SELF-EXECUTING and NON-SELF-EXECUTING provisions of the Constitution Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: The State recognizes

s: The State recognizes the sanctity of

family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn
from conception.
- Are provisions of the Constitution self-executory? Or is there a need for legislation
to implement these provisions?

In its plain and ordinary meaning, the traditional meaning of conception according
to reputable dictionaries cited by the speaker is that life begins at fertilization. Medical
A constitutional provision is self-executing when it can be given effect without the aid sources also support the view that conception begins at fertilization.
of legislation, and there is nothing to indicate that legislation is intended to make it
operative. For example, a constitutional provision that any municipality by vote of four-
sevenths of its qualified electors may issue and sell revenue bonds in order to pay for
the cost of purchasing a municipally owned public utility is self-executing and effective The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) conception to refer to the
without a legislative enactment. moment of fertilization and (b) the protection of the unborn child upon fertilization.
In addition, they did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being unconstitutional;
only those that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum would be prohibited. Contraceptives
that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and female ovum, and those that
Constitutional provisions are not self-executing if they merely set forth a line of policy similarly take action before fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus
or principles without supplying the means by which they are to be effectuated, or if the constitutionally permissible.
language of the constitution is directed to the legislature. As a result, a constitutional
provision that the legislature shall direct by law in what manner and in what court suits
may be brought against the state is not self-executing.
The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the unborn child
Just as with constitutional provisions, statutes and court judgments can be self- was to prevent the Legislature from passing a measure prevent abortion. The Court
executing. cannot interpret this otherwise. The RH Law is in line with this intent and actually
prohibits abortion. By using the word or in defining abortifacient (Section 4(a)), the
RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation but also those
that induce abortion and induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mothers womb.
Imbong vs. Ochoa, GR 204819, April 8, 2014
The RH Law recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a
bounded duty to protect it.

Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for

violating the:
However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the
meaning of abortifacient by using the term primarily. Recognizing as abortifacients
only those that primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the
1. Right to life mothers womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in
the mothers womb (Sec. 3.01(a) of the IRR) would pave the way for the approval of
NO. Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question of when life begins contraceptives that may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from
is a scientific and medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without conception/fertilization. This violates Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. For the
proper hearing and evidence. However, they agreed that individual Members could same reason, the definition of contraceptives under the IRR (Sec 3.01(j)), which also
express their own views on this matter. uses the term primarily, must be struck down.
2. Right to health FACTS:

NO. Petitioners claim that the right to health is violated by the RH Law because it
requires the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and
other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and
supplies in the National Drug Formulary and in the regular purchase of essential
medicines and supplies of all national hospitals (Section 9 of the RH Law). They cite
risks of getting diseases gained by using e.g. oral contraceptive pills.
The NBI Investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who
declared that JLN Corporation (Janet Lim Napoles) had swindled billions of pesos from
the public coffers for "ghost projects" using dummy NGOs. Thus, Criminal complaints
were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, charging five (5) lawmakers for
Plunder, and three (3) other lawmakers for Malversation, Direct Bribery, and Violation
of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Also recommended to be charged in the
complaints are some of the lawmakers chiefs -of-staff or representatives, the heads
and other officials of three (3) implementing agencies, and the several presidents of
the NGOs set up by Napoles.

Some petitioners do not question contraception and contraceptives per se. Rather,
they pray that the status quo under RA 4729 and 5921 be maintained. These laws Whistle-blowers alleged that" at least P900 Million from royalties in the operation of
prohibit the sale and distribution of contraceptives without the prescription of a duly- the Malampaya gas project off Palawan province intended for agrarian reform
licensed physician. beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO. Several petitions were lodged before the
Court similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional

The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With RA 4729 in place,
the Court believes adequate safeguards exist to ensure that only safe contraceptives G.R. No. 208493 SJS filed a Petition for Prohibition seeking that the "Pork Barrel
are made available to the public. In fulfilling its mandate under Sec. 10 of the RH Law, System" be declared unconstitutional, and a writ of prohibition be issued permanently
the DOH must keep in mind the provisions of RA 4729: the contraceptives it will
procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that G.R. No. 208566 - Belgica, et al filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition
the actual distribution of these contraceptive drugs and devices will be done following
With Prayer For The Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ
a prescription of a qualified medical practitioner. of Preliminary Injunction seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel System," presently
embodied in the provisions of the GAA of 2013 which provided for the 2013 PDAF, and
Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be considered the Executives lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and the
mandatory only after these devices and materials have been tested, evaluated and Presidential Social Fund, be declared unconstitutional and null and void for being acts
approved by the FDA. Congress cannot determine that contraceptives are safe, legal, constituting grave abuse of discretion. Also, they pray that the Court issue a TRO
non-abortificient and effective. against respondents

Belgica vs. Ochoa, GR 208566, Nov. 19, 2013 UDK-14951 A Petition filed seeking that the PDAF be declared unconstitutional, and a
cease and desist order be issued restraining President Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III
(President Aquino) and Secretary Abad from releasing such funds to Members of
Congress
NATURE:

These are consolidated petitions taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, all of which
assail the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System. ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel
Laws similar thereto are unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles
of/constitutional provisions on (a) separation of powers; (b) non-delegability of (b) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects was declared
legislative power; (c) checks and balances; (d) accountability; (e) political dynasties; constitutional. IT INDICATED PURPOSE ADEQUATELY CURTAILS THE AUTHORITY OF THE
and (f) local autonomy. PRESIDENT TO SPEND THE PRESIDENTIAL SOCIAL FUND ONLY FOR RESTORATION
PURPOSES WHICH ARISE FROM CALAMITIES.
2. Whether or not the phrases (under Section 8 of PD 910,116 relating to the
Malampaya Funds, and under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating
to the Presidential Social Fund, are unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue
delegations of legislative power. (b) and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities,
as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines
was declared unconstitutional.IT GIVES THE PRESIDENT CARTE BLANCHE AUTHORITY
TO USE THE SAME FUND FOR ANY INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT HE MAY SO DETERMINE
HELD: AS A PRIORITY. VERILY, THE LAW DOES NOT SUPPLY A DEFINITION OF PRIORITY
INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS AND HENCE, LEAVES THE PRESIDENT
1. Yes, the PDAF article is unconstitutional. The post-enactment measures which WITHOUT ANY GUIDELINE TO CONSTRUE THE SAME.
govern the areas of project identification, fund release and fund realignment are not
related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to
intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget
execution. This violates the principle of separation of powers. Congressrole must be Oposa vs. Factoran Case Digest (G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993)
confined to mere oversight that must be confined to: (1) scrutiny and (2) investigation
and monitoring of the implementation of laws. Any action or step beyond that will
undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the constitution.
FACTS:

The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented and joined by their parents.
Thus, the court declares the 2013 pdaf article as well as all other provisions of law The first complaint was filed as a taxpayer's class suit at the Branch 66 (Makati, Metro
which similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the Manila), of the Regional Trial Court, National capital Judicial Region against defendant
implementation or enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, (respondent) Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Reasources
as violative of the separation of powers principle and thus unconstitutional. (DENR). Plaintiffs alleged that they are entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment
of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests. They
further asseverate that they represent their generation as well as generations yet
unborn and asserted that continued deforestation have caused a distortion and
disturbance of the ecological balance and have resulted in a host of environmental
tragedies.
2. Yes. Sec 8 of PD 910- the phrase and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President constitutes an undue delegation of legislative Plaintiffs prayed that judgement be rendered ordering the respondent, his agents,
power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to cancel all existing Timber
the limits of the Presidents authority with respect to the purpose for which the License Agreement (TLA) in the country and to cease and desist from receiving,
Malampaya Funds may be used. It gives the President wide latitude to use the accepting, processing, renewing or approving new TLAs.
Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to
unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law. Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
complaint had no cause of action against him and that it raises a political question.

The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further ruling that granting of the relief
Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993- the phrases: prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the
Constitution.
Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari and asked Second paragraph, Section 1 of Article VIII of the constitution provides for the
the court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the expanded jurisdiction vested upon the Supreme Court. It allows the Court to rule upon
respondent RTC Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action. even on the wisdom of the decision of the Executive and Legislature and to declare
their acts as invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because it is tainted with grave
ISSUES: abuse of discretion.

(1) Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action. Third Issue: Violation of the non-impairment clause.

