1. Alvarez vs IAC and Yanes
18 Thereafter, the court required Rodolfo Siason to
Facts:
Aniceto left his children Lots 773 and 823. Teodora cultivated only three hectares of
Lot 823 as she could not attend to the other portions of the two lots. The record
does not show whether the children of Felipe also cultivated some portions of the
lots but it is established that Rufino and his children left the province to settle in
other places as a result of the outbreak of World War II. According to Estelita, from
the "Japanese time up to peace time", they did not visit the parcels of land in
question but "after liberation", when her brother went there to get their share of
the sugar produced therein, he was informed that Fortunato Santiago,
Fuentebella (Puentevella) and Alvarez were in possession of Lot 773. 2
It is on record that on May 19, 1938, Fortunato D. Santiago was issued Transfer
Certificate of Title covering Lot 773-A and Lot 773-B. On May 30, 1955, Santiago
sold Lots 773-A and 773-B to Monico B. Fuentebella, Jr and consequently, TCTs
were issued in Fuentebella's name. 6 After Fuentebella's death and during the
settlement of his estate, the administratrix thereof (Arsenia R. Vda. de Fuentebella,
his wife) filed a motion requesting authority to sell Lots 773-A and 773-B to
Rosendo Alvarez. 9 Hence, it were respectively issued to Rosendo Alvarez. 10
Two years later or on May 26, 1960, Teodora Yanes and the children of her
brother Rufino, namely, Estelita, Iluminado and Jesus, filed in the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental a complaint against Fortunato Santiago, Arsenia
Vda. de Fuentebella, Alvarez and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental for
the "return" of the ownership and possession of Lots 773 and 823. During the
pendency in court of said case, Alvarez sold the said lot to Dr. Rodolfo Siasion.
Accordingly, TCT Nos. 30919 and 30920 were issued to Siason, 13who thereafter,
declared the two lots in his name for assessment purposes
It will be noted that the above-mentioned manifestation of Jesus Yanes was not
mentioned in the aforesaid decision.
However, execution of said decision proved unsuccessful with respect to Lot 773. In
his return of service dated October 20, 1965, the sheriff stated that he discovered
that Lot 773 had been subdivided into Lots 773-A and 773-B; that they were "in the
name" of Rodolfo Siason who had purchased them from Alvarez, and that Lot 773
could not be delivered to the plaintiffs as Siason was "not a party per writ of
execution." 17 The execution of the decision in Civil Case No. 5022 having met a
hindrance, herein private respondents (the Yaneses) filed on July 31, 1965, in the
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental a petition for the issuance of a new
certificate of title and for a declaration of nullity of TCT Nos. T-23165 and T-23166
issued to Rosendo Alvarez.
produce the certificates of title covering Lots 773 and 823.
Expectedly, Siason filed a manifestation stating that he purchased Lots 773-A, 773-B
and 658, not Lots 773 and 823, "in good faith and for a valuable consideration
without any knowledge of any lien or encumbrances against said properties"; that
the decision in the cadastral proceeding 19 could not be enforced against him as he
was not a party thereto; and it has long become final and executory. The cadastral
court nullified its previous order requiring Siason to surrender the certificates of
title mentioned therein. 21
In 1968, the Yaneses filed an ex-parte motion for the issuance of an alias writ of
execution in Civil Case No. 5022. Siason opposed it. 22 In its order of September 28,
1968 in Civil Case No. 5022, the lower court, noting that the Yaneses had instituted
another action for the recovery of the land in question, ruled that at the judgment
therein could not be enforced against Siason as he was not a party in the case. 23
The CFI held that the defendants, Laura, Flora and Raymundo, are hereby ordered
to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs the sum of P20,000.00 representing the
actual value of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of Murcia Cadastre, Negros Occidental;
the sum of P2,000.00 as actual damages suffered by the plaintiff; the sum of
P5,000.00 representing moral damages and the sum of P2.000 as attorney's fees, all
with legal rate of interest from date of the filing of this complaint up to final
payment.
The Alvarez appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court which in its decision
of August 31, 1983 30 affirmed the lower court's decision "insofar as it ordered
defendants-appellants to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs-appellees the sum
of P20,000.00 representing the actual value of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of the
cadastral survey of Murcia, Negros Occidental, and is reversed insofar as it awarded
the sums of P2,000.00, P5,000.00 and P2,000.00 as actual damages, moral damages
and attorney's fees, respectively. Finding no cogent reason to grant appellants
motion for reconsideration, said appellate court denied the same.
Hence, the instant petition. Petitioners further contend that the liability arising
from the sale of Lots No. 773-A and 773-B made by Rosendo Alvarez to Dr. Rodolfo
Siason should be the sole liability of the late Rosendo Alvarez or of his estate, after
his death.
Issue:
WON the liability or liabilities of Rosendo Alvarez arising from the sale of Lots Nos.
773-A and 773-B of Murcia Cadastre to Dr. Rodolfo Siason, if ever there is any, could
Wills and Succession Case Digest 17-18 - Atty. Castillo-Taleon | MATEO
be legally passed or transmitted by operations (sic) of law to the petitioners without
violation of law and due process
Held:
Yes. According to the Civil Code state:
Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights
and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are
transmitted through his death to another or others either by his will or by operation
of law.
Art. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a
person which are not extinguished by his death.
Art. 1311. Contract stake effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs
except in case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not
transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law. The heir is not
liable beyond the value of the property received from the decedent.
Petitioners being the heirs of the late Rosendo Alvarez, they cannot escape the legal
consequences of their father's transaction, which gave rise to the present claim for
damages. That petitioners did not inherit the property involved herein is of no
moment because by legal fiction, the monetary equivalent thereof devolved into
the mass of their father's hereditary estate, and we have ruled that the hereditary
assets are always liable in their totality for the payment of the debts of the estate. It
must, however, be made clear that petitioners are liable only to the extent of the
value of their inheritance.
2. Gevero vs IAC
Facts:
The parcel of land under litigation is Lot No. 2476 situated at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro
City. Said lot was acquired by DELCOR purchase from the late Luis Lancero Luis
Lancero, in turn acquired the same parcel from Ricardo Gevero on February 5, 1952
per deed of sale executed by Ricardo Gevero which was duly annotated as entry No.
1128 at the back of Original Certificate of Title No. 7610 covering the mother lot
identified as Lot No. 2476 in the names of Teodorica Babangha 1/2 share and her
children: Maria; Restituto, Elena, Ricardo, Eustaquio and Ursula, all surnamed
surnamed Gevero, 1/2 undivided share of the whole area containing 48,122 square
meters.
