neighbour. Isn't the faked compassionand carefor a
digital toy infinitely more perversethan a simple, direct egoisticalignoranceof
others, since it somehow blurs the very difference befween egoism and
a-ltruisticcompassion?However, doesn't the same hold also for all kinds of
inanimate objectswith which children and adultsplay gamesunder the con-
dition of the fetishistdisavowal('l know very well that this isjust an inanimare
object, bur none the lcss I acr as if I believe this is a living being,), from
children's dolls to inflatable sex-dollswith appropriateholes for penetration?
Two features distinguish tamagochifrom the usual inanimate plaything: (1) in
contrast to a doll, the tarnagochi no longer aims at imitating (asrealistically as
 108 Culture The Fantasyin Cyberspace 109
possible)the contours of what it replaces;it doesnot 'look like' a smallbaby
or with an entiry which is purely virtual - that is, which existsonly asan interface
a naked woman or a puppet * we are dealing with a radical reduction of
simulacrum.
imagingryresemblanceto the syqlQ_oticlevel, to the exchange of sigrrals;that is, In other words, tamagochiis a machine which allowsyou to satisfyyour needto
tamagochi is an object that merely emits demandsin the form ofsignals, (2) In
Ioueyour neighbour. You have a need to indulge in care for your neighbour, a
contrast to a doll, which is a passive,pliable object with which we can do
child, a pet? No problem: tamagochi enablesyou to do it without bothering
whatever we want, tamagochiis thorougtrly active; that is, the whole point
of your actual neighbours with your intrusive compassion - tamagochican take
'l the game is that il always
hasthe initiatiue,that the object controls the game and
careof this pathologicalneed ofyours. The charm of this solution residesin the
t bombardsus with demands.
fact that (what tradirional ethics regarded as) the highest expression of your
This brings us back to the problem of the interpassive delegating of our
humanity - the compassionateneed to take care of another living being - is
innermost feelings (ultimately, our jouissance)to another. If, in oui f.elirrgs, *e
treated as a dirry idiosyncratic pathology which should be satisfiedin privare,
always minimally imitate what a presupposedother feels- one cries and laughs
without bothering your actual fellow beings.
.when one seesone's neighbourscrylng or laughing - who, then, was the first Tamagochithus gives the ultimate twist to interpassiviry: a purely virtual
,Jink in the chain? what if there i, .rohrst ti.rti wrr"t if delegation
ro a non- passiveother that bombards us with demandsand pushesus to frenetic activiry
\'l',existentother is primordial? However, if there is no first link, then the whole
to keep it satisfied- that is, calm, immobile, ultimately asleep.As every child
chain potentially collapses,falling down like a house of cards or a series of
knows, one is most profoundly satisfiedwhen tamagochileaves one alone and is
dominoes, so that we arrive at tamagochi.That is, I can replace my immediate 'asleep'
for a couple of hours. - Tamagochi is thus an instrument of interpassiviry
partner with a mechanical toy consisting of mere signals of my partner,s
in its contrast wirh the standardpuppet-toy (a doll, a dog, etc.), which is a
emotions. The link with obsessionalneurosis is crucial for the notion of
passiveobject oflering itself to be manipulated (caredfor, fondled, etc.) by us:
interpassiviry,since the key problem of the obsessionalneurotic is how to
we do the same with the tamagochi,but with the crucial difference that, in
postpone the encounter with jouissance(and thus maintain the belief in its
doing it, we are not following our whims, 6s1 fslfilling its demands.Does not
possibiliry): if,, instead of viewing fi.lms, I just endlessly record rhem on
this reference to the interpassiveobject also explain in what sense,for the
video, this postponing maintains the belief that, if or when I finally do it, this
subject-patient,the analystishis objetpetit a, or, more precisely,in what sense
will really be 'it'. Tamagochimerely draws the logical conclusion from this
the patient wants to reduce the analyst to a kind of tamagochito be kept happy
obsessionalpostponing: if I never really want to encounter the other, why
by the patient's incessantseductive babble? In*both g?Sss,-y.S*fg5|pl"ng;yj_qt-.
bother at all with a ReaI other? Isn't a machine which manipulates and
fabricatessubstanceless signds of the other good enough? Lltimately, the toy
rl1 f i:lrir"l erE"e-:pjbs{:*i*;s.;,1_h:."e.,:ll__e
4:_*f*"pJ",ll"*:r$Ls"re1e t"nq pl.rs*r s .$ernands.ft,.p-o*
99.se!!.!gl]-4i^*r"ltlrt!$g. pJ9.y9+: lh-e
itself, the small round object, becomesthe object of our worqr, in accordance "glh.qr.'q"d"lit:
fr9,f+.,,pmergrng.,
In the caseof tamagochi,we have a -ech"nicil'otttlr-*tiiiir,"'
with the obsessional strategythat consistsin erasingthe other (the ,realperson'
although it incessantlyemits demands,hasno desireproper - this is what makes
qua spltt/desiringsubject),in reducing him or her to the partial object with
it such a perfect partner for the obsessional. And it is the samein the obsessio-
