SECTION 14 RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF appellants, shortly after the filing of the information, submitted
ling of the information, submitted a motion for
ACCUSATION
1. PEOPLE v. QUITLONG
[G.R. No. 121562. July 10, 1998]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RONNIE QUITLONG y FRIAS,
SALVADOR QUITLONG y FRIAS and EMILIO SENOTO, Jr., y PASCUA, accused-
appellants.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
The Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 5,[1] disposed of Criminal Case No.
13336-R; thus:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds and declares the accused RONNIE QUITLONG Y
FRIAS, SALVADOR QUITLONG Y FRIAS and EMILIO SENOTO, JR. Y PASCUA guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as charged and hereby sentences
EACH of them to suffer an indeterminate penalty of TWENTY (20) YEARS of reclusion
temporal, as minimum, to FORTY (40) YEARS of reclusion perpetua, as maximum; to
indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of the deceased Jonathan Calpito y Castro in
the sums of P50,000.00 for the latters death; P35,700.00 as consequential damages;
and P100,000.00 as moral damages, plus their proportionate shares in the costs.
"In the service of their sentence, the said accused shall be credited with their preventive
imprisonment under the terms and conditions prescribed in Article 29 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended.
"Conformably with Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as
amended, the corresponding filing fee for the P100,000.00 moral damages herein
awarded shall constitute a first lien on this judgment.
"The evidence knife, Exhibit `B, is hereby declared forfeited in favor of the Government.
"Pursuant to Circular No. 4-92-A of the Court Administrator, the Warden of the City Jail
of Baguio is directed to immediately transfer the same accused to the custody of the
Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila.
"Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Warden of the City Jail of Baguio for his
information and guidance.
"There being no indication that the remaining accused, Jesus Mendoza, and several
John Does could be arrested/identified and arrested shortly, let the case against them
be, as it is hereby, archived without prejudice to its prosecution upon their
apprehension.
"SO ORDERED.[2]
The case was generated by an information for murder filed on 25 October 1994 against
accused-appellants Salvador Quitlong, Ronnie Quitlong, Emilio Senoto, Jr., and
several other unidentified persons following the killing of Jonathan Calpito. Accused-
reinvestigation alleging that it was a certain Jesus Mendoza who stabbed the victim
after getting irked when the latter urinated near and in front[3] of his wife. The trial court
acted favorably on the motion. On 12 December 1994, the City Prosecutor filed a
motion to admit an amended information on the basis of affidavits[4] executed by Nonita
F. delos Reyes, Nicanor Ellamil, Lydia Q. Cultura, as well as accused-appellants
Salvador and Ronnie Quitlong themselves, to the effect that it was Jesus Mendoza who
had been responsible for the death of the victim. The information, as amended, included
Jesus Mendoza among the named accused.[5] Unlike accused-appellants who were
immediately arrested after the commission of the crime, Jesus Mendoza remained at
large. At their arraignment, the detained accused pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged.
The evidence of the prosecution has narrated how a simple misunderstanding and
relatively so small a matter could lead to so dastardly and unfortunate an outcome.
At around six oclock in the evening of 20 October 1994, Lito Adjaro, who had just come
from work as a dispatcher of passenger jeepneys plying the Baguio City-Loakan route,
repaired to a nearby game parlor where he saw 19-year-old University of Baguio
medical technology student Jonathan Calpito playing billiards with Jonathan Gosil.
Adjaro was Calpitos neighbor and barkada (gangmate) in Loakan. At past eight oclock,
Calpito decided that it was time to go home. Since at that hour there were no longer
passenger jeepneys bound for Loakan, the three friends decided to walk down to
Harrison Road behind the Melvin Jones grandstand to grab a taxicab. The area was
well-lighted. Wanting to partake of some "fishballs," Calpito and Gosil approached a
fishball vendor about three to four meters away. The two returned with three sticks of
fishballs worth fifteen pesos. When Calpito counted the change for his 100-peso bill,
he saw that he had only been handed back thirty five pesos. Confronted by Calpito and
Gosil, the fishball vendor would not admit that he had short-changed Calpito.
Herbert Soriano, a civil engineer driving a passenger-type jeep on his way to Loakan
from the Dominican Hill, was seen passing by. Adjaro, his neighbor, hailed him. Soriano
positioned his jeep around four or five meters from where Gosil and Calpito were still
having an argument with the fishball vendor. Soriano called out to the two to board the
jeep but they ignored him. Moments later, Soriano saw eight men rushing towards Gosil
and Calpito from the direction of the taxicab-stand behind his jeep. Some of the men
later backed out but four of them pursued Calpito who, meanwhile, had started to retreat
from the group. The four men, however, succeeded in cornering Calpito. Soriano saw
Calpito fall to the ground and thought that the latter had just been weakened by the
men's punches but, when Calpito was carried on board his jeep, Soriano realized that
Calpito had been stabbed.
Adjaro saw no less than eight men approach and aggressively confront Calpito and
Gosil. Seeing that his friends were outnumbered, Adjaro shouted at Calpito and Gosil
to run posthaste. Adjaro promptly boarded Sorianos jeep. From where he sat, Adjaro
could see appellant Emilio Senoto embracing Calpito from behind and appellants
Salvador Quitlong and Ronnie Quitlong holding Calpitos right hand and left hand,
respectively. Calpito struggled unsuccessfully to free himself. Suddenly, appellant
Ronnie Quitlong stabbed Calpito at the left side of the body just below the nipple. Once
the three men had released their hold on Calpito, the latter fell to the ground. Despite
the condition that Calpito was already in, his assailants still went on hitting him with
their feet.

