ALVAREZ v. IAC
FACTS: The real properties involved are two parcels of land identified as Lot 773-A and Lot
773-B which were originally known as Lot 773 of the cadastral survey of Murcia, Negros
Occidental. Lot 773, with an area of 156,549 square meters, was registered in the name of the
heirs of Aniceto Yanes. Aniceto Yanes was survived by his children and grandchildren, herein
private respondents.
It is on record that on May 19, 1938 and September 6, 1938 Lot 773-A and Lot 773-B,
respectively, were registered in the name of Fortunato D. Santiago. Fortunato D. Santiago
eventually sold the two lots to Monico Fuentebella which was eventually sold to Rosendo
Alverez. The Yaneses filed a complaint against Santiago, Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella, Alvarez
and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental for the return of the ownership and
possession of the lots, and prayed for an accounting of the produce of the land from 1944 up to
the filing of the complaint, and that the share or money equivalent due the heirs be delivered to
them, and damages. During the pendency of the case, Alvarez sold the lots to Dr. Rodolfo
Siason.
ISSUE: Are the heirs of Rosendo Alvarez liable to the respondents, Yaneses, for damages for
the properties sold by their late father (in bad faith while there was a case pending) to Dr.
Siason even though the heirs of Alvarez have not inherited the property involved herein?
RULING: YES. Such contention is untenable for it overlooks the doctrine obtaining in this
jurisdiction on the general transmissibility of the rights and obligations of the deceased to his
legitimate children and heirs. Thus, the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code state:
Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and
obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his
death to another or others either by his will or by operation of law. Art. 776. The inheritance
includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person which are not extinguished by his
death.
Art. 1311. Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs except in case
where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature,
or by stipulation or by provision of law. The heir is not liable beyond the value of the property
received from the decedent.
Petitioners being the heirs of the late Rosendo Alvarez, they cannot escape the legal
consequences of their father's transaction, which gave rise to the present claim for damages.
That petitioners did not inherit the property involved herein is of no moment because by legal
fiction, the monetary equivalent thereof devolved into the mass of their father's hereditary
estate, and we have ruled that the hereditary assets are always liable in their totality for the
payment of the debts of the estate.
GEVERO v. IAC
FACTS: Respondent corporation purchased a parcel of land from one Luis Lancero, and the
latter purchased the same on February 5, 1952 per deed of sale executed by Ricardo Gevero
which was duly annotated as entry No. 1128 at the back of Original Certificate of Title No.
7610 covering the mother lot identified as Lot No. 2476 in the names of Teodorica Babangha
1/2 share and her children: Maria; Restituto, Elena, Ricardo, Eustaquio and Ursula, all
surnamed surnamed Gevero, 1/2 undivided share of the whole area containing 48,122 square
meters. Teodorica Babangha died long before World War II and was survived by her six
children aforementioned.
The heirs of Teodorica Babangha on October 17, 1966 executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement and
Partition of the estate of Teodorica Babangha, consisting of two lots, among them was lot 2476. By
virtue of the extra-judicial settlement and partition executed by the said heirs of Teodorica Babangha,
Lot 2476-A to Lot 2476-I, inclusive, under subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-80450 duly approved by the
Land Registration Commission, Lot 2476-D, among others, was adjudicated to Ricardo Gevero who was
then alive at the time of extra-judicial settlement and partition in 1966. Plaintiff (private respondent
herein) filed an action with the CFI (now RTC) of Misamis Oriental to quiet title and/or annul the
partition made by the heirs of Teodorica Babangha insofar as the same prejudices the land which it
acquired a portion of lot 2476.
ISSUE: Is the right to succession deemed to have transmitted only from the date of the execution of an
extrajudicial partition thereby rendering the sale of the land to respondent invalid?
RULING: NO. The hereditary share in a decedents' estate is transmitted or vested immediately from the
moment of the death of the "causante" or predecessor in interest (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art.
777), and there is no legal bar to a successor (with requisite contracting capacity) disposing of his
hereditary share immediately after such death, even if the actual extent of such share is not determined
until the subsequent liquidation of the estate (De Borja v. Vda. de Borja, 46 SCRA 577 [1972]).
Teodorica Babangha died long before World War II, hence, the rights to the succession were transmitted
from the moment of her death. It is therefore incorrect to state that it was only in 1966, the date of
extrajudicial partition, when Ricardo received his share in the lot as inheritance from his mother
Teodorica. Thus, when Ricardo sold his share over lot 2476 that share which he inherited from
Teodorica was also included unless expressly excluded in the deed of sale.
LOCSIN v. CA
FACTS: During the lifetime of Dona Catalina Locsin, she executed a will affirming and ratifying the
transfer she made during her lifetime in favour of her husband and her own own relatives. After the will
was read all relatives agreed that there was no need to submit it to probate. Six years after the death of
testatrix some of her nephews and nieces (surnamed Jaucian) who had already received their legacies
and hereditary shares from the estate filed an action to recover the properties which the testatrix
conveyed to the Locsins during her lifetime, averring that the same were inofficious, without
consideration and intended to circumvent the laws on succession. Both the RTC and CA decided the
case in favour of Locsins. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Are private respondents, nephew and nieces of testatrix entitled to inherit the properties which
she had already disposed of ten years before her death?
RULING: NO. The trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the private respondents,
nephews and nieces of Doa Catalina J. Vda. de Locsin, entitled to inherit the properties which she had
already disposed of more than ten (10) years before her death. For those properties did not form part of
her hereditary estate, i.e., "the property and transmissible rights and obligations existing at the time of
(the decedent's) death and those which have accrued thereto since the opening of the succession." The
rights to a person's succession are transmitted from the moment of his death, and do not vest in his heirs
until such time. Property which Doa Catalina had transferred or conveyed to other persons during her
lifetime no longer formed part of her estate at the time of her death to which her heirs may lay claim.
Had she died intestate, only the property that remained in her estate at the time of her death devolved to
her legal heirs; and even if those transfers were, one and all, treated as donations, the right arising under
certain circumstances to impugn and compel the reduction or revocation of a decedent's gifts inter vivos
does not inure to the respondents since neither they nor the donees are compulsory (or forced) heirs. All
that the respondents had was an expectancy that in nowise restricted her freedom to dispose of even her
entire estate subject only to the limitation set forth in Art. 750, Civil Code which, even if it were
breached, the respondents may not invoke:
Art. 750. The donation may comprehend all the present property of the donor or part thereof,
provided he reserves, in full ownership or in usufruct, sufficient means for the support of
himself, and of all relatives who, at the time of the acceptance of the donation, are by law
entitled to be supported by the donor. Without such reservation, the donation shall be reduced
on petition of any person affected.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in not dismissing this action for annulment and
reconveyance on the ground of prescription. Commenced decades after the transactions had
been consummated, and six (6) years after Doa Catalina's death, it prescribed four (4) years
after the subject transactions were recorded in the Registry of Property, whether considered an
action based on fraud, or one to redress an injury to the rights of the plaintiffs. The private
respondents may not feign ignorance of said transactions because the registration of the deeds
was constructive notice thereof to them and the whole world.
OPULENCIA v. CA
FACTS: In a complaint for specific performance filed with the court a quo Aladin Simundac
and Miguel Oliven (private respondents) alleged that Natalia Opulencia (petitioner) executed in
their favor a CONTRACT TO SELL Lot 2125 of the Sta. Rosa Estate, consisting of 23,766
square meters located in Sta. Rosa, Laguna at P150.00 per square meter; that plaintiffs paid a
downpayment of P300,000.00 but defendant, despite demands, failed to comply with her
obligations under the contract. [Private respondents] therefore prayed that [petitioner] be
ordered to perform her contractual obligations and to further pay damages, attorneys fee and
litigation expenses. Opulencia put forward the following affirmative defenses: that the property
subject of the contract formed part of the Estate of Demetrio Carpena (petitioners father), in
respect of which a petition for probate was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Laguna; that
at the time the contract was executed, the parties were aware of the pendency of the probate
proceeding; that the contract to sell was not approved by the probate court; that realizing the
nullity of the contract [petitioner] had offered to return the downpayment received from [private
respondents], but the latter refused to accept it; that [private respondents] further failed to
provide funds for the tenant who demanded P150,00.00 in payment of his tenancy rights on the
land; that [petitioner] had chosen to rescind the contract. With these defenses, Opulencia denies
the validity and efficacy of the contract to sell.
ISSUE: Is the Contract to Sell dated February 3, 1989 executed by the petitioner and private
respondents without the requisite probate court approval valid
RULING: The contract is VALID. Hereditary rights are vested in the heir or heirs from the
moment of the decedents death. Petitioner, therefore, became the owner of her hereditary share
the moment her father died. Thus, the lack of judicial approval does not invalidate the Contract
to Sell, because the petitioner has the substantive right to sell the whole or a part of her share in
the estate of her late father. Article 440 of the Civil Code provides that the possession of
hereditary property is deemed to be transmitted to the heir without interruption from the instant
of the death of the decedent, in case the inheritance be accepted. upon the death of a person,
each of his heirs becomes the undivided owner of the whole estate left with respect to the part
or portion which might be adjudicated to him, a community of ownership being thus formed
among the co-owners of the estate while it remains undivided. Hence, where some of the heirs,
without the concurrence of the others, sold a property left by their deceased father, this Court,
speaking thru its then Chief Justice Cayetano Arellano, said that the sale was valid, but that the
effect thereof was limited to the share which may be allotted to the vendors upon the partition of the
estate.
EMNACE v CA
FACTS: Petitioner Emilio Emance, Vicente Tabanao and Jacinto Divinagracia were partners in a
business known as Ma. Nelma Fishing Industry. Sometime in January 1986, they decided to dissolve
their partnership and executed an agreement of partition and distribution of the partnership properties
among them, consequent to Divinagracias withdrawal from the partnership. Throughout the existence
of the partnership, and even after Vicente Tabanaos untimely demise, petitioner failed to submit to
Tabanaos heirs any statement of assets and liabilities of the partnership, and to render accounting of the
partnership finances. Petitioner also reneged on his promise to turn over to Tabanaos heirs the
deceaseds 1/3 share in the total assets of the partnership. Consequently, Tabanaos heirs, respondents
herein, filed against petitioner an action for accounting, payment of shares division of assets and
damages. Petitioner asserts that the surviving spouse of Vicente Tabanao has no legal capacity to sue
since she was never appointed as administratrix or executrix of his estate.
ISSUE: In the absence of an appointment as administratrix or executrix of an estate, does a surviving
spouse (and other heirs) have legal capacity to sue on behalf of the estate of the deceased spouse?