(2) Whether or not the complaint raises a political issue. The Court held that the Timber License Agreement is an instrument by which the state
regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public
(3) Whether or not the original prayer of the plaintiffs result in the impairment of welfare is promoted. It is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause
contracts. thus, the non-impairment clause cannot be invoked. It can be validly withdraw
whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case. The granting of
RULING:
license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights.
First Issue: Cause of Action.
Moreover, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is
Respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal limit by the exercise by the police power of the State, in the interest of public health,
right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. The safety, moral and general welfare. In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to
Court did not agree with this. The complaint focuses on one fundamental legal right -- the police power of the State.
the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which is incorporated in Section 16 Article
The instant petition, being impressed with merit, is hereby GRANTED and the RTC
II of the Constitution. The said right carries with it the duty to refrain from impairing
decision is SET ASIDE.
the environment and implies, among many other things, the judicious management
and conservation of the country's forests. Section 4 of E.O. 192 expressly mandates the FACTS:
DENR to be the primary government agency responsible for the governing and
supervising the exploration, utilization, development and conservation of the country's
natural resources. The policy declaration of E.O. 192 is also substantially re-stated in
Title XIV Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987. Both E.O. 192 and Administrative The petitioners, all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents,
Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formation, filed a petition to cancel all existing timber license agreements (TLAs) in the country
and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR. Thus, right of the petitioners and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving
(and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as DENR's new timber license agreements. This case is filed not only on the appellants right as
duty to protect and advance the said right. taxpayers, but they are also suing in behalf of succeeding generations based on the
concept of intergenerational responsibility in so far as the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is concerned.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or
obligation to respect or protect or respect the same gives rise to a cause of action.
Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLA, which they claim was done with Together with the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), the petitioners presented
grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balance and healthful ecology. scientific evidence that deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental
Hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or tragedies. One of these is the reduction of the earths capacity to process carbon
granted. dioxide, otherwise known as the greenhouse effect.
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, the Court finds it to be
adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights.
Continued issuance by the defendant of TLAs to cut and deforest the remaining forest
Second Issue: Political Issue. stands will work great damage and irreparable injury to the plaintiffs. Appellants have
exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendants office regarding the plea to
cancel the said TLAs. The defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel existing TLAs.
Taada vs. Angara, GR 118295, May 2, 1997

THE FACTS
ISSUES:

Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing on the said case
Petitioners Senators Taada, et al. questioned the constitutionality of the concurrence
Admitting that all facts presented are true, whether or not the court can render a valid by the Philippine Senate of the Presidents ratification of the international Agreement
judgement in accordance to the prayer of the complaints establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO). They argued that the WTO
Agreement violates the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to develop a self-reliant
Whether or not the TLAs may be revoked despite the respondents standing that these and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos . . . (to) give
cancellation of these TLAs are against the non-impairment clause of the Constitution preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino labor,
domestic materials and locally produced goods. Further, they contended that the
HELD: national treatment and parity provisions of the WTO Agreement place nationals
and products of member countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local
The petitioners have locus standi (legal standing) on the case as a taxpayers (class)
products, in contravention of the Filipino First policy of our Constitution, and render
suit. The subject matter of complaint is of common and general interest to all the
meaningless the phrase effectively controlled by Filipinos.
citizens of the Philippines. The court found difficulty in ruling that the appellants can,
for themselves, and for others file a class suit.

The right of the petitioners to a balanced and healthful ecology has been clearly II. THE ISSUE
stated. A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or
obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. The granting
of the TLAs, as the petitioners claim to be done with grave abuse of discretion, violated
their right to a balanced and healthful ecology hence, the full protection thereof Does the 1987 Constitution prohibit our country from participating in worldwide trade
requires that no TLAs should be renewed or granted. The appellants have also liberalization and economic globalization and from integrating into a global economy
submitted a document with the sub-header CAUSE OF ACTION which is adequate that is liberalized, deregulated and privatized?
enough to show, prima facie, the violation of their rights. On this basis, these actions
must therefore be granted, wholly or partially.

Despite the Constitutions non-impairment clause, TLAs are not contracts, rather III. THE RULING
licenses; thus, the said clause cannot be invoked. Even if these are protected by the
said clause, these can be revoked if the public interest so required as stated in Section
20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705). Furthermore, Section 16 of Article II of
[The Court DISMISSED the petition. It sustained the concurrence of the Philippine
the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that: The State shall protect the right of the
Senate of the Presidents ratification of the Agreement establishing the WTO.]
people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of
nature. The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative
duty to refrain from impairing the government. The said right is also clear as the
DENRs duty under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under NO, the 1987 Constitution DOES NOT prohibit our country from participating in
Executive Order No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 to protect and advance worldwide trade liberalization and economic globalization and from integrating into a
the said right. global economy that is liberalized, deregulated and privatized.

Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded. It is not a contract,
property or property right protected by the due process clause of the Constitution.
There are enough balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow the Senate to ratify
the Philippine concurrence in the WTO Agreement.
[W]hile the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services,
labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange
with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection
of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that are
unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy.
It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the development of the
Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of
foreign goods, services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them
either.In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning
only on foreign competition that is unfair.
It is true, as alleged by petitioners, that broad constitutional principles require the
State to develop an independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos;
and to protect and/or prefer Filipino labor, products, domestic materials and locally
produced goods. But it is equally true that such principles while serving as judicial
and legislative guides are not in themselves sources of causes of action.
Moreover, there are other equally fundamental constitutional principles relied upon by
the Senate which mandate the pursuit of a trade policy that serves the general
welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality
and reciprocity and the promotion of industries which are competitive in both
domestic and foreign markets, thereby justifying its acceptance of said treaty. So too,
the alleged impairment of sovereignty in the exercise of legislative and judicial powers
is balanced by the adoption of the generally accepted principles of international law as
part of the law of the land and the adherence of the Constitution to the policy of
cooperation and amity with all nations.

[T]he constitutional policy of a self-reliant and independent national economy does

not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It
contemplates neither economic seclusion nor mendicancy in the international
community. As explained by Constitutional Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, sponsor
of this constitutional policy:
Economic self-reliance is a primary objective of a developing country that is keenly
aware of overdependence on external assistance for even its most basic needs. It does
not mean autarky or economic seclusion; rather, it means avoiding mendicancy in the
international community. Independence refers to the freedom from undue foreign
control of the national economy, especially in such strategic industries as in the
development of natural resources and public utilities.
The WTO reliance on most favored nation, national treatment, and trade without
discrimination cannot be struck down as unconstitutional as in fact they are rules of
equality and reciprocity that apply to all WTO members. Aside from envisioning a trade
policy based on equality and reciprocity, the fundamental law encourages industries
that are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets, thereby demonstrating a
clear policy against a sheltered domestic trade environment, but one in favor of the
gradual development of robust industries that can compete with the best in the foreign
markets. Indeed, Filipino managers and Filipino enterprises have shown capability and
tenacity to compete internationally. And given a free trade environment, Filipino
entrepreneurs and managers in Hongkong have demonstrated the Filipino capacity to
grow and to prosper against the best offered under a policy of laissez faire.
That the Senate, after deliberation and voting, voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its
consent to the WTO Agreement thereby making it a part of the law of the land is a
legitimate exercise of its sovereign duty and power. We find no patent and gross
arbitrariness or despotism by reason of passion or personal hostility in such exercise.
It is not impossible to surmise that this Court, or at least some of its members, may
even agree with petitioners that it is more advantageous to the national interest to
strike down Senate Resolution No. 97. But that is not a legal reason to attribute grave
abuse of discretion to the Senate and to nullify its decision. To do so would constitute
grave abuse in the exercise of our own judicial power and duty. Ineludibly, what the
Senate did was a valid exercise of its authority. As to whether such exercise was wise,
beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. That is a matter
between the elected policy makers and the people. As to whether the nation should
join the worldwide march toward trade liberalization and economic globalization is a
matter that our people should determine in electing their policy makers. After all, the
WTO Agreement allows withdrawal of membership, should this be the political desire
of a member.
Tanada vs Angara, 272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997
Facts : This is a petition seeking to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) Agreement. Petitioners question the concurrence of herein
respondents acting in their capacities as Senators via signing the said agreement.
The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners,
through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial disallowed the grant of Food Basket Allowance. Petitioners moved for reconsideration
products. Thus, provides new opportunities for the service sector cost and uncertainty and prayed for the lifting of the disallowance for being unconstitutional as it
associated with exporting and more investment in the country. These are the predicted contravenes the fundamental principle of the State enshrined under Sections 9 and 10,
benefits as reflected in the agreement and as viewed by the signatory Senators, a free Article II of the 1987 Constitution:
market espoused by WTO.
Section 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the
Petitioners on the other hand viewed the WTO agreement as one that limits, restricts prosperity and independence of the nation and free the people from poverty through
and impair Philippine economic sovereignty and legislative power. That the Filipino policies that provide adequate social services, promote full employment, a rising
First policy of the Constitution was taken for granted as it gives foreign trading standard of living, and an improved quality of life for all.
intervention.
Section 10. The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national development.
Issue : Whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Senate in giving its concurrence of the said Issue: Is the disallowance in question unconstitutional?
WTO agreement.
Held: The court denied the petition. Social justice provisions of the Constitution are not
Held: In its Declaration of Principles and state policies, the Constitution adopts the self-executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They are merely
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and statements of principles and policies giving guidelines for legislation and that they do
adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity , with not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights.
all nations. By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally
accepted principles of international law, which are considered automatically part of Separation of Powers pp. 677-678
our own laws. Pacta sunt servanda international agreements must be performed in
good faith. A treaty is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding
obligation on the parties.