which one can play games - tamagochi,the ultimate exemplification of thc
nal's dealings with his analyst: the goal hii i"ieisa"f acti"iry ii io ivoid or,
Lacag'ianobjetpetit a. "f
.."t"I.. poltpone indefinitely rhe confronration with the abyssof the other's
risk the most daring hypothesis:is not the ultimate consequenceof
**lK,d,-to desire.
all this for a materialist that God himsetfk the ultimatetamagochi, fabricated by
i The first thirrg to do here, of course,would be to opposethe analystto the
our unconscious and bombarding us with inexorable demands?That is, is
'] theatricalpractice ofso-called'claques', people paid by the artist or his or her
tamagochinot thevirtual entity, non-existent in itseld with whom we exchange
supportersto start applaudingand thus organize a triumphant reception of the
signalsand comply to its demands?Does not the non-imaginary characterof
artist'sperformance.In rhe cascof a claque, the other is paid for stagingthe
(which no longer endeavoursto resemblethe pet it standsfor) hold
,tamagochi gestureof recognition (of the artist'sendeavour)and thus satisfyinghis or her
j .jp..:tnt for the Judaic rradition, with its prohibition on producing imagesof narcissism,while, in clcar c()nrrastro it, the patient pays the analystfor the
Again, no wonder that for some theologi anstamagoihiis Satanincarnate:
iGod? exact opposite reason:that is, not to give direct recognition to his superficial
it, as it were, lays bare the mechanism of the believer's dialogue with God,
self-perception,to frustratehis demand for recognition and narcissisticsatisfac-
since it demonstrateshow an intense, caring exchangeof symtols is possible
tion. In the analytictreatment,true interpassiviryis discernibleat a more radical
 110 Culture
The Fantasyin Cyberspace 1't1
subject'sentry into the symbolic order) to some new, post-oedipallibidinal
economy. Of course,the mode ofperception of this'end of Oedipus'depends
on the standpoint of the theoretician. First, there are those who see in ir a
dystopianprospectof individuals regressingto pre-synnbolicpsychoticimmer-
sion, of losing the symbolic distance that susrainsthe minimum of citicil,/
reflective attitude (the idea that the computer functions as a maternal Thing
that swallows the subject, who entertains an attitude of incestuous fusion
towards it). In short, today, in the digitalized universe of simulation, the
Imaginary overlaps the Real, at the expenseof the Symbolic (JeanBaudrillard,
Paul Virilio).
This position is at its strongesrwhen it insistson the difference berween
appearanceand simulacrum: 'appearance'has nothing in common with the
postmodem notion that we are entering the era of universalizedsimulacra,in
which reality itself becomesindisringuishablefrom its simulated double. The
nostalgiclonging for the authentic experienceof being lost in the deluge of
simulacra(detectablein virilio), aswell asthe postmodern assertionof a Brave
New'world of universalized simulacra as the sign rhat we are finally getting rid
of the metaphysicalobsessionwith authentic Being (detectablein vartimo),
both missthe distinction ber'uveen simulacrumand appearance: what getslost in
today's digital 'plague of simulations'is not the firm, rrue, non-simulated real.
but appearance ikelf. so what is appearance?In a sentimental answer to a child
askingwhat God's face looks like, a priest answeredthat, whenever the child
encountersa human f.Lceradiating benevolence and goodness,whoever this
face belongsto, he gets a glimpse of God's face. The truth of this sentimental
platitude is that the Supra-sensible(God's face) is discernibleas a momenrary,
fleeting appearance,a 'grimace', of an earthly face. It is t/ris dimension of
'appearance'
that, asit were, transubstantiates a piece of reality into somcthing
that, for a brief moment, radiatesthe supra-sensible Etemiry that is missingin
the logrc of the simulacrum.In the simulacrum,which becomesindistinguish-
able from the real, everything is here and not other; a transcendentdimension
effectively 'appears'inlthrough it. Here we are back at rhe Kantian proble-
lt matic of the Sublime: in Kant's famous reading of the enthusiasmevoked by
As a psychoanalytically oriented (Lacanian)philosopher, the French Revolution in the enlightened public throughout Europe, the
let me begin with the revolutionary events funcrioned as a sign through which the dimension of
questronone expectsan analystto raise:what are the
consequencesofcyber_ trans-phenomenalFreedom, of a free sociery,appeared.'Appearance'
spacefor oedipus - that is, for the mode of subjectivizarion is thus the
rliat psychoanalysis domain not simply of phenomena, but of those 'magic moments' in which
conceptualizedas the oedipus complex and its dissolution?
doxa today is that cyberspaceexplodes,or ar leastpotentialy
The predominant another, noumena-ldimension momentarily 'appears' in ('shines through,)
unJermines the some empirical/contingent phenomenon. Therein also residesthe problem
reign of oedipus: it involves the 'end of oedipus', in
rhat whar occurs in it is with cyberspaceand virtual realiry: what virtual reality threatensis not 'realiry',
the passagefrom the structure of symbolic castration(the
intervention of the which is dissolvedin the multipliciry of irs simulacra,but, on the contrary,
Third Agency that prohibits/disturbsthe incesruousdyad,
and thus enablesthe appearance itself, To put it in Lacanian terms: simulacrum is imaginary (illusion),
 112 Culture
The Fantasyin Cyberspace 113
while appearanceis symbolic (fiction); when
the specific dimension of sFn- creation: cyberspacedelivers me from the vestigesof biologicat constraintsand i
bolic appearancestarts to disintegrate, the
Imaginary and the Rear become elevatesmy capaciry to construct freely my Self, to let myself go in a multitude,i
more and more indistinguishable. The key
to today's universe of simuracra,in of shifting identities. l
which the Real is less-andless distinguishable
from its imaginary simurarion, However, opposed to both versionsof 'cyberspaceas the end of oedipus'
residesin the rerreat of 'symboric effiliency'.
This cruciar distinction berween are some rare, but none the less penetrating, theoreticians who assert the
the simulacrum (overlapping with the Rearj
and appearanceis eas'y discernible continuity of cyberspacewith the oedipal mode of subjectivizatiorr.6cyb..-
in the domain of sexuariry'in the guise of the
distinction berween po-ogr"prry spaceretains the fundamental oedipal stnrcture of an intervening Third order
and seduction:pornography 'shows it alr', 'rear
sex', and for that very reason which, in its very capacity as the agency of mediation,/mediatizarion, susrains
produces mere simulacraof sexuality,while
the processof seduction consists the subject'sdesire,while simultaneously acring as the agent ofprohibition that
entirely in the play of appearances,hints and promises,
and thereby evokes the prevents its direct, full gratification. owing to this intervening Third, every
elusivedomain of the supra-sensible sublime Thing. partial gratification,/satisfactionis marked by a fundamental ,Jhis is not that,.
on the other hand, there are those who emphasiie
the liberating potencial of The notion that cyberspaceas the medium of hyper-realry,rfriliityHiiffi?
cyberspace:cyberspaceopens up the domain
of shifting *rtt pt; ,.*ual and efficiency and brings about a fllse total transparencyof the imaginary simulacra
social identities, at leastpotenrially riberaring us
from the hola of th. patriarchal coinciding with the Real, while effectively expressinga certain ,spontaneous
Law; it, as it were, realizesin our e.reryd"y practical
experience the ldecon_ ideology of cyberspace'(to paraphraseAlthusser),=.*::i.**l*#"Eh*E**gl*.*._Slg_
struction' of old metaphysicalbinaries ('rearSeH'
versus,artificiarmask,, etc.).