RULING: YES. A prior settlement of the estate, or even the appointment of the surviving spouse as
executrix or administratrix, is not necessary for any of the heirs to acquire legal capacity to sue. As
successors who stepped into the shoes of their decedent upon his death, they can commence any action
originally pertaining to the decedent. She and her children are complainants in their own right as
successors of Vicente Tabanao. From the very moment of the death of the decedent, his rights insofar as
the partnership was concerned were transmitted to his heirs, for rights to the succession are transmitted
from the moment of the death of the decedent (CIVIL CODE, Art. 777). Whatever claims and rights the
deceased had against the partnership and petitioner were transmitted to his heirs by operation of law,
more particularly by succession, which is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights
and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted. Respondents
became owners of their respective hereditary shares from the moment Vicente Tabanao died. From the
moment of his death, his rights as a partner and to demand fulfillment of petitioners obligations were
transmitted to respondents. They, therefore, had the capacity to sue and seek the courts intervention to
compel petitioner to fulfill his obligations.
RABADILLA v CA
FACTS: Testator Aleja Belleza appended a codicil to his last will and testament wherein he instituted Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla as a devisee of a parcel of land in Bacolod. Devisee herein is the predecessor-ininterest
of the petitioner. The codicil was duly probated and admitted before the CFI of Negros Occidental. The
codicil stated that should the devisee die ahead of the testator, the property and rights shall be inherited
by his children and spouse. The codicil also required Rabadilla to deliver 75 piculs of export sugar and
25 piculs of domestic sugar to Maria Marlina Cosculuella y Belleza, and should he die, his heir shall
have the same obligation. Lastly, in the event that the devisee or his heir shall later sell, lease, mortgage
the said lot, the buyer, lessee, mortgagee shall also have the obligation to deliver the piculs. Dr.
Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wife and children (pet).In 1989, Maria Marlena brought
a complaint against the heirs to enforce the provisions of the codicil and to revert the ownership to the
heirs of the testator. The RTC dismissed the complaint. The appellate court reversed the decision of the
trial court.
ISSUES: 1. Did the heirs of Jorge Rabadilla inherited his obligations under the Codicil 2. Was there a
substitution?
RULING: 1. YES. Under Article 776 of the New Civil Code, inheritance includes all the
property, rights and obligations of a person, not extinguished by his death. Conformably,
whatever rights Dr. Jorge Rabadilla had by virtue of subject Codicil were transmitted to his
forced heirs, at the time of his death. And since obligations not extinguished by death also form
part of the estate of the decedent; corollarily, the obligations imposed by the Codicil on the
deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his death.
2. NONE. Substitution is the designation by the testator of a person or persons to take the place
of the heir or heirs first instituted. Under substitutions in general, the testator may either (1)
provide for the designation of another heir to whom the property shall pass in case the original
heir should die before him/her, renounce the inheritance or be incapacitated to inherit, as in a
simple substitution, or (2) leave his/her property to one person with the express charge that it be
transmitted subsequently to another or others, as in a fideicommissary substitution. The Codicil
sued upon contemplates neither of the two. In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the
inheritance in default of the first heir by reason of incapacity, predecease or renunciation. In the
case under consideration, the provisions of subject Codicil do not provide that should Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla default due to predecease, incapacity or renunciation, the testatrix's near descendants
would substitute him. What the Codicil provides is that, should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs
not fulfill the conditions imposed in the Codicil, the property referred to shall be seized and
turned over to the testatrix's near descendants. Neither is there a fideicommissary substitution.
In a fideicommissary substitution, the first heir is strictly mandated to preserve the property and
to transmit the same later to the second heir. In the case under consideration, the instituted heir
is in fact allowed under the Codicil to alienate the property provided the negotiation is with the
near descendants or the sister of the testatrix. Thus, a very important element of a
fideicommissary substitution is lacking; the obligation clearly imposing upon the first heir the
preservation of the property and its transmission to the second heir. "Without this obligation to
preserve clearly imposed by the testator in his will, there is no fideicommissary substitution."
Also, the near descendants' right to inherit from the testatrix is not definite. The property will
only pass to them should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the obligation to deliver part
of the usufruct to private respondent.
Another important element of a fideicommissary substitution is also missing. Under Article
863, the second heir or the fideicommissary to whom the property is transmitted must not be
beyond one degree from the first heir or the fiduciary. A fideicommissary substitution is
therefore, void if the first heir is not related by first degree to the second heir. In the case under
scrutiny, the near descendants are not at all related to the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.
TANEDO v. CA
FACTS: On October 20, 1962, Lazardo Taedo executed a notarized deed of absolute sale in
favor of his eldest brother, Ricardo Taedo, and the latters wife, Teresita Barera, whereby he
conveyed to the latter in consideration of P1,500.00, one hectare of whatever share I shall have
over Lot No. 191 of the cadastral survey of Gerona, Province of Tarlac, the said property being
his future inheritance from his parents. Upon the death of his father, Lazaro executed an
Affidavit of Conformity dated February 28, 1980 to re-affirm, respect, acknowledge and
validate the sale he made in 1962. On January 13, 1981, Lazaro executed another notarized
deed of sale in favor of private respondents covering his undivided ONE TWELVE (1/12) of a
parcel of land known as Lot 191. He acknowledged therein his receipt of P 10,000.00 as
consideration therefor. In February 1981, Ricardo learned that Lazaro sold the same property to
his children, petitioners herein, through a deed of sale dated December 29, 1980. On June 7,
1982, private respondents recorded the Deed of Sale in their favor in the Registry of Deeds and
the corresponding entry was made in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 166451.
ISSUE: Is a sale of future inheritance valid?
RULING: NO. Pursuant to Article 1347 of the Civil Code, no contract may be entered into upon a
future inheritance except in cases expressly authorized by law. Consequently, said contracts made in
1962 conveying one (1) hectare of his future inheritance is not valid and cannot be the source of any
right nor the creator of any obligation between parties. Hence, the affidavit of conformity dated
February 28, 1980, insofar as it sought to validate or ratify the 1962 sale is also useless and in the words
of the respondent Court, suffers the same infirmity.
SANTOS vs. LUMBAO
FACTS: Herein petitioners, all surnamed Santos, are the legitimate and surviving heirs of the late Rita
Catoc Santos. Herein respondents Spouses Lumbao are the alleged owners of a lot (subject property),
which they purportedly bought from Rita during her lifetime. The facts of the present case are as
follows: On two separate occasions during her lifetime, Rita sold to respondents Spouses Lumbao the
subject property which is a part of her share in the estate of her deceased mother, Maria Catoc. Rita sold
100 square meters of her inchoate share in her mothers estate through a document denominated as
Bilihan ng Lupa. After acquiring the subject property, respondents Spouses Lumbao took actual
possession thereof and erected thereon a house which they have been occupying as exclusive owners up
to the present. As the exclusive owners of the subject property, respondents Spouses Lumbao made
several verbal demands upon Rita, during her lifetime, and thereafter upon herein petitioners, for them
to execute the necessary documents to effect the issuance of a separate title in favor of respondents
insofar as the subject property is concerned. Respondents alleged that prior to her death, Rita informed
respondent Proserfina Lumbao she could not deliver the title to the subject property because the entire
property inherited by her and her coheirs from Maria had not yet been partitioned. After the death of
Rita, petitioners executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement adjudicating and partitioning among
themselves and the other heirs, the estate left by Maria, which included the subject property already sold
to respondents.
ISSUE: Are petitioner heirs legally bound to comply with the Bilihan ng Lupa that was supposedly
executed by the late Rita Catoc?
RULING: YES. The general rule that heirs are bound by contracts entered into by their predecessorsin-
interest applies in the present case. Article 1311 of the NCC is the basis of this rule. It is clear from the
said provision that whatever rights and obligations the decedent have over the property were transmitted
to the heirs by way of succession, a mode of acquiring the property, rights and obligations of the
decedent to the extent of the value of the inheritance of the heirs. Thus, the heirs cannot escape the legal
consequence of a transaction entered into by their predecessor-in-interest because they have inherited
the property subject to the liability affecting their common ancestor. Being heirs, there is privity of
interest between them and their deceased mother. They only succeed to what rights their mother had and
what is valid and binding against her is also valid and binding as against them. The death of a party does
not excuse nonperformance of a contract which involves a property right and the rights and obligations
thereunder pass to the personal representatives of the deceased. Similarly, nonperformance is not
excused by the death of the party when the other party has a property interest in the subject matter of the
contract.
NHA v ALMEIDA
FACTS: The Land Tenure Administration (now the National Housing Authority), awarded to Margarita
Herrera several portions of land evidenced by an Agreement to Sell No. 3787. Margarita Herrera had
two children: Beatriz Herrera-Mercado (mother of the private respondent) and Francisca Herrera.
Beatriz predeceased her mother and left heirs. After Margaritas death, Francisca executed a
Deed of Self-Adjudication, claiming that she is the only remaining relative, being the sole
surviving daughter of the deceased. She also claimed to be the exclusive legal heir of Margarita.
The Deed of Self Adjudication was based on a Sinumpaang Salaysay allegedly executed by
Margarita, wherein she stated that it was Francisca who continued paying for the subject
portions of land and that she conveys said portions of land to Francisca. It was also stated that
the Sinumpaang Salaysay shall take effect upon the death of Margarita. The surviving heirs of
Beatriz filed a case for annulment of the Deed of Self Adjudication. The CFI declared the deed
as null and void. However, during the trial of the case for annulment of the Deed, Francisca
filed an application with the NHA to purchase the same portions of land submitting therewith a
copy of the Sinumpaang Salaysay executed by her mother. Private respondent Almeida
protested the application. The NHA granted the application. When Francisca died, her heirs
executed an extrajudicial settlement of her estate which they submitted to the NHA. The NHA
executed several deeds of sale in favor of the heirs of Francisca. Almeida sought the
cancellation of the titles issued in favor of Franciscas heirs. The RTC and the CA both ruled
that the Sinumpaang Salaysay was not an assignment of rights to Francisca but a disposition of
property which shall take effect upon death. They also held that said document must first be
submitted to probate before it can transfer property.
ISSUE: Is the Sinumpaang Salaysay executed by Margarita Herrera her last will?
