Legal Ethics Jurisprudence

LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS BarCom 2014
ATTY. LEONOR M. ALCANTARA et.al. v ATTY. EDUARDO C. DE VERA
634 SCRA 674

A.C. NO. 5859, NOVEMBER 23, 2010
En banc, Per curiam
Practice of law is a privilege.
FACTS: A writ of execution pending appeal was issued in favor of Rosario Mercado in relation to her civil
case handled by respondent. Respondent garnished the bank deposits of Mercado but did not give him
his share as part of the proceeds were already used to pay the judge and what was left constituted his
attorneys fees. An administrative complaint for disbarment was filed by Mercado and the IBP Board of
Governors found him guilty of infidelity in the custody and handling of the clients funds and recommended
a one-year suspension. Following this resolution, a series of lawsuits were filed by respondent against the
Mercados and all those responsible for his suspension including members of the judiciary. His disbarment
is also sought for because of barratry, forum shopping, exploitation of family problems, and use of
intemperate language.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is guilty as charged.
RULING: Yes. It is worth stressing that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege and is vested only
to those who act in good behavior. In the present case, the respondent committed professional
malpractice and gross misconduct particularly in his acts against his former clients and virtually all those
connected to his suspension. The barrage of cases filed by respondent appears to be an act of revenge
and hate driven by frustration and anger. The respondent not only filed frivolous and unfounded lawsuits
that violated his duties as an officer of the court in the proper administration of justice but he did so
against a former client to whom he owes loyalty and fidelity. This is in clear violation of Canon 21 and
Rule 21.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that a lawyer shall preserve the
confidence and secrets of his client even if their attorney-client relationship is terminated. Respondent is
disbarred.
FIDELA BENGCO et al. vs. ATTY. PABLO S. BERNARDO
672 SCRA 8
A.C. No. 6368, JUNE 13, 2012

Second Division, Reyes, J.
Profession, not a business.
FACTS: Respondent and Magat convinced complainants that if they finance and deliver to them the
amount of [P]495,000.00 as advance money, they would expedite the titling of the subject land.
Respondent represented himself to be the lawyer of William Gatchalian, the owner of Plastic City located
at Canomay Street, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, who was allegedly the buyer of the subject land once it
has been titled. Respondent and Magat also represented that they have contacts at NAMREA, DENR,
CENRO and the Register of Deeds which representation they knew to be false, fraudulent and were only
made to induce complainants to give and deliver to them the amount of [P]495,000.00. Once in
possession of the said amount, far from complying with their obligation to expedite and cause the titling of
the subject land, respondent and Magat [wilfully], unlawfully and illegally misappropriated, misapplied and
converted the said amount to their personal use and benefit and despite demand upon them to return the
said amount, they failed and refused to do so.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent committed misconduct.
RULING: Yes, respondent committer misconduct. It cannot be overstressed that lawyers are instruments
in the administration of justice. While he begs for the Courts indulgence, his contrition is shallow
considering the fact that he used his position as a lawyer in order to deceive the complainants into
believing that he can expedite the titling of the subject properties. The practice of law is not a business. It
is a profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not
Saint Louis University | SCHOOL OF LAW Bar Operations Committee 2014 1

primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields
profits. The gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary consideration. The duty to public service and
to the administration of justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their
personal interests or what they owe to themselves.
FERDINAND CRUZ vs. ALBERTO MINA
G.R. NO. 154207, APRIL 27, 2007

Third Division, Austria-Martinez, j
Law Student Practice Rule/ Non-lawyer in courts
FACTS: On September 25, 2000, Ferdinand A. Cruz filed before the MeTC a formal Entry of Appearance,
as private prosecutor, in a case for Grave Threats, where his father, Mariano Cruz, is the complaining
witness. He described himself as a third year law student, justifying his appearance as private prosecutor
on the bases of Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court that a non-lawyer may appear before the
inferior courts as an agent or friend of a party litigant. He avers that his appearance was with the prior
conformity of the public prosecutor and a written authority of Mariano Cruz appointing him to be his agent
in the prosecution of the said criminal case. However, in an Order dated February 1, 2002,
the MeTC denied permission for petitioner to appear as private prosecutor on the ground that Circular No.
19 governing limited law student practice in conjunction with Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court (Law
Student Practice Rule) should take precedence.
ISSUE: whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of
a party litigant.
RULING: Yes. The Court admitted the Entry of Appearance filed by the petitioner. Section 34, Rule 138 is
clear that appearance before the inferior courts by a non-lawyer is allowed, irrespective of whether or not
he is a law student. As succinctly clarified in Bar Matter No. 730, by virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a law
student may appear, as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, without the supervision of a lawyer before
inferior courts. In inferior courts, a law student may appear in his personal capacity without the
supervision of a lawyer. Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a
party without the supervision of a member of the bar.
ATTY. EVELYN MAGNO vs. ATTY. OLIVIA VELASCO-JACOBA
A.C. No. 6296, NOVEMBER 22, 2005

Third Division, Garcia, J.
Proceedings where lawyers are prohibited from appearing
FACTS: Atty. Evelyn J. Magno, President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Nueva Ecija
Chapter had a disagreement with her uncle, Lorenzo Inos, over a landscaping contract they had entered
into. During the conciliation/confrontation proceeding, Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba appeared on the
strength of a Special Power of Attorney signed by Lorenzo Inos. Atty. Magno objected to Atty. Jacobas
appeareance in the conciliation but the latter interpose that Lorenzo Inos is entitled to be represented by
a lawyer inasmuch as complainant is herself a lawyer.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba violated the Local Government Code and the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
RULING: Yes. Atty. Jacoba violated LGC and CPR. Section 415 of the LGC of 1991, on the subject
Katarungang Pambarangay clearly requires the personal appearance of the parties in katarungan
pambarangay conciliation proceedings, unassisted by counsel or representative. The rationale behind the
personal appearance requirement is to enable the lupon to secure first hand and direct information about
the facts and issues, the exception being in cases where minors or incompetents are parties. There can
be no quibbling that laymen of goodwill can easily agree to conciliate and settle their disputes between
themselves without what sometimes is the unsettling assistance of lawyers whose presence could

sometimes obfuscate and confuse issues. Worse still, the participation of lawyers with their penchant to
use their analytical skills and legal knowledge tend to prolong instead of expedite settlement of the case.
RODRIGO A. MOLINA vs. ATTY. CEFERINO R. MAGAT
672 SCRA 1
A.C. No. 1900, JUNE 13, 2012
Third Division, Mendoza, J.
Persons without authority
FACTS: The counsel of record for accused de Leon in both cases (Assault Upon an Agent of a Person in
Authority and Breach of the Peace and Resisting Arrest ) was Atty. Magat. It was alleged that Atty. Magat
committed willful disobedience of the court order when he appeared as counsel for de Leon on two (2)
occasions despite the fact that he was suspended from the practice of law.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Magat should be suspended.
RULING: Atty. Magat expressly admitted appearing in court on two occasions despite having been
suspended from the practice of law by the Court. Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from office as an attorney for a wilful disobedience of
any lawful order of a superior court and/or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney without
authority to do so. As stated, if Atty. Magat was truly moved by altruistic intentions when he appeared
before the trial court despite having been suspended, he could have informed the Presiding Judge of his
plight and explained why the party he was representing could not attend. On the contrary, Atty. Magat
kept his silence and proceeded to represent his client as counsel.
FELIPE ABELLA vs. ATTY. ASTERIA E. CRUZABRA
A.C. NO. 5688, JUNE 4, 4009

First Division, Carpio, J.
Lawyers in the government
FACTS: Atty. Asteria E. Cruzabra was admitted to the Philippine Bar on 30 May 1986 and was appointed
as Deputy Register of Deeds of General Santos City on 11 August 1987. Complainant asserted that as
Deputy Register of Deeds, respondent filed a petition for commission as a notary public and was
commissioned on 29 February 1988 without obtaining prior authority from the Secretary of the
Department of Justice (DOJ). Complainant claimed that respondent has notarized some 3,000
documents. Complainant pointed out that respondent only stopped notarizing documents when she was
reprimanded by the Chief of the Investigation Division of the Land Registration Authority.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Cruzabra engaged in unauthorized notarial practice.
RULING: Yes. Atty. Cruzaba Atty. Asteria E. Cruzabra is guilty of engaging in notarial practice without the
written authority from the Secretary of the Department of Justice. It is clear that when respondent filed her
petition for commission as a notary public, she did not obtain a written permission from the Secretary of
the DOJ. Respondents superior, the Register of Deeds, cannot issue any authorization because he is not
the head of the Department. And even assuming that the Register of Deeds authorized her, respondent
failed to present any proof of that written permission. Respondent cannot feign ignorance or good faith
because respondent filed her petition for commission as a notary public after Memorandum Circular No.
17 was issued in 1986.
ANASTACIO N. TEODORO III vs. ATTY. ROMEO S. GONZALES
A.C. NO. 6760, JANUARY 30, 2013

