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EN BANC

[GR No. L-49090. February 28, 1947.]

TEODORA L. VDA. DE MIRANDA AND


OTHERS , applicants , appellants , against FELICIANO IMPERIALA
ND JUANA DE IMPERIAL , Defendants-appellants .

Mr. Manuel M. Calleja and Mr. Ramon C. Fernandez, on behalf of the


appellants.
D. Toribio P. Perez, in representation of the appeals.

SYLLABUS

1. JUDGES; COURT OF APPEALS; CONCLUSION OR


PRONOUNCEMENT AS A RULE OF JURISPRUDENCE. - Only the judgments of
this Supreme Court feel jurisprudence or doctrine in this jurisdiction.However, this
does not mean that a conclusion or pronouncement of the Court of Appeals that
covers some point of law not yet resolved in our jurisprudence may serve as a legal
rule to lower courts, and that such conclusion or pronouncement is raised to doctrine
if, after Of being tested in the crucible of analysis and judicial review, this Supreme
Court will find that it had merits and carats sufficient for its consecration as a rule of
jurisprudence.
2. ANTICRESIS; APPLICATION OF THE LAW OF USURE. - (a) Anticresis
known in this country as the vernacular of "sangla" or "saop" can not be prosecuted
and declared as usury, unless usury itself is raised as an "issue," a point Litigation
between the parties, in accordance with the procedural rules established on the
matter; (B) and for such a contract to be considered and declared usurious it is not
enough that the goods of the property given the anticresis, when perceived by the
creditor, exceed somewhat the legal interest rates, but it is necessary that the
excess be so Palpable, so repulsive and so shocking to the conscience that
necessarily the feeling that the contract has been set to hide the avian intention to
infringe or evade the law of usury;