RULING: YES. The NHA should have noted that the Sinumpaang Salaysays effectivity
commences at the time of death of the author of the instrument; in Margaritas words sakaling
akoy bawian na ng Dios ng aking buhay Hence, in such period, all the interests of the
person should cease to be hers and shall be in the possession of her estate until they are
transferred to her heirs by virtue of a will or by operation of law, as provided in Article 774 of
the Civil Code. By considering the document, petitioner NHA should have noted that the
original applicant (Margarita) has already passed away. Margarita Herrera passed away on
October 27, 1971. The NHA issued its resolution on February 5, 1986. The NHA gave due
course to the application made by Francisca Herrera without considering that the initial
applicant's death would transfer all her property, rights and obligations to the estate including
whatever interest she has or may have had over the disputed properties. To the extent of the
interest that the original owner had over the property, the same should go to her estate.
Margarita Herrera had an interest in the property and that interest should go to her estate upon
her demise so as to be able to properly distribute them later to her heirsin accordance with a
will or by operation of law.
The death of Margarita Herrera does not extinguish her interest over the property. Margarita
Herrera had an existing Contract to Sell with NHA as the seller. Upon Margarita Herrera's
demise, this Contract to Sell was neither nullified nor revoked. This Contract to Sell was an
obligation on both parties Margarita Herrera and NHA. Obligations are transmissible.
Margarita Herrera's obligation to pay became transmissible at the time of her death either by
will or by operation of law. If we sustain the position of the NHA that this document is not a
will, then the interests of the decedent should transfer by virtue of an operation of law and not
by virtue of a resolution by the NHA. For as it stands, NHA cannot make another contract to
sell to other parties of a property already initially paid for by the decedent. Such would be an
act contrary to the law on succession and the law on sales and obligations.
When the original buyer died, the NHA should have considered the estate of the decedent as the
next "person likely to stand in to fulfill the obligation to pay the rest of the purchase price.
CONDE V. ABAYA
FACTS: Casiano Abaya, unmarried, the son of Romualdo Abaya and Sabina Labadia, died. Paula
Conde, as the mother of the natural children Jose and Teopista Conde, whom she states she had by
Casiano Abaya, moved the settlement of' the said intestate succession. Roman Abaya, brother of
Casiano, was appointed as administrator claiming himself as the nearest relative of the deceased. Roman
Abaya moved that the court declare him to be the sole heir of Casiano Abaya, to the exclusion of all
other persons, especially of Paula Conde, and to be therefore entitled to take possession of all the
property of said estate, and that it be adjudicated to him.
Paula Conde, in reply, claims that her right was superior and moved for a hearing of the matter, and, in
consequence of the evidence that she intended to present she prayed that she be declared to have
preferential rights to the property left by Casiano Abaya, and that the same be adjudicated to her
together with the corresponding products thereof. The trial held that the administrator of the estate of
Casiano Abaya should recognize Teopista and Jose Conde as being natural children of Casiano Abaya;
that the petitioner Paula Conde should succeed to the hereditary rights of her children with respect to the
inheritance of their deceased natural father Casiano Abaya; and therefore, it is hereby declared that she
is the only heir to the property of the said intestate estate, to the exclusion of the administrator, Roman
Abaya.
ISSUE: Is an action for acknowledgment by a natural child transmissible as a portion of his inheritance
to his ascendants or descendants?
RULING: NO. As a general rule, the right of action of a child to enforce recognition of its legitimacy
lasts during the lifetime of such child, but the right of a natural child to compel acknowledgment of its
status continues only during the life of the alleged parents. The right of action for a declaration of
legitimacy is transmitted to the heirs of the child only when - the latter dies during minority or while
insane, or in case the action has already been instituted. On the other hand an action by a natural child
can only be brought against the heirs of the parents in the event of the death of the parents during the
minority of the child, or upon the discovery of a document, after the death of the parents, expressly
acknowledging such child. This right of action which the law concedes to this natural child is not
transmitted to his ascendants or descendants. Therefore, the respective corollary of each of the two
above-cited articles is: (1) That the right of action which devolves upon the child to claim his legitimacy
under article 118, may be transmitted to his heirs in certain cases designated in the said article; (2) That
the right of action for the acknowledgment of natural children to which article 137 refers, can never be
transmitted, for the reason that the code makes no mention of it in any case, not even as an exception. It
is evident that the right of action to claim his legitimacy is not one of those rights which the legitimate
child may transmit by inheritance to his heirs; it forms no part of the component rights of his
inheritance. If it were so, there would have been no necessity to establish its transmissibility to heirs as
an exception in the terms and conditions of article 118 of the code. So that, in order that it may
constitute a portion of the child's inheritance, it is necessary that the conditions and the terms contained
in article 118 shall be present, since without them, the right that the child held during his lifetime, being
personal and exclusive in principle, and therefore, as a general rule not susceptible of transmission,
would and should have been extinguished by his death. Therefore, where no express provision like that
of article 118 exists, the right of action for the acknowledgment of a natural child is, in principle and
without exception, extinguished by his death, and cannot be transmitted as a portion of the inheritance of
the deceased child.
PAMPLONA v. CA
FACTS: Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega were husband and wife. During their marriage, they
acquired adjacent lots 1495, 4545, and 1496 of the Calamba Friar Land Estate, situated in Calamba,
Laguna. The spouses Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega begot during their marriage six (6) children,
namely, Ursulo, Marta, La Paz, Alipio, Pablo, and Leandro, all surnamed Moreto. Ursulo Moreto died
intestate on May 24, 1959 leaving as his heirs herein plaintiffs Vivencio, Marcelo, Rosario,
Victor, Paulina, Marta and Eligio, all surnamed Moreto. Marta Moreto died also intestate on
April 30, 1938 leaving as her heir plaintiff Victoria Tuiza. La Paz Moreto died intestate on July
17, 1954 leaving the following heirs, namely, herein plaintiffs Pablo, Severina, Lazaro, and
Lorenzo, all surnamed Mendoza. Alipio Moreto died intestate on June 30, 1943 leaving as his
heir herein plaintiff Josefina Moreto. Pablo Moreto died intestate on April 25, 1942 leaving no
issue and as his heirs his brother plaintiff Leandro Moreto and the other plaintiffs herein. On
May 6, 1946, Monica Maniega died intestate in Calamba, Laguna. On July 30, 1952, or more
than six (6) years after the death of his wife Monica Maniega, Flaviano Moreto, without the
consent of the heirs of his said deceased wife Monica, and before any liquidation of the
conjugal partnership of Monica and Flaviano could be effected, executed in favor of Geminiano
Pamplona, married to defendant Apolonia Onte, the deed of absolute sale covering lot No. 1495
for P900.00. The deed of sale contained a description of lot No. 1495 as having an area of 781
square meters and covered by transfer certificate of title No. 14570 issued in the name of
Flaviano Moreto, married to Monica Maniega, although the lot was acquired during their
marriage. As a result of the sale, the said certificate of title was cancelled and a new transfer
certificate of title no. T-5671 was issued in the name of Geminiano Pamplona married to
Apolonia Onte.
After the execution of the above-mentioned deed of sale, the spouses Geminiano Pamplona and
Apolonia Onte constructed their house on the eastern part of lot 1496 as Flaviano Moreto, at the
time of the sale, pointed to it as the land which he sold to Geminiano Pamplona. Shortly
thereafter, Rafael Pamplona, son of the spouses Geminiano Pamplona and Apolonia Onte, also
built his house within lot 1496 about one meter from its boundary with the adjoining lot. The
vendor Flaviano Moreto and the vendee Geminiano Pamplona thought all the time that the
portion of 781 square meters which was the subject matter of their sale transaction was No.
1495 and so lot No. 1495 appears to be the subject matter in the deed of sale although the fact is
that the said portion sold thought of by the parties to be lot No. 1495 is a part of lot No. 1496.
From 1956 to 1960, the spouses Geminiano Pamplona and Apolonio Onte enlarged their house
and they even constructed a piggery corral at the back of their said house about one and one-
half meters from the eastern boundary of lot 1496. On August 12, 1956, Flaviano Moreto died
intestate. In 1961, the plaintiffs demanded on the defendants to vacate the premises where they
had their house and piggery on the ground that Flaviano Moreto had no right to sell the lot
which he sold to Geminiano Pamplona as the same belongs to the conjugal partnership of
Flaviano and his deceased wife and the latter was already dead when the sale was executed
without the consent of the plaintiffs who are the heirs of Monica. The spouses Geminiano
Pamplona and Apolonia Onte refused to vacate the premises occupied by them and hence, this
suit was instituted by the heirs of Monica Maniega seeking for the declaration of the nullity of
the deed of sale of July 30, 1952 as regards one-half of the property subject matter of said deed;
to declare the plaintiffs as the rightful owners of the other half of said lot; to allow the plaintiffs
to redeem the one-half portion thereof sold to the defendants. After a relocation of lots 1495,
1496 and 4545 made by agreement of the parties, it was found out that there was mutual error
between Flaviano Moreto and the defendants in the execution of the deed of sale because while
the said deed recited that the lot sold is lot No. 1495, the real intention of the parties is that it
was a portion consisting of 781 square meters of lot No. 1496 which was the subject matter of
their sale transaction.
ISSUE: Does Moreto have the right to sell the property without the consent of the wifes heirs,
considering that the subject property is part of the conjugal partnership and that the sale was
made when the wife was already dead?
RULING: YES. The Court held that at the time of the sale in 1952, the conjugal partnership
was already dissolved six years before and therefore, the estate became a co-ownership between
Flaviano Moreto, the surviving husband, and the heirs of his deceased wife, Monica Maniega. Article
493 of the New Civil Code is applicable. The Court held that there was a partial partition of the
coownership when at the time of the sale Flaviano Moreto pointed out the area and location of the 781
sq. meters sold by him to the petitioners-vendees on which the latter built their house and also that
whereon Rafael, the son of petitioners likewise erected his house and an adjacent coral for piggery. The
Court rejected CAs pronouncement that the sale was valid as to one-half and invalid as to the other half
for the very simple reason that Flaviano Moreto, the vendor, had the legal right to more than 781 sq.
meters of the communal estate, a title which he could dispose, alienate in favor of the vendees-
petitioners. The title may be pro indiviso or inchoate but the moment the co-owner as vendor pointed out
its location and even indicated the boundaries over which the fences were to be erectd without objection,
protest or complaint by the other co-owners, on the contrary they acquiesced and tolerated such
alienation, occupation and possession, the Court ruled that a factual partition or termination of the co-
ownership, although partial, was created, and barred not only the vendor, Flaviano Moreto, but also his
heirs, the private respondents herein from asserting as against the vendees petitioners any right or title in
derogation of the deed of sale executed by said vendor Flaviano Moreto. Lastly, equity commands that
the private respondents, the successors of both the deceased spouses, Flaviano Moreto and Monica
Maniega be not allowed to impugn the sale executed by Flaviano Moreto who indisputably received the
consideration of P900.00 and which he, including his children, benefitted from the same. Moreover, as
the heirs of both Monica Maniega and Flaviano Moreto, private respondents are duty-bound to comply
with the provisions of Articles 1458 and 1495, Civil Code, which is the obligation of the vendor of the
property of delivering and transferring the ownership of the whole property sold, which is transmitted on
his death to his heirs, the herein private respondents. Under Article 776, New Civil Code, the inheritance
which private respondents received from their deceased parents and/or predecessors-in-interest included
all the property rights and obligations which were not extinguished by their parents' death. And under
Art. 1311, paragraph 1, New Civil Code, the contract of sale executed by the deceased Flaviano Moreto
took effect between the parties, their assigns and heirs, who are the private respondents herein.