Second Division, Brion, J.
Duty to Society: Respect for law and legal processes

FACTS: Anastacio N. Teodoro Ill related that Atty. Gonzales acted as counsel of Araceli Teodoro-Marcial
in two civil cases that the latter filed against him. The first ccise, Special Proceeding No. 99-95587,
involved the settlement of the intestate estate of Manuela Teodoro. While the settlement proceeding was
pending, Atty. Gonzales assisted Teodord-Marcial in filing Civil Case No. 00-99207, for Annulment of
Document, Reconveyance and Damages, without indicating the special proceeding earlier tiled. The tiling
of the civil cases, according to Anastacio, was a deliberate act of forum shopping that warrants the
disbarment of Atty. Gonzales.
ISSUE: Whether Atty. Gonzales committed forum shopping and thereby violated the Code of
RULING: Yes. Atty. Romeo S. Gonzales violated his duties by resorting to forum shopping. To advise his
client therefore to execute the affidavit of non-forum shopping for the second case (annulment case) and
state that there is no pending case involving the same or similar issue would constitute misconduct which
should be subject to disciplinary action. It was his duty to advise his client properly, and his failure to do
so, in fact his deliberate assertion that there was no falsity in the affidavit is indicative of a predisposition
to take lightly his duty as a lawyer to promote respect and obedience to the law. In engaging in forum
shopping, Atty. Gonzales violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which directs
lawyers to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal processes.
ENGR. GILBERT TUMBOKON vs. ATTY. MARIANO R. PEFIANCO
678 SCRA
A.C. No. 6116, AUGUST 1, 2012
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
Duty to the Legal Profession: Assisting persons not authorized to practice law
FACTS: Complainant filed a disbarment case against the respondent, alleging that the latter undertook to
give him 20% commission, later reduced to 10%, of the attorney's fees the latter would receive in
representing Spouses Amable and Rosalinda Yap (Sps. Yap), whom he referred, in an action for partition
of the estate of the late Benjamin Yap. Despite receiving fees amounting to 40 million, the respondent
failed to pay the agreed commission and consequently wrote the complainant, informing him that that
Sps. Yap assumed to pay the same after respondent had agreed to reduce his attorney's fees from 25%
to 17%. Complainants demand for payment had been ignored by respondent.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent violated Rule 9.02 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
responsibility.
RULING: Yes. Respondent has violated Rule 9.02,12 Canon 9 of the Code which prohibits a lawyer from
dividing or stipulating to divide a fee for legal services with persons not licensed to practice law when he
undertook to give complainant commission despite the latter not having any authority to practice law. Atty.
Pefianco is suspended from the active practice of law for one year, effective upon notice thereof.
AMPARO BUENO vs. ATTY. RAMON RANESES
687 SCRA 711

A.C. No. 8383, DECEMBER 11, 2012
En banc
Duty to Court
FACTS: Complainant hired the services of the respondent to represent her in a civil case. Respondent
allegedly convinced her to give P10,000 and another P5,000 in order to bribe the judge and win the case.
Despite the complainants giving of the required money, however, she was shocked to find out that the
case turned out against her despite her counsels assurance of winning the case. Worse, the respondent
allegedly concealed all the development of the case from her, including his failure to comment on the

adverse partys offer of evidence and to submit their memorandum on the case. The respondent has also
failed to attend the hearings set by the IBP.
ISSUE: Whether or not the acts of the respondent warrant disbarment from the practice of law
RULING: Yes. In this case, Atty. Raeses committed a grave offense. As explained below, he committed
a fraudulent exaction, and at the same time maligned both the judge and the Judiciary. These are
exacerbated by his cavalier attitude towards the IBP during the investigation of his case; he practically
disregarded its processes and even lied to one of the Investigating Commissioners regarding the notices
given him about the case. From these perspectives, Atty. Raeses wronged his client, the judge allegedly
on the take, the Judiciary as an institution, and the IBP of which he is a member. The Court cannot and
should not allow offenses such as these to pass unredressed. Let this be a signal to one and all to all
lawyers, their clients and the general public that the Court will not hesitate to act decisively and with no
quarters given to defend the interest of the public, of our judicial system and the institutions composing it,
and to ensure that these are not compromised by unscrupulous or misguided members of the Bar.
TERESITA BAYONLA vs. ATTY. PURITA REYES
660 SCRA 490

A.C. No. 4808, NOVEMBER 22, 2011
En banc
Duty to client: Fiduciary Relationship
FACTS: Bayonla alleged that on October 21, 1993, she and Alfredo had engaged the legal services of
Atty. Reyes to collect their share in the expropriation compensation from the Air Transportation Office
(ATO), Cagayan De Oro City agreeing to her attorneys fees of 10% of whatever amount would be
collected; that in November 1993, Atty. Reyes had collected P1 million from the ATO; that Bayonlas
share, after deducting Atty. Reyes attorneys fees, would be P75,000.00, but Atty. Reyes had delivered to
her onlyP23,000.00, and had failed to deliver the balance of P52,000.00 despite repeated demands; that
on June 5, 1995, Atty. Reyes had collected the amount ofP121,119.11 from the ATO; that Bayonlas
share, after deducting Atty. Reyes attorneys fees, would be P109,007.20, but Atty. Reyes had handed
her onlyP56,500.00, and had failed to deliver the balance of P52,507.20.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent lawyer violated Canon 16.

RULING: Yes. The canons are appropriate considering that the relationship between a lawyer and her
client is highly fiduciary, and prescribes on a lawyer a great degree of fidelity and good faith. There is no
question that the money or property received by a lawyer for her client properly belongs to the
latter. Conformably with these canons of professional responsibility, we have held that a lawyer is obliged
to render an accounting of all the property and money she has collected for her client. This obligation
includes the prompt reporting and accounting of the money collected by the lawyer by reason of a
favorable judgment to his client. Despite demands by Bayonla and despite the orders from the IBP Board
of Governors for her to remit the shortage, Atty. Reyes refused to do so. By not delivering Bayonlas
share despite her demand, Atty. Reyes violated the aforestated canons.
SANTOS VENTURA vs. ATTY. RICHARD V. FUNK
678 SCRA 368

A.C. No. 9094, AUGUST 15, 2012
Abad, J.
Duty to client: Conflict of interest
FACTS: Complainant Hocorma Foundation alleged that respondent Atty. Richard Funk, who used to work
as corporate secretary, counsel, chief executive officer, and trustee of the foundation from 1983 to 1985
and served as its counsel in several criminal and civil cases, filed an action for quieting of title and
damages against Hocorma Foundation on behalf of Mabalacat Institute, Inc. (Mabalacat Institute) using
information that he acquired while serving as its counsel in violation of the Code of Professional

Responsibility (CPR) and in breach of attorney-client relationship. In his defense, respondent claimed that
in 1985 when Hocorma Foundation refused to pay his attorney's fees, he severed his professional
relationship with it. The Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) found Atty. Funk to have violated Canon 15,
Rule 15.0312 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) with the aggravating circumstance of a
pattern of misconduct consisting of four court appearances against his former client, the Hocorma
Foundation.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Funk betrayed the trust and confidence of a former client in violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
RULING: Yes. Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the CPR provides that a lawyer cannot represent conflicting
interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Here, it is
undeniable that Atty. Funk was formerly the legal counsel of Hocorma Foundation. Years after terminating
his relationship with the foundation, he filed a complaint against it on behalf of another client, the
Mabalacat Institute, without the foundation's written consent.An attorney owes his client undivided
allegiance. Because of the highly fiduciary nature of their relationship, sound public policy dictates that he
be prohibited from representing conflicting interests or discharging inconsistent duties. An attorney may
not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest conflicts
with that of his present or former client. This rule is so absolute that good faith and honest intention on the
erring lawyer's part does not make it inoperative. Atty. Richard Funk is suspended from the practice of law
for one year effective immediately.
GODOFREDO C. PINEDA vs ATTY. TEDDY C. MACAPAGAL
476 SCRA 292

A.C. No. 6026, November 29, 2005
First Division, Ynares-Santiago J.
Duty to client: Negligence, Duty to apprise client
FACTS: Complainant alleged that respondent was absent 11 times out of the total 15 scheduled hearings
in Civil Case No. 23744, despite due notice in open court. Complainant alleged that every time he would
inquire from respondent regarding any development in the case, the latter would either pretend to be
busy, or that he has a prior commitment, or would just fail to show up during the scheduled meeting; that
complainant was surprised when upon inquiry from the court about the status of the civil case, he was
informed that the same was dismissed for failure of respondent to attend the scheduled hearings. As
regards the criminal case for libel, complainant alleged that when the decision convicting him was
promulgated, he instructed respondent to file an appeal. While respondent filed a notice of appeal with
the Court of Appeals, he failed to submit an appeal brief, hence, the lower courts decision became final
and executory. In a Report, the investigating commissioner recommended that respondent be suspended
from the practice of law for one year. The commissioner noted that indeed, respondent was remiss in his
responsibilities as a lawyer. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the report of the
investigating commissioner
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent violated his Lawyers Oath and the Code of Professional responsibility
RULING: Yes. Records show that respondent was negligent in handling the civil case which led to its
dismissal. In the libel suit, respondent failed to file an appeal brief, hence, the lower courts decision
convicting complainant of libel became final and executory. The failure of a lawyer to file an appeal brief
certainly constitutes inexcusable negligence on his part. Further, respondent lacked candor in dealing
with his client. He not only omitted to apprise him of the status of the cases; worse, he avoided any
meeting with the complainant. He failed to keep the latter informed of the status of the cases and to
respond to request for information. Failure of a lawyer to communicate to his client important matters of
the case and to respond within a reasonable time to his requests for information is tantamount to
unjustifiable denial of his right to be fully informed of the developments in and the status of the case. In
failing to inform his client of the status of the cases, respondent failed to exercise such skill, care, and
diligence as men of the legal profession commonly possess and exercise in such matters of professional
employment. The relationship of a lawyer-client being one of confidence, there is a need for the client to

be adequately and fully informed as to the mode and manner in which his interests are being defended. It
is only thus that their faith in counsel may remain unimpaired.
VOLUNTAD-RAMIREZ vs. ATTY. ROSARIO B. BAUTISTA
683 SCRA 327