DECISION

BRIONES , M : p

This is a pre-war affair. The lawsuit was filed before the Court of First
Instance of Albay on November 25, 1941, that is, almost on the eve of the
outbreak of the Pacific War. The Court delivered its judgment on March 17, 1943.
The case was brought before this Supreme Court, by virtue of the appeal filed by
the plaintiff on June 9, 1943. Before it could be decided, the file was burned
together with The other files of this Court in the conflagration of Manila on the
occasion of the battle of liberation. What we have, therefore, before Us is a file
reconstituted with documents provided by the appellant's lawyers, namely: ( a )
copies of the record on appeal; ( B ) copies of the allegation submitted by the
appellant's lawyers.
It is alleged in the lawsuit that before November 17, 1938, the conjugados
defendados, Feliciano Imperial and Juana de Imperial , owed to Elias Imperial the
amount of P1,000; That in consideration of this debt and in order to guarantee
their payment, they had ceded the possession and enjoyment of three parcels of
paddy land owned by him to the said Imperial Elias ; That on that date November
17, 1938, the defendants proposed to the applicant, Teodora L. Vda. Of Miranda ,
that lent them the amount of P1,000 to rescue of Elias Imperial the lands, She
being the creditor of the place of Elias under the same terms and conditions of the
contract of antichresis concluded with the latter; That as the applicant had the
requested amount and, furthermore, the defendant is her sister-in-law, being the
widow of a brother of the latter, she accepted the proposition, effectively delivering
the amount of P1,000 to the defendants, who in turn returned it To Elias
Imperial for the rescue of the farms; That, in the case of relatives, the contract was
not reduced to writing, but after the ransom and having been recorded by
Elias Imperial at the foot of the property documents on the three parcels of land,
said documents were delivered in the same act of redemption To the applicant that
he was present in the company of the defendant, As proof of the loan and the
transfer of the new contract of antichresis; That since then the applicant has been
enjoying the products, receiving its share in the harvests corresponding to 1939
and 1940 for two harvests per year, and in the first harvest of 1941, or a total of 5
harvests since November 17, 1938 until April 1941; That the applicant was no
longer able to enjoy the second harvest of 1941, that is to say, the harvest for
October, since the defendants resolved from then on to take possession of that
harvest and the subsequent harvest to the present; That the harvest collected by
the defendants in October 1941, and which belonged to the plaintiff, was 50
cavanes de palay, whose market price was at P2.50, that is, a total amount of
P120. The applicant therefore asks that "
Regarding the first ground of action the defendants defend themselves by
claiming that they only received from the applicant the amount of P500, to which
were added other P500 to rescue the lands of Elias Imperial ; And that said P500
debt was more than paid with the products of the land received by the applicant in
5 consecutive harvests, "thereby automatically extinguishing the contractual rights
and obligations of the parties." Regarding the second ground of action, they deny
it, and say that the harvest collected in October 1941 and all that were later
collected legally belonged to them of warrants; And that this harvest of October, as
in previous years, I report as a participation 70 cavanes de palay.
The defendants also raise in their defense a claim alleging (1) that between
the applicant and the defendant, Juana de Imperial , a verbal agreement was
concluded under which it received from it the sum of P500 to recover the said
lands, On the understanding that the applicant would make all its products under
the same terms and conditions of the previous agreement with Elias Imperial until
its credit was entirely paid for such products; (2) that, in effect, the redemption was
effected by returning the documents to Juana with a note of cancellation of the
debt at the foot of the same, but that later the plaintiff lent those documents under
the pretext of familiarizing himself with the adjoining the lands, Being this the
explanation of how the documents went to rest in the hands of the plaintiff holding
them until the day of the hearing; (3) that, in addition to the three parcels in
question, the applicant enjoyed the products of a fourth parcel of the defendants,
amounts to 10 cavanes de palay in each harvest; (4) that of the 4 parcels of land
the applicant received as a share in the 5 harvests that a total of 400 cavans of
palay collected, and that the dig was then quoted at P2.50 in the market; (5)
which, therefore, the applicant made no less than P1,000 with the products
received by it, and deducting from that sum the P500 owed by the defendants,
plus P100 as interest at the legal rate, is still in favor Of these a balance of P400,
After having seen the matter, the Court rendered its judgment in which the
following facts are conclusively proven: (1) that for some 10 years prior to
November 17, 1938, the defendants owed Elias Imperial the amount of P1,000
; (2) that between the creditor and the debtors an accessory contract of anticresis
had been concluded under which he would enjoy as he actually enjoyed during
that 10-year period of all the products of the three areas mentioned, These
products being considered as interests of money borrowed; (3) that during all the
time that Elias Imperial had under his possession and enjoyed the land, not a
single grain of palay produced was applied to pay or amortize the capital of the
loan; (4) that on November 17, 1938, the defendants received from P-0000, as
they claim, but P1,000, to redeem the estates from Elias Imperial being the