Accordingly, to the private respondents is transmitted the obligation to deliver in full ownership the
whole area of 781 sq. meters to the petitioners (which was the original obligation of their predecessor
Flaviano Moreto) and not only one-half thereof. Private respondents must comply with said obligation.
The records reveal that the area of 781 sq. meters sold to and occupied by petitioners for more than 9
years already as of the filing of the complaint in 1961 had been re-surveyed by private land surveyor
Daniel Aranas. Petitioners are entitled to a segregation of the area from Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-9843 covering Lot 1496 and they are also entitled to the issuance of a new Transfer Certificate of Title
in their name based on the relocation survey.
PEOPLE v UMALI
FACTS: Pierre Pangan a minor was investigated for drug dependency and for an alleged crime of
robbery. As Pierre Pangan is a minor, the police investigators sought the presence of his parents.
Leopoldo Pangan, father of the minor was invited to the police headquarters and was informed about the
problem of his son. Mr. Pangan asked the police investigators if something could be done to determine
the source of the marijuana which has not only socially affected his son, but other minors in the
community. The police then sought the help of Francisco Manalo. Previous to the case of Pierre Pangan
was the case of Francisco Manalo, who was likewise investigated by operatives and for which a case for
violation of the Dangerous Drug Act was filed against him. Aside from said case, accused Francisco
Manalo was likewise facing other charges such as concealment of deadly weapon and other crimes
against property. Manalo agreed to help in the identification of the source of the marijuana. Manalo
returned with two (2) foils of dried marijuana which he allegedly bought from the accused Gloria Umali.
Gloria Umali and Suzeth Umali were charged for violation of Section 4, Article 1 of the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972. The lower court rendered a decision finding accused Gloria Umali guilty beyond
reasonable doubt. The appellant denied the findings of the lower court and insisted that said court
committed reversible errors in convicting her. She alleged that witness Francisco Manalo is not reputed
to be trustworthy and reliable and that his words should not be taken on its face value.
Furthermore, he stressed that said witness has several charges in court and because of his desire
to have some of his cases dismissed, he was likely to tell falsehood. The plaintiff-appellee
through the Solicitor General said that even if Francisco Manalo was then facing several
criminal charges when he testified, such fact did not in any way disqualify him as a witness. His
testimony is not only reasonable and probable but more so, it was also corroborated in its
material respect by the other prosecution witnesses, especially the police officers.
ISSUE: Is a person facing several criminal charges disqualified from being a witness?
RULING: NO. The phrase "conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law" takes into
account Article 821 of the Civil Code which states that persons convicted of falsification of a
document, perjury or false testimony" are disqualified from being witnesses to a will." Since the
witness Francisco Manalo is not convicted of any of the abovementioned crimes to disqualify
him as a witness and this case does not involve the probate of a will, the Court ruled that the
fact that said witness is facing several criminal charges when he testified did not in any way
disqualify him as a witness. The testimony of a witness should be given full faith and credit, in
the absence of evidence that he was actuated by improper motive. Hence, in the absence of any
evidence that witness Francisco Manalo was actuated by improper motive, his testimony must
be accorded full credence.
DOLAR v DIANCIN
FACTS: The will of the deceased Paulino Diancin was denied probate in the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo on the sole ground that the thumbmarks appearing thereon were not the
thumbmarks of the testator. Disregarding the other errors assigned by the proponent of the will,
we would direct attention to the third error which challenges squarely the correctness of this
finding. The will in question is alleged to have been executed by Paulino Diancin at Dumangas,
Iloilo, on November 13, 1927. A thumbmark appears at the end of the will and on the left hand
margin of each of its pages in the following manner: "Paulino Diancin, Su Signo, Por Pedro
Diamante." The witnesses to the will were the same Pedro Diamante, Inocentes Deocampo, and
Juan Dominado. The will is detailed in nature, and disposes of an estate amounting
approximately to P50,000.
ISSUE: Is the disputed will valid despite the fact that there was a thumbmark instead of a
signature in the will?
RULING: YES. The requirement of the statute that the will shall be "signed" is satisfied not
only the customary written signature but also by the testator's or testatrix' thumbmark. Expert
Testimonyas to the identity of thumbmarks or fingerprints is of course admissible. The method
of identification of fingerprints is a science requiring close study .Where thumb impressions are
blurred and many of the characteristic marks far from clear, thus rendering it difficult to trace
the features enumerated by experts as showing the identity or lack of identity of the
impressions, the court is justified in refusing to accept the opinions of alleged experts and in
substituting its own opinion that a distinct similarity in some respects between the admittedly
genuine thumbmark and the questioned thumbmarks, is evident .This we do here.
There is another means of approach to the question and an obvious one. The three instrumental
witnesses united in testifying concerning the circumstances surrounding the execution of the
will. It was stated that in addition to the testator and themselves, on other person, Diosdado
Dominado, was present. This latter individual was called as a witness by the oppositors to the
will to identify Exhibit 8. He was later placed on the witness stand by the proponent on rebuttal,
and thereupon declared positively that he was the one who prepared the will for the signature of Paulino
Diancin; that the thumbmarks appearing on the will were those of Paulino Diancin, and that he saw
Paulino Diancin make these impressions. The testimony of a witness called by both parties is worthy of
credit. We reach the very definite conclusion that the document presented for probate as the last will of
the deceased Paulino Diancin was, in truth, his will, and that the thumbmarks appearing thereon were
the thumbmarks of the testator .Accordingly, error is found, which means that the judgment appealed
from must be, as it is hereby, reversed, and the will ordered admitted to probate, without special finding
as to costs in this instance.
YAP TUA v. YAP KA KUAN
FACTS: In 1909, Perfecto Gabriel, representing the petitioner, Yap Tua, presented a petition in the Court
of First Instance of the city of Manila, asking that the will of Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong be admitted to
probate, as the last will and testament of Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong, deceased. It appears that the will
was signed by the deceased, as well as Anselmo Zacarias, Severo Tabora, and Timoteo Paez. The judge
ordered that the last will and testament of Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong be allowed and admitted to
probate. The court further ordered that one Yap Tua be appointed as executor of the will, upon the giving
of a bond, the amount of which was to be fixed later. In 1910, Yap Ca Kuan and Yap Ca Llu appeared
and presented a petition, alleging that they were interested in the matters of the said will and desired to
intervene and asked that a guardian ad litem be appointed to represent them in the cause. The court
appointed Gabriel La O as guardian ad litem of said parties. In his motion, he alleged the following:
First. That the will dated the 11th day of August, 1909, and admitted to probate by order of the court on
the 29th day of September, 1909, was null, for the following reasons: (a) Because the same had not been
authorized nor signed by the witnesses as the law prescribes. (b) Because at the time of the execution of
the will, the said Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong was not then mentally capacitated to execute the same, due
to her sickness. (c) Because her signature to the will had been obtained through fraud and illegal
influence upon the part of persons who were to receive a benefit from the same, and because the said
Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong had no intention of executing the same. Second. That before the execution
of the said will, which they alleged to be null, the said Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong had executed another
will, with all the formalities required by law, upon the 6th day of August, 1909. Third. That the said Yap
Ca Kuan and Yap Ca Llu were minors and that, even though they had been negligent in presenting their
opposition to the legalization of the will, said negligence was excusable, on account of their age. Upon
the foregoing facts the court was requested to annul and set aside the order allowing and admitting the
will to probate.
ISSUE: Did Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong execute, freely and voluntarily, while she was in the right use of
all her faculties, the will dated August 11, 1909?
RULING: YES. While it is true that some of the witnesses testified that the brother of Tomasa, one
Lorenzo, had attempted to unduly influence her mind in the execution of he will, upon the other hand,
there were several witnesses who testified that Lorenzo did not attempt, at the time of the execution of
the will, to influence her mind in any way. The lower court having had an opportunity to see, to hear,
and to note the witnesses during their examination reached the conclusion that a preponderance of the
evidence showed that no undue influence had been used. While the testimony of Dr. Papa is very strong
relating to the mental condition of Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong, yet, nevertheless, his testimony related to
a time perhaps twenty-four hours before the execution of the will in question. Several witnesses testified
that at the time the will was presented to her for her signature, she was of sound mind and memory and
asked for a pen and ink and kept the will in her possession for ten or fifteen minutes and finally signed
it. The lower court found that there was a preponderance of evidence sustaining the conclusion that
Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong was of sound mind and memory and in the possession of her faculties at the
time she signed this will. Also, the mere fact that she executed a former will is no proof that she did not
execute a later will. She had a perfect right, by will, to dispose of her property, in accordance with the
provisions of law, up to the very last of moment her life. She had a perfect right to change, alter, modify
or revoke any and all of her former wills and to make a new one. Neither will the fact that the
new will fails to expressly revoke all former wills, in any way sustain the charge that she did
not make the new will.
