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When change becomes

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Article in Research in Organizational Change and Development April 2005

DOI: 10.1016/S0897-3016(04)15002-7

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WHEN CHANGE BECOMES
EXCESSIVE

Joyce Falkenberg, Inger G. Stensaker, Christine

B. Meyer and Anne Cathrin Haueng

ABSTRACT

Change or perish has become a corporate mantra (Abrahamson, 2000).

What happens when change becomes excessive? We dene excessive change
as when organizations pursue several seemingly unrelated and perhaps
conicting changes simultaneously, or when organizations introduce new
changes before previous changes have been completed. When change is
perceived as excessive, organizational members react in various ways. In
this paper we draw on existing literature in strategy and management to
theoretically develop the phenomenon of excessive change, ways of coping
with excessive change, and organizational consequences of excessive change.
Implications include how excessive change can be managed as well as
suggestions for future research.

There is too much started that is not implemented.

Before we get the structure in place from one organizational development process, management
comes with new ideas on how we should work.

Strategic change is one of the most frequently researched topics in the field of
strategy. Change is perceived as not only necessary for survival but is often equated
with progression (Gagliardi, 1999). In addition to the empirical articles which have
focused on antecedents and outcomes of change and change processes, the field is

Research in Organizational Change and Development

Research in Organizational Change and Development, Volume 15, 3162
2005 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
ISSN: 0897-3016/doi:10.1016/S0897-3016(04)15002-7
31
32 JOYCE FALKENBERG ET AL.

abundant with cook books to inform organizations about how to change. With
all this emphasis on change, it is not surprising that in some organizations change
may become excessive.
In an empirical study, we found evidence of excessive change. Drawing on our
data we defined the phenomenon and uncovered coping mechanisms individuals
used as well as the individual and organizational consequences of excessive change
(Stensaker et al., 2002). In this paper we theoretically develop our definition of
excessive change and discuss different coping mechanisms and consequences in
relation to existing research within strategy and management.
Excessive change has shown strong face validity. In this paper we address the
issue of whether the term is just another example of the kings new clothes.
That is, are we only adding yet another label to describe strategic change, when
a label from the existing classifications could be used? To answer this charge,
we attempt to classify excessive change based on the existing categories (such as
degree of change, or urgency). This paper shows that while the categories were
useful in suggesting possible characteristics, excessive change appears to cut across
categories, and not be limited to a single classification of change.
When change becomes excessive individuals react and respond. Resistance to
change was an expected reaction. In addition to the negative response of resistance,
we found a series of other responses, including those having positive effects.
Comparing our findings to some recent research suggesting that individuals do
not resist change per se, we find support for those who suggest discontinuing the
use of the term resistance to change and recommend focusing on the consequences
of change (Dent & Goldberg, 1999; Piderit, 2000). As an alternative to the
resistance to change literature, we build on the work that has been done on
burnout, change fatigue and cynicism. We use this literature to help us better
understand coping mechanisms and to suggest potential movement in these
mechanisms.
Excessive change was found to have consequences for organizations as well
as for individuals. Managers were rotated from one position to another; middle
managers were unable to function effectively, and organizational structures
became inefficient. Literature on the role of middle management; the paradoxes
facing managers who lead change, and managing under conditions of chaos and
complexity were used to explain these consequences. Again the literature in the
field, specifically the work on the role of middle management and the patterns of
change, was useful in helping to explain these consequences.
Building on existing literature in the areas of strategy and management allows us
to draw implications for managing excessive change. Additionally, it has allowed
us to suggest several areas for future research which will further our understanding
of excessive change.
When Change Becomes Excessive 33

This paper adds to the growing body of research on strategy process.

We have taken seriously the demands of strategy process research made by
Chakravarthy and White (2002) for a longitudinal in-depth investigation that
follows strategic changes throughout the organization. The major contributions
include the recognition that change is perceived in different ways within an
organization. This can have serious consequences for the outcome of the change
initiative, for organizational members, for organizational performance, as well as
for future change initiatives.
The paper is organized as follows: before theoretically developing our empirical
findings, we outline the methods used for uncovering excessive change. We
then present our definition of excessive change and discuss this in the context
of strategic change. Our findings include reactions and responses to excessive
change. These are discussed in light of the literature in order to develop a more
complete understanding of the consequences of excessive change. In conclusion,
we direct attention to managerial implications and suggest areas for future research
on excessive change.

DISCOVERING AND UNCOVERING

EXCESSIVE CHANGE
In this section we present the cases and methods used in discovering and uncovering
excessive change. We begin with the context and describe the three cases. We then
discuss the research design and finally, discuss the sources of data that were used.
Perceptions of excessive change were unexpectedly discovered in our analyses
of three cases, Teleco, Oilco 1, and Oilco 2. Although the information on
these three cases were originally gathered to investigate strategic implementation
issues, the methodology allowed for the development of the definition and for
uncovering consequences of excessive change. The three cases were used to
elaborate preliminary findings on defining the construct and to investigate the
consequences of excessive change.
The Teleco case was designed to study the implementation of acquisitions in
the IT-sector made by the largest and dominating national telecom-company. The
focus of the other two cases examined the implementation of major organizational
changes facilitated by IT change taking place in two major divisions in Oilco.
Oilco referred to this change as the largest ever undertaken by the company.
Teleco: The study of Teleco was undertaken in a period when the organization
was going through substantial changes and struggling to adapt to a rapidly
changing environment. Teleco had been the monopoly firm in the highly regulated
telecom-sector. Deregulation required the firm to adjust to the intense rivalry.
34 JOYCE FALKENBERG ET AL.