Teodorica Babangha died long before World War II and was survived by her six
children aforementioned. The heirs of Teodorica Babangha on October 17,1966
executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement and Partition of the estate of Teodorica
Babangha, consisting of two lots, among them was lot 2476. By virtue of the extra-
judicial settlement and partition executed by the said heirs of Teodorica Babangha,
Lot 2476-A to Lot 2476-I, inclusive, under subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-80450 duly
approved by the Land Registration Commission, Lot 2476-D, among others, was
adjudicated to Ricardo Gevero who was then alive at the time of extra-judicial
settlement and partition in 1966. DELCOR filed an action with the CFI (now RTC) of
Misamis Oriental to quiet title and/or annul the partition made by the heirs of
Teodorica Babangha insofar as the same prejudices the land which it acquired a
portion of lot 2476. Plaintiff claims to have bought the land in good faith and for
value, occupying the land since the sale and taking over from Lancero's possession
until May 1969, when the defendants Abadas forcibly entered the property.
RTC held declaring the plaintiff corporation as the true and absolute owner of that
portion of Lot No. 2476 of the Cagayan Cadastre, particularly Lot No. 2476-D of the
subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-80450, containing an area of SEVEN THOUSAND EIGHT
HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT (7,878) square meters, more or less. The other portions
of Lot No. 2476 are hereby adjudicated to the heirs of Gevero.
From said decision, defendant heirs of Ricardo Gevero (petitioners herein) appealed
to the IAC (now Court of Appeals) which subsequently, on March 20, 1986, affirmed
the decision appealed from.
Petitioners, on March 31, 1986, filed a motion for reconsideration (Rollo, p. 28) but
was denied on April 21, 1986.
Hence, the present petition.
Issue: whether or not the 1/2 share of interest of Teodorica Babangha in one of the
litigated lots, lot no. 2476 under OCT No. 7610 is included in the deed of sale
Held:
Yes. The hereditary share in a decedents' estate is transmitted or vested
immediately from the moment of the death of the "causante" or predecessor in
interest (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 777), and there is no legal bar to a
successor (with requisite contracting capacity) disposing of his hereditary share
immediately after such death, even if the actual extent of such share is not
determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate (De Borja v. Vda. de
Borja, 46 SCRA 577 [1972]).
Wills and Succession Case Digest 17-18 - Atty. Castillo-Taleon | MATEO
Teodorica Babangha died long before World War II, hence, the rights to the
succession were transmitted from the moment of her death. It is therefore
incorrect to state that it was only in 1966, the date of extrajudicial partition, when
Ricardo received his share in the lot as inheritance from his mother Teodorica. Thus,
when Ricardo sold his share over lot 2476 that share which he inherited from
Teodorica was also included unless expressly excluded in the deed of sale.
3. Locsin v CA
Facts:
The late Getulio Locsin had three children named Mariano, Julian and Magdalena,
all surnamed Locsin. He owned extensive residential and agricultural properties in
the provinces of Albay and Sorsogon. After his death, his estate was divided among
his three (3) children. Eventually, the properties of Mariano and Catalina were
brought under the Torrens System. Those that Mariano inherited from his father,
Getulio Locsin, were surveyed cadastrally and registered in the name of "Mariano
Locsin, married to Catalina Jaucian.'' 2
Mariano Locsin executed a Last Will and Testament instituting his wife, Catalina, as
the sole and universal heir of all his properties. 3 The will was drawn up by his wife's
nephew and trusted legal adviser, Attorney Salvador Lorayes. Attorney Lorayes
disclosed that the spouses being childless, they had agreed that their properties,
after both of them shall have died should revert to their respective sides of the
family, i.e., Mariano's properties would go to his "Locsin relatives" (i.e., brothers
and sisters or nephews and nieces), and those of Catalina to her "Jaucian
relatives." 4
Don Mariano Locsin died of cancer on September 14, 1948 after a lingering illness.
In due time, his will was probated in Special Proceedings No. 138, CFI of Albay
without any opposition from both sides of the family. As directed in his will, Doa
Catalina was appointed executrix of his estate. Her lawyer in the probate
proceeding was Attorney Lorayes. In the inventory of her husband's estate 5 which
she submitted to the probate court for approval, 6 Catalina declared that "all items
mentioned from Nos. 1 to 33 are the private properties of the deceased and form
part of his capital at the time of the marriage with the surviving spouse, while items
Nos. 34 to 42 are conjugal." 7
Don Mariano relied on Doa Catalina to carry out the terms of their compact,
hence, nine (9) years after his death, as if in obedience to his voice from the grave,
and fully cognizant that she was also advancing in years, Doa Catalina began
transferring, by sale, donation or assignment, Don Mariano's as well as her own,
properties to their respective nephews and nieces.
Doa Catalina died on July 6, 1977.
Four years before her death, she had made a will on October 22, 1973 affirming and
ratifying the transfers she had made during her lifetime in favor of her husband's,
and her own, relatives. After the reading of her will, all the relatives agreed that
there was no need to submit it to the court for probate because the properties
devised to them under the will had already been conveyed to them by the deceased
when she was still alive, except some legacies which the executor of her will or
estate, Attorney Salvador Lorayes, proceeded to distribute.
In 1989, or six (6) years after Doa Catalina's demise, some of her Jaucian nephews
and nieces who had already received their legacies and hereditary shares from her
estate, filed action in the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City (Branch VIII, Civil Case
No. 7152) to recover the properties which she had conveyed to the Locsins during
her lifetime, alleging that the conveyances were inofficious, without consideration,
and intended solely to circumvent the laws on succession. Those who were closest
to Doa Catalina did not join the action.
After the trial, judgment was rendered on July 8, l985 in favor of the plaintiffs
(Jaucian), and against the Locsin defendants declaring the, plaintiffs, except the
heirs of Josefina J. Borja and Eduardo Jaucian, who withdrew, the rightful heirs and
entitled to the entire estate, in equal portions, of Catalina Jaucian Vda. de Locsin,
being the nearest collateral heirs by right of representation of Juan and Gregorio,
both surnamed Jaucian, and full-blood brothers of Catalina; (2) declaring the deeds
of sale, donations, reconveyance and exchange and all other instruments conveying
any part of the estate of Catalina J. Vda. de Locsin including, but not limited to
those in the inventory of known properties (Annex B of the complaint) as null and
void ab-initio;
The Locsins appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. CV-11186) which
rendered its now appealed judgment on March 14, 1989, affirming the trial court's
decision.
Issue:
WON the private respondents were entitled to inherit the properties which she had
already disposed of more than ten (10) years before her death.
