Article 263. Serious physical injuries.
- Any person who shall
Art. 248. Murder. Any person who, not falling within the
provisions of Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of
murder and shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to death, if committed with any of the
following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength,
with the aid of armed men, or employing means to
weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or
afford impunity.
2. In consideration of a price, reward, or promise.
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion,
shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault
upon a street car or locomotive, fall of an airship, by
means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other
means involving great waste and ruin.
4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in
the preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption
of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or other
public calamity.
5. With evident premeditation.
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly
augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or
scoffing at his person or corpse.
Art. 249. Homicide. Any person who, not falling within the
provisions of Article 246, shall kill another without the
attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in the next
preceding article, shall be deemed guilty of homicide and be
punished by reclusion temporal.
Article 256. Intentional abortion. - Any person who shall
intentionally cause an abortion shall suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion temporal, if he shall use any
violence upon the person of the pregnant woman.
2. The penalty of prision mayor if, without using
violence, he shall act without the consent of the woman.
3. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods, if the woman shall have consented.
Article 259. Abortion practiced by a physician or midwife
and dispensing of abortives. - The penalties provided in Article
256 shall be imposed in its maximum period, respectively, upon
any physician or midwife who, taking advantage of their
scientific knowledge or skill, shall cause an abortion or assist in
causing the same.
Any pharmacist who, without the proper prescription
from a physician, shall dispense any abortive shall suffer arresto
mayor and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos.
Article 262. Mutilation. - The penalty of reclusion temporal to
reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall
intentionally mutilate another by depriving him, either totally or
partially, or some essential organ of reproduction.
Any other intentional mutilation shall be punished by
prision mayor in its medium and maximum periods.
wound, beat, or assault another, shall be guilty of the crime of
serious physical injuries and shall suffer:
1. The penalty of prision mayor, if in consequence of the
physical injuries inflicted, the injured person shall become
insane, imbecile, impotent, or blind;
2. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods, if in consequence of the physical injuries
inflicted, the person injured shall have lost the use of speech
or the power to hear or to smell, or shall have lost an eye, a
hand, a foot, an arm, or a leg or shall have lost the use of any
such member, or shall have become incapacitated for the
work in which he was therefor habitually engaged;
3. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and
medium periods, if in consequence of the physical injuries
inflicted, the person injured shall have become deformed, or
shall have lost any other part of his body, or shall have lost
the use thereof, or shall have been ill or incapacitated for the
performance of the work in which he as habitually engaged
for a period of more than ninety days;
4. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to
prision correccional in its minimum period, if the physical
injuries inflicted shall have caused the illness or incapacity
for labor of the injured person for more than thirty days.
If the offense shall have been committed against any of
the persons enumerated in Article 246, or with attendance of
any of the circumstances mentioned in Article 248, the case
covered by subdivision number 1 of this Article shall be
punished by reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum
periods; the case covered by subdivision number 2 by prision
correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
minimum period; the case covered by subdivision number 3
by prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods;
and the case covered by subdivision number 4 by prision
correccional in its minimum and medium periods.
The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not be
applicable to a parent who shall inflict physical injuries upon
his child by excessive chastisement.
Article 264. Administering injurious substances or
beverages. - The penalties established by the next preceding
article shall be applicable in the respective case to any person
who, without intent to kill, shall inflict upon another any serious,
physical injury, by knowingly administering to him any
injurious substance or beverages or by taking advantage of his
weakness of mind or credulity.
Article 265. Less serious physical injuries. - Any person who
shall inflict upon another physical injuries not described in the
preceding articles, but which shall incapacitate the offended
party for labor for ten days or more, or shall require medical
assistance for the same period, shall be guilty of less serious
physical injuries and shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor.
Whenever less serious physical injuries shall have been
inflicted with the manifest intent to kill or offend the injured
person, or under circumstances adding ignominy to the offense
in addition to the penalty of arresto mayor, a fine not exceeding
500 pesos shall be imposed.
 Any less serious physical injuries inflicted upon the
offender's parents, ascendants, guardians, curators, teachers, or
persons of rank, or persons in authority, shall be punished by
prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods,
provided that, in the case of persons in authority, the deed does
not constitute the crime of assault upon such person.
Article 266. Slight physical injuries and maltreatment. - The
crime of slight physical injuries shall be punished:
1. By arresto menor when the offender has inflicted
physical injuries which shall incapacitate the offended
party for labor from one to nine days, or shall require
medical attendance during the same period.
2. By arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 20 pesos and
censure when the offender has caused physical injuries
which do not prevent the offended party from engaging in
his habitual work nor require medical assistance.
3. By arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not
exceeding 50 pesos when the offender shall ill-treat another
by deed without causing any injury.
Article 359. Slander by deed. - The penalty of arresto mayor in
its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum
period or a fine ranging from 200 to 1,000 pesos shall be
imposed upon any person who shall perform any act not
included and punished in this title, which shall cast dishonor,
discredit or contempt upon another person. If said act is not of a
serious nature, the penalty shall be arresto menor or a fine not
exceeding 200 pesos.
The provisions contained in this article shall NOT be applicable:
1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or
lower than those provided in the first two paragraphs of this
article, in which case the court shall impose the penalty
next lower in degree than that which should be imposed in
the period which they may deem proper to apply.
2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation
of the Automobile Law, to death of a person shall be
caused, in which case the defendant shall be punished by
prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods.
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without
malice, doing or falling to do an act from which material damage
results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part
of the person performing of failing to perform such act, taking
into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of
intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances
regarding persons, time and place.
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution
displayed in those cases in which the damage impending to be
caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest.
The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in
this article shall be imposed upon the offender who fails to lend
on the spot to the injured parties such help as may be in this hand
to give. (As amended by R.A. 1790, approved June 21, 1957).

Article 365. Imprudence and negligence. - Any person who,

by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been
intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the
penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a
less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum
and medium periods shall be imposed; if it would have
constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its
maximum period shall be imposed.

Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence,

shall commit an act which would otherwise constitute a grave
felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium
and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious
felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall
be imposed.

When the execution of the act covered by this article

shall have only resulted in damage to the property of another,
the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount
equal to the value of said damages to three times such value, but
which shall in no case be less than twenty-five pesos.

A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure

shall be imposed upon any person who, by simple imprudence
or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done
maliciously, would have constituted a light felony.

In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall

exercise their sound discretion, without regard to the rules
prescribed in Article sixty-four.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 165483 September 12, 2006
RUJJERIC Z. PALAGANAS,1 petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Criminal Law; Homicide; Justifying Circumstances; Self-
Defense; As an element of self-defense, unlawful aggression
refers to an assault or attack, or a threat thereof in an imminent
and immediate manner, which places the defendants life in
actual peril.As an element of self-defense, unlawful
aggression refers to an assault or attack, or a threat thereof in an
imminent and immediate manner, which places the defendants
life in actual peril. It is an act positively strong showing the
wrongful intent of the aggressor and not merely a threatening or
intimidating attitude. It is also described as a sudden and
unprovoked attack of immediate and imminent kind to the life,
safety or rights of the person attacked. There is an unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim when he puts in actual or
imminent peril the life, limb, or right of the person invoking self-
defense. There must be actual physical force or actual use of
weapon. In order to constitute unlawful aggression, the person
attacked must be confronted by a real threat on his life and limb;
and the peril sought to be avoided is imminent and actual, not
merely imaginary.
Justifying Circumstances; Self-Defense; It is an oft-repeated
rule that the nature and number of wounds inflicted by the
accused are constantly and unremittingly considered important
indicia to disprove a plea of self-defense.It is significant to
note that the shooting resulted in the death of Melton, and
wounding of Servillano and Michael. With regard to Melton, a
bullet hit his right thigh, and another bullet hit his head which
caused his instant death. As regards Servillano, a bullet
penetrated two of his vital organs, namely, the large intestine
and urinary bladder. He underwent two (2) surgeries in order to
survive and fully recover. Michael, on the other hand, sustained
a gunshot wound on the right shoulder. It must also be noted that
the Ferrer brothers were shot near the videoke bar, which
contradict petitioners claim he was chased by the Ferrer
brothers. Given the foregoing circumstances, it is difficult to
believe that the Ferrer brothers were the unlawful aggressors. As
correctly observed by the prosecution, if the petitioner shot the
Ferrer brothers just to defend himself, it defies reason why he
had to shoot the victims at the vital portions of their body, which
even led to the death of Melton who was shot at his head. It is
an oft-repeated rule that the nature and number of wounds
inflicted by the accused are constantly and unremittingly
considered important indicia to disprove a plea of self-defense.
Same; Same; The reasonableness of the means employed by the
person defending himself may take into account the weapons,
the physical condition of the parties and other circumstances
showing that there is a rational equivalence between the means
of attack and the defense.The second element of self-defense
requires that the means employed by the person defending
himself must be reasonably necessary to prevent or repel the
unlawful aggression of the victim. The reasonableness of the
means employed may take into account the weapons, the
physical condition of the parties and other circumstances
showing that there is a rational equivalence between the means
of attack and the defense. In the case at bar, the petitioners act
of shooting the Ferrer brothers was not a reasonable and
necessary means of repelling the aggression allegedly initiated
by the Ferrer brothers. As aptly stated by the trial court,
petitioners gun was far deadlier compared to the stones thrown
by the Ferrer brothers. Moreover, we stated earlier that when the
Ferrer brothers allegedly threw stones at the petitioner, the latter
had other less harmful options than to shoot the Ferrer brothers.
Such act failed to pass the test of reasonableness of the means
employed in preventing or repelling an unlawful aggression.
Homicide; Self-Defense; Where an accused admits killing the
victim but invokes self-defense, it is incumbent upon the
accused to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he acted
in self-defense. In resolving criminal cases where the accused
invokes self-defense to escape criminal liability, this Court
consistently held that where an accused admits killing the victim
but invokes self-defense, it is incumbent upon the accused to
prove by clear and convincing evidence that he acted in self-
defense. As the burden of evidence is shifted on the accused to
prove all the elements of self-defense, he must rely on the
strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the
prosecution.
Criminal Law; Words and Phrases; Frustrated Felony and
Attempted Felony, Distinguished.The distinctions between
frustrated and attempted felony are summarized as follows: 1.)
In frustrated felony, the offender has performed all the acts of
execution which should produce the felony as a consequence;
whereas in attempted felony, the offender merely commences
the commission of a felony directly by overt acts and does not
perform all the acts of execution. 2.) In frustrated felony, the
reason for the non-accomplishment of the crime is some cause
independent of the will of the perpetrator; on the other hand, in
attempted felony, the reason for the non-fulfillment of the crime
is a cause or accident other than the offenders own spontaneous
desistance.
Physical Injuries; If there was no intent to kill on the part of the
accused and the wound/s sustained by the victim were not fatal,
the crime committed may be serious, less serious or slight
physical injury.In addition to these distinctions, we have ruled
in several cases that when the accused intended to kill his victim,
as manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in his assault, and
his victim sustained fatal or mortal wound/s but did not die
because of timely medical assistance, the crime committed is
frustrated murder or frustrated homicide depending on whether
or not any of the qualifying circumstances under Article 249 of
the Revised Penal Code are present. However, if the wound/s
sustained by the victim in such a case were not fatal or mortal,
then the crime committed is only attempted murder or attempted
homicide. If there was no intent to kill on the part of the accused
and the wound/s sustained by the victim were not fatal, the crime
committed may be serious, less serious or slight physical injury.
Criminal Law; Aggravating Circumstances; Generic
aggravating circumstances are those that generally apply to all
crimes such as those mentioned in Article 14, pars. No. 1, 2, 3,
4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 14, 18, 19 and 20, of the Revised Penal Code, and
have the effect of increasing the penalty for the crime to its
maximum period, but it cannot increase the same to the next
higher degree; Special aggravating circumstances are those
which arise under special conditions to increase the penalty for
the offense to its maximum period, but the same cannot increase
the penalty to the next higher degree; The meaning and effect of
generic and special aggravating circumstances are exactly the
same except that in case of generic aggravating, the same CAN
be offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance whereas in the
case of special aggravating circumstance, it CANNOT be offset
by an ordinary mitigating circumstance.Generic aggravating
circumstances are those that generally apply to all crimes such
as those mentioned in Article 14, paragraphs No. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6,
9, 10, 14, 18, 19 and 20, of the Revised Penal Code. It has the
effect of increasing the penalty for the crime to its maximum
period, but it cannot increase the same to the next higher degree.
It must always be alleged and charged in the information, and
must be proven during the trial in order to be appreciated.
Moreover, it can be offset by an ordinary mitigating
circumstance. On the other hand, special aggravating
circumstances are those which arise under special conditions to
increase the penalty for the offense to its maximum period, but
the same cannot increase the penalty to the next higher degree.
Examples are quasi-recidivism under Article 160 and complex
crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. It does not
change the character of the offense charged. It must always be
alleged and charged in the information, and must be proven
during the trial in order to be appreciated. Moreover, it cannot
be offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance. It is clear from
the foregoing that the meaning and effect of generic and special
aggravating circumstances are exactly the same except that in
case of generic aggravating, the same CAN be offset by an
ordinary mitigating circumstance whereas in the case of special
aggravating circumstance, it CANNOT be offset by an ordinary
mitigating circumstance.
Same; Illegal Possession of Firearms; With the passage of R.A.
No. 8294 on 6 June 1997, the use of an unlicensed firearm in
murder or homicide is now considered as a SPECIAL
aggravating circumstance and not a generic aggravating
circumstance.Aside from the aggravating circumstances
abovementioned, there is also an aggravating circumstance
provided for under Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended
by Republic Act No. 8294, which is a special law. Its pertinent
provision states: If homicide or murder is committed with the
use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm
shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance. In
interpreting the same provision, the trial court reasoned that such
provision is silent as to whether it is generic or qualifying.
Thus, it ruled that when the law is silent, the same must be
interpreted in favor of the accused. Since a generic aggravating
circumstance is more favorable to petitioner compared to a
qualifying aggravating circumstance, as the latter changes the
nature of the crime and increase the penalty thereof by degrees,
the trial court proceeded to declare that the use of an unlicensed
firearm by the petitioner is to be considered only as a generic
aggravating circumstance. This interpretation is erroneous since
we already held in several cases that with the passage of
Republic Act No. 8294 on 6 June 1997, the use of an unlicensed
firearm in murder or homicide is now considered as a SPECIAL
aggravating circumstance and not a generic aggravating
circumstance. Republic Act No. 8294 applies to the instant case
since it took effect before the commission of the crimes in 21
April 1998. Therefore, the use of an unlicensed firearm by the
petitioner in the instant case should be designated and
appreciated as a SPECIAL aggravating circumstance and not
merely a generic aggravating circumstance.
Damages; Documentary evidence should be presented to
substantiate a claim for loss of earning capacity; Exceptions.
The rule is that documentary evidence should be presented to
substantiate a claim for loss of earning capacity. By way of
exception, damages therefore may be awarded despite the
absence of documentary evidence if there is testimony that the
victim was either (1) self-employed, earning less than the
minimum wage under current labor laws, and judicial notice is
taken of the fact that in the victims line of work, no
documentary evidence is available; of (2) employed as a daily-
wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under current
labor laws.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
For what is a man, what has he got?
If not himself, then he has naught.
To say the things he truly feels;
And not the words of one who kneels.
The record shows I took the blows -
And did it my way!
The song evokes the bitterest passions. This is not the first time
the song "My Way"2 has triggered violent behavior resulting in
people coming to blows. In the case at bar, the few lines of the
song depicted what came to pass when the victims and the
aggressors tried to outdo each other in their rendition of the
song.
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari3 under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court, petitioner Rujjeric Z. Palaganas prays
for the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR No. 22689 dated 30 September 2004,4 affirming with
modification the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 46, of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, in Criminal Cases No. U-
9608, U-9609, and U-9610 and U-9634, dated 28 October
1998,5 finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code,
and two (2) counts of Frustrated Homicide under Article 249 in
relation to Articles 6 and 50 of the same Code.
On 21 April 1998, petitioner and his older brother, Ferdinand Z.
Palaganas (Ferdinand), were charged under four (4) separate
Informations6 for two (2) counts of Frustrated Murder, one (1)
count of Murder, and one (1) count for Violation of COMELEC
Resolution No. 29587 relative to Article 22, Section 261, of the
Omnibus Election Code,8 allegedly committed as follows:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. U-9608
That on or about January 16, 1998, in the evening at Poblacion,
Manaoag, Pangasinan and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused armed with an
unlicensed firearm, with intent to kill, treachery and evident
premeditation, conspiring together, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously shoot SERVILLANO FERRER, JR.
y Juanatas, inflicting upon him "gunshot wound penetrating
perforating abdomen, urinary bladder, rectum bullet sacral
region," the accused having thus performed all the acts of
execution which would have produced the crime of Murder as a
consequence, but which nevertheless, did not produce it by
reason of the causes independent of the will of the accused and
that is due to the timely medical assistance rendered to said
Servillano J. Ferrer, Jr. which prevented his death, to his damage
and prejudice.
CONTRARY to Art. 248 in relation with Arts. 6 and 50, all of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

CRIMINAL CASE NO. U-9609
That on or about January 16, 1998, in the evening at Poblacion,
Manaoag, Pangasinan and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused armed with an
unlicensed firearm, with intent to kill, treachery and evident
premeditation, conspiring together, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously shoot MICHAEL FERRER alias
"Boying Ferrer", inflicting upon him gunshot wound on the right
shoulder, the accused having thus performed all the acts of
execution which would have produced the crime of murder as a
consequence, but which nevertheless, did not produce it by
reason of the causes independent of the will of the accused and
that is due to the medical assistance rendered to said Michael
"Boying" Ferrer which prevented his death, to his damage and
prejudice.
CONTRARY to Art. 248 in relation with Arts. 6 and 50, all of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
CRIMINAL CASE NO. U-9610
That on or about January 16, 1998, in the evening at Poblacion,
Manaoag, Pangasinan and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused armed with an
unlicensed firearm, with intent to kill, treachery and evident
premeditation, conspiring together, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously shoot MELTON FERRER alias
"TONY FERRER", inflicting upon him mortal gunshot wounds
in the head and right thigh which caused the instantaneous death
of said Melton "Tony" Ferrer, to the damage and prejudice of
his heirs.
CONTRARY to Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by R.A. 7659.
CRIMINAL CASE NO. U-9634
That on or about January 16, 1998 which is within the election
period at Poblacion, Manaoag, Pangasinan, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously bear and
carry one (1) caliber .38 without first securing the necessary
permit/license to do the same.
CONTRARY to COMELEC RES. 2958 in relation with SEC.
261 of the OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE, as amended.9
(Underscoring supplied.)
When arraigned on separate dates,10 petitioner and Ferdinand
entered separate pleas of "Not Guilty." Upon motion of
Ferdinand,11 the four cases were consolidated and were
assigned to Branch 46 of the RTC in Urdaneta, Pangasinan.12
The factual antecedents as viewed by the prosecution, are
summarized in the Comment dated 18 April 2005 of the Office
of the Solicitor General,13 to wit:
On January 16, 1998, around 8:00 in the evening, brothers
Servillano, [Melton] and Michael, all surnamed Ferrer were
having a drinking spree in their house because [Melton], who
was already living in San Fernando, La Union, visited his three
brothers and mother at their house in Sitio Baloking, Poblacion,
Manaoag, Pangasinan. At 9:45 in the evening, the three brothers
decided to proceed to Tidbits Videoke bar located at the corner
of Malvar and Rizal Streets, Poblacion, Manaoag to continue
their drinking spree and to sing. Inside the karaoke bar, they
were having a good time, singing and drinking beer.
Thereafter, at 10:30 in the evening, Jaime Palaganas arrived
together with Ferdinand Palaganas and Virgilio Bautista. At that
time, only the Ferrer brothers were the customers in the bar. The
two groups occupied separate tables. Later, when Jaime
Palaganas was singing, [Melton] Ferrer sang along with him as
he was familiar with the song [My Way]. Jaime however,
resented this and went near the table of the Ferrer brothers and
said in Pangasinan dialect "As if you are tough guys." Jaime
further said "You are already insulting me in that way." Then,
Jaime struck Servillano Ferrer with the microphone, hitting the
back of his head. A rumble ensued between the Ferrer brothers
on the one hand, and the Palaganases, on the other hand. Virgilio
Bautista did not join the fray as he left the place. During the
rumble, Ferdinand went out of the bar. He was however pursued
by Michael. When Servillano saw Michael, he also went out and
told the latter not to follow Ferdinand. Servillano and Michael
then went back inside the bar and continued their fight with
Jaime.
Meantime, Edith Palaganas, sister of Jaime and the owner of the
bar, arrived and pacified them. Servillano noticed that his
wristwatch was missing. Unable to locate the watch inside the
bar, the Ferrer brothers went outside. They saw Ferdinand about
eight (8) meters away standing at Rizal Street. Ferdinand was
pointing at them and said to his companion, later identified as
petitioner [Rujjeric] Palaganas, "Oraratan paltog mo lara",
meaning "They are the ones, shoot them." Petitioner then shot
them hitting Servillano first at the left side of the abdomen,
causing him to fall on the ground, and followed by [Melton] who
also fell to the ground. When Servillano noticed that [Melton]
was no longer moving, he told Michael "Bato, bato." Michael
picked up some stones and threw them at petitioner and
Ferdinand. The latter then left the place. Afterwards, the police
officers came and the Ferrer brothers were brought to the
Manaoag Hospital and later to Villaflor Hospital in Dagupan.
Servillano later discovered that [Melton] was fatally hit in the
head while Michael was hit in the right shoulder.
On the other hand, the defense, in its Appellant's Brief dated 3
December 1999,14 asserted the following set of facts:
On January 16, 1998, at around 11:00 in the evening, after a
drinking session at their house, the brothers Melton (Tony),
Servillano (Junior) and Michael (Boying), all surnamed Ferrer,
occupied a table inside the Tidbits Caf and Videoke Bar and
started drinking and singing. About thirty minutes later, Jaime
Palaganas along with his nephew Ferdinand (Apo) and friend
Virgilio Bautista arrived at the bar and occupied a table near that
of the Ferrers'.
After the Ferrers' turn in singing, the microphone was handed
over to Jaime Palaganas, who then started to sing. On his third
song [My Way], Jaime was joined in his singing by Tony Ferrer,
who sang loudly and in an obviously mocking manner. This
infuriated Jaime, who then accosted Tony, saying, "You are
already insulting us." The statement resulted in a free for all fight
between the Ferrers', on one hand, and the Palaganases on the
other. Jaime was mauled and Ferdinand, was hit on the face and
was chased outside of the bar by Junior and Boying Ferrer.
Ferdinand then ran towards the house of the appellant Rujjeric
Palaganas, his brother, and sought the help of the latter. Rujjeric,
stirred from his sleep by his brother's shouts, went out of his
house and, noticing that the van of his uncle was in front of the
Tidbits Videoke Bar, proceeded to that place. Before reaching
the bar, however, he was suddenly stoned by the Ferrer brothers
and was hit on different parts of his body, so he turned around
and struggled to run towards his house. He then met his brother,
Ferdinand, going towards the bar, so he tugged him and urged
him to run towards the opposite direction as the Ferrer brothers
continued pelting them with large stones. Rujjeric then noticed
that Ferdinand was carrying a gun, and, on instinct, grabbed the
gun from the latter, faced the Ferrer brothers and fired one shot
in the air to force the brothers to retreat. Much to his surprise,
however, the Ferrer brothers continued throwing stones and
when (sic) the appellant was again hit several times. Unable to
bear the pain, he closed his eyes and pulled the trigger.
On 28 October 1998, the trial court rendered its Decision finding
petitioner guilty only of the crime of Homicide and two (2)
counts of Frustrated Homicide.15 He was, however, acquitted
of the charge of Violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 2958
in relation to Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code.16 On
the other hand, Ferdinand was acquitted of all the charges
against him.17
In holding that petitioner is liable for the crimes of Homicide
and Frustrated Homicide but not for Murder and Frustrated
Murder, the trial court explained that there was no conspiracy
between petitioner and Ferdinand in killing Melton and
wounding Servillano and Michael.18 According to the trial
court, the mere fact that Ferdinand "pointed" to where the Ferrer
brothers were and uttered to petitioner "Araratan, paltog mo
lara!" (They are the ones, shoot them!), does not in itself connote
common design or unity of purpose to kill. It also took note of
the fact that petitioner was never a participant in the rumble
inside the Tidbits Cafe Videoke Bar (videoke bar) on the night
of 16 January 1998. He was merely called by Ferdinand to
rescue their uncle, Jaime, who was being assaulted by the Ferrer
brothers. It further stated that the shooting was instantaneous
and without any prior plan or agreement with Ferdinand to
execute the same. It found that petitioner is solely liable for
killing Melton and for wounding Servillano and Michael, and
that Ferdinand is not criminally responsible for the act of
petitioner.
Further, it declared that there was no treachery that will qualify
the crimes as murder and frustrated murder since the Ferrer
brothers were given the chance to defend themselves during the
shooting incident by stoning the petitioner and Ferdinand.19 It
reasoned that the sudden and unexpected attack, without the
slightest provocation on the part of the victims, was absent. In
addition, it ratiocinated that there was no evident premeditation
as there was no sufficient period of time that lapsed from the
point where Ferdinand called the petitioner for help up to the
point of the shooting of the Ferrer brothers.20 Petitioner was
sleeping at his house at the time he heard Ferdinand calling him
for help. Immediately, petitioner, still clad in pajama and
sleeveless shirt, went out of his room to meet Ferdinand.
Thereafter, both petitioner and Ferdinand went to the videoke
bar where they met the Ferrer brothers and, shortly afterwards,
the shooting ensued. In other words, according to the trial court,
the sequence of the events are so fast that it is improbable for the
petitioner to have ample time and opportunity to then plan and
organize the shooting.
Corollarily, it also stated that petitioner cannot successfully
invoke self-defense since there was no actual or imminent
danger to his life at the time he and Ferdinand saw the Ferrer
brothers outside the videoke bar.21 It noted that when petitioner
and Ferdinand saw the Ferrer brothers outside the videoke bar,
the latter were not carrying any weapon. Petitioner then was free
to run or take cover when the Ferrer brothers started pelting them
with stones. Petitioner, however, opted to shoot the Ferrer
brothers. It also stated that the use by petitioner of a gun was not
a reasonable means to prevent the attack of the Ferrer brothers
since the latter were only equipped with stones, and that the gun
was deadlier compared to stones. Moreover, it also found that
petitioner used an unlicensed firearm in shooting the Ferrer
brothers.22
As regards the Violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 2958, in
relation to Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code, the trial
court acquitted the petitioner of the offense as his use and
possession of a gun was not for the purpose of disrupting
election activities.23 In conclusion, the trial court held:
WHEREFORE, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Under CRIM. CASE NO. U-9610, [Rujjeric] PALAGANAS
is hereby CONVICTED beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of HOMICIDE (Not Murder) with the use of an unlicensed
firearm. The penalty imposable is in its maximum period which
is 20 years. The Court sentences [Rujjeric] Palaganas to suffer
the penalty of Reclusion Temporal in its maximum period or 20
years of imprisonment; and to pay the heirs of [MELTON]
Ferrer the sum of P7,791.50 as actual medical expenses of
[MELTON] Ferrer; P500,000.00 as moral damages representing
unearned income of [MELTON]; P50,000.00 for the death of
[MELTON]; P50,000.00 for exemplary damages and
P100,000.00 for burial and funeral expenses.
Ferdinand Palaganas is hereby ACQUITTED for failure of the
prosecution to prove conspiracy and likewise, for failure to
prove the guilt of Ferdinand Palaganas beyond reasonable
doubt.
2. Under CRIM. CASE NO. U-9608, [Rujjeric] PALAGANAS
is hereby CONVICTED beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE (Not Frustrated Murder), with
the use of an unlicensed firearm, the Court sentences him to
suffer the penalty of Prision Mayor in its maximum period or 12
years of imprisonment and to pay Servillano Ferrer the sum of
P163,569.90 for his medical expenses and P50,000.00 for
exemplary damages;
Ferdinand Palaganas is ACQUITTED for failure of the
prosecution to prove conspiracy and likewise, for failure to
prove the guilt of Ferdinand Palaganas beyond reasonable
doubt.
3. Under CRIM. CASE NO. U-9609, [Rujjeric] PALAGANAS
is hereby CONVICTED beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE (Not Frustrated Murder), with
the use of an unlicensed firearm, the Court sentences him to
suffer the penalty of Prision Mayor in its maximum period or 12
years of imprisonment; and to pay Michael Ferrer the sum of
P2,259.35 for his medical expenses and P50,000.00 for
exemplary damages;
Ferdinand Palaganas is ACQUITTED for failure of the
prosecution to prove conspiracy and likewise, for failure to
prove the guilt of Ferdinand Palaganas beyond reasonable
doubt.

Ordering accused [Rujjeric] Palaganas to pay Mrs. Elena Ferrer,
the mother of the Ferrer brothers, the amount of P100,000.00 as
attorney's fees in CRIM. CASES NOS. U-9608, U-9609, U-
9610.
4. Under CRIM. CASE NO. U-9634, for failure of the
prosecution to prove the guilt of [Rujjeric] Palaganas beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of COMELEC
Resolution No. 2958 in relation with Section 261 of the
Omnibus Election Code, the Court ACQUITS [RUJJERIC]
PALAGANAS.24
Aggrieved, the petitioner appealed the foregoing Decision of the
RTC dated 28 October 1998, before the Court of Appeals. In its
Decision dated 30 September 2004, the Court of Appeals
affirmed with modifications the assailed RTC Decision. In
modifying the Decision of the trial court, the appellate court held
that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender under
Article 13, No. 7, of the Revised Penal Code should be
appreciated in favor of petitioner since the latter, accompanied
by his counsel, voluntarily appeared before the trial court, even
prior to its issuance of a warrant of arrest against him.25 It also
stated that the Indeterminate Sentence Law should be applied in
imposing the penalty upon the petitioner.26 The dispositive
portion of the Court of Appeals' Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction is hereby
AFFIRMED, subject to the MODIFICATION that the penalty
to be imposed for the crimes which the appellant committed are
as follows:
(1) For Homicide (under Criminal Case No. U-9610), the
appellant is ordered to suffer imprisonment of ten (10) years of
prision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4)
months of reclusion temporal as maximum. Appellant is also
ordered to pay the heirs of Melton Ferrer civil indemnity in the
amount of P50,000.00, moral damages in the amount of
P50,000.00 without need of proof and actual damages in the
amount of P43,556.00.
(2) For Frustrated Homicide (under Criminal Case No. U-9609),
the appellant is hereby ordered to suffer imprisonment of four
(4) years and two (2) months of prision correcional as minimum
to ten (10) years of prision mayor as maximum. Appellant is also
ordered to pay Michael Ferrer actual damages in the amount of
P2,259.35 and moral damages in the amount of P30,000.00.
(3) For Frustrated Homicide (under Criminal Case No. U-9608),
the appellant is hereby penalized with imprisonment of four (4)
years and two (2) months of prision correcional as minimum to
ten (10) years of prision mayor as maximum. Appellant is also
ordered to pay Servillano Ferrer actual damages in the amount
of P163,569.90 and moral damages in the amount of
P30,000.00.27
On 16 November 2004, petitioner lodged the instant Petition for
Review before this Court on the basis of the following
arguments:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION OF THE
TRIAL COURT.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
ACQUITTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT ON THE GROUND
OF LAWFUL SELF-DEFENSE.28
Anent the first issue, petitioner argued that all the elements of a
valid self-defense are present in the instant case and, thus, his
acquittal on all the charges is proper; that when he fired his gun
on that fateful night, he was then a victim of an unlawful
aggression perpetrated by the Ferrer brothers; that he, in fact,
sustained an injury in his left leg and left shoulder caused by the
stones thrown by the Ferrer brothers; that the appellate court
failed to consider a material evidence described as "Exhibit O";
that "Exhibit O" should have been given due weight since it
shows that there was slug embedded on the sawali wall near the
sign "Tidbits Caf and Videoke Bar"; that the height from which
the slug was taken was about seven feet from the ground; that if
it was true that petitioner and Ferdinand were waiting for the
Ferrer brothers outside the videoke bar in order to shoot them,
then the trajectory of the bullets would have been either straight
or downward and not upward considering that the petitioner and
the Ferrer brothers were about the same height (5'6"-5'8"); that
the slug found on the wall was, in fact, the "warning shot" fired
by the petitioner; and, that if this exhibit was properly
appreciated by the trial court, petitioner would be acquitted of
all the charges.29
Moreover, petitioner contended that the warning shot proved
that that the Ferrer brothers were the unlawful aggressors since
there would have been no occasion for the petitioner to fire a
warning shot if the Ferrer brothers did not stone him; that the
testimony of Michael in the trial court proved that it was the
Ferrer brothers who provoked petitioner to shoot them; and that
the Ferrer brothers pelted them with stones even after the
"warning shot."30
Petitioner's contention must fail.
Article 11, paragraph (1), of the Revised Penal Code provides
for the elements and/or requisites in order that a plea of self-
defense may be validly considered in absolving a person from
criminal liability, viz:
ART. 11. Justifying circumstances. The following do not incur
any criminal liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided
that the following circumstances concur;
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent
or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself. x x x.
As an element of self-defense, unlawful aggression refers to an
assault or attack, or a threat thereof in an imminent and
immediate manner, which places the defendant's life in actual
peril.31 It is an act positively strong showing the wrongful intent
of the aggressor and not merely a threatening or intimidating
attitude.32 It is also described as a sudden and unprovoked
attack of immediate and imminent kind to the life, safety or
rights of the person attacked.33

There is an unlawful aggression on the part of the victim when
he puts in actual or imminent peril the life, limb, or right of the
person invoking self-defense. There must be actual physical
force or actual use of weapon.34 In order to constitute unlawful
aggression, the person attacked must be confronted by a real
threat on his life and limb; and the peril sought to be avoided is
imminent and actual, not merely imaginary.35
In the case at bar, it is clear that there was no unlawful
aggression on the part of the Ferrer brothers that justified the act
of petitioner in shooting them. There were no actual or imminent
danger to the lives of petitioner and Ferdinand when they
proceeded and arrived at the videoke bar and saw thereat the
Ferrer brothers. It appears that the Ferrer brothers then were
merely standing outside the videoke bar and were not carrying
any weapon when the petitioner arrived with his brother
Ferdinand and started firing his gun.36
Assuming, arguendo, that the Ferrer brothers had provoked the
petitioner to shoot them by pelting the latter with stones, the
shooting of the Ferrer brothers is still unjustified. When the
Ferrer brothers started throwing stones, petitioner was not in a
state of actual or imminent danger considering the wide distance
(4-5 meters) of the latter from the location of the former.37
Petitioner was not cornered nor trapped in a specific area such
that he had no way out, nor was his back against the wall. He
was still capable of avoiding the stones by running away or by
taking cover. He could have also called or proceeded to the
proper authorities for help. Indeed, petitioner had several
options in avoiding dangers to his life other than confronting the
Ferrer brothers with a gun.
The fact that petitioner sustained injuries in his left leg and left
shoulder, allegedly caused by the stones thrown by the Ferrer
brothers, does not signify that he was a victim of unlawful
aggression or that he acted in self-defense.38 There is no
evidence to show that his wounds were so serious and severe.
The superficiality of the injuries sustained by the petitioner is no
indication that his life and limb were in actual peril.39
Petitioner's assertion that, despite the fact that he fired a warning
shot, the Ferrer brothers continued to pelt him with stones,40
will not matter exonerate him from criminal liability. Firing a
warning shot was not the last and only option he had in order to
avoid the stones thrown by the Ferrer brothers. As stated earlier,
he could have run away, or taken cover, or proceeded to the
proper authorities for help. Petitioner, however, opted to shoot
the Ferrer brothers.
It is significant to note that the shooting resulted in the death of
Melton, and wounding of Servillano and Michael. With regard
to Melton, a bullet hit his right thigh, and another bullet hit his
head which caused his instant death.41 As regards Servillano, a
bullet penetrated two of his vital organs, namely, the large
intestine and urinary bladder.42 He underwent two (2) surgeries
in order to survive and fully recover.43 Michael, on the other
hand, sustained a gunshot wound on the right shoulder.44 It
must also be noted that the Ferrer brothers were shot near the
videoke bar, which contradict petitioner's claim he was chased
by the Ferrer brothers. Given the foregoing circumstances, it is
difficult to believe that the Ferrer brothers were the unlawful
aggressors. As correctly observed by the prosecution, if the
petitioner shot the Ferrer brothers just to defend himself, it
defies reason why he had to shoot the victims at the vital
portions of their body, which even led to the death of Melton
who was shot at his head.45 It is an oft-repeated rule that the
nature and number of wounds inflicted by the accused are
constantly and unremittingly considered important indicia to
disprove a plea of self-defense.46
Let it not be forgotten that unlawful aggression is a primordial
element in self-defense.47 It is an essential and indispensable
requisite, for without unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim, there can be, in a jural sense, no complete or incomplete
self-defense.48 Without unlawful aggression, self-defense will
not have a leg to stand on and this justifying circumstance cannot
and will not be appreciated, even if the other elements are
present.49 To our mind, unlawful aggression, as an element of
self-defense, is wanting in the instant case.
The second element of self-defense requires that the means
employed by the person defending himself must be reasonably
necessary to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression of the
victim. The reasonableness of the means employed may take
into account the weapons, the physical condition of the parties
and other circumstances showing that there is a rational
equivalence between the means of attack and the defense.50 In
the case at bar, the petitioner's act of shooting the Ferrer brothers
was not a reasonable and necessary means of repelling the
aggression allegedly initiated by the Ferrer brothers. As aptly
stated by the trial court, petitioner's gun was far deadlier
compared to the stones thrown by the Ferrer brothers.51
Moreover, we stated earlier that when the Ferrer brothers
allegedly threw stones at the petitioner, the latter had other less
harmful options than to shoot the Ferrer brothers. Such act failed
to pass the test of reasonableness of the means employed in
preventing or repelling an unlawful aggression.
With regard to the second issue, petitioner asserts that the Court
of Appeals erred in not acquitting him on the ground of lawful
self-defense.
Petitioner's argument is bereft of merit.
In resolving criminal cases where the accused invokes self-
defense to escape criminal liability, this Court consistently held
that where an accused admits killing the victim but invokes self-
defense, it is incumbent upon the accused to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that he acted in self-defense.52 As the
burden of evidence is shifted on the accused to prove all the
elements of self-defense, he must rely on the strength of his own
evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution.53
As we have already found, there was no unlawful aggression on
the part of the Ferrer brothers which justified the act of petitioner
in shooting them. We also ruled that even if the Ferrer brothers
provoked the petitioner to shoot them, the latter's use of a gun
was not a reasonable means of repelling the act of the Ferrer
brothers in throwing stones. It must also be emphasized at this
point that both the trial court and the appellate court found that
petitioner failed to established by clear and convincing evidence
his plea of self-defense. In this regard, it is settled that when the
trial court's findings have been affirmed by the appellate court,
said findings are generally conclusive and binding upon this
Court.54 In the present case, we find no compelling reason to
deviate from their findings. Verily, petitioner failed to prove by
clear and convincing evidence that he is entitled to an acquittal
on the ground of lawful self-defense.
On another point, while we agree with the trial court and the
Court of Appeals that petitioner is guilty of the crime of
Homicide for the death of Melton in Criminal Case No. U-9610,
and Frustrated Homicide for the serious injuries sustained by
Servillano in Criminal Case No. U-9608, we do not, however,
concur in their ruling that petitioner is guilty of the crime of
Frustrated Homicide as regards to Michael in Criminal Case No.
U-9609. We hold that petitioner therein is guilty only of the
crime of Attempted Homicide.
Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code states and defines the stages
of a felony in the following manner:
ART. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies.
Consummated felonies, as well as those which are frustrated and
attempted, are punishable.
A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for
the for its execution and accomplishment are present; and it is
frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution
which would produce the felony as a consequence but which,
nevertheless, do not produce it by reason or causes independent
of the will of the perpetrator.
There is an attempt when the offender commences the
commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not
perform all the acts of execution which should produce the
felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance (italics supplied).
Based on the foregoing provision, the distinctions between
frustrated and attempted felony are summarized as follows:
1.) In frustrated felony, the offender has performed all the acts
of execution which should produce the felony as a consequence;
whereas in attempted felony, the offender merely commences
the commission of a felony directly by overt acts and does not
perform all the acts of execution.
2.) In frustrated felony, the reason for the non-accomplishment
of the crime is some cause independent of the will of the
perpetrator; on the other hand, in attempted felony, the reason
for the non-fulfillment of the crime is a cause or accident other
than the offender's own spontaneous desistance.
In addition to these distinctions, we have ruled in several cases
that when the accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested
by his use of a deadly weapon in his assault, and his victim
sustained fatal or mortal wound/s but did not die because of
timely medical assistance, the crime committed is frustrated
murder or frustrated homicide depending on whether or not any
of the qualifying circumstances under Article 249 of the Revised
Penal Code are present.55 However, if the wound/s sustained by
the victim in such a case were not fatal or mortal, then the crime
committed is only attempted murder or attempted homicide.56
If there was no intent to kill on the part of the accused and the
wound/s sustained by the victim were not fatal, the crime
committed may be serious, less serious or slight physical
injury.57
Based on the medical certificate of Michael, as well as the
testimony of the physician who diagnosed and treated Michael,
the latter was admitted and treated at the Dagupan Doctors-
Villaflor Memorial Hospital for a single gunshot wound in his
right shoulder caused by the shooting of petitioner.58 It was also
stated in his medical certificate that he was discharged on the
same day he was admitted and that the treatment duration for
such wound would be for six to eight days only.59 Given these
set of undisputed facts, it is clear that the gunshot wound
sustained by Michael in his right shoulder was not fatal or mortal
since the treatment period for his wound was short and he was
discharged from the hospital on the same day he was admitted
therein. Therefore, petitioner is liable only for the crime of
attempted homicide as regards Michael in Criminal Case No. U-
9609.
With regard to the appreciation of the aggravating circumstance
of use of an unlicensed firearm, we agree with the trial court and
the appellate court that the same must be applied against
petitioner in the instant case since the same was alleged in the
informations filed against him before the RTC and proven
during the trial. However, such must be considered as a special
aggravating circumstance, and not a generic aggravating
circumstance.
Generic aggravating circumstances are those that generally
apply to all crimes such as those mentioned in Article 14,
paragraphs No. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 14, 18, 19 and 20, of the
Revised Penal Code. It has the effect of increasing the penalty
for the crime to its maximum period, but it cannot increase the
same to the next higher degree. It must always be alleged and
charged in the information, and must be proven during the trial
in order to be appreciated.60 Moreover, it can be offset by an
ordinary mitigating circumstance.
On the other hand, special aggravating circumstances are those
which arise under special conditions to increase the penalty for
the offense to its maximum period, but the same cannot increase
the penalty to the next higher degree. Examples are quasi-
recidivism under Article 160 and complex crimes under Article
48 of the Revised Penal Code. It does not change the character
of the offense charged.61 It must always be alleged and charged
in the information, and must be proven during the trial in order
to be appreciated.62 Moreover, it cannot be offset by an ordinary
mitigating circumstance.
It is clear from the foregoing that the meaning and effect of
generic and special aggravating circumstances are exactly the
same except that in case of generic aggravating, the same CAN
be offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance whereas in the
case of special aggravating circumstance, it CANNOT be offset
by an ordinary mitigating circumstance.
Aside from the aggravating circumstances abovementioned,
there is also an aggravating circumstance provided for under
Presidential Decree No. 1866,63 as amended by Republic Act
No. 8294,64 which is a special law. Its pertinent provision
states:
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an
unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be
considered as an aggravating circumstance.
In interpreting the same provision, the trial court reasoned that
such provision is "silent as to whether it is generic or
qualifying."65 Thus, it ruled that "when the law is silent, the
same must be interpreted in favor of the accused."66 Since a
generic aggravating circumstance is more favorable to petitioner
compared to a qualifying aggravating circumstance, as the latter
changes the nature of the crime and increase the penalty thereof
by degrees, the trial court proceeded to declare that the use of an
unlicensed firearm by the petitioner is to be considered only as
a generic aggravating circumstance.67 This interpretation is
erroneous since we already held in several cases that with the
passage of Republic Act. No. 8294 on 6 June 1997, the use of
an unlicensed firearm in murder or homicide is now considered
as a SPECIAL aggravating circumstance and not a generic
aggravating circumstance.68 Republic Act No. 8294 applies to
the instant case since it took effect before the commission of the
crimes in 21 April 1998. Therefore, the use of an unlicensed
firearm by the petitioner in the instant case should be designated
and appreciated as a SPECIAL aggravating circumstance and
not merely a generic aggravating circumstance.
As was previously established, a special aggravating
circumstance cannot be offset by an ordinary mitigating
circumstance. Voluntary surrender of petitioner in this case is
merely an ordinary mitigating circumstance. Thus, it cannot
offset the special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed
firearm. In accordance with Article 64, paragraph 3 of the
Revised Penal Code, the penalty imposable on petitioner should
be in its maximum period.69
As regards the civil liability of petitioner, we deem it necessary
to modify the award of damages given by both courts.
In Criminal Case No. U-9610 for Homicide, we agree with both
courts that the proper amount of civil indemnity is P50,000.00,
and that the proper amount for moral damages is P50,000.00
pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence.70 However, based on the
receipts for hospital, medicine, funeral and burial expenses on
record, and upon computation of the same, the proper amount of
actual damages should be P42,374.18, instead of P43,556.00.
Actual damages for loss of earning capacity cannot be awarded
in this case since there was no documentary evidence to
substantiate the same.71 Although there may be exceptions to
this rule,72 none is availing in the present case. Nevertheless,
since loss was actually established in this case, temperate
damages in the amount of P25,000.00 may be awarded to the
heirs of Melton Ferrer. Under Article 2224 of the New Civil
Code, temperate or moderate damages may be recovered when
the court finds that some pecuniary loss was suffered but its
amount cannot be proved with certainty. Moreover, exemplary
damages should be awarded in this case since the presence of
special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm
was already established.73 Based on prevailing jurisprudence,
the award of exemplary damages for homicide is P25,000.00.74
the Indeterminate Sentence of Law, the penalty now becomes
four (4) years and two (2) months of arresto mayor as minimum
period to six (6) years of prision correccional as maximum
period. As regards the civil liability of petitioner, the latter is
hereby ordered to pay Michael Ferrer exemplary damages in the
amount of P25,000.00 in addition to the actual damages and
moral damages awarded by the Court of Appeals.
(2) In Criminal Case No. U-9608, the penalty imposable on the
petitioner for the frustrated homicide is prision mayor under
Article 50 of the Revised Penal Code.76 There being a special
aggravating circumstance of the use of an unlicensed firearm
and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty now
becomes six (6) years of prision correccional as minimum
period to twelve (12) years of prision mayor as maximum
period. As regards the civil liability of petitioner, the latter is
hereby ordered to pay Servillano Ferrer exemplary damages in
the amount of P25,000.00 in addition to the actual damages and
moral damages awarded by the Court of Appeals.
(3) In Criminal Case No. U-9610, the penalty imposable on
petitioner for the homicide is reclusion temporal under Article
249 of the Revised Penal Code.77 There being a special
aggravating circumstance of the use of an unlicensed firearm
and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty now
is twelve (12) years of prision mayor as minimum period to
twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum period. As
regards the civil liability of petitioner, the latter is hereby
ordered to pay Melton Ferrer exemplary damages in the amount
of P25,000.00 in addition to the actual damages and moral
damages awarded by the Court of Appeals. The actual damages
likewise awarded by the Court of Appeals is hereby reduced to
P42,374.18.
SO ORDERED.

In Criminal Cases No. U-9608 and U-9609, we agree with both

courts as to the award of actual damages and its corresponding
amount since the same is supported by documentary proof
therein. The award of moral damages is also consistent with
prevailing jurisprudence. However, exemplary damages should
be awarded in this case since the presence of special aggravating
circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm was already
established. Based on prevailing jurisprudence, the award of
exemplary damages for both the attempted and frustrated
homicide shall be P25,000.00 for each.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court

of Appeals dated 30 September 2004 is hereby AFFIRMED
with the following MODIFICATIONS:

(1) In Criminal Case No. U-9609, the petitioner is found guilty

of the crime of attempted homicide. The penalty imposable on
the petitioner is prision correccional under Article 51 of the
Revised Penal Code.75 There being a special aggravating
circumstance of the use of an unlicensed firearm and applying

FIRST DIVISION
January 16, 2017
G.R. No. 213224
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ROQUE DAYADAY y DAGOOC1, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
CAGUIOA, J.:
On appeal is the May 26, 2014 Decision2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA), Special Twenty-Third Division in CA-G.R. CR-
HC No. 00887-MIN, which affirmed the Decision3 dated
September 27, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court (R TC) of
Surallah, South Cotabato, Branch 26, in Criminal Case No.
4005-N.
The Facts
In an Information4 filed with the RTC, accused-appellant Roque
Dayaday y Dagooc (Roque) was charged with the crime of
Murder, the accusatory portion of which reads:
"That on or about the 27th day of October 2005 at around 10:00
o'clock in the evening thereof, at Barangay Esperanza,
Municipality of Norala, Province of South Cotabato,
Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, while armed with a handgun and a knife,
with intent to kill, attended by treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and shoot for several times and stab
one BASILIO GALLENERO, hitting and inflicting upon the
latter several mortal gunshot wounds on the different parts of his
body, and stab wound at the epigastric area of the victim's
abdomen, which caused his death shortly thereafter."
CONTRARY TO LAW, attended by aggravating circumstance
of Illegal Possession of Firearms.5
Upon arraignment, Roque pleaded not guilty to the offense
charged. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. The prosecution
presented Alex Gallenero (Alex), the son of the victim, and Dr.
Lanelita Lanaria-Amido (Dr. Amido ), the Municipal Health
Officer of Norala, South Cotabato, as witnesses who testified to
the following facts, to wit:
On the evening of October 27, 2005 at about 10 o'clock, Alex
and his father, Basilio Gallenero (Basilio), were walking home
along the road in Barrio 3, Norala, South Cotabato6 after
attending a wedding celebration at the house of Rodolfo
Dayaday,7 when suddenly, Roque shot the victim in the back
four (4) times, successively. Alex easily recognized Roque as
the assailant because the place was well lit and he was just about
ten (10) meters away from Roque when the latter fired his gun.
8 For fear of his life, Alex an away from the place of incident. 9
He reported the incident to his uncle Petring Pinuela and to the
police officers of Norala.10
The postmortem report of Dr. Amido showed that the victim
suffered four (4) gunshot wounds and one (1) stab wound11 and
died due to cardiopulmonary arrest, probably secondary to
multiple injuries caused by the gunshot and stab wounds. 12
Roque, on the other hand, through the testimonies of Reynald
Dayaday (Reynald) and Dennis Blancada (Dennis), denied the
accusation and interposed the defense of alibi.
Reynald, accused-appellant's brother, testified that on October
27, 2005, the night before the wedding of his niece, he was at
the house of his older Brother, Teodolfo Dayaday, at Barangay
Esperanza (Barrio 3), Norala, South Cotabato.13 He was with
Roque and seven (7) other people, who were tasked to prepare
the food for the wedding celebration. They were all together in
the kitchen from 5 o'clock in the evening to 3 o'clock in the
morning. 14
Dennis testified that he was at Barangay Esperanza, Norala,
South Cotabato on October 27, 2005 because he was invited to
cook in the house of Teodolfo Dayaday. 15 He arrived there at
12 o'clock noon but his duty started at 5 o'clock in the evening
and ended at 3 o'clock in the morning the following day. 16 He
recalled that during those times that he was cooking, Roque
never left the kitchen. 17
Ruling of the RTC
Finding the positive testimony of Alex credible as against
Roque's defense of alibi, the RTC convicted Roque of the crime
of murder and sentenced him accordingly. The dispositive
portion of the Decision18 dated September 27, 2010 reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises all considered, the court finds the
evidence of the prosecution sufficient to sustain it in finding the
accused criminally responsible of the crime charged.
Consequently, accused Roque Dayaday y Dago-oc is hereby
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder as
he is charged in this case.
He is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of
reclusion perpetua.
He is further ordered to pay the heirs of his deceased victim,
Basilio Gallenero, the amount of P75,000.00 as indemnity for
his death; the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages; the
amount of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages and the amount of
P30,000.00 as reasonable actual expenses for his wake and
burial and the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.19
Aggrieved, Roque appealed to the CA by a Notice of Appeal
dated October 28, 2010.20 Both parties accordingly filed their
respective Briefs dated April 26, 201121 and November 22,
2011.22
Ruling of the CA
The CA concurred with the RTC's finding on Alex's credibility
and dismissed the alleged inconsistencies in his testimony. 23
Moreover, the CA found Roque's defense of alibi very flimsy.
According to the CA, while the defense witnesses claimed that
Roque was cooking at the time of the commission, it was not
physically impossible for Roque to be at the scene of the crime
because the place where he was allegedly cooking was in the
same vicinity where the crime was committed. 24
The CA further ruled that while the prosecution failed to prove
the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation,
treachery was very patent in the instant case, which is sufficient
to qualify the crime to murder. Records showed that the victim
was shot several times in the back while he was walking, which
means that he was defenseless at the time of the attack; and the
fact that the stab wound was located on the victim's abdomen
would not preclude treachery because the victim was already
vulnerable due to the gunshot wounds.25
Thus, on May 26, 2014, the CA rendered the assailed
Decision26 affirming Rogue's conviction, the decretal portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated September 27, 2010
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, Surallah, South
Cotabato finding accused-appellant Roque Dayaday y Dagooc
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder in
Criminal Case No. 4005-N is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.27
Hence, this appeal. 28
In the Resolution dated January 28, 2015,29 this Court required
the parties to file their supplemental briefs; but both parties
manifested30 that they would no longer file the pleadings and
opted to replead and adopt the arguments submitted before the
CA.
Issue
Consequently, the only issue for the Court's consideration is
whether the CA erred in affirming Roque's conviction for the
crime of murder.
The Court's Ruling
In the instant appeal, Roque essentially questions the credibility
of Alex and the veracity of his accusations. Roque insists that
Alex is a biased witness considering his relationship with the
victim. He further avers that Alex exhibited a propensity to lie
when he stated in his affidavit that there were other witnesses
who saw the commission of the crime, and later admitted in open
court that he was the sole witness to the crime. Roque also
claims that the testimony of Alex that his father had been shot
four (4) times runs counter to the postmortem report of Dr.
Amido, which indicates that there were seven (7) gunshot
wounds.
The appeal fails.
Time and again, the Court has held that when the issues involve
matters of credibility of witnesses, the findings of the trial court,
its calibration of the testimonies, and its assessment of the
probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on
said findings, are accorded high respect, if not conclusive effect.
This is so because the trial court has the unique opportunity to
observe the demeanor of witnesses and is in the best position to
discern whether they are telling the truth. 31 Hence, it is a settled
rule that appellate courts will not overturn the factual findings
of the trial court unless there is a showing that the latter
overlooked facts or circumstances of weight and substance that
would affect the result of the case. 32 The foregoing rule finds
an even more stringent application where the findings of the
RTC are sustained by the CA. 33
In the present case, both the RTC and CA found the testimony
of Alex straightforward and worthy of belief. Alex identified
Roque as the one who shot his father at the back and his positive
declaration was never destroyed even after cross-examination in
court. 34
For his part, Roque failed to identify any significant factor
circumstance which would justify the reversal of the RTC's and
CA's findings on Alex's credibility.
The imputation of bias to Alex because of his relationship with
the victim must necessarily fail. In People v. Montemayor,35the
Court ruled that relationship by itself does not give rise to any
presumption of bias or ulterior motive, nor does it impair the
credibility of witnesses or tarnish their testimonies. 36 The
relationship of a witness to the victim would even make his
testimony more credible, as it would be unnatural for a relative
who is interested in vindicating the crime to charge and
prosecute another person other than the real culprit. 37 Relatives
of victims of crimes have a natural knack for remembering the
faces of the attacker and they, more than anybody else, would
be concerned with obtaining justice for the victim by having the
felon brought to justice and meted the proper penalty.38 Where
there is no showing of an improper motive on the part of the
prosecution's witnesses for testifying against the appellant, their
relationship to the victim does not render their testimony less
credible. 39 In this case, since there is no showing of any ill or
improper motive on the part of Alex to testify against the
accused, his relationship with the victim even made his
testimony more credible and truthful.
Furthermore, the alleged discrepancy between Alex's testimony
and the postmortem report of Dr. Amido as to the number of
gunshot wounds is more imagined than real. As correctly
pointed out by the CA, the postmortem report showing that there
are four (4) entry gunshot wounds and three (3) exit wounds,
which means that there are three (3) perforating gunshots and
one (1) penetrating gunshot, coincides with Alex's declaration
that his father was shot four (4) times.39-a
The Court also agrees with the CA that the inconsistency
between Alex's affidavit and his testimony in open court as to
whether there are other witnesses to the crime is immaterial to
affect his credibility, because it does not detract from the fact
that Alex saw and identified Roque as the assailant of his
father.40 In People v. Yanson, 41the Court held:
x x x [T]his Court had consistently ruled that the alleged
inconsistencies between the testimony of a witness in open court
and his sworn statement before the investigators are not fatal
defects to justify a reversal of judgment. Such discrepancies do
not necessarily discredit the witness since ex parte affidavits are
almost always incomplete. A sworn statement or an affidavit
does not purport to contain a complete compendium of the
details of the event narrated by the affiant. Sworn statements
taken ex parte are generally considered to be inferior to the
testimony given in open court.
xxxx
The discrepancies in [the witness]'s testimony do not damage the
essential integrity of the prosecution's evidence in its material
whole. Instead, the discrepancies only erase suspicion that the
testimony was rehearsed or concocted. These honest
inconsistencies serve to strengthen rather than destroy [the SO ORDERED.
witness]'s credibility.42

Under Article 24843 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), murder

is committed when: (1) a person was killed; (2) the accused
killed him; (3) the killing was with the attendance of any of the
qualifying circumstances enumerated in Article 248; and (4) the
killing neither constitutes parricide nor infanticide.44

All elements of the crime of murder have been established in

this case beyond reasonable doubt.