Through WTO the sovereignty of the state cannot in fact and reality be considered as
absolute because it is a regulation of commercial relations among nations. Such as
when Philippines joined the United Nations (UN) it consented to restrict its sovereignty
right under the concept of sovereignty as autolimitation. What Senate did was a valid
exercise of authority. As to determine whether such exercise is wise, beneficial or
viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. The act of signing the said
agreement is not a legislative restriction as WTO allows withdrawal of membership Non-Delegation of Powers - pp. 685-696
should this be the political desire of a member. Also, it should not be viewed as a
limitation of economic sovereignty. WTO remains as the only viable structure for
multilateral trading and the veritable forum for the development of international trade
law. Its alternative is isolation, stagnation if not economic self-destruction. Thus, the
people be allowed, through their duly elected officers, make their free choice. Separation of Powers

Essence. In essence, separation of powers means that legislation belongs to Congress,

BFAR Employees vs. COA, GR 169815, Aug. 13, 2008 execution to the executive, settlement of legal controversies to the judiciary. Each is
prevented from invading the domain of others. (Bernas, Commentary 656, 2003 ed.)
Facts: The BFAR Employees Union issued a resolution requesting the BFAR Central Division and Assignment. Its starting point is the assumption of the division of the
Office for a Food Basket Allowance. It justified its request on the high cost of living functions of the government into three distinct classesthe executive, the legislative
which makes it hard to sustain even the four basic needs. On post-audit, COA
and the judicial. Its essence consists in the assignment of each class of functions to one approval or disapproval.
of the three organs of government. 2. The executive department may veto the acts of the legislature if in its judgment they
are not in conformity with the Constitution or are detrimental to the interests of the
Theory. The theory is that a power definitely assigned by the Constitution to one people.
department can neither be surrendered nor delegated by that department, nor vested 3. The courts are authorized to determine the validity of legislative measures or
by statute in another executive acts.
department or agency. 4. Through its pardoning power, the executive may modify or set aside the judgments
of the courts.
Reason. The underlying reason of this principle is the assumption that arbitrary rule 5. The legislature may pass laws that in effect amend or completely revoke decisions of
and abuse of authority would inevitably result from the concentration of the three the courts if in its judgment they are not in harmony with its intention or policy which
powers of government in is not contrary to the Constitution.
the same person, body of persons or organ. 6. President must obtain the concurrence of Congress to complete certain significant
acts.
More specifically, according to Justice Laurel, the doctrine of separation of powers is
7. Money can be released from the treasury only by authority of Congress
intended to:
1.Secure action Justiciable Questions vs Political Questions:
2. To forestall overaction
3. To prevent despotism A justiciable question is one that can be decided by courts like issues arising out of
4. To obtain efficiency obligations and contracts, and violations of laws, etc. The courts have jurisdiction over
these things, meaning they can hold a trial and issue judgments.
History. Separation of powers became the pith and core of the American system of
government largely through the influence of the French political writer Montesquieu. Political questions, on the other hand, are beyond the reach and jurisdiction of courts
By the establishment of the American sovereignty in the Philippines, the principle was and are better decided by the people using their sovereign rights and discretion. A
introduced as an inseparable feature of the governmental system organized by the classic example is who should win in an election? The courts cannot dictate who is the
United States in this country. better candidate, as this is a political question that only the people can decide. But if
there is cheating during the election, the court can decide whether there was cheating
Limitations on the Principle or not because there are laws that determine it, hence, this is a justiciable issue.
1. System of Checks and Balances
2. Existence of overlapping powers A political question is one the resolution of which has been vested by the Constitution
exclusively in either the people, in the exercise of their sovereign capacity, or in which
Republicanism full discretionary authority has been delegated to a co-equal branch of the
Government.
The essence of republicanism is representation and renovation, the selection by the
citizenry of a corps of public functionaries who derive their mandate from the people PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
and act on their behalf, serving for a limited period only, after which they are replaced
or retained at the option of their principal - 1935 Constitution

Checks and Balances - 1973 Constitution

The Constitution fixes certain limits on the independence of each department. In order
that these limits may be observed, the Constitution gives each department certain - 1987 Constitution
powers by which it may definitely restrain the other from exceeding their authority.
Thus, checks and balances are formed. Republicanism

To carry out the system of checks and balances, the Constitution provides: o Manifestations of Republicanism
1. The acts of the legislative department have to be presented to the executive for
OURS IS A GOVERNMENT OF LAWS AND NOT OF MEN
(Villavicencio vs. Lukban, GR L-14639, March 25, 1919) O Why is it observed in our Government?

Rule of the majority (Plurality in elections) O What is the purpose?

Accountability of public officials O Acc. to Justice Laurel,

Bill of Rights - to secure action

Legislature cannot pass irrepealable laws - to forestall overaction

SEPARATION OF POWERS - to prevent despotism

NON-DELEGATION OF POWERS - to obtain efficiency

Villacicencio Vs Lukban O To be understood not as INDEPENDENCE but INTERDEPENDENCE

Facts : One hundred and seventy women were isolated from society, and then at O Doctrine of Blending of Powers
night, without their consent and without any opportunity to consult with friends or to
defend their rights, were forcibly hustled on board steamers for transportation to O Doctrine of Checks and Balances, Belgica vs. Ochoa, GR 208566, Nov. 19, 2013
regions unknown. Despite the feeble attempt to prove that the women left voluntarily
Which department ensures the constitutional distribution of powers?
and gladly, that such was not the case is shown by the mere fact that the presence of
the police and the constabulary was deemed necessary and that these officers of the - Does it mean such department is superior to the other departments?
law chose the shades of night to cloak their secret and stealthy acts. Indeed, this is a
fact impossible to refute and practically admitted by the respondents. Angara vs. Electoral Commission (see session 2)

ISSUE : WON Mayor Lukban has the right to deport women with ill repute.

HELD : Law defines power. No official, no matter how high, is above the law. Lukban DOCTRINE OF SUPREMACY OF THE CONSTITUTION
committed a grave abuse of discretion by deporting the prostitutes to a new domicile
against their will. There is no law expressly authorizing his action. On the contrary,
there is a law punishing public officials, not expressly authorized by law or regulation, FACTS:
who compels any person to change his residence Furthermore, the prostitutes are still,
as citizens of the Philippines, entitled to the same rights, as stipulated in the Bill of
Rights, as every other citizen. Thei rchoice of profession should not be a cause for
discrimination. It may make some, like Lukban, quite uncomfortable but it does not In the elections of Sept. 17, 1935, petitioner Jose A. Angara and the respondents Pedro
authorize anyone to compel said prostitutes to isolate themselves from the rest of the Ynsua, Miguel Castillo, and Dionisio Mayor were candidates for the position of
human race. These women have been deprived of their liberty by being exiled to Davao members of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas.
without even being given the opportunity to collect their belongings or, worse, without
even consenting to being transported to Mindanao. For this, Lukban etal must be
severely punished
On Oct. 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-
elect of the National Assembly and on Nov. 15, 1935, he took his oath of office.

PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS

O Under 1987 Constitution

On Dec. 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8, which in effect, fixed the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests
the last date to file election protests. relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly."
On Dec. 8, 1935, Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest"
against Angara and praying, among other things, that Ynsua be named/declared
elected Member of the National Assembly or that the election of said position be
nullified. The Electoral Commission was created to transfer in its totality all the powers
previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of
its members, to an independent and impartial tribunal. The express lodging of that
power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial in the exercise of that power by
On Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution (No. 6) stating that last the National Assembly. And thus, it is as effective a restriction upon the legislative
day for filing of protests is on Dec. 9. Angara contended that the Constitution confers power as an express prohibition in the Constitution.
exclusive jurisdiction upon the Electoral Commission solely as regards the merits of
contested elections to the National Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore has no
jurisdiction to hear the case.
Therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper
exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary
ISSUES: implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.

Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and It appears that on Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission met for the first time and
the subject matter of the controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the approved a resolution fixing said date as the last day for the filing of election protests.
affirmative, When, therefore, the National Assembly passed its resolution of Dec. 3, 1935,
confirming the election of the petitioner to the National Assembly,
the Electoral Commission had not yet met; neither does it appear that said body had
actually been organized.
RULING:
While there might have been good reason for the legislative practice of confirmation of
the election of members of the legislature at the time the power to decide election
In the case at bar, here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a contests was still lodged in the legislature, confirmation alone by the legislature cannot
conflict of a grave constitutional nature between the National Assembly on one hand, be construed as depriving the Electoral Commission of the authority incidental to its
and the Electoral Commission on the other. Although the Electoral Commission may constitutional power to be "the sole judge of all contests...", to fix the time for the
not be interfered with, when and while acting within the limits of its authority, it does filing of said election protests.
not follow that it is beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the
people and that it is not subject to constitutional restrictions.
The Electoral Commission is not a separate department of the government, and even if
The Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional
it were, conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law between
prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent,
departmental powers and agencies of the government are necessarily determined by
Pedro Ynsua against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and that the
the judiciary in justiciable and appropriate cases.
resolution of the National Assembly on Dec. 3, 1935, cannot in any manner toll the
time for filing protest against the election, returns, and qualifications of the members
The court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of protests within such time as the
present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope, and extent of rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.
 No. It is unconstitutional.In the case of Macalintal, in the discussion of J. Puno,