In cyberspace,I am compeiled to renounce any
fixed symbolic identrty, the "9d"q_ cny :".tli:]p.-.,::lp::.T;:"r
_9_l-.qy9-._l'!1.9:,_y_Hch.not lr'g,"sls"qs;*,y
legallpolitical fiction of a unique Self guaranteed
disp;ositif
oi iie iymEotic Law, but evenrenders ,"rpo* palp"bt. 1.,o."l
by my prace in the socio-
symbolic structure. In short, according to this second .,r.rrior, iC'tiii.idi ;h; .;r,drioni'arar:s"maA*;ns:ygv
@,__;Ip#'.*.1'Siiff'EE rn rne
(Sandy Stone, Internet or parricipatirrg in a virtual communify: fint, there is the gap berween
Sherry Turkle), cyberspaceannounces the end of
the carteri"r, ,rg;ro ,, tlr. the 'subject of enunciation' (the anonyrnous X who does it, *ho speak$
unique 'thinking substance'.of course, from this
second point of view, the and the'subject of the enunctated/of the sratement'(the symbolic identiry
pessimisticprophets of the psychotic 'end of
oedipus, in the universe of that I assumein cyberspace,which can be, and in a sensealwaysis, 'invented,-
simulacra simply betray their inabiJiry to imagine
'what an altemarive to oedipus. the signifier that marks my identiry in cyberspaceis never directly ,myself');
we have here is another version of the standard
postmodem deconsrruc_ the samegoesfor the other side, for my partner(s)in cyberspacecommunica-
tionist narrative, according to which, in the bad
old patriarchal order, the tion. Here, the undecidabiliry is radical: I can ,never be sure who thev are.
subject'ssexual identiry was predetermined by
his o. h.. place and,/or role whEtber
within the fixed symbolic oedipal framework - 'big 'real' !lr9yale,frq+[y:-_qhg
y,?ythg.d9.seo_q.9_p.-i.1y;;"#iltft;iH6fi;-;
'#h.ih;i
the other, took care of us, personat all behind , r..".tr-perror",
and conferred on us the identity of either a ,man, ittlxieitan:tersoil is a
or a ,woman,, and the maskfor a multiplicity ofpersons,whetherthe same'real' personp^orr"rr.,,rrd
subjectt ethical dury was limited to the effort ro
succeedi' o...rffrrg the pre- manipulates more screen-personas,or whether I am simply dealing with a
ordained symbolic place
ftromosexuality and other ,p"*..riorrr;.i,.r. p.r_ digitalized entity that does not stand for any 'real'person. It thus seemsthat
ceived as simply so many signs of the subject's
faituri to fonow the oedipal cyberspacematerializesdirectly the so-called schema L elaborated.by Lacan in
path and thus achieving'normar'/'mature'sexuar
identity). Today, however, as the early fifties to account for the structure of comrnunication: *ithi, cyber-
Foucrult supposedlydemonstrated, the legal,/prohibitive
matrix of power that space,Frlro-sQ.r*-e-q-Jg;g.gARJrrtsrAg!_.d^-"*g.th*E.-tmgg"mry-
underlies the oediparfunctioning of sexualiryis axis, myself (a)*gdjt,
in retreat, so that, insteadof mirror-partner (a'), while, beneath it and tr.rr.nrof-tl"r1i6lE*is tlia:;y-uoti.
being interpellatedto o.:rrpl a pre_ordainedplace
in the socio_rlrrrr-Uoli. ora.., axis of-tlie-relahonshipberween myself asthe subject of rhe enunciation (ff) and
the subject has gained the freedom (or at least
the promise, th. prorp..t of the other, which for ever remainsan enigmabeyond the 'wall oflanguage',his
freedom) to shift berween different socio-symboiic
sexual identities, to con_ or her 'che vuoi?' for ever unanswered(he or she is sendingme this message,
struct his Self asan aestheticoeuure - the motif at work from
the late Foucault,s but what is behind it? what docs he or she want to achievewith it?). In short,
notion of the 'careof the Self ' up to deconstructionist
feminist emphasison the inter-face meanspreciselythat nry relationshipto the other is neverfacetoface,
social formation of gender. It is easyto perceive
how the."f"..rr.. to cyber- that it is alwaysmediat(iz)edby the interposeddigital machinery thai standsfor
space can provide an additional impetus to
this ideology of aestheticselG the Lacanian lbig other', the anonymous symbolic order whose structure is
 't14
Culture The Fantasyin Cyberspace 115
that of a labynnth' I 'browse', I bounce around
in this infirute space where qua the formal structure of prohibition/mediation. In other words, what is
messagescirculate freely without fixed destination, 'beyond
while the Whole ofit - this Oedipus' (asa certain historically specified narrative./myth) is Oedipus
immense circuitry of 'murmurs' - remains for ever
beyond the scope of my itself qua purely formal structure co-substantial with the very fact of the
comprehension.(In this sense,one is tempted to propose
the proto-Kantian symbolic order.TParadoxically,cyberspacethus designatesa potential 'relapse'
notion of the 'cyberspaceSublime' as the magnitude
of messagesand their into psychosis,a breakdown of the symbolic mediation, preciselyin so far asit
circuits, which even the greatesteffort of my synthetic
imagrnarion cannor actualizesthe pure structure of symbolic prohibition,/mediation without the
encompass/comprehend.)Furthermore, doesn't 'little
the a priori possibiliry of piece of the real'of a figure which gives body to it.