Through the testimony of Alex, the eyewitness to the crime, it

was established that Basilio was killed and it was Roque who
had killed him. As to the presence of qualifying circumstances,
the Court sustains the CA's finding that treachery attended the
killing of Basilio. There is treachery when a victim is set upon
by the accused without warning, as when the accused attacks the
victim from behind, or when the attack is sudden and
unexpected and without the slightest provocation on the part of
the victim, or is, in any event, so sudden and unexpected that the
victim is unable to defend himself, thus insuring the execution
of the criminal act without risk to the assailant. 45

Here, the evidence unequivocally shows that the attack against

Basilio, which came from behind, was sudden, deliberate and
unexpected. The victim was completely unaware of any threat
to his life as he was merely walking home with his son. The use
of a firearm showed deliberate intent to kill Basilio and the
location and number of gunshot wounds rendered him
defenseless and incapable of retaliation. Hence, treachery was
evident in the case at bar, sufficient to qualify the crime to
Murder.

Penalty, Civil Indemnity and Damages

Under Article 248 of the RPC, the penalty for murder qualified
by treachery is reclusion perpetua to death. Considering that,
apart from treachery, the aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation and illegal possession of firearms, as alleged in
the Information, were not duly proven, the RTC correctly held
that the proper imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua.

As to the award of damages, the Court deems it proper to modify

the CA's award pursuant to the Court's recent ruling in People v.
Jugueta.46Therefore, in addition to the amount of 30,000.00 as
reasonable actual expenses for the wake and burial and the costs
of suit, the victim's heirs are entitled to 75,000.00 as civil
indemnity; 75,000.00 as moral damages; and 75,000.00 as
exemplary damages. All damages awarded shall earn interest at
the rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of this judgment
until fully paid.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Appeal is

DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Decision dated May 26,

2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00887-
MIN, finding accused-appellant Roque Dayaday y Dagooc
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS in that the award
of civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages are
each increased to Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (75,000.00)
and all monetary awards shall earn interest at the legal rate of
six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this
Decision until fully paid.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-13315 April 27, 1960
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
BUENAVENTURA BULING, defendant-appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Esmeraldo Umali and Solicitor
Emerito M. Salva for appellee.
Francisco A. Puray for appellant.
LABRADOR, J.:
Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Leyte,
Hon. Gaudencio Cloribel, presiding, finding the accused
Buenaventura Buling guilty of serious physical injuries and
sentencing him to imprisonment of four months of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to one year of prision correccional, as
maximum, and to indemnify the offended party.
The following uncontroverted facts appear in the record: On
December 7, 1956, the accused was charged in the Justice of the
Peace Court of Cabalian, Leyte, with the crime of less serious
physical injuries for having inflicted wounds on complaining
witness Isidro Balaba, which according to the complaint would
"require, medical attendance for a period from 10 to 15 days and
will incapacitate the said Isidro Balaba from the performance of
his customary labors for the game period of time." The accused
pleaded guilty to the complaint and was on December 8, 1957
found guilty of the crime charged and sentenced to 1 month and
1 day of arresto mayor and to pay damages to the offended party
in the sum of P20.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency. On the same day he began to serve his sentence and
has fully served the same.
However, Balaba's injuries did not heal within the period
estimated, and so on February 20, 1957, the Provincial Fiscal
filed an information against the accused before the Court of First
Instance of Leyte, charging him of serious physical injuries. The
information alleges that the wounds inflicted by the accused on
Isidro Balaba require medical attendance and incapacitated him
for a period of from 1 months to 2 months. After trial the
accused was found guilty of serious physical injuries and
sentenced in the manner indicated in first paragraph hereof. This
is the decision now sough to be set aside and reversed in this
appeal.
The only question for resolution by this Court whether the
prosecution and conviction of Balaba for less serious physical
injuries is a bar to the second prosecution for serious physical
injuries.
Two conflicting doctrines on double jeopardy have been
enunciated by this Court, one in the cases of People vs. Tarok,
73 Phil., 260 and People vs. Villasis, 81 Phil., 881, and the other,
in the cases of Melo vs. People, 85 Phil., 766, People vs.
Manolong, 85 Phil., 829 and People vs. Petilla, 92 Phil., 395.
But in Melo vs. People, supra, we expressly repealed our ruling
in the case of People vs. Tarok, supra, and followed in the case
of People vs. Villasis, supra. In the Melo vs. People case, we
stated the ruling to be that:
. . . Stating it in another form, the rule is that "where after the
first prosecution a new fact supervenes for which the defendant
is responsible, which changes the character of the offense and,
together with the facts existing at the time, constitutes a new and
distinct offense" (15 Am. Jur., 66), the accused cannot be said
to be in second jeopardy if indicted for the new offense. (85
Phil., 769-770).
Do the facts in the case at bar justify the application of the new
ruling? In other words, has a new fact supervened, like death in
the case of Melo vsno. People, which changes the character of
the offense into one which was not in existence at the time the
case for less serious physical injuries was filed? We do not
believe that a new fact supervened, or that a new fact has come
into existence. What happened is that the first physician that
examined the wounds of the offended party certified on
December 10, 1956 that the injury was as follows: "wound,
incised, wrist lateral, right, 3/4 inch long, sutured" and that the
same would take from 10 to 15 days to heal and incapacitated
(the wounded man) for the same period of time from his usual
work (Exh. 3). It was on the basis of this certificate that on
December 8, 1956, defendant-appellant was found guilty of less
serious physical injuries and sentenced to imprisonment of 1
month and 1 day of arresto mayor, etc.
But on January 18, 1957, another physician examined the
offended party, taking an X-ray picture of the arm of the
offended party which had been wounded. The examination
discloses, according to the physician, the following injuries:
Old stab wound 4 inches long. With infection, distal end arm,
right. X-ray plate finding after one month and 12 days
Fracture old oblique, incomplete distal end, radius right, with
slight calus. (Exh. "E").
and the certification is to the effect that treatment will take from
1 months to 2 months barring complications.
Counsel for the appellant claims that no fact had supervened in
the case at bar, as a result of which another offense had been
ommitted. It is argued that the injury and the condition thereof
was the same when the first examination was made on
December 10, 1956, as when the examination was made on
January 18, 1957, and that if any new fact had been disclosed in
the latter examination failure of this new fact to be disclosed in
the previous examination may be attributed to the incompetence
on the part of the examining physician. We find much reason in
this argument. What happened is no X-ray examination of the
wounded hand was made during the first examination, which
was merely superficial. The physician who made the first
examination could not have seen the fracture at the distal end of
the right arm, and this could only be apparent or visible by X-
ray photography.
Under the circumstances above indicated, we are inclined to
agree with the contention made on behalf of appellant that no
new supervening fact has existed or occurred, which has
transformed the offense from less serious physical injuries to
serious physical injuries.
But the Solicitor General cites the case of People vs. Manolong,
supra, and argues that our ruling in said case should apply to the
case at bar, for the reason that in the said case the first crime
with which the accused was charged was less serious physical
injuries and the second one was serious physical injuries and yet
we held that there was no jeopardy. We have carefully examined
this case and have found that the first examination made of the
offended party showed injuries which would take from 20 to 30
days to heal, whereas the subsequent examination disclosed that
the wound of the offended party would require medical
attendance and incapacitate him for labor for a period of 90 days,
"causing deformity and the loss of the use of said member". No
finding was made in the first examination that the injuries had
caused deformity and the loss of the use of the right hand. As
nothing was mentioned in the first medical certificate about the
deformity and the loss of the use of the right hand, we presume
that such fact was not apparent or could not have been
discernible at the time the first examination was made. The
course (not the length), of the healing of an injury may not be
determined before hand; it can only be definitely known after
the period of healing has ended. That is the reason why the court
considered that there was a supervening fact occurring since the
filing of the original information.

But such circumstances do not exist in the case at bar. If the X-

ray examination discloses the existence of a fracture on January
17, 1957, that fracture must have existed when the first
examination was made on December 10, 1956. There is,
therefore, no now or supervening fact that could be said to have
developed or arisen since the filing of the original action, which
would justify the application of the ruling enunciated by us in
the cases of Melo vs. People and People vs. Manolong, supra.
We attribute the new finding of fracture, which evidently
lengthened the period of healing of the wound, to the very
superficial and inconclusive examination made on December
10, 1956. Had an X-ray examination taken at the time, the
fracture would have certainly been disclosed. The wound
causing the delay in healing was already in existence at the time
of the first examination, but said delay was caused by the very
superficial examination then made. As we have stated, we find
therefore that no supervening fact had occurred which justifies
the application of the rule in the case of Melo vs. People and
People vs. Manolong, for which reason we are constrained to
apply the general rule of double jeopardy.

We take this opportunity to invite the attention of the

prosecuting officers that before filing informations for physical
injuries, thorough physical and medical examinations of the
injuries should first be made to avoid instances, like the present,
where by reason of the important Constitutional provision of
double jeopardy, the accused can not be held to answer for the
graver offense committed.

The decision appealed from is hereby reversed. The judgment of

conviction is set aside and the defendant-appellant acquitted of
the charge of serious physical injuries. Without costs.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo,

Concepcion, Endencia, Barrera and Gutierrez David, JJ.,
concur.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-29270 November 23, 1971
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
RODRIGO YORAC, defendant-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant
Solicitor General
Pacifico P. de Castro and Solicitor Pedro A. Ramirez for
plaintiff- appellant.
Vicente F. Delfin for defendant-appellee.
FERNANDO, J.:
The constitutional right not to be put twice in jeopardy for the
same offense 1 was the basis for a motion to quash filed by the
accused, now appellee, Rodrigo Yorac. He was prosecuted for
frustrated murder arising allegedly from having assaulted,
attacked, and hit with a piece of wood the offended party, for
which he had been previously tried and sentenced for slight
physical injuries, his plea being one of guilt. The later
information for frustrated murder was based on a second
medical certificate after the lapse of one week from the former
previously given by the same physician who, apparently, was
much more thorough the second time, to the effect that the
victim did suffer a greater injury than was at first ascertained.
The lower court, presided by the Honorable Judge Nestor B.
Alampay, considering that there was no, supervening fact that
would negate the defense of double jeopardy, sustained the
motion to quash in an order of June 21, 1968. The People
appealed. As the order complained of is, fully supported by the
latest authoritative ruling of this Tribunal, People v. Buling, 2
we have to affirm.
In the brief for the People of the Philippines, it was shown that
the accused Yorac was charged with slight physical injuries
before the City Court of Bacolod, the offended party being a
certain Lam Hock who, according to the medical certificate
issued in April 10, 1968 by a Dr. Rogelio Zulueta, a resident
physician of the Occidental Negros Provincial Hospital, was
confined "since April 8, 1968 up to the present time for head
injury." 3 Then came a plea of guilty by the accused on April
16, 1968 resulting in his being penalized to suffer ten days of
arresto menor. He started serving his sentence forthwith. On
April 18, 1968, the provincial fiscal filed an information, this
time in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental,
charging the same defendant with frustrated murder arising from
the same act against the aforesaid victim Lam Hock upon
another medical certificate dated April 17, 1968 issued by the
same Dr. Zulueta. In the medical certificate of April 17, 1968, it
was made to appear that the confinement of the offended party
in the hospital was the result of: "1. Contusion with lacerated
wound 4 inches parieto-occipital region scalp mid portion. 2.
Cerebral concussion, moderately severe, secondary." 4
Moreover, it further contained a statement that the X-ray finding
did not yield any "radiographic evidence of fracture." The
healing period barring complications, was declared to be from
eighteen to twenty-one days. 5
Afterwards, a motion to quash was filed by the accused on June
10, 1968 on the ground that, having been previously convicted
of slight physical injuries by the City Court of Bacolod and
having already served the penalty imposed on him for the very
same offense, the prosecution for frustrated murder arising out
of the same act committed against the same offended party, the
crime of slight physical injuries necessarily being included in
that of frustrated murder, he would be placed in second jeopardy
if indicted for the new offense. 6 In its well-reasoned resolution
of June 21, 1968 granting the motion to quash and ordering the
dismissal of a criminal case for frustrated murder against the
accused, Judge Alampay relied on People v. Buling which, in
his opinion, A motion for reconsideration being unavailing, an
appeal was elevated to us.
As succinctly set forth in the brief of the People of the
Philippines: "The sole issue in this case is whether the
defendant, who had already been convicted of slight physical
injuries before the City Court of Bacolod for injuries inflicted
upon Lam Hock, and had served sentence therefore, may be
prosecuted anew for frustrated murder for the same act
committed against the same person." 7 The position taken by the
appellant is in the affirmative but, as indicated at the outset, the
controlling force of People v. Buling would preclude us from
reversing the resolution of Judge Alampay.
1. The Constitution, to repeat, is quite explicit: "No
person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense. As Justice Laurel made clear in an address as delegate
before the Constitutional Convention, such a provision finds its
origin" from the days when sanguinary punishments were
frequently resorted to by despots." 9 A defendant in a criminal
case should therefore, according to him, be adjudged either
guilty or not guilty and thereafter left alone in peace, in the latter
case the State being precluded from taking an appeal. 10 It is in
that sense that the right against being twice put in jeopardy is
considered as possessing many features in common with the rule
of finality in civil cases. For the accused is given assurance that
the matter is closed, enabling him to plan his, future accordingly,
protecting him from continued distress, not to mention saving
both him and the state from the expenses incident to redundant
litigation. There is likewise the observation that this
constitutional guarantee helps to equalize the adversary
capabilities of two grossly mismatched litigants, a poor and
impecunious defendant hardly in a position to keep on
shouldering the costs of a suit.
Then, as a member of the Supreme Court, Justice Laurel had the
first opportunity to give meaning to what, under the
Constitution, should be considered "the same offense." In the
case of People v. Tarok, decided in 1941, 11 the then
comparatively new Rules of Court in its Section 9 of Rule 113
speaks of a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged
after a defendant shall have been convicted or acquitted or the
case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
express consent, "or for any attempt to commit the same or
frustration thereof or for, any offense which necessarily includes
or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former
complaint or information." 12
In the Tarok case, the conviction for parricide of the accused
was sought to be set aside, as previously he had been indicted
for the crime of serious physical injuries, to which he had
pleaded guilty. He was sentenced and was actually incarcerated
by virtue of such penalty imposed. The offended party was his
wife whom he hacked with bolo, his ire being aroused by certain,
remarks made her. While he was thus serving sentence, the
victim died resulting in the new prosecution for parricide of
which he was convicted. On appeal to this Court, it was decided
over the dissents of the then Justice Moran and Justice Diaz that
the offense of serious physical injury of which he was found
guilty being included in parricide his previous conviction was a
bar to such subsequent prosecution for the more serious crime.
The lower court judgement of conviction was thus reversed.
According to Justice Laurel who spoke for the Court: "To our
mind, the principle embodied in the New Rules of Court is a
clear expression of selection of rule amidst conflicting theories.
We take the position that when we amended section 26 of
General Orders No. 58 by providing that the conviction or
acquittal of the defendant or the dismissal of the case shall be a
bar to another prosecution for any offense not only necessarily
therein included but which necessarily includes the offense
charged in the former complaint or information, we meant what
we have, in plain language, stated. We certainly did not mean to
engage in the simple, play of words." 13
2. Such a ruling was however re-examined and set aside
in Melo v. People, 14 where it was held that an accused who
pleaded guilty to the offense of frustrated homicide, the
offended party thereafter dying in the evening of the same day,
could not rely on a plea of double jeopardy if, as a result thereof,
the information was amended to charge him with homicide. 15
As was clarified in the opinion of this Court through the then
Chief Justice Moran, one of the dissenters in the Tarok case:
"This rule of identity does not apply, however, when the second
offense was not in existence at the time of the first prosecution,
for the simple reason that in such case there is no possibility for
the accused, during the first prosecution, to be convicted for an
offense that was then inexistent. Thus, where the accused was
charged with physical injuries and after conviction the injured
person dies, the charge for homicide against the same accused
does not put him twice in jeopardy." 16 Stated differently, if
after the first prosecution "a new fact supervenes on which
defendant may be held liable, resulting in altering the character
of the crime and giving rise to a new and distinct offense, "the
accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if indicted for
the new offense." 17 It is noteworthy, however, that in the Melo
ruling, there was a reiteration of what was so emphatically
asserted by Justice Laurel in the Tarok case in these words: "As
the Government cannot begin with the highest, and then down
step by step, bringing the man into jeopardy for every dereliction
included therein, neither can it begin the lowest and ascend to
the highest with precisely the same result." 18
3. There is then the indispensable requirement of the
existence of "a new fact [which] supervenes for which the
defendant is responsible" changing the character of the crime
imputed to him and together with the facts existing previously
constituting a new and distinct offense. The conclusion reached
in People v. Buling, 19 the latest case in point relied upon by
Judge Alampay in the resolution no appeal, was thus,
predictable. As set forth in the opinion of Justice Labrador in the
case, there was a medical certification that the wounds for which
the accused Buenaventura as first prosecuted for less serious
physical injuries would require medical attendance from a
period of from ten days to fifteen days. He pleaded guilty and
on December 8, 1956, sentenced by the Justice of the Peace of
Cabalian Leyte, to one month and one day of arresto mayor. He
started serving his sentence on the same day. On January 18,
1957, however, another physician examined the offended party
and with the use of an X-ray apparatus, certified that he did
suffer a fracture requiring a treatment of from one and one-half
months to two and one half months, barring complications. As a
result, on February 20, 1957, an information was filed against
the same accused, this time before the Court of First Instance of
Leyte, charging him with serious physical injuries. He stood trial
and was found guilty of such an offense and sentenced to
imprisonment of four months of arresto mayor as minimum to
one year of prision correccional as maximum. On appeal to this
Court, his invocation of the defense of double jeopardy struck a
responsive chord, and he was acquitted.
4. The opinion of Justice Labrador explained with clarity
why the constitutional right against being put twice in jeopardy
was a bar to the second prosecution. Thus: "If the X-ray
examination discloses the existence of a fracture on January 17,
1957, that fracture must have existed when the first examination
was made on December 10, 1956. There is therefore, no view or
supervening fact that could be said to have developed or arisen
since the filing of the original action, which would justify the
application of the ruling enunciated by us in the cases if Melo
vs. People and People vs. Manolong ... . We attribute the new
finding of fracture, which evidently lengthened the period of
healing of the wound, to the very superficial and inconclusive
examination made on December 10, 1956. Had an X-ray
examination been taken at the time, the fracture would have
certainly been disclosed. The wound causing the delay in
healing was already in existence at the time of the first
examination, but said delay was, caused by the very superficial
examination then made. As we have stated, we find therefore
that no supervening fact had occurred which justifies the
application of the rule in the case of Melo vs. People and People
vs. Manolong for which reason we are constrained to apply the
general rule of double jeopardy." 20 It is quite apparent, in the
light of the foregoing, why the lower court, submitting to the
compulsion of the Buling decision, had to sustain the motion to
quash and to dismiss the information against appellee Yorac. No
error could therefore be rightfully imputed to it.
WHEREFORE, the resolution of June 21, 1968 of Judge Nestor
B. Alampay granting the motion to quash, ordering the dismissal
of the case and the immediate release of the appellee Rodrigo
Yorac, is affirmed. Without costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro,
Teehankee, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur. Barredo, J.,
took no part.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-41863 April 22, 1977
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and ASST. PROV'L
FISCAL F. VISITACION, JR., petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE MIDPANTAO L. ADIL, Presiding Judge,
Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch II, and
MARGARITO FAMA, JR., respondents.
Acting Solicitor General Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., Assistant
Solicitor General Alicia V. Sempio-Diy and Solicitor Amado
D. Aquino for petitioners.
Fama & Jimenea for private respondent.
BARREDO, J:
Petition for certiorari; to set aside the orders of respondent judge
dated September 22, 1975 and October 14, 1975 dismissing
Criminal Case No. 5241 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo
against private respondent Margarito Fama, Jr., said dismissal
being predicated on the ground of double jeopardy, in view of
the dismissal of a previous charge of slight physical injuries
against the same respondent for the same incident by the
Municipal Court of Janiuay, Iloilo in Criminal Case No. 3335,
notwithstanding that in the information in the first-mentioned
case, it was alleged that the injuries sustained by the offended
party, aside from possibly requiring medical attendance from 6
to 9 days barring complications", as was alleged in the
information in Criminal Case No. 3335, had left "a permanent
sear and deform(ed) the right face of (said offended party)
Miguel Viajar."
The first criminal complaint filed against respondent Fama Jr.
on April 15, 1975 (Case No. 3335) was as follows:
That at about 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon of April 12, 1975, at
Aquino Nobleza St., Municipality of January, Province of Iloilo,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court
the above-named accused, while armed with a piece of stone,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, assault,
attack and use personal violence upon one Miguel Viajar by then
hurling the latter with a stone, hitting said Miguel Viajar on the
right cheek, thereby inflicting physical injuries which would
have required and will require medical attendance for a period
from 5 to 9 days barring complication as per medical certificate
of the physician hereto attached.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Pp. 93-94, Record)
Arraigned on July 7, 1975, the accused entered a plea of not
guilty.
Meanwhile, on June 8, 1975, complainant Viajar filed a letter-
complaint with the Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo charging Atty.
Alfredo Fama, Raul Fama and herein respondent Margarito
Fama, Jr. with serious physical injuries arising from the same
incident alleged in above Criminal Case No. 3335. After
conducting a preliminary investigation, under date of July 28,
1975, the Fiscal filed in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo an
information, but only against respondent Fama Jr., (Case No.
5241) for serious physical injuries as follows:
That on or about April 12, 1975, in the Municipality of January,
Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Court, the said accused, with deliberate intent, and without any
justifiable motive, armed with pieces of stone did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and throw
pieces of stone at Miguel Viajar, hitting him on the lower right
eye which would heal from five (5) to nine (9) days barring
complications but leaving a permanent scar and deforming on
the right face of said Miguel Viajar.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Pp. 94-95, Record)
On August 1, 1975, Fama Jr. filed an urgent motion to defer
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 5241, claiming that since he
was already charged and pleaded not guilty in Criminal Case
No. 3335, he would be in double jeopardy, if Case No. 5241
were to be prosecuted. This motion was opposed by the Fiscal
and the Court required both parties to file their respective
memorandum on the issue of double jeopardy.
In the meantime, the Fiscal after filing Case No. 5241, sought
the dismissal of Case No. 3335, but the Municipal Court did not
act on said motion. Instead, the case was set for hearing, and in
view of the postponements asked by the Fiscal in order to await
the resolution of the issue of double jeopardy in Case No. 5241,
on September 11, 1975, the following order was entered:
Under our democratic and constituted system of government
litigants before our courts of justice, plaintiffs and defendants,
complainants and accused are entitled to the equal protection of
our laws. More is an accused, the trial of his case has been
repeatedly postponed for several times by this Court in the
exercise of its sound discretion at the instance of the
prosecution. So, when this case was called for hearing on the
afternoon of September 1, 1975 the accused through counsel
vigorously objected to another postponement and moved for the
dismissal of the case against him. To grant another
postponement as sought by the Fiscal against the vehement,
strong and vigorous objection of the accused is to the mind of
the Court, no longer an exercise of sound discretion consistent
with justice and fairness but a clear and palpable abuse of
discretion amounting to a serious denial to, and a grave violation
of, the right of the accused to a speedy trial to which he is
rightfully entitled to under Section 16 of Article IV, (Bill of
Rights) of the Philippine Constitution.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the above-entitled case is
hereby ordered dismissed. The Cash Bond posted by the accused
is hereby ordered cancelled and released (Pp. 96-97, Record.)
Whereupon, on even date, Fama Jr. filed an addendum to his
memorandum in Case No. 5241 inviting attention to the above
dismissal order and reiterating his theory of double jeopardy. On
September 22, 1975, respondent court issued the impugned
order sustaining the contention of double jeopardy and
dismissing Case No. 5241. The prosecution's motion for
reconsideration was denied in the other assailed order of
October 14, 1975, respondent judge relying on the ruling laid
down in Peo. vs. Silva, 4 SCRA 95.
In brief, what happened here was that when Case No. 3335 was
filed in the inferior court of January, the charge against Fama Jr.
had to be for slight physical injuries only, because according to
the certification of the attending physician, the injuries suffered
by the offended party Viajar, would require medical attendance
from 5 to 9 days only "baring complications." Indeed, when the
complaint was filed on April 15, 1975, only three days had
passed since the incident in which the injuries were sustained
took place, and there were yet no indications of a graver injury
or consequence to be suffered by said offended party. Evidently,
it was only later, after Case No. 3335 had already been filed and
the wound on the face of Viajar had already healed, that the
alleged deformity became apparent.
ACCORDINGLY, the orders of September 22, 1975 and
October 14, 1975 herein complained of are hereby set aside and
respondent court is ordered to proceed with the trial and
judgment thereof according to law. Costs against private
respondent Fama Jr.
Fernando (Chairman), Antonio, Aquino and Concepcion, Jr., JJ.,
concur.

Now, expert evidence is not needed for anyone to understand

that the scar or deformity that would be left by a wound on the
face of a person cannot be pre-determined. On the other hand,
whether or not there is actually a deformity on the face of Viajar
is a question of fact that has to be determined by the trial court.
The only issue We are to resolve here is whether or not the
additional allegation of deformity in the information in Case No.
5241 constitutes a supervening element which should take this
case out of the ruling in People vs. Silva cited by respondent
court.

In Silva, there was no question that the extent of the damage to

property and physical injuries suffered by the offended parties
therein were already existing and known when the prior minor
case was prosecuted, What is controlling then in the instant case
is Melo vs. People, 85 Phil. 766, in which it was held:

This rule of identity does not apply, however, when the second
offense was not in existence at the time of the first prosecution,
for the simple reason that in such case there is no possibility for
the accused during the first prosecution, to be convicted for an
offense that was then inexistent Thus, where the accused was
charged with physical injuries and after conviction the injured
dies, the charge of homicide against the same accused does not
put him twice in jeopardy.

So also is People vs. Yorac, 42 SCRA, 230, to the following

effect:

Stated differently, if after the first. prosecution 'a new fact

supervenes on which defendant may be held liable, resulting in
altering the character of the crime and giving rise to a new and
distinct offense, 'the accused cannot be said to be in second
jeopardy if indicted for the new offense.

In People vs. Buling, 107 Phil. 112, We explained how a

deformity may be considered as a supervening fact. Referring to
the decision in People vs. Manolong, 85 Phil. 829, We held:

No finding was made in the first examination that the injuries

had caused deformity and the loss of the use of the right hand.
As nothing was mentioned in the first medical certificate about
the deformity and the loss of the use of the right hand, we
presumed that such fact was not apparent or could have been
discernible at the time the first examination was made. The
course (not the length) of the healing of an injury may not be
determined before hand; it can only be definitely known after
the period of healing has ended. That is the reason why the court
considered that there was a supervening fact occuring since the
filing of the original information.

In other words, in the peculiar circumstances of this case, the

plea of double jeopardy of private respondent Fama Jr., cannot
hold. It was, therefore, a grave error correctible by certiorari for
respondent court to have dismissed Criminal Case No. 5241.

1Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 166414 October 22, 2014
GODOFREDO ENRILE AND DR. FREDERICK ENRILE,
Petitioners,
vs.
HON. DANILO A. MANALASTAS (AS PRESIDING
JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MALOLOS
BULACAN, BR. VII), HON. ERANIO G. CEDILLO, SR.,
(AS PRESIDING JUDGE, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT
OF MEYCAUAYAN, BULACAN, BR.1) AND PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The remedy against the denial of a motion to quash is for the
movant accused to enter a plea, go to trial, and should the
decision be adverse, reiterate on appeal from the final judgment
and assign as error the denial of the motion to quash. The denial,
being an interlocutory order, is not appealable, and may not be
the subject of a petition for certiorari because of the availability
of other remedies in the ordinary course of law.
Antecedents
Petitioners Godofredo Enrile and Dr. Frederick Enrile come to
the Court on appeal, seeking to reverse and undo the adverse
resolutions promulgated on August 31, 20041 and December 21,
2004,2 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) respectively
dismissed their petition for certiorari and prohibition (assailing
the dismissal of their petition for certiorariby the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 7, in Malolos, Bulacan, presided by RTC
Judge Danilo A. Manalastas, to assail the denial of their motions
to quash the two informations charging themwith less serious
physical injuries by the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Meycauayan, Bulacan), and denied their motion for
reconsideration anent such dismissal.
The mauling incident involving neighbors that transpired on
January 18, 2003 outside the house of the petitioners in St.
Francis Subdivision, Barangay Pandayan, Meycauayan Bulacan
gave rise to the issue subject of this appeal. Claiming themselves
to be the victims in that mauling, Josefina Guinto Morano,3
Rommel Morano and Perla Beltran Morano charged the
petitioners and one Alfredo Enrile4 in the MTC with frustrated
homicide (victim being Rommel) in Criminal Case No. 03-275;
with less serious physical injuries (victim being Josefina) in
Criminal Case No. 03-276; and with less serious physical
injuries (victim being Perla) in Criminal Case No. 03-277, all of
the MTC of Meycauayan, Bulacan on August 8, 2003 after the
parties submitted their respective affidavits, the MTC issued its
joint resolution,5 whereby it found probable cause against the
petitioners for less serious physical injuries in Criminal Case
No. 03-276 and Criminal Case No. 03-277, and set their
arraignment on September 8, 2003. On August 19, 2003, the
petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the joint resolution,
arguing that the complainants had not presented proof of their
having been given medical attention lasting 10 days or longer,
thereby rendering their charges of less serious physical injuries
dismissible; and that the two cases for less serious physical
injuries, being necessarily related to the case of frustrated
homicide still pending in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor,
should not be governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure.6
On November 11, 2003, the MTC denied the petitioners motion
for reconsideration because the grounds of the motion had
already been discussed and passed upon in the resolution sought
to be reconsidered; and because the cases were governed by the
Rules on Summary Procedure, which prohibited the motion for
reconsideration.7 Thereafter, the petitioners presented a
manifestation with motion to quash and a motion for the
deferment of the arraignment.8
On February 11, 2004, the MTC denied the motion to quash, and
ruled that the cases for less serious physical injuries were
covered by the rules on ordinary procedure; and reiterated the
arraignment previously scheduled on March 15, 2004.9 It
explained its denial of the motion to quash in the following
terms, to wit:
xxxx
As to the Motion to Quash, this Court cannot give due course to
said motion. A perusal of the records shows that the grounds
and/or issues raised therein are matters of defense that can be
fully ventilated in a full blown trial on the merits.
Accordingly, Criminal Cases Nos. 03-276 and 03-277 both for
Less Serious Physical Injuries are hereby ordered tried under the
ordinary procedure.
The Motion to Quash is hereby DENIED for reasons aforestated.
Meanwhile, set these cases for arraignment on March 15, 2004
as previously scheduled.
SO ORDERED.10
Still, the petitioners sought reconsideration of the denial of the
motion to quash, but the MTC denied their motion on March 25,
2004.11
Unsatisfied, the petitioners commenced a special civil action for
certiorari assailing the order dated February 11, 2004 denying
their motion to quash, and the order dated March 25, 2004
denying their motion for reconsideration. The special civil
action for certiorari was assigned to Branch 7, presided by RTC
Judge Manalastas.
On May 25, 2004, the RTC Judge Manalastas dismissed the
petition for certiorari because:
As could be gleaned from the order of the public respondent
dated February 11, 2004, the issuesraised in the motion toquash
are matters of defense that could only be threshed outin a full
blown trial on the merits. Indeed, proof of the actual healing
period of the alleged injuries of the private complainants could
only be established in the trial of the cases filed against herein
petitioners by means of competent evidence x x x. On the other
hand, this court is likewise not in a position, not being a trier of
fact insofar as the instant petition is concerned, to rule on the
issue as to whether or not there was probable cause to prosecute
the petitioners for the alleged less physical injuries with which
they stand charged. x x x.
All things considered, it would be premature to dismiss, the
subject criminal cases filed against the herein petitioners when
the basis thereof could be determined only after trial on the
merits. x x x.12
The petitioners moved for the reconsideration, but the RTC
denied their motion on July 9, 2004.13
The petitioners next went to the CA via a petition for certiorari
and prohibition to nullify the orders issued by the RTC on May
25, 2004 and July 9, 2004, averring grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the
RTC. They urged the dismissal of the criminal cases on the same
grounds they advanced in the RTC.
However, on August 31, 2004, the CA promulgated its assailed
resolution dismissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition
for being the wrong remedy, the proper remedy being an appeal;
and ruling that they should have filed their notice of appealon or
before August 18, 2004 due to their receiving the order of July
9, 2004 on August 3, 2004.14
On December 21, 2004, the CA denied the petitioners motion
for reconsideration.15
Issues
In this appeal, the petitioners submit that:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
UPHOLDING THE TRIAL COURTS RULING DENYING
THE PETITIONERS' MOTION TO QUASH THE
COMPLAINTS DESPITE THE CLEAR AND PATENT
SHOWING THAT BOTH COMPLAINTS, ON THEIR FACE,
LACKED ONE OF THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE
ALLEGED CRIME OF LESS SERIOUS PHYSICAL
INJURIES.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
RULING THAT THE INJURIES SUSTAINED BY THE
PRIVATE COMPLAINANTS WERE NOT PERPETRATED
BY THE PETITIONERS.16
Ruling of the Court
The CA did not commit any reversible errors.
Firstly, considering that the certiorari case in the RTC was an
original action, the dismissal of the petition for certiorarion May
25, 2004, and the denial of the motion for reconsideration onJuly
9, 2004, were in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. As such,
the orders were final by reason of their completely disposing of
the case, leaving nothing more to be done by the RTC.17 The
proper recourse for the petitioners should be an appeal by notice
of appeal,18 taken within 15 days from notice of the denial of
the motion for reconsideration.19
Yet, the petitioners chose to assail the dismissal by the RTC
through petitions for certiorari and prohibition in the CA, instead
of appealing by notice of appeal. Such choice was patently
erroneous and impermissible, because certiorari and prohibition,
being extra ordinary reliefs to address jurisdictional errors of a
lower court, were not available to them. Worthy to stress is that
the RTC dismissed the petition for certiorari upon its finding that
the MTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in denying the
petitioners motion to quash. In its view, the RTC considered the
denial of the motion to quash correct, for it would be premature
and unfounded for the MTC to dismiss the criminal cases against
the petitioners upon the supposed failure by the complainants to
prove the period of their incapacity or of the medical attendance
for them. Indeed, the timeand the occasion to establish the
duration of the incapacity or medical attendance would only be
at the trial on the merits.
Secondly, the motion to quash is the mode by which an accused,
before entering his plea, challenges the complaint or information
for insufficiency on its facein point of law, or for defects
apparent on its face.20 Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court
enumerates the grounds for the quashal of the complaint or
information, as follows: (a) the facts charged do not constitute
an offense; (b) the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over
the offense charged; (c) the court trying the case has no
jurisdiction over the person of the accused; (d) the officer who
filed the information had no authority to do so; (e) the complaint
or information does not conform substantially to the prescribed
form; (f) more than one offense is charged except when a single
punishment for various offenses is prescribed by law; (g) the
criminal action or liability has been extinguished; (h) the
complaint or information contains averments which, if true,
would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and (i) the
accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the
offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent.
According to Section 6,21 Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, the
complaint or information is sufficient if it states the names of the
accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the
acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the
name of the offended party; the approximate date of the
commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was
committed. The fundamental test in determining the sufficiency
of the averments in a complaint or information is, therefore,
whether the facts alleged therein, if hypothetically admitted,
constitute the elements of the offense.22
By alleging in their motion to quashthat both complaints should
be dismissed for lack of one of the essential elements of less
serious physical injuries, the petitioners were averring that the
facts charged did not constitute offenses. To meet the test of
sufficiency, therefore, it is necessary to refer to the law
definingthe offense charged, which,in this case, is Article 265 of
the Revised Penal Code, which pertinently states:
Article 265. Less serious physical injuries Any person who
shall inflict upon another physical injuries x x x which shall
incapacitate the offended party for labor for ten days or more, or
shall require medical assistance for the same period, shall be
guilty of less serious physical injuries and shall suffer the
penalty of arresto mayor.
x x x x.
Based on the law, the elements of the crime of less serious
physical injuries are, namely: (1) that the offender inflicted
physical injuries upon another; and (2) that the physical injuries
inflicted either incapacitated the victim for labor for 10 days or
more, or the injuries required medical assistance for more than
10 days.
Were the elements of the crime sufficiently averred in the
complaints? To answer this query, the Court refersto the
averments of the complaints themselves, to wit:
Criminal Case No. 03-276
That on the 18th day of January 2003, at around 7:30 in the
evening more or less, in Brgy. Pandayan (St. Francis Subd.),
Municipality of Meycauayan, Province of Bulacan, Republic of
the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above named accused motivated by anger by
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping with another did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and strike the face of one JOSEFINA GUINTO
MORAO, thereby inflicting upon his (sic) physical injuries
that will require a period of 10 to 12 days barring healing and
will incapacitate his customary labor for the same period of time
attached Medical Certificate (sic).
CONTRARY TO LAW.23
Criminal Case No. 03-277
That on the 18th day of January 2003, at around 7:30 in the
evening more or less, in Brgy. Pandayan (St. Francis Subd.),
Municipality of Meycauayan, Province of Bulacan, Republic of
the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable
Court, the above named accused MOTIVATED by anger did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and right and give hitting her head against pavement of
one PERLA BELTRAN MORAO inflicting the latter physical
injuries and will require Medical Attendance for a period of 12
to 15 days barring unforeseen complication as per Medical
Certificate hereto attached.
CONTRARY TO LAW.24
The aforequoted complaints bear out that the elements of less
serious physical injuries were specifically averred therein. The
complaint in Criminal Case No. 03-276 stated that: (a) the
petitioners "wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault
and strike the face of one JOSEFINA GUINTO MORAO;"
and (b) the petitioners inflicted physical injuries upon the
complainant "that will require a period of 10 to 12 days barring
healing and will incapacitate his customary labor for the same
period of time;" while that in CriminalCase No. 03-277 alleged
that: (a) the petitioners "wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and right and give hitting her head against
pavement of one PERLA BELTRAN MORAO;" and (b) the
petitioners inflicted upon the complainant "physical injuries
[that] will require Medical Attendance for a period of 12 to 15
days barring unforeseen complication."
In the context of Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court,25
the complaints sufficiently charged the petitioners with less
serious physical injuries. Indeed, the complaints onlyneeded to
aver the ultimate facts constituting the offense, not the details of
why and how the illegal acts allegedly amounted to undue injury
or damage, for such matters, being evidentiary, were appropriate
for the trial. Hence, the complaints were not quashable.
In challenging the sufficiency of the complaints, the petitioners
insist that the "complaints do not provide any evidence/s that
would tend to establish and to show that the medical attendance
rendered on private complainants actually and in fact lasted for
a period exceeding ten (10) days;" and the medical certificates
attached merely stated that "the probable disability period of
healing is 10 to 12 days, for Josefina G. Morano, and, 12-15
days, for Perla B. Morano, hence, the findings of the healing
periods were merely speculations, surmises and conjectures
."They insist that the "private complainants should have
presented medical certificates that would show the number of
days rendered for medication considering that they filed their
complaint on March 15, 2003 or about two (2) months after the
alleged incident."26
The petitioners insistence is utterly bereft of merit.1wphi1
As the MTC and RTC rightly held, the presentation of the
medical certificates to prove the duration of the victims need
for medical attendance or of their incapacity should take place
only at the trial, not before or during the preliminary
investigation. According to Cinco v. Sandiganbayan,27 the
preliminary investigation, which is the occasion for the
submission of the parties respective affidavits, counter-
affidavits and evidence to buttress their separate allegations, is
merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering
whether a person may be reasonably charged with a crime, to
enable the prosecutor to prepare the information.28 It is not yet
a trial on the merits, for its only purpose is to determine whether
a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause
to believe that the accused is guilty thereof.29 The scope of the
investigation does not approximate that of a trial before the
court; hence, what is required is only that the evidence be
sufficient to establish probable causethat the accused committed
the crime charged, not that all reasonable doubtof the guilt of the
accused be removed.30
We further agree with the RTCs observation that "the issues
raised in the motion to quash are matters of defense that could
only be threshed out in a full blown trial on the merits. Indeed,
proof of actual healing period of the alleged injuries of the
private complainant could only be established in the trial of the
cases filed against herein petitioners by means of competent
evidence, and to grant the main prayer of the instant petition for
the dismissal of the criminal cases against them for less serious
physical injuries is to prevent the trial court to hear and receive
evidence in connection with said cases and to render judgments
thereon. x x x All things considered, it would be premature to
dismiss the subject criminal cases filed against the herein
petitioners when the basis thereof could be determined only after
trial of the merits."31
And, lastly, in opting to still assail the denial of the motion to
quash by the MTC by bringing the special civil action for
certiorariin the RTC, the petitioners deliberately disregarded the
fundamental conditions for initiating the special civil action for
certiorari. These conditions were, firstly, the petitioners must
show thatthe respondent trial court lacked jurisdiction or
exceeded it, or gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction; and,secondly, because the denial was
interlocutory, they must show that there was no plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.32
The petitioners disregard of the fundamental conditions
precluded the success of their recourse. To start with, the
petitioners did not show that the MTC had no jurisdiction, or
exceeded its jurisdiction in denying the motion to quash, or
gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in its denial. That showing was the door that would
have opened the way to their success with the recourse. Yet, the
door remained unopened to them because the denial by the MTC
of the motion to quash was procedurally and substantively
correct because the duration of the physical incapacity or
medical attendance should be dealt with only during the trial on
the merits, not at the early stage of dealing with and resolving
the motion to quash. As to the second condition, the fact that the
denial was interlocutory, not a final order, signified that the
MTC did not yet completely terminate its proceedings in the
criminal cases. The proper recourse of the petitioners was to
enter their pleas as the accused, go to trial in the MTC, and
should the decision of the MTC be adverse to them in the end,
reiterate the issue on their appeal from the judgment and assign
as error the unwarranted denial of their motion to quash.33
Certiorari was not available to them in the RTC because they
had an appeal, or another plain, speedy or adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on

certiorari; AFFIRMS the resolutions promulgated on August 31,
2004 and December 21, 2004; and ORDERS the petitioners to
pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 172608 February 6, 2007

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
BERNARD MAPALO, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

In its Decision1 dated 27 October 2004, the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 32 of Agoo, La Union, in Criminal Case No. A-
2871, found appellant Bernard Mapalo guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Murder, and imposed upon him the penalty
of reclusion perpetua. On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered
a Decision2 dated 21 November 2005, modifying the Decision
of the RTC, and finding Bernard Mapalo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Murder.
The Indictments
Appellant, together with Peter Doe, John Doe and Peter Doe, Jr.,
was charged before the RTC of Agoo, La Union with the crime
of Murder, said to have been committed as follows:
That on or about the 13th day of February, 1994, in the
Municipality of Aringay, Province of La Union, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, with intent to kill and being then armed with
lead pipes and bladed weapons and conspiring, confederating
and mutually helping each other, did then and there by means of
treachery and with evident premeditation and taking advantage
of their superior strength, wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and use personal violence on one Manuel
Piamonte y Ugay by clubbing him with the said pipes and
stabbing him several times with the said bladed weapons, and
thereby inflicting on the aforenamed victim fatal injuries which
were the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the damage
and prejudice of his heirs.
Contrary to law.3
The RTC ordered the issuance of a warrant of arrest for the
apprehension of the appellant. No bail was recommended.4
When the case was called, appellant filed a Motion for
Reinvestigation and Bail, which was granted.
On 27 March 1995, 3rd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Manuel
S. Oliva filed a Motion to Admit Amended Information and for
the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest for the Apprehension of the
Other Accused,5 alleging that a reinvestigation was conducted
and a prima facie case was found against the other accused. It
was prayed that an amended information be admitted and a
warrant of arrest be issued for the apprehension of Alejandro
Fajardo, Jr., Jimmy Frigillana, and Rolando Mapalo alias
"Lando." Finding the Motion to be well-taken, the RTC issued
an Order,6 dated 27 April 1995, admitting the Amended
Information, viz:
The undersigned Assistant Provincial Prosecutor accuses
BERNARD MAPALO, ALEJANDRO FAJARDO, JR.,
JIMMY FRIGILLANA and ROLANDO MAPALO alias Lando
of the crime of MURDER, committed as follows:
That on or about the 13th day of February, 1994, in the
Municipality of Aringay, Province of La Union, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed
accused, with intent to kill and being then armed with lead pipe
and bladed weapons and conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping each other, did then and there by means of treachery and
with evident premeditation and taking advantage of their
superior strength, wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and use personal violence on one Manuel Piamonte y
Ugay by clubbing him with the said pipe and stabbing him
several times with the said bladed weapons, and thereby
inflicting on the aforenamed victim fatal injuries which were the
direct and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and
prejudice of his heirs.7
Consequently, a warrant of arrest was issued for the
apprehension of Alejandro Fajardo, Jr., Jimmy Frigillana, and
Rolando Mapalo alias "Lando." Only Alejandro Fajardo, Jr. was
apprehended; the other two remain at large.
On arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty.8 Thereafter, trial
on the merits commenced.
After the prosecution had rested its case, Alejandro Fajardo, Jr.
filed a Demurrer to Evidence which was granted by the RTC, in
its Order9 dated 5 November 1998, on the ground that the
prosecution did not present any evidence against him. Thus,
only accused Bernard Mapalo proceeded to present his
evidence. He was eventually found guilty.
The Case for the Prosecution
The prosecution presented Calixto Garcia (Garcia) as its lone
eyewitness.
Garcia testified that on 12 February 1994, a pre-Valentine dance
was held in Sitio Baracbac, Brgy. Sta. Cecilia in Aringay, La
Union. He watched the dance, along with the appellant and
Jimmy Frigillana.10 In the early morning of 13 February 1994,
at around 3:00 a.m., a fight erupted between Manuel Piamonte
(Piamonte) and the group of Lando Mapalo,11 Jimmy
Frigillana, and the appellant.12
Garcia further testified that he witnessed the fight from a
distance of more or less five (5) meters. He claimed that he could
see the incident very clearly because of the light at the dancing
hall.13 He saw the appellant club Piamonte with a lead pipe
from behind, hitting him on the right side of the head.14 The
pipe was one and a half (1 and ) feet in length, and one and a
half (1 and ) inches in diameter.15 At that time when the
appellant struck Piamonte with a lead pipe, he saw Jimmy
Frigillana and Lando Mapalo standing in front of Piamonte.
Later, he saw the dead body of Piamonte, which had suffered
multiple stab wounds.16 He saw stab wounds on the left and
right parts of the abdomen, and below the left breast, as well as
small wounds on the front part of his left hip.17 Garcia disclosed
that he neither witnessed how Piamonte was stabbed, nor did he
see the act of stabbing Piamonte.18 He does not know who
stabbed the latter.19 It was only when Piamontes shirt was
removed when he saw stab wounds on the formers dead
body.20
The Case for the Defense
Appellant testified that in the evening of 13 February 1994,21 at
around 9:00 p.m., he, along with his wife, Caridad Mapalo,
entertained several guests at their residence, namely, Crispin
Calderon, Noel Cordero, Ruel Mercado, and Rolando
Mapalo.22 They drank wine.23 Appellant knew that there was a
Valentines Day dance celebration at the dance hall, located
northeast of his house at a distance of about 20-30 meters.24 At
12:30 a.m., after his guests had left the house, he went to
sleep.25 At 3:00 a.m., his wife woke him up and was informed
that somebody had been stabbed. He said he came to know that
Piamonte was the person who was stabbed.26 He added that he
planned to go out of the house, but his wife prevented him from
doing so.27 He, thereafter, returned to his room, and went back
to sleep.28
Corroborating the appellants defense of denial and alibi, his
wife, Caridad Mapalo, narrated that on 13 February 199429 at
8:00 p.m., she served brandy to her husband and their guests at
their residence. The celebration finished at around 12:00
midnight.30 Thereafter, she and her husband went to sleep,
while their guests proceeded to the dance hall. At 3:00 a.m., she
awoke because of a commotion from the dance hall.31 She
described that the dance hall is around 60 to 70 meters,
southwest of their residence.32 She went outside of their house,
and along with her sister-in-law, Marissa Dapit, proceeded to the
edge of the dancing hall.33 She claimed that her husband did not
go out and just stayed at their house.34 She explained that she
and Marissa Dapit went out to see or to know the name of the
person who died at the commotion.35 At the dancing hall, she
saw the body of Piamonte, lying face down.36
The Ruling of the RTC
After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision, dated 27 October 2004,
finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Murder.
It ruled that appellants defense of alibi cannot prevail over the
positive identification of the lone eyewitness. As emphasized by
the RTC, per admission of appellant, the distance between his
house and the dancing hall is only 20 to 30 meters, more or less.
There was no physical impossibility for the appellant to be
present at the scene of the crime. Moreover, it found Garcias
testimony to be consistent and uncontradicted. On the other
hand, the RTC considered the testimony of Caridad Mapalo as
defying the natural course of human reaction and experience.
The RTC found it strange that it was only Caridad Mapalo who
was awakened by the commotion, while the appellant remained
asleep. Learning of the same, Caridad Mapalo exposed herself
to danger by proceeding to the dance hall to see what the
commotion was all about without even informing her husband.
The RTC conjectured that Caridad Mapalo proceeded to the
dance hall not to see what the commotion was all about, but
because she was informed that her husband was involved in a
fight.37
Further, the RTC ruled that conspiracy was established by the
prosecution. According to the RTC, the appellant was clearly
identified by Garcia as the one who struck Piamonte on the head
with a lead pipe, which alone is "sufficient manifestation of a
concerted, common and united design with the other accused to
commit an unlawful and felonious act." The fact that the medical
certificate shows the cause of death as stab wounds was deemed
by the RTC as immaterial, in view of the presence of conspiracy.
The RTC also appreciated the attendance of abuse of superior
strength as a qualifying circumstance, on the rationalization that
the perpetrators were armed with bladed weapons and a lead
pipe that were out of proportion to the unarmed Piamonte.
The decretal portion of the RTC Decision states:
WHEREFORE, the accused BERNARD MAPALO is hereby
found Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
MURDER and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA.
Further, the accused is ordered to pay the heirs of Manuel
Piamonte the amount of Twelve Thousand Seven Hundred
Pesos (P12,700.00) as actual damages. Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) as civil indemnity for the death of Piamonte and
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages.38
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Before the appellate court, appellant challenged the credibility
of the prosecutions lone eyewitness. Appellant similarly
assailed the ruling of the RTC on the ground that it erred in
convicting him despite the failure of the prosecution to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.39
The Court of Appeals found no adequate reason to disturb the
findings of the RTC in weighing the testimony of Garcia. It did
not find significant the alleged inconsistencies in Garcias
affidavits as executed before the investigating police and the
prosecutor.40 The appellate court did not accept the appellants
defense of alibi. The positive identification of the prosecution
witness which was consistent and categorical, and shown to be
without ill-motive, has discredited appellants defense.
The Court of Appeals, however, found reason to modify the
findings of the RTC. It convicted the appellant of frustrated
murder only. It was not convinced that the evidence on record
established conspiracy among the appellant and his co-accused.
The appellate court rationalized that while the evidence shows
that Piamonte sustained stab wounds which caused his death,41
the appellant was never identified as the one who inflicted the
stab wounds on the deceased. According to the appellate court,
the prosecutions evidence only established that the appellant
clubbed Piamonte with a lead pipe. However, the prosecutions
witness did not see the stabbing. He was not able to describe the
particular acts which caused Piamontes death. Hence, it cannot
be inferred from the account of the witness that the appellant and
his co-accused came to an agreement to commit a felony, or that
they decided to commit the same, by concerted acts.42 The
Court of Appeals made the following observations:
In the first place, the killing was the result of a fight that erupted
suddenly during the Valentine dance, which discourages the
conclusion that the killing was planned. Also, the witness did
not see any stabbing. He did not see anyone else perform any act
of stabbing or hitting, other than the appellant delivering blows
with a lead pipe on the victim. There is no proof, therefore, of
any concerted action or common design to kill the victim that
could be the basis for a finding of conspiracy among several
malefactors. Because of this, it could not be said that conspiracy
was proven attendant beyond reasonable doubt.43
In the absence of a conspiracy, the Court of Appeals said that
the appellant could only be held liable for the consequences of
his own criminal act. It ruled that when the appellant hit
Piamonte in the head with the lead pipe, he performed all the
acts that would have brought about the death of the victim.44
Piamontes death however was due to some other supervening
cause, independent of the appellants will.45
The fallo of the Court of Appeals Decision reads, viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the lower courts
Decision is hereby MODIFIED, in that the accused-appellant
Bernard Mapalo is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Frustrated Murder. Accused-appellant is hereby
sentenced to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum to
14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum.