A.C. No. 6733, October 10, 2012
Secong Division, Carpio, J.
Attorneys Fees: Acceptance Fee
FACTS: The complainant engaged the legal services of respondent to file a complaint against
complainants siblings for encroachment of her right of way. For his legal services, respondent demanded
P 15,000 as acceptance fee, plus P 1,000 per court appearance. Complainant then paid respondent the P
15,000 acceptance fee. Six months after she hired respondent, complainant severed the legal services of
respondent because respondent failed to file a complaint within a reasonable period of time as requested
by complainant. Because of the respondents inaction, the complainant was constrained to hire the
services of another counsel. Complainant alleged that the respondent failed to refund the amount (P
14,000) he received from her despite previous demands, thus prompting her to initiate the current action.
In his defense, the respondent cited his willingness to return the money and that he has not neglected his
duties as counsel of the complainant. The investigating commissioner on the Commission on Bar
discipline recommended the respondents suspension for a year for violating various canons of the Code.
The Board of Governors of the IBP, on the other hand, modified the penalty to admonition only.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent lawyer violated the Code of Professional Ethics by being negligent
in handling the case of complainant
RULING: In this case, the Court found that the complainant asked for the refund of P 14,000 out of
the P 15,000 acceptance fee considering that, apart from sending a letter to the City Engineer of Navotas
City, respondent did nothing more to advance his clients cause during the six months that complainant
engaged his legal services. Because of this, the Court held that the respondent breached his duty to
serve his client with competence and diligence. Respondent was found to be guilty of violating Rule 18.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which states that "a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable."
SHIRLEY TOLEDO and ROSIE DAJAC vs. JUDGE KALLOS
449 SCRA
AM RTJ-05-1900, January 28, 2005
Chief Justice Davide
Contingent Fees
FACTS: Prior to his appointment as a judge, Judge Kallos was complainants counsel of record in a Civil
Case involving the recovery of hereditary shares with damages. On 25 March 1979, a judgment was
rendered ordering the defendants to, among other things, turn over to herein complainants, the plaintiffs
therein, the possession and ownership of the total area of 4,514square meters of "lot 2082 Albay
Cadastre." On appeal, the decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and became final and executor.
In 2002, the respondent filed in the same action, a Civil Case for the issuance of an order constituting in
his favor an attorneys lien to the extent of one-third over the lot awarded in favor of the complainants
representing his attorneys fee. He based his motion on a written contingency agreement on attorneys
fees for professional services rendered whereby he is entitled to one-third share of what would be
awarded to the complainants. He claimed that this agreement had already been implemented when "one
of the three (3) lots levied upon by the sheriff to answer for the award of damages was given to (him) as
his one-third share while the other two lots went to the plaintiffs as their two-third share. Later, the
complainants filed a complaint praying for three things. First, they pray for an order directing the
respondent to stop demanding his "1/3 share attorneys fees. Second, the recovery of the property
involved in said Deed of Absolute Sale. Lastly, the removal of the respondent from his position as RTC
judges for his alleged abusive conduct unbecoming a judge.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent has the right to demand his attorneys fees
RULING: Yes. Respondent judge was, indeed, complainants counsel in a Civil
Case and he should therefore be compensated for his services. The act of demanding payment for his
attorneys fees is not a ground for administrative liability. Canon 20 of t he Code of Professional
Responsibility A lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees.As what constitute fair and
reasonable fees in this case is not yet certain. The respondents claimfor attorneys fees was still being
litigated in a Civil Case.
Thus, said reasonable fees is not yet certain. As a lawyer, it is but just that he be fairly compensated for
his services. And his filing of a claim for attorneys fees in a Civil Case was an appropriate legal remedy.
Considering the pendency of such claim, the suspension of the determination of the instant administrative
complaint until the rendition of a final judicial ruling on the matter of respondents attorneys fees is just
proper. In other words, the complaint is not yet ripe for administrative evaluation. The hearing on the
matter being conducted by the trial court should be allowed to run its course as that court is
the appropriate forum for a ruling on the dispute. Here, the duty of the court is not only to see that lawyers
act in a proper and lawful manner, but also to see that lawyers are paid their just and lawful fees.
LETICIA GONZALES vs. ATTY. MARCELINO CABUCANA
479 SCRA 320

A.C. No. 6836, January 23, 2006
First Division, Austria-Martinez, J.
Duty to client: Disclosure
FACTS: Complainant was a party litigant to a civil case where she was represented by Atty. Edmar
Cabucana and respondent was the associate/partner, having been in the same law firm. A decision was
rendered ordering the other party in the civil case to pay a certain amount to complainant but the sheriff
failed to fully implement the writ of execution in connection to the judgment prompting complainant to file
a complaint against said sheriff. It was then alleged that the sheriff and his wife harassed complainant,
asking her to execute an affidavit of desistance regarding her complaint. Complainant, because of such
incident, filed criminal cases against the sheriff and his wife.
The sheriff was represented by respondent despite the pendency of the civil case where
respondent's law firm was still representing complainant. After submission of the parties' respective
positions, investigating Commissioner Reyes submitted his report and recommendation which provided
that respondent indeed made a mistake in the acceptance of the administrative case against the sheriff
but that there was no malice in said acceptance as showed by the withdrawal of the case filed by
complainant against respondent. It was recommended that respondent be reprimanded. Such
recommendation was approved by the Board of Governors of the IBP.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility
RULING: Yes. Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer
shall not represent conflicting interest except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts. It is well-settled that a lawyer is barred from representing conflicting interests
except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Such prohibition is
founded on principles of public policy and good taste as the nature of the lawyer-client relations is one of
trust and confidence of the highest degree.As respondent admitted, it was their law firm which
represented Gonzales in the civil case. Such being the case, the rule against representing conflicting
interests applies.
IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. VICENTE RAUL
ALMACEN

G.R. No. L-27654, February 18, 1970

EN BANC; CASTRO, J.
Nature of disciplinary actions against lawyers (Sui generis)
FACTS: Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen filed a Petition to Surrender the Lawyers Certificate of Title to the
Supreme Court as a sign of his protest as against to what he call a tribunal peopled by people who are
calloused to our pleas for justice He also expressed strong words as against the judiciary
like justice is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb.. The petition rooted from the case he lost due to
the absence of time and place in his motion in the trial court. His appeal was dismissed in the Court of
Appeals by reason of jurisprudence. In a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court, it was again
dismissed thru a minute resolution. With the disappointments, he thought of this sacrificial move. He
claimed that this petition to surrender his title is only in trust, and that he may obtain the title again as
soon as he regained confidence in the justice system.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Almacen should be given disciplinary actions for his acts?
RULING: His accusations caused enough damage and disrepute to the judiciary. Since this particular
case is sui generis in its nature, they are distinct from and may proceed independently of civil and criminal
cases. Hence, a number of foreign and local jurisprudence in analogous cases were cited as benchmarks
and references.
FRIAS vs. ATTY. LOZADA
A.C. No. 6656, May 4, 2006

En Banc; Corona, J.
Prescriptive period for filing administrative complaints against lawyers
FACTS: Respondent seeks reconsideration of the courts earlier resolution finding her guilty of violating
Rules 15.03 and 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and of willfully disobeying a final and
executory decision of the Court of Appeals and suspending her from the practice of law for two
years.Respondent contends that, pursuant to Rule VIII of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on
Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), the complaint against her was already
barred by prescription. Respondent anchors her defense of prescription on Rule VIII, Section 1 of the
Rules of Procedure of the CBD-IBP which provides that , A complaint for disbarment, suspension or
discipline of attorneys prescribes in two (2) years from the date of the professional misconduct.
ISSUE: Whether or not, the complaint against respondent was already barred by prescription?
RULING: An administrative complaint against a member of the bar does not prescribe. If the rule were
otherwise, members of the bar would be emboldened to disregard the very oath they took as lawyers,
prescinding from the fact that as long as no private complainant would immediately come forward, they
stand a chance of being completely exonerated from whatever administrative liability they ought to
answer for. It is the duty of this Court to protect the integrity of the practice of law as well as the
administration of justice.
OLBES vs. DECIEMBRE
AC-5365, April 27, 2005

EN BANC; PANGANIBAN, J.
Deceit as a ground for suspension and disbarment of members of the bar under the Rules of Court
FACTS: Atty. Victor V. Deciembre was given five blank checks by Spouses Olbes for security of a loan.
Notwithstanding the full payment of the loan and a receipt issued, Atty. Deciembre filled up four of the five
checks for P50, 000 with different maturity date. All checks were dishonored. Thus, Atty. Deciembre fled a

case for estafa against the spouses Olbes. This prompted the spouses Olbes to file a disbarment case
against Atty. Deciembre with the Office of theBar Confidant of this Court. In the report, Commissioner
Dulay recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two years for violating
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
ISSUE: Whether or not the suspension of Atty. Deciembre was in accord with his fault?
RULING: The Code of Professional Responsibility was seriously transgressed by his malevolent act of
filling up the blank checks by indicating amounts that had not been agreed upon at all and despite
respondents full knowledge that the loan supposed to be secured by the checks had already been paid.
His was a brazen act of falsification of a commercial document, resorted to for his material gain.
Deception and other fraudulent acts are not merely unacceptable practices that are disgraceful and is
honorable; they reveal a basic moral flaw. The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by
conduct that merely enables one to escape the penalties of criminal laws.
TAN TEK BENG vs. DAVID
A.C. No. 1261 December 29, 1983

SECOND DIVISION; AQUINO, J.
Malpractice as a ground for suspension and disbarment of members of the bar under the Rules of Court
FACTS: In 1970, Atty. David and Tan Tek Beng, a non-lawyer, entered into an agreement whereby Tan
Tek Beng will supply clients to Atty. David and in exchange thereof, Atty. David shall give Tan Tek Beng
50% of the attorneys fees collected as the latters commission. Atty. David also agreed not to deal with
clients supplied by Tan Tek Beng directly without the latters consent. The agreement went sour due to
allegations of double-cross from both sides. Tan Tek Beng denounced Atty. David before the Supreme
Court but did not seek the enforcement of their agreement.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. David is guilty of Malpractice?
RULING: Yes. The agreement between Atty. David and Tan Tek Beng is void because it was tantamount
to malpractice which is the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers. Malpractice ordinarily refers to any malfeasance or dereliction of duty
committed by a lawyer. That meaning is in consonance with the elementary notion that the practice of law
is a profession, not a business. The lawyer may not seek or obtain employment by himself or through
others for to do so would be unprofessional.
VITUG vs. RONGCAL
A.C. No. 6313, September 7, 2006

Third Division; Tinga, J.
Grossly immoral conduct as a ground for suspension and disbarment of members of the bar under the
Rules of Court
FACTS:
Catherine Joie P. Vitug sought the service of respondent Atty. Diosdado M. Rongcal who was introduced
to her by a common friend. Complainant asked Atty. Rongcal to represent her in the support case she
was going to file against her former lover, Arnulfo Aquino. Soon after, herein complainant and respondent
started having sexual relationship with each other. In 2001, respondent allegedly convinced complainant
to sign an Affidavit of Disclaimer which the latter signed without reading the said affidavit. It was said that
Aquino will give complainant a lump sum provided she would execute an affidavit to the effect that Aquino
is not the father of her daughter.
Complainant argues that respondent's acts constitute a violation of his oath as a lawyer.
ISSUE: Whether or not, respondent is guilty of immorality?