In another assignment of error there is involved in the statement that "The signature of Tomasa
Elizaga Yap Caong, in her first will was not identical with that which appears in her second
will. Several witnesses testified that they saw her write the name "Tomasa." One of the
witnesses testified that she had written her full name. The Court is of the opinion that if Tomasa
Elizaga Yap Caong signed any portion of her name to the will, with the intention to sign the
same, that the will amount to a signature. It has been held time and time again that one who
makes a will may sign the
same by using a mark, the name having been written by others. If writing a mark simply upon a
will is sufficient indication of the intention of the person to make and execute a will, then
certainly the writing of a portion or all of her name ought to be accepted as a clear indication of
her intention to execute the will. With reference to the fourth assignment of error, it may be said
that during the trial of the cause, the protestants made a strong effort to show that Tomasa
Elizaga Yap Caong did not sign her name in the presence of the witnesses and that they did not
sign their names in their presence nor in the presence of each other. Upon that question there is
considerable conflict of proof. An effort was made to show that the will was signed by the
witnesses in one room and by Tomasa in another. A plan of the room or rooms in which the will
was signed was presented as proof and it was shown that there was but one room; that one part
of the room was one or two steps below the floor of the other; that the table on which the
witnesses signed the will was located upon the lower floor of the room. It was also shown that
from the bed in which Tomasa was lying, it was possible for her to see the table on which the
witnesses signed the will. While the rule is absolute that one who makes a will must sign the
same in the presence of the witnesses and that the witnesses must sign in the presence of each
other, as well as in the presence of the one making the will, yet, nevertheless, the actual seeing
of the signatures made is not necessary. It is sufficient if the signatures are made where it is
possible for each of the necessary parties, if they desire to see, may see the signatures placed
upon the will. Upon a full consideration of the record, the Court finds that a preponderance of
the proof shows that Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong did execute, freely and voluntarily, while she
was in the right use of all her faculties, the will dated August 11, 1909.
AVERA v GARCIA
FACTS: In proceedings in the court below, instituted by Eutiquia Avera for probate of the will
of one Esteban Garcia, contest was made by Marino Garcia and Juan Rodriguez. Upon the date
appointed for the hearing, the proponent of the will introduced one of the three attesting
witnesses who testified that the will was executed with all necessary external formalities, and
that the testator was at the time in full possession of disposing faculties. Upon the latter point
the witness was corroborated by the person who wrote the will at the request of the testator.
Two of the attesting witnesses were not introduced, nor was their absence accounted for by the
proponent of the will.
When the proponent rested the attorney for the opposition introduced a single witness whose
testimony tended to show in a vague and indecisive manner that at the time the will was made
the testator was so debilitated as to be unable to comprehend what he was about. Judge found
that the testator at the time of the making of the will was of sound mind and disposing memory
and that the will had been properly executed. He accordingly admitted the will to probate. From
this judgment an appeal was taken in behalf of the persons contesting the will.
ISSUES: 1. Whether a will can be admitted to probate, where opposition is made, upon the proof of a
single attesting witness, without producing or accounting for the absence of the other two; and
2. Whether the will in question is rendered invalid by reason of the fact that the signature of the testator
and of the three attesting witnesses are written on the right margin of each page of the will instead of the
left margin.
RULING: 1. NO. (But in this case, it was admitted to probate, read below). All three witnesses must be
produced. While it is undoubtedly true that an uncontested will may be proved by the testimony of only
one of the three attesting witnesses, nevertheless in Cabang vs. Delfinado, 34 Phil., 291, this court
declared after an elaborate examination of the American and English authorities that when a contest is
instituted, all of the attesting witnesses must be examined, if alive and within reach of the process of the
court. In the present case no explanation was made at the trial as to why all three of the attesting
witnesses were not produced, but the probable reason is found in the fact that, although the petition for
the probate of this will had been pending from December 21, 1917, until the date set for the hearing,
which was April 5, 1919, no formal contest was entered until the very day set for the hearing; and it is
probable that the attorney for the proponent, believing in good faith the probate would not be contested,
repaired to the court with only one of the three attesting witnesses at hand, and upon finding that the will
was contested, incautiously permitted the case to go to proof without asking for a postponement of the
trial in order that he might produce all the attesting witnesses. Although this circumstance may explain
why the three witnesses were not produced, it does not in itself supply any basis for changing the rule
expounded in the case above referred to; and were it not for a fact now to be mentioned, this court would
probably be compelled to reverse this case on the ground that the execution of the will had not been
proved by a sufficient number of attesting witnesses. It appears, however, that this point was not raised
by the appellant in the lower court either upon the submission of the cause for determination in that
court or upon the occasion of the filing of the motion for a new trial. Accordingly it is insisted for the
appellee that this question cannot now be raised for the first time in this court. We believe this point is
well taken, and the first assignment of error must be declared not be well taken. This exact question has
been decided by the Supreme Court of California adversely to the contention of the appellant, and we
see no reason why the same rule of practice should not be observed by us. Estate of McCarty, 58 Cal.,
335, 337.
2. NO. The controlling considerations on the point now before us were well stated In Re will of
Abangan 40 Phil., 476, 479, where the court, speaking through Mr. Justice Avancea, in a case where
the signatures were placed at the bottom of the page and not in the margin, said: The object of the
solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid
substitution o will and testaments and to guarantee their truth and authenticity. Therefore the laws on
this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the other
hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the
exercise of the right to make a will. So when an interpretation already given assures such ends, any other
interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless
and frustrative of the testator's last will, must be disregarded. In the case before us, where ingenuity
could not suggest any possible prejudice to any person, as attendant upon the actual deviation from the
letter of the law, such deviation must be considered too trivial to invalidate the instrument.
NAYVE v. MOJAL
FACTS: The Court of First Instance of Albay ordered the probate of the will, holding that the document
in controversy was the last will and testament of Antonio Mojal, executed in accordance with law. The
defects attributed to the will are: (a) The fact of not having been signed by the testator and the witnesses
on each and every sheet on the left margin; (b) the fact of the sheets of the document not being paged
with letters; (c) the fact that the attestation clause does not state the number of sheets or pages actually
used of the will; and (d) the fact that the testator does not appear to have signed all the sheets in the
presence of the three witnesses, and the latter to have attested and signed all the sheets in the
presence of the testator and of each other.
Attestation Clause: "In witness whereof, I set my hand unto this will here in the town of
Camalig, Albay, Philippine Islands, this 26th day of November, nineteen hundred and eighteen,
composed of four sheets, including the next: "ANTONIO MOJAL " (Signed and declared by
the testator Don Antonio Mojal to be his last will and testament in the presence of each of us,
and at the request of said testator Don Antonio Mojal, we signed this will in the presence of
each other and of the testator.) "PEDRO CARO "SlLVERIO MORCO "ZOILO MASINAS"
ISSUE: Is the will valid?
RULING: YES. Where each and every page upon which the will is written was signed by the
testator and the witnesses, the fact that the signatures on each page do not all appear on the left
margin thereof does not detract from the validity of the will. Paging with Arabic numerals and
not with letters is within the spirit of the law, and is just as valid as paging with letters. The
number of sheets or pages of which the will is composed must be stated in the attestation clause
(Uy Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca, 43 Phil., 405); but where such a fact appears at the end of the
will so that no proof aliunde is necessary of the number of its sheets, then the failure to state in
the attestation clause the number of the pages of the instrument does not invalidate it. The
attestation clause must state the fact that the testator and the witnesses reciprocally saw the
signing of the will, for such an act cannot be proved by the mere exhibition of the will, if it is
not stated therein. But the fact that the testator and the witnesses signed each and every page of
the will can be proved also by the mere examination of the signatures appearing on the
document itself, and the omission to state such evident fact does not invalidate the will.
PILAPIL v CA
FACTS: P. Eleuterio Pilapil, the parish priest of Mualboal of Cebu Province, died on December
6, 1935. No will has been presented after his death, at least until early February 1939. A part of
the will states that:
ART. SECOND: I hereby certify that this Last Will and Testament, which confirms, affirms and
assures the legitimacy of documents for my buyers granted consists of two items; contains
sixteen provisions and is written on three pages; x x x x x x x x x
Also at the bottom of the pages (1) and (2) are respectively the notes: "Go to 2. Pages", "go to
3. Pages".
ISSUE: Is the will NOT valid because the attestation clause does not state the number of pages
upon which the will was written?
RULING: NO. The will is valid. First translation: The court held that this deficiency was cured
by the will itself, which stated that it consisted of three pages and in fact it had three pages.
Second translation: The court held that the law has been substantially complied with inasmuch
as in the body of the will and on the same page wherein the attestation clause appears written it
is expressly stated that will contains three pages each of which was numbered in letters and in
figures.
ABADA v ABAJA
FACTS: Alipio Abada (Abada) died sometime in May 1940, while his widow died sometime in
1943. Both died without legitimate children. Respondent Alipio Abaja (respondent) filed before
the RTC a petition for the probate of the last will and testament of Abada. Abada allegedly
named as his testamentary heirs his natural children Eulogio Abaja and Rosario Cordova. Respondent is
the son of Eulogio Abaja. Nicanor Caponong (Caponong) opposed to the petition on the ground that
Abada left no will when he died. He further alleged that assuming a will was really executed, the same
should be disallowed on the ground, among others, that it was not executed and attested as required by
law. The nephews, nieces and grandchildren of Abada also opposed based on the same grounds that
Caponong alleged. The RTC allowed the probate of the will. On appeal, the CA affirmed the ruling of
the RTC. Hence, this petition. Petitioner Caponong primarily based the arguments on Article 804 and
806 of the New Civil Code. Article 804. Every will must be in writing and executed in a language or
dialect known to the testator. Article 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by
the testator and the witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file
another with the Office of the Clerk of Court.
ISSUE: Was the will executed and attested in accordance with the law?
RULING: YES. Abada executed his will on 4 June 1932. The laws in force at that time are the Old Civil
Code (Civil Code of 1889) and the Code of Civil Procedure, which governed the execution of the wills
before the enactment of the New Civil Code. Articles 804 and 806 of the New Civil Code are new
provisions. Relevant provision: Article 795. The validity of the will as to its form depends upon the
observance of the law in force at the time it is made. Caponong pointed out that nowhere in the will can
one discern that Abada knew the Spanish language. This contention must fail, as there is no statutory
requirement to state in the will itself that the testator knew the language or dialect used in the will. This
is a matter that a party may establish by proof aliunde. Respondent testified that Abada used to gather
Spanish-speaking people in their place. In these gatherings, Abada and his companions would talk in
Spanish language. This sufficiently proves that Abada speaks the Spanish language. The Code of Civil
Procedure repealed Article 685 of the Old Civil Code. Under the Code of Civil procedure, the
intervention of a notary public is not necessary in the execution of any will. Therefore, Abadas will
does not require acknowledgment before a notary public. Moreover, a scrutiny of Abadas will shows
that it has an attestation clause. Caponong argued that the attestation clause does not indicate the number
of witnesses. On this point, the Court applies the rule on substantial compliance. While the attestation
clause does not state the number of witnesses, a close inspection of the will shows that three witnesses
signed it. If the surrounding circumstances point to a regular execution of the will, and the instrument
appears to have been executed substantially in accordance with the requirements of the law, the
inclination should, in the absence of any suggestion of bad faith, forgery or fraud, lean towards its
admission to probate, although the document may suffer from some imperfection of language, or other
non-essential defect. The Court explained the extent and limits of the rule on liberal construction, thus:
They do not allow evidence aliunde to fill a void in any part of the document or supply missing details
that should appear in the will itself. They only permit a probe into the will, an exploration within its
confines, to ascertain its meaning or to determine the existence or absence of the requisite formalities of
law. This clear, sharp limitation eliminates uncertainty and ought to banish any fear of dire results.