Further, the accused is ordered to pay the heirs of Manuel
Piamonte[,] the amount of Twenty Five Thousand Pesos
(P25,000.00) as temperate damages, Thirty Thousand Pesos
(P30,000.00) as civil indemnity and Thirty Thousand Pesos
(P30,000.00) as moral damages pursuant to prevailing
jurisprudence. (People v. Pacana, 345 SCRA 72 [2000]; People
v. Givera, 349 SCRA 513 [2001]).46
The Issues
Appellant contends that:
I It appears that the accused Bernard Mapalo was being notified
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE
FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO IDENTIFY THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT IN OPEN COURT; and
II
ASSUMING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS
GUILTY, THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
CONVICTING HIM OF FRUSTRATED MURDER INSTEAD
OF FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE.47
The Ruling of the Court
In support of the first assignment of error, appellant raises, for
the first time, the defense that the witness for the prosecution
failed to positively identify him during the trial proceedings.
Citing People v. Galera48 and People v. Hatton,49 appellant
submits that the prosecution failed to discharge its first duty,
which is the identification of the accused as the author of the
crime charged.50 Witness Garcia did not identify the appellant
in open court.
Appellant further posits that Garcia did not deny drinking gin at
around 9:00 p.m. on 13 February 1994 until 3:00 a.m. of the
following day. Garcia was then intoxicated if he had been
drinking hard liquor continuously for six hours. At such point,
he can no longer positively determine a persons identity. It is
argued that the foregoing circumstances create doubts as to the
identity of the appellant as one of the perpetrators of the crime.
We first tackle the issue on the lack of in-court identification.
True that on the matter of identification, the Court in Hatton
said:
More importantly, the accused-appellant was not positively
identified in court. True, his name was referred to by both
Basierto and Ongue in their respective direct testimonies.
However, he was not identified in Court. The failure of the
prosecution witness to positively identify the assailant in court
is fatal to the prosecutions cause. Pre-trial identification is not
sufficient.51
Verily, the records are bereft of proof that there was in-court
identification by the witness Garcia of the appellant. Indeed,
Garcia did not point to the appellant in the courtroom. Such fact
can be gleaned from the pertinent portion of the transcript of
stenographic notes of the trial, reproduced hereunder, as
follows:
Direct-examination by Prosecutor Rudio of the witness Calixto
Garcia
Q Do you know the accused Bernard Mapalo?
A I know, sir.
Q If that accused is inside the courtroom now will you please
stand up and point to him if he is inside the courtroom?
A No, he is not around.
COURT:
Q Was he notified for (sic) todays hearing?
INTERPRETER:
Yes, he signed, sir.
COURT: O R D E R:
for (sic) todays hearing and his wife came to Court and
informed the Honorable Court that her husband could not come
to Court because he is sick.52
The same testimony, however, conspicuously reveals that there
was no identification in open court of the appellant because said
appellant was not present at the time, despite notice, as
according to his wife, he was sick.
In a later case, this Court clarified that a physical courtroom
identification is essential only when there is a question or doubt
on whether the one alleged to have committed the crime is the
same person who is charged in the information and subject of
the trial. In People v. Quezada,53 this Court expounded, thus:
We do not see the absolute need for complainant to point to
appellant in open court as her attacker. While positive
identification by a witness is required by the law to convict an
accused, it need not always be by means of a physical courtroom
identification. As the court held in People v. Paglinawan:
"x x x. Although it is routine procedure for witnesses to point
out the accused in open court by way of identification, the fact
that the witness x x x did not do so in this case was because the
public prosecutor failed to ask her to point out appellant, hence
such omission does not in any way affect or diminish the truth
or weight of her testimony."
In-court identification of the offender is essential only when
there is a question or doubt on whether the one alleged to have
committed the crime is the same person who is charged in the
information and subject of the trial. This is especially true in
cases wherein the identity of the accused, who is a stranger to
the prosecution witnesses, is dubitable. In the present case,
however, there is no doubt at all that the rapist is the same
individual mentioned in the Informations and described by the
victim during the trial. (Emphasis supplied.)54
We do not find herein a case where there is a question or doubt
as to whether the one alleged to have committed the crime is the
same person charged in the information and subject of the trial.
In fact, appellant never denied that he is the person indicted in
the Information, and subject of the proceedings. His denial is
that he did not participate in the commission of the crime.
Hence, in-court identification is not indispensable in the case at
bar.
We are convinced that the identity of the appellant was
sufficiently established by the evidence on record.
The appellant is not a stranger to the witness Garcia. The identity
of the appellant to Garcia does not appear to be controvertible.
In fact, appellant himself admits that he and Garcia are friends.
Thus:
 Q Until now, this Calixto Garcia is your friend?
Cross-examination by Prosecutor Lachica of [appellant] A Yes, sir.
Bernard Mapalo PROSECUTOR LACHICA:
That would be all for the witness.
Q Mr. Witness you said that you were informed by your counsel RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION BY ATTY. RIMANDO:
a while ago that a certain Calixto Garcia testified against you in Q This Calixto Garcia was your guest in that evening in your
this case did I get you right? residence?
A No, sir.
A Yes, sir. Q Is your family close with (sic) this Calixto Garcia?
Q And this Calixto Garica is a resident of the same Barangay as A Yes, sir.56
you are?
A Yes, sir. Moreover, we do not find herein the presence of factors57 that
Q In fact this Calixto Garcia is an acquaintance of yours? could cause the witness Garcia to misidentify the appellant. In
A Yes, sir. People v. Limpangog,58 this Court enumerated several other
Q He is considered a friend? known causes of misidentification, viz:
A Yes, sir I consider him as such.
Q Prior to the incident which happened sometime on February x x x Known causes of misidentification have been identified as
13, 1994, you have never quarreled with this Calixto Garcia? follows:
A No, sir.
Q Even after that incident that happened on February 13, 1994 "Identification testimony has at least three components. First,
you never quarreled with Calixto Garcia? witnessing a crime, whether as a victim or a bystander, involves
A No, sir. perception of an event actually occurring. Second, the witness
Q You know that this Calixto Garcia is not a relative of must memorize details of the event. Third, the witness must be
Piamonte the victim in this case? able to recall and communicate accurately. Dangers of
A I do not know whether he is a relative of the victim or not. unreliability in eyewitness testimony arise at each of these three
Q You know for a fact that Calixto Garcia executed a statement stages, for whenever people attempt to acquire, retain, and
before the police pointing to you or pointing to you as the retrieve information accurately, they are limited by normal
assailant of Paimonte did you come to know that? human fallibilities and suggestive influences."59
A No, sir.
Q You said that you know Calixto Garcia your friend according There is no question that the witness Garcia was at a close range
to you, did you confront him when he testified against you in of merely five meters more or less from the scene of the
court? incident.60 Neither can it be said that the illumination was poor.
A No, sir. The dancing hall was lighted.61 No improper motive was
Q You did not tell your friend that he was mistaken in attributed to the witness Garcia for testifying against the
identifying you as the assailant of Piamonte, correct? appellant. Moreover, witness Garcia is familiar not only to
A No, sir. 55 appellant. Garcia was also familiar with the deceased, Piamonte.
Witness Garcia, in his testimony, referred to Piamonte as his
The proper identification of the appellant is further bolstered by third cousin.62
the fact that appellants wife, Caridad Mapalo corroborated the
testimony that the witness Garcia is a family friend of the On appellants submission that it is doubtful if witness Garcia
spouses. Thus: can still have positively identified him as one of the perpetrators
of the crime considering that the former admitted to drinking
Cross examination of Caridad Mapalo by Prosecutor Lachica hard liquor from 9:00 p.m. on 13 February 1994 until 3:00 a.m.
Q Do you know a certain Calixto Garcia? of the following day, we are not convinced that the same can
A Yes, sir. overthrow the trial courts evaluation of Garcias testimony.
Q He is your Barangay mate? Beyond appellants bare allegations, no evidence whatsoever
A Yes, sir. was produced to show that Garcia suffered from such a level of
Q His house is closed to your house, correct? intoxication as to impair his facility and disable him to identify
A Far, sir. appellant. In the case of People v. Dee,63 the credibility of the
Q But he is staying within your barangay which is Sta. Cecilia? surviving victim therein as witness was disputed because he was
A Yes, sir. under the influence of liquor at the time of the incident. In Dee,
Q This Calixto Garcia whom you know is a friend of your the witness was even found positive for alcoholic breath, but the
family, correct? Court ruled that such fact does not necessarily prevent him from
A Yes, sir. making a positive identification of his attackers, especially since
Q In fact, your family have (sic) never quarreled with Calixto his level of intoxication was not shown to impair his faculties.
Garcia? The credibility of the witness therein was not made to suffer on
A None, sir. that score alone.64
Q Prior to the filing of this case, you know that Calixto Garcia
being a friend will not falsify his testimony regarding your The foregoing material considerations, taken together with the
husband? fact that witness Garcia and the appellant are not strangers to
A Yes, sir. each other, satisfy us that the danger of Garcia misidentifying
ATTY. RIMANDO: the appellant does not exist. Where the prosecution eyewitness
Objection, your honor. was familiar with both victim and accused, and where the locus
COURT: criminis afforded good visibility, and where no improper motive
Objection overruled. can be attributed to the witness for testifying against the
PROSECUTOR LACHICA: accused, his version of the story deserves much weight.65

Hence, we do not find any reason to depart from the general rule
that the conclusions of the trial court on the credibility of
witnesses deserve great respect, viz:
The assessment of the credibility of witness and their testimony
is a matter best undertaken by the trial court because of its
unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand; and to
note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under examination. Its
findings on such matters are binding and conclusive on appellate
courts unless some facts or circumstances of weight and
substance have been overlooked, misapprehended or
misinterpreted.66
Appellants defense of alibi and denial cannot stand in the face
of the positive identification of the accused. We have unfailingly
held that alibi and denial being inherently weak cannot prevail
over the positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator
of the crime.67 It is facile to fabricate and difficult to disprove,
and is generally rejected.68
For the defense of alibi to prosper, it must be shown with clear
and convincing evidence that at the time of the commission of
the crime charged, the accused is in a place other than the situs
of the crime such that it was physically impossible for him to
have been at the situs criminis when the crime was
committed.69
In the case at bar, appellant was not successful in invoking the
defense of alibi. Appellant insists that he was sleeping at his
residence at the time when the incident occurred. The RTC and
the Court of Appeals consistently found that the distance
between appellants residence and the dance hall, or the situs
criminis, is 20 to 30 meters, more or less.70 Such a distance is
negligible. In fact, appellants wife testified that from their
residence, she could see the people dancing at the hall.71 It was
not highly impossible for the appellant to be physically present
at the dancing hall at the time of the occurrence of the incident.
We, therefore, reject appellants defense of alibi.
We shall now determine the criminal liability of the appellant.
To reiterate, the RTC, in convicting the appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, proceeded from a
rationalization that there was conspiracy among appellant and
his co-accused. It also appreciated the attendance of abuse of
superior strength to qualify the crime to Murder.
The Court of Appeals was unable to agree with the RTC. It
found that the conspiracy was not proven beyond reasonable
doubt. It ruled that the witness Garcia admitted to not being able
to see the stabbing. He could only attest to the clubbing of the
victim by appellant with a lead pipe. No proof was shown as to
the concerted action of the malefactors of their common design
to kill. It, thus, modified the RTCs conviction, and, instead,
found appellant guilty of frustrated murder.
The Amended Information charged the appellant and his co-
accused with conspiracy in killing Piamonte.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it.72 Conspiracy as a basis for conviction must rest on
nothing less than a moral certainty.73 Considering the far-
reaching consequences of criminal conspiracy, the same degree
of proof necessary in establishing the crime is required to
support the attendance thereof, i.e., it must be shown to exist as
clearly and convincingly as the commission of the offense
itself.74 Thus, it has been held that neither joint nor
simultaneous actions is per se sufficient proof of conspiracy.75
We are, further, guided by the following pronouncement of the
Court:
For conspiracy to exist, the participants must agree to the
commission of the felony and decide to commit it, which
agreement may be deduced from the mode and manner of the
commission of the offense or inferred from the acts that point to
joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of
intent. x x x.76
While conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence, it
is, nonetheless, required that it be proved by clear and
convincing evidence by showing a series of acts done by each
of the accused in concert and in pursuance of the common
unlawful purpose.77
There is a want of evidence to show the concerted acts of the
appellant and his co-accused in pursuing a common design - to
kill the deceased, Piamonte. The sole eyewitness for the
prosecution, Garcia, was categorical and precise in declaring
that he did not see the act of stabbing Piamonte, nor the manner
in which Piamonte was stabbed. He later learned that Piamonte
died from stab wounds when he saw the latters dead body
covered with stab wounds. The cause of death of Piamonte, as
found by the RTC and the Court of Appeals,78 and as borne by
the records, is multiple stab wounds.79 It was, thus, incumbent
on the part of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt
that the appellant and his co-accused acted in concert with a
unity of purpose to kill Piamonte. They must show to the
satisfaction of this Court the appellants overt act in pursuance
or furtherance of the complicity.80 They must show that
appellants act of striking Piamonte with a pipe was an
intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the
furtherance of the common design and purpose.81
The prosecution was unable to show, either by direct or indirect
evidence, proof of the agreement among the appellant and his
co-accused to warrant conspiracy as a basis for appellants
conviction. No evidence was even adduced to show implied
conspiracy. Nothing has been shown that the appellant and his
co-accused were "aimed by their acts towards the
accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part
so that their combined acts, though apparently independent of
each other were, in fact, connected and cooperative, indicating
a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of
sentiment."82
This complete absence of evidence on the part of the prosecution
to show the conduct of the appellant and his co-accused,
disclosing a common understanding among them relative to the
commission of the offense,83 is fatal to the prosecution. The
prosecutions witness could not testify on the manner by which
the deceased Piamonte was stabbed, precisely because by his
own admission, he did not see the stabbing. No account of the
stabbing which caused the death of the deceased Piamonte was
ever given nor shown. Unfortunately, no account of how
Piamonte died was ever given, except for the established fact
that he died due to stabbing. The appellants act of holding a
lead pipe and hitting the deceased in the head was not shown to
be in furtherance of the common design of killing the deceased.
What transpired during the stabbing of the victim, which is
material to proving the fact of conspiracy, is, regrettably, left
merely to speculation. This Court must neither conjecture nor
surmise that a conspiracy existed. The rule is clear that the guilt
of the accused must be proved with moral certainty.84 All
doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused. Thus, the time
honored principle in criminal law that if the inculpatory facts are
capable of two or more explanations, one consistent with the
innocence of the accused and the other with his guilt, the Court
should adopt that which is more favorable to the accused for then
the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty.85
Liability of the Accused Bernard Mapalo
There being no conspiracy, the liability of the appellant will
revolve around his individual participation in the event.86
In the case of Li v. People,87 a street fight ensued resulting in
the death of the victim therein. No conspiracy was proven
beyond reasonable doubt. The liability of the accused Li who
was shown to have struck the victims right arm with a baseball
bat, resulting in a contusion was, thus, determined by the Court
in the following manner:
The only injury attributable to Li is the contusion on the victims
right arm that resulted from Li striking [the victim] Arugay with
a baseball bat. In view of the victims supervening death from
injuries which cannot be attributed to Li beyond reasonable
doubt, the effects of the contusion caused by Li are not mortal
or at least lie entirely in the realm of speculation. When there is
no evidence of actual incapacity of the offended party for labor
or of the required medical attendance, the offense is only slight
physical injuries, penalized as follows:
xxxx
The duration of the penalty of arresto menor is from one day to
thirty days. The felony of slight physical injuries is necessarily
included in the homicide charges. Since the Information against
Li states that among the means employed to commit the
felonious act was the use of the baseball bat, conviction on the
lesser offense or slight physical injuries is proper. There being
no aggravating or mitigating circumstances established, the
imposition of the penalty in its medium period is warranted. Li
was convicted by the RTC on January 5, 1994. Having long
served more than the imposable penalty, Li is entitled to
immediate release unless, of course, he is being lawfully
detained for another cause.88
In the case at bar, no injury was shown to be attributable to the
appellant. The only medical evidence that appears on records is
the deceased Piamontes death certificate,89 which indicates
that the cause of death is massive hypovolemia90 secondary to
multiple stab wounds. The factual findings of the RTC and the
Court of Appeals coincide to show that the cause of death of
Piamonte is multiple stab wounds. Nothing has been shown
otherwise. Other than the presence of multiple stab wounds, no
other type of injury on the deceased was established. No
contusions or injury on the head of the victim or anywhere else
in his body caused by a lead pipe was shown. The witness
Garcia, in his testimony, merely pointed to stab wounds on the
different parts of the body of the deceased.91 No proof on the
injury that was sustained by the deceased that can be attributable
to appellants act was demonstrated. No other physical evidence
was proffered.92
We cannot convict appellant of Attempted or Frustrated Murder
or Homicide. The principal and essential element of attempted
or frustrated homicide or murder is the assailants intent to take
the life of the person attacked.93 Such intent must be proved
clearly and convincingly, so as to exclude reasonable doubt
thereof.94 Intent to kill may be proved by evidence of: (a)
motive; (b) the nature or number of weapons used in the
commission of the crime; (c) the nature and number of wounds
inflicted on the victim; (d) the manner the crime was committed;
and (e) words uttered by the offender at the time the injuries are
inflicted by him on the victim.95
In the case at bar, no motive on the part of appellant to kill
Piamonte was shown either prior or subsequent to the incident.
Nor can such intent to kill be inferred from his acts. It bears
reiterating that no injury on the body of the deceased was
attributed to the appellants act of hitting the victim with a lead
pipe. On the nature of the weapon used, the lead pipe was
described by Garcia as one and a half feet in length, and one and
a half inches in diameter. The relevant testimony of Garcia on
the incident follows:
Q Now you said that Bernard Mapalo clubbed this Manuel
Piamonte. He clubbed him from behind?
A Yes, sir.
Q And what did he use in clubbing the victim, is it lead pipe?
A Yes, sir.
Q How long is that lead pipe?
A Around this length. (Witness demonstrated 1 1/2 feet).
Q And how wide is the diameter?
A 1 inches.
Q What part of his body was hit?
A Right side of the head, sir. (Witness showing the right side of
his head.)96
Homicidal intent must be evidenced by the acts that, at the time
of their execution, are unmistakably calculated to produce the
death of the victim by adequate means.97 We cannot infer intent
to kill from the appellants act of hitting Piamonte in the head
with a lead pipe. In the first place, wounds were not shown to
have been inflicted because of the act. Secondly, absent proof of
circumstances to show the intent to kill beyond reasonable
doubt, this Court cannot declare that the same was attendant.
When the offender shall ill-treat another by deed without
causing any injury, and without causing dishonor, the offense is
Maltreatment under Article 266,98 par. 3 of the Revised Penal
Code. It was beyond reasonable doubt that by hitting Piamonte,
appellant ill-treated the latter, without causing any injury. As we
have earlier stated, no proof of injury was offered. Maltreatment
is necessarily included in Murder, which is the offense charged
in the Information. Thus:
ART. 266. Slight physical injuries and maltreatment. The
crime of slight physical injuries shall be punished:
xxxx
3. By arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not
exceeding 50 pesos when the offender shall ill-treat another by
deed without causing any injury.
The duration of the penalty of arresto menor in its minimum
period is 1 day to 10 days.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 21
November 2005, in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00408 is MODIFIED.
Appellant Bernard Mapalo is ACQUITTED of the charge of
MURDER for lack of evidence beyond reasonable doubt. He is
found GUILTY of the crime of MALTREATMENT, as defined
and punished by Article 266, par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code.
He is accordingly sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of arresto menor of 10 days. Considering that
appellant has been incarcerated since 2004, which is well- Republic of the Philippines
beyond the period of the penalty herein imposed, the Director of SUPREME COURT
the Bureau of Prisons is ordered to cause appellants Manila
IMMEDIATE RELEASE, unless appellant is being lawfully
held for another cause, and to inform this Court, within five (5) SECOND DIVISION
days from receipt of this Decision, of the compliance therewith.
G.R. No. 172834 February 6, 2008
SO ORDERED.
JUN MUPAS and GIL MUPAS, petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

Petitioners Jun and Gil1 Mupas were found guilty of frustrated

homicide in Criminal Case No. 2314 in the Decision2 dated 22
November 2002 rendered by the Regional Trial Court of
Malaoan, La Union, Branch 34. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the Court hereby

renders judgment declaring both accused JUN MUPAS and GIL
MUPAS @ "Banjo" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE as defined and penalized in Art.
249 in relation with Art. 6 of the Revised Penal Code, and
thereby sentenced EACH of the accused to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from FOUR (4) YEARS
and TWO (2) MONTHS PRISION CORRECCIONAL as
Minimum to TEN (10) years PRISION MAYOR as maximum
and the accessory penalties provided for by law and to
indemnify jointly the private complainant the reasonable
amount of P5,000.00 for hospital expenses and other
miscellaneous expenses.

The preventive imprisonment suffered by the accused is counted

in his favor.

SO ORDERED.3

The relevant antecedents are as follows:

The Information4 for frustrated homicide alleged:

That on or about the 18th day of February 1993, in the

Municipality of Bangar, Province of La Union, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
one another and with intent to kill, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, maul with fist and stones and
stab with a knife Rogelio Murao y Sibayan hitting the latter and
inflicting injuries on his face and head thus performing all the
acts of execution which would have produced the crime of
Homicide as a consequence but which nevertheless did not
produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the
accused, that was the timely and able medical assistance
rendered to the offended party which saved his life to his damage
and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
During the arraignment, petitioners, assisted by counsel, pleaded
not guilty to the charge.6 Thereafter, trial ensued.
The prosecution presented three witnesses, namely: Rogelio
Murao (Rogelio), Flaviano Murao (Flaviano) and Dr. Arsenio
B. Martinez (Dr. Martinez).
Rogelio testified that at around 7:30 in the morning of 18
February 1993, he was walking to school with his companion
Eduardo Murao, Jr. when Jun suddenly stopped and stabbed him
using a 29-inch Batangas knife. Meantime, Banjo bodily
restrained him but luckily Rogelio was able to avoid the blow.
Next, Banjo and Jun hurled stones at him and hit him on the leg
while Rogelio was running eastward. Rogelio then flagged
down a motorized tricycle but the two assailants continued to
pursue him. While inside the tricycle, Banjo held Rogelio by his
neck and punched him while Jun stabbed him several times.
Then, Rogelio alighted from the tricycle and ran home.
Afterwards, his father and mother accompanied him to the
hospital.7 There, Dr. Martinez attended to Rogelio and issued a
medical certificate containing the following findings:
Cut wound, 2-3 cm. parietal area
Abrasion, maxiliary area, (L)
Contusion, maxiliary area, (L)
Abrasion, lumbar area, (L)
HEALING PERIOD: It may take two weeks to heal.8
Prior to the incident, Rogelio recalled that in January of the same
year, he had a misunderstanding with Jun where he and the latter
hurled invectives at each other. Rogelio suspected that this event
gave rise to the subject incident.9
Flaviano, Rogelios father, testified that on 18 February 1993,
Rogelio came home bleeding from head injuries. Immediately,
he brought Rogelio to the Martinez Clinic in Bangar, La Union.
Flaviano reported that he has spent P2,000.00 for Rogelios
medical treatment and P3,000.00 for attorneys fees and
transportation.10
For the defense, Jun testified that on 18 February 1993, at around
7:30 in the morning, he was watering the plants in front of Gils
house when he accidentally sprayed water on Rogelio who was
passing by. Rogelio scolded him and Jun immediately
apologized. Rogelio then challenged Jun to a fistfight which Jun
accepted. After that, Rogelio ran away, picked up big stones and
threw them at Gils house. Jun gave chase and was able to catch
up with Rogelio. They both boarded a tricycle and continued
their fighting inside. One of the passengers of the tricycle,
Josefina Mendoza, pacified the two men. Banjo arrived only
when the fighting ceased.11
Afterwards, Jun went home. Then, Rogelio and Flaviano, each
armed with a bolo, arrived and challenged Jun to a fight.
However, the two could not enter the house as the gate was
locked.12
Gil testified that in the morning of 18 February 1993, at around
7:00, somebody threw a stone at their house. He went outside
the house and saw Jun chasing Rogelio. He went near them and
saw that they had already been pacified by one Ms. Monis.
Afterward, he sent the two men home. Gil also went home and
thereat, Rogelio, who had a stone with him, arrived with his
father Flaviano who was carrying a bolo. Rogelio then
challenged Gil and Jun to a fight.13
Danilo Olpindo testified that between 7:00 and 8:00 in the
morning of 18 February 1993, he was buying soap from Banjos
store when a fistfight transpired between Rogelio and Jun.
Rogelio then ran away, picked up a stone and threw it at Jun.
After Rogelio threw another stone at Banjos house, Jun chased
him and had a fistfight with him again. Banjo then came out of
the house and asked the two to go home. Danilo also saw
Teresita Monis at the scene trying to pacify the two.14
Teresita Monis testified that on that fateful day, she was riding
a tricycle when suddenly, somebody from outside punched one
of her co-passengers. She saw an arm reach inside the tricycle
and hit the passenger. Blood started to ooze from the fellows
forehead. Shortly, she had to alight from the tricycle to attend
the flag ceremony at her school.15
Josefina Mendoza testified that on said day, she saw Jun box
Rogelio. Subsequently, Banjo went near the two and dispersed
them.16
Jun and Gil were found guilty as charged and the judgment of
conviction was elevated to the Court of Appeals.
Before the Court of Appeals, Jun and Gil argued that the trial
court erred in: (1) finding Gil guilty of the crime charged despite
the prosecutions failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt; and (2) finding Jun guilty of the crime of frustrated
homicide instead of physical injuries only.17
Jun and Gil contended that Rogelio had failed to identify with
moral certainty that Gil had been one of those who inflicted the
injury on him. They pointed out that Rogelio had failed to
categorically state that Gil and Banjo Mupas are one and the
same person. Moreover, they asserted that in Juns case, the
prosecution had failed to prove intent to kill and as such, he
should be convicted only of the crime of physical injuries.18
The Court of Appeals in a Decision19 dated 23 January 2006, in
CA-G.R. CR. No. 27768, affirmed with modifications the
decision of the trial court. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from convicting
accused-appellants JUN MUPAS and GIL MUPAS alias
BANJO MUPAS of the crime of Frustrated Homicide is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that appellants are
ordered to pay ROGELIO MURAO in the amount of P4,000 as
temperate damages.
SO ORDERED.20
After a review of the records of the case, the Court of Appeals
concluded that Banjo Mupas and Gil Mupas are one and the
same person. The Court of Appeals observed that when Banjo
posted a bail bond in the case entitled "People of the Philippines
v. Jun Mupas and Banjo Mupas," he had made no objection to
the caption of the case and he had even signed his name as Gil
Mupas. Secondly, when the Information was amended to
include Gils alias, Banjo did not interpose any objection to the
correction. Lastly, Rogelio had not been able to identify Banjo
in court due to the latters absence at the time of his testimony.21
The Court of Appeals likewise held that Jun already performed
all the acts of execution necessary to bring about the death of
Rogelio which would have transpired had it not been for the
timely medical intervention. As such, the trial court correctly
found him liable for the crime of frustrated homicide.22
Jun and Gil are now before the Court reiterating their assertion
that the prosecution failed to establish Gils identity as one of
the perpetrators of the crime and that his defense of denial was
duly supported by clear and convincing evidence.23 They also
contend that on the assumption that Jun is guilty of having
committed a crime, he should only be convicted of the crime of
physical injuries.24
There is merit in the petition.
The Constitution mandates that an accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt.
The prosecution has the burden to overcome such presumption
of innocence by presenting the quantum of evidence required. In
addition, the prosecution must rest on its own merits and must
not rely on the weakness of the defense. In fact, if the
prosecution fails to meet the required quantum of evidence, the
defense may logically not even present evidence on its own
behalf. In which case, the presumption of innocence shall
prevail and hence, the accused shall be acquitted. However, once
the presumption of innocence is overcome, the defense bears the
burden of evidence to show reasonable doubt as to the guilt of
the accused. Reasonable doubt is that doubt engendered by an
investigation of the whole proof and an inability after such
investigation to let the mind rest each upon the certainty of guilt.
Absolute certainty of guilt is not demanded by the law to convict
a criminal charge, but moral certainty is required as to every
proposition of proof requisite to constitute the offense.25
The trial court solely hinged its judgment of conviction on the
victim Rogelios lone and uncorroborated testimony. While it is
true that the testimony of one witness is sufficient to sustain a
conviction if such testimony establishes the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt, the Court rules that the testimony of
one witness in this case is not sufficient for this purpose.26
Apart from Rogelios testimony, the Court observes that the
prosecutions version of events has no leg to stand on.
In his Sworn Statement27 dated 23 February 1993, Rogelio
admitted that he had a companion with him on that fateful
incident named Eduardo Murao, Jr. He also stated that there
were other persons who may have witnessed the assault namely,
"Josephine Mendoza, Terisita Mico and one Mario Olpindo, the
driver of the tricycle." On the witness stand, Rogelio likewise
testified that there had been others who may have witnessed the
incident including Eduardo Murao, Jr. and Teresita Monis.28
Interestingly, Josephine Mendoza testified for the defense that
she had only witnessed a fistfight between Jun and Rogelio
while Teresita Monis, also for the defense, testified that she had
only seen a hand reach inside the tricycle to hit Rogelio.
It appears then that Rogelio had at his disposal many witnesses
who could have supported his allegations but curiously and
without any explanation, none of these so-called witnesses were
presented. It is thus Rogelios word against the attestations of
others. Such omission already raises a reasonable doubt as to the
guilt of the petitioners.
In contrast, the defense was able to present three (3) other
witnesses than the petitioners themselves. In the Courts view,
Danilo Olpindo, one of the defense witnesses, could hardly be
called a biased witness contrary to the appellate courts opinion.
He may indeed be Juns second cousin but the appellate court
failed to consider that Danilo is likewise Rogelios third
cousin29 which fact, in the Courts estimation, cancels the
supposed partiality based on kinship.
Danilo Olpindo, Josefina Mendoza together with Jun and Gil are
in agreement that a fistfight occurred between Jun and Rogelio.
In addition, Jun admitted that the fighting continued inside a
tricycle. Teresita Monis attested that this latter detail did occur
but was not able to identify whose hand it was that reached in
the tricycle and hit Rogelio.
Juxtaposing the testimonies of the witnesses, it can be safely
deduced that a fistfight occurred only between Jun and Rogelio
which continued inside a tricycle. Rogelios allegations of
Banjos participation in the incident and that Jun carried with
him a bolo are uncorroborated and bereft of any proof. Absent
proof of Gil alias Banjos involvement in the incident, his
acquittal is in order.
Assuming that Gil alias Banjo had any participation, there is
likewise no evidence that he or Jun had intent to kill Rogelio.
Intent to kill is the principal element of homicide or murder, in
whatever stage of commission. Such intent must be proved in a
clear and evident manner to exclude every possible doubt as to
the homicidal intent of the aggressor.30
Although it can be fairly assumed that the injuries suffered by
Rogelio were sustained during the fistfight, it is not conclusive
that the same were inflicted purposely to kill him. For one, if Jun
in fact had been carrying a bolo with intent of killing Rogelio,
and if indeed Banjo had conspired with Jun, it is no small
wonder why the wounds inflicted were more superficial than
mortal, more mild than grave. That Rogelio was able to go home
shortly after the tricycle incident without being pursued by his
aggressor also shows that Jun and Banjo were not intent on
beating him to death or even leaving him for dead.31 It is thus
wrong to infer that the intent to kill was present in the absence
of circumstances sufficient to prove this fact beyond reasonable
doubt.32 Moreover, Rogelios suggested motive for killing him,
i.e., his previous altercation with Jun, was too weak and shallow
a reason to kill under the circumstances.33
Notably, Dr. Martinez, Rogelios attending physician, opined
that if Rogelios wound was left untreated it could lead to his
death, but at the same time he also testified that such wound
merely required suturing. He also testified that the wound,
which was only 2-3 cm long and whose depth he did not
indicate, could have been caused by a rough or sharp object not
necessarily a knife. And in the medical certificate he issued, he
reported that the wounds sustained by Rogelio would take two
(2) weeks to heal.34 Dr. Martinez stated as follows:
Q And what did you do when you noticed the wounds on the
patient Rogelio Murao?
A I gave the necessary injections and medicines preliminary
in suturing the wound and treating the wound, sir.
Q What particular kind of injections did you make on the
patient?
A Regularly a patient who will undergo the kind of operation to conclusively prove that he had conspired with Jun in the
[sic] we gave novaine injection[.] [T]hen after ten minutes we commission of the crime or that he had any participation in it.
gave the local anesthesia for suturing, sir.
Q You said that you conducted surgery, what exactly did you The Court sustains the appellate courts award of P4,000.00 as
do? temperate damages. Having suffered actual injuries, Rogelio is
A After rushing and preparing the operative area and after likewise entitled to moral damages.40 The award of P5,000.00
giving the novaine injection [sic] and I will now examine the as moral damages is sufficient under the circumstances.41
kind of wound, it was a two to three cms. long on the parietal
area and partially cut and after cleaning the wound, we put WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED IN PART and the
anesthesia and suture the wound, sir. Decision dated 23 January 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
xxx G.R. CR. No. 27768 is MODIFIED. Petitioner Jun Mupas is
Q Particularly this cut wound which you mentioned as the found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Less
wound on the parietal area of the patient, what particularly [sic] Serious Physical Injuries, and sentenced to suffer a straight
did you do when you said you applied surgery, did you do prison term of four (4) months and ten (10) days of arresto
surgery only on the cut wound? mayor in its maximum period, and to pay Rogelio Murao the
A I referred to injuries, damages tissues, we removed amount of Four Thousand Pesos (P4,000.00) as temperate
unnecessary tissues, sir. damages, and Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) as moral
Q After removing the unnecessary tissues, and cut wound, damages.
what did you do?
A I have to suture, sir. Petitioner Gil Mupas is ACQUITTED and the bail bond posted
Q And in laymans language, what is meant by suture? for his provisional liberty is cancelled and released.
A We used the chromic sutures and followed by the skin suture
which is made of silk, sir. SO ORDERED.
Q Now, this cut would as you have said doctor, what would
be the result of this cut wound if it was not treated by you? Quisumbing,Chairperson, Carpio, Carpio-Morales, Velasco, Jr.,
A Death, sir. JJ., concur.
Q How come it would result to death, if you did not treat the
cut wound?
A In the first place according to the legal ethics made by Dr.
Solis even if there is slight wound on the head, it is considered
serious because the wound on the head is proximal to the brain,
sir. Meaning, usually, it gets in when the injuries were on the
head, sir.35
xxx
Q You also stated that it is a cut wound which must have been
caused by a sharp instrument or bladed edge?
A Sharp edge, sir.
xxx
Q Because it is a cut wound, the tendency was not penetrating
wound?
A No, not penetrating wound, sir.
Q The wound is possible to have been caused by a knife or it
might have been caused by any sharp object not necessarily a
knife or by any rough or sharp object?
A Yes, sir.36

Taken in its entirety, there is a dearth of medical evidence on

record to sustain the claim that petitioners had any intention to
kill Rogelio. When such intent is lacking but wounds were
inflicted, the crime is not frustrated homicide but physical
injuries only and in this case, less serious physical injuries
considering the attending physicians opinion that the wounds
sustained by Rogelio would take two (2) weeks to heal.37

Although the Information charged petitioners with frustrated

homicide, a finding of guilt for the lesser offense of less serious
physical injuries may be made considering that the latter offense
is necessarily included in the former, and since the essential
ingredients of physical injuries constitute and form part of those
constituting the offense of homicide.38

In sum, absent competent proof, Jun should be held liable only

for the crime of less serious physical injuries under Article
26539 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Gil, alias Banjo,
must be absolved from any liability for failure of the prosecution
 AGUIRRE, DR. JUVIDO AGATEP and DR. MARISSA B.
PASCUAL, respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the

Rules of Court, as amended, petitioner Gloria Pilar S. Aguirre
(Gloria Aguirre) seeks the reversal of the 21 July 2005
Decision2 and 5 December 2005 Resolution,3 both of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88370, entitled "Gloria Pilar S.
Aguirre v. Secretary of the Department of Justice, Michelina S.
Aguirre-Olondriz, Dr. Juvido Agatep, Dra. Marissa B. Pascual,
Pedro B. Aguirre and John and Jane Does."

The Court of Appeals found no grave abuse of discretion on the

part of the Secretary of the Department of Justice (DOJ) when
the latter issued the twin resolutions dated 11 February 20044
and 12 November 2004,5 respectively, which in turn affirmed
the 8 January 2003 Resolution6 of the Office of the City
Prosecutor (OCP) of Quezon City.

The Assistant City Prosecutor for the OCP of Quezon City

recommended the dismissal of the criminal complaint, docketed
as I.S. No. 02-12466, for violation of Articles 172 (Falsification
by Private Individuals and Use of Falsified Documents) and 262
(Mutilation), both of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to
Republic Act No. 7610, otherwise known as "Child Abuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination Act," for insufficiency of
evidence.

The case stemmed from a complaint filed by petitioner Gloria

Aguirre against respondents Pedro B. Aguirre (Pedro Aguirre),
Michelina S. Aguirre-Olondriz (Olondriz), Dr. Juvido Agatep
(Dr. Agatep), Dr. Marissa B. Pascual (Dr. Pascual) and several
John/Jane Does for falsification, mutilation and child abuse.

The antecedents of the present petition are:

Laureano "Larry" Aguirre7 used to be a charge of the Heart of

Mary Villa, a child caring agency run by the Good Shepherd
Sisters and licensed by the Department of Social Work and
Development (DSWD). Sometime in 1978, respondent Pedro
Aguirre; the latter's spouse, Lourdes S. Aguirre (Lourdes
Aguirre); and their four daughters, who included petitioner
Gloria Aguirre and respondent Olondriz, came to know Larry,
who was then just over a year old. The Aguirres would have
Larry spend a few days at their home and then return him to the
orphanage thereafter. In June 1980, Larry, then two years and
nine months of age, formally became the ward of respondent
Pedro Aguirre and his spouse Lourdes Aguirre by virtue of an
Affidavit of Consent to Legal Guardianship executed in their
favor by Sister Mary Concepta Bellosillo, Superior of the Heart
Republic of the Philippines of Mary Villa. On 19 June 1986, the Aguirre spouses'
SUPREME COURT guardianship of Larry was legalized when the Regional Trial
Manila Court (RTC), Branch 3 of Balanga, Bataan, duly appointed them
as joint co-guardians over the person and property of Larry.
THIRD DIVISION
As Larry was growing up, the Aguirre spouses and their children
G.R. No. 170723 March 3, 2008 noticed that his developmental milestones were remarkably
delayed. His cognitive and physical growth did not appear
GLORIA PILAR S. AGUIRRE, petitioner, normal in that "at age 3 to 4 years, Larry could only crawl on his
vs. tummy like a frog x x x;"8 he did not utter his first word until he
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, was three years of age; did not speak in sentences until his sixth
MICHELINA S. AGUIRRE-OLONDRIZ, PEDRO B. year; and only learned to stand up and walk after he turned five
years old. At age six, the Aguirre spouses first enrolled Larry at
the Colegio de San Agustin, Dasmarias Village, but the child
experienced significant learning difficulties there. In 1989, at
age eleven, Larry was taken to specialists for neurological and
psychological evaluations. The psychological evaluation9 done
on Larry revealed the latter to be suffering from a mild mental
deficiency.10 Consequent thereto, the Aguirre spouses
transferred Larry to St. John Ma. Vianney, an educational
institution for special children.
In November of 2001, respondent Dr. Agatep, a
urologist/surgeon, was approached concerning the intention to
have Larry, then 24 years of age, vasectomized. Prior to
performing the procedure on the intended patient, respondent
Dr. Agatep required that Larry be evaluated by a psychiatrist in
order to confirm and validate whether or not the former could
validly give his consent to the medical procedure on account of
his mental deficiency.
In view of the required psychiatric clearance, Larry was brought
to respondent Dr. Pascual, a psychiatrist, for evaluation. In a
psychiatric report dated 21 January 2002, respondent Dr.
Pascual made the following recommendation:
[T]he responsibility of decision making may be given to his
parent or guardian.11
the full text of which reads
PSYCHIATRY REPORT
21 January 2002
GENERAL DATA
LAUREANO AGUIRRE, 24 years old, male, high school
graduate of St. John [Marie Vianney], was referred for
psychiatric evaluation to determine competency to give consent
for vasectomy.
CLINICAL SUMMARY
Larry was adopted at age 3 from an orphanage and prenatal
history is not known to the adoptive family except that abortion
was attempted. Developmental milestones were noted to be
delayed. He started to walk and speak in single word at around
age 5. He was enrolled in Colegio de San Agustin at age 6 where
he showed significant learning difficulties that he had to repeat
1st and 4th grades. A consult was done in 1989 when he was 11
years old. Neurological findings and EEG results were not
normal and he was given Tecretol and Encephabol by his
neurologist. Psychological evaluation revealed mild to moderate
mental retardation, special education training was advised and
thus, he was transferred to St. John Marie Vianney. He finished
his elementary and secondary education in the said school. He
was later enrolled in a vocational course at Don Bosco which he
was unable to continue. There has been no reported behavioral
problems in school and he gets along relatively well with his
teachers and some of his classmates.
Larry grew up with a very supportive adoptive family. He is the
youngest in the family of four sisters. Currently, his adoptive
parents are already old and have medical problem and thus, they
could no longer monitor and take care of him like before. His
adoptive mother has Bipolar Mood Disorder and used to
physically maltreat him. A year ago, he had an episode of
dizziness, vomiting and headaches after he was hit by his
adoptive mother. Consult was done in Makati Medical Center
and several tests were done, results of which were consistent
with his developmental problem. There was no evidence of
acute insults. The family subsequently decided that he should
stay with one of his sisters to avoid similar incident and the
possibility that he would retaliate although he has never hurt
anybody. There has been no episode of violent outburst or
aggressive behavior. He would often keep to himself when sad,
angry or frustrated.
He is currently employed in the company of his sister and given
assignment to do some photocopying, usually in the mornings.
He enjoys playing billiards and basketball with his nephews and,
he spends most of his leisure time watching TV and listening to
music. He could perform activities of daily living without
assistance except that he still needs supervision in taking a bath.
He cannot prepare his own meal and never allowed to go out and
run errands alone. He does not have friends and it is only his
adoptive family whom he has significant relationships. He
claims that he once had a girlfriend when he was in high school
who was more like a best friend to him. He never had sexual
relations. He has learned to smoke and drink alcohol few years
ago through his cousins and the drivers. There is no history of
abuse of alcohol or any prohibited substances.
MEDICAL STATUS EXAMINATION
The applicant was appropriately dressed. He was cooperative
and he had intermittent eye contact. Speech was spontaneous,
soft, and relevant. He responded to questions in single words or
simple sentences. He was anxious specially at the start of the
interview, with full affect appropriate to mood and thought
content. There was no apparent thought or perceptual
disturbance. No suicidal/homicidal thoughts elicited. He was
oriented to time, place and person. He has intact remote and
recent memory. He could do simple calculation. He could write
his name and read simple words. His human figure was
comparable to a 7-8 year old. He demonstrated fair judgment
and poor insight. He had fair impulse control.
PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTS
Psychological tests done on March 6, 1990 (Dr. Lourdes
Ledesma) and on August 4, 2000 (Dr. Ma. Teresa Gustilo-
Villaosor) consistently revealed mild to moderate mental
deficiency.
SIGNIFICANT LABORATORY EXAMS RESULTS
CT scan done 09 January 2001 showed nonspecific right deep
parietal subcortical malacia. No localized mass lesion in the
brain.
MRI done on 10 January 2001 showed bilateral parietal x x x
volume loss, encephalomalacia, gliosis and ulegyria consistent
with sequela of postnatal or neonatal infarcts. Ex-vacuo
dilatation of the atria of lateral ventricles associated thinned
posterior half of the corpus callosum.
ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION
Axis I None
Axis II Mental Retardation, mild to moderate type
Axis III None
Axis IV None at present
Axis V Current GAF = 50-60
Larry's mental deficiency could be associated with possible
perinatal insults, which is consistent with the neuroimaging
findings. Mental retardation associated with neurological
problems usually has poorer prognosis. Larry is very much
dependent on his family for his needs, adaptive functioning,
direction and in making major life decisions. At his capacity, he
may never understand the nature, the foreseeable risks and
benefits, and consequences of the procedure (vasectomy) that
his family wants for his protection. Thus, the responsibility of
decision making may be given to his parent or guardian.
Marissa B. Pascual, M.D.
Psychiatrist12
Considering the above recommendation, respondent Pedro
Aguirre's written consent was deemed sufficient in order to
proceed with the conduct of the vasectomy. Hence, on 31
January 2002, respondent Dr. Agatep performed a bilateral
vasectomy on Larry.
On 11 June 2002, petitioner Gloria Aguirre, respondent Pedro
Aguirre's eldest child, instituted a criminal complaint for the
violation of the Revised Penal Code, particularly Articles 172
and 262, both in relation to Republic Act No. 7610 against
respondents Pedro Aguirre, Olondriz, Dr. Agatep, Dr. Pascual
and several John/Jane Does before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City.
The Complaint Affidavit,13 docketed as I.S. No. 02-12466,
contained the following allegations:
2. x x x Dr. Agatep and Dra. Pascual were (sic) medical
practitioners specializing in urology and psychiatry
respectively; while respondent Pedro B. Aguirre is my father;
Michelina S. Aguirre-Olondriz is my sister, and the victim
Laureano "Larry" Aguirre xxx is my common law brother.
JOHN and JANE DOES were the persons who, acting upon the
apparent instructions of respondents Michelina Aguirre-
Olondriz and/or Pedro B. Aguirre, actually scouted, prospected,
facilitated, solicited and/or procured the medical services of
respondents Dra. Pascual and Dr. Agatep vis--vis the intended
mutilation via bilateral vasectomy of my common law brother
Larry Aguirre subject hereof.
xxxx
4. Sometime in March 2002, however, the Heart of Mary Villa
of the Good Shepherd Sisters was furnished a copy of
respondent Dra. Pascual's Psychiatry Report dated 21 January
2004 by the "DSWD," in which my common law brother
"Larry" was falsely and maliciously declared incompetent and
incapable of purportedly giving his own consent to the
MUTILATION VIA BILATERAL VASECTOMY intended to
be performed on him by all the respondents.
xxxx
6. Based on the foregoing charade and false pretenses invariably
committed by all of the respondents in conspiracy with each
other, on 31 January 2002, my common law brother Larry
Aguirre, although of legal age but conspiratorially caused to be
declared by respondents to be "mentally deficient" and
incompetent to give consent to his BILATERAL
VASECTOMY, was then intentionally, unlawfully,
maliciously, feloniously and/or criminally placed thereafter
under surgery for MUTILATION VIA "BILATERAL
VASECTOMY" x x x, EVEN WITHOUT ANY
AUTHORIZATION ORDER from the GUARDIANSHIP
COURT, nor personal consent of Larry Aguirre himself.
In addition to the above, the complaint included therein an
allegation that
v. x x x without a PRIOR medical examination, professional
interview of nor verification and consultation with my mother,
Lourdes Sabino-Aguirre, respondent Dra. Pascual baselessly,
fraudulently and with obvious intent to defame and malign her
reputation and honor, and worse, that of our Sabido family,
falsely concluded and diagnosed, via her falsified Psychiatry
Report, that my mother Lourdes Sabido-Aguirre purportedly
suffers from "BIPOLAR MOOD DISORDER" x x x.
To answer petitioner Gloria Aguirre's accusations against them,
respondents Pedro Aguirre, Olondriz, Dr. Agatep and Dr.
Pascual submitted their respective Counter-Affidavits.
In her defense,14 respondent Olondriz denied that she
"prospected, scouted, facilitated, solicited and/or procured any
false statement, mutilated or abused" her common-law brother,
Larry Aguirre. Further, she countered that:
3. x x x While I am aware and admit that Larry went through a
vasectomy procedure, there is nothing in the Complaint which
explains how the vasectomy amounts to a mutilation.
xxxx
5. In any case, as I did not perform the vasectomy, I can state
with complete confidence that I did not participate in any way
in the alleged mutilation.
6. Neither did I procure or solicit the services of the physician
who performed the vasectomy, Dr. Juvido Agatep x x x. It was
my father, Pedro Aguirre, Larry's guardian, who obtained his
services. I merely acted upon his instructions and accompanied
my brother to the physician, respondents Dra. Marissa B.
Pascual x x x.
xxxx
10. Neither does the Complaint explain in what manner the
Complainant is authorized or has any standing to declare that
Larry's consent was not obtained. Complainant is not the
guardian or relative of Larry. While she argues that Larry's
consent should have been obtained the Complaint does not
dispute the psychiatrist's findings about Larry's inability to give
consent.
xxxx
13. x x x the Complaint does not even state what alleged
participation was falsified or the portion of the psychiatric report
that allegedly states that someone participated when in fact that
person did not so participate.
xxxx