Police officers Jerry Patacsil, Arthur Viado and Nito Revivis were on foot patrol that
evening. Attracted by the commotion along Harrison Road, the police officers hurriedly
proceeded to the brightly-lighted place and saw Calpito lying on the ground. Three of
the malefactors started to flee upon seeing the approaching police officers but the rest
kept on with their attack on Calpito. Patacsil drew out his service firearm and told the
attackers to freeze. Seeing that the victim had bloodstains on his left chest, Patacsil
advised the victims companions to rush him to the hospital. Soriano, Gosil and Adjaro
took Calpito to the Baguio General Hospital on board Sorianos jeep.
The police officers brought accused-appellants to the police station. SPO1 Gabriel
Isican prepared the complaint assignment sheet[6] before turning them over to the
investigation division. SPO4 Avelino Tolean, officer-in-charge of the police investigation
division on the 4:00 p.m. to 12:00 midnight shift, also received a call from the Baguio
General Hospital about the incident. SPO4 Tolean, along with SPO1 Rafael Ortencio,
Jr., and two "Bombo" radio reporters, went to the hospital where Calpito was by then in
the operating room. The police officers interviewed Adjaro and Gosil at the hospitals
emergency room and then repaired to the crime scene and searched the area.
Recovered near the flowering plants beside the electric post was a stainless knife[7]
with bloodstains on its blade. Adjaro recognized the knife to be the one used in stabbing
Calpito. SPO4 Gerardo Tumbaga prepared Form 1 of the National Crime Reporting
System indicating that accused-appellants were arrested and that a certain Mendoza
escaped and went into hiding. The report also disclosed that Adjaro and Gosil had a
drinking spree with the victim at the Genesis Folkden before the stabbing incident.
SPO4 Tumbaga based his findings on the documents attached to the records of the
case.
That same evening of 20 October 1994, at 8:55, Calpito died at the Baguio General
Hospital. Dr. Kathryna Ayro, the hospitals medico-legal officer, conducted the autopsy
on the victim upon the request of Dr. Samuel Cosme, the attending surgeon, and of
First Assistant City Prosecutor Herminio Carbonell, with the consent of a brother of
Calpito.[8] Dr. Ayro found a solitary stab wound that penetrated Calpitos left thoracic
cavity at the level of the 5th intercostal space that caused a "through and through"
laceration of his anterior pericardium and the apex of the left ventricle of his heart.[9]
Dr. Ayro indicated the cause of Calpitos death as being one of hypovolemic shock
secondary to stab wound.[10] She opined that a knife, single or double bladed, must
have been used in inflicting the stab wound. Abrasions were also found on different
parts of Calpitos body.
Precy Calpito, the mother of the victim, testified that the family had spent the amount
of P37,500.00[11] for his wake, burial and 9-day prayers. Her youngest sons death left
her losing hope in life and "feeling very badly."
The defense gave no alibi and admitted the presence of accused-appellants at the
vicinity of the crime scene; however, it interposed denial by appellants of any
participation in the commission of the crime.
Appellant Emilio Senoto, Jr., a taxicab driver, testified that out of curiosity, after parking
his cab to buy some cigarettes and getting attracted by the commotion, went near the
scene and saw the victim lying on the ground beside a cart. He was about to leave the
place when several policemen arrived and arrested him.
Appellant Salvador Quitlong, a food vendor at the Burnham Park and father of five
children, denied having had any participation in the stabbing incident nor having been
acquainted with Jesus Mendoza. He admitted, however, that on the night in question
when he was selling "fishballs" at the park, around eighty meters away from where
Mendoza was selling his wares, the latters daughter, who was a classmate of his own
daughter, asked for help yelling that her father was in trouble. He rushed over to
Mendozas place (puesto) but barely in time to witness the stabbing of Calpito by
Mendoza.
Appellant Ronnie Quitlong, Salvador Quitlongs 26-year-old younger brother, was also
a sidewalk vendor at the waiting shed along Harrison Road. He learned of the trouble
Mendoza got himself into when the latter's daughter summoned for help. When he and
his brother responded, Mendoza had by then already stabbed Calpito.
Nonita de los Reyes and Lydia Cultura, both sidewalk vendors, corroborated the story
of the Quitlong brothers. According to Nonita, it was Mendoza who stabbed Calpito.
She witnessed the incident from a distance of ten meters away. Nonita explained that
she did not immediately reveal what she saw to the authorities because of shock. Lydia
Cultura, on her part, said that she saw Jesus Mendoza in the "rumble" with five or six
men who had come from the Genesis Folkden. She saw Mendoza embrace and stab
the man in white t-shirt. Nonita and Alma Balubar followed appellants to the police
station but did not tell the police what she knew because she was busy attending to the
crying pregnant wife of appellant Ronnie Quitlong.
On 21 April 1995, the trial court, following his evaluation of the respective submissions
of the prosecution and the defense, including their rebuttal and sur-rebuttal evidence,
rendered its now assailed decision.
In their assignment of errors, the Quitlong brothers would have it -
1. That the Honorable Lower Court gravely abused its discretion and/or acted in excess
of or without jurisdiction in finding that conspiracy may readily be inferred inspite of
explicit failure to allege in the information or complaint;
"2. That the Honorable Lower Court gravely abused its discretion and/or acted in excess
of or without jurisdiction in finding that there was conspiracy between and among the
accused-appellants in the commission of the crime;
"3. That the Honorable Lower Court gravely abused its discretion and/or acted in excess
of or without jurisdiction in finding the accused-appellants guilty of the crime of Murder
instead of Homicide.[12]
In his case, appellant Senoto contends that the trial court has erred in finding
conspiracy among the accused and argues that the crime committed is homicide, not
murder, given the circumstances.
On the particular issue of conspiracy, the trial court had this to say:
The question is whether or not the herein three accused participated in, and may be
held guilty as co-principals by reason of conspiracy for, the fatal stabbing of the victim,
Calpito, there being no dispute that the latter died due to the solitary stab inflicted on
him.