CANEDA v CA
FACTS: Mateo Caballero, a widower without any children and already in the twilight years of his life,
executed a last will and testament at his residence in Talisay, Cebu before three attesting witnesses. The
said testator was duly assisted by his lawyer and a notary public. Mateo Caballero himself filed a
petition before the then Court of First Instance of Cebu seeking the probate of his last will and
testament. The testator passed away before his petition could finally be heard by the probate court.
Petitioners, claiming to be nephews and nieces of the testator, instituted a second petition for the
intestate proceeding of Mateos estate, had their said petition consolidated with the first petition
aforementioned and opposed the probate of the testator's will and the appointment of a special
administrator for his estate, claiming that the will in question is null and void for the reason that its
attestation clause is fatally defective since it fails to specifically state that the instrumental witnesses to
the will witnessed the testator signing the will in their presence and that they also signed the will and all
the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another. The contested attestation
clause are reproduced below: We, the undersigned attesting Witnesses, whose Residences and
postal addresses appear on the Opposite of our respective names, we do hereby certify that the
Testament was read by him and the testator, MATEO CABALLERO; has published unto us the
foregoing Will consisting of THREE PAGES, including the Acknowledgment, each page
numbered correlatively in the letters on the upper part of each page, as his Last Will and
Testament and he has the same and every page thereof, on the spaces provided for his signature
and on the left hand margin, in the presence of the said testator and in the presence of each and
all of us. The attestation clause is subscribed at the end thereof and at the left margin of each
page by the three attesting witnesses.
ISSUE: Is the absence of the statement \that the witnesses signed the will and every page
thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another in the attestation clause fatally
defective?
RULING: YES. Under the third paragraph of Article 805, an attestation clause, the complete
lack of which would result in the invalidity of the will, should state (1) the number of the pages
used upon which the will is written; (2) that the testator signed, or expressly caused another to
sign, the will and every page thereof in the presence of the attesting witnesses; and (3) that the
attesting witnesses witnessed the signing by the testator of the will and all its pages, and that
said witnesses also signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of
one another.
The absence of that statement required by law is a fatal defect or imperfection which must
necessarily result in the disallowance of the will that is here sought to be admitted to probate.
The Court stresses that under Article 809, i.e., the substantial compliance rule, the defects and
imperfections must only be with respect to the form of the attestation or the language employed
therein. Such defects or imperfections would not render a will invalid should it be proved that
the will was really executed and attested in compliance with Article 805. In this regard,
however, the manner of proving the due execution and attestation has been held to be limited to
merely an examination of the will itself without resorting to evidence aliunde, whether oral or
written. The foregoing considerations do not apply where the attestation clause totally omits the
fact that the attesting witnesses signed each and every page of the will in the presence of the
testator and of each other. In such a situation, the defect is not only in the form or language of
the attestation clause but the total absence of a specific element required by Article 805 to be
specifically stated in the attestation clause of a will. The rule, as it now stands, is that omissions
which can be supplied by an examination of the will itself, without the need of resorting to
extrinsic evidence, will not be fatal and, correspondingly, would not obstruct the allowance to
probate of the will being assailed. However, those omissions which cannot be supplied except
by evidence aliunde would result in the invalidation of the attestation clause and ultimately, of
the will itself.
CODOY v CALUGAY
FACTS: Evangeline Calugay, Josephine Salcedo and Eufemia Patigas, devisees and legatees of
the holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seno Vda. Ramonal, filed with the RTC for
probate of the holographic will of the deceased, who died on January 16, 1990. Respondents
claimed that deceased was of sound and disposing mind when she executed the will on August
30, 1978, there was no fraud, undue influence and duress and the will was written voluntarily.
Egneia Codoy and Manuel Ramonal filed an opposition to the petition for probate, alleging that
the holographic will was a forgery and that same is even illegible. It gives the impression that a
third hard of an interested party executed the holographic will. Codoy and Ramonal argued that
the repeated dates incorporated or appearing on the will after every disposition is out of the
ordinary. If the deceased was the one who executed the will, the dates and signature should appear at the
bottom after the dispositions, as regularly done.
The lower court denied the petition for probate of the document. On Appeal, the decision of the lower
court was reversed. The CA held, citing J.B.L. Reyes, xxx even if the genuineness of the holographic
will were contested, we are of the opinion that Article 811 of our present civil code can not be
interpreted as to require compulsory presentation of 3 witnesses to identify the handwriting of the
testator, under penalty of having the probate denied. Since no witness may been present at the execution
of the holographic will, none being required by law, it becomes obvious that the existence of witnesses
possessing the requisite qualifications is a matter beyond the control of the proponent. xxx but it can not
be ignored that the requirement can be considered mandatory only in case of ordinary testaments,
precisely because of the presence of at least 3 witnesses at the execution of ordinary wills is made by
law essential to their validity. Where the will is holographic, no witness need be present and the rule
requiring production of witnesses must be deemed merely permissive if absurd results are to be
avoided.
ISSUE: Is Article 811 of the Civil Code mandatory?
RULING: YES. The word shall connotes a mandatory order. We have ruled that shall in a statute
commonly denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that the
presumption is that the word shall, when used in a statute is mandatory. Laws are enacted to achieve a
goal intended and to guide against an evil or mischief it aims to prevent. In the case at bar, the goal to
achieve is to give effect to the wishes of the deceased and the evil to be prevented is the possibility that
unscrupulous individuals who for their benefit will employ means to defeat the wishes of the testator.
The paramount consideration is to determine the true intent of the deceased. We cannot eliminate the
possibility of a false document being adjudged as the will of the testator, which is why if the holographic
will is contested, that law requires three witnesses to declare that the will as in the handwriting of the
deceased. It will be noted that not all the witnesses presented by the respondents testified explicitly that
they were familiar with the handwriting of the testator. The Court of Appeals allowed the will to probate
and disregard the requirement of three witnesses in case of a contested holographic will. Moreover, the
will was found not in the personal belongings of the deceased but with one of the respondents, who kept
it even before the death of the deceased.
There was no opportunity for an expert to compare the signature and the handwriting of the deceased
with other documents signed and executed by her during her lifetime. The only chance at comparison
was during the cross-examination of Ms. Binanay when the lawyer of petitioners asked Ms. Binanay to
compare the documents, which contained the signature of the deceased with that of the holographic will,
and she is not a handwriting expert. Even the formal lawyer of the deceased expressed doubts as to the
authenticity of the signature in the holographic will. A visual examination of the holographic will
convince us that the strokes are different when compared with other documents written by the testator.
The signature of the testator in some of the disposition is not readable. There were uneven strokes,
retracing and erasures on the will. Comparing the signature in the holographic will and the signatures in
several documents such as the application letter for pasture permit, the strokes are different. In the
letters, there are continuous flows of the strokes evidencing that there is no hesitation in writing unlike
that of a holographic will. We, therefore, cannot be certain that the holographic will was in the
handwriting of the deceased.
AJERO v CA
FACTS: The decedent names as devisees Roberto and Thelma Ajero, private respondent Clemente Sand,
Meriam Arong, Leah Sand, Lilia Sand, Edgar Sand, Fe Sand, Lisa Sand, and Dr. Jose Ajero and their
children. The petitioners filed a petition for the allowance of decedent's holo will. Private Respondent
opposed the petition on the grounds that: neither the testament's body nor the signature therein was in
decedent's handwriting; it contained alterations and corrections which were not duly signed by
the decedent; and the will was procured by pets through improper pressure and undue influence.
Dr. Jose Ajero also opposed the petition. He contested the disposition in the will of a house and
lot located in Cabadbaran, Agusan Del Norte. He claimed that said property could not be
conveyed by decedent in its entirety, as she was not its sole owner. The trial court admitted the
holo will to probate. On appeal, the said decision was reversed and the pet for probate was
dismissed. The CA found that the holo will failed to meet the requirements for its validity. I
held that the decedent did not comply with Arts 813 and 814. It alluded to certain dispositions
in the will which were either unsigned and undated, or signed but not dated. It also found that
the erasures, alterations and cancellations made thereon had not been authenticated by decedent.
ISSUE: Is the respondent court correct in disallowing the probate of the will?
RULING: NO. Refer to Art. 839. These lists are exclusive; no other grounds can serve to
disallow a will. 5 Thus, in a petition to admit a holographic will to probate, the only issues to be
resolved are: (1) whether the instrument submitted is, indeed, the decedent's last will and
testament; (2) whether said will was executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by
law; (3) whether the decedent had the necessary testamentary capacity at the time the will was
executed; and, (4) whether the execution of the will and its signing were the voluntary acts of
the decedent. A reading of Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows that its requirement affects
the validity of the dispositions contained in the holographic will, but not its probate. If the
testator fails to sign and date some of the dispositions, the result is that these dispositions
cannot be effectuated. Such failure, however, does not render the whole testament void.
AZAOLA v. SINGSON
FACTS: When Fortunata S. Vda. de Yance died, petitioner Francisco Azaola filed a petition for
the probate of the formers holographic will, whereby Maria Milagros Azaola was made the
sole heir as against the nephew of the deceased Cesario Singson. Witness Francisco Azaola
testified that he saw the holographic will one month, more or less, before the death of the
testatrix, as the same was handed to him and his wife. Witness Francisco testified also that he
recognized all the signatures appearing in the holographic will as the handwriting of the
testatrix and to reinforce said statement, witness presented the mortgage, the special power of
attorney, and the general power of attorney, besides the deeds of sale and including an affidavit
and two residence certificates to show the signatures of the testatrix, for comparison purposes.
The opposition to the probate was on the grounds that (1) the execution of the will was
procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the petitioner and his
wife, and (2) that the testatrix did not seriously intend the instrument to be her last will, and that
the same was actually written either on the 5th or 6th day of August 1957 and not on November
20, 1956 as appears on the will. The probate was denied on the ground that under Article 811 of
the Civil Code, the proponent must present three witnesses who could declare that the will and
the signature are in the writing of the testatrix, the probate being contested. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Does Article 811 mandatorily require the production of three witnesses to identify the
handwriting and signature of a holographic will, even if its authenticity should be denied by the
adverse party?