15. Again, I had no participation in the preparation of the report
of Dr. Pascual x x x.
xxxx
17. x x x the Complaint does not dispute that he (Larry) is
mentally deficient or incompetent to give consent.
xxxx
19. x x x I verified that the effect of a vasectomy operation was
explained to him (Larry) by both respondent doctors.
20. x x x I accompanied Larry and obeyed my father on the
belief that my father continues to be the legal guardian of Larry.
I know of no one else who asserts to be his legal guardian x x
x.15
Alleging the same statement of facts and defenses, respondent
Pedro Aguirre argues against his complicity in the crime of
mutilation as charged and asserts that:
5. In any case, as I did not perform the vasectomy, I can state
with complete confidence that I did not participate in any way
in the alleged mutilation.16
Nevertheless, he maintains that the vasectomy performed on
Larry does not in any way amount to mutilation, as the latter's
reproductive organ is still completely intact.17 In any case,
respondent Pedro Aguirre explains that the procedure performed
is reversible through another procedure called Vasovasostomy,
to wit:
8. I understand that vasectomy is reversible through a procedure
called Vasovasostomy. I can also state with confidence that the
procedure enables men who have undergone a vasectomy to sire
a child. Hence, no permanent damage was caused by the
procedure.
Respondent Pedro Aguirre challenges the charge of falsification
in the complaint, to wit:
14. x x x I did not make it appear that any person participated in
any act or proceeding when that person did not in fact participate
x x x.
xxxx
16. x x x I had no participation in the preparation of the report
of Dra. Pascual. She arrived at her report independently, using
her own professional judgment x x x.
xxxx
31. What I cannot understand about Petita's Complaint is how
Larry is argued to be legally a child under the definition of one
law but nonetheless and simultaneously argued to be capacitated
to give his consent as fully as an adult.18
Respondent Pedro Aguirre further clarifies that co-guardianship
over Larry had been granted to himself and his wife, Lourdes
Aguirre, way back on 19 June 1986 by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 3 of Balanga, Bataan. Respondent Pedro Aguirre
contends that being one of the legal guardians, consequently,
parental authority over Larry is vested in him. But assuming for
the sake of argument that Larry does have the capacity to make
the decision concerning his vasectomy, respondent Pedro
Aguirre argues that petitioner Gloria Aguirre has no legal
personality to institute the subject criminal complaint, for only
Larry would have the right to do so.
Just as the two preceding respondents did, respondent Dr.
Agatep also disputed the allegations of facts stated in the
Complaint. Adopting the allegations of his co-respondents
insofar as they were material to the charges against him, he
vehemently denied failing to inform Larry of the intended
procedure. In his counter-statement of facts he averred that:
(b) x x x I scheduled Larry for consultative interview x x x
wherein I painstakingly explained what vasectomy is and the
consequences thereof; but finding signs of mental deficiency, x
x x I advised his relatives and his nurse who accompanied him
to have Larry examined by a psychiatrist who could properly
determine whether or not Larry x x x can really give his consent,
thus I required them to secure first a psychiatric evaluation and
clearance prior to the contemplated procedure.
(c) On January 21, 2002, I was furnished a copy of a psychiatric
report prepared by Dr. Marissa Pascual x x x. In her said report,
Dr. Pascual found Larry to suffer from "mental retardation, mild
to moderate type" and further stated that "at his capacity, he may
never understand the nature, the foreseeable risks and benefits
and consequences of the procedure (vasectomy) x x x, thus the
responsibility of decision making may be given to his parent or
guardian x x x."
(d) x x x I was likewise furnished a copy of an affidavit executed
by Pedro Aguirre stating that he was the legal guardian of Larry
x x x Pedro Aguirre gave his consent to vasectomize Larry x x
x.
(e) Only then, specifically January 31, 2002, vasectomy was
performed with utmost care and diligence.19
In defense against the charge of falsification and mutilation,
respondent Dr. Agatep argued that subject complaint should be
dismissed for the following reasons:
1. The complainant has no legal personality to file this case. As
mentioned above, she is only a common law sister of Larry who
has a legal guardian in the person of Pedro Aguirre, one of the
herein respondents x x x.
2. x x x [t]he allegations in the complaint clearly centers on the
condition of complainant's mother, Lourdes Aguirre, her
reputation, and miserably fails to implicate the degree of
participation of herein respondent. x x x
xxxx
(b) Falsification. x x x I strongly aver that this felony does not
apply to me since it clearly gives reference to co-respondent, Dr.
Marissa Pascual's Psychiatry Report, dated January 21, 2002, in
relation with her field of profession, an expert opinion. I do not
have any participation in the preparation of said report, x x x
neither did I utilized (sic) the same in any proceedings to the
damage to another. x x x I also deny using a falsified document
x x x.
(c) Mutilation. x x x Vasectomy does not in anyway equate to
castration and what is touched in vasectomy is not considered
an organ in the context of law and medicine, it is quite remote
from the penis x x x.
(d) Child Abuse. x x x the complaint-affidavit is very vague in
specifying the applicability of said law. It merely avers that
Laureano "Larry" Aguirre is a child, and alleges his father,
Pedro Aguirre, has parental authority over him x x x.20
Similarly, respondent Dr. Pascual denied the criminal charges of
falsification and mutilation imputed to her. She stands by the
contents of the assailed Psychiatric Report, justifying it thus:
x x x My opinion of Larry Aguirre's mental status was based on
my own personal observations, his responses during my
interview of him, the results of the two (2) psychological tests
conducted by clinical psychologists, the results of laboratory
tests, including a CT Scan and MRI, and his personal and family
history which I obtained from his sister, Michelina Aguirre-
Olondriz x x x.
5. x x x the reference in my report concerning Mrs. Lourdes
Aguirre is not a statement of my opinion of Mrs. Aguirre's
mental status, x x x. Rather, it is part of the patient's personal
and family history as conveyed to me by Mrs. Aguirre-Olondriz.
6. x x x An expression of my opinion, especially of an expert
opinion, cannot give rise to a charge for falsification. A contrary
opinion by another expert only means that the experts differ, and
does not necessarily reflect on the truth or falsity of either
opinion x x x.
7. x x x I never stated that I examined Mrs. Aguirre, because I
never did x x x.
8. I had no participation in the surgery performed on Larry
Aguirre except to render an opinion on his capacity to give
informed consent to the vasectomy x x x.
9. Without admitting the merits of the complaint, I submit that
complainants are not the proper persons to subscribe to the same
as they are not the offended party, peace officer or other public
officer charged with the enforcement of the law violated x x x.21
The Assistant City Prosecutor held that the circumstances
attendant to the case did not amount to the crime of falsification.
He held that
[T]he claim of the complainant that the Psychiatric Report was
falsified, because consent was not given by Larry Aguirre to the
vasectomy and/or he was not consulted on said operation does
not constitute falsification. It would have been different if it was
stated in the report that consent was obtained from Larry Aguirre
or that it was written therein that he was consulted on the
vasectomy, because that would mean that it was made to appear
in the report that Larry Aguirre participated in the act or
proceeding by giving his consent or was consulted on the matter
when in truth and in fact, he did not participate. Or if not, the
entry would have been an untruthful statement. But that is not
the case. Precisely (sic) the report was made to determine
whether Larry Aguirre could give his consent to his intended
vasectomy. Be that as it may, the matter of Larry's consent
having obtained or not may nor be an issue after all, because
complainant's (sic) herself alleged that Larry's mental condition
is that of a child, who can not give consent. Based on the
foregoing consideration, no falsification can be established
under the circumstances.22
Even the statement in the Psychiatric Report of respondent Dr.
Pascual that Lourdes Aguirre had Bipolar Mood Disorder cannot
be considered falsification since
The report did not state that Lourdes Aguirre was in fact
personally interviewed by respondent Dr. Pascual and that the
latter concluded that Lourdes Aguirre has Bipolar Mood
Disorder. The report merely quoted other sources of information
with respect to the condition of Lourdes Aguirre, in the same
manner that the fact that Lourdes Aguirre was physically
abusing Larry Aguirre was also not of Dra. Pascual personal
knowledge. But the fact that Dra. Pascual cited finding, which
is not of her own personal knowledge in her report does not
mean that she committed falsification in the process. Her
sources may be wrong and may affect the veracity of her report,
but for as long as she has not alleged therein that she personally
diagnosed Lourdes Aguirre, which allegation would not then be
true, she cannot be charged of falsification. Therefore, it goes
without saying that if the author of the report is not guilty, then
with more reason the other respondents are not liable.23
Respecting the charge of mutilation, the Assistant City
Prosecutor also held that the facts alleged did not amount to the
crime of mutilation as defined and penalized under Article 262
of the Revised Penal Code, i.e., "[t]he vasectomy operation did
not in any way deprived (sic) Larry of his reproductive organ,
which is still very much part of his physical self." He
ratiocinated that:
While the operation renders him the inability (sic) to procreate,
the operation is reversible and therefore, cannot be the
permanent damage contemplated under Article 262 of the
Revised Penal Code.24
The Assistant City Prosecutor,25 in a Resolution26 dated 8
January 2003, found no probable cause to hold respondents
Pedro Aguirre, Olondriz, Dr. Agatep and Dr. Pascual liable for
the complaint of falsification and mutilation, more specifically,
the violation of Articles 172 and 262 of the Revised Penal Code,
in relation to Republic Act No. 7610. Accordingly, the Assistant
City Prosecutor recommended the dismissal of petitioner Gloria
Aguirre's complaint for insufficiency of evidence. The
dispositive portion of the resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, it is recommended that the above-entitled case
be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.27
On 18 February 2003, petitioner Gloria Aguirre appealed the
foregoing resolution to the Secretary of the DOJ by means of a
Petition for Review.28
In a Resolution dated 11 February 2004, Chief State Prosecutor
Jovencito R. Zuo, for the Secretary of the DOJ, dismissed the
petition. In resolving said appeal, the Chief State Prosecutor
held that:
Under Section 12, in relation to Section 7, of Department
Circular No. 70 dated July 3, 2000, the Secretary of Justice may,
motu proprio, dismiss outright the petition if there is no showing
of any reversible error in the questioned resolution or finds the
same to be patently without merit.
We carefully examined the petition and its attachments and
found no error that would justify a reversal of the assailed
resolution which is in accord with the law and evidenced (sic)
on the matter.29
Petitioner Gloria Aguirre's Motion for Reconsideration was
likewise denied with finality by the DOJ in another Resolution
dated 12 November 2004.
Resolute in her belief, petitioner Gloria Aguirre went to the
Court of Appeals by means of a Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
as amended.
On 21 July 2005, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision
dismissing petitioner Gloria Aguirre's recourse for lack of merit.
The fallo of the assailed decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is
hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and accordingly DISMISSED
for lack of merit. Consequently, the assailed Resolutions dated
February 11, 2004 and November 12, 2004 of the Secretary of
Justice in I.S. No. 02-12466 are hereby AFFIRMED.30
Petitioner Gloria Aguirre's motion for reconsideration proved
futile as it was denied by the appellate court in a Resolution
dated 5 December 2005.
Hence, the present petition filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, as amended, premised on the following arguments:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS,
GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERRORS OF LAW WHEN IT
CONCLUDED, BASED PURPORTEDLY ON THE
INTERNET WHICH RUNS AMUCK WITH OUR SYSTEM
OF THE RULE OF LAW AND THE EVIDENCE ON
RECORD, THAT BILATERAL VASECTOMY IS
PURPORTEDLY 100% REVERSIBLE BY A FUTURE
MEDICAL PROCEDURE HENCE NOT AMOUNTING TO
MUTILATION, X X X; AND
xxxx
II.
WORSE, THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
GRAVE, SERIOUS AND REVERSIBLE ERRORS OF LAW
WHEN IT REFUSED TO DIRECT THE INDICTMENT OF
THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FOR MUTILATION AND
FALSIFICATION DESPITE THE EXISTENCE OF
SUFFICIENT PROBABLE CAUSE THEREFOR X X X.31
The foregoing issues notwithstanding, the more proper issue for
this Court's consideration is, given the facts of the case, whether
or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the DOJ did not
commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when the latter affirmed the public prosecutor's
finding of lack of probable cause for respondents Pedro Aguirre,
Olondriz, Dr. Agatep and Dr. Pascual to stand trial for the
criminal complaints of falsification and mutilation in relation to
Republic Act No. 7610.
In ruling that the DOJ did not commit grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals
explained that:
Evidently, the controversy lies in the permanency of sterilization
as a result of a vasectomy operation, and the chances of restoring
fertility with a reversal surgery x x x.
We sustain the DOJ in ruling that the bilateral vasectomy
performed on Larry does not constitute mutilation even if
intentionally and purposely done to prevent him from siring a
child.
xxxx
Sterilization is to be distinguished from castration: in the latter
act the reproductive capacity is permanently removed or
damaged.32
It then concluded that:
The matter of legal liability, other than criminal, which private
respondents may have incurred for the alleged absence of a valid
consent to the vasectomy performed on Larry, is certainly
beyond the province of this certiorari petition. Out task is
confined to the issue of whether or not the Secretary of Justice
and the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City committed
grave abuse of discretion in their determining the existence or
absence of probable cause for filing criminal cases for
falsification and mutilation under Articles 172 (2) and 262 of the
Revised Penal Code.33
Petitioner Gloria Aguirre, however, contends that the Court of
Appeals and the DOJ failed to appreciate several important
facts: 1) that bilateral vasectomy conducted on petitioner's
brother, Larry Aguirre, was admitted34; 2) that the procedure
caused the perpetual destruction of Larry's reproductive organs
of generation or conception;35 3) that the bilateral vasectomy
was intentional and deliberate to deprive Larry forever of his
reproductive organ and his capacity to procreate; and 4) that
respondents, "in conspiracy with one another, made not only one
but two (2) untruthful statements, and not mere inaccuracies
when they made it appear in the psychiatry report"36 that a)
Larry's consent was obtained or at the very least that the latter
was informed of the intended vasectomy; and b) that Lourdes
Aguirre was likewise interviewed and evaluated. Paradoxically,
however, petitioner Gloria Aguirre does not in any way state that
she, instead of respondent Pedro Aguirre, has guardianship over
the person of Larry. She only insists that respondents should
have obtained Larry's consent prior to the conduct of the
bilateral vasectomy.
In contrast, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for public
respondent DOJ, argues that "the conduct of preliminary
investigation to determine the existence of probable cause for
the purpose of filing (an) information is the function of the
public prosecutor."37 More importantly, "the element[s] of
castration or mutilation of an organ necessary for generation is
completely absent as he was not deprived of any organ necessary
for reproduction, much less the destruction of such organ."38
Likewise, in support of the decision of the Court of Appeals,
respondents Pedro Aguirre and Olondriz assert that,
fundamentally, petitioner Gloria Aguirre has no standing to file
the complaint, as she has not shown any injury to her person or
asserted any relationship with Larry other than being his
"common law sister"; further, that she cannot prosecute the
present case, as she has not been authorized by law to file said
complaint, not being the offended party, a peace officer or a
public officer charged with the enforcement of the law.
Accordingly, respondents Pedro Aguirre and Olondriz posit that
they, together with the other respondents Dr. Agatep and Dr.
Pascual, may not be charged with, prosecuted for and ultimately
convicted of: 1) "mutilation x x x since the bilateral vasectomy
conducted on Larry does not involve castration or amputation of
an organ necessary for reproduction as the twin elements of the
crime of mutilation x x x are absent"39; and 2) "falsification x x
x since the acts allegedly constituting falsification involve
matters of medical opinion and not matters of fact,"40 and that
petitioner Gloria Aguirre failed to prove damage to herself or to
any other person.
Respondent Dr. Agatep, in the same vein, stresses that
vasectomy is not mutilation. He elucidates that vasectomy is
merely the "excision of the vas deferens, the duct in testis which
transport semen"41; that it is the penis and the testis that make
up the male reproductive organ and not the vas deferens; and
additionally argues that for the crime of mutilation to be
accomplished, Article 262 of the Revised Penal Code
necessitates that there be intentional total or partial deprivation
of some essential organ for reproduction. Tubes, seminal ducts,
vas deferens or prostatic urethra not being organs, respondent
Dr. Agatep concludes, therefore, that vasectomy does not
correspond to mutilation.
Anent the charge of falsification of a private document,
respondent Dr. Agatep asseverates that he never took part in
disclosing any information, data or facts as contained in the
contentious Psychiatric Report.
For her part, respondent Dr. Pascual insists that the assailed
Psychiatry Report was the result of her independent exercise of
professional judgment. "Rightly or wrongly, (she) diagnosed
Larry Aguirre to be incapable of giving consent, based on
interviews made by the psychiatrist on Larry Aguirre and
persons who interacted with him."42 And supposing that said
report is flawed, it is, at most, an erroneous medical diagnosis.
The petition has no merit.
Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts
and circumstances as would excite belief in a reasonable mind,
acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that
the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was
prosecuted.43 The term does not mean "actual and positive
cause" nor does it import absolute certainty.44 It is merely based
on opinion and reasonable belief;45 that is, the belief that the act
or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. A
finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand
trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt.46
The executive department of the government is accountable for
the prosecution of crimes, its principal obligation being the
faithful execution of the laws of the land. A necessary
component of the power to execute the laws is the right to
prosecute their violators,47 the responsibility of which is thrust
upon the DOJ. Hence, the determination of whether or not
probable cause exists to warrant the prosecution in court of an
accused is consigned and entrusted to the DOJ. And by the
nature of his office, a public prosecutor is under no compulsion
to file a particular criminal information where he is not
convinced that he has evidence to prop up the averments thereof,
or that the evidence at hand points to a different conclusion.
Put simply, public prosecutors under the DOJ have a wide range
of discretion, the discretion of whether, what and whom to
charge, the exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord of
factors which are best appreciated by (public) prosecutors.48
And this Court has consistently adhered to the policy of non-
interference in the conduct of preliminary investigations, and to
leave to the investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude of
discretion in the determination of what constitutes sufficient
evidence as will establish probable cause for the filing of an
information against the supposed offender.49
But this is not to discount the possibility of the commission of
abuses on the part of the prosecutor. It is entirely possible that
the investigating prosecutor may erroneously exercise the
discretion lodged in him by law. This, however, does not render
his act amenable to correction and annulment by the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari, absent any showing of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.50
Prescinding from the above, the court's duty in an appropriate
case, therefore, is confined to a determination of whether the
assailed executive determination of probable cause was done
without or in excess of jurisdiction resulting from a grave abuse
of discretion. For courts of law to grant the extraordinary writ of
certiorari, so as to justify the reversal of the finding of whether
or not there exists probable cause to file an information, the one
seeking the writ must be able to establish that the investigating
prosecutor exercised his power in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be
patent and gross as would amount to an evasion or to a unilateral
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation
of law. Grave abuse of discretion is not enough.51 Excess of
jurisdiction signifies that he had jurisdiction over the case but
has transcended the same or acted without authority.52
Applying the foregoing disquisition to the present petition, the
reasons of the Assistant City Prosecutor in dismissing the
criminal complaints for falsification and mutilation, as affirmed
by the DOJ, is determinative of whether or not he committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
In ruling the way he did that no probable cause for falsification
and mutilation exists - the Assistant City Prosecutor deliberated
on the factual and legal milieu of the case. He found that there
was no sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case for the
crimes complained of as defined and punished under Articles
172, paragraph 2, and 262 of the Revised Penal Code in relation
to Republic Act No. 7610, respectively. Concerning the crime
of falsification of a private document, the Assistant City
Prosecutor reasoned that the circumstances attendant to the case
did not amount to the crime complained of, that is, the lack of
consent by Larry Aguirre before he was vasectomized; or the
fact that the latter was not consulted. The lack of the two
preceding attendant facts do not in any way amount to
falsification, absent the contention that it was made to appear in
the assailed report that said consent was obtained. That would
have been an untruthful statement. Neither does the fact that the
Psychiatric Report state that Lourdes Aguirre has Bipolar Mood
Disorder by the same token amount to falsification because said
report does not put forward that such finding arose after an
examination of the concerned patient. Apropos the charge of
mutilation, he reasoned that though the vasectomy rendered
Larry unable to procreate, it was not the permanent damage
contemplated under the pertinent provision of the penal code.
We agree. Grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of the DOJ and the Assistant City
Prosecutor was not shown in the present case.
In the present petition, respondents Pedro Aguirre, Olondriz, Dr.
Agatep and Dr. Pascual are charged with violating Articles 172
and 262 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Republic Act
No. 7610. Article 172, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code,
defines the crime of falsification of a private document, viz
Art. 172. Falsification by private individuals and use of falsified
documents. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods and a fine of not more than 5,000 pesos
shall be imposed upon:
xxxx
2. Any person who, to the damage of a third party, or with the
intent to cause such damage, shall in any private document
commit any of the acts of falsification enumerated in the next
preceding article.
Petitioner Gloria Aguirre charges respondents with falsification
of a private document for conspiring with one another in keeping
Larry "in the dark about the foregoing (vasectomy) as the same
was concealed from him by the respondents x x x,"53 as well as
for falsely concluding and diagnosing Lourdes Aguirre to be
suffering from Bipolar Mood Disorder.
A scrutiny, however, of Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code
which defines the acts constitutive of falsification, that is
Art. 171. x x x shall falsify a document by committing any of
the following acts:
1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature, or
rubric;
2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act
or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate;
3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or
proceeding statements other than those in fact made by them;
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
5. Altering true dates;
6. Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document
which changes its meaning;
7. Issuing in an authenticated form a document purporting to be
a copy of an original document when no such original exists, or
including in such copy a statement contrary to, or different from,
that of the genuine original; or
8. Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance
thereof in a protocol, registry, or official book.
vis--vis the much criticized Psychiatric Report, shows that the
acts complained of do not in any manner, by whatever stretch of
the imagination, fall under any of the eight (8) enumerated acts
constituting the offense of falsification.
In order to properly address the issue presented by petitioner
Gloria Aguirre, it is necessary that we discuss the elements of
the crime of falsification of private document under the Revised
Penal Code, a crime which all the respondents have been
accused of perpetrating. The elements of said crime under
paragraph 2 of Article 172 of our penal code are as follows: 1)
that the offender committed any acts of falsification, except
those in par. 7, enumerated in Article 171; 2) that the
falsification was committed in any private document; and 3) that
the falsification caused damage to a third party or at least the
falsification was committed with intent to cause such damage.
Under Article 171, paragraph 2, a person may commit
falsification of a private document by causing it to appear in a
document that a person or persons participated in an act or
proceeding, when such person or persons did not in fact so
participate in the act or proceeding. On the other hand,
falsification under par. 3 of the same article is perpetrated by a
person or persons who, participating in an act or proceeding,
made statements in that act or proceeding and the offender, in
making a document, attributed to such person or persons
statements other than those in fact made by such person or
persons. And the crime defined under paragraph 4 thereof is
committed when 1) the offender makes in a document
statements in a narration of facts; 2) he has a legal obligation to
disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; 3) the facts
narrated by the offender are absolutely false; and 4) the
perversion of truth in the narration of facts was made with the
wrongful intent of injuring a third person.
Applying the above-stated elements of the crime to the case at
bar, in order that respondent Dr. Pascual, and the rest acting in
conspiracy with her, to have committed the crime of falsification
under par. 3 and 4 of Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, it
is essential that that there be prima facie evidence to show that
she had caused it to appear that Larry gave his consent to be
vasectomized or at the very least, that the proposed medical
procedure was explained to Larry. But in the assailed report, no
such thing was done. Lest it be forgotten, the reason for having
Larry psychiatrically evaluated was precisely to ascertain
whether or not he can validly consent with impunity to the
proposed vasectomy, and not to obtain his consent to it or to
oblige respondent Dr. Pascual to explain to him what the import
of the medical procedure was. Further, that Larry's consent to be
vasectomized was not obtained by the psychiatrist was of no
moment, because nowhere is it stated in said report that such
assent was obtained. At any rate, petitioner Gloria Aguirre
contradicts her very own allegations when she persists in the
contention that Larry has the mental age of a child; hence, he
was legally incapable of validly consenting to the procedure.
In the matter of the supposed incorrect diagnosis of Lourdes
Aguirre, with regard to paragraph 2 of Article 171 of the Revised
Penal Code, we quote with approval the succinct statements of
the Assistant City Prosecutor:
[T]he fact that Dra. Pascual cited finding, which is not of her
own personal knowledge in her report does not mean that she
committed falsification in the process. Her sources may be
wrong and may affect the veracity of her report, but for as long
as she has not alleged therein that she personally diagnosed
Lourdes Aguirre, which allegation would not then be true, she
cannot be charged of falsification. Therefore, it goes without
saying that if the author of the report is not guilty, then with
more reason the other respondents are not liable.54
As to the charge of mutilation, Art. 262 of the Revised Penal
Code defines the crime as
Art. 262. Mutilation. The penalty of reclusion temporal to
reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall
intentionally mutilate another by depriving him, either totally or
partially, of some essential organ for reproduction.
Any other intentional mutilation shall be punished by prision
mayor in its medium and maximum periods.
A straightforward scrutiny of the above provision shows that the
elements55 of mutilation under the first paragraph of Art. 262
of the Revised Penal Code to be 1) that there be a castration, that
is, mutilation of organs necessary for generation; and 2) that the
mutilation is caused purposely and deliberately, that is, to
deprive the offended party of some essential organ for
reproduction. According to the public prosecutor, the facts
alleged did not amount to the crime of mutilation as defined and
penalized above, i.e., "[t]he vasectomy operation did not in any
way deprived (sic) Larry of his reproductive organ, which is still
very much part of his physical self." Petitioner Gloria Aguirre,
however, would want this Court to make a ruling that bilateral
vasectomy constitutes the crime of mutilation.
This we cannot do, for such an interpretation would be contrary
to the intentions of the framers of our penal code.
A fitting riposte to the issue at hand lies in United States v.
Esparcia,56 in which this Court had the occasion to shed light
on the implication of the term mutilation. Therein we said that:
The sole point which it is desirable to discuss is whether or not
the crime committed is that defined and penalized by article 414
of the Penal Code. The English translation of this article reads:
"Any person who shall intentionally castrate another shall suffer
a penalty ranging from reclusion temporal to reclusion
perpetua." The Spanish text, which should govern, uses the word
"castrare," inadequately translated into English as "castrate."
The word "capar," which is synonymous of "castrar," is defined
in the Royal Academic Dictionary as the destruction of the
organs of generation or conception. Clearly it is the intention of
the law to punish any person who shall intentionally deprived
another of any organ necessary for reproduction. An applicable
construction is that of Viada in the following language:
"At the head of these crimes, according to their order of gravity,
is the mutilation known by the name of 'castration' which
consists of the amputation of whatever organ is necessary for
generation. The law could not fail to punish with the utmost
severity such a crime, which, although not destroying life,
deprives a person of the means to transmit it. But bear in mind
that according to this article in order for 'castration' to exist, it is
indispensable that the 'castration' be made purposely. The law
does not look only to the result but also to the intention of the
act. Consequently, if by reason of an injury or attack, a person
is deprived of the organs of generation, the act, although
voluntary, not being intentional to that end, it would not come
under the provisions of this article, but under No. 2 of article
431." (Viada, Codigo Penal, vol. 3, p. 70. See to same effect, 4
Groizard, Codigo Penal, p. 525.)
Thus, the question is, does vasectomy deprive a man, totally or
partially, of some essential organ of reproduction? We answer
in the negative.
In the male sterilization procedure of vasectomy, the tubular
passage, called the vas deferens, through which the sperm (cells)
are transported from the testicle to the urethra where they
combine with the seminal fluid to form the ejaculant, is divided
and the cut ends merely tied.57 That part, which is cut, that is,
the vas deferens, is merely a passageway that is part of the duct
system of the male reproductive organs. The vas deferens is not
an organ, i.e., a highly organized unit of structure, having a
defined function in a multicellular organism and consisting of a
range of tissues.58 Be that as it may, even assuming arguendo
that the tubular passage can be considered an organ, the cutting
of the vas deferens does not divest or deny a man of any essential
organ of reproduction for the simple reason that it does not entail
the taking away of a part or portion of the male reproductive
system. The cut ends, after they have been tied, are then dropped
back into the incision.59
Though undeniably, vasectomy denies a man his power of
reproduction, such procedure does not deprive him, "either
totally or partially, of some essential organ for reproduction."
Notably, the ordinary usage of the term "mutilation" is the
deprivation of a limb or essential part (of the body),60 with the
operative expression being "deprivation." In the same manner,
the word "castration" is defined as the removal of the testies or
ovaries.61 Such being the case in this present petition, the
bilateral vasectomy done on Larry could not have amounted to
the crime of mutilation as defined and punished under Article
262, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code. And no criminal
culpability could be foisted on to respondent Dr. Agatep, the
urologist who performed the procedure, much less the other
respondents. Thus, we find sufficient evidence to explain why
the Assistant City Prosecutor and the DOJ ruled the way they
did. Verily, We agree with the Court of Appeals that the writ of
certiorari is unavailing; hence, should not be issued.
It is once more apropos to pointedly apply the Court's general
policy of non-interference in the conduct of preliminary
investigations. As it has been oft said, the Supreme Court cannot
order the prosecution of a person against whom the prosecutor
does not find sufficient evidence to support at least a prima facie
case.62 The courts try and absolve or convict the accused but,
as a rule, have no part in the initial decision to prosecute him.63
The possible exception to this rule is where there is an
unmistakable showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction that will justify judicial intrusion
into the precincts of the executive. But that is not the case herein.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is
DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed 21 July 2005 Decision
and 5 December 2005 Resolution, both of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 88370 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner Gloria Aguirre.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, Chairperson, Austria-Martinez, Corona*,
Reyes, JJ., concur.

l
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 167766 April 7, 2010
ENGR. CARLITO PENTECOSTES, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Assailed before Us is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA), dated February 18, 2005, in CA-G.R. CR. No. 27458,
which affirmed with modification the Decision2 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 6, in Criminal
Case No. VI-984, finding petitioner Engr. Carlito Pentecostes,
Jr. guilty of the crime of less serious physical injuries instead of
attempted murder, and the Resolution3 dated April 19, 2005,
denying the motion for reconsideration.
The antecedents are as follows:
On September 2, 1998, Rudy Baclig was drinking with his
brother-in-law. After consuming bottle of gin, he left and
went to the house of a certain Siababa to buy coffee and sugar.
He was accompanied by his four- year-old son. On their way
there, a gray automobile coming from the opposite direction
passed by them. After a while, he noticed that the vehicle was
moving backward towards them. When the car was about two
arms length from where they were, it stopped and he heard the
driver of the vehicle call him by his nickname Parrod. Rudy
came closer, but after taking one step, the driver, which he
identified as the petitioner, opened the door and while still in the
car drew a gun and shot him once, hitting him just below the left
armpit. Rudy immediately ran at the back of the car, while
petitioner sped away. After petitioner left, Rudy and his son
headed to the seashore. Rudy later went back to the place where
he was shot and shouted for help.4
The people who assisted him initially brought him to the
Municipal Hall of Gonzaga, Cagayan, where he was
interrogated by a policeman who asked him to identify his
assailant. He informed the policeman that petitioner was the one
who shot him. After he was interrogated, he was later brought to
the Don Alfonso Ponce Memorial Hospital at Gonzaga,
Cagayan. The following day, he was discharged from the
hospital.5
On June 1, 1999, an Information6 was filed by the Provincial
Prosecutor of Aparri, Cagayan, charging the petitioner of
frustrated murder, the pertinent portion of which reads:
That on or about September 2, 1998, in the [M]unicipality of
Gonzaga, [P]rovince of Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a
gun, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and with
treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously assault, attack and shoot one Rudy Baclig, inflicting
upon the latter gunshot injuries.
That the accused had performed all the acts of execution which
would have produce[d] the crime of Murder as a consequence,
but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of his own will.
That the same was aggravated by the use of an unlicensed
firearm.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Duly arraigned, petitioner pleaded Not Guilty to the crime as
charged.7
During the trial, it was established that at the time the incident
occurred, petitioner was employed by the National Irrigation
Administration (NIA) as Irrigation Superintendent assigned at
the Baua River Irrigation System (BRIS). Petitioner vehemently
denied any involvement in the incident, alleging that he was in
Quezon City at the time the crime was being committed. He
contended that he was following-up the funding for one of the
projects of NIA in Gonzaga, Cagayan. He insisted that he
reported at the NIA Central Office on September 1, 1998 and
stayed in Manila until the afternoon of September 4, 1998. To
buttress his allegations, the petitioner presented a Certificate of
Appearance8 issued by Engr. Orlando C. Hondrade, then NIA
Deputy Administrator, who testified thru a deposition that he
indeed signed the document. Engr. Hondrade testified that he
specifically remembered that petitioner personally appeared
before him on the 1st and 4th days of September for a duration
of 10 to 15 minutes. Petitioner also submitted his daily time
record to prove that he was not at their office in Cagayan from
the afternoon of August 31, 1998, claiming that he traveled to
Quezon City pursuant to a travel authority issued by his
superior.9
On February 27, 2003, after presentation of the parties
respective evidence, the RTC rendered a Decision10 finding
petitioner guilty of the crime of attempted murder. The decretal
portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Engr. Carlito
Pentecostes, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of
the crime of Attempted Murder and sentences him the penalty
of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor,
as maximum. Further, the accused is ordered to pay private
complainant Rudy Baclig the amount of Two Thousand Pesos
(P2,000.00).
SO ORDERED.11
The RTC concluded that Rudy positively identified the
petitioner as the one who shot him there was sufficient lighting
for Rudy to identify the perpetrator and he knew petitioner ever
since he attained the age of reason. As to petitioners defense of
alibi, the RTC ratiocinated that when petitioner personally
appeared before Engr. Hondrade on September 1, 1998, it would
not be impossible for him to immediately return to Gonzaga,
Cagayan that afternoon and commit the crime in the evening of
September 2, 1998.12
Petitioner then sought recourse before the CA, arguing that the
RTC committed serious errors in finding that he was guilty of
attempted murder and that the RTC failed to consider the
testimonies of his witnesses and the documentary evidence
presented in his favor.13
On February 18, 2005, the CA rendered a Decision affirming
with modification the decision of the RTC, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court dated
27 February 2003 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that
accused-appellant Pentecostes is only found GUILTY OF LESS
SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES and is hereby sentenced to
suffer imprisonment of six (6) months of arresto mayor, there
being one aggravating and no mitigating circumstance to offset
it.
SO ORDERED.14
In convicting the petitioner to a lesser offence, the CA opined
that it was not established that petitioner intended to kill Rudy
when he shot him. Petitioners act of shooting Rudy once was
not followed by any other assault or any act which would ensure
his death. Considering that petitioner was driving a car, he could
have chased Rudy if he really intended to kill the latter, or run
him over since Rudy went to the rear of the car. Petitioners
desistance displayed his nonchalance to cause the death of Rudy.
Moreover, Rudy only sustained a gunshot wound on the arm,
which required only 10 days of medical attendance.15
Not satisfied, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,16
but was denied in a Resolution dated April 9, 2005.
Hence, this petition which raises the following issues:
The honorable Court of Appeals, with due respect, committed a
grave abuse of discretion when it gives credence to the statement
of the private complainant presuming that the petitioner-
appellant is the assailant allegedly due to his voice and his
alleged ownership of the vehicle, and considering that the
private complainant was then intoxicated, and the crime was
committed at nighttime, such conclusion is entirely grounded on
speculations, surmises and conjectures.
The honorable fourteenth division committed grave abuse of
discretion when it failed to give weight, discuss and consider the
arguments and defenses made the petitioner-appellant in our
brief, vis--vis the manifestation and motion of the solicitor
general.
The honorable fourteenth division committed an error when it
relied heavily on an unfounded, baseless and alleged motive of
petitioner, being a crusader of illegal drugs in their own town, to
be the basis that he is the assailant.17
Petitioner questions the conclusion of the CA when it found him
guilty of the crime of less serious physical injuries. He argues
that Rudy failed to positively identify him as the assailant, since
Rudy never admitted that he was able to identify the petitioner
through his physical appearance, but only through his voice,
despite the fact that it was the first time Rudy heard petitioners
voice when he allegedly shot him. Petitioner also insists that
when the incident occurred, Rudys vision was impaired as he
just drank half a bottle of gin and the place was not properly lit.
Rudy also failed to identify the type of gun used during the
shooting. Moreover, the prosecution failed to establish that the
car used by the perpetrator was owned by the petitioner.
Further, petitioner maintains that it was impossible for him to
have shot the victim on the night of September 2, 1998, since he
was not in the Province of Cagayan Valley from September 1,
1998 to September 4, 1998.
The petition is bereft merit.
In sum, petitioner submits before this Court two issues for
resolution. First, whether or not the prosecution established
beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner was the one who shot
the victim; Second, whether or not petitioners defense of alibi
would prosper.
As regards the first issue, this Court finds that the prosecution
established beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner was the one
who shot Rudy that fateful night of September 2, 1998. Both the
RTC and the CA found that petitioner indeed shot Rudy. In
arriving at this conclusion, the RTC ratiocinated in this wise:
Private complainant Rudy Baclig averred that he personally
knew the accused since he was of the age of reason. Rudy knew
accused Engr. Carlito Pentecostes Jr. to be working with the
NIA at Sta. Cruz, Gonzaga, Cagayan. Both private complainant
Rudy Baclig and accused Engr. Carlito Pentecostes Jr. were
residents of Gonzaga, Cagayan, although they reside in different
barangays. Rudy was residing at Brgy. Batangan, while the
accused was living two-and-a-half kilometers away at Brgy.
Flourishing. Rudy Baclig categorically stated that when the car
of the accused passed by him, it slowly stopped then moved
backward and when the car was at a distance of about two arms
length, which was about three (3) meters, the accused called
Rudys nickname Parrod. Hearing his nickname, Rudy went
towards the car, but he was only able to take one step, accused
Engr. Carlito Pentecostes Jr. opened the door of the car and shot
Rudy once and afterwards the accused hurriedly sped away.
Asked how he was able to identify Engr. Carlito Pentecostes Jr.
to be the person who shot him when it was night time, Rudy said
that he was able to identify the accused through the lights of the
car and on cross-examination he said that aside from the lights
of the car, there were also lights coming from a store nearby the
place of the incident. The Court believes that with these kinds of
lights, Rudy Baclig was able to identify the accused, considering
the distance between the assailant and the victim was only three
(3) meters.
x x x x.
Rudy Baclig was not telling a lie when he declared that he was
shot at about two arms length only because the doctor who
treated him, Dr. Mila M. Marantan, declared that Rudy Baclig
suffered a gunshot wound, the entry was with powder burns
which is an evidence that Rudy Baclig was shot at a close range.
The defense harped on the fact that the private complainant
smelled liquor. The complainant at first denied having taken
liquor, but he admitted he took one-half bottle of gin before he
went to buy coffee and sugar. On cross-examination, the
complainant admitted also that every afternoon, he drank liquor.
He admitted that he could still walk naturally a distance of about
one kilometer. He also said that his vision might be affected.
This testimony of Rudy Baclig cannot be considered as evidence
that he was not able to identify the accused. He was categorical
in stating that he was able to identify the accused. The doctor
who treated Rudy of his injury declared the patient smelled
liquor, but she could not tell how much liquor the patient took,
however, the patient could answer all her questions.
x x x x.
There are other evidences that tend to show that Rudy Baclig
was able to identify the assailant. Immediately after he was shot,
Rudy told a police investigator, a certain Torres and Dr. Mila
Marantan that it was Engr. Carlito Pentecostes, Jr. who shot
him.18
This conclusion was concurred into by the CA, which
categorically stated in its decision that "[t]he prosecution was
able to present a witness, in the person of Baclig, who
categorically identified petitioner as his assailant and whose
testimony was characterized by frankness."19 Contrary to
petitioners contention, Rudy saw him and positively identified
him as his shooter, viz:
Q: When you heard the driver of the car calling you by your
nickname Parrod, what was your reaction?
A: I went near because I thought he was telling me something.
Q: And what made you decide to go near the driver of the
vehicle?
A: Because he called me by my name, Sir.
Q: When the driver of the car called you by your [nickname],
were you able to recognize the driver of the car who called you?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: And who was that person who called you by your name
Parrod?
A: It was Engr. Pentecostes, Sir.
Q: The same person you identified a while ago?
A: Yes, Sir.20
Corollarilly, petitioner already raised these arguments in his
motion for reconsideration of the decision of the court a quo,
which the CA addressed point by point in the assailed resolution
denying the motion. We quote with approval the following
discussion of the CA:
On the first allegation, accused-appellant wrongly read the
decision. The Court upheld the trial courts finding that it was
indeed accused-appellant who attacked the private complainant,
not because the latter heard accused-appellants voice but that
he was able to see him through the lights of the car when he
opened the window and the door. x x x
xxxx
Clearly, it was not merely hearing the assailants voice, but that
he was able to see him, that private-complainant was able to
identify the accused-appellant. It was admittedly a fact that
private complainant had a drink but it does not mean that he was
intoxicated, especially since he admitted that he drinks
everyday. Thus, his bodys tolerance to alcohol is probably
heightened. There was also no proof that his vision had been
affected by the alcohol intake, and that he would have mistaken
someone else for the accused.
Again, positive declaration is given more weight than the denial
of the accused-appellant. In addition, the same findings were
previously reached by the trial court which had the opportunity
to observe first-hand the demeanor of the witnesses, and assess
their credibility.
Regarding the Solicitor Generals recommendation, the Court is
not bound to follow it although in some cases, we are persuaded
by the same. However, in this case, it was not able to persuade
Us as it only adopted the same arguments advanced by accused-
appellants counsel.
Some of these arguments include the failure to present any
document or evidence showing that the car used was owned by
the accused-appellant. The ownership of the car, however, is
immaterial in the light of the positive identification of the
accused. In addition, the statement of the prosecutions
witnesses that the car was often used by accused-appellants
father does not remove the possibility that he may also use it.
On the third allegation of error, again, accused-appellant has
misread the decision and exaggerated by accusing us of relying
heavily on the existence of a probable motive on the part of
accused-appellant to commit the act complained of. This is clear
in the decision that the same was meant to assess whether there
was a probable motive for the private complainant to lie.21
It is clear that the arguments advanced by the petitioner in the
case at bar, questioning the conclusion of the RTC and the CA
that petitioner shot the victim, are trivial. The fact remains that
Rudy has been shot with a gun and he positively identified his
shooter as the petitioner. Petitioner faulted the RTC and the CA
for giving credence to the testimony of Rudy. However, it is to
be noted that even the lone declaration of a sole eyewitness is
sufficient to convict if that testimony is found to be credible.
Credibility of witnesses is to be weighed and should not be based
on numbers. The matter of assigning values to declaration on the
witness stand is best and most competently performed by the
trial judge who had the unmatched opportunity to observe the
witnesses and to assess their credibility by various indicia
available but not reflected on the record.22
This Court has meticulously scrutinized the transcripts of
stenographic notes of this case and finds that the RTC, as well
as the CA, committed no error in giving credence to the evidence
of the prosecution. The Court has long adhered to the rule that
findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies are accorded great respect unless it overlooked
substantial facts and circumstances, which if considered, would
materially affect the result of the case. This deference to the trial
courts appreciation of the facts and of the credibility of
witnesses is consistent with the principle that when the
testimony of a witness meets the test of credibility, that alone is
sufficient to convict the accused.23 This is especially true when
the factual findings of the trial court are affirmed by the
appellate court.24
As regards petitioners defense of alibi, well settled is the rule
that alibi is an inherently weak defense which cannot prevail
over the positive identification of the accused by the victim.25
Moreover, in order for the defense of alibi to prosper, it is not
enough to prove that the petitioner was somewhere else when
the offense was committed, but it must likewise be demonstrated
that he was so far away that it was not possible for him to have
been physically present at the place of the crime or its immediate
vicinity at the time of its commission.26 In the case at bar, it was
established that petitioner personally appeared before Engr.
Hondrade only on September 1 and 4, 1998. His whereabouts
for the two days in between the said dates are unaccounted for.
There was no showing that he could not have gone back to
Cagayan, committed the crime, and went back to Quezon City
during those two days. Petitioners defense of denial and alibi
cannot prevail as against the positive, straightforward and
consistent testimony of Rudy that it was petitioner who shot him
on the night of September 2, 1998.
As to the crime committed by petitioner, this Court also concurs
with the conclusion of the CA that petitioner is guilty of the
crime of less serious physical injuries, not attempted murder.
Indeterminate Sentence Law finds no application in the case at
bar, since it does not apply to those whose maximum term of
imprisonment is less than one year.31
As regards the awards for damages, moral damages may be
recovered in criminal offenses resulting in physical injuries, but
there must be a factual basis for the award.32 We have studied
the records and find no factual basis for the award of moral
damages.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals, dated February 18, 2005, and the Resolution
dated April 19, 2005 in CA-G.R. CR No. 27458, are
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner Engr. Carlito
Pentecostes, Jr. is sentenced to suffer the straight penalty of
three (3) months of arresto mayor.

The principal and essential element of attempted or frustrated SO ORDERED.

murder is the intent on the part of the assailant to take the life of
the person attacked. Such intent must be proved in a clear and
evident manner to exclude every possible doubt as to the
homicidal intent of the aggressor.27 In the present case, intent
to kill the victim could not be inferred from the surrounding
circumstances. Petitioner only shot the victim once and did not
hit any vital part of the latters body. If he intended to kill him,
petitioner could have shot the victim multiple times or even ran
him over with the car. Favorably to petitioner, the inference that
intent to kill existed should not be drawn in the absence of
circumstances sufficient to prove this fact beyond reasonable
doubt.28 When such intent is lacking but wounds are inflicted
upon the victim, the crime is not attempted murder but physical
injuries only. Since the Medico-Legal Certificate29 issued by
the doctor who attended Rudy stated that the wound would only
require ten (10) days of medical attendance, and he was, in fact,
discharged the following day, the crime committed is less
serious physical injuries only. The less serious physical injury
suffered by Rudy is defined under Article 265 of the Revised
Penal Code, which provides that "(A)ny person who inflicts
upon another physical injuries not described as serious physical
injuries but which shall incapacitate the offended party for labor
for ten (10) days or more, or shall require medical attendance for
the same period, shall be guilty of less serious physical injuries
and shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor."1avvphi1

As to the aggravating circumstainnce of treachery, this Court

finds that the CA erroneously concluded that treachery attended
the commission of the crime. To establish treachery, the
following must be proven: (1) the employment of such means of
execution as would give the person attacked no opportunity for
self-defense or retaliation; and (2) the deliberate and conscious
adoption of the means of execution.30 The circumstances Republic of the Philippines
attending the commission of the crime negate the existence of SUPREME COURT
treachery in its execution. Although petitioner deliberately Manila
assaulted Rudy and there was suddenness in his attack, he did
not logically plan to assault the latter when he chanced upon him FIRST DIVISION
while he was driving. In treachery, the perpetrator intentionally
and purposely employs ways and means to commit the crime. G.R. No. L-47448 May 17, 1978
There was no evidence, however, to show that petitioner
employed such means of execution that would ensure the THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
commission of the crime without harm to his person. Thus, vs.
treachery did not attend the commission of the crime. HON. EMETERIO C. OCAYA, as District Judge, 15th
Judicial District, Branch VI, Province of Bukidnon, and
There being no aggravating and no mitigating circumstance, the ESTERLINA MARAPAO, LETICIA MARAPAO and
penalty for the crime of less serious physical injuries should be DIOSDADO MARAPAO, respondents.
taken from the medium period of arresto mayor, which is from
two (2) months and one (1) day to four (4) months. The
Arcadio D. Fabria and Camilo E. Tamin, Office of the
Provincial Fiscal of Malaybalay, Bukidnon for petitioner.
Eusebio P. Aquino for private respondents.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
The Court declares the questioned orders of respondent judge
dismissing the information for supposed lack of jurisdiction as
null and void. Respondent judge wrongfully dismissed the case
before him in disregard to the elemental rule that jurisdiction is
determined by the allegations of the information and that the
offense of serious physical injuries charged in the information
had duly vested his court with jurisdiction. The Court orders the
transfer of the case below to another branch of the Bukidnon
court of-first instance, since it is doubtful that the State and
offended party may expect a fair and impartial hearing and
determination of the case from respondent judge who with his
erroneous pre-conceptions and predilections has adversely
prejudged their case for serious physical injuries as one merely
of slight or less serious physical injuries.
The office of the provincial fiscal of Bukidnon, after preliminary
investigation filed an information dated October 13, 1977 in the
court of respondent judge, charging the three private
respondents- accused (Esterlina Marapao, Leticia Marapao and
Diosdado Marapao) for serious physical injuries committed as
follows:
That on or about the 23rd day of July, 1977, in Don Carlos,
Bukidnon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping each other, did then and
there willfully unlawfully and feloneously attack, assault and
use personal violence upon one Mrs. LOLITA ARES, a mother
who was then still on the twelfth (12th) day from her child
delivery, by then and there wrestling her to the ground and
thereafter throwing and hitting her with a fist-size stone at the
face thereby inflicting upon said Mrs. LOLITA ARES:-
lacerated wound, transverse right at about 2.5 cm. x 0.5 cm. in
width at the level of the m arch of the face, with contusion and
swelling all around the inflicted area
which injury considerably deforms her face, and further causing
upon said Mrs. LOLITA ARES to suffer a relapse (nabughat in
the local dialect) arising from her weak constitution due to her
recent child delivery, which relapse incapacitated her from
performing her customary labor for a period of more than thirty
days.
Contrary to and in violation of Article 263, paragraph 3 of the
Revised Penal Code.
The records do not show that arraignment or trial on the merits
has been held, much less that warrants for the arrest of the
accused had been issued. Instead, after "scanning the records of
(the) case" and noting that the thereto attached medical
certificate stated that the injuries suffered by the victim Lolita
Ares would require medical attention from 7 to 10 days and,
therefore, 4 "may either be slight or less serious physical injuries
only" contrary to victim's affidavit that she was incapacitated
from her customary labor for more than 30 days and the fiscal's
findings as to the prominent sear left on the victim's face as a
result "which considerably deforms her face" (as duly alleged in
the information), respondent judge motu proprio ordered the
dismissal of the case "as the crime of slight or less physical
injury is not within the jurisdiction of the court" as per his Order
of October 27, 1977, stating as his reason that
The Court is of the opinion that what governs in the filing of a
physical injury case is the certificate issued by the physician
regarding the duration of treatment, and not what the victim
declares because the same is self-serving.
The fiscal's motion for reconsideration proved futile with
respondent judge in his Order of November 16, 1977 denying
the same, evaluating the case without having heard the parties
or their witnesses (particularly the physician who issued the
medical certificate) nor having received their evidence and
ruling against the deformity alleged in the information on the
basis of his perception from a reading of the medical certificate
and the fiscal's written resolution finding proper basis for the
filing of the information, that
Now, does the finding of the fiscal to the effect that he observed
a big scar at the left cheek bone of Mrs. Lolita Ares justify the
filing of the charge of serious physical injuries, under Article
263 of the Revised Penal Code, when the attending physician
certified that what he found was a lacerated wound on the right
side of the face? Clearly, the scar found by the investigating
fiscal could not be the result of the acts imputed to the accused
but for some other cause, for how could the scar be found on the
left side when the injury inflicted was on the right side?
(Emphasis supplied)
Hence, the petition at bar as filed by the provincial fiscal for
nullification of respondent judge's orders.
The Solicitor General in his comment has noted that there is
ample legal and factual basis for the information charging
serious physical injuries, stating that "(T)hat the allegations in
the Information that a fist-size stone hit the face of Lolita Ares
causing lacerated wound on the maxillary arch of the face which
considerably deformed her face (are) not only supported by the
medical certificate, but also by the admission of accused
Diosdado Marapao during the pre investigation that he threw a
fist-size stone which hit the face of Lolita Ares and the personal
finding of Fiscal Tamin during the preliminary in. investigation
that there is a prominent scar on her face," and that the offense
as charged falls under Article 263, paragraph 3 of the Revised
Penal Code which imposes thereon a penalty of prision
correccional in its minimum and medium periods and is
therefore properly cognizable by respondent judge's court.
The Court finds that respondent judge committed a grave abuse
of discretion in precipitately dismissing the case for alleged lack
of jurisdiction on the mere basis of his totally wrong notion that
what governs in the filing of a physical injury case is the medical
certificate regarding the duration of treatment and "not what the
victim declares because the same is self-serving."
It is elemental that the jurisdiction of a court in criminal cases is
determined by the allegations of the information or criminal
complaint and not by the result of the evidence presented at the
trial,' much less by the trial judge's personal appraisal of the
affidavits and exhibits attached by the fiscal to the record of the
case without hearing the parties and their witnesses nor
receiving their evidence at a proper trial.
It is equally elementary that the mere fact that evidence
presented at the trial would indicate that a lesser offense outside
the trial, 1 court's jurisdiction was committed does not deprive
the trial court of its jurisdiction which had vested in it under the
allegations of the information as filed since "(once) the
jurisdiction attaches to the person and subject matter of the
litigation, the subsequent happening of events, although they are
of such a character as would have prevented jurisdiction from
attaching in the first instance, will not operate to oust
jurisdiction already attached. 2

Indeed, the Solicitor General has aptly commented that "the

dismissal of the case had only resulted in duplication of work
and wasted time in the remand of records when respondent trial
judge dismissed the instant case for want of jurisdiction, when
it could have immediately proceeded to arraign the accused and
try him. "

Once more the Court is constrained to admonish the trial courts

to proceed with proper study and circumspection before
summarily dismissing cases duly filed within their court's
cognizance and needlessly burdening the appellate courts with
cases such as that at bar which should not have reached us at all
in the first instance. Respondent judge's disregard of the
established rule that the information for serious physical injuries
properly vested his court with jurisdiction to try and hear the
case, and that if from the evidence submitted a lesser offense
was established, that he equally had jurisdiction to impose the
sentence for such lesser offense, is difficult of comprehension.
Besides, the doctor who issued the medical certificate had yet to
be presented at the trial and conceivably could corroborate the
victim's testimony that her injuries had taken longer to heal than
had at first been estimated by him as well as clearify the location
of he victim's facial scar.