RULING: Respondent is obviously guilty of immorality in violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code which states
that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Grossly immoral
conduct is one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful
as to be reprehensible to a high degree.
SORIANO vs. DIZON
A.C. No. 6792, January 25, 2006

EN BANC; PER CURIAM
Conviction of a Crime Involving Moral Turpitude as a ground for suspension and disbarment of members
of the bar under the Rules of Court
FACTS:
A Complaint-Affidavit for the disbarment of Atty. Manuel Dizon was filed by Soriano with the Commission
on Bar Discipine (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Complainant alleges that the
conviction of respondent for a crime involving moral turpitude, together with the circumstances
surrounding the conviction, violates Canon 1 of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and
constitutes sufficient ground for his disbarment under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether respondent be disbarred for the commission of a crime involving moral turpitude?
RULING: Moral turpitude has been defined as "everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or
good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes
his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. Moral
turpitude has been defined as "everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an
act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or
to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.
IN RE: PETITION TO TAKE THE LAWYER'S OATH BY ARTHUR M. CUEVAS, JR
B.M. No. 810, January 27, 1998

EN BANC, FRANCISCO, J.
Violation of oath of office as a ground for suspension and disbarment of members of the bar under the
Rules of Court
FACTS: In 1991, a neophyte died during the initiation rites of Lex Talionis Fraternitas in the San Beda
College of Law. Arthur Cuevas Jr was one of the persons charged (with murder) for the death of the
neophyte. He pleaded guilty and was later convicted to the lesser crime of Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Homicide. Thereafter, Cuevas was granted probation and he continued taking up law. In
1995, he was discharged from probation. In 1996, the Supreme Court allowed Cuevas to take the bar on
the condition that in case he will pass, his oath taking will have to be approved by the Supreme Court
first. Cuevas did pass the 1996 bar exams and in 1997, he filed a petition before the Supreme Court
asking the latter to allow him to take the Lawyers Oath.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Cuevas may be allowed to take the Lawyers Oath?
RULING:
Yes. The court is willing to give him a chance considering that Cuevas has received various certifications
regarding his good behavior while on probation. As a lawyer, Cuevas shall be expected to abide by the
oath strictly and to conduct himself beyond reproach at all times. The Lawyers Oath is a solemn
affirmation of the lawyers lifetime commitment to be a loyal citizen, law-abiding person, a defender of
truth and justice, an advocate of the rule of law, an exemplar of loyalty a fidelity to the courts and to
clients and a model to emulate both in his professional and private life.

OMBAC vs. RAYOS
A.C. No. 2884, January 28, 1998

EN BANC; PUNO, J.
Disbarment proceeding
FACTS: A petition for disbarment filed with this Court by Mrs. Irene Rayos-Ombac against her nephew,
Atty. Orlando A. Rayos, a legal practitioner in Metro Manila, for "his failure to adhere to the standards of
mental and moral fitness set up for members of the bar."
In January 1985, respondent induced complainant who was then 85 years old to withdraw all her bank
deposits and entrust them to him for safekeeping. Respondent, upon demand from the complainant,
adamantly refuses to return the said amount. Thus, the case at bar. However, an affidavit of withdrawal
by the complainant was filed.
ISSUE: Whether or not, the affidavit of withdrawal exonerates the liability of the respondent?
RULING: The affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment case allegedly executed by complainant does not,
in any way, exonerate the respondent. A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of
interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out
by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven. This rule is
premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in
any sense a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a
defendant. Hence, if the evidence on record warrants, the respondent may be suspended or disbarred
despite the desistance of complainant or his withdrawal of the charges. In the instant case, it has been
sufficiently proved that respondent has engaged in deceitful conduct, in violation of the Code of
IN RE: SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW IN THE TERRITORY OF GUAM OF ATTY.
LEON G. MAQUERA
B.M. No. 793. July 30, 2004

EN BANC; TINGA, J
Discipline of Filipino lawyers practicing abroad
FACTS: The IBP found that Maquera was admitted to the Philippine Bar on February 28, 1958. On
October 18, 1974, he was admitted to the practice of law in the territory of Guam. He was suspended
from the practice of law in Guam for misconduct, as he acquired his clients property as payment for his
legal services, then sold it and as a consequence obtained an unreasonably high fee for handling his
clients case.
ISSUE: Whether or not, his suspension in Guam automatically results in his suspension or disbarment in
the Philippines?
RULING: No. The acts which led to his suspension in another country, are mere grounds for disbarment
or suspension in this jurisdiction, and only if the basis of the foreign courts action includes any of the
grounds for disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction.
ZALDIVAR vs.GONZALEZ
G.R. Nos. 79690-707, April 7, 1993EN BANC; PER CURIAM
Readmission to the Bar of lawyers who have been suspended
FACTS: Raul Gonzales was found guilty of both contempt of court in facie curiae and gross misconduct
as an officer of court and member of the bar. For this, he was suspended indefinitely. After more than 4
years from his suspension, Gonzales filed an ex-parte motion to lift his suspension from the practice of
law, alleging that he gave free legal aid services by paying lawyers to do the same as he could not

personally represent said clients; pursued civic work for the poor; brought honor to the country by
delivering a paper in Switzerland; that he has a long record in the service of human rights and the rule of
law; his suspension of 51 months has been the longest so far; states his profound regrets for the
inconvenience which he has caused to the Court; sincerely reiterates his respect to the institution as he
reiterates his oath to conduct himself as a lawyer.
ISSUE: May his suspension be lifted?
RULING:
Yes. The Gonzales contrition, so noticeably absent in his earlier pleadings, has washed clean the offense
of his disrespect. His remorse has soften his arrogance and made up for his misconduct. Gonzales
suspension has given him ample time and opportunity to amend his erring ways, rehabilitate himself, and
thus, prove himself worthy once again to enjoy the privileges of membership of the Bar. His motion was
granted.
TAN vs. SABANDAL
B.M. No. 44, February 24, 1992

EN BANC; MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.
Admission to the Bar
FACTS: Respondent Nicolas El. Sabandal passed the 1978 Bar Examinations but because of pending
administrative complaints filed against him regarding instances when he called himself attorney knowing
full well that he was not yet admitted to the Bar, he was not allowed to take the lawyers oath. Oppositors
evidence sufficiently show that respondent had held himself out as an attorney in the agrarian, civil and
criminal cases and he was paid for his legal services. He then filed a petition to be admitted to the
Philippine Bar and to be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys. In a resolution promulgated on November
29, 1983 respondent petition was denied. Respondent asks for forgiveness, understanding and
benevolence and promises that, if given a chance to be a member of the Phil. Bar, he would always be
faithful to the lawyers oath and conduct himself in an upright manner.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent shall be admitted to the Philippine Bar?
RULING: Whether or not the applicant shall be reinstated rests on the discretion of the court. An applicant
must satisfy the Court that he is a person of good moral character, fit and proper to practice law.
Sabandal is hereby allowed to take the lawyers oath
PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW,

BENJAMIN M. DACANAY
B.M. No. 1678, December 17, 2007

EN BANC; CORONA, J.
Readmission to the Bar of lawyers who have been repatriated
FACTS: Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated to
Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied for
Canadian citizenship to avail of Canadas free medical aid program. His application was approved and he
became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.
On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of
2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship. On that day, he took his oath of allegiance as a
Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the
Philippines and now intends to resume his law practice.
ISSUE:Whether or not, petitioner may still resume practice?

RULING: The retaking of the lawyers oath which will not only remind him of his duties and responsibilities
as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to maintain allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines.
DE ROY vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 80718 January 29, 1988

THIRD DIVISION; CORTES, J.
Mandatory continuing legal education
FACTS: De Roy was the owner of a burnt building. The firewall of said building collapsed on the house of
Luis Bernal thereby killing his daughter. Bernal sued De Roy. Bernal won in the trial court. Eventually, De
Roy appealed and the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. De Roy received a copy of
the decision on August 25, 1987. Under the Rules, they have 15 days to file a motion for reconsideration.
On September 9, 1987, the last day for them to file said MFR, De Roys counsel filed a motion for
extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Court of Appeals. The
Court of Appeals ruled that pursuant to the case of Habaluyas Enterprises vs Japzon (August 1985), the
fifteen-day period for appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended.
De Roy assailed the denial as she alleged that her counsel was ignorant of the rule laid down in the
Habaluyas Case; that said rule should not be made to apply to the case at bar owing to the non-
publication of the Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette.
ISSUE: Whether or not De Roys contention is correct?

RULING: No. It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of
decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated, and
published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions (G.R.s) and in such publications as the
Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.
PEOPLE vs. GACOTT
G.R. No. 116049, March 20, 1995

SECOND DIVISION; BIDIN, J.
FACTS: On February 2, 1994, a complaint for violation of the Anti-Dummy Law (C.A. No. 108) was filed
by Asst. City Prosecutor Perfecto E. Pe against respondents Strom and Reyes. The accused filed a
Motion to Quash/Dismiss the criminal case contending that since the power to prosecute is vested
exclusively in the Anti-Dummy Board under Republic Act No. 1130, the City Prosecutor of Puerto
Princesa has no power or authority to file the same. The prosecution filed an opposition pointing out that
the Anti-Dummy Board has already been abolished by Letter of Implementation No. 2, Series of 1972.
Despite such opposition, however, respondent judge granted the motion espousing the position that the
Letter Of Implementation relied upon by the City Fiscal is not the law contemplated in Article 7 of the
New Civil Code which can repeal another law such as R.A. 1130. Thus, respondent judge in the assailed
order of March 18, 1994 held that the City Prosecutor has no power or authority to file and prosecute the
case and ordered that the case be quashed.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge in granting the Motion to Quash gravely abused his discretion
as to warrant the issuance of a writ of certiorari?
RULING: Yes. The error committed by respondent judge in dismissing the case is quite obvious in the
light of P.D. No. 1, LOI No. 2 and P.D. No. 1275 aforementioned. The intent to abolish the Anti-Dummy
Board could not have been expressed more clearly than in the aforequoted LOI. Even assuming that the
City Fiscal of Puerto Princesa failed to cite P.D. No. 1 in his opposition to the Motion to Quash, a mere
perusal of the text of LOI No. 2 would have immediately apprised the respondent judge of the fact that
LOI No. 2 was issued in implementation of P.D. No. 1. Paragraph 1 of LOI