"But before proceeding any further, the Court takes notice of the lapse committed,
perhaps inadvertently, by the prosecution in drafting the indictment. Both the original
and amended Informations fail to explicitly allege conspiracy. This could have been
timely cured if obeisance had been observed of the admonition, often given, that the
prosecution should not take the arraignment stage for granted but, instead, treat the
notice thereof as a reminder to review the case and determine if the complaint or
information is in due form and the allegations therein contained are sufficient vis--vis
the law involved and the evidence on hand. It is fortunate that in the case at bench
conspiracy may readily be inferred from the way the allegation of abuse of superior
strength has been phrased, to wit: `xxx the above-named accused, being then armed
with a knife, with intent to kill xxx and taking advantage of their numerical superiority
and combined strength did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and stab JONATHAN CALPITO y CASTRO xxx.[13]
Citing Balmadrid vs. Sandiganbayan,[14] the trial court has opined that "conspiracy
may be deemed adequately alleged if the averments in the Information logically convey
that several persons (have been) animated with the single purpose of committing the
offense charged and that they (have) acted in concert in pursuance of that purpose.[15]
Holding that no direct proof is essential and that it suffices that the existence of a
common design to commit the offense charged is shown by the acts of the malefactors
and attendant circumstances, the trial court has concluded:
In the case on hand, it bears repeating that Ronnie Quitlong and Salvador Quitlong
were admittedly responding to Jesus Mendozas call for help through the latters
daughter. They must have, therefore, been disposed, out of empathy with a fellow
sidewalk vendor, to lend Mendoza all the assistance the latter needed under the
circumstances. They were joined, according to prosecution witnesses Lito Adjaro and
Herbert Soriano, by no less than six others, including Emilio Senoto, Jr. They came
upon Mendoza engaged in a heated altercation with the victim Calpito. When they
reached Calpito, they pushed him and started beating him up and his companion
Jonathan Gosil. Four to five men manhandled Calpito who kept on retreating and even
went around Sorianos parked jeep until he was cornered. Senoto then held Calpitos
body from behind; Ronnie, his left hand; and Salvador, his right hand, and they mauled
him. Calpito struggled to free himself but that proved futile and, instead, Ronnie stabbed
him once. It was only then that he was released and when he fell down on his back, his
attackers still kicked him. Only the arrival of some policemen made some of the
assailants stop and run away. However, Ronnie, Salvador and Senoto, kept on kicking
the victim and they were restrained and arrested.
"Guided by the jurisprudential authorities heretofore cited, it becomes ineluctable for
the Court to conclude that Ronnie, Salvador and Senoto acted in a conspiracy and may
thus be held liable as co-principals for the death of Calpito.[16]
Overwhelming, such as it may have been thought of by the trial court, evidence of
conspiracy is not enough for an accused to bear and to respond to all its grave legal
consequences; it is equally essential that such accused has been apprised when the
charge is made conformably with prevailing substantive and procedural requirements.
Article III, Section 14, of the 1987 Constitution, in particular, mandates that no person
shall be held answerable for a criminal offense without due process of law and that in
all criminal prosecutions the accused shall first be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him.[17] The right to be informed of any such indictment is
likewise explicit in procedural rules.[18] The practice and object of informing an accused
in writing of the charges against him has been explained as early as the 1904 decision
of the Court in U.S. vs. Karelsen;[19] viz:
First. To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will
enable him to make his defense; and second, to avail himself of his conviction or
acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause; and third, to
inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in
law to support a conviction, if one should be had. (United States vs. Cruikshank, 92
U.S., 542). In order that this requirement may be satisfied, facts must be stated, not
conclusions of law. Every crime is made up of certain acts and intent; these must be
set forth in the complaint with reasonable particularity of time, place, names (plaintiff
and defendant), and circumstances. In short, the complaint must contain a specific
allegation of every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the crime charged.
An information, in order to ensure that the constitutional right of the accused to be
informed of the nature and cause of his accusation is not violated, must state the name
of the accused; the designation given to the offense by the statute; a statement of the
acts or omissions so complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the
offended party; the approximate time and date of the commission of the offense; and
the place where the offense has been committed.[20] In embodying the essential
elements of the crime charged, the information must set forth the facts and
circumstances that have a bearing on the culpability and liability of the accused so that
the accused can properly prepare for and undertake his defense. One such fact or
circumstance in a complaint against two or more accused persons is that of conspiracy.
Quite unlike the omission of an ordinary recital of fact which, if not excepted from or
objected to during trial, may be corrected or supplied by competent proof, an allegation,
however, of conspiracy, or one that would impute criminal liability to an accused for the
act of another or others, is indispensable in order to hold such person, regardless of
the nature and extent of his own participation, equally guilty with the other or others in
the commission of the crime. Where conspiracy exists and can rightly be appreciated,
the individual acts done to perpetrate the felony becomes of secondary importance, the
act of one being imputable to all the others.[21] Verily, an accused must know from the
information whether he faces a criminal responsibility not only for his acts but also for
the acts of his co-accused as well.
A conspiracy indictment need not, of course, aver all the components of conspiracy or
allege all the details thereof, like the part that each of the parties therein have
performed, the evidence proving the common design or the facts connecting all the
accused with one another in the web of the conspiracy. Neither is it necessary to
describe conspiracy with the same degree of particularity required in describing a
substantive offense. It is enough that the indictment contains a statement of the facts
relied upon to be constitutive of the offense in ordinary and concise language, with as
much certainty as the nature of the case will admit, in a manner that can enable a
person of common understanding to know what is intended, and with such precision
that the accused may plead his acquittal or conviction to a subsequent indictment based
on the same facts. It is said, generally, that an indictment may be held sufficient "if it
follows the words of the statute and reasonably informs the accused of the character of
the offense he is charged with conspiring to commit, or, following the language of the
statute, contains a sufficient statement of an overt act to effect the object of the
conspiracy, or alleges both the conspiracy and the contemplated crime in the language
of the respective statutes defining them.[22]