Because of the blurring boundaries between the telecom and IT-sectors, the
increased competition arose not only from traditional telecom companies, but
also from a range of IT-companies investing heavily in the telecom sector.
Furthermore, the leading actors in the market were constantly changing, making
the competitive arena complex and unpredictable. Teleco chose to adapt to these
changing conditions by diversifying into the IT-sector. They acquired a number of
companies that were market leaders. Moreover, the company went through several
reorganizations of their existing businesses as they tried to balance the need for
adaptations to a changing market with the need to realize synergies across business
entities.
Oilco: The study of Oilco was undertaken to investigate the corporate
wide implementation of organizational changes facilitated by the integrated IT-
system, SAP (SAP stands for Systems, Applications and Products). During the
implementation process, the top management of the company was changed and
a plan to change governance structure and to privatize was set in motion. Oilco
believed that the implementation of SAP and subsequent organizational changes
were necessary to maintain competitiveness in the future. They were facing more
cost-efficient competitors and reduced oil reserves. Their changes were proactive
and involved no immediate time pressure. Two divisions were investigated for this
study. In addition to the corporate change program mentioned above, both divisions
had additional change programs that were being implemented. The changes in
Oilco 1 and Oilco 2 were similar except for timing. Oilco 1 was the first division
to implement change after the pilot program; Oilco 2 was in the middle of the
roll-out period.
We can compare the context of the cases in terms of the environment facing the
organizations and their responses. Teleco faced a highly uncertain and complex
environment due to changing industry boundaries and new players. Additionally,
they were part of changing the environment in their acquisition of four companies
in the IT sector. Oilcos environment was changing from being highly predictable
to one of increasing uncertainty and turbulence that was reflected in a decrease
in munificence. The competitive arena was no longer stable. In his study of the
oil industry, Grant (2003) found that oil companies had experienced a radical
transformation of their industry environment from one of stability and continuity
to one of uncertainty and turbulence. After several decades of stability and growth
when they had been masters of their destiny, their competitive environment
was thrown into turmoil by the oil shocks of 19731974 and 19791980, the
nationalization of the reserves, and the growth of competition (Grant, 2003; Grant
& Cibin, 1996).
The change undertaken by Teleco can be viewed as a change in corporate level
strategy, as they chose to diversify into a new industry. The changes at Oilco were
When Change Becomes Excessive 35

decided at corporate level but primarily made at the business level, with focus on
increasing effectiveness.
Both Teleco and Oilco were concerned with organizational issues. The focus at
Teleco was in terms of organizing to take advantage of the synergies provided by
the acquisitions. The emphasis at Oilco was on implementing new organizational
structures and work processes necessary for implementation success of the new
IT system.
Regardless of these differences, perceptions of excessive change were found
in all three cases. Both organizations experienced that many changes were set in
motion simultaneously. These changes were interrupted as other change programs
were initiated. Finding the same phenomena (excessive change) in different cases
undertaken by different researchers convinced us that excessive change was a
phenomenon in need of further exploration.
We then undertook a more systematic investigation of the phenomenon to
deliberately explore the concept of excessive change. The purpose was to further
elaborate our preliminary conceptions of excessive change, as well as to investigate
the consequences at the organizational level.

Choice of Research Design

The three cases were designed to investigate the strategic and organizational change
in a natural context and over time. For these reasons, we chose a qualitative case
study design. In analyzing the data we started inductively and developed categories
from informants rather than specifying them in advance of the research.
Our inductive approach can be characterized as an emerging design where the
questions and categories were redefined as the study proceeded. The selection of
the first two cases was opportunistic in the context of this paper, and it involved
following new leads and taking advantage of the unexpected (Miles & Huberman,
1994, p. 28). In case three, we used theoretical sampling and searched for an
additional case where we could examine the concept of excessive change.
We used a grounded theory approach to study how individuals interacted, took
actions or responded to a phenomenon (Creswell, 1998). Moreover, this approach
allowed for in-depth exploration of issues that were complex and could be sensitive
(Sykes, 1990), and understanding social processes in their organizational and
environmental contexts (Hartley, 1994).
Interviews. In line with the explorative character of the study, the goal of
the interviews was to explore the change process from the perspective of the
interviewee, and to understand why s/he came to have this particular perspective.
In the interviews, we followed the recommendation made by King (1994) to have
36 JOYCE FALKENBERG ET AL.

a low degree of structure imposed on the interviewer, a preponderance of open

questions, a focus on specific situations and action sequences in the world of the
interviewee rather than abstractions and general opinions (King, 1994, p. 15).
Hence, the collection of primary data in these studies consisted of unstructured
and semi-structured interviews.
We used four criteria for sampling informants. (1) We drew informants from
populations representing multiple organizational levels, including members of
the board of directors, top managers, middle managers, union representatives
and other employees. Thus our data meets the challenge presented by Bartunek
(1993) who pointed out that virtually all discussions of change take the change
agents perspective. (2) We used multiple informants within each sub-group to
increase validity. (3) We selected key informants, and used the participants as
observers and interpreters of the change process (Van de Ven & Huber, 1990). We
used our contacts within the companies to help us select the key informants. In
addition, we used snowball sampling, asking for names of possible interviewees
from the informants. (4) We selected some informants who had not participated in
formulating the change programs/projects, but who were largely affected by the
changes. Again, these participants were used as observers and interpreters of the
change process. The majority of the interviews were tape-recorded. This enabled
us to fully concentrate on asking questions and responding to the interviewees
answers.
The number of interviews varied among the three cases. In Teleco, nineteen
interviews were held at an earlier phase and again at a later period. Ten interviews
were held in Oilco 1 while thirty-seven interviews were held in Oilco 2.
Documents. A substantial amount of documents were analyzed for each case.
The documents were used as background information and as input to the interview
guide. The documents were also useful in counteracting the biases of the interviews.
For Teleco, the documents included strategy and marketing plans, project reports
for the change programs, internal newsletters, copies of speeches and results
from climate surveys. In Oilco, the strategy and implementation plans as well
as divisional development plans were perused. In addition, the evaluations used to
map the present and future situation (as-is/to-be evaluations) at the divisional
levels were made available.
Observation. Observation and participation in meetings and seminars were
important in helping the research team to understand the setting. The research
team members were both observers and participants. In Teleco, one member of
the research team participated in the seminar that mapped the present situation. In
Oilco 1, two members of the research team participated in weekly meetings with
the committee working on improvements. Confusion and frustrations arising as a
result of the organizational changes often came to the surface in these meetings.
When Change Becomes Excessive 37

Observation also provided the opportunity to crosscheck statements made in the

interviews.

Data Analysis

The advantage of using a grounded theory approach is that the process of analysis
is systematic and follows a standard format. Using open coding we formed initial
categories of information about excessive change. The open coding was data driven
without reference to existing literature. Three members of the research team coded
empirical data into two broad categories: descriptions of too much change and
statements revealing consequences of too much change. All four researchers then
worked together in further categorizations of the definition and consequences of
excessive change. This process allowed for crosschecking to ensure intercoder
reliability.
Following the open coding, we used axial coding to explore the links between the
central phenomenon of excessive change and its consequences. To aid us with open
and axial coding we used the computer program NUD*IST. Finally, we applied
selective coding; writing a story that integrated the categories in the axial coding
model. In this procedure we consulted our data and drew on existing literature.

WHAT IS EXCESSIVE CHANGE?

We defined excessive change using the subjective perceptions of individuals. In
this section, we discuss this construct, first comparing our definition of change
with the way the term has been used in the literature. We then focus on the issue
of the kings new clothes and discuss how excessive change differs from those
classifications of strategic change commonly used.