Respondent judge's actions and premature and baseless

declaration that the victim's declaration as to the period of her
incapacity is "self-serving" raise serious doubts as to whether
the State and the offended party may expect a fair and impartial
hearing and determination of the case from him, since seemingly Republic of the Philippines
with his erroneous pre-conceptions and predilections, he has SUPREME COURT
adversely prejudged their case as one merely of slight or less Manila
serious physical injuries. The case below should therefore be
transferred to another court presided by another judge. FIRST DIVISION

ACCORDINGLY, the questioned orders of respondent judge
are declared null and void. The case below for serious physical
injuries is remanded and ordered transferred to Branch V of the
court of first instance below, and the judge presiding the same is
ordered to issue the corresponding warrants of arrest and to
proceed with dispatch with the arraignment of the respondents-
accused and the trial and determination of the case on the merits.
Let copy of this decision be attached to the personal record of
respondent judge. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Santos, Fernandez, and
Guerrero, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 169533 March 20, 2013
GEORGE BONGALON, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Not every instance of the laying of hands on a child constitutes
the crime of child abuse under Section 10 (a) of Republic Act
No. 7610.1 Only when the laying of hands is shown beyond
reasonable doubt to be intended by the accused to debase,
degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child
as a human being should it be punished as child abuse.
Otherwise, it is punished under the Revised Penal Code.

The Case

On June 22, 2005,2 the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the

conviction of the petitioner for the crime of child abuse under
Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610.

Antecedents
On June 26, 2000, the Prosecutors Office of Legazpi City
charged the petitioner in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Legazpi City with child abuse, an act in violation of Section
10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610, alleging as follows:
That on or about the 11th day of May 2000, in the City of
Legazpi Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit on the person of
JAYSON DELA CRUZ, a twelve year-old,
Grade VI pupil of MABA Institute, Legazpi City, acts of
physical abuse and/or maltreatment by striking said JAYSON
DELA CRUZ with his palm hitting the latter at his back and by
slapping said minor hitting his left cheek and uttering derogatory
remarks to the latters family to wit: "Mga hayop kamo, para
dayo kamo digdi, Iharap mo dito ama mo" (You all animals, you
are all strangers here. Bring your father here), which acts of the
accused are prejudicial to the childs development and which
demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the said child as a
human being.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
The Prosecution showed that on May 11, 2002, Jayson Dela
Cruz (Jayson) and Roldan, his older brother, both minors, joined
the evening procession for the Santo Nio at Oro Site in Legazpi
City; that when the procession passed in front of the petitioners
house, the latters daughter Mary Ann Rose, also a minor, threw
stones at Jayson and called him "sissy"; that the petitioner
confronted Jayson and Roldan and called them names like
"strangers" and "animals"; that the petitioner struck Jayson at
the back with his hand, and slapped Jayson on the face;4 that the
petitioner then went to the brothers house and challenged
Rolando dela Cruz, their father, to a fight, but Rolando did not
come out of the house to take on the petitioner; that Rolando
later brought Jayson to the Legazpi City Police Station and
reported the incident; that Jayson also underwent medical
treatment at the Bicol Regional Training and Teaching
Hospital;5 that the doctors who examined Jayson issued two
medical certificates attesting that Jayson suffered the following
contusions, to wit: (1) contusion .5 x 2.5 scapular area, left; and
(2) +1x1 cm. contusion left zygomatic area and contusion .5 x
2.33 cm. scapular area, left.6
On his part, the petitioner denied having physically abused or
maltreated Jayson. He explained that he only talked with Jayson
and Roldan after Mary Ann Rose and Cherrylyn, his minor
daughters, had told him about Jayson and Roldans throwing
stones at them and about Jaysons burning Cherrylyns hair. He
denied shouting invectives at and challenging Rolando to a fight,
insisting that he only told Rolando to restrain his sons from
harming his daughters.7
To corroborate the petitioners testimony, Mary Ann Rose
testified that her father did not hit or slap but only confronted
Jayson, asking why Jayson had called her daughters "Kimi" and
why he had burned Cherrlyns hair. Mary Ann Rose denied
throwing stones at Jayson and calling him a "sissy." She insisted
that it was instead Jayson who had pelted her with stones during
the procession. She described the petitioner as a loving and
protective father.8
Ruling of the RTC
After trial, the RTC found and declared the petitioner guilty of
child abuse as charged, to wit:9
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations,
judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused GEORGE
BONGALON @ "GI" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
Violation of Republic Act No. 7610, and is hereby ordered to
undergo imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day to eight
(8) years of prision mayor in its minimum period.
SO ORDERED.
Ruling of the CA
On appeal, the petitioner assailed the credibility of the
Prosecution witnesses by citing their inconsistencies. He
contended that the RTC overlooked or disregarded material facts
and circumstances in the records that would have led to a
favorable judgment for him. He attacked the lack of credibility
of the witnesses presented against him, citing the failure of the
complaining brothers to react to the incident, which was
unnatural and contrary to human experience.
The CA affirmed the conviction, but modified the penalty,10
viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated
October 20, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9 of
Legazpi City is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in
that accused-appellant George Bongalon is sentenced to suffer
the indeterminate penalty of (4) years, two (2) months and one
(1) day of prision correccional, as minimum term, to six (6)
years, eight (8) months and 1 day of prision mayor as the
maximum term.
Further, accused-appellant is ordered to pay the victim, Jayson
de la Cruz the additional amount of P5,000 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
Issues
The petitioner has come to the Court via a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.11
The petitioner asserts that he was not guilty of the crime
charged; and that even assuming that he was guilty, his liability
should be mitigated because he had merely acted to protect her
two minor daughters.
Ruling of the Court
At the outset, we should observe that the petitioner has adopted
the wrong remedy in assailing the CAs affirmance of his
conviction. His proper recourse from the affirmance of his
conviction was an appeal taken in due course. Hence, he should
have filed a petition for review on certiorari. Instead, he wrongly
brought a petition for certiorari. We explained why in People v.
Court of Appeals:12
The special civil action for certiorari is intended for the
correction of errors of jurisdiction only or grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Its
principal office is only to keep the inferior court within the
parameters of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing
such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. As observed in Land Bank of the Philippines v.
Court of Appeals, et al. "the special civil action for certiorari is
a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and
not errors of judgment. The raison detre for the rule is when a
court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so
engaged does not deprived it of the jurisdiction being exercised
when the error is committed. If it did, every error committed by
a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous
judgment would be a void judgment. In such a scenario, the
administration of justice would not survive. Hence, where the
issue or question involved affects the wisdom or legal soundness
of the decisionnot the jurisdiction of the court to render said
decisionthe same is beyond the province of a special civil
action for certiorari. The proper recourse of the aggrieved party
from a decision of the Court of Appeals is a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.
It is of no consequence that the petitioner alleges grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the CA in his petition. The allegation of
grave abuse of discretion no more warrants the granting of due
course to the petition as one for certiorari if appeal was available
as a proper and adequate remedy. At any rate, a reading of his
presentation of the issues in his petition indicates that he thereby
imputes to the CA errors of judgment, not errors of jurisdiction.
He mentions instances attendant during the commission of the
crime that he claims were really constitutive of justifying and
mitigating circumstances; and specifies reasons why he believes
Republic Act No. 7610 favors his innocence rather than his guilt
for the crime charged.13 The errors he thereby underscores in
the petition concerned only the CAs appreciation and
assessment of the evidence on record, which really are errors of
judgment, not of jurisdiction.
Even if we were to treat the petition as one brought under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, it would still be defective due to its
being filed beyond the period provided by law. Section 2 of Rule
45 requires the filing of the petition within 15 days from the
notice of judgment to be appealed. However, the petitioner
received a copy of the CAs decision on July 15, 2005,14 but
filed the petition only on September 12, 2005,15 or well beyond
the period prescribed by the Rules of Court.
The procedural transgressions of the petitioner notwithstanding,
we opt to forego quickly dismissing the petition, and instead set
ourselves upon the task of resolving the issues posed by the
petition on their merits. We cannot fairly and justly ignore his
plea about the sentence imposed on him not being
commensurate to the wrong he committed. His plea is worthy of
another long and hard look. If, on the other hand, we were to
outrightly dismiss his plea because of the procedural lapses he
has committed, the Court may be seen as an unfeeling tribunal
of last resort willing to sacrifice justice in order to give premium
to the rigidity of its rules of procedure. But the Rules of Court
has not been intended to be rigidly enforced at all times. Rather,
it has been instituted first and foremost to ensure justice to every
litigant. Indeed, its announced objective has been to secure a
"just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and
proceeding."16 This objective will be beyond realization here
unless the Rules of Court be given liberal construction and
application as the noble ends of justice demand. Thereby, we
give primacy to substance over form, which, to a temple of
justice and equity like the Court, now becomes the ideal
ingredient in the dispensation of justice in the case now awaiting
our consideration.
The petitioners right to liberty is in jeopardy. He may be
entirely deprived of such birthright without due process of law
unless we shunt aside the rigidity of the rules of procedure and
review his case. Hence, we treat this recourse as an appeal timely
brought to the Court. Consonant with the basic rule in criminal
procedure that an appeal opens the whole case for review, we
should deem it our duty to correct errors in the appealed
judgment, whether assigned or not.17
The law under which the petitioner was charged, tried and found
guilty of violating is Section 10 (a), Article VI of Republic Act
No. 7610, which relevantly states:
Section 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or
Exploitation and other Conditions Prejudicial to the Childs
Development.
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse,
cruelty or exploitation or be responsible for other conditions
prejudicial to the childs development including those covered
by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but
not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer
the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.
xxxx
Child abuse, the crime charged, is defined by Section 3 (b) of
Republic Act No. 7610, as follows:
Section 3. Definition of terms.
xxxx
(b) "Child Abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual
or not, of the child which includes any of the following:
(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual
abuse and emotional maltreatment;
(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or
demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human
being;
(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival,
such as food and shelter; or
(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured
child resulting in serious impairment of his growth and
development or in his permanent incapacity or death.
xxxx
Although we affirm the factual findings of fact by the RTC and
the CA to the effect that the petitioner struck Jayson at the back
with his hand and slapped Jayson on the face, we disagree with
their holding that his acts constituted child abuse within the
purview of the above-quoted provisions. The records did not
establish beyond reasonable doubt that his laying of hands on
Jayson had been intended to debase the "intrinsic worth and
dignity" of Jayson as a human being, or that he had thereby
intended to humiliate or embarrass Jayson. The records showed
the laying of hands on Jayson to have been done at the spur of
the moment and in anger, indicative of his being then
overwhelmed by his fatherly concern for the personal safety of
his own minor daughters who had just suffered harm at the hands
of Jayson and Roldan. With the loss of his self-control, he lacked
that specific intent to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic
worth and dignity of a child as a human being that was so
essential in the crime of child abuse.
It is not trite to remind that under the well-recognized doctrine
of pro reo every doubt is resolved in favor of the petitioner as
the accused. Thus, the Court should consider all possible
circumstances in his favor.18
What crime, then, did the petitioner commit?
Considering that Jaysons physical injury required five to seven
days of medical attention,19 the petitioner was liable for slight
physical injuries under Article 266 (1) of the Revised Penal
Code, to wit:
Article 266. Slight physical injuries and maltreatment. The
crime of slight physical injuries shall be punished:
1. By arresto menor when the offender has inflicted physical
injuries which shall incapacitate the offended party for labor
from one to nine days, or shall require medical attendance during
the same period.
xxxx
The penalty for slight physical injuries is arresto menor, which
ranges from one day to 30 days of imprisonment.20 In imposing
the correct penalty, however, we have to consider the mitigating
circumstance of passion or obfuscation under Article 13 (6) of
the Revised Penal Code,21 because the petitioner lost his reason
and self-control, thereby diminishing the exercise of his will
power.22 Passion or obfuscation may lawfully arise from causes
existing only in the honest belief of the accused.23 It is relevant
to mention, too, that in passion or obfuscation, the offender
suffers a diminution of intelligence and intent. With his having
acted under the belief that Jayson and Roldan had thrown stones
at his two minor daughters, and that Jayson had burned
Cherrlyns hair, the petitioner was entitled to the mitigating
circumstance of passion. Arresto menor is prescribed in its
minimum period (i.e., one day to 10 days) in the absence of any
aggravating circumstance that offset the mitigating
circumstance of passion. Accordingly, with the Indeterminate
Sentence Law being inapplicable due to the penalty imposed not
exceeding one year,24 the petitioner shall suffer a straight
penalty of 10 days of arresto menor.
The award of moral damages to Jayson is appropriate. Such
damages are granted in criminal cases resulting in physical
injuries.25 The amount of P5,000.00 fixed by the lower courts
as moral damages is consistent with the current jurisprudence.26
WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the decision of the Court of
Appeals; and ENTER a new judgment: (a) finding petitioner
George Bongalon GUlLTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES under paragraph 1,
Article 266, of the Revised Penal Code; (b) sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of 10 days of arresto menor; and (c) ordering
him to pay Jayson Dela Cruz the amount of P5,000.00 as moral
damages, plus the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Republic Act No. 8504 February 13, 1998
AN ACT PROMULGATING POLICIES AND
PRESCRIBING MEASURES FOR THE PREVENTION
AND CONTROL OF HIV/AIDS IN THE PHILIPPINES,
INSTITUTING A NATIONWIDE HIV/AIDS
INFORMATION AND EDUCATIONAL PROGRAM,
ESTABLISHING A COMPREHENSIVE HIV/AIDS
MONITORING SYSTEM, STRENGTHENING THE
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL AIDS COUNCIL, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES
ARTICLE VI
CONFIDENTIALITY
Sec. 30. Medical confidentiality. All health professionals,
medical instructors, workers, employers, recruitment agencies,
insurance companies, data encoders, and other custodians of any
medical record, file, data, or test results are directed to strictly
observe confidentiality in the handling of all medical
information, particularly the identity and status of persons with
HIV.
Section 31. Exceptions to the mandate of confidentiality.
Medical confidentiality shall not be considered breached in the
following cases:
(a) when complying with reportorial requirements in
conjunction with the AIDSWATCH programs provided in Sec.
27 of this Act;
(b) when informing other health workers directly involved or
about to be involved in the treatment or care of a person with
HIV/AIDS: Provided, That such treatment or care carry the risk
of HIV transmission: Provided, further, That such workers shall
be obliged to maintain the shared medical confidentiality;
(c) when responding to a subpoena duces tecum and subpoena
ad testificandum issued by a Court with jurisdiction over a legal
proceeding where the main issue is the HIV status of an
individual: Provided, That the confidential medical record shall
be properly sealed by its lawful custodian after being double-
checked for accuracy by the head of the office or department,
hand delivered, and personally opened by the judge: Provided,
further, That the judicial proceedings be held in executive
session.
Section 32. Release of HIV/AIDS test results. All results of
HIV/AIDS testing shall be confidential and shall be released
only to the following persons:
(a) the person who submitted himself/herself to such test;
(b) either parent of a minor child who has been tested;
(c) a legal guardian in the case of insane persons or orphans;
(d) a person authorized to receive such results in conjunction
with the AIDSWATCH program as provided in Sec. 27 of this
Act;
(e) a justice of the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, as
provided under subSec. (c) of this Act and in accordance with
the provision of Sec. 16 hereof.
Section 33. Penalties for violations of confidentiality. Any
violation of medical confidentiality as provided in Sec.s 30 and
32 of this Act shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment for six
(6) months to four (4) years, without prejudice to administrative
sanctions such as fines and suspension or revocation of the
violator's license to practice his/her profession, as well as the
cancellation or withdrawal of the license to operate any business
entity and the accreditation of hospitals, laboratories or clinics.
Section 34. Disclosure to sexual partners. Any person with
HIV is obliged to disclose his/her HIV status and health
condition to his/her spouse or sexual partner at the earliest
opportune time.
R. RPC
Art. 174, 175, 347, 365
Article 174. False medical certificates, false certificates of
merits or service, etc. - The penalties of arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period
and a fine not to exceed P1,000 pesos shall be imposed upon:
1. Any physician or surgeon who, in connection, with the
practice of his profession, shall issue a false certificate; and
2. Any public officer who shall issue a false certificate of merit
of service, good conduct or similar circumstances.
The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed upon any private
person who shall falsify a certificate falling within the classes
mentioned in the two preceding subdivisions.
Article 175. Using false certificates. - The penalty of arresto
menor shall be imposed upon any one who shall knowingly use
any of the false certificates mentioned in the next preceding
article.
Article 347. Simulation of births, substitution of one child for
another and concealment or abandonment of a legitimate child.
- The simulation of births and the substitution of one child for
another shall be punished by prision mayor and a fine of not
exceeding 1,000 pesos.
The same penalties shall be imposed upon any person who shall
conceal or abandon any legitimate child with intent to cause
such child to lose its civil status.
Any physician or surgeon or public officer who, in violation of
the duties of his profession or office, shall cooperate in the
execution of any of the crimes mentioned in the two next
preceding paragraphs, shall suffer the penalties therein
prescribed and also the penalty of temporary special
disqualification.
CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE
Article 365. Imprudence and negligence. - Any person who, by
reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been
intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the
penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a
less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum
and medium periods shall be imposed; if it would have
constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its
maximum period shall be imposed.

Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall

commit an act which would otherwise constitute a grave felony,
shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and
maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious
felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall
be imposed.

When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have
only resulted in damage to the property of another, the offender
shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the Republic of the Philippines
value of said damages to three times such value, but which shall Congress of the Philippines
in no case be less than twenty-five pesos. Metro Manila

A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be Eighth Congress
imposed upon any person who, by simple imprudence or
negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously,
would have constituted a light felony. Republic Act No. 7170 January 7, 1992

In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE LEGACY OR DONATION
sound discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed in OF ALL OR PART OF A HUMAN BODY AFTER DEATH
Article sixty-four. FOR SPECIFIED PURPOSES

The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:
1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower
than those provided in the first two paragraphs of this article, in
which case the court shall impose the penalty next lower in
degree than that which should be imposed in the period which
they may deem proper to apply.
2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the
Automobile Law, to death of a person shall be caused, in which
case the defendant shall be punished by prision correccional in
its medium and maximum periods.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
Philippines in Congress assembled::
Section 1. Title. This Act shall be known as the "Organ
Donation Act of 1991".
Section 2. Definition of Terms. As used in this Act the
following terms shall mean:
(a) "Organ Bank Storage Facility" - a facility licensed,
accredited or approved under the law for storage of human
bodies or parts thereof.

Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, (b) "Decedent" - a deceased individual, and includes a still-
doing or falling to do an act from which material damage results born infant or fetus.
by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the
person performing of failing to perform such act, taking into (c) "Testator" - an individual who makes a legacy of all or
consideration his employment or occupation, degree of part of his body.
intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances
regarding persons, time and place. (d) "Donor" - an individual authorized under this Act to
donate all or part of the body of a decedent.1awphilalf
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed
in those cases in which the damage impending to be caused is (e) "Hospital" - a hospital licensed, accredited or approval
not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest. under the law, and includes, a hospital operated by the
Government.
The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this
article shall be imposed upon the offender who fails to lend on (f) "Part" - includes transplantable organs, tissues, eyes,
the spot to the injured parties such help as may be in this hand bones, arteries, blood, other fluids and other portions of the
to give. (As amended by R.A. 1790, approved June 21, 1957). human body.

(g) "Person" - an individual, corporation, estate, trust,

partnership, association, the Government or any of its
subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including
government-owned or -controlled corporations; or any other
legal entity.

(h) "Physician" or "Surgeon" - a physician or surgeon

licensed or authorized to practice medicine under the laws of the
Republic of the Philippines.
(i) "Immediate Family" of the decedent - the persons
enumerated in Section 4(a) of this Act.
(j) "Death" - the irreversible cessation of circulatory and
respiratory functions or the irreversible cessation of all functions
of the entire brain, including the brain stem. A person shall be
medically and legally dead if either:1awphilalf
(1) In the opinion of the attending physician, based on the
acceptable standards of medical practice, there is an absence of
natural respiratory and cardiac functions and, attempts at
resuscitation would not be successful in restoring those
functions. In this case, death shall be deemed to have occurred
at the time these functions ceased; or
(2) In the opinion of the consulting physician, concurred in
by the attending physician, that on the basis of acceptable
standards of medical practice, there is an irreversible cessation
of all brain functions; and considering the absence of such
functions, further attempts at resuscitation or continued
supportive maintenance would not be successful in resorting
such natural functions. In this case, death shall be deemed to
have occurred at the time when these conditions first appeared.
The death of the person shall be determined in accordance with
the acceptable standards of medical practice and shall be
diagnosed separately by the attending physician and another
consulting physician, both of whom must be appropriately
qualified and suitably experienced in the care of such parties.
The death shall be recorded in the patient's medical record.
Section 3. Person Who May Execute A Legacy. Any
individual, at least eighteen (18) years of age and of sound mind,
may give by way of legacy, to take effect after his death, all or
part of his body for any purpose specified in Section 6 hereof.
Section 4. Person Who May Execute a Donation.
(a) Any of the following, person, in the order of property
stated hereunder, in the absence of actual notice of contrary
intentions by the decedent or actual notice of opposition by a
member of the immediate family of the decedent, may donate
all or any part of the decedent's body for any purpose specified
in Section 6 hereof:
(1) Spouse;
(2) Son or daughter of legal age;
(3) Either parent;
(4) Brother or sister of legal age; or
(5) Guardian over the person of the decedent at the time of
his death.
(b) The persons authorized by sub-section (a) of this
Section may make the donation after or immediately before
death.
Section 5. Examination of Human Body or Part Thereof . A
legacy of donation of all or part of a human body authorizes any
examination necessary to assure medical acceptability of the
legacy or donation for the purpose(s) intended.
For purposes of this Act, an autopsy shall be conducted on the
cadaver of accident, trauma, or other medico-legal cases
immediately after the pronouncement of death, to determine
qualified and healthy human organs for transplantation and/or in
furtherance of medical science.
Section 6. Persons Who May Become Legatees or Donees.
The following persons may become legatees or donees of human
bodies or parts thereof for any of the purposes stated hereunder:
(a) Any hospital, physician or surgeon - For medical or
dental education, research, advancement of medical or dental
science, therapy or transplantation;
(b) Any accredited medical or dental school, college or
university - For education, research, advancement of medical or
dental science, or therapy;
(c) Any organ bank storage facility - For medical or dental
education, research, therapy, or transplantation; and
(d) Any specified individual - For therapy or
transplantation needed by him.
Section 7. Duty of Hospitals. A hospital authorized to receive
organ donations or to conduct transplantation shall train
qualified personnel and their staff to handle the task of
introducing the organ donation program in a humane and
delicate manner to the relatives of the donor-decedent
enumerated in Section 4 hereof. The hospital shall accomplish
the necessary form or document as proof of compliance with the
above requirement.
Section 8. Manner of Executing a Legacy.
(a) Legacy of all or part of the human body under Section
3 hereof may be made by will. The legacy becomes effective
upon the death of the testator without waiting for probate of the
will. If the will is not probated, or if it is declared invalid for
testamentary purposes, the legacy, to the extent that it was
executed in good faith, is nevertheless valid and effective.
(b) A legacy of all or part of the human body under Section
3 hereof may also be made in any document other than a will.
The legacy becomes effective upon death of the testator and
shall be respected by and binding upon his executor or
administrator, heirs, assigns, successors-in-interest and all
members of the family. The document, which may be a card or
any paper designed to be carried on a person, must be signed by
the testator in the presence of two witnesses who must sign the
document in his presence. If the testator cannot sign, the
document may be signed for him at his discretion and in his
presence, in the presence of two witnesses who must, likewise,
sign the document in the presence of the testator. Delivery of the
document of legacy during the testator's lifetime is not necessary
to make the legacy valid.
(c) The legacy may be made to a specified legatee or
without specifying a legatee. If the legacy is made to a specified
legatee who is not available at the time and place of the testator's
death, the attending physician or surgeon, in the absence of any
expressed indication that the testator desired otherwise, may
accept the legacy as legatee. If the legacy does not specify a
legatee, the legacy may be accepted by the attending physician
or surgeon as legatee upon or following the testator's death. The
physician who becomes a legatee under this subsection shall not
participate in the procedures for removing or transplanting a part
or parts of the body of the decedent.
(d) The testator may designate in his will, card or other
document, the surgeon or physician who will carry out the
appropriate procedures. In the absence of a designation, or if the
designee is not available, the legatee or other persons authorized
to accept the legacy may authorize any surgeon or physician for
the purpose.
Section 9. Manner of Executing a Donation. Any donation by
a person authorized under subsection (a) of Section 4 hereof
shall be sufficient if it complies with the formalities of a
donation of a movable property.
In the absence of any of the persons specified under Section 4
hereof and in the absence of any document of organ donation,
the physician in charge of the patient, the head of the hospital or
a designated officer of the hospital who has custody of the body
of the deceased classified as accident, trauma, or other medico-
legal cases, may authorize in a public document the removal
from such body for the purpose of transplantation of the organ
to the body of a living person: Provided, That the physician,
head of hospital or officer designated by the hospital for this
purpose has exerted reasonable efforts, within forty-eight (48)
hours, to locate the nearest relative listed in Section 4 hereof or
guardian of the decedent at the time of death.
In all donations, the death of a person from whose body an organ
will be removed after his death for the purpose of transplantation
to a living person, shall be diagnosed separately and certified by
two (2) qualified physicians neither of whom should be:
(a) A member of the team of medical practitioners who
will effect the removal of the organ from the body; nor
(b) The physician attending to the receipt of the organ to
be removed; nor
(c) The head of hospital or the designated officer
authorizing the removal of the organ.
Section 10. Person(s) Authorized to Remove Transplantable
Organs. Only authorized medical practitioners in a hospital
shall remove and/or transplant any organ which is authorized to
be removed and/or transplanted pursuant to Section 5 hereof.
Section 11. Delivery of Document of Legacy or Donation. If
the legacy or donation is made to a specified legatee or donee,
the will, card or other document, or an executed copy thereof,
may be delivered by the testator or donor, or is authorized
representative, to the legatee or donee to expedite the
appropriate procedures immediately after death. The will, card
or other document, or an executed copy thereof, may be
deposited in any hospital or organ bank storage facility that
accepts it for safekeeping or for facilitation or procedures after
death. On the request of any interested party upon or after the
testator's death, the person in possession shall produce the
document of legacy or donation for verification.
Section 12. Amendment or Revocation of Legacy or Donation.
a) If he will, card or other document, or an executed copy
thereof, has been delivered to a specific legatee or donee, the
testator or donor may amend or revoke the legacy or donation
either by:
(1) The execution and delivery to the legatee or donee of a
signed statement to that effect; or
(2) An oral statement to that effect made in the presence of
two other persons and communicated to the legatee or donee; or
(3) A statement to that effect during a terminal illness or
injury addressed to an attending physician and communicated to
the legatee or donee; or
(4) A signed card or document to that effect found on the
person or effects of the testator or donor.
(b) Any will, card or other document, or an executed copy
thereof, which has not been delivered to the legatee or donee
may be revoked by the testator or donor in the manner provided
in subsection (a) of this Section or by destruction, cancellation
or mutilation of the document and all executed copies thereof.
Any legacy made by a will may also be amended or revoked in
the manner provided for amendment or revocation of wills, or
as provided in subsection (a) of this Section.
Section 13. Rights and Duties After Death.
(a) The legatee or donee may accept or reject the legacy or
donation as the case may be. If the legacy of donation is of a part
of the body, the legatee or donee, upon the death of the testator
and prior to embalming, shall effect the removal of the part,
avoiding unnecessary mutilation. After removal of the part,
custody of the remainder of the body vests in the surviving
spouse, next of kin or other persons under obligation to dispose
of the body of the decedent.
(b) Any person who acts in good faith in accordance with
the terms of this Act shall not be liable for damages in any civil
action or subject to prosecution in any criminal proceeding of
this Act.
Section 14. International Sharing of Human Organs or Tissues.
Sharing of human organs or tissues shall be made only through
exchange programs duly approved by the Department of Health:
Provided, That foreign organ or tissue bank storage facilities and
similar establishments grant reciprocal rights to their Philippine
counterparts to draw organs or tissues at any time.
Section 15. Information Drive. In order that the public will
obtain the maximum benefits from this Act, the Department of
Health, in cooperation with institutions, such as the National
Kidney Institute, civic and non-government health organizations
and other health related agencies, involved in the donation and
transplantation of human organs, shall undertake a public
information program.
The Secretary of Health shall endeavor to persuade all health
professionals, both government and private, to make an appeal
for human organ donation.
Section 16. Rules and Regulations. The Secretary of Health,
after consultation with all health professionals, both government
and private, and non-government health organizations shall
promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary or
proper to implement this Act.

Section 17. Repealing Clause. All laws, decrees, ordinances,
rules and regulations, executive or administrative orders, and
other presidential issuance inconsistent with this Act, are hereby
repealed, amended or modified accordingly.
Section 18. Separability Clause. The provisions of this Act are
hereby deemed separable. If any provision hereof should be
declared invalid or unconstitutional, the remaining provisions
shall remain in full force and effect.
Section 19. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect after fifteen
(15) days following its publication in the Official Gazette or at
least two (2) newspapers of general circulation.
Approved: January 7, 1992
RA 7885 AN ACT TO ADVANCE CORNEAL
TRANSPLANTATION IN THE PHILIPPINES,
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE REPUBLIC ACT
NUMBERED SEVEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED
AND SEVENTY (R.A. NO. 7170), OTHERWISE KNOWN
AS THE ORGAN DONATION ACT OF 1991
Section 1. Sec. 9 of Republic Act No. 7170 is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 9. Manner of Executing a Donation. Any donation
by a person authorized under subsection (a) of Sec. 4 hereof
shall be sufficient if it complies with the formalities of a
donation of a movable property.
"In the absence of any persons specified under Sec. 4 hereof
and in the absence of any document of organ donation, the
physician in charge of the patient, the head of the hospital or a
designated officer of the hospital who has custody of the body
of the deceased classified as accident, trauma, or other medico-
legal cases, may authorize in a public document the removal
from such body for the purpose of transplantation of the organ
to the body of a living person: provided, that the physician,
head of the hospital or officer designated by the hospital for
this purpose has exerted reasonable efforts, within forty-eight
(48) hours, to locate the nearest relative listed in Sec. 4 hereof
or guardian of the decedent at the time of death: provided,
however, that the said physician, head or designated officer of
the hospital, or the medico-legal officer of any government
agency which has custody of such body may authorize the
removal of the cornea or corneas of the decedent within twelve
(12) hours after death and upon the request of qualified legatees
or donees for the sole purpose of transplantation: provided, that
such removal of the cornea or corneas will not interfere with
any subsequent investigation or alter the post-mortem facial
appearance of the decedent by such means as placing eye caps
after the said cornea or corneas have been removed.
"In all donations, the death of a person from whose body an
organ will be removed after his death for the purpose of
transplantation to a living person, shall be diagnosed separately
and certified by two (2) qualified physicians neither of whom
shall be:
"(a) A member of the team of medical practitioners who will
effect the removal of the organ from the body; nor
"(b) The physician attending to recipient of the organ to be
removed; nor
"(c) The head of hospital or the designated officer authorizing
the removal of the organ."
Sec. 2. Section 10 of Republic Act No. 7170 is also amended
to read as follows:
"Sec. 10. Person(s) Authorized to Remove and Transplant
Organs and Tissues. Only authorized medical practitioners
in a hospital shall remove and/or transplant any organ which is
authorized to be removed and/or transplanted pursuant to Sec.
5 hereof: provided, however, that the removal of corneal tissues
shall be performed only by ophthalmic surgeons and
ophthalmic technicians trained in the methodology of such
procedure and duly certified by the accredited National
Association of Ophthalmologists."
Sec. 3. The implementing rules and regulations of Republic
Act No. 7170 shall be amended accordingly by the Secretary
of Health, in consultation with professional health groups and
non-government health organizations, to make it consistent
with the provisions of this Act.
Sec. 4. The provisions of this Act are hereby declared
separable, and in the event any such provisions is declared
unconstitutional, the other provisions not affected thereby shall
remain in force and effect.
Sec. 5. All other laws, decrees, executive orders,
administrative orders, rules and regulations or parts thereof
which are inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are
hereby repealed, amended or modified accordingly.
Sec. 6. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
This deals with the Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court praying that the Decision1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA), dated March 31, 2006, adjudging
petitioner liable for damages, and the Resolution2 dated
November 22, 2006, denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration thereof, be reversed and set aside.

The CA's narration of facts is accurate, to wit:

Approved: February 20, 1995 Plaintiff-appellee Zenaida Magud-Logmao is the mother of

deceased Arnelito Logmao. Defendant-appellant Dr. Filoteo
Alano is the Executive Director of the National Kidney
Institute (NKI).

At around 9:50 in the evening of March 1, 1988, Arnelito

Logmao, then eighteen (18) years old, was brought to the East
Avenue Medical Center (EAMC) in Quezon City by two
sidewalk vendors, who allegedly saw the former fall from the
overpass near the Farmers Market in Cubao, Quezon City. The
patients data sheet identified the patient as Angelito Lugmoso
of Boni Avenue, Mandaluyong. However, the clinical abstract
prepared by Dr. Paterno F. Cabrera, the surgical resident on-
duty at the Emergency Room of EAMC, stated that the patient
is Angelito [Logmao].

Dr. Cabrera reported that [Logmao] was drowsy with alcoholic

breath, was conscious and coherent; that the skull x-ray showed
no fracture; that at around 4:00 oclock in the morning of
March 2, 1988, [Logmao] developed generalized seizures and
was managed by the neuro-surgery resident on-duty; that the
condition of [Logmao] progressively deteriorated and he was
intubated and ambu-bagging support was provided; that
admission to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU) and mechanical
ventilator support became necessary, but there was no vacancy
at the ICU and all the ventilator units were being used by other
patients; that a resident physician of NKI, who was rotating at
EAMC, suggested that [Logmao] be transferred to NKI; and
that after arrangements were made, [Logmao] was transferred
to NKI at 10:10 in the morning.

At the NKI, the name Angelito [Logmao] was recorded as

Angelito Lugmoso. Lugmoso was immediately attended to and
given the necessary medical treatment. As Lugmoso had no
relatives around, Jennifer B. Misa, Transplant Coordinator,
was asked to locate his family by enlisting police and media
assistance. Dr. Enrique T. Ona, Chairman of the Department of
Surgery, observed that the severity of the brain injury of
Lugmoso manifested symptoms of brain death. He requested
the Laboratory Section to conduct a tissue typing and tissue
cross-matching examination, so that should Lugmoso expire
Republic of the Philippines despite the necessary medical care and management and he
SUPREME COURT would be found to be a suitable organ donor and his family
Baguio City would consent to organ donation, the organs thus donated could
be detached and transplanted promptly to any compatible
THIRD DIVISION beneficiary.

G.R. No. 175540 April 7, 2014 Jennifer Misa verified on the same day, March 2, 1988, from
EAMC the identity of Lugmoso and, upon her request, she was
DR. FILOTEO A. ALANO, Petitioner, furnished by EAMC a copy of the patients date sheet which
vs. bears the name Angelito Lugmoso, with address at Boni
ZENAIDA MAGUD-LOGMAO, Respondent. Avenue, Mandaluyong. She then contacted several radio and
television stations to request for air time for the purpose of
DECISION locating the family of Angelito Lugmoso of Boni Avenue,
Mandaluyong, who was confined at NKI for severe head injury
PERALTA, J.: after allegedly falling from the Cubao overpass, as well as
Police Station No. 5, Eastern Police District, whose area of
jurisdiction includes Boni Avenue, Mandaluyong, for
assistance in locating the relatives of Angelito Lugmoso.
Certifications were issued by Channel 4, ABS-CBN and GMA
attesting that the request made by the NKI on March 2, 1988 to
air its appeal to locate the family and relatives of Angelito
Lugmoso of Boni Avenue, Mandaluyong was accommodated.
A Certification was likewise issued by Police Station No. 5,
Eastern Police District, Mandaluyong attesting to the fact that
on March 2, 1988, at about 6:00 p.m., Jennifer Misa requested
for assistance to immediately locate the family and relatives of
Angelito Lugmoso and that she followed up her request until
March 9, 1988.
On March 3, 1988, at about 7:00 oclock in the morning, Dr.
Ona was informed that Lugmoso had been pronounced brain
dead by Dr. Abdias V. Aquino, a neurologist, and by Dr.
Antonio Rafael, a neurosurgeon and attending physician of
Lugmoso, and that a repeat electroencephalogram (EEG) was
in progress to confirm the diagnosis of brain death. Two hours
later, Dr. Ona was informed that the EEG recording exhibited
a flat tracing, thereby confirming that Lugmoso was brain dead.
Upon learning that Lugmoso was a suitable organ donor and
that some NKI patients awaiting organ donation had blood and
tissue types compatible with Lugmoso, Dr. Ona inquired from
Jennifer Misa whether the relatives of Lugmoso had been
located so that the necessary consent for organ donation could
be obtained. As the extensive search for the relatives of
Lugmoso yielded no positive result and time being of the
essence in the success of organ transplantation, Dr. Ona
requested Dr. Filoteo A. Alano, Executive Director of NKI, to
authorize the removal of specific organs from the body of
Lugmoso for transplantation purposes. Dr. Ona likewise
instructed Dr. Rose Marie Rosete-Liquete to secure permission
for the planned organ retrieval and transplantation from the
Medico-Legal Office of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI), on the assumption that the incident which lead to the
brain injury and death of Lugmoso was a medico legal case.
On March 3, 1988, Dr. Alano issued to Dr. Ona a
Memorandum, which reads as follows:
This is in connection with the use of the human organs or any
portion or portions of the human body of the deceased patient,
identified as a certain Mr. Angelito Lugmoso who was brought
to the National Kidney Institute on March 2, 1988 from the East
Avenue Medical Center.
As shown by the medical records, the said patient died on
March 3, 1988 at 9:10 in the morning due to craniocerebral
injury. Please make certain that your Department has exerted
all reasonable efforts to locate the relatives or next of kin of the
said deceased patient such as appeal through the radios and
television as well as through police and other government
agencies and that the NBI [Medico-Legal] Section has been
notified and is aware of the case.
If all the above has been complied with, in accordance with the
provisions of Republic Act No. 349 as amended and P.D. 856,
permission and/or authority is hereby given to the Department
of Surgery to retrieve and remove the kidneys, pancreas, liver
and heart of the said deceased patient and to transplant the said
organs to any compatible patient who maybe in need of said
organs to live and survive.
A Certification dated March 10, 1988 was issued by Dr.
Maximo Reyes, Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI, stating that
he received a telephone call from Dr. Liquete on March 3, 1988
at 9:15 a.m. regarding the case of Lugmoso, who was declared
brain dead; that despite efforts to locate the latters relatives,
no one responded; that Dr. Liquete sought from him a second
opinion for organ retrieval for donation purposes even in the
absence of consent from the family of the deceased; and that he
verbally agreed to organ retrieval.
At 3:45 in the afternoon of March 3, 1988, a medical team,
composed of Dr. Enrique Ona, as principal surgeon, Drs.
Manuel Chua-Chiaco, Jr., Rose Marie Rosete-Liquete, Aurea
Ambrosio, Ludivino de Guzman, Mary Litonjua, Jaime
Velasquez, Ricardo Fernando, and Myrna Mendoza, removed
the heart, kidneys, pancreas, liver and spleen of Lugmoso. The
medical team then transplanted a kidney and the pancreas of
Lugmoso to Lee Tan Hoc and the other kidney of Lugmoso to
Alexis Ambustan. The transplant operation was completed at
around 11:00 oclock in the evening of March 3, 1988.
On March 4, 1988, Dr. Antonio R. Paraiso, Head of the
Cadaver Organ Retrieval Effort (CORE) program of NKI,
made arrangements with La Funeraria Oro for the embalmment
of the cadaver of Lugmoso good for a period of fifteen (15)
days to afford NKI more time to continue searching for the
relatives of the latter. On the same day, Roberto Ortega,
Funeral Consultant of La Funeraria Oro, sent a request for
autopsy to the NBI. The Autopsy Report and Certification of
Post-Mortem Examination issued by the NBI stated that the
cause of death of Lugmoso was intracranial hemorrhage
secondary to skull fracture.
On March 11, 1988, the NKI issued a press release announcing
its successful double organ transplantation. Aida Doromal, a
cousin of plaintiff, heard the news aired on television that the
donor was an eighteen (18) year old boy whose remains were
at La Funeraria Oro in Quezon City. As the name of the donor
sounded like Arnelito Logmao, Aida informed plaintiff of the
news report.
It appears that on March 3, 1988, Arlen Logmao, a brother of
Arnelito, who was then a resident of 17-C San Pedro Street,
Mandaluyong, reported to Police Station No. 5, Eastern Police
District, Mandaluyong that the latter did not return home after
seeing a movie in Cubao, Quezon City, as evidenced by a
Certification issued by said Station; and that the relatives of
Arnelito were likewise informed that the latter was missing.
Upon receiving the news from Aida, plaintiff and her other
children went to La Funeraria Oro, where they saw Arnelito
inside a cheap casket.
On April 29, 1988, plaintiff filed with the court a quo a
complaint for damages against Dr. Emmanuel Lenon, Taurean
Protectors Agency, represented by its Proprietor, Celso
Santiago, National Kidney Institute, represented by its
Director, Dr. Filoteo A. Alano, Jennifer Misa, Dr. Maximo
Reyes, Dr. Enrique T. Ona, Dr. Manuel Chua-Chiaco, Jr., Dr.
Rose Marie O. Rosete-Liquete, Dr. Aurea Z. Ambrosio, Dr.
Ludivino de Guzman, Dr. Mary Litonjua, Dr. Jaime Velasquez,
Dr. Ricardo Fernando, Dr. Myrna Mendoza, Lee Tan Koc,
Alexis Ambustan, Dr. Antonio R. Paraiso, La Funeraria Oro,
Inc., represented by its President, German E. Ortega, Roberto
Ortega alias Bobby Ortega, Dr. Mariano B. Cueva, Jr., John
Doe, Peter Doe, and Alex Doe in connection with the death of
her son Arnelito. Plaintiff alleged that defendants conspired to
remove the organs of Arnelito while the latter was still alive
and that they concealed his true identity.
On January 17, 2000, the court a quo rendered judgment
finding only Dr. Filoteo Alano liable for damages to plaintiff
and dismissing the complaint against the other defendants for
lack of legal basis.3
After finding petitioner liable for a quasi-delict, the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City (RTC) ordered petitioner to pay
respondent P188,740.90 as actual damages; P500,000.00 as
moral damages; P500,000.00 as exemplary damages;
P300,000.00 as attorney's fees; and costs of suit. Petitioner
appealed to the CA.
On March 31, 2006, the CA issued its Decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED,
with MODIFICATION by DELETING the award of
P188,740.90 as actual damages and REDUCING the award of
moral damages to P250,000.00, the award of exemplary
damages to P200,000.00 and the award of attorney's fees to
P100,000.00.
SO ORDERED.4
Petitioner then elevated the matter to this Court via a petition
for review on certiorari, where the following issues are
presented for resolution:
A. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS DISREGARDED
EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE PRONOUNCED BY THIS
HONORABLE SUPREME COURT IN HOLDING
PETITIONER DR. FILOTEO ALANO LIABLE FOR
MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND
ATTORNEY'S FEES DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE ACT
OF THE PETITIONER IS NOT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE
NOR IS THERE ANY FINDING THAT THE ACT OF THE
PETITIONER WAS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE
INJURY OR DAMAGE ALLEGEDLY SUSTAINED BY
RESPONDENT ZENAIDA MAGUD-LOGMAO.
B. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN REFUSING AND/OR FAILING TO DECLARE
THAT PETITIONER DR. ALANO ACTED IN GOOD
FAITH AND PURSUANT TO LAW WHEN HE ISSUED
THE AUTHORIZATION TO REMOVE AND RETRIEVE
THE ORGANS OF ANGELITO LUGMOSO (LATER
IDENTIFIED TO BE IN FACT ARNELITO LOGMAO)
CONSIDERING THAT NO NEGLIGENCE CAN BE
ATTRIBUTED OR IMPUTED ON HIM IN HIS
PERFORMANCE OF AN ACT MANDATED BY LAW.
C. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN AWARDING RESPONDENT ZENAIDA
MAGUD-LOGMAO MORAL AND EXEMPLARY
DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES THAT ARE NOT IN
ACCORDANCE WITH AND ARE CONTRARY TO
ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE.5
The first two issues boil down to the question of whether
respondent's sufferings were brought about by petitioner's
alleged negligence in granting authorization for the removal or
retrieval of the internal organs of respondent's son who had
been declared brain dead.
Petitioner maintains that when he gave authorization for the
removal of some of the internal organs to be transplanted to
other patients, he did so in accordance with the letter of the law,
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 349, as amended by Presidential
Decree (P.D.) 856, i.e., giving his subordinates instructions to
exert all reasonable efforts to locate the relatives or next of kin
of respondent's son. In fact, announcements were made through
radio and television, the assistance of police authorities was
sought, and the NBI Medico-Legal Section was notified. Thus,
petitioner insists that he should not be held responsible for any
damage allegedly suffered by respondent due to the death of
her son and the removal of her sons internal organs for
transplant purposes.
The appellate court affirmed the trial court's finding that there
was negligence on petitioner's part when he failed to ensure that
reasonable time had elapsed to locate the relatives of the
deceased before giving the authorization to remove said
deceased's internal organs for transplant purposes. However, a
close examination of the records of this case would reveal that
this case falls under one of the exceptions to the general rule
that factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the
appellate court, are binding on this Court. There are some
important circumstances that the lower courts failed to consider
in ascertaining whether it was the actions of petitioner that
brought about the sufferings of respondent.6
The Memorandum dated March 3, 1988 issued by petitioner,
stated thus:
As shown by the medical records, the said patient died on
March 3, 1988 at 9:10 in the morning due to craniocerebral
injury. Please make certain that your Department has exerted
all reasonable efforts to locate the relatives or next-of-kin of
the said deceased patient, such as appeal through the radios and
television, as well as through police and other government
agencies and that the NBI [Medico-Legal] Section has been
notified and is aware of the case.
If all the above has been complied with, in accordance with the
provisions of Republic Act No. 349 as amended and P.D. 856,
permission and/or authority is hereby given to the Department
of Surgery to retrieve and remove the kidneys, pancreas, liver
and heart of the said deceased patient and to transplant the said
organs to any compatible patient who maybe in need of said
organs to live and survive.7
A careful reading of the above shows that petitioner instructed
his subordinates to "make certain" that "all reasonable efforts"
are exerted to locate the patient's next of kin, even enumerating
ways in which to ensure that notices of the death of the patient
would reach said relatives. It also clearly stated that permission
or authorization to retrieve and remove the internal organs of
the deceased was being given ONLY IF the provisions of the
applicable law had been complied with. Such instructions
reveal that petitioner acted prudently by directing his
subordinates to exhaust all reasonable means of locating the
relatives of the deceased. He could not have made his directives
any clearer. He even specifically mentioned that permission is
only being granted IF the Department of Surgery has complied
with all the requirements of the law. Verily, petitioner could
not have been faulted for having full confidence in the ability
of the doctors in the Department of Surgery to comprehend the
instructions, obeying all his directives, and acting only in
accordance with the requirements of the law.
Furthermore, as found by the lower courts from the records of
the case, the doctors and personnel of NKI disseminated
notices of the death of respondent's son to the media and sought
the assistance of the appropriate police authorities as early as
March 2, 1988, even before petitioner issued the
Memorandum. Prior to performing the procedure for retrieval
of the deceased's internal organs, the doctors concerned also
the sought the opinion and approval of the Medico-Legal
Officer of the NBI.

Thus, there can be no cavil that petitioner employed reasonable

means to disseminate notifications intended to reach the
relatives of the deceased. The only question that remains
pertains to the sufficiency of time allowed for notices to reach
the relatives of the deceased.

If respondent failed to immediately receive notice of her son's

death because the notices did not properly state the name or
identity of the deceased, fault cannot be laid at petitioner's door.
The trial and appellate courts found that it was the EAMC, who
had the opportunity to ascertain the name of the deceased, who
recorded the wrong information regarding the deceased's
identity to NKI. The NKI could not have obtained the
information about his name from the patient, because as found
by the lower courts, the deceased was already unconscious by
the time he was brought to the NKI.

Ultimately, it is respondent's failure to adduce adequate

evidence that doomed this case.1wphi1 As stated in Otero v.
Tan,8 "[i]n civil cases, it is a basic rule that the party making
allegations has the burden of proving them by a preponderance
of evidence. The parties must rely on the strength of their own
evidence and not upon the weakness of the defense offered by
their opponent."9 Here, there is to proof that, indeed, the period
of around 24 hours from the time notices were disseminated,
cannot be considered as reasonable under the circumstances.
They failed to present any expert witness to prove that given
the medical technology and knowledge at that time in the
1980's, the doctors could or should have waited longer before
harvesting the internal organs for transplantation.