DULALIA, JR. vs.CRUZ
A.C. No. 6854, April 25, 2007

SECOND DIVISION; CARPIO MORALES, J.
FACTS: Herein respondent is the municipal legal officer of Meycauayan. Susan Dulalia applied for
building permit for the construction of a warehouse. Despite compliance to requirements, the application
was denied. This was, according to Dulalai was due to the opposition of respondent because of his
personal grudge against the applicant who objected to respondents marrying her first cousin Imelda
Soriano. They then filed to the office of Ombudsman for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility.
ISSUE: Whether or not, Atty. Cruz violated Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility?
RULING: It is the duty of a lawyer to be well informed of the existing laws and to keep abreast with legal
development, recent enactment and jurisprudence. The respondents contention that the civil code
provision applies at the time he contracted his second marriage is untenable. The purpose of MCLE is to
ensure that lawyers, throughout their career, they keep abreast with law and jurisprudence, maintain the
ethics of the profession and enhance the standards of the practice of law.
IN RE: PETITION TO RE-ACQUIRE

THE PRIVILEGE TO PRACTICE LAW
IN THE PHILIPPINES
B.M. No. 2112, JULY 24, 2012

EN BANC; REYES, J.
Compliance to MCLE
FACTS: The petitioner alleged that he became a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on
March 21, 1966; that he lost his privilege to practice law when he became a citizen of the United States of
America (USA) on August 28, 1981; that on September 15, 2006, he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship
pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003 by
taking his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Washington,
D.C., USA; that he intends to retire in the Philippines and if granted, to resume the practice of law.
ISSUE: Whether or not, he shall be granted to practice law in the Philippines?
RULING: The OBC further required the petitioner to update his compliance, particularly with the MCLE.
After all the requirements were satisfactorily complied with and finding that the petitioner has met all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications for membership in the bar, the OBC recommended that the
petitioner be allowed to resume his practice of law.
JUDGE LILY LYDIA A. LAQUINDANUM vs. ATTY. NESTOR Q. QUINTANA
A.C. No. 7036, June 29, 2009

En Banc, Carpio, J.
Notarial Practice: Qualification, Unauthorized Practice
FACTS: Judge Laquindanum sent a letter to the Supreme Court requesting that proper disciplinary action
be imposed to Atty. Nestor Quintana for the following acts:
1. Notarizing documents outside of the area of his commission as notary public;
2. Allowing his wife to notarize documents in his absence;
3. Notarizing a document where one of the signatories therein was already dead at that time.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a lawyer of good standing has the right to practice his profession including notarial acts
in the entire Philippines, as so claimed by the respondent
2. Whether or not Atty. Quintana can transfer the blame to his wife for the latter unauthorized practice of
notarial acts
3. Whether or not a notary public can notarize documents where one of the signatories therein was
already dead at that time
RULING:
1. No. While it is true that lawyers in good standing are allowed to engage in the practice of law in
the Philippines, however, not every lawyer even in good standing can perform notarial functions
without having been commissioned as notary public. He must have submitted himself to the
commissioning court by filing his petition for issuance of his Notarial Practice.
2. No. A notary public takes full responsibility for all the entries in his notarial register. Respondent
cannot take refuge claiming that it was his wifes act and that he did not authorize his wife to
notarize documents. He is personally accountable for the activities in his office as well as the acts
of his personnel including his wife, who acts as his secretary.
3. No. Sec. 2, (b), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides Aperson shall not
perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or document (1) is not
in the notarys presence personally at the time of the notarization; and (2) is not personally known
to the notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules.
LUZVIMINDA R. LUSTESTICA vs. ATTY. SERGIO E. BERNABE
628 SCRA 613

A.C. No. 6258, August 24, 2010
En Banc, Per Curiam
Notarial Practice: Competent evidence of identity
FACTS: Respondent admitted the fact of death of the alleged donors, considering their death certificates
attached to the complaint. The respondent claimed, however, that he had no knowledge that the real
Benvenuto H. Lustestica and Cornelia P. Rivero were already dead at the time he notarized the Deed of
Donation.He also claimed that he exerted efforts to ascertain the identities of the persons who appeared
before him and represented themselves as the donors under the Deed of Donation.The IBP
Commissioner found the respondent grossly negligent in the performance of his duties as notary public
and recommended that the respondents notarial commission be suspended for a period of one (1) year.
The Board of Governors of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline adopted and approved the Report of
the IBP Commissioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent was grossly negligent in discharging his duties as a notary public.
RULING: Yes. Respondent failed to ascertain the identities of the affiants before him and failed to comply
with the most basic function that a notary public must do, i.e., to require the parties presentation of their
residence certificates or any other document to prove their identities. Given the respondents admission in
his pleading that the donors were already dead when he notarized the Deed of Donation, we have no
doubt that he failed in his duty to ascertain the identities of the persons who appeared before him as
donors in the Deed of Donation. Under the circumstances, we find that the respondent should be made
liable not only as a notary public but also as a lawyer. He not only violated the Notarial Law (Public Act
No. 2103), but also Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
AVELINO O. ANGELES et. al vs. ATTY. AMADO O. IBAEZ
576 SCRA 90
A.C. No. 7860, , January 15, 2009
CARPIO, J.:
Notarial Practice: Competent evidence of identity

FACTS: Atty. Amado Ibaez allegedly notarized an "Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale" without
having the authority to notarize such as he did not have a commission as notary public at that time. The
petitioners further denied executing the said document or, that they ever appeared before respondent
Atty. Ibaez for this purpose. He stated that his failure to require the presence of the parties to the
"Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale" is wholly justified because of the assurance of complainant
Rosalina Angeles that the signatures appearing in the said document were indeed those of her co-heirs.
The respondent also alleged that almost all the complainants submitted their residence certificates, the
numbers of which were recorded in the acknowledgement portion of the document.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent violated his oath as a lawyer and the Code of Professional
Responsibility when he notarized the "Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale" in the absence of the
affiants.
RULING: The Supreme Court have reminded lawyers commissioned as notaries public that the affiants
must personally appear before them. The physical presence of the affiants enables the notary public to
verify the genuineness of the signatures of the acknowledging parties and to ascertain that the document
is the parties free act and deed. Under the facts and circumstances of the case, respondents notarial
commission should not only be suspended but respondent must also be suspended from the practice of
law.
A.M. NO. MTJ-99-1204 GERONIMO FUENTES vs. JUDGE ROMUALDO BUNO
July 28, 2008

First Division, Leonardo-Castro, J.
Judges on Notarial Practice
FACTS: This administrative complaint was filed by Geronimo Fuentes against Judge Romualdo Buno for
abuse of discretion and authority and graft and corruption. Accordingly, Judge Buno notarized an Extra-
judicial Partition and subsequently an Absolute Deed of Sale between their mother Eulalia and a vendee
without their consent as to the shares in their fathers property and while the judge was in his capacity as
such. In his comment, respondent judge averred that he could not be charged of graft and corruption
since in a municipality where there is no notary public, a municipal judge is allowed to notarize documents
or deeds as ex-officio notary public.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge is allowed to notarize documents.
RULING: Pursuant to Section 76 of RA 296, although judges are allowed to be ex-officio notary publics
when there is none in a municipality, they may act as such only in the notarization of documents
connected to the performance of their official functions and duties. SC Circular No. 1-90 prohibits judges
from the preparation and acknowledgment of private documents, contracts and other deeds of
conveyances which have no direct relation to the discharge of their official functions. Whether or not
respondent acted in good faith when he notarized such documents is beside the point since he failed to
observe the requirements of SC Circular No. 1-90. Judge Romualdo Buno was fined.
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs JUDGE HARUN ISMAEL
610 SCRA 281

A.M. No. RTJ-07-2045, January 19, 2010
Third Division, Corona, J.
New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary
FACTS: On April 25 to May 14, 2005, a judicial audit was conducted in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pagadian, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 22, presided over by respondent Judge Harun B. Ismael. As a
result, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) issued a memorandum directing respondent to explain
his failure to decide and act on current and inherited cases, as well as to resolve incidents in various
cases pending before him, within the reglementary period provided by law. Respondent was likewise

directed to inform the OCA if cases already submitted for decision or resolution had in fact been decided
or resolved within the reglementary period.
In its memorandum, the OCA noted that respondent failed to fully comply with its directives and the
respondent judge did not ask for extensions of time within which to comply with the subject directives.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge violated the New Code of Judicial Conduct in not promptly
deciding the case within the reglementary period
RULING: Yes. It is settled that failure to decide or resolve cases within the reglementary period
constitutes gross inefficiency and is not excusable. The New Code of Judicial Conduct requires that a
judge shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and
with reasonable promptness. Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code admonishes all judges to dispose of the
courts business promptly and decide cases within the period specified in Section 15 (1) and (2), Article
VIII of the Constitution. Violation of the basic tenets of judicial conduct embodied in the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary and the Code of Judicial Conduct constitutes a breach of
Canons 1 and 12 as well as Rules 1.03 and 12.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
CRISELDA GACAD vs JUDGE HILARION CLAPIS, JR.
676 SCRA 534

A.M. No. RTJ-10-2257, JULY 17, 2012
En Banc, Per Curiam
New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary
FACTS: Complainant alleged that she had given the judge P50,000, upon suggestion of a prosecutor who
told her that the judge should be compensated to favor her cause and deny the petition for reinvestigation
of the accused in a criminal case where the complainants brother was gunned down. After the first
payment, complainant also alleged that the judge wanted to borrow P50,000 from her again but said
request was not granted by the complainant. Thereafter, complainant noticed certain irregularities
committed by the judge, such as the sending of notice hearings to complainant belatedly and the
conducting of bail hearings even without application for bail.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judges acts amount to gross misconduct constituting violations of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct
RULING: Yes. The arbitrary actions of respondent judge, taken together, give doubt as to his impartiality,
integrity and propriety. It is an ironclad principle that a judge must not only be impartial; he must also
appear to be impartial at all times. Being in constant scrutiny by the public, his language, both written and
spoken, must be guarded and measured lest the best of intentions be misconstrued Needless to state,
any gross misconduct seriously undermines the faith and confidence of the people in the judiciary.
Judge Clapis is liable for gross ignorance of the law for conducting bail hearings without a petition for bail
being filed by the accused and without affording the prosecution an opportunity to prove that the guilt of
the accused is strong. Here, the act of Judge Clapis is not a mere deficiency in prudence, discretion and
judgment but a patent disregard of well-known rules.
ATTY. NORLINDA R. AMANTE-DESCALLAR vs HON. REINERIO (ABRAHAM) B. RAMAS
638 SCRA 358