Held:
Wills and Succession Case Digest 17-18 - Atty. Castillo-Taleon | MATEO
No. the private respondents, nephews and nieces of Doa Catalina J. Vda. de Locsin,
are not entitled to inherit the properties which she had already disposed of more
than ten (10) years before her death. For those properties did not form part of her
hereditary estate, i.e., "the property and transmissible rights and
obligations existing at the time of (the decedent's) death and those which have
accrued thereto since the opening of the succession." 10 The rights to a person's
succession are transmitted from the moment of his death, and do not vest in his
heirs until such time.11 Property which Doa Catalina had transferred or conveyed
to other persons during her lifetime no longer formed part of her estate at the time
of her death to which her heirs may lay claim. Had she died intestate, only the
property that remained in her estate at the time of her death devolved to her legal
heirs; and even if those transfers were, one and all, treated as donations, the right
arising under certain circumstances to impugn and compel the reduction or
revocation of a decedent's gifts inter vivos does not inure to the respondents since
neither they nor the donees are compulsory (or forced) heirs. 12
There is thus no basis for assuming an intention on the part of Doa Catalina, in
transferring the properties she had received from her late husband to his nephews
and nieces, an intent to circumvent the law in violation of the private respondents'
rights to her succession. Said respondents are not her compulsory heirs, and it is
not pretended that she had any such, hence there were no legitimes that could
conceivably be impaired by any transfer of her property during her lifetime. All that
the respondents had was an expectancy that in nowise restricted her freedom to
dispose of even her entire estate subject only to the limitation set forth in Art.
750, Civil Code which, even if it were breached, the respondents may not invoke:
Art. 750. The donation may comprehend all the present property of the donor or
part thereof, provided he reserves, in full ownership or in usufruct, sufficient
means for the support of himself, and of all relatives who, at the time of the
acceptance of the donation, are by law entitled to be supported by the donor.
Without such reservation, the donation shall be reduced on petition of any person
affected. (634a)
4. Opulencia vs CA
Facts:
In a complaint for specific performance filed with the court a quo [herein private
respondents] Aladin Simundac and Miguel Oliven alleged that [herein petitioner]
Natalia Carpena Opulencia executed in their favor a CONTRACT TO SELL Lot 2125 of
the Sta. Rosa Estatethat plaintiffs paid a downpayment of P300,000.00 but
defendant, despite demands, failed to comply with her obligations under the
contract. [Private respondents] therefore prayed that [petitioner] be ordered to
perform her contractual obligations and to further pay damages, attorneys fee and
litigation expenses.
In her traverse, [petitioner] admitted the execution of the contract in favor of
plaintiffs and receipt of P300,000.00 as downpayment. However, she put forward
the following affirmative defenses: that the property subject of the contract formed
part of the Estate of Demetrio Carpena (petitioners father), in respect of which a
petition for probate was filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Bian, Laguna;
that at the time the contract was executed, the parties were aware of the pendency
of the probate proceeding; that the contract to sell was not approved by the
probate court; that realizing the nullity of the contract [petitioner] had offered to
return the downpayment received from [private respondents], but the latter
refused to accept it; that [private respondents] further failed to provide funds for
the tenant who demanded P150,00.00 in payment of his tenancy rights on the land;
that [petitioner] had chosen to rescind the contract.
The trial courts order of dismissal was elevated to the Court of Appeals by private
respondents who alleged: 1. The lower court erred in concluding that the contract
to sell is null and void, there being no approval of the probate court.
Declaring the Contract to Sell valid, subject to the outcome of the testate
proceedings on Demetrio Carpenas estate, the appellate court set aside the trial
courts dismissal of the complaint and ruled that the appellee sold Lot 2125 not in
her capacity as executrix of the will or administratrix of the estate of her father, but
as an heir and more importantly as owner of said lot which, along with other
properties, was devised to her under the will sought to be probated. That being so,
the requisites stipulated in Rule 89 of the Revised Rules of Court which refer to a
sale made by the administrator for the benefit of the estate do not apply. Hence,
this appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the Contract to Sell dated 03 February 1989 executed by the
[p]etitioner and [p]rivate [r]espondent[s] without the requisite probate court
approval is valid.
Held:
Yes. petitioner entered into the Contract to Sell in her capacity as an heiress,
not as an executrix or administratrix of the estate. In the contract, she represented
herself as the lawful owner and seller of the subject parcel of land. The hereditary
rights are vested in the heir or heirs from the moment of the decedents death.
Petitioner, therefore, became the owner of her hereditary share the moment her
father died. Thus, the lack of judicial approval does not invalidate the Contract to
Sell, because the petitioner has the substantive right to sell the whole or a part of
her share in the estate of her late father.
Wills and Succession Case Digest 17-18 - Atty. Castillo-Taleon | MATEO
Consequently, although the Contract to Sell was perfected between the petitioner
and private respondents during the pendency of the probate proceedings, the
consummation of the sale or the transfer of ownership over the parcel of land to
the private respondents is subject to the full payment of the purchase price and to
the termination and outcome of the testate proceedings. Therefore, there is no
basis for petitioners apprehension that the Contract to Sell may result in a
premature partition and distribution of the properties of the estate. Indeed, it is
settled that the sale made by an heir of his share in an inheritance, subject to the
pending administration, in no wise stands in the way of such administration.
5. Emnace vs CA
Facts:
Petitioner Emilio Emnace, Vicente Tabanao and Jacinto Divinagracia were partners
in a business concern known as Ma. Nelma Fishing Industry. Sometime in January of
1986, they decided to dissolve their partnership and executed an agreement of
partition and distribution of the partnership properties among them, consequent to
Jacinto Divinagracia's withdrawal from the partnership.1 Among the assets to be
distributed were five (5) fishing boats, six (6) vehicles, two (2) parcels of land
located at Sto. Nio and Talisay, Negros Occidental, and cash deposits in the local
branches of the Bank of the Philippine Islands and Prudential Bank.
Throughout the existence of the partnership, and even after Vicente Tabanao's
untimely demise in 1994, petitioner failed to submit to Tabanao's heirs any
statement of assets and liabilities of the partnership, and to render an accounting of
the partnership's finances. Petitioner also reneged on his promise to turn over to
Tabanao's heirs the deceased's 1/3 share in the total assets of the partnership,
amounting to P30,000,000.00, or the sum of P10,000,000.00, despite formal
demand for payment thereof.2
Consequently, Tabanao' s heirs, respondents herein, filed against petitioner an
action for accounting, payment of shares, division of assets and damages. Petitioner
filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of improper venue, lack of
jurisdiction over the nature of the action or suit, and lack of capacity of the estate
of Tabanao to sue.
RTC denieid the motion to dismiss and held that the heirs of Tabanao had aright to
sue in their own names, in view of the provision of Article 777 of the Civil Code,
which states that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of
the death of the decedent. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the Court
of Appeals, but was dismissed. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
WON there is lack of capacity to sue on the part of plaintiff heirs of Vicente Tabanao
Held:
No. The surviving spouse does not need to be appointed as executrix or
administratrix of the estate before she can file the action. She and her children are
complainants in their own right as successors of Vicente Tabanao. From the very
moment of Vicente Tabanao' s death, his rights insofar as the partnership was
concerned were transmitted to his heirs, for rights to the succession are
transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent.32
Whatever claims and rights Vicente Tabanao had against the partnership and
petitioner were transmitted to respondents by operation of law, more particularly
by succession, which is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights
and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance of a person are
transmitted.33 Moreover, respondents became owners of their respective
hereditary shares from the moment Vicente Tabanao died. 34
A prior settlement of the estate, or even the appointment of Salvacion Tabanao as
executrix or administratrix, is not necessary for any of the heirs to acquire legal
capacity to sue. As successors who stepped into the shoes of their decedent upon
his death, they can commence any action originally pertaining to the
decedent.35 From the moment of his death, his rights as a partner and to demand
fulfillment of petitioner's obligations as outlined in their dissolution agreement
were transmitted to respondents. They, therefore, had the capacity to sue and seek
the court's intervention to compel petitioner to fulfill his obligations.