Dening Excessive Change

Excessive change has been defined (Stensaker et al., 2002, p. 302) as:
(1) The organization pursues several, seemingly unrelated and sometimes
conflicting changes simultaneously.
(2) The organization introduces new changes before the previous change has been
completed and evaluated, without allowing time for a period of business as
usual or for reaping the benefits of the previous change.
38 JOYCE FALKENBERG ET AL.

Fig. 1. Defining Excessive Change.

These situations are illustrated as in Fig. 1.

We can compare our definition of excessive change with the dictionary definition
and also the way the term was used in the literature. The dictionary defines
excessive as exceeding what is normal, proper or reasonable. Change is the
movement away from a present state toward a future state. An objective definition
of excessive change would then be: A movement that exceeds that which is normal,
proper or reasonable, away from the present state toward a future state. The major
difference between this and our findings is that our definition is based on individual
perceptions of what exceeds that which is normal.
Within the strategy literature the term excessive change was introduced in Zajac
et al.s (2000) article on the dynamics of strategic fit. Changes in the environment
often require organizations to change or adapt. Strategic fit has been used to
describe both the relationship of the organization with the environment and the
internal fit between strategy and structure (Miller, 1992; Siggelkow, 2001). Zajac
et al. (2000) use the term excessive to describe the situations when the organization
changes although the environment and organizational contingencies do not suggest
the need to change and when the organization changes for changes sake. In both
of these cases, excessive change results from formulating strategic changes when
When Change Becomes Excessive 39

they are not needed. The implication is that it is possible to objectively determine
whether or not strategic change has become excessive, for example, by comparing
information on the environment with changes made in the organization.
The third situation that resulted in excessive change focuses on internal
strategic fit in terms of the match between the strategy and the dimensions of
implementation, for example, structure, systems, etc. Zajac et al. (2000) state that
change becomes excessive when the organization rightly changes one element but
fails to change other organizational dimensions accordingly. We question whether
this is excessive change or the opposite, not enough change. In the view taken by
Zajac et al. (2000) change becomes excessive because the organization is unable
or unwilling to implement it. Alternatively, it can be viewed as incomplete change
in that the organization is unwilling or unable to make the necessary structural
changes to implement the strategic change.
Zajac et al.s (2000) work is important for increasing our understanding of
strategic fit but differs in several ways to our definition. First, their definition
of excessive change focuses on the organization as the level of analysis while our
definition focuses on the individual level of analysis. Second, change becomes
excessive because it does not get implemented. We find that this may be a
consequence of excessive change, but we define excessive change independently
of whether or not it is implemented. A third difference concerns whether or not
it is possible to objectively determine excessive change. Zajac et al.s (2000)
conceptualization of excessive change assumes that it is possible to objectively
evaluate whether the adaptation of the organization to the environment is necessary
or excessive. We question this assumption of objectivity. We have experienced, for
example, that researchers investigating change may assume that a given change has
less strategic importance than the insiders (the organization) who have formulated
and implemented the change. In the determination of excessive change, the
assumption of objective determination was further challenged given the differences
among the perceptions of organizational members as to the degree to which change
was excessive.

Differences in Perceptions of Excessive Change

Defining excessive change as we did allowed us to gain new insight into our
understanding of the construct. Specifically, we learned that not everyone in
the organization experienced change as excessive. Whether or not change had
become excessive depended on the position of the individual in the organization.
We found no evidence of perception of excessive change among the top-level
managers. However, individuals in middle management positions and in lower
40 JOYCE FALKENBERG ET AL.

organizational positions often experienced strategic change as excessive. We

explore these differences drawing on the literature to help explain these findings.
Top managers described strategic changes in the organization differently than
middle managers or lower level employees. The simultaneous pursuit of different
strategies was described as being excessive by middle managers and lower-
level employees. Top managers described these same changes as a single major
change process having different components, rather than several different change
strategies. Top managers saw the changes in a holistic manner, a major change to
achieve an overall goal.
Middle managers and lower level employees also defined as excessive those
changes that were introduced before previous changes had been implemented.
Middle managers and other employees experienced one change project taking
over the next, without ever finishing and evaluating previous change projects. Top
managers disagreed that the different changes actually overlapped and argued that
previous changes had been completed and evaluated (Fig. 2).
These differences in perception can be understood if we draw on the literature
on strategy formulation and implementation. Although we recognize that it is not
always possible to separate the strategic management process into formulation
and implementation, we find general agreement that top managements focus is on

Fig. 2. Differences in Perceptions of Excessive Change.

When Change Becomes Excessive 41

formulation and not on implementation, while middle management is responsible

for implementing the strategy. The need for communication, information, and
building support all imply that strategy is formulated at the top level and therefore
needs to be sold to the organization. It is the middle managers who are
responsible for communicating the strategy to others in the organization as part of
implementing the strategy.
What implications does this have for the differences in perceptions at different
levels in the organization that we found in our study? Because top-level
management formulate the change, they have both more information and a more
holistic perspective on strategic change. Their focus is often on the overall goal,
and the activities that are needed to achieve that goal. Thus they are better able
to see the links connecting different elements within a change project or indeed
connecting different change projects. They are exposed to the changes earlier,
which give them a relatively longer time to adjust to the changes than the rest of
the organization. Because of the separation of formulation and implementation,
top managers let go of the changes earlier as they push the changes downward
in the organization. The following statement by one of the top managers emphasizes
this: It takes a long time for things to mature. What we [the top managers] have
used years to absorb and understand, we expect others to understand in a couple
of months. Its not that simple (Oilco 2).
Change is likely to become excessive at middle and lower organizational levels,
as this is the level at which implementation actually occurs. In addition to their
day-to-day work activities, these employees have to deal with implementing the
change. In an attempt to achieve a goal, additional changes may be required.
Pettigrew (1998, p. 280) suggests that although change programs often appeared
to be focused, one-issue interventions, they also have an indefinite character. These
ambiguities breed uncertainties and complexities.
Additionally change processes, although sometimes completed, are seldom
evaluated. Early promising results, early wins, receive a great deal of attention,
but complete evaluations as to the degree of success of a change in terms of time or
benefits are seldom undertaken. Top management is often anxious to announce that
a change has been successful when middle managers start to report early results,
but they still have the remaining implementation ahead of them. Thus, the top
manager team seems to be operating within a different time frame compared with
the rest of the organization.
Pettigrew (1998) recognizes that formulators and implementers of change may
be facing competing versions of reality. For those who formulate, it is exciting
to focus on a problem of substance and exhilarating to complete a difficult task
and move the organization on to the next step in its development. Progress and
progression are the elixir for those who lead major change episodes. For those who
42 JOYCE FALKENBERG ET AL.

are the recipients, much of the change appears as initiativistic, unfocused meddling
churning not changing (Pettigrew, 1998, p. 272).