The information charging herein appellants for the death of Jonathan Calpito, as
amended, has but simply stated:
That on or about the 20th day of October 1994, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then
armed with a knife, with intent to kill and with treachery and taking advantage of their
numerical superiority and combined strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and stab JONATHAN CALPITO Y CASTRO suddenly and
unexpectedly, without any warning whatsoever, inflicting upon him a stab wound at the
left thorax at the level of the 7th rib, left medclavicular line, penetrating the pereduum
and left ventricle causing left remothones of 700 cc and hemoperecuduum of 250 cc,
which directly caused his death.
"CONTRARY TO LAW.[23]
The opinion of the trial court to the effect that conspiracy may be inferred from the
allegation of abuse of superior strength and with the aid of armed men, i.e., that x x x
the above-named accused, being then armed with a knife, with intent to kill xxx and
taking advantage of their numerical superiority and combined strength, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab JONATHAN CALPITO
Y CASTRO x x x[24] is difficult to accept. Conspiracy arises when two or more persons
come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.
Conspiracy comes to life at the very instant the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly,
to commit the felony and forthwith to actually pursue it.[25] Verily, the information must
state that the accused have confederated to commit the crime or that there has been a
community of design, a unity of purpose or an agreement to commit the felony among
the accused. Such an allegation, in the absence of the usual usage of the words
conspired or confederated or the phrase acting in conspiracy, must aptly appear in the
information in the form of definitive acts constituting conspiracy. In fine, the agreement
to commit the crime, the unity of purpose or the community of design among the
accused must be conveyed such as either by the use of the term conspire or its
derivatives and synonyms or by allegations of basic facts constituting the conspiracy.
Conspiracy must be alleged, not just inferred, in the information on which basis an
accused can aptly enter his plea, a matter that is not to be confused with or likened to
the adequacy of evidence that may be required to prove it. In establishing conspiracy
when properly alleged, the evidence to support it need not necessarily be shown by
direct proof but may be inferred from shown acts and conduct of the accused.
In the absence of conspiracy, so averred and proved as heretofore explained, an
accused can only be made liable for the acts committed by him alone and this criminal
responsibility is individual and not collective.[26] And so it is that must be so held in this
case. The conflicting claims of the prosecution and the defense on who stabbed the
victim is an issue that ultimately and unavoidably goes into the question of whom to
believe among the witnesses. This issue of credibility requires a determination that is
concededly best left to the trial court with its unique position of having been enabled to
observe that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the deportment of witnesses on
the stand.[27] Findings of the trial court, following that assessment, must be given the
highest degree of respect absent compelling reasons to conclude otherwise.[28]
The Court is not, at this time and in this instance, disposed to deviate from the foregoing
rule. In the first place, Lito Adjaro, the eyewitness in the stabbing of Calpito, has
steadfastly stood by, even on rebuttal, to his story on the commission of the crime. A
witness who testifies in a categorical, straightforward and spontaneous manner, as well
as remains consistent on cross and rebuttal examination, is not likely to be an incredible
witness.[29] Secondly, the defense has failed to establish any ill motive on the part of
Adjaro that would have prompted him to testify wrongly against appellants. Where there
is no evidence to indicate that the prosecution witness has been actuated by any
improper motive, it would be hard to reject the supposition that a person will not
prevaricate and cause damnation to one who has brought him no harm.[30] Finally,
Herbert Soriano and the police, who have testified seeing the already wounded Calpito
lying on the ground and still being attacked, both corroborate Adjaros positive
identification of appellants as the persons who did maul Calpito.
After positively pointing to appellants in open court to be the persons who ganged up
on Calpito, Adjaro testified on their respective participations in the commission of the
crime; thus:
PROSECUTOR:
"Q. Now, you pointed to Emilio Senoto, Jr. as one of the persons who held the deceased
Jonathan Calpito. What part of the body of Jonathan Calpito did he hold?
"A. His body, sir.
"Q. How about Salvador Quitlong whom you also identified in Court. What part of the
body of Jonathan Calpito did he hold?
"A. I saw him hold his hand.
"Q. What hand was held by Salvador Quitlong?
"A. Right hand, sir.
"Q. How about Ronnie Quitlong?
"A. His left hand.
"Q. After Jonathan Calpito was held by these three persons and other, what happened
next?
"A. They mauled (binugbog) Jonathan Calpito.
"Q. Did you notice what part of the body was hit and boxed by these three persons?
"A. His body and his face.
"Q. What did Jonathan Calpito do, if any, when he is being held by these three persons
and others?
"A. He was struggling, sir.
"Q. Was he able to free himself from the helds (sic) of these persons?
"A. No more, sir.
"Q. What do you mean no more?
"A. He was not able to free himself.
"Q. Yes, why was he not able to free himself anymore?
"A. They held him tightly, he could not struggle.
"Q. And what happened next when you said he could no longer struggle?
"A. They boxed him and also stabbed him, sir.
"Q. Did you see the person who stabbed him?
"A. I saw, sir.
"Q. Will you be able to identify him?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. I will request you to again look inside the courtroom and point to the person whom
you saw stab Jonathan Calpito?
"WITNESS:
The person wearing white jacket.
"INTERPRETER:
Witness pointing to a gentleman inside the courtroom wearing cream jacket who gave
his name as Ronnie Quitlong.[31]
Appellant Ronnie Quitlong was a principal by his own act of stabbing Calpito that
caused the latter's death.[32] Appellants Salvador Quitlong and Emilio Senoto, Jr., were
holding the hands of Calpito at the precise time that Ronnie Quitlong was in the act of
executing his criminal intent. Simultaneity, however, would not itself demonstrate the
concurrence of will or the unity of action and purpose that could be a basis for collective
responsibility of two or more individuals;[33] indeed, from all indications, the incident
would appear to have occurred at the spur of moment. Appellants Salvador Quitlong
and Emilio Senoto, Jr., shall therefore be held to be mere accomplices conformably
with Article 18[34] of the Revised Penal Code.
The crime committed was qualified by abuse of superiority.[35] While superiority in
number would not per se mean superiority in strength, enough proof was adduced,
however, to show that the attackers had cooperated in such a way as to secure
advantage of their superiority in strength certainly out of proportion to the means of
defense available to the person attacked.[36]
Treachery may not be here considered as a generic aggravating circumstance although
it might have ensured the commission of the crime. In order that treachery may be taken
as an aggravating circumstance, there must be proof that the accused has consciously
adopted a mode of attack to facilitate the perpetration of the killing without risk to
himself, i.e., appellant Ronnie Quitlong in this case.[37] No such proof has been
adequately shown.
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of murder is punishable by
reclusion temporal maximum to death. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating
circumstances to appropriately appreciate in this case, appellant Ronnie Quitlong, as
principal, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The indeterminate penalty of
twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as minimum to forty (40) years of reclusion
perpetua, as maximum, has been imposed by the trial court on the premise that
reclusion perpetua is a divisible penalty. In the Court's Resolution of 09 January 1995,
clarifying its decision[38] in People vs. Lucas,[39] the Court has said that -
x x x although Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659 has fixed the duration of reclusion perpetua
from twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years, there was no clear legislative
intent to alter its original classification as an indivisible penalty. It shall then remain as
an indivisible penalty.[40]
The two accomplices, appellants Salvador Quitlong and Emilio Senoto, Jr., shall be
subject to the imposition of the penalty next lower in degree than reclusion temporal
maximum to death or, accordingly, prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion
temporal in its medium period. Absent any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the
penalty that may be imposed is reclusion temporal minimum. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law to them, each may be held to suffer the indeterminate
sentence of anywhere from prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor
in its medium period, as the minimum penalty, to anywhere within the range of reclusion