6. Rabadilla vs CA
Facts:
In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner, Johnny S.
Rabadilla, was instituted as a devisee of 511, 855 square meters of that parcel of
land surveyed as Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre. The said Codicil, which was
duly probated and admitted in Special Proceedings No. 4046 before the then Court
of First Instance of Negros Occidental, contained the following provisions:
FOURTH: (a)....It is also my command, in this my addition (Codicil), that should I die
and Jorge Rabadilla shall have already received the ownership of the said Lot No.
1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002
(10942), and also at the time that the lease of Balbinito G. Guanzon of the said lot
shall expire, Jorge Rabadilla shall have the obligation until he dies, every year to
give to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, Seventy (75) (sic) piculs of Export sugar
Wills and Succession Case Digest 17-18 - Atty. Castillo-Taleon | MATEO
and Twenty Five (25) piculs of Domestic sugar, until the said Maria Marlina
Coscolluela y Belleza dies.
FIFTH: (a) Should Jorge Rabadilla die, his heir to whom he shall give Lot No. 1392 of
the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10492),
shall have the obligation to still give yearly, the sugar as specified in the Fourth
paragraph of his testament, to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza on the month of
December of each year.
SIXTH: I command, in this my addition (Codicil) that the Lot No. 1392, in the event
that the one to whom I have left and bequeathed, and his heir shall later sell, lease,
mortgage this said Lot, the buyer, lessee, mortgagee, shall have also the obligation
to respect and deliver yearly ONE HUNDRED (100) piculs of sugar to Maria Marlina
Coscolluela y Belleza, on each month of December, SEVENTY FIVE (75) piculs of
Export and TWENTY FIVE (25) piculs of Domestic, until Maria Marlina shall die, lastly
should the buyer, lessee or the mortgagee of this lot, not have respected my
command in this my addition (Codicil), Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, shall
immediately seize this Lot No. 1392 from my heir and the latter's heirs, and shall
turn it over to my near desendants, (sic) and the latter shall then have the
obligation to give the ONE HUNDRED (100) piculs of sugar until Maria Marlina shall
die. I further command in this my addition (Codicil) that my heir and his heirs of this
Lot No. 1392, that they will obey and follow that should they decide to sell, lease,
mortgage, they cannot negotiate with others than my near descendants and my
sister."[4]
Pursuant to the same Codicil, Lot No. 1392 was transferred to the deceased, Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44498 thereto issued in his
name. Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wife Rufina and
children Johnny (petitioner), Aurora, Ofelia and Zenaida, all surnamed Rabadilla.
On August 21, 1989, Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza Villacarlos brought a
complaint, before Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court in Bacolod City, against the
above-mentioned heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to enforce the provisions of subject
Codicil. The Complaint alleged that the defendant-heirs violated the conditions of
the Codicil, in that:
1. Lot No. 1392 was mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank and the Republic
Planters Bank in disregard of the testatrix's specific instruction to sell, lease, or
mortgage only to the near descendants and sister of the testatrix.
2. Defendant-heirs failed to comply with their obligation to deliver one hundred
(100) piculs of sugar (75 piculs export sugar and 25 piculs domestic sugar) to
plaintiff Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza from sugar crop years 1985 up to the
filing of the complaint as mandated by the Codicil, despite repeated demands for
compliance.
3. The banks failed to comply with the 6th paragraph of the Codicil which provided
that in case of the sale, lease, or mortgage of the property, the buyer, lessee, or
mortgagee shall likewise have the obligation to deliver 100 piculs of sugar per crop
year to herein private respondent.
The plaintiff then prayed that judgment be rendered ordering defendant-heirs to
reconvey/return-Lot No. 1392 to the surviving heirs of the late Aleja Belleza, the
cancellation of TCT No. 44498 in the name of the deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and
the issuance of a new certificate of title in the names of the surviving heirs of the
late Aleja Belleza.
RTC ruled that the action is prematurely filed as no cause of action against the
defendants has as yet arose in favor of plaintiff. While there maybe the non-
performance of the command as mandated exaction from them simply because
they are the children of Jorge Rabadilla, the title holder/owner of the lot in
question, does not warrant the filing of the present complaint. The remedy at bar
must fall. Incidentally, being in the category as creditor of the left estate, it is
opined that plaintiff may initiate the intestate proceedings, if only to establish the
heirs of Jorge Rabadilla and in order to give full meaning and semblance to her
claim under the Codicil.
First Division of the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court;
ratiocinating and ordering thus:
"Therefore, the evidence on record having established plaintiff-appellant's right to
receive 100 piculs of sugar annually out of the produce of Lot No. 1392; defendants-
appellee's obligation under Aleja Belleza's codicil, as heirs of the modal heir, Jorge
Rabadilla, to deliver such amount of sugar to plaintiff-appellant; defendants-
appellee's admitted non-compliance with said obligation since 1985; and, the
punitive consequences enjoined by both the codicil and the Civil Code, of seizure of
Lot No. 1392 and its reversion to the estate of Aleja Belleza in case of such non-
compliance, this Court deems it proper to order the reconveyance of title over Lot
No. 1392 from the estates of Jorge Rabadilla to the estate of Aleja Belleza.
However, plaintiff-appellant must institute separate proceedings to re-open Aleja
Belleza's estate, secure the appointment of an administrator, and distribute Lot No.
1392 to Aleja Belleza's legal heirs in order to enforce her right, reserved to her by
the codicil, to receive her legacy of 100 piculs of sugar per year out of the produce
of Lot No. 1392 until she dies.
Wills and Succession Case Digest 17-18 - Atty. Castillo-Taleon | MATEO
Issue: WON the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the reversion of Lot 1392 to the
estate of the testatrix Aleja Belleza on the basis of paragraph 6 of the Codicil
Held:
No. It is a general rule under the law on succession that successional rights are
transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent [10]and compulsory heirs are
called to succeed by operation of law. The legitimate children and descendants, in
relation to their legitimate parents, and the widow or widower, are compulsory
heirs.[11] Thus, the petitioner, his mother and sisters, as compulsory heirs of the
instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, succeeded the latter by operation of law,
without need of further proceedings, and the successional rights were transmitted
to them from the moment of death of the decedent, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.