RULING: NO. We agree with the appellant that since the authenticity of the will was not
contested, he was not required to produce more than one witness; but even if the genuineness of
the holographic will were contested, we are of the opinion that Article 811 of our present Civil
Code can not be interpreted as to require the compulsory presentation of three witnesses to
identify the handwriting of the testator, under penalty of having the probate denied. Since no
witness may have been present at the execution of a holographic will, none being required by
law (Art. 810, new Civil Code), it becomes obvious that the existence of witnesses possessing the
requisite qualifications is a matter beyond the control of the proponent. For it is not merely a question of
finding and producing any three witnesses; they must be witnesses "who know the handwriting and
signature of the testator" and who can declare (truthfully, of course, even if the law does not so express)
"that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator." There may be no available witness
acquainted with the testators hand; or even if so familiarized, the witnesses may be unwilling to give a
positive opinion. Compliance with the rule of paragraph 1 of Article 811 may thus become an
impossibility. That is evidently the reason why the second paragraph of Article 811 prescribes that - "in
the absence of any competent witness referred to in the preceding paragraph, and if the court deems it
necessary, expert testimony may be resorted to." As can be seen, the law foresees the possibility that no
qualified witness may be found (or what amounts to the same thing, that no competent witness may be
willing to testify to the authenticity of the will), and provides for resort to expert evidence to supply the
deficiency.
NAZARENO v CA
FACTS: Maximino Nazareno, Sr. and Aurea Poblete were husband and wife. Aurea died on April 15,
1970, while Maximino, Sr. died on December 18, 1980. They had five children, namely, Natividad,
Romeo, Jose, Pacifico, and Maximino, Jr. Natividad and Maximino, Jr. are the petitioners in this case,
while the estate of Maximino, Sr., Romeo, and his wife Eliza Nazareno are the respondents. After the
death of Maximino, Sr., Romeo filed an intestate case in the Court of First Instance of Cavite, Branch
XV, where the case was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. NC-28. Upon the reorganization of the courts in
1983, the case was transferred to the Regional Trial Court of Naic, Cavite. Romeo was appointed
administrator of his fathers estate. In the course of the intestate proceedings, Romeo discovered that his
parents had executed several deeds of sale conveying a number of real properties in favor of his sister,
Natividad. Among the lots covered by the above Deed of Sale is Lot 3- B which is registered under TCT
No. 140946. This lot had been occupied by Romeo, his wife Eliza, and by Maximino, Jr. since 1969.
Unknown to Romeo, Natividad sold Lot 3-B on July 31, 1982 to Maximino, Jr., for which reason the
latter was issued TCT No. 293701 by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City.
Romeo sought the declaration of nullity of the sale made on January 29, 1970 to Natividad and that
made on July 31, 1982 to Maximino, Jr. on the ground that both sales were void for lack of
consideration. Natividad and Maximino, Jr. filed a third-party complaint against the spouses Romeo and
Eliza.They alleged that Lot 3, which was included in the Deed of Absolute Sale of January 29, 1970 to
Natividad, had been surreptitiously appropriated by Romeo by securing for himself a new title (TCT No.
277968) in his name. They alleged that Lot 3 is being leased by the spouses Romeo and Eliza to third
persons. They therefore sought the annulment of the transfer to Romeo and the cancellation of his title,
the eviction of Romeo and his wife Eliza and all persons claiming rights from Lot 3, and the payment of
damages. Romeo presented evidence to show that Maximino and Aurea Nazareno never intended to sell
the six lots to Natividad and that Natividad was only to hold the said lots in trust for her siblings. He
presented the Deed of Partition and Distribution dated June 28, 1962 executed by Maximino Sr. and
Aurea and duly signed by all of their children, except Jose, who was then abroad and was represented by
their mother, Aurea. Petitioners make capital of the fact that in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 12932, which was
declared final by this Court in G.R. No. 107684, the Court of Appeals upheld the right of Maximino, Jr.
to recover possession of Lot 3-B. In that case, the Court of Appeals held: As shown in the preceding
disquisition, Natividad P. Nazareno acquired the property in dispute by purchase in 1970. She was
issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. 162738 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City. When her
parents died, her mother Aurea Poblete-Nazareno in 1970 and her father Maximino A. Nazareno, Sr. in
1980, Natividad P. Nazareno had long been the exclusive owner of the property in question. There was
no way therefore that the aforesaid property could belong to the estate of the spouses Maximino
Nazareno, Sr. and Aurea Poblete. The mere fact that Romeo P. Nazareno included the same property in
an inventory of the properties of the deceased Maximino A. Nazareno, Sr. will not adversely affect the
ownership of the said realty. Appellant Romeo P. Nazarenos suspicion that his parents had entrusted all
their assets under the care and in the name of Natividad P. Nazareno, their eldest living sister
who was still single, to be divided upon their demise to all the compulsory heirs, has not
progressed beyond mere speculation. His barefaced allegation on the point not only is without
any corroboration but is even belied by documentary evidence. x x x x
ISSUES: 1. Should the judgment of the Court of Appeals upholding the ownership of Maximo,
Jr. over the lot under consideration be binding to the estate of Maximo Sr.?
2. Should the lots in question be a proper subject of collation?
RULING: 1. NO. To be sure, the abovecited case decided by the Court of Appeals was for
recovery of possession based on ownership of Lot 3-B. The parties in that case were Maximino,
Jr., as plaintiff, and the spouses Romeo and Eliza, as defendants. On the other hand, the parties
in the present case for annulment of sale are the estate of Maximino, Sr., as plaintiff, and
Natividad and Maximino, Jr., as defendants. Romeo and Eliza were named third-party
defendants after a third-party complaint was filed by Natividad and Maximino, Jr. As already
stated, however, this third-party complaint concerned Lot 3, and not Lot 3-B.
The estate of a deceased person is a juridical entity that has a personality of its own. Though
Romeo represented at one time the estate of Maximino, Sr., the latter has a separate and distinct
personality from the former. Hence, the judgment in CA-GR CV No. 12932 regarding the
ownership of Maximino, Jr. over Lot 3-B binds Romeo and Eliza only, and not the estate of
Maximino, Sr., which also has a right to recover properties which were wrongfully disposed.
2. YES. As Romeo admitted, no consideration was paid by him to his parents for the Deed of
Sale. Therefore, the sale was void for having been simulated. Natividad never acquired
ownership over the property because the Deed of Sale in her favor is also void for being
without consideration and title to Lot 3 cannot be issued in her name. Nonetheless, it cannot be
denied that Maximino, Sr. intended to give the six Quezon City lots to Natividad. As Romeo
testified, their parents executed the Deed of Sale in favor of Natividad because the latter was
the only female and the only unmarried member of the family. She was thus entrusted with
the real properties in behalf of her siblings. As she herself admitted, she intended to convey
Lots 10 and 11 to Jose in the event the latter returned from abroad. There was thus an implied
trust constituted in her favor. Art. 1449 of the Civil Code states: There is also an implied trust
when a donation is made to a person but it appears that although the legal estate is transmitted
to the donee, he nevertheless is either to have no beneficial interest or only a part thereof. There
being an implied trust, the lots in question are therefore subject to collation in accordance with
Art. 1061 which states: Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs,
must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from
the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title,
in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the
account of the partition.
RIVERA v IAC
FACTS: A prominent and wealthy resident of that town named Venancio Rivera died. Jose
Rivera, claiming to be the only surviving legitimate son of the deceased, filed a petition for the
issuance of letters of administration over Venancio's estate which was opposed by Adelaido J.
Rivera, who denied that Jose was the son of the decedent. Adelaido averred that Venancio was
his father and did not die intestate but in fact left two holographic wills which was eventually
admitted to probate. Zenaida and Venancio Rivera, Jr., siblings of Adelaido, authenticated the
wills as having been written and signed by their father. The existence and also the authenticity
of the holographic wills were questioned by Jose Rivera. In his own petition, he declared that Venancio
Rivera died intestate; he also denied the existence of the holographic wills presented by Adelaido Rivera
for probate. In both proceedings, Jose Rivera opposed the holographic wills submitted by Adelaido
Rivera and claimed that they were spurious.
After joint trial, it was found that Jose Rivera was not the son of the decedent but of a different Venancio
Rivera who was married to Maria VITAL. The Venancio Rivera whose estate was in question was
married to Maria JOCSON, by whom he had seven children, including Adelaido.
ISSUE: Can Jose Rivera contest the validity of the supposed holographic wills of Venancio Rivera?
RULING: NO. Jose Rivera is not the son of the deceased Venancio Rivera whose estate is in question.
Hence, being a mere stranger, he had no personality to contest the wills and his opposition thereto did
not have the legal effect of requiring the three witnesses. The testimony of Zenaida and Venancio
Rivera, Jr., who authenticated the wills as having been written and signed by their father, was sufficient.
In the probate of a holographic will, it shall be necessary that at least one witness who knows the
handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in the
handwriting of the testator. If the will is contested, at least three of such witnesses shall be required. The
respondent court considered the holographic wills valid because it found them to have been written,
dated and signed by the testator himself in accordance with Article 810 of the Civil Code. It also held
there was no necessity of presenting the three witnesses required under Article 811 because the
authenticity of the wills had not been questioned.
LABRADOR v CA
FACTS: On June 10, 1972, Melecio Labrador died leaving behind a parcel of land and the following
heirs, namely: Sagrado, Enrica, Cristobal, Jesus, Gaudencio, Josefina, Juliana, Hilaria and Jovita, all
surnamed Labrador, and a holographic will.
Sagrado Labrador (deceased but substituted by his heirs) filed a petition for the probate of the alleged
will of the late Melecio Labrador. Subsequently, Jesus Labrador and Gaudencio Labrador filed an
opposition on the ground that the will has been revoked by implication of law, alleging that before the
death of Melecio, he executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of oppositors Jesus and Gaudencio.
Sagrado filed for the annulment of the Deed of Absolute Sale over a parcel of land which Sagrado
allegedly had already acquired by device from their father under a holographic will executed on March
17, 1968 being premised on the fact that the Deed of Absolute Sale is fictitious. The Trial Court allowed
the probate of the holographic will and declared null and void the Deed of Sale. The CA modified the
decision by denying the allowance of the probate of the will for being undated. It is principally alleged
that the holographic will is dated, although the date is not in its usual place.
ISSUE: Is a holographic will still considered as dated when the date is not located in its usual place?
RULING: YES. The law does not specify a particular location where the date should be placed in the
will. The only requirements are that the date be in the will itself and executed in the hand of the testator.