agreement between the parties that the claimant would subrogate as a creditor In
place of said Imperial Elias under the same terms and conditions of the contract of
antichresis concluded with him; That "after careful consideration of the evidence
and all the concomitant circumstances, the Court concludes, and thus declares,
that the plaintiff is presently liable to the defendants P1,000 and that the
agreement between the parties was that the applicant would receive The products
of the 3 parcels previously put in anticresis in favor of Imperial Elias ,
From the facts established in the judgment, as it is extracted, it is evident
that the contract of antichresis on this matter is defined in Article 1885 of the Civil
Code which states: "The contracting parties may stipulate that Interest of the debt
with the fruits of the property given in anticresis. " However, the court a quo, rather
than apply that article as itshould by imperative of the facts declared proven and
established at trial, makes the following statement: "However, notwithstanding this
agreement, the claim of the defendants that The amount of the products received
by the applicant must be applied to the payment of the principal of its debt after
deduction of interest at the statutory rate must be sustained. That is to say, The
court applied the case not to Article 1885 already cited, but to article 1881 of the
Civil Code, whose text is: "Through antichresis, the creditor acquires the right to
receive the fruits of a property of his debtor with the obligation to apply them To
the payment of interest, if any, and then to the capital of his credit. " And the Court
bases its conclusion on the judgment rendered by the previous Court of Appeals in
the case of Santa Rosa v. Noble (RG No. 43769, 35 Off Gaz., 2734, The Lawyer's
Journal, Vol. V , No. 23, P.1109), presentation by Judge Hon. Jose Lopez
Vito. 43769, 35 Off. Gaz., 2734; The Lawyer's Journal, Vol. V , No. 23, p. 1109),
presentation of Judge Hon. Jose Lopez Vito. 43769, 35 Off. Gaz., 2734; The
Lawyer's Journal, Vol. V , No. 23, p. 1109), presentation of Judge Hon. Jose
Lopez Vito.
So the court a quo , after making the corresponding arithmetic operation
applying, first, the payment of interest, and then to the principal of the debt,
awards for the applicant a balance of P435.17 and orders To continue to apply the
products of the land until payment is complete, or that the defendants settle it once
with interest at a rate of 6 percent a year from May 1, 1941 Against the ruling thus
dictated by the plaintiff Has filed this appeal, raising only questions of law, namely:
that the Court erred in not applying to the present case in all its rigor to Article
1885 of the Civil Code; Which the court could not, from a fiat , Create arbitrarily for
the parties a contract not concluded between them; That Article 1885 specifically
refers to one type of antichresis and Article 1881 to another; That when the
agreement is, as in the present case, that the products of the property given in
antichresis be compensated with the interests of the debt, no part of the products
should be applied to the amortization of capital; And therefore, she, the appellant,
has the right to be refunded the capital of her credit, that is, the amount of P1,000,
plus the corresponding products or interest. No part of the products should be
applied to the amortization of capital; And therefore, she, the appellant, has the
right to be refunded the capital of her credit, that is, the amount of P1,000, plus the
corresponding products or interest. No part of the products should be applied to
the amortization of capital; And therefore, she, the appellant, has the right to be
refunded the capital of her credit, that is, the amount of P1,000, plus the
corresponding products or interest.
The Tribunal a quo bases its judgment in the aforementioned judgment of
the Court of Appeal, believing that these are entirely analogous cases, mainly
because both come from the same region - the bicolana - and they refer to a very
common contract in that region, The contract called therein vulgarly "sangla" or
"pledge," and that in the Visayas where the Cebuan dialect is spoken and in
Mindanao it is called "saop" and also "pledge" sometimes.
It seems superfluous to say that only the judgments of this Supreme Court
feel jurisprudence or doctrine in this jurisdiction. However, this does not mean that
a conclusion or pronouncement of the Court of Appeals that covers some point of
law not yet resolved in our jurisprudence may serve as a legal rule to lower courts,
and that such conclusion or pronouncement is raised to doctrine if, after Of being
tested in the crucible of analysis and judicial review, we will find that it had enough
merit and carat for its consecration as a rule of jurisprudence. To this end, and to
this end, we have carefully and carefully examined the judgment of the Court of
Appeals in the said case of Santa Rosa v. Noble, proceeding, as has been said,
Unsubscribed - we are not now called for it, nor need we do - the interesting
findings that the Court of Appeals made in that judgment, we believe, however
, that the Court a quo erred in applying it to this case, as there is between them
Cases fundamental differences, namely:
First difference : in the case of the Court of Appeals usury was an "issue," a
key issue in controversy. That is why the Court says in its sentence "But the
defendants argue that the contract contained in Exhibit E is usurious, which raises
the question of whether Law No. 2655 known as the Usury Law that establishes
the interest rate that It is permissible to charge on loans, it is applicable to
contracts of antichresis. " Although not expressly stated, the Court of Appeals, in
finding that the Law of Usury was applicable, thereby establishing the collectible
interest at the statutory rate of 6 percent, practically ejuicio and published as a