Under Article 776 of the New Civil Code, inheritance includes all the property, rights
and obligations of a person, not extinguished by his death. Conformably, whatever
rights Dr. Jorge Rabadilla had by virtue of subject Codicil were transmitted to his
forced heirs, at the time of his death. And since obligations not extinguished by
death also form part of the estate of the decedent; corollarily, the obligations
imposed by the Codicil on the deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise
transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his death.
In the said Codicil, testatrix Aleja Belleza devised Lot No. 1392 to Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, subject to the condition that the usufruct thereof would be delivered to
the herein private respondent every year. Upon the death of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his
compulsory heirs succeeded to his rights and title over the said property, and they
also assumed his (decedent's) obligation to deliver the fruits of the lot involved to
herein private respondent. Such obligation of the instituted heir reciprocally
corresponds to the right of private respondent over the usufruct, the fulfillment or
performance of which is now being demanded by the latter through the institution
of the case at bar. Therefore, private respondent has a cause of action against
petitioner and the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint below.
In the interpretation of Wills, when an uncertainty arises on the face of the
Will, as to the application of any of its provisions, the testator's intention is
to be ascertained from the words of the Will, taking into consideration the
circumstances under which it was made.[23] Such construction as will
sustain and uphold the Will in all its parts must be adopted. [24]
7. Tanedo vs CA
Facts:
On October 20, 1962, Lazardo Taedo executed a notarized deed of absolute
sale in favor of his eldest brother, Ricardo Taedo, and the latters wife, Teresita
Barera, private respondents herein, whereby he conveyed to the latter in
consideration of P1,500.00, one hectare of whatever share I shall have over Lot No.
191 of the cadastral survey of Gerona, Province of Tarlac and covered by Title T-
l3829 of the Register of Deeds of Tarlac, the said property being his future
inheritance from his parents (Exh. 1). Upon the death of his father Matias, Lazaro
executed an Affidavit of Conformity dated February 28, 1980 (Exh. 3) to re-affirm,
respect. acknowledge and validate the sale I made in 1962. On January 13, 1981,
Lazaro executed another notarized deed of sale in favor of private respondents
covering his undivided ONE TWELVE (1/12) of a parcel of land known as Lot 191 x x
(Exh. 4). He acknowledged therein his receipt of P 10,000.00 as consideration
therefor. In February 1981, Ricardo learned that Lazaro sold the same property to
his children, petitioners herein, through a deed of sale dated December 29,
1980 (Exh. E). On June 7, 1982, private respondents recorded the Deed of Sale (Exh.
4) in their favor in the Registry of Deeds and the corresponding entry was made in
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 166451 (Exh. 5).
Petitioners on July 16, 1982 filed a complaint for rescission (plus damages) of the
deeds of sale executed by Lazaro in favor of private respondents covering the
property inherited by Lazaro from his father. Petitioners claimed that their father,
Lazaro, executed an Absolute Deed of Sale dated December 29, 1980 (Exit. E),
conveying to his ten children his allotted portion under the extrajudicial partition
executed by the heirs of Matias, which deed included the land in litigation (Lot 191).
Petitioners also presented in evidence: (1) a private writing purportedly
prepared and signed by Matias dated December 28, 1978, stating that it was his
desire that whatever inheritance Lazaro would receive from him should be given to
his (Lazaros) children (Exh. A); (2) a typewritten document dated March 10, 1979
signed by Lazaro in the presence of two witnesses, wherein he confirmed that he
would voluntarily abide by the wishes of his father, Matias, to give to his (Lazaros)
children all the property he would inherit from the latter (Exh. B); and (3) a letter
dated January 1, 1980 of Lazaro to his daughter, Carmela, stating that his share in
the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of his father was intended for his children,
petitioners herein (Exh. C).
Private respondents, however presented in evidence a Deed of Revocation of a
Deed of Sale dated March 12, 1981 (Exh. 6), wherein Lazaro revoked the sale in
favor of petitioners for the reason that it was simulated or fictitious - without any
consideration whatsoever.
Shortly after the case a quo was filed, Lazaro executed a sworn statement (Exh. G)
which virtually repudiated the contents of the Deed of Revocation of a Deed of Sale
(Exh. 6) and the Deed of Sale (Exh. 4) in favor of private respondents. However,
Lazaro testified that he sold the property to Ricardo, and that it was a lawyer who
Wills and Succession Case Digest 17-18 - Atty. Castillo-Taleon | MATEO
induced him to execute a deed of sale in favor of his children after giving him five
pesos (P5.00) to buy a drink (TSN September 18, 1985, pp. 204-205).
The trial court decided in favor of private respondents, holding that petitioners
failed to adduce a preponderance of evidence to support (their) claim. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court, ruling that the Deed of
Sale dated January 13, 1981(Exh. 9) was valid and that its registration in good faith
vested title in said respondents.
Issue: WON the sale of a future inheritance valid
Held:
No. Pursuant to Article 1347 of the Civil Code, (n)o contract may be entered
into upon a future inheritance except in cases expressly authorized by law.
Consequently, said contract made in 1962 is not valid and cannot be the
source of any right nor the creator of any obligation between the parties.
Hence, the affidavit of conformity dated February 28, 1980, insofar as it
sought to validate or ratify the 1962 sale, is also useless and, in the words of the
respondent Court, suffers from the same infirmity. Even private respondents in
their memorandum4 concede this.
However, the documents that are critical to the resolution of this case are: (a)
the deed of sale of January 13, 1981 in favor of private respondents covering
Lazaros undivided inheritance of one-twelfth (1/12) share in Lot No. 191, which was
subsequently registered on June 7, 1982; and (b) the deed of sale dated December
29, 1980 in favor of petitioners covering the same property. These two documents
were executed after the death of Matias (and his spouse) and after a deed of
extrajudicial settlement of his (Matias) estate was executed, thus vesting in Lazaro
actual title over said property. In other words, these dispositions, though
conflicting, were no longer infected with the infirmities of the 1962 sale.
Critical in determining which of these two deeds should be given effect is the
registration of the sale in favor of private respondents with the register of deeds
on June 7, 1982.
Article 1544 of the Civil Code governs the preferential rights of vendees in
cases of multiple sales, as follows:
Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the
ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken possession
thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person
acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in
good faith was first in the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person
who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith.
The property in question is land, an immovable, and following the above-
quoted law, ownership shall belong to the buyer who in good faith registers it first
in the registry of property. Thus, although the deed of sale in favor of private
respondents was later than the one in favor of petitioners, ownership would vest in
the former because of the undisputed fact of registration. On the other hand,
petitioners have not registered the sale to them at all.
8. Santos vs Lumbao
Facts:
On two separate occasions during her lifetime, Rita sold to respondents Spouses
Lumbao the subject property which is a part of her share in the estate of her
deceased mother, Maria Catoc (Maria), who died intestate on 19 September 1978.