Excessive Change: The Kings New Clothes?

In the previous section we defined and discussed excessive change. In this section
we compare and contrast the construct of excessive change to the classifications
often used in the strategic change literature.
Strategic changes are often categorized using terms such as revolution vs.
evolution or radical vs. incremental change (Greiner, 1972; Miller & Friesen,
1982; Tushman & Romanelli, 1985). These categories are descriptive of the
degree of change and give a useful means of differentiating major changes from
less major changes. However, the classification appears to place change along a
single continuum and does not account for other potentially relevant characteristics
(Gallivan et al., 1994).
Dutton and Duncan (1987) developed a more complete typology using urgency
and feasibility. The urgency of an issue is dependent on the perceived cost of not
taking action with respect to that issue. Feasibility results from knowing what to do
(high understanding) and having the means to be able to do this (issue capability).
Thus their final categorization of change was built on three determinants: urgency,
and feasibility that included understanding and capability.
More recently, researchers have used other descriptors of strategic change.
Examples of these include first order change that occurs within the system itself
and second order change in which the system itself changes (Denis et al., 2001;
Fox-Wolfgramm et al., 1998).
These categories and descriptors are helpful in classifying different types of
change. Are they useful for classifying excessive change as well? We test this out
using a simple typology based on two continua: degree of change and urgency,
and focusing on the two extreme cells, turnaround change which is high on both
degree and urgency and incremental change which is low on both characteristics.
Revolutionary, turnaround or second order change is characterized as having a high
degree of both change and urgency. Does excessive change fit here? Many would
suggest that major revolutionary changes in which many things are changed at
the same time would be excessive. However, individuals may feel that it is proper
or reasonable for an organization to undergo a change that is urgent and major.
If an organization is facing a crisis, individuals may perceive the many change
initiatives not as excessive but rather as necessary. On the other hand, incremental
change, which for many observers would appear to be the opposite of excessive,
may be perceived as excessive. Incremental changes may result in one change not
When Change Becomes Excessive 43

being completed before another change process is started. Pettigrew (1998) states:
Many change processes deliver variations which are seen by some as small scale
and incremental, yet for others they represent bruising encounters with the devil
(1998, p. 272). We therefore suggest that it is not useful to try to place excessive
change within the context of the normal categories of types of change, rather it
appears to be a separate construct which may have characteristics of either or both
turnaround and incremental changes.
We have drawn on the existing literature in strategic change to find definitions
or operationalizations of excessive change as well as to investigate whether the
existing categories of change are useful for our understanding of excessive change.
We conclude that excessive change focuses on a unique phenomenon.

REACTIONS AND RESPONSES TO

EXCESSIVE CHANGE
In this section we focus on the ways that individuals react and respond to excessive
change. Reactions to excessive change are reported and then discussed in relation to
resistance to change. More surprising than employees reactions were the ways in
which they made responses to change when they felt these changes were excessive.
We describe these coping mechanisms and classify them on two categories: passive
or active responses and whether or not the responses make the change attempt likely
or unlikely.

Reacting to Excessive Change

Individuals reacted to excessive change with frustration and anger. Some

individuals expressed that they experienced stress and physical and psychological
problems. These reactions could affect the health of the recipients of excessive
change. Other reactions were related to the job situation such as job dissatisfaction
and lack of motivation. Employees also expressed feelings of uncertainty resulting
from the change: uncertainty about their job, and about their competence and
adequacy.
Do these reactions suggest that employees resist change? In general, researchers
investigating resistance to change draw on Levins (1951) definition of resistance as
a restraining force moving in the direction of maintaining the status quo. As a result,
much of the resistance to change literature focuses on negative reactions to change.
Recently, however, several review articles on resistance to change have proposed
that this dichotomized response is an oversimplification (Dent & Goldberg, 1999;
Piderit, 2002).
44 JOYCE FALKENBERG ET AL.

Dent and Goldberg (1999) suggest that people do not resist change per se,
rather they resist the loss of status, loss of pay, or loss of comfort. They resist
the unknown, they resist being dictated to, or they resist management ideas that
do not seem feasible from their standpoint. Dent and Goldbergs (1999) work
supports Piderits (2000) tripartite structure model of attitudes toward change.
Piderit uncovered three different emphases in conceptualizations of resistance:
a cognitive state, an emotional state, and a behavioral or intentional state. The
cognitive dimension of an attitude refers to an individuals beliefs about the attitude
object. The emotional dimension of an attitude refers to an individuals feelings in
response to the attitude object. The intentional dimension is a plan or resolution
to take some action.
Our findings support the work done by Piderit and Dent and Goldberg. We agree
with Dent and Goldberg that the term resistance to change may be misleading.
Instead we found, like Dent and Goldberg, that individuals do not resist the change
but resist the consequences of that change. In addition we found that individuals
have a behavioral or intentional response to change, as indicated by Piderit. In
the following section we focus on how individuals manage under conditions of
excessive change.

Responding to Excessive Change

Individuals responded to excessive change in many different ways. We have

classified these along two dimensions. One dimension was the degree to which
the individuals were active or passive in responding to the change. The other
dimension focused on the likelihood that the responses would result in the change
or not.
These dimensions were determined based on our data; however, these dimen-
sions have been used in categorizing change at the organizational level. Barker and
Barr (2002) found a difference in the level of response depending on whether
the stimuli were interpreted as causing some impact on the organization on not
(active/passive). Lant et al. (1992) found likelihood of strategic change depended
on external attributions (change improbable/improbable).
We categorized the responses and placed them along the two continua mapping
out the different ways individuals coped with excessive change. See Fig. 3A.
We start our discussion on the change probable side, and begin with active/
change probable.
Active Coping Mechanisms/Change Probable: Regardless of the well-accepted
axiom of resistance to change, we found that a number of employees worked to
support the change. For some employees the response was an active, take-charge,
When Change Becomes Excessive 45

Fig. 3. (A) Coping Mechanisms. (B) Movement Among Coping Mechanisms.

46 JOYCE FALKENBERG ET AL.

take-over attitude. When faced with many different change programs, or initiatives
for new changes, they attempted taking control of the situation.
We have more or less found the way ourselves (Teleco).

. . . we called a meeting with our superiors (Teleco).