The petition for a writ of prohibition against the electoral commission is hereby denied, the power of oversight embraces all activities undertaken by Congress to enhanceits
with cost against the petitioner. understanding of and influence over the

implementation

Abakada Guro Party List vs. Purisima, GR 166715, Aug. 14, 2008; of legislation it has enacted. Clearly, oversight concerns

post-enactment

This petition for prohibition seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and measures undertaken by Congress: (a) to monitor bureaucratic compliance with
enforcing Republic Act (RA) 9335 program objectives, (b) to determine whether agenciesare properly administered, (c)
to eliminate executive waste and dishonesty, (d) to prevent executive usurpation of
legislative authority,and (d) to assess executive conformity with the congressional
perception of public interest.
(Attrition Actof 2005).RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation
capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and theBureau of The power of oversight has been held to beintrinsic in the grant of legislative power
Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to itself and integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of
exceed their revenue targets byproviding a system of rewards and sanctions through governmentWith this backdrop, it is clear that congressional oversight is not
the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a RevenuePerformance unconstitutional
Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC
with at least six months of service, regardless of employment status2. per se, meaning, it neither necessarily constitutes anencroachment on the executive
power to implement laws nor undermines the constitutional separation of powers.
Rather, it is integral tothe checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of
government. It may in fact even enhance the separation of powers as itprevents the
Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the over-accumulation of power in the executive branch.
constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax reformlegislation. They contend that, by establishing
a system of rewards and incentives, the law "transform[s] the officials andemployees However, to forestall the danger of congressional encroachment "beyond the
of the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters" as they will do their best legislative sphere," the Constitution imposes two basicand related constraints on
only in consideration of suchrewards. Petitioners also assail the creation of a Congress. It may not vest itself, any of its committees or its members with either
congressional oversight committee on the ground that it violates the doctrineof executive or judicial power.
separation of powers,

for it permits legislative participation in the implementation and enforcement of the

law. And, when it exercises its legislative power, it must follow the "single, finely wrought
and exhaustively considered, procedures" specifiedunder the Constitution including
the procedure for enactment of laws and presentment.Thus, any post-enactment
congressional measure such as this should be limited to scrutiny and investigation. In
ISSUE: particular, congressionaloversight must be confined to the
following:(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress' power of appropriation and the bud
WON the joint congressional committee is valid and constitutional
get hearings conducted in connection withit, its power to ask heads of departments to
appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on any matterpertaining to their
departments and its power of confirmation and(2) investigation and monitoring of the
HELD: implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct inquiries inaid
of legislation.
Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by
the Constitution. Legislative vetoes fall in thisclass. Legislative veto is a statutory
provision requiring the President or an administrative agency to present the proposed
implementing rules andregulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or through a
committee formed by it, retains a "right" or "power" to approve or disapprovesuch
regulations before they take effect. As such, a legislative veto in the form of
a congressional oversight committee is in the form of aninward-turning delegation
designed to attach a congressional leash (other than through scrutiny and
investigation) to an agency to whichCongress has by law initially delegated broad
powers. It radically changes the design or structure of the Constitution's diagram of
power asit entrusts to Congress a direct role in enforcing, applying or implementing its
own laws.
Belgica vs. Ochoa, GR 208566, Nov. 19, 2013 (note: case involves
various issues, but focus only on issue about separation of
powers)
WHAT IS THE TEST TO DETERMINE WHETHER A GIVEN POWER HAS
BEEN VALIDLY EXERCISED BY A PARTICULAR DEPARTMENT?
O FIRST, SC determines whether the power has been constitutionally conferred
upon the department. Conferment of power is either:
1. EXPRESS Art. VI, VII, VIII of the 1987 Constitution
2. IMPLIED - DOCTRINE OF NECESSARY IMPLICATION
Angara vs. Electoral Commission (see session 2)
3. INHERENT OR INCIDENTAL
Harvey vs. Defensor-Santiago GR 82544, June 28, 1988
Facts:
Petitioners were among the 22 suspected alien pedophiles who were
apprehended after three months close surveillance by the Commission on Immigration
Petitioners were found with young boys in their respective rooms, the ones with John
and Deportation (CID) agents in Pagsanjan Laguna. Two days after apprehension 17
Sherman being naked. Under those circumstances the CID agents had reasonable
opted for self deportation, one released for lack of evidenced, one was charged by
another offense, working without a valid working visa. Thus, three was left to face the
deportation proceedings.
Seized during petitioners apprehension were rolls of photo negatives and photos
of the suspected child prostitute shown in salacious poses as well as boys and girls
engaged in the sexual act. There were also posters and other literatures advertising the
child prostitution.
Warrant of arrest was issued by respondent against petitioners for violation of
Sec. 37, 45 and 46 of the Immigration act and sec. 69 of the revised administrative
Code.
Issue:
Whether or not the Philippines immigration act clothed the commissioner with
any authority to arrest and detained petitioner pending determination of the existence
of a probable cause
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that there can be no question that the right against
unreasonable search and seizure is available to all persons, including aliens, whether
accused of a crime or not.
One of the constitutional requirement of a valid search warrant or warrant of
arrest is that it must be based upon probable cause.
The arrest of petitioners was based on probable cause determined after close
surveillance for three (3) months during which period their activities were monitored.
The existence of probable cause justified the arrest and the seizure of the photo
negatives, photographs and posters without warrant. Those articles were seized as an
incident to a lawful arrest and, are therefore, admissible in evidence.
But even assuming arguendo that the arrest of petitioners was not valid at its
inception, the records show that formal deportation charges have been filed against
them, as undesirable aliens.
That petitioners were not "caught in the act" does not make their arrest illegal.
grounds to believe that petitioners had committed "pedophilia" defined as 3.) WhetherOng is a resident of Samar.
"psychosexual perversion involving children"
(DOCTRINE OF ACT OF STATE)
SECOND, after sustaining the exercise of power (meaning, there is
determination of valid constitutional grant of power to exercise), the SCs
official action does not stop there; it now then determines whether the act in
question had been performed in accordance with the rules laid down by the
constitution.
- But you should qualify whether the question involved is Justiciable or Political
o Justiciable vs. Political Questions?
Co vs. HRET GR 92191,July 30, 1991
Facts:
On May 11, 1987, the congressional election of Northern Samar was held.Among the
candidate is herein respondent Jose Ong, Jr. Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED.
elected representative of the second district of Northern Samar. Petitioners questioned
the citizenship of respondent Ong since Ongs father was only a naturalized Filipino
citizen and questioned Ongs residence qualificationsince Ong does not own any
property in Samar.
ISSUE/s:
1.) Whether the decision of HRET is appealable;
2.) Whether respondent is a citizen of the Philippines; and
RULING:
1.) Yes. The Constitution explicitly provides that the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole
judges of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective members. In the case at bar, the Court finds no improvident use of power,
no denial of due process on the part of the HRET which will necessitate the exercise of
the power of judicial review by the Supreme Court.
2.) Yes. On April 28, 1955, Jose OngChuan, respondents father, an immigrant from
China was declared a Filipino citizen by the CFI of Samar. At the time Jose OngChuan
took his oath, the private respondent then is a minor of nine years, was finishing his
elementary education in the province of Samar. Hence, there is no ground to deny the
Filipino citizenship of respondent Ong. Respondent Ong was also born of a natural-
born Filipino mother, thus the issue of citizenship is immaterial.
3.) Yes. The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier definition given to the
word residence which regarded it as having the same meaning as domicile. The
domicile of origin of the private respondent, which was the domicile of his parents, is
fixed at Laoang, Samar. Contrary to the petitioners' imputation, Jose Ong, Jr. never
abandoned said domicile; it remained fixed therein even up to the present. Hence, the
residency of respondent Ong has sufficiently proved.
Bengzon vs. Senatte Blue Ribbon Committee GR 89914, Nov. 20, 1991
FACTS:
PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan against Benjamin Romualdez, et al for engaging in
devices, schemes and stratagems to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense of
plaintiff and the Filipino people.
The Senate Minority Floor Leader Enrile delivered a speech before the Senate on the
alleged take-over personal privilege before the Senate on the alleged "takeover of
SOLOIL Inc," the FlagShip of the First Manila Management of Companies or FMMC by
Ricardo Lopa and called upon the Senate to look into the possible violation of the law 1. Yes. In Angara vs Electoral Commission, the Constitution provided for an elaborate
in the case with regard to RA 3019 (Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various
departments of the government. The Court has provided that the allocation of
The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee (Committee on Accountability of Public Officers constitutional boundaries is a task which the judiciary must perform under the
[SBRC]) started its investigation on the matter. Petitioners and Ricardo Lopa were Constitution. Moreover, as held in a recent case, "(t)he political question doctrine
subpoenaed by the SBRC to appear before it and testify on what they know regarding neither interposes an obstacle to judicial determination of the rival claims. The
the sale of 36 corporations belonging to Benjamin Romualdez. Lopa and Bengzon jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court. It cannot
refused to testify, invoking their rights to due process, and that their testimony may abdicate that obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution, although said provision by
unduly prejudice the defendants and petitioners in case before the Sandiganbayan. no means does away with the applicability of the principle in appropriate cases."

The Court is thus of the considered view that it has jurisdiction over the present
controversy for the purpose of determining the scope and extent of the power of the
SBRC rejected the petitioner's plea to be excused from testifying and the SBRC Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to conduct inquiries into private affairs in purported aid
continued its investigation of the matter. of legislation.

The petitioners filed for prohibition with a prayer for TRO and/or injunctive relief, 2. No.
claiming that the SBRC in requiring their attendance and testimony, acted in excess of
its jurisdiction and legislative purpose. The power to conduct formal inquiries or investigations is specifically provided for in
Sec. 1 of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation. Such
The Supreme Court intervened upon a motion for reconsideration filed by one of the inquiries may refer to the implementation or re-examination of any law or in
defendants of the civil case. connection with any proposed legislation or the formulation of future legislation. They
may also extend to any and all matters vested by the Constitution in Congress and/or
in the Senate alone.
ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over the case. It appears, therefore, that the contemplated inquiry by respondent Committee is not
really "in aid of legislation" because it is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction
2. Whether or not the SBRC's inquiry has valid legislative purpose.
of Congress, since the aim of the investigation is to find out whether or not the
3. whether or not the civil case of Sandiganbayan is beyond the power of the SBRC to relatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 RA No. 3019, the
inquire into. "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act", a matter that appears more within the province
of the courts rather than of the legislature.
4. Whether or not the inquiry violates the petitioners' right to due process.