On the first occasion, Rita sold 100 square meters of her inchoate share in her
mothers estate through a document denominated as "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17
August 1979.4 Respondents Spouses Lumbao claimed the execution of the aforesaid
document was witnessed by petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo, as shown by their
signatures affixed therein. On the second occasion, an additional seven square
meters was added to the land as evidenced by a document also denominated as
"Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 9 January 1981.5
After acquiring the subject property, respondents Spouses Lumbao took actual
possession thereof and erected thereon a house which they have been occupying
as exclusive owners up to the present. As the exclusive owners of the subject
property, respondents Spouses Lumbao made several verbal demands upon Rita,
during her lifetime, and thereafter upon herein petitioners, for them to execute the
necessary documents to effect the issuance of a separate title in favor of
respondents Spouses Lumbao insofar as the subject property is concerned.
Respondents Spouses Lumbao alleged that prior to her death, Rita informed
respondent Proserfina Lumbao she could not deliver the title to the subject
property because the entire property inherited by her and her co-heirs from Maria
had not yet been partitioned.
On 2 May 1986, the Spouses Lumbao claimed that petitioners, acting fraudulently
and in conspiracy with one another, executed a Deed of Extrajudicial
Wills and Succession Case Digest 17-18 - Atty. Castillo-Taleon | MATEO
Settlement,6 adjudicating and partitioning among themselves and the other heirs,
the estate left by Maria, which included the subject property already sold to
respondents Spouses Lumbao and now covered by TCT No. 81729 7 of the Registry
of Deeds of Pasig City.
On 15 June 1992, respondents Spouses Lumbao, through counsel, sent a formal
demand letter8 to petitioners but despite receipt of such demand letter, petitioners
still failed and refused to reconvey the subject property to the respondents Spouses
Lumbao. Consequently, the latter filed a Complaint for Reconveyance with
Damages9before the RTC of Pasig City.
Petitioners filed their Answer denying the allegations that the subject property had
been sold to the respondents Spouses Lumbao. They likewise denied that the Deed
of Extrajudicial Settlement had been fraudulently executed because the same was
duly published as required by law. On the contrary, they prayed for the dismissal of
the Complaint for lack of cause of action because respondents Spouses Lumbao
failed to comply with the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law under Republic
Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, which
repealed Presidential Decree No. 150810 requiring first resort to barangay
conciliation.
Respondents Spouses Lumbao, with leave of court, amended their Complaint
because they discovered that on 16 February 1990, without their knowledge,
petitioners executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage in favor of Julieta S. Esplana
for the sum of 30,000.00. The said Deed of Real Estate Mortgage was annotated at
the back of TCT No. PT-81729 on 26 April 1991. Also, in answer to the allegation of
the petitioners that they failed to comply with the mandate of the Revised
Katarungang Pambarangay Law, respondents Spouses Lumbao said that the
Complaint was filed directly in court in order that prescription or the Statute of
Limitations may not set in.
During the trial, respondents Spouses Lumbao presented Proserfina Lumbao and
Carolina Morales as their witnesses, while the petitioners presented only the
testimony of petitioner Virgilio.
The trial court held that the instant complaint is hereby denied for lack of merit.
Aggrieved, respondents Spouses Lumbao appealed to the Court of Appeals. CA held
that the present appeal is hereby GRANTED. The appealed Decision dated June 17,
1998 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 69 in Civil Case No. 62175 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new judgment is hereby entered ordering
[petitioners] to reconvey 107 square meters of the subject [property] covered by
TCT No. PT-81729 of the Registry of Deeds of Pasig City, Metro Manila, and to pay
to [respondents spouses Lumbao] the sum of 30,000.00 for attorneys fees and
litigation expenses.
Dissatisfied, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Decision
but it was denied in the Resolution of the appellate court dated 29 July 2005 for
lack of merit. Hence, this Petition.
Issue: Whether or not herein petitioners are legally bound to comply with the
"Bilihan ng Lupa" dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981 and consequently,
reconvey the subject property to herein respondents spouses Lumbao.
Held:
Yes. The general rule that heirs are bound by contracts entered into by their
predecessors-in-interest applies in the present case. Article 131132 of the NCC is the
basis of this rule. It is clear from the said provision that whatever rights and
obligations the decedent have over the property were transmitted to the heirs by
way of succession, a mode of acquiring the property, rights and obligations of the
decedent to the extent of the value of the inheritance of the heirs. 33 Thus, the heirs
cannot escape the legal consequence of a transaction entered into by their
predecessor-in-interest because they have inherited the property subject to the
liability affecting their common ancestor. Being heirs, there is privity of interest
between them and their deceased mother. They only succeed to what rights their
mother had and what is valid and binding against her is also valid and binding as
against them. The death of a party does not excuse nonperformance of a contract
which involves a property right and the rights and obligations thereunder pass to
the personal representatives of the deceased. Similarly, nonperformance is not
excused by the death of the party when the other party has a property interest in
the subject matter of the contract.34
In the end, despite the death of the petitioners mother, they are still bound to
comply with the provisions of the "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17 August 1979 and 9
January 1981. Consequently, they must reconvey to herein respondents Spouses
Lumbao the 107-square meter lot which they bought from Rita, petitioners
mother.
**** The property owned by Maria, the mother of Rita, was not yet divided among
her and her co-heirs and so the description of the entire estate is the only
description that can be placed in the "Bilihan ng Lupa, dated 17 August 1979 and 9
January 1981" because the exact metes and bounds of the subject property sold to
respondents Spouses Lumbao could not be possibly determined at that time.
Nevertheless, that does not make the contract of sale between Rita and
respondents Spouses Lumbao invalid because both the law and jurisprudence have
Wills and Succession Case Digest 17-18 - Atty. Castillo-Taleon | MATEO
categorically held that even while an estate remains undivided, co-owners have
each full ownership of their respective aliquots or undivided shares and may
therefore alienate, assign or mortgage them. 28 The co-owner, however, has no right
to sell or alienate a specific or determinate part of the thing owned in common,
because such right over the thing is represented by an aliquot or ideal portion
without any physical division. In any case, the mere fact that the deed purports to
transfer a concrete portion does not per se render the sale void. The sale is valid,
but only with respect to the aliquot share of the selling co-owner. Furthermore, the
sale is subject to the results of the partition upon the termination of the co-
ownership.29
In the case at bar, when the estate left by Maria had been partitioned on 2 May
1986 by virtue of a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement, the 107- square meter lot sold
by the mother of the petitioners to respondents Spouses Lumbao should be
deducted from the total lot, inherited by them in representation of their deceased
mother, which in this case measures 467 square meters. The 107-square meter lot
already sold to respondents Spouses Lumbao can no longer be inherited by the
petitioners because the same was no longer part of their inheritance as it was
already sold during the lifetime of their mother.