Lower level employees became impatient waiting for management to take charge of
the implementation. They themselves took charge and figured out how the changes
could be implemented. A situation of self-organization (Lichtenstein, 2000; Stacey,
2000) could occur if many individuals attempted this.
Passive/Change probable: Other employees loyally followed orders without
taking initiative on their own. Characteristic of this group was that their loyalty to
the organization and to the change resulted in massive overtime as they attempted
to carry out the work associated with the change in addition to their regular work.
People worked more and more as time went by. I could no longer abide by the labor laws
(Teleco).

Passive/Change Improbable: We placed three responses in the cell

passive/change improbable, BOHICA, cynicism and paralysis. BOHICA (Bend
Over Here It Comes Again) was the most common way to cope with perceptions
of excessive change. Our data clearly show that many coped with excessive change
by waiting it out, waiting until the forces of change had blown over. Those who
described BOHICA as a way of dealing with excessive change had been exposed
to a number of change initiatives, which indicates that this strategy was based on
learning by experience.
There seems to be a tendency for people to wait for the change to blow over, thinking that it
will soon pass (Teleco).

Cynicism results from a loss of faith in the leaders of change and a response to
a history of change attempts that are not entirely or clearly successful. Employees
who are cynical respond in a scornful way.
We continue our work just as we used to and make fun of it (the change program).

Viewed from the perspective of the organization, BOHICA and cynicism are
not entirely negative. Although the changes have only a small chance of being
implemented, since employees are somewhat indifferent to the changes, employees
are able to focus their attention on the daily, operationally oriented tasks.
The third response classified in the category of passive coping mecha-
nism/change improbable is paralysis. This is a more serious condition than
BOHICA and cynicism in that the employees become paralyzed and cannot
perform even their daily tasks. People were not unwilling, but unable, to carry
When Change Becomes Excessive 47

through the changes, nor could they carry out the simple, routine tasks that they
had always managed previously.
It gets messy, frustrating and there is too much to cope with. In the end your body doesnt
function . . . and you just float along . . . (Teleco).

Active/Change Improbable: Some middle managers and employees coped with

excessive change more actively. We placed two coping mechanisms in this
category: exit and sabotage. Exit was the active coping mechanism used by those
who terminated their employment, who quit. The result of exit is that the changes
are not likely to be implemented. Turnover has been found to be higher among the
best workers. Those who are best in one organization are most attractive to other
organizations as well, and are often among the first to leave.
In this process a number of highly qualified employees leave and find work elsewhere. Often it
is the best people who choose to leave (Teleco).

Sabotage of the change initiative describes active resistance. Descriptions of

sabotage include blaming the change initiative for everything that went wrong,
playing down the importance of the change initiative, or punishing people who
tried to implement the changes.
Local groups sent in loads of negative and trivial input. It was all about painting a black picture
of the process and making everything look negative (Oilco).

There have been incidents of disloyalty. People sit there in the team meetings and both indirectly
and directly support statements [against the changes] which they know are not true (Oilco).

Movement Among Coping Mechanisms

The frequency with which the different coping mechanisms occurred was not equal.
We found an overrepresentation of BOHICA tendencies. This may be a result of the
timing of the data collection (mid-stream in the change process). If we had collected
data at a later point in the process, we may have found different reactions. However,
the high frequency of BOHICA may also be a result of movement among the coping
mechanisms as a person experiences that change more and more change. We draw
on the literature to suggest paths of movements among coping mechanisms. These
expected paths are indicated in Fig. 3B.
Loyalty, a positive response that is expected to result in implementation of the
change projects, can, alternatively, lead to burnout or change fatigue. Shirom (1989)
defines burnout as a chronic condition of physical and emotional reduction that
is a result of extensive demands in work. Pettigrew (1998) uses the term change
48 JOYCE FALKENBERG ET AL.

fatigue to describe change programs that appear to be all input and process without
achieving the change.
Our work load has increased as a result of these (changes). It gets harder to stay motivated
(Oilco 2).

We suggest that burnout or change fatigue can lead to BOHICA that can then result
in cynicism or it can lead to paralysis. In either case, the responses move along the
continuum from change likely to change unlikely.
In proposing this movement toward BOHICA, we draw on Molinsky (1999).
Molinsky found that overzealous change leaders often diffuse and dilute the
process. By flooding the organization with multiple projects, managers confuse
workers and stretch resources too thin. This leads to change as rhetoric rather than
change as reality. He poses this as a paradox in which the commitment needed to
lead the change keeps the change from happening (Molinsky, 1999). This paradox
was found to be especially important in organizations that had not delivered on
their promises in the past regarding major changes. We suggest that the response
on the part of the individuals who are to make that change is BOHICA.
We draw on the work of Reichers et al. (1997) to propose a reinforcing movement
between BOHICA and cynicism. Reichers et al. (1997) found that, if cynics refuse
to support change, then cynicism about organizational change could become a self-
fulfilling prophecy. Their lack of support may bring about failure or very limited
success. This failure reinforces cynical beliefs that further inhibit the willingness
to try again, a BOHICA response.
In addition to loyalty leading to BOHICA, we also expect that burnout caused by
loyalty may lead to paralysis. Professional efficacy is a feeling of being competent,
successful and able to reach goals in work (Reichers et al., 1997). When ones
resources are inadequate to meet the work demands, individuals no longer feel
they have sufficient emotional resources to handle the stressors confronting them
(Lee & Ashforth, 1996). This can result in paralysis.
These propositions are tentative, but they can contribute to explaining the over-
representation of BOHICA. In addition, we acknowledge the dynamics involved
in coping with excessive change.

ORGANIZATIONAL CONSEQUENCES

Excessive change has organizational level consequences in addition to

consequences at the individual level. We first report on the structural consequences,
categorized under the labels: Rotating Responsibility, Non-functioning Middle
Management, and Structural Instabilities. We then discuss the consequences of
excessive change on organizational performance.
When Change Becomes Excessive 49

Rotating Responsibility

Management rotation was a common feature in all three cases. Managers were
continually shifted and sometimes eliminated. They were frequently moved from
one part of the organization to other parts, sometimes even back to a position
where they had been previously. This led to a perceived lack of continuity and
lack of responsibility in the change process. The continuous shifting around also
resulted in managers not being able to keep track or manage the different change
initiatives.
Molinsky (1999) suggests that change leaders in organizations are often in a
win-lose situation. Early wins result in career movement for the leaders with
the result that advancement is made before change projects are completed. Thus
rotation may prevent managers from having to take long-term responsibility for
any potential failure. Losing, for example, non-success of a change project, could
result in involuntary turnover.
While many managers were moved around, some managers were eliminated.
Turnover was both involuntary and voluntary. When managers positions were
shuffled and lay-offs were expected, key people sometimes chose to leave. The
best managers, those who were attractive on the job market, left first. Thus,
excessive change resulted in losing good managers in addition to the rotating
of poor managers. Drawing on our data, we found evidence of excessive change
allowing poor managers an opportunity to hide in the chaos. Over time, this resulted
in sustaining poor management.
Weve had three managers since the reorganization in 1996 (Oilco 1).