A.M. No. RTJ-06-2015, DECEMBER 15, 2010
First Division, Leonardo-De Castro, J.
Code of Judicial Conduct
FACTS: Atty. Cerilles claimed to know Judge Ramas very well since the latter is his godfather and
wedding sponsor. Atty. Cerilles admitted that he had many pending cases before Judge Ramas sala,
including Criminal Case No. 04-7003 which involved his grandnephews. On May 12, 2005, Atty. Cerilles

went to the RTC-Branch 18 to find out if his grandnephews Urgent Motion for Reinvestigation could be
heard. However, he was told that Judge Ramas was not around because his estranged wife arrived.
When Atty. Cerilles returned the following day, May 13, 2005, he was informed that Judge Ramas was
still absent. Atty. Descallar testified that Judge Ramas failed to indicate his absences on May 12, 13, 24,
and 27 to 30, 2005, and June 1 to 21, 2005 in his Certificates of Service for the months of May and June
2005. The absence of Judge Ramas can be gleaned from the court calendar of hearings and his failure to
attend the raffle of cases done every Thursday of the week. Also, the Omnibus Order dated May 23, 2005
issued by Judge Ramas manifested his momentary desistance from performing judicial functions from
May 24, 2005 onwards.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge is guilty of violating the Code of Judicial Conduct
RULING: Yes. Judge Ramas is presumed to be aware of his duties and responsibilities under the Code of
Judicial Conduct. Canon 3 generally mandates that a judge should perform official duties honestly, and
with impartiality and diligence. Rule 3.01 requires that a judge be faithful to the law and maintain
professional competence, while Rule 3.09 commands a judge to observe high standards of public service
and fidelity at all times. Judge Ramas irrefragably failed to observe these standards by making untruthful
statements in his Certificates of Service to cover up his absences.
IN THE MATTER OF THE ALLEGATIONS CONTAINED IN THE COLUMNS OF MR. AMADO P.

MACASAET PUBLISHED IN MALAYA DATED SEPTEMBER 18, 19, 20 AND 21, 2007
A.M. No. 07-09-13-SC, August 8, 2008

En Banc, Reyes, R.T., J.
Qualities: Judicial Independence
FACTS: Amado Macasaet penned several articles in Malaya newspaper regarding alleged bribery
incidents in Supreme Court. From the series of articles, he painted a clear picture that he was pertaining
to Associate Justice Ynarez Santiago; that she ordered the dismissal of Henry Gos case upon receiving
cash gift of P10 million from him and that she fired her secretary Cecilia Muoz Delis when the latter
opened the box containing the cash gift without knowledge of the lady justice.
Despite attempts of Delis and Associate Justice Ynarez- Santiago to correct Macasaets claims,
publications never ceased. The Investigating Committee recommended to hold Macasaet in indirect
contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not freedom of the press is violated by judicial independence
RULING: No, there is an important line between legitimate criticism and illegitimate attack upon the courts
or their judges. Both judicial independence and the publics trust and confidence in the judiciary as an
institution are vital components in maintaining a healthy democracy. Judicial independence encompasses
two distinct but related concepts of independence.
One concept is individual judicial independence, which focuses on each particular judge and seeks to
insure his or her ability to decide cases with autonomy within the constraints of the law. A judge has this
kind of independence when he can do his job without having to hear or at least without having to take it
seriously if he does hear criticisms of his personal morality and fitness for judicial office.
The second concept is institutional judicial independence. It focuses on the independence of the judiciary
as a branch of government and protects judges as a class.
MUTYA B. VICTORIO vs JUDGE MAXWELL S. ROSETE
585 SCRA 65,

A.M. No. MTJ-08-1706, April 16, 2009

Third Division, Chico-Nazario, J.
Qualities: Integrity
FACTS: The Court rendered a Decision in Chua v. Victorio which ordered Leonardo Chua and Heirs of
Yong Tian to vacate the leased premises owned by Mutya Victorio. The aforementioned Decision in Chua
v. Victorio became final and executory on 6 August 2004, per Entry of Judgment issued by this Court.
A Motion for Execution was filed by Victorio before the MTCC in Civil Cases No. 11-551 and No. 556-557,
but Judge Rosete denied the same. The second motion for execution was filed but was denied. The third
motion however was partially granted, it was only for the enforcement of the rental obligations of
Leonardo Chua and Heirs of Yong Tian.
Victorino filed the instant case for the refusal of respondent to execute the judgment ordering Leonardo
Chua and Heirs of Yong Tian to vacate the leased premises.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge failed to uphold integrity under the Code of Judicial Conduct
RULING: Judges, being the visible representations of law and justice are expected to be circumspect in
the performance of their tasks, for it is their duty to administer justice in a way that inspires confidence in
the integrity of the justice system. For this reason, the Code of Judicial Conduct requires high standards
of competence, integrity and independence. It mandates judges to be faithful to the law and to maintain
professional competence.
In this case, it is very clear that Judge Rosete disregarded a basic, unequivocal rule that execution shall
issue as a matter of right when the order becomes final and executory. Canon 18 mandates that he
should administer his office with due regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself, as a judge
under the sanction of law.
MARISSA MONDALA vs JUDGE REBECCA MARIANO
512 SCRA 585

A.M. No. RTJ-06-2010, January 25, 2007
En Banc, Ynares-Santiago, J.
Qualities: Integrity
FACTS: Complainant Mondala charged respondent judge with misrepresenting in her "Report of Pending
Cases for January 2005" that she had already decided the Amanet case, when in fact the case was still
with Mondala for research and drafting of the decision. Judge Mariano denied Mondala's allegations and
insisted that at the time she prepared the monthly report, a decision had actually been prepared in the
Amanet case and it was mere "oversight" on her part, not misrepresentation, when she reported the
status of the subject case as decided. Notwithstanding this, Judge Mariano subsequently prepared and
signed "another decision" on the same case. Apparently, other cases were also submitted for decision but
remained undecided beyond the 90-day reglementary period without any request for extension of time
within which to decide the same being submitted.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge failed to show integrity by intentionally misrepresenting her
records
RULING: Yes. In this case, Judge Mariano misrepresented herself regarding the date of the promulgation
of the decision in the Amanet case. While the January 2005 monthly report of Branch 136 was submitted
on March 7, 2005, the subject decision in the Amanet case had not yet been printed. Amanet had
obviously not yet been decided in January 2005.

Under Sec. 1, Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, judges ought to ensure that not only is their
conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer. Integrity is
essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the personal demeanor of
judges.
JULIO VERZOSA vs JUDGE MANUEL CONTRERAS
518 SCRA 94
A.M. NO. MTJ-06-1636, March 12, 2007
Third Division, Austria-Martinez, J.
Qualities: Impartiality
FACTS: Judge Contreras relayed information to the Philippine National Police Officers of Ocampo,
Camarines Sur which led to the arrest of Verzosa, a forest ranger of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) Protected Area Office conducting surveillance on treasure hunting activities.
Judge Contreras contends that while at Mt. Isarog, he received information on the looting of the steel
trusses and bars of the PLDT Tower. The second time that he went on mountain hiking at Tinablanan
River, he was again informed that the steel trusses and bars of the PLDT Tower were already being
loaded in a truck bound for the junkshop in Naga City.
Judge Contreras did not inhibit himself from conducting the preliminary investigation despite his proven
bias against all of the accused. Verzosa was not among the persons on board the truck when the same
was apprehended by members of the PNP. However, on the basis of the affidavit executed by Credo, a
treasure hunter, Judge Contreras hastily issued an order for Verzosa's arrest. Apparently, Judge
Contreras was the mastermind behind the treasure hunting activities in Ocampo, Camarines Sur and the
robbery case for which complainant was implicated as an accessory.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge violated Section 5, Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct
RULING: Yes. Respondent judge failed to consider the proscription under Rule 3.12(a) of Canon 3, Code
of Judicial Conduct which provides that A judge should take no part in a proceeding where the judge's
impartiality might reasonably be questioned. These cases include, among others, proceedings where: (a)
the judge has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding xxx.
Respondent is merely guilty of violating the Code of Judicial Conduct in not recusing himself from
conducting preliminary investigation.
RODRIGO N. VIDAL vs JUDGE JAIME L. DOJILLO, JR
463 SCRA 264

AM No. MTJ-05-1591, July 14, 2005
Second Division, Austria-Martinez, J.
Qualities: Propriety
FACTS: Complainant Vidal alleged that during the hearings of the election protest, Judge Dojillo sat
beside the counsel of his brother and actively coached, aided assisted and guided the said counsel by
saying something, handing piece of writing, reminding and or stopping the counsel from manifesting
something to the court, and other similar acts. Judge Dojillo admitted that he was present in the hearings
but denied coaching the counsel, as he was there only to observe how election protests are conducted as
he had never conducted one, and also to give moral support to his brother. The Office of the Court
Administrator then recommended that the complaint be dismissed but respondent judge be advised to be
more circumspect in his actions in the future.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Dojillo violated Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct

RULING: Yes. The Supreme Court did not agree with the OCA recommendation. Although concern for
family members is deeply ingrained in the Filipino culture, respondent, being a judge should bear in mind
that he is also called upon to serve the higher interest of preserving the integrity of the entire judiciary.
Canon 2 requires a judge to avoid not only impropriety but also the mere appearance of impropriety in all
activities. Even if respondent did not intend to use his position as a judge to influence the outcome of his
brothers election protest, it cannot be denied that his presence in the courtroom during the hearing of his
brothers case would immediately give cause for the community to suspects that his being a colleague in
the judiciary would influence the judge trying the case in favour of his brother. Respondent should have
refrained from publicly showing his seemingly active interest and participation in the case.
HEIRS OF THE LATE REV. FR. JOSE ASPIRAS vs JUDGE CLIFTON GANAY
608 SCRA 379