usufruct the contract of antichresis of which it was about.
In the case before us, the question of usury was never raised in either the
allegations or the trial; And in the sentence there is no de facto pronouncement on
usury; And as it may be in this appeal, there are no more questions of law than
that the facts set forth in the judgment are established and admitted without
discussion, this is that our faculty of revision must be written and inflexible to these
facts, without being Allowed to go beyond your radio. After all, it is not surprising
that the defendants did not raise any question about usury, since for 10 years they
had been indebted to EliasImperial without apparently differences that jeopardize
their relations (Elias declared at the hearing in favor of the defendants ),
Second difference : It is evident that the anticresis dealt with in the case of
Santa Rosa against Noble is defined in Article 1881 of the Civil Code, anticresis in
which "the creditor acquires the right to receive the fruits of a property of his debtor
the Obligation to apply them to the payment of interest, if any, and then to the
capital of their credit. " Here is what the Court of Appeal says in its sentence that
we comment on this point: "As to whether the same rate established by the Law
against Usury should be applied when there is an express provision that the fruits
be compensated with the Interest of the debt in accordance with article
1885, qurre: this being the case that is submitted today to our consideration,
In contrast, the antichresis dealt with in the present case is that defined in
Article 1885, which provides "that contractors may stipulate that the interest of the
debt be compensated with the fruits of the property given in anticresis."Here is the
final pronouncement of the Court on this matter: "After a careful consideration of
the evidence and all attending circumstances, the court concludes, and therefore
holds, that the plaintiff actually lent the defendants P1,000, and that the agreement
between That the parties was the plaintiff would recei v e the products of the three
parcels of land formerly with v eyed in anticresis to Elias Imperial as interests on
loan Said Until the same is paid . "
If, according to the aforementioned court's finding , the agreement that the
products of the farms are offset by the interest on the debt, in accordance with
article 1885 of the Civil Code, it is arbitrary to change it judicially, making for the
parties a contract Which they have not celebrated, or to say more specifically,
transforming the truly agreed pact into something that falls under an article of code
that was neither in the mind nor in the will of the contractors. Article 1255 of the
Civil Code prescribes that "the contracting parties may establish the covenants,
causes and conditions they deem fit, provided they are not contrary to law, morals,
or public order." This excludes from the contracts the fiaf ; Judieial Courts may
interpret contracts; What they can not do is mold them, forge them for the parts.
We agree with the Court of Appeal that the contract called "sangla" or
"pledge" (on property) in Bicol, "saop" or "pledge" in Visayas and Mindanao, does
indeed have the antiseesis earaeters and therefore may Considered as such. In
addition to the sale of a retro pact, this agreement is the most common and
commonplace in our towns and rural neighborhoods - from the hands of peasants
and peasants, to improve and expand their crops, and to buy new lands with which
to increase their Possessions, and to marry their children and equip them, and
sometimes even to give a proper and fitting burial to their dead. And why not say
so ? The unfortunate passion for the game sometimes culminates in this contract
to embitter existence, if not to work the ruin of the small owner.
The question that we now have to determine is: is it automatically or
ministerially applicable to the law of usury, as it seems to be inferred from the
judgment appealed? Undoubtedly not. Antieresis, as a contract - either under
article 1881, already under article 1885 of the Civil Code - is not necessarily
usurious; Can be, that yes, usuuraria. But in order to be able to declare itself, it is
not only absolutely necessary that usury be an "issue", a contentious point in the
allegations and in the trial, so that each party has its "day in court," that is, Which
can be properly and adequately defended, but also that it must be demonstrated
and established positively that usury is of such proportions that, upon repugnance
to conscience, Incline the mood to ereer that the contract has been used as a
disguise or device to violate or evade the law of usury. The reason for this is quite
simple: in antiheresis there is a contingent element, random, by nature. The
perception of the products by the creditor, which is its main characteristic, is
subject to several contingencies and eventualities. There may be a bad harvest, or
none at all, either because it has destroyed a typhoon, or because the hoops have
overflowed, or because a band of locusts has devastated the sowing and planting,
or because deep social upheavals have subverted the peace. Order preventing
the tillage of the fields, etcetera, etcetera. Thus, in the case of antichresis, articles
2, 3 and 8 of Law No. 2655 on usury, since these refer to the perception of a fixed
number of products: the debtor has to deliver indeclinably, or their equivalent in
money, whether good or bad, whether or not there is. The fact that sometimes in
the anticresis the amount of the fruits, when making the liquidation, exceeds the
rates set by the law of usury, does not make the usurious contract, because the
law assumes that such excess is of the dividend that collects The creditor in
exchange for the premium of risks and contingencies that he has paid over the
principal of his credit.