We call it musical chairs. We change places and some have to leave (Oilco 2).

In the past six months we have had six managers, one manager twice (Teleco).

Its easy to play hide and seek . . . They [poor managers] can surf on the waves. Nobody has the
time to follow them up (Teleco).

There is little continuity at the level that is supposed to implement the strategy. When you
delegate the strategic responsibility to the level with the least continuity, well, then no one
remembers the strategy (Teleco).

Non-Functioning Middle Management

Employees often had to deal with middle managers who were incapable of
managing the change process. Evidence of the lack of leadership at the local
level included employees perceptions of inconsistencies in communication and
in the way they were treated in the change process. Employees became uncertain
50 JOYCE FALKENBERG ET AL.

about who their leader was at any given time. The relationship between employees
and managers naturally became more loosely coupled. In general, employees who
were part of the change process did not perceive that their needs were being met.
They felt they were left on their own to figure out how to carry out the change.
They chose to turn to colleagues and previous leaders for advice rather than the
new manager.
I must admit this has been a hard time. The manager hasnt had time to take care of his own
group of employees (Teleco).

The managers hardly know what we are doing (Oilco 1).

The CEO said one thing, and his subordinate said another. They were inconsistent and we really
began to wonder what was going on (Teleco).

I could have just as well needed a secretary [instead of a manager]. If I need help I make a
phone call or ask a colleague (Oilco 2).

Our findings are supported by Molinsky (1999). He found that managers, who
were involved in many change efforts in addition to the normal operations of
their divisions, had only minimal effectiveness in any single change initiative. The
simultaneous focus on many change programs resulted in a shortage of time to
oversee and manage any single process.

Structural Instabilities

Excessive change also resulted in structural and organizational instabilities. These

instabilities included the lack of overall structure and lack of continuity in the
change process. Employees who perceived change to be excessive described the
organization as being in a state of chaos, having a high degree of turbulence.
The organization was characterized as being in a transition mode where existing
routines were not maintained, and new routines were not yet put into place. The
lines of responsibilities were unclear and there was a lack of long-term continuity.
This condition as described by the employees can be related to the discussions
about being on the edge of chaos (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1998). Connor (1998),
Sanders (1998), and Brown and Eisenhardt (1998) propose the need to promote
change relentlessly to the edge of chaos with crisis where managers are stretched
and stressed. Stacey et al. (2000) question this notion of managers being able to
push the organization deliberately to the edge of chaos as well as the moral of doing
so. In their terms, being on the edge of chaos implies that certain parameters fall
within a critical range for example critical rates of information flow, degrees of
connectivity and diversity between agents (p. 146).
When Change Becomes Excessive 51

The name of the game is the more change the better. Everything gets very turbulent (Oilco 2).

Everything has happened at once. We have not had time to sit down and draw the map. We have
had to go out and work in the terrain without any guidelines. I feel we have had an inhuman
task to cope with (Teleco).

Lists have gone missing and not even been handed to the pay office. There is such a lack of
routines and when this starts to show up on peoples paychecks, they really get upset (Teleco).

There is a troll in Oilco that has been set free (Oilco 1).

Consequences Related to Performance

Other consequences of excessive change at the organizational level are related to

performance. Here we found both implementation failure and loss of effectiveness.
Implementation failure refers to the failure of actually changing the organization.
We found instances in which the change was on paper only; it had never been put
into practice. Employees referred to this when they said the company was excellent
at planning, but failed to carry through the changes. They also stated that things
had not changed in reality and probably would not change for a long time.
We are masters at running without jumping here. There is too much we want to start that cannot
be implemented. When we started, we experienced processes that were carried out to a large
extent and then suddenly abandoned (Oilco 2).

First there is unrest, and then we fall back into old working habits (Oilco 2).

You cannot turn 20.000 heads and hearts upside down in five minutes. Most people will work
along the same paths as before for a long, long time (Teleco).

My feeling is that hardly anything is expected to last for long. We are sort of doing everything
on a half-a-year basis (Teleco).

Loss of effectiveness was the result of the organizations attention being focused on
the change rather than on their customers, markets, and operational tasks. Income
deriving activities were not given resources needed to carry out these activities.
We also found that the organization was often forced to prioritize change projects
at the expense of other more market-oriented projects. In some cases customer
relations suffered both because of the chaos in the organization, and also because
customers were neglected when employees focused too much on changes in the
organization. Forcing the organization to prioritize change projects affected other
primary tasks as well, such as safety dimensions. Excessive change can also result
in lost effectiveness because of a loss of capabilities. The organization risks losing
well-functioning routines and other good dimensions because too much focus is
put on continuous (and excessive) changes.
52 JOYCE FALKENBERG ET AL.

Our customers are very upset for the simple reason that they do not know where to call. They
cannot tell the difference between our numerous entities. They expect us to connect them to the
right people (Teleco).

I understand that the customer thinks this is a mess, in fact that is my own experience [when
trying to get hold of someone in this organization] (Teleco).

By changing work routines you reduce effectiveness . . . temporarily. However, when things
change frequently, then it [reduced effectiveness] is no longer temporary (Oilco 2).

First we get frustrated, then indifferent, and we neglect a whole lot of matters. The consequence
is that things start to go wrong and accidents are bound to happen (Oilco 2).

These organizational level consequences can be viewed in light of the literature

on middle management. Floyd and Wooldridge (2000) found that in turbulent
environments, strategic effectiveness depends on middle managers who effectively
monitor, interpret and communicate changing conditions. This role is weakened
with rotating managers who continually face new work situations.
Pettigrew (1998) offers a different perspective. He emphasizes the important
role of followers and suggests that leading change is not just about individual
leadership, but is also about followership. Leaders and managers need reciprocal
and reinforcing pressure from followers. This reciprocal role is reduced when
employees no longer follow their managers or the managers are not there to lead.
The performance consequences are supported by Miller (1992) who found that
organizations could either be highly efficient (high congruence among the elements
of implementation) or highly effective, that is, have a close match to the prevailing
environment. Although tight fit makes it difficult for an organization to be able to
respond to changes in the environment, continual creation of new change programs
may prevent an organization from becoming efficient.