viruses disintegrating the virtual universe point toward,
ih. fr.t that, in the However, clear and elucidating as it may appear, this difference between
virtual universe as well, there is no 'other of th.
oth..', that this universe is a Oedipus qua rnythical narrative and Oedipus qua forrnal stmcture leaves a
i' priori inconsisrent, with no final guarantee of its coherent functioning? The crucial question unanswered:where does the need for the narrative supplement
\ conclusion
thus seemsto be that there ls a properry .symbolic, functioning
of to the formal structure come from? Why can the formal structure not reign in
cyberspace:cyberspaceremains 'oedipaf i., ih. ,.nr. that,
in order ro circulate its purity, without its confusing identification w"ith an empirical 'pathological'
freely in it, one must assumea fundamental prohibition
and/ ora,lienation.yes, element (the paternal figure) which gives body to it? Why can we not simply
in cyberspace,'you can be whatever you want', you're
free to choose a enter the symbolic order, and direct\ assumethe loss involved in this entry?
symbolic identity (screen-persona), but you must choose one whichin a way Needlessto add, we encounter thereby the enigma of the prohibition of the
will always betray you, which w'l never be fully adequate;
you musr accepr impossible: if jouissanceis in itseH impossible,why do we need the superfluous
representation in cyberspaceby a signifying erement
th", ,rrr,, around in the gesture of formally prohibitingit? That is to say, the basic paradox of symbolic
circuitry asyour stand-in.yes, in cyberspace,'everything
is possible,,but at the prohibition residesnot in why a human animal acceptsand 'intemalizes' an
price of assuming a fundamental impossibirity:y:ou 'irrational'
."n.ro, circumvent the harsh renunciation, but, quite to the contrary, in its ultimately
mediation of the inteface, its'bypass', whichseparates
you (asthe subject of superJluous character. Let us recall the small scene from Sergio Leone's Once
enunciation) for ever from your symbolic stand_in.
Upon a Time in the West,in which Henry Fonda shoots a cheap informer,
There is, however, a sensein which 'oedipus on-line'
no longer functions telling him that he cannot trust him - how can one trust a man who doesn't
as oedipus proper' To get this break clear, one has
to bear in mind Lacan,s even trust his belt (he wears,to support his trousers,abelt andshoulderstraps)?8
strict distinction berween the oedipus myth (the nanatiue
of his parncide and The hystericalinhibitions are somewhat like that: one acts as if the barrier,/
incest, etc.) and the underlying purely formal srructure
of symbolic prohibition obstacleis not alreadyin languageitself; so one imposeson oneselfan addi-
as the price to be paid for entry into the symbolic order: ,No!,
of the father is tional empirical prohibition (or cut or burden) - with the illusion, of course,
just a stand-in for, an imaginary embodiment
'jouissance of, the purely formal fact that that, if one were to circumvent this zdditional prohibition, one would ger the
is prohibited to the one who speaksas such, (Lacan).
The moment thing itself. Perhaps this very illusion provides the reason for the otherwise
my need is formulated as a symbolic demand addressed
to the other, I get senseless superfluousgestureof prohibiting somethingwhich is alreadyin itself
involved in the rwists and deadlocks of the impossibiJiry
of its full gratification impossible.Berliners used to refer to the wall separatingthe easternfrom the
(the gap opens up berween every material object
*hicl satisfiesmy need and western part of the divided ciry till 1989 as an atempt to 'stabilize the
the unfathomable 'it' at which my desire aims; my desire
becomesmediated by impossible': is this not the elementary function of every wall of symbolic
'"- -7 the.desireof the other - that is, the fundame.rti
'whar enigm" which borhersme is prohibition?'
il) am I asan object of desirefor the other?'what does
the other seein me This same paradox accounts also for the fundamental ambiguiry of the
,l."-l-!1r--rO.s me (un)worthy of his or her desire?',etc., etc.). So, although psychoanalyticnotion oftransference.In Lacan, 'transference'does not desig-
cyberspace does invorve a fundamentar prohibition,/alienation,
what we nate a 'personal'relationship:transferenceis inherent in languageassuch,in the
encounter in it is rather the purery formar srrucrure 'big 'supposed
of symbolic prohibition, Other'. Languageitself is to know'; that is, the subjectspeaksin
without the 'little piece of the (paternal)real' (the parernar
figure) sustainingit. so far ashe or shepresupposes that the big Other is complete, that the meaning
Does this not open the way to mediate be*veen the
two r"eadingsof cyber- of his or her utterancesis guaranteedin or by the big Other. Transference,as
space,post-oedipal and oedipal? Cyberspacels post-oedipar
with regard to such, is another name for what Davidson called the 'charity principle', the
oedipus qua mytbical narrarive,but nor post-oedipalwith [,,
regard to oedipus fi fundamental attitude of trust towards the other. tjgl's_rlglnUH:ln+sg.pru*-
I

il
't16
Culture
bg gupported by !3""peu de r6el,by".sorne.rem4ipderof t!e- Real, Say,with regard
to the gap berween the synbolic function-place of the father and the person
who occupies this function, there is no transferenceto the father without some
'peu
de r6el', some stain, some purely idiosyncratic fearure which apparently
prevents him from fully embodying the patemal function. In other words, our
standardattitude towards a paternal figure of authoriry involves a fundamental
misperception: usually,we say,'In spite ofhis idiosyncrasies,I still believe in his
authoriry, since he is afier *y father', whereas the true relationship is the
"ll
opposite one: that is, that these litde idiosyncrasiesguarantee that this flesh-
and-blood person actually acts as the embodiment of the patemal authority -
that without them, there would be no transferenceproper, and 'father' would
remain a monstrous pure symbolic function, all-devouring and real in his very
spectral invisibrlity.