Verily, the Court cannot, in conscience, agree with the lower

court. Finding petitioner liable for damages is improper. It
should be emphasized that the internal organs of the deceased
were removed only after he had been declared brain dead; thus,
the emotional pain suffered by respondent due to the death of
her son cannot in any way be attributed to petitioner. Neither
can the Court find evidence on record to show that respondent's
emotional suffering at the sight of the pitiful state in which she
found her son's lifeless body be categorically attributed to
petitioner's conduct.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the

Court of Appeals, dated March 31, 2006, is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The complaint against petitioner is hereby
DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 4226
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 4226 - AN ACT REQUIRING THE
LICENSURE OF ALL HOSPITALS IN THE
PHILIPPINES AND AUTHORIZING THE BUREAU OF
MEDICAL SERVICES TO SERVE AS THE LICENSING
AGENCY
Section 1. This Act shall also be known as the Hospital
Licensure Act.
Sec. 2. Definitions. As used in this Act
(a) 'Hospital' means a place devoted primarily to the
maintenance and operation of facilities for the diagnosis,
treatment and care of individuals suffering from illness, disease,
injury or deformity, or in need of obstetrical or other medical
and nursing care. The term 'hospital shall also be construed as
any institution, building or place where there are installed beds,
or cribs, or bassinets for twenty-four-hour use or longer by
patients in the treatment of diseases, diseased-conditions,
injuries, deformities, or abnormal physical and mental states,
maternity cases, and all institutions such as those for
convalescence, sanitarial or sanitarial care, infirmities,
nurseries, dispensaries and such other names by which they may
designated.
(b) 'Government hospital' means a hospital operated and
maintained either partially or wholly by the national, provincial,
municipal or city government or other political subdivision, or
by any department, division, board or other agency thereof.
(c) 'Private hospital' means one which is privately owned,
established and operated with funds raised or contributed
through donations, or by private capital or other means, by
private individuals, association, corporation, religious
organization, firm, company or joint stock association.
(d) 'Clinic' means a place in which patients avail of medical
consultations or treatments on an out-patient basis. However,
any clinic or dispensary where there is at least six beds or cribs
or bassinets installed for twenty-four-hour use by patients shall
be construed to fall within the definition of a hospital as
described in this Act.
(e) 'Licensee' is the person or persons granted a license to
operate and maintain a hospital according to an approved
minimum standard.
Sec. 3. Construction Permit. No hospital, government or
private, shall be constructed unless plans have been approved
and construction permit issued by the licensing agency as
defined in this Act.
Sec. 4. Registration and license. No hospital shall operate
or be opened to the public unless it shall have been registered
and a license for its operation obtained from the licensing
agency provided in this Act.
Sec. 5. Licensing Agency. For purposes of setting standards
in hospital construction and operation, the Bureau of Medical
Services in addition to its present duties shall act as the licensing
agency. The Secretary of Health shall reorganize this Bureau to
include a staff of hospital architects, hospital administrators,
sanitary engineers and such personnel as may be necessary to
carry out the purposes of this Act without necessarily increasing
the present personnel strength of this Bureau.
Sec. 6. Powers and duties of the licensing agency. The
Bureau of Medical Services, or the licensing agency shall have
the following powers and duties:
a. To conduct an ocular survey of all existing hospitals in the
Philippines, government or private, with a view to determine
their fitness to operate considering their facilities and physical
plant.
b. To prescribe standard plans for government hospital plants
in consultation with the Division of Architecture, Bureau of
Public Works.
c. To approve plans for hospital plants, government or private,
and to issue permits or authority to construct hospitals in
accordance with the provisions of this Act.
d. To keep a permanent register of approved hospitals or those
issued licenses to operate indicating the name of the hospital,
address or location, type of hospital, name of the director or
administrator, ownership, number of authorized beds and
bassinets and such other pertinent data as may be necessary.
e. To grant licenses for the operation and maintenance of
hospitals or revoke the same in accordance with the provisions
of this Act.
f. To make periodic inspection of all hospitals so as to check
compliance with rules and regulations legally promulgated or
with the provisions of this Act and to make recommendations to
directors or administrators of hospitals for the correction of
defects found during such inspections.
g. To publish yearly a list of all approved hospitals indicating
the name, location, type, authorized beds, and name of the
director or administrator.
h. To submit yearly reports to the Secretary of Health, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, the President of the
Senate and the chairmen and members of the Committees on
Health of both Houses of Congress, such reports to include a list
of approved hospitals indicating the name of the hospital,
location, bed capacity and name of the director or administrator
and make recommendations on hospital needs or requirements
for hospital service in certain communities that do not enjoy
such hospital services.
Sec. 7. Filing of Application for Construction Permit.
Application for a permit to construct a hospital shall be
submitted to the Office of the Director, Bureau of Medical
Services in a form prescribed by the latter and accompanied by
a plan of the hospital plant proposed to be constructed. The
application shall state the name of the hospital, ownership,
number of beds proposed to be operated, location and type of
hospital to be constructed.
Sec. 8. Minimum Standards of Construction. In order that
a permit to construct a hospital can be issued the hospital plan
shall provide sufficient bed space for the hospital bed capacity
proposed, a laboratory room, an operating room, including work
rooms for sterilization, anesthesia preparation, etc., an X-ray or
radiology room, pharmacy, dispensary or out-patient
department, delivery room, isolation rooms, autopsy room or
morgue, sufficient quarters for residents, nurses, attendants and
helpers and sufficient number of toilet facilities.
Wards shall be constructed such that segregation of the sexes is
observed and as far as practicable classified as to the type of
cases to be confined.
Sec. 9. Application for Registration and Issuance of License.
Application for registration of a hospital and for the issuance
of a license for its operation and maintenance shall be filed with
the Bureau of Medical Services on a form prescribed by it.
Registration may be made and license issued upon compliance
with the provisions of Section eight hereof and the rules and
regulations prescribed by the licensing agency pursuant to the
provisions of this Act.
SECTION 10. Inspection. Permit to construct a hospital or
a major portion thereof and license to operate and maintain the
same shall be issued by the licensing agency only after a
representative of the licensing agency has conducted an ocular
inspection and certified that the applicant has satisfactorily
complied with requisites prescribed in this Act. The license to
operate and maintain a hospital shall be renewed every year
upon payment of the prescribed fees.
SECTION 11. Revocation of License. The licensing agency
may suspend or revoke a license already issued for any of the
following grounds: (a) repeated violation by the licensee of any
provision of this Act or of any other existing law; (b) repeated
violation of rules and regulations prescribed in the
implementation of this Act; or (c) repeated failure to make
necessary corrections or adjustments required by the licensing
agency in the improvement of facilities and services.
SECTION 12. Hearing. Any person, association,
corporation, or any other private entity who has been refused a
license to operate and maintain a hospital or whose license for
such hospital has been suspended or revoked shall be entitled to
an administrative hearing to be conducted by the Secretary of
Health and his two undersecretaries to determine the
justifiability of such denial, suspension or revocation of the
license: provided, that the licensee may resort to the courts, as
in other cases provided by law.
SECTION 13. Separate Licenses Required. Separate
licenses shall be required for hospitals or branches thereof
maintained in separate premises, even though they are operated
under the same management: provided, however, that separate
licenses shall not be required for separate buildings in the same
compound: provided, further, that permits for construction or
alteration of buildings within the same compound shall also be
secured from the licensing agency to determine compliance with
standards and requirements herein authorized.
SECTION 14. License not transferable. License for the
operation of hospitals shall not be transferable. The licensing
agency shall be notified of any change in ownership, change of
name of the hospital, and transfer of location and in the latter
case, an application for a new license should be submitted.
SECTION 15. Rules and Regulations. The Bureau of
Medical Services acting as a licensing agency and subject to the
approval of the Secretary of Health, shall promulgate rules and
regulations to implement the provisions of this Act.
SECTION 16. Classification of Hospitals. The licensing
agency shall study and adopt a system of classifying hospitals in
the Philippines as to: (1) general or special; (2) hospital services
capabilities; (3) size or bed capacity and (4) class of hospital
whether training or not.
SECTION 17. Fees. Each applicant for a permit to construct
a hospital shall pay the amount of five pesos as permit fee. A
registration fee of five pesos and an annual license fee of ten
pesos shall likewise be collected for each hospital and for each
approved license: provided, that a government hospital shall be
exempt from the payment of such fees. The amount herein
collected shall be officially receipted by the licensing agency
and shall constitute as a revolving fund for the use of the
licensing agency.
SECTION 18. Penalties. Any person, partnership,
association, or corporation who establishes, operates, conducts,
manages or maintains a hospital or hospital clinic within the
meaning of this Act without first obtaining a license as provided
for in this Act or violates any provision hereof shall be guilty of
a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof shall be liable to a
fine of not more than five hundred pesos for the first offense and
not more than one thousand pesos for each subsequent offense,
and each day that the hospital shall operate after the first
conviction shall be considered a subsequent offense.
SECTION 19. Repeal. Any law or laws or parts thereof
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed.
Sec. 20. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect upon its
approval.
 SEC. 4. The Department of Health shall promulgate the
necessary rules and regulations to carry out the provisions of this
Act.

SEC. 5. If any provision of this Act is declared void and

unconstitutional the remaining provisions hereof not affected
thereby shall remain in full force and effect.

SEC. 6. All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations or part

thereof inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed or
amended accordingly.

SEC. 7. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its
Republic of the Philippines publication in two national newspapers of general circulation.
Congress of the Philippines
Metro Manila Approved,

Thirteenth Congress
Third Regular Session

Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the nineteenth

day of February, two thousand seven.

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9439 April 27, 2007

AN ACT PROHIBITING THE DETENTION OF PATIENTS

IN HOSPITALS AND MEDICAL CLINICS ON GROUNDS
OF NONPAYMENT OF HOSPITAL BILLS OR MEDICAL
EXPENSES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the

Philippines in Congress assembled:

SECTION 1. It shall be unlawful for any hospital or medical

clinic in the country to detain or to otherwise cause, directly or
indirectly, the detention of patients who have fully or partially
recovered or have been adequately attended to or who may have
died, for reasons of nonpayment in part or in full of hospital bills
or medical expenses.

SEC. 2. Patients who have fully or partially recovered and who

already wish to leave the hospital or medical clinic but are
financially incapable to settle, in part or in full, their
hospitalization expenses, including professional fees and
medicines, shall be allowed to leave the hospital or medical
clinic, with a right to demand the issuance of the corresponding
medical certificate and other pertinent papers required for the
release of the patient from the hospital or medical clinic upon
the execution of a promissory note covering the unpaid
obligation. The promissory note shall be secured by either a
mortgage or by a guarantee of a co-maker, who will be jointly
and severally liable with the patient for the unpaid obligation. In
the case of a deceased patient, the corresponding death
certificate and other documents required for interment and other
purposes shall be released to any of his surviving relatives
requesting for the same: Provided, however, That patients who
stayed in private rooms shall not be covered by this Act.

SEC. 3. Any officer or employee of the hospital or medical clinic

responsible for releasing patients, who violates the provisions of
this Act shall be punished by a fine of not less than Twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00), but not more than Fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00), or imprisonment of not less than one month,
but not more than six months, or both such fine and
imprisonment, at the discretion of the proper court.

Republic of the Philippines
Congress of the Philippines
Metro Manila
Tenth Congress
Republic Act No. 8344 August 25, 1997
AN ACT PENALIZING THE REFUSAL OF HOSPITALS
AND MEDICAL CLINICS TO ADMINISTER
APPROPRIATE INITIAL MEDICAL TREATMENT AND
SUPPORT IN EMERGENCY OR SERIOUS CASES,
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE BATAS PAMBANSA
BILANG 702, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS "AN ACT
PROHIBITING THE DEMAND OF DEPOSITS OR
ADVANCE PAYMENTS FOR THE CONFINEMENT OR
TREATMENT OF PATIENTS IN HOSPITALS AND
MEDICAL CLINICS IN CERTAIN CASES"
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
Philippines in Congress assembled::
Section 1. Section 1 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 702 is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"SECTION 1. In emergency or serious cases, it shall be unlawful
for any proprietor, president, director, manager or any other
officer, and/or medical practitioner or employee of a hospital or
medical clinic to request, solicit, demand or accept any deposit
or any other form of advance payment as a prerequisite for
confinement or medical treatment of a patient in such hospital
or medical clinic or to refuse to administer medical treatment
and support as dictated by good practice of medicine to prevent
death or permanent disability: Provided, That by reason of
inadequacy of the medical capabilities of the hospital or medical
clinic, the attending physician may transfer the patient to a
facility where the appropriate care can be given, after the patient
or his next of kin consents to said transfer and after the receiving
hospital or medical clinic agrees to the transfer: Provided,
however, That when the patient is unconscious, incapable of
giving consent and/or unaccompanied, the physician can
transfer the patient even without his consent: Provided, further,
That such transfer shall be done only after necessary emergency
treatment and support have been administered to stabilize the
patient and after it has been established that such transfer entails
less risks than the patient's continued confinement: Provided,
furthermore, That no hospital or clinic, after being informed of
the medical indications for such transfer, shall refuse to receive
the patient nor demand from the patient or his next of kin any
deposit or advance payment: Provided, finally, That strict
compliance with the foregoing procedure on transfer shall not
be construed as a refusal made punishable by this Act."
Section 2. Section 2 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 702 is hereby
deleted and in place thereof, new sections 2, 3 and 4 are added,
to read as follows:
"SEC. 2. For purposes of this Act, the following definitions shall
govern:
"(a) 'Emergency' - a condition or state of a patient wherein
based on the objective findings of a prudent medical officer on
duty for the day there is immediate danger and where delay in
initial support and treatment may cause loss of life or cause
permanent disability to the patient.
"(b) 'Serious case' - refers to a condition of a patient
characterized by gravity or danger wherein based on the
objective findings of a prudent medical officer on duty for the
day when left unattended to, may cause loss of life or cause
permanent disability to the patient.
"(c) 'Confinement' - a state of being admitted in a hospital
or medical clinic for medical observation, diagnosis, testing, and
treatment consistent with the capability and available facilities
of the hospital or clinic.
"(d) 'Hospital' - a facility devoted primarily to the diagnosis,
treatment and care of individuals suffering from illness, disease,
injury or deformity, or in need of obstetrical or other medical
and nursing care. It shall also be construed as any institution,
building or place where there are facilities and personnel for the
continued and prolonged care of patients.
"(e) 'Emergency treatment and support' - any medical or
surgical measure within the capability of the hospital or medical
clinic that is administered by qualified health care professionals
to prevent the death or permanent disability of a patient.
"(f) 'Medical clinic' - a place in which patients can avail of
medical consultation or treatment on an outpatient basis.
"(g) 'Permanent disability' - a condition of physical
disability as defined under Article 192-C and Article 193-B and
C of Presidential Decree No 442; as amended, otherwise known
as the Labor Code of the Philippines.
"(h) 'Stabilize' - the provision of necessary care until such
time that the patient may be discharged or transferred to another
hospital or clinic with a reasonable probability that no physical
deterioration would result from or occur during such discharge
or transfer.
"SEC. 3. After the hospital or medical clinic mentioned above
shall have administered medical treatment and support, it may
cause the transfer of the patient to an appropriate hospital
consistent with the needs of the patient, preferably to a
government hospital, specially in the case of poor or indigent
patients.
"SEC. 4. Any official, medical practitioner or employee of the
hospital or medical clinic who violates the provisions of this Act
shall, upon conviction by final judgment, be punished by
imprisonment of not less than six (6) months and one (1) day but
not more than two (2) years and four (4) months, or a fine of not
less than Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00), but not more
than One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or both, at the
discretion of the court: Provided, however, That if such violation
was committed pursuant to an established policy of the hospital
or clinic or upon instruction of its management, the director or
officer of such hospital or clinic responsible for the formulation
and implementation of such policy shall, upon conviction by
final judgment, suffer imprisonment of four (4) to six (6) years,
or a fine of not less than One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00), but not more than Five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000.00) or both, at the discretion of the court."
Section 3. Section 3 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 702 is hereby
repealed.
Section 4. Section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 702 shall become
Section 5 thereof and shall be amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 5. The Department of Health shall promulgate the
necessary rules and regulations to carry out the provisions of this
Act."
Section 5. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its
publication in two (2) national newspapers of general
circulation.
Approved: August 25, 1997
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS OF
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8344,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS "AN ACT PENALIZING THE
REFUSAL OF HOSPITALS AND MEDICAL CLINICS TO
ADMINISTER APPROPRIATE INITIAL MEDICAL
TREATMENT AND SUPPORT IN EMERGENCY OR
SERIOUS CASES, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE
BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 702, OTHERWISE KNOWN
AS AN ACT PROHIBITING THE DEMAND OF DEPOSITS
OR ADVANCE PAYMENTS FOR THE CONFINEMENT OR
TREATMENT OF PATIENTS IN HOSPITALS AND
MEDICAL CLINICS IN CERTAIN CASES"
WHEREAS, the Tenth Congress of the Republic of the
Philippines enacted Republic Act No. 8344 on June 05, 1997;
WHEREAS, the President of the Republic of the Philippines
signed into law R.A. 8344 on August 25, 1997;
WHEREAS, under Section 5 of R.A. 8344, the Department of
Health (DOH) is mandated to promulgate the necessary rules
and regulations to carry out the provisions of the aforementioned
law.
NOW THEREFORE, pursuant to the provisions of R.A. 8344
authorizing the Department of Health to promulgate the
necessary rules and regulations, the following are hereby issued:
1. Section 1 of said Act provides: "In emergency or
serious cases, it shall be unlawful for any proprietor, president,
director, manager or any other officer, and/or medical
practitioner or employee of a hospital or medical clinic to
request, solicit, demand or accept any deposit or any other form
of advance payment as a prerequisite for confinement or medical
treatment of a patient in such hospital or medical clinic or to
refuse to administer medical treatment and support as dictated
by good practice of medicine to prevent death or permanent
disability: Provided, That by reason of inadequacy of the
medical capabilities of the hospital or medical clinic, the
attending physician may transfer the patient to a facility where
appropriate care can be given, after the patient or his next of kin
consents to said transfer: Provided, however, That when the
patient is unconscious, incapable of giving consent and/or
unaccompanied, the physician can transfer the patient even
without his consent, Provided, further, That such transfer shall
be done only after the necessary emergency treatment and
support have been administered to stabilize the patient and after
it has been established that such transfer entails less risks than
the patient's continued confinement: Provided, finally, That
strict compliance with the foregoing procedure on transfer shall
not be construed as a refusal made punishable by this Act."
2. For the purpose of implementing the above, the
following definitions are provided:
2.1 Emergency - A condition or state of patient wherein
based on the objective findings of a prudent medical officer on
duty for the day there is immediate danger and where delay in
initial support and treatment may cause loss of life or cause
permanent disability to the patient.
2.2 Serious Case - refers to a condition of a patient
characterized by gravity or danger wherein based on the
objective findings of a prudent medical officer on duty for the
day when left unattended to, may cause loss of life or cause
permanent disability to the patient.
2.3 Confinement - a state of being admitted in a hospital or
medical clinic for medical observation, diagnosis, testing, and
treatment consistent with the capability and available facilities
of the hospital or clinic.
2.4 Hospital - a facility devoted primarily to the diagnosis,
treatment and care of individuals or other medical and nursing
care. It shall also be construed as any institution, building or
place where there are facilities and personnel for the continued
and prolonged care of patients. The hospital shall be duly
licensed by the Bureau of Licensing and Regulation of the DOH.
2.5 Emergency Treatment and Support - any medical or
surgical measure within the capability of a hospital or medical
clinic that is administer by qualified health care professionals to
prevent the death or permanent disability of a patient. (In
determining the capability of a hospital or clinic, the standards
and the classification of these facilities set by the DOH Bureau
of Licensing and Regulation shall be used).
2.6 Medical Clinic - a place in which patients can avail of
medical consultation or treatment on an outpatient basis.
2.7 Permanent Disability - a condition of physical
disability as defined under Article 192-C and Article 193-B and
C of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise known
as the Labor Code of the Philippines.
2.8 Stabilize - the provision of necessary care until such
time that the patient may be discharged or transferred to another
hospital or clinic with a reasonable probability that no physical
deterioration would result from or occur during such discharge
or transfer.
3. Transfer of Patients - Section 3 of R.A. 8344 provides:
"After the hospital or medical clinic mentioned above shall have
administered medical treatment and consistent with the needs of
the patients preferably to a government hospital, specially in the
case of poor or indigent patients."
3.1 The transferring and receiving hospital, shall be as
much as practicable, be within ten (10) kilometer radius of each
other.
3.2 The transfer of patients contemplated under this Act
shall at all times be properly documented.
3.3 Hospitals may require a deposit or advance payment
when the patient is no longer under the state of emergency and
he/she refuses to be transferred.
4. All hospitals shall use a Uniform Discharge/Transfer
Slip for cases covered by RA 8344 which shall include the
following information:
4.1 Admission Form of transferring hospital.
4.2 Transfer Form of Transferring Hospital, to include but
not necessarily limited to the following information:
4.2.1 Vital signs
4.2.2 Name of Attending Physician
4.2.3 Treatment given to patient
4.2.4 Name of receiving hospital
4.2.5 Name of contact person and approving official at
receiving hospital
4.2.6 Consent of the patient or companion. In case of an
unaccompanied minor or patient, they may be transferred
without consent provided that the provisions of Section 1 of RA
8344 is strictly observed.
The hospital shall endeavor to use all forms of media to contact
the next of kin of the unaccompanied minor or patient.
4.2.7 In case of refusal of transfer, the name of the hospital,
the name(s) of persons who refused and the reason(s) for the
refusal.
A copy of the Uniform Discharge/Transfer Slip is hereto
attached as Annex A*.
5. Penal Provisions - any official, medical practitioner or
employee of the hospital or medical clinic who violates the
provisions of RA 8344 shall, upon conviction by final judgment,
be punished by imprisonment of not less than six (6) months and
one (1) day but not more than two (2) years and four months, or
a fine of not less than Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) but
not more than One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) or
both at the discretion of the court: Provided, however, That if
such violation was committed pursuant to an established policy
of the hospital or clinic or upon instruction of its management,
the director or officer of such hospital or clinic responsible for
the formulation and imprisonment of four (4) to six (6) years, or
a fine of not less than One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00), but not more than Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00) or both, at the discretion of the court.
6. In order to demonstrate compliance with the Act's
provisions, all hospitals and medical clinics are instructed to
institute the following measures:
6.1 A copy of the law and this implementing rules and
regulations should be displayed prominently at hospital
emergency rooms, hospital admission, counters and medical
clinic premises.
6.2 Hospital and clinic managers shall establish billing and
collection procedure for treatment or confinement of emergency
and serious cases which shall not commence until the essential
appropriate treatment of such cases has been completed.
6.3 Hospital and clinic managers shall instruct their
personnel to provide prompt and immediate medical attention to
emergency and serious cases without any prior requirements for
payment or deposit.
6.4 It is clarified that the law and this administrative order
covers only the provision of medical and surgical goods and
services, and do not cover the provision of non-medical
amenities which have nothing to do with the treatment of the
emergency or serious case. The provisions of and payment for
these non-medical amenities shall be subject to appropriate
institutional business practice.
6.5 Alleged violations of the Act and this Order may be
reported to the Bureau of Licensing and Regulations, Office for
Standards and Regulations, Department of Health, Sta. Cruz,
Manila, or to the nearest Regional Health Office which shall
immediately conduct a fact-finding investigation. The findings
shall be referred to the appropriate fiscal for criminal
prosecution. Persons convicted of violation shall be punished in
accordance with the Act.
6.6 At the instance of the Bureau of Licensing and
Regulation, Administrative proceedings may also be pursued
against erring clinics or hospitals that could lead to either
suspension or revocation of appropriate licenses.
These Rules and Regulations shall take effect fifteen (15) days
after publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation.
Adopted: February 18, 1998
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6615
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6615 - AN ACT REQUIRING
GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE HOSPITALS AND
CLINICS TO EXTEND MEDICAL ASSISTANCE IN
EMERGENCY CASES
Section 1. All government and private hospitals or clinic duly
licensed to operate as such are hereby required to render
immediate emergency medical assistance and to provide
facilities and medicine within its capabilities to patients in
emergency cases who are in danger of dying and/or who may
have suffered serious physical injuries.

Sec. 2. The expenses and losses of earnings incurred by a

private hospital of clinic for medicines, facilities and services
beyond first aid extended to emergency cases as required herein,
and not to exceed fifty thousand pesos per year, shall be
deductible expenses and losses for income tax purposes which
may be carried over for a period of five years, any provision of
law or regulation to the contrary notwithstanding.

Sec. 3. Any hospital director, administrator, officer-in-charge

or physician in the hospital, medical center or clinic, who shall
refuse or fail without good cause to render the appropriate
assistance pursuant to the requirements of section one after said
case had been brought to his attention, or any nurse, midwife or
medical attendant who shall refuse to extend the appropriate
assistance, subject to existing rules, or neglect to notify or call a
physician shall be punished by imprisonment of one month and
one day to one year and one day, and a fine of three hundred
pesos to one thousand pesos, without prejudice to the provisions
of Republic Act Numbered Twenty-three hundred eighty-two in
the case of physicians.

In the case of Government hospitals, the imposition of the

penalty upon the person or persons guilty of the violations shall
be without prejudice to the administrative action that might be
proper.

In the case of private hospitals, aside from the imposition of

penalty upon the person or persons guilty of the violations, the
license of the hospital to operate shall, whenever justified, be
suspended or revoked.

Sec. 4. Subject to the approval of the Secretary of Health, the

Bureau of Medical Services shall promulgate the necessary rules
and regulations to carry out the provisions of this Act.

Sec. 5. Any law or laws or parts thereof inconsistent with the

provisions of this Act is hereby repealed.

Sec. 6. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Approved: October 23, 1972

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 150355 July 31, 2006

MANILA DOCTORS HOSPITAL, petitioner,

vs.
SO UN CHUA and VICKY TY, respondents.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under

Rule 45 questioning the Decision1 dated October 2, 2001
promulgated by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
61581, which affirmed the Decision dated September 30, 1997
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 159, Pasig City, but
which reduced the award of damages.
This case originated from an action for damages filed with the
RTC by respondents So Un Chua and Vicky Ty against
petitioner Manila Doctors Hospital.2 The complaint is premised
on the alleged unwarranted actuations of the petitioner towards
its patient, respondent So Un Chua (Chua), who was confined
for hypertension, diabetes, and related illnesses.
The antecedents of the case follow:
On December 13, 1993, respondents filed a Complaint averring
that on October 30, 1990, respondent Chua, the mother of
respondent Vicky Ty, was admitted in petitioner's hospital for
hypertension and diabetes; that while respondent Chua was
confined, Judith Chua, the sister of respondent Ty, had been
likewise confined for injuries suffered in a vehicular accident;
that partial payments of the hospital bills were made, totaling
P435,800.00; that after the discharge of Judith Chua, respondent
Chua remained in confinement and the hospital bills for both
patients accumulated; that respondent Chua was pressured by
the petitioner, through its Credit and Collection Department, to
settle the unpaid bills; that respondent Ty represented that she
will settle the bills as soon as the funds become available; that
respondent Ty pleaded to the management that in view of the
physical condition of her mother, respondent Chua, the
correspondences relating to the settlement of the unpaid hospital
bills should be relayed to the former; that these pleas were
unheeded by the petitioner; that petitioner threatened to
implement unpleasant measures unless respondent Ty
undertakes her mother's obligation as well as the obligation of
her sister, Judith Chua, to pay the hospitalization expenses; that
petitioner made good its threat and employed unethical,
unpleasant and unlawful methods which allegedly worsened the
condition of respondent Chua, particularly, by (i) cutting off the
telephone line in her room and removing the air-conditioning
unit, television set, and refrigerator, (ii) refusing to render
medical attendance and to change the hospital gown and bed
sheets, and (iii) barring the private nurses or midwives from
assisting the patient. Respondents thus prayed for the award of
moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.
In its Answer, Amended Answer, and Rejoinder, petitioner
specifically denied the material averments of the Complaint and
Reply, and interposed its counterclaims arguing that as early as
one week after respondent Chua had been admitted to its
hospital, Dr. Rody Sy, her attending physician, had already
given instructions for her to be discharged, but respondents
insisted that Chua remain in confinement; that, through its staff,
petitioner accordingly administered medical examinations, all of
which yielded negative results; that respondent Ty voluntarily
undertook, jointly and severally, to pay the hospital bills for both
patients; that although respondent Ty paid up to P435,000.00,
more or less, she reneged on her commitment to pay the balance
in violation of the Contract for Admission and Acknowledgment
of Responsibility for Payment dated October 30, 1990 which she
voluntarily executed; that she signed a Promissory Note on June
5, 1992 for the unpaid balance of P1,075,592.95 and issued
postdated checks to cover the same; that no such undue pressure
had been imposed upon respondent Chua to settle the bills, the
truth being that, as a matter of standard procedure, the reminders
to settle the bills were transmitted not to the patients but to their
relatives who usually undertook to pay the same; that respondent
Ty deliberately evaded the staff of the Credit and Collection
Department; that the cutting-off of the telephone line and
removal of the air-conditioning unit, television set, and
refrigerator cannot constitute unwarranted actuations, for the
same were resorted to as cost-cutting measures and to minimize
respondents' charges that were already piling up, especially after
respondent Ty refused to settle the balance notwithstanding
frequent demands; that respondent Ty evaded the staff when the
latter attempted to inform her that the room facilities will be cut
off to minimize the rising charges; and that respondents
instituted the present civil case purposely as leverage against the
petitioner after the latter had filed criminal charges for violation
of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22 against respondent Ty for
issuing checks, later dishonored, totaling P1,075,592.95, the
amount referring to the unpaid hospital bills. In its compulsory
counterclaim, petitioner prayed, among other items, for the
award of no less than P1,000,000.00 as compensatory damages
due to the filing of a malicious and unfounded suit, and, in its
permissive counterclaim, petitioner prayed for respondents to
pay P1,075,592.95, the amount representing the due and
demandable obligation under the Promissory Note dated June 5,
1992, including the stipulated interest therein and the 25 percent
of the total amount due as attorney's fees.
During pre-trial, the parties stipulated on the following issues:
First, whether the respondents are liable to the petitioner to pay
the hospital bills arising from the hospitalization of respondent
Chua and Judith Chua; and second, whether the parties are
entitled to their respective claims for damages.3 Furthermore,
the parties stipulated on the following facts: a) Judith Chua was
confined from June 14, 1991 to May 2, 1992; b) respondents
failed to pay the balance despite repeated reminders; c) the said
reminders referred to the hospital bills of respondent Chua and
Judith Chua; d) one of the attending physicians of respondent
Chua was Dr. Rody Sy; and e) the petitioner ordered the removal
of the facilities in question from the room of its patient,
respondent Chua, with the qualification that they were
constrained to discontinue the same after the representative of
respondent Chua refused to update the hospital bills or refused
to transfer her to semi-deluxe room or ward to lessen costs.4
On September 30, 1997, the RTC rendered its Decision in favor
of the respondents, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment on the
complaint is hereby rendered in favor of the [respondents] as
against the [petitioner] as follows:
[O]rdering the [petitioner] to pay the [respondents] the
following, to wit:
a) P200,000.00 as moral damages;
b) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
c) P50,000.00 as attorney's fees and the amount of P50,000.00
as litigation costs.
SO ORDERED.5
In brief, the RTC held that the removal of the facilities of the
room triggered the hypertension of respondent Chua; that the
petitioner acted in bad faith in removing the facilities without
prior notice; that her condition was aggravated by the pressure
employed by the administration upon her to pay the hospital
bills; that the food always came late as compared to the other
patients; that the beddings and clothes of respondent Chua were
no longer changed and, as a result, bed sores emerged on her
body; that there was an utter lack of medical attendance; that,
because of these, respondent Chua suffered from self-pity and
depression; that petitioner clearly discriminated against the
respondents; that respondent Ty had no choice but to sign the
promissory notes in order to secure the release of her mother,
respondent Chua; that the foregoing actuations constitute an
abuse of rights; that petitioner failed to establish the pecuniary
loss it suffered and, hence, it is not entitled to compensatory
damages; and that, since the promissory note is a contract of
adhesion, the petitioner is not entitled to the award of attorney's
fees as stipulated thereon.
On appeal to the CA, the petitioner assigned the following
errors:
A.
THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE ERROR BY FINDING THE ACTUATIONS
OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF DEFENDANT-
APPELLANT TO BE IN BAD FAITH, OPPRESSIVE AND
UNNECESSARY AS TO MAKE IT LIABLE TO
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES FOR DAMAGES AND
ATTORNEY'S FEES.
B.
THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE ERROR BY NOT RULING UPON THE
PERMISSIVE COUNTERCLAIM OF DEFENDANT-
APPELLANT WITH RESPECT TO THE P1,075,592.95
REPRESENTING THE HOSPITAL BILL OF PLAINTIFFS-
APPELLEES, WHICH OBLIGATION IS NOT DISPUTED
AND WHICH AMOUNT WAS NEVER CONTROVERTED
BY PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES.6
On October 2, 2001, the CA promulgated its Decision the
dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed Decision
is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that the award of
moral damages, exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees is
reduced to Seventy Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00), Thirty
Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) and Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00), respectively. Litigation costs are hereby deleted.
Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.7
Apart from the reduction in the award of damages, the CA
affirmed all salient portions of the RTC Decision and declined
to disturb the findings of fact.
Petitioner is now before this Court raising essentially the same
grounds heard by the CA.
Incidentally, with respect to the related criminal case against
respondent Ty, this Court, on September 27, 2004, promulgated
its Decision entitled Ty v. People of the Philippines,8 which
affirmed the decisions of the lower courts finding respondent Ty
guilty of violating B.P. Blg. 22 and ordering her to pay the
private complainant, herein petitioner, the total amount of the
dishonored checks.
The petition is impressed with merit.
While, as a rule, only questions of law may be raised in a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45, under certain exceptions,
the Court may re-examine the evidence presented by the parties
during the trial. At least four exceptions exist in this case,
namely: (a) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely
on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (b) when the judgment
is based on a misapprehension of facts; (c) when the findings of
fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record; and (d) when the courts
a quo manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed
by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion.9
The principal questions are, first, whether the actuations of the
petitioner amount to actionable wrongs, and second, whether the
counterclaims of the petitioner can be backed up by the measure
of preponderant evidence.
In brief, the courts a quo concurred in the holding that the
petitioner and its staff failed to take into consideration the
physical condition of its patient, respondent Chua, when it
removed the facilities provided in her room;10 that the removal
of these facilities, namely, the air-conditioner, telephone lines,
television, and refrigerator, aggravated the condition of the
patient, triggered her hypertension, and caused her blood
pressure to fluctuate,11 considering that there was no proper
ventilation in the room.12 In view of the foregoing, the courts a
quo concluded that the actuations of the petitioner were
oppressive, unnecessary,13 and anti-social,14 done in bad faith
without proper notice,15 with no intention other than to harass
or irritate the respondents,16 all of which constitute an abuse of
rights.17
We do not agree. The conclusions of the courts a quo are either
haphazard conjectures, or founded on a misapprehension of
facts. The record is replete with evidence that justifies a different
conclusion.
Indeed the operation of private pay hospitals and medical clinics
is impressed with public interest and imbued with a heavy social
responsibility. But the hospital is also a business, and, as a
business, it has a right to institute all measures of efficiency
commensurate to the ends for which it is designed, especially to
ensure its economic viability and survival. And in the legitimate
pursuit of economic considerations, the extent to which the
public may be served and cured is expanded, the pulse and life
of the medical sector quickens, and the regeneration of the
people as a whole becomes more visibly attainable. In the
institution of cost-cutting measures, the hospital has a right to
reduce the facilities and services that are deemed to be non-
essential, such that their reduction or removal would not be
detrimental to the medical condition of the patient.18 For the
moment, the question to be considered is whether the subject
facilities are indeed non-essential the air-conditioner,
telephone, television, and refrigerator the removal of which
would cause the adverse health effects and emotional trauma the
respondents so claimed. Corollary to this question is whether the
petitioner observed the diligence of a good father of the
family19 in the course of ascertaining the possible repercussions
of the removal of the facilities prior to the removal itself and for
a reasonable time thereafter, with a view to prevent damage.20
After an extensive analysis of the record, it becomes rather
worrisome to this Court that the courts a quo unreservedly drew
their conclusions from the self-serving and uncorroborated
testimonies of the respondents the probative value of which is
highly questionable.21 We hold that the respondents failed to
prove the damages so claimed.
The evidence in the record firmly establishes that the staff of the
petitioner took proactive steps to inform the relatives of
respondent Chua of the removal of facilities prior thereto, and to
carry out the necessary precautionary measures to ensure that
her health and well-being would not be adversely affected: as
early as around two weeks after her admission on October 30,
1990, to the time when the facilities had been removed
sometime in the middle of May 1992,22 and even up to the point
when she actually left the premises of the hospital three weeks
later, or during the first week of June 1992,23 the medical
condition of respondent Chua, as consistently and indisputably
confirmed by her attending physician, Dr. Rody Sy, a
cardiologist, who was called as witness for both parties,24
whom even respondent Chua repeatedly praised to be "my
doctor" and "a very good doctor"25 at that, and whose
statements at times had been corroborated as well by Sister Mary
Philip Galeno, SPC, the Administrator of the hospital and who
also happens to be a registered nurse, had been "relatively
well,"26 "ambulatory,"27 "walking around in the room,"28 and
that she was "able to leave the hospital on her own without any
assistance;"29 that although she complained of symptoms such
as dizziness, weakness,30 and abdominal discomfort,31 Dr. Sy
requested several medical examinations, such as the laboratory
tests, renal tests, MRI, ultrasound, and CT scan,32 all of which
were administered after procuring the consent of respondent
Chua's family33 as admitted by respondent Ty herself,34 and
even called on other specialists, such as a neurologist,
endocrinologist, and gastroenterologist, to look into her
condition35 and conduct other tests as well36 according to their
fields of specialty, all of which yielded no serious finding;37
that her illnesses were "lifelong illnesses"38 at a stage where
they cannot be totally removed or abolished,39 making it clear
to her family that "one hundred percent recovery is not possible"
despite being given daily medication in the hospital;40 but that
her condition, nonetheless, is not serious,41 as the blood
pressure is more or less controlled and within acceptable
limits,42 "not that critical to precipitate any acute attack,"43 nor
likely to fall into any emergency,44 nor yet does she require
continuous or prolonged hospitalization45 since she was stable
enough to be treated at home and on an "out-patient" basis, so
much so that Dr. Sy encouraged her to exercise and avoid resting
all the
time,46 and recommended that "anytime she may be
discharged"47
even in just "two weeks after confinement,"48 the propriety of
his order of discharge concurred upon by the other specialists as
well,49 had it not been for respondents' insistence to stay in the
hospital in view of their hope for absolute recovery50 despite
the admission of respondent Chua herself that she cannot
anymore be totally cured.51
It is also undisputed that the hospital administrator, Sister
Galeno, prior to the removal of the facilities, consulted the
attending physician, Dr. Sy.52 To Sister Galeno, also a
registered nurse, the matter of removal and its possible
repercussions on the health of the patient, as a matter of hospital
policy, is a critical and sensitive maneuver, and, hence, it is
carried out only after discussing with the doctors to evaluate all
important factors.53 The fact of prior consultation54 as well as
the medical determination to the effect that it was safe to remove
the facilities and would cause no harmful effect55 had been
amply corroborated by respondent Chua's own doctor
himself.56 When Dr. Sy testified as rebuttal witness for the
respondents themselves and whose credibility respondents
failed to impeach, he categorically stated that he consented to
the removal since the removal of the said facilities would not by
itself be detrimental to the health of his patient, respondent
Chua.57 And in this respect, he had been advising respondent
Ty, the daughter of the patient, that the facilities, such as the air-
conditioner, television, refrigerator, and telephone, are not
absolutely necessary, and, that although they may add to the
comfort of the patient, if absent, they will not cause any
significant deterioration of her condition,58 given that, in his
experience as a cardiologist, and after personally attending
respondent Chua on a daily basis before, during, and after the
removal and even up to the time of her actual discharge,59 he
concluded that many hypertensive and diabetic patients, as in
her case, do not at all need in particular an air-conditioning unit,
among the other facilities aforementioned.60 And, contrary to
the findings of the courts a quo and the self-serving testimonies
of respondents that the lack of ventilation, after the removal of
the air-conditioner, triggered her hypertension, Dr. Sy
categorically stated that during his daily rounds with the patient
he was certain that, although admittedly the blood pressure in
general would fluctuate daily, there had been no adverse effect
on her, and that her blood pressure were within acceptable
limits,61 especially considering that he treated the patient on a
daily basis up to the point of actual discharge,62 and
accordingly, as confirmed by the medical records, he made no
change in the medications thereafter.63 In support of Dr. Sy's
findings, Sister Galeno, testified that she knew the condition of
the ventilation of the patient's deluxe room, located at the fifth
floor, even without the air-conditioning, notably in times of
brownout, and that there had been enough ventilation since the
grilled window of that room was large enough which, if opened,
would permit sufficient ventilation.64 The Court finds that the
premise of the RTC judgment refers merely to hypothetical
statements which fail to establish any clear and direct link to the
injury allegedly suffered by the patient:
Q You found it safe to remove these facilities from the room
of the patient suffering from diabetes and hypertension?
A Yes, Sir. Many hypertensive, diabetic patients do not need
air-conditioning, or T.V. or refrigerator.
Q Do you agree with me that hypertension is triggered
sometimes by excitement, anger or (sic) a person suffering from
such illness?
A Hypertension can be triggered by anything.
Court:
Q And even in other words the discomfort can also trigger?
A Sometimes mental stress can trigger.
xxxx
Court:
Q You mentioned earlier that this hypertension may be
triggered mentally?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Court:
Q Will the removal of these facilities not affect the patient
including the relatives?
A It may to a certain extent. And well, maybe the days after
the removal would prove that fluctuation in blood pressure are
within acceptable limits.65
With respect to the findings of the courts a quo that bed sores
appeared on the body of respondent Chua, that she suffered from
depression after the disconnection of the said facilities, that her
private midwives were barred, and that the delivery of food was
delayed, this Court holds, as above, that these conclusions are
bereft of sound evidentiary basis, self-serving and
uncorroborated as they are. Again, Dr. Sy affirmed that during
the daily rounds he would make on the patient, he did not detect
any skin lesion or any other abnormality up to the time she was
actually discharged.66 Nor did he find any sign of depression,
although, admittedly, he observed that she had been "very
angry" because of the removal of the facilities.67 All the while
he did not receive any complaint from respondent Chua
indicating that she suffered from the foregoing infirmities,68
considering that it is the responsibility of the family of the
patient to specifically inform the attending physician or the
nurses during their rounds whatever they feel is important, or if
there were any new developments since the last visit.69 As
corroborated by Sister Galeno, throughout respondent Chua's
confinement, she never received any complaint from the latter
or her relatives that she had not been attended to by the nursing
staff.70 Worth noting again is the fact that the nursing staff and
the attending physicians, which included Dr. Sy, in accordance
with hospital policy, would routinely make their rounds on a
daily basis, or would visit the patient whenever they are called
for any problem,71 and, in the case of the specialists other than
the attending physician, they would visit the patient about once
a week.72 The nurses, on the other hand, would make their
rounds more frequently, that is, at least once per shift, or every
eight hours.73 Apart from the self-serving statements of
respondents, which by now have become rather indicative of
being mere afterthoughts, there is no clear showing from the
record that the petitioner and its medical staff deviated from the
foregoing policy and practice, nor had they been called upon to
look into the alleged physical reactions or emotional trauma
respondent Chua claims to have suffered during and after the
removal of the facilities. It must be emphasized that, as stated
above, respondent Chua herself explicitly found Dr. Sy to be a
"very good doctor" because he personally attended to her
"almost every hour."74 And throughout her confinement, Dr. Sy
positively stated that her family employed a private midwife
who attended to her all the time.75
The evidence in the record overwhelmingly demonstrates that
respondent Chua had been adequately attended to, and this Court
cannot understand why the courts a quo had declared that there
was an "utter lack of medical attendance," or that her health
suffered during the period after the removal of the facilities. The
Court finds that the facilities in question are non-essential for
the care of respondent Chua and, hence, they may be lessened
or removed by the petitioner for the sake of economic necessity
and survival.
Though human experience would show that the deactivation of
the air-conditioner may cause a temperature differential that
may trigger some physical discomfort, or that the removal of
entertainment facilities such as the television set, or the
disconnection of communication devices such as the telephone,
may cause some exasperation on the part of the one who benefits
from these, nevertheless, all things considered, and given the
degree of diligence the petitioner duly exerted, not every
suppression of the things that one has grown accustomed to
enjoy amounts to an actionable wrong, nor does every physical
or emotional discomfort amount to the kind of anguish that
warrants the award of moral damages under the general
principles of tort. The underlying basis for the award of tort
damages is the premise that an individual was injured in
contemplation of law. Thus, there must first be the breach of
some duty and the imposition of liability for that breach before
damages may be awarded; it is not sufficient to state that there
should be tort liability merely because the plaintiff suffered
some pain and suffering.76
Moreover, this Court must reiterate the standard of tort to arrive
at a proper award for damages premised on matters that suggest
the application of medical knowledge, especially in the
description of the causal link between external or environmental
factors, on one hand, and their effect unto the physical or
emotional health of the patient, on the other, expert opinion, as
discussed in Cruz v. Court of Appeals,77 is generally required:
All three courts below bewail the inadequacy of the facilities of
the clinic and its untidiness; the lack of provisions such as blood,
oxygen, and certain medicines; the failure to subject the patient
to a cardio-pulmonary test prior to the operation; the omission
of any form of blood typing before transfusion; and even the
subsequent transfer of Lydia to the San Pablo Hospital and the
reoperation performed on her by the petitioner. But while it may
be true that the circumstances pointed out by the courts below
seemed beyond cavil to constitute reckless imprudence on the
part of the surgeon, this conclusion is still best arrived at not
through the educated surmises nor conjectures of laymen,
including judges, but by the unquestionable knowledge of expert
witnesses. For whether a physician or surgeon has exercised the
requisite degree of skill and care in the treatment of his patient
is, in the generality of cases, a matter of expert opinion. The
deference of courts to the expert opinions of qualified physicians
stems from its realization that the latter possess unusual
technical skills which laymen in most instances are incapable of
intelligently evaluating. Expert testimony should have been
offered to prove that the circumstances cited by the courts below
are constitutive of conduct falling below the standard of care
employed by other physicians in good standing when
performing the same operation. It must be remembered that
when the qualifications of a physician are admitted, as in the
instant case, there is an inevitable presumption that in proper
cases he takes the necessary precaution and employs the best of
his knowledge and skill in attending to his clients, unless the
contrary is sufficiently established. This presumption is
rebuttable by expert opinion which is so sadly lacking in the case
at bench.78
With respect to the propriety of the notice of removal of
facilities, the evidence shows that the hospital staff,
accompanied by Sister Gladys Lim, SPC, Finance
Administrative Assistant of the hospital,79 through written and
verbal notices as per hospital policy, forewarned the
respondents, through respondent Ty and her sister, Judith Chua,
of the impending removal of the facilities over a week
beforehand80 in view of their obstinate refusal to vacate and
transfer to a lower rate room81 or to update the mounting
hospital bills82 which, by then, had swollen to approximately
one million pesos.83 Respondent Ty refused to read many of the
written notices sent by the Credit
Department.84 After repeated attempts to contact respondent
Ty85 and before the actual removal of the facilities, the staff of
the petitioner tried to personally serve the final notice dated
April 23, 1992,86 signed by Sister Gladys Lim, addressed to
respondent Ty, which adopted the tenor of the prior verbal
warnings, and which expressly and sternly warned the
respondents that the hospital shall be constrained to take legal
action and that they shall be compelled to transfer the patient,
respondent Chua, to a lower rate room unless the balance could
be satisfied.87 Respondent Ty, for no justifiable reason, and
sticking to her inclination to avoid the staff, refused to receive
or acknowledge this letter as well.88 Worth noting is that Sister
Galeno, testified that, as a matter of hospital policy the tenor of
which respondents, by virtue of the Contract for Admission
dated October 30, 1990, agreed to comply with,89 the hospital
can only cut off the non-essential facilities and only in extreme
cases90 if the patient occupies a private room all to herself;
had the room been semi-private shared by other patients, or had
it been the ward, the hospital cannot disconnect the facilities
since this would unduly prejudice the other patients. But
respondent Chua herself insisted on staying in a private room
despite her being fully aware of the ballooning charges,91 and
even if she could have freely gone home anytime to her
condominium unit which, as admitted, was equipped with an air-
conditioner.92 With respect to the "pressure" and "harassment"
respondents allegedly suffered daily whenever the hospital staff
would follow up the billing during odd hours, or at 10pm, 11pm,
12 midnight, 1am, or 2am,93 this averment had been
convincingly refuted by the witnesses for the petitioner, namely,
Editha L. Vecino, the Head of Credit and Collection, and Sister
Galeno, in that the Credit and Collection Department would only
hold office hours from 8am to 5pm and, hence, it is impossible
to "harass" the respondents during the times they so claimed.94
The courts a quo found that respondent Ty had "no choice but to
sign the promissory note in order for her mother to be released
from the hospital,"95 thus suggesting that the hospital refused to
actually discharge or bodily release its patient, respondent Chua,
until arrangements had been made to settle the charges.
While there are portions of the testimonies of the witnesses for
the petitioner which state that although, as per standard
procedure, the patient "cannot leave"96 the hospital without the
"discharge,"97 "clearance" or "gate pass" issued only after
arrangements on the settlement of bills had been made,98 still,
it must be understood that these are only demonstrative of the
precondition that a patient cannot step out of the premises
"without the consent" of the hospital, or, in other words, that the
"clearance" merely indicates that the hospital expressly
consented to the actual release of the patient,99 but, even
without its consent, the patient is still free to leave "anytime" as
a matter of policy, in spite of the refusal to issue a "clearance"
or "gate pass,"100 or even in cases where the accounts have not
yet been liquidated or settled,101 or yet even if no promissory
note or post-dated check were executed in favor of the petitioner,
as testified by no less than Sister Galeno,102 and corroborated
by Editha Vecino;103 and that, petitioner, a private hospital
established for profit,104 being also a business, by warning
respondents that it shall withhold clearance, is simply exercising
its right to protest against an absconding patient as a precursor
to avail of other appropriate legal remedies; that, on the contrary,
the respondents opted not to leave because of their own promise
not to leave unless the hospital bills were fully settled;105 that
the accusations found in the Demand Letter dated May 19, 1992,
and signed by the counsel for the respondents,106 particularly,
that the petitioner "refused to discharge the patient, [respondent
Chua,] despite orders from the attending physician, Dr. Rody
Sy," had all been refuted by Sister Galeno when she read its
contents in front of the counsel for respondents, emphatically
telling him that "we are not detaining his clients;" that
"[respondent Ty] was the one who told us that they are not going
to leave the hospital unless they have fully paid the hospital;"107
and that, most importantly, no physical restraint upon the person
of respondent Chua or upon the person of her relatives had been
imposed by the staff.
Authorities, including those of common law origin, explicitly
declare that a patient cannot be detained in a hospital for non-
payment of the hospital bill. If the patient cannot pay the hospital
or physician's bill, the law provides a remedy for them to pursue,
that is, by filing the necessary suit in court for the recovery of
such fee or bill.108 If the patient is prevented from leaving the
hospital for his inability to pay the bill, any person who can act
on his behalf can apply in court for the issuance of the writ of
habeas corpus.109
The form of restraint must be total; movement must be
restrained in all directions. If restraint is partial, e.g., in a
particular direction with freedom to proceed in another, the
restraint on the person's liberty is not total.110 However, the
hospital may legally detain a patient against his will when he is
a detained or convicted prisoner, or when the patient is suffering
from a very contagious disease where his release will be
prejudicial to public health, or when the patient is mentally ill
such that his release will endanger public safety,111 or in other
exigent cases as may be provided by law. Moreover, under the
common law doctrines on tort, it does not constitute a trespass
to the person to momentarily prevent him from leaving the
premises or any part thereof because he refuses to comply with
some reasonable condition subject to which he entered them. In
all cases, the condition of this kind of restraint must be
reasonable in the light of the circumstances.112 At any rate, as
stated above, the patient is free to leave the premises, even in the
ostensible violation of these conditions, after being momentarily
interrupted by the hospital staff for purposes of informing him
of those reasonable conditions, such as the assessment of
whether the patient is fit to leave, insane, or suffering from a
contagious disease, etc., or simply for purposes of making a
demand to settle the bill. If the patient chooses to abscond or
leave without the consent of the hospital in violation of any of
the conditions deemed to be reasonable under the circumstances,
the hospital may nonetheless register its protest and may choose
to pursue the legal remedies available under law, provided that
the hospital may not physically detain the patient, unless the
case falls under the exceptions abovestated.
Authorities are of the view that, ordinarily, a hospital, especially
if it is a private pay hospital,113 is entitled to be compensated
for its services, by either an express or an implied contract, and
if no express contract exists, there is generally an implied
agreement that the patient will pay the reasonable value of the
services rendered;114 when a hospital treats a patient's injuries,
it has an enforceable claim for full payment for its services,
regardless of the patient's financial status.115 At this juncture, it
must be noted that there is testimony, though to a degree
disputable, to the effect that the execution of the promissory note
and the issuance of postdated checks were conditions imposed
not by the petitioner but voluntarily offered by the counsel for
respondents.116 At any rate, however, this Court holds, in view
of the foregoing authorities, that the requirement to have the
relative of respondent Chua to execute a promissory note as part
of the arrangement to settle the unpaid obligations is a formality
that converts any implied contract into written form and,
moreover, amounts to a reasonable condition, the non-
fulfillment of which, in itself, however, as discussed, cannot
allow the hospital to detain the patient. It must also be stressed,
contrary to the findings of the courts a quo, that such an
agreement embodied in a promissory note, as well as the
Contract for Admission and Acknowledgment of Responsibility
for Payment dated October 30, 1990, do not become contracts
of adhesion simply because the person signing it was under
stress that was not the result of the actions of the hospital,117
especially taking into account that there is testimony to the effect
that respondent Ty signed the Promissory Note dated June 5,
1992 in the presence of counsel and acting under his advise.118
But as to the propriety of the circumstances surrounding the
issuance of the postdated checks to cover the amount stated in
the Promissory Note dated June 5, 1992, this Court must refer to
the discussion of the recent case of Ty v. People of the
Philippines119 where this Court affirmed the conviction of
respondent Ty for the issuance of bouncing checks addressed to
the petitioner herein. While the instant case is to be
distinguished from the Ty case in nature, applicable law, the
standards of evidence, and in the defenses available to the
parties, hence, the judgment of conviction in that case should not
at all prejudice the disposition of this case, even if the facts
coincide, nonetheless, for purposes of convenience and
instructive utility, the Court quotes the relevant portions:
In this case, far from it, the fear, if any, harbored by Ty was not
real and imminent. Ty claims that she was compelled to issue
the checks a condition the hospital allegedly demanded of her
before her mother could be discharged for fear that her mother's
health might deteriorate further due to the inhumane treatment
of the hospital or worse, her mother might commit suicide. This
is speculative fear; it is not the uncontrollable fear contemplated
by law.
To begin with, there was no showing that the mother's illness
was so life-threatening such that her continued stay in the
hospital suffering all its alleged unethical treatment would
induce a well-grounded apprehension of her death. Secondly, it
is not the law's intent to say that any fear exempts one from
criminal liability much less petitioner's flimsy fear that her
mother might commit suicide. In other words, the fear she
invokes was not impending or insuperable as to deprive her of
all volition and to make her a mere instrument without will,
moved exclusively by the hospital's threats or demands.
Ty has also failed to convince the Court that she was left with
no choice but to commit a crime. She did not take advantage of
the many opportunities available to her to avoid committing one.
By her very own words, she admitted that the collateral or
security the hospital required prior to the discharge of her
mother may be in the form of postdated checks or jewelry. And
if indeed she was coerced to open an account with the bank and
issue the checks, she had all the opportunity to leave the scene
to avoid involvement.
Moreover, petitioner had sufficient knowledge that the issuance
of checks without funds may result in a violation of B.P. 22. She
even testified that her counsel advised her not to open a current
account nor issue postdated checks "because the moment I will
not have funds it will be a big problem." Besides, apart from
petitioner's bare assertion, the record is bereft of any evidence to
corroborate and bolster her claim that she was compelled or
coerced to cooperate with and give in to the hospital's demands.
Ty likewise suggests . . . that the justifying circumstance of state
of necessity under par. 4, Art. 11 of the Revised Penal Code may
find application in this case.
We do not agree. The law prescribes the presence of three
requisites to exempt the actor from liability under this
paragraph: (1) that the evil sought to be avoided actually exists;
(2) that the injury feared be greater than the one done to avoid
it; (3) that there be no other practical and less harmful means of
preventing it.
In the instant case, the evil sought to be avoided is merely
expected or anticipated. If the evil sought to be avoided is
merely expected or anticipated or may happen in the future, this
defense is not applicable. Ty could have taken advantage of an
available option to avoid committing a crime. By her own
admission, she had the choice to give jewelry or other forms of
security instead of postdated checks to secure her obligation.
Moreover, for the defense of state of necessity to be availing, the
greater injury feared should not have been brought about by the
negligence or imprudence, more so, the willful inaction of the
actor. In this case, the issuance of the bounced checks was
brought about by Ty's own failure to pay her mother's hospital
bills.
The Court also thinks it rather odd that Ty has chosen the
exempting circumstance of uncontrollable fear and the
justifying circumstance of state of necessity to absolve her of
liability. It would not have been half as bizarre had Ty been able
to prove that the issuance of the bounced checks was done
without her full volition. Under the circumstances, however, it
is quite clear that neither uncontrollable fear nor avoidance of a
greater evil or injury prompted the issuance of the bounced
checks.
Parenthetically, the findings of fact in the Decision of the trial
court in the Civil Case for damages filed by Ty's mother against
the hospital is wholly irrelevant for purposes of disposing the
case at bench. While the findings therein may establish a claim
for damages which, we may add, need only be supported by a
preponderance of evidence, it does not necessarily engender
reasonable doubt as to free Ty from liability.120
In view of the foregoing, the Court therefore holds that the
courts a quo committed serious errors in finding that the
petitioner was "biased,"121 "discriminated" against the
respondents,122 and "purposely intended to irritate"123 or
"harass"124 them; that it "acted in bad faith in removing the
facilities without prior notice;"125 and that its acts were "anti-
social."126 The aforequoted declarations of the witnesses,
significant portions of which this Court considers as expert
testimony, are reliable and remain considerably trustworthy to
controvert respondents' assertions as well as to reverse the
conclusions of fact and law of the CA and the RTC that
respondent Chua suffered the physical and emotional anguish so
claimed, and so, for these reasons, the Court holds that the
petitioner inflicted no actionable wrong.
This Court observes that the courts a quo awarded both
respondents moral damages. But it is well-settled that in case of
physical injuries, with some exceptions,127 moral damages are
recoverable only by the party injured and not by her spouse, next
of kin, or relative who happened to sympathize with the injured
party.128 Hence, even if the courts a quo were correct in their
basis for damages, they should have declined to award damages
to respondent Ty.
The last issue to be resolved is the question whether the
counterclaims of the petitioner are supported by a
preponderance of evidence.
We agree with the petitioner that the courts a quo seriously erred
in mistaking the case of its compulsory counterclaim for its
permissive counterclaim and for failing to consider the evidence
which impressively supports the latter. First, for failure without
justifiable cause of respondents' counsel to comment on the
Partial Formal Offer of Evidence dated February 14, 1996129
filed by the petitioner, the RTC issued an order during the course
of the trial, which counsel for respondents neither contested nor
raised on appeal, admitting Exhibits "1" to "16", together with
their submarkings and the purposes for which the same were
offered,130 all of which had also been previously authenticated
and their contents verified by the witnesses for the petitioner.131
These documents include the Contract for Admission of
respondent Chua dated October 30, 1990, duly executed by
respondent Ty, incorporating therein the rules and regulations of
the hospital, including the duty to understand the same132 as
well as the undertaking of respondent Ty to be jointly and
severally liable for the payment of the hospital bills of
respondent Chua;133 the Promissory Note dated June 5, 1992 in
the amount of P1,075,592.95 duly executed by respondent Ty in
favor of the petitioner agreeing to be jointly and severally liable
to pay the unpaid obligations of respondent Chua and Judith
Chua, including interest and attorney's fees in case of
default;134 the Undertakings signed by respondent Ty dated
March 3, 1992 and April 7, 1992 to maintain regular
deposits;135 and the credit memos and statements of account
that support the amount referring to the unpaid obligation.136
Second, the parties stipulated during pre-trial that respondents
failed to pay the balance despite repeated reminders.137 And
third, respondent Ty in open court identified and admitted that
she signed the Contract of Admission dated October 30, 1990 as
well as the Undertakings dated March 3, 1992 and April 7, 1992
but which, for no justifiable reason, she "did not bother to
read,"138 and, what is more, she repeatedly admitted during the
course of the trial that she failed to fully settle the foregoing
hospital bills.139 In fact, while the Ty case cannot control the
incidents of the instant case as heretofore stated, it is still worth
mentioning, at least for informative purposes, the findings of
this Court in Ty with respect to respondents' obligations to the
petitioner:
Ty's mother and sister availed of the services and the facilities
of the hospital. For the care given to her kin, Ty had a legitimate
obligation to pay the hospital by virtue of her relationship with
them and by force of her signature on her mother's Contract of
Admission acknowledging responsibility for payment, and on
the promissory note she executed in favor of the hospital.140
In view of all these findings, the Court earnestly disagrees with
the sweeping conclusion of the CA that "[Petitioner] failed to
present any iota of evidence to prove his claim,"141 a statement
apparently referring to the permissive counterclaim of
P1,075,592.95. However, with respect to the compulsory
counterclaim predicated on the filing of a baseless suit and
injury to its reputation, petitioner did not raise this matter on
appeal and, hence, is deemed to have waived the same.
But the Court in Ty made a partial finding on the civil liability
of respondent Ty with respect to the amount covered by seven
of the several dishonored checks she issued equivalent to
P210,000.00.142 Since this amount forms a fraction of her total
civil liability, then this amount, in deference to Ty, should be
deducted therefrom.
The claim for attorney's fees, as stipulated under the Promissory
Note dated June 5, 1992, should be reduced for being
unreasonable under the circumstances, from 25 percent to 12
percent of the total amount due.143
As a final word, the Court takes judicial notice of the pending
Senate Bill No. 337, entitled "An Act Prohibiting the Detention
of Patients in Hospitals and Medical Clinics on Grounds of Non-
Payment of Hospital Bills or Medical Expenses," which
declares, among others, that it shall be unlawful for any hospital
or medical clinic to cause directly or indirectly the detention of
patients for non-payment, in part or in full, of their hospital
bills,144 and, furthermore, requires patients who have fully
recovered and are financially incapable to settle the
hospitalization expenses to execute a promissory note, co-signed
by another individual, to the extent of the unpaid obligation
before leaving the hospital.145 While this Court may have
touched upon these matters in the adjudication of the instant
case, it must be stated that this decision should in no way
preempt any constitutional challenge to the provisions of Senate
Bill No. 337 if passed into law, bearing in mind the standards
for the exercise of the power of judicial review146 as well as the
recognition that the tenor of the bill may adjust with the times,
or that the bill itself may fail to pass, according to the dynamism
of the legislative process, especially in light of the objections
interposed by interest groups to date.147
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated October 2, 2001, together with the
Decision dated September 30, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court
in Civil Case No. 63958, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Another judgment is entered dismissing the Complaint and
ordering respondents, jointly and severally, to pay the petitioner
the amount of P865,592.95, with stipulated interest of 12 percent
reckoned from the date of extrajudicial demand until full
payment, and 12 percent of the total amount due as attorney's
fees.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 89572 December 21, 1989