temporal minimum, as the maximum penalty.
The trial court correctly imposed the payment of a civil indemnity of P50,000.00 in favor
of the heirs of the victim. The consequential (actual) damages in the amount of
P35,700.00 not having been substantiated, except for the amount P12,000.00 paid to
the memorial chapel, is disallowed. The award of moral damages recoverable under
Article 2219(1), in relation to Article 2206, of the Civil Code is reduced from
P100,000.00 to P20,000.00.
WHEREFORE, appellant Ronnie Quitlong is found guilty of the crime of murder for the
killing of Jonathan Calpito and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
and further ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P50,000.00, to
reimburse them the actual damages of P12,000.00 and to pay moral damages of
P50,000.00. Appellants Salvador Quitlong and Emilio Senoto, Jr., are found guilty as
accomplices in the commission of the crime, and each shall suffer the indeterminate
sentence of nine (9) years and four (4) months of prision mayor minimum period, as
minimum penalty, to thirteen (13) years and nine (9) months and ten (10) days of
reclusion temporal minimum period, as maximum penalty. Appellants Salvador
Quitlong and Emilio Senoto, Jr., are also hereby held solidarily liable with appellant
Ronnie Quitlong in the payment of the damages hereinabove mentioned. Costs against
appellants.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Philippine National Police and the
Department of Justice in order that the other participants in the killing of Jonathan
Calpito, specifically Jesus Mendoza, be arrested and made to face the force of the law.
SO ORDERED.
 2. PECHO v. PEOPLE
[G.R. No. 111399. September 27, 1996]
ODON PECHO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and the
SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents.
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In our decision of 14 November 1994, we modified the appealed judgment of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 14844 by holding the petitioner guilty of the
complex crime of attempted estafa through falsification of official and commercial
documents, and sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from two (2)
years, four (4) months, and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to ten (10)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum and to pay a fine of Two Thousand
Pesos (P2,000.00).
In short, we held that although the petitioner could not be convicted of the crime
charged, viz., violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended -- because the
said section penalizes only consummated offenses and the offense charged in this case
was not consummated -- he could, nevertheless, be convicted of the complex crime of
attempted estafa through falsification of official and commercial documents, which is
necessarily included in the crime charged.
Unable to accept our verdict, the petitioner seasonably filed a motion for
reconsideration on the ground that after having been acquitted of the violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, a special law, he could not be convicted anymore of
attempted estafa through falsification of official and commercial documents, an offense
punishable under the Revised Penal Code, a general law; otherwise, the constitutional
provision on double jeopardy would be violated. In other words, his acquittal of the
crime charged precludes conviction for the complex crime of attempted estafa through
falsification of official and commercial documents, because both offenses arose from
the same overt act as alleged in the information in Criminal Case No. 14844.
In its Comment on the motion for reconsideration signed only by Assistant Solicitor
General Romeo C. de la Cruz and Solicitor Josette Sonia Holgado-Marcilla, the Office
of the Solicitor General disagrees with the petitioner and asserts that the rule on double
jeopardy cannot be successfully invoked in this case considering that no new
information for estafa through falsification of public document was filed against the
petitioner; only one information was filed against him and his co-accused. For double
jeopardy to exist, there must be such new information and the accused must be able to
show that (1) he has been previously brought to trial, (2) in a court of competent
jurisdiction, (3) upon a valid complaint or information sufficient in form and substance,
(4) for the same offense or an attempt to or frustration thereof as that charged in the
new information, and that (5) the case has been dismissed or terminated without his
consent or after he had pleaded to the information but before judgment was
rendered.[1]
Nevertheless, the Office of the Solicitor General joins the petitioner in the latters plea
for his acquittal, but for another ground, namely, insufficiency of evidence.
In the resolution of 22 August 1995, we directed the Solicitor General to inform the
Court whether he agrees with the recommendation of Assistant Solicitor General De la
Cruz and Solicitor Holgado-Marcilla. In his Manifestation of 14 September 1995, the
Solicitor General not only expressed full agreement with the said recommendation, but
even added the following observations:
10. After reading the Courts Decision, the Solicitor General has noted that petitioners
conviction is based on circumstantial evidence.
11. The law and a host of the Courts ruling declare that circumstantial evidence is
sufficient for conviction if the following conditions concur:
(1) There is more that one circumstance;
(2) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(3) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt (Section 3, Rule 133, Rules of Court).
12. In this case, it should be stressed that the inference that petitioner falsified
documents appears to be based on another inference, i.e., that he was in possession
of the same because he accompanied his co-accused Catre in the transactions.
However, other than accompanying Catre, there is no evidence on record that petitioner
had custody of the falsified documents.
13. As to the conspiracy angle, there is likewise no showing that petitioner interceded
for Catre. In fact, it was Catre who talked to Calica. (p. 19-20, TSN, August 26, 1991)
Neither was it shown that petitioner had a hand in the processing of the import entry
declaration for the release of the shipment from the Bureau of Customs. It was not also
proven that he was instrumental in the approval of the import entry declaration.
14. The elements of conspiracy, like the physical acts constituting the crime itself, must
be proven beyond reasonable doubt. (People vs. Manuel, 234 SCRA 532). To hold an
accused guilty as co-principal by reason of conspiracy, it must be shown that he
performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the conspiracy. (People vs.
Roxas, 241 SCRA 369). In this regard, it is respectfully submitted that there is no overt
act conclusively attributable to petitioner which would pin him down as a co-conspirator.
15. Thus, it is the inexorable duty of the Solicitor General to recommend petitioners
acquittal, as he so recommends, inasmuch as the People was not able to adduce
evidence sufficient to overcome the constitutional presumption of petitioners
innocence.
We then required the parties to submit their respective memoranda on the following
issues:
(a) the sufficiency of the evidence for the complex crime of attempted estafa through
falsification of public and commercial documents, and
(b) the validity of the conviction therefor under an information for the violation of Section
3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, vis-a-vis the constitutional right of the accused to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
In their respective memoranda, the petitioner and the Office of the Solicitor General are A Yes, sir.
one in asserting that the petitioner could not be convicted based entirely on
circumstantial evidence because of the failure of the prosecution to satisfy the Q Who actually delivered to you the documents, Mr. Catre or Mr. Pecho?
requisites set forth in Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, namely, (a) there is
more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are A It was Mr. Catre, sir, he was the one handling the case.
proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The petitioner further cited portions of the AJ ESCAREAL
transcripts of the stenographic notes of the testimony of Customs Broker Constantino
Calica which prove that it was Catre alone who made the introduction to Calica that Q [To] Whom did you talk first?
they were agents of Eversun Commercial Trading, and that it was Catre who did all the
talking and directly transacted with Calica regarding the terms and conditions of the A Mr. Catre, Your Honor, he was the one handling the case, the documents, Your
particular engagement and who actually delivered the documents to him. There is no Honor.
evidence that the petitioner had a hand in the processing of the import entry declaration
for the release of the shipment from the Bureau of Customs or was instrumental in the Q Do you know how they introduced themselves to you?
approval of the import entry declaration. Thus:
A That is the only thing that I remember Your Honor that they came to my office and
Q Now, did Mr. Odon Pecho actually engage your services? told me that they are the importers representatives and that they are engaging my
services.
A They are two, sir, Mr. Joe Catre and Mr. Odon Pecho.
Q Who said that?
Q Who actually transacted with you with regards to your services, is it Mr. Catre or Mr.
Pecho? A Mr. Catre, Your Honor.