3. No. It cannot be said that the contemplated inquiry on the subject of the privilege
speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, i.e., the alleged sale of the 36 (or 39) corporations
RULING: belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa Group is to be conducted
pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 212 because, firstly, Senator Enrile did not indict the
PCGG, and, secondly, neither Mr. Ricardo Lopa nor the herein petitioners are
connected with the government but are private citizens.
4. Yes. The Constitution expressly provides that "the rights of persons appearing in or
affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
It should be emphasized that the constitutional restriction does not call for the banning
or prohibition of investigations where a violation of a basis rights is claimed. It only
requires that in the course of the proceedings, the right of persons should be
respected.
What the majority opinion mandates is a blanket prohibition against a witness
testifying at all, simply because he is already facing charges before the Sandiganbayan.
To my mind, the Constitution allows him to interpose objections whenever an
incriminating question is posed or when he is compelled to reveal his court defenses,
but not to refuse to take the witness stand completely.
Tanada vs. Angara GR 118295, May 2, 1997
Defensor-Santiago vs. Guingona GR 134577, Nov. 18, 1998
FACTS
: 3. Was Respondent Guingona usurping, unlawfully holding and  
During the first regular session of the eleventh Congress Sen. Marcelo B.
Fernan was declared the duly elected President of the Senate. The following
were likewise elected: Senator Ople as president pro tempore, and Sen.
Franklin M. Drilon as majority leader.
Senator Tatad thereafter manifested that, with the agreement of Senator
Santiago, allegedly the only other member of the minority, he was assuming
the position of minority leader. He explained that those who had voted for
Senator Fernan comprised the “majority,” while only
those who had voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the
“minority.”
During the discussion on who should constitute the Senate
“minority,” Sen. Juan M. Flavier manifested that the
senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party — numbering seven
(7) and, thus, also a minority — had chosen Senator Guingona as the
minority leader. No consensus on the matter was arrived at. The following
session day, the debate on the question continued, with Senators Santiago and
Tatad delivering privilege speeches. On the third session day, the Senate met in
caucus, but still failed to resolve the issue.
On July 30, 1998, the majority leader informed the body chat he was in receipt
of a letter signed by the seven Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators, stating that they
had elected Senator Guingona as the minority leader. By virtue thereof, the
Senate President formally recognized Senator Guingona as the minority leader
of the Senate.
The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before this Court the
subject petition for quo warranto, alleging in the main that Senator
Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of
Senate minority leader, a position that, according to them, rightfully belonged
to Senator Tatad.
ISSUES:
1. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the petition?
2. Was there an actual violation of the Constitution? 
 exercising the position of Senate minority leader 
4. Did Respondent Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing
Respondent Guingona as the minority leader?
HELD:
FIRST ISSUE
The Court initially declined to resolve the question of who was the rightful
Senate President, since it was deemed a political controversy falling exclusively
within the domain of the Senate. Upon a motion for reconsideration, however,
the Court ultimately assumed jurisdiction (1) “in the light of
subsequent events which justify its intervention;” and (2) because
the resolution of the issue hinged on the interpretation of the constitutional
provision on the presence of a quorum to hold a session and therein
elect a Senate President(read Avelino vs. Cuenco about the scope of the
Court’s power of judicial review).
The Court ruled that the validity of the selection of members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal by the senators was not a political question. The choice of
these members did not depend on the Senate’s “full
discretionary authority,” but was subject to mandatory
constitutional limitations. Thus, the Court held that not only was it
clearly within its jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the selection
proceedings, but it was also its duty to consider and determine the issue.
SECOND ISSUE
There was no violation. The Court finds that the interpretation proposed by
petitioners finds no clear support from the Constitution, the laws, the Rules of
the Senate or even from practices of the Upper House. The Constitution
mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number
constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it however does
not provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso
facto constitute the “minority,” who could
thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation states that the
defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority leader. While the
Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a
House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other
officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says is that
“[e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it may deem
necessary." The method of choosing who will be
such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative
conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such method
must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court.
THIRD ISSUE
Usurpation generally refers to unauthorized arbitrary assumption and PRINCIPLE OF NON-DELEGATION OF POWERS
exercise of power by one without color of title or who is not entitled by
law thereto. A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to O General rule is non-delegation
determine the right or title to the contested public office and to oust the holder
from its enjoyment. The action may be brought by the solicitor general or a
public prosecutor or any person claiming to be entitled to the public office or
position usurped or unlawfully held or exercise by another.
In order for a quo warranto proceeding to be successful, the person suing must
show that he or she has a clearright to the contested office or to use or
exercise the functions of the office allegedly usurped or unlawfully held by the
respondent. In this case, petitioners present not sufficient proof of a
clear and indubitable franchise to the office of the Senate minority
leader. Furthermore, no grave abuse of discretion has been shown to
characterize any of his specific acts as minority leader.
FOURTH ISSUE
Grave abuse of discretion - such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment
as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion and hostility.
By the above standard, we hold that Respondent Fernan did not gravely abuse
his discretion as Senate President in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the
minority leader. To recall, the latter belongs to one of the minority parties in
the Senate, the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP. By unanimous resolution of the members
of this party that he be the minority leader, he was recognized as such by the
Senate President. Such formal recognition by Respondent Fernan came only
after at least two Senate sessions and a caucus, wherein both sides were
liberally allowed to articulate their standpoints.
Therefore, the Senate President cannot be accused of capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment or of an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion or hostility. Where no provision of the Constitution, the laws or even
the rules of the Senate has been clearly shown to have been violated,
disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to
Senate officials for acts done within their competence and authority.
Potestas Delegata Non Potest Delegare
states that no delegated powers can be further delegated. It is also known as
delegatus non potest delegare which means one to whom power is delegated cannot
himself further delegate that power. One who has the power or authority from
another to do an act must do it himself/herself as this is a trust or confidence reposed
in that person personally. It cannot be assigned to stranger whose ability and intergrity granted, the mode of conducting the business,the charter and the quality of the service
might not be known to the principal. to be rendered and the duty of the grantee to the public in exercising thefranchise are
almost always defined in clear and unequivocal language. Herein, PAGCOR has acted
Jaworski vs. PAGCOR, GR 144463, Jan. 14, 2004 beyond the limits of its authority when it passed on or shared its franchise to SAGE.
While PAGCOR is allowed under its charter to enter into operators and/or
Facts: PAGCOR is a government owned and controlled corporation existing under PD management contracts, it is not allowed under the same charter to relinquish or share
1869, issued on 11 July 1983 by then President Ferdinand Marcos. The PAGCOR was itsfranchise, much less grant a veritable franchise to another entity such as SAGE.
granted, subject to the terms and conditions established in theDecree, for a period of PAGCOR can not delegate its power inview of the legal principle of delegata potestas
25 years, renewable for another 25 years, the rights, privileges and authority to delegare non potest, inasmuch as there is nothing in the charter to show that it
operate and maintain gambling casinos, clubs, and other recreation or amusement has been expressly authorized to do so.
places, sports, gaming pools, i.e. basketball,football, lotteries, etc. whether on land or
sea, within the territorial jurisdiction of the Republic of the Philippines. On 31March Belgica vs. Ochoa, GR 208566, Nov. 19, 2013 (note: case
1998, PAGCORs board of directors approved an instrument denominated as "Grant of
Authority and Agreement for the Operation of Sports Betting and Internet Gaming", involves various issues, but focus only on issue about nondelegability
which granted SAGE the authority to operate and maintainSports Betting station in
PAGCORs casino locations, and Internet Gaming facilities to service local and of legislative power)
international bettors, provided that to the satisfaction of PAGCOR, appropriate
safeguards and procedures are established to ensurethe integrity and fairness of the O Not absolute, because there are exceptions (PERMISSIBLE
games. On 1 September 1998, PAGCOR, represented by its Chairperson, Alicia Ll.Reyes,
DELEGATIONS) take note of the permissible delegations!
and SAGE, represented by its Chairman of the Board, Henry Sy, Jr., and its President,
Antonio D. Lacdao,executed the document. Pursuant to the authority granted by Chapter 7- Delegation of Powers
PAGCOR, SAGE commenced its operations by conducting gambling on the Internet on a
trial-run basis, making pre-paid cards and redemption of winnings available at various Corollary to the doctrine of separation of powers is the principle of non-delegation of
Bingo Bonanza outlets. Senator Robert S. Jaworski, in his capacity as member of the powers.
Senate and Chairman of the Senate Committee on Games, Amusement and Sports,
files the petition for certiorari and prohibition, praying that the grant of authority by Potestas delegata non delegari potest- What has been delegated cannot be delegated
PAGCOR in favor of SAGE be nullified. He maintains that PAGCOR committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it authorized SAGE Such delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the
to operate gambling on the internet. Hecontends that PAGCOR is not authorized under delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment and notthrough the
its legislative franchise, P.D. 1869, to operate gambling on the internet for the simple intervening mind of another.
reason that the said decree could not have possibly contemplated internet gambling
The principle of non-delegation of powers is applicable to all the three major powers
since at the time of its enactment the internet was yet inexistent and gambling
of the government but is especially important in the case of thelegislative power
activities were confined exclusively to real-space. Further,he argues that the internet,
because of the many instances when its delegation is permitted.
being an international network of computers, necessarily transcends the
territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines, and the grant to SAGE of authority to operate Permissible Delegation
internet gambling contravenes thelimitation in PAGCORs franchise.Issue: Whether
PAGCORs legislative franchise include the right to vest another entity, SAGE, with the Delegation of tariff powers to the President.
authority tooperate Internet gambling.Held: A legislative franchise is a special privilege
granted by the state to corporations. It is a privilege of public concernwhich cannot be oSection 28(2). The Congress may by law authorize the President to fix within specified
exercised at will and pleasure, but should be reserved for public control and limits, and subject to such limitations andrestrictions as it may impose, tariff rates,
administration, either by the government directly, or by public agents, under such import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts,
conditions and regulations as the government may impose onthem in the interest of within theframework of the national development program of the Government.
the public. It is Congress that prescribes the conditions on which the grant of the
franchise may be made. Thus the manner of granting the franchise, to whom it may be
oReason for the delegation: The necessity, not to say expediency, of giving the Chief oBased on the recognition that local legislatures are more knowledgeable than the
Executive the authority to act immediately on certainmatters affecting the national national lawmaking body on matters of purely localconcern and are therefore in
economy lest delay result in hardship to the people. a better position to enact the necessary and appropriate legislation thereon.