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND

SPORTS (DECS) and DIRECTOR OF CENTER FOR
EDUCATIONAL MEASUREMENT, petitioners,
vs.
ROBERTO REY C. SAN DIEGO and JUDGE TERESITA
DIZON-CAPULONG, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila,
Branch 172, respondents.

Ramon M. Guevara for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:

The issue before us is mediocrity. The question is whether a

person who has thrice failed the National Medical Admission
Test (NMAT) is entitled to take it again.

The petitioner contends he may not, under its rule that-

h) A student shall be allowed only three (3) chances to take the

NMAT. After three (3) successive failures, a student shall not
be allowed to take the NMAT for the fourth time.

The private respondent insists he can, on constitutional grounds.

But first the facts.

The private respondent is a graduate of the University of the East

with a degree of Bachelor of Science in Zoology. The petitioner
claims that he took the NMAT three times and flunked it as
many times. 1 When he applied to take it again, the petitioner
rejected his application on the basis of the aforesaid rule. He
then went to the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, to compel his admission to the test.

In his original petition for mandamus, he first invoked his

constitutional rights to academic freedom and quality education.
By agreement of the parties, the private respondent was allowed
to take the NMAT scheduled on April 16, 1989, subject to the
outcome of his petition. 2 In an amended petition filed with
leave of court, he squarely challenged the constitutionality of
MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972, containing the above-cited
rule. The additional grounds raised were due process and equal
protection.

After hearing, the respondent judge rendered a decision on July

4, 1989, declaring the challenged order invalid and granting the
petition. Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong held that the petitioner
had been deprived of his right to pursue a medical education
through an arbitrary exercise of the police power. 3

We cannot sustain the respondent judge. Her decision must be

reversed.

In Tablarin v. Gutierrez, 4 this Court upheld the constitutionality

of the NMAT as a measure intended to limit the admission to
medical schools only to those who have initially proved their
competence and preparation for a medical education. Justice
Republic of the Philippines Florentino P. Feliciano declared for a unanimous Court:
SUPREME COURT
Manila Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether
there is some reasonable relation between the prescribing of
EN BANC passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to medical
school on the one hand, and the securing of the health and safety
of the general community, on the other hand. This question is
perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that the
regulation of the pratice of medicine in all its branches has long
been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health
and safety of the public. That the power to regulate and control
the practice of medicine includes the power to regulate
admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine,
is also well recognized. Thus, legislation and administrative
regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicine first
to take and pass medical board examinations have long ago been
recognized as valid exercises of governmental power. Similarly,
the establishment of minimum medical educational
requirements-i.e., the completion of prescribed courses in a
recognized medical school-for admission to the medical
profession, has also been sustained as a legitimate exercise of
the regulatory authority of the state. What we have before us in
the instant case is closely related: the regulation of access to
medical schools. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, as noted earlier,
articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the
improvement of the professional and technical quality of the
graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those
admitted to the student body of the medical schools. That
upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process of admission,
selectivity consisting, among other things, of limiting admission
to those who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for
medical studies and eventually for medical practice. The need to
maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in
our professional schools in general, and medical schools in
particular, in the current state of our social and economic
development, are widely known.
We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an
admission test like the NMAT as a means of achieving its stated
objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our]
medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of medical
education in the country." Given the widespread use today of
such admission tests in, for instance, medical schools in the
United States of America (the Medical College Admission Test
[MCAT] and quite probably, in other countries with far more
developed educational resources than our own, and taking into
account the failure or inability of the petitioners to even attempt
to prove otherwise, we are entitled to hold that the NMAT is
reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end of
legislation and regulation in this area. That end, it is useful to
recall, is the protection of the public from the potentially deadly
effects of incompetence and ignorance in those who would
undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or trauma.
However, the respondent judge agreed with the petitioner that
the said case was not applicable. Her reason was that it upheld
only the requirement for the admission test and said nothing
about the so-called "three-flunk rule."
We see no reason why the rationale in the Tablarin case cannot
apply to the case at bar. The issue raised in both cases is the
academic preparation of the applicant. This may be gauged at
least initially by the admission test and, indeed with more
reliability, by the three-flunk rule. The latter cannot be regarded
any less valid than the former in the regulation of the medical
profession.
There is no need to redefine here the police power of the State.
Suffice it to repeat that the power is validly exercised if (a) the
interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of
a particular class, require the interference of the State, and (b)
the means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment
of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals. 5
In other words, the proper exercise of the police power requires
the concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method.
The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the
ambit of the police power. It is the right and indeed the
responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession
is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may
unwarily entrust their lives and health.
The method employed by the challenged regulation is not
irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor is it arbitrary or
oppressive. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the
medical schools and ultimately the medical profession from the
intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors.
While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does
not have a constitutional right to be a doctor. This is true of any
other calling in which the public interest is involved; and the
closer the link, the longer the bridge to one's ambition. The State
has the responsibility to harness its human resources and to see
to it that they are not dissipated or, no less worse, not used at all.
These resources must be applied in a manner that will best
promote the common good while also giving the individual a
sense of satisfaction.
A person cannot insist on being a physician if he will be a
menace to his patients. If one who wants to be a lawyer may
prove better as a plumber, he should be so advised and adviced.
Of course, he may not be forced to be a plumber, but on the other
hand he may not force his entry into the bar. By the same token,
a student who has demonstrated promise as a pianist cannot be
shunted aside to take a course in nursing, however appropriate
this career may be for others.
The right to quality education invoked by the private respondent
is not absolute. The Constitution also provides that "every
citizen has the right to choose a profession or course of study,
subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic
requirements. 6
The private respondent must yield to the challenged rule and
give way to those better prepared. Where even those who have
qualified may still not be accommodated in our already crowded
medical schools, there is all the more reason to bar those who,
like him, have been tested and found wanting.
The contention that the challenged rule violates the equal
protection clause is not well-taken. A law does not have to
operate with equal force on all persons or things to be
conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution.
There can be no question that a substantial distinction exists
between medical students and other students who are not
subjected to the NMAT and the three-flunk rule. The medical
profession directly affects the very lives of the people, unlike
other careers which, for this reason, do not require more vigilant
regulation. The accountant, for example, while belonging to an
equally respectable profession, does not hold the same delicate
responsibility as that of the physician and so need not be
similarly treated.
There would be unequal protection if some applicants who have
passed the tests are admitted and others who have also qualified
are denied entrance. In other words, what the equal protection
requires is equality among equals.
The Court feels that it is not enough to simply invoke the right
to quality education as a guarantee of the Constitution: one must
show that he is entitled to it because of his preparation and
promise. The private respondent has failed the NMAT five
times. 7 While his persistence is noteworthy, to say the least, it
is certainly misplaced, like a hopeless love.
No depreciation is intended or made against the private
respondent. It is stressed that a person who does not qualify in
the NMAT is not an absolute incompetent unfit for any work or
occupation. The only inference is that he is a probably better,
not for the medical profession, but for another calling that has
not excited his interest.
In the former, he may be a bungler or at least lackluster; in the
latter, he is more likely to succeed and may even be outstanding.
It is for the appropriate calling that he is entitled to quality
education for the full harnessing of his potentials and the
sharpening of his latent talents toward what may even be a
brilliant future.
We cannot have a society of square pegs in round holes, of
dentists who should never have left the farm and engineers who
should have studied banking and teachers who could be better
as merchants.
It is time indeed that the State took decisive steps to regulate and
enrich our system of education by directing the student to the
course for which he is best suited as determined by initial tests
and evaluations. Otherwise, we may be "swamped with
mediocrity," in the words of Justice Holmes, not because we are
lacking in intelligence but because we are a nation of misfits.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the
respondent court dated January 13, 1989, is REVERSED, with
costs against the private respondent. It is so ordered.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras,
Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Grio-
Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 144681 June 21, 2004
PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION (PRC),
CHAIRMAN HERMOGENES P. POBRE, ASSOCIATE
COMMISSIONER ARMANDO PASCUAL, BOARD OF
MEDICINE, CHAIRMAN RODOLFO P. DE GUZMAN,
JOSE S. RAMIREZ, JUANITO B. BILLOTE, RUBEN R.
POLICARPIO, EDGARDO T. FERNANDO and
RICARDO D. FULGENCIO II, petitioners,
vs.
ARLENE V. DE GUZMAN, VIOLETA V. MENESES,
CELERINA S. NAVARRO, JOSE RAMONCITO P.
NAVARRO, ARNEL V. HERRERA and GERALDINE
ELIZABETH M. PAGILAGAN, ELNORA R. RAQUENO,
MARISSA A. REGODON, LAURA M. SANTOS,
KARANGALAN D. SERRANO, DANILO A. VILLAVER,
MARIA ROSARIO L. LEONOR, ALICIA S. LIZANO,
MARITEL M. ECHIVERRI, BERNADETTE T.
MENDOZA, FERNANDO F. MANDAPAT, ALELI A.
GOLLAYAN, ELCIN C. ARRIOLA, HERMINIGILDA E.
CONEJOS, SALLY B. BUNAGAN, ROGELIO B.
ANCHETA, OSCAR H. PADUA, JR., EVELYN D.
GRAJO, EVELYN S. ACOSTA, MARGARITA BELINDA
L. VICENCIO, VALENTINO P. ARBOLEDA, EVELYN O.
RAMOS, ACHILLES J. PERALTA, CORAZON M. CRUZ,
LEUVINA P. CHICO, JOSEPH A. JAO, MA. LUISA S.
GUTIERREZ, LYDIA C. CHAN, OPHELIA C. HIDALGO,
FERNANDO T. CRUZ, MELVIN M. USITA, RAFAEL I.
TOLENTINO, GRACE E. UY, CHERYL R. TRIGUERO,
MICHAEL L. SERRANO, FEDERICO L. CASTILLO,
MELITA J. CAEDO, SAMUEL B. BANGOY,
BERNARDITA B. SY, GLORIA T. JULARBAL,
FREDERICK D. FRANCISCO, CARLOS M. BERNARDO,
JR., HUBERT S. NAZARENO, CLARISSA B. BACLIG,
DAYMINDA G. BONTUYAN, BERNADETTE H.
CABUHAT, NANCY J. CHAVEZ, MARIO D.
CUARESMA, ERNESTO L. CUE, EVELYN C.
CUNDANGAN, RHONEIL R. DEVERATURDA,
DERILEEN D. DORADO, SAIBZUR N. EDDING,
VIOLETA C. FELIPE, HERMINIO V. FERNANDEZ, JR.,
MARIA VICTORIA M. LACSAMANA, NORMA G.
LAFAVILLA, RUBY B. LANTIN, MA. ELOISA Q.
MALLARI, CLARISA SJ. NICOLAS, PERCIVAL H.
PANGILINAN, ARNULFO A. SALVADOR, ROBERT B.
SANCHEZ, MERLY D. STA. ANA and YOLANDA P.
UNICA, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This petition for review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure seeks to nullify the D E C I S I O N,1 dated May 16,
2000, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283. The
appellate court affirmed the judgment2 dated December 19,
1994, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 52,
in Civil Case No. 93-66530. The trial court allowed the
respondents to take their physicians oath and to register as duly
licensed physicians. Equally challenged is the R E S O L U T I
O N3 promulgated on August 25, 2000 of the Court of Appeals,
denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
The facts of this case are as follows:
The respondents are all graduates of the Fatima College of
Medicine, Valenzuela City, Metro Manila. They passed the
Physician Licensure Examination conducted in February 1993
by the Board of Medicine (Board). Petitioner Professional
Regulation Commission (PRC) then released their names as
successful examinees in the medical licensure examination.
Shortly thereafter, the Board observed that the grades of the
seventy-nine successful examinees from Fatima College in the
two most difficult subjects in the medical licensure exam,
Biochemistry (Bio-Chem) and Obstetrics and Gynecology (OB-
Gyne), were unusually and exceptionally high. Eleven Fatima
examinees scored 100% in Bio-Chem and ten got 100% in OB-
Gyne, another eleven got 99% in Bio-Chem, and twenty-one
scored 99% in OB-Gyne. The Board also observed that many of
those who passed from Fatima got marks of 95% or better in
both subjects, and no one got a mark lower than 90%. A
comparison of the performances of the candidates from other
schools was made. The Board observed that strangely, the
unusually high ratings were true only for Fatima College
examinees. It was a record-breaking phenomenon in the history
of the Physician Licensure Examination.
On June 7, 1993, the Board issued Resolution No. 19,
withholding the registration as physicians of all the examinees
from the Fatima College of Medicine.4 The PRC asked the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to investigate whether
any anomaly or irregularity marred the February 1993 Physician
Licensure Examination.
Prior to the NBI investigation, the Board requested Fr.
Bienvenido F. Nebres, S.J., an expert mathematician and
authority in statistics, and later president of the Ateneo de
Manila University, to conduct a statistical analysis of the results
in Bio-Chem and Ob-Gyne of the said examination.
On June 10, 1993, Fr. Nebres submitted his report. He reported
that a comparison of the scores in Bio-Chem and Ob-Gyne, of
the Fatima College examinees with those of examinees from De
La Salle University and Perpetual Help College of Medicine
showed that the scores of Fatima College examinees were not
only incredibly high but unusually clustered close to each other.
He concluded that there must be some unusual reason creating
the clustering of scores in the two subjects. It must be a cause
"strong enough to eliminate the normal variations that one
should expect from the examinees [of Fatima College] in terms
of talent, effort, energy, etc."5
For its part, the NBI found that "the questionable passing rate of
Fatima examinees in the [1993] Physician Examination leads to
the conclusion that the Fatima examinees gained early access to
the test questions."6
On July 5, 1993, respondents Arlene V. De Guzman, Violeta V.
Meneses, Celerina S. Navarro, Jose Ramoncito P. Navarro,
Arnel V. Herrera, and Geraldine Elizabeth M. Pagilagan (Arlene
V. De Guzman et al., for brevity) filed a special civil action for
mandamus, with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction
docketed as Civil Case No. 93-66530 with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 52. Their petition was adopted
by the other respondents as intervenors.
Meanwhile, the Board issued Resolution No. 26, dated July 21,
1993, charging respondents with "immorality, dishonest
conduct, fraud, and deceit" in connection with the Bio-Chem
and Ob-Gyne examinations. It recommended that the test results
of the Fatima examinees be nullified. The case was docketed as
Adm. Case No. 1687 by the PRC.
On July 28, 1993, the RTC issued an Order in Civil Case No.
93-66530 granting the preliminary mandatory injunction sought
by the respondents. It ordered the petitioners to administer the
physicians oath to Arlene V. De Guzman et al., and enter their
names in the rolls of the PRC.
The petitioners then filed a special civil action for certiorari with
the Court of Appeals to set aside the mandatory injunctive writ,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 31701.
On October 21, 1993, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. SP
No. 31701, with the dispositive portion of the Decision
ordaining as follows:
WHEREFORE, this petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued by the lower
court against petitioners is hereby nullified and set aside.
SO ORDERED.7
Arlene V. de Guzman, et al., then elevated the foregoing
Decision to this Court in G.R. No. 112315. In our Resolution
dated May 23, 1994, we denied the petition for failure to show
reversible error on the part of the appellate court.
Meanwhile, on November 22, 1993, during the pendency of the
instant petition, the pre-trial conference in Civil Case No. 93-
66530 was held. Then, the parties, agreed to reduce the
testimonies of their respective witnesses to sworn questions-
and-answers. This was without prejudice to cross-examination
by the opposing counsel.
On December 13, 1993, petitioners counsel failed to appear at
the trial in the mistaken belief that the trial was set for December
15. The trial court then ruled that petitioners waived their right
to cross-examine the witnesses.
On January 27, 1994, counsel for petitioners filed a
Manifestation and Motion stating the reasons for her non-
appearance and praying that the cross-examination of the
witnesses for the opposing parties be reset. The trial court denied
the motion for lack of notice to adverse counsel. It also denied
the Motion for Reconsideration that followed on the ground that
adverse counsel was notified less than three (3) days prior to the
hearing.
Meanwhile, to prevent the PRC and the Board from proceeding
with Adm. Case No. 1687, the respondents herein moved for the
issuance of a restraining order, which the lower court granted in
its Order dated April 4, 1994.
The petitioners then filed with this Court a petition for certiorari
docketed as G.R. No. 115704, to annul the Orders of the trial
court dated November 13, 1993, February 28, 1994, and April
4, 1994. We referred the petition to the Court of Appeals where
it was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 34506.
On August 31, 1994, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. SP
No. 34506 as follows:
WHEREFORE, the present petition for certiorari with prayer for
temporary restraining order/preliminary injunction is
GRANTED and the Orders of December 13, 1993, February 7,
1994, February 28, 1994, and April 4, 1994 of the RTC-Manila,
Branch 52, and all further proceedings taken by it in Special
Civil Action No. 93-66530 are hereby DECLARED NULL and
VOID. The said RTC-Manila is ordered to allow petitioners
counsel to cross-examine the respondents witnesses, to allow
petitioners to present their evidence in due course of trial, and
thereafter to decide the case on the merits on the basis of the
evidence of the parties. Costs against respondents.
IT IS SO ORDERED.8
The trial was then set and notices were sent to the parties.
A day before the first hearing, on September 22, 1994, the
petitioners filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation and Motion
praying for the partial reconsideration of the appellate courts
decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 34506, and for the outright
dismissal of Civil Case No. 93-66530. The petitioners asked for
the suspension of the proceedings.
In its Order dated September 23, 1994, the trial court granted the
aforesaid motion, cancelled the scheduled hearing dates, and
reset the proceedings to October 21 and 28, 1994.
Meanwhile, on October 25, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied
the partial motion for reconsideration in CA-G.R. SP No. 34506.
Thus, petitioners filed with the Supreme Court a petition for
review docketed as G.R. No. 117817, entitled Professional
Regulation Commission, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al.
On November 11, 1994, counsel for the petitioners failed to
appear at the trial of Civil Case No. 93-66530. Upon motion of
the respondents herein, the trial court ruled that herein
petitioners waived their right to cross-examine the herein
respondents. Trial was reset to November 28, 1994.
On November 25, 1994, petitioners counsel moved for the
inhibition of the trial court judge for alleged partiality. On
November 28, 1994, the day the Motion to Inhibit was to be
heard, petitioners failed to appear. Thus, the trial court denied
the Motion to Inhibit and declared Civil Case No. 93-66530
deemed submitted for decision.
On December 19, 1994, the trial court handed down its judgment
in Civil Case No. 93-66530, the fallo of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered ordering the respondents
to allow the petitioners and intervenors (except those with
asterisks and footnotes in pages 1 & 2 of this decision) [sic],9 to
take the physicians oath and to register them as physicians.
It should be made clear that this decision is without prejudice to
any administrative disciplinary action which may be taken
against any of the petitioners for such causes and in the manner
provided by law and consistent with the requirements of the
Constitution as any other professionals.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.10
As a result of these developments, petitioners filed with this
Court a petition for review on certiorari docketed as G.R. No.
118437, entitled Professional Regulation Commission v. Hon.
David G. Nitafan, praying inter alia, that (1) G.R. No. 118437
be consolidated with G.R. No. 117817; (2) the decision of the
Court of Appeals dated August 31, 1994 in CA-G.R. SP No.
34506 be nullified for its failure to decree the dismissal of Civil
Case No. 93-66530, and in the alternative, to set aside the
decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 93-66530, order the
trial court judge to inhibit himself, and Civil Case No. 93-66530
be re-raffled to another branch.
On December 26, 1994, the petitioners herein filed their Notice
of Appeal11 in Civil Case No. 93-66530, thereby elevating the
case to the Court of Appeals, where it was docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 37283.
In our Resolution of June 7, 1995, G.R. No. 118437 was
consolidated with G.R. No. 117817.
On July 9, 1998, we disposed of G.R. Nos. 117817 and 118437
in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 117817 is DISMISSED
for being moot. The petition in G.R. No. 118437 is likewise
DISMISSED on the ground that there is a pending appeal before
the Court of Appeals. Assistant Solicitor General Amparo M.
Cabotaje-Tang is advised to be more circumspect in her dealings
with the courts as a repetition of the same or similar acts will be
dealt with accordingly.
SO ORDERED.12
While CA-G.R. SP No. 37283 was awaiting disposition by the
appellate court, Arnel V. Herrera, one of the original petitioners
in Civil Case No. 93-66530, joined by twenty-seven intervenors,
to wit: Fernando F. Mandapat, Ophelia C. Hidalgo, Bernadette
T. Mendoza, Ruby B. Lantin-Tan, Fernando T. Cruz, Marissa A.
Regodon, Ma. Eloisa Q. Mallari-Largoza, Cheryl R. Triguero,
Joseph A. Jao, Bernadette H. Cabuhat, Evelyn S. Acosta-
Cabanes, Laura M. Santos, Maritel M. Echiverri, Bernadette C.
Escusa, Carlosito C. Domingo, Alicia S. Lizano, Elnora R.
Raqueno-Rabaino, Saibzur N. Edding, Derileen D. Dorado-
Edding, Robert B. Sanchez, Maria Rosario L. Leonor-
Lacandula, Geraldine Elizabeth M. Pagilagan-Palma, Margarita
Belinda L. Vicencio-Gamilla, Herminigilda E. Conejos,
Leuvina P. Chico-Paguio, Elcin C. Arriola-Ocampo, and Jose
Ramoncito P. Navarro, manifested that they were no longer
interested in proceeding with the case and moved for its
dismissal. A similar manifestation and motion was later filed by
intervenors Mary Jean I. Yeban-Merlan, Michael L. Serrano,
Norma G. Lafavilla, Arnulfo A. Salvador, Belinda C. Rabara,
Yolanda P. Unica, Dayminda G. Bontuyan, Clarissa B. Baclig,
Ma. Luisa S. Gutierrez, Rhoneil R. Deveraturda, Aleli A.
Gollayan, Evelyn C. Cundangan, Frederick D. Francisco,
Violeta V. Meneses, Melita J. Caedo, Clarisa SJ. Nicolas,
Federico L. Castillo, Karangalan D. Serrano, Danilo A. Villaver,
Grace E. Uy, Lydia C. Chan, and Melvin M. Usita. The Court of
Appeals ruled that its decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283 would
not apply to them.
On May 16, 2000, the Court of Appeals decided CA-G.R. SP
No. 37283, with the following fallo, to wit:
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision
appealed from, We hereby AFFIRM the same and DISMISS the
instant appeal.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.13
In sustaining the trial courts decision, the appellate court
ratiocinated that the respondents complied with all the statutory
requirements for admission into the licensure examination for
physicians in February 1993. They all passed the said
examination. Having fulfilled the requirements of Republic Act
No. 2382,14 they should be allowed to take their oaths as
physicians and be registered in the rolls of the PRC.
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS HAVE A VALID
CAUSE OF ACTION FOR MANDAMUS AGAINST
PETITIONERS IN THE LIGHT OF THE RESOLUTION OF
THIS HONORABLE COURT IN G.R. NO. 112315
AFFIRMING THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION
DECLARING THAT IF EVER THERE IS SOME DOUBT AS
TO THE MORAL FITNESS OF EXAMINEES, THE
ISSUANCE OF LICENSE TO PRACTICE MEDICINE IS
NOT AUTOMATICALLY GRANTED TO THE
SUCCESSFUL EXAMINEES.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITION FOR MANDAMUS
COULD PROCEED DESPITE THE PENDENCY OF
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1687, WHICH WAS
PRECISELY LODGED TO DETERMINE THE MORAL
FITNESS OF RESPONDENTS TO BECOME DOCTORS.15
To our mind, the only issue is: Did the Court of Appeals commit
a reversible error of law in sustaining the judgment of the trial
court that respondents are entitled to a writ of mandamus?
The petitioners submit that a writ of mandamus will not lie in
this case. They point out that for a writ of mandamus to issue,
the applicant must have a well-defined, clear and certain legal
right to the thing demanded and it is the duty of the respondent
to perform the act required. Thus, mandamus may be availed of
only when the duty sought to be performed is a ministerial and
not a discretionary one. The petitioners argue that the appellate
courts decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283 upholding the
decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 93-66530
overlooked its own pronouncement in CA-G.R. SP No. 31701.
The Court of Appeals held in CA-G.R. SP No. 31701 that the
issuance of a license to engage in the practice of medicine
becomes discretionary on the PRC if there exists some doubt
that the successful examinee has not fully met the requirements
of the law. The petitioners stress that this Courts Resolution
dated May 24, 1994 in G.R. No. 112315 held that there was no
showing "that the Court of Appeals had committed any
reversible error in rendering the questioned judgment" in CA-
G.R. SP No. 31701. The petitioners point out that our Resolution
in G.R. No. 112315 has long become final and executory.
Respondents counter that having passed the 1993 licensure
examinations for physicians, the petitioners have the obligation
to administer to them the oath as physicians and to issue their
certificates of registration as physicians pursuant to Section
2016 of Rep. Act No. 2382. The Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 37283, found that respondents complied with all the
requirements of Rep. Act No. 2382. Furthermore, respondents
were admitted by the Medical Board to the licensure
examinations and had passed the same. Hence, pursuant to
Section 20 of Rep. Act No. 2382, the petitioners had the
obligation to administer their oaths as physicians and register
them.
Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of competent
jurisdiction, in the name of the state or the sovereign, directed to
some inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or
person requiring the performance of a particular duty therein
specified, which duty results from the official station of the party
to whom the writ is directed, or from operation of law.17 Section
3 of Rule 6518 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure outlines
two situations when a writ of mandamus may issue, when any
tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully (1)
neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station; or (2)
excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office
to which the other is entitled.
We shall discuss the issues successively.
1. On The Existence of a Duty of the Board of Medicine To Issue
Certificates of Registration as Physicians under Rep. Act No.
2382.
For mandamus to prosper, there must be a showing that the
officer, board, or official concerned, has a clear legal duty, not
involving discretion.19 Moreover, there must be statutory
authority for the performance of the act,20 and the performance
of the duty has been refused.21 Thus, it must be pertinently
asked now: Did petitioners have the duty to administer the
Hippocratic Oath and register respondents as physicians under
the Medical Act of 1959?
As found by the Court of Appeals, on which we agree on the
basis of the records:
It bears emphasizing herein that petitioner-appellees and
intervenor-appellees have fully complied with all the statutory
requirements for admission into the licensure examinations for
physicians conducted and administered by the respondent-
appellants on February 12, 14, 20 and 21, 1993. Stress, too, must
be made of the fact that all of them successfully passed the same
examinations.22
The crucial query now is whether the Court of Appeals erred in
concluding that petitioners should allow the respondents to take
their oaths as physicians and register them, steps which would
enable respondents to practice the medical profession23
pursuant to Section 20 of the Medical Act of 1959?
The appellate court relied on a single provision, Section 20 of
Rep. Act No. 2382, in concluding that the petitioners had the
ministerial obligation to administer the Hippocratic Oath to
respondents and register them as physicians. But it is a basic rule
in statutory construction that each part of a statute should be
construed in connection with every other part to produce a
harmonious whole, not confining construction to only one
section.24 The intent or meaning of the statute should be
ascertained from the statute taken as a whole, not from an
isolated part of the provision. Accordingly, Section 20, of Rep.
Act No. 2382, as amended should be read in conjunction with
the other provisions of the Act. Thus, to determine whether the
petitioners had the ministerial obligation to administer the
Hippocratic Oath to respondents and register them as
physicians, recourse must be had to the entirety of the Medical
Act of 1959.
A careful reading of Section 20 of the Medical Act of 1959
discloses that the law uses the word "shall" with respect to the
issuance of certificates of registration. Thus, the petitioners
"shall sign and issue certificates of registration to those who
have satisfactorily complied with the requirements of the
Board." In statutory construction the term "shall" is a word of
command. It is given imperative meaning. Thus, when an
examinee satisfies the requirements for the grant of his
physicians license, the Board is obliged to administer to him his
oath and register him as a physician, pursuant to Section 20 and
par. (1) of Section 2225 of the Medical Act of 1959.
However, the surrounding circumstances in this case call for
serious inquiry concerning the satisfactory compliance with the
Board requirements by the respondents. The unusually high
scores in the two most difficult subjects was phenomenal,
according to Fr. Nebres, the consultant of PRC on the matter,
and raised grave doubts about the integrity, if not validity, of the
tests. These doubts have to be appropriately resolved.
Under the second paragraph of Section 22, the Board is vested
with the power to conduct administrative investigations and
"disapprove applications for examination or registration,"
pursuant to the objectives of Rep. Act No. 2382 as outlined in
Section 126 thereof. In this case, after the investigation, the
Board filed before the PRC, Adm. Case No. 1687 against the
respondents to ascertain their moral and mental fitness to
practice medicine, as required by Section 927 of Rep. Act No.
2382. In its Decision dated July 1, 1997, the Board ruled:
WHEREFORE, the BOARD hereby CANCELS the
respondents[] examination papers in the Physician Licensure
Examinations given in February 1993 and further DEBARS
them from taking any licensure examination for a period of ONE
(1) YEAR from the date of the promulgation of this DECISION.
They may, if they so desire, apply for the scheduled
examinations for physicians after the lapse of the period
imposed by the BOARD.
SO ORDERED.28
Until the moral and mental fitness of the respondents could be
ascertained, according to petitioners, the Board has discretion to
hold in abeyance the administration of the Hippocratic Oath and
the issuance of the certificates to them. The writ of mandamus
does not lie to compel performance of an act which is not duly
authorized.
The respondents nevertheless argue that under Section 20, the
Board shall not issue a certificate of registration only in the
following instances: (1) to any candidate who has been
convicted by a court of competent jurisdiction of any criminal
offense involving moral turpitude; (2) or has been found guilty
of immoral or dishonorable conduct after the investigation by
the Board; or (3) has been declared to be of unsound mind. They
aver that none of these circumstances are present in their case.
Petitioners reject respondents argument. We are informed that
in Board Resolution No. 26,29 dated July 21, 1993, the Board
resolved to file charges against the examinees from Fatima
College of Medicine for "immorality, dishonesty, fraud, and
deceit in the Obstetrics-Gynecology and Biochemistry
examinations." It likewise sought to cancel the examination
results obtained by the examinees from the Fatima College.
Section 830 of Rep. Act No. 2382 prescribes, among others, that
a person who aspires to practice medicine in the Philippines,
must have "satisfactorily passed the corresponding Board
Examination." Section 22, in turn, provides that the oath may
only be administered "to physicians who qualified in the
examinations." The operative word here is "satisfactorily,"
defined as "sufficient to meet a condition or obligation" or
"capable of dispelling doubt or ignorance."31 Gleaned from
Board Resolution No. 26, the licensing authority apparently did
not find that the respondents "satisfactorily passed" the licensure
examinations. The Board instead sought to nullify the
examination results obtained by the respondents.
2. On the Right Of The Respondents To Be Registered As
Physicians
The function of mandamus is not to establish a right but to
enforce one that has been established by law. If no legal right
has been violated, there can be no application of a legal remedy,
and the writ of mandamus is a legal remedy for a legal right.32
There must be a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the
thing demanded.33 It is long established rule that a license to
practice medicine is a privilege or franchise granted by the
government.34
It is true that this Court has upheld the constitutional right35 of
every citizen to select a profession or course of study subject to
a fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic
requirements.36 But like all rights and freedoms guaranteed by
the Charter, their exercise may be so regulated pursuant to the
police power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace,
education, order, safety, and general welfare of the people.37
Thus, persons who desire to engage in the learned professions
requiring scientific or technical knowledge may be required to
take an examination as a prerequisite to engaging in their chosen
careers. This regulation takes particular pertinence in the field
of medicine, to protect the public from the potentially deadly
effects of incompetence and ignorance among those who would
practice medicine. In a previous case, it may be recalled, this
Court has ordered the Board of Medical Examiners to annul both
its resolution and certificate authorizing a Spanish subject, with
the degree of Licentiate in Medicine and Surgery from the
University of Barcelona, Spain, to practice medicine in the
Philippines, without first passing the examination required by
the Philippine Medical Act.38 In another case worth noting, we
upheld the power of the State to upgrade the selection of
applicants into medical schools through admission tests.39
It must be stressed, nevertheless, that the power to regulate the
exercise of a profession or pursuit of an occupation cannot be
exercised by the State or its agents in an arbitrary, despotic, or
oppressive manner. A political body that regulates the exercise
of a particular privilege has the authority to both forbid and grant
such privilege in accordance with certain conditions. Such
conditions may not, however, require giving up ones
constitutional rights as a condition to acquiring the license.40
Under the view that the legislature cannot validly bestow an
arbitrary power to grant or refuse a license on a public agency
or officer, courts will generally strike down license legislation
that vests in public officials discretion to grant or refuse a license
to carry on some ordinarily lawful business, profession, or
activity without prescribing definite rules and conditions for the
guidance of said officials in the exercise of their power.41
In the present case, the aforementioned guidelines are provided
for in Rep. Act No. 2382, as amended, which prescribes the
requirements for admission to the practice of medicine, the
qualifications of candidates for the board examinations, the
scope and conduct of the examinations, the grounds for denying
the issuance of a physicians license, or revoking a license that
has been issued. Verily, to be granted the privilege to practice
medicine, the applicant must show that he possesses all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications. Furthermore, it
must appear that he has fully complied with all the conditions
and requirements imposed by the law and the licensing
authority. Should doubt taint or mar the compliance as being less
than satisfactory, then the privilege will not issue. For said
privilege is distinguishable from a matter of right, which may be
demanded if denied. Thus, without a definite showing that the
aforesaid requirements and conditions have been satisfactorily
met, the courts may not grant the writ of mandamus to secure
said privilege without thwarting the legislative will.
3. On the Ripeness of the Petition for Mandamus
Lastly, the petitioners herein contend that the Court of Appeals
should have dismissed the petition for mandamus below for
being premature. They argue that the administrative remedies
had not been exhausted. The records show that this is not the
first time that petitioners have sought the dismissal of Civil Case
No. 93-66530. This issue was raised in G.R. No. 115704, which
petition we referred to the Court of Appeals, where it was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 34506. On motion for
reconsideration in CA-G.R. SP No. 34506, the appellate court
denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that the prayers for
the nullification of the order of the trial court and the dismissal
of Civil Case No. 93-66530 were inconsistent reliefs. In G.R.
No. 118437, the petitioners sought to nullify the decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 34506 insofar as it did not
order the dismissal of Civil Case No. 93-66530. In our
consolidated decision, dated July 9, 1998, in G.R. Nos. 117817
& 118437, this Court speaking through Justice Bellosillo opined
that:
Indeed, the issue as to whether the Court of Appeals erred in not
ordering the dismissal of Civil Case No. 93-66530 sought to be
resolved in the instant petition has been rendered meaningless
by an event taking place prior to the filing of this petition and
denial thereof should follow as a logical consequence.42 There
is no longer any justiciable controversy so that any declaration
thereon would be of no practical use or value.43 It should be
recalled that in its decision of 19 December 1994 the trial court
granted the writ of mandamus prayed for by private respondents,
which decision was received by petitioners on 20 December
1994. Three (3) days after, or on 23 December 1994, petitioners
filed the instant petition. By then, the remedy available to them
was to appeal the decision to the Court of Appeals, which they
in fact did, by filing a notice of appeal on 26 December 1994.44
The petitioners have shown no cogent reason for us to reverse
the aforecited ruling. Nor will their reliance upon the doctrine of
the exhaustion of administrative remedies in the instant case
advance their cause any.
Section 2645 of the Medical Act of 1959 provides for the
administrative and judicial remedies that respondents herein can
avail to question Resolution No. 26 of the Board of Medicine,
namely: (a) appeal the unfavorable judgment to the PRC; (b)
should the PRC ruling still be unfavorable, to elevate the matter
on appeal to the Office of the President; and (c) should they still
be unsatisfied, to ask for a review of the case or to bring the case
to court via a special civil action of certiorari. Thus, as a rule,
mandamus will not lie when administrative remedies are still
available.46 However, the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies does not apply where, as in this case, a
pure question of law is raised.47 On this issue, no reversible
error may, thus, be laid at the door of the appellate court in CA-
G.R. SP No. 37283, when it refused to dismiss Civil Case No.
93-66530.
As we earlier pointed out, herein respondents Arnel V. Herrera,
Fernando F. Mandapat, Ophelia C. Hidalgo, Bernadette T.
Mendoza, Ruby B. Lantin-Tan, Fernando T. Cruz, Marissa A.
Regodon, Ma. Eloisa Q. Mallari-Largoza, Cheryl R. Triguero,
Joseph A. Jao, Bernadette H. Cabuhat, Evelyn S. Acosta-
Cabanes, Laura M. Santos, Maritel M. Echiverri, Bernadette C.
Escusa, Carlosito C. Domingo, Alicia S. Lizano, Elnora R.
Raqueno-Rabaino, Saibzur N. Edding, Derileen D. Dorado-
Edding, Robert B. Sanchez, Maria Rosario Leonor-Lacandula,
Geraldine Elizabeth M. Pagilagan-Palma, Margarita Belinda L.
Vicencio-Gamilla, Herminigilda E. Conejos, Leuvina P. Chico-
Paguio, Elcin C. Arriola-Ocampo, and Jose Ramoncito P.
Navarro manifested to the Court of Appeals during the pendency
of CA-G.R. SP No. 37283, that they were no longer interested
in proceeding with the case and moved for its dismissal insofar
as they were concerned. A similar manifestation and motion
were later filed by intervenors Mary Jean I. Yeban-Merlan,
Michael L. Serrano, Norma G. Lafavilla, Arnulfo A. Salvador,
Belinda C. Rabarra, Yolanda P. Unica, Dayminda G. Bontuyan,
Clarissa B. Baclig, Ma. Luisa S. Gutierrez, Rhoneil R.
Deveraturda, Aleli A. Gollayan, Evelyn C. Cundangan,
Frederick D. Francisco, Violeta V. Meneses, Melita J. Caedo,
Clarisa SJ. Nicolas, Federico L. Castillo, Karangalan D.
Serrano, Danilo A. Villaver, Grace E. Uy, Lydia C. Chan, and
Melvin M. Usita. Following these manifestations and motions,
the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283 decreed that its
ruling would not apply to them. Thus, inasmuch as the instant
case is a petition for review of the appellate courts ruling in CA-
G.R. SP No. 37283, a decision which is inapplicable to the
aforementioned respondents will similarly not apply to them.
As to Achilles J. Peralta, Evelyn O. Ramos, Sally B. Bunagan,
Rogelio B. Ancheta, Oscar H. Padua, Jr., Evelyn D. Grajo,
Valentino P. Arboleda, Carlos M. Bernardo, Jr., Mario D.
Cuaresma, Violeta C. Felipe, Percival H. Pangilinan, Corazon
M. Cruz and Samuel B. Bangoy, herein decision shall not apply
pursuant to the Orders of the trial court in Civil Case No. 93-
66530, dropping their names from the suit.
Consequently, this Decision is binding only on the remaining
respondents, namely: Arlene V. de Guzman, Celerina S.
Navarro, Rafael I. Tolentino, Bernardita B. Sy, Gloria T.
Jularbal, Hubert S. Nazareno, Nancy J. Chavez, Ernesto L. Cue,
Herminio V. Fernandez, Jr., Maria Victoria M. Lacsamana and
Merly D. Sta. Ana, as well as the petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Accordingly,
(1) the assailed decision dated May 16, 2000, of the Court of
Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283, which affirmed the
judgment dated December 19, 1994, of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch 52, in Civil Case No. 93-66530, ordering
petitioners to administer the physicians oath to herein
respondents as well as the resolution dated August 25, 2000, of
the appellate court, denying the petitioners motion for
reconsideration, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE; and (2) the
writ of mandamus, issued in Civil Case No. 93-66530, and
affirmed by the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283 is
NULLIFIED AND SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 88259 August 10, 1989
THE BOARD OF MEDICAL EDUCATION and the HON.
LOURDES R. QUISUMBING, in her capacity as Secretary
of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports and
Chairman, Board of Medical Education, petitioners,
vs.
HON. DANIEL P. ALFONSO, Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 74, Fourth Judicial Region,
Antipolo, Rizal, and the PHILIPPINE MUSLIM-
CHRISTIAN COLLEGE OF MEDICINE FOUNDATION,
INC., respondents.
Carpio, Villaraza & Cruz for private respondent.
Anatolio S. Tuazon, Jr. for intervenors.
NARVASA, J.:
Petitioners, the Board of Medical Education, the government
agency which supervises and regulates the country's medical
colleges, and Secretary Lourdes R. Quisumbing of the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports, as Chairperson of
the Board, pray for a writ of certiorari to nullify and set aside the
order issued by respondent Judge Daniel P. Alfonso, Regional
Trial Court, Antipolo, Rizal, in Civil Case No. 1385 restraining
the enforcement of petitioner Quisumbing's order of closure of
the respondent Philippine Muslim-Christian College of
Medicine Foundation, Inc. (hereafter simply
College).lwph1.t
The, College, a private educational institution, was founded in
1981 for the avowed purpose of producing physicians who will
"emancipate Muslim citizens from age-old attitudes on health."
The, unstable peace and order situation in Mindanao led to the
establishment of the College in Antipolo, Rizal, which granted
it a temporary permit to operate in the municipality, instead of
in Zamboanga City where the school was first proposed to be
located. It has since adopted Antipolo as its permanent site and
changed its name to the Rizal College of Medicine.
In 1985, the Department of Education, Culture and Sports
(DECS) and the Board of Medical Education (BME) authorized
the Commission on Medical Education to conduct a study of all
medical schools in the Philippines. The, report of the
Commission showed that the College fell very much short of the
minimum standards set for medical schools. 1 The, team of
inspectors, composed of Doctors Florentino Herrera, Jr., Elena
Ines Cuyegkeng, Horacio Estrada, Jose V. Silao, Jr. and Andres
L. Reyes, recommended the closure of the school 2 upon the
following findings, to wit:
(a) the College was not fulfilling the purpose for which it
had been created because of its inappropriate location and the
absence in its curriculum of subjects relating to Muslim culture
and welfare;
(b) its lack of university affiliation hindered its students
from obtaining a "balanced humanistic and scientific"
education;
(c) it did not have its philosophy base hospital for the
training of its students in the major clinical disciplines, as
required by the DECS;
(d) more than 60% of the college faculty did not teach in
the College full-time, resulting in shortened and irregular class
hours, subject overloading, and in general, poor quality
teaching.
The, school disputed these findings as biased and
discriminatory. At its request, the Board of Medical Education,
in May, 1987, sent another team of doctors 3 for a re-evaluation
of the College. After inspection, the team confirmed the
previous findings and recommended the phase-out of the school.
4
The, first two reports were verified on June 23, 1987 by a third
team of inspectors. 5 A year thereafter, the College failed
another test what was in effect the fourth evaluation of its fitness
to continue as a medical school conducted on March 4 and 5,
1988 by a team from the Board of Medical Education
determining the eligibility of medical schools for government
recognition. The, College was adjudged "inadequate" in all
aspects of the survey, to wit, college, curriculum, facilities,
teaching hospital, and studentry. 6 The, inspectors, Doctors Nilo
Rosas, Macario Tan and Elena Ines Cuyegkeng, accordingly
recommended denial of government; recognition.
Accordingly, the Board of Medical Education recommended to
the DECS the closure of the College, effective the end of the
school year 1988-1989. The, College however succeeded in
having the Board form yet another team to review the previous
findings. Doctors Elena Ines Cuyegkeng, Alberto Romualdez,
Artemio Ordinaria Joven Cuanang and Nilo L. Rosas conducted
their inspection on June 18, 1988. Their findings: although there
the had been a "major effort to improve the physical plant for
classroom instructions and the library, serious deficiencies
remain(ed) in the areas of clinical facilities and library
operations;" "faculty continue(d) to be quite inadequate with no
prospects for satisfactory growth and development;" "student
profile ... (was) below par from the point of view of credentials
(NMAT and transfer records) as well as level knowledge and
preparedness at various stages of medical education," and "the
most serious deficiency ... (was) the almost total lack of serious
development efforts in academic medicine i.e., seeming lack
of philosophy of teaching, no serious effort to study curricula,
almost non-existent innovative approaches." Again, the
recommendation was to close the College with provisions for
the dispersal of its students to other medical schools. 7
In her letter of June 23, 1988, Secretary Quisumbing informed
the Chairman of the College's Board of Trustees, Mr. Victor
Sumulong, of the decision of the Board of Medical Education to
close the College. Mr. Sumulong instead proposed a gradual
phase-out starting the school year 1989-1990 in order not to
dislocate the students and staff and to minimize financial loss. 8
The, Board subsequently allowed the College to continue its
operations but only until May, 1989, after which it was to be
closed, this decision being "final and unappealable." The,
College was, however, assured of assistance in the relocation of
its students and in its rehabilitation as an institution for health-
related and paramedical courses. 9
The, College appealed the decision to the Office of the
President, imputing grave abuse of discretion to the Secretary.
10 On February 16, 1989, Executive Secretary Catalino
Macaraig, Jr., finding "no reason to disturb" the contested
decision, affirmed it. 11
On March 2, 1989, the College went to court. It filed Civil Case
No. 1385 in the court of respondent Judge Daniel P. Alfonso
against Secretary Quisumbing in her capacity as Secretary of
Education, Culture and Sports, questioning the decision as
illegal, oppressive, arbitrary and discriminatory and applied for
a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain its implementation.
The, writ issued as prayed for by order of the respondent Judge
dated May 10, 1989. 12 His Honor ruled that the inspection of
June 18, 1988 was the principal basis of the closure order, and
on such basis sustained the claim of the College that the
inspection was done in an "arbitrary and haphazard manner" by
a team of inspectors who had already prejudged the school.
Judge Alfonso held that there was no evidence supporting the
findings in the report of June 18, 1988, and declared that his
philosophy ocular inspection of the College disclosed that the
deficiencies mentioned in the report were non-existent, and that
on the contrary, the laboratory and library areas were "big
enough," and in the operations of the proposed base hospital
were going on smoothly at the time of the ocular inspection."
The, school thereupon promptly advertised in major newspaper
dailies for enrollees in all levels of the medical college and in its
pre-board review classes. 13
Hence the present petition, assailing the order of injunction
dated May 10, 1989 as having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion, and praying for a restraining order against its
enforcement as well as for the dismissal of the action instituted
in the court a quo. The, Court on June 1, 1989 ordered the
respondent College to desist from advertising and admitting
students, and the respondent judge to refrain from enforcing his
injunction order.
The, College in its Comment would justify its entitlement to the
questioned injunction on the ground that the closure order
against which it was directed was issued without factual basis
and in violation of the right of the College to due process of law,
and that it violates MECS Order No. 5 (Series of 1986) to the
effect that the penalty of closure cannot be imposed earlier than
three (3) years from the last evaluation, which in this instance
was made, on June 18, 1988.
Resort to the Courts to obtain a reversal of the determination by
the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports that the College
is unfit to continue its operations is in this case clearly
unavailing. There is, to begin with, no law authorizing an appeal
from decisions or orders of the Secretary of Education, Culture
and Sports to this Court or any other Court. It is not the function
of this Court or any other Court to review the decisions and
orders of the Secretary on the issue of whether or not an
educational institution meets the norms and standards required
for permission to operate and to continue operating as such. On
this question, no Court has the power or prerogative to substitute
its opinion for that of the Secretary. Indeed, it is obviously not
expected that any Court would have the competence to do so.
The, only authority reposed in the Courts in the matter is the
determination of whether or not the Secretary of Education,
Culture and Sports has acted within the scope of powers granted
him by law and the Constitution. As long as it appears that he
has done so, any decision rendered by him should not and will
not be subject to review and reversal by any court.
Of course, if it should be made, to appear to the Court that those
powers were in a case exercised so whimsically, capriciously,
oppressively, despotically or arbitrarily as to call for peremptory
correction or stated otherwise, that the Secretary had acted
with grave abuse of discretion, or had unlawfully neglected the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a
duty, or excluded another from the use or enjoyment of a right
or office to which such other is entitled it becomes the Court's
duty to rectify such action through the extraordinary remedies
of certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus, whichever may properly
apply. Yet even in these extreme instances, where a Court finds
that there has been abuse of powers by the Secretary and
consequently nullifies and/or forbids such an abuse of power, or
compliance whatever is needful to keep its exercise within
bounds, the Court, absent any compelling reason to do
otherwise, should still leave to the Secretary the ultimate
determination of the issue of the satisfy action or fulfillment by
an educational institution of the standards set down for its
legitimate operation, as to which it should not ordinarily
substitute its over judgment for that of said office.
In any case, the recorded facts quite clearly fail to support the
College's claim of grave abuse of discretion containing the order
of closure, and on the contrary convincingly show the
challenged decision to be correct. From 1985, no less than five
(5) surveys were conducted of respondent institution to
determine its compliance with the minimum standards
established for a medical college. The, first survey, that
undertaken by the Commission on Medical Education, disclosed
such various and significant deficiencies in the school as to
constrain the inspectors to recommend its closure. Four (4) other
surveys were thereafter made by as many different committees
or teams, at the school's instance or otherwise, all of which
basically confirmed the results of that first survey. Moreover,
the findings of all five (5) surveys were affirmed by the Office
of the President. Indeed, the petitioner, through the Chairman of
its Board of Trustees, to all intents and purposes accepted the
validity of the findings of those five (5) survey groups when it
proposed, in 1988, a gradual phase-out of the school starting in
1989. The, respondent College knew that the recommendation
for its closure was made, as early as 1986, that recommendation
was reiterated and reaffirmed four (4) times thereafter until it
was finally approved and acted upon by the Secretary, whose
action was confirmed by the Office of the President. Said
respondent was given notice in June 1988, that in consequence
of all these, the time for its definite closure had been unalterably
set at May, 1989, a notice which was accompanied by
assurances of assistance in the relocation of its students before
June, 1989 and in its rehabilitation as a school for other courses.
After having resorted to the whole range of administrative
remedies available to it, without success, it sought to obtain from
the respondent Court the relief it could not obtain from those
sources, and what can only be described as a deliberate attempt
to frustrate and obstruct implementation of the decision for its
closure as of June, 1989 openly solicited, by newspaper
advertisements or otherwise, enrollment of new and old
students.
Given these facts, and it being a matter of law that the Secretary
of Education, Culture and Sports exercises the power to enjoin
compliance with the requirements laid down for medical schools
and to mete out sanctions where he finds that violations thereof
have been committed, it was a grave abuse of discretion for the
respondent judge to issue the questioned injunction and thereby
thwart official action, in the premises correctly taken, allowing
the College to operate without the requisite government permit.
A single ocular inspection, done after the College had been pre-
warned thereof, did not, in the circumstances, warrant only the
findings of more qualified inspectors about the true state of the
College, its faculty, facilities, operations, etc. The, members of
the evaluating team came from the different sectors in the fields
of education and medicine, 14 and their judgment in this
particular area is certainly better than that of the respondent
Judge whose sole and only visit to the school could hardly have
given him much more to go on than a brief look at the physical
plant and facilities and into the conduct of the classes and other
school activities. Respondent Judge gravely abused his
discretion in substituting his judgment for theirs. It is well-
settled doctrine that courts of justice should not generally
interfere with purely administrative and discretionary functions;
that courts have no supervisory power over the proceedings and
actions of the administrative departments of the government;
involving the exercise of judgment and findings of facts,
because by reason of their special knowledge and expertise over
matters falling under their jurisdiction, the latter are in a better
position to pass judgment on such matters andn their findings of
facts in that regard are generally accorded respect, if not finality,
by the courts. 15 There are, to be sure, exceptions to this general
rule but none of them obtains in this case.
The, claim of denial of due process likewise holds no water, as
the record clearly shows that the College was given every
opportunity to so improve itself as to come up to requirements,
but remained sadly sub-standard after the inspections conducted
by the evaluating teams. It had, in fact, admitted its failure to
have up to the desired standards when it proposed its gradual
phase-out in its letter dated June 27, 1988 to Secretary
Quisumbing. It was also precisely because of its complaints of
bias and prejudice that the Board of Medical Education
dispatched new teams to survey and re-evaluate its performance.
It had even gone all the way up to the Office of the President to
seek a reversal of the order of closure. There is thus no reason
for it to complain of a lack of opportunity to be heard and to
explain its side as well as to seek reconsideration of the ruling
complained of.
There is also no merit in respondent College's argument that the
closure violated NMCS ORDER No. 5, Series of 1986, because
it was sought to be effected before the lapse of the three-year
period therein snowed, which in this case is sought to be counted
from June 18, 1988, or the date of the last evaluation. The,
provision referred to reads:
The following sanction shall be applied against any medical
school, for failure to comply with the specific requirements of
the essentials, viz.:
c. Withdrawal or cancellation of the school's government;
authority to operate, for failure to fully comply with the
prescribed requirements after three (3) years from the last
evaluation conducted on the school.
It must at once be obvious from a reading of the provision,
paragraph c, that the situation therein contemplated where a
school is found to have failed to "fully comply with the
prescribed requirements," i.e., has not complied with some
requirements and has failed to do so within three (3) years from
the last evaluation is quite distinct from that obtaining in the case
at bar where respondent school was found to have
deficiencies so serious as to warrant its immediate closure. Said
paragraph c should not be construed to prohibit absolutely the
withdrawal or cancellation of government; authority to operate
until after three (3) years from the last evaluation conducted on
the school; or, stated otherwise, it does not unexceptionally
prescribe a three-year waiting period before authority to operate
may be withdrawn. Rather, it should be read as giving the
Secretary of Education the discretion, depending on the
seriousness of the discovered deficiencies, to afford an
educational institution which has failed to comply with some
requirement or other, time not exceeding three (3) years to
correct the deficiencies before applying the sanction of
withdrawal or cancellation of the government; authority to
operate. The, circumstances in the case at bar are far from
nominal and, to repeat, are different from those obviously
envisioned by the paragraph in question. There had never been
a recommendation that the College be granted an opportunity to
comply with certain requirements. From the outset, the proposal
had been that it be forthwith closed, its discovered deficiencies
as a medical college being of so serious a character as to be
irremediable. The, other four (4) surveys were conducted, not to
determine if in the course of time the petitioner school had
already fully complied with all the prescribed requisites, but
rather, whether or not the original recommendation for its
closure was correct and should be sustained. And, as already
mentioned, the subsequent surveys, over a period of more than
three (3) years, served but to confirm the validity of that initial
proposal for its closure. Under these circumstances, therefore,
even if it be assumed that the provision, paragraph c, applied to
petitioner school, it must be held that there has been substantial
compliance therewith.
Having thus disposed of the issues raised by the facts of the case,
the Court sees no useful purpose to be served by remanding the
case to the Trial Court for further proceedings. The, only
acceptable reason for such a remand would be so that the Trial
Court may determine whether or not the petitioners' first have
acted within the scope of their powers or grossly abused them, a
matter that this Court has already passed upon here. Such a
remand cannot be justified on the theory that the Trial Court will
make its philosophy independent determination of whether or
not respondent medical institution has complied with the
minimum standards laid down for its continued operation, since,
as here ruled, it has not that power.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby
granted and the temporary restraining order issued by the Court
is made, permanent. The, questioned writ of preliminary
injunction dated May 10, 1989 is set aside and respondent Judge
is ordered to dismiss Civil Case No. 1385. SO ORDERED