A Mr. Joe Catre, sir. Q How about Mr. Pecho?

Q So it was Joe Catre? A No, Your Honor.

A Yes, sir. Q Did he say anything?

Q And not Odon Pecho, is that right? A At that time your Honor, it was Mr. Catre who was doing that talking.

A Well, he is the companion of Mr. Catre and they introduced themselves to me that Q Did Mr. Catre give his name to you?
they are the authorized representative of the importer.
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q That is right. Who introduced to you?
Q How did he introduce himself?
A Mr. Catre was the one who talks [sic] to me, sir.
A That he is Mr. Joe Catre, Your Honor.
Q But in your testimony, the person who delivered to you the documents, the bill of
lading, the commercial invoices, the packing list, the importers sworn statement, etc. Q How about his companion, did his companion introduce himself to you or he was
which was made the basis of the, of your preparation for the processing of the import introduced by Mr. Catre to you?
entry, who delivered to you these documents that you mentioned?
A He did not introduce himself to me Your Honor.
A Mr. Catre, sir.
Q So during that meeting you do not know that the name of the companion of Mr. Catre
Q And who talked to you about the terms and conditions of this engagement or is Odon Pecho.
contracts?
A Yes, your Honor.
A Mr. Catre, sir.
Q And how did your son attend to it?
Q And not Mr. Odon Pecho?
A Two days after Your Honor, Mr. Catre called our office to assist and help them in the
preparation of the cargo at the arrastre operator because that is usually being done by
the broker when the shipment goes for examination. (t.s.n., Hearing of August 26, 1991)
As to the second issue, the Office of the Solicitor General rejects the theory of the
petitioner and submits that the information in this case contains the essential
ingredients of estafa through falsification of public and commercial documents;
therefore, assuming there is sufficient evidence, the petitioner could be convicted of the
complex crime of attempted estafa through falsification of public and commercial
documents without violating Section 14(2), Article III of the Constitution on the right of
the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
I 3019 and the complex crime of attempted estafa through falsification of official and
We shall first take up the second issue since it involves a constitutional right of the
accused.
On the assumption that the prosecutions evidence had satisfied the quantum of proof
for conviction for the complex crime of attempted estafa through falsification of public
and commercial documents, there is absolutely no merit in the petitioners claim that he
could not be convicted of the said crime without offending his right to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him, which is guaranteed by the Bill of
Rights.[2] Such right, an ancient bulwark of the liberties of men, has its origin in the Bill
of Rights which the people of Great Britain demanded and received from the Prince
and Princess of Orange on 13 February 1688. It was adopted by the Constitution of the
United States and was extended to the Philippines by Act No. 235, or the Philippine Bill
of 1902.[3] It was later carried into the Jones Law and, ultimately, enshrined in the
Constitutions of 1935, 1973, and 1987. It has the following objectives:
First. To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will
enable him to make his defense; second, to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal
for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause; and third, to inform the
court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to
support a conviction, if one should be had (United States vs. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542).
In order that this requirement may be satisfied, facts must be stated; not conclusions of
law. Every crime is made up of certain acts and intent; these must be set forth in the
complaint with reasonable particularity of time, place, names (plaintiff or defendant),
and circumstances. In short, the complaint must contain a specific allegation of every
fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the crime charged.[4]
Conformably therewith, the Rules of Court has prescribed the appropriate rules.[5]
What determines the real nature and cause of accusation against an accused is the
actual recital of facts stated in the information or complaint and not the caption or
preamble of the information or complaint nor the specification of the provision of law
alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law.[6] An incorrect caption is
not a fatal mistake.[7]
It follows then that an accused may be convicted of a crime which, although not the one
charged, is necessarily included in the latter. Section 4, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court
thus provides:
SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. -- When there is
variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information, and that proved
or established by the evidence, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily
includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved
included in that which is charged, or of the offense charged included in that which is
proved.
The succeeding Section 5 prescribes the rule in determining when an offense includes
or is included in another. We have shown in the challenged decision why the complex
crime of attempted estafa through falsification of public and commercial documents is
included in the offense charged. Moreover, we held that the information in this case can
also be considered as charging two offenses: the violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
commercial documents, and since the petitioner failed to object before trial to such
duplicity,[8] he could be validly convicted of both or either of the offenses charged and
proved.[9]
II
We shall now turn to the first issue: whether the evidence adduced by the prosecution
had established beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the petitioner for the complex
crime of attempted estafa through falsification of public and commercial documents. In
light of the consistent and persistent negative stance of the Office of the Solicitor
General, personally confirmed and reinforced by the Solicitor General in his separate
Manifestation, we re-evaluated the evidence.
In our decision of 14 November 1994, we based the conviction of the petitioner on
conspiracy.
The question that logically crops up then is not whether the combination of the
circumstantial evidence proved in this case against the petitioner had established
beyond reasonable doubt that he is guilty of the complex crime of attempted estafa
through falsification of public and commercial documents, as asseverated by him and
the public respondent. Rather, the question is whether the prosecution had discharged
its duty to establish conspiracy between the petitioner and Catre.
The information[10] charges the petitioner and his co-accused Joe Catre as
principals[11] who conspir[ed], confabulat[ed], conniv[ed], confederat[ed], and mutually
help[ed] one another, with Catre representing himself to be a representative of Eversun
Commercial Trading of Cotabato City, a corporation, firm or partnership which turned
out to be non-existent, fake or fictitious. The evidence for the prosecution, as admitted
by the respondent, only showed that it was Catre who possessed the falsified
documents, contracted the services of Calica, and delivered the documents to the latter
for processing. In the absence of satisfactory explanation, Catre, being the one in
possession of the forged documents, is presumed to be the forger.[12] Catre, however,
could not provide the explanation because only the petitioner was tried. The information
states that his address is unknown, and the record does not show that a warrant for his
arrest was issued. The only warrant of arrest that was issued was that for the
petitioner.[13] Assuming that such evidence and the others adduced by the prosecution
are to be admitted to prove the commission of the crime, a prima facie case enough to
prove the guilt of Catre with moral certainty was duly established against Catre as a
principal. Accordingly, if conspiracy were proven, the petitioner would be equally guilty
of the offense proved. For, in a conspiracy, every act of one of the conspirators in
furtherance of a common design or purpose of such a conspiracy is, in contemplation
of law, the act of each of them.[14]
There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it.[15] Direct proof of previous agreement
to commit a crime is not necessary. Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and
manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused
themselves when such point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and
community of interest.[16] It is, however, settled that the same degree of proof required
for establishing the crime is likewise required to support a finding of conspiracy. In other
words, conspiracy must be shown to exist as clearly and as convincingly as the
commission of the offense itself in order to uphold the fundamental principle that no
one shall be found guilty of a crime except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt.[17]
It is also essential for one to be a party to a conspiracy as to be liable for the acts of the
others that there be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the
furtherance of the common design.[18] Except when he is the mastermind in a
conspiracy, it is necessary that a conspirator should have performed some overt act as
a direct or indirect contribution in the execution of the crime planned to be
committed.[19] The overt act may consist of active participation in the actual
commission of the crime itself, or it may consist of moral assistance to his co-
conspirators by being present at the commission of the crime or by exerting moral
ascendancy over the other co-conspirators.[20]
Since conspiracy must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt, then the next
inquiry would be whether the prosecution was able to adduce such proof against the
petitioner. It is in this respect that we agree with the People and the petitioner that the
prosecution had only circumstantial evidence against the petitioner.
Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence would be
sufficient to convict if (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which
the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances
is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. As jurisprudentially
formulated, a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld
only if the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair
and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as
the guilty person, i.e., the circumstances proven must be consistent with each other,
consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time
inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of guilty.[21]
In the instant case, all that the prosecution was able to prove insofar as the petitioner
is concerned is that he and co-accused Catre are from Surigao del Norte; that he
accompanied Catre in contracting the services of customs broker Constantino Calica;
and that he also was with Catre when the latter went with Dennis Calica, son of
Constantino Calica, to the Manila International Container Port. In all these instances,
however, it was Catre who transacted the business and did all the talking. As a matter
of fact, the petitioner was not even introduced to Calica. As recapitulated by the Office
of the Solicitor General in its Memorandum:
[T]here is no evidence that petitioner interceded for Catre. Prosecution witness Calica
testified that it was Catre and not petitioner, who introduced themselves as agents of
Eversun Commercial Trading. He also testified that it was Catre who did all the talking
and directly transacted with him (Calica) regarding the terms and conditions of the
particular engagement and it was also Catre, and not petitioner, who actually delivered
the documents to him (tsn, August 26, 1991). There is no evidence that petitioner had
a hand in the processing of the import entry declaration for the release of the shipment
from the Bureau of Customs. There is also no evidence that petitioner was instrumental
in the approval of the import entry declaration. In short, there is no showing that
petitioner performed an overt act in furtherance of alleged conspiracy.[22]
The evidence for the prosecution likewise failed to prove that the petitioner (1)
personally represented himself as an agent of Eversun Commercial Trading; (2) knew
of the falsity of any of the public and commercial documents in question; and (3) had,
at any time, possession of all or some of the said documents.
Otherwise stated, there is no sufficient circumstantial evidence to prove conspiracy
between the petitioner and Catre to commit the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of public and commercial documents. Neither is there evidence of
petitioners active participation in the commission of the crime. The concordant
combination and cumulative effect of the acts of the petitioner as proven by the
prosecutions evidence fails to satisfy the requirements of Section 4, Rule 133 of the
Rules of Court. There is reasonable doubt as to his guilt. And since his constitutional
right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty[23] can be overthrown only by proof
beyond reasonable doubt,[24] the petitioner must then be acquitted even though his
innocence may be doubted.[25]
WHEREFORE, the petitioners motion for reconsideration is GRANTED. Our decision
of 14 November 1994 is SET ASIDE, and another is hereby rendered REVERSING the
challenged decision of 28 June 1993 and resolution of 12 August 1993 of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 14844 and ACQUITTING petitioner ODON
PECHO of the complex crime of attempted estafa through falsification of official and
commercial documents, without, however, prejudice to any appropriate administrative
action which his office may take against him as may be warranted by the circumstances
in this case.
SO ORDERED.
 3. SORIANO v. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. L-65952 July 31, 1984
LAURO G. SORIANO, JR., petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
Dakila F. Castro for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
The principal issue in this petition to review a decision of the Sandiganbayan is whether
or not the preliminary investigation of a criminal complaint conducted by a Fiscal is a
"contract or transaction" so as to bring it within the ambit of Section 3 (b) of Republic
Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The factual background is as follows:
Thomas N. Tan was accused of qualified theft in a complaint lodged with the City Fiscal
of Quezon City. The case was docketed as I.S. No. 82-2964 and assigned for
investigation to the petitioner who was then an Assistant City Fiscal. In the course of
the investigation the petitioner demanded P4,000.00 from Tan as the price for
dismissing the case. Tan reported the demand to the National Bureau of Investigation
which set up an entrapment. Because Tan was hard put to raise the required amount
only P2,000.00 in bills were marked by the NBI which had to supply one-half thereof.
The entrapment succeeded and an information was filed with the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Case No. 7393 which reads as follows:
The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accuses LAURO G. SORIANO, for
Violation of Section 3, paragraph (b) of Republic Act 3019, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, committed as follows:
That on or about the 21st day of March 1983, at Quezon City, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer,
being then and still is an Assistant City Fiscal of the Quezon City Fiscal's Office, detailed
as the Investigating Fiscal in the case of MARIANNE Z. LACAMBRA versus THOMAS
N. TAN, docketed as I.S. No. 82-2964, for Qualified Theft, taking advantage of his
official position and with grave abuse of authority, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously demand and request from Thomas N. Tan the amount of FOUR
THOUSAND PESOS (P4,000.00) Philippine Currency, and actually received from said
Thomas N. Tan the amount of TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P2,000.00) Philippine
Currency, in consideration for a favorable resolution by dismissing the abovementioned
case, wherein said accused has to intervene in his official capacity as such
Investigating Fiscal.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Manila, Philippines, March 22, 1983.
(SGD.) EDGARDO C. LABELLA
Special Prosecutor
After trial the Sandiganbayan rendered a decision with the following dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Lauro G. Soriano, Jr., GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt, as Principal in the Information, for Violation of Section 3, paragraph
(b), of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, and hereby sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment ranging from SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) MONTH, as minimum, to NINE
(9) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY, as maximum; to suffer perpetual disqualification from
public office; to suffer loss of all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law; and, to
pay costs.
Of the sum of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) used in the entrapment operations,
and which was fully recovered from the accused, One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00)
shall be returned to private complainant Thomas N. Tan, and the other half, to the
National Bureau of Investigation, National Capital Region.
A motion to reconsider the decision was denied by the Sandiganbayan; hence the
instant petition.
The petitioner has raised several legal questions plus one factual question. The latter
is to the effect that the Sandiganbayan convicted him on the weakness of his defense
and not on the strength of the prosecution's evidence. This claim is not meritorious not
only because it is not for Us to review the factual findings of the court a quo but also
because a reading of its decision shows that it explicitly stated the facts establishing
the guilt of the petitioner and the competence of the witnesses who testified against
him.
As stated above, the principal issue is whether or not the investigation conducted by
the petitioner can be regarded as a "contract or transaction" within the purview of Sec.
3 (b) of R.A. No. 3019. On this issue the petition is highly impressed with merit.
The afore-mentioned provision reads as follows:
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public
officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices
of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
(a) ...
(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share,
percentage, or benefit, for himself or for any other person, in connection with any
contract or transaction between the Government and any other party, wherein the
public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law.
The petitioner states:
Assuming in gratia argumenti, petitioner's guilt, the facts make out a case of Direct
Bribery defined and penalized under the provision of Article 210 of the Revised Penal
Code and not a violation of Section 3, subparagraph (b) of Rep. Act 3019, as amended.