Linkages Between Individual and Organizational Consequences

In addition to the direct linkages uncovered between excessive change and

consequences at both the individual and organizational level, we found some
suggestion of relationships between the individual and organizational levels
leading to performance consequences.
It is all a big mess . . . In the end your body does not cope anymore and you set yourself aside,
floating along. But who is taking responsibility? (Teleco).

The structure at the middle management level has been stable, but with totally different
managers all along. This has not been a good combination . . . There is little continuity at
the level which is supposed to implement the strategy . . . When you delegate the strategic
When Change Becomes Excessive 53

responsibility to the level where the continuity is least, well then nobody remembers the strategy
(Teleco).

In the first quote there are indications of structural instability, paralysis and non-
functioning middle managers. The second quote suggests a relationship between
rotating responsibility influences implementation failure. Thus our data suggests
that if structural instabilities become linked with perceptions of excessive change,
then a number of different reactions, mostly negative, are likely. We illustrate these
possible linkages in Fig. 4.
The causality is not clear-cut and results are highly tentative. The outcomes
may be linked together in positive feedback loops (Stacey, 2000) suggesting that
causality is circular.

MANAGING EXCESSIVE CHANGE

As discussed above, excessive change has individual and organizational
consequences. In this section we draw on our findings and other relevant research
to discuss how excessive change can be managed and eliminated. We use Porras
and Robertsons (1987) framework of implementation and organize our discussion
based on their steps of diagnosis, planning, intervention and evaluation.

Fig. 4. Potential Linkages among Organizational and Individual Consequences.

54 JOYCE FALKENBERG ET AL.

Diagnosis

Managers in many organizations believe that large-scale or whole system changes

are necessary to maintain effectiveness in todays environment (Weber & Manning,
1998). However, a fundamental question in managing excessive change is whether
or not the change is necessary. Both our definition of excessive change, based on
perceptions, and Zajac et al.s (2000) objective definition recognize that excessive
change can arise when the organization changes for changes sake, or advocates
change even though the environment and organizational contingencies do not
suggest the need to change.
A direct implication of this for the diagnosis stage is that excessive change can
be managed by a careful analysis of the environment and limiting the changes to
those which are found to be necessary in order to react to environmental changes
or make pro-active changes to pre-empt environmental change.

Planning

The next step focuses on the importance of planning in implementing change.

Discourse is one aspect of the planning stage that has particular importance
in managing excessive change. Change can be made part of the organizational
conversation and the conversations can be an instrument for organizational change.
(Ford, 1999).
Drawing on the results of our study, we suggest that discourse is particularly
important for developing an understanding for a major, holistic change rather than
a number of independent, simultaneous changes. Armenakis, Harris and Field
(1999) suggest that programs of the month, often perceived as excessive, can
be turned into long term changes for the organization through use of conversation
tools. They found that persuasive communication; managing internal and external
information and diffusion practices were useful tools. These same conversation
tools can be used to develop perceptions of holistic change for those involved in
all phases of the change process.

Intervention

We suggest that those responsible for managing excessive change can benefit from
the intervention tactics used for continual improvements (CI). Reporting on the
findings of a major study of CI, Lillrank, Shani, Kolodny, Stymne, Figurera and
Lui (1998) identified design requirements useful for the successful implementation
When Change Becomes Excessive 55

of continuous improvement. We discuss three of these requirements that have

particular relevance for managing excessive change: involvement, empowerment,
and development of skills.
Involvement: Involvement of middle management may be a necessary,
although insufficient, condition for managing perceptions of excessive change.
The involvement of middle managers has traditionally been focused on
implementation; however, middle managers have much to offer in the process
of formulation. They are closest to the daily operations as well as to the customers
and are therefore in a unique position to visualize, as well as implement change
(Huy, 2001; Wooldridge & Floyd, 1990). Involvement at the formulation level can
result in more efficient implementation. Floyd and Wooldridge (2000) found that
when middle managers were involved in setting goals and generating alternatives,
there was a greater performance effect than when they were only involved in
implementation.
Involvement in and of itself may not reduce the perceptions of excessive change.
However, involvement is relevant in reducing excessive change when it allows
for increased understanding and commitment to the strategy. Involvement of
organizational members at all levels allows them to develop an understanding of
the changes, triggering sensemaking and sensegiving (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991).
Allowing individuals time to absorb change, supporting employees and facilitating
their understanding of how changes are linked to other organizational processes,
and ensuring two-way communication becomes important from a sensemaking
perspective.
Empowerment: Empowered individuals see themselves as proactive starters who
act under their own volition and are able to make independent decisions (Spreitzer,
1997). Kirkman and Rosen (1997) propose that teams as well as individuals can
feel empowered. This can be done in ways similar to empowering individuals:
delegate responsibilities to the team, solicit and utilize team input when making
decisions, relinquish control of work to the team, let the team set its own goals,
encourage the team to assess its own problems and general solutions, verbally
persuade them to expect a lot from themselves and display trust and confidence
in the team (Kirkman & Rosen, 1997, p. 142). Many of the changes that lead
to excessive change are organization wide, resulting in the need to carry out the
changes by working in teams or groups.
Empowerment has, as summarized by Spreitzer (1997), many positive outcomes.
However, in situations of excessive change, empowerment can be a double-edged
sword. Individual or teams may become empowered at a time that they are already
experiencing excessive change, or the empowerment may lead to feelings of
excessive change as they receive added responsibilities. Thus empowerment can
lead to either loyalty or taking control, or, oppositely, paralysis or BOHICA.
56 JOYCE FALKENBERG ET AL.

The dilemma becomes how much support a leader should give in the process
of empowering individuals or teams. If the purpose is that people should take
responsibility and become empowered, the leader must determine how much
advice and support can be given so that the individuals or teams take on the added
responsibilities without this leading to perceptions of excessive change.
Skill development: What skills are necessary to carry out the change? Our
findings indicate that individuals become frustrated when they do not have the skills
needed. This becomes exaggerated when cross-functional teams are involved, as
is often the case in large-scale organizational changes. Mohrman and Mohrman
(1997) suggest that organizations need to learn how to develop a flexible, team-
based organization. Teams need to be trained, not only for technical competencies,
but also in interpersonal competencies and in conflict resolution (Lam, Bischoff,
Higgins & Persing, 1999).
Developing the necessary skills can therefore contribute to reduction of
perceptions of excessive change. However, in determining what skills are necessary
and from whom, management must be cognizant that there may be a period of
trial and error, or learning by doing as implementation of the change takes place
(Stensaker, Falkenberg & Grnhaug, 2003).