A.M. No. RTJ-07-2055, December 17, 2009
En Banc, Leonardo- De Castro, J.
Qualities: Propriety
FACTS: The heirs of the late Rev. Fr. Aspiras stated in their letter that Judge Ganay has been abusing
his authority as he previously ordered to withdraw the amount of P50,000.00 in his favour, from the bank
account of the late Rev. Fr. Jose O. Aspiras, to purchase law books. As per Judge Ganays order, he
alleged that, In the spirit of this Yuletide season and considering the efforts of the Judge of this Court, the
guardians in the above entitled case deemed it best to give him fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) worth
of law books to aid him in his work as a judge. However, it was all the idea of Judge Ganay himself, and
was never consented by the guardians. The heirs further mentioned that there are still other orders issued
by Judge Ganay ordering the bank to release certain amounts from the bank account of the late Rev. Fr.
Jose O. Aspiras in his favor without the written consent of the guardians.
The OCA conducted a surprise investigation and examination of the records of SP Case No. A-1026 from
August 30 to September 2, 2005. The investigating team selected pertinent documents relative to the
anonymous complaint in order to verify the irregularities allegedly committed by respondent Judge
Ganay.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge exhibited impropriety in his activities
RULING: Yes. Respondent Judge Ganay clearly fell short of the exacting standards set by the New Code
of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, particularly Sections 13, 14 and 15 of Canon 4. His acts of
receiving law books worth fifty thousand pesos, cellular phones and monthly cellular phone prepaid cards
from the property guardians of the late Rev. Fr. Aspiras, who was then the ward of the court, constitute
impropriety which the Court cannot allow. A judge should avoid impropriety and even the appearance of
impropriety in all activities, and that he should perform his duties honestly and with impartiality and
diligence. Also, a judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary.
ATTY. RAUL CORREA vs JUDGE MEDEL ARNALDO BELEN
627 SCRA 13
A.M. No. RTJ-10-2242, August 6, 2010
Second Division, Nachura, J.
Qualities: Equality
FACTS: Complainant was one of the Co-Administrators appointed by the court in Special Proceedings
No. 660-01C, entitled Intestate Estate of Hector Tan. During the hearing of the case, respondent Judge
Belen disagreed with various items in the Administrators Report and immediately ruled that they should
be disallowed. Allegedly in the course of the proceedings, complainant was asked by respondent Judge
Belen to stand up while the latter dictated his order on their Administrators Report. Respondent Judge

Belen even rebuked him for some mistakes in managing the affairs of the estate, adding that it is
regrettable because Atty. Raul Correa is a U.P. Law Graduate and a Bar Topnotcher at that.
Respondent Judge Belen issued an Order citing complainant for indirect contempt, for surreptitiously and
unlawfully withdrawing from and emptying the account of the estate of Hector Tan. The OCA found
respondent Judge Belen guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge for his use of intemperate language and
inappropriate actions in dealing with counsels appearing in his sala.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge failed to observe equality of treatment before the court
RULING: Yes. Respondent Judge Belen should be more circumspect in his language in the discharge of
his duties. The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary exhorts members of the
judiciary, in the discharge of their duties, to be models of propriety at all times. Moreover, the Code also
calls upon judges to ensure equality of treatment to all before the courts. Section 3, Canon 5 on Equality
provides that Judges shall carry out judicial duties with appropriate consideration for all persons, such as
the parties, witnesses, lawyers, court staff and judicial colleagues, without differentiation on any irrelevant
ground, immaterial to the proper performance of such duties.
MARISSA MONDALA vs JUDGE REBECCA MARIANO
512 SCRA 585

A.M. No. RTJ-06-2010, January 25, 2007
En Banc, Ynares-Santiago, J.
Qualities: Competence and Diligence
FACTS: Complainant Mondala charged respondent judge with misrepresenting in her "Report of Pending
Cases for January 2005" that she had already decided the Amanet case, when in fact the case was still
with Mondala for research and drafting of the decision. Judge Mariano denied Mondala's allegations and
insisted that at the time she prepared the monthly report, a decision had actually been prepared in the
Amanet case and it was mere "oversight" on her part, not misrepresentation, when she reported the
status of the subject case as decided. Notwithstanding this, Judge Mariano subsequently prepared and
signed "another decision" on the same case. Apparently, other cases were also submitted for decision but
remained undecided beyond the 90-day reglementary period without any request for extension of time
within which to decide the same being submitted.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge failed to exhibit competence and diligence as mandated by the
New Code of Judicial Conduct
RULING: Yes. A number of other cases were decided more than a year from the time these were
submitted for decision without any request for extension. No less than the Constitution mandates that all
cases or matters must be decided or resolved within 24 months from date of submission for the Supreme
Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, 12 months for all lower collegiate courts, and three
months for all other lower courts.
In implementing this constitutional mandate, Sec. 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
exhorts in the section on Competence and Diligence that judges shall perform all judicial duties,
including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness.
BGen. (Ret.) JOSE S. RAMISCAL, JR. vs. HON. JOSE R. HERNANDEZ
630 SCRA 505

G.R. Nos. 173057-74, September 20, 2010
Third Division, Villarama, Jr., J.
Duty to Court: Compulsory and Voluntary Disqualification

FACTS: In 1998, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee conducted an extensive investigation regarding
anomalies in the acquisition of parcels of land by the Armed Forces of the Philippines-Retirement and
Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS) signed by Petitioner Ramiscal, Jr.
On April 6, 2006, petitioner filed two motions to inhibit Justice Hernandez from taking part in Criminal
Case Nos. 25122-45 and Criminal Case Nos. 28022-23 pending before the Fourth Division. Petitioner
cited that Justice Hernandezs wife, Professor Hernandez, was tasked to implement fully the
recommendations of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. The spousal relationship between Justice
Hernandez and Professor Hernandez created in his mind impression of partiality and bias.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Judge Hernandez committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack and/or excess of jurisdiction in refusing to inhibit himself.
RULING: No. The Rules contemplate two kinds of inhibition: compulsory and voluntary. Under par. 1 of
Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, it is conclusively presumed that judges cannot actively and impartially sit
in the instances mentioned. The second paragraph, which embodies voluntary inhibition, leaves to the
sound discretion of the judges. An allegation of prejudgment, without more, constitutes mere conjecture
and is not one of the just or valid reasons contemplated in the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137
of the Rules of Court for which a judge may inhibit himself from hearing the case. The bare allegations of
the judges partiality, as in this case, will not suffice in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to
overcome the presumption that the judge will undertake his noble role of dispensing justice in accordance
with law and evidence, and without fear or favor.
THE INCORPORATORS OF MINDANAO INSTITUTE INC. et al vs. THE UNITED CHURCH OF

CHRIST IN THE PHILIPPINES
668 SCRA 637

G.R. No. 171765, March 21, 2012
Third Division, Mendoza, J.
Duty to Court: Compulsory Disqualification
FACTS: This case stemmed when Mindanao Institute, Inc. filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with
Prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction against the United Church of Christ
in the Philippines They prayed that they should be declared the sole owner of the assets and properties
of MI and to prevent the impending takeover by UCCP of MIs properties. They averred that UCCP was
unlawfully claiming ownership of MIs properties.The Law Office of Bernabe, Doyon, Bringas and Partners
entered its appearance as counsel for UCCP. Atty. Roy Doyon, the son of Executive Judge Orlando F.
Doyon , was one of the partners in the said law firm. This prompted Atty. Nelbert T. Poculan, UCCPs lead
counsel, to move for the inhibition of Judge Doyon from the case. However, Judge Doyon proceeded with
the joint hearing. Thereafter, the RTC granted the MI incorporators prayer for preliminary injunction
against UCCP in its Omnibus Order.
ISSUES: Whether or not Judge Doyon is disqualified to sit in the case
RULING: Yes. The prohibitions under Rule 137 of the Rules of Court and Rule 3.12 of Canon 3 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct are clear. The disqualification is mandatory and gives the judicial officer
concerned no discretion but to inhibit himself from trying or sitting in a case. The rationale, therefore, is to
preserve the people's faith and confidence in the judiciary's fairness and objectivity.
494 SCRA 456

A.M. No. RTJ-02-1743, July 11, 2006
Second Division, Sandoval-Guttierez, J.
Duty to Court: Court Records and General Duties of Clerks
FACTS: Complainant alleged that he is plaintiff's counsel in Civil Case No. Q-95-23426. It was Judge Gil
P. Fernandez, Sr. (now deceased) who was then the Presiding Judge. The records of the case did not get
lost. When Judge Fernandez, Sr. died, Judge Demetrio B. Macapagal, Sr. replaced him. The records of

the same case did not also get lost. However, when respondent Judge Layosa was appointed Presiding
Judge of the same court, the entire records of the case "disappeared" as shown by the May 14 and June
1, 1993 Orders issued by her. The records of this case had been reported missing by the Branch Clerk of
Court and despite efforts exerted to locate it, said records could not be found.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents are liable for gross neglect of duty for not safeguarding records of
their branch.
RULING: No. In the absence of any direct evidence pointing responsibility to any of the respondents
relative to the loss of the records of Civil Case No. Q-95-23426, the persons responsible for their
safekeeping should be held accountable and they are the Branch Clerk of Court. Respondent Cheryl
Buenaventura, as the clerk-in-charge of civil cases is undoubtedly the person who has custody of the lost
records and the one primarily responsible therefor. As the person in charge of the records of civil cases,
respondent Buenaventura should have devised means to safeguard the records.
DELOS REYES vs. JUDGE CRUZ and GUNDRAN
610 SCRA 134