Delegation of emergency powers to the President. oLocal affairs managed by local authorities and General affairs by the central authority.

oSection 23(2). In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may by law
authorize the President, for a limited period andsubject to such restrictions as it may
prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national
policy. Unlesssooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease
upon its next adjournment.
Delegation to administrative body.
oWith this power administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in
a statute by filling in the details which the Congressmay not have the opportunity or
competence to provide.

oWhen emergency powers are delegated to the President, he becomes in effect a oThis is effected by their promulgation of what are know as SUPPLEMENTARY
constitutional dictator. REGULATIONS.

oConditions for the vesture of emergency powers in the President are the following: oThey may also issue contingent regulations pursuant to a delegation of authority to
determine some fact or state of things upon which theenforcement of law depends. In
There must be a war or other national emergency. other words, they are allowed to ascertain the existence of particular contingencies
and on the basis thereof enforce or suspend the operation of a law.
The delegation must be for a limited period only.
Tests of Delegation
The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
Question of whether or not the delegation has been validly made.
The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by
the Congress. oCompleteness Test

oOther national emergency may include rebellion, economic crisis, pestilence or The law must be complete in all its essential terms and conditions when it leaves the
epidemic, typhoon, flood or other similar catastrophe of nation-wide proportions or legislature so that there will be nothing leftfor the delegate to do when it reaches him
effect. except to enforce it.

oConferment of emergency powers on the President is NOT MANDATORY on the If there are gaps in the law that will prevent its enforcement unless they are first filed,
Congress. the delegate will then have been given theopportunity to step into the shoes of the
legislature and to exercise a discretion essentially legislative in order to repair
oThe emergency does not automatically confer emergency powers on the President. theomission. This is INVALID DELEGATION.

Delegation to the people at large. oSufficient Standard Test

oReferendum- a method of submitting an important legislative measure to a It is intended to map out the boundaries of the delegates authority by defining the
direct vote of the whole people. legislative policy and indicating thecircumstances under which it is to be pursued and
effected.
oPlebiscite
PURPOSE: to prevent a total transference of legislative power from the lawmaking
- a device to obtain a direct popular vote on a matter of political importance, but body to the delegate.
chiefly in order to create a some more or less permanent political condition.

Delegation to the local government.

O Tests of Delegation
1. Again, general rule is, there is non-delegation of powers;
2. But there are exceptions, where powers can be permissibly delegated;
3. Assuming it falls under the exception, you still have to determine whether these
exceptions (permissible delegations) has been validly made;
4. To be valid, delegation itself must be circumscribed by legislative restrictions judge denied the motion saying that RA 4670 particularly Section 32 is valid and
(otherwise, delegation is tantamount to abdication of
FACTS: several pubic school officials of Leyte were charged for violation of RA 4670
(Magna Carta for public school teachers).These officials motioned to quash the charges
against them for (1)lack of jurisdiction (2) unconstitutionality of Section 32. This motion
was denied for lack of merit. The private respondents filed a petition for certiorari to
the Court of First Instance of Leyte.They added to the grounds of unconsttutionality of
Section 32 the following reasons: (1) it imposes a cruel and unusual punishment (2) it
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power, for the duration of penalty of the
imprisonment is left to the discretion of the court. Judge Dacuycuy, the respondent
constitutional.

legislative authority, a total surrender by legislature of its prerogatives in favor of the

delegate);
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 32 of RA 4670 is constitutional
- COMPLETENESS TEST

o People vs. Dacuycuy, G.R. L-45127, May 5, 1989

HELD: NO. Section 32 is unconstitutional since it provides an indeterminable period of
Facts: imprisonment. Too much discretion was left by the legislature to the court, making it
undue delegation of power of the legislature. Section 32 did not pass the test of
Private respondents were charged with violation of RA 4670 (Magna Carta for Public sufficient standard. If section 32 will be allowed, it will violate not just the rules of
School Teachers. They also charged constitutionality of Sec.32 (be punished by a fine separation of powers but also the delegability of legislative powers.
of not less than P100 nor more than P1000, or by imprisonment, in the discretion of
the court.) of said R.A on grounds that it a.) imposes a cruel and unusual punishment,
b.) constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. Judge Dacuycuy ruled that the
Nota Bene: The charge against the public school officials will still be remanded to the
said section is a matter of statutory construction and not an undue of delegation of
municipal court where it was first filed. RA 4670 ontains a separability clause in Section
legislative power.
34. Although Sec 32 was declared unconstitutional, other parts are still valid.
Issue:

W/N Sec. 6 constitutes undue delegation of legislative power and is valid.

- SUFFICIENCY STANDARD TEST
Held:
o Chiongbian vs. Orbos GR 96754, June 22, 1995
NOT VALID! The duration of penalty for the period of imprisonment was left for the
courts to determine as if the judicial department was a legislative dept. The exercise of
judicial power not an attempt to use legislative power or to prescribe and create a law G.R. No. 96754 June 22, 1995CHIONGBIAN, et.al. v. ORBOS et.al.FACTS:
but is an instance of the admin. of justice and the app. of existing laws to the facts of
particular cases. Said section violates the rules on separation of powers and non- Pursuant to the Constitution, Congress passed R.A 6734, the Organic Act for the
delegability of legislative powers Autonomous Region in MuslimMindanao calling for a plebiscite to create an
autonomous region. The provinces of Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao,Sulu and Tawi-Tawi,
People vs Dacuycuy which voted for the creation of such region were later on known as the Autonomous
Region inMuslim Mindanao. Consistent with the authority granted by Article XIX,
GR No. 45127 May 5, 1989
Section 13 of RA 6734 which authorizesthe President to merge the existing regions,
President Corazon Aquino issued E.O No. 429 providing for theReorganization of the
Administrative Regions in Mindanao.Petitioners contend that Art. XIX, Section 13 of
R.A. No. 6734 is unconstitutional because it unduly delegateslegislative power to the
President by authorizing him to merge by administrative determination the existing
regionsor at any rate provides no standard for the exercise of the power delegated and
that the power granted is notexpressed in the title of the law.aw libraryThey also
challenge the validity of E.O. No. 429 on the ground that the power granted by RA 6734
to the Presidentis only to merge regions IX and XII but not to reorganize the entire
administrative regions in Mindanao and certainlynot to transfer the regional center
of Region IX from Zamboanga City to Pagadian City.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the R.A 6734 is invalid because it contains no standard to guide the
Presidents discretion. Issue: Whether or not the universal charge is a tax.
HELD:
No, in conferring on the President the power to merge by
administrative determination the existing regionsfollowing the establishment of the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Congress merely followed the patternset in
previous legislation dating back to the initial organization of administrative regions in
1972. The choice of thePresident as delegate is logical because the division of the
country into regions is intended to facilitate not only theadministration of local
governments but also the direction of executive departments which the law requires
shouldhave regional offices. While the power to merge administrative regions is not
expressly provided for in theConstitution, it is a power which has traditionally been
lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision
over local governments. (Abbas v. COMELEC) The regions themselves are notterritorial
and political divisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays but are "mere
groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes. The power conferred
on the President is similar to the power toadjust municipal boundaries which has been
described as "administrative in nature. (Pelaez v. Auditor General)Thus, the
regrouping is done only on paper. It involves no more than are definition or redrawing
of the linesseparating administrative regions for the purpose of facilitating the
administrative supervision of local governmentunits by the President and insuring the
efficient delivery of essential services
o Gerochi vs. Department of Energy GR 159796, July 17,
2007
Facts: RA 9136, otherwise known as the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001
(EPIRA), which sought to impose a universal charge on all end-users of electricity for
the purpose of funding NAPOCORs projects, was enacted and took effect in 2001.
Petitioners contest the constitutionality of the EPIRA, stating that theimposition of the
universal charge on all end-users is oppressive and confiscatory and amounts to
taxation without representation for not giving the consumers a chance to be heard and
be represented.
Held: NO. The assailed universal charge is not a tax, but anexaction in the exercise of
the States police power. That public welfare is promoted may be gleaned from Sec. 2
of the EPIRA, which enumerates the policies of the State regarding electrification.
Moreover, the Special Trust Fund feature of the universal charge reasonably serves and
assures the attainment and perpetuity of the purposes for which the universal charge
is imposed (e.g. to ensure the viability of the countrys electric power industry), further
boosting the position that the same is an exaction primarily in pursuit of the States
police objectives
If generation of revenue is the primary purpose and regulation ismerely incidental,
the imposition is a tax; but if regulation is the primary purpose, the fact that revenue is
incidentally raised does not make the imposition a tax.
The taxing power may be used as an implement of police power. The theory behind the
exercise of the power to tax emanates from necessity; without taxes, government
cannot fulfill its mandate of promoting the general welfare and well-being of the
people.
Delegation of Powers
Department Secretary alter ego of Congress.
Congress delegated the power of ascertainment of facts upon which the enforcement
and administration of the increase rate under the law is contingent to the Secretary of
Finance. The legislature has made the operation of the 12% rate effective January 1, National Power Corporation-Strategic Power Utilities Group (NPC-SPUG) filed
2006 contingent upon a specified fact or condition. It leaves the entire operation or with Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) a petition for the availment from the
non-operation of the 12% rate upon factual matters outside the control of the Universal Charge of its share for Missionary Electrification.
executive. No discretion would be exercised by the President.