The will has been dated in the hand of the testator himself in perfect compliance with Art. 810. It is
worthy of note to quote the first paragraph of the second page of the holographic will: And this is the
day in which we agreed that we are making the partitioning and assigning the respective assignment of
the said fishpond, and this being in the month of March, 17th day, in the year 1968 The intention to
show 17 March 1968 as the date of the execution of the will is plain from the tenor of the succeeding
words of the paragraph. As aptly put by petitioner, the will was not an agreement by a unilateral act of
Melecio Labrador who plainly knew that he was executing was a will. The act of partitioning
and the declaration that such partitioning as the testators instruction or decision to be followed
reveal that Melecio was fully aware of the nature of the estate property to be disposed of and of
the character of the testamentary act as a means to control the disposition of his estate.
SEANGIO v. REYES
FACTS: Private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of the late
Segundo Seangio. This petition was opposed by the petitioners on the ground that Segundo left
a holographic will, disinheriting one of the private respondents, Alfredo Seangio, for cause,
among others. In view of the purported holographic will, petitioners averred that in the event
the decedent is found to have left a will, the intestate proceedings are to be automatically
suspended and replaced by the proceedings for the probate of the will. The petitioners instead
filed a petition for the probate of the holographic will.
Then private respondents moved for the dismissal of the probate proceedings primarily on the
ground that the document purporting to be the holographic will of Segundo does not contain
any disposition of the estate of the deceased and thus does not meet the definition of a will
under Article 783 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE: Can the document executed by Segundo be considered as a holographic will?
RULING: YES. A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil Code, must be
entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other
form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed. Segundos
document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance instrument, conforms
to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by the
hand of Segundo himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa can be clearly deduced from the
terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative disposition of the latters
property, the disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself. In other
words, the disinheritance results in the disposition of the property of the testator Segundo in
favor of those who would succeed in the absence of Alfredo. Moreover, it is a fundamental
principle that the intent or the will of the testator, expressed in the form and within the limits
prescribed by law, must be recognized as the supreme law in succession. All rules of
construction are designed to ascertain and give effect to that intention. It is only when the
intention of the testator is contrary to law, morals, or public policy that it cannot be given effect.
In this regard, the Court is convinced that the document, even if captioned as Kasulatan ng Pag-
Aalis ng Mana, was intended by Segundo to be his last testamentary act and was executed by
him in accordance with law in the form of a holographic will. Unless the will is probated, the
disinheritance cannot be given effect.
CAPITLE v. ELBAMBUENA
FACTS: A Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) was issued to Cristobal Olar (Olar)
covering a parcel of agricultural land in Nueva Ecija. Respondents alleged that on petitioners
request, petitioners were allowed to occupy the lot to pursue a means of livelihood. Since 1990,
however, petitioners did not pay rentals despite demand therefor, and neither did they heed the
demand to return the possession of the lot, drawing respondents to file a Petition for Recovery
of Possession and Payment of Back Rentals before the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB). Petitioners, on the other hand, claiming that they have been in
possession of the lot since 1960, presented a "Waiver of Rights" executed by Olar wherein he
renounced in their favor his rights and participation over the lot; a "Sinumpaang Salaysay"
wherein Olar acknowledged that he copossessed the lot with petitioner Capitle since 1960; and
a Pinagsamang Patunay from the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC) Chairman and
barangay chairman of Valle certifying that they (petitioners) are the actual tillers and possessors of the
lot. Petitioners further claim that since 1959, Fortunata was already separated from Olar and she even
remarried, thus giving her no right to inherit from Olar. DARAB ruled against petitioners. The CA ruled
that Olars death substantially passed all his rights and interest in and over the subject property to his
legal heirs by operation of law. In the case at bench, to herein respondents-appellees: to Fortunata
Elbambuena, being his surviving wife, and to Rosalinda Olar, his sons surviving spouse. This is as it
should, considering that rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the
decedent. And since Fortunata and Rosalindas relationship with Olar was in this case never put in issue,
their being legal heirs of the deceased gave them unqualified right to participate in all proceedings
affecting the subject property.
ISSUE: Does the waiver of rights made by the deceased deprive the legal heirs of their participation in
the proceedings over the subject property?
RULING: NO. Petitioners concede that although Olars death passed all his rights and interest over the
lot to his legal heirs, his intent of not bequeathing them to his estranged wife but to a relative, who
helped him in tilling the lot and who took care of him, should be accorded respect over the intent of the
law on hereditary succession. The Court does not agree. Petitioners argument that it would be absurd
for Olar to bequeath his property to his estranged wife not to a relative who had indeed helped him in
tilling the property and took good care of his needs, is a virtual admission that their possession was not
in the concept of owners, they having merely helped in tilling the lot, thereby acknowledging that Olar
was the actual possessor and tiller. Even assuming that petitioners were indeed the actual tillers of the
lot, their petition for the cancellation of the CLOA issued in favor of Olar would not bind respondents as
they were not impleaded. Although estranged from Olar, respondent Fortunata remained his wife and
legal heir, mere estrangement not being a legal ground for the disqualification of a surviving spouse as
an heir of the deceased spouse. Rosalinda, on the other hand, is the surviving spouse of Olars son. The
two are thus real parties-in-interest who stand to be injured or benefited by the judgment on the
cancellation of the CLOA issued in Olars name.
GUERRERO v. BIHIS
FACTS: On February 19, 1994, Felisa Tamio de Buenaventura, mother of petitioner Bella A. Guerrero
and respondent Resurreccion A. Bihis, died at the Metropolitan Hospital in Tondo, Manila. On May 24,
1994, petitioner filed a petition for the probate of the last will and testament of the decedent in Branch
95 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City where the case was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. Q-94-
20661. Respondent opposed her elder sister's petition on the following grounds: the will was not
executed and attested as required by law; its attestation clause and acknowledgment did not comply with
the requirements of the law; the signature of the testatrix was procured by fraud and petitioner and her
children procured the will through undue and improper pressure and influence. On January 17, 2000,
after petitioner presented her evidence, respondent filed a demurrer thereto alleging that petitioner's
evidence failed to establish that the decedent's will complied with Articles 804 and 805 of the Civil
Code. In a resolution dated July 6, 2001, the trial court denied the probate of the will ruling that Article
806 of the Civil Code was not complied with because the will was "acknowledged" by the testatrix and
the witnesses at the testatrix's, residence at No. 40 Kanlaon Street, Quezon City before Atty. Macario O.
Directo who was a commissioned notary public for and in Caloocan City.
ISSUE: Did the will "acknowledged" by the testatrix and the instrumental witnesses before a notary
public acting outside the place of his commission satisfy the requirement under Article 806 of the Civil
Code?
RULING: NO. One of the formalities required by law in connection with the execution of a notarial will
is that it must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. This formal
requirement is one of the indispensable requisites for the validity of a will. In other words, a
notarial will that is not acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the instrumental 2. NO. The oppositors failed to establish, by preponderance of evidence, said allegation and contradict
witnesses is void and cannot be accepted for probate. The acknowledgment of a notarial will the presumption that the testator was of sound mind. Not one of the oppositors witnesses has mentioned
coerce the testator and the instrumental witnesses to declare before an officer of the law, the any instance that they observed act/s of the testator during her lifetime that could be construed as a
notary public, that they executed and subscribed to the will as their own free act or deed. Such manifestation of mental incapacity. The testator may be admitted to be physically weak but it does not
declaration is under oath and under pain of perjury, thus paving the way for the criminal necessarily follow that she was not of sound mind. 3. NO. The petitioner and her siblings are not
prosecution of persons who participate in the execution of spurious wills, or those executed compulsory heirs of the decedent under Article 887 of the Civil Code and as the decedent validly
without the free consent of the testator. It also provides a further degree of assurance that the disposed of her properties in a will duly executed and probated, petitioner has no legal right to claim any
testator is of a certain mindset in making the testamentary dispositions to the persons instituted part of the decedents estate. Note: The Supreme Court ruled that the issues raised by petitioner concern
as heirs or designated as devisees or legatees in the will A notary public's commission is the pure questions of fact, which may not be the subject of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
grant of authority in his favor to perform notarial acts. It is issued "within and for" a particular When supported by substantial evidence, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and
territorial jurisdiction and the notary public's authority is co-extensive with it. In other words, a binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court. SC only affirmed CAs decision.
notary public is authorized to perform notarial acts, including the taking of acknowledgments,
within that territorial jurisdiction only. Outside the place of his commission, he is bereft of
power to perform any notarial act; he is not a notary public. Any notarial act outside the limits
of his jurisdiction has no force and effect. Since Atty. Directo was not a commissioned notary
public for and in Quezon City, he lacked the authority to take the acknowledgment of the
testatrix and the instrumental witnesses. In the same vein, the testatrix and her witnesses could
not have validly acknowledged the will before him. Thus, Felisa Tamio de Buenaventura's last
will and testament was, in effect, not acknowledged as required by law.

PAZ SAMANIEGO- CELADA v. ABENA

FACTS: The RTC had declared the last will and testament of Margarita S. Mayores probated
and designated Lucia Abena, her life-long companion, as the executor of her will. It also
ordered the issuance of letters testamentary in favor of Lucia. Paz Samaniego-Celada, the first
cousin of Margarita, questioned the order of the court. Paz alleged that the will was not signed
in the presence of instrumental witnesses and in the presence of one another. She also argued
that there was an indication that the pages of the will were not signed by the testator on the
same day and there was a discrepancy in the numbering of pages. She alleged that the will was
procured through undue influence and pressure because at the time of the execution of the will,
the testator was weak, sickly, jobless and entirely dependent upon Lucia for support, thereby
affecting her freedom and willpower to decide on her own. Finally, she claimed that the letters
of administration should be issued in favor of her and her cousins as the only living collateral
relatives of the decedent.

ISSUES: 1. Is the will invalid for failure to conform to the formalities required by law?
2. Is the will invalid because it was procured through undue influence and pressure? 3. Did the
court err in not granting the letters of administration to the petitioner?

RULING: 1. NO. While it is true that the attestation clause is not a part of the will, the court,
after examining the totality of the will, is of the considered opinion that error in the number of
pages of the will as stated in the attestation clause is not material to invalidate the subject will.
It must be noted that the subject instrument is consecutively lettered with pages A, B, and C
which is a sufficient safeguard from the possibility of an omission of some of the pages. The
error must have been brought about by the honest belief that the will is the whole instrument
consisting of three (3) pages inclusive of the attestation clause and the acknowledgement. The
position of the court is in consonance with the doctrine of liberal interpretation enunciated in
Article 809 of the Civil Code.