In American jurisprudence we also know certain types of contract similar to
our "sangla" or "saop," as evidenced by the following authorities:
"In view, however, of the rule that a creditor's return need not be
limited to the statutory rate when it is affected by a contingency putting the
whole of it at risk, a contract is ordinarily not usurious under which the
creditor is to receive, In consideration of his or her loan or forbearance,
property or services of uncertain value, even though the probable value is
greater than lawful interest, unless the excess is not palpable as a slow to
corrupt attempt to violate or evade the usury laws, unless the contract is
Made for the purpose of such violation or evasion. " 1 (66 CJ, 212.)
"Where the lender is to receive something else than money for his
loan, the property or services, the value of such profit being necessarily
uncertain, the contract is not usurious, even though the probability is greater
than legal interest, unless the consideration is given Is so palpably in excess
of the certain profit allowed by law to show a corrupt intent to violate the
usury laws. " 2 39 Cyc. 259; Wright v s . McAlexander, 11 Ala.,
236; Rapier v . Gulf City Peper C., Ala., 126. (102 Southern Reporter, pp.
204.)
"So, an agreement that instead of interest, the lender of money
should receive the parts and profits of certain land for a term of years, is not
usurious where no intention to evade the statute is shown, and the fact that
such rents and profits Happen to warrant. " 3 (Webb on Usury, p.85).
Manresa, lecturing on the relative conveniences of antichresis, although he
sometimes lends himself as an instrument of usury, makes the following
observations:
"By proceeding in this way, the Authors of the Code responded with
great precision to a need imposed by the modern principles in which the laws
of mutuality are inspired, according to which there is no economic or juridical
reason to condemn antichresis. In this way, damage and prejudice to the
debtor who, in the alternative, were unavoidable, since experience had
clearly demonstrated that, despite the prohibition of laws, the anti-retic pact
was very much in practice, because the provisions Prohibiting, disguising the
agreement with the form or the name of sales to the challenge pact, so that
far from favoring the borrower, as proposed by the legislator, caused great
break,Since it could not grant the creditor the enjoyment of the fruits to apply
them to the amortization of interest or to the partial payment of capital, they
were obliged to file the property in the form indicated, disposing of a property
that could hardly be re-acquired . "(Manresa, Com. Cod. Espanol, tome 12,
page 545.)
The rule, therefore, is, or must be, the following: ( a ) the anticresis known
in this country as the vernacular of "sangla" or "saop" can not be prosecuted and
declared as usurious, unless usury In itself, an "issue" is raised as a contentious
point between the parties, in accordance with the procedural rules studied on the
matter; ( B ) and in order to be considered and declared usurious it is not enough
that the property products given in antichresis, when perceived by the creditor,
exceed somewhat the legal interest rates, but it is necessary that the excess be so
palpable , So repulsive and so shocking to the conscience that necessarily the
feeling that the contract has been set to hide the avian intention to infringe or
evade the law of usury; ( C ) in the absence of these circumstances, the sangla or
saop shall be respected and its compliance shall be permitted under article 1881
or article 1885 of the Civil Code, as the case may be, and the courts shall not
change the terms of Anticresis, which must be between the parties.
The present case offers some difficulties with regard to the ruling to be
rendered. The applicant requests that the defendants be ordered to pay in their
favor a mortgage document on the three parcels of land in order to guarantee the
payment of the P1,000 tax, "by fixing in that document a period of three months for
the Payment, or the term that is reasonable according to the prudent judgment of
the Court and by an interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum, or its place, any
other remedy that may be appropriate. In our view, this would only delay the final
disposition and liquidation of the matter to the detriment of the parties and
expeditious administration of justice.
The defendants of the parcels of land having been transferred to the
plaintiffs by the defendants and having enjoyed their fruits after October 1941, the
plaintiffs demonstrated their agreement to terminate the enticretico contract by
filing the petition On November 25, 1941, not to recuse these parcels of land, but
to demand payment of the debt with the corresponding interest from that date,
after revocation of the judgment appealed, we issued the following ruling:
(1) The defendants are ordered to pay the claimants the amount of one
thousand pesos (P1,000), the amount of the credit of the latter, with interests at
the rate of 6 per cent per annum, as of November 25, 1941 That the claim is filed,
and the judicial costs, and that sum must be paid with interest and the costs to the
plaintiffs, or deposited in the Court of First Instance of Albay within a period of
three months counted from the official lifting of this moratorium;
(2) In the absence of payment, as ordered in the above paragraph, the
three parcels of land on which this case deals will be sold by the Sheriff in public
auction in accordance with the law on collection of mortgage credit;
(3) In the meantime, no payment shall be made, as ordered in this section,
of the sum owed with its legal interests and the judicial costs shall pass as a
preferential lien on the three parcels of land in question. That is how it is
commanded.
Moran, Pres., Feria, Bengzon, Padilla and Tuason MM., Are satisfied.

