PHILOSOPHY OF LAW CASES

1. FRANCISCO VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES G.R. NO. 160261. November 10, 2003

ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner,NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA

MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC., ITS OFFICERS AND MEMBERS, petitioner-in-
intervention,WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-
intervention, vs THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON,
REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C. TEODORO, JR. AND REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B.
FUENTEBELLA, respondents.JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention,SENATOR
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

FACTS: On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by
Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an
investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)." On June 2, 2003, former President
Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven
Associate Justices of this Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and
other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B.
Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen, and was referred to the House Committee. The House
Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in
form," but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. To date, the
Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in accordance with the said
Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2,
2003 of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to
dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House
Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of
Representatives.

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario
G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the
Constitution.2. Whether the resolution thereof is a political question has resulted in a political crisis.

HELD: 1. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment
complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of
Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the
foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following
Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution. In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was
filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate
justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5,
2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix
William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition
against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year
period. 2.From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear
that judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere
specter of this creature called the political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify,
however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly political questions." From this
clarification it is gathered that there are two species of political questions: (1) "truly political questions" and
(2) those which "are not truly political questions." Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review,
the reason for respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by
virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review questions which are not truly political
in nature.

2. Oposa vs Factoran (G.R. No. 101083)GR No. 101083; July 30 1993

FACTS: A taxpayers class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., representing their
generation and generations yet unborn, and represented by their parents against Fulgencio Factoran Jr.,
Secretary of DENR. They prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the defendant, his agents,
representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to:

1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country;

2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or appraising new TLAs;

and granting the plaintiffs such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises. They alleged that
they have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to
protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae. Furthermore, they claim that the act of the
defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forests constitutes a
misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resources property he holds in trust for the benefit of
the plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.

The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:

1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;

2. The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the
legislative or executive branches of the government.

ISSUE:Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to prevent the
misappropriation or impairment of Philippine rainforests?

HELD:Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations to come.
The Supreme Court ruled that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation, and for the
succeeding generation, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of succeeding generations is
based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is concerned. Such a right considers the rhythm and harmony of nature which indispensably
include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the
countrys forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other natural resources to the
end that their exploration, development, and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as
the future generations.

Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony
for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors assertion of
their right to a sound environment constitutes at the same time, the performance of their obligation to
ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.
3. Tecson vs. Commission on Elections [GR 151434, 3 March 2004] [GR 151434, 3 March 2004]

Facts: On 31 December 2003, Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ), filed his
certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon
ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the 2004 national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ,
representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.,"
or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila. Victorino
X. Fornier, (GR 161824) initiated, on 9 January 2004, a petition (SPA 04-003) before the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy
upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to
be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his
mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being
the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, Fornier asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a
Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate
child of an alien mother. Fornier based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of FPJ on two assertions: (1)
Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley
and, (2) even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after
the birth of FPJ. On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA 04-003 for lack of merit. 3 days
later, or on 26 January 2004, Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration. The motion was denied on 6
February 2004 by the COMELEC en banc. On 10 February 2004, Fornier assailed the decision of the
COMELEC before the Supreme Court conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition likewise prayed for a temporary restraining order, a writ of
preliminary injunction or any other resolution that would stay the finality and/or execution of the
COMELEC resolutions. The other petitions, later consolidated with GR 161824, would include GR 161434
and GR 161634, both challenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting that, under Article VII,
Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court had original and exclusive
jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case.

Issue: Whether FPJ was a natural born citizen, so as to be allowed to run for the offcie of the President of
the Philippines.

Held: Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses that "No person may be elected President
unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least
forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years
immediately preceding such election." The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who
are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Philippine citizenship." Herein, the date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939
during the regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through its history, four modes of acquiring citizenship -
naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis had been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus
sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs.
Collector of Customs (1912), did not last long. With the adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the reversal
of Roa in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor (1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationship would now
become the primary basis of citizenship by birth. Considering the reservations made by the parties on the
veracity of some of the entries on the birth certificate of FPJ and the marriage certificate of his parents,
the only conclusions that could be drawn with some degree of certainty from the documents would be that
(1) The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley; (2) FPJ was born to them on 20 August
1939; (3) Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16 September, 1940; (4) The
father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and (5) At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo
Poe was 84 years old. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of
FPJ, and the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou are documents of public record in the custody of a public
officer. The documents have been submitted in evidence by both contending parties during the
proceedings before the COMELEC. But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively
that FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his
favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his
certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code.
Fornier has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity
given to the parties to present their position and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been
material misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, must not only be
material, but also deliberate and willful. The petitions were dismissed.