The ERC decided the NPCs petition authorizing it to draw up to P70, 000,
In making his recommendation to the President on the existence of either of the two 000.00 from PSALM for its 2003 Watershed Rehabilitation Budget subject to the
conditions, the Secretary of Finance is not acting as the alter ego of the President or availability of funds for the Environmental Fund component of the Universal Charge.
even her subordinate. In such instance, he is not subject to the power of control and
direction of the President. He is acting as the agent of the legislative department, to
determine and declare the event upon which its expressed will is to take effect. The
On the basis of the said ERC decisions, Panay Electric Company, Inc. (PECO)
Secretary becomes the means or tool by which legislative policy is determined and
charged Romeo P. Gerochi and all other end-users with the Universal Charge as
implemented, considering that he possesses all the facilities to gather data and
reflected in their respective electric bills starting from the month of July 2003.
information and has a much broader perspective to properly evaluate them. His
personality in such instance is in reality but a projection of that of Congress. Thus,
being the agent of Congress and not of the President, the President cannot alter or
modify or nullify, or set aside the findings of the Secretary and to substitute the Hence, this original action.
judgment of the former for that of the latter. Congress simply granted the Secretary
the authority to ascertain the existence of a fact. If it is exists, the Secretary, by
legislative mandate, must submit such information to the President who must impose
the 12% VAT rate. There is no undue delegation of legislation power but only of the Petitioners submit that the assailed provision of law and its IRR which sought to
discretion as to the execution of a law. This is constitutionally permissible. (Abakada implement the same are unconstitutional on the following grounds:
Guro Party List, etc., et al. vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 168056, and other cases,
September 1, 2005).
1. The universal charge provided for under Section 34 of the EPIRA and sought to
be implemented under Sec. 2, Rule 18 of the IRR of the said law is a tax which is to be
Q Section 34 of RA 9136, otherwise known as the Electric Power Industry Reform collected from all electric end-users and self-generating entities. The power to tax is
Act of 200_ (EPIRA) imposes Universal Charge upon end-users of electricity (a charge strictly a legislative function and as such, the delegation of said power to any executive
imposed for the recovery of stranded cost; stranded debts refer to any unpaid financial or administrative agency like the ERC is unconstitutional, giving the same unlimited
obligations of the NPC which has not been liquidated by the proceeds from the sales authority. The assailed provision clearly provides that the Universal Charge is to be
and privatization of NPC Assets; stranded contract costs of NPC or distribution utility determined, fixed and approved by the ERC, hence leaving to the latter complete
refer to the excess of the contract cost of electricity under eligible contracts over the discretionary legislative authority.
actual selling price of the contracted energy output of such contracts in the market.
2. The ERC is also empowered to approve and determine where the funds
collected should be used.

ERC issued its Implementing Rules and Regulations defining Universal Charge 3. The imposition of the Universal Charge on all end-users is oppressive and
refers to the charge, if any, imposed for the recovery of Stranded Debts, Stranded confiscatory and amounts to taxation without representation as the consumers were
Contract Costs of NPC and Stranded Contract Costs of Eligible Contracts of Distribution not given a chance to be heard and represented.
Utilities and other purposes pursuant to Section 34 of the EPIRA. (Rule 4 (rrr, IRR).
Petitioners contend that the Universal Charge has the characteristics of a tax and is
collected to fund the operations of the NPC. They argue that the cases Osmea v.
Orbos, G.R. No. 99886, March 31, 1993, 220 SCRA 703;Valmonte v. Energy Regulatory
Board, G.R. Nos. L-79601-03, June 23, 1988, 162 SCRA 521; and Gaston v. Republic
Planters Bank, L-77194, March 15, 1988, 158 SCRA 626, invoked by the respondents
clearly show the regulatory purpose of the charges imposed therein, which is not so in
the case at bench. In said cases, the respective funds were created in order to balance
and stabilize the prices of oil and sugar, and to act as buffer to counteract the changes
and adjustments in prices, peso devaluation, and other variables which cannot be
adequately and timely monitored by the legislature. Thus, there was a need to
delegate powers to administrative bodies. They posited that the Universal Charge is
imposed not for a similar purpose.
The ultimate issues in the case at bar are:
Phil. 148 (1955)). In Valmonte v. Energy Regulatory Board, et al. and in Gaston v.
Republic Planters Bank, it was held that the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) and the
Sugar Stabilization Fund (SSF) were exactions made in exercise of the police power. The
doctrine was reiterated in Osmea v. Orbos, with respect to the OPSF.
With the Universal Charge, a Special Trust Fund (STF) is also created under the
administration of PSALM.
As aptly pointed out by the OSG, evidently, the establishment and maintenance of the
Special Trust Fund, under the last paragraph of Section 34, R.A. No. 9136, is well within
the pervasive and non-waivable power and responsibility of the government to secure
the physical and economic survival and well-being of the community, that
comprehensive sovereign authority we designate as the police power of the State.

1. Whether or not, the Universal Charge imposed under Sec. 34 of the EPIRA is a
tax; and This feature of the Universal Charge further boosts the position that the same is an
exaction imposed primarily in the pursuit of the States police objectives. The STF
2. Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power to tax on the reasonably serves and assures attainment and perpetuity of the purposes for which the
part of the ERC. Universal Charge is imposed, i.e., to ensure the viability of the countrys electric power
industry. (Gerochi, et al. v. Dept. of Energy, et al., G.R. No. 159796, July 17, 2007,
Nachura, J).

Decide.

2. As to the second issue.

ANS: 1. As to the first issue.

No, there is no undue delegation of powers to the ERC. The EPIRA, read and
appreciated in its entirety, in relation to Sec. 34 thereof, is complete in all its essential
No, the Universal Charge is not a tax. In exacting the said charge through Sec. 34 terms and conditions, and it contains sufficient standards.
of the EPIRA, the States police power, particularly its regulatory dimension, is invoked.
Such can be deduced from Sec. 34 which enumerates the purposes for which the
Universal Charge is imposed, and which can be amply discerned as regulatory in
character. Although Sec. 34 of the EPIRA merely provides that within one (1) year from the
effectivity thereof, a Universal Charge to be determined, fixed and approved by the
ERC, shall be imposed on all electricity end-users, and therefore, does not state the
specific amount to be paid as Universal Charge, the amount nevertheless is made
Moreover, it is a well-established doctrine that the taxing power may be used as an certain by the legislative parameters provided by the law itself when it provided for the
implement of police power. (Osmea v. Orbos, Gaston v. Republic Planters Bank, Tio v. promulgation and enforcement of a National Grid Code, and a Distribution Code.
Videogram Regulatory Board, No. L-75697, 151 SCRA 208, 216, and Lutz v. Araneta, 98
 Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno described the immensity of police power in
relation to the delegation of powers to the ERC and its regulatory functions over
This is also the case when the EPIRA law authorized the PSALM to compute the electric power as a vital public utility, to wit:
stranded debts and stranded costs of the NPC which is to form the basis of the ERC in
determining its universal charge.

As to the second test, the Court had, in the past, accepted as sufficient
standards the following: interest of law and order; adequate and efficient
instruction; public interest; justice and equity; public convenience and welfare; concomitants of an unrestrained industrial economy. Police power is not exerted to
simplicity, economy and efficiency; standardization and regulation of medical
education; and fair and equitable employment practices. Provisions of the EPIRA
such as, among others, to ensure the total electrification of the country and the
quality, reliability, security and affordability of the supply of electric power, and
watershed rehabilitation and management meet the requirements for valid
delegation, as they provide the limitations on the ERCs power to formulate the IRR.
These are sufficient standards. (Gerochi, et al. v. Dept. of Energy, et al., G.R. No.
159796, July 17, 2007, Nachura, J).
Note:
It may be noted that this is not the first time that the ERCs conferred powers
were challenged. In Freedom from Debt Coalition v. Energy Regulatory Commission,
G.R. No. 161113, June 15, 2004, 432 SCRA 157, it has been held:
Over the years, however, the range of police power was no longer
limited to the preservation of public health, safety and morals, which used to be the
primary social interests in earlier times. Police power now requires the State to
assume an affirmative duty to eliminate the excesses and injustices that are the
further the public welfare a concept as vast as the good of society itself. When the
police power is delegated to administrative bodies with regulatory functions, its
exercise should be given a wide latitude. Police power takes on an even broader
dimension in developing countries such as ours, where the State must take a more
active role in balancing the many conflicting interests in society. The Questioned Order
was issued by the ERC, acting as an agent of the State in the exercise of police power.
We should have exceptionally good grounds to curtail its exercise. This approach is
more compelling in the field of rate-regulation of electric power rates. Electric power
generation and distribution is a traditional instrument of economic growth that affects
not only a few but the entire nation. It is an important factor in encouraging
investment and promoting business. The engines of progress may come to a screeching
halt if the delivery of electric power is impaired. Billions of pesos would be lost as a
result of power outrages or unreliable electric power services. The State thru the ERC
should be able to exercise its police power with great flexibility, when the need arises.