So the only consistent answer to the question ''Why does the superfluous
prohibition emerge, which merely prohibits the impossible?' is: in order to
obfuscate this inherent impossibfiry - that is, in order to sustain the illusion
that, were it not for the externallyimposed prohibition, the full ('incestuous')
gratification would be possible. Far from acting as the 'repressive agency
preventing us gaining accessto the ultimate object of desire', the function of
the patemal figure is thus quite the opposite, to relieve us from the debilitating
deadlock of desire, to 'maintain hope' . . . The problem with 'Oedipus on-line'
is thus that what is missing in it is precisely this 'paci$ring' function of the
patemal figure which enablesus to obfuscatethe debilitating deadlock of desire
- hence the strange mixure of 'everything is possible' (since there is no
positive prohibiting figure) and an all-pervasive frustrarion and deadlock that
characterizes the subject'sexperienceof cyberspace.
ill
Clinically, it is easyto categorizethesethree versionsas psychosis,pervenion
and hysteria: the first version claims that cybenpace entails univenalized
psychosis:according to the second one, cybenpace opens up the Liberating
perspectiveof globalizedmultiple perversion;the third one claims that cyber-
spaceremains within the confines of the enigmatic Other that hystericizesthe
subject.So which of them is the right one? One is tempted to answer:a fourth
one - a perversionlike the secondone, but on condition that one conceptual-
izes perversion in a much stricter way. That is to say,both standardreactions ro
'too
cyberspaceare deficient: one is strong' (cyberspaceas involving a break
with Oedipus), while the other is
'too
weak' (cybenpaceas a continuation of
The Fantasyin Cyberspace 117
Oedipus by other means).In contrastto them, perversionis the position (the
'!proper
libidinal stance)that endeavoursto provide some kind of measurein
'to
order to contain the threat of libidinal disintegation' and stabilize the
impossible'. However, the key point is clearly to delineate the specific inter-
mediatestatusofperversion, in berweenpsychosisand neurosis,in berweenthe
psychotic'sforeclosureof the Law and the neurotic's integration into the Law.
According to the standardview, the perverse scenario stagesthe
'disavowal
of
'death
castration':pervenion can be seenasa defenceagainstthe motif of and
sexualiry', againstthe threat of mortaliry aswell asthe contingent imposition of
sexual difference: what the pervert enactsis a universe in which, asin cartoons,
a human being can survive any catastrophe,in which adult sexualiryis reduced
to a childish game; in which one is not forced to die or to chooseone of the
rwo sexes.As such, the pervert's universe is the universe of pure symbolic
order, of the signifier'sgame running its course,unencumberedby the Real of
human finitude.
In a first approach, it may seem that c,ur experience of cyberspacefits
perfectly this universe. Isn't cyberspacealso a universe unencumberedby the
inertia of the Real, constrarnedonly by its self-imposed rules? However,
according to Lacan, what this standardnotion of perversion leaves out of
consideration is the unique short circuit befween Law and jouissancethat
characterizesthe innermost stnrctureof perversion:in contrastto the neurotic,
who acknowledges the Law in order to occasionally take enjoyment in its
transgressions (masturbation, theft, etc.), and thus obtains satisfaction by
snatching back from the Other part of the stolenjouissance,the pervert directly
elevatesthe enjoying big Other into the agency of Law. to
Thg.pS'ryE;;l.S"d-111'ig
establkh,not to undermine, the Law: the proverbial male masochistelevateshis
plhnei-tfr"-a;ffi;;ti&;'into the t"*-gi.r., whose orders are to be obeyed.
A pervert fully acknowledgesthe obsceneundersideof the Law, since he gains
satisfactionfrom the very obsceniry of the gesture of installing the rule of Law -
'castration'. 'normal'
that is, out of In the state of things, the symbolic Law
preventsaccessto the (incestuous)object, and thus createsthe desirefor it; in
perversion,it is theobjectitself(say,the dominatrix in masochism),that makesthe
I-aw. The theoretical concept of the masochistperversion touches here the
common notion of a masochistwho 'enjoys being tortured by the Law': a
masochist locatesenjoymentin the ueryagencyof the I-aw that prohibits the access to
enjoyment.A peryerse ritual thus stagesqhe apt of cas$a,.t*g*;.._oj1h:.p.t-gr-di-a!_"
loss that allows the subject to elteJ the symbolic._gt{gf,^h*ly;fb_g.j,pScifiq_fwl*t,
'normal'
in contrastro rhe subjeci,'fo; ;h;rn-iffi ir." f""fli"tii'ii th. ,g.n.y
ofprohibition that regulates(access to the object o1)his desire,for the pervert,
i: the.Lawis theIdealhelongsfor, hewantsto
!1.:"l!t:*"rJ"!tltk:tf !y,ii11!f -
be fully acknowledgedby the Law, integratedinto its functioning. The irony
I
 118 Culture
(5f this should not escapeus: the pervert, this'transgressor'ytarexcellencewho
'normal',
{,purpo.tr to violate all the rules of decent behaviour, effectivelylongs
fr'for the very rule of Law.10 A further point regarding the pervert is that, since,
il.for him, the Law is not fully established (the Law is his lostobject of desire), he
,ililpiilements this lack with an intricate set of regulations(see the masochist
,firitifrf). The crucial point is thus to bear in mind the opposition berween Law
'rules'):
flan.{,rggyrlations(or the latter bear witnessto rhe absenceor suspension
,i.of Law,
-"
So what is effectively at stake in perversion? There is an agency in New
York called 'Slavesare us', which provides people who are willing ro clean
your apartmentfor free, and want to be treatedrudely by the lady of the house.