Evaluation

The evaluation stage for managing excessive change sets focus on two issues:
completion of the change and developing capacity for change.
Completing the process: Our findings indicate that while management perceived
the change to have been completed, this perception was not shared by others in the
organization who were involved in the implementation of the change. This resulted
in perceptions of excessive change when additional changes were proposed by
management. We suggest that management make evaluations and results explicit
and present this information throughout the firm. Individuals can gain a sense of
completion and accomplishment. Making the completion of the change visible
(Wanous & Reitchers, 2001) can be a way to manage excessive change.
Upon completion of one change, Abrahamson (2000) suggests that organizations
need to enjoy a period of business as usual in order to reap the benefits of that
change. This logic follows the punctuated equilibrium model of change (Tushman
& Romanelli, 1985). Periods of stability give time for organizational structures
and systems to reinforce the basic strategies. These stable periods are punctuated
by short bursts of fundamental change in strategy. The employees we investigated
expect and prefer change processes where the beginning, purpose and end of change
can be clearly defined (Lewin, 1951).
When Change Becomes Excessive 57

Developing capacity for change: What do organizational members learn about

changing when they perceive change as excessive? Our findings indicate that
BOHICA was a typical response; this implies that organizational members may
learn to disregard change. In managing excessive change, it may be necessary
to develop a capacity for change. Although we cannot draw conclusions based
on our limited study, further investigation will help us better understand what
creates a capacity for change. If the organization manages to influence the level
at which employees perceive strategic changes as excessive, and thus reduce the
number of people who experience excessive change, then the consequences would
be minimized as well.

CONCLUDING REMARKS
The purpose of this paper was to theoretically develop the phenomenon of excessive
change. The definition of excessive change emerged empirically from perceptions
of those involved in the change processes. We argued that it is necessary to define
the term using perceptions given that organizational members at different levels
of the organization experience excessive change differently. To explain why the
same set of changes could be viewed as being excessive by middle and lower-
level employees, but not for the top management team we drew on the work done
on the role of middle management. We also argued that excessive change is a
unique construct in that it cannot be described using the classifications often used
to categorize strategic change.
Individual and organizational level consequences of excessive change were
presented. The coping mechanisms that describe different ways of dealing with
excessive change suggest that we need to extend our understanding of reactions
beyond resistance to change. Our findings of the reactions and responses to
excessive change suggest a need to focus on both active and passive responses
affecting change in positive or negative ways. Focusing on the reactions and
response has clear implications for managers who may find that potentially positive
intentions may trigger negative responses to change.

Extending Our Knowledge of Excessive Change

We recognize the limitations of the present study both in terms of the context
and construct development. Regarding context, can our findings be generalized
to other types of change? That is, is excessive change found when the changes
are not strategic? Concerning construct development, can excessive change be
distinguished theoretically from strategic change in general?
58 JOYCE FALKENBERG ET AL.

While the cases used in our investigation varied in terms of types of changes,
all three cases investigated could be described as being strategic changes in
relatively large monopolistic-type organizations. However, in presenting our work
to different types of audiences, there has been general acknowledgement that our
findings are relevant for the way that change is experienced in many organizations.
Individuals have shared their stories, relating to us that both perceptions of
excessive change as well as the consequences we uncovered in our study were
also found in their organizations. The changes they described ranged from
major strategic changes similar to our context, to relatively minor changes. The
impression we have based on these stories is that organizations and individuals are
constantly dealing with change. Perceptions of excessive change appear to result
regardless of whether the changes are strategic, similar to those described in our
study, organizational such as changes in reward systems, reorganization, etc., or
relate to the individual, such as relocation from one city to another or one office
to another. While there remains a need for further empirical research in different
contexts, it may be useful for organizations to recognize that change may result in
perceptions of excessive change and that excessive change can have consequences
for both the individual and organization.
The other limitation relates to the issue of separating the consequences of
excessive change from consequences of change in general. As we discussed, some
reactions to excessive change were similar to those discussed by Dent and Goldberg
(1999) and Piderit (2002). Also, the consequences we uncovered may have been
a result of change in general. Further research will be required to disentangle the
unique consequences of excessive change. While this research is important in terms
of theoretically developing excessive change as a construct, our findings can have
relevance for managers by contributing to their understanding of the consequences
of change.

New Directions

Although there are numerous ways to extend the knowledge of excessive change,
we focus on the three issues which have been discussed above, but which require
further investigation: movement among coping mechanisms, linkages between
individual and organizational level consequences and developing a capacity to
change.
Patterns in coping mechanisms: We uncovered seven different coping
mechanisms in our data, and placed these in a matrix. The theory used to explain
these coping mechanisms also suggests that there might be a pattern of movement
among the mechanisms. Extending the framework developed by Reichers et al.
When Change Becomes Excessive 59

(1997) to excessive change, we could suggest that burnout (resulting from loyalty)
may lead to paralysis, and BOHICA may lead to cynicism. Mapping these patterns
of coping mechanisms would be an important extension of knowledge on excessive
change. Greater knowledge about how people move between different coping
mechanisms over time may also be helpful for managers in trying to promote
more positive ways of reacting to change.
Linkages between individual and organizational level consequences: While our
data allowed us to suggest that there might be linkages between individual and
organizational level consequences, it did not allow us to draw firm conclusions.
This remains an area for further investigation. Among the interesting relationships
would be uncovering organizational consequences which trigger and reinforce
some of the individual reactions which might reinforce perceptions of a non-
functioning management.
Capacity for change: While our study did not allow for investigation of capacity
for change, we recognize this as an important area for future research. Pettigrew
and Whipp (1993) operationalized the concept at the macro level as the capacity of
the firm to comprehend the competitive forces in play and how they change over
time and the ability of a business to mobilize and manage resources to respond.
We believe that it is important to investigate what capacity to change means at the
individual level as well. Some researchers (Pettigrew, 1998; Reichers et al., 1997)
suggest that capacity to change is increased when change programs have been
successfully implemented. We found indications that continuous change leads,
not to capacity for change, but to BOHICA. These ambiguous findings suggest
that understanding capacity for change is an important extension of the work on
excessive change.
Regardless of the limitations and need for future research discussed above,
we conclude that excessive change is pervasive. The implications of this for
practitioners are recognized by Pettigrew (1998) In todays business world the
pressures for change are such that there is no longer the luxury of handling changes
sequentially (p. 287). It also has implications for researchers who can no longer
portray change as a discrete event. Organizations are a cacophony of complemen-
tary and competing change attempts . . . (Dutton et al., 2001, p. 716). We feel that
by defining and recognizing the consequences of excessive change we have taken
an important first important step toward understanding excessive change.

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