The evidence for the prosecution clearly and undoubtedly support, if at all the offense
of Direct Bribery, which is not the offense charged and is not likewise included in or is
necessarily included in the offense charged, which is for violation of Section 3,
subparagraph (b) of Rep. Act 3019, as amended. The prosecution showed that: the
accused is a public officer; in consideration of P4,000.00 which was allegedly solicited,
P2,000.00 of which was allegedly received, the petitioner undertook or promised to
dismiss a criminal complaint pending preliminary investigation before him, which may
or may not constitute a crime; that the act of dismissing the criminal complaint pending
before petitioner was related to the exercise of the function of his office. Therefore, it is
with pristine clarity that the offense proved, if at all is Direct Bribery. (Petition, p. 5.)

Upon the other hand, the respondents claim:

A reading of the above-quoted provision would show that the term 'transaction' as used
thereof is not limited in its scope or meaning to a commercial or business transaction
but includes all kinds of transaction, whether commercial, civil or administrative in
nature, pending with the government. This must be so, otherwise, the Act would have
so stated in the "Definition of Terms", Section 2 thereof. But it did not, perforce leaving
no other interpretation than that the expressed purpose and object is to embrace all
kinds of transaction between the government and other party wherein the public officer
would intervene under the law. (Comment, p. 8.)

It is obvious that the investigation conducted by the petitioner was not a contract.
Neither was it a transaction because this term must be construed as analogous to the
term which precedes it. A transaction, like a contract, is one which involves some
consideration as in credit transactions and this element (consideration) is absent in the
investigation conducted by the petitioner.

In the light of the foregoing, We agree with the petitioner that it was error for the
Sandiganbayan to have convicted him of violating Sec. 3 (b) of R.A. No. 3019.

The petitioner also claims that he cannot be convicted of bribery under the Revised
Penal Code because to do so would be violative of as constitutional right to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Wrong. A reading of the
information which has been reproduced herein clearly makes out a case of bribery so
that the petitioner cannot claim deprivation of the right to be informed.

IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the Sandiganbayan is modified