The agency gets the cleanersthrough ads (whose motto is 'Slavery is its own
reward!'): most of them are highly paid executives,doctors and lawyers,who,
when questioned abour their motives, prorest that they are sick of being in
charge all the time. They imrnensely enjoy just being brutally ordered to do
,
their job and shouted at, in so far as this is the only way open to them to gain
,q
1 accessto Being. And the philosophical point not to be missed here is that
&'-masochismas the only accessto Being is strictly
correlative with the advent of
modern Kantian subjectivity,with the subject reduced to the empty point of
self-relating negativity. At this point, a brief survey of post-Cartesian philo-
sophy is very instructive: it was haunted by the vestigesof an Other Scene at
which the subject - this &ee, active, self-positing agent - is reduced to an
object of unbearable suffering or humiliation, deprived of the digniry of his
freedom.
In'Le Prix du progrds', one of the fragmentsrhat conclude The Dialecticof
Enlightenmenf, Adorno and Horkheimer quote the argumentationof the nine-
teenth-century French physiologistPierre Flourensagainstmedical anaesthesia
with chloroform. Flourens claims that it can be proved that the anaesthetic
works only on our memory's neuronal network. In short, while we are being
butchered alive on the operatingtable, we feel fully the terrible pain, but later,
after awakening,we do not remember it. For Adorno and Horkheimer, this, of
course,is the perfect metaphor of the fate of Reasonbasedon the repressionof
nature in itself his body, the part of nature in the subject,feelsfully the pain; it
is only that, owing to repression,the subject does not remember it. Therein
residesthe perfect revengeof nature for our domination over it: unknowingly,
we are our own greatestvictims, butchering ourselvesalive. Isn't it alsopossible
to read this as the perfect fantasy-scenario of interpassiviry,of the Other Scene
in which we pay the price for our active intervention in the world? A sado-
masochist willingly assumesthis suffering as rhe accessto Ileing.
Our second example: Kant, in a section of his Citique of PracticalReason
mysteriouslyentitled'Of the Wise Adaptation of Man's Cognitive Facultiesto
The Fantasyin Cyberspace 119
his PracticalVocation', answersthe questionof what would happento us if we
were to gain accessto the noumenal domain, to Things in themselves,thus:
[l]nsteadof the conflict which now the moral dispositionhasto wagewith inclinations
and in which, aftersomedefeats,moral strengthof mind may be graduallywon, God
and eternity in their awful majesrywould standunceasinglybeforeour eyes.. . . Thus
mostactionsconformingto the law would be donefrom fear,few would be donefrom
hope,nonefrom dury.The moralworth of actions,on which alonethe worth of the
penon andevenof the world depends in the eyesof supremewisdom,would not edst
at all. The conductof man, so long as his natureremain:d as it is now, would be
changedinto meremechanism, where,asin a puppetshow,everythingwould gesticu-
I
latewell but no life would be found in the fizures.r
No wonder this vision of a man who, through his direct insight into the
monstrosity of the divine being-in-ieelf, would tum into a lifeless puppet
provokes such uneaseamong corrunentatorson Kant (usually,it is either passed
over in silence or dismissedasan uncanny foreign body). What Kant delivers in
'Kantian
it is no lessthan what one is tempted to call the fundamentalfantasy',
the interpassiveOther Scene of freedom, of the spontaneous free agent, the
scenein which the free agentis turned into a lifelesspuppet at the mercy of the
perverseGod. Its lesson,of course,is that there is no active free agent without
this fantasmatic support, without this Other Scene in which he is totally
manipulated by the Other.12 That is to say, in so far as the Kantian subject,
this empry point of self-relating negativity, is none other than the Lacanian
'barred'
subject of the signifier - Ie manqued 6tre, Tacking a supPort in the
positive order of Being - what fantasystagesis preciselythe subject'simpossible *
being lost owing to the subject'sentry into the symbolic order. No wonder. f
'masochistic',reducing me to an
then, that the fundamentalfantasyrs passive, I
object acted upon by others: it is as if only the experienceof the utmost pain I
can guaranteethe subject accessto Being: Ia douleurd'existermeansthat I'am'
only in so far as I experiencepain. For this reason,the Kantian prohibition of
direct accessto the noumenal domain should be reformulated: what should
remain inaccessibleto us is not the noumenal Real, but o:urfundamentalfantasy
itself- the moment the subjectcomestoo closeto this fantasmaticcore, it loses
the consistencyof irs existence.
This is alsoone of the ways of specifyingthe meaning of Lacan'sassertionof
the subject'sconstitutive'decentrement': the point is not that my subjective
experience is regulated by objective unconscious mechanisms that are
'decentred'with regardto my self-experienceand, assuch,beyond my control
(a point assertedby every materialist), but rather something much more
'subjective' expenence,
unsettling. I am deprived of even my most intimate
 120 Culture The Fantasyin Cyberspace 121
'really the genetic formula of what I objectively am, it will still be unable to
the way things seem to me', the experience of the fundamental fantasy
'objectively
that constituteS and guarantees the core of my being, since I can never formulate my subjective' fantasmatic identiry, this objectal coun-
consciouslyexperienceit and assumeit. According to the standardview, the terpoint to my subjectiviry, which is neither subjective (experienced) nor
dimension that is constitutive of subjectiviry is that of the phenomenal (self-) obiective.