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-25135 September 21, 1968

PHILIPPINE MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, petitioner,

vs.
BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS and JOSE MA.
TORRES, respondents.

Seva-Albert-Vergara and Julio V. Presbitero for petitioner.

Regino Hermosisima, Jr., for respondent Jose Ma. Torres.
Solicitor General for respondent Board of Medical Examiners.

CONCEPCION, C.J.:

Original action for certiorari and mandamus, against the Board

of Medical Examiners and Jose Ma. Torres, to annul a resolution
of the former and a certificate issued by the same authorizing the
latter to practice medicine in the Philippines without
examination.

The facts are not disputed. Jose Ma. Torres hereinafter

referred to as respondent is a Spanish subject and a member
of the Missionary Sons of the Immaculate Heart of Mary,
otherwise known as the Claretian Missionaries. Having
graduated from the University of Barcelona, Spain, with the
degree of Licentiate in Medicine and Surgery, he is entitled,
under the laws of Spain, to practice medicine and surgery
throughout the territory thereof.
On January 21, 1955, respondent was granted special authority
to practice medicine in Lamitan, Basilan City, where he resides,
pursuant to Section 771(e) of the Revised Administrative Code
reading:
SEC. 771. Persons exempt from registration. Registration
shall not be required of the following classes of persons: . . .
(e) In cases of epidemic or in municipalities where there is no
legally qualified practicing physician, or when the
circumstances require it, in the interest of the public health, the
Director of Health may issue special authorizations, to all
medical students who have completed the first three years of
their studies, or to persons who have qualified in medicine, and
to graduate or registered nurses, who may request it.
This authority was revoked, on November 8, 1960, by the then
Secretary of Health, upon the ground that "the conditions under
which it was granted no longer obtained in Lamitan Basilan
City, there being enough practising physicians in that locality."
Said officer restored the authority on December 19, 1960, to be
revoked again, on January 22, 1963. It was renewed once more,
on September 1, 1963, and, once again, it was revoked on
February 10, 1964, upon the recommendation of the Board of
Medical Examiners hereinafter referred to as the Board. On
motion for reconsideration filed by respondent, the Board
issued, on April 6, 1965, its Resolution No. 25, series of 1965,
which was approved by the President, granting respondent a
certificate to practice medicine in the Philippines without the
examination required in Republic Act No. 2882, otherwise
known as the Medical Act of 1959. The resolution relied
therefor upon The Treaty on the Validity of Academic Degrees
and The Exercise of the Professions between the Republic of the
Philippines and the Spanish State, signed at Manila on March 4,
1949, and ratified on May 19, 1949. 1
Petitioner herein, Philippine Medical Association, is a domestic
corporation. On June 14, 1965, it addressed the Chairman of the
Board a communication requesting reconsideration of said
resolution No. 25, upon the ground that, pursuant to said
Medical Act of 1959, respondent has to take and pass the
examination therein prescribed, before he can be allowed to
practice medicine in the Philippines. This letter was followed by
another, dated October 6, 1965, to which said Chairman replied
on October 8, 1965, stating "that the final decision on the matter
will have to come from the President of the Philippines upon
whose authority said resolution has been finally approved and
implemented."
Thereupon, or, on October 18, 1965, petitioner commenced the
present action, for the purpose stated at the beginning of this
decision, upon the theory that the Board had violated Republic
Act No. 2882 in granting respondent's certificate for the general
practice of medicine in the Philippines without the examination
prescribed in said Act; that the Board had exceeded its authority
in passing said Resolution, because of which the same is null
and void; that the Board should, therefore, be ordered to cancel
the certificate issued in pursuance of said resolution; and that
petitioner has no other plain, adequate and speedy remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
In their respective answers, respondents admit the basic facts,
but not the conclusions drawn therefrom by the petitioner and
allege that the resolution in question is sanctioned by the
provisions of the Treaty above referred to; that petitioner has no
cause of action; and that the petition should be dismissed for
failure of the petitioner to exhaust the available administrative
remedies.
Respondents cite the cases of Costas vs. Aldanese2 and Almario
vs. City Mayor 3 in support of the theory that petitioner herein
has no sufficient interest or "personality" to maintain the present
case. In the first case, it was held that the President of the
Association of Philippine (Marine) Engineers4 had no particular
"individual" interest, and, hence,no cause of action for
mandamus to compel the Collector of Customs to implement
section 1203(j) of the Administrative Code, providing that
steamers making round trips of more than 48 hours or travelling
at night shall carry the complement of marine engineers therein
specified. In the second case, a citizen of the Philippines, as
such, who is not an Applicant for any stall or booth, or the
representative of any such applicant, stallholder or any
association of persons who are deprived of the right to occupy
stalls in said market, "is not the real party in interest who has the
capacity, right or personality" to bring an action for mandamus,
to compel the office of Pasay City to comply with the provisions
of Republic Act No. 37, by ejecting, from the public market of
said City, stallholders who are not nationals of the Philippines.
Said cases are not in point. To begin with, both are actions for
mandamus, whereas the case at bar is mainly one for certiorari.
Although, petitioner herein, likewise, seeks a writ of mandamus,
directing the Board to cancel the certificate of registration issued
to the respondent, this would be a necessary consequence of the
writ of certiorari annulling the disputed resolution. Moreover,
said two (2) cases were commenced by individuals, who, as
such, had no special interest in the relief therein prayed for.
Indeed, in the Almario case it was intimated that the result might
have been otherwise had it been brought by an "association"
whose members have an interest in the subject matter of the
action.
This was confirmed by PHILCONSA vs. Gimenez,5 in which
we sustained the right of the Philippine Constitution Association
to assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 3836, insofar
as it allowed retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation
and sick leave to members of Congress and to elective officials
thereof. Further authority in favor of petitioner herein is supplied
by Nacionalista Party vs. F. Bautista Angelo 6 in which the
Nacionalista Party successfully impugned the validity of the
designation of the then Solicitor General as Acting Member of
the Commission on Elections.
It is our considered opinion that the view adopted in the last
three (3) cases should be maintained and that, in line therewith,
petitioner herein has sufficient interest to prosecute the case at
bar and a cause of action against respondents herein.
As regards their objection based upon petitioner's failure to
appeal to the President, suffice it to say that the rule requiring
exhaustion of administrative remedies is concededly subject to
exceptions, among which are cases involving only questions of
law or when jurisdiction is in issue7or the action complained of
bears the approval of a department secretary, as the disputed
resolution, which was approved by the Executive Secretary "by
authority of the President," or as an alter ego of the Executive. 8
The case at bar falls under these exceptions to said
rule.1awphl.nt
The main issue herein hinges on the interpretation of Article I of
the Treaty aforementioned, reading as follows:
The nationals of both countries who shall have obtained degrees
or diplomas to practice the liberal professions in either of the
Contracting States, issued by competent national authorities,
shall be deemed competent to exercise said professions in the
territory of the Other, subject to the laws and regulations of the
latter. When the degree or diploma of Bachelor, issued by
competent national authorities allows its holder without
requiring further evidence of proficiency to pursue normally
higher courses of study, he shall also be deemed qualified to
continue his studies in the territory of either Party in conformity
with the applicable laws and regulations of the State which
recognizes the validity of the title or diploma in question, and
with the rules and regulations of the particular educational
institution in which he intends to pursue his studies.
This Treaty provision was the subject matter of our resolution of
August 15, 1961, in connection with the petition of Arturo Efren
Garcia for admission to the Philippine Bar without taking the
Bar Examinations. After completing, in Spain, the course
prescribed therefor, Garcia had been graduated from the College
of Law of the Universidad Central de Madrid with the degree of
"Licenciado en Derecho", which entitled him to practice law in
Spain. Having invoked the provisions of said treaty in support
of his claim of exemption from the requisite bar examinations,
this Court denied his petition upon the ground, among others ".
. . that the privileges provided in the Treaty invoked by the
applicant are made expressly subject to the laws and regulations
of the contracting State in whose territory it is desired to exercise
the legal profession; and Section 1 of Rule 127, in connection
with Sections 2, 9, and 16 thereof, which have the force of law,
require that before anyone can practice the legal profession in
the Philippines he must first successfully pass the required bar
examinations; . . ."
We find no plausible reason to depart from this view. On the
contrary, we reiterate the same, inasmuch as the theory of
respondent herein cannot be accepted without placing graduates
from our own educational institutions at a disadvantage vis-a-
vis Spanish graduates from Spanish schools, colleges or
universities. Indeed, the latter could under respondent's
pretense engage in the practice of medicine in the Philippines
without taking the examination prescribed in Republic Act No.
2882, whereas the former would have to take and pass said
examination. Worse still, since as we ruled in the Garcia case
the benefits of the aforementioned Treaty cannot be availed
of in the Philippines except by Spanish subjects, the result would
be should respondent's contention be sustained that
graduates from Spanish schools of medicine would be entitled
to practice medicine in the Philippines without examination, if
they were Spanish subjects, but not if they are Filipinos.
Surely said treaty was not made to discriminate against
Philippine schools, colleges or universities, much less against
nationals of the Philippines.
WHEREFORE, we hold that said Treaty merely extended to
diplomas issued or degrees conferred by educational institutions
of Spain the same recognition and treatment that we accord to
similar diplomas or degrees from local institutions of learning;
that holders of said Spanish diplomas or degrees must take the
examination prescribed by our laws for holders of similar
diplomas or degrees from educational institutions in the
Philippines; that resolution No. 25, series of 1965, of respondent
Board is violative of Republic Act No. 2882 and hence, null and
void; and that, respondent Board of Medical Examiners should
be, as it is hereby ordered to cancel the certificate of registration,
for the practice of medicine in the Philippines, issued in favor of
respondent Jose Ma. Torres, without special pronouncement as
to costs. It is so ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro,
Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 78164 July 31, 1987
TERESITA TABLARIN, MA, LUZ CIRIACO, MA NIMFA B.
ROVIRA, EVANGELINA S. LABAO, in their behalf and in
behalf of applicants for admission into the Medical Colleges
during the school year 1987-88 and future years who have not
taken or successfully hurdled tile National Medical Admission
Test (NMAT). petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE JUDGE ANGELINA S. GUTIERREZ,
Presiding Judge of Branch XXXVII of the Regional Trial Court
of the National Capital Judicial Region with seat at Manila, THE
HONORABLE SECRETARY LOURDES QUISUMBING, in
her capacity as Chairman of the BOARD OF MEDICAL
EDUCATION, and THE CENTER FOR EDUCATIONAL
MEASUREMENT (CEM), respondents.
FELICIANO, J.:
The petitioners sought admission into colleges or schools of
medicine for the school year 1987-1988. However, the
petitioners either did not take or did not successfully take the
National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) required by the
Board of Medical Education, one of the public respondents, and
administered by the private respondent, the Center for
Educational Measurement (CEM).
On 5 March 1987, the petitioners filed with the Regional Trial
Court, National Capital Judicial Region, a Petition for
Declaratory Judgment and Prohibition with a prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. The
petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture
and Sports, the Board of Medical Education and the Center for
Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f)
of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No.
52, series of 1985, dated 23 August 1985 and from requiring the
taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing
certificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding with
accepting applications for taking the NMAT and from
administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in
the future. After hearing on the petition for issuance of
preliminary injunction, the trial court denied said petition on 20
April 1987. The NMAT was conducted and administered as
previously scheduled.
Petitioners accordingly filed this Special Civil Action for
certiorari with this Court to set aside the Order of the respondent
judge denying the petition for issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction.
Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 4224 and
5946, known as the "Medical Act of 1959" defines its basic
objectives in the following manner:
Section 1. Objectives. This Act provides for and shall govern
(a) the standardization and regulation of medical education (b)
the examination for registration of physicians; and (c) the
supervision, control and regulation of the practice of medicine
in the Philippines. (Underscoring supplied)
The statute, among other things, created a Board of Medical
Education which is composed of (a) the Secretary of Education,
Culture and Sports or his duly authorized representative, as
Chairman; (b) the Secretary of Health or his duly authorized
representative; (c) the Director of Higher Education or his duly
authorized representative; (d) the Chairman of the Medical
Board or his duly authorized representative; (e) a representative
of the Philippine Medical Association; (f) the Dean of the
College of Medicine, University of the Philippines; (g) a
representative of the Council of Deans of Philippine Medical
Schools; and (h) a representative of the Association of
Philippine Medical Colleges, as members. The functions of the
Board of Medical Education specified in Section 5 of the statute
include the following:
(a) To determine and prescribe equirements for admission
into a recognized college of medicine;
(b) To determine and prescribe requirements for minimum
physical facilities of colleges of medicine, to wit: buildings,
including hospitals, equipment and supplies, apparatus,
instruments, appliances, laboratories, bed capacity for
instruction purposes, operating and delivery rooms, facilities for
outpatient services, and others, used for didactic and practical
instruction in accordance with modern trends;
(c) To determine and prescribe the minimum number and
minimum qualifications of teaching personnel, including
student-teachers ratio;
(d) To determine and prescribe the minimum required
curriculum leading to the degree of Doctor of Medicine;
(e) To authorize the implementation of experimental medical
curriculum in a medical school that has exceptional faculty and
instrumental facilities. Such an experimental curriculum may
prescribe admission and graduation requirements other than
those prescribed in this Act; Provided, That only exceptional
students shall be enrolled in the experimental curriculum;
(f) To accept applications for certification for admission to a
medical school and keep a register of those issued said
certificate; and to collect from said applicants the amount of
twenty-five pesos each which shall accrue to the operating fund
of the Board of Medical Education;
(g) To select, determine and approve hospitals or some
departments of the hospitals for training which comply with the
minimum specific physical facilities as provided in
subparagraph (b) hereof; and
(h) To promulgate and prescribe and enforce the necessary rules
and regulations for the proper implementation of the foregoing
functions. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 7 prescribes certain minimum requirements for
applicants to medical schools:
Admission requirements. The medical college may admit any
student who has not been convicted by any court of competent
jurisdiction of any offense involving moral turpitude and who
presents (a) a record of completion of a bachelor's degree in
science or arts; (b) a certificate of eligibility for entrance to a
medical school from the Board of Medical Education; (c) a
certificate of good moral character issued by two former
professors in the college of liberal arts; and (d) birth certificate.
Nothing in this act shall be construed to inhibit any college of
medicine from establishing, in addition to the preceding, other
entrance requirements that may be deemed admissible.
xxx xxx x x x (Emphasis supplied)
MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, issued by the then Minister of
Education, Culture and Sports and dated 23 August 1985,
established a uniform admission test called the National Medical
Admission Test (NMAT) as an additional requirement for
issuance of a certificate of eligibility for admission into medical
schools of the Philippines, beginning with the school year 1986-
1987. This Order goes on to state that:
2. The NMAT, an aptitude test, is considered as an
instrument toward upgrading the selection of applicants for
admission into the medical schools and its calculated to improve
the quality of medical education in the country. The cutoff score
for the successful applicants, based on the scores on the NMAT,
shall be determined every year by the Board of Medical
Education after consultation with the Association of Philippine
Medical Colleges. The NMAT rating of each applicant, together
with the other admission requirements as presently called for
under existing rules, shall serve as a basis for the issuance of the
prescribed certificate of elegibility for admission into the
medical colleges.
3. Subject to the prior approval of the Board of Medical
Education, each medical college may give other tests for
applicants who have been issued a corresponding certificate of
eligibility for admission that will yield information on other
aspects of the applicant's personality to complement the
information derived from the NMAT.
xxx xxx xxx
8. No applicant shall be issued the requisite Certificate of
Eligibility for Admission (CEA), or admitted for enrollment as
first year student in any medical college, beginning the school
year, 1986-87, without the required NMAT qualification as
called for under this Order. (Underscoring supplied)
Pursuant to MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, the private respondent
Center conducted NMATs for entrance to medical colleges
during the school year 1986-1987. In December 1986 and in
April 1987, respondent Center conducted the NMATs for
admission to medical colleges during the school year
1987.1988.1avvphi1
Petitioners raise the question of whether or not a writ of
preliminary injunction may be issued to enjoin the enforcement
of Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended,
and MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, pending resolution of the issue
of constitutionality of the assailed statute and administrative
order. We regard this issue as entirely peripheral in nature. It
scarcely needs documentation that a court would issue a writ of
preliminary injunction only when the petitioner assailing a
statute or administrative order has made out a case of
unconstitutionality strong enough to overcome, in the mind of
the judge, the presumption of constitutionality, aside from
showing a clear legal right to the remedy sought. The
fundamental issue is of course the constitutionality of the statute
or order assailed.
1. The petitioners invoke a number of provisions of the 1987
Constitution which are, in their assertion, violated by the
continued implementation of Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic
Act 2381, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985. The
provisions invoked read as follows:
(a) Article 11, Section 11: "The state values the dignity of every
human person and guarantees full respect of human rights. "
(b) ArticleII, Section l3: "The State recognizes the vital role of
the youth in nation building and shall promote and protect their
physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual and social well being. It
shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and
encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs."
(c) Article II, Section 17: "The State shall give priority to
education, science and technology, arts, culture and sports to
foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress and
to promote total human liberation and development. "
(d) Article XIV, Section l: "The State shall protect and promote
the right of all citizens to quality education at all levels and take
appropriate steps to make such education accessible to all. "
(e) Article XIV, Section 5 (3): "Every citizen has a right to select
a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable and
equitable admission and academic requirements."
Article II of the 1987 Constitution sets forth in its second half
certain "State policies" which the government is enjoined to
pursue and promote. The petitioners here have not seriously
undertaken to demonstrate to what extent or in what manner the
statute and the administrative order they assail collide with the
State policies embodied in Sections 11, 13 and 17. They have
not, in other words, discharged the burden of proof which lies
upon them. This burden is heavy enough where the
constitutional provision invoked is relatively specific, rather
than abstract, in character and cast in behavioral or operational
terms. That burden of proof becomes of necessity heavier where
the constitutional provision invoked is cast, as the second
portion of Article II is cast, in language descriptive of basic
policies, or more precisely, of basic objectives of State policy
and therefore highly generalized in tenor. The petitioners have
not made their case, even a prima facie case, and we are not
compelled to speculate and to imagine how the legislation and
regulation impugned as unconstitutional could possibly offend
the constitutional provisions pointed to by the petitioners.
Turning to Article XIV, Section 1, of the 1987 Constitution, we
note that once more petitioners have failed to demonstrate that
the statute and regulation they assail in fact clash with that
provision. On the contrary we may note-in anticipation of
discussion infra that the statute and the regulation which
petitioners attack are in fact designed to promote "quality
education" at the level of professional schools. When one reads
Section 1 in relation to Section 5 (3) of Article XIV as one must
one cannot but note that the latter phrase of Section 1 is not to
be read with absolute literalness. The State is not really enjoined
to take appropriate steps to make quality education " accessible
to all who might for any number of reasons wish to enroll in a
professional school but rather merely to make such education
accessible to all who qualify under "fair, reasonable and
equitable admission and academic requirements. "
2. In the trial court, petitioners had made the argument that
Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended,
offend against the constitutional principle which forbids the
undue delegation of legislative power, by failing to establish the
necessary standard to be followed by the delegate, the Board of
Medical Education. The general principle of non-delegation of
legislative power, which both flows from the reinforces the more
fundamental rule of the separation and allocation of powers
among the three great departments of government,1 must be
applied with circumspection in respect of statutes which like the
Medical Act of 1959, deal with subjects as obviously complex
and technical as medical education and the practice of medicine
in our present day world. Mr. Justice Laurel stressed this point
47 years ago in Pangasinan Transportation Co., Inc. vs. The
Public Service Commission:2
One thing, however, is apparent in the development of the
principle of separation of powers and that is that the maxim of
delegatus non potest delegare or delegate potestas non potest
delegare, adopted this practice (Delegibus et Consuetudiniis
Anglia edited by G.E. Woodbine, Yale University Press, 1922,
Vol. 2, p. 167) but which is also recognized in principle in the
Roman Law (d. 17.18.3) has been made to adapt itself to the
complexities of modern government, giving rise to the adoption,
within certain limits of the principle of "subordinate legislation,"
not only in the United States and England but in practically all
modern governments. (People vs. Rosenthal and Osmena [68
Phil. 318, 1939]. Accordingly, with the growing complexity of
modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental
regulation and the increased difficulty of administering the laws,
there is a constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of
greater power by the legislature, and toward the approval of the
practice by the courts." 3
The standards set for subordinate legislation in the exercise of
rule making authority by an administrative agency like the
Board of Medical Education are necessarily broad and highly
abstract. As explained by then Mr. Justice Fernando in Edu v.
Ericta4
The standard may be either expressed or implied. If the former,
the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though
does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied
from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In
the Reflector Law, clearly the legislative objective is public
safety. What is sought to be attained as in Calalang v. Williams
is "safe transit upon the roads. 5
We believe and so hold that the necessary standards are set forth
in Section 1 of the 1959 Medical Act: "the standardization and
regulation of medical education" and in Section 5 (a) and 7 of
the same Act, the body of the statute itself, and that these
considered together are sufficient compliance with the
requirements of the non-delegation principle.
3. The petitioners also urge that the NMAT prescribed in MECS
Order No. 52, s. 1985, is an "unfair, unreasonable and
inequitable requirement," which results in a denial of due
process. Again, petitioners have failed to specify just what
factors or features of the NMAT render it "unfair" and
"unreasonable" or "inequitable." They appear to suggest that
passing the NMAT is an unnecessary requirement when added
on top of the admission requirements set out in Section 7 of the
Medical Act of 1959, and other admission requirements
established by internal regulations of the various medical
schools, public or private. Petitioners arguments thus appear to
relate to utility and wisdom or desirability of the NMAT
requirement. But constitutionality is essentially a question of
power or authority: this Court has neither commission or
competence to pass upon questions of the desirability or wisdom
or utility of legislation or administrative regulation. Those
questions must be address to the political departments of the
government not to the courts.
There is another reason why the petitioners' arguments must fail:
the legislative and administrative provisions impugned by them
constitute, to the mind of the Court, a valid exercise of the police
power of the state. The police power, it is commonplace
learning, is the pervasive and non-waivable power and authority
of the sovereign to secure and promote an the important interests
and needs in a word, the public order of the general
community.6 An important component of that public order is the
health and physical safety and well being of the population, the
securing of which no one can deny is a legitimate objective of
governmental effort and regulation.7
Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether
there is some reasonable relation between the prescribing of
passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to medical
school on the one hand, and the securing of the health and safety
of the general community, on the other hand. This question is
perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that the
regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long
been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health
and safety of the public.8 That the power to regulate and control
the practice of medicine includes the power to regulate
admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine,
is also well recognized. thus, legislation and administrative
regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicine first
to take and pass medical board examinations have long ago been
recognized as valid exercises of governmental power.9
Similarly, the establishment of minimum medical educational
requirements i.e., the completion of prescribed courses in a
recognized medical school for admission to the medical
profession, has also been sustained as a legitimate exercise of
the regulatory authority of the state.10 What we have before us
in the instant case is closely related: the regulation of access to
medical schools. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, as noted earlier,
articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the
improvement of the professional and technical quality of the
graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those
admitted to the student body of the medical schools. That
upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process of admission,
selectivity consisting, among other things, of limiting admission
to those who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for
medical studies and eventually for medical practice. The need to
maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in
our professional schools in general, and medical schools in
particular, in the current stage of our social and economic
development, are widely known.
We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an
admission test like the NMAT as a means for achieving its stated
objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our]
medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of medical
education in the country." Given the widespread use today of
such admission tests in, for instance, medical schools in the
United States of America (the Medical College Admission Test
[MCAT]11 and quite probably in other countries with far more
developed educational resources than our own, and taking into
account the failure or inability of the petitioners to even attempt
to prove otherwise, we are entitled to hold that the NMAT is
reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end of
legislation and regulation in this area. That end, it is useful to
recall, is the protection of the public from the potentially deadly
effects of incompetence and ignorance in those who would
undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or trauma.
4. Petitioners have contended, finally, that MECS Order No. 52,
s. 1985, is in conflict with the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. More specifically, petitioners assert that that
portion of the MECS Order which provides that
the cutoff score for the successful applicants, based on the scores
on the NMAT, shall be determined every-year by the Board of
Medical 11 Education after consultation with the Association of
Philippine Medical Colleges. (Emphasis supplied)
infringes the requirements of equal protection. They assert, in
other words, that students seeking admission during a given
school year, e.g., 1987-1988, when subjected to a different
cutoff score than that established for an, e.g., earlier school year,
are discriminated against and that this renders the MECS Order
"arbitrary and capricious." The force of this argument is more
apparent than real. Different cutoff scores for different school
years may be dictated by differing conditions obtaining during
those years. Thus, the appropriate cutoff score for a given year
may be a function of such factors as the number of students who
have reached the cutoff score established the preceding year; the
number of places available in medical schools during the current
year; the average score attained during the current year; the level
of difficulty of the test given during the current year, and so
forth. To establish a permanent and immutable cutoff score
regardless of changes in circumstances from year to year, may
wen result in an unreasonable rigidity. The above language in
MECS Order No. 52, far from being arbitrary or capricious,
leaves the Board of Medical Education with the measure of
flexibility needed to meet circumstances as they change.
We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain
minimum scores therein as a condition for admission to medical
schools in the Philippines, do not constitute an unconstitutional
imposition.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for certiorari is DISMISSED and
the Order of the respondent trial court denying the petition for a
writ of preliminary injunction is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera,
Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento THIRD DIVISION
and Cortes, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 166097 July 14, 2008

BOARD OF MEDICINE, DR. RAUL FLORES (now DR.

JOSE S. RAMIREZ), in his capacity as Chairman of the Board,
PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION, through its
Chairman, HERMOGENES POBRE (now DR. ALCESTIS M.
GUIANG), Petitioners,
vs.
YASUYUKI OTA, Respondent.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing

the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
849452 dated November 16, 2004 which affirmed the Decision3
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 22, Manila, dated
October 19, 2003.4

The facts are as follows:

Yasuyuki Ota (respondent) is a Japanese national, married to a

Filipina, who has continuously resided in the Philippines for
more than 10 years. He graduated from Bicol Christian College
of Medicine on April 21, 1991 with a degree of Doctor of
Medicine.5 After successfully completing a one-year post
graduate internship training at the Jose Reyes Memorial Medical
Center, he filed an application to take the medical board
examinations in order to obtain a medical license. He was
required by the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) to
submit an affidavit of undertaking, stating among others that
should he successfully pass the same, he would not practice
medicine until he submits proof that reciprocity exists between
Japan and the Philippines in admitting foreigners into the
practice of medicine.6

Respondent submitted a duly notarized English translation of the

Medical Practitioners Law of Japan duly authenticated by the
Consul General of the Philippine Embassy to Japan, Jesus I.
Yabes;7 thus, he was allowed to take the Medical Board
Examinations in August 1992, which he subsequently passed.8

In spite of all these, the Board of Medicine (Board) of the PRC,

in a letter dated March 8, 1993, denied respondent's request for
a license to

practice medicine in the Philippines on the ground that the Board

"believes that no genuine reciprocity can be found in the law of
Japan as there is no Filipino or foreigner who can possibly
practice there."9

Respondent then filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus

against the Board before the RTC of Manila on June 24, 1993,
which petition was amended on February 14, 1994 to implead
the PRC through its Chairman.10

In his petition before the RTC, respondent alleged that the Board
and the PRC, in refusing to issue in his favor a Certificate of
Registration and/or license to practice medicine, had acted
Republic of the Philippines arbitrarily, in clear contravention of the provision of Section 20
SUPREME COURT of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 2382 (The Medical Act of 1959),
Manila
depriving him of his legitimate right to practice his profession
in the Philippines to his great damage and prejudice.11
On October 19, 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision finding that
respondent had adequately proved that the medical laws of
Japan allow foreigners like Filipinos to be granted license and
be admitted into the practice of medicine under the principle of
reciprocity; and that the Board had a ministerial duty of issuing
the Certificate of Registration and license to respondent, as it
was shown that he had substantially complied with the
requirements under the law.12 The RTC then ordered the Board
to issue in favor of respondent the corresponding Certificate of
Registration and/or license to practice medicine in the
Philippines.13
The Board and the PRC (petitioners) appealed the case to the
CA, stating that while respondent submitted documents showing
that foreigners are allowed to practice medicine in Japan, it was
not shown that the conditions for the practice of medicine there
are practical and attainable by a foreign applicant, hence,
reciprocity was not established; also, the power of the PRC and
the Board to regulate and control the practice of medicine is
discretionary and not ministerial, hence, not compellable by a
writ of mandamus.14
The CA denied the appeal and affirmed the ruling of the RTC.15
Hence, herein petition raising the following issue:
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FINDING THAT RESPONDENT
HAD ESTABLISHED THE EXISTENCE OF RECIPROCITY
IN THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE BETWEEN THE
PHILIPPINES AND JAPAN.16
Petitioners claim that: respondent has not established by
competent and conclusive evidence that reciprocity in the
practice of medicine exists between the Philippines and Japan.
While documents state that foreigners are allowed to practice
medicine in Japan, they do not similarly show that the conditions
for the practice of medicine in said country are practical and
attainable by a foreign applicant. There is no reciprocity in this
case, as the requirements to practice medicine in Japan are
practically impossible for a Filipino to comply with. There are
also ambiguities in the Medical Practitioners Law of Japan,
which were not clarified by respondent, i.e., what are the
provisions of the School Educations Laws, what are the criteria
of the Minister of Health and Welfare of Japan in determining
whether the academic and technical capability of foreign
medical graduates are the same or better than graduates of
medical schools in Japan, and who can actually qualify to take
the preparatory test for the National Medical Examination.
Consul General Yabes also stated that there had not been a single
Filipino who was issued a license to practice medicine by the
Japanese Government. The publication showing that there were
foreigners practicing medicine in Japan, which respondent
presented before the Court, also did not specifically show that
Filipinos were among those listed as practicing said
profession.17 Furthermore, under Professional Regulation
Commission v. De Guzman,18 the power of the PRC and the
Board to regulate and control the practice of medicine includes
the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized
to practice medicine, which power is discretionary and not
ministerial, hence, not compellable by a writ of mandamus.19
Petitioners pray that the CA Decision dated November 16, 2004
be reversed and set aside, that a new one be rendered reinstating
the Board Order dated March 8, 1993 which disallows
respondent to practice medicine in the Philippines, and that
respondent's petition before the trial court be dismissed for lack
of merit.20
In his Comment, respondent argues that: Articles 2 and 11 of the
Medical Practitioners Law of Japan and Section 9 of the
Philippine Medical Act of 1959 show that reciprocity exists
between the Philippines and Japan concerning the practice of
medicine. Said laws clearly state that both countries allow
foreigners to practice medicine in their respective jurisdictions
as long as the applicant meets the educational requirements,
training or residency in hospitals and pass the licensure
examination given by either country. Consul General Yabes in
his letter dated January 28, 1992 stated that "the Japanese
Government allows a foreigner to practice medicine in Japan
after complying with the local requirements." The fact that there
is no reported Filipino who has successfully penetrated the
medical practice in Japan does not mean that there is no
reciprocity between the two countries, since it does not follow
that no Filipino will ever be granted a medical license by the
Japanese Government. It is not the essence of reciprocity that
before a citizen of one of the contracting countries can demand
its application, it is necessary that the interested citizens
country has previously granted the same privilege to the citizens
of the other contracting country.21 Respondent further argues
that Section 20 of the Medical Act of 195922 indicates the
mandatory character of the statute and an imperative obligation
on the part of the Board inconsistent with the idea of discretion.
Thus, a foreigner, just like a Filipino citizen, who successfully
passes the examination and has all the qualifications and none
of the disqualifications, is entitled as a matter of right to the
issuance of a certificate of registration or a physicians license,
which right is enforceable by mandamus.23
Petitioners filed a Reply24 and both parties filed their respective
memoranda25 reiterating their arguments.1avvphi1
The Court denies the petition for lack of merit.
There is no question that a license to practice medicine is a
privilege or franchise granted by the government.26 It is a right
that is earned through years of education and training, and which
requires that one must first secure a license from the state
through professional board examinations.27
Indeed,
[T]he regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches
has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting
the health and safety of the public. That the power to regulate
and control the practice of medicine includes the power to
regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice
medicine, is also well recognized. Thus, legislation and
administrative regulations requiring those who wish to practice
medicine first to take and pass medical board examinations have
long ago been recognized as valid exercises of governmental
power. Similarly, the establishment of minimum medical
educational requirements i.e., the completion of prescribed
courses in a recognized medical school for admission to the
medical profession, has also been sustained as a legitimate
exercise of the regulatory authority of the state."28
It must be stressed however that the power to regulate the
exercise of a profession or pursuit of an occupation cannot be
exercised by the State or its agents in an arbitrary, despotic, or
oppressive manner. A political body which regulates the
exercise of a particular privilege has the authority to both forbid
and grant such privilege in accordance with certain conditions.
As the legislature cannot validly bestow an arbitrary power to
grant or refuse a license on a public agency or officer, courts will
generally strike down license legislation that vests in public
officials discretion to grant or refuse a license to carry on some
ordinarily lawful business, profession, or activity without
prescribing definite rules and conditions for the guidance of said
officials in the exercise of their power.29
R.A. No. 2382 otherwise known as the Medical Act of 1959
states in Section 9 thereof that:
Section 9. Candidates for Board Examinations.- Candidates for
Board examinations shall have the following qualifications:
1. He shall be a citizen of the Philippines or a citizen of any
foreign country who has submitted competent and conclusive
documentary evidence, confirmed by the Department of Foreign
Affairs, showing that his countrys existing laws permit citizens
of the Philippines to practice medicine under the same rules and
regulations governing citizens thereof;
xxxx
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 22330 also provides in Section
(j) thereof that:
j) The [Professional Regulation] Commission may, upon the
recommendation of the Board concerned, approve the
registration of and authorize the issuance of a certificate of
registration with or without examination to a foreigner who is
registered under the laws of his country: Provided, That the
requirement for the registration or licensing in said foreign state
or country are substantially the same as those required and
contemplated by the laws of the Philippines and that the laws of
such foreign state or country allow the citizens of the Philippines
to practice the profession on the same basis and grant the same
privileges as the subject or citizens of such foreign state or
country: Provided, finally, That the applicant shall submit
competent and conclusive documentary evidence, confirmed by
the Department of Foreign Affairs, showing that his country's
existing laws permit citizens of the Philippines to practice the
profession under the rules and regulations governing citizens
thereof. The Commission is also hereby authorized to prescribe
additional requirements or grant certain privileges to foreigners
seeking registration in the Philippines if the same privileges are
granted to or some additional requirements are required of
citizens of the Philippines in acquiring the same certificates in
his country;
xxxx
As required by the said laws, respondent submitted a copy of the
Medical Practitioners Law of Japan, duly authenticated by the
Consul General of the Embassy of the Philippines in Japan,
which provides in Articles 2 and 11, thus:
Article 2. Anyone who wants to be medical practitioner must
pass the national examination for medical practitioner and get
license from the Minister of Health and Welfare.
xxxx
Article 11. No one can take the National Medical Examination
except persons who conform to one of the following items:
1. Persons who finished regular medical courses at a university
based on the School Education Laws (December 26, 1947) and
graduated from said university.
2. Persons who passed the preparatory test for the National
Medical Examination and practiced clinics and public sanitation
more than one year after passing the said test.
3. Persons who graduated from a foreign medical school or
acquired medical practitioner license in a foreign country, and
also are recognized to have the same or more academic ability
and techniques as persons stated in item 1 and item 2 of this
article.31
Petitioners argue that while the Medical Practitioners Law of
Japan allows foreigners to practice medicine therein, said
document does not show that conditions for the practice of
medicine in said country are practical and attainable by a foreign
applicant; and since the requirements are practically impossible
for a Filipino to comply with, there is no reciprocity between the
two countries, hence, respondent may not be granted license to
practice medicine in the Philippines.
The Court does not agree.
R.A. No. 2382, which provides who may be candidates for the
medical board examinations, merely requires a foreign citizen to
submit competent and conclusive documentary evidence,
confirmed by the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA),
showing that his countrys existing laws permit citizens of the
Philippines to practice medicine under the same rules and
regulations governing citizens thereof.
Section (j) of P.D. No. 223 also defines the extent of PRC's
power to grant licenses, i.e., it may, upon recommendation of
the board, approve the registration and authorize the issuance of
a certificate of registration with or without examination to a
foreigner who is registered under the laws of his country,
provided the following conditions are met: (1) that the
requirement for the registration or licensing in said foreign state
or country are substantially the same as those required and
contemplated by the laws of the Philippines; (2) that the laws of
such foreign state or country allow the citizens of the Philippines
to practice the profession on the same basis and grant the same
privileges as the subject or citizens of such foreign state or
country; and (3) that the applicant shall submit competent and
conclusive documentary evidence, confirmed by the DFA,
showing that his country's existing laws permit citizens of the
Philippines to practice the profession under the rules and
regulations governing citizens thereof.
The said provision further states that the PRC is authorized to
prescribe additional requirements or grant certain privileges to
foreigners seeking registration in the Philippines if the same
privileges are granted to or some additional requirements are
required of citizens of the Philippines in acquiring the same
certificates in his country.
Nowhere in said statutes is it stated that the foreign applicant
must show that the conditions for the practice of medicine in
said country are practical and attainable by Filipinos. Neither is
it stated that it must first be proven that a Filipino has been
granted license and allowed to practice his profession in said
country before a foreign applicant may be given license to
practice in the Philippines. Indeed, the phrase used in both R.A.
No. 2382 and P.D. No. 223 is that:
[T]he applicant shall submit] competent and conclusive
documentary evidence, confirmed by the Department of Foreign
Affairs, showing that his country's existing laws permit citizens
of the Philippines to practice the profession [of medicine] under
the [same] rules and regulations governing citizens thereof. x x
x (Emphasis supplied)
It is enough that the laws in the foreign country permit a Filipino
to get license and practice therein. Requiring respondent to
prove first that a Filipino has already been granted license and
is actually practicing therein unduly expands the requirements
provided for under R.A. No. 2382 and P.D. No. 223.
While it is true that respondent failed to give details as to the
conditions stated in the Medical Practitioners Law of Japan --
i.e., the provisions of the School Educations Laws, the criteria
of the Minister of Health and Welfare of Japan in determining
whether the academic and technical capability of foreign
medical graduates are the same as or better than that of graduates
of medical schools in Japan, and who can actually qualify to take
the preparatory test for the National Medical Examination
respondent, however, presented proof that foreigners are
actually practicing in Japan and that Filipinos are not precluded
from getting a license to practice there.
Respondent presented before the trial court a Japanese
Government publication, Physician-Dentist-Pharmaceutist
Survey, showing that there are a number of foreign physicians
practicing medicine in Japan.32 He also presented a letter dated
January 28, 1992 from Consul General Yabes,33 which states:
Sir:
With reference to your letter dated 12 January 1993, concerning
your request for a Certificate of Confirmation for the purpose of
establishing a reciprocity with Japan in the practice of medical
profession relative to the case of Mr. Yasuyuki Ota, a Japanese
national, the Embassy wishes to inform you that inquiries from
the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Health and
Welfare as well as Bureau of Immigration yielded the following
information:
1. They are not aware of a Filipino physician who was granted a
license by the Japanese Government to practice medicine in
Japan;
2. However, the Japanese Government allows a foreigner to
practice medicine in Japan after complying with the local
requirements such as holding a valid visa for the purpose of
taking the medical board exam, checking the applicant's
qualifications to take the examination, taking the national board
examination in Japanese and filing an application for the
issuance of the medical license.
Accordingly, the Embassy is not aware of a single Filipino
physician who was issued by the Japanese Government a license
to practice medicine, because it is extremely difficult to pass the
medical board examination in the Japanese language. Filipino
doctors here are only allowed to work in Japanese hospitals as
trainees under the supervision of a Japanese doctor. On certain
occasions, they are allowed to show their medical skills during
seminars for demonstration purposes only. (Emphasis supplied)
Very truly yours,
Jesus I. Yabes
Minister Counsellor &
Consul General
From said letter, one can see that the Japanese Government
allows foreigners to practice medicine therein provided that the
local requirements are complied with, and that it is not the
impossibility or the prohibition against Filipinos that would
account for the absence of Filipino physicians holding licenses
and practicing medicine in Japan, but the difficulty of passing
the board examination in the Japanese language. Granting that
there is still no Filipino who has been given license to practice
medicine in Japan, it does not mean that no Filipino will ever be
able to be given one.
Petitioners next argue that as held in De Guzman, its power to
issue licenses is discretionary, hence, not compellable by
mandamus.
The Court finds that the factual circumstances of De Guzman
are different from those of the case at bar; hence, the principle
applied therein should be viewed differently in this case. In De
Guzman, there were doubts about the integrity and validity of
the test results of the examinees from a particular school which
garnered unusually high scores in the two most difficult
subjects. Said doubts called for serious inquiry concerning the
applicants satisfactory compliance with the Board
requirements.34 And as there was no definite showing that the
requirements and conditions to be granted license to practice
medicine had been satisfactorily met, the Court held that the writ
of mandamus may not be granted to secure said privilege
without thwarting the legislative will.35
Indeed, to be granted the privilege to practice medicine, the
applicant must show that he possesses all the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications. It must also appear that he has fully
complied with all the conditions and requirements imposed by
the law and the licensing authority.36
In De Guzman itself, the Court explained that:
A careful reading of Section 2037 of the Medical Act of 1959
discloses that the law uses the word "shall" with respect to the
issuance of certificates of registration. Thus, the petitioners
[PRC] "shall sign and issue certificates of registration to those
who have satisfactorily complied with the requirements of the
Board." In statutory construction the term "shall" is a word of
command. It is given imperative meaning. Thus, when an
examinee satisfies the requirements for the grant of his
physician's license, the Board is obliged to administer to him his
oath and register him as a physician, pursuant to Section 20 and
par. (1) of Section 22 of the Medical Act of 1959.38
In this case, there is no doubt as to the competence and
qualifications of respondent. He finished his medical degree
from Bicol Christian College of Medicine. He completed a one-
year post graduate internship training at the Jose Reyes
Memorial Medical Center, a government hospital. Then he
passed the Medical Board Examinations which was given on
August 8, 1992 with a general average of 81.83, with scores
higher than 80 in 9 of the 12 subjects.
In fine, the only matter being questioned by petitioners is the
alleged failure of respondent to prove that there is reciprocity
between the laws of Japan and the Philippines in admitting
foreigners into the practice of medicine. Respondent has
satisfactorily complied with the said requirement and the CA has
not committed any reversible error in rendering its Decision
dated November 16, 2004 and Resolution dated October 19,
2003.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of

merit.

SO ORDERED.