This was reiterated in National Association of Electricity Consumers for Reforms

In determining the extent of powers possessed by the ERC, the v. Energy Regulatory Commission, G.R. No. 163935, February 2, 2006, 481 SCRA 480,
provisions of the EPIRA must not be read in separate parts. Rather, the law must be where it was held that the ERC, as regulator, should have sufficient power to respond
read in its entirely, because a statute is passed as a whole, and is animated by one in real time to changes wrought by multifarious factors affecting public utilities.
general purpose and intent. Its meaning cannot to be extracted from any single part
thereof but from a general consideration of the statute as a whole. Considering the
intent of Congress in enacting the EPIRA and reading the statute in its entirety, it is From the foregoing disquisitions, we there fore hold there is no undue
plain to see that the law has expanded the jurisdiction of the regulatory body, the ERC delegation of legislative power to the ERC.
in this case, to enable the latter to implement the reforms sought to be accomplished
by the EPIRA. When the legislators decided to broaden the jurisdiction of the ERC, they
did not intend to abolish or reduce the powers already conferred upon ERCs
predecessors. To sustain the view that the ERC possess only the powers and functions Petitioners failed to pursue in their Memorandum the contention in the
listed under Section 43 of the EPIRA is to frustrate the objectives of the law. Complaint that the imposition of the Universal Charge on all end-users is oppressive
and confiscatory, and amounts to taxation without representation. Hence, such
contention is deemed waived or abandoned per Resolution of August 3, 2004.
Moreover, the determination of whether or not a tax is excessive, oppressive or
confiscatory is an issue which essentially involves questions of fact, and thus, the Court course of business are presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. (Villena v.
is precluded from reviewing the same.
Note:
One of the landmark pieces of legislation enacted by Congress in recent years is
the EPIRA. It established a new policy, legal structure and regulatory framework for the
electric power industry. The new thrust is to tap private capital for the expansion and
improvement of the industry as the large government debt and the highly capital-
intensive character of the industry itself have long been acknowledged as the critical
constraints to the program. To attract private investment, largely foreign, the jaded
structure of the industry had to be addressed. While the generation and transmission
sectors were centralized and monopolistic, the distribution side was fragmented with
over 10 utilities, mostly small and uneconomic. The pervasive flaws have caused a low
utilization of existing generation capacity; extremely high and uncompetitive power
rates; poor quality of service to consumers; dismal to forgettable performance of the
government power sector; high system losses; and an inability to develop a clear
strategy for overcoming these shortcomings.
Thus, the EPIRA provides a framework for the restructuring of the industry,
including the privatization of the assets of the National Power Corporation (NPC), the
transition to a competitive structure, and the delineation of the roles of various
government agencies and the private entities. The law ordains the division of the
industry into four (4) distinct sectors, namely: generation, transmission, distribution
and supply. Corollarily, the NPC generating plants have to privatized and its
transmission business spun off and privatized thereafter. (Freedom from Debt Coalition
v. ERC, G.R. No. 161113, June 15, 2004, 432 SCRA 157).
O Principle of Sub-delegation of powers
1. Transmission of power from head of agency to his subordinates for
purposes of expediency and achieving maximum efficiency in public
service
2. Example is DOCTRINE OF QUALIFIED POLITICAL AGENCY
DOCTRINE OF QUALIFIED POLITICAL AGENCY
Doctrine of qualified political agency or alter ego principle means that the acts of the recommended the suspension of Villena to the President of the Philippines, in which it
secretaries of the Executive departments performed and promulgated in the regular was verbally granted. The Secretary then suspended Villena from office. Villena filed a
Secretary of the Interior, G.R. No. L46570, April 21, 1939)
EXCEPTIONS:
1. In cases wherein the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or by the law to
act in person or
2. the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious
executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and
through the executive departments.
All the different executive and administrative organizations are mere adjuncts of the
executive department. This is an adjunct of the Doctrine of Single Executive.
The heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief
Executive. [Villena v. Sec. of Interior (1939)]
In the case of Abakada Guro v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 168056, Sept. 1, 2005, the
SC held that the Secretary of Finance can act as an agent of the Legislative Dept. to
determine and declare the event upon which its expressed will is to take effect. Thus,
being the agent of Congress and not of the President, the latter cannot alter, or modify
or nullify, or set aside the findings of the Secretary of Finance and to substitute the
judgment of the former for that of the latter.
REASON:
Since the President is a busy man, he is not expected to exercise the totality of his
power of control all the time. He is not expected to exercise all his powers in person.
He is expected to delegate some of them to men of his confidence, particularly to
members of his Cabinet.
President delegate certain powers to members of cabinet, who
are his alter egos;
Villena vs. Secretary of the Interior, GR L-46570, April 21,
1939
FACTS:
Division of Investigation of the DOJ, upon the request of the Secretary of the Interior,
conducted an inquiry into the conduct of the Villena, mayor of Makati, Rizal, as a result
of which the latter was found to have committed bribery, extortion, malicious abuse of
authority ad unauthorized practice of the law profession. The respondent
petition for preliminary injunction against the Sec. to restrain him and his agents from
proceeding with the investigation.
The Department Head shall have direct control, direction, and supervision over all
bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction and may, any provision of existing law to the
contrary notwithstanding, repeal or modify the decisions of the chiefs of said bureaus
ISSUE: of offices when advisable in the public interest.
Whether or not the Secretary of the Interior has jurisdiction or authority to suspend
and order investigation over Villena.
The Department Head may order the investigation of any act conduct of any person in
the service of any bureau of office under his department and in connection therewith
may appoint a committee or designate an official or person who shall conduct such
RULING: investigations, and such committee, official, or person may summon, witness
by subpoena and subpoena duces tecum, administer oath and take testimony relevant
The Secretary of Interior has the power to order investigation and to suspend Mayor
to the investigation.
Villena. As to the power to order investigation, it was provided in Section 79 (C) of RAC
that Department of Interior was given the authority to supervise bureaus and offices
under its jurisdiction. This was interpreted in relation to Section 86 of the same Code
which granted the said Department of executive supervision over administration of The above section speaks, it is true, of direct control, direction, and supervision over
provinces, municipalities and other political subdivisions. This supervision covers the bureaus and offices under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Interior, but this
power to order investigation because supervision implies authority to inquire into section should be interpreted in relation to section 86 of the same Code which grants
facts and conditions in order to render power real and effective.However, unlike this to the Department of the Interior executive supervision over the administration of
power to order investigation, the power to suspend a mayor was not provided in any provinces, municipalities, chartered cities and other local political subdivisions.
law. There was no express grant of authority to the Secretary of Interior to suspend a Therefore, the Secretary of the Interior is invested with authority to order the
Mayor. Nevertheless, Section 2188 of the Administrative Code granted the provincial investigation of the charges against the petitioner and to appoint a special investigator
governor the power of suspension. Yet this did not mean that the grant precluded the for that purpose.
Secretary of Interior.

The Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency which provides that the acts of the
department secretaries, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business,
are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the President, presumptively the acts of the
President. The power to suspend may be exercised by the President. It follows that
the heads of the Department under her may also exercise the same, unless the law
required the President to act personally or that situation demanded him so, because
the heads of the departments are assistants and agents of the President.
Held:
Section 79 (C) of the Administrative Code provides as follows:
Administrative Code which provides that The provincial governor shall receive and
investigate complaints made under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty,
oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration of office, and conviction by
final judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude. For minor delinquency he may
reprimand the offender; and if a more severe punishment seems to be desirable he
shall submit written charges touching the matter to the provincial board, furnishing a
copy of such charges to the accused either personally or by registered mail, and he may
in such case suspend the officer (not being the municipal treasurer) pending action by
the board, if in his opinion the charge be one affecting the official integrity of the
officer in question. Where suspension is thus effected, the written charges against the
officer shall be filed with the board within five days. The fact, however, that the
power of suspension is expressly granted by section 2188 of the Administrative Code to
the provincial governor does not mean that the grant is necessarily exclusive and
precludes the Secretary of the Interior from exercising a similar power.
The suspension of the petitioner should be sustained on the principle of approval or
ratification of the act of the Secretary of the Interior by the President of the
Philippines.

Under the presidential type of government which we have adopted and considering
the departmental organization established and continued in force by paragraph 1,
section 12, Article VII, of our Constitution, all executive and administrative
organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various
executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and except in
cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or the law to act in
person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the
multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are
performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the secretaries
of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business,
are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of
the Chief Executive.