A.M. No. RTJ-08-2152, January 18, 2010
Second Division, Del Castillo, J.
Duty to Court: Court Records and General Duties of Clerks
FACTS: A letter-complaint was filed by complainant Luminza Delos Reyes (Delos Reyes) against
respondents Judge Danilo S. Cruz (Judge Cruz) and Clerk of Court V Godolfo R. Gundran (Gundran) for
dereliction of duty. Specifically, Judge Cruz is charged with delay in the disposition of LRC Case No. R-
5740 while Gundran is charged with failure to timely transmit the records of said case. Complainant
alleged that she is the defendant in LRC Case No. R-5740 pending before Branch 152 of
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City. Complainant alleged that after receipt of the adverse decision, she
timely filed a notice of appeal and paid the corresponding appeal and docket fees. However, despite the
lapse of more than six months from the time the appeal was filed, respondent Gundran still failed to
transmit the records to the appellate court in violation of Section 10, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not both respondents neglected their duty.
RULING: The Court finds both respondents to be remiss in their duties. The Court ruled that Gundran is
guilty of simple neglect of duty for failure to timely transmit the records of LRC Case No. R-5740. The duty
to verify the correctness and completeness of the records of the case rests with the
respondent. However, in this case, respondent Clerk of Court Gundran relegated the performance of his
job to another court employee without any justifiable reason.
JUDGE JOSE MANUEL P. TAN vs HENRY G. PAREDES
464 SCRA 47
AM P-04-1789, July 22, 2005
En Banc, Per Curiam
Duty to Court: Legal Fees
FACTS: Judge Tan filed a complaint against Respondent Sheriff Henry Paredes and alleged that the
latter was constantly asking money for the execution of the judgment and demolition of the fences of the
premises Mijares. The respondent then filed a letter-complaint charging Judge Tan for Gross Ignorance of
the Law, Oppression, Gambling, Misconduct and Immorality. Upon referral of the case to the OCA, both
were held administratively liable. Sherrif Paredes is liable for gross misconduct and dishonesty for failure

to comply with the provisions of Section 9 of Rule 141. Judge Tan, on the other hand, violated Rule 2.01
of the Code of judicial conduct.
ISSUE: Whether or not both respondents violated pertinent rules concerning legal ethics
RULING: Yes. Under Sec 9, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, the sheriff is required to secure the courts
prior approval of the estimated expenses and fees needed to implement the court process. Corollary, a
sheriff cannot unilaterally demand sums of money from a party-litigant without observing the proper
procedural steps; otherwise it would amount to dishonesty or extortion. In this case, sheriff asked
P10,000 from the plaintiff to defray the expenses for the implementation of the decision without any
approval from the court. Although the plaintiffs gave P5,500 directly to the sherrif, he failed to deposit with
the court the amount received from the plaintiffs. The Court stated that high standards are expected of
sherrifs who play an important role in the administration of justice. Their conducts must be geared
towards maintaining the prestige and integrity of the court. It is indeed the duty if the members of the
bench to avoid any impression of impropriety to protect the image and integrity of the judiciary.
ATTY. STANLEY ZAMORA vs RAMON VILLANUEVA
560 SCRA 646

A.M. NO. P-04-1898, July 28, 2008
En banc, Per Curiam
Duty to Court: Persons Authorized to Collect Legal Fees
FACTS: This administrative complaint was filed by Atty. Stanley Zamora against Sheriff Ramon
Villanueva for Gross Misconduct. Atty. Zamora alleged that he was the counsel for the plaintiffs in a civil
case to which a writ of execution was issued in favour of his clients for the property of Ernesto in
Nasugbu, Batangas. Thus, complainant requested respondent to prepare a levy on the property. The
respondent allegedly asked for Php10,000 first to defray expenses. Complainant gave Php5,000 initially
reserving the balance upon the annotation of the deed of the property. However before executing the
property, respondent allegedly demanded the remaining Php5,000 and hence complainant acceded to it.
However, no execution was done despite several demands by the complainant. Respondent avers that
he could not execute the property since the Sheriff was also executing the same property, and that he
really did incur a number of expenses.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is guilty of gross misconduct.
RULING: A sheriff is guilty of violating Section 9, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court if he fails to (1) prepare
an estimate of the expenses to be incurred in the execution (2) render an accounting and (3) issue an
official receipt for the total amount received from the judgment debtor.
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. TRAVERSE DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATION and CENTRAL SURETY AND INSURAnCE COMPANY
658 SCRA 614

G.R. No. 169293, October 5, 2011
First Division, Leonardo-De Castro, J.
Duty to Court: Recovery of Costs
FACTS: The Development of the Philippines (DBP)-Tarlac Branch granted a Real Estate Loan
of 910,000.00 to Traverse Development Corporation (Traverse) for the construction of its three-storey
commercial building at Taedo St., Tarlac City. To secure the payment of this loan, Traverse constituted
a mortgage on the land on which the building was to be built on July 21, 1980.Among the conditions
imposed by DBP in the mortgage contract was Traverses acquisition of an insurance coverage for an
amount not less than the loan, to be endorsed in DBPs favor. From 1980 to 1981, Traverse submitted to

DBP three policies in accordance with the insurance condition in the mortgage contract. Originally, the
fire insurance was under the FGU Insurance for one (1) million, but the DBP transferred the building
insurance to Central Surety & Insurance Company (Central) for the same terms. On August 9, 1982, a fire
of undetermined origin razed and gutted Traverses building. The following day, Traverse informed
Central of the mishap and requested it to immediately conduct the necessary inspection, evaluation, and
investigation however Central denied the proposal of one (1) million claim of Traverse. Hence, Traverse
instituted a case in the court.
Traverse averred that it was obvious from the beginning that Central was unable or unwilling to fulfill its
liability. Traverse impleaded DBP as a co-defendant because of its alleged failure or refusal to convince
Central to pay Traverses claims, considering that it transferred Traverses insurance to Central without
Traverses knowledge. The RTC adjudged DBP to be solidarily liable with Central for damages, attorneys
fees, and costs of suit in view of its refusal or failure to pursue the claim against Central. The RTC said
that as beneficiary-assignee of the Policy, DBP should not have stopped at following-up its claim through
letters and telegrams but should have either filed its own case against Central or joined Traverse as a co-
plaintiff.
ISSUE: Whether or not DBP can be held solidarily liable with Central for the payment of attorneys fees
and cost of litigation hence answerable to damages, attorneys fees and cost of suit?
RULING: NO. Even if it were true that DBP had a hand in the transfer of Traverses insurance coverage
to Central, such act is not sufficient to hold it solidarily liable with Central for the payment of attorneys
fees and cost of litigation under paragraph (2) of Article 2208. This Court also cannot sustain the
insinuation that DBPs lax attitude in pursuing its claim against Central was tantamount to bad faith as to
make it liable for attorneys fees and costs of suit. Even a resort to the principle of equity will not justify
making DBP liable.
The award of attorneys fees is the exception rather than the rule and the court must state explicitly the
legal reason for such award. The general rule is that attorneys fees cannot be recovered as part of
damages because of the policy that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate. They are not to
be awarded every time a party wins a suit. The power of the court to award attorneys fees under Article
2208 demands factual, legal, and equitable justification.
Even when a claimant is compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his rights,
still attorneys fees may not be awarded where no sufficient showing of bad faith could be reflected in a
partys persistence in a case other than an erroneous conviction of the righteousness of his cause.


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LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS BarCom 2014

ATTY. LEONOR M. ALCANTARA et.al. v ATTY. EDUARDO C. DE VERA

634 SCRA 674

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is guilty as charged.

FIDELA BENGCO et al. vs. ATTY. PABLO S. BERNARDO

A.C. No. 6368, JUNE 13, 2012

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent committed misconduct.

Saint Louis University | SCHOOL OF LAW Bar Operations Committee 2014 1

FERDINAND CRUZ vs. ALBERTO MINA

G.R. NO. 154207, APRIL 27, 2007

Law Student Practice Rule/ Non-lawyer in courts

ATTY. EVELYN MAGNO vs. ATTY. OLIVIA VELASCO-JACOBA

A.C. No. 6296, NOVEMBER 22, 2005

Saint Louis University | SCHOOL OF LAW Bar Operations Committee 2014 2

RODRIGO A. MOLINA vs. ATTY. CEFERINO R. MAGAT

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Magat should be suspended.

FELIPE ABELLA vs. ATTY. ASTERIA E. CRUZABRA

A.C. NO. 5688, JUNE 4, 4009

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Cruzabra engaged in unauthorized notarial practice.

ANASTACIO N. TEODORO III vs. ATTY. ROMEO S. GONZALES

A.C. NO. 6760, JANUARY 30, 2013

Saint Louis University | SCHOOL OF LAW Bar Operations Committee 2014 3

ENGR. GILBERT TUMBOKON vs. ATTY. MARIANO R. PEFIANCO

AMPARO BUENO vs. ATTY. RAMON RANESES

687 SCRA 711

Saint Louis University | SCHOOL OF LAW Bar Operations Committee 2014 4

TERESITA BAYONLA vs. ATTY. PURITA REYES

660 SCRA 490

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent lawyer violated Canon 16.

SANTOS VENTURA vs. ATTY. RICHARD V. FUNK

678 SCRA 368

Saint Louis University | SCHOOL OF LAW Bar Operations Committee 2014 5

GODOFREDO C. PINEDA vs ATTY. TEDDY C. MACAPAGAL

476 SCRA 292

Saint Louis University | SCHOOL OF LAW Bar Operations Committee 2014 6

VOLUNTAD-RAMIREZ vs. ATTY. ROSARIO B. BAUTISTA

683 SCRA 327

SHIRLEY TOLEDO and ROSIE DAJAC vs. JUDGE KALLOS

Saint Louis University | SCHOOL OF LAW Bar Operations Committee 2014 7

RULING: Yes. Respondent judge was, indeed, complainants counsel in a Civil

LETICIA GONZALES vs. ATTY. MARCELINO CABUCANA

479 SCRA 320

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility

Saint Louis University | SCHOOL OF LAW Bar Operations Committee 2014 8

G.R. No. L-27654, February 18, 1970

FRIAS vs. ATTY. LOZADA

A.C. No. 6656, May 4, 2006

OLBES vs. DECIEMBRE

AC-5365, April 27, 2005

Saint Louis University | SCHOOL OF LAW Bar Operations Committee 2014 9

TAN TEK BENG vs. DAVID

A.C. No. 1261 December 29, 1983

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. David is guilty of Malpractice?

VITUG vs. RONGCAL

A.C. No. 6313, September 7, 2006

ISSUE: Whether or not, respondent is guilty of immorality?

Saint Louis University | SCHOOL OF LAW Bar Operations Committee 2014 10

SORIANO vs. DIZON

A.C. No. 6792, January 25, 2006

IN RE: PETITION TO TAKE THE LAWYER'S OATH BY ARTHUR M. CUEVAS, JR

B.M. No. 810, January 27, 1998

Saint Louis University | SCHOOL OF LAW Bar Operations Committee 2014 11

OMBAC vs. RAYOS

A.C. No. 2884, January 28, 1998