in that the petitioner is deemed guilty of bribery as defined and penalized by Article 210
of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty
of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years of prision correccional
as maximum, and to pay a fine of Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos. The rest of the
judgment is hereby affirmed. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 4. BORJA v. MENDOZA
G.R. No. L-45667 June 20, 1977
MANUEL BORJA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RAFAEL T. MENDOZA, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu (Branch VI)
and HON. ROMULO R. SENINING, Judge of the City Court of Cebu (Branch I),
respondents.
Hermis I. Mopntecillo for petitioner.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor Jose F. Racela, Jr. and
Solicitor Carlos N. Ortega for respondents.
FERNANDO, J.:
The jurisdictional infirmity imputer to respondent Judge Romulo R. Senining of the City
of Cebu which was not remedied by respondent Judge Rafael T. Mendoza of the Court
of First Instance of Cebu in this certionrari proceeding was the absence of an
arrainment of petitioner Manuel Borja, who was accused of slight physical injuries. This
notwithstanding respondent Judge Senining proceeded with the trial in abssentia and
thereafter, in a decision promulgated on August 18, 1976, found him guilty of such
offense and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment for a period of twenty days of arresto
menor. 1 Thereafter, an appeal was duly elevated to the Court of First Instance of Cebu
presided by respondent Judge Mendoza. 2 It was then alleged that without any notice
to petitioner and without requiring him to submit his memorandum, a decision on the
appealed case was rendered on November 16, 1976 petitioner that the failure to arraign
him is violative of his constitutional right to procedural due process, 3 more specifically
of his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him and of
his right to be heard by himself and counsel. 4 Ther was thus, at the very least, a
graveabuse of discretion. The Solicitor General, 5 when asked to comment, agreed that
the procedural defect was of such gravity as to render void the decision of the City
Court affirmed by the Court of First Instance. The comment was considered as answer,
with the case being submitted for decision.
Respect for the constitutional rights of an accused as authoritatively construed by this
Court, duly taken note of in the comment of the Solicitor General, thus calls for the grant
of the writ of certiorari prayed for.
1. The plea of petitioner to nullify the proceedings had in the criminal case
against him finds support in the procedural due process mandate of the Constitution. It
requires that the accused be arraigned so that he may be informed as to why he was
indicted and what penal offense he has to face, to be convicted only on a showing that
his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt with full opportunity to disprove the
evidence against him. Moreover, the sentence to be imposed in such a case is to be in
accordance with a valid law. 6 This Court, in People v. Castillo, 7 speaking through
Justice De Joya and following the language of the American Supreme Court, Identified
due process with the accused having "been heard in a court of competent jurisdiction,
and proceeded against under the orderly processes of law, and only punished after
inquiry and investigation, upon notice to him, with an opportunity to be heard, and a
judgment awarded with the authority of a constitutional law, ..." 8 An arraignment thus
becomes indispensable as the means "for bringing the accused into court and notifying
him of the cause he is required to meet ... " 9 Its importance was stressed by Justice
Moreland as early as 1916 in the leading case of United States v. Binayoh. 10 He
pointed out that upon the accused being arraigned, "there is a duty laid by the Code
[now the Rules of Court] upon the court to inform [him] of certain rights and to extend
to him, on his demand, certain others. This duty is an affirmative one which the court,
on its own motion, must perform, unless waived." 11 To emphasize its importance, he
added: "No such duty, however, is laid on the court with regard to the rights of the
accused which he may be entitled to exercise during the trial. Those are rights which
he must assert himself and the benefits of which he himself must demand. In other
words, in the arraignment the court must act of its own volition, ..." 12 In the terse and
apt language of the Solicitor General: "Arraignment is an indispensable requirement in
any criminal prosecution." 13 Procedural due process demands no less.
2. Nor is it only the due process guarantee that calls for the accused being duly
arraigned. As noted, it is at that stage where in the mode and manner required by the
Rules, an accused, for the first time, is granted the opportunity to know the precise
charge that confronts him. It is imperative that he is thus made fully aware of Possible
loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him.
At the very least then, he must be fully informed of why the prosecuting arm of the state
is mobilized against him. An arraignment serves that purpose. Thereafter he is no
longer in the dark. It is true, the complaint or information may not be worded with
sufficient clarity. He would be in a much worse position though if he does not even have
such an opportunity to plead to the charge. With his counsel by his side, he is thus in a
position to enter his plea with full knowledge of the consequences. He is not even
required to do so immediately. He may move to quash. What is thus evident is that an
arraignment assures that he be fully acquainted with the nature of the crime imputed to
him and the circumstances under which it is allegedly committed. It is thus a vital aspect
of the constitutional rights guaranteed him. It is not useless formality, much less an Idle
ceremony.
3. An equally fatal defect in the proceeding had before respondent Judge
Senining was that notwithstanding its being conducted in the absence of petitioner, he
was convicted. It was shown that after one postponement due to his failure to appear,
the case was reset for hearing. When that date came, December 14, 1973, without
petitioner being present, although his bondsmen were notified, respondent Judge, as
set forth in the comment of the Solicitor General, "allowed the prosecution to present
its evidence invoking Letter of Instruction No. 40. Only one witness testified, the
offended party herself, and three documents were offered in evidence after which the
prosecution rested its case. Thereupon, respondent City Court set the promulgation of
the decision on December 28, 1973." 14 It could then conclude: :Verily the records
clearly show that petitioner was not arraigned at all and was not represented by counsel
throughout the whole proceedings in the respondent City Court." 15 It is indisputable
then that there was a denial of petitioner's constitutional right to be heard by himself
and counsel. As categorically affirmed by Justice Ozaeta for this Court in the leading
case of Abriol v. Homeres: 16 "It is the constitutional right of the accused to be heard
in his defense before sentence is pronounced on him." 17 He added further that such
"constitutional right is inviolate." 18 There is no doubt that it could be waived, but here
there was no such waiver, whether express or implied. It suffices to refer to another
leading case, People v. Holgado, 19 where the then Chief Justice Moran emphatically
took note of the importance of the right to counsel: "In criminal cases there can be no
fair hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to be heard by counsel. The
right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by
counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of
the law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he may be
convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his
innocence." 20 With the violation of the constitutional right to be heard by himself and
counsel being thus manifest, it is easily understandable why the Solicitor General
agreed with petitioner that the sentence imposed on him should be set aside for being
null.

4. The provision in the present Constitution allowing trial to be held in absentia

is unavailing. It cannot justify the actuation of respondent Judge Senining. Its language
is clear and explicit. What is more, it is mandatory. Thus: "However, after arraignment,
trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has
been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified." 21 As pointed out then by the
Solicitor General, the indispensable requisite for trial in absentia is that it should come
"after arraignment." The express mention in the present Constitution of the need for
such a step emphasizes its importance in the procedural scheme to accord an accused
due process. Without the accused having been arraigned, it becomes academic to
discuss the applicability of this exception to the basic constitutional right that the
accused should be heard by himself and counsel.

5. Nor did the appeal to the Court of First Instance presided by respondent Judge
Mendoza possess any curative aspect. To quote anew from the comment of the
Solicitor General: "Respondent Court of First Instance ... considered the appeal taken
by the petitioner as waiver of the defects in the proceedings in the respondent City
Court. Precisely, the appeal itself is tantamount to questioning those defects. In fact,
the Memorandum in support of the appeal unmistakably raised as error the absence of
petitioner at the arraignment and cited jurisprudence, commentaries and the rules to
bolster his position. Specifically, the absence of an arraignment can be invoked at
anytime in view of the requirements of due process to ensure a fair and impartial trial."
22

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted. The decision of respondent Judge
Romulo R. Senining dated December 28, 1973, finding the accused guilty of the crime
of slight physical injuries, is nullified and set aside. Likewise, the decision of respondent
Judge Rafael T. Mendoza dated November 16, 1976, affirming the aforesaid decision
of Judge Senining, is nullified and set aside. The case is remanded to the City Court of
Cebu for the prosecution of the offense of slight physical injuries, with due respect and
observance of the provisions of the Rules of Court, starting with the arraignment of
petitioner.

Barredo, Antonio, Aquino and Fernandez, JJ, concur.

Concepcion Jr., J, is on leave.