Likewise, the fact that the property mentioned in the two "Bilihan ng Lupa"
documents was described as "a portion of a parcel of land covered in Tax
Declarations No. A-018-01674," while the subject matter of the Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement was the property described in Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 3216 of the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Rizal in the name of
Maria is of no moment because in the "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17 August 1979 and
9 January 1981, it is clear that there was only one estate left by Maria upon her
death. And this fact was not refuted by the petitioners. Besides, the property
described in Tax Declaration No. A-018-01674 and the property mentioned in TCT
No. 3216 are both located in Barrio Rosario, Municipality of Pasig, Province of Rizal,
and almost have the same boundaries. It is, thus, safe to state that the property
mentioned in Tax Declaration No. A-018-01674 and in TCT No. 3216 are one and the
same.
9. NHA vs Almeida
Facts:
June 28, 1959, the Land Tenure Administration (LTA) awarded to Margarita Herrera
several portions of land which are part of the Tunasan Estate in San Pedro,
Laguna. The award is evidenced by an Agreement to Sell No. 3787. 1 By virtue of
Republic Act No. 3488, the LTA was succeeded by the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR). On July 31, 1975, the DAR was succeeded by the NHA by virtue of
Presidential Decree No. 757. 2 NHA as the successor agency of LTA is the petitioner
in this case.
The records show that Margarita Herrera had two children: Beatriz Herrera-
Mercado (the mother of private respondent) and Francisca Herrera. Beatriz
Herrera-Mercado predeceased her mother and left heirs.
Margarita Herrera passed away on October 27, 1971. 3
On August 22, 1974, Francisca Herrera, the remaining child of the late Margarita
Herrera executed a Deed of Self-Adjudication claiming that she is the only
remaining relative, being the sole surviving daughter of the deceased. She also
claimed to be the exclusive legal heir of the late Margarita Herrera.
The Deed of Self-Adjudication was based on a Sinumpaang Salaysay dated October
7, 1960, allegedly executed by Margarita Herrera.
2. That the property is payable by the Land Tenure Administration, and on
July 30, 1959, the AGREEMENT TO SELL No. 3787 is made and adopted in
the City of Manila, at In front of Notario Publico G. Jose C. Tolosa, and
appearing in his Notebook as Documents No. 13, Pagina no. 4; Book No. IV,
Serie of 1959;
3. Due to my old age and no work life, I live and serve my son Francisca
Herrera, and the solar ore that is said to be paid for his own stake in the
Land Tenure Administration;
4. For the sake of the foregoing, in the event that the life of the God of
my life has been taken away, the land to which I am to say is given to my
son FRANCISCA HERRERA, Philippines, in the middle age, married to
Macario Berroya , Currently residing and receiving a letter to Nayong of
San Vicente, San Pedro Laguna, or to his or her successors;
5. WHICH I LOVED to anybody, if I ever had the life of God in my life, I
would like to acknowledge, PRAISE and CONTINUE the content in my
son's name, Francisca Herrera, the front of the house.
The said document was signed by two witnesses and notarized. The witnesses
signed at the left-hand side of both pages of the document with the said document
having 2 pages in total. Margarita Herrera placed her thumbmark 5 above her name
in the second page and at the left-hand margin of the first page of the document.
Wills and Succession Case Digest 17-18 - Atty. Castillo-Taleon | MATEO
The surviving heirs of Beatriz Herrera-Mercado filed a case for annulment of the
Deed of Self-Adjudication before the then Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch
1 in Binan, Laguna (now Regional Trial Court Branch 25). The case for annulment
was docketed as Civil Case No. B-1263. 6
On December 29, 1980, a Decision in Civil Case No. B-1263 (questioning the Deed of
Self-Adjudication) was rendered and the deed was declared null and void. 7
During trial on the merits of the case assailing the Deed of Self-Adjudication,
Francisca Herrera filed an application with the NHA to purchase the same lots
submitting therewith a copy of the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" executed by her
mother. Private respondent Almeida, as heir of Beatriz Herrera-Mercado, protested
the application.
NHA granted the application made by Francisca Herrera, holding that; On October
7, 1960, Margarita Herrera executed a "Sworn Statement" whereby she waived or
transferred all her rights and interest over the lots in question in favor of the
protestee ; This Office finds that protestee has a better preferential right to
purchase the lots in question. 9
Private respondent Almeida appealed to the Office of the President. 10 The NHA
Resolution was affirmed by the Office of the President in a Decision dated January
23, 1987. 11
On February 1, 1987, Francisca Herrera died. Her heirs executed an extrajudicial
settlement of her estate which they submitted to the NHA. Said transfer of rights
was approved by the NHA. 12 The NHA executed several deeds of sale in favor of the
heirs of Francisca Herrera and titles were issued in their favor. 13 Thereafter, the
heirs of Francisca Herrera directed Segunda Mercado-Almeida to leave the
premises that she was occupying.
Feeling aggrieved by the decision of the Office of the President and the resolution
of the NHA, private respondent Segunda Mercado-Almeida sought the cancellation
of the titles issued in favor of the heirs of Francisca. She filed a Complaint on
February 8, 1988, for " Nullification of Government Lot's Award ," with the
Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31.
In her complaint, private respondent Almeida invoked her forty-year occupation of
the disputed properties, and re-raised the fact that Francisca Herrera's declaration
of self-adjudication has been adjudged as a nullity because the other heirs were
disregarded. The defendant heirs of Francisca Herrera alleged that the complaint
was barred by laches and that the decision of the Office of the President was
already final and executory. 14 They also contended that the transfer of purchase of
the subject lots is perfectly valid as the same was supported by a consideration and
that Francisca Herrera paid for the property with the use of his own
money. 15 Further, they argued that plaintiff's occupation of the property was by
mere tolerance and that they had been paying taxes thereon.
On March 9, 1998, the Regional Trial Court rendered a Decision setting aside the
resolution of the NHA and the decision of the Office of the President awarding the
subject lots in favor of Francisca Herrera. It declared the deeds of sale executed by
NHA in favor of Herrera's heirs null and void and ruled that the "Sinumpaang
Salaysay" was not an assignment of rights but a disposition of property which
shall take effect upon death. It then held that the said document must first be
submitted to probate before it can transfer property.
Both the NHA and the heirs of Francisca Herrera filed their respective motions for
reconsideration which were both denied on July 21, 1998 for lack of merit. They
both appealed to the Court of Appeals. On August 28, 2003, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. The Court of Appeals ruled that
the NHA acted arbitrarily in awarding the lots to the heirs of Francisca Herrera. It
upheld the trial court ruling that the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" was not an assignment
of rights but one that involved disposition of property which shall take effect upon
death. The issue of whether it was a valid will must first be determined by probate.
Petitioner NHA elevated the case to this Court.