experience- I am a subjectthe moment I can sayto myself; 'No matter what
unknown mechanismgovernsmy acts,perceptionsand thoughts, nobody can
take &om me what I seeand feel now.' Say,when I am passionatelyin love,
and a biochemist informs me that all my intense sentiments arejust the result of IV
biochemical processesin my body, I can answer him by clinging to the
'All So how doesall this concern cyberspace? It is often said that cyberspaceopens
appearance: that you're saying may be true, but, none the less,nothing
can take from me the intensiry of the passionthat I am experiencing now.' up the domain which allows us to realize (to externalize, to stage)our inner-
Lacan'spoint, however, is that the psychoanalystis the one who, precisely,car most Antasies.By focusing on fundamentalfantasy,today'sartisticpracticesare
take this from the subject:that is, his ultimate aim is to deprive the subject of assertingtheir statusof art in the age of the scientific objectivization of human
the very fundamental fantasy that regulates the universe of his (self-) experi- .rr.rr..f-i*'reGrs io the spaceoi*h", a pribn eludes the grasp of scientific
ence. The Freudian 'subject of the unconscious' emergesonly when a key oLjecti rization. And perhaps cyberspace,with its capaciryto externalizeour
aspectof the subject'sphenomenal (self-)experience(his 'fundamental fantasy') innermost fantasiesin all thejr inconsistency,opens up to artisticpracticea
- 'primordially 'act
becomes inaccessible to him that is, is repressed'.At its most unique possibiliry to stage,to out', the fantasmaticsupport of our exist-
'sado-masochistic'fantasy that can never be
radical, the unconscious is the inaccessible phenomenon,not the objective ence, up to the fundamental
'We
mechanism that regulatesmy phenomenal experience.So, in contrast to the subjectivized. are thus invited to risk the most radical experience imagin-
'noumenal ',
commonplace that we are dealing with a subject the moment an enrity displays able:the encounterwith our Self with the Other Scenethat stages
signs of inner life' - that is, of a fantasmatic self-experience that cannot be the foreclosedhard core of the subject'sBeing. Far from enslavingus to these
reduced to external behaviour - one should claim that what characterizes Antasies,and thus turning us into de-subjectivizedblind puppets,it enablesus
human subjectiviry proper is, rather, the gap that separatesthe two: the fact to treat them in a plaful way, and thus to adopt towards them a minimum of
that fantasy,at its most elementary,becomesinaccessible to the subject;it is this distance - in short, to achieve what Lacan cal\sIa trauersiedufantasme('going-
inaccessibilitythat makesthe subject 'empry' (il. W. thus obtain a relationship through, traversingthe fantasy').
,
,./ that totally subvertsthe standardnotion of the subjectwho directly experiences So let us conclude with a referenceto the (in)famous last proposition of
'inner 'impossible' ''Wovon
,,'f himself, his states':an relationshipberween the empty,non- Wittgenstein's Tractatus: man nicht sprechenkann, dariiber mussman
,,.'J phenomenalsubjectand the phenomenathat remain inarcessible to the subject- the schweigen.' This proposition renders in the most succinct way possiblethe
t1, very relation registeredby Lacan'sformula of fantasy,fl O o. paradox of the oedipal Law that prohibits something (incestuousfusion) that is
\\ Geneticists predict that in about ten to fifteen years, they will be able to already in itself impossible (and thereby gives rise to the hope that, if we
'impossible'
identifl' and manipulate each individual's exact genome (c.six billion genetic remove or overcome the prohibition, the incest will become
marks comprising the entirery of inherited 'knowledge'). Potentially, ar least, possible).If we are effectivelyto move to a region'beyond Oedipus','Witt-
'-Wovonman nicht
each individual will thus have at his disposalthe complete formula of what he genstein'sproposition must be rephrasedas: sprechenkann,
'objectively
or she is'. How will this 'knowledge in the real', the fact that I will daniber mussman schreiben.'There is, of course,a long tradition of conceiv-
'one
be able to locate and identify myself completely as an object in realiry, affect ing art asa mode or practiceofwriting auguringwhat cannot speakabout'
'Will - that is, the utopian potential 'repressed'
the statusof subjectivity? it lead to the end of human subjectiviry?Lacan's by the existing socio-symbolic
answer is negative: what will continue to elude the geneticist is not my nefwork of prolribitions. There is also a long tradition of using writing as a
phenomenal self-experience(say, the experience of a love passionthat no nlcar)sto colrllnLlrllcatea declarationoflove too intimate and/or too painful to
knowledge of the genetic and other material mechanismsdetermining it can bc clircctlyasscrteclin a face-to-facespeech-act.Not only is the Intemet widely
'objectively used as a spacefcrr the amorous encountersof shy people; significantly,one of
take from me), but the subjective'fundamentalAnrasy,the fantas-
matic core inaccessible to my consciousexperience.Even if scienceformulates thc anccdotesabout Edison, the inventor of the telegraph,is that he himself
 122 Culture
usedit to declarelove and ask the hand of his secretary(being too shy to do it
directly, by meansof a spokenword). However, what we are aiming at is not
this standardeconomy of using cyberspaceasa place in which, since we are not
directly engagedin it - that is, since we maintain a distance from it - we feel
'What
free to externalize and stageour innermost private fantasies. we have in
mind is a more radical level, the level that concerns our very fundamental
fantasyas that 'wovon man nicht sprechenkann': the subject is never able to
assumehis or her fundamental fantasy,to recognize himself or herself in it in a
performanceof a speech-act:perhapscyberspaceopens up a domain in which
the subject can none the lessextemalize/stagehis or her fundamentalfantasy,
and thus gain a minimum of distance towards it.
In short, what we are claiming is that, in cybenpace(or through cyberspace),
f .u,|t,,)' possibleto accomplishwhat Lacancallsan authenticact, which consistsin a
it is
that disturbs ('traverses')the subject'sfundamental fantasy.For Lacan, a
,#r{l#:""r:;lure
'-
gesture counts as an act only in so far as it disturbs (unhinges) this most radical
level of the subject'sconsistency,the level that is even more fundamentalthan
the subject'sbasicsymbolic identification(s).The first negativeconsequenceof
ttris proposition, of course,is that we should reject the coffinon-sense notion
that indulging in cyberspaceis by definition not an act, since we dwell in a
virtual universe of simulacrainstead of engaging ourselveswith the 'real thing'.