4. SALVACION VS. CENTRAL BANK G.R. No. 94723 August 21, 1997

KAREN E. SALVACION, minor, thru Federico N. Salvacion, Jr., father and Natural Guardian, and
Spouses FEDERICO N. SALVACION, JR., and EVELINA E. SALVACION vs. CENTRAL BANK OF
THE PHILIPPINES, CHINA BANKING CORPORATION and GREG BARTELLI y NORTHCOTT

FACTS: Greg Bartelli, an American tourist, was arrested for committing four counts of rape and serious
illegal detention against Karen Salvacion. Police recovered from him several dollar checks and a dollar
account in the China Banking Corp. He was, however, able to escape from prison. In a civil case filed
against him, the trial court awarded Salvacion moral, exemplary and attorneys fees amounting to almost
P1,000,000.00.Salvacion tried to execute the judgment on the dollar deposit of Bartelli with the China
Banking Corp. but the latter refused arguing that Section 11 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 exempts
foreign currency deposits from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court,
legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever. Salvacion therefore filed this
action for declaratory relief in the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Should Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, as
amended by PD 1246, otherwise known as the Foreign Currency Deposit Act be made applicable to a
foreign transient?

HELD: NO. The provisions of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246, insofar as it
amends Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, are hereby held to be INAPPLICABLE to this case because
of its peculiar circumstances. Respondents are hereby required to comply with the writ of execution
issued in the civil case and to release to petitioners the dollar deposit of Bartelli in such amount as would
satisfy the judgment.

Supreme Court ruled that the questioned law makes futile the favorable judgment and award of damages
that Salvacion and her parents fully deserve. It then proceeded to show that the economic basis for the
enactment of RA No. 6426 is not anymore present; and even if it still exists, the questioned law still
denies those entitled to due process of law for being unreasonable and oppressive. The intention of the
law may be good when enacted. The law failed to anticipate the iniquitous effects producing outright
injustice and inequality such as the case before us.

The SC adopted the comment of the Solicitor General who argued that the Offshore Banking System and
the Foreign Currency Deposit System were designed to draw deposits from foreign lenders and investors
and, subsequently, to give the latter protection. However, the foreign currency deposit made by a
transient or a tourist is not the kind of deposit encouraged by PD Nos. 1034 and 1035 and given
incentives and protection by said laws because such depositor stays only for a few days in the country
and, therefore, will maintain his deposit in the bank only for a short time. Considering that Bartelli is just a
tourist or a transient, he is not entitled to the protection of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960
and PD No. 1246 against attachment, garnishment or other court processes.

Further, the SC said: In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of its justice. Eventually, if
we rule that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 which exempts from
attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency
or any administrative body whatsoever, is applicable to a foreign transient, injustice would result
especially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest like accused Greg Bartelli. This would negate Article
10 of the New Civil Code which provides that in case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws,
it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.

NOTES:On February 4, 1989, Greg Bartelli y Northcott, an American tourist, coaxed and lured petitioner
Karen Salvacion, then 12 years old to go with him to his apartment. Therein, Greg Bartelli detained Karen
Salvacion for four days, or up to February 7, 1989 and was able to rape the child once on February 4, and
three times each day on February 5, 6, and 7, 1989. On February 7, 1989, after policemen and people
living nearby, rescued Karen, Greg Bartelli was arrested and detained at the Makati Municipal Jail. The
policemen recovered from Bartelli the following items: 1.) Dollar Check No. 368, Control No. 021000678-
1166111303, US 3,903.20; 2.) COCOBANK Bank Book No. 104-108758-8 (Peso Acct.); 3.) Dollar
Account China Banking Corp., US$/A#54105028-2; 4.) ID-122-30-8877; 5.) Philippine Money
(P234.00) cash; 6.) Door Keys 6 pieces; 7.) Stuffed Doll (Teddy Bear) used in seducing the complainant.