Separate Opinions

PARAS , J., dissenting :

Although the trial court held that the plaintiff actually loaned the defendants
P1,000, and that the agreement between the parties was that the plaintiff would
receive the products of the three parcels of land formerly conveyed in antichresis
to Elias Imperial as interest on said loan Until the same is paid, "he nevertheless
sustained, citing the decision of the Court of Appeals in the case of Santa
Rosa v s. Noble (35 Off Gaz., 2724), "the contention of the defendants that the
value of the products received by the plaintiff, after deducting therefrom the
interests at legal rate, should be applied to the principal of their debt."
The plaintiff has appealed; Does not controvert the correctness of the
appraisal made by the trial court of the value of the products received by her from
the lots in question; 1885 of the Civil Code which provides that "the contracting
parties may stipulate that the interest of the debt be set off against the fruits of the
estate given in antichresis." In other words, it is the view of the plaintiff that the
products, regardless of their value, should be in payment of interest on the
defendant's loan of P1,000. This is also the view expressed in the majority opinion.
I dissent. The right of the contacting parties to establish any pacts, clauses,
and conditions they may deem advisable, is subject to the proviso that "they are
not contrary to law, morals, or public order." (Article 1255, Civil Code.) After the
enactment of the Usury Law ( Act No. 2655 ), which fixes the rate of interest, in the
absence of express stipulation, at six per centum per annum (section 1) and
provides 8) that "all under which payment is to be made in agriculture products or
seeds or in any other kind of commodities shall also be null and void unless they
provide that commodities or commodities shall be appraised at the time when the
obligation Falls due at the current local market price, " Article 1885 of the Civil
Code must be considered modified, if not repealing clause (section 11) of the
Usury Law .In other words, any antichresis agreement, under either article 1881 or
article 1885, may now be validly enforced only in the light of the provisions of
the Usury Law . The unrestricted freedom conceded in article 1855 was good
before the Government had laid down its policy regarding interest on loans.
"Article 1881 sanctions, therefore, the general rule that must govern
necessarily and necessarily provided there is no special pact indicated, and
1885 establishes the exception of that rule in the case that stipulated such a
pact.
"This is a consequence of the freedom granted for the fixing of
interests, since the legal rate abolished by the law of 1855, the parties can
freely determine the amount and condition of these interests, being able to
be perceived the same in money that in kind, and , Therefore, to compensate
them with the fruits. " (12 Manresa, Civil Code, page 482.)
The majority argue that the Usury Law can not be applied because the
defense of usury is not set up. The claimant made no less than P1,000 in the
products received by it, and deducting from that sum the P500 owed by the
defendants, but P100 In terms of interest at the legal rate, it is still in favor of the
latter a balance of P400, so they ask for a judgment against the plaintiff for the
latter amount. "If this allegation did not amount to a charge that the plaintiff
received more than The legal interest, It was sufficient to apprise the court and the
plaintiff that it was the contention of the defendant that the plaintiff had no right to
apply the products entirely in compensation of the interest notwithstanding their
agreement, and this issue should be decided in the light of existing law Which was
not necessary for the defendant to specify in his answer. We would not be
digressing from the issues raised by the parties, or creating new ones, by simply
adjudicating concrete cases conformably to law.
"It is clear that the Courts may in each case determine the nature of
the obligation and the conditions attached thereto, if a particular pact is
constituted for the purposes of law. (11 Manresa Civil Code, page 550.)
The contingent character of the arrangement contemplated by Article 1885,
can not warrant its continued existence. The Usury Law , which is later and hence
controlling controlling, protects borrowers and at the same time eliminate the
element of change that may prove disadvantageous to lenders who to be paid in
agricultural products.
The appealed judgment should be affirmed.
Paul, Perfecto and Yarn, JJ., Concur.

Footnotes

1. "After careful consideration of the evidence and the concomitant circumstances, the
Court concludes, and thus declares, that the plaintiff is presently lodged with the
defendants P1,000, and that it is agreed between the parties that the plaintiff He
would receive the proceeds of the three parcels of land previously given in
anticreease to Elias Imperial as interest ten said loan , until he himself was paid. "

1. In view, however, of the rule that a creditor's credit should not be limited to the legal
rate when it is affected by a contingency that puts everything at risk, a contract will
not ordinarily be usurious when the creditor receives in consideration of your loan
or largess, property or services of uncertain value, although this is higher than the
rate or legal interest, unless the excess is so palpable that denuestre a corrupt
intention of v iolar oe v Add the usury law or unless the contract was made for the
purpose of the v iolacion oe v asion "(66 CJ, 212.)

2. Where the contract is for the lender RECIDA something other than your loan, that is, in
kind or services, the value of such anecessarily uncertain profit, the contract is not
usurious although v alue likely be greater than the Legal interest, unless such
conduct is so palpably in excess of the gain permitted by law that it is inferred from
and demonstrates the vicious intention of infringing the usury laws. "(39 Cy., 959;
Wright v s. McAlexander, 11 Ala., 236; Rapier v s. Gulf City Paper Co., 77 Ala.,
126.)

3. Thus, a contract in which, instead of interest, the lender receives the income earned
from a certain land for a period of years, is not usury if it is not shown that there
has been an attempt to evade the law; And the fact that such rentals and rewards
amount to more than the rate or legal interest makes the contract usurious .
"(Webb on Usura, page 85.)

1
2

||| (Vda. de Miranda v. Imperial, G.R. No. L-49090, [February 28, 1947], 77 PHIL 1066-1083)

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