For Lacan, fantasy is not simply a work of imagination as opposed to hard
realiry - that is, a product of our mind that obfuscatesour direct approachto
'With
reality, our abiliry to 'perceive things the way they really are'. regard to
basic opposition beftveen realiry and imagination, fantasyis not simply on
o;oof,he
s, the side of imagination; fantasy is, rather, the little piece of imagination by
t6which we gain accessto reality - the frame that guaranteesour accessto realify,
*6ur'sense
of realiry' (when our fundamentalfantasyis shattered,we experience
'loss
the of reality').13For this reason, 'traversing the fantasy' has absolutely
nothing to do with a soberingact of dispellingthe fantasiesthat obfuscateour
clearperception of the real stateof things, or with a reflectiveact of acquiring a
critical distance from the ruminations of our imagination (getting rid of false
superstitions,etc.). The paradoxical point is, rather, that fantasyintervenes
(servesas a support) preciselywhen we draw the line of distinction berween
what is merely our imagination and what 'really exists out there'. 'Traversing
the fantasy',on the contrary,involves our over-identfication with the domain of
imagination: in it, through it, we break the constraintsof the fantasyand enter
,i
tlhe terri$ring, violent domain of pre-synthetic imagination, the domain in
j yhich disjectamembrafloat around, not yet unified and 'domesticatcd'by the
intervention of a homogenizing fantasmaticframe. This, perhaps, is what
playing in cyberspaceenablesus to do; if we follow it to the end, if we
immerse ourselvesin it without restraint,ifwe externalizein it our imagination
The Fantasyin Cyberspace 123
in its very inconsistency, the very fantasmatic frame that guaranteesthe con-
sistencyof our (self-) experiencecan, perhaps,be undermined.
'traversethe fantasy'is
This, however, in no way implies that inducing us to
an automatic effbct of our immersion into cyberspace.What one should do
here is, rather, to accomplish a Hegelian reversalof epistemologicalobstacle
into ontological deadlock: what if it is wrong and misleading to ask direcdy
which of the four versions of the libidinal/symbolic economy of cyberspace
'correct' one (psychotic suspensic,nof the Oedipus
that we outlined is the
complex; the continuation of the Oedipus complex by other means; the
'What
perversestaging of the Law; traversing the fantasy)? if these four versions
are the four possibilities opened up by cyberspacetechnology, so that, ultim-
ately, the choice is ours, the stake in a politico-ideological struggle?How
cyberspacewill aflect us is not directly inscribedinto its technologicalproper-
ties; rather,it hingeson the nervvorkof socio-symbolicrelations(of power and
domination, etc.) which always-already overdetermine the way cyberspace
affectsus.
Notes
1 SeeRobert Pfaller's intervention at the symposium Die Dinge lachenan unsererStelle,
Linz (Austria),8-10 October, 1996. For a more detailed elaborationof interpassiv-
iry, see ZiZek,
'fhe
ch. 3.
Plagueof Fantasies,
2 Lacan, The Ethics of (London, Routledge, 1992), p. 252'
Psychoanalysis
Jacques
3 Borrowed from Robert Pfaller.
4 Another amusingdetail is what often happenswhen the toy'awakens' in the middle
of the night, demanding immediate attention: the child wants the toy to be taken
care ofproperiy; however, sincehe or she is too tired to get uP and do it, he or she
awakenshis or her parentsand demandsthat they do what the toy demands(feed it,
etc.).'We are thus dealing with the double structure of delegation:the parent, who
does not take the game seriously,has to occupy him or herself with feeding the
purely virtual, non-existent animal in the middle of the night, while the child, the
only one who takes the game seriously,continues his or her sound sleep. . . No
wonder, then, that there are already web sitesfor parents, telling them how to deal
vith tamagochis on behalf of their children-
5 There are, of course,alreadyburial sitesfor the dead tamagochis.
'Oedipus
6 SeeJerry Aline Flieger, On-Line?', Pretexts1'/6 (July 1'997),pp- 81-94
Is this not confirmed by a referenceto Lacan'sdevelopment itself first, in his early
7
ComplexesJamiliaux (1938), Lacan historicized Oedipus (asa specific family struc-
ture); later, however, hc claboratedthe underlying formal prohibitiona-lstructureof
the symbolic order, which can be actualizedin a set of different historical shapes.
8 I owe this examtrleto Alain Abelhauser,Paris.
124 Culture
9 To put it in a slightly different way: what is crucial here is the distiaction berween
lack/void (the impossibiliry which is operative already ar the level of diue) and
symbolic Lawllnterdiction which founds the dialectic of desire:'oedious com-
piex' (the imposition of the symbolic Law) is ukimately the operatorof tie transfor-
mation of diue into desire.
10 For a closer elaboration of the structure of perversion, see Lti.ek, plague oJ
PartIl
Fantasies, ch. l.
1,1, Immanuel Ka,nt, Citique of PracticalReasoz (New York, Macmillan, 1956), pp.
152-3.
'what
Woman
12 Hegel does is to 'rravene' rhis fanrasyby demonstrating its function of fiiling
in the pre-ontological abyssoffreedom - i.e. ofreconstituting the positive scene
in which the subject is inserted into a positive noumenal order. In other words, for
Hegel, Kant's vision is meaninglessand inconsistent, since it secretly reinrroduces
the ontologically fully constifured divine totaliry, i.e. a world conceived only as
Substance,not alsoas Subject.
13 our ideological experience today is srrucrured by a series of oppositions which
stake out the terrain and the terms of the big debates:simulacrum versus realify,
globalization venus maintaining particular identities, antasy versus reality, etc.
Each of these oppositions is false, obfuscaring the true one. For example, globa-
Iization and the resuscitation ofparticular ethnic, religious, etc. idencities are rwo
sides of the same process: what is effectively threatened by globalization is,
paradoxically, the proper dimension of universality co-substantial with subjectivi-
zation. Along the same lines, simulacrum and real ultimately coincide, so that
what is ultimately threatened by the reign of digital and other simulacra is not the
'real
realiry', but the very dimension of appearancewhich is the locus of sub-
jectiviry. Arrd, again, along the samelines, far &om obfuscating true reality, fantasy
is that which constigutes it: the true opposition is that between fantasy and
imagination in the radical senseof the violent pre-synthetic gesture of exploding
the ontological consistency of Being, a gesture which is another name for the
subject.