Issue: WON the decision of the NHA is arbitrary
Held:
Yes. When the petitioner received the "Sinumpaang Salaysay," it should have noted
that the effectivity of the said document commences at the time of death of the
author of the instrument; In her words "in case I will be deprived of God of my
life ..." Therefore, in such period, all the interests of the person should cease to be
hers and shall be in the possession of her estate until they are transferred to her
heirs By virtue of Article 774 of the Civil Code which provides that:
Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the
property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the
inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to another or
others either by his will or by operation of law . 33
By considering the document, petitioner NHA should have noted that the original
applicant has already passed away. Margarita Herrera passed away on October 27,
1971. 34 The NHA issued its resolution 35 on February 5, 1986. The NHA gave due
course to the application made by Francisca Herrera without considering that the
Wills and Succession Case Digest 17-18 - Atty. Castillo-Taleon | MATEO
initial applicant's death would transfer all her property, rights and Obligations to
the estate including whatever interest she has or may have had over the disputed
properties. To the extent of the interest that the original owner had over the
property, the same should go to his estate.
The death of Margarita Herrera does not extinguish her interest over the
property. Margarita Herrera had an existing Contract to Sell 36 with NHA as the
seller. Upon Margarita Herrera's demise, this Contract to Sell was neither nullified
nor revoked. This Contract to Sell was an obligation on both parties - Margarita
Herrera and NHA. Obligations are transmissible. 37 Margarita Herrera's obligation to
pay became transmissible at the time of her death either by will or by operation of
law.
If we sustain the position of the NHA that this document is not a will, then the
interests of the decedent should transfer by virtue of an operation of law and not
by virtue of a resolution by the NHA. For as it stands, NHA can not make another
contract to sell to other parties of a property already initially paid for by the
decedent. Such would be an act contrary to the law on succession and the law on
sales and obligations. 38
When the original buyer died, the NHA should have considered the estate of the
decedent as the next "person" 39likely to stand in to fulfill the obligation to pay the
rest of the purchase price. The opposition of other heirs to the repurchase by
Francisca Herrera should have put the NHA on guard as to the award of the
lots. Further, the Decision in the said Civil Case No. B-1263 (questioning the Deed of
Self-Adjudication) which rendered the deed therein null and void 40 should have
alerted the NHA that there are other heirs to the interests and properties of the
decedent who may claim the property after a testate or intestate proceeding Is
concluded. The NHA therefore acted arbitrarily in the award of the lots.
We need not delve into the validity of the will. The issue is for the probate court to
determine. We affirm the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court which
noted that it has an element of testamentary disposition where (1) it devolved and
transferred property; (2) the effect of which shall transpire upon the death of the
instrument maker. 41
10. People vs Umali
Facts:
Pierre Pangan a minor was investigated by Pat. Felino Noguerra for drug
dependency and for an alleged crime of robbery. In the course of the investigation,
the policemen discovered that Pierre Pangan was capable of committing crime
against property, only if under the influence of drug (sic). Francisco Manalo, who
was likewise investigated by operatives of the Tiaong, Quezon Police Department
and for which a case for violation of the Dangerous Drug Act was filed against him
before Branch 60 of the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City. Aside from said case,
accused Francisco Manalo was likewise facing other charges such as concealment of
deadly weapon and other crimes against property. Pat. Felino Noguerra went to the
Tiaong Municipal Jail, and sought the help of Francisco Manalo and told him the
social and pernicious effect of prohibited drugs like marijuana being peddled to
minors of Tiaong, Quezon. Manalo although a detention prisoner was touched by
the appeal made to him by the policeman and agreed to help in the identification of
the source of the marijuana. In return he asked the policeman to help him in some
cases pending against him. He did not negotiate his case for violating the dangerous
drug act, as he has entered a plea of guilty to the charged (sic) before the sala of
Judge Eriberto Rosario.
With the consent of Francisco Manalo, Pfc. Sarmiento, Chief of the Investigation
Division gave him four (4) marked P5.00 bills to buy marijuana from sources known
to him. The serial numbers of the money was entered in the police blotter. The
instruction was (sic) for Manalo to bring back the prohibited drug purchased by him
to the police headquarters. Few minutes there after (sic), Manalo returned with
two (2) foils of dried marijuana which lie allegedly bought from the accused Gloria
Umali. Thereafter, he was asked by the police investigators to give a statement on
the manner and circumstances of how he was able to purchase two (2) marijuana
foils from accused Gloria Umali. With the affidavit of Francisco Manalo, supported
by the two (2) foils of marijuana. the Chief of the Investigation Division petitioned
the Court for the issuance of a search warrant as a justification for them to search
the house of Gloria Umali located at Rector (sic) Street. Poblacion, Tiaong, Quezon.
After securing the same, the police operatives, went to the house of Gloria Umali
and served the search warrant on her.
Gloria Umali and Suzeth Umali were charged for violation of Section 4, Article 1 of
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Upon arraignment, Gloria Umali entered a plea of
"not, guilty" as accused Suzeth Umali remained at large. After trial, the lower court
rendered a decision finding accused Gloria Umali guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating Sec. 4, Art. 1 (sic) of RA 6425 as amended, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua. Accused being a detention prisoner is entitled to enjoy the
privileges of her preventive imprisonment. The case against Suzeth Umali, her co-
accused in this case is hereby ordered ARCHIVED to be revived until the arrest of
said accused is effected. The warrant of arrest issued against her is hereby ordered
reiterated.
Wills and Succession Case Digest 17-18 - Atty. Castillo-Taleon | MATEO
Hence, this appeal from the lower court's decision contending that the court
GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE BIASED TESTIMONY OF
FRANCISCO MANALO. The appellant vehemently denied the findings of the lower
court and insisted that said court committed reversible errors in convicting her. She
alleged that witness Francisco Manalo is not reputed to be trustworthy and reliable
and that his words should not be taken on its face value. Furthermore, he stressed
that said witness has several charges in court and because of his desire to have
some of his cases dismissed, he was likely to tell falsehood.

Issue: WON Francisco Manalos testimony should be given weight and credit
Held:

Yes. The phrase "conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law" takes into
account Article 821 of the Civil Code which states that persons 91 convicted of
falsification of a document, perjury or false testimony" are disqualified from being
witnesses to a will." (Paras, RULES OF COURT ANNOTATED, Vol. IV First Ed., p. 44)

Since the witness Francisco Manalo is not convicted of any of the above-mentioned
crimes to disqualify him as a witness and this case does not involve the probate of a
will, We rule that the fact that said witness is facing several criminal charges when
he testified did not in any way disqualify him as a witness.

The testimony of a witness should be given full faith and credit, in the absence of
evidence that he was actuated by improper motive (People v. Melgar, G.R. No.
75268,29 January 1988, 157 SCRA 718). Hence, in the absence of any evidence that
witness Francisco Manalo was actuated by improper motive, his testimony must be
accorded full credence.

Wills and Succession Case Digest 17-18 - Atty. Castillo-